GONZALES VS KATIGBAK

G.R. NO. L-69500 JULY 22, 1985

FACTS: In a resolution of a sub-committee of respondent Board of October 23, 1984, a

permit to exhibit the film Kapit sa Patalim under the classification "For Adults Only," with
certain changes and deletions enumerated was granted. A motion for reconsideration
was filed by petitioners stating that the classification of the film "For Adults Only" was
without basis. 4 Then on November 12, 1984, respondent Board released its decision:
"Acting on the applicant's Motion for Reconsideration dated 29 October 1984, the
Board, after a review of the resolution of the sub-committee and an examination of the
film, Resolves to affirm in toto the ruling of the sub-committee. Considering, however,
certain vital deficiencies in the application, the Board further Resolves to direct the
Chairman of the Board to Withheld the issuance of the Permit to exhibit until these
deficiencies are supplied

ISSUE: WON the rating made with grave abuse of discretion

 HELD : Roth- Sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is material
which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest. The portrayal of sex,
e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material
the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press. Sex, a great and
mysterious motive force in human life has indisputably been a subject of absorbing
interest to mankind through the ages; it is one of the vital problems of human interest
and public concern. In the Philippine context, E.O. 876 applied contemporary Filipino
cultural values as a standard. Moreover, as far as the question of sex and obscenity are
concerned, it cannot be stressed strongly that the arts and letters "shall be under the
patronage of the State. Given this constitutional mandate, It will be less than true to its
function if any government office or agency would invade the sphere of autonomy that
an artist enjoys. There is no orthodoxy in what passes for beauty or for reality. It is for
the artist to determine what for him is a true representation. It is not to be forgotten that
art and belleslettres deal primarily with imagination, not so much with ideas in a strict
sense. What is seen or perceived by an artist is entitled to respect, unless there is a
showing that the product of his talent rightfully may be considered obscene. On the
question of obscenity, therefore, such standard set forth in Executive Order No. 878 is
to be construed in such a fashion to avoid any taint of unconstitutionality. To repeat,
what was stated in a recent decision in Trinidad- an elementary, a fundamental, and a
universal role of construction, applied when considering constitutional questions, that
when a law is susceptible of two constructions' one of which will maintain and the other
destroy it, the courts will always adopt the former. There can be no valid objection to the
controlling standard. There was really a grave abuse of discretion when the Board and
its perception of what obscenity is is very restrictive. But, sadly, THERE WERE NOT
ENOUGH VOTES TO MAINTAIN THAT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION. The supporting evidence was in the fact that some scenes were not for
young people. They might misunderstand the scenes. The respondents offered to make
it GP if the petitioners would remove the lesbian and sex scenes. But they refused. The
ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity applicable to motion pictures. It is the
consensus of this Court that where television is concerned: a less liberal approach calls
for observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to
pay their way, television reaches every home where there is a set. It is hardly the
concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult population. It cannot be
denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of
caring for the welfare of the young.
 BORJAL VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 126466, JANUARY 14, 1999
FACTS: Private respondent filed for damages against petitioners for the series of
articles written by the latter in a newspaper column, which dealt with alleged anomalous
activities without naming or identifying private respondent. Petitioners contends that the
right to free press is a privilege communication.
ISSUE: WON commentaries on matters of public interest are privilege.
HELD: Yes. No culpability could be imputed to petitioners for the alleged offending
publication without doing violence to the concept of privileged communications implicit
in the freedom of the press.

AGLIPAY V. RUIZ,
GR NO. L-45459, MARCH 13, 1937
FACTS:
Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition
against respondent Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and
selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized
by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling, as
authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose – for the
benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?
HELD/REASON:
The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the
respondent does not contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the
purpose was only ‘to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist’ and the
government just took advantage of an event considered of international importance,
thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision on the separation of the Church and
State. Moreover, the Court stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as a constitutional
mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its
influence in human affairs’. Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino people ‘implored the
aid of Divine Providence’, they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the
destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is
recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately
accorded to religious sects and denominations.’

ESTRADA VS ESCRITOR
A.M. NO. P-02-1651, AUGUST 4, 2003

FACTS:
Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an
investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter, is living with
a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old.
Estrada is not personally related either to Escritor or her partner. Nevertheless, he filed
the charge against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that
tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed
therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.
Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was
already a widow, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she has been
living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for twenty years and that
they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is
in conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living together, she
executed on July 28, 1991 a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness," insofar as the
congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement
between Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members in good standing in the
congregation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of "gross
and immoral conduct."
HELD:
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and
interests but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent
possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by
laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based
on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. It still remains to be
seen if respondent is entitled to such doctrine as the state has not been afforded the
chance has demonstrate the compelling state interest of prohibiting the act of
respondent, thus the case is remanded to the RTC.

