Copyright © 2010 by the author(s). Published here under license by the Resilience Alliance.

Cox, M., G. Arnold, and S. Villamayor Tomás. 2010. A review of design principles for community-based
natural resource management. Ecology and Society 15(4): 38. [online] URL: http://www.
ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss4/art38/

Synthesis
A Review of Design Principles for Community-based Natural Resource
Management

Michael Cox 1, Gwen Arnold 1, and Sergio Villamayor Tomás 1

ABSTRACT. In 1990, Elinor Ostrom proposed eight design principles, positing them to characterize robust
institutions for managing common-pool resources such as forests or fisheries. Since then, many studies
have explicitly or implicitly evaluated these design principles. We analyzed 91 such studies to evaluate the
principles empirically and to consider what theoretical issues have arisen since their introduction. We found
that the principles are well supported empirically and that several important theoretical issues warrant
discussion. We provide a reformulation of the design principles, drawing from commonalities found in the
studies.

Key Words: common-pool resources; design principles; diagnostics; institutions

INTRODUCTION In 1983, the National Research Council established

a research committee to examine the problems
The challenge of complexity facing the users of CPRs, bringing together scholars
from a wide diversity of disciplines to review the
Scholars in the social sciences have only recently existing empirical evidence about CPRs and the
begun to deal with the challenges involved in impacts of diverse governance arrangements. A
analyzing complex systems. The central problem is report was published in 1986 that criticized the
the large number of relevant variables and their confusion related to property regimes for CPRs and
interactions that affect how human systems operate recommended the need for further research on how
at multiple levels. This complexity increases when diversely structured systems for governing and
social systems interact with natural systems that managing CPRs perform in the field (National
present similar analytical difficulties. Communities Research Council 1986). The report argued that the
of users managing common-pool resources (CPRs) complexity of the systems used to manage CPRs in
such as forests or fisheries are excellent examples the field had confused scholars into thinking that
of this complexity. Understanding these situations chaos prevailed unless simple government or
is important given the increasing impact humans are private-property systems were imposed.
having on the environment and the important role
that communities often play in natural resource
management in diverse settings worldwide. Previous analyses of common-pool resources

Until the 1980s, many scholars had presumed that Concurrently with these events, colleagues at the
the users of such resources could not self-organize Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis
to manage them. Thus, scholars often recommended at Indiana University in Bloomington, Indiana,
the imposition of government or private ownership USA, created a database to record key information
based on the theories of Gordon (1954), Demsetz from the growing number of case studies found in
(1967), and Hardin (1968). Scholarly reports during the literature related to how self-organized regimes
the mid-1980s, however, began to raise serious manage CPRs. The database included variables
questions about the wisdom of massive efforts to describing the structure of the resource systems, the
impose particular institutional arrangements on the history of the people involved, the rules in use, the
users of CPRs (Feeny et al. 1990). organizations involved, the amount of resource
units harvested, and the conditions of the resource.

1
Indiana University
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A core question pursued by the group was: What METHODS

