Rem 2 Case Doctrines

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II
CASE DOCTRINES
S.Y. 2020-2021
I. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES (RULES 57-61)
A. PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT (R-57)
 LIM, JR. VS. LAZARO

700 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
“By its nature, preliminary attachment, under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court (Rule
57), is an ancillary remedy applied for not for its own sake but to enable the
attaching party to realize upon the relief sought and expected to be granted in the
main or principal action; it is a measure auxiliary or incidental to the main action.
As such, it is available during its pendency which may be resorted to by a litigant
to preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the interim, awaiting
the ultimate effects of a final judgment in the case. In addition, attachment is also
availed of in order to acquire jurisdiction over the action by actual or constructive
seizure of the property in those instances where personal or substituted service
of summons on the defendant cannot be effected.
In this relation, while the provisions of Rule 57 are silent on the length of time
within which an attachment lien shall continue to subsist after the rendition of a
final judgment, jurisprudence dictates that the said lien continues until the debt is
paid, or the sale is had under execution issued on the judgment or until the
judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in the same
manner provided by law.”
 LIGON VS. RTC OF MAKATI BR. 56

717 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
“Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by which the property of an

adverse party is taken into legal custody, either at the commencement of an
action or at any time thereafter, as a security for the satisfaction of any judgment
that may be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper party. Case law instructs that
an attachment is a proceeding in rem, and, hence, is against the particular
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REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 2-2ND SEM. S.Y 19-20
property, enforceable against the whole world. Accordingly, the attaching creditor
acquires a specific lien on the attached property which nothing can subsequently
destroy except the very dissolution of the attachment or levy itself. Such a
proceeding, in effect, means that the property attached is an indebted thing and a
virtual condemnation of it to pay the owner’s debt.”
 MANGILA VS. CA
387 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
“In the instant case, the Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued on
September 27, 1988 and implemented on October 28, 1988. However, the alias
summons was served only on January 26, 1989 or almost three months
after the implementation of the writ of attachment.
We hold that the alias summons belatedly served on petitioner cannot be

deemed to have cured the fatal defect in the enforcement of the writ. The trial
court cannot enforce such a coercive process on petitioner without first obtaining
jurisdiction over her person. The preliminary writ of attachment must be served
after or simultaneous with the service of summons on the defendant whether by
personal service, substituted service or by publication as warranted by the
circumstances of the case. The subsequent service of summons does not confer
a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over her person because the law does not
allow for retroactivity of a belated service.”
 CHUIDIAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

349 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
“This issue of fraud, however, touches on the very merits of the main case which
accuses petitioner of committing fraudulent acts in his dealings with the
government. Moreover, this alleged fraud was one of the grounds for the
application of the writ, and the Sandiganbayan granted said application after it
found a prima facie case of fraud committed by petitioner. In fine, fraud was not
only one of the grounds for the issuance of the preliminary attachment, it was at
the same time the government's cause of action in the main case.
We have held that when the writ of attachment is issued upon a ground which is
at the same time the applicant's cause of action, the only other way the writ can
be lifted or dissolved is by a counterbond, in accordance with Section 12 of the
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same rule. This recourse, however, was not availed of by petitioner, as noted by
the Solicitor General in his comment.
To reiterate, there are only two ways of quashing a writ of attachment: (a) by
filing a counterbond immediately; or (b) by moving to quash on the ground of
improper and irregular issuance. These grounds for the dissolution of an
attachment are fixed in Rule 57 of the Rules of Court and the power of the Court
to dissolve an attachment is circumscribed by the grounds specified
therein. Petitioner's motion to lift attachment failed to demonstrate any infirmity or
defect in the issuance of the writ of attachment; neither did he file a
counterbond.”
 ALEJANDRO NG WEE VS. MANUEL TANKIANSEE

G.R. NO. 171124 : FEBRUARY 13, 2008
NACHURA, J.:
DOCTRINE:
Section 1(d) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court which pertinently reads:
xxx
(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the
debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the
performance thereof.
For a writ of attachment to issue under this rule, the applicant must sufficiently
show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent
cannot be inferred from the debtor's mere non-payment of the debt or failure to
comply with his obligation. The applicant must then be able to demonstrate that
the debtor has intended to defraud the creditor.
In this case, petitioner has not fully satisfied the legal obligation to show the
specific acts constitutive of the alleged fraud committed by respondent, the trial
court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it issued the writ of preliminary
attachment against the properties of respondent.
 TORRES VS. SATSATIN

605 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
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“In provisional remedies, particularly that of preliminary attachment, the
distinction between the issuance and the implementation of the writ of
attachment is of utmost importance to the validity of the writ. The distinction is
indispensably necessary to determine when jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant should be acquired in order to validly implement the writ of attachment
upon his person.
This Court has long put to rest the issue of when jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant should be acquired in cases where a party resorts to provisional
remedies. A party to a suit may, at any time after filing the complaint, avail of the
provisional remedies under the Rules of Court. Specifically, Rule 57 on
preliminary attachment speaks of the grant of the remedy "at the commencement
of the action or at any time before entry of judgment." This phrase refers to the
date of the filing of the complaint, which is the moment that marks "the
commencement of the action." The reference plainly is to a time before summons
is served on the defendant, or even before summons issues.
Thus, it is indispensable not only for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, but also upon consideration of fairness, to
apprise the defendant of the complaint against him and the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment and the grounds therefor that prior or
contemporaneously to the serving of the writ of attachment, service of
summons, together with a copy of the complaint, the application for
attachment, the applicant’s affidavit and bond, and the order must be
served upon him.”
 LUZON DEV. BANK VS. KRISHMAN

755 SCRA, APRIL 13, 2015
DOCTRINE:
“It is evidently clear that once the writ of attachment has been issued, the only
remedy of the petitioners in lifting the same is through a cash deposit or the filing
of the counter-bond. Thus, the Court holds that petitioner's argument that it has
the option to deposit real property instead of depositing cash or filing a counter-
bond to discharge the attachment or stay the implementation thereof is
unmeritorious.”
 NORTHERN LUZON ISLANDS CO., INC. VS. GARCIA,

753 SCRA 603, G.R. No. 203240, March 18, 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
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DOCTRINE:
Attachment is an auxiliary remedy and cannot have an independent existence

apart from the main suit or claim instituted by the plaintiff against the defendant.
Being merely ancillary to a principal proceeding, the attachment must fail if the
suit itself cannot be maintained as the purpose of the writ can no longer be
justified.
 WATERCRAFT VENTURE CORPORATION VS. WOLFE

770 SCRA 179, G.R. No. 181721, September 9, 2015
PERALTA, J.
DOCTRINE:
Watercraft’s Affidavit of Preliminary Attachment does not contain specific

allegations of other factual circumstances to show that Wolfe, at the time of
contracting the obligation, had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay.
Neither can it be inferred from such affidavit the particulars of why he was guilty
of fraud in the performance of such obligation.** the Court explained that to
constitute a ground for attachment in Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court,
it must be shown that the debtor in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation
intended to defraud the creditor. A debt is fraudulently contracted if at the time of
contracting it, the debtor has a preconceived plan or intention not to pay. “The
fraud must relate to the execution of the agreement and must have been the
reason which induced the other party into giving consent which he would not
have otherwise given.”
 PHIL-AIR CONDITIONING CENTER VS. RCJ LINES

775 SCRA 265, G.R. No. 193821 November 23, 2015
BRION, J.
DOCTRINE:
Phil-Air cannot be held directly liable for the costs (for the counter-bond premium
and RCJ Lines’ alleged unrealized profits) adjudged to and the damages
sustained by RCJ Lines because of the attachment. Section 4 of Rule 57
positively lays down the rule that the attachment bond will pay “all the costs
which may be adjudged to the adverse party and all damages which he may
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sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the
applicant was not entitled thereto.”
Granting that RCJ Lines suffered losses, the judgment award should have been
first executed on the attachment bond. Only if the attachment bond is insufficient
to cover the judgment award can Phil-Air be held liable.
B. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (R-58)
 IDOLOR VS. COURT OF APPEALS

351 SCRA 399, G.R. No. 141853 February 7, 2001
GONZAGA-REYES, J.
DOCTRINE:
Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be

present:
1. there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be
protected;
2. the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of
such right. Hence the existence of a right violated, is a prerequisite to the
granting of an injunction.
When petitioner filed her complaint for annulment of sheriff’s sale against private
respondents with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on
June 25, 1998, she failed to show sufficient interest or title in the property sought
to be protected as her right of redemption had already expired on June 23, 1998,
i.e. two (2) days before the filing of the complaint.
 GUSTILO VS. REAL, SR.

353 SCRA 1, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1250, February 28, 2001
QUISUMBING, J.
DOCTRINE:
Before an injunctive writ can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites
be present:
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1. there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be
protected;
3. the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of
such right. Hence the existence of a right violated, is a prerequisite to the
granting of an injunction.
The onus probandi is on movant to show that there exists a right to be protected,
which is directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined. Further, there must
be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial and that
there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent a serious
damage. In this case, complainant had been duly proclaimed as the winning
candidate for punong barangay. He had taken his oath of office. Unless his
election was annulled, he was entitled to all the rights of said office. We do not
see how the complainant’s exercise of such rights would cause an irreparable
injury or violate the right of the losing candidate so as to justify the issuance of a
temporary restraining order “to maintain the status quo.
 Michael Lagrosas vs. Bristo-Myers Squibb

G.R. No. 168637 September 12, 2008
Quisumbing, J.
DOCTRINE:
On the Second issue, it is settled that the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to

prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties
before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole aim is to
preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully.
A preliminary injunction may be granted only when, among other things, the
applicant, not explicitly exempted, files with the court where the action or
proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an
amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay such party
or person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or
temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide that the applicant
was not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary
injunction shall be issued.
The injunction bond is intended as a security for damages in case it is finally

decided that the injunction ought not to have been granted. Its principal purpose
is to protect the enjoined party against loss or damage by reason of the
injunction, and the bond is usually conditioned accordingly.
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 Nelson Jenosa vs. Rev. Fr. Jose Rene C. Delariarte
G.R. No. 172138 Semptember 8 2010
Carpio, J.
DOCTRINE:
Since injunction is the strong arm of equity, he who must apply for it must come
with equity or with clean hands. This is so because among the maxims of equity
are (1) he who seeks equity must do equity, and (2) he who comes into equity
must come with clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim which is
also expressed in the principle that he who has done inequity shall not have
equity. It signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the
ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent,
or deceitful as to the controversy in issue.
 Solid Builders Inc. vs. China Bank

G.R. No. 179665 April 3, 2013
Leonardo - De Castro, J.
DOCTRINE:
This Court has recently reiterated the general principles in issuing a writ of
preliminary injunction in Palm Tree Estates, Inc. vs. Philippine National Bank:
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to
judgment of final order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from
a particular act or acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a
party's substantive rights or interests pending the final judgment in the principal
action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of a claimed
emergency or extraordinary situation which should be avoided for otherwise, the
outcome of a litigation would be useless as far as the party applying for the writ is
concerned.
At times referred to as the "Strong Arm of Equity," we have consistently ruled that
there is no power the exercise of which is more delicate and which calls for
greater circumspection than the issuance of an injunction. It should only be
extended in cases of great injury where courts of law cannot afford an adequate
or commensurate remedy in damages," in cases of extreme urgency; where the
right is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in
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complainant's favor; where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff's
right against his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one, and
where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish and maintain
a preexisting continuing relation between parties, recently and arbitrarily
interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation."
A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be granted

only in the face of actual and existing substantial rights. The duty of the court
taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is to determine
whether the requisites necessary for the grant of an injunction are present in the
case before it. In this connection, a writ of preliminary injunction is issued to
preserve the status quo ante, upon the applicant's showing of two important
requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and
(2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that
the violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injury.
 Knights of Rizal vs. DMCI Homes, Inc.

G.R. No. 213948 April 18, 2017
Carpio, J.
DOCTRINE:
It is a basic principle that "one who seeks equity and justice must come to court
with clean hands." In Jenosa v. Delariate, the Court reiterated, that he who seeks
equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean
hands. This "signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on
the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or
fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue." Thus, the KOR, having
earlier proposed a national theater a mere 286meters in distance from the back
of the Rizal Monument that would have dwarfed the Rizal Monument, comes to
this Court with unclean hands. It is now precluded from "seeking any equitable
refuge" from the Court. The KOR's petition should be dismissed on this ground
alone.
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Injunctive reliefs are meant to preserve substantive rights and prevent further
injury until final adjudication on the merits of the case. In the present case, since
the legal rights of the KOR are not well-defined, clear, and certain, the petition for
mandamus must be dismissed and the TRO lifted.
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 Saturnino Novencio vs. Hon. Rodrigo F. Lim
G.R. No. 193809 March 23, 2015
Brion, J.
DOCTRINE:
A preliminary injunction is proper when the plaintiff appears to be clearly entitled

to the relief sought and has substantial interest in the right sought to be
defended. As this Court has previously ruled, "while the existence of the right
need not be conclusively established, it must be clear."
A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial or incomplete

evidence. Such evidence need only be a sampling intended merely to give the
court an evidence of justification for a preliminary injunction pending the decision
of the merits of the case, and is not conclusive of the principal action which has
yet to be decided.
In a prayer for preliminary injunction, the plaintiff is not required to submit
conclusive and complete evidence. He is only required to show that he has an
ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his complaint.
 Hon. Mylyn P. Cayabyab vs. Jaime C. Dimson

G.R. No. 223862 July 10, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
DOCTRINE:
A preliminary writ of injunction and a TRO are injunctive reliefs and preservative
remedies for the protection of substantive rights and interests." To be entitled to
the injunctive writ, the applicant must show that: (a) there exists a clear and
unmistakable right to be protected; (b) this right is directly threatened by an act
sought to be enjoined; (c) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and
(d) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and
irreparable damage. The grant or denial of an injunctive relief in a pending case
rests on the sound discretion of the court since the assessment and evaluation of
evidence towards that end involve findings of fact left for the conclusive
determination of the said court. "Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a
court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with, except when there is grave
abuse of discretion." The burden is, thus, on the applicant to show that there is
meritorious ground for the issuance of a TRO in his favor, since an application for
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injunctive relief is construed strictly against him. Here, Dimson failed to
sufficiently show the presence of the requisites to warrant the issuance of a TRO
against the CDO and the Closure Order of Mayor Cayabyab.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Commander Raymond

Alpuerto of the Naval Base Camillo Osias, Port San Vicente, Sta. Ana,
Cagayan, Petitioner, vs. REV. CLAUDIO R. CORTEZ, SR., Respondent.
GR. No. 197472, September 7, 2015
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
DOCTRINE:
An inalienable public land cannot be appropriated and thus may not be the
proper object of possession. Hence, injunction cannot be issued in order to
protect ones alleged right of possession over the same.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to
the State. Hence, “all lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the
inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have
reclassified or alienated them to private persons." To prove that a land is
alienable, the existence of a positive act of the government, such as presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports
of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute declaring the
land as alienable and disposable must be established.
this case, there is no such proof showing that the subject portion of Palaui Island
has been declared alienable and disposable when Rev. Cortez started to occupy
the same. Hence, it must be considered as still inalienable public domain.
 AMA Land Inc. vs. Wack Wack Resident's Association, Inc.

G.R. No. 202342 July 19, 2017
Caguioa, J.
DOCTRINE:
The Court in Lukang v. Pagbilao Development Corporation reiterated the

purpose and grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. viz.:
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A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy which is adjunct
to a main suit, as well as a preservative remedy issued to maintain the
status quo of the things subject of the action or the relations between
the parties during the pendency of the suit. The purpose of injunction
is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to the
parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and educated. Its
sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case are
fully heard. Under Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, an
application for a writ of preliminary injunction may be granted if the
following grounds are established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or
part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or

acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice
to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is

attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or
acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.
Thus, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, the petitioner must show that: (1) there
exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right is directly
threatened by the act sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is
material and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage.
The grant or denial of the injunctive relief rests on the sound discretion of the
court taking cognizance of the case, since the assessment and evaluation of
evidence towards that end involves findings of fact left to the conclusive
determination by such court; and the exercise of judicial discretion by such court
will not be interfered with except upon finding of grave abuse of discretion.
In the issuance of the injunctive writ, grave abuse of discretion implies a

capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;
or the exercise of power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
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C. RECEIVERSHIP (R-59)
 SPS. CESAR A. LARROBIS, JR. and VIRGINIA S. LARROBIS, petitioners,

vs. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, respondent.
G.R. No. 135706 ,October 1, 2004
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
DOCTRINE:
While the respondent bank was banned from pursuing its business and
was placed under receivership, “foreclosure” should not be considered included
in the acts prohibited whenever banks are “prohibited from doing business during
receivership and liquidation proceedings.” This is consistent with the purpose of
receivership proceedings, i.e., to receive collectibles and preserve the assets of
the bank in substitution of its former management and prevent the dissipation of
its assets to the detriment of the creditors of the bank.
While it is true that foreclosure falls within the broad definition of “doing
business,” it should not be considered included, however, in the acts prohibited
whenever banks are “prohibited from doing business” during receivership and
liquidation proceedings. This is consistent with the purpose of receivership
proceedings, i.e., to receive collectibles and preserve the assets of the bank in
substitution of its former management, and prevent the dissipation of its assets to
the detriment of the creditors of the bank.
In this case, it is not disputed that Philippine Veterans Bank was placed
under receivership by the Monetary Board of the Central Bank pursuant to
Section 29 of the Central Bank Act on insolvency of banks. Unlike Provident
Savings Bank, there was no legal prohibition imposed upon herein respondent to
deter its receiver and liquidator from performing their obligations under the law.
Thus, the ruling laid down in the Provident case cannot apply in the case at bar.
 EVELINA G. CHAVEZ and AIDA CHAVEZ-DELES, Petitioners, v. COURT OF

APPEALS and ATTY. FIDELA Y. VARGAS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 174356, January 20, 2010
ABAD, J.:
DOCTRINE:
In any event, we hold that the CA erred in granting receivership over the
property in dispute in this case. For one thing, a petition for receivership under
Section 1(b), Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the property or
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fund subject of the action is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially
injured, necessitating its protection or preservation. Its object is the prevention of
imminent danger to the property. If the action does not require such protection or
preservation, the remedy is not receivership.
Fidelas main gripe is that Evelina and Aida deprived her of her share of
the lands produce. She does not claim that the land or its productive capacity
would disappear or be wasted if not entrusted to a receiver. Nor does Fidela
claim that the land has been materially injured, necessitating its protection and
preservation. Because receivership is a harsh remedy that can be granted only in
extreme situations. Fidela must prove a clear right to its issuance. But she has
not. Indeed, in none of the other cases she filed against Evelina and Aida has
that remedy been granted her.
 ANA MARIA A. KORUGA, Petitioner, v. TEODORO O. ARCENAS, JR.,

ALBERT C. AGUIRRE, CESAR S. PAGUIO, FRANCISCO A. RIVERA, and
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD
DIVISION, Respondents
G.R. NO. 168332, June 19, 2009
NACHURA, J.:
DOCTRINE:
Section 30 of the New Central Bank Act provides that the “appointment of
a receiver under this section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary
Board.” The term “exclusively” connotes that only the Monetary Board can
resolve the issue of whether a bank is to be placed under receivership and, upon
an affirmative finding, it also has authority to appoint a receiver. This is further
affirmed by the fact that the law allows the Monetary Board to take action
“summarily and without need for prior hearing.”
On the strength of these provisions, it is the Monetary Board that
exercises exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings for receivership of banks. From
the foregoing disquisition, there is no doubt that the RTC has no jurisdiction to
hear and decide a suit that seeks to place Banco Filipino under receivership. The
court's jurisdiction could only have been invoked after the Monetary Board had
taken action on the matter and only on the ground that the action taken was in
excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.
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 MILA CABOVERDE TANTANO and ROSELLER CABOVERDE, Petitioners,
vs. DOMINALDA ESPINA-CABOVERDE, EVE CABOVERDE-YU, FE
CABOVERDE-LABRADOR, and JOSEPHINE E. CABOVERDE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 203585, July 29, 2013
VELASCO, JR., J.:
DOCTRINE:
We have repeatedly held that receivership is a harsh remedy to be

granted with utmost circumspection and only in extreme situations. The doctrinal
pronouncement in Velasco & Co. v. Gochico & Co is instructive:
The power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one and should be exercised

with extreme caution and only under circumstances requiring summary relief or
where the court is satisfied that there is imminent danger of loss, lest the injury
thereby caused be far greater than the injury sought to be averted. The court
should consider the consequences to all of the parties and the power should not
be exercised when it is likely to produce irreparable injustice or injury to private
rights or the facts demonstrate that the appointment will injure the interests of
others whose rights are entitled to as much consideration from the court as those
of the complainant.
This Court has held that a receiver should not be appointed to deprive a
party who is in possession of the property in litigation, just as a writ of preliminary
injunction should not be issued to transfer property in litigation from the
possession of one party to another where the legal title is in dispute and the party
having possession asserts ownership in himself, except in a very clear case of
evident usurpation.
D. REPLEVIN (R-60)
 JOSE S. OROSA AND MARTHA P. OROSA V. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

PCP CREDIT CORPORATION
GR. NO.111080, April 5, 2000
J. YNARES-SANTIAGO
DOCTRINE:
To return the subject car or its equivalent considering that the petitioner had not
yet fully paid the purchase price would amount to unjust enrichment.
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 SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC VS. REGINA ASTORGA
GR.151079 and 151372, January 28, 2008
J. NACHURA
DOCTRINE:
Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of

goods or chattels may recover those goods or chattels from one who has
wrongfully distrained or taken, or who wrongfully detains such goods or chattels.
It is designed to permit one having right to possession to recover property in
specie from one who has wrongfully taken or detained the property. Either the
term may refer to the action itself, for the recovery of personality, or the
provisional remedy traditionally associated with it by which possession of the
property may be obtained by the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the
action.
 KENNET JAO V. ABE C. ANDRES

AM NO.P-07-2384, JUNE 18, 2008
J.QUISUMBING
DOCTRINE:
To recapitulate what should be the common knowledge to sheriffs, the pertinent

provision of Rule 60 of the Rules of Court are quoted hereunder:
Sec4. Duty of the Sheriff.
Upon receiving such order, the sheriff must serve a copy thereof on the adverse
party, together with a copy of the application, affidavit and bond, and must
forthwith take the property, if it were the possession of the adverse party, or his
agent and retain it his custody. If the property or any part thereof were concealed
in, a building or enclosure to be broken open and take property into possession.
After the sheriff has taken possession of the property as herein provided, he
must keep it I a secure place and shall be responsible for its delivery to the party
entitled thereto upon receiving his fees and necessary expenses for taking and
keeping
16
Sec. 6 Disposition of property by Sheriff.
If within five (5) days after taking of the property by the sheriff, the adverse party
does not object to the sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon,
or if the adverse party so objects and the court affirms its approval of the
applicants bonds or approves a new bond, or if the adverse party requires the
return of the property but his bond is objected to and found insufficient and does
no forthwith file an approved bond, the property shall be delivered to the
applicant. If for any reason the property is not delivered to the applicant, the
sheriff must return it to the adverse party.
 ROGER V NAVARRO V. JOSE ESCOBIDO

GR NO.153788, Nov.27,2009
J. BRION
DOCTRINE:
Demand nor required prior to filing of replevin action.
For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit
and bond, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Sec.2 Affidavit and bond
The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that some other person who
personally knows the facts:
a. That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly claimed ,
particularly describing it or is entitled to the possession thereof;
b. That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging the
cause of detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge, information
and belief
c. That the property has been distrained of taken for tax assessment or a fine
pursuant to law or seized undr a writ of execution or preliminary attachment,
or otherwise place under custodial legis,or if so seized that it is exempt from
such seizure or custody and
d. The actual market value of the property.
The applicant must also give bond , executed to the adverse party in double the
value of the property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned , for the return of
17
the property to then adverse party, if such return be adjudged , and for the
payment to the adverse party of such as he may recover from the applicant in the
action.
Nothing in the provisions, which requires the applicant to make a prior demand
on the possessor of the property before he can file an action for writ of replevin,
thus, a prior demand is not a condition precedent to action for s writ of replevin.
 AGNER V. BPI FAMILY SAVING S BANK, INC

GR. NO. 182963, JUNE 3.2013
J. PERALTA
DOCTRINE:
Prior Demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin,
since there is nothing in Section 2 Rule 60 of the Rules of Court that requires the
applicant to make a demand on the possessor of the property before an action
for a writ of replevin could be filed.
E. SUPPORT (R-61)
 MANUEL DE ASIS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JAIME T.

HAMOY, Branch 130, RTC, Kalookan City and GLEN CAMIL ANDRES DE
ASIS represented by her mother/guardian VIRCEL D. ANDRES,
respondents.,
G.R. No. 127578, February 15, 1999
PURISIMA J
DOCTRINE:
Res judicata is not applicable in the case at bar because the previous case was
predicated upon a compromise of future support which is illegal under the civil
code, hence the first dismissal cannot have force and effect and cannot bar the
filing of another action, asking for the same relief against the same defendant
The right to receive support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a

third person; neither can it be compensated with what the recipient owes the
obligator. Furthermore, the right to support cannot be waived or transferred to
third parties and future support cannot be the subject of compromise. It appears
that the former dismissal was predicated upon a compromise. Acknowledgment,
affecting as it does the civil status of persons and future support, cannot be the
18
subject of compromise. Hence, the first dismissal cannot have force and effect
and cannot bar the filing of another action, asking for the same relief against the
same defendant
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANUEL MANAHAN,

alias "Maning," defendant-appellant
G.R. No. 128157, September 29, 1999
BELLOSILLO, J
DOCTRINE:
Compulsory acknowledgment of victim's child not proper where accused is

married man however, we sustain that part ordering the accused to support the
child.
Article 345 of The Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape shall
also be sentenced to "acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent
him from doing so," and "in every case to support the offspring." In the case
before us, compulsory acknowledgment of the child Melanie Tibigar is not proper
there being a legal impediment in doing so as it appears that the accused is a
married man. As pronounced by this Court in People v. Guerrero, "the rule is that
if the rapist is a married man, he cannot be compelled to recognize the offspring
of the crime, should there be any, as his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate."
Consequently, that portion of the judgment under review is accordingly deleted.
In any case, we sustain that part ordering the accused to support the child as it is
in accordance with law.
 SPOUSES PRUDENCIO and FILOMENA LIM, petitioners, vs. MA. CHERYL

S. LIM, for herself and on behalf of her minor children LESTER EDWARD S.
LIM, CANDICE GRACE S. LIM, and MARIANO S. LIM, III, respondents
G.R. No. 163209, October 30, 2009
CARPIO
DOCTRINE:
Grandparents are liable to provide support but extends only to their descendants
as this word is commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower
degree.
19
As petitioners' grandchildren by blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice
Grace and Mariano III belong to this category. Indeed, Cheryl's right to receive
support from the Lim family extends only to her husband Edward, arising from
their marital bond.
 CHARLES GOTARDO, petitioner, vs. DIVINA BULING, respondent

G.R. No. 165166. August 15, 2012
BRION
DOCTRINE:
If filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent

is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists
of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity
of the family. Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no final
judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion
to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. It may
be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of
the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged
to support.
 SUSAN LIM-LUA, petitioner, vs. DANILO Y. LUA, respondent

G.R. Nos. 175279-80. June 5, 2013
VILLARAMA, JR.
DOCTRINE:
As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and
family relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to
the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient. Such
support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family.
The amount of support may be reduced or increased proportionately according

to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources
or means of the person obliged to support.
20
Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such
nature that its allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire period
that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified or
altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased needs, and with the
means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final determination.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Armed Forces of the

Philippines Finance Center (AFPFC), petitioner, vs. DAISY R. YAHON,
respondent
G.R. No. 201043. June 16, 2014
VILLARAMA JR.
DOCTRINE:
Retirement benefits of members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines are

subject to the financial spousal support of respondent spouse. Military institution
may be ordered to automatically deduct a percentage from the retirement
benefits of its enlisted personnel, and to give the same directly to the latter's
lawful wife as spousal support in compliance with a protection order issued by
the RTC pursuant to R.A. No. 9262.
 DEL SOCORRO VS. VAN WILSEM

G.R. No. 193707., December 10, 2014.
Peralta.
DOCTRINE:
a. When the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and

established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order
shall not be applied. Hence, even if the National law of the respondents states
that parents have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is
not punishable by law, said law would still not find applicability.
b. The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No.
9262 is a continuing offense.
 SALAS VS. MATUSALEM

G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013.
Villarama, JR.
21
DOCTRINE:
A high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order

for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an
irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if
paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.
 ABELLA VS. CABANERO

G.R. No. 206647, August 09, 2017.
Leonen.
DOCTRINE:
An action for support may very well resolve that ineluctable issue of paternity if it
involves the same parties, is brought before a court with the proper jurisdiction,
prays to impel recognition of paternal relations, and invokes judicial intervention
to do so. This is in keeping with the rules on proper joinder of causes of action
II. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS (RULES 62-71)

A. INTERPLEADER (R-62)
 WACK-WACK GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB VS. WON

G.R. No.L-23851, March 26, 1976.
Castro.
DOCTRINE:
An action of interpleader must be filed within a reasonable time after a dispute

has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants.
Failure to do so, would barred him to file one by means of laches or undue delay.
 ETERNAL GARDENS VS. IAC

G.R. No. 73794, September 19, 198.
Paras.
DOCTRINE:
The essence of an interpleader, aside from the disavowal of interest in the

property in litigation on the part of the petitioner, is the deposit of the property or
funds in controversy with the court. it is a rule founded on justice and equity: "that
22
the plaintiff may not continue to benefit from the property or funds in litigation
during the pendency of the suit at the expense of whoever will ultimately be
decided as entitled thereto.
 PASRICHA VS. DON LUIS DIZON REALTY

G.R. No. 136409, March 14, 2008.
Nachura.
DOCTRINE:
An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know to whom
payment of rentals should be made due to conflicting claims on the property (or
on the right to collect). The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against
double liability but to protect him against double vexation in respect of one
liability.
 BANK OF COMMERCE, Petitioner, vs.PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK

and BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Respondent.
G.R. Nos. 154470-71, September 24, 2012

BRION, J.
DOCTRINE:
Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides when an interpleader is proper

– Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made
against a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an
interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring
an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and
litigate their several claims among themselves.
The remedy of an action of interpleader is designed to protect a person against
double vexation in respect of a single liability. Through this remedy, the
stakeholder can join all competing claimants in a single proceeding to determine
conflicting claims without exposing the stakeholder to the possibility of having to
pay more than once on a single liability. The remedy of interpleader, when
proper, merely provides an avenue for the conflicting claims on the same subject
matter to be threshed out in an action.
B. DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES (R-63)
23
 EUFEMIA ALMEDA and ROMEL ALMEDA, petitioners, vs. BATHALA
MARKETING INDUSTRIES, INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 150806, January 28, 2008

NACHURA, J.
DOCTRINE:
A petition for declaratory relief may not be dismissed despite the filing of an
action for rescission, ejectment and damages where the trial court had not yet
resolved the rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of the declaratory
relief petition.
There is no showing that respondent committed an act constituting a breach of
the subject contract of lease at the time of the filing of the declaratory relief
petition. Thus, respondent is not barred from instituting before the trial court the
petition for declaratory relief.
 ROSENDO DE BORJA, Petitoner, vs. PINALAKAS NA UGNAYAN NG

MALILIIT NA MANGINGISDA NG LUZON, MINDANAO AT VISAYAS
("PUMALU-MV"), PAMBANSANG KATIPUNAN NG MGA SAMAHAN SA
KANAYUNAN ("PKSK") AND TAMBUYOG DEVELOPMENT CENTER,
INC("TDCI"), Respondents
G.R. NO. 185320, April 19, 2017
JARDELEZA, J.:
DOCTRINE:
For a petition for declaratory relief to prosper, it must be shown that (a)
there is a justiciable controversy, (b) the controversy is between persons whose
interests are adverse, (c) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy, and (d) the issue invoked is ripe for judicial determination. We agree
with the CA when it dismissed De Borja's petition for being premature as it lacks
the first and fourth requisites. We hasten to add that the petition, in fact, lacks all
four requisites.
The CA ruled that De Borja's petition did not meet the two requisites of a
petition for declaratory relief, namely: justiciable controversy and ripeness for
judicial determination. It noted that there is no actual case or controversy
regarding the definition of municipal waters for municipalities with offshore
islands because the DA has yet to issue guidelines with respect to these.
24
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for
declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again,
declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency," where both the
activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a
public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.
 CARMEN DANAO MALANA, MARIA DANAO ACORDA, EVELYN DANAO,

FERMINA DANAO, LETICIA DANAO and LEONORA DANAO, the last two
are represented herein by their Attorney-in-Fact, MARIA DANAO ACORDA,
Petitioners, vs.
BENIGNO TAPPA, JERRY REYNA, SATURNINO CAMBRI and SPOUSES
FRANCISCO AND MARIA LIGUTAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 181303, September 17, 2009

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
DOCTRINE:
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or

remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the
Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule 63 on Declaratory Reliefs and Other
Remedies.
To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be
read together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
amended.
As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax
Declaration No. 02-48386 is only ₱410.00; therefore, petitioners’ Complaint
involving title to and possession of the said property is within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC for it is provided in Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 that MTC shall Exclusive original jurisdiction in all
civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real property, or any interest
therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not
exceed Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such assessed value does not exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00)
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses and costs:. Thus, RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing petitioners’ Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
25
 FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, vs. JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN.
FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013, MENDOZA J.

DOCTRINE:
Notwithstanding the fact that only questions of law are raised in the petition, an
action for declaratory relief is not among those within the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
The Constitution as the subject matter, and the validity and construction of
Section 8 (1), Article VIII as the issue raised, the petition should properly be
considered as that which would result in the adjudication of rights sans the
execution process because the only relief to be granted is the very declaration of
the rights under the document sought to be construed. It being so, the original
jurisdiction over the petition lies with the appropriate Regional Trial Court (RTC).
 SPOUSES CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR. and MA. ROSARIO M.