Benevolent neutrality is inconsistent with the Free Exercise Clause as far as it prohibits
such exercise given a compelling state interest. It is the respondent’s stance that the
respondent’s conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within
the scope of free exercise protection. Should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct
where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Court’s action would be an
unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. The Court cannot
therefore simply take a passing look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom, but
must instead apply the “compelling state interest” test. The government must be heard
on the issue as it has not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of
demonstrating the state’s compelling interest which can override respondent’s religious
belief and practice.

EVERSON V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 30 U.S. 1, 1946

Facts. The Petitioner in his status as a taxpayer filed suit challenging the ability of the
Respondent to reimburse funds to parents of parochial school students for the
transportation of their children to and from school. The Petitioner brought suit alleging
that the New Jersey reimbursement statute respects the establishment of religion, by
allowing the parents of parochial school students to benefit from the reimbursement
scheme. The New Jersey Court of Appeals held that the statute did not violate the
Constitution and the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) granted
certiorari to consider the issue.
Issue. This case considers whether the parents of parochial school children can benefit
from the same services afforded to the parents of public school children.

Held. Affirmed.
In affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court found the statute
was not unconstitutional because it was designed to provide a benefit to the parents of
all school children, distinct from any religious function in which the children engaged.

LEMON V. KURTZMAN, 403 U.S. 602, 1971

Facts. Pennsylvania has a statute that reimburses religious schools for teacher

salaries, textbooks, and other instructional materials. Rhode Island has a similar statute
that allows the state to pay private school teachers a 15% salary supplement.
Issue. Is it constitutional for the state to provide financial assistance to religious schools
for the cost of teaching secular subjects?

Held. No. The statutes result in excessive entanglement between the government and
religion. Excessive entanglement is determined by the character and purpose of the
institution benefited, the nature of the aid given, and the resulting relationship between
the government and church.

EBRANILAG V. DIVISION OF SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOL OF CEBU.

G.R. NO. 95770, MARCH 1, 1993

FACTS : In G.R. No. 95770 "Roel Ebralinag, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of
Schools of Cebu and Manuel F. Biongcog, Cebu District Supervisor," the petitioners are
43 high school and elementary school students in the towns of Daan Bantayan,
Pinamungajan, Carcar, and Taburan Cebu province. All minors, they are assisted by
their parents who belong to the religious group known as Jehovah's Witnesses which
claims some 100,000 "baptized publishers" in the Philippines. In G.R. No. 95887, "May
Amolo, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and Antonio A. Sangutan,"
the petitioners are 25 high school and grade school students enrolled in public schools
in Asturias, Cebu, whose parents are Jehovah's Witnesses. Both petitions were
prepared by the same counsel, Attorney Felino M. Ganal. All the petitioners in these two
cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for
refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as
required by Republic Act No. 1265 of July 11, 1955, and by Department Order No. 8
dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making
the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions ISSUE :

ISSUE : WON the expulsion is illegal

HELD : Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority
and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man
to his Creator Petitioners stress, however, that while they do not take part in the
compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would
offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the
observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag
ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the
solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no
warrant for their expulsion We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's
Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic
pledge, this religious group which admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school
population" will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught
and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country
and admiration for national heroes" Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine
schools will bring about the very situation that this Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing
a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony
that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect
for dully constituted authorities If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony
while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite
the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or
pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public
health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right (and duty) to
prevent.

MANOTOC V. CA,
G.R. NO. L-62100, MAY 30, 1986

FACTS : There was a torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities Inc
which was suspected to be fake. 6 of its clients filed separate criminal complaints
against the petitioner and Leveriza, President and VP respectively. He was charged
with estafa and was allowed by the Court to post bail. Petitioner filed before each trial
court motion for permission to leave the country stating his desire to go to US relative to
his business transactions and opportunities. Such was opposed by the prosecution and
was also denied by the judges. He filed petition for certiorari with CA seeking to annul
the prior orders and the SEC communication request denying his leave to travel abroad.
According to the petitioner, having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the
courts that granted him bail nor SEC, which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could
prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel

 ISSUE : WON the Court Acted with grave abuse of discretion

 HELD : A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given
for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before
any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or
recognizance The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all
times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his
right to travel If the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient
reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts As petitioner has failed to
satisfy the trial courts and the appellate court of the urgency of his travel, the duration
thereof, as well as the consent of his surety to the proposed travel, We find no abuse of
judicial discretion in their having denied petitioner's motion for permission to leave the
country, in much the same way, albeit with contrary results, that We found no reversible
error to have been committed by the appellate court in allowing Shepherd to leave the
country after it had satisfied itself that she would comply with the conditions of her bail
bond.