type of rules appear to be most successful in
sustaining the productive use of CPRs? Data collection and coding
Although it appeared that some common attributes We examined studies that evaluated Ostom’s (1990)
were shared by the long-surviving CPR systems, design principles directly or indirectly in the context
these were not in the form of specific institutional of communities that use common-property
rules such as those propounded in the literature. In arrangements to manage CPRs. A study is a journal
Ostrom’s (1990) textbook Governing the commons: article, book, or other work that we coded for the
the evolution of institutions for collective action, she purposes of analysis. We used two data sets: the
drew on this work to posit a set of eight general study data set, which we discuss first; and the case
design principles that appeared to characterize the data set, which we discuss second.
efficacy of multiple types of rules and sets of rules.
Two methods were used to populate the study data
While the formulation of principles associated with set. The first method involved conducting searches
successful collective action in CPR governance is a in standard academic databases and relevant
challenging endeavor, it is equally important to journals, as well as in the library at the Workshop
understand the mechanisms underlying these in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana
associations. A full account of the theoretical University. This library is a special collection
mechanisms and the models of human behavior created to form a thorough representation of
involved is beyond the scope of our analysis. The writings on the commons. It includes the Digital
model of the individual that Ostrom (1990:185) Library of the Commons, which is an online
relied on consisted of “fallible, norm-adopting repository of full-text articles, books, book chapters,
individuals who pursue contingent strategies in conference papers, theses, dissertations, and
complex and uncertain environments.” The working papers (http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/). The
institutional design principles then follow North’s second method involved a snowball procedure
(1990) conception of institutions as mechanisms for wherein studies analyzed in the first step were used
reducing uncertainty in complex, uncertain to find other studies that referenced them or were
environments. By reducing uncertainty, trust and referenced by them and were considered relevant to
norms of reciprocity may be built and sustained, and the project.
collective action may become possible. In this
context, the primary role of the design principles is Only studies published subsequent to Ostrom’s
to explain under what conditions trust and (1990) book were considered. Many of the studies
reciprocity can be built and maintained to sustain analyzed are mentioned later in this analysis for
collective action in the face of social dilemmas demonstrative purposes. The full list of studies that
posed by CPRs. This collective action, in turn, helps we coded is available as an appendix to the Digital
prevent the deterioration of a managed CPR. Library of the Commons website (http://hdl.handle.
net/10535/6613). Following data collection, we
A substantial volume of literature has amassed looked for patterns in the studies by coding relevant
concerning the usefulness and validity of Ostom’s variables for each study and entering them into a
(1990) design principles, and the reactions have common database. Some of the primary fields coded
been mixed. Although there has been substantial included: methodology, sector, evaluation, and
support for the principles, some scholars have overt.
criticized their theoretical grounding or argued that
they are overly precise with respect to the range of Methodology
conditions to which they might be applied. Given
that much has been written about the design We first divided the studies into four
principles since 1990, it seems appropriate now to methodological types that indicated whether the
conduct a review of the relevant literature to study was a relatively detailed case study, a
document its findings and re-evaluate the principles. statistical study, a synthesis study, or an abstract
study. The first three methodological types are
empirical studies, whereas the fourth type is not.
The following descriptions were used as a guide in
determining the type of each study. A detailed study
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contained a detailed description of one or more cases of an impressionistic variable, the field was coded
of community-based CPR management. Detailed by two separate coders for each study. Where there
studies included single and comparative case studies was disagreement between the two coders, we opted
and in-depth meta-analyses of cases conducted by for the more conservative (lower) value.
others. A statistical study contained a statistical
analysis of many cases without exploring their Finally, for both empirically grounded and abstract
individual properties in depth. A synthesis study studies, if our impressions of the data presented
combined findings from two or more cases, but did disagreed with the author’s own interpretations or
not contain the detail needed to produce case- descriptions, we always coded according to the
specific conclusions regarding the design author’s inferences, rather than our own
principles. An abstract study contained a primarily impressions. This procedure helped to protect
abstract or theoretical argument, with only against possible bias in coding the studies.
anecdotal references to cases or empirical data.
Overt
Sector
The overt field indicated whether a study explicitly
We then divided the studies into sectors based on or implicitly evaluated the design principles.
what type of CPR was being managed: forest,
fishery, irrigation, pasture, multiple, or other. Coding of cases
Studies that were coded as multiple did not focus
exclusively on one of these four sectors, but rather A detailed study may contain more than one case.
examined combinations of some or all of the sectors. A case is an empirical work focusing on a particular
Studies that were coded as other examined a geographic area that contains one or more
different resource altogether. communities that manage a single CPR or a set of
closely related CPRs, and which evaluates Ostrom’s
Evaluation (1990) design principles explicitly or implicitly.
Cases were coded separately in the case data set. If
The evaluation variable is an important outcome a study described a number of cases but only
variable in our analysis. It indicates the general level discussed them anecdotally to produce its
of support that a study shows for the design conclusions, or if it described a whole set of cases
principles and ranges from one to five, with one as one type of case, it was coded as a synthesis and
being highly unsupportive and five being highly not a detailed case study, and the cases mentioned
supportive. For empirical studies, the coding was were not included in the case data set. Likewise,
based on the balance of positive and negative observations from statistical studies were not
evidence presented in the study. If there was positive included as cases in our analysis. A detailed study
evidence and no negative evidence, or if there was could contain two cases of the same set of
overwhelming positive evidence and little negative communities and CPR if they were presented during
in an empirical study, it was coded as highly substantially different time periods and important
supportive. If there was moderately positive changes had taken place between the periods. A
evidence that outweighed some negative evidence, common example of this is an account of a
or slightly positive evidence and no negative historically successful case that in more recent times
evidence, the study was coded as moderately has been struggling to deal with novel
supportive. If there was an equal mix of positive and socioeconomic disturbances (e.g., timber markets).
negative evidence, the study was coded as neutral. For such an example, there could be a historical case
Coding moderately to highly unsupportive studies and a modern case for the same community or set
followed criteria that were analogous to the of communities managing a CPR.
supportive categories.
The most important variables coded for each of the
Coding the evaluation field for studies that did not cases were the success and evidence variables, each
have empirical data was more impressionistic. For is of which is binary. The success variable was
abstract studies, we had to interpret the degree to coded as one if a case reported successful long-term
which the author favored or criticized specific environmental management and zero if it reported
principles or the design principles approach. In a clear failure in collective action and management.
recognition of the possibility for bias in the coding If the author was ambiguous, offered multiple
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conflicting outcomes, or offered an outcome Following this, we evaluated the importance of the
irrelevant to the collective action theory of the individual design principles as they were coded in
design principles, the success field was left blank. the cases. Because most of the cases did not give
enough information to code the importance of all of
We coded an evidence variable for each of the the principles, we analyzed these data on a principle
design principles for each case. This variable basis, rather than attempting to combine the data
indicated whether we could infer from the evidence into one larger analysis, which would suffer from a
that conditions satisfying each principle were large missing-data problem. Thus, we conducted a
present in a case. If there was evidence of satisfying separate analysis for each design principle.
conditions, we coded a one for that case. If there
was positive evidence against such conditions, we For each principle, we explored the joint distribution
coded a zero. If no reference was made to the of the evidence and success variables of the cases
principle, or if we considered the description overly that recorded values of each variable for that
ambiguous, we left the field blank for that principle principle. These distributions gave us an idea of
and considered it a missing datum. As a result of whether the presence of conditions related to a
this method of coding, many of the cases have no particular principle is positively associated with a
entries for several of the principles, and each case reporting successful long-term CPR
principle is essentially associated with its own management. We used Fisher’s exact test to
subset of cases in the data set. determine whether the evidence variable was
independent from the success variable. This test is
Unlike the evaluation variable for the studies, we more appropriate for 2 × 2 tables with smaller
did not double-code the important variables for sample sizes than those analyzed using the common
every case because, for many, the authors itemized Chi-square test (Field 2009). We then reported the
their discussion of each principle and overtly stated proportion of supportive cases to unsupportive cases
its presence and/or importance. Similarly to the for each principle. Finally, we calculated an effect
coding of studies, we coded according to the size between the two variables using the phi statistic,
authors’ own statements, rather than our which is an appropriate measure of the strength of
impressions, if there was a conflict between the two. correlation between two dichotomous variables
Depending on how ambiguous a case was in its (Field 2009).
description, more or less discussion among the
coders took place to determine what coding, if any,
was warranted. RESULTS