SABITSANA, Petitioners, vs. JUANITO F. MUERTEGUI, represented by his
Attorney-in-Fact DOMINGO A. MUERTEGUI, JR., Respondent.
G.R. No. 181359, August 5, 2013

DEL CASTILLO, J.
DOCTRINE:
On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear under the Rules that an action for
quieting of title may be instituted in the RTCs, regardless of the assessed value
of the real property in dispute. Under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, an action to
quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom may be brought in the
appropriate RTC.
The suit for quieting of title was prompted by petitioners' August 24, 1998 letter-
opposition to respondent's application for registration. Thus, in order to prevent a
cloud from being cast upon his application for a title, respondent filed Civil Case
No. B-1097 to obtain a declaration of his rights. In this sense, the action is one
for declaratory relief, which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC
pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules.
 DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, REPRESENTED BY HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA

IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY, AND THE BUREAU OF
CUSTOMS, REPRESENTED BY HON. ROZZANO RUFINO B. BIAZON, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, Petitioners, v.
26
HON. MARINO M. DELA CRUZ, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE
JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA, HON. FELICITAS O. LARON-
CACANINDIN, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, MANILA, BRANCH 17, RONNIE C. SILVESTRE, EDWARD P. DELA
CUESTA, ROGEL C. GATCHALIAN, IMELDA D.CRUZ, LILIBETH S. SANDAG,
RAYMOND P. VENTURA, MA. LIZA S. TORRES, ARNEL C. ALCARAZ, MA.
LOURDES V. MANGAOANG, FRANCIS AGUSTIN Y. ERPE, CARLOS T. SO,
MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, CARMELITA M. TALUSAN,1] AREFILES H.
CARREON,2] AND ROMALINO G. VALDEZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 209331, August 24, 2015
CARPIO, J.:
DOCTRINE:
The CSC has jurisdiction over all employees of government branches,

subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters. The CSC is the sole arbiter of
controversies relating to the civil service. The rule is that disciplinary cases and
cases involving personnel actions, including "appointment through certification,
promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, detail, reassignment,
demotion, and separation," are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CSC. This
rule is embodied in Section 1, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book
V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws (Omnibus
Rules).
When respondents raised the issue of validity and constitutionality of CPO 189-
2013, the issue took the case beyond the scope of the CSC's jurisdiction
because the matter is no longer limited to personnel action. Thus, the RTC did
not abuse its discretion in taking cognizance of the action.
 EDGAR R. ERICE, Complainant vs. PRESIDING JUDGE DIONISIO C. SISON,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 125, CALOOCAN CITY, Respondent
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2407, November 22, 2017
CAGUIOA, J.:
DOCTRINE:
Court orders or decisions cannot be the subject matter of a petition for

declaratory relief. They are not included within the purview of the words "other
written instrument" in Rule 63 of the Rules of Court governing petitions for
declaratory relief. The same principle applies to orders, resolutions, or decisions
27
of quasi-judicial bodies, and this is anchored on the principle ofresjudicata.
Consequently, a judgment rendered by a court or a quasi-judicial body is
conclusive on the parties, subject only to appellate authority. The losing party
cannot modify or escape the effects of judgment under the guise of an action for
declaratory relief.
C. REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS OF COMELEC AND

COA (R-64)
 ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD), Petitioner, vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 206987, September 10, 2013
PEREZ, J.:
DOCTRINE:
The only question that may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Section 2,
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. For a petition for
certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in
the exercise of discretion.
"Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, has a specific meaning. It is the
arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal
hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts
to an evasion or a refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at
all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been done
with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross.
We hold that the COMELEC, being a specialized agency tasked with the
supervision of elections all over the country, its factual findings, conclusions,
rulings and decisions rendered on matters falling within its competence shall not
be interfered with by this Court in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any
jurisdictional infirmity or error of law.
As empowered by law, the COMELEC may motu proprio cancel, after due notice
and hearing, the registration of any party-list organization if it violates or fails to
comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections. Thus, we find no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it issued the
assailed Resolution dated 11 May 2013.
28
D. CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS (R-65)
1. CERTIORARI (S-1)
 OSCAR R. AMPIL, Petitioner, vs. THE HON. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,

POLICARPIO L. ESPENESIN, Registrar, Register of Deeds, Pasig City,
FRANCIS SERRANO, YVONNE S. YUCHENGCO, and GEMA O. CHENG,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 192685, July 31, 2013
PEREZ, J.:
DOCTRINE:
Plainly, the Ombudsman has "full discretion," based on the attendant facts and
circumstances, to determine the existence of probable cause or the lack thereof.
On this score, we have consistently hewed to the policy of non-interference with
the Ombudsman’s exercise of its constitutionally mandated powers. The
Ombudsman’s finding to proceed or desist in the prosecution of a criminal case
can only be assailed through certiorari proceedings before this Court on the
ground that such determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion which
contemplates an abuse so grave and so patent equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
However, on several occasions, we have interfered with the Ombudsman’s

discretion in determining probable cause:
(a) To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;

(b) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression
or multiplicity of actions;
(c) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
(d) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
(e) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
(f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
(g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
(h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
(i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance.23 (Emphasis supplied).
The fourth circumstance is present in G.R. No. 192685.
29
While we agree with the Ombudsman’s disquisition that there is no probable
cause to indict respondents for Falsification of Public Documents under Article
171(6) of the Revised Penal Code, we are puzzled why the Ombudsman
completely glossed over Ampil’s charge that respondents committed prohibited
acts listed in Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Nowhere in the
Resolution or in the Order denying reconsideration thereof did the Ombudsman
tackle and resolve the issue of whether respondents violated the particular
provisions of Republic Act No. 3019.
We are aware that the calibration of evidence to assess whether a prima facie
graft case exists against respondents is a question of fact. We have consistently
held that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the consideration of
the extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither questions of fact nor law are
entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion. In this case, however, certiorari will lie, given that the Ombudsman
made no finding at all on respondents possible liability for violation of Sections
3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
 A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC., Petitioner, vs. EMMA MONDEJAR, accompanied

by her husband, EFREN MONDEJAR, Respondent.
G.R. No. 200804, January 22, 2014
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
DOCTRINE 1:
Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that:
SEC. 23. Decision. — After the hearing, the court shall render its decision on the
same day, based on the facts established by the evidence (Form 13-SCC). The
decision shall immediately be entered by the Clerk of Court in the court docket
for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served on the parties.
The decision shall be final and unappealable.

Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under the above-
stated rule, the remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party may,
thus, immediately move for its execution. Nevertheless, the proscription on
appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings where appeal is not
an available remedy, does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This general rule has been
30
enunciated in the case of Okada v. Security Pacific Assurance Corporation,
wherein it was held that:
In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that "the extraordinary
writ of certiorari is always available where there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In Jaca v. Davao
Lumber Co., the Court ruled:
x x x Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the special
civil action of certiorari may only be invoked when "there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law," this rule is not without
exception. The availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute
sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari where appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial,
speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy – not the mere absence – of all other
legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ that usually
determines the propriety of certiorari.
DOCTRINE 2:
Likewise, the Court finds that petitioner filed the said petition before the proper
forum (i.e., the RTC). To be sure, the Court, the Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari.
Such concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not give a party unbridled
freedom to choose the venue of his action lest he ran afoul of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Instead, a becoming regard for judicial hierarchy dictates that
petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari against first level courts should be
filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of
Appeals, before resort may be had before the Court. This procedure is also in
consonance with Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction
of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, certiorari petitions assailing its
dispositions should be filed before their corresponding Regional Trial Courts.
This petitioner complied with when it instituted its petition for certiorari before the
RTC which, as previously mentioned, has jurisdiction over the same. In fine, the
RTC erred in dismissing the said petition on the ground that it was an improper
remedy, and, as such, RTC Case No. 11-13833 must be reinstated and
remanded thereto for its proper disposition.
31
 MARK JEROME S. MAGLALANG, Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT
AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), as represented by its incumbent
Chairman EFRAIM GENUINO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 190566 December 11, 2013
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
DOCTRINE 1:
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is

allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed
himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or
her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide
on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be
exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought. The premature
invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. The
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal
reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and
provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of
justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until
the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so
as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its
error and dispose of the case.
However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as

it admits of the following exceptions:
(1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely
a legal question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the
administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when
the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to
require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when
it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a
private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would
greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) where no administrative review is
provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies and (14)
32
where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered
moot.
The case before us falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per
se provides no administrative review for administrative cases whereby an
employee like petitioner is covered by Civil Service law, rules and
regulations and penalized with a suspension for not more than 30 days.
Section 37 (a) and (b) of P.D. No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service
Decree of the Philippines, provides for the unavailability of any appeal:
Section 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.
(a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary
cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty
days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days’ salary, demotion in rank or
salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from Office. A complaint may be filed
directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or
employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any
department or agency or official or group of officials to conduct the investigation.
The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with
recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.
(b) The heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities

and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their
jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is
suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty
days’ salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is
appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the
department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be
executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be
executory only after confirmation by the department head. (Emphasis supplied.)
DOCTRINE 2:
Decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final and unappealable

by law are still subject to judicial review. In Republic of the Phils. v. Francisco, we
held:
Since the decision of the Ombudsman suspending respondents for one (1)
month is final and unappealable, it follows that the CA had no appellate
33
jurisdiction to review, rectify or reverse the same. The Ombudsman was not
estopped from asserting in this Court that the CA had no appellate jurisdiction to
review and reverse the decision of the Ombudsman via petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. This is not to say that decisions of the
Ombudsman cannot be questioned. Decisions of administrative or quasi-
administrative agencies which are declared by law final and unappealable
are subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon
proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. When such
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of such
nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse
the factual findings. Thus, the decision of the Ombudsman may be reviewed,
modified or reversed via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, on a finding that it had no jurisdiction over the complaint, or of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
 PEOPLE VS. CASTANEDA

G.R. No. 208290, December 11, 2013
Justice Velasco, Jr.
DOCTRINE:
While a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for

certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, it must be shown that there was
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial
of due process.
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility. Here, the subject resolutions of the CTA have been issued
in accordance with the rules on evidence and existing jurisprudence.
 UP BOARD OF REGENTS VS. JUDGE ELSIE LIGOT-TELAN

G.R. No. 110280, October 12, 1993
Justice Romero
34
DOCTRINE:
Admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the

same being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a right.
The case involves an issue on the right of an academic institution to refuse

admission to a student arising from the imposition upon him of an administrative
disciplinary sanction. In our recent decision in Ateneo de Manila University
v. Hon. Ignacio M. Capulong, wherein certain law students were dismissed for
hazing resulting in the death of another, we held that the matter of admission of
students is within the ambit of academic freedom and therefore, beyond the
province of the courts to decide. Certain fundamental principles bear stressing.
One of the arguments of Nadal in his petition for mandamus below was that he

was denied due process. To clarify, the so-called lack of due process referred
only to the March 29, 1993 meeting of the BOR. As stated by respondent's
counsel: "What was conceded by undersigned counsel was that Nadal was
afforded due process from the start of the administrative proceeding up to the
meeting of the Board of Regents on March 28, 1993."
In this regard, we find such information to be irrelevant and a mere superfluity. In

his July, 12, 1991 certification aforementioned, Nadal admitted, although
inconsistently, that his mother was a "TNT" who could not find a "stable, regular,
well-paying employment" but that she was supporting the education of his
brothers with the help of another son. To our mind, this constitutes sufficient
admission that Nadal withheld information on the income, however measly and
irregular, of his mother. Unlike in criminal cases which require proof beyond
reasonable doubt as basis for a judgment, in administrative or quasi-
judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence is required, that which means
more than a mere scintilla or relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally
reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. In light of the foregoing
circumstances, we find that Nadal has been sufficiently proven to have violated
his undertaking to divulge all information needed when he applied for the benefits
of the STFAP.
To revert to the instant case, inasmuch as it has been shown sufficiently that
respondent has committed an act of dishonesty in withholding vital information in
connection with his application for STFAP benefits, all in blatant violation of the
Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of petitioner
University, the latter's inherent power and authority to impose disciplinary
sanction may be invoked and rightfully exercised.
35
At the risk of being repetitious, the matter of admission to a University is
encompassed by the right of academic freedom. In Garcia v. The Faculty
Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology the Court stated that a school
or college which is possessed of the right of academic freedom "decides for itself
its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for
some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the
choice of students." Elucidating, in Ateneo de Manila University v. Hon. Ignacio
M. Capulong, the Court further expounded:
Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, we have consistently upheld the

salutary proposition that admission to an institution of higher learning is
discretionary upon a school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student
rather than a right. While under the Education Act of 1982, students have a right
"to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue
their course therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to
the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic
institution.
For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations
for the admission, discipline and promotion of students. This right . . . extends as
well to parents . . . as parents are under a social and moral (if not legal)
obligation, individually and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the schools.
Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to
the successful management of the college. The rules may include those
governing student discipline." Going a step further, the establishment of rules
governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student
discipline, may be regarded as vital, if not merely to the smooth and efficient
operation of the institution, but to its very survival.
Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in the
academic groves as collectively, the students demanded and plucked for
themselves from the panoply of academic freedom their own rights encapsulized
under the rubric of "right to education" forgetting that, in Hohfeldian terms, they
have a concomitant duty, that is, their duty to learn under the rules laid down by
the school.
 ROMAN AND REMEDIOS TUASON VS. RD-CALOOCAN

G.R. No. 70484, January 29, 1988
Justice Narvasa
36
DOCTRINE:
The extraordinary writ of certiorari may properly issue to nullify only judicial or
quasi-judicial acts, unlike the writ of prohibition which may be directed
against acts either judicial or ministerial.
The extraordinary writ of certiorari may properly issue to nullify only judicial or
quasi-judicial acts, unlike the writ of prohibition which may be directed
against acts either judicial or ministerial.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court deals with the writ of certiorari in relation
to "any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions, while Section 2 of
the same Rule treats of the writ of prohibition in relation to "proceedings of any
tribunal, corporation, board, or person ... exercising functions judicial or
ministerial." But the petition will be shown upon analysis to be in reality directed
against an unlawful exercise of judicial power.
The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. He
made a determination of facts, and applied the law to those facts, declaring what
the legal rights of the parties were in the premises. These acts essentially
constitute a judicial function, or an exercise of jurisdiction — which is the power
and authority to hear or try and decide or determine a cause. He adjudged it to be
an established fact that neither the original purchasers nor their subsequent
transferees have made full payment of all installments of the purchase money
and interest on the lots claimed by Carmel Farms, Inc., including those on which
the dwellings of the members of ... (the) Association (of homeowners) stand."
These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari, because
done by an officer in the performance of what in essence is a judicial function, if it
be shown that the acts were done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion. Since Mr. Marcos was never vested with judicial
power, such power, as everyone knows, being vested in the Supreme Court and
such inferior courts as may be established by law — the judicial acts done by him
were in the circumstances indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction. The acts
were completely alien to his office as chief executive, and utterly beyond the
permissible scope of the legislative power that he had assumed as head of the
martial law regime.
Moreover, he had assumed to exercise power — i.e. determined the relevant

facts and applied the law thereto without a trial at which all interested parties
were accorded the opportunity to adduce evidence to furnish the basis for a
determination of the facts material to the controversy.
37
In any event, this Court has it in its power to treat the petition for certiorari as one
for prohibition if the averments of the former sufficiently made out a case for the
latter.
There is no dispute about the fact that title to the land purchased by Carmel was
actually issued to it by the Government.
It may well be the fact that Carmel really did fail to make full payment of the price
of the land purchased by it from the Government pursuant to the provisions of
Act 1120. This is a possibility that cannot be totally discounted. If this be the fact,
the Government may bring suit to recover the unpaid installments and interest,
invalidate any sale or encumbrance involving the land subject of the sale, and
enforce the lien of the Government against the land by selling the same in the
manner of the foreclosure of mortgages.
One last word, respecting the petitioners in intervention, Their petition to

intervene substantially fulfilled the requirements laid down for a class suit and
was consequently given due course by the Court. They are therefore covered by
this judgment.
 GSIS vs. CA
GR No. 230953, June 20, 2018
Justice Peralta
DOCTRINE:
A special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will not be a cure for
failure to timely file an appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
A special civil action for certiorari, under Rule 65, is an independent action based
on the specific grounds therein provided and will lie only if there is no appeal or
any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A
petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and
proved to exist.
"Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, refers to the arbitrary or despotic
exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the
whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion
or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
38
contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been done with
grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross.
Having said this, there is a preliminary need to address the GSIS-BOT's

argument that Demonteverde should have filed an appeal under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court instead of filing the certiorari suit before the CA.
A special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will not be a cure for
failure to timely file an appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Rule 65 is an
independent action that cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy
of an ordinary appeal, especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned by one's
own neglect or error in the choice of remedies. As this Court held in Butuan
Development Corporation v. CA:
A party cannot substitute the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court for the remedy of appeal. The existence and availability of the
right of appeal are antithetical to the availability of the special civil action
of certiorari. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are
mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and
cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error
in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the requisites
of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even
if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.
Nonetheless, the general rule that an appeal and a certiorari are not

interchangeable admits of exceptions. This Court has, before, treated a petition
for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari, particularly:
(1) if the petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period within
which to file a petition for review on certiorari;
(2) when errors of judgment are averred; and
(3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of rules.
In the instant case, the CA itself, in its June 19, 2014 Resolution, initially
dismissed Demonteverde's special civil action for certiorari, reasoning that
Demonteverde had the remedy of appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
The CA states that:
Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not
be entertained. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review)
and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive.
39
Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if
one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or
lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is
available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefore is grave abuse
of discretion.
The CA even categorically ruled that the present circumstances in

Demonteverde's case did not warrant the application of the exceptions to the
general rule provided by Rule 43, thereafter proceeding to identify the
aforementioned procedural defects in the petition.
Yet, when the CA, upon Demonteverde's motion for reconsideration, reversed
itself and reinstated the latter's Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, and Prohibition
in the assailed February 17, 2016 Resolution, it failed to substantiate its decision
to grant the said motion and set aside its June 19, 2014 Resolution. Apart from
Demonteverde's bare allegations in her pleadings and her own testimony that her
case falls under the exception to the general rule that if appeal is
available, certiorari is not a remedy, there is nothing on record that would warrant
the grant of her motion for reconsideration and the setting aside of the CA's June
19, 2014 Resolution.
A reading of the CA's assailed February 16, 2017 Resolution reveals that
Demonteverde's motion for resolution of the CA's June 19, 2014 Resolution was
approved hastily. While the CA appears to have ruled on the merits of
Demonteverde's motion, its ratiocination merely consists of two paragraphs and it
summarily made a conclusion that Demonteverde's case may be classified as an
exception to the general rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. In
doing so, the CA did not clearly and distinctly explain how it reached such
conclusion.
The Court agrees with petitioner, that the instant case may be classified as an
exception to the general rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal
under any of the following grounds: where appeal does not constitute a speedy
and adequate remedy and for certain special considerations as public welfare or
public policy. In this case, the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration on the
assailed GSIS decision maybe [sic] dispensed with on the same cited grounds of
public welfare and the advancement of public policy and in addition, in the
broader interests of justice.
"Public policy" has a specific definition in jurisprudence. It has been defined as

that principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that
40
which has a tendency to be injurious to the public of against public good. 34 It is
the principle under which freedom of contract or private dealing is restricted for
the good of the community. 35
Demonteverde's claim of public policy as a justification of her inability to comply

with the general rule on appeal is unacceptable in the absence of legal and
factual bases for its invocation. The assumption of the appellate court that
Demonteverde could possibly face "a grim prospect of a lengthy appeal as it is
very likely that the resolution will not happen during her lifetime as she is already
seventy-three years old" is inconsistent with the aforementioned definition of
public policy.
 CARMENCITA REYES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 203797-98, June 27, 2018
Justice Reyes, Jr.
DOCTRINE:
In a petition for certiorari, the public respondent acts without jurisdiction if it does

not have the legal power to determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction
where the respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case,
oversteps its authority as determined by law.
2. PROHIBITION (S-2)
 ALFEO D. VIVAS VS. BSP

G.R. No. 191424, August 7, 2013
Justice Mendoza
DOCTRINE:
Any act of the MB placing a bank under conservatorship, receivership or

liquidation may not be restrained or set aside except on a petition for certiorari.
41
prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered which
would direct the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an
act perceived to be illegal. As a rule, the proper function of a writ of prohibition is
to prevent the doing of an act which is about to be done. It is not intended to
provide a remedy for acts already accomplished.
Though couched in imprecise terms, this petition for prohibition apparently seeks
to prevent the acts of closing of ECBI and placing it under receivership.
Resolution No. 276, however, had already been issued by the MB and the
closure of ECBI and its placement under receivership by the PDIC were already
accomplished. Apparently, the remedy of prohibition is no longer appropriate.
Settled is the rule that prohibition does not lie to restrain an act that is already a
fait accompli.
Also,even if treated as a petition for certiorari, the petition should have been filed
with the CA. Section 4 of Rule 65 reads:
Section 4. When and where petition filed. — The petition shall be filed not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a
motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is
required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the
denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or
omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by
the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not
the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-
judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition
shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
That the MB is a quasi-judicial agency was already settled and reiterated in the
case of Bank of Commerce v. Planters Development Bank And Bangko Sentral
Ng Pilipinas.
In any event, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the MB for the
issuance of the assailed Resolution No. 276.
The Central Bank shall have the power to enforce the laws, orders, instructions,
rules and regulations promulgated by the Monetary Board, applicable to rural
banks; to require rural banks, their directors, officers and agents to conduct and
42
manage the affairs of the rural banks in a lawful and orderly manner; and, upon
proof that the rural bank or its Board of Directors, or officers are conducting and
managing the affairs of the bank in a manner contrary to laws, orders,
instructions, rules and regulations promulgated by the Monetary Board or in a
manner substantially prejudicial to the interest of the Government, depositors or
creditors, to take over the management of such bank when specifically
authorized to do so by the Monetary Board after due hearing process until a new
board of directors and officers are elected and qualified without prejudice to the
prosecution of the persons responsible for such violations under the provisions of
Sections 32, 33 and 34 of Republic Act No. 265, as amended.
The "close now, hear later" doctrine has already been justified as a measure for
the protection of the public interest. Swift action is called for on the part of the
BSP when it finds that a bank is in dire straits. Unless adequate and determined
efforts are taken by the government against distressed and mismanaged banks,
public faith in the banking system is certain to deteriorate to the prejudice of the
national economy itself, not to mention the losses suffered by the bank
depositors, creditors, and stockholders, who all deserve the protection of the
government.
In Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court also wrote that
x x x due process does not necessarily require a prior hearing; a hearing or an

opportunity to be heard may be subsequent to the closure. One can just imagine
the dire consequences of a prior hearing: bank runs would be the order of the
day, resulting in panic and hysteria. In the process, fortunes may be wiped out
and disillusionment will run the gamut of the entire banking community.
The doctrine is founded on practical and legal considerations to obviate

unwarranted dissipation of the bank’s assets and as a valid exercise of police
power to protect the depositors, creditors, stockholders, and the general public.
Swift, adequate and determined actions must be taken against financially
distressed and mismanaged banks by government agencies lest the public faith
in the banking system deteriorate to the prejudice of the national economy.
Accordingly, the MB can immediately implement its resolution prohibiting a

banking institution to do business in the Philippines and, thereafter, appoint the
PDIC as receiver. The procedure for the involuntary closure of a bank is
summary and expeditious in nature. Such action of the MB shall be final and
executory, but may be later subjected to a judicial scrutiny via a petition for
certiorari to be filed by the stockholders of record of the bank representing a
majority of the capital stock. Obviously, this procedure is designed to protect the
43
interest of all concerned, that is, the depositors, creditors and stockholders, the
bank itself and the general public. The protection afforded public interest
warrants the exercise of a summary closure.
 ROSENDO R. CORALES, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MUNICIPAL

MAYOR OF NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA, AND DR. RODOLFO R. ANGELES, IN
HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATOR OF
NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA, PETITIONERS, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, AS
REPRESENTED BY PROVINCIAL STATE AUDITOR OF LAGUNA MAXIMO L.
ANDAL, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 186613, August 27, 2013
PEREZ, J.
DOCTRINE:
Prohibition, being a preventive remedy to seek a judgment ordering the

defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to
be illegal, may only be resorted to when there is "no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
 LOIDA M. JAVIER, Petitioner, vs. PEPITO GONZALES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 193150, January 23, 2017
SERENO, CJ.
DOCTRINE:
While the OSG ordinarily represents the People in proceedings before this Court,
We have in the past allowed private parties to file certiorari petitions assailing
rulings and orders of the RTC in criminal cases. As early as 1969, in Paredes v.
Gopengco, the Court already held that offended parties in criminal cases have
sufficient interest and personality as "persons aggrieved" to file a special civil
action of prohibition and certiorari under Sections l and 2 of Rule 65. That ruling
was in line with the underlying spirit of adopting a liberal construction of the Rules
of Court in order to promote their object. Recently, We reiterated this ruling
in Almero v. People. Similarly, in the case at bar, We find that the ends of
substantial justice would be better served and the issues determined in a more
just, speedy, and inexpensive manner, by entertaining the present Petition.
44
 CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. 197762. March 7, 2017
SERENO, CJ
DOCTRINE:
It is settled that a resort to the extraordinary remedies of certiorari and prohibition

is proper only in cases where (a) a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (b)
there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. In this case, the second requirement is plainly absent. As
respondents correctly observed, there was an appeal available to the CESB in
the form of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. In
this case, the second requirement is plainly absent. As respondents correctly
observed, there was an appeal available to the CESB in the form of a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
3. MANDAMUS (S-3)
 NILO HIPOS, SR. REPRESENTING DARRYL HIPOS, BENJAMIN CORSIÑO

REPRESENTING JAYCEE CORSIÑO, and ERLINDA VILLARUEL
REPRESENTING ARTHUR VILLARUEL, Petitioners, vs. HONORABLE RTC
JUDGE TEODORO A. BAY, Presiding Judge, RTC, Hall of Justice, Quezon
City, Branch 86, Respondent.
G.R. Nos. 174813-15, March 17, 2009
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
DOCTRINE:
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer

to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to
control the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon
him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is
required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of
the court.
 EX-C1C JIMMY B. SANCHEZ and EX-C2C SALVADOR A. METEORO,
Petitioners, vs. ROBERTO T. LASTIMOSO, in his capacity as DIRECTOR
GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 161735, September 25, 2007
NACHURA, J.
45
DOCTRINE:
We have repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions that the remedy of

mandamus is employed only to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty, but not to require anyone to fulfill a discretionary one. The
issuance of the writ is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed
and to perform a duty already imposed. In Manila International Airport Authority
v. Rivera Village Lessee Homeowners Association, Inc., we emphasized, through
the erudite and eloquent ponencia of Justice Dante O. Tinga, that the writ can be
issued only when the applicant’s legal right to the performance of a particular act
sought to be compelled is clear and complete, one which is indubitably granted
by law or is inferable as a matter of law.
 SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, and

BONIFACIO S. TUMBOKON, Petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in
his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila, Respondent.
G.R. No. 156052, March 7, 2007
CORONA, J.
DOCTRINE:
Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus may be
filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust or station. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is
employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty that is
already imposed on the respondent and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner should have a
well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it
must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be
done.
 FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA vs. THE SUPERINTENDENT

OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, ET AL.
G.R. No. 211362 February 24, 2015
Peralta, J:
DOCTRINE:
“Certainly, mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases. It cannot be availed

against an official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of
46
discretion or judgment. For a writ to issue, petitioners should have a clear legal
right to the thing demanded, and there should be an imperative duty on the part
of respondents to perform the act sought to be mandated.
xxx in the absence of a clear and unmistakable provision of a law, a mandamus

petition does not lie to require anyone to a specific course of conduct or to control
or review the exercise of discretion; it will not issue to compel an official to do
anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do or give to the
applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law.”
 FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

G.R. No. 211833 April 7, 2015
Reyes, J:
DOCTRINE:
“It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant should
have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty
of the respondent to perform the act required. The petitioner bears the burden to
show that there is such a clear legal right to the performance of the act, and a
corresponding compelling duty on the part of the respondent to perform the act.
The remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer
to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. Clearly, the use of
discretion and the performance of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive.”
E. QUO WARRANTO (R-66)
 PEDRO MENDOZA vs. RAY ALLAS and GODOFREDO OLORES

G.R. No. 131977 February 4, 1999
Puno, J:
DOCTRINE:
“Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his
successor in office. This rule, however, is not applicable in quo warranto cases. A
judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in office,
even though such successor may trace his title to the same source. This follows
from the nature of the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer
as such, but always against the person — to determine whether he is
47
constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act in, or exercise any
function of the office to which he lays claim.”
 MA. LUTGARDA P. CALLEJA, ET AL., vs. JOSE PIERRE A. PANDAY,

AUGUSTO R. PANDAY and MA. THELMA P. MALLARI
G.R. No. 168696
Austria-Martinez, J:
DOCTRINE:
“xxx Section 1(a) of Rule 66 of the present Rules no longer contains the phrase
"or an office in a corporation created by authority of law" which was found in the
old Rules. Clearly, the present Rule 66 only applies to actions of quo
warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public
officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations
without being legally incorporated despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799. It is,
therefore, The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate
Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 (hereinafter the Interim Rules) which applies
to the petition for quo warranto filed by respondents before the trial court since
what is being questioned is the authority of herein petitioners to assume the
office and act as the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital,
Incorporated.”
 LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. Nos. 179431-32 June 22, 2010
Bersamin, J:
DOCTRINE:
“A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the

State, or of ineligibility of the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to
unseat the ineligible person from the office, but not to install the petitioner in his
place. Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest
where the parties strive for supremacy because the petitioner will not be seated
even if the respondent may be unseated.”
48
 EFREN RACEL ARA TEA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ESTELA D.
ANTIPOLO
G.R. No.195229 October 9, 2012
Carpio, J:
DOCTRINE:
“Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the

CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate
made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the
qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted
that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office
he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to
the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or
eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material
representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is
empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the
Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto
proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility
or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a
"Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto
is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.”
 De Castro vs. Carlos

GR No. 194994, 16 April 2013
Sereno, CJ
Doctrine:
In a quo warranto proceeding, the person suing must show that he has a clear
right to the office allegedly held unlawfully by another. Absent a showing of that
right, the lack of qualification or eligibility of the supposed usurper is immaterial.
 Velasco vs. Belmonte

GR No. 211140, 12 January 2016
Leonardo-Castro, J.
Doctrine:
A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to

the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its
49
enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy
the privilege. Where the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that he
is entitled to the controverted position; otherwise, respondent has a right to the
undisturbed possession of the office.
F. EXPROPRIATION (R-67)
 City of Manila vs. Serrano

GR No. 142304, 20 June 2001
Mendoza, J.
Doctrine:
A writ of execution may be issued by a court upon the filing by the government of
a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance and upon deposit
made by the government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the
property subject to expropriation. Upon compliance with these requirements, the
issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial.
 National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

GR No. 106804, 12 August 2004
Carpio, J.
Doctrine:
Eminent domain is the authority and right of the state, as sovereign, to take
private property for public use upon observance of due process of law and
payment of just compensation. The power of eminent domain may be validly
delegated to the local governments, other public entities and public utilities such
as NPC. Expropriation is the procedure for enforcing the right of eminent domain.
In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiff's matter of right to
dismiss the complaint precisely because the landowner may have already
suffered damages at the start of the taking. The plaintiff's right in expropriation
cases to dismiss the complaint has always been subject to court approval and to
certain conditions. The power of eminent domain is subject to limitations. A
landowner cannot be deprived of his right over his land until expropriation
proceedings are instituted in court. The court must then see to it that the taking is
for public use, there is payment of just compensation and there is due process of
law.
50
If the propriety of the taking of private property through eminent domain is subject
to judicial scrutiny, the dismissal of the complaint must also pass judicial inquiry
because private rights may have suffered in the meantime. The dismissal,
withdrawal or abandonment of the expropriation case cannot be made arbitrarily.
If it appears to the court that the expropriation is not for some public use, then it
becomes the duty of the court to dismiss the action. However, when the
defendant claims that his land suffered damage because of the expropriation, the
dismissal of the action should not foreclose the defendant's right to have his
damages ascertained either in the same case or in a separate action.
There is nothing in Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court that provided for the
dismissal of the defendant's claim for damages, upon the dismissal of the
expropriation case. Case law holds that in the event of dismissal of the
expropriation case, the claim for damages may be made either in a separate or in
the same action, for all damages occasioned by the institution of the
expropriation case. The dismissal of the complaint can be made under certain
conditions, such as the reservation of the defendant's right to recover damages
either in the same or in another action.
Ordinarily, the dismissal of the expropriation case restores possession of the

expropriated land to the landowner. However, when possession of the land
cannot be turned over to the landowner because it is neither convenient nor
feasible anymore to do so, the only remedy available to the aggrieved landowner
is to demand payment of just compensation.
 Republic vs. Andaya

GR No. 160656, 15 June 2007
Quisumbing, J.
Doctrine:
"Taking," in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, occurs not only when
the government actually deprives or dispossesses the property owner of his
property or of its ordinary use, but also when there is a practical destruction or
material impairment of the value of his property.
 Asia’s Emerging Dragon vs. Department of Transportation and

Communication
51
GR No. 169914, 18 April 2008
Chico-Nazario, J.
Doctrine:
The right of eminent domain extends to personal and real property. Section 1 of
Rule 67 (on Expropriation) recognizes the possibility that the property sought to
be expropriated may be titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines,
although occupied by private individuals, and in such case an averment to that
effect should be made in the complaint. Eminent domain though may be the most
effective, as well as the speediest means by which such goals may be
accomplished. Not only does it enable immediate possession after satisfaction of
the requisites under the law, it also has a built-in procedure through which just
compensation may be ascertained. In ascertaining the ultimate amount of just
compensation, the duty of the trial court is to ensure that such amount conforms
not only to the law, such as Rep. Act No. 8974, but to principles of equity as well.
Section 4(c) of Rep. Act No. 8974 states that "in case the completion of a
government infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and importance, and there
is no existing valuation of the area concerned, the implementing agency shall
immediately pay the owner of the property its proferred value, taking into
consideration the standards prescribed in Section 5 [of the law]." The "proffered
value" may strike as a highly subjective standard based solely on the intuition of
the government, but Rep. Act No. 8974 does provide relevant standards by
which "proffered value" should be based, as well as the certainty of judicial
determination of the propriety of the proffered value.
 SPOUSES LETICIA & JOSE ERVIN ABAD, Petitioner vs. FIL-HOMES REALTY
and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent
G.R. No. 189239 November 24, 2010
CARPIO MORALES, J.
DOCTRINE:
In this case, the doctrine that was laid down by the Supreme Court resolves on
the matter of how an expropriation case is finally completed.
Citing the case of Lintag v. National Power Corporation, the two stages of
expropriation proceedings are:
(1) First phase which is concerned with the determination of the authority of the
plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its
52
exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if
not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has
a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use
or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint;
and
(2) The second phase of the eminent domain action which is concerned with the
determination by the court of "the just compensation for the property sought to
be taken." This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three
(3) commissioners.
This means that mere issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation

proceedings did not transfer ownership of the lots in favor of the City. Such
issuance was only the first stage in expropriation. There is even no evidence that
judicial deposit had been made in favor of respondents prior to the City’s
possession of the lots, contrary to Section 19 of the LGC.
Respecting petitioners’ claim that they have been named beneficiaries of the lots,
the city ordinance authorizing the initiation of expropriation proceedings does not
state so. Petitioners cannot thus claim any right over the lots on the basis of the
ordinance.
Even if the lots are eventually transferred to the City, it is non sequitur for
petitioners to claim that they are automatically entitled to be beneficiaries thereof.
For certain requirements must be met and complied with before they can be
considered to be beneficiaries.
To conclude, spouses Abad cannot claim that they have the better right on the
land against Fil-Homes by virtue that there was already a writ of possession by
the Parañaque City and they were the beneficiaries for said expropriation, since
the writ of possession does not transfer ownership but rather, the payment of just
compensation to the lawful property owners.
 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner vs. YCLA SUGAR

