Santamaria v. Equitable PCI-Bank, Inc., G.R. No.

229540 (Notice),
[September 6, 2017]

IN GENERAL: One of the cases where the bank won. Cards are stacked against banks but it’s still
facts and circumstances. But still it’s charged with high standard of care.

Petitioner Vivian M. Santamaria ("Vivian") was hired as operations manager of a Select Convenience
Store in a Shell Gasoline Station at Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City which was owned and
operated by Lourdes Casimero ("Casimero"), Vivian's professor at the University of the Philippines.
Vivian served as such until January 29, 2004 when she left for the United States to attend to her ailing
sister-in-law.

Casimero also owns two (2) other entities, namely, Tensorex Industrial Corporation (Tensorex) and
Extra Mile Tire (EMT). Both are clients of respondent Equitable PCI- Bank, Inc., now called BDO
Unibank, Inc. ("BDO"). Respondent Mary Rose Tabing is an officer at BDO's West Avenue Branch.

On the other hand, petitioner Nina Rica M. Santamaria ("Nina") is the daughter of petitioner Vivian
who had no connection whatsoever with Casimero or any of Casimero's stores or businesses.
However, she had joined her mother in ling the present case against respondents since her name had
been signed on several checks issued from a current account which was opened by Casimero in the
name of petitioner Vivian.

It appears that a few months after Vivian was hired, Casimero suggested that they open a current
account in the name of Vivian to facilitate the payment of suppliers.

Vivian agreed to this suggestion and a current account was opened at respondent BDO's West
Avenue branch, without the presence of Vivian but with the aid of Tabing. Current Account No.
000237-00087-0 (the "Account") was opened in the name of Vivian and Lorelei Ibasco ("Ibasco"), the
daughter of Casimero. The required initial deposit was financed by Casimero, who thereafter gave
Vivian blank signature cards which she filled up and returned to Casimero for submission to the
bank.

Upon Casimero's instructions, Vivian proceeded to issue checks from the Account until the latter left
for an authorized leave of absence on January 29, 2004.

When she returned from the United States on June 9, 2004, Vivian was shocked to receive a letter
from BDO notifying her that she, who was addressed in the letter as "Proprietress of a certain
Santamaria Tires," was a debtor of Tensorex and that the latter had assigned Vivian's debt to BDO.
She thereafter learned that several checks were issued from the Account in favor of several entities
after she left for the United States (US) on January 30, 2004.

Vivian then called Casimero and asked about the matter. However, Casimero told her to disregard the
same as she will settle it with the bank and will contact Vivian thereafter. However, Casimero never
got in touch with Vivian and the former's whereabouts could no longer be found.
Meantime, Vivian left again for the US in November 2004 and came back in March 2005 due to the
failing health and eventual death of her sister-in-law. Upon her return, she was surprised to receive a
letter from Rykom Leasing and Finance Corporation demanding that she pay Tensorex's receivables
from her. In view of this, Vivian became more worried and she was forced to go from one offi ce to
another to verify if she incurred loans from the checks she allegedly issued on behalf of Santamaria
Tires which ghost firm apparently was just Casimero's creation. In the process, Vivian discovered that
some checks issued from the Account were negotiated while others were dishonored as they bore the
forged signatures of petitioner Nina, who was neither the owner nor an authorized signatory of the
Account.

Petitioners filed a Complaint for damages seeking redress against respondents' actions. In their
defense, respondents BDO and Tabing sought for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack
of cause of action, claiming that they exercised good faith in accordance with ordinary banking
procedures while handling Vivian's account.

ISSUE: W/N bank was negligent and can be made liable. NO.

HELD: Petitioner Vivian's account was not solely owned by her. Petitioners conveniently omitted
this fact in the petition. However, records reveal that the subject account, Current Account No.
000237-00087-0, was indeed under the name of petitioner Vivian and Ibasco. Petitioners also
seemingly neglected to state that Ibasco had signed an authorization in favor of Casimero and a
certain Rosalia Agustin to "inquire balances" and for "confirmation of checks," among others. This
was never refuted by petitioners.

In fact, petitioner Vivian herself testified that Casimero had access to the subject account. Thus, the
CA properly concluded that petitioners failed to establish any negligence on the part of respondents
in having another person aside from petitioner Vivian to access the subject account.