A total of 91 studies and 77 cases were coded. The overall average of the evaluation variable
across all 91 studies was 3.73, or slightly below the
value for moderately supportive (Table 1). There
Analytical methods was a significant difference among the levels of
support for the design principles across the
We applied two levels of quantitative analysis to methodological study types (Kruskal-Wallis test; P
these data once they were coded. The first was a = 0.004). There were more detailed studies and
statistical description of the level of support found syntheses than other study types, and they tended to
in the studies based on the evaluation variable. We have the highest evaluation values. Statistical
examined the interactions between an ordinal studies were somewhat lower in their evaluations,
dependent variable that ranged from one to five (the but were still supportive. Abstract studies had a
evaluation variable) and several categorical median evaluation score of 2.0, or moderately
variables (the various types of studies). We used unsupportive. The difference between the
descriptive tables and two statistical tests: the evaluation value of the abstract studies and the three
Mann-Whitney test to explore possible differences types of empirical studies as one group was
in the evaluation scores between any two study statistically significant (Mann-Whitney test; P =
categories, and the Kruskal-Wallis test to look for 0.002). Moreover, when abstract studies were
significant differences between a set of study excluded from the analysis, the differences among
categories. the other three categories became nonsignificant
(Kruskal-Wallis test; P = 0.122). This indicates that
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much of the criticism or lack of support directed at For each principle, we examined the joint
the principles in the literature that we reviewed was distribution of the evidence and success variables
of an abstract, rather than an empirical, nature. for the cases that recorded each variable for that
principle (Table 3). The evidence variable indicates
We also analyzed several other relationships. When whether conditions satisfying a principle are present
we analyzed the evaluation variable by study sector, in the case, whereas the success variable indicates
each sector was at least somewhat supportive of the whether the case reports successful community-
design principles (Table 2), and the differences based natural resource management. Combinations
among the categories was not statistically in which the evidence and success variables have
significant (Kruskal-Wallis test; P = 0.747). equal values (both one or both zero) are supportive
Similarly, the medians were consistent across all of the design principles theory. For example, the
categories. The slightly lower mean values for the upper left cell for principle 1A indicates that 31
pastoral and other categories resulted primarily cases were coded as indicating successful
from a single study in each group that had an management as well as the presence of user
evaluation value of one (highly unsupportive). The boundaries; these cases are supportive of principle
value of the multiple category likewise contained 1A. These supportive combinations are in the main
two such highly unsupportive studies that lowered diagonal of each of the cross-tabulations. The two
its mean. Without these critical studies, the mean other combinations in the off-diagonals are
for each of these groups would have been four, or unsupportive. With more cases in each main
moderately supportive. Thus, we conclude that there diagonal than in the corresponding off-diagonal,
was not much difference among sectors in the level these joint distributions show that each principle has
of support for the principles. more supportive than unsupportive cases.

Subsequently, we tested and found no statistical Fisher’s exact test between the evidence and success
relationship between the evaluation score of a study variables produced probabilities that were
and the year in which it was published or produced. significant at the 5% level for every principle except
Finally, we analyzed whether studies that overtly Principle 8, which was significant at the 10% level
evaluated the principles were more or less (Table 3). Therefore, we generally reject the null
supportive than studies that only evaluated them hypothesis that the two variables are independent
implicitly, without mentioning the principles. Of the for each principle. The principles varied widely in
91 studies, 60 were overt and 31 were not. The mean their ratios of supportive to unsupportive cases, but
evaluation score for the overt studies was 3.60, every one had at least twice as many supportive
whereas the mean for studies that did not directly cases as unsupportive. In our following discussion
evaluate the principles was 3.97, and the median for of the design principles, we refer to principles with
both categories was 4.0; the difference was not ratios > 10 as very strongly supported, ratios of 5–
statistically significant (P = 0.343). Moreover, we 10 as strongly supported, and ratios of 2 to < 5 as
attribute much of the difference between the means moderately well supported. Finally, the phi statistic
to the fact that all nine abstract (and generally measures the strength of an association between two
unsupportive) studies were overt. If we take these dichotomous variables and is similar to a correlation
nine abstract studies out of the overt group, the coefficient in interpretation. A value of zero for this
average evaluation value for empirical studies that statistic indicates little to no association between
overtly evaluated the design principles rises to 3.82. two dichotomous variables, whereas a value of one
The difference remains statistically nonsignificant indicates a very strong positive association. All of
(P = 0.842). the associations between the two variables are
positive.
We then looked at the importance of the individual
design principles in the coded cases. We used a
slightly modified version of the design principles to DISCUSSION
code the studies. Ostrom initially constructed eight
principles. For coding purposes, we divided Here, we discuss each of the design principles
principles 1, 2, and 4 into subcomponents labeled qualitatively to address particular issues that arose,
1A and 1B and so forth, so that we could analyze or important critiques that we found.
the importance of these subcomponents individually
(Table 3).
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Table 1. Mean and median ranking of the evaluation of the design principles for each methodological type
of study.

Study type N Mean Median

Detailed 46 3.85 4.0

Statistical 8 3.50 3.5

Synthetic 28 4.04 4.0

Abstract 9 2.33 2.0

Total/all types 91 3.73 4.0

Eight principles of any social arrangement.” Likewise, Turner

(1999:649) states, “Practitioners tend to expect the
Principle 1: Well-defined boundaries ‘community’ to be an immutable group of people
jointly managing a delimited common resource
This principle, as Agrawal (2002) notes, originally through uncontested, clearly defined rules of access.
stipulated the presence of well-defined boundaries Agro-pastoral reality strongly diverges from this
around a community of users and boundaries around model. Rules of access are often politically
the resource system this community uses. Each malleable and spatial boundaries fluid.” Finally,
component helps to internalize the positive and Ruddle (1996) emphasizes that boundaries may
negative externalities produced by participants, so have a gradient quality to them, with the strength of
they bear the costs of appropriation and receive access rights of a particular group to a CPR
some of the benefits of resource provision. Each gradually diminishing or increasing across a certain
component was coded separately, with community distance.
boundaries coded as principle 1A and resource
boundaries coded as 1B (Table 3). There was strong Several critics who favor a looser conception of
evidence for 1A and moderate evidence for 1B. geographic boundaries note, however, that they do
Pinkerton and Weinstein (1995:25), for example, not mean that the resource should be open access or
state, “Exclusion of outsiders from fishing space entirely boundary free, but merely that boundaries
was the main mechanism used by the villagers to should be more fluid than they think Ostrom (1990)
control fishing effort. This is one of the most conceptualizes them (e.g., Turner 1999). Niamir-
common and universal mechanisms found in Fuller (1998) gives an example of how such a system
community-managed inshore fisheries.” of fluid boundaries can persist, describing how the
boundaries between different groups of pastoralists
This principle was also the most frequent target of in Sahelian Africa are fuzzy and contain
(primarily theoretical) criticisms. The main overlapping, jointly managed zones and areas to
complaints concerning this principle are that it is which access is negotiated ad hoc among interested
too rigid and that, in many systems, fuzzier social parties.
or geographic boundaries are needed to facilitate
more flexible, ad hoc arrangements between Principle 2: Congruence between appropriation
participants (Ruddle 1996, Cleaver 1999, 2000, and provision rules and local conditions
Turner 1999, Mandondo 2001, Blaikie 2006).
Cleaver (1999:603) states, “A concentration on Ostrom’s (1990:92) second design principle refers
boundaries highlights the need in development for to the “congruence between appropriation and
clear administrative arrangements, more to do with provision rules and local conditions.” Like the first
the delivery of goods and facilities than a reflection principle, this principle stipulates two separate
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Table 2. Mean and median ranking of the evaluation of the design principles for each resource sector
analyzed.