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent
G.R. No. 193936 December 11, 2013
REYES, J.
DOCTRINE:
In this case, the Supreme Court laid down the doctrine on what constitutes as
“just compensation”, holding that it is settled that the amount of just
compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually
53
coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the
institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the amount of just
compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.
The Courts cannot rely heavily on the Board of Commissioners’ Report dated
September 15, 2003, which, in turn, was arrived at after conducting an ocular
inspection of the subject properties on August 27, 2003. However, the Board of
Commissioners’ recommendation as to the amount of just compensation was
based on the prevailing market value of the subject properties in 2003. What
escaped the attention of the lower courts is that the prevailing market value of the
subject properties in 2003 cannot be used to determine the amount of just
compensation considering that the Complaint for expropriation was filed by NPC
on December 2, 1997.
Further, the Court notes that the Board of Commissioners, in its Report dated
September 15, 2003, merely alleged that its members arrived at the amount of
₱1,000.00 per sq m as just compensation for the subject properties based on
actual sales, presumably of surrounding parcels of land, and on the opinion of
"reliable persons" that were interviewed. However, the Report dated September
15, 2003 is not supported by any corroborative documents such as sworn
declarations of the "reliable persons" that were supposedly interviewed.
The Court has consistently ruled that just compensation cannot be arrived at
arbitrarily; several factors must be considered such as, but not limited to,
acquisition cost, current market value of like properties, tax value of the
condemned property, its size, shape, and location. But before these factors can
be considered and given weight, the same must be supported by documentary
evidence. The amount of just compensation could only be attained by using
reliable and actual data as bases for fixing the value of the condemned property.
A commissioners’ report of land prices which is not based on any documentary
evidence is manifestly hearsay and should be disregarded by the court.
A commissioners’ report of land prices is considered as evidence in the

determination of the amount of just compensation due the land owner in
expropriation cases. The recommended amount of just compensation contained
in the commissioners’ report of land prices, in turn, is based on various factors
such as the fair market value of the property, the value of like properties. Thus, it
becomes imperative that the commissioners’ report of land prices be supported
by pertinent documents, which impelled the commissioners to arrive at the
recommended amount for the condemned properties, to aid the court in its
determination of the amount of just compensation. Otherwise, the
54
commissioner’s report becomes hearsay and should thus not be considered by
the court.
 JOCELYN S. LIMKAICHONG, Petitioner vs. LAND BANK OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G.R. No. 158464 August 2, 2016
BERSAMIN, J.
DOCTRINE:
The doctrine laid down in this case resolves the matter as to ‘who has the final
say on the amount of just compensation.
In ruling, the Supreme Court so holds that in an expropriation proceeding the

court technically would still have the power to determine the just compensation
for the property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to
simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or
the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to
appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need
to satisfy the due process clause in the taking of private property is seemingly
fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial proceeding was not had before the
actual taking. However, the strict application of the decrees during the
proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court
has only to choose between the valuation of the owner and that of the assessor,
and its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The court cannot exercise
its discretion or independence in determining what is just and fair. Even a grade
school pupil could substitute for the judge insofar as the determination of
constitutional just compensation is concerned.
In the present petition, the High Court were once again confronted with the same
question of whether the courts under P.D. No. 1533, which contains the same
provision on just compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the power
and authority to determine just compensation, independent of what is stated by
the decree and to this effect, to appoint commissioners for such purpose.
The Supreme Court held in the affirmative.
It is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that the
valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to the basic
concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor
bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court
promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property,
55
after evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all
factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been
judiciously evaluated.
To resolve the conflict in the rulings of the Court, we now declare herein, for the
guidance of the bench and the bar, that the better rule is that stated in Philippine
Veterans Bank, reiterated in Lubrica and in the August 14, 2007 Decision in this
case. Thus, while a petition for the fixing of just compensation with the SAC is not
an appeal from the agrarian reform adjudicator's decision but an original action,
the same has to be filed within the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules;
otherwise, the adjudicator's decision will attain finality. This rule is not only in
accord with law and settled jurisprudence but also with the principles of justice
and equity. Verily, a belated petition before the SAC, e.g., one filed a month, or a
year, or even a decade after the land valuation of the DAR adjudicator, must not
leave the dispossessed landowner in a state of uncertainty as to the true value of
his property.
 LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. EUGENIO DALAUTA,

Respondent
G.R. No. 190004 August 8, 2017

MENDOZA, J.
DOCTRINE:
The Special Agrarian Courts (SACs) are the Regional Trial Courts expressly
granted by law with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners and the prosecution of all
criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings
before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act. The Special
Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction
within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.
The valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function
which cannot be vested in administrative agencies. The executive department or
the legislature may make the initial determination, but when a party claims a
violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be
taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive
order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s
findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the just-ness’
of the decreed compensation.
56
G. FORECLOSURE OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE (R-68)
 JOSE T. RAMIREZ, Petitioner vs. THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION,

Respondent
G.R. No. 198800 December 11, 2013
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
DOCTRINE:
In this case, the doctrine laid down by the High Court resolved on the matter on
‘what is the legal effect of violating clause in the deed of mortgage which requires
personal notice to the petitioner–mortgagor by the respondent–mortgagee bank?
The Supreme Court held that when mortgagee fails to send a notice of
extrajudicial foreclosure sale to the mortgagor, it committed a contractual breach
of the contract by violating the aforementioned clause sufficient to render the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale on September 8, 1994 null and void. Thus, we
reverse the assailed CA Decision and Resolution.
As the Supreme Court already explained in Metropolitan Bank v. Wong, a bank’s

violation of a clause in a real estate mortgage is sufficient to invalidate the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Holding that a contract is the law between the
parties and absent any showing that its provisions are wholly or in part contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy, it shall be enforced to
the letter by the courts.
Section 3, Act No. 3135 provides that notice shall be given by posting notices of
the sale for not less than twenty days in at least three public places of the
municipality or city where the property is situated, and if such property is worth
more than four hundred pesos, such notice shall also be published once a week
for at least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
municipality and city.”
The Act only requires (1) the posting of notices of sale in three public places, and
(2) the publication of the same in a newspaper of general circulation. Personal
notice to the mortgagor is not necessary. Nevertheless, the parties to the
mortgage contract are not precluded from exacting additional requirements. In
this case, petitioner and respondent in entering into a contract of real estate
mortgage, agreed inter alia that “all correspondence relative to this mortgage,
including demand letters, summonses, subpoenas, or notifications of any judicial
or extra–judicial action shall be sent to the MORTGAGOR….”
57
Precisely, the purpose of the foregoing stipulation is to apprise respondent of any
action which petitioner might take on the subject property, thus according him the
opportunity to safeguard his rights. When petitioner failed to send the notice of
foreclosure sale to respondent, he committed a contractual breach sufficient to
render the foreclosure sale null and void.
 SPOUSES NICASIO C. MARQUEZ AND ANITA J. MARQUEZ, Petitioner vs.

SPOUSES CARLITO ALINDOG AND CARMEN ALINDOG, Respondent
G.R. No. 184045 January 22, 2014
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
DOCTRINE:
The doctrine laid down in this case resolves the matter regarding the duty of the
Trial Courts in the event that the purchaser in a foreclosure sale applies for a writ
of possession.
The High Court explained that in a foreclosure sale, a writ of possession duly
applied for by said purchaser should issue as a matter of course, and thus,
merely constitutes a ministerial duty on the part of the court.
The procedure for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage is governed

by Act No. 3135, as amended. The purchaser at the public auction sale of an
extrajudicially foreclosed real property may seek possession thereof in
accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135 which provides
“x x x the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the
province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated,
to give him possession thereof during the redemption period,
furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property
for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be
shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or
without complying with the requirements of this Act. x x x”
As may be seen, the law expressly authorizes the purchaser to petition for
a writ of possession during the redemption period by filing an ex parte
motion under oath for that purpose in the corresponding registration or
cadastral proceeding in the case of property with Torrens title; and upon
the filing of such motion and the approval of the corresponding bond, the
law also in express terms directs the court to issue the order for a writ of
possession. Under the legal provisions above copied, the order for a writ
of possession issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper
motion and the approval of the corresponding bond. No discretion is left to
the court. And any question regarding the regularity and validity of the sale
58
(and the consequent cancellation of the writ) is left to be determined in a
subsequent proceeding as outlined in section 8. Such question is not to be
raised as a justification for opposing the issuance of the writ of
possession, since, under the Act, the proceeding for this is ex parte.
 RUSTICO A. ARDIENTE and ASUNCION PALOMARDIENTE, Petitioners vs.

PROVINCIAL SHERIFF, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON and
PENINSULA DEVELOPMENT BANK, Respondents
G.R. No. 148448 August 17, 2004
CARPIO MORALES, J.
DOCTRINES:
In this case, the doctrine involved tackles on matters of:

(1) whether or not personal notice shall be served to the mortgagors; and
(2) matters of compliance with the requisite of publication of the foreclosure.
With respect to petitioners’ paragraphs 15 and 16 allegations in their Complaint,

they were questioning the validity of the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage
on the basis of lack of notice to them as mortgagors.
It is settled that personal notice to the mortgagor in extra-judicial foreclosure

proceedings is not necessary, hence, not a ground to set aside the foreclosure
sale. (As held in Fortune Motors (Phils.), Inc. v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co.)
With respect to petitioners’ argument that the bank, in its Answer, in fact put in
issue its compliance with the requirements of Act 3135, "more specifically with
regards to the notices of the public auction sale as well as the extra-judicial
application in accordance with law," to thus call for the presentation of evidence,
they citing again Benavides, the same fails.
Benavides bears on the rendition of judgment on the pleadings. It holds that

where the defendant’s answer tenders an issue, as where it does not only deny
the material allegations of the complaint but also sets up certain special and
affirmative defenses, the nature of such answer calls for presentation of
evidence, hence, it is error to render a judgment on the pleadings thereon without
such evidence.
No doubt, it is a well-settled rule that statutory provisions governing publication of

notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with, and that
even slight deviations therefrom will invalidate the notice and the sale at least
voidable.
59
Despite petitioners’ non-allegation of lack of publication of notice of foreclosure in
their Complaint, the bank pleaded in its Answer
(1) "that petitioners were duly notified of the extrajudicial foreclosure and public
auction sale" and “there was sufficient notice and publication served to all
concerned of said public auction sale,"; and
(2) that it and the Office of the provincial Sheriff "fully compl[ied] with the
requirements of law under Act 3135, more specifically with regard to notices of
the public auction as well as the extra-judicial foreclosure in accordance with
law."
Yet petitioners never refuted in their Reply and Answer to Counterclaim such
defense of the bank nor presented evidence before the trial court to disprove the
same.
As the appellate court thus held, the issue of lack of publication of notice cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal.
 LZK HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner vs.

PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK , Respondent
G.R. No. 187973 January 20, 2014
REYES, J.
DOCTRINE:
The doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in this case resolves on the matter
concerning the status of a writ of possession upon conclusiveness of judgment.
In ruling, the Supreme Court so holds that under the principle of conclusiveness
of judgment, the right of Planter’s Bank to a writ of possession is binding and
conclusive on the parties.
The doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment postulates that ''when

a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of
the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the
parties and those in privity with them.”
All the elements of the doctrine are present in this case. The final judgment in
was rendered by the Court pursuant to its jurisdiction over the review of decisions
60
and rulings of the CA. It was a judgment on the merits of Planters Banks’s right to
apply for and be issued a writ of possession.
Lastly, the parties involved in the ruling are the same parties involved in the
present case.
Hence, LZK Holdings can no longer question Planter Bank’s right to a writ of
possession over the subject property because the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment bars the relitigation of such particular issue.
Moreover, the authority relied upon by LZK Holdings defeats rather than support
its position. The ruling in PNB21 echoes the very same rationale of the judgment
in G.R. No. 167998 that is the purchaser in foreclosure sale may take
possession of the property even before the expiration of the redemption period
by filing an ex parte motion for such purpose and upon posting of the necessary
bond.
No hearing is required prior to the issuance of a writ of possession. This is clear

from the following disquisitions in Espinoza v. United Overseas Bank Phils. which
reiterates the settled rules on writs of possession, to wit:
The proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in

nature. It is a judicial proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only and
without notice by the court to any person adverse of interest. It is a proceeding
wherein relief is granted without giving the person against whom the relief is
sought an opportunity to be heard.
By its very nature, an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a

non-litigious proceeding. It is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one’s
right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not an ordinary suit
filed in court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement of a wrong or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
Given the ex-parte nature of the proceedings for a writ of possession, the RTC
did not err in cancelling the previously scheduled hearing and in granting
Planters Bank’s motion without affording notice to LZK Holdings or allowing it to
participate.
 GOLDENWAY MERCHANDISING CORPORATION vs. EQUITABLE PCI

BANK
G.R. No. 195540, March 13, 2013
Villarama, JR., J.
61
Doctrine:
The one-year period of redemption is counted from the date of the registration of
the certificate of sale. In this case, the parties provided in their real estate
mortgage contract that upon petitioner's default and the latter's entire loan
obligation becoming due, respondent may immediately foreclose the mortgage
judicially in accordance with the Rules of Court, or extra judicially in accordance
with Act No. 3135, as amended. Notwithstanding Act 3135, juridical persons
whose property is being sold pursuant to an extrajudicial foreclosure, shall have
the right to redeem the property in accordance with this provision until, but not
after, the registration of the certificate of foreclosure sale with the applicable
Register of Deeds which in no case shall be more than three (3) months after
foreclosure, whichever is earlier. Owners of property tht has been sold in a
foreclosure sale prior to the effectivity of this Act shall retain their redemption
rights until their expiration. Under the new law, an exception is thus made in the
case of juridical persons which are allowed to exercise the right of redemption
only "until, but not after, the registration of the certificate of foreclosure sale" and
in no case more than three (3) months after foreclosure, whichever comes first.
 SOLID BUILDERS, INC. and MEDINA FOODS INDUSTRIES, INC. vs. CHINA
BANKING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 179665, April 3, 2013
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
Doctrine:
Where the parties stipulated in their credit agreements, mortgage contracts and
promissory notes that the mortgagee is authorized to foreclose the mortgaged
properties in case of default by the mortgagors, the mortgagee has a clear right
to foreclosure in case of default, making the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction improper. x x x. (Citation omitted.)
In addition, the default of SBI and MFII to pay the mortgage indebtedness
disqualifies them from availing of the equitable relief that is the injunctive writ. In
particular, SBI and MFII have stated in their Complaint that they have made
various requests to CBC for restructuring of the loan.40 The trial court’s Order
dated December 14, 2000 also found that SBI wrote several letters to CBC
"requesting, among others, for a reduction of interests and penalties and
restructuring of the loan."41 A debtor’s various and constant requests for
deferment of payment and restructuring of loan, without actually paying the
amount due, are clear indications that said debtor was unable to settle his
62
obligation.42 SBI’s default or failure to settle its obligation is a breach of
contractual obligation which tainted its hands and disqualified it from availing of
the equitable remedy of preliminary injunction.
 ROLANDO ROBLES vs. FERNANDO FIDEL YAPCINCO, PATROCINIO B.

YAPCINCO, MARIA CORAZON B. YAPCINCO, and MARIA ASUNCION
B.YAPCINCO-FRONDA
G.R. No. 169568, June 5, 2009
Peralta, J.
Doctrine:
As this Court held in Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. v. OJ-Mark Trading, Inc.:
Where the parties stipulated in their credit agreements, mortgage contracts and
promissory notes that the mortgagee is authorized to foreclose the mortgaged
properties in case of default by the mortgagors, the mortgagee has a clear right
to foreclosure in case of default, making the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction improper. x x x. (Citation omitted.)
In addition, the default of SBI and MFII to pay the mortgage indebtedness
disqualifies them from availing of the equitable relief that is the injunctive writ. In
particular, SBI and MFII have stated in their Complaint that they have made
various requests to CBC for restructuring of the loan. The trial court’s Order
dated December 14, 2000 also found that SBI wrote several letters to CBC
"requesting, among others, for a reduction of interests and penalties and
restructuring of the loan." A debtor’s various and constant requests for deferment
of payment and restructuring of loan, without actually paying the amount due, are
clear indications that said debtor was unable to settle his obligation. SBI’s default
or failure to settle its obligation is a breach of contractual obligation which tainted
its hands and disqualified it from availing of the equitable remedy of preliminary
injunction.
 METOROPLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. CPR PROMOTIONS

AND MARKETING, INC. and SPOUSES CORNELIO P. REYNOSO, JR. and
LEONIZA* F. REYSONO
G.R. No. 200567, June 22, 2015
Velasco, JR., J.
Doctrine:
63
We have already ruled in several cases that in extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage, where the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to pay the debt, the
mortgagee has the right to recover the deficiency from the debtor. In ascertaining
the deficit amount, Sec. 4, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court is elucidating, to wit:
Section 4. Disposition of proceeds of sale.—The amount realized from the
foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property shall, after deducting the costs of the
sale, be paid to the person foreclosing the mortgage, and when there shall be
any balance or residue, after paying off the mortgage debt due, the same shall
be paid to junior encumbrancers in the order of their priority, to be ascertained by
the court, or if there be no such encumbrancers or there be a balance or residue
after payment to them, then to the mortgagor or his duly authorized agent, or to
the person entitled to it. (emphasis added) Verily, there can only be a deficit
when the proceeds of the sale is not sufficient to cover (1) the costs of
foreclosure proceedings; and (2) the amount due to the creditor, inclusive of
interests and penalties, if any, at the time of foreclosure.
 ALONA G. ROLDAN vs SPOUSES CLARENCE I. BARRIOS and ANNA LEE

T. BARRIOS, ROMMEL MATORRES, and HON. JEMENA ABELLAR ARBIS,
in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 6, Regional Trial Court, Aldan
G.R. No. 214803, April 23, 2018
Peralta, J.
Doctrine:
The allegations and reliefs sought in petitioner's action for foreclosure of

mortgage showed that the loan obtained by respondents spouses Barrios from
petitioner fell due and they failed to pay such loan which was secured by a
mortgage on the property of the respondents spouses; and prayed that in case of
default of payment of such mortgage indebtedness to the court, the property be
ordered sold to answer for the obligation under the mortgage contract and the
accumulated interest. It is worthy to mention that the essence of a contract of
mortgage indebtedness is that a property has been identified or set apart from
the mass of the property of the debtor-mortgagor as security for the payment of
money or the fulfillment of an obligation to answer the amount of indebtedness, in
case of default in payment. Foreclosure is but a necessary consequence of non-
payment of the mortgage indebtedness. In a real estate mortgage when the
principal obligation is not paid when due, the mortgagee has the right to foreclose
the mortgage and to have the property seized and sold with the view of applying
the proceeds to the payment of the obligation. Therefore, the foreclosure suit is a
real action so far as it is against property, and seeks the judicial recognition of a
property debt, and an order for the sale of the res.
64
Petitioner cites Russell v. Vestil to show that action for foreclosure of mortgage is
an action incapable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, within the jurisdiction
of the RTC. We are not persuaded. In the Russell case, we held:
In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, we had the occasion to rule that: In determining
whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of
the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of
money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would
depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something
other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has
considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first
instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific

performance, support, or foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment; also
actions questioning the validity of a mortgage, annulling a deed of sale or
conveyance and to recover the price paid and for rescission, which is a
counterpart of specific performance.
While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary
estimation, the law specifically mandates that they are cognizable by the MTC,
METC, or MCTC where the assessed value of the real property involved does
exceed ₱20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or ₱50,000.00, if located elsewhere. If the
value exceeds ₱20,000.00 or ₱50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the Regional
Trial Courts which have jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2). However, the subject
matter of the complaint in this case is annulment of a document denominated as
"DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS
ORAL PARTITION.
Clearly, the last paragraph clarified that while civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein, are also incapable of
pecuniary estimation as it is not for recovery of money, the court's jurisdiction will
be determined by the assessed value of the property involved.
H. PARTITION (R-69)
 CAROLINA (CARLINA) VDA. DE FIGURACION, HEIRS OF ELENA

FIGURACION-ANCHETA vs. EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA
65
G.R. No. 151334, February 13, 2013
Reyes, J.
Doctrine:
The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the issue of
ownership. Such an action will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest in the
subject property. In fact, the parties filing the action are required by the Rules of
Court to set forth in their complaint the nature and the extent of their title to the
property. It would be premature to effect a partition until and unless the question
of ownership is first definitely resolved.
Mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not
foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with
persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee,
or that other parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to
the issuance of the certificate of title. Stated differently, placing a parcel of land
under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof
can no longer be disputed. The certificate cannot always be considered as
conclusive evidence of ownership. In this case, co-ownership of Lot No. 707 was
precisely what respondent Emilia was able to successfully establish, as correctly
found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA.
When Carolina sold the entire Lot No. 707 on December 11, 1962 to Hilaria and
Felipa without the consent of her co-owner Agripina, the disposition affected only
Carolina’s pro indiviso share, and the vendees, Hilaria and Felipa, acquired only
what corresponds to Carolina’s share. A co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided
share; hence, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent
of the other co-owners is not null and void and only the rights of the co-
owner/seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the
property.
In a contract of sale of co-owned property, what the vendee obtains by virtue of

such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, and the vendee
merely steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner. Hilaria and Felipa did not
acquire the undivided portion pertaining to Agripina, which has already been
effectively bequeathed to respondent Emilia as early as November 28, 1961 thru
the Deed of Quitclaim. In turn, being the successor-in-interest of Agripina’s share
in Lot No. 707, respondent Emilia took the former’s place in the co-ownership
and as such co-owner, has the right to compel partition at any time.
66
Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share of the
other co-heirs or co-owners absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership. The
act of repudiation, as a mode of terminating co-ownership, is subject to certain
conditions, to wit: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of
repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence
thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the period
required by law.
 CELESTINO BALUS vs. SATURNINO BALUS and LEONARDA BALUS VDA.

DE CALUNOD
G.R. No. 168970, January 15, 2010
Peralta, J.
Doctrine:
The rights to a person’s succession are transmitted from the moment of his
death. In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and
transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as
those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. In the
present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his
lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no
longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated
differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from their
father.
Petitioner’s contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their

supposed co-ownership of the subject property contradicts the provisions of the
subject Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly manifested their intention of
having the subject property divided or partitioned by assigning to each of the
petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the same. Partition calls for
the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property owned
in common. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner,
vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and giving each one a
right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other. In
other words, the purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership, an
objective which negates petitioner’s claims in the present case.
 FELICIANO vs. CANOSA

629 SCRA 550 (2010) / G.R. No. 161746 (September 1, 2010)
VILLARAMA, JR.
67
DOCTRINE:
We affirm the ruling of the CA. As the records show, the heirs of Doroteo and
Esteban did not participate in the extrajudicial partition executed by Salina with
the other compulsory heirs, Leona, Maria and Pedro. Undeniably, the said deed
was fraudulently obtained as it deprived the known heirs of Doroteo and Esteban
of their shares in the estate. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without
including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same,
is fraudulent and vicious. Hence, an action to set it aside on the ground of fraud
could be instituted. Such action for the annulment of the said partition, however,
must be brought within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud.
The applicable prescriptive period to institute the action to annul the deed of
extrajudicial settlement was four (4) years counted from the discovery of fraud as
held in the case of Gerona v. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964). However, the
records show that petitioners’ complaint was filed only on October 18, 1993, or
almost sixteen (16) years after Jacinto Feliciano was issued Free Patent No. (IV-
4) 012293 on November 28, 1977, and almost fourteen (14) years from the time
Pedro Canoza was issued OCT No. P-364 on November 28, 1979. As petitioners
are deemed to have obtained constructive notice of the fraud upon the
registration of the Free Patent, they clearly failed to institute the present civil
action within the allowable period. The same result obtains even if their complaint
is treated as one (1) essentially for reconveyance as more than ten (10) years
have passed since petitioners’ cause of action accrued. The CA committed no
error in dismissing their complaint.
 MANGAHAS vs. BROBIO

634 SCRA 351 (2010) / G.R. No. 183852 (October 20, 2010)
NACHURA
DOCTRINE:
The foregoing discussion renders the final issue insignificant. Be that as it may,
we would like to state that the remedy suggested by the CA is not the proper one
under the circumstances. An action for partition implies that the property is still
owned in common. Considering that the heirs had already executed a deed of
extrajudicial settlement and waived their shares in favor of respondent, the
properties are no longer under a state of co-ownership; there is nothing more to
be partitioned, as ownership had already been merged in one person.
 AGARRADO vs. LIBRANDO-AGARRADO

G.R. No. 212413, June 06, 2018
68
REYES, JR.
DOCTRINE:
In determining whether a case is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the case of

Cabrera vs. Francisco,14 in reiterating the case of Singson vs. Isabela Sawmill,
teaches that identifying the nature of the principal action or remedy sought is
primarily necessary. It states:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not

capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of
first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought.
If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal
courts or in the Courts of First Instance would depend on the amount of the
claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such
actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by Courts of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Courts).
For actions on partition, the subject matter is two-phased. In Bagayas vs.

Bagayas, the Court ruled that partition is at once an action (1) for declaration of
co-ownership and (2) for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of
the properties involved. Thus, in a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first,
a declaration that he/she is a co-owner of the subject properties, and second, the
conveyance of his/her lawful share.
The case of Russel, the very same case cited by the Court of Appeals,
determined that while actions for partition are incapable of pecuniary estimation
owing to its two-phased subject matter, the determination of the court which
will acquire jurisdiction over the same must still conform to Sec. 33(3) of
B.P. 129, as amended. Russel said:
While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of
pecuniary estimation, the law specifically mandates that they are
cognizable by the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed value of the
real property involved does exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or
P50,000.00, if located elsewhere. If the value exceeds P20,000.00 or
69
P50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the Regional Trial Courts which
have jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2).
I. FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER (R-70)
 PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOVERNOR LUIS

RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE, JR., petitioner, vs. BODEGA GLASSWARE,
represented by its owner JOSEPH D. CABRAL, respondent.
G.R. No. 194199. March 22, 2017.
DOCTRINE:
The essence of an ejectment suit is for the rightful possessor to lawfully

recover the property through lawful means instead of unlawfully wresting
possession of the property from its current occupant.—Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court covers the ejectment cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. These
actions are summary proceedings and are devised to provide for a particular
remedy for a very specific issue. Actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry
involve only the question of actual possession. In these actions, courts are asked
to ascertain which between the parties has the right to the possession de facto or
physical possession of the property in question. Its purpose is to restore the
aggrieved party to possession if he or she successfully establishes his or her
right to possess the property. The essence of an ejectment suit is for the rightful
possessor to lawfully recover the property through lawful means instead of
unlawfully wresting possession of the property from its current occupant. Thus,
an action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a summary proceeding and is
an expeditious means to recover possession. If the parties raise the issue of
ownership, courts may only pass upon that issue for the purpose of ascertaining
who has the better right of possession. Any ruling involving ownership is not final
and binding. It is merely provisional and does not bar an action between the
same parties regarding the title of the property.
Unlawful detainer refers to a situation where the current occupant of the

property initially obtained possession lawfully. This possession only became
unlawful due to the expiration of the right to possess which may be a contract,
express or implied, or by mere tolerance.—An action for unlawful detainer, as in
this case, pertains to specific circumstances of dispossession. It refers to a
situation where the current occupant of the property initially obtained possession
70
lawfully. This possession only became unlawful due to the expiration of the right
to possess which may be a contract, express or implied, or by mere tolerance.
Jurisdictional Facts Which Must be Alleged and Established in an Action for

Unlawful Detainer.—An action for unlawful detainer must allege and establish the
following key jurisdictional facts: (1) initially, possession of property by the
defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually,
such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter’s right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant
remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the
enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to
vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
 SANTIAGO VS. NORTHBAY KNITTING, INC.

G.R. No. 217296, October 11, 2017.
Peralta.
DOCTRINE:
In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the
question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the lower courts and the CA,
nonetheless, have the undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the issue
of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession. Such
decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land nor
is conclusive of the facts found in said case between the same parties but upon a
separate cause of action involving possession.
 REGALADO vs. DE LA RAMA

GR No. 202448, Dec. 13, 2017
DEL CASTILLO
DOCTRINE:
Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, there are special jurisdictional
facts that must be set forth in the complaint to make a case for ejectment, which,
as mentioned, may either be for forcible entry or unlawful detainer.
In particular, a complaint for forcible entry must allege the plaintiff's prior physical
possession of the property; the fact that plaintiff was deprived of its possession
by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; and the action must be filed
71
within one year from the time the owner or the legal possessor learned of their
dispossession. On the other hand, a complaint for unlawful detainer must state
that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession of the real property after
the expiration or termination of his or her right to possess it; and the complaint is
filed within a year from the time such possession became unlawful.
Respondents only averred in the Complaint that they are registered owners of
the subject properties, and petitioner unlawfully deprived them of its possession.
They did not assert therein that they were dispossessed of the subject properties
under the circumstances necessary to make a case of either forcible entry or
unlawful detainer. Hence, in the absence of the required jurisdictional facts, the
instant action is not one for ejectment.
 FERRER vs. RABACA

632 SCRA 204 (2010) / A.M. No. MTJ-05-1580 (October 6, 2010)
BERSAMIN
DOCTRINE:
Indeed, respondent Judge should have granted the plaintiff’s motion for
immediate executionconsidering that the defendant did not file the sufficient
supersedeas bond despite having appealed. Granting the plaintiff’s motion for
immediate execution became his ministerial duty upon the defendant’s failure to
file the sufficient supersedeas bond. Section 19, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court
clearly imposes such duty, viz.:
Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. — If
judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue
immediately upon motion unless an appeal has been perfected and the
defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved
by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the
rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment
appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits
with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the
contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court.
In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court
the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the
preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the
lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period.
The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court,
with the papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action
is appealed.
72
Respondent Judge’s excuse, that he had lost jurisdiction over the case by virtue
of the defendant’s appeal, was unacceptable in light of the clear and explicit text
of the aforequoted rule. To begin with, the perfection of the appeal by the
defendant did not forbid the favorable action on the plaintiff’s motion for
immediate execution. The execution of the decision could not be stayed by the
mere taking of the appeal. Only the filing of the sufficient supersedeas bond and
the deposit with the appellate court of the amount of rent due from time to time,
coupled with the perfection of the appeal, could stay the execution. Secondly, he
could not also credibly justify his omission to act according to the provision by
claiming good faith or honest belief, or by asserting lack of malice or bad faith. A
rule as clear and explicit as Section 19 could not be misread or misapplied, but
should be implemented without evasion or hesitation. To us, good faith, or honest
belief, or lack of malice, or lack of bad faith justifies a non-compliance only when
there is an as-yet unsettled doubt on the meaning or applicability of a rule or
legal provision. It was not so herein. And, thirdly, given that his court, being
vested with original exclusive jurisdiction over cases similar to Civil Case No.
176394-CV, had been assigned many such cases, he was not a trial judge bereft
of the pertinent prior experience to act on the issue of immediate execution, a
fact that further exposed the abject inanity of his excuses.
 CGR CORP. vs. TREYES

522 SCRA 765 (2007) / G.R. NO. 170916 (April 27, 2007)
CARPIO MORALES
DOCTRINE:
The 2006 case of Dumo v. Espinas, 480 SCRA 56 (2006), reiterates the long-
established rule that the only form of damages that may be recovered in an
action for forcible entry is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the property: Lastly, we agree with the CA and the
RTC that there is no basis for the MTC to award actual, moral, and exemplary
damages in view of the settled rule that in ejectment cases, the only damage that
can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the
use and occupation of the property. Considering that the only issue raised in
ejectment is that of rightful possession, damages which could be recovered are
those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those
caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the
damages which he may have suffered but which have no direct relation to his
loss of material possession. x x x (Emphasis and italics supplied; citations
omitted) Other damages must thus be claimed in an ordinary action.
73
Surely, one of the elements of litis pendentia—that the identity between the
pending actions, with respect to the parties, rights asserted and reliefs prayed
for, is such that any judgment rendered on one action will, regardless of which is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration—is not
present, hence, it may not be invoked to dismiss petitioners’ complaint for
damages.Res judicata may not apply because the court in a forcible entry case
has no jurisdiction over claims for damages other than the use and occupation of
the premises and attorney’s fees.
Petitioners’ filing of an independent action for damages other than those

sustained as a result of their dispossession or those caused by the loss of their
use and occupation of their properties could not thus be considered as splitting of
a cause of action.
 AMADA C. ZACARIAS, petitioner, vs. VICTORIA ANACAY, EDNA

ANACAY, CYNTHIA ANACAY-GUISIC, ANGELITO ANACAY, JERMIL
ISRAEL, JIMMY ROY ISRAEL and all other persons claiming
authority under them, respondents.
G.R. No. 202354. September 24, 2014.
VILLARAMA, JR., J p:
DOCTRINE:
In Cabrera v. Gataruela, 586 SCRA 129 (2009), the Court held that a complaint
sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the
following: (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract
with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became
illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of
possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property
and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from
the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment.
 ESPERANZA SUPAPO and the HEIRS OF ROMEO SUPAPO, namely:

ESPERANZA, REX EDWARD, RONALD TROY, ROMEO, JR., SHEILA
LORENCE, all surnamed SUPAPO, and SHERYL FORTUNE SUPAPO-
SANDIGAN, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES ROBERTO and SUSAN DE
JESUS, MACARIO BERNARDO, and THOSE PERSONS CLAIMING
RIGHTS UNDER THEM, respondents.
G.R. No. 198356. April 20, 2015
74
BRION, J.
 DOCTRINE:
This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to
recover possession only, not ownership. However, where the parties raise the
issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who
between the parties has the right to possess the property.
This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it is only

for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of
ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication of
the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the
same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not
conclusive on the issue of ownership.
Thus, while we will dissect the Spouses Supapo's claim of ownership over the
subject property, we will only do so to determine if they or the respondents
should have the right of possession.
Having thus determined that the dispute involves possession over a real
property, we now resolve which court has the jurisdiction to hear the case.
 FATIMA O. DE GUZMAN-FUERTE, married to MAURICE GEORGE

FUERTE, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES SILVINO S. ESTOMO and CONCEPCION
C. ESTOMO, respondents.
G.R. No. 223399. April 23, 2018.
PERALTA, J p:
DOCTRINE:
In summary ejectment suits such as unlawful detainer and forcible entry, the only
issue to be determined is who between the contending parties has better
possession of the contested property. The Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over these cases and the proceedings are governed by the Rules on
Summary Procedure.
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one

who illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right
to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the
defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the
expiration or termination of the right to possess.
75
 THE IGLESIA DE JESUCRISTO JERUSALEM NUEVA OF MANILA,
PHILIPPINES, INC., represented by its President, FRANCISCO
GALVEZ, petitioner, vs. LOIDA DELA CRUZ using the name CHURCH OF
JESUS CHRIST, "NEW JERUSALEM" and all persons claiming rights under
her, respondents.
G.R. No. 208284. April 23, 2018.
DEL CASTILLO, J p:
DOCTRINE:
When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in [her] pleadings and the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue
of possession. In other words, "[w]here the parties to an ejectment case raise the
issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to determine who
between the parties has the better right, to possess the property. However,
where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession,
adjudication of the ownership issue is not final and binding, but only for the
purpose of resolving the issue or possession.
The principal issue must be possession de facto, or actual possession, and

ownership is merely ancillary to such issue. The summary character of the
proceedings is designed to quicken the determination of possession de facto in
the interest of preserving the peace of the community, but the summary
proceedings may not be proper to resolve ownership of the property.
Consequently, any issue on ownership arising in forcible entry or unlawful
detainer is resolved only provisionally for the purpose of determining the principal
issue of possession.
J. CONTEMPT (R-71)
 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION CHAIRMAN PERFECTO R.