EFRAIM C. GENUINO v. LEILA M. DE LIMA, GR No. 197930, 2018-04-17

FACTS:
then DOJ Secretary Silvestre H. Bello III issued DOJ Circular No. 17, prescribing rules
and regulations governing the issuance of HDOs. The said issuance was intended to
restrain the indiscriminate issuance of HDOs which impinge on the people's right to
travel. Then Acting DOJ Secretary Alberto C. Agra issued the assailed DOJ Circular No.
41, consolidating DOJ Circular Nos. 17 and 18, which will govern the issuance and
implementation of HDOs, WLOs, and ADOs. Section 10 of DOJ Circular No. 41
expressly repealed all rules and regulations contained in DOJ Circular Nos. 17 and 18,
as well as all instructions, issuances or orders or parts thereof which are inconsistent
with its provisions. In three separate letters dated October 20, 2011, October 21, 2011,
and October 24, 2011, GMA requested for the issuance of an ADO, pursuant to Section
7 of DOJ Circular No. 41, so that she may be able to seek medical attention from
medical specialists abroad for her hypoparathyroidism and metabolic bone mineral
disorder. He mentioned six different countries where she intends to undergo
consultations and treatment. GMA filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction, docketed as G.R. No. 199034, to annul and set aside DOJ
Circular No. 41 and WLOs issued against her for allegedly being unconstitutional, while
the petitioners anchor their right in esse on the right to travel under Section 6, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution, the said right is not absolute. One of the limitations on the right
to travel is DOJ Circular No. 41, which was issued pursuant to the rule-making powers
of the DOJ in order to keep individuals under preliminary investigation within the
jurisdiction of the Philippine criminal justice system.
ISSUES:
he petitioners impute the respondents of violating their constitutional right to travel
through the enforcement of DOJ Circular No. 41. They claim that the issuance
unnecessarily places a restraint on the right to travel even in the absence of the
grounds provided in the Constitution.
RULING:
Liberty under the foregoing clause includes the right to choose one's residence, to leave
it whenever he pleases and to travel wherever he wills.
It is apparent, however, that the right to travel is not absolute. There are constitutional,
statutory and inherent limitations regulating the right to travel. Section 6 itself provides
that the right to travel may be impaired only in the interest of national security, public
safety or public health, as may be provided by law.
Clearly, under the provision, there are only three considerations that may permit a
restriction on the right to travel: national security, public safety or public health. As a
further requirement, there must be an explicit provision of statutory law or the Rules of
Court[80] providing for the impairment.
 LEGASPI VS CIVIL SERV. COMM.
G.R. NO. L-72119 MAY 29, 1987

 FACTS : The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is
invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi
against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for
information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the
Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and
Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the
civil service examinations for sanitarians.

 ISSUE : WON the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate the civil service
eligibilities of the Health Department employees

 HELD : The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not

absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access
to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" The law
may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting
national security It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public
record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public
concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the
operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not
the information sought is of public interest or public concern. This question is first addressed to
the government agency having custody of the desired information. However, as already
discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In
case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information
requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been
exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the
constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an advantageous position to
marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]).
To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government agency
concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled
by a writ of Mandamus Public office being a public trust it is the legitimate concern of citizens to
ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons
who are eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to the people even as to their
eligibilities for their respective positions. In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny
the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law
which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles.
We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service
examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are
released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if
actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And
when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles,
the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil
Service Commission. The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in
the absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service
eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil
service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus,
therefore lies.
 VALMONTE vs BELMONTE
G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989

FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction
invoke their right to information and pray that respondent be directed: (a) to furnish
petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the
February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda
Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents
evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public
records for the subject information On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet
received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy
General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for
failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever
action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of
public interest."

 ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon
GSIS records on behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to
Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political
parties.

 HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of
confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is
apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy
issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be.
Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political
branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State
power. The concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke
their right to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the
loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the
interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those
holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as
compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny
The "transactions" used here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can cover both
steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract, Considering the intent
of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are
nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and controlled
corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are accountable
to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a
government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of
the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in
government dealings. Although citizens are afforded the right to information and,
pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not
accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts,
summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public
concern.

ECHEGARAY v. SEC. OF JUSTICE

January 19, 1999 (G.R. No. 132601)
FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo
Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary
assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the
rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant
reprieve.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality
of judgment has already been rendered… that by granting the TRO, the Honorable
Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function.
HELD:
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of
the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and
forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. The provision, however, cannot be
interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions
after their finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death
convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than
the right to life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the
right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal
and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.