Sector N Mean Median

Forestry 27 3.67 4.0

Pastoral 6 3.50 4.0

Irrigation 24 3.92 4.0

Fishery 17 3.88 4.0

Multiple 12 3.50 4.0

Other 5 3.40 4.0

Total/all sectors 91 3.73 4.0

conditions that Agrawal (2002) recognizes. The first by the Dhulikhel municipality imposed a total ban
condition is that both appropriation and provision on the harvest of forest products and that these rules
rules conform in some way to local conditions; did not match the resource conditions and
Ostrom emphasizes local conditions of the CPR, contradicted customary rules of villagers, who had
such as its spatial and temporal heterogeneity. The traditionally allowed activities such as the collection
second condition is that congruence exists between of leaf litter for animal bedding and fallen twigs for
appropriation and provision rules. We found very firewood. In turn, the effectiveness of monitoring
strong empirical evidence for both principles. and compliance with rules was very low, and the
forest had come under high extraction pressure.
Regarding principle 2A and the congruence Morrow and Hull (1996) studied a donor-initiated
between rules and local conditions (Table 3), the forestry cooperative in the Palcazu Valley of Peru
literature predominately reflects Ostrom’s emphasis and came to similar conclusions regarding the need
on an institutional congruence with the resource for this internal-external type of congruency.
condition, in line with the Spanish irrigation case
she discusses. For example, Guillet (1992:104) Turning to principle 2B (Table 3), congruence
describes practices in Peruvian irrigation systems: between appropriation and provision rules is
“Under normal conditions farmers are given water frequently described in the literature as congruence
sufficient to cover the requirements of their fields, between costs incurred by users and the benefits
a proportional allocation with Inka antecedents... they receive via their participation in collective
when water scarcity threatens, this principle is action. Pomeroy et al. (2001:4) echo Ostrom’s
modified and actions are taken to ensure that each finding, stating that in successful systems,
household has access to a subsistence minimum.” “individuals have an expectation that the benefits to
be derived from participation in and compliance
Some scholars have also identified local conditions with community-based management will exceed the
as involving the predominant culture, ideology, costs of investments in such activities.” Similarly,
customs, and livelihood strategies of a community Klooster (2000) compared seven communities that
(Morrow and Hull 1996, Young 2002, Gautam and have been successful in managing logging activities
Shivakoti 2005). Other authors have highlighted the and found that a common feature in these
negative consequences that result when externally communities is their effort to fairly reinvest benefits
imposed rules do not match local customs and into the community by paying for reforestation work
livelihood strategies. For example, Gautam and and providing public goods such as road
Shivakoti (2005) observed that the rules designed maintenance.
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Table 3. Relationship between each design principle and success or failure in the cases analyzed.

Evidence

Design principle† Support 1 0 N P‡ Ratio§ Effect

size|

1A. Clearly defined boundaries: Individuals or households who have rights Success 31 2 63 < 0.0001 5.3 0.692
to withdraw resource units from the common-pool resource (CPR) must be
clearly defined. Failure 8 22

1B. Clearly defined boundaries: The boundaries of the CPR must be well Success 22 4 42 0.049 2.2 0.313
defined.
Failure 9 7

2A. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local Success 20 0 30 0.001 5.0 0.737
conditions: Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or
quantity of resource units are related to local conditions. Failure 5 5

2B. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local Success 11 1 22 0.002 10.0 0.632
conditions: The benefits obtained by users from a CPR, as determined by
appropriation rules, are proportional to the amount of inputs required in the Failure 1 9
form of labor, material, or money, as determined by provision rules.

3. Collective-choice arrangements: Most individuals affected by the Success 20 6 49 0.001 2.8 0.466
operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules.
Failure 7 16

4A. Monitoring: Monitors are present and actively audit CPR conditions Success 32 3 63 < 0.0001 3.8 0.587
and appropriator behavior.
Failure 10 18

4B. Monitoring: Monitors are accountable to or are the appropriators. Success 27 2 38 < 0.0001 11.7 0.792

Failure 1 8

5. Graduated sanctions: Appropriators who violate operational rules are Success 13 4 36 0.019 2.3 0.398
likely to be assessed graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and
context of the offense) by other appropriators, officials accountable to these Failure 7 12
appropriators, or both.

6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms: Appropriators and their officials have Success 26 2 42 0.01 3.2 0.429
rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among
appropriators or between appropriators and officials. Failure 8 6

7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize: The rights of appropriators to Success 28 3 51 0.032 2.2 0.311
devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental
authorities. Failure 13 7

8. Nested enterprises: Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, Success 27 4 51 0.065 2.0 0.262
conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple
layers of nested enterprises. Failure 13 7