YASAY, JR., ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONERS FE ELOISA C. GLORIA,
EDIJER MARTINEZ and ROSALINDA U. CASIGURAN, petitioners, vs.
MANUEL D. RECTO, PELAGIO T. RICALDE and CESAR P.
MANALAYSAY, respondents.
[G.R. No. 129521. September 7, 1999.]
76
PARDO, J p:
DOCTRINE:
A distinction is made between a civil and criminal contempt. Civil contempt is the
failure to do something ordered by a court to be done for the benefit of a party. A
criminal contempt is any conduct directed against the authority or dignity of the
court.
 SALVADOR SISON, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR.,

Presiding Judge, and TEODORO S. ALVAREZ, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial
Court, Las Piñas City, Branch 253, respondents.
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1771. May 27, 2004 (Formerly A.M. OCA-IPI No. 99-842-RTJ)
DOCTRINE:
The act of a judge in citing a person in contempt of court in a manner which

smacks of retaliation, as in the case at bar, is appalling and violative of Rule 2.01
of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that "a judge should so behave
at all times to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary." The very delicate function of administering justice demands that a
judge should conduct himself at all times in a manner which would reasonably
merit the respect and confidence of the people, for he is the visible
representation of the law. The irresponsible or improper conduct of judges
erodes public confidence in the judiciary; as such, a judge must avoid all
impropriety and the appearance thereof.
 JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPAÑOL vs. ATTY. BENJAMIN S. FORMOSO and

SPOUSES BENITO SEE and MARLY SEE
G.R. No. 150949, June 21, 2007
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
DOCTRINE:
The use of falsified and forged documents is a contumacious act. However, it

constitutes indirect contempt not direct contempt. Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 71,
such act is an improper conduct which degrades the administration of justice. In
Santos v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VI, we ruled that the imputed
use of a falsified document, more so where the falsity of the document is not
apparent on its face, merely constitutes indirect contempt, and as such is subject
to such defenses as the accused may raise in the proper proceedings.
77
Thus, following Section 3, Rule 71, a condemner may be punished only after a
charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity has been given to the
accused to be heard by himself and counsel. Moreover, settled is the rule that a
contempt proceeding is not a civil action, but a separate proceeding of a criminal
nature in which the court exercises limited jurisdiction.
 P/SUPT. HANSEL M. MARANTAN vs. ATTY. JOSE MANUEL DIOKNO and

MONIQUE CU-UNJIENG LA'O
G.R. No. 205956, February 12, 2014
MENDOZA, J.:
DOCTRINE:
The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial
proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or
obstructing the administration of justice. A violation of this rule may render one
liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
For a comment to be considered as contempt of court "it must really appear" that
such does impede, interfere with and embarrass the administration of justice.
The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in order to allow them to conduct
their business unhampered by publications and comments which tend to impair
the impartiality of their decisions or otherwise obstruct the administration of
justice. As important as the maintenance of freedom of speech, is the
maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary.
The "clear and present danger" rule may serve as an aid in determining the
proper constitutional boundary between these two rights. The "clear and present
danger" rule means that the evil consequence of the comment must be
"extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before an
utterance can be punished. There must exist a clear and present danger that the
utterance will harm the administration of justice. Freedom of speech should not
be impaired through the exercise of the power of contempt of court unless there
is no doubt that the utterances in question make a serious and imminent threat to
the administration of justice. It must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely,
threat.
Freedom of public comment should, in borderline instances, weigh heavily

against a possible tendency to influence pending cases. The power to punish for
contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to
78
unless necessary in the interest of justice. 14 In the present case, such necessity
is wanting.
 CAPITOL HILLS GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC. AND PABLO B. ROMAN,
JR. vs. MANUEL O. SANCHEZ
G.R. No. 182738, February 24, 2014
J. PERALTA
DOCTRINE
A person guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a court

or commits any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice may be punished for indirect
contempt. The person adjudged in indirect contempt must file an appeal under
Rule 41 and post a bond for its suspension pendente lite.
 JILL M. TORMIS vs. JUDGE MEINRADO P. PAREDES

A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366, February 4, 2015
MENDOZA, J.:
DOCTRINE:
The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial
proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or
obstructing the administration of justice. The rationale for the rule was spelled out
in Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Sanchez, where it was stated that it is a traditional
conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of
issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that
facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the
determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or
sympathies.
Although the reasons of Judge Paredes for discussing the marriage scams in his
classes seemed noble, his objectives were carried out insensitively and in bad
taste. The pendency of the administrative case of Judge Tormis and the publicity
of the marriage scams did not give Judge Paredes unrestrained license to
criticize Judge Tormis in his class discussions. The publicity given to the
investigation of the said scams and the fact that it was widely discussed in legal
circles let people expressed critical opinions on the issue. There was no need for
Judge Paredes to "rub salt to the wound.”
79
 BRO. BERNARD OCA, BRO. DENNIS MAGBANUA, CIRILA N. MOJICA,
ALEJANDRO N. MOJICA, JOSEFINA PASCUAL, SILVESTRE PASCUAL
AND ST. FRANCIS SCHOOL OF GENERAL TRIAS, CAVITE, INC. vs.
LAURITA CUSTODIO
G.R. No. 199825, July 26, 2017
LEONEN, J.:
DOCTRINE:
Indirect contempt is committed through any of the acts enumerated under Rule
71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Civil contempt is committed when a party
fails to comply with an order of a court or judge "for the benefit of the other party.
A criminal contempt is committed when a party acts against the court's authority
and dignity or commits a forbidden act tending to disrespect the court or judge.
This stems from the two (2)-fold aspect of contempt which seeks: (i) to punish the
party for disrespecting the court or its orders; and (ii) to compel the party to do an
act or duty which it refuses to perform. Civil contempt proceedings seek to
compel the contemnor to obey a court order, judgment, or decree which he or
she refuses to do for the benefit of another party. It is for the enforcement and
the preservation of a right of a private party, who is the real party in interest in the
proceedings. The purpose of the contemnor's punishment is to compel
obedience to the order. Thus, civil contempt is not treated like a criminal
proceeding and proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary to prove it.
While the nature of the punishment imposed is a mixture of both criminal and
civil, the contempt proceeding in this case is more civil than criminal. The
purpose of the filing and the nature of the contempt proceeding show that
Custodio was seeking enforcement of the trial court orders in the intra-corporate
controversy because petitioners refused to comply. Hence, this is a civil
contempt case, which does not need proof beyond reasonable doubt. This Court
has ruled that while the power to cite parties in contempt should be used
sparingly, it should be allowed to exercise its power of contempt to maintain the
respect due to it and to ensure the infallibility of justice where the defiance is so
clear and contumacious and there is an evident refusal to obey. This Court finds
that it was sufficiently proven that there was willful disobedience on the part of
petitioners. Therefore, petitioners ought to be cited in contempt.
 ATTY. BERTENI C. CAUSING and PERCIVAL CARAG MABASA vs.

PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE LORENZO R. DELA ROSA, Regional Trial Court
OCA IPI No. 17-4663-RTJ, March 7, 2018
CAGUIOA, J.:
80
DOCTRINE:
The Court likewise finds no merit in Complainants' allegation that respondent

Judge Dela Rosa should have first required Atty. Causing to show cause for his
act of posting matters pertaining to the pending criminal case on the internet. The
Court agrees with the OCA that respondent Judge Dela Rosa's act of referring
the matter to the IBP, an independent tribunal who exercises disciplinary powers
over lawyers, was a prudent and proper action to take for a trial court judge. The
Court has explained, in the case of Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. Distribution
Management Association of the Philippines, that judges' power to punish
contempt must be exercised judiciously and sparingly, not for retaliation or
vindictiveness, viz.: x x x [T]he power to punish for contempt of court is exercised
on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, and only occasionally
should a court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without
which the administration of justice must falter or fail. As judges[,] we ought to
exercise our power to punish contempt judiciously and sparingly, with utmost
restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing the power for the correction and
preservation of the dignity of the Court, not for retaliation or vindictiveness.
 RE: CA-G.R. CV NO. 96282 (SPOUSES BAYANI AND MYRNA M. PARTOZA

VS. LILIAN B. MONTANO AND AMELIA SOLOMON) vs. ATTY. CLARO
JORDAN M. SANTAMARIA
A.C. No. 11173 (Formerly CBD No. 13-3968), June 11, 2018
J. DEL CASTILLO
DOCTRINE:
The repeated failure, refusal or inability to comply with the CA resolutions

is not only reprehensible conduct but shows an utter lack of respect for the CA
and its orders. A resolution issued by the CA, or any court for that matter, is not
mere request that may be complied with partially or selectively. Lawyers are duty
bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court.
III. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (RULES 72-109)

A. SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
 San Luis v. San Luis
81
G.R No. 133743, February 6, 2007
Ponente: Justice Ynares-Santiago
DOCTRINE:
In San Luis v. San Luis (G.R No. 133743, February 6, 2007), the high
court ruled that even assuming that the petitioner was not capacitated to marry
respondent in 1974, the former has the legal personality to file the subject
petition for letters of administration since he is considered the co-owner of
respondent as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts
during their cohabitation.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may
be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent . However, Section 2, Rule 79
thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of the petition for letters of administration. –

A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show, as far as known to the
petitioner: x x x.
The high court defined “interested person” as one who would be benefited by the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as
creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or
contigent.
 AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER

QUIAZON vs. MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES
ELISE QUIAZON
G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013, Penned by Justice Perez
DOCTRINE:
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the
province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished
from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing"
and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or
purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue
statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
82
statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not
domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the
terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its
popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. 16 It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat.
 Agtarap v. Agtarap
G.R No. 177099, June 8, 2011
Ponente: Justice Nachura
DOCTRINE:
In Agtarap v. Agtarap (G.R No. 177099, June 8, 2011), the Supreme Court
held that the Regional Trial Court, as an intestate court, had jurisdiction to
resolve issues on the ownership of the subject real properties.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate
or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the
will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to
the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by the

expediency and convenience. First, the probate court may provisionally pass
upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or
exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to the final
determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties
are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or
the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the
rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to
resolve issues on ownership.
 Suntay III v. Cojuanco-Suntay

G.R No. 183053, October 10, 2012
Ponente: Justice Perez
DOCTRINE:
83
In Suntay III v. Cojuanco-Suntay (G.R No. 183053, October 10, 2012), it
was held that the paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator
over the estate of a decedent is the prospective administrator’s interest in the
estate. The high court explained that the reason behind the rule is that those who
will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the
estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or
mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to
administer the estate correctly.
Also, the high court defined “next of kin” as those persons who are
entitled under the statute of distribution to the decedent’s property.
 Lee v. RTC of Quezon City Br. 85 et. al.

G.R No. 146006, February 23, 2004
Ponente: Justice Corona
DOCTRINE:
In Lee v. RTC of Quezon City Br. 85 (G.R No. 146006, February 23,
2004), the Supreme Court ruled that any disposition of estate property by an
administrator or prospective heir pending final adjudication requires court
approval and any unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled by
the probate court, there being no need for a separate action to annul the
unauthorized disposition.
 Heirs of Hilario Ruiz v. Edmond Ruiz

G.R No. 118671, January 29, 1996
Ponente: Justice Puno
DOCTRINE:
In Heirs of Hilario Ruiz v. Edmond Ruiz (G.R No. 118671, January 29,
1996), the Supreme Court held that grandchildren are not entitled to provisional
support from the funds of the decedent's estate. The law clearly limits the
allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it to the deceased's
grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.
 Unionbank v. Santibanez
84
G.R No. 149926, February 23, 2005
Ponente: Justie Callejo, Sr.
DOCTRINE:
In Unionbank v. Santibanez (G.R No. 149926, February 23, 2005), the
high court ruled that the heirs, during the pendency of the probate proceedings,
cannot enter into an agreement distributing among themselves the properties of
the testatator.
Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or
devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an
exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.
Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an

extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the
heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate.
 HEIRS OF THE LATE MAGLASANG V. MANILA BANKING CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 171206, SEPTEMBER 23, 2013

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
DOCTRINE:
Jurisprudence breaks down the rule under Section 7, Rule 86 and
explains that the secured creditor has three remedies/options that he may
alternatively adopt for the satisfaction of his indebtedness. In particular, he may
choose to: (a) waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of
the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (b) foreclose the mortgage judicially and
prove the deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (c) rely on the mortgage
exclusively, or other security and foreclose the same before it is barred by
prescription, without the right to file a claim for any deficiency. It must, however,
be emphasized that these remedies are distinct, independent and mutually
exclusive from each other; thus, the election of one effectively bars the exercise
of the others.
 ERLINDA PILAPIL and HEIRS OF DONATA ORTIZ BRIONES vs. HEIRS OF

MAXIMINO R. BRIONES
G.R. No. 150175, February 05, 2007, Penned by Justice Chico-Nazario
DOCTRINE:
85
The settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a proceeding in rem, and
that the publication in the newspapers of the filing of the application and of the
date set for the hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice
to the whole world of the existence of the proceedings and of the hearing on the
date and time indicated in the publication. The publication requirement of the
notice in newspapers is precisely for the purpose of informing all interested
parties in the estate of the deceased of the existence of the settlement
proceedings, most especially those who were not named as heirs or creditors in
the petition, regardless of whether such omission was voluntarily or involuntarily
made.
 RODOLFO C. SABIDONG vs. NICOLASITO S. SOLAS (Clerk of Court IV)
A.M. No. P-01-1448, June 25, 2013, Penned by Justice Villarama, Jr.
DOCTRINE
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over
it in court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action
of the judge. A property forming part of the estate under judicial settlement
continues to be subject of litigation until the probate court issues an order
declaring the estate proceedings closed and terminated. The rule is that as long
as the order for the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the
probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated.
The sale of Lot 11 in favor of respondent did not violate the rule on
disqualification to purchase property because Sp. Proc. No. 1672 was then
pending before another court (RTC) and not MTCC where he was Clerk of Court.
 THELMA M. ARANAS vs. TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO,

CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA
M. ANDERSON, and FRANKLIN L. MERCADO
G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014, Penned by Justice Bersamin
DOCTRINE:
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court
or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the
will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to
the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.
The patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises special and
limited jurisdiction.
86
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and
convenience such as:
a. The probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate

proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of
a piece of property without prejudice to final determination of ownership in
a separate action;
b. If the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on
ownership.
 RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR. vs. RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR., CITRINE

HOLDINGS, INC., MONICA P. OCAMPO and ZEE2 RESOURCES, INC.
G.R. Nos. 208828-29, August 13, 2014
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
DOCTRINE:
The probate court having jurisdiction over properties under administration has the
authority not only to approve any disposition or conveyance, but also to annul an
unauthorized sale by the prospective heirs or administrator.
There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare null and void the
disposition of the property under administration, made by private respondent, the
same having been effected without authority from said court. It is the probate
court that has the power to authorize and/or approve the sale (Section 4 and 7,
Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is said court that can declare it null and void for as
long as the proceedings had not been closed or terminated. To uphold
petitioner’s contention that the probate court cannot annul the unauthorized sale,
would render meaningless the power pertaining to the said court. Our
jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any disposition of estate property by an
administrator or prospective heir pending final adjudication requires court
approval and (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled
by the probate court, there being no need for a separate action to annul the
unauthorized disposition.
In this case, the sale of the subject properties was executed by respondent
Silverio, Jr. with prior approval of the intestate court under its Omnibus Order
dated October 31, 2006. Subsequently, however, the sale was annulled by the
said court on motion by petitioner.
87
In reversing the intestate court's order annulling the sale of the subject
properties, the CA noted that said ruling is anchored on the fact that the deeds of
sale were executed at the time when the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction
issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 was still in effect.
 SPS. MARIA BUTIONG AND FRANCISCO VILLAFRIA, SUBSTITUTED BY

DR. RUEL B. VILLAFRIA vs. MA. GRACIA RINOZA AND FE RINOZA
ALARAS
G.R. No.187254, August 05, 2015, Penned by Justice Peralta
DOCTRINE:
The trial court has jurisdiction in this case. Even if the complaint alleged causes
of action identifying the heirs of the decedent, properties of the estate, and their
rights thereto, does not perforce make it an action for settlement of estate.
General rule is that when a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an
executor in his will or the executor or named is incompetent, or refuses the trust,
or fails to furnish the bond equipped by the Rules of Court, then the decedent’s
estate shall be judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint a
qualified administrator. An exception to this rule, however, is wherein the heirs of
a decedent, who left no will and no debts due from is estate, may divide the
estate either extrajudicially or in an ordinary action or partition without submitting
the same for judicial administration nor applying for the appointment of an
administrator by the court. Here, Pedro died without a will, leaving his estate
without any obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s contention, respondents
were under no legal obligation to submit the subject properties of the estate of a
special proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and are, in fact, encouraged
to have the same partitioned, judicially or extrajudicially.
B. ESCHEATS (R-91)
 CASTORIO ALVARICO vs. AMELITA SOLA
G.R. No. 138953, June 6, 2002

Penned by Justice Quisumbing
DOCTRINE:
88
Sec. 101.All actions for reversion to the Government of lands of the public
domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or
the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines.
In other words, a private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any
action which would have the effect of canceling a free patent and the
corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis thereof, such that the land
covered thereby will again form part of the public domain. Only the Solicitor
General or the officer acting in his stead may do so. Since Amelita Solas title
originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between
the grantor and the grantee. Clearly then, petitioner has no standing at all to
question the validity of Amelita’s title.
 ELISEO MALTOS AND ROSITA P. MALTOS vs. HEIRS OF EUSEBIO

BORROMEO
G.R. No. 172720, September 14, 2015
J.LEONEN
DOCTRINE:
The purpose of reversion is to restore public land fraudulently awarded

and disposed of to private individuals or corporations to the mass of public
domain. The general rule is that reversion of lands to the state is not automatic,
and the Office of the Solicitor General is the proper party to file an action for
reversion. The remedy of reversion is not the same as the remedy of declaration
of nullity of free patents and certificate of title. In reversion, the allegations in the
complaint would admit State ownership of the disputed land, while in an action
for the declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate of title, the allegations
would include plaintiffs ownership of the contested lot prior to the issuance of the
free patent and certificate of title.
C. GUARDIANS AND GUARDIANSHIP (R92-97) AS AMENDED BY A.M.

NO. 03-02-05-SC, MAY 1, 2003
 PILAR Y. GOYENA vs. AMPARO LEDESMA-GUSTILO
G. R. No. 147148, January 13, 2003

J. CARPIO-MORALES
89
DOCTRINE:
In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the judge

who deals directly with the parties. As a rule, when it appears that the judge has
exercised care and diligence in selecting the guardian, and has given due
consideration to the reasons for and against his action which are urged by the
interested parties, his action should not be disturbed unless it is made very clear
that he has fallen into grievous error.
 THE INCOMPETENT, CARMEN CAIZA, REPRESENTED BY HER LEGAL

GUARDIAN, AMPARO EVANGELISTA v. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO
ESTRADA AND HIS WIFE, LEONORA ESTRADA
G.R. No. 110427, February 24, 1997

C.J. NARVASA
DOCTRINE:
The guardian has the right and duty to get possession of, and exercise
control over, both real and personal, it being recognized principle that the ward
has no right to possession or control of his property during her
incompetency. That right to manage the ward's estate carries with it the right to
take possession thereof and recover it from anyone who retains it, and bring and
defend such actions as may be needful for this purpose.
 NAPOLEON D. NERI, ALICIA D. NERI-MONDEJAR, VISMINDA D. NERI-

CHAMBERS, ROSA D. NERI-MILLAN, DOUGLAS D. NERI, EUTROPIA D.
ILLUT-COCKINOS AND VICTORIA D. ILLUT-PIALA vs. HEIRS OF HADJI
YUSOP UY AND JULPHA IBRAHIM UY
G.R. No. 194366, October 10, 2012
J. PERLAS-BERNABE
DOCTRINE:
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the
receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of
disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the patrimony of
child, exceeds the limits of administration. Thus, a father or mother, as the
natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, does not have the power
to dispose or encumber the property of the latter. Such power is granted by law
only to a judicial guardian of the wards property and even then only with courts
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prior approval secured in accordance with the proceedings set forth by the Rules
of Court.
 NILO OROPESA, Petitioner, vs. CIRILO OROPESA, Respondent.

GR No. 184528, April 25, 2012
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
DOCTRINE:
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Guardianship; A guardianship is a trust

relation of the most sacred character, in which one person, called a “Guardian”
acts for another called the “ward” whom the law regards as incapable of
managing his own affairs. – In Francisco v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 371
(1984), we laid out the nature and purpose of guardianship in the following wise;
A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one
person, called a “guardian” acts for another called the “ward” whom the law
regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. A guardianship is designed to
further the ward’s well-being, not that of the guardian. It is intended to preserve
the ward’s property as well as to render any assistance that the ward may
personally require. It has been stated that while custody involves immediate care
and control, guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of
one in loco parentis as well. In guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a
qualified guardian if the prospective ward is proven to be a minor or an
incompetent.
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Guardianship; Incompetents; A reading of

Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons who, though of
sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes,
are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid
are considered incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. –
A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Courts tells us that persons who,
though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar
causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without
outside aid are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under
guardianship. The full text of the said provision reads: Sec. 2. Meaning of the
word “incompetent”. – Under this rule, the word “incompetent” includes persons
suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals,
deaf and dumb.
 EDUARDO T. ABAD, petitioner, vs. LEONARDO BIASON and GABRIEL A.

MAGNO, respondents.
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G.R. NO. 191993, December 5, 2012
REYES, J.:
DOCTRINE:
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Guardianship; The relationship of guardian

and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or he
ward. – It is a well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is
necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward. The
supervening event of death rendered it pointless to delve into the propriety of
Biason’s appointment since the juridical tie between him and Maura has already
been dissolved. The petition, regardless of its disposition will not afford Abad, or
anyone else for that matter any substantial relief.
D. TRUSTEES (R-98)
 ADVENT CAPITAL AND FINANCE CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS.

NICASIO I. ALCANTARA AND EDITHA I. ALCANTARA, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 183050, January 25, 2012
ABAD, J.
DOCTRINE:
The real owner of the trust property is the trustor-beneficiary. In this case, the
trustors-beneficiaries are the Alcantaras. Thus, Advent Capital could not dispose
of the Alcantaras' portfolio on its own. The income and principal of the portfolio
could only be withdrawn upon the Alcantaras' written instruction or order to
Advent Capital. The latter could not also assign or encumber the portfolio or its
income without the written consent of the Alcantaras.
Advent Capital must file a separate action for collection to recover the trust fees
that it allegedly earned and, with the trial court's authorization if warranted, put
the money in escrow for payment to whoever it rightly belongs. Having failed to
collect the trust fees at the end of each calendar quarter as stated in the contract,
all it had against the Alcantaras was a claim for payment which is a proper
subject for an ordinary action for collection. It cannot enforce its money claim by
simply filing a motion in the rehabilitation case for delivery of money belonging to
the Alcantaras but in the possession of a third party.
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 LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LAMBERTO C. PEREZ,
NESTOR C. KUN, MA. ESTELITA P. ANGELES-PANLILIO and NAPOLEON
O. GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. NO. 166884, June 13, 2012
BRION, J.:
DOCTRINE:
Civil Law; Trusts; Under the Trust Receipts Law, intent to defraud is presumed
when (1) the entrustee fails to turn over the proceeds of the sale of goods
covered by the trust receipt to the entruster; or (2) when the entrustee fails to
return the goods under trust, if they are not disposed of in accordance with the
terms of the trust receipts. – There are two obligations in a trust receipt
transaction. The first is covered by the provision that refers to money under the
obligation to deliver it (entregarla) to the owner of the merchandise sold. The
second is covered by the provision referring to merchandise received under the
obligation to return it (devolvera) to the owner. Thus, under the Trust Receipts
Law intent to defraud is presumed when (1) the entrustee fails to turn over the
proceeds of the sale of goods covered by the trust receipt to the entruster; or (2)
when the entrustee fails to return the goods under trust, if they are not disposed
of in accordance with the terms of the trust receipts.
Civil Law; Trusts; In all trust receipt transactions, both obligations on the part of
the trustee exist in the alternative – the return of the proceeds of the sale or the
return or recovery of the goods, whether raw or processed. – In all trust receipt
transactions, both obligations on the part of the trustee exist in the alternative –
the return of the proceeds of the sale or the return or recovery of the goods,
whether raw or processed. When both parties enter into an agreement knowing
that the return of the goods subject of the trust receipt is not possible even
without any fault on the part of the trustee, it is not a trust receipt transaction
penalized under Section 13 of PD 115; the only obligation actually agreed upon
by the parties would be the return of the proceeds of the sale transaction. This
transaction becomes a mere loan, where the borrower is obligated to pay the
bank the amount spent for the purchase of the goods.
Criminal Law; Estafa; Trust Receipts Law; Elements of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation with Section 13 of the
Trust Receipts Law. – In order that the respondents “may validly prosecuted for
estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation
with Section 13 of the Trust Receipts Law, the following elements must be
established: (a) they received the subject goods in trust or under the obligation to
sell the same and to remit the proceeds thereof to the trustor, or to return the
goods if not sold; 9b) they misappropriated or converted the goods and/or the
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proceeds of the sale; (c) they performed such acts with abuse of confidence to
the damage and prejudice of Metrobank; and (d) demand was made on them by
the trustor for the remittance of the proceeds or the return of the unsold goods.
E. ADOPTION AND CUSTODY OF MINORS (R-99-100)
 HERBERT CANG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

G.R. NO. 105308, September 25, 1998
ROMERO, J.
DOCTRINE:
Remedial Law; Actions; Jurisdiction; The established rule is that the statute in
force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction
of the court. – Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule
is that the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action
determines the jurisdiction of the court. As such, when private respondents filed
the petition for adoption on September 25, 1987, the applicable law was the Child
and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 91.
Civil Law; Adoption; The written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has
remained a requisite for its validity. – It is thus evident that notwithstanding the
amendments to the law, the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption
has remained a requisite for its validity.
Civil Law; Adoption; Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity
“insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws.”. – During the pendency of the petition for
adoption or on August 3, 1988, the Family Code which amended the Child and
Youth Welfare Code took effect. Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its
retroactivity “insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.” As amended by the Family Code,
the statutory provision on consent for adoption now reads: “Art. 188. The written
consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary: (1) The person to be
adopted, if ten years of age or over; (2) The parents by nature of the child, the
legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality; (3) The legitimate and
adopted children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parent or parents; (4)
The illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parents, if
living with said parent and the latter’s spouse, if any; and (5) The spouse, if any,
of the person adopting or to be adopted.”
94
Civil Law; Adoption; The requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if
the parent has abandoned the child. – As clearly inferred from the foregoing
provisions of law, the written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for
the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written
consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child or that such
parent is “insane or hopelessly intemperate.” The court may acquire jurisdiction
over the case even without the written consent of the parents or one of the
parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant
exemption from compliance therewith. This is in consonance with the liberality
with which this Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption.
Civil Law; Adoption; Allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption,

even absent the written consent of petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court
with jurisdiction. – The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption,
even absent the written consent of petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court
with jurisdiction since abandonment of the child by his natural parents is one of
the circumstances under which our statues ad jurisprudence dispense with the
requirement of written consent to the adoption of their minor children.
Civil Law; Adoption; The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is
a preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront. – In cases where
the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent thereto was not
sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper
issue for determination. The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural
parent is a preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon
failure of the oppositor natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that
he did not abandon his child may the petition for adoption be considered on its
merits.
Civil Law; Adoption; Meaning of Abandonment. – In its ordinary sense, the word
abandon means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly. The
dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of putting under a ban. The emphasis
is on the finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control
of another, hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to
resume or claim one’s rights or interests. In reference to abandonment of a child
by his parent, the act of abandonment imports any conduct of the parent which
evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental
claims to the child. It means neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support which parents owe their children.
Civil Law; Adoption; Meaning of Abandonment; Physical estrangement alone,

without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. – In the
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instant case, records disclose that petitioner’s conduct did not manifest a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his
children as to constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without
financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While
admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United States,
he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support
for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children
through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to
their whims.
Civil Law; Adoption; Parental authority cannot be entrusted to a person simply

because he could give the child a larger measure of material comfort than his
natural parent. – In a number of cases, this court has held that parental authority
cannot be entrusted to a person simply because he could give the child a larger
measure of material comfort than his natural parent. Thus, in David v. Court of
Appeals, the court awarded custody of a minor illegitimate child to his mother
who was a mere secretary and market vendor instead of to his affluent father
who was a married man, not solely because the child opted to go with his
mother.
Civil Law; Adoption; In awarding custody, the court shall take into account all
relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of
age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. – The transfer of custody over the children
to Anna Marie by virtue of the decree of legal separation did not, of necessity
deprive petitioner of parental authority for the purpose of placing the children up
for adoption. Article 213 of the Family Code states: . . . in case of legal
separation of parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
designated by the court. In awarding custody, the court shall take into account all
relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of
age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
Civil Law; Adoption; Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may
not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. – Parental
authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental
authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only
in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an
orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another,
such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely
temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority.
Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same
96
 TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate Estate
of Deceased Alfredo E. Jacob, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO
PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS for the Province of Camarines Sur, and
JUAN F. TRIVINO as publisher of Balalong, respondents.
G.R. NO. 135216, August 19, 1999
PANGANIBAN, J.:
DOCTRINE:
Trial Courts; Finality of Findings of Fact; Adoption; The burden of proof in

establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship. – The
burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such
relationship. This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence
presented by petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a sham.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE R.

HERNANDEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 158, Pasig City and SPOUSES VAN MUNSON y NAVARRO and
REGINA MUNSON y ANDRADE, respondents.
G.R. No. 117209 February 9, 1996
REGALADO, J.
DOCTRINE:
The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in the
adoption proceedings in order to vest the court with jurisdiction to hear and
determine the same and shall continue to be so used until the court orders
otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the
civil register is a substantial change in one's official or legal name and cannot be
authorized without a judicial order. The purpose of the statutory procedure
authorizing a change of name is simply to have, wherever possible, a record of
the change, and in keeping with the object of the statute, a court to which the
application is made should normally make its decree recording such change.
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the
name appearing therein. If a change in one's name is desired, this can only be
done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural
requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be
threshed out and accordingly determined.
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Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the regional trial
court of the province where the person desiring to change his name resides. It
shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name to be changed or by
some other person in his behalf and shall state that the petitioner has been
a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three
years prior to such filing, the cause for which the change of name is sought, and
the name asked for. An order for the date and place of hearing shall be made
and published, with the Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city
prosecutor appearing for the Government at such hearing. It is only upon
satisfactory proof of the veracity of the allegations in the petition and the
reasonableness of the causes for the change of name that the court may adjudge
that the name be changed as prayed for in the petition, and shall furnish a copy
of said judgment to the civil registrar of the municipality concerned who shall
forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,

JAIME B. CARANTO, and ZENAIDA P. CARANTO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 103695 (March 15, 1996, J. Mendoza)
DOCTRINE:
Under Section 3, Rule 108, in actions involving Cancellation and Correction of

Entries in the Civil Registry, it is mandated that the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected shall be made parties to
the such proceeding. Such rule thus provides that the local civil registrar being
required to be made a party to the proceeding is an indispensable party, without
whom, no final determination of the case can be had. Further under Section 4 of
Rule 108, it provides that a notice of order as to the time and place of hearing
shall be given to the persons named in the petition and that the order shall be
published once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation.
In this case, a relief prayed for that the first name which was mistakenly
registered as “MIDAEL” be corrected to “MICHAEL” is considered as a clerical
error which would merely substitutes letter “d” to “ch” and the same can be made
in the same proceeding for the adoption of the child to prevent multiplicity of
actions. However, based on the records presented, Section 3 and Section 4 of
Rule 108 has not been complied with. The Local Civil Registry, an indispensable
party, was not impleaded much less given notice, hence renders ineffectual all
the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment.
Further, though there was a notice given by publication, the same was a notice of
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the petition for adoption in compliance with Rule 99 and not in compliance with
Section 4 Rule 108, which do not include nor mentioned that in addition, the
correction of the name of the minor in the civil registry was also being sought.
 EUGENIO R. REYES, joined TIMOTHY JOSEPH M. REYES, MA. GRACIA S.