In response to the CA's findings, petitioners now argue that respondents should be liable for
tolerating the negotiation of the forged checks. They assert that respondents failed to exercise the
high standards of integrity and performance required of them

when they accepted the negotiated checks bearing the forged signatures of petitioner Nina.

SC cited CA:

We stress that the signing of the checks bearing what appears to be appellee Nina Santamaria's name
is a separate matter. While We hold that the access of Vivian's account is presumed to have been
made in good faith by her co-depositor, the issuance of those checks in Nina's name bears an indicia
of bad faith. However, the liability attending the execution of such checks and its issuance to the
collection entities are beyond the scope of this appeal. Appellants cannot be held liable for something
over which they have no control over, i.e., the possessor of such checks deciding to breach the trust
reposed in him by issuing the checks under the signature of one who does not own the account.

What lies within the province of this appeal, instead, is whether there is liability attending
appellants' acceptance of deposits for the alleged falsified checks and appellants' acceptance/receiving
of checks issued by Casimero in the course of her application for a discounting/credit line for
Tensorex

Appellees, however, never claimed injury or damage from the deposits of these falsified checks. As
We have held above, the funding of such checks was never shown to have been made by an
unauthorized person. Without contrary proof, We cannot discount that these were made by Ibasco,
as co-owner of the subject account.

Anent the irregularity of funding those checks, We reach the similar conclusion that the appellees
have not shown how they were inconvenienced or worried by the deposits. Appellee Vivian's
anxieties only came about from her assumption that Casimero was operating her account; however, as
We have discussed, such assumption has not been proved and she has failed to eliminate the plausible
explanation that her co- depositor Ibasco was the one operating their account while she (Vivian) was
abroad.

In fact, the funding of the checks saved appellee Vivian from liability. As a result of credit infusions
for the Nina Rica Santamaria checks, appellees never had to shell out any money for those
instruments, notwithstanding that these were drawn from Vivian's account.

Yet it cannot be denied that BDO committed questionable practices in accepting late payments for
these Nina Rica Santamaria checks. However, BDO ought to be answerable to the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, for possibly violating its duties and responsibilities as a banking institution, and not to the
appellees, who failed to prove that they were made to answer for those checks, and hence,
consequently failed to prove any injury from the transactions.

Article 1173 of the Civil Code defines negligence as the "omission of that diligence which is required
by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the

circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place."

SC found that respondents were not negligent and in fact exercised utmost diligence to verify the
authenticity of the checks or, at least, confirm if the checks were validly issued by the owners of the
subject account. Respondent bank referred the questionable checks to its Branch's Technical
Overdraft Screen/Report and tried contacting Ibasco or petitioner Vivian for confirmation of the
checks. However, when neither could be reached, respondent bank resorted to the depositors'
authorized representatives — Casimero and Agustin — who confirmed the issuance of the checks.
This act of confirming checks was within the explicit scope of the powers given to these authorized
representatives by Ibasco as a co-depositor of the account. Thus, We do not agree that respondents
were negligent.

Respondents even sent a Statement of Account to petitioner Vivian which required the depositor to
contact the bank immediately should there be any discrepancies in the transactions made. Yet,
petitioner Vivian never contacted respondent bank about any discrepancies despite receiving the
Statement of Account.

It is also worthy to note that petitioners themselves admitted in the petition that as early as June 9,
2004, petitioner Vivian had already received the notice of assignment of debts from BDO, and yet,
she did not even bother to confront BDO on the matter. Instead, she merely contacted Casimero who
told her to disregard the same as the latter had already settled the matter. After five months,
petitioner Vivian had to go back to the States to attend to her ailing sister-in-law. Despite the lapse of
five months since she received the notice from BDO, petitioner Vivian still failed to contact
respondent Bank after not having heard back from Casimero. It was only upon receiving a demand
letter from Rykom Financing and other financing companies and after speaking with other possible
creditors that petitioner Vivian decided to contact respondent Bank to settle the matter.

Proximate cause is that cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result

would not have occurred. 23 Petitioners assert that the proximate cause of their supposed injuries is
respondent bank's alleged negligence. However, as had been discussed earlier, We find that
respondent bank did not commit any negligence on its part.

Instead, it can be seen in the present case that the proximate cause of the supposed injury which
petitioners had suffered resulted from the issuance of the allegedly forged checks by a yet unidenti ed
person. Even then, petitioners failed to establish that the issuance of the allegedly forged checks were
caused by either respondent bank or respondent Tabing.