†The language used to describe each principle follows that of Ostrom (1990:90).
‡Significance of Fisher’s exact test between the evidence and success variables.
§The number of supportive cases (main diagonal) to unsupportive cases (off-diagonal).
|The effect size was determined using the phi statistic, which is similar in interpretation to a beta
coefficient in a standard regression.
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Additionally, some scholars have pointed to the organization. Other venues for collective
importance of users perceiving the match between management, although present, were also weak.
appropriation and provision rules as fair, relating
this condition to a principle of equity found in the Some scholars who have critiqued this principle do
literature. In the Andean irrigation system of not argue that it would lead to negative results if
Huayncotas, for example, all farmers have to properly implemented. Rather, they are concerned
contribute to maintenance of the system, but they with situations wherein the principle exists in form
do it in proportion to the amount of land each of but in practice has been co-opted or undermined by
them irrigates (Trawick 2001). Trawick (2001) locally powerful or external bureaucratic actors
found that the fact that appropriation and provision (Cleaver 1999, Skjølsvold 2008). The concern is
rules are applied to everybody while varying with similar to that expressed by others for principle 1A:
each farmer’s needs reinforced a commonly shared the critical feature might result from an
sense of equity and facilitated the sustainability of administrative or bureaucratic imposition, or it
the management system. Cox (2010) observed a might ignore some important features of the local
similar feature in the acequia irrigation systems in context.
the Taos Valley, New Mexico. In times of plenty,
the acequias apportion water to members in Principle 4: Monitoring
accordance to the amount of land owned, which is
in turn proportional to members’ provision Like principles 1 and 2, we treated principle 4 as
obligations. In times of scarcity, this principle is two subcomponents. Principle 4A stipulates the
altered to assure that each member has enough to presence of monitors, whereas 4B stipulates the
survive. This system is in fact a combination of condition that these monitors are members of the
principles 2A and 2B and is an example showing community or otherwise accountable to those
that what is considered equitable may vary members. Monitoring makes those who do not
depending on how much of a resource is available. comply with rules visible to the community, which
facilitates the effectiveness of rule enforcement
Principle 3: Collective-choice arrangements mechanisms and informs strategic and contingent
behavior of those who do comply with rules.
Regarding principle 3, Ostrom (1990:90) states, Empirically, principle 4A was moderately well
“most individuals affected by the operational rules supported, whereas 4B was very strongly supported
can participate in modifying the operational rules.” by the case data.
This principle is in the spirit of a large amount of
literature on the importance of local knowledge in In many cases, monitoring is a byproduct of
natural resource management (e.g., Berkes et al. particular ways of managing the commons, and the
2000), in which local users have first-hand and low- costs of monitoring are kept low (Schmidtz and
cost access to information about their situation and Willott 2003). Ostrom (1990) noted this possibility
thus a comparative advantage in devising effective in her original study. Trawick (2001) echoes
rules and strategies for that location, particularly Ostrom’s example in his analysis of a community
when local conditions change. irrigation system in Peru, in which the farmers
developed a contiguous pattern for irrigating one
This principle was moderately well supported. section of the system at a time before moving to
Sarker and Itoh (2001:19), for example, examined other sections. This system was effective at
the successful Nishikanbara Land Improvement conserving water, but it also made irrigation a public
District in Japan and found that terminal water user affair and facilitated effective decentralized
groups within the district “collectively participate monitoring. This pattern also occurs in the acequia
in modifying their daily operational rules.” A lack irrigation systems in New Mexico (Cox 2010).
of a functional collective-choice arrangement is
frequently correlated with CPR management In other cases, monitors constitute a separate
failure. For example, in discussing the management position that is compensated. Agrawal and Yadama
of communal grazing land in rural Tanzania, (1997:455) studied the strength of local forest
Nilsson (2001) describes a failure case wherein institutions in Kumaon Himalaya, India, and found
residents of Endabeg Village were members of the that “the number of months a guard was hired has
decision-making village assembly, but the assembly a very strong and statistically highly significant
was ineffective as a local decision-making direct effect on forest condition.” Likewise,
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Bardhan (2000) performed a statistical analysis of provided by multiple external authorities. Pinkerton
48 irrigation systems and found a positive and Weinstein (1995) compared four U.S. oyster
correlation between cooperative behavior and the fisheries and found that the two cases that used stock
presence of a guard position. However, Agrawal and assessment processes appeared to be more
Chhatre (2006) found a negative correlation sustainable.
between the presence of a guard and forest
conditions in their statistical analysis of 95 Principle 5: Graduated sanctions
community-based forest management systems in
India. They interpret this result as follows. “In the Principle 5 stipulates the efficacy of graduated
studied cases, villagers are more likely to hire guards sanctioning systems. Sanctioning deters participants
and impose fines more frequently if their forests are from excessive violations of community rules.
not in a good condition in an effort to improve their Graduated sanctions progress incrementally based
forests. Thus, the causal arrow suggested by our data on either the severity or the repetition of violations.
runs in the reverse direction from what we had Graduated sanctions help to maintain community
hypothesized” (Agrawal and Chhatre 2006:160). As cohesion while genuinely punishing severe cases;
these examples indicate, conditions regarding they also maintain proportionality between the
monitoring were prominent in the statistical studies. severity of violations and sanctions, similar to the
proportionality between appropriation and provision
Monitors may not perform satisfactorily if they do rules from principle 2.
not directly benefit from improved resource
conditions. Thus, it may be important that monitors Principle 5 was moderately well supported. Ghate
are accountable to those who most depend on the and Nagendra (2005), for example, describe the
resource. Gautam and Shivakoti (2005), who failure of efficacious forest management in two
studied two forest systems located in the Middle communities in Maharashtra, India, relative to
Hills of Nepal, found that the ability of local users successful management in a third. Although
to oversee monitors’ performance affected resource graduated sanctions formally existed in all three
conditions. In Jylachitti Forest, local users hired two communities, only the successful community had a
people for regular monitoring and paid them strictly implemented, graduated penalty structure.
through contributions from each member
household. In Dhulkhel Forest, guards were also There was a small subset of the literature that
hired, but they were paid by local authorities. questioned principle 5 by arguing that sanctions are
Whereas Jylachitti local users were engaged in not needed in the presence of strong social capital
supervising the guards’ performance in controlling and should not be implemented as a replacement for
timber extraction levels, this was not the case in it. Cleaver (2000:374) describes such a situation in
Dhulkhel, where overextraction was becoming an her account of water management practices in the
issue by the end of the study. Nkayi District in western Zimbabwe. There is a
similarity here with the concerns expressed for
Scholars have also pointed to the importance of principles 1A and 1B that the design principles
environmental monitoring, that is, the acquisition abstract too much from local context, which, in this
of information about the conditions of the case, is the web of relationships in which actors are
appropriated CPR (Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995, embedded.
Cinner et al. 2009). With environmental
information, community members can elaborate We have already seen that people prefer to
and adapt appropriation and provision rules that spend more time negotiating consensus
help to guarantee the sustainability of the resource than establishing and imposing sanctions.
(López Gunn and Hernandez Mora 2001, Young Solidarity in this case cannot simply be
2002, Johnson and Nelson 2004, Sandström and interpreted functionally as being directly
Widmark 2007). López Gunn and Hernandez Mora about cooperation over the mechanisms of
(2001) studied three groundwater irrigation systems water resource management. It is
and found that an irrigation community whose comprised of complex networks of
members were engaged in environmental cooperation based on family structure,
monitoring enjoyed higher levels of information labour-sharing arrangements and numerous
sharing and collective preparedness than a interrelated associational activities such as
community that depended on the information church groups, savings clubs, and income-
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generating groups. The village apparently (1945) and Scott (1998) if the externally imposed
most successful at collective action rules do not correspond to local conditions.
regarding water supplies was also
remarkable for its other cooperative The empirical evidence for this principle was
activities, for its success in agricultural moderately supportive. Pagdee et al. (2006), in their
production and for the frequency and analysis of 69 case studies of forest management
cheerful creativity of its public social worldwide, found that local authority was
occasions. Cleaver (2000:374). associated with tenure security, a key element for
sustainable forest management. There is also
Principle 6: Conflict-resolution mechanisms evidence in the studies that violations of this
principle can be associated with less successful
Principle 6 states that systems with low-cost conflict community-based resource management regimes.
resolution mechanisms are more likely to survive. Community-based resource management projects
Conflict over an exhaustible resource is inevitable developed in Sudano-Sahelian West Africa in the
in CPR management, necessitating the presence of 1990s, which involved the devolution of resource
established mechanisms for conflict resolution to management authority to rural communities
maintain collective action. This principle was through the assistance of nongovernmental
moderately well supported by the empirical data. In organizations, failed in part by not recognizing local
the acequia irrigation communities in northern New knowledge and existing institutions at the early
Mexico, for example, there is a long history of stages of the devolution process (Turner 1999).
recourse to external court systems under different
national regimes to resolve intercommunity Principle 8: Nested enterprises
conflicts. Several agreements reached by territorial
probate courts more than 100 years ago are the basis Principle 8 states that in successful systems,
for functioning, modern water-sharing agreements “governance activities are organized in multiple
today (Cox 2010). layers of nested enterprises” (Ostrom 1990:90). As
for principle 7, which also deals with cross-scale