REYES, ROMAN GABRIEL M. REYES, AND MA. ANGELES S. REYES,
Petitioners, vs. LIBRADA F. MAURICIO (deceased) and LEONIDA F,
MAURICIO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 175080 (November 24, 2010, J. Perez)
DOCTRINE:
It is a settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked. As explained by a

well-known Civilist Dr. Tolentino, “The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested
by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different
purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the
legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican code (article 335) which
provides: "The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs
must be made by proper complaint before the competent court; any contest
made in any other way is void." This principle applies under our Family Code.
Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to "the
action to impugn the legitimacy." This action can be brought only by the husband
or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.” Further, the Court
stated in Braza that legitimacy and filiation can only be questioned in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack.
In the present case, the contention of Eugenio that Leonida is a mere ward of
Godofredo Librada and not a legal heir is untenable. Eugenio cannot collaterally
attack the status of Leonida in the instant petition since legitimacy and filiation
can only be attacked in a direct action.
 IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA

GARCIA
G.R. No. 148311 (March 31, 2005, J. Sandoval-Gutierrez)
DOCTRINE:
Under the law, it is silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article
365 of the Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted child shall bear the
surname of the adopter." Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the
legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus: "(1) For civil
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purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters
and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the
surname of the adopters; x x x" One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted
is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes
pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 Article V of RA 8552.
In the present case, Stephanie, being a legitimate child by virtue of adoption, is

entitled to all the rights provided to a legitimate child, including the right to bear
the surname of her father and mother. Since, as to the middle name, there is no
law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father to use as middle
name her mother’s surname, the same should be allowed to do so.
 IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM,

Petitioner. IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
G.R. Nos. 168992-93 (May, 21, 2009, J. Carpio)
DOCTRINE:
As to the adoption made by a married person at the time the action was filed,
Section 7, Article III of Republic Act No. 8552, provides that:
“SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen xxx;

(b) Any Alien xxx;
(i) A former Filipino citizen xxx; or
(ii) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter xxx;
or
(iii) One who is married to a Filipino citizen xxx
(c) The guardian xxx.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the
other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate
son/daughter: Provided, however,That the other spouse has
signified his/her consent thereto; or
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(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.”
In this case, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had
already remarried and she filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by
her husband Olario. The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision
means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the
ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate
child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures
harmony between the spouses.
 MELODY R. NERY, Complainant, vs. ATTY. GLICERIO A. SAMPANA,

Respondent.
A.C. No. 10196 (September 9, 2014, Acting C.J. Carpio)
DOCTRINE:
As to the qualification of an alien to adopt a Filipino Citizen adoptee, Section 7,

Article III of Republic Act No. 8552, provides that:
“SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen xxx;

(b) Any Alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for
Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations
with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the
Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption
decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or
consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the
legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government
allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted
son/daughter: Provided, further, that the requirements on residency and
certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt in his/her country
may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the
fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or (ii) one who seeks
to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt
jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or xxx”
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In the present case, the suggestion made by Sampana that the alien adopter can
jointly adopt a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of
his/her Filipino spouse, and the certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt is
waived is correct. However, Sampana failed to perform his duty as a lawyer
when it did not file the petition for adoption, without valid reason and that he even
misinformed Nery of the status of the petition. He then conceded that the
annulment case overshadowed the petition for adoption. Verily, Sampana
neglected the legal matter entrusted to him.
 ROSARIO MATA CASTRO and JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M.

CASTRO, a.k.a. “Maria Socorro M. Castro” and “Jayrose M. Castro”,
petitioners, vs. JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO and ANA MARIA
REGINA GREGORIO, respondents.
G.R. NO. 188801, October 15, 2014
BRION, J.:
DOCTRINE:
Civil Law; Adoption; The law on adoption requires that the adoption by the father
of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only he consent of his wife but also the
consent of his legitimate children. – It is settled that the “jurisdiction of the curt is
determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the
action.” As Jose filed the petition for adoption on August 1, 2000, it is Republic
Act No. 8552 which applies over the proceedings. The law on adoption requires
that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the
consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children under Article III,
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the husband must first obtain the consent of
his wife if he seeks to adopt his own children born out of wedlock.
Civil Law; Adoption; As a general rule, the husband and wife must file a joint
petition for adoption; The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule;
as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out
of wedlock. – As a general rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for
adoption. The rationale for this is stated In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle.
Lim, 588 SCRA 98 (2009): The use of the word “Shall” in the above quoted
provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory.
This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child
which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule
also insures harmony between the spouses. The law provides for several
exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt
his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not
102
necessary. However, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent
of his or her spouse.
Civil Law; Civil Procedure Adoption; Service of Summons; Personal Service of

Summons; Personal service of summons should have been effected on the
spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are
protected. – For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by
Republic Act N. 8552. Personal service of summons should have been effected
on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights
are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case.
Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over
substantive statutory rights
Civil Law; Adoption; Domestic Adoption Act of 1993 (R.A. No. 8552); Republic
Act RA) No. 8552 fails to provide any provision on the status of adoption decrees
if the adoption is found to have been obtained fraudulently.. – The law itself
provides for penal sanctions for those who violate its provisions. Under Article
VII, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 8552: Article VII Violations and Penalties Sec.
21. Violations and Penalties. – (a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six
(6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and/or a fine not less than Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00), but not more than Two hundred thousand pesos
(200,000.00) at the discretion of the court shall be imposed on any person who
shall commit any of the following acts: (i) obtaining consent for an adoption
through coercion, undue influence, fraud, improper material inducement, or other
similar acts; (ii) noncompliance with the procedures and safeguards provided by
the law for adoption; or (iii) subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to
danger, abuse, or exploitation, (b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious
registration of the birth of a child under the name(s) of a person(s) who is not
his/her biological parent(s) shall be guilty of simulation of birth, and shall be
punished by prision mayor in its medium period and a fine not exceeding Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00). (Emphasis supplied) Unfortunately, Jose’s death
carried with it the extinguishment of any of its criminal liabilities. Republic Act No.
8552 also fails to provide any provision on the status of adoption decrees if the
adoption is found to have been obtained fraudulently. Petitioners also cannot
invoke Article VI, Section 19 of Republic Act No. 8552 since rescission of
adoption can only be availed of by the adoptee. Petitioners, therefore, are left
with no other remedy in law other than the annulment of the judgment.
 BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. 192531, (November 12, 2014, J. Velasco, Jr.)
103
DOCTRINE:
Reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological

parents is provided under Section 20 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known
as the Domestic Adoption Act in relation to Article 984 of the New Civil Code,
provides respectively:
“Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for rescission

of adoption] is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's
biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the
Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or
incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the
adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.”
xxx
“Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no

children or descendants, his parents and relatives by consanguinity
and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs. “
In the present case, RA 8552 an only be applied by analogy since RA 8552 was
enacted after Cornelio’s death, the adopter of the deceased employee.
Nevertheless, We are guided by the catena of cases and the state policies
behind RA 855224 wherein the paramount consideration is the best interest of
the child. Moreover, the fact that even though parental authority is severed by
virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents are
not entirely eliminated, for some instances, the latter are able to inherit from the
adoptee. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee
do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on
legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the
biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits
from the adopted. Further, certain rights and obligations still attach by virtue of
the blood relation which include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of
the untimely passing of their minor’s adoptive parent. Hence, Cornelio’s (adopter)
death at the time of John’s minority (who was about 4 years of age) resulted in
the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the adopted child.
F. HABEAS CORPUS (R-102)
 Ilusorio vs. Bildner

G.R. No.: 139789 (332 SCRA 169)
104
Promulgation Date: May 12, 2000
Ponente: Pardo, J: (Hon. Justice Bernardo Pardo)
DOCTRINE:
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention,

or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled
thereto—it is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.—
As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld
from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continues to be
unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is
denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are
unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later
become arbitrary. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom.
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint
is illegal.—The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom
if such restraint is illegal. To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty
must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal
restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.
Mental Incapacity; The fact that a person is about 86 years of age, or under
medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated; Soundness
of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the
individual to discern his actions.—The evidence shows that there was no actual
and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty that
would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is
about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him
mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical
condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.
Right to Privacy; A person of sound mind is possessed with the capacity to make
choices, and even as the choices he makes may not appeal to some of his family
members these are choices which exclusively belong to him.—As to lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio’s mental state, the Court of Appeals observed that he was of
sound and alert mind, having answered all the relevant questions to the
105
satisfaction of the court. Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the
capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his
residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices he made may
not appeal to some of his family members but these are choices which
exclusively belong to Potenciano. He made it clear before the Court of Appeals
that he was not prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that
declaration, and absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to
reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.
A person with full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice may not be the
subject of visitation rights against his free choice.—With his full mental capacity
coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of
visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right
to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional
right. The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation
rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such
right. The ruling is not consistent with the finding of subject’s sanity.
Husband and Wife; Marriage; In case the husband refuses to see his wife for
private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty attached to
the exercise of his right.—When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it
also emphasized that the same shall be enforced under penalty of contempt in
case of violation or refusal to comply. Such assertion of raw, naked power is
unnecessary. The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve
the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband.
In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to
do so without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with

his wife; Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus
carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process.—No court is empowered
as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot
be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or
by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is
best left to the man and woman’s free choice.
 Serapino vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. Nos.: 148468, 148769, 149116 (396 SCRA 443)
Promulgation Date: January 28, 2003
Ponente: CALLEJO, SR., J. (Hon. Justice Romeo J. Callejo Sr.)
DOCTRINE:
106
In exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by the courts even
when the person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary
surrender; Writ issued where the deprivation of liberty while initially valid under
the law had later become invalid.—As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus
will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in custody of
an officer under a process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so. In
exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus, may be granted by the courts even
when the person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary
surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as “the fundamental instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action” due to
“its ability to cut through the barriers of form and procedural mazes.” Thus, in
previous cases, we issued the writ where the deprivation of liberty, while initially
valid under the law, had later become invalid, and even though the persons
praying for its issuance were not completely deprived of their liberty.
Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in favor of
petitioner.—The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
in favor of petitioner. The general rule that habeas corpus does not lie where the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court which had jurisdiction to issue the same applies,
because petitioner is under detention pursuant to the order of arrest issued by
the Sandiganbayan on April 25, 2001 after the filing by the Ombudsman of the
amended information for plunder against petitioner and his co-accused.
Petitioner had in fact voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities on April
25, 2001 upon learning that a warrant for his arrest had been issued.
A petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for asserting one’s
right to bail. It cannot be availed of where accused is entitled to bail not as a
matter of right but on the discretion of the court and the latter has not abused
such discretion in refusing to grant bail, or has not even exercised said
discretion. The proper recourse is to file an application for bail with the court
where the criminal case is pending and to allow hearings thereon to proceed.
The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not only be unjustified but would
also preempt the Sandiganbayan’s resolution of the pending application for bail
of petitioner. The recourse of petitioner is to forthwith proceed with the hearing on
his application for bail.
 Lacson vs. Perez

G.R. Nos.: 147780, 147781, 147799, 147810 (357 SCRA 756)
Promulgation Date: May 10, 2001
Ponente: MELO, J. (Hon. Justice Jose Armando Melo)
107
DOCTRINE:
Action; Party; Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose legal
right has been invaded or infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent threat
of invasion or infringement.—Petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino is not a
real party-in-interest. The rule requires that a party must show a personal stake
in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a
favorable decision so as to warrant an invocation of the court’s jurisdiction and to
justify the exercise of the court’s remedial powers in his behalf (KMU Labor
Center v. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 [1994]). Here, petitioner has not
demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify resort to the Court. Petitioner
is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened
by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and
supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the
crime of rebellion. Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose
legal right has been invaded or infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent
threat of invasion or infringement.
The application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is not proper since its
purpose is to relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint a matter which remains
speculative up to this very day.
 Sangca vs. City Prosecutor of Cebu

G.R. No.: 175864 (524 SCRA 610)
Promulgation Date: June 8. 2007
Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. (Hon. Justice Conseulo Ynares-Santiago)
DOCTRINE:
The singular function of a petition for habeas corpus is to protect and secure the
basic freedom of physical liberty. — A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases
of illegal confinement or detention in which any person is deprived of his liberty,
or in which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
to it. Its essential object and purpose is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint and to relieve a person from it if such restraint is illegal. The singular
function of a petition for habeas corpus is to protect and secure the basic
freedom of physical liberty.
 Mangila vs. Pangilinan

G.R. No.: 160739 (701 SCRA 355)
Promulgation Date: July 17, 2013
108
Ponente: BERSAMIN, J. (Hon. Justice Lucas Bersamin)
DOCTRINE:
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus has been devised as a speedy and
effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint.
Habeas corpus is that of a civil proceeding in character. It seeks the enforcement

of civil rights. Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of which
the complaint is made, but into the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act and the
immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint. The rule applies
even when instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution and secure freedom. When
a prisoner petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, he thereby commences a suit
and prosecutes a case in that court.
Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute
for the trial court’s function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of
error. The writ cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of error that
might be raised relating to procedure or on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas
corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of whether the proceedings and
the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void. The writ is not ordinarily
granted where the law provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in
the absence of exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not
be granted in advance of trial. The orderly course of trial must be pursued and
the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ where exceptional
circumstances are extant. In another case, it was held that habeas corpus cannot
be issued as a writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law and
irregularities not involving the questions of jurisdiction occurring during the
course of the trial, subject to the caveat that constitutional safeguards of human
life and liberty must be preserved, and not destroyed. It has also been held that
where restraint is under legal process, mere errors and irregularities, which do
not render the proceedings void, are not grounds for relief by habeas corpus
because in such cases, the restraint is not illegal.
The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the
detention, and, if the detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of the
detainee.—The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of
the detention, and, if the detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of
the detainee. Equally well-settled however, is that the writ will not issue where
the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of
an officer under process issued by a court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of
a judgment or order of a court of record.
109
A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a "palladium of liberty," is a
prerogative writ which does not issue as a matter of right but in the sound
discretion of the court or judge. It is, however, a writ of right on proper formalities
being made by proof. Resort to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of
which a complaint is made but unto the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act,
and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint. The
primary, if not the only object of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjuciendum, is to
determine the legality of the restraint under which a person is held.
 Tujan-Militante vs. Cada-Deapera

G.R. No.: 210636 (731 SCRA 194)
Promulgation Date: July 28, 2014
Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J. (Hon. Justice Presbitero Jose Velasco Jr.)
DOCTRINE:
Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a judicial region, petitions for
the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, whether they be filed under Rule 102
of the Rules of Court or pursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may
therefore be filed with any of the proper Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) within the
judicial region where enforcement thereof is sought.—Considering that the writ is
made enforceable within a judicial region, petitions for the issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus, whether they be filed under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or
pursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may therefore be filed with any
of the proper RTCs within the judicial region where enforcement thereof is
sought.
Summons; Service of summons is not required in a habeas corpus petition, be it

under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC.—As regards
petitioner’s assertion that the summons was improperly served, suffice it to state
that service of summons, to begin with, is not required in a habeas corpus
petition, be it under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC. As
held in Saulo v. Cruz, 105 Phil. 315 (1959), a writ of habeas corpus plays a role
somewhat comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service
of said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.
 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN

MALANG SALIBO, DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, Petitioner, vs. WARDEN,
QUEZON CITY JAIL ANNEX, BJMP BUILDING, CAMP BAGONG DIWA,
TAGUIG CITY AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON HIS BEHALF
110
AND/OR HAVING CUSTODY OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 197597, April 08, 2015
LEONEN, J.
DOCTRINE:
Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to
mistaken identity. In such cases, the person is not under any lawful process and
is continuously being illegally detained.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed
before the Supreme Court or any of its members, the Court of Appeals or any of
its members in instances authorized by law, or the Regional Trial Court or any of
its presiding judges. The court or judge grants the writ and requires the officer or
person having custody of the person allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return
of the writ. A hearing on the return of the writ is then conducted.
Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus "shall
extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto." The primary purpose of the writ "is to inquire
into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal." "Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient."
It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer
Police Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan
S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the presence of the police officers of
Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing nor attempting to commit
an offense. The police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he
might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner.
The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo
without a warrant. They deprived him of his right to liberty without due process of
law, for which a petition for habeas corpus may be issued.
G. CHANGE OF NAME VS. CORRECTION/ CANCELLATION OF ENTRIES,

AS AMENDED R.A. 9048 AND 10172 (R 103 VS. R108)
111
 MA. LOURDES BARRIENTOS ELEOSIDA, for and in behalf of her minor
child, CHARLES CHRISTIAN ELEOSIDA, petitioner, vs. LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and CARLOS VILLENA
BORBON, respondents
G.R. No. 130277 May 9, 2002
PUNO, J.:
DOCTRINE:
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation
or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings under said rule may
either be summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made in
the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the
rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is
deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
This is our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia where we held that even substantial
errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established under
Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is
one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts
have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been
given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence
has been thoroughly weighed and considered.
the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the

cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are—(1) the civil
registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court
to—(1) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and
(2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The
following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition:--(1) the civil registrar, and
(2) any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation
or correction is sought.
If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction
and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted
under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as
'summary'.
112
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CARLITO I. KHO, MICHAEL
KHO, MERCY NONA KHO-FORTUN, HEDDY MOIRA KHO-SERRANO, KEVIN
DOGMOC KHO (Minor), and KELLY DOGMOC KHO (Minor), respondents.
G.R. No. 170340 June 29, 2007
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
DOCTRINE:
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate
The philosophy behind this requirement lies in the fact that the books making up
the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be prima facie evidence
of the facts therein contained. If the entries in the civil register could be corrected
or changed through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate
action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or
represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the
consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching.
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the
correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one
involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as
controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in
nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong
may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres
to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected
and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.
 IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR

CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN
LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN WANG, to be
amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN WANG, duly
represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG, Petitioners, vs. CEBU CITY
CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B.
MOLO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005
TINGA, J.:
DOCTRINE:
113
Change of Name
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be ‘proper and
reasonable cause’ for which the change is sought. To justify a request for change
of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason
therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are:
(a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in
legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was
unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to
erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody;
and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that
the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of
name would prejudice public interest.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his
middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name would make
his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly
established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion
and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his
registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on

which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of
change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the
age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and
appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this
point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
 BRAZA VS. CIVIL REGISTRAR OF NEG. OCCIDENTAL

G.R. No. 181174 December 4, 2009
Carpio Morales, J.
DOCTRINE:
In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108, the trial court has
no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation. Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court charts the procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may
be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally
be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous
errors in the civil registry.
114
 REPUBLIC VS. SILVERIO
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
Corona, J.
DOCTRINE:
1. A person’s first name cannot be changed on the ground of sex

reassignment. RA 9048 provides for specific grounds for which a change
of first name or nickname may be allowed and sex reassignment was not
mentioned as one of the grounds.
2. Change of entry in the Birth Certificate as to sex on the ground of sex

reassignment is also not sanctioned by RA 9048.
The correction or change of clerical and typographical errors can be made

through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial
order.
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of
sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change
for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
 REPUBLIC VS. CAGANDAHAN

G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008
Quisimbing, J.
DOCTRINE:
Correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change the sex or

gender, from female to male, and the name Jennifer to Jeff on the ground of her
medical condition known as Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia(CAH) was allowed
by the court. Respondent has simply let nature take its course and has not taken
unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. In the absence
of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a
matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less
on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency
due to CAH.
 REPUBLIC VS. UY
G.R. No. 198010 August 12, 2013
115
Peralta, J.
DOCTRINE:
In filing the petition for the correction of first name and surname, filiation, and
citizenship, the Local Civil Registrar, parents or siblings, or any person who has
an interest or affected by the change or correction must be impleaded and
notified as provided by the procedure in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
 FUJIKI VS. MARINAY

G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
Carpio, J.
DOCTRINE:
Recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of judgment so it

may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
In cases of a bigamous marriage, the prior spouse has the personality to file a
petition for recognition of a foreign divorce of the second marriage because the
judgment concerns the civil status of the prior spouse.
 PEOPLE VS. OLAYBAR

G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014
Peralta, J.
DOCTRINE:
A petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot

substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. However, in this case, there is
overwhelming evidence showing that no marriage was entered and respondent
was not even aware of the marriage. Nullification of a marriage was not sought
because there was no marriage in the first place. Therefore, the petition for
correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry was a proper remedy.
 FRANCLER P. ONDE vs. THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR

OF LAS PIÑAS CITY
G.R. No. 197174 | September 10, 2014.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
116
DOCTRINE:
Corrections of entries in the civil register including those on citizenship,

legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, involve substantial
alterations. Substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true
facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of
the appropriate adversary proceedings.
Even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.
A petition seeking a substantial correction of an entry in a civil register must

implead as parties to the proceedings not only the local civil registrar, as
petitioner did in the dismissed petition for correction of entries, but also all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the
correction.
When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register

involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance
with the requirements of the Rules of Court is mandated.
H. PREROGATIVE WRITS
1. WRIT OF AMPARO
 DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, et al vs. HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL

ROSARIO
G.R. No. 182484 | June 17, 2008
BRION, J.:
DOCTRINE:
The writ of amparo is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to

life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond
those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these
Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain
grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo—in line with the
117
extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance
demands—requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be
supported by justifying allegations of fact.
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminary satisfied with the prima facie
existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that
detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the
rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being
committed.
 ARMANDO Q. CANLAS, MIGUEL D. CAPISTRANO, MARRIETA PIA vs.

NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, I-XIII, INC., et al.
G.R. No. 182795 | June 5, 2008
REYES, R.T., J.:
DOCTRINE:
The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court
is not included among the enumeration of the rights stated in Section 1 for which
the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Their claim to their dwelling,
assuming they still have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse to
them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no
legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo.
No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear allegation of the

supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be protected. Under
Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issue the writ upon filing of the
petition, only if on its face, the court ought to issue said writ.
 P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO, POLICE OFFICERS ROMEO BAGTAS,

RUPERTO BORLONGAN, EDMUNDO DIONISIO, RONNIE MORALES,
ARNOLD TRIA, and GILBERTO PUNZALAN, ENGR. RICASOL P. MILLAN,
ENGR. REDENTOR S. DELA CRUZ, MR. ANASTACIO L. BORLONGAN, MR.
ARTEMIO ESGUERRA, “TISOY,” and JOHN DOES, petitioners, vs. DR.
AMANDA T. CRUZ, NIXON T. CRUZ, and FERDINAND T. CRUZ,
respondents.
G.R. No. 182165. November 25, 2009.
DOCTRINE:
Writ of Amparo; Writ of Habeas Data; The coverage of the writs is limited to
the protection of rights to life, liberty and security; The writs cover not only actual
118
but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.—The coverage of the writs is
limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and security. And the writs cover
not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.
To be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondent must meet the

threshold requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with an unlawful act or omission.—To thus be covered by the
privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold requirement that their
right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or
omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute
between the Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable
nexus between the acts complained of and its effect on respondents’ right to life,
liberty and security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners’ entry
into the property.
Absent any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is undue
and continuing restraint on their liberty and/or that there exists threat or
intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons,
the issuance of the writ cannot be justified.—Although respondents’ release from
confinement does not necessarily hinder supplication for the writ of amparo,
absent any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is undue and
continuing restraint on their liberty, and/or that there exists threat or intimidation
that destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the issuance
of the writ cannot be justified.
Petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are extraordinary remedies
which cannot be used as tools to stall the execution of a final and executory
decision in a property dispute.—It need not be underlined that respondents’
petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are extraordinary remedies which
cannot be used as tools to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in
a property dispute.
Same; Same; Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is
a defense that may be set up by respondents during trial and not before a
petition for writs of amparo and habeas data.—At all events, respondents’ filing of
the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have been barred, for
criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested
in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted
thereafter is a defense that may be set up by respondents during trial and not
before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data. The reliefs afforded by the
writs may, however, be made available to the aggrieved party by motion in the
criminal proceedings.
119
 GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP);
Police Chief Superintendent RAUL CASTAÑEDA, Chief, Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent
LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response
(PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM,
PNP, Petitioners, vs. MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY.
FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-in-Fact, Respondent.
G.R. No. 182498, December 3, 2009
BRION, J.
DOCTRINE:
The nature of the Writ of Amparo – a protective remedy against violations or

threats of violation against the rights to life, liberty and security. It embodies the
court’s directive to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to
address the disappearance of an individual. It does not determine guilt nor
pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines
responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for
purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by

substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission,
in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall
craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases
against the responsible parties in the proper courts.
Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should
be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance
without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined
above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but
have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation
of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of
Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that
the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.
 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE

WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS, MELISSA C.
ROXAS, Petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT
TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME VERZOSA,
120
LT. GEN. DELFIN N. BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ, MAJ.
GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO LACADIN, AND
CERTAIN PERSONS WHO GO BY THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND
ROSE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 189155, September 7, 2010
PEREZ, J.
DOCTRINE:
Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings.
The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that

establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to
implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition.
Amparo Rule placed a potent safeguard—requiring the respondent who is a

public official or employee to prove that no less than extraordinary diligence as
required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the
performance of duty. Thus, unless and until any of the public respondents is able
to show to the satisfaction of the amparo court that extraordinary diligence has
been observed in their investigations, they cannot shed the allegations of
responsibility despite the prevailing scarcity of evidence to that effect.
 EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner, vs. CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED

FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR.;
Commanding General of the Philippine Army, LT. GEN. ALEXANDER
YANO; and Chief of the Philippine National Police, DIRECTOR GENERAL
AVELINO RAZON, JR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 178497, February 4, 2014
BRION, J.
DOCTRINE:
Courts role in a writ of Amparo proceeding is merely to determine whether an

enforced disappearance has taken place; to determine who is responsible or
accountable; and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance.
2. WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
121
 Infant JULIAN YUSAY CARAM, represented by his mother, MA. CHRISTINA
YUSAY CARAM vs. Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D. ESCUTIN,
VILMA B. CABRERA, and CELIA YANGCO
G.R. No. 193652 | August 5, 2014
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
DOCTRINE:
The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof.
Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child
custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and
purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule
cannot be properly applied. To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a
remedy available to victims of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances
or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the
unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or a private individual. It
is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to life, liberty and
security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.
 RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID

SUZARA, Petitioners, vs. ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T.
ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014
VELASCO, JR., J.
DOCTRINE:
It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online
dealings and activities and must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity
serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts, as here, requires that
claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a right which they allege
to have been violated. These are indispensable. We cannot afford protection to
persons if they themselves did nothing to place the matter within the confines of
their private zone.
122
 MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A.
SAPITULA, Petitioners, vs. ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM, Respondent.
G.R. No. 184769, October 5, 2010
CARPIO MORALES, J.
DOCTRINE:
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial

complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of
an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and
to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a
person’s right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information
technology.
Habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor
when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or
doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due
process clause of the Constitution.
 DR. JOY MARGATE LEE V. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN
G.R. NO. 203254, OCTOBER 8, 2014

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
DOCTRINE:
The writ of habeas corpus is a remedy available to any person whose right
to privacy to life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding
the person, family home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
3. RULES ON ENVIRONMENTAL CASES

a. WRIT OF KALIKASAN
 MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO ET AL V. SCOTT H. SWIFT
G.R. NO. 206510, September 16, 2014

VILLARAMA JR, J.
DOCTRINE:
123
The waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal
jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for
issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule
7of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an
environmental law is to be filed separately.
 HON. RAMON JESUS PAJE V. TEODORO S. CASINO
G.R. NO. 207257, FEBRUARY 3, 2015

DEL CASTILLO, J.
DOCTRINE:
A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or

irregularities in the issuance of an ECC must only allege and prove such defects
or irregularities, but must also provide a causal link or, at least, a reasonable
connection between the defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and
the actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the
petition should be dismissed outright and the action re-filed before the proper
forum with due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
 RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE OF

TAÑON V. ANGELO REYES ET AL.
G.R. NO. 180771, APRIL 21, 2015

LEONEN, J.
DOCTRINE:
Because the JAPEX contract was executed solely by the Energy

Secretary, and not reported to the Philippine congress, the Court held that it was
unconstitutional.True to the constitutional policy that the "State shall protect and
advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature," Congress enacted the NIPAS Act to
secure the perpetual existence of all native plants and animals through the
establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated protected areas. These
areas possess common ecological values that were incorporated into a holistic
plan representative of our natural heritage. The system encompasses
outstandingly remarkable areas and biologically important public lands that are
habitats of rare and endangered species of plants and animals, biogeographic
zones and related ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland, or marine. It
124
classifies and administers all the designated protected areas to maintain
essential ecological processes and life-support systems, to preserve genetic
diversity, to ensure sustainable use of resources found therein, and to maintain
their natural conditions to the greatest extent possible.
 WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM VS. PHIL. IND. CORP.
G.R. NO. 194239, JUNE 16, 2015

VELASCO JR., J.
DOCTRINE:
The precautionary principle only applies when the link between the cause,
that is the human activity sought to be inhibited, and the effect, that is the
damage to the environment, cannot be established with full scientific certainty.
b. WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS
 MARICRIS D. DOLOT, CHAIRMAN OF THE BAGONG ALYANSANG

MAKABAYAN-SORSOGON, PETITIONER vs. HON. RAMON PAJE, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, REYNULFO A. JUAN, REGIONAL DIRECTOR,
MINES AND GEOSCIENCES BUREAU, DENR, HON. RAUL R. LEE,
GOVERNOR, PROVINCE OF SORSOGON, ANTONIO C. OCAMPO, JR.,
VICTORIA A. AJERO, ALFREDO M. AGUILAR, AND JUAN M. AGUILAR,
ANTONES ENTERPRISES, GLOBAL SUMMIT MINES DEV'T CORP., AND TR
ORE, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 199199, August 27, 2013
REYES, J.
DOCTRINE:
Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case

directing any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to
perform an act or series of acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain
effective until judgment is fully satisfied.
A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of continuing

compliance with a final judgment as it "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after
judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs
mandated under the court’s decision.
125
IV. EVIDENCE (RULES 128-134)
A. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION
 ONG CHIA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT

OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 127240, March 27, 2000
MENDOZA, J.:
DOCTRINE:
It is settled that naturalization law should be rigidly enforced and strictly

construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. The rules of
strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat the petitioner’s
argument of “substantial compliance” with the requirement under the Revised
Naturalization Law.
The reason for the rule prohibiting admission of evidence which has not been
formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their
admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to
the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State.
 CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO

MARTIN, respondents.
G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996
MENDOZA, J.:
DOCTRINE:
The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and

correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the
wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party
against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception
to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or
when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any
purpose in any proceeding."
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JOEL YATAR alias

"KAWIT", appellant.
G.R. No. 150224, May 19, 2004
126
DOCTRINE:
No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of DNA typing
involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained
under the Rules of Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a
question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual determination of the probative
weight of the evidence presented. The kernel of the right is not against all
compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against self-
incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the
accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be
excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
 NENA LAZALITA* TATING, Petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA,

represented by SALVADOR MARCELLA, CARLOS TATING, and the COURT
OF APPEALS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 155208, March 27, 2007
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
DOCTRINE:
It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not
generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in
writing the affiant’s statements, which may thus be either omitted or
misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived
of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiant. For this reason, affidavits are
generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed
on the witness stand to testify thereon.
 SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT

OF APPEALS, STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC., DANILO ARRIETA and
LEOPOLDO HALILI, respondent.
G.R. No. 128538, February 28, 2001
QUISUMBING, J.:
DOCTRINE:
As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value.

However, the rule does admit of an exception. Where a party failed to object to
hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible. The rationale for this exception
is to be found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that it is the
127
opportunity to cross-examine which negates the claim that the matters testified to
by a witness are hearsay.
B. WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED
 LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES VICENTE

BANAL and LEONIDAS ARENAS-BANAL, respondents.
G.R. No. 143276, July 20, 2004
DOCTRINE:
Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or
are pending in the same court or before the same judge. They may only do so “in
the absence of objection” and “with the knowledge of the opposing party,” which
are not obtaining here. Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall
apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts. In this regard,
Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity
of a hearing before a court takes judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:
“SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. – During the trial, the court,
on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take
judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own
initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow
the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the
case. The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.
 People vs. Kulais

G.R. Nos. 100901-08. July 16, 1998
PONENTE: Panganiban, J
DOCTRINE:
Judicial Notice and Denial of Due Process
Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due process when the trial court took
judicial notice of the testimony given in another case by one Lt. Melquiades
Feliciano, who was the team leader of the government troops that captured him
and his purported cohorts. Because he was allegedly deprived of his right to
128
cross-examine a material witness in the person of Lieutenant Feliciano, he
contends that the latter’s testimony should not be used against him.
True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence
presented in other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in
the same court, or have been heard and are actually pending before the same
judge. This is especially true in criminal cases, where the accused has the
constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.
Having said that, we note, however, that even if the court a quo did take judicial
notice of the testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in
deciding the cases against the appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied
due process. His conviction was based mainly on the positive identification made
by some of the kidnap victims, namely, Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and
Edilberto Perez. These witnesses were subjected to meticulous cross-
examinations conducted by appellant’s counsel. At best, then, the trial court’s
mention of Lieutenant Feliciano’s testimony is a decisional surplusage which
neither affected the outcome of the case nor substantially prejudiced Appellant
Kulais.
 Laureano vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 114776. February 2, 2000
PONENTE: Quisumbing, J
DOCTRINE:
Actions; Conflict of Laws; The party who claims the applicability of a foreign
law has the burden of proof, and where said party has failed to discharge
the burden, Philippine law applies.—At the outset, we find it necessary to state
our concurrence on the assumption of jurisdiction by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 9. The trial court rightly ruled on the application of Philippine law,
thus: “Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is
legal under the Singapore Laws because of the defendant’s failure to show which
specific laws of Singapore Laws apply to this case. As substantially discussed in
the preceding paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the
laws of Singapore. The defendant that claims the applicability of the Singapore
Laws to this case has the burden of proof. The defendant has failed to do so.
Therefore, the Philippine law should be applied.”
 Maquiling v. COMELEC
129
G.R. No. 195649. April 16, 2013
PONENTE: SERENO, J
DOCTRINE:
The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws, which must be
presented as public documents of a foreign country and must be
"evidenced by an official publication thereof." Mere reference to a foreign
law in a pleading does not suffice for it to be considered in deciding a case.
Respondent likewise contends that this Court failed to cite any law of the United
States "providing that a person who is divested of American citizenship thru an
Affidavit of Renunciation will re-acquire such American citizenship by using a US
Passport issued prior to expatriation."
American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code calls for application in the case before us, given the fact
that at the time Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy, he was not only a
Filipino citizen but, by his own declaration, also an American citizen. It is the
application of this law and not of any foreign law that serves as the basis for
Arnado’s disqualification to run for any local elective position.
With all due respect to the dissent, the declared policy of Republic Act No. (RA)
9225 is that "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall
be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of
this Act." This policy pertains to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Section
5(2) requires those who have re-acquired Philippine citizenship and who seek
elective public office, to renounce any and all foreign citizenship.
This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when read
together with Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code 7 which disqualifies
those with dual citizenship from running for any elective local position, indicates a
policy that anyone who seeks to run for public office must be solely and
exclusively a Filipino citizen. To allow a former Filipino who reacquires Philippine
citizenship to continue using a foreign passport – which indicates the recognition
of a foreign state of the individual as its national – even after the Filipino has
renounced his foreign citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of this policy.
 People v. Baharan
G.R. No. 188314. January 10, 2011
PONENTE: SERENO, J
DOCTRINE:
130
While it is true that statements made by a conspirator against a co-
conspirator are admissible only when made during the existence of the
conspiracy, if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial
confession becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible
as to both conspirators.—Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is
inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It is true that
under the rule, statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are
admissible only when made during the existence of the conspiracy. However, as
the Court ruled in People v. Buntag, 427 SCRA 180 (2004), if the declarant
repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial
admission, making the testimony admissible as to both conspirators. Thus, in
People v. Palijon, 343 SCRA 486 (2000), the Court held the following: … [W]e
must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An
extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but not
against his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine
him. A judicial confession is admissible against the declarant’s co-accused since
the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former. Section 30, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not
to testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant. Mercene’s admission implicating his co-accused
was given on the witness stand. It is admissible in evidence against appellant
Palijon. Moreover, where several accused are tried together for the same
offense, the testimony of a co-accused implicating his co-accused is competent
evidence against the latter.
 Republic v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 152375. December 13, 2011
PONENTE: BRION, J
DOCTRINE:
Evidence; Judicial Notice; In adjudicating a case on trial, courts are not

authorized to take a judicial notice of the contents of the records of other
cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same
court and notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are
actually pending before the same judge; Rule admits of exceptions.—In
adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have
been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding that both cases
may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge. This rule
though admits of exceptions. As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a
131
court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its
archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the
knowledge of, and absent an objection from, the adverse party, reference is
made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by
which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case
or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives at the court’s direction, at
the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the
record of the case then pending. Courts must also take judicial notice of the
records of another case or cases, where sufficient basis exists in the records of
the case before it, warranting the dismissal of the latter case. Republic vs.
Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), 662 SCRA 152, G.R. No. 152375 December
13, 2011
 MONICO LIGTAS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondent.
G.R. No. 200751. August 17, 2015
PONENTE: LEONEN, J
DOCTRINE:
Evidence; Judicial Notice; It is true that trial courts are not mandated to take
judicial notice of decisions of other courts or even records of other cases
that have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same
judge.—It is true that trial courts are not mandated to take judicial notice of
decisions of other courts or even records of other cases that have been tried or
are pending in the same court or before the same judge. In declaring that the
DARAB’s findings on the tenancy relationship between petitioner and private
complainant are immaterial to the criminal case for theft, the Court of Appeals
relied on Cornes, et al. v. Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc., 560 SCRA 545 (2008).
C. RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY
1. OBJEC/REAL EVIDENCE
 NARCISO SALAS, petitioners, vs. ANNABELLE MATUSALEM, respondent.

