Estrada V Escritor
Estrada V Escritor
Estrada V Escritor
FACTS
Petitioner Estrada filed a complaint for immorality against respondent Escritor, a court interpreter in Branch 253, Las
Piñ as City RTC.
In his frequent visits to the Hall of Justice of Las Piñ as City, Estrada learned from conversations therein that
respondent was living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and that she had an 18 to 20-year old son by
this man. This prompted petitioner to file the charge against respondent as he believes that she is committing an
immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it
might appear that the court condones her act.
Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband
having died in 1998. She admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage
for twenty years and that they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses
and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious
beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness”
which was approved by the congregation.
Moreover, the Jehovah's congregation believes that once all legal impediments for the couple are lifted, the validity of
the declarations ceases, and the couple should legalize their union. In Escritor's case, although she was widowed in
1998, thereby lifting the legal impediment to marry on her part, her mate was still not capacitated to remarry. Thus,
their declarations remained valid. In sum, therefore, insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing
immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members in good
standing in the congregation.
Gregorio Salazar, a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since 1991,
testified and explained the import of and procedures for executing the declaration which was completely executed by
Escritor and Quilapio’s in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central
Office.
An investigation was done by Executive Judge Bonifcaio Maceda. In his Report and Recommendation, he found
Escritors factual allegations credible as they were supported by testimonial and documentary evidence. While
immoral if viewed in Catholic standards, he recognized that Escritor as a member of Jehovah’s witness. He
acknowledged that religious freedom is a fundamental right, and dismissed the complaint.
After considering the Report and Recommendation of Executive Judge Maceda, the Office of the Court Administrator,
through Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Christopher Lock concurred with the factual findings of Judge Maceda
but departed from his recommendation to dismiss the complaint. DCA Lock stressed that although Escritor had
become capacitated to marry by the time she joined the judiciary as her husband had died a year before, it is due to
her relationship with a married man, voluntarily carried on, that respondent may still be subject to disciplinary action.
DCA Lock found Escritors defense of freedom of religion unavailing to warrant dismissal of the charge of immorality.
Accordingly, he recommended that respondent be found guilty of immorality and that she be penalized with
suspension of six months and one day without pay.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s right to religious freedom should carve out an exception from the prevailing
jurisprudence on illicit relations for which government employees are held administratively liable (YES)
HELD:
BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY
In the Filipino context, the benevolent neutrality approach is taken in interpreting the religion clauses. Benevolent
neutrality recognizes the religious nature of the Filipino people and the elevating influence of religion in society; at the
same time, it acknowledges that government must pursue its secular goals. Thus, such an approach looks further than
the secular purposes of the government action and examines the effect of these actions on religious exercise. As a
result, in the absence of legislation granting an exemption from a law of general applicability, the Court can carve out
an exception when the religion clauses justify it.
It primarily gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free exercise Clause. In the case
at bar, it involves a type of accommodation where an exemption is sought from a law of general applicability that
inadvertently burdens religious exercise.
But while history, constitutional construction, and earlier jurisprudence unmistakably show that benevolent
neutrality is the lens with which the Court ought to view religion clause cases, it must be stressed that the interest of
the state should also be afforded utmost protection.
Thus, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test
requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter
religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In determining which shall prevail between the
state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide.
In applying the benevolent neutrality and the compelling state interest test to the case at bar, the first inquiry is
whether respondent’s right to religious freedom has been burdened. There is no doubt that choosing between
keeping her employment and abandoning her religious belief and practice and family on the one hand, and giving up
her employment and keeping her religious practice and family on the other hand, puts a burden on her free exercise of
religion.
The second step is to ascertain respondent’s sincerity in her religious belief. Respondent appears to be sincere in
her religious belief and practice and is not merely using the “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” to avoid
punishment for immorality. She did not secure the Declaration only after entering the judiciary where the moral
standards are strict and defined, much less only after an administrative case for immorality was filed against her. The
Declaration was issued to her by her congregation after ten years of living together with her partner, Quilapio, and ten
years before she entered the judiciary. Ministers from her congregation testified on the authenticity of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses’ practice of securing a Declaration and their doctrinal or scriptural basis for such a practice.
The state’s interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high standard
of morality and decency. There is nothing in the OCA’s (Office of the Court Administrator) memorandum to the Court
that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should override respondent’s plea of religious freedom
nor is it shown that the means employed by the government in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to
respondent’s religious exercise.
Should the Court prohibit and punish respondent’s conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the
Court’s action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom.
Thus, the case is remanded to the office of the Court Administrator to give the government the opportunity to prove
how such a state interest is compelling enough to override respondent’s religious belief and practice.