When conflict resolution mechanisms are not institutional factors, the empirical evidence for
available or easily accessible, successful CPR principle 8 was moderately supportive.
management appears more difficult. One example
of this comes from several user groups of Chilika Many scholars, particularly those focusing on
Lake in Orissa, India (S. P. Rout, unpublished pastoral and irrigation systems, have stressed the
manuscript: http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/ importance of nesting smaller common-property
handle/10535/2073/Shyama_Prasad.pdf?sequence=1 systems in larger and still larger ones, given the high
). In the 1990s, the management of this resource probability that the social systems have cross-scale
system was proving to be very problematic. physical relationships when they manage different
Nonfishers began to compete with traditional parts of a larger resource system and thus may need
cultural fishing communities over access and mechanisms to facilitate cross-scale cooperation
resource use, leading to major conflict and unrest (Lane and Scoones 1993, Niamir-Fuller 1998). Part
and, in 1999, violence that resulted in the shooting of the motivation for this principle, then, relates to
of four community members. Although the national principle 1 (user and resource boundaries) and is
government subsequently stepped in to mediate, stated by Hanna et al. (1995:20) as: “It is important
Rout (unpublished manuscript) notes that this to ensure that a property rights regime has clearly
mechanism for conflict resolution has not yet defined boundaries, and that to the extent possible,
proven itself viable. those boundaries are consistent with the natural
boundaries of the ecological system.” It is not just
Principle 7: Minimum recognition of rights user and resource boundaries that are important; a
match between these boundaries may be important
Principle 7 stipulates that external government as well, and institutional nesting is an important way
agencies do not challenge the right of local users to to accomplish this in many situations.
create their own institutions. An external
government agency imposing its own rules on a One additional clarification regarding principle 8 is
community managing a CPR may suffer from a that the nesting may occur either between user
government failure of the kind discussed by Hayek groups and larger governmental jurisdictions, or
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between user groups themselves. Many traditional mechanisms, i.e., trust, legitimacy, and
irrigation systems, for example, contain multiple transparency.
levels of organization that mirror the branching
properties of an irrigation system (Coward 1977). Other scholars argue for including the relevant
This is somewhat different from co-management properties of the resource system itself in more
arrangements between user groups and a larger detail (Schlager et al. 1994, Agrawal 2002, Young
government body, described in extensive 2002, Agrawal and Chhatre 2006, Tucker et al.
publications (Berkes and Folke 1998, Berkes 2002, 2007). Young (2002) argues that more sophisticated
Yandle 2006, Cinner et al. 2009). Intercommunity treatment of ecosystem properties and structures
connections can be thought of as horizontal should be incorporated into a diagnostic analytical
linkages, whereas connections between multiple approach that seeks to match institutional
jurisdictional levels can be thought of as vertical arrangements to those properties and structures.
linkages. It is our understanding that, when she Ostrom (2007) takes a similar direction in
formulated this principle, Ostrom (1990) was formulating a framework that contains many types
referring to vertical linkages. We would generalize of resource properties across multiple scales. These
principle 8 to include both horizontal and vertical two works are highly relevant to the third critique,
linkages because they may accomplish similar which we discuss later.
functions.
Besides local biophysical properties, much of the
literature stresses the importance of external factors
Critique of the principles that are not stressed in the design principles
(Johnson 1997, Steins and Edwards 1999, Bardhan
We identified three primary critiques directed at the 2000, Agrawal 2002; N. A. Steins, N. G. Röling,
design principles as a whole. First, some of the and V. M. Edwards, unpublished manuscript: http:
publications argue that the design principles are //dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/507/
incomplete, and many studies suggest additional steinsn052400.pdf?sequence=1). External socioec-
criteria for sustainable management. Some scholars onomic factors are particularly emphasized. Tucker
argue that critical social variables need to be (1999) and Tucker et al. (2007) stress that market
included in a full account of successful community- integration can lead to rising inequality or declining
based natural resource management. Singleton and resource (forest) conditions. Bardhan (2000:861)
Taylor (1992), for example, argue that the more finds that “cooperative behavior in an irrigation
fundamental feature of the successful systems in community is by and large significantly related
Ostrom’s (1990) study is the quality that each negatively to... urban or market connections.” Some
involves a “community of mutually vulnerable authors such as Klooster (2000) argue that
actors.” In Singleton and Taylor’s (1992) view, development and market forces can destabilize CPR
these conditions explain why some communities are arrangements that worked well when the
able to fulfill the design principles and sustain community and resource were isolated. In an
themselves while others are not. In another example, analysis of factors affecting overfishing in small-
Harkes (2006:250-251), who studied marine sasi scale coral reef fisheries in Papua New Guinea,
fishery systems in Indonesia, states: Cinner and McClanahan (2006:78) find suggestive
statistical evidence that “communities in close
The design principles of Ostrom (1990) and proximity to markets had likely overfished the
other scientists who have pursued this line higher value and high trophic level species.”
of thinking thus are an interesting point of
exit, but only partly explain the success of Market integration may effectively remove control
management institutions. Most of the of a resource from a user group. Another mechanism
conditions mentioned are merely characteristics that seems to be functioning in some of these
of the community or institution, such as situations is that external integration alters local
scale, village size, homogeneity, or the incentives, frequently by decreasing the dependence
ability to exclude outsiders, and even of local users on the resource. Pinkerton and
though these factors undoubtedly contribute Weinstein (1995) and Gibson (2001) note that
to their functionality, from our study it has dependence on the resource used by a community
become clear that the real ‘glue’ that keeps is an important factor in the robustness of the
an institution alive over time are the social management regime. When members are not as
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dependent on the resource, their welfare is not as socially, and environmentally embedded perspective
strongly tied to their cooperative behavior. that departs from viewing actors as rational decision
makers, and communities of users as coherent
In our view, the critique that the design principles wholes without internal conflict or heterogeneity
are incomplete is sound. There are several other (Mosse 1997, Leach et al. 1999, Klooster 2000).
important features of relevant systems that affect Others authors suggest that the design principles are
outcomes when CPRs are managed by communities biased toward formal rules and strategies and may
of users. In an increasingly interconnected world, it abstract too much from the complexity of the
is hard to argue that we should only consider local- environment and the social context of the actors
level institutional properties. Local and external (Cleaver 1999, 2000, Steins 1999, Steins and
socioeconomic factors need to be considered as Edwards 1999, Blaikie 2006).
well. At the same time, we do not think that this
critique undercuts the empirical support for the Related to these arguments is the general concern
principles indicated by our quantitative analysis. To that the principles might be seen as something of a
some extent, exploring socioeconomic or magic bullet or institutional panacea and thus be
biophysical factors is an analysis that is distinct from misapplied as a prescription for improving the
the one considered here, and empirical evaluations governance of CPRs in particular settings (Bruns
of the two are likewise distinct. 2007). This concern is over the possible
overgeneralization the principles to a large diversity
The second main issue raised regarding the design of cases, the individuality of which they do not
principles is whether they can be applied to a wide sufficiently reflect. This issue of theoretical
range of cases beyond those that were used to generalizability and the tension between it and
develop them. Several authors (Pomeroy et al. 2001, theoretical precision is too large to treat adequately
Young 2002, Berkes 2005, 2006) question the here. Cox (2008) describes the trade-off between
applicability of the principles to cases larger in scale generalizability and precision that Ostrom (1990)
than those from which Ostrom (1990) derived them. made in her formulation of the principles.
Berkes (2005:19), for example, states, “Globalization
has a major impact on local-level resource A concern about implementing a set of possibly
management through such mechanisms as the overgeneralized design principles is analogous to
creation of international markets. Can a theory of that raised by Hayek (1945) and Scott (1998): that
the commons, based on local-level cases, be scaled a government may fail by homogenizing the
up to deal with the complexity of communities and diversity of contexts to which it applies its policies
social-political networks?” Young (2002) argues and management practices. This is sometimes
that this is unlikely to be the case. referred to as a blueprint approach to governance,
which leads to a lack of fit between programs and
We cannot offer an empirical answer to this critique their supposed beneficiaries (Korten 1980). In
because we did not formally analyze large, effect, there is a concern that such an application of
noncommunity-based systems. Nevertheless, it the principles may violate principle 2A, i.e.,
seems plausible that several of the principles would congruency between rules and local conditions.
be applicable to higher levels of governance
(Rowland 2005). Proportionality of costs and Young (2002) contrasts the design principles
benefits, conflict-resolution mechanisms, nested approach with what he calls a diagnostic approach
institutional arrangements, and effective and to analysis. He states, “Because design principles
participatory collective-choice arrangements seem are framed as universal propositions, they should
particularly relevant. The applicability of the design hold across all members of the relevant universe of
principles to a higher level of governance is not a cases” (Young 2002:170). Agrawal (2002:49)
claim that communities can necessarily resolve makes a similar argument that the principles “are
large-scale environmental problems. The co- expressed as general features of long-lived,
management literature (Berkes 2002) makes a successful commons management rather than as
strong case that, by themselves, they likely cannot. relationships between characteristics of the
constituent analytical units or as factors that depend
The final critique criticizes what it conceives as the for their efficacy on the presence (or absence) of
design principle approach itself. Several authors other variables.”
argue for a more constructionist or historically,
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In lieu of the design principles approach, Young

(2002) favors a diagnostic process of subdividing Likewise, one needs to consider multiple, nested
environmental problems into subsets to tease out the types of governance arrangements. Beyond the
institutional implications of different types of basic trichotomy of markets, states, and
environmental problems. Indeed, Ostrom (2007, communities, one needs to consider multiple forms
2009) is moving in a diagnostic direction as well. of each of these ideal types. We think that the design
She states, “We need to recognize and understand principles can be placed effectively within such a
the complexity to develop diagnostic methods to nested typology of governance arrangements. For
identify combinations of variables that affect the example, we could specify multiple types of
incentives and actions of actors under diverse monitoring (principle 4), conflict resolution
governance systems” (Ostrom 2007:15181). mechanisms (principle 6), and institutional nesting
(principle 8). Indeed, two basic distinctions we have
Although we think that there are likely limitations already made contrast environmental and social
in generalizing the design principles to larger-scale monitoring and distinguish between horizontal and
cases, we argue that the dichotomy between vertical linkages. Different subtypes of these
diagnostic and design principle approaches is false, arrangements will likely be more effective in
at least in this context. A diagnostic approach most resolving different types of problems.
fundamentally involves two tasks: identifying an
environmental problem, and identifying the As such, we see the diagnostic and design principles
governance arrangements that are most likely to be approaches to be potentially complementary,
effective in resolving that problem. To do this most instead of mutually exclusive. Although we do not
effectively, one needs to construct nested typologies agree with the critique of the design principles as
of environmental problems and governance being tied to a simplistic blueprint approach, we
arrangements. If this can be done, it may be possible, think that a significant amount of work is needed to
with accumulated empirical evidence, to match combine them with a well-developed diagnostic
types of governance arrangements to types of approach.
problems that they have proven to be effective in
resolving. A nested typology contains types that are
arranged hierarchically, with each level being a Reformulation of design principles
subdivision of types from the previous level into
further subtypes. The instances belonging to types The principles we reformulate are 1, 2, and 4. We
at each successive level are more similar than are propose that principles 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 remain as
those at previous levels. they are. We divided each of the first two principles
into two components for our analysis. We found that
One very basic example of a subdivision that could these individual components often made important
form a basis for this process is the distinction contributions to the outcomes of cases and
between two types of collective-action problems: conclusions of studies. Thus, we recommend
CPR problems and public goods problems. In dividing principles 1 and 2 into their component
addition, a division is often made between parts. One addition could be made to principle 1:
environmental (pollution) problems and natural congruence between user and resource boundaries.
resource (consumption) problems. The implications We also divide principle 4 (monitoring) into two
for which governance arrangements are most components, but not along the lines used in
effective will likely differ between these types of conducting the analysis. Rather, we divide it into a
problems. Furthermore, there are many different principle regarding users monitoring one another’s
subtypes of environmental and natural resource behavior (social monitoring) and users monitoring
problems. Sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions and the condition of the resource (environmental
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions are both monitoring). Each of these was often found to be
environmental pollution problems, but various important in determining the success of community-
lower-level properties of these problems favor based natural resource management. Thus, we
different types of governance arrangements propose a modified set of design principles (Table
(Stavins 1998). As such, a tradable emissions permit 4).
system may not be as effective in limiting CO2
emissions as it has been in limiting SO2 emissions
under Title 4 of the United States’ 1990 Clean Air
Act amendments.
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Table 4. List of proposed, modified design principles.

Principle Description

1A User boundaries: Clear boundaries between legitimate users and nonusers must be clearly defined.

1B Resource boundaries: Clear boundaries are present that define a resource system and separate it from the larger
biophysical environment.

2A Congruence with local conditions: Appropriation and provision rules are congruent with local social and
environmental conditions.

2B Appropriation and provision: The benefits obtained by users from a common-pool resource (CPR), as
determined by appropriation rules, are proportional to the amount of inputs required in the form of labor,
material, or money, as determined by provision rules.

3 Collective-choice arrangements: Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in
modifying the operational rules.

4A Monitoring users: Monitors who are accountable to the users monitor the appropriation and provision levels of
the users.

4B Monitoring the resource: Monitors who are accountable to the users monitor the condition of the resource.

5 Graduated sanctions: Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions
(depending on the seriousness and the context of the offense) by other appropriators, by officials accountable
to the appropriators, or by both.

6 Conflict-resolution mechanisms: Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to
resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators and officials.

7 Minimal recognition of rights to organize: The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not
challenged by external governmental authorities.

8 Nested enterprises: Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance
activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.

CONCLUSION Analyses similar to ours, with a focus on these other

relevant factors from several disciplinary
We attempted to synthesize a large number of perspectives, could be a fruitful source of progress
studies that examined Ostrom’s (1990) design in this field. Much work remains to be done to
principles. Empirically, we think that the principles augment the biophysical sophistication of CPR case
are well supported. The most trenchant critiques studies to understand how institutional variables
were abstract, rather than empirical. This does not interact with biophysical variables to produce
mean that the principles are complete; their outcomes. Finally, work from cultural and political
incompleteness is the most important empirical ecology could serve as a useful complement to the
critique we found in the literature. Other factors such primarily political science orientation embodied in
as the size of user groups, differing types of the principles.
heterogeneity within or between user groups, and
the type of government regime within which users As such, a probabilistic, rather than deterministic,
operate are clearly important in many cases (see interpretation of the design principles is warranted.
Agrawal 2002). Likewise, we remain uncertain as to whether the
principles may apply to systems at a variety of
 Ecology and Society 15(4): 38
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scales. Ultimately, however, the design principles commons. National Academy Press, Washington,
are robust to empirical testing in our analysis of 91 D.C., USA.
studies. Thus, we conclude that they are a sound
basis for future research conducted to further Agrawal, A., and A. Chhatre. 2006. Explaining
disentangle the interactive effects of relevant success in the commons: community forest
variables, both within and across multiple governance in the Indian Himalaya. World
environmental and social scales. Development 34(1):149-166.

Aside from our empirical analysis, we dealt with an Agrawal, A., and G. Yadama. 1997. How do local
important theoretical debate regarding the institutions mediate market and population
principles: Are they inherently part of a blueprint pressures on resources? Forest panchayats in
approach to CPR management or can they be Kumaon, India. Development and Change 28
combined with a more diagnostic approach? We (3):435-465.
think the latter is the case, and this points us in a
specific direction for future research. Each of the Bardhan, P. 2000. Irrigation and cooperation: an
aforementioned empirical complications could empirical analysis of 48 irrigation communities in
likely be addressed by approaching CPR south India. Economic Development and Cultural
management from a diagnostic perspective. This is Change 48(4):847-865.
a process that helps to sort out what is important in
a CPR setting, when, and why. We hope to see and Berkes, F. 2002. Cross-scale institutional linkages:
plan to participate in future work to develop this perspectives from the bottom up. Pages 293-321 in
approach further. E. Ostrom, T. Dietz, N. Dolšak, P. C. Stern, S.
Stovich, and E. U. Weber, editors. The drama of the
commons. National Academy Press, Washington,
Responses to this article can be read online at: D.C., USA.
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss4/art38/
responses/
Berkes, F. 2005. Commons theory for marine
resource management in a complex world. Senri
Ethnological Studies 67:13-31.
Acknowledgments:
Berkes, F. 2006. From community-based resource
This paper is a revision of an earlier report to the management to complex systems: the scale issue
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Cambridge, and marine commons. Ecology and Society 11(1):
Massachusetts, USA, entitled Design Principles Are 45. [online] URL: http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/
not Blue Prints, but Are They Robust?: a Meta- vol11/iss1/art45/.
analysis of 112 Studies. Financial support from the
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, the National Berkes, F., J. Colding, and C. Folke. 2000.
Science Foundation (grant no. BCS-0527744), and Rediscovery of traditional ecological knowledge as
La Fundación Caja Madrid: Departamento de adaptive management. Ecological Applications 10
Becas, Investigación y Universidades is deeply (5):1251-1262.
appreciated. We thank Xavier Basurto, Bryan
Bruns, and Elinor Ostrom for their feedback on the Berkes, F., and C. Folke, editors. 1998. Linking
manuscript, and Patty Lezotte for editing the final social and ecological systems: management
draft. practices and social mechanisms for building
resilience. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
UK.

Blaikie, P. 2006. Is small really beautiful?

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