G.R. No. 180284 September 11, 2013
Doctrine:
Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate filiation may
be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states:
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
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(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the
putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the father
did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor,
registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity. Neither can such
birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument nor it has no
probative value to establish filiation to the alleged father.
As to the Baptismal Certificate (Exhibit "B") of Christian Paulo Salas also

indicating petitioner as the father, we have ruled that while baptismal certificates
may be considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not
necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to
the child's paternity.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-apellee, vs. MERCURY DELA CRUZ

ALIAS "DEDAY," accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 212171 September 07, 2016
Doctrine:
We have consistently held that in order to secure a conviction for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, it is necessary that the prosecution is able to establish the
following essential elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object of the sale and its consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
its payment. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took
place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.
The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of
the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction.
This Court has consistently ruled that even if the arresting officers failed to strictly
comply with the requirements under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, such
procedural lapse is not fatal and will not render the items seized inadmissible in
evidence. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
133
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In other words, to be
admissible in evidence, the prosecution must be able to present through records
or testimony, the whereabouts of the dangerous drugs from the time these were
seized from the accused by the arresting officers; turned-over to the investigating
officer; forwarded to the laboratory for determination of their composition; and up
to the time these are offered in evidence. For as long as the chain of custody
remains unbroken, as in this case, even though the procedural requirements
provided for in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not faithfully observed, the guilt of
the accused will not be affected. In the instant case, the failure to strictly comply
with the requirements of Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was satisfactorily explained by
the apprehending officers.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs. MANUEL DELA ROSA

Y LUMANOG@ "MANNY", accused-appellant
G.R. No. 230228 December 13, 2017
Doctrine:
Aside from the inconsistent dates of the conduct of the buy-bust operation, the
Court finds that the prosecution failed to sufficiently comply with the chain of
custody rule. In prosecuting both illegal sale of dangerous drugs, conviction
cannot be sustained if doubt persists on the identity of said drugs. The identity of
the dangerous drug must be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing
that the elements of sale are present, the fact that the dangerous drug illegally
sold is the same drug offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established with
the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict.
Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to
receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include
the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the
seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the
course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOEY SANCHEZ Y

LICUDINE, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 231383 March 07, 2018
134
Doctrine:
It is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established with moral
certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of
the corpus delicti of the crime. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt
on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken
chain of custody over the same and account for each link in the chain of custody
from the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as
evidence of the crime.
The law requires the presence of an elected public official, as well as
representatives from the DOJ and the media during the actual conduct of
inventory and photography to ensure that the chain of custody rule is observed
and thus, remove any suspicion of tampering, switching, planting, or
contamination of evidence which could considerably affect a case. However,
minor deviations may be excused in situations where a justifiable reason for non-
compliance is explained. In this case, despite the non-observance of the witness
requirement, no plausible explanation was given by the prosecution.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EMMANUEL OLIVA Y

JORJIL, BERNARDO BARANGOT Y PILAIS AND MARK ANGELO
MANALASTAS Y GAPASIN, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 234156 January 07, 2019
Doctrine:
The apprehending team having in trial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof.
In this case, the absence of a representative of the National Prosecution Service
or the media during the inventory of the seized items was not justifiably explained
by the prosecution. A review of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes does not
yield any testimony from the arresting officers as to the reason why there was no
representative from the DOJ or the media. Neither was there any testimony to
show that any attempt was made to secure the presence of the required witness.
2. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
 ST. MARTIN POLYCLINIC, INC., Petitioner, vs. LWV CONSTRUCTION

CORPORATION, Respondent.
135
G.R. No. 217426 December 04, 2017
Doctrine:
Section 20. Proof of private document. - Before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
(c) Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
Notably, the foregoing provision applies since the Certification does not fall within
the classes of public documents under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court - and hence, must be considered as private. It has been settled that
an unverified and unidentified private document cannot be accorded probative
value. In addition, case law states that "since a medical certificate involves an
opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness, it cannot be
given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to
show his qualifications. It is precluded because the party against whom it is
presented is deprived of the right and opportunity to cross-examine the person to
whom the statements or writings are attributed. Its executor or author should be
presented as a witness to provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity
to question its contents. Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the
author of the medical certificate renders its contents suspect and of no probative
value," as in this case.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MAURICIO CABAJAR

VIBAR
G.R. NO: G.R. No. 215790

DATE: March 12, 2018
PONENTE: MARTIRES
DOCTRINE:
For a private document to be admissible in court it must conform with the rules
set forth in Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that in order for
any private document offered as authentic to be admitted as evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either: (1) by anyone who saw the
document executed or written; or (2) by evidence of the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of the maker. The authentication of private document
before it is received in evidence is vital because during such process, a witness
positively identifies that the document is genuine and has been duly executed or
136
that the document is neither spurious nor counterfeit nor executed by mistake or
under duress.
a) BEST EVIDENCE RULE
 MCMP CONSTRUCTION CORP., Petitioner, vs. MONARK EQUIPMENT

CORP., Respondent.
G.R. NO: G.R. No. 201001

DATE: November 10, 2014
PONENTE: VELASCO, JR.
DOCTRINE:
As a rule, to prove the existence and due execution of a document, the original
document must be presented in court in conformity with the best evidence rule
found in Sec.3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. However, if said original is lost
and falls under the exemption under the same section, as above mentioned, then
the offeror may result to presenting secondary evidence. The same rule also
provides for the procedure in how to present secondary evidence, which can be
found under section 5 and 6.
 WILGEN LOON, JERRY ARCILLA, ALBERTPEREYE, ARNOLD PEREYE,

EDGARDO OBOSE, ARNEL MALARAS, PATROCINO TOETIN, EVELYN
LEONARDO, ELMER GLOCENDA, RUFO CUNAMAY, ROLANDOSAJOL,
ROLANDO ABUCAYON, JENNIFER NATIVIDAD, MARITESS TORION,
ARMANDO LONZAGA, RIZAL GELLIDO, EVIRDE HAQUE,1 MYRNA VINAS,
RODELITO AYALA, WINELITO OJEL, RENATO RODREGO, NENA ABINA,
EMALYN OLIVEROS, LOUIE ILAGAN, JOEL ENTIG, ARNEL ARANETA,
BENJAMIN COSE, WELITO LOON and WILLIAM ALIPAO, Petitioners, vs.
POWER MASTER, INC., TRI-C GENERAL SERVICES, and SPOUSES HOMER
and CARINA ALUMISIN, Respondents.
G.R. NO: G.R. No. 189404

DATE: December 11, 2013
PONENTE: BRION
DOCTRINE:
In labor cases, strict adherence to the technical rules of procedure is not

required. Time and again, we have allowed evidence to be submitted for the first
time on appeal with the NLRC in the interest of substantial justice. However, this
liberal policy should still be subject to rules of reason and fairplay. The liberality
of procedural rules is qualified by two requirements: (1) a party should
137
adequately explain any delay in the submission of evidence; and (2) a party
should sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven.
As for the second requirement, while we generally admit in evidence and give
probative value to photocopied documents in administrative proceedings,
allegations of forgery and fabrication should prompt the adverse party to present
the original documents for inspection.
 THERESITA, JUAN, ASUNCION, PATROCINIA, RICARDO, and GLORIA, all

surnamed DIMAGUILA, Petitioners, vs. JOSE and SONIA A. MONTEIRO,
Respondents.
G.R. NO: G.R. No. 201011

DATE: January 27, 2014
PONENTE: MENDOZA
DOCTRINE:
Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except when
the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office. Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its
contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public documents may
be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody or the
record.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS HON. JESUS M. MUPAS
G.R. NO.: G.R. No. 181892

DATE: September 08, 2015
PONENTE: BRION
DOCTRINE:
Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry relates to the contents
of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself. In proving the terms of a written document, the original of the document
must be produced in court. Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of
inquiry relates to the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original document itself. In proving the terms of a written
document, the original of the document must be produced in court.
138
 CARLINA P. ROBIÑOL, Complainant vs. ATTY. EDILBERTO P. BASSIG,
Respondent
G.R. NO: A.C. No. 11836

DATE: November 21, 2017
PONENTE: TIJAM
DOCTRINE:
A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not admissible unless it is

shown that the original is unavailable.18 Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court states:
SEC.5 When original document is unavailable.-When the original document has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of
its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on
his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
b) PAROLE EVIDENCE
 MODESTO LEOVERAS vs. CASIMERO VALDEZ

G.R. No. 169985 , June 15, 2011
BRION, J.
DOCTRINE:
Leoveras made a damaging admission that the Benigna Deed is fabricated

thereby completely bolstering Valdez’ COA for reconveyance
To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the Rules of Court allows a
party to present evidence modifying, explaining or adding to the terms of the
written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading the failure of the written
agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties.
 SPOUSES BONIFACIO AND LUCIA PARAS vs. KIMWA CONSTRUCTION

AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 171601, April 8, 2015
LEONEN, J.
DOCTRINE:
139
Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the Parol
Evidence Rule, the rule on admissibility of documentary evidence when the terms
of an agreement have been reduced into writing; Per this rule, reduction to
written form, regardless of the formalities observed, “forbids any addition to, or
contradiction of, the terms of a written agreement by testimony or other evidence
purporting to show that different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying
the purport of the written contract.”
Two (2) things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted: first, that
the existence of any of the four (4) exceptions has been put in issue in a party’s
pleading or has not been objected to by the adverse party; and second, that the
parol evidence sought to be presented serves to form the basis of the conclusion
proposed by the presenting party.
 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. GAYAM. PAS IMIO

G.R. No. 205590, September 02, 2015
VELASCO JR., J.
DOCTRINE:
It is well to consider this rule: that when the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all such terms, and,
therefore, there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no
evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing.
Under this rule, parol evidence or oral evidence cannot be given to contradict,
change or vary a written document, except if a party presents evidence to modify,
explain, or add to the terms of a written agreement and puts in issue in his
pleadings: (a) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or imperfection in the written
agreement; (b) the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties; (c) the validity of the written agreement; and (d) the
existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in-interest
after the execution of the written agreement.
Such evidence, however, must be clear and convincing and of such sufficient
credibility as to overturn the written agreement. 52 Since no evidence of such
nature is before the Court, the documents embodying the loan agreement of the
parties should be upheld.
 FERNANDO MANCOL, JR. vs. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 204289, November 22, 2017
140
TIJAM, J.
DOCTRINE:
"The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the terms of
a written agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that
different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written
contract.
This, however, is merely a general rule. Provided that a party puts in issue in its
pleading any of the exceptions in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence, a party may present evidence to modify, explain
or add to the terms of the agreement. Moreover, as with all possible objections to
the admission of evidence, a party's failure to timely object is deemed a waiver,
and parol evidence may then be entertained.
c) ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
 HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN: BERNARDO S. SABANPAN, RENE

S. SABANPAN, DANILO S. SABANPAN and THELMA S. CHU; HEIRS OF
ADOLFO SAEZ: MA. LUISA SAEZ TAPIZ, MA. VICTORIA SAEZ LAPITAN,
MA. BELEN SAEZ and EMMANUEL SAEZ; and HEIRS OF CRISTINA SAEZ
GUTIERREZ: ROY SAEZ GUTIERREZ and LUIS SAEZ JR., vs. ALBERTO C.
COMORPOSA, HERDIN C. COMORPOSA, OFELIA C. ARIEGO, 1 REMEDIOS
COMORPOSA, VIRGILIO A. LARIEGO, 1a BELINDA M. COMORPOSA and
ISABELITA H. COMORPOSA
G. R. No. 152807, August 12, 2003
PANGANIBAN, J.
DOCTRINE:
CENR Certification correctly admitted despite mere facsimile; CENR Officer

did not disclaim, but acknowledged and used as reference
"A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and

reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one
elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a
specified amount of electric current.
141
Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best
exact copies. As such, they are not admissible in evidence, as there is no way of
determining whether they are genuine or authentic.
 ELLERY MARCH G. TORRES vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING

CORPORATION, represented by ATTY. CARLOS R. BAUTISTA, JR.
G.R. No. 193531, December 14, 2011
PERALTA, J.
DOCTRINE:
Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic evidence

under the Electronic Commerce Act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v.
Ssangyong Corporation,19 We determined the question of whether the original
facsimile transmissions are "electronic data messages" or "electronic documents"
within the context of the Electronic Commerce Act, and We said:
We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic
document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not
include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be
considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original
under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.
 RUSTAN ANG Y PASCUA VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND

IRISH SAGUD
G.R. No. 182835, April 20, 2010
Abad, J.
DOCTRINE:
As raised by petitioner, obscene picture which was sent to private respondent

through a text message constitutes an electronic document. It should be
authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1,
Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
The court ruled that the objection is too late since petitioner should have objected
to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in
evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for
objection. Also, the rules on evidence does not apply to criminal action. The
142
Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial
proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. NOEL ENOJAS Y HINGPIT, ET AL.

G.R. No. 204894, March 10, 2014
Abad, J.
DOCTRINE:
In applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions, text messages

are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or
has personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused
Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in order to identify and
entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the mobile
phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages
and was competent to testify on them.
 RAMON A. SYHUNLIONG VS. TERESITA D. RIVERA

G.R. No. 200148, June 4, 2014
Reyes, J.
DOCTRINE:
Text Messages; Rivera’s text message falls within the ambit of a qualified
privileged communication since she “was speaking in response to duty [to protect
her own interest] and not out of an intent to injure the reputation” of Syhunliong.
—The Court thus finds no error in the CA’s declaration that Rivera’s text
message falls within the ambit of a qualified privileged communication since she
“was speaking in response to duty [to protect her own interest] and not out of an
intent to injure the reputation” of Syhunliong. Besides, “[t]here was no
unnecessary publicity of the message beyond [that] of conveying it to the party
concemed.”
 ELLA M. BARTOLOME VS. ROSALIE B. MARANAN, COURT

STENOGRAPHER III, RTC BRANCH 20, IMUS, CAVITE
A.M. No. P-11-2979, November 18, 2014
DOCTRINE:
143
Ephemeral electronic communications are now admissible evidence, subject to
certain conditions. "Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone
conversations, text messages, chatroom sessions, streaming audio, streaming
video, and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not
recorded or retained. It may be proven by the testimony of a person who was a
party to the communications or has personal knowledge thereof. In the present
case, we have no doubt regarding the probative value of the text messages as
evidence in considering the present case. The complainant, who was the
recipient of the text messages and who therefore has personal knowledge of
these text messages, identified the respondent as the sender through cell phone
number 09175775982. The respondent herself admitted that her conversations
with the complainant had been thru SMS messaging and that the cell phone
number reflected in the complainant’s cell phone from which the text messages
originated was hers.
Under Section 1, Rule 11 of A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, audio, photographic and video
evidence of events, acts or transactions shall be admissible provided it shall be
shown, presented or displayed to the court and shall be identified, explained or
authenticated by the person who made the recording or by some other person
competent to testify on the accuracy thereof.
 BBB vs. AAA

G.R. No. 193225, February 9, 2015
Reyes, J
DOCTRINE:
In the case of Justice Vidallon-Magtolis v. Salud, 469 SCRA 439 (2005), it is

stated that any question as to the admissibility of text messages as evidence is
rendered moot and academic if the party raising such issue admits authorship of
the subject messages.—In the case of Justice Vidallon-Magtolis v. Salud, 469
SCRA 439 (2005), it is stated that any question as to the admissibility of text
messages as evidence is rendered moot and academic if the party raising such
issue admits authorship of the subject messages. BBB argues that the RTC and
the CA erred in admitting as evidence the text messages which were sent by him
and FFF to AAA since they were unauthenticated. However, BBB himself
effectively admitted in the pleadings filed with this Court and the CA that he
indeed sent the text messages attributed to him by AAA.
 ASTORGA AND REPOL LAW OFFICES VS. ALEXANDER D. VILLANUEVA
144
A.M. No. P-09-2668, February 24, 2015
DOCTRINE:
In administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is that of substantial

evidence. In Menor v. Guillermo, 574 SCRA 395 (2008): Administrative
proceedings are governed by the substantial evidence rule. Otherwise stated, a
finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long
as it is supported by substantial evidence that the respondent has committed
acts stated in the complaint. Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. The standard of substantial evidence is justified when there is
reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct
complained of, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or even preponderant.
In previous administrative cases involving other court personnel, text messages

were admitted as evidence and given probative value by this court. In those
cases, the court considered the content of the text messages and the
identification of the person sending them as substantial evidence to prove the
commission of administrative offenses. Atty. Lugares was able to present the text
messages he received in his cellular phone. He attached photographs of the
screen of his cellular phone, showing the messages as they were received. He
submitted respondent’s calling card that contained the same phone number seen
in the text messages. Through this calling card, he was able to prove that
respondent was the source of the text messages. Respondent denied meeting
with Atty. Lugares, but he never denied sending the text messages to him. The
content of the text messages from respondent and the circumstances within
which they were made constitute substantial evidence that justify the finding of
administrative liability. The presentation of text messages that Atty. Lugares sent
to respondent is not necessary. Respondent’s text messages sent to Atty.
Lugares show an actual evasion of duty to implement the Writ of Execution. The
contents of the text messages sufficiently prove his manifest refusal to properly
implement the Writ of Execution.
3. TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
a) QUALIFICATONS
b) DISQUALIFICATIONS
 LUISA NAVARRO MARCOS*, Petitioner, vs. THE HEIRS OFTHE LATE DR.

ANDRES NAVARRO, JR., namely NONITA NAVARRO, FRANCISCA
NAVARRO MALAPITAN, SOLEDAD NAVARRO BROCHLER, NONITA
145
BARRUN NAVARRO, JR., IMELDA NAVARRO, ANDRES NAVARRO III,
MILAGROS NAVARRO YAP, PILAR NAVARRO, TERESA NAVARRO-
TABITA, and LOURDES BARRUN-REJUSO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 198240 July 3, 2013
Ponente: J. Villarama, Jr.
DOCTRINE:
The generosity with which the Rule allows people to testify is apparent. Interest
in the outcome of a case, conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law,
and religious belief are not grounds for disqualification.
Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications. Section 19

disqualifies those who are mentally incapacitated and children whose tender age
or immaturity renders them incapable of being witnesses. Section 20 provides for
disqualification based on conflicts of interest or on relationship. Section 21
provides for disqualification based on privileged communications. Section 15 of
Rule 132 may not be a rule on disqualification of witnesses but it states the
grounds when a witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was
called.
There is no provision of the Rules disqualifying parties declared in default from

taking the witness stand for non-disqualified parties. The law does not provide
default as an exception. The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses
excludes the operation of causes of disability other than those mentioned in the
Rules. It is a maxim of recognized utility and merit in the construction of statutes
that an express exception, exemption, or saving clause excludes other
exceptions. x x x As a general rule, where there are express exceptions these
comprise the only limitations on the operation of a statute and no other exception
will be implied. x x x The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception
not embodied therein.
(1) MENTAL INCAPACITY OR IMMUNITY
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. SALVADOR GOLIMLIM @

"BADONG", appellants.
G.R. No. 145225 April 2, 2004
Ponente: J. Carpio Morales
DOCTRINE:
146
A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from
being a witness, her mental condition not being a vitiation of her credibility. It is
now universally accepted that intellectual weakness, no matter what form it
assumes, is not a valid objection to the competency of a witness so long as the
latter can still give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter
testified to.
It can not then be gainsaid that a mental retardate can be a witness, depending
on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows. If his or her testimony is
coherent, the same is admissible in court. To be sure, modern rules on evidence
have downgraded mental incapacity as a ground to disqualify a witness. As
observed, the remedy of excluding such a witness who may be the only person
available who knows the facts, seems inept and primitive. Our rules follow the
modern trend of evidence. Thus, in a long line of cases, this Court has upheld the
conviction of the accused based mainly on statements given in court by the
victim who was a mental retardate. From a meticulous scrutiny of the records of
this case, there is no reason to doubt Evelyn’s credibility. To be sure, her
testimony is not without discrepancies, given of course her feeblemindedness.
(2) MARITAL DISQUALIFICATION
 MAXIMO ALVAREZ, Petitioner, vs. SUSAN RAMIREZ, Respondent.

G.R. No. 143439 October 14, 2005
Ponente: J. Sandoval – Gutierrez
DOCTRINE:
The marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil actions
between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one
against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound
reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general
rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that
there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may
be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such
a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury
based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security
and confidences of private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing
but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy
home.
In the case, the offense of arson attributed to the petitioner, directly impairs the
conjugal relation between him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in
147
the Information for arson filed against him, eradicates all the major aspects of
marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by which virtues the
conjugal relationship survives and flourishes.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HON. MARIANO C.

CASTAÑEDA, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
Branch III, and BENJAMIN F. MANALOTO, Respondents.
G.R. No. L-46306. February 27, 1979
Ponente: J. Santos
DOCTRINE:
A criminal case for Falsification of Public Document filed against the husband—
who allegedly forged the signature of his wife in a deed of sale, thereby making it
appear that the latter gave her marital consent to the sale of a house and lot
belonging to their conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth she did not —
may be considered as a criminal case for a crime committed by a husband
against his wife, and, therefore, an exception to the rule on marital
disqualification. Hence, the wife may testify against the husband for crime of
falsification of a deed of sale of conjugal house and lot where wife was made to
appear as having given far consent to the sale.
Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife underscore the fact that the
martial and domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have
become so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved said nor
peace and tranquility which may be disturbed. In such a case, the "identity of
interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity
is nonexistent. It must be noted that had the sale of the said house and lot, and
the signing of the wife's name by her husband in the deed of sale, been made
with the consent of the wife, no crime could have been charged against said
husband Clearly, therefore, it is the husband's breach of his wife's confidence
which gave rise to the offense charged. And it is this same breach of trust which
prompted the wife to make the necessary complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly, filed the aforesaid criminal case. Thus, there
is no reason to apply the martial disqualification rule.
(3) DEATH OR INSANITY (DEAD MAN’S STATUTE)
 ENRIQUE RAZON, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and

VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, in his capacity as Administrator of the Estate of the
Deceased JUAN T. CHUIDIAN, respondents.
148
G.R. No. 74306 March 16, 1992
Ponente: J. Gutierrez Jr.
DOCTRINE:
Dead man’s statute.”—In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the
appellate court is that of the defendant (petitioner herein) to the effect that the
late Juan Chuidian, (the father of private respondent Vicente Chuidian, the
administrator of the estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in the
lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are
actually owned by the defendant unless the deceased Juan Chuidian opted to
pay the same which never happened. The case was filed by the administrator of
the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc.
allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian. It is clear, therefore, that the
testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of the rule. The case was
not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims
against the estate. Furthermore, the records show that the private respondent
never objected to the testimony of the petitioner as regards the true nature of his
transaction with the late elder Chuidian. The petitioner’s testimony was subject to
cross-examination by the private respon-dent’s counsel. Hence, granting that the
petitioner’s testimony is within the prohibition of Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, the private respondent is deemed to have waived the rule.
 LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA, Petitioners, vs. LAMBERTO

T. CHUA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 143340. August 15, 2001
PONENTE: J. Gonzaga - Reyes
DOCTRINE:
The “Dead Man’s Statute” provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is
precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the
surviving party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own
uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction. But before this rule
can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is
necessary that:
“1.The witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose

behalf a case is prosecuted.
2.The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a
deceased person or a person of unsound mind;
149
3.The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of
such deceased person or against person of unsound mind;
4.His testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred before the death of
such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.”
The testimony of Josephine is not covered by the “Dead Man’s Statute” for the
simple reason that she is not “a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons
in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.” Records show that respondent offered the
testimony of Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership between
respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners’ insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of
respondent does not make her an assignor because the term “assignor” of a
party means “assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the
assignor of a right assigned before any cause of action has arisen.”
 TERESITA BORDALBA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF JAYME, and

HEIRS OF BACLAY
G. R. No. 112443, January 25, 2002 | Ynares-Santiago, J.
DOCTRINE:
Bordalba contends that the testimonies given by the witnesses for private
respondents which touched on matters occurring prior to the death of her mother
should not have been admitted by the trial court, as the same violated the dead
man’s statute. However, the Court found that said rule finds no application in the
present case. The dead man’s statute does not operate to close the mouth of a
witness as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other way than
through personal dealings with the deceased person, or communication made by
the deceased to the witness
Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses in the
present case is based, inter alia, on the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and
other documents, and not on dealings and communications with the deceased,
the questioned testimonies were properly admitted by the trial court.
(4) PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
 JOSIELENE LARA CHAN vs. JOHNNY CHAN
G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013 | Abad, J.
DOCTRINE:
150
The issue in this case is the propriety of issuing a subpoena duces tecum for the
production and submission in court of the Johnny Chan’s hospital record in a
case for declaration of nullity of marriage where one of the issues is his mental
fitness as a husband. The CA ruled that, if courts were to allow the production of
medical records, then patients would be left with no assurance that whatever
relevant disclosures they may have made to their physicians would be kept
confidential. The prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also affidavits,
certificates, and pertinent hospital records. The CA added that, although Johnny
can waive the privilege, he did not do so in this case. He attached the Philhealth
form to his answer for the limited purpose of showing his alleged forcible
confinement.
The SC held that the physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially

means that a physician who gets information while professionally attending a
patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the patient’s consent as to any
facts which would blacken the latter’s reputation. This rule is intended to
encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his
ailment, and give him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a
correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a
physician could be compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all that
had transpired between him and the patient might prompt the latter to clam up,
thus putting his own health at great risk.
 JUDGE UBALDINO LACUROM vs. ATTY. ELLIS JACOBA and ATTY. OLIVIA
VELASCO-JACOBA
A.C. No. 5921, March 10, 2006 | Carpio, J.
DOCTRINE:
Jacoba’s Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition did not contain a denial of his
wife’s account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the motion by
stating that he "trained his guns and fired at the errors which he perceived and
believed to be gigantic and monumental." The marital privilege rule, being a rule
of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to object timely to its
presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent. This
waiver applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001
motion.
 CLARITA SAMALA vs. ATTY. LUCIANO VALENCIA
A.C. No. 5439, January 22, 2007 | Austria-Martinez, J.
DOCTRINE:
151
Termination of the attorney-client relationship precludes an attorney from
representing a new client whose interest is adverse to his former client. Alba may
not be his original client but the fact that he filed a case entitled "Valdez and
Alba v. Bustamante and her husband," is a clear indication that Atty. Valencia is
protecting the interests of both Valdez and Alba in the said case. He cannot just
claim that the lawyer-client relationship between him and Alba has long been
severed without observing Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court wherein
the written consent of his client is required.
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a

situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in
an unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon
to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client,
or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired
from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly
unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would
lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer's
respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty
of undivided fidelity to both clients.
Valencia is bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall preserve the confidences and
secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is terminated." The
reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is
one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar
with all the facts connected with his client's case. He learns from his client the
weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be
considered sacred and guarded with care.
 COMMISSIONER JOSE ALMONTE, et al. vs. HON. CONRADO VASQUEZ and

CONCERNED CITIZENS
G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995 | Mendoza, J.
DOCTRINE:
Where the claim of confidentiality does not rest on the need to protect military,
diplomatic or other national security secrets but on a general public interest in the
confidentiality of his conversations, courts have declined to find in the
Constitution an absolute privilege of the President against a subpoena
considered essential to the enforcement of criminal laws.
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be
disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB.
152
Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and
information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as,
but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting."
Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to
determine from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger
that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling
production, no similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other
considerations. Nor has our attention been called to any law or regulation which
considers personnel records of the EIIB as classified information. To the
contrary, COA Circular No. 88-293, which petitioners invoke to support their
contention that there is adequate safeguard against misuse of public funds,
provides that the "only item of expenditure which should be treated strictly
confidential" is that which refers to the "purchase of information and payment of
rewards."
Above all, even if the subpoenaed documents are treated as presumptively

privileged, this decision would only justify ordering their inspection in camera but
not their nonproduction. However, as concession to the nature of the functions of
the EIIB and just to be sure no information of a confidential character is
disclosed, the examination of records in this case should be made in strict
confidence by the Ombudsman himself. Reference may be made to the
documents in any decision or order which the Ombudsman may render or issue
but only to the extent that it will not reveal covert activities of the agency. Above
all, there must be a scrupulous protection of the documents delivered.
 RAMON A. SYHUNLIONG vs. TERESITA D. RIVERA

G.R. No. 200148 | June 4, 2014
REYES, J.:
DOCTRINE:
The rule on privileged communication means that a communication made in

good faith on any subject matter in which the communicator has an interest, or
concerning which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a
correspondent duty. In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of
a qualified privileged communication under Article 354 No. 1, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the person who made the communication had a legal,
moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to
protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made;
(2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having
some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the
153
protection sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are made in
good faith and without malice.
(5) EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGED
 SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA

G.R. No. 169777 | April 20, 2006
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
DOCTRINE:
Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized
exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of
“executive privilege.” Executive privilege has been defined as the power of the
Government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the
Congress, ad well as the right of the President and high-level executive branch
officers to withhold information from the Congress, the courts, and ultimately the
public.
Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public,
is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive
character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof
may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context
in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials
are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being
executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions
indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in
favor of disclosure.
 ROMULO NERI V. SENATE COMMITTEE
G.R. NO. 180643, SEPTEMBER 4, 2008

LEONARDO-CASTRO, J.
DOCTRINE:
Executive privilege a\Is "the power of the Government to withhold

information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. "The expectation of a
President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondences, like
the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, he has all the
values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to
those values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid,
154
objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. A
President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the
process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many
would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations
justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege
is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the
separation of powers under the Constitution.
c) TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE
d) ADMISSIONS
 OSCAR CONSTANTINO, et al. vs. HEIRS OF PEDRO CONSTANTINO, JR.
G.R. No. 181 508, October 02, 2013 | Perez, J.
DOCTRINE:
Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. Pre-
trial admission in civil cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions
explicitly provided for under Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. Once the
stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties and their counsels,
they become binding on the parties who made them. They become judicial
admissions of the fact or facts stipulated. Even if placed at a disadvantageous
position, a party may not be allowed to rescind them unilaterally, it must assume
the consequences of the disadvantage.
Moreover, a party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge the fact as
judicial admissions are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed
with. A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact from the field of
controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings cannot be
controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to such
party, and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored,
whether objection is interposed by the party or not. The allegations, statements
or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A
party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with what
was pleaded.
In addition, Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules provides that an admission, verbal
or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case,
does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that
it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. As
155
contemplated in the same provision, the general rule regarding conclusiveness of
judicial admission upon the party making it and the dispensation of proof admits
of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was made through
palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact
made. The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that
he made such an admission.
 CAMBE VS OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

GR No. 212014-15, December 06, 2016
Perlas-Bernabe, J
DOCTRINE:
Under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, which states that the
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another, unless the admission is by a conspirator under the parameters of
Section 30 of the same Rule. To be sure, the foregoing rule constitutes a
technical rule on evidence which should not be rigidly applied in the
course of preliminary investigation proceedings. In Estrada, the Court
sanctioned the Ombudsman's appreciation of hearsay evidence, which would
otherwise be inadmissible under technical rules on evidence, during the
preliminary investigation "as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay." This is because "such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not
finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties." Applying the same logic, and
with the similar observation that there lies substantial basis for crediting the
testimonies of the whistleblowers herein, the objection interposed by the
Napoles siblings under the evidentiary res inter alios acta rule should
falter. Ultimately, as case law edifies, "[t]he technical rules on evidence are not
binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a
preliminary investigation," as in this case.
Absent any countervailing reason, the rule on stare decisis mandates a similar

application of the foregoing ruling to this case.
In any event, even if it is assumed that the rule on res inter alios acta were to
apply during preliminary investigation, the treatment of the whistleblowers'
statements as hearsay is bound by the exception on independently relevant
statements. "Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements,
regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have been made
is relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and the statements are admissible
as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but
156
primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact."
It is basic that an extrajudicial confession binds only the confessant or

declarant and is inadmissible against his or her coaccused.[43] This basic
postulate, an extension of the res inter alios acta rule, is embodied in Section 28,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which states:
SECTION 28. Admission by third party. - The rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter
provided.
Under the rule, the testimony made by the confessant is he,arsay and
inadmissible as against his co-accused even during the preliminary investigation
stage.[44] We explained why so in Tamargo v. Awingan:
Considering the paucity and inadmissibility of the evidence presented

against the respondents, it would be unfair to hold them for trial. Once it is
ascertained that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt
of the accused, they should be relieved from the pain of going through a full
blown court case. When, at the outset, the evidence offered during the
preliminary investigation is nothing more than an uncorroborated
extrajudicial confession of an alleged conspirator, the criminal complaint
should not prosper so that the system would be spared from the
unnecessary expense of such useless and expensive litigation. The rule is
all the more significant here since respondent Licerio Antiporda remains in
detention for the murder charges pursuant to the warrant of arrest issued by
Judge Daguna
The exception to the above rule, the succeeding Section 30 of Rule 130, requires
foremost, the existence of an independent and conclusive proof of the
conspiracy[47] and that the person concerned has performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.
 OCAMPO VS OCAMPO
G.R. No. 150707, April 14, 2004
Panganiban, J
DOCTRINE:
A statement may be admissible as such a declaration if it complies with the

following requisites: 1) the declarant is dead or unable to testify; 2) it relates to a
fact against the interest of the declarant; 3) at the time of the declaration, the
157
declarant was aware that it was contrary to his or her interest; and 4) the
declarant had no motive to falsify and believed the declaration to be true.
e) CONFESSIONS
 PEOPLE VS DACANAY
G.R. No. 216064, November 07, 2016
Caguioa, J
DOCTRINE:
On this score, our pronouncements in People v. Andan are instructive. In said

case, we held that a confession made before news reporters, absent any
showing of undue influence from the police authorities, is sufficient to sustain a
conviction for the crime confessed to by the accused.
It is well-settled that where the accused fails to present evidence of compulsion;

where he did not institute any criminal or administrative action against his
supposed intimidators for maltreatment; and where no physical evidence of
violence was presented, all these will be considered as factors indicating
voluntariness.
Next, as a rule, an extrajudicial confession, where admissible, must be

corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti in order to sustain a finding of guilt. In
this connection, extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary until the
contrary is proved.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. ROMALDO LUMAYAG Y

DELA CRUZ, DIONY OPINIANO Y VERANO, AND JERRY DELA CRUZYDIAZ,
Accused DIONY OPINIANO y VERANO, Accused-Appellants
G.R. No. 181474, 26 July 2017
LEONEN, J.
DOCTRINE:
This kind of perfunctory giving of the so-called Miranda rights is what this Court
has previously frowned upon as ineffective and inadequate compliance with the
mandates of the Constitution. Any confession obtained under these
circumstances is flawed and cannot be used as evidence not only against the
declarant but also against his co-accused.
158
In People v. Jara, this Court held that where a confession was illegally obtained
from two (2) of the accused, and consequently were not admissible against them,
with much more reason should the same be inadmissible against a third accused
who had no participation in its execution.
 LEANDRO CRUZ, EMMANUEL MANAHAN, ALRIC JERVOSO, Petitioners vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G.R. No. 206437, 22 November 2017
DEL CASTILLO, J.
DOCTRINE:
On this, the Court is not unmindful of the presumption of voluntariness of a

confession. However, the confessant may overcome such presumption provided
that he or she substantiates that one's admission was not true and the
confession was unwillingly given. In People v. Enanoria, the Court held that there
must be external manifestations to prove that the confession was not voluntary.
These external manifestations included institution of a criminal action against the
alleged intimidators for maltreatment, and evidence of compulsion, duress or
violence on the confessant. Undeniably, these external manifestations are
present here.
f) CONDUCT AND CHARACTER
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAUL SANTOS Y

NARCISO, MARIO MORALES Y BACANI, PETER DOE and RICHARD DOE,
Accused, RAUL SANTOS y NARCISO, accused-appellant.
G.R. Nos. 100225-26, May 11, 1993
FELICIANO, J.
DOCTRINE:
In People v. Jacolo, et al., 6 the Court said:
While evidence as to the identity of the accused as the person who committed
the crime should be carefully analyzed, . . . "were the conditions of visibility are
favorable and the witness does not appear to be biased against the man on the
dock, his or her assertions as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be
accepted. And this is more so where the witness is the victim or his near-relative,
as in this case, because these (people) usually strive to remember the faces of
the assailants."
159
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALFREDO NARDO Y
ROSALES, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 133888, March 1, 2001
DOCTRINE:
Be that as it may, recantations are frowned upon by the courts. A recantation of a

testimony is exceedingly unreliable, for there is always the probability that such
recantation may later on be itself repudiated. Courts look with disfavor upon
retractions, because they can easily be obtained from witnesses through
intimidation or for monetary consideration. A retraction does not necessarily
negate an earlier declaration. Especially, recantations made after the conviction
of the accused deserve only scant consideration.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF FELIPE
ALEJAGA SR., represented by ROQUETA ALEJAGA, FELIPE ALEJAGA
JR., MARIA DULLA ALEJAGA, FELIPE ALEJAGA III, ROQUETA ALEJAGA,
JENNIFER ALEJAGA, EVERETTE CAPUNDAN, AND LYNETTE ALEJAGA;
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
ROXAS CITY, respondents.
G.R. No. 146030, December 3, 2002
PANGANIBAN, J.
DOCTRINE:
The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations

communicated to a witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that,
regardless of their truth or falsity, they were actually made. Evidence as to the
making of such statements is not secondary but primary, for in itself it (a)
constitutes a fact in issue or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the existence of
such fact.
g) HEARSAY EVIDENCE RULE
 ANNA LERIMA PATULA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012
BERSAMIN, J.
160
DOCTRINE:
Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is
offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor
becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received as
evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject to the test of cross-
examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion
to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter
asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander case, if a
prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say that the complainant
was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant was
really a thief, but merely to show that the accused uttered those words. This kind
of utterance is hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay. The distinction is,
therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the
hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the
statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs. JEHLSON AGUIRRE y

ARIDIDON, MICHAEL ARABIT y PA CAMARA, JEFFERSON PARALEJAS y
PIGTAIN and JEFFREY ROXAS y ARAGON CILLO, Accused JEHLSON
AGUIRRE y ARIDIDON, MICHAEL ARABIT y PACAMARA and JEFFERSON
PARALEJAS y PIGTAIN, Accused-Appellants
G.R. No. 219952, November 20, 2017
TIJAM, J.:
DOCTRINE:
The hearsay rule has been premised on the theory that "(a) person who relates a
hearsay is not obliged to enter into any particular, to answer any question, to
solve any difficulties, to reconcile any. contradictions, to explain any obscurities,
to remove any ambiguities; and that she entrenches herself in the simple
assertion that she was told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the absent
author."43 In this case, accused-appellants were able to cross-examine private
complainants; in fact, CCC was even subjected to re-cross-examination. 44 Thus,
it cannot be said that private complainants had not been obliged to answer any
question or to explain obscurities or contradictions, or that their testimonies had
not been tested for veracity or truthfulness.
(1) DYING DECLARATION
161
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. ROMEO D. CALINA
WAN a.k.a "MEO", Accused-Appellants
G.R. No. 226145, February 13, 2017
MENDOZA, J.:
DOCTRINE:
Dying Declaration; Rule on Res Gestae
Marigor's positive identification was further bolstered by the statement of Janice

to Jonathan that it was Calinawan who stabbed her.
The courts a quo considered the said statement as an admissible dying

declaration. For a dying declaration to be deemed an exception to the hearsay
rule, the following conditions must concur: (a) the declaration must concern the
cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) that at the
time the declaration was made, the declarant was conscious of his impending
death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is
offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the declarant
is the victim.
In this case, the Court notes that in her affidavit, Janice said that she thought she
could survive the attack. She never thought that she was dying. In fact, she was
optimistic of her recovery. In view of this, there seems to be a doubt whether she
was aware of her impending death.
Granting there is such doubt, Janice's statement, nevertheless, is admissible as

an exception to the hearsay rule for being part of res gestae. In order for a
statement to be considered part of res gestae, the following elements must
concur: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the
statement was made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c)
the statement concerns the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.13 All the foregoing elements are present in the case at bench.
(2) DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THEODORE

BERNAL, JOHN DOE and PETER DOE, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 113685 June 19, 1997
162
ROMERO, J.:
DOCTRINE:
Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the

perpetrator. Coupled with enough circumstantial evidence of facts from which it
may be reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive may be
sufficient to support a conviction. Openda, Jr.'s revelation to Enriquez regarding
his illicit relationship with Bernal's wife is admissible in evidence, pursuant to
Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:
Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. — The declaration made by a

person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant,
if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far
contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position
would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may
be received in evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest
and against third persons.
With the deletion of the phrase "pecuniary or moral interest" from the present
provision, it is safe to assume that "declaration against interest" has been
expanded to include all kinds of interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or
even penal.11
A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to

wit: "(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact
against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he made said declaration
the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and
(4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be
true."12
Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to
testify. His confession to Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own
interest, since his affair with Naty Bernal was a crime, is admissible in
evidence13 because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his
own detriment.
(3) DECLARATION ABOUT PEDIGREE
 CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER, petitioners, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORA DOMINGO, respondents.
G.R. No. 121027 July 31, 1997
163
REGALADO, J.:
DOCTRINE:
The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the

parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically
declared that the former is Teodora's niece. 16 Such a statement is considered a
declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the
hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the
following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the
declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3)
that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4)
that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the
commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but
before any controversy has arisen thereon.
There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements. What
remains for analysis is the third element, that is, whether or not the other
documents offered in evidence sufficiently corroborated the declaration made by
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime regarding the pedigree of petitioner
Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is necessary to present evidence other than
such declaration.
American jurisdiction has it that a distinction must be made as to when the

relationship of the declarant may be proved by the very declaration itself, or by
other declarations of said declarant, and when it must be supported by
evidence aliunde. The rule is stated thus:
One situation to be noted is that where one seeks to set up a claim through, but
not from, the declarant and to establish the admissibility of a declaration
regarding claimant's pedigree, he may not do by declarant's own statements as
to declarant's relationship to the particular family. The reason is that declarant's
declaration of his own relationship is of a self-serving nature. Accordingly there
must be precedent proof from other sources that declarant is what he claimed to
be, namely, a member of the particular family; otherwise the requirement to
admissibility that declarant's relationship to the common family must appear is
not met. But when the party claiming seeks to establish relationship in order to
claim directly from the declarant or the declarant's estate, the situation and the
policy of the law applicable are quite different. In such case the declaration of the
decedent, whose estate is in controversy, that he was related to the one who
claims his estate, is admissible without other proof of the fact of relationship.
While the nature of the declaration is then disserving, that is not the real ground
164
for its admission. Such declarations do not derive their evidential value from that
consideration, although it is a useful, if not an artificial, aid in determining the
class to which the declarations belong. The distinction we have note is
sufficiently apparent; in the one case the declarations are self-serving, in the
other they are competent from reasons of necessity. 17 (Emphasis ours.)
The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery
against a relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the
declarant himself or the declarant's estate, the relationship of the declarant to the
common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself. There must be
some independent proof of this fact. As an exception, the requirement that there
be other proof than the declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does
not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not
merely to establish a right through his declarations to the property of some other
member of the family.
(4) FAMILY REPUTATION
 JISON V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124853 24 February 1998
Davide, Jr., J.
DOCTRINE:
The Supreme Court ruled that the scope of enumeration in the second portion of
Rule 130, Section 40 is limited to objects which are commonly known as family
possessions, or those articles which represent, in effect, a family’s joint
statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person. These have been described
as objects openly exhibited and well known to the family, or those which, if
preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a family tradition. Other
examples of these objects which are regarded as reflective of a family’s
reputation or tradition regarding pedigree are inscriptions on tombstones,
monuments or coffin plates.
It is the general repute, the common reputation in the family, and not the
common reputation in community, that is a material element of evidence
establishing pedigree. Thus matters of pedigree may be proved by reputation in
the family, and not by reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity, except where the
165
pedigree in question is marriage which may be proved by common reputation in
the community.
(5) COMMON REPUTATION

(6) RES GESTAE
 PEOPLE V. DIMAPILIT
G.R. No. 210802 09 August 2017
Leonen, J.
DOCTRINE:
The Court already established that assignment of values to the testimony of a

witness is virtually left, almost entirely, to the trial court which has the opportunity
to observe the demeanor of the witness on the stand. Except for significant
matters that might have been overlooked or discarded, the findings of credibility
by the trial court will not generally be disturbed on appeal.
Inconsistencies between the sworn statement and direct testimony given in open
court do not necessarily discredit the witness. An affidavit, being taken ex-parte,
is oftentimes incomplete and is generally regarded as inferior to the testimony of
the witness in open court. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that testimonies
given during trial are much more exact and elaborate than those stated in sworn
statements, which are usually incomplete and inaccurate for a variety of reasons.
More so, because of the partial and innocent suggestions, or for want of specific
inquiries. In addition, an extrajudicial statement or affidavit is generally not
prepared by the affiant himself or herself but by another who uses his or her own
language in writing the affiant's statement, hence, omissions and
misunderstandings by the writer are not infrequent. Indeed, the prosecution
witnesses' direct and categorical declarations on the witness stand are superior
to their extrajudicial statements.
 PEOPLE V. SANTILLAN
G.R. No. 227878 09 August 2017
DOCTRINE:
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its

hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites
concur, namely: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
166
circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) at the time the declaration is made,
the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) the declarant
is competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for
homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus

admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following
requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to
contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances.
(7) ENTRIES IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS
 PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. V. RAMOS

G.R. No. 92740 23 March 1992
Medialdea, J.
DOCTRINE:
In the absence of any controverting evidence, the documentary evidence

presented to corroborate the testimonies of PAL's witnesses are prima facie
evidence of the truth of their allegations. The plane tickets of the private
respondents and the passenger Manifest of Flight PR 264 are entries made in
the regular course of business which the private respondents failed to overcome
with substantial and convincing evidence other than their testimonies.
Consequently, they carry more weight and credence. A writing or document
made contemporaneously with a transaction in which are evidenced facts
pertinent to an issue, when admitted as proof of those facts, is ordinarily
regarded as more reliable proof and of greater probative force than the oral
testimony of a witness as to such facts based upon memory and recollection.
The hearsay rule will not apply in this case as statements, acts or conduct
accompanying or so nearly connected with the main transaction as to form a part
of it, and which illustrate, elucidate, qualify or characterize the act, are admissible
as part of the res gestae.
(8) ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS
 PEOPLE V. CORPUZ
G.R. No. 215320 28 February 2018
Martires, J.
167
DOCTRINE:
Entries in the police blotter are not evidence of the truth thereof but merely of the
fact that the entries were made. Affidavits executed before the police or entries in
such police blotters cannot prevail over the positive testimony given in open
court. The entry in the police blotter is not necessarily entitled to full credit for it
could be incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from either partial suggestions or
for want of suggestions or inquiries. Without the aid of such, the witness may be
unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the
correction of the first suggestion of his memory and for his accurate recollection
of all that pertain to the subject. It is understandable that the testimony during the
trial would be more lengthy and detailed than the matters stated in the police
blotter.
 SABILI V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 193261 24 April 2012
Sereno, J.
DOCTRINE:
Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court provides that, “Entries in official
records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines,
or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.”
The following three (3) requisites must concur for entries in official records to be
admissible in evidence:
(a) The entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially
enjoined by law to do so;
(b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by
such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law;
and
(c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts
stated by him, which facts must have been acquired by him personally or
through official information.
168
 SIMPLICIA CERCADO-SIGA and LIGAYA CERCADO-BELISON, petitioners,
vs. VICENTE CERCADO, JR., MANUELA C. ARABIT, LOLITA C. BASCO,
MARIA C. ARALAR and VIOLETA C. BINADAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 185374, March 11, 2015, PEREZ, J.
DOCTRINE:
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that it is a private document. As early as in
the case of U.S. v. Evangelista, 29 Phil. 215 (1915), it has been settled that
church registries of births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the
promulgation of General Order No. 68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no
longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public officials.—In
support of the existence of the alleged first marriage, petitioners presented a
copy of the Contrato Matrimonial. There is no dispute that said marriage contract
was issued by Iglesia Filipina Independiente church. They are private writings
and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all other private writings in
accordance with the rules of evidence.
Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private document is
admitted in evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who executed
it, the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, any person who
was present and saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and
recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the instruments
had previously confessed execution thereof. As observed by the Court of
Appeals, petitioners failed to present any one of such witnesses. In fact, only
Simplicia testified that her mother gave her the marriage contract. Unfortunately
however, she was not present during its execution nor could she identify Benita’s
handwriting because Simplicia admitted that she is illiterate.
(9) COMMERCIAL LISTS
 MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. Hon. SECRETARY of LABOR

LEONARDO QUISUMBING and MERALCO EMPLOYEES and WORKERS
ASSOCIATION (MEWA), respondents
G.R. No. 127598, February 22, 2000, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
DOCTRINE:
A mere newspaper account is not considered a commercial list—it is at most an
analysis or opinion which carries no persuasive weight in determining the rate of
wage increase.
169
The All Asia Capital report upon which the Union relies to support its position
regarding the wage issue cannot be an accurate basis and conclusive
determinant of the rate of wage increase.
Section 45 of Rule 130 Rules of Evidence provides: “Commercial lists and the
like.—–Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an
occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation
is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that
compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is
generally used and relied upon by them therein.” Under the afore-quoted rule,
statement of matters contained in a periodical may be admitted only “if that
compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is
generally used and relied upon by them therein.”As correctly held in our Decision
dated January 27, 1999, the cited report is a mere newspaper account and not
even a commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis or opinion which carries no
persuasive weight for purposes of this case as no sufficient figures to support it
were presented. Neither did anybody testify to its accuracy. It cannot be said that
businessmen generally rely on news items such as this in their occupation.
Besides, no evidence was presented that the publication was regularly prepared
by a person in touch with the market and that it is generally regarded as
trustworthy and reliable. Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy, these reports
are not admissible. In the same manner, newspapers containing stock quotations
are not admissible in evidence when the source of the reports is available. With
more reason, mere analyses or projections of such reports cannot be admitted.
In particular, the source of the report in this case can be easily made available
considering that the same is necessary for compliance with certain governmental
requirements.
(10) LEARNED TREATIES
(11) TESTIMONY OR DEPOSITION AT A FORMER

PROCEEDING
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LANIE ORTIZ-

MIYAKE, accused-appellant.
G.R. Nos. 115338-39, September 16, 1997,

REGALADO, J.
DOCTRINE:
170
The position of the Solicitor General is that the conviction of appellant should be
merely for the lesser offense of simple illegal recruitment. He submits that the
Regional Trial Court of Makati erred in convicting appellant of illegal recruitment
in large scale because the conviction was based on an earlier decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque where appellant was found guilty of estafa
committed against Generillo and Del Rosario. It is argued that the Makati court
could not validly adopt the facts embodied in the decision of the Parañaque court
to show that illegal recruitment was committed against Generillo and Del Rosario
as well. Illegal recruitment was allegedly proven to have been committed against
only one person, particularly, Elenita Marasigan. Appellant, therefore, may only
be held guilty of simple illegal recruitment and not of such offense in large scale.
He further submits that the adoption by the Makati court of the facts in the
decision of the Parañaque court for estafa to constitute the basis of the
subsequent conviction for illegal recruitment is erroneous as it is a violation of the
right of appellant to confront the witnesses, that is, complainants Generillo and
Del Rosario, during trial before it. He cites the pertinent provision of Rule 115 of
the Rules of Court, to wit: Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled: x x x (f) To confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as part of
its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or cannot, with
due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to
testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving
the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having had the
opportunity to cross-examine him. x x x It will be noted that the principle
embodied in the foregoing rule is likewise found in the following provision of Rule
130: Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding.—The
testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in
a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same
parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse
party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
Under the aforecited rules, the accused in a criminal case is guaranteed the right
of confrontation. Such right has two purposes: first, to secure the opportunity of
cross-examination; and, second, to allow the judge to observe the deportment
and appearance of the witness while testifying. This right, however, is not
absolute as it is recognized that it is sometimes impossible to recall or produce a
witness who has already testified in a previous proceeding, in which event his
previous testimony is made admissible as a distinct piece of evidence, by way of
exception to the hearsay rule. The previous testimony is made admissible
because it makes the administration of justice orderly and expeditious. Under
these rules, the adoption by the Makati trial court of the facts stated in the
decision of the Parañaque trial court does not fall under the exception to the right
171
of confrontation as the exception contemplated by law covers only the utilization
of testimonies of absent witnesses made in previous proceedings, and does not
include utilization of previous decisions or judgments. In the instant case, the
prosecution did not offer the testimonies made by complainants Generillo and
Del Rosario in the previous estafa case. Instead, what was offered, admitted in
evidence, and utilized as a basis for the conviction in the case for illegal
recruitment in large scale was the previous decision in the estafa case.A
previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence, may only prove that
an accused was previously convicted of a crime.30 It may not be used to prove
that the accused is guilty of a crime charged in a subsequent case, in lieu of the
requisite evidence proving the commission of the crime, as said previous
decision is hearsay. To sanction its being used as a basis for conviction in a
subsequent case would constitute a violation of the right of the accused to
confront the witnesses against him.
 HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO and JANE GO, petitioners, vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE COMPANY, LTD., ET
AL., respondents
G.R. No. 185527, July 18, 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
DOCTRINE:
The pertinent provision reads thus: “SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the
prosecution.—When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is
too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the
Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally
examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the
presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the
examination has been served on him shall be conducted in the same manner as
an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the
examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may
be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.”
Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no

other place than the court where the case is pending, the RTC properly nullified
the MeTC’s orders granting the motion to take the deposition of Li Luen Ping
before the Philippine consular official in Laos, Cambodia. We quote with approval
the RTC’s ratiocination in this wise:“The condition of the private complainant
being sick and of advanced age falls within the provision of Section 15 Rule 119
of the Rules of Court. However, said rule substantially provides that he should be
conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Thus, this
172
Court concludes that the language of Section 15 must be interpreted to require
the parties to present testimony at the hearing through live witnesses, whose
demeanor and credibility can be evaluated by the judge presiding at the hearing,
rather than by means of deposition. Nowhere in the said rule permits the taking
of deposition outside the Philippines whether the deponent is sick or not.”
In this case, where it is the prosecution that seeks to depose the complaining
witness against the accused, the stringent procedure under Section 15, Rule 119
cannot be ignored without violating the constitutional rights of the accused to due
process. Finally, the Court takes note that prosecution witness Li Luen Ping had
managed to attend the initial trial proceedings before the MeTC of Manila on
September 9, 2004. At that time, Li Luen Ping’s old age and fragile constitution
should have been unmistakably apparent and yet the prosecution failed to act
with zeal and foresight in having his deposition or testimony taken before the
MeTC pursuant to Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court. In fact, it
should have been imperative for the prosecution to have moved for the
preservation of Li Luen Ping’s testimony at that first instance given the fact that
the witness is a non-resident alien who can leave the Philippines anytime without
any definite date of return. Obviously, the prosecution allowed its main witness to
leave the court’s jurisdiction without availing of the court procedure intended to
preserve the testimony of such witness. The loss of its cause is attributable to no
other party.Still, even after failing to secure Li Luen Ping’s conditional
examination before the MeTC prior to said witness’ becoming sick and
unavailable, the prosecution would capitalize upon its own failure by pleading for
a liberal application of the rules on depositions.
(12) CHILD WITNESS RULE
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDWIN IBAÑEZ y

ALBANTE and ALFREDO (FREDDIE) NULLA y IBAÑEZ, accused-appellants
G.R. No. 197813, September 25, 2013, PEREZ, J.
DOCTRINE:
The Rule on Examination of a Child Witness specifies that every child is
presumed qualified to be a witness.—
As the lower courts have done, we accord full faith and credence to Rachel’s
testimony. She was young and unschooled, but her narration of the incident was
categorical, without wavering. It has no markings of a concocted story, impressed
upon her by other people. The defense, accused-appellants herein, tried to
further discredit Rachel’s testimony by arguing that Rachel was a mere child who
173
had studied only until the first grade of elementary school and could barely read,
and did not know how to tell time. We cannot take Rachel’s testimony lightly
simply because she was a mere child when she witnessed the incident and when
she gave her testimony in court. There is no showing that her mental maturity
rendered her incapable of testifying and of relating the incident truthfully. With
exceptions provided in the Rules of Court, all persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. That
is even buttressed by the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness which specifies
that every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption,
the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child’s competence. Only
when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive,
remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty
to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party,
conduct a competency examination of a child. Thus, petitioners’ flimsy objections
on Rachel’s lack of education and inability to read and tell time carry no weight
and cannot overcome the clear and convincing testimony of Rachel as to who
killed her father. We likewise note that the line of questioning of the defense
during cross-examination on the competency of Rachel to read and tell time did
not distract her in recollecting how her father was attacked by accused-
appellants. From her position underneath the house of her “Kuya Unyo,” she saw
her father, Wilfredo, attacked by accused-appellants. Although she was
astonished as the happening unfolded, her ability to perceive, remember, and
make known her perception was not diminished.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALVIN ESUGON y

AVILA, accused-appellant
G.R. No. 195244, June 22, 2015, BERSAMIN, J.
DOCTRINE: CHILD WITNESS RULE
As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or
incident, and can communicate such awareness, experience, or observation to
others can be a witness. Age, religion, ethnicity, gender, educational attainment,
or social status are not necessary to qualify a person to be a witness, so long as
he does not possess any of the disqualifications as listed the rules. The
generosity with which the Rules of Court allows people to testify is apparent, for
religious beliefs, interest in the outcome of a case, and conviction of a crime
unless otherwise provided by law are not grounds for disqualification.
174
That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The
dismissiveness with which the testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the
past has long been erased. Under the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness
(A.M. No. 004-07-SC, 15 December 2000), every child is now presumed qualified
to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party
challenging the child’s competency. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding
the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from
falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu
proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.
Carl, a 5-year-old lad, positively identified the appellant as the culprit during the
investigation and during the trial. Worthy to note is that the child could not have
been mistaken about his identification of him in view of his obvious familiarity with
the appellant as a daily presence in the billiard room maintained by the child’s
family. Verily, the evidence on record overwhelmingly showed that the appellant,
and no other, had robbed and stabbed the victim.
h) OPINION RULE
(1) EXPERT WITNESS
 LAVAREZ vs. GUEVARRA

G.R. No. 206103 | March 29, 2017
PERALTA, J.:
DOCTRINE:
The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within the
province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of the
witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the
reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the
side for whom he testifies, the fact that he might be a paid witness, the relative
opportunities for study and observation of the matters about which he testifies,
and any other matters which deserve to illuminate his statements.
The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by

the court in view of all the facts and circumstances in the case and when
common knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling
effect.
 AVELINO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 181444 | July 17, 2013
175
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
DOCTRINE:
Witness was not qualified as an expert, only an ordinary witness.
Expert evidence is admissible only if: (a) the matter to be testified to is one that
requires expertise, and (b) the witness has been qualified as an expert. In this
case, counsel for the petitioner failed to make the necessary qualification upon
presenting Cabamongan during trial.
(2) ORDINARY WITNESS
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DURANAN

G.R. No. 134074-75 | January 16, 2001
MENDOZA, J.
DOCTRINE:
Mental Retardates; Witnesses; The mother of an offended party in a case of

rape, though not a psychiatrist, if she knows the physical and mental condition of
the party, how she was born, what she is suffering from, and what her
attainments are, is competent to testify on the matter; It is competent for the
ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of a
person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the
speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person in question.
i) CHARACTER EVIDENCE
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DEOPITA

G.R. No. 130601 | December 4, 2000
BELLOSILLO, J.
DOCTRINE:
Robbery with rape; religiosity not always an emblem of good conduct.
An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous good

moral character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his
conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of whether the prosecution had
discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond any peradventure of doubt. Since
the evidence of the crime in the instant case is more than sufficient to convict, the
176
evidence of good moral character of accused-appellant is unavailing. The fact
that accused-appellant is endowed with such “sterling” qualities hardly justifies
the conclusion that he is innocent of the crime charged. Similarly, his having
attained the position of “Ministerial Servant” in his faiath is no guarantee against
any sexual perversion and plunderous proclivity on his part. Indeed, religiosity is
not always an emblem of good conduct, and it is not the unreligious alone who
succumbs to the impulse to rob and rape.
D. BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS
1. BURDEN OF PROOF VS. BURDEN OF EVIDENCE
 FEBTC vs. CHANTE

G.R. No. 170598 | October 9, 2013
BERSAMIN, J.
DOCTRINE:
Burden of proof is a term that refers to two separate and quite different concepts,
namely: (a) the risk of non-persuasion, or the burden of persuasion, or simply
persuasion burden; and (b) the duty of producing evidence, or the burden of
going forward with the evidence, or simply the production burden or the burden of
evidence. In its first concept, it is the duty to establish the truth of a given
proposition or issue by such a quantum of evidence as the law demands in the
case at which the issue arises. In its other concept, it is the duty of producing
evidence at the beginning or at any subsequent stage of trial in order to make or
meet a prima facie case. Generally speaking, burden of proof in its second
concept passes from party to party as the case progresses, while in its first
concept it rests throughout upon the party asserting the affirmative of the issue.
The burden of proof, which may either be on the plaintiff or the defendant, is on
the plaintiff if the defendant denies the factual allegations of the complaint in the
manner required by the Rules of Court; or on the defendant if he admits
expressly or impliedly the essential allegations but raises an affirmative defense
or defenses, that, if proved, would exculpate him from liability.―In civil cases, the
burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is given on
either side. This is because our system frees the trier of facts from the
responsibility of investigating and presenting the facts and arguments, placing
that responsibility entirely upon the respective parties. The burden of proof, which
may either be on the plaintiff or the defendant, is on the plaintiff if the defendant
denies the factual allegations of the complaint in the manner required by the
Rules of Court; or on the defendant if he admits expressly or impliedly the
177
essential allegations but raises an affirmative defense or defenses, that, if
proved, would exculpate him from liability.
2. PRESUMPTIONS
a) CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTIONS
 SPOUSES REYNALDO ALCARAZ and ESMERALDA ALCARAZ,

petitioners, vs. PEDRO M. TANGGA-AN, MENAS R. TANGGAAN, VIRGINIA
III YVETTE R. TANGGA-AN, CECIL T. VILLAFLOR, HERMES R. TANGGA-
AN, VENUS R. TANGGA-AN, JUPITER R. TANGGA-AN, YVONNE T. FRI,
VIVIEN R. TANGGA-AN and HON. JUDGE JOSE P. BURGOS and THE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 128568. April 9, 2003.
DOCTRINE:
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides a conclusive presumption.—Section 2,
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides as a conclusive presumption that: Sec.
2. Conclusive presumptions.—The following are instances of conclusive
presumptions: (a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or
omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing
true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such
declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it; xxx xxx xxx After
recognizing the validity of the lease contract for two years, the petitioner spouses
are barred from alleging the automatic cancellation of the contract on the ground
that the respondents lost ownership of the house after Virgilio acquired title over
the lot.
 UNIVERSITY OF MINDANAO, INC., Petitioner, vs. BANGKO SENTRAL

PILIPINAS, ET AL., Respondents.
G.R. No. 194964-65, January 11, 2016
J. Leonen
DOCTRINE:
Presumptions are “inferences as to the existence of a fact not actually

known, arising from its usual connection with another which is known, or a
conjecture based on past experience as to what course human affairs ordinarily
take. Presumptions may be conclusive or disputable. Conclusive presumptions
are presumptions that may not be overturned by evidence, however strong the
evidence is. They are made conclusive not because there is an established
178
uniformity in behavior whenever identified circumstances arise. They are
conclusive because they are declared as such under the law or the rules. On the
other hand, disputable presumptions are presumptions that may be overcome by
contrary evidence. They are disputable in recognition of the variability of human
behavior.
In this case, the presumption that the execution of mortgage contracts was
within petitioner's corporate powers does not apply. Securing third-party loans is
not connected to petitioner's purposes as an educational institution. It does not
appear that securing third-party loan was necessary to maintain petitioner’s
business of providing instruction to individuals.
b) DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION
 ROSAROSO VS. SORIA

G.R. No.: 194846 (699 SCRA ), June 19, 2013
Ponente: MENDOZA, J.
DOCTRINE:
• • Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the following are disputable
presumptions: (1) private transactions have been fair and regular; (2) the
ordinary course of business has been followed; and (3) there was sufficient
consideration for a contract. These presumptions operate against an adversary
who has not introduced proof to rebut them. They create the necessity of
presenting evidence to rebut the prima facie case they created, and which, if no
proof to the contrary is presented and offered, will prevail. The burden of proof
remains where it is but, by the presumption, the one who has that burden is
relieved for the time being from introducing evidence in support of the averment,
because the presumption stands in the place of evidence unless rebutted.
 HEIRS OF CIPRIANO TRAZONA, Namely: FRANCISCA T. MATBAGON,

NATIVIDAD T. ABADIANO, CARLITO C. TRAZONA; and Heirs of
EDELBERTO C. TRAZONA represented by his daughter DOMICINA T.
ARANAS, ELADIA T. ALICAMEN (Now Deceased) Substituted by DOMINGO
ALICAMEN, LUPECIO ALICAMEN, REBECCA ALICAMEN-BALBUTIN, ELSEI
ALICAMEN, GLENN ALICAMEN, LENNEI ALICAMEN-GEONZON, DANILO
ALICAMEN, JOVELYN ALICAMEN-VILLETA, JIMBIE ALICAMEN and
HERMOGENES C. TRAZONA (Now Deceased) Substituted by LILYBETH
TRAZONA-MANGILA, GEMMA TRAZONA, ELIZALDE TRAZONA, BOBBY
TRAZONA, and PALABIANA B. TRAZONA, Petitioners, vs.
179
HEIRS OF DIONISIO CANADA, Namely: ROSITA C. GERSALINA,
CONCEPTION C. GEONZON, DANIEL CANADA, GORGONIO CANADA,
LEOPOLDO CANADA, SUSANA C. DUNGOG, LUZVIMINDA C. TABUADA,
AND CEFERINA CANADA; PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR of Cebu and
MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR of Minglanilla, Cebu, Respondents.
G.R. No. 175874 December 11, 2013
SERENO, CJ.:
DOCTRINE:
It is true that notarized documents are accorded evidentiary weight as regards

their due execution. Nevertheless, while notarized documents enjoy the
presumption of regularity, this presumption is disputable. They can be
contradicted by evidence that is clear, convincing, and more than merely
preponderant. Here, contrary to the conclusion of the CA, we find clear and
convincing evidence that is enough to overturn the presumption of regularity of
the assailed deed.

 LUIS UY, substituted by LYDIA UY VELASQUEZ and SHIRLEY UY
MACARAIG, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES JOSE LACSAMANA and
ROSAURA** MENDOZA, substituted by CORAZON BUENA, respondent.
G.R. No. 206220. August 19, 2015.
DOCTRINE:
Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumptions; Marriages; There is a presumption

established in our Rules “that a man and woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.”—The main
issue in determining the validity of the sale of the property by Rosca alone is
anchored on whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage. There is a
presumption established in our Rules “that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.” Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage.
However, this presumption may be contradicted by a party and overcome by
other evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In Pugeda v. Trias, 4 SCRA 849 (1962), the
Supreme Court (SC) held that testimony by one (1) of the parties to the
marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the marriage, as well as the person who
officiated at the solemnization of the marriage, has been held to be admissible to
prove the fact of marriage.—Marriage may be proven by any competent and
180
relevant evidence. In Pugeda v. Trias, 4 SCRA 849 (1962), we held that
testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the
marriage, as well as the person who officiated at the solemnization of the
marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he
was legally married to Rosca, their property relations would be governed by
Article 147 of the Family Code which applies when a couple living together were
not incapacitated from getting married.—Since Uy failed to discharge the burden
that he was legally married to Rosca, their property relations would be governed
by Article 147 of the Family Code which applies when a couple living together
were not incapacitated from getting married.
 DOLORES DIAZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LETICIA

S. ARCILLA, respondents.
G.R. No. 208113. December 2, 2015.
DOCTRINE:
Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumptions; Under Section 3(d), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court, the legal presumption is that a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns.—In this relation, it should be pointed out that under Section 3(d), Rule
131 of the Rules of Court, the legal presumption is that a person takes ordinary
care of his concerns. To this, case law dictates that the natural presumption is
that one does not sign a document without first informing himself of its contents
and consequences. Further, under Section 3(p) of the same Rule, it is equally
presumed that private transactions have been fair and regular. This behooves
every contracting party to learn and know the contents of a document before he
signs and delivers it. The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to
create the need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case
created, thereby which, if no contrary proof is offered, will prevail. In this case,
petitioner failed to present any evidence to controvert these presumptions. Also,
respondent’s possession of the document pertaining to the obligation strongly
buttresses her claim that the same has not been extinguished. Preponderance of
evidence only requires that evidence be greater or more convincing than the
opposing evidence. All things considered, the evidence in this case clearly
preponderates in respondent’s favour.
c) SUPPRESSION OF TESTIMONY
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO PADRIGONE a.k.a.

“ROBERTO SAN MIGUEL”
181
G.R. No. 137664 | May 9, 2002
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
DOCTRINE:
The non-representation of Rowena on the witness stand cannot be considered

as suppression of evidence. Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court,
the rule that “evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced” does
not apply if (a) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; (b) the suppression
was not willful; (c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative; and (d) the
suppression is an exercise of a privilege.
 METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and G.T.P. DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 122899, June 8, 2000
BUENA, J.
DOCTRINE:
It is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to prove a material fact
which imposes a liability on a party, and he has it in his power to produce
evidence which from its very nature must overthrow the case made against him if
it is not founded on fact, and he refuses to produce such evidence, the
presumption arises that the evidence, if produced would operate to his prejudice,
and support the case of his adversary. . . .
No rule of law is better settled than that a party having it in his power to prove a
fact, if it exists, which, if proved, would benefit him, his failure to prove it must be
taken as conclusive that the fact does not exist.
d) OFFICIAL DUTY
 FILOMENA G. DELOS SANTOS, JOSEFA A. BACALTOS, NELANIE A.

ANTONI, AND MAUREEN A. BIEN, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
REPRESENTED BY ITS COMMISSIONERS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 19845, August 13, 2013
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
DOCTRINE:
Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. However, this
presumption must fail in the presence of an explicit rule that was violated.
182
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDDIE
BARTE y MENDOZA, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 179749. March 1, 2017.
DOCTRINE:
Presumption of Regularity; The presumption of regularity can be overturned if

evidence is presented to prove either of two (2) things, namely: (1) that they were
not properly performing their duty, or (2) that they were inspired by any improper
motive.—Courts are cognizant of the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duties of public officers. This presumption can be overturned if
evidence is presented to prove either of two things, namely: (1) that they were
not properly performing their duty, or (2) that they were inspired by any improper
motive. This case sprang from the buy-bust operation conducted by several
police officers against the accused-appellant based on the tip from a caller
whose identification was only through the alias of Ogis. Surveillance was made
following such tip, but the same was unrecorded and no other proof was
presented to corroborate the policemen’s conclusion that the man known
as Ogis was the same man they were looking for during the surveillance.
Anything short of observance and compliance by the arresting lawmen with what
the law required meant that the former did not regularly perform their duties.—
We regard and declare as unwarranted the RTC’s position that the absence of
proof showing the compliance by the arresting lawmen with the procedure
outlined under Section 21 of RA No. 9165 was not fatal to the entrapment. Such
noncompliance with the procedural safeguards under Section 21 was fatal
because it cast doubt on the integrity of the evidence presented in court and
directly affected the validity of the buy-bust operation. It put into serious question
whether the sachet of shabu had really come from the accused-appellant, and
whether the sachet of shabu presented in court was the same sachet
of shabu obtained from the accused-appellant at the time of the arrest.
Testimonies provided by the police officers and the presumption of regularity in
the performance of their duties did not override the noncompliance with the
procedural safeguards instituted by our laws. Indeed, anything short of
observance and compliance by the arresting lawmen with what the law required
meant that the former did not regularly perform their duties. The presumption of
regularity in the performance of their duties then became inapplicable. As such,
the evidence of the State did not overturn the presumption of innocence in favor
of the accused-appellant. Furthermore, although noncompliance with the
prescribed procedural requirements would not automatically render the seizure
and custody of the contraband invalid, that is true only when there is a justifiable
183
ground for such noncompliance, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved. Any departure from the prescribed
procedure must then still be reasonably justified, and must further be shown not
to have affected the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated contraband.
Otherwise, the noncompliance constitutes an irregularity, a red flag, so to speak,
that cast reasonable doubt on the identity of the corpus delicti.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HADJI SOCOR

CADIDIA, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 191263. October 16, 2013
PONENTE: PEREZ, J
DOCTRINE:
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Presumption of Regularity; In cases

involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the
narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are
police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular
manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.—In cases involving violations
of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the
incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers
who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless
there is evidence to the contrary. Further, the evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose
conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect because the judge has
the direct opportunity to observe said witnesses on the stand and ascertain if
they are telling the truth or not. Applying the foregoing, we affirm the findings of
the lower court in the appreciation of facts and credibility of the witnesses.
Same; Same; Same; Minor inconsistencies do not negate the eyewitnesses’

positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.—We have
consistently held time and again that minor inconsistencies do not negate the
eyewitnesses’ positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the
crime. As long as the testimonies as a whole presented a coherent and
believable recollection, the credibility would still be upheld. What is essential is
that the witnesses’ testimonies corroborate one another on material details
surrounding the commission of the crime. People vs. Cadidia, 707 SCRA 494,
G.R. No. 191263 October 16, 2013
184
e) COHABITATION
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelee, vs. JESUS

EDUALINO, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 119072 April 11, 1997
Doctrine:
The court further provides that a person accused of rape can be convicted solely
on the testimony of the victim provided the testimony is credible, natural,
convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature and the course of things.
On the issue of morality of the complainant, the court pointed out that the moral
character of a rape victim is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of the
accused.
E. PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
1. ORDER OF PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEONARDO FABRE y

VICENTE, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 146697, July 23, 2002
VITUG
DOCTRINE:
The cross-examination of a witness is a prerogative of the party against whom
the witness is called. The purpose of cross-examination is to test the truth or
accuracy of the statements of a witness made on direct examination. The party
against whom the witness testifies may deem any further examination
unnecessary and instead rely on any other evidence theretofore adduced or
thereafter to be adduced or on what would be believed is the perception of the
court thereon. Certainly, the trial court is not bound to give full weight to the
testimony of a witness on direct examination merely because he is not cross-
examined by the other party.
2. LEADING AND MISLEADING QUESTIONS
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESUS PEREZ y SEBUNGA

G.R. No. 142556, February 5, 2003
Davide Jr. J.
185
DOCTRINE:
As a rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, the rules provide for
exceptions when the witness is a child of tender years as it is usually difficult for
such child to state facts without prompting or suggestion. Leading questions are
necessary to coax the truth out of their reluctant lips. In the case at bar, the trial
court was justified in allowing leading questions to Mayia as she was evidently
young and unlettered, making the recall of events difficult, if not uncertain.
As explained in People v. Rodito Dagamos:
The trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the courts in exercising
control over the questioning of a child witness. The reasons are spelled out in our
Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, which took effect on December 15,
2000, namely, (1) to facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, (2) to ensure that
questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the child,
(3) to protect children from harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid
waste of time. Leading questions in all stages of examination of a child are
allowed if the same will further the interests of justice.
The Court has repeatedly stated that it is highly inconceivable for a child of
tender age, inexperienced in the ways of the world, to fabricate a charge of
defloration, undergo a medical examination of her private part, subject herself to
public trial, and tarnish her family’s honor and reputation, unless she was
motivated by a strong desire to seek justice for the wrong committed against her.
3. IMPEACHMENT
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JAIME CASTILLANO, SR.,

alias “Talino,” RONALD CASTILLANO alias “Nono” and JAIME
CASTILLANO, JR. alias “Junjun,” accused. RONALD CASTILLANO alias
“Nono” and JAIME CASTILLANO, JR., alias “Junjun,” appellants.
G.R. No. 139412. April 2, 2003.
DOCTRINE:

Impeachment; The witness must be given a chance to recollect and to
explain the apparent inconsistency between his two statements and state the
186
circumstances under which they were made.—Before the credibility of a witness
and the truthfulness of his testimony can be impeached by evidence consisting of
his prior statements which are inconsistent with his present testimony, the cross-
examiner must lay the predicate or the foundation for impeachment and thereby
prevent an injustice to the witness being cross-examined. The witness must be
given a chance to recollect and to explain the apparent inconsistency between
his two statements and state the circumstances under which they were made.
“Laying a predicate”; The process of cross-examining a witness upon the

point of prior contradictory statements is called “laying a predicate” for the
introduction of contradictory statements.—If the witness admits the making of
such contradictory statement, the accused has the benefit of the admission, while
the witness has the opportunity to explain the discrepancy, if he can. On the
other hand, if the witness denies making any such contradictory statement, the
accused has the right to prove that the witness did make such statement; and if
the fiscal should refuse upon due notice to produce the document, secondary
evidence of the contents thereof would be admissible. This process of cross-
examining a witness upon the point of prior contradictory statements is called in
the practice of the American courts “laying a predicate” for the introduction of
contradictory statements. It is almost universally accepted that unless a ground is
thus laid upon cross-examination, evidence of contradictory statements are not
admissible to impeach a witness; though undoubtedly the matter is to a large
extent in the discretion of the court.
Minor contradictions among several witnesses of a particular incident and
aspect thereof are to be expected in view of their differences in impressions,
memory, vantage points and other related factors.—It bears stressing that even
the most truthful witness can make mistakes but such innocent lapses do not
necessarily affect his credibility. The testimonies of witnesses must be
considered and calibrated in their entirety and not by their truncated portions or
isolated passages. And then again, minor contradictions among several
witnesses of a particular incident and aspect thereof which do not relate to the
gravamen of the crime charged are to be expected in view of their differences in
impressions, memory, vantage points and other related factors.
4. REFERENCE TO MEMORANDUM
a) PRESENT MEMORY REVIVED
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTONIO PLASENCIA

y DESAMPARADO alias "Tonying," ROBERTO DESCARTIN PASICARAN
alias "Ruby" and JOELITO (JULITO) DESCARTIN y PASICARAN, Accused-
Appellants.
187
G.R. No. 90198. November 7, 1995
Ponente: J. Vitug
DOCTRINE:
The use of memory aids during an examination of a witness is not altogether

proscribed. Allowing a witness to refer to her notes rest on the ground on the
sound discretion of the trial court. In this case, the exercise of that the discretion
has not been abused; the witness herself has explained that she merely wanted
to be accurate on dates and like details. Appellants see inadvertency on
Francisca’s appearing to be "jittery" on the witness stand. Nervousness and
anxiety of a witness is a natural reaction particularly in the case of those who are
called to testify for the first time. The real concern, in fact, should be when they
show no such emotions.
Transcript of Steno-graphic Notes; The initial assessment on the testimony of a

witness is done by the trial court, and its findings still deserve due regard
notwithstanding that the presiding judge who pens the decision is not the one
who personally may have heard the testimony; Reliance on the transcript of
stenographic notes should not, for that reason alone, render the judgment
subject to challenge.
b) PAST RECOLLECTION RECORDED
 ROSELLA CANQUE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SOCOR CONSTRUCTION

CORP.
G.R. No. 96202, April 13, 1999 | Mendoza, J.
DOCTRINE:
Socor Construction’s counsel offered the Book of Collectible Accounts (Exh. K)
for the purpose of showing the amount of petitioner's indebtedness. This is also
the purpose for which its admission is sought as a memorandum to refresh the
memory of Dolores Aday as a witness.
Be that as it may, considered as a memorandum, Exh. K does not itself

constitute evidence. Under Rule 132, Sec. 16, the memorandum used to refresh
the memory of the witness does not constitute evidence, and may not be
admitted as such, for the simple reason that the witness has just the same to
testify on the basis of refreshed memory. In other words, where the witness has
testified independently of or after his testimony has been refreshed by a
188
memorandum of the events in dispute, such memorandum is not admissible as
corroborative evidence. It is self-evident that a witness may not be corroborated
by any written statement prepared wholly by him. He cannot be more credible
just because he supports his open-court declaration with written statements of
the same facts even if he did prepare them during the occasion in dispute, unless
the proper predicate of his failing memory is priorly laid down. What is more,
even where this requirement has been satisfied, the express injunction of the rule
itself is that such evidence must be received with caution, if only because it is not
very difficult to conceive and fabricate evidence of this nature. This is doubly true
when the witness stands to gain materially or otherwise from the admission of
such evidence.
As the entries in question (Exh. K) were not made based on personal knowledge,
they could only corroborate Dolores Aday's testimony that she made the entries
as she received the bills.
5. CLASSES OF DOCUMENTS
a) PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
 YASUO IWASAWA, PETITIONER, vs. FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN1 (A.K.A

FELISA GANGAN ARAMBULO, AND FELISA GANGAN IWASAWA) AND THE
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASAY CITY, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 204169 September 11, 2013
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
DOCTRINE:
Republic Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the Law on Registry of Civil Status,
and the Civil Code elaborated on the character of documents arising from
records and entries made by the civil registrar and categorically declared them as
public documents. Being public documents, said documents are admissible in
evidence even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness and
consequently, there was no need for the court to require petitioner to present the
records custodian or officer from the NSO to testify on them. The OSG further
contends that public documents have probative value since they are prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein as provided in the above-quoted provision of
the Civil Code.
As provided in the Civil Code:
189
ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating
thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence
of the facts therein contained.
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof
of their due execution and genuineness.
 ASIAN TERMINALS, INC., Petitioner, vs. PHILAM INSURANCE CO., INC. (now
Chartis Philippines Insurance, Inc.), Respondent.
G.R. No. 181163, July 24, 2013
VILLARAMA, JR. J.
DOCTRINE:
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the

documents may be presented as evidence in court. Public documents, as
enumerated under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, are self-
authenticating and require no further authentication in order to be presented as
evidence in court.
b) PRIVATE DOCUMENTS
6. OFFER OF EVIDENCE
 LOMISES ALUDOS, deceased, substituted by FLORA ALUDOS, Petitioner,

vs. JOHNNY M. SUERTE,* Respondent.
G.R. No. 165285 June 18, 2012
BRION, J.:
DOCTRINE:
Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. "The offer of evidence is
necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact and its
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and
until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which
such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of
probative weight."22 Although the contract was referred to in Lomises’ answer to
Johnny’s complaint23 and marked as Exhibit "2" in his pre-trial brief, 24 a copy of it
190
was never attached. In fact, a copy of the May 1, 1985 lease contract "surfaced"
only after Lomises filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA decision. What
was formally offered was the 1969 permit, which only stated that Lomises was
permitted to occupy a stall in the Baguio City market and nothing else. 25 In other
words, no evidence was presented and formally offered showing that any and all
improvements in the market stalls shall be owned by the Baguio City
Government.
 WESTMONT INVESTMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. AMOS P.

FRANCIA, JR., CECILIA ZAMORA, BENJAMIN FRANCIA, and PEARLBANK
SECURITIES, INC., respondents.
V. G.R. No. 194128. December 7, 2011.
DOCTRINE:
Remedial Law; Evidence; Offer of Evidence; The offer of evidence is

necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact and its
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties.—It bears
stressing too that all the documents attached by Wincorp to its pleadings before
the CA cannot be given any weight or evidentiary value for the sole reason that,
as correctly observed by the CA, these documents were not formally offered as
evidence in the trial court. To consider them now would deny the other parties
the right to examine and rebut them. “The offer of evidence is necessary because
it is the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and
strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the
court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such document is
offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight.”
Same; Same; Same; It is elementary that objection to evidence must be

made after evidence is formally offered.—The Court cannot, likewise, disturb the
findings of the RTC and the CA as to the evidence presented by the Francias. It
is elementary that objection to evidence must be made after evidence is formally
offered. It appears that Wincorp was given ample opportunity to file its
Comment/Objection to the formal offer of evidence of the Francias but it chose
not to file any.
1. TENDER OF EXCLUDED EVIDENCE
 FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF

INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent
G.R. No. 192024, July 1, 2015, MENDOZA, J.
191
DOCTRINE: TENDER OF EXCLUDED EVIDENCE
Where documentary evidence was rejected by the lower court and the offeror did
not move that the same be attached to the record, the same cannot be
considered by the appellate court, as documents forming no part of proofs before
the appellate court cannot be considered in disposing the case.—
Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 40. Tender of excluded evidence.—If documentts or things offered in

evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror may have the same attached to
or made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state
for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the
substance of the proposed testimony.
The rule is that evidence formally offered by a party may be admitted or excluded
by the court. If a party’s offered documentary or object evidence is excluded, he
may move or request that it be attached to form part of the records of the case. If
the excluded evidence is oral, he may state for the record the name and other
personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed
testimony. These procedures are known as offer of proof or tender of excluded
evidence and are made for purposes of appeal. If an adverse judgment is
eventually rendered against the offeror, he may in his appeal assign as error the
rejection of the excluded evidence.
It is of record that the denial of the excluded evidence was never assigned as an
error in this appeal. Thus, this Court cannot pass upon nor consider the propriety
of their denial. Moreover, this Court cannot and should not consider the
documentary and oral evidence presented which are not considered to be part of
the records in the first place. Thus, Exhibits “G,” “G-1” to “G-7” and Exhibit “H,”
together with the testimony of petitioner’s witness thereon, cannot be admitted
and be given probative value.
It has been repeatedly ruled that where documentary evidence was rejected by
the lower court and the offeror did not move that the same be attached to the
record, the same cannot be considered by the appellate court, as documents
forming no part of proofs before the appellate court cannot be considered in
disposing the case. For the appellate court to consider as evidence, which was
not offered by one party at all during the proceedings below, would infringe the
constitutional right of the adverse party — in this case, the CIR, to due process of
law.
192
It also bears pointing out that at no point during the proceedings before the CTA
En Banc and before this Court has petitioner offered any plausible explanation as
to why it failed to properly make an offer of proof or tender of excluded evidence.
Instead, petitioner harps on the fact that respondent CIR simply refused its claim
for refund on the ground that RR 17-99 was a valid issuance. Thus, for its failure
to seasonably avail of the proper remedy provided under Section 40, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, petitioner is precluded from doing so at this late stage of the
case. Clearly, estoppel has already stepped in.
B. WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE (HEIRARCHY OF

EVIDENCE)
1. OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE
2. PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
 PEOPLE vs. CALISO

G.R. No. 183830 | October 19, 2011
BERSAMIN, J.
DOCTRINE:
In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the identity of the culprit,
the accused’s constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved is not overcome, and he is entitled to an acquittal, though his innocence
may be doubted. The constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to
every individual is of primary importance, and the conviction of the accused must
rest not on the weakness of the defense he put up but on the strength of the
evidence for the Prosecution.
 PEOPLE VS. PATENTES

716 SCRA
DOCTRINE:
“A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable
doubt, which means a moral certainty that the accused is guilty; the burden of
proof rests upon the prosecution.”
3. CLEAR AND CONVINCING
 SUPREME COURT, complainant, vs. EDDIE V. DELGADO, UTILITY

WORKER II, JOSEPH LAWRENCE M. MADEJA, CLERK IV, AND WILFREDO
193
A. FLORENDO, UTILITY WORKER II, ALL OF THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK
OF COURT, SECOND DIVISION, respondents.
A.M. No. 2011-07-SC. October 4, 2011.
DOCTRINE:
Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Evidence; Denials; The basic principle

in evidence is that denials, unless supported by clear and convincing evidence,
cannot prevail over the affirmative testimony of truthful witnesses.—The
unsubstantiated denial of respondents, therefore, falters in light of the direct and
positive statements of respondent Delgado. The basic principle in Evidence is
that denials, unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail
over the affirmative testimony of truthful witnesses.
Same; Same; Owing to the confidential nature of the contents of an Agenda,

the Office of the Clerk of Court-Second Division (OCC-SD) follows a very strict
procedure in handling them.—Owing to the confidential nature of the contents of
an Agenda, the OCC-SD follows a very strict procedure in handling them. Thus,
as can be gathered from the factual narration, only a few specified personnel
within the OCC-SD are authorized to have access to an Agenda—e.g., only Ms.
Puno is authorized to receive and open; only four (4) persons are authorized to
photocopy.
Same; Same; The act of the respondents in causing the removal of several
pages in a copy of the 30 May 2011 Agenda is a malevolent transgression of
their duties as court personnel—particularly, as employees detailed at the Office
of the Clerk of Court-Second Division (OCC-SD).—The act of the respondents in
causing the removal of several pages in a copy of the 30 May 2011 Agenda is a
malevolent transgression of their duties as court personnel—particularly, as
employees detailed at the OCC-SD. The act is unauthorized and a blatant
disregard of the standard operating procedures observed by the office in
handling confidential documents, such as the Agenda. It compromised the ability
of the OCC-SD to efficiently perform its functions and also imperiled the
environment of confidentiality the office is supposed to be clothed with.
Same; Same; The acts of respondents fall squarely under the offense of
grave misconduct; Grave Misconduct Defined.—The acts of the respondents fall
squarely under the offense Grave Misconduct. In Valera v. Ombudsman, 547
SCRA 42 (2008), We defined the offense as follows: Misconduct is a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is
194
grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to
violate the law or disr
egard of established rules, which must be proved by substantial
evidence.
Same; Same; Penalties; Grave Misconduct; Grave misconduct classified as

a grave offense punishable with dismissal even in its first commission.—Rule IV,
Section 52(A) (3) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, on the other hand, classifies Grave Misconduct as a grave offense
punishable with Dismissal even in its first commission.
Same; Same; The conduct and behavior of all officials and employees of an
office involved in the administration of justice from the highest judicial official to
the lowest personnel requires them to live up to the strictest standard of honesty,
integrity and uprightness in order to maintain public confidence in the judiciary.—
This Court had already held that the conduct and behavior of all officials and
employees of an office involved in the administration of justice, from the highest
judicial official to the lowest personnel, requires them to live up to the strictest
standard of honesty, integrity and uprightness in order to maintain public
confidence in the judiciary. Court employees, as the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel puts it, “serve as sentinels of justice” and “any act of impropriety on
their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the
people’s confidence in it.”
 GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION,

represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner, vs. HON.
FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007
DOCTRINE:
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required

in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in
criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil
cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence
used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition
law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In
his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and
convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition
195
cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond
reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential
extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight
risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented

evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be
remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be
granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALFONSO

FONTANILLA y OBALDO, accused-appellant
G.R. No. 177743. January 25, 2012
BERSAMIN
For self-defense to be appreciated, the accused had to prove by clear and

convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part
of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.
Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no
unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is
unavailing, for there is nothing to repel.
4. PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE
 PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO

B. BALMACEDA and ROLANDO N. RAMOS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 158143, September 21, 2011

BRION, J.
DOCTRINE:
“Preponderance of evidence” is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the
term “greater weight of the evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence”.
Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means
probability of the truth, evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy
of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. In civil cases, the party
carrying the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence, or evidence which, to the court, is more worthy of belief than the
evidence offered in opposition.
196
PCIB, as plaintiff, had to prove, by preponderance of evidence, its positive
assertion that Ramos conspired with Balmaceda in perpetrating the latter's
scheme to defraud the Bank. PCIB failed to establish Ramos' participation in
Balmaceda's scheme. The mere fact that Balmaceda made Ramos the payee on
some of the Manager's checks is not enough basis to conclude that Ramos was
complicit in Balmaceda's fraud.
 DRA, LEILA A DELA LLANA, Petitioner, vs. REBECCA BIONG, doing

business under the name and style of Pongkay Trading, Respondent.
G.R. No. 182356, December 4, 2013
BRION, J.:
DOCTRINE:
In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.
He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of

evidence or greater weight of credible evidence.
The reason for this rule is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are
not equivalent to proof.
In short, mere allegations are not evidence.
In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between
Joel’s negligence and Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana.
She must establish by preponderance of evidence that Joel’s negligence, in its
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produced her whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash injury would not
have occurred.
 ZACARIA A. CANDAO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. Nos. 186659-710, October 19, 2011
Justice Villarama, Jr.
DOCTRINE:
197
Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise
or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the
burden of proof loses.
The equipoise rule finds application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to
produce a conviction.
Such is not the situation in this case because the prosecution was able to prove
by adequate evidence that Disbursing Officer Haron failed to account for funds
under his custody and control upon demand, specifically for the ₱21,045,570.64
illegally withdrawn from the said funds. In the crime of malversation, all that is
necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable officer had
received public funds, that he did not have them in his possession when demand
therefor was made, and that he could not satisfactorily explain his failure to do
so. Direct evidence of personal misappropriation by the accused is hardly
necessary in malversation cases.
5. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO T. REYES,

Respondent.
G.R. No. 170512, October 5, 2011
LEONARDO – DE CASTRO, J.
DOCTRINE:
Indeed, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 mandates that the findings of fact
by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial
evidence. In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial
evidence is necessary to establish the case for or against a party. Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It is that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine
otherwise.
 XAVIER C. RAMOS vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK INC.

G.R. No. 203186 December 4, 2013
Perlas-Bernabe, J:
198
DOCTRINE:
In labor disputes, the NLRC’s findings are said to be tainted with grave abuse of
discretion when its conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence.
The CA only examines the factual findings of the NLRC to determine whether or
not the conclusions are supported by substantial evidence whose absence points
to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
As a general rule, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,

the appellate court does not assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon
which the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their conclusion. The query in this
proceeding is limited to the determination of whether or not the NLRC acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
rendering its decision. However, as an exception, the appellate court may
examine and measure the factual findings of the NLRC if the same are not
supported by substantial evidence
.
The Court has not hesitated to affirm the appellate court’s reversals of the
decisions of labor tribunals if they are not supported by substantial evidence.
6. PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE
 JESSE U. LUCAS, PETITIONER, VS. JESUS S. LUCAS, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 190710. June 6, 2011.
DOCTRINE:
A party is confronted by the so-called procedural aspects in a paternity case
during trial, when the parties have presented their respective evidence—they are
matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the
proceedings; A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere
allegations in the initiatory pleading.—The statement in Herrera v. Alba, 460
SCRA 197 (2005), that there are four significant procedural aspects in a
traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely
misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-
called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their
respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at
this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation
has been filed. The CA’s observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima
facie case—the first procedural aspect in a paternity case—is therefore
199
misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere
allegations in the initiatory pleading. Clearly then, it was also not the opportune
time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA testing
since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. More essentially, it
is premature to discuss whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing order is
warranted considering that no such order has yet been issued by the trial court.
In fact, the latter has just set the said case for hearing.
Same; Same; Same; Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Testing; Paternity;

Searches and Seizures; In some foreign states, a court order for blood testing is
considered a “search,” which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be
preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid, hence, the
requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil
actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause; The same condition
precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from
mere harassment suits—thus, during the hearing on the motion for
Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) testing, the petitioner must present prima facie
evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.—In some states, to
warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause
hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish
a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or “good cause” for the
holding of the test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a
“search,” which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a
finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima
facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a
counterpart of a finding of probable cause. The Supreme Court of Louisiana
eloquently explained—Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still
applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular
factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a
compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the
kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost
universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can
constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and
find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for
compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable
possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is
contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a
show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there
is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of
a court order for blood testing. The same condition precedent should be applied
in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus,
200
during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must
present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
7. PROBABLE CAUSE
 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, PETITIONER, VS. AMELIO TRIA AND JOHN

DOE, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 193250. April 25, 2012.
DOCTRINE:
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; What is necessary for the
filing of a criminal information is not proof beyond reasonable doubt that the
person accused is guilty of the acts imputed on him, but only that there is
probable cause to believe that he is guilty of the crime charged; A finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than
not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused.—It
must be emphasized at the outset that what is necessary for the filing of a
criminal information is not proof beyond reasonable doubt that the person
accused is guilty of the acts imputed on him, but only that there is probable
cause to believe that he is guilty of the crime charged. Probable cause, for
purposes of filing a criminal information, are such facts as are sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof. It is the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the
facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty
of the crime for which he is to be prosecuted. A finding of probable cause needs
only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and that it was committed by the accused.
 RUBEN DEL CASTILLO @ BOY CASTILLO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 185128. January 30, 2012.
DOCTRINE:
Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched. A finding of probable cause
needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has
201
been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause
demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would
justify conviction. The judge, in determining probable cause, is to consider the
totality of the circumstances made known to him and not by a fixed and rigid
formula, and must employ a flexible, totality of the circumstances standard. The
existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge
conducting the examination. This Court, therefore, is in no position to disturb the
factual findings of the judge which led to the issuance of the search warrant. A
magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was
substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis means that the
questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be
seized are in the place sought to be searched. A review of the records shows
that in the present case, a substantial basis exists.
Presumption of Innocence; Evidence; Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt; The

accused, in all criminal prosecutions, is presumed innocent of the charge laid
unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.—In considering a
criminal case, it is critical to start with the law’s own starting perspective on the
status of the accused—in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of
the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral
certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in
judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence.
8. IOTA OF EVIDENCE
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALBERTO ANTICAMARA y CABILLO et

al. G.R. No. 178771, June 8, 2011
PERALTA, J.:
DOCTRINE:
The trial court found that although there was no direct eyewitness in the killing of
Abad, the prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish
with moral certainty the identities and guilt of the perpetrators of the crime.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances
202
from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason
and common experience. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain
conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; (c) the combination of all circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the
circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as
the perpetrator.
In the case at bar, although no one directly saw the actual killing of Sulpacio, the
prosecution was able to paint a clear picture that the appellants took Sulpacio
away from the house of the Estrellas, tied and blindfolded him, and brought him
to another place where he was repeatedly shot and buried.
 PEOPLE V. DEOCAMPO
G.R No. 185212, February 15, 2012
Ponente: Justice Abad
DOCTRINE:
In People v. Deocampo (G.R No. 185212, February 15, 2012), the

Supreme Court ruled that in circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must
constitute an unbroken chain that inexorably leads to one fair conclusion: the
accused committed the crime to the exclusion of all others.
 EDUARDO CELEDONIO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 209137, July 01, 2015, Penned by Justice Mendoza
DOCTRINE:
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one
circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
In this case, the prosecution sufficiently laid down the circumstances that, when
taken together, constituted an unbroken chain that led to a reasonable
conclusion that Celedonio was the perpetrator. Celedonio never claimed
ownership of the subject items. He could have overcome the presumption, but he
203
failed to give a justifiable and logical explanation. Thus, the only plausible
scenario that could be inferred therefrom was that he took the items.
204

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REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II

I. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES (RULES 57-61)

A. PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT (R-57)

 LIM, JR. VS. LAZARO

 LIGON VS. RTC OF MAKATI BR. 56

“Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by which the property of an

We hold that the alias summons belatedly served on petitioner cannot be

 CHUIDIAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

 ALEJANDRO NG WEE VS. MANUEL TANKIANSEE

Section 1(d) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court which pertinently reads:

 TORRES VS. SATSATIN

 LUZON DEV. BANK VS. KRISHMAN

 NORTHERN LUZON ISLANDS CO., INC. VS. GARCIA,

Attachment is an auxiliary remedy and cannot have an independent existence

 WATERCRAFT VENTURE CORPORATION VS. WOLFE

Watercraft’s Affidavit of Preliminary Attachment does not contain specific

 PHIL-AIR CONDITIONING CENTER VS. RCJ LINES

B. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (R-58)

 IDOLOR VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be

 GUSTILO VS. REAL, SR.

 Michael Lagrosas vs. Bristo-Myers Squibb

On the Second issue, it is settled that the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to

The injunction bond is intended as a security for damages in case it is finally

 Solid Builders Inc. vs. China Bank

A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be granted

 Knights of Rizal vs. DMCI Homes, Inc.

A preliminary injunction is proper when the plaintiff appears to be clearly entitled

A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial or incomplete

 Hon. Mylyn P. Cayabyab vs. Jaime C. Dimson

 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Commander Raymond

GR. No. 197472, September 7, 2015

 AMA Land Inc. vs. Wack Wack Resident's Association, Inc.

The Court in Lukang v. Pagbilao Development Corporation reiterated the

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is

In the issuance of the injunctive writ, grave abuse of discretion implies a

 SPS. CESAR A. LARROBIS, JR. and VIRGINIA S. LARROBIS, petitioners,

 EVELINA G. CHAVEZ and AIDA CHAVEZ-DELES, Petitioners, v. COURT OF

 ANA MARIA A. KORUGA, Petitioner, v. TEODORO O. ARCENAS, JR.,

G.R. NO. 168332, June 19, 2009

We have repeatedly held that receivership is a harsh remedy to be

The power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one and should be exercised

 JOSE S. OROSA AND MARTHA P. OROSA V. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of

 KENNET JAO V. ABE C. ANDRES

To recapitulate what should be the common knowledge to sheriffs, the pertinent

Sec4. Duty of the Sheriff.

 ROGER V NAVARRO V. JOSE ESCOBIDO

Demand nor required prior to filing of replevin action.

Sec.2 Affidavit and bond

 AGNER V. BPI FAMILY SAVING S BANK, INC

 MANUEL DE ASIS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JAIME T.

The right to receive support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a

 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANUEL MANAHAN,

Compulsory acknowledgment of victim's child not proper where accused is

 SPOUSES PRUDENCIO and FILOMENA LIM, petitioners, vs. MA. CHERYL

 CHARLES GOTARDO, petitioner, vs. DIVINA BULING, respondent

If filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent