Criminal Law Review Case Digests First Wave

CRIMINAL
LAW REVIEW: CASE DIGESTS

Basic Principles in Criminal Law
TICKLER: Car repair shop, Mancor, Corazon Teng

Oriel Magno vs. Honorable Court Of Appeals And People Of The Philippines
G.R. No. 96132 June 26, 1992
PARAS, J.:
FACTS:
Oriel Magno (petitioner) was in the process of putting up a car repair shop but did not have
complete equipment that could make his venture workable. He also lacked funds to purchase the
necessary equipment; thus, he approached Corazon Teng, Vice President of Mancor Industries
(Mancor) for his needed car repair service. Having been approached by petitioner who fully bared
he had no sufficient funds, Corazon Teng referred him to LS Finance and Management
Corporation, advising Joey Gomez, the latter’s Vice President, that Mancor was willing and able
to supply the pieces of equipment if LS Finance could accommodate petitioner and provide him
credit facilities. The arrangement was on a condition that petitioner has to put up a warranty deposit
equivalent to 30% of the total value of the equipment. Because he did not have funds for the
deposit, petitioner requested Joey Gomez to look for a third party who could lend him the amount.
However, unknown to the petitioner, it was Corazon teng who advanced the deposit in question.
Petitioner and LS Finance entered into a leasing agreement. The equipment were delivered to
petitioner who issued a postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez who, unknown to the petitioner,
delivered the same to Corazon Teng. When the check matured, petitioner requested through Joey
Gomez not to deposit the check as he was no longer banking with Pacific Bank. To replace the
first check issued, petitioner issued another set of six postdated checks, two of which were cleared,
and four of which were held momentarily by Corazon Teng, on the request of Magno as they were
not covered with sufficient funds. Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the monthly
rentals, thus it pulled out the garage equipment. It was then on this occasion that petitioner became
aware that Corazon Teng was the one who advanced the warranty deposit. Petitioner with his wife
went to see Corazon Teng and promised to pay the latter but the payment never came and when
the four (4) checks were deposited they were returned for the reason "account closed."
A case was filed against petitioner for four counts of violation of Batas Pambansa 22.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT RULING: Guilty of violation of Batas Pambansa 22.
ISSUE: Should petitioner be held liable for violation of Batas Pambansa 22?
HELD:
NO. Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that the primary
function of punishment is the protective (sic) of society against actual and potential wrongdoers."
Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that "criminal law is founded upon
that moral disapprobation of actions which are immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or dangerous)
to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society. Thus, it
behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed upon the accused, the
4F (2016-2017) Prosecutor Victoria C. Garcia 1

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW: CASE DIGESTS

objective of retribution of a wronged society, should be directed against the "actual and potential
wrongdoers."
In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioner's four (4) checks were used to collateralize an
accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of an actual "account or credit for value" as this was
absent, and therefore petitioner should not be punished for mere issuance of the checks in question.
Following the aforecited theory, in petitioner's stead the "potential wrongdoer", whose operation
could be a menace to society, should not be glorified by convicting the petitioner. It is intriguing
to realize that Mrs. Teng did not want the petitioner to know that it was she who "accommodated"
petitioner's request for Joey Gomez, to source out the needed funds for the "warranty deposit".
Thus it unfolds the kind of transaction that is shrouded with mystery, gimmickry and doubtful
legality. It is in simple language, a scheme whereby Mrs. Teng as the supplier of the equipment in
the name of her corporation, Mancor, would be able to "sell or lease" its goods as in this case, and
at the same time, privately financing those who desperately need petty accommodations as this
one.
Thus, the appealed decision must be REVERSED and the accused-petitioner must be
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.


Article 3: Felonies
TICKLER: Gunshot to ear and nape

Rogelio Roque vs. People
G.R. No. 193169 April 6, 2015
FACTS: November 22, 2001, while brothers Reynaldo and Rodolfo Marquez were in the house
of Bella in Pandi, Bulacan, Rodolfo spotted dela Cruzand shouted to him to join them. At that
instant, Roque and his wife were passing-by on board a tricycle. Believing that Rodolfo's shout
was directed at him, petitioner stopped the vehicle and cursed the former. Reynaldo apologized for
the misunderstanding but Roque was unyielding. Before leaving, he warned the Marquez brothers
that something bad would happen to them if they continue to perturb him.
Bothered, Rodolfo went to the house of Chairman Tayao to ask for assistance in settling the
misunderstanding. Because of this, Reynaldo, who had already gone home, was fetched by dela
Cruz and brought to the house of Tayao. But since Tayao was then no longer around, Reynaldo
just proceeded to Rouqers house to follow Tayao and Rodolfo who had already gone ahead. Upon
arriving at petitioner's residence, Reynaldo again apologized to Roque but the latter did not reply.
Instead, then, he entered the house and when he came out, he was already holding a gun which he
suddenly fired at Reynaldo who was hit in his right ear. Roque then shot Reynaldo who fell to the
ground after being hit in the nape. Unsatisfied, Roque kicked Reynaldo on the face and back.
Reynaldo pleaded Tayao for help but to no avail since petitioner warned those around not to get
involved. Fortunately, Reynaldo's parents arrived and took him to a local hospital for emergency
medical treatment. He was later transferred to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital in Manila where he
was operated on and confined for three weeks.
Roque claimed that Reynaldo went to their house then hurled invective words and challenged him
to a duel/ Roque interposed self-defense.
CRIME CHARGED: Frustrated homicide

RTC RULING: Frustrated homicide
CA RULING: Frustrated homicide
ISSUE: Is there intent to kill?
RULING: Yes. Intent to kill is shown by the kind of weapon used by the offender and the parts
of the victim's body at which the weapon was aimed, as shown by the wounds inflicted. It is worth
highlighting that the Reynaldo received two gunshot wounds in the head. Indeed the location of
the wounds plus the nature of the weapon used are ready indications that the accused-Roque’s
objective is not merely to warn or incapacitate a supposed aggressor. Verily, had Roque been
slightly better with his aim, any of the two bullets surely would have killed him outright. Also, the
intent to kill is further exhibited by the fact that the Roque even prevented barangay officials from
intervening and helping the bleeding victim. Indeed, the fact that Reynaldo Marquez was
miraculously able to live through the ordeal and sustain only modicum injuries does not mean that
the crime ought to be downgraded from frustrated homicide to less serious physical injuries. After
all, as was mentioned above, what should be determinative of the crime is not the gravity of the
resulting injury but the criminal intent that animated the hand that pulled the trigger


TICKLER: Land lady

De Guzman, Jr. vs People
G.R. No. 178512, November 26, 2014
FACTS: At about 10 o’clock in the evening of December 1997, Alexander Flojo (Alexander) was
fetching water below his rented house at 443 Aglipay St., Old aniga St., Mandaluyong City when
suddenly Alfredo De Guzman (Alfredo), the brother of his land lady, Lucia Bautista (Lucila), hit
him on the nape. Alexander informed Lucila about what Alfredo did to him. Lucila apologized to
Alexander by saying, “Pasensya ka na Mang Alex” and told the latter to just go up. Alexander
obliged and went upstairs. He took a rest for about two hours. Thereafter, at around 12:00 to 12:15
AM, Alexander went down and continued to fetch water. While pouring water into a container,
Alfredo suddenly appeared in front of Alexander and stabbed him on his left face and chest.
Alfredo denied having stabbed Alexander. According to him, he accidentally hit Alexander’s back,
causing the latter to thro invective words against him. He felt insulted, thus, a fistfight ensued
between them. Alfredo adamantly denies that intent to kill was present during the fistfight between
him and Alexander. He claims that the heightened emotions during the fistfight naturally
emboldened both of them, but he maintains that he only inflicted minor abrasions on Alexander,
not the stab wounds that he appeared to have sustained. Hence, he should only be held liable only
for serious physical injuries.
Crime Charged: (Silent)

RTC: Frustrated Homicide
CA: Frustrated Homicide
ISSUE: Whether or not Alfredo had intent to kill Alexander.
HELD: Yes, there was intent to kill.
The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of the offender to kill the
victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a
specific intent that the State must allege in the information, and then prove by either direct or
circumstantial evidence, as differentiated from a general criminal intent, which is presumed from
the commission of a felony by dolo. Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by the courts
only through external manifestations, i.e., the acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the
assault and immediately thereafter. In Rivera v. People, we considered the following factors to
determine the presence of intent to kill, namely: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the
nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors
before, during, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under
which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. We have also considered as
determinative factors the motive of the offender and the words he uttered at the time of inflicting
the injuries on the victim.
Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed that intent to kill was present. We concur with
them. Contrary to the petitioner’s submission, the wounds sustained by Alexander were not mere


scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger or as the result of a fistfight between them. The petitioner
wielded and used a knife in his assault on Alexander. The medical records indicate, indeed, that
Alexander sustained two stab wounds, specifically, one on his upper left chest and the other on the
left side of his face. The petitioner’s attack was unprovoked with the knife used therein causing
such wounds, thereby belying his submission, and firmly proving the presence of intent to kill.
There is also to be no doubt about the wound on Alexander’s chest being sufficient to result into
his death were it not for the timely medical intervention.
With the State having thereby shown that the petitioner already performed all the acts of execution
that should produce the felony of homicide as a consequence, but did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of his will, i.e., the timely medical attention accorded to Alexander, he was
properly found guilty of frustrated homicide
TICKLER: Hollow Block Murder Charge

Esmeraldo Rivera, Ismael Rivera, Edgardo Rivera V. People Of The Philippines
G.R. No. 166326, January 25, 2006
FACTS: On the night of the incident, Ruben Rodil was walking on the street with his 3year old
daughter when petitioners (brothers) emerged from their house and ganged up on Ruben.
Esmeraldo and Ismael mauled Ruben with fist blows and he fell to the ground. In that helpless
position, Edgardo hit Ruben 3 times with a hollow block on the parietal area.
Esmeraldo and Ismael continued mauling Ruben. Ruben felt dizzy but managed to stand
up. Ismael threw a stone at him, hitting him at the back. When policemen on board a mobile car
arrived, petitioners fled to their house. Ruben was brought to the hospital where the doctor declared
that his lacerated wounds were slight and superficial and would heal from 1-7 days. Thereafter, an
Information was filed against petitioners charging them of attempted
murder. RTC found the accused guilty of the crime of frustrated murder. Accused
then appealed to CA which in turn affirmed with modification the RTC Ruling.
CA convicted the accused of attempted murder.
Thus, the accused, now petitioners, filed the instant petition for review on certiorar
i. Petitioners argue that the prosecution failed to prove that they had the intention
to kill Ruben when they mauled and hit him with a hollow block. Moreover, ba
sed on the testimony of Dr. Cagingin, Ruben sustained only a superficial wound i
n the parietal area; hence, they should be held criminally liable for physical injuri
es only. On the other hand, CA argued that the intent to kill was shown by the
fact that the 3 brothers helped each other maul the defenseless victim, and even
after he had already fallen to the ground; that one of them even picked up a
cement hollow block and proceeded to hit the victim on the head with it 3 time
s; and that it was only the arrival of the policemen that made the appellants des
ist from their concerted act of trying to kill Ruben. Further, the nature of the inj
ury does not negate the intent to kill.
Crime Charged: Attempted Murder

RTC: Frustrated Murder
CA: Attempted Murder


ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners’ intent to kill was duly established.
RULING: Yes. An essential element of murder and homicide, whether in their con
summated, frustrated or attempted stage, is intent of the offenders to kill the victi
m immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kil
l is a specific intent which the prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial
evidence, while general criminal intent is presumed from the commission of a fel
ony by dolo.
In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to
prove the intent of petitioners to kill Ruben. Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled th
e victim with fist blows. Even as Ruben fell to the ground, unable to defend hi
mself against the sudden and sustained assault of petitioners, Edgardo hit him 3 ti
mes with a hollow block. Edgardo tried to hit Ruben on the head, missed, but s
till managed to hit the victim only in the parietal area, resulting in a lacerated
wound and cerebral contusions. That the head wounds sustained by the victim wer
e merely superficial and could not have produced his death does not negate petiti
oners’ criminal liability for attempted murder. Even if Edgardo did not hit the vic
tim squarely on the head, petitioners are still criminally liable for attempted murder.
TICKLER: Hazing
Villareal vs People
G.R. No. 151258 February 1, 2012
FACTS:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were
informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. After their
"briefing," they were brought in Caloocan for the commencement of their initiation. The neophytes
were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan initiation rites such as the Indian Run, Bicol
Express, Rounds and Auxies Privilege Round. The fraternity members, including Fidelito Dizon
(Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal), subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional
rounds of physical pain. Leonardo "Lenny" Villa received several paddle blows, one of which was
so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. When they were sleeping, the neophytes were roused
by Lenny’s shivering and mumblings. He was rushed to the hospital but was pronounced dead on
arrival. Accused contends that their acts were part of the traditional initiation rites and were not
tainted by evil motives.
CRIME CHARGED: HOMICIDE for 35 Aquilans

RTC RULING: 26- Homicide; 9- Acquitted
CA RULING: 28- acquitted; 4 (Tecson, Ama, Almeda and Bantug)-Slight Physical Injuries; 2
(Dizon and Villareal)- Homicide; 1-passed away
ISSUES:
1. Is there an intent to kill?


2. Is there an intent to do wrong against the physical integrity of Lenny?
3. What is the crime committed by the accused?
RULING:
1. No. The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is an ingredient in
establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide. Being mala in se, the
felony of homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo immediately before or
simultaneously with the infliction of injuries.
Dizon concocted the fictitious stories, so that he could "justify" giving the neophytes harder
blows, all in the context of fraternity initiation and role playing. The infliction of
psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct of hazing. Thus, without proof beyond
reasonable doubt, Dizon’s behavior must not be automatically viewed as evidence of a
genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny.
2. No. In case of physical injuries under the RPC, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi
or malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a person,
so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof
beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting
physical injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an
intentional felony.
3. Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon are guilty of Reckless Imprudence resulting in
Homicide. The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean that the accused
fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The RPC also punishes
felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). The collective acts of the fraternity
members were tantamount to recklessness, which made the resulting death of Lenny a
culpable felony. Organizations owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury
in the process. With the foregoing, the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide.
Topic: Mental element (Mens rea) - Deliberate intent (Dolo) - Mistake of fact
US vs. Ah Chong
15 Phil 488, March 19, 1910
Facts:
The defendant Ah Chong was a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort McKinley, Rizal Province
Pascual Gualberto, deceased, works at the same place as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers'
quarters, No. 27" was a detached house some 40 meters from the nearest building. No one slept in
the house except the two servants who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the
building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building.
This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of
the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock; the occupants, as a measure of security,
had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing
this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. On the night of


August 14, 1908, at about 10:00 pm, the defendant was suddenly awakened by some trying to force
open the door of the room. He called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was
convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing
his way into the room. The defendant warned the intruder "If you enter the room, I will kill you."
Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly
at the intruder (when he entered the room) who turned out to be his roommate Pascual.
Pascual ran out upon the porch heavily wounded. Recognizing Pascual, the defendant called to his
employers who slept in the next house and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up
Pascual's wounds. Pascual died from the effects of the wound the following day. The roommates
appear to have been in friendly and amicable terms prior to the incident, and had an understanding
that when either returned at night, he should knock that the door and acquaint his companion with
his identity. The defendant alleges that he kept the knife under his pillow as personal protection
because of repeated robberies in Fort McKinley. Defendant admitted to stabbing his roommate,
but said that he did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron (thief)" because he forced
open the door of their sleeping room, despite the defendant's warnings. Defendant was found guilty
by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating (mitigating) circumstances, and
sentenced to 6 years and 1 day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law
Issue: Is Ah Chong guilty of homicide?
HELD:
No. By reason of a mistake as to the facts, the defendant did an act for which he would be exempt
from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be (i.e. if Pascual was actually a
thief, he will not be criminally liable/responsible because it would be self-defense), but would
constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts
(i.e. if he knew that it was actually Pascual, he would be guilty of homicide/assassination)
The defendant's ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith
"The act itself foes not make man guilty unless his intention were so"
The essence of the offense is the wrongful intent, without which it cannot exist
"The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him."
If one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing, if without
fault or carelessness he does believe them, he is legally guiltless of the homicide
The defendant was doing no more than exercise his legitimate right of self-defense
He cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in
falling into his mistake as to the facts
RTC's decision is reversed. The defendant is acquitted.
TICKLER: Marinduque, MarCopper Mining Company, Tailing Ponds Leak, Absorption of

Mala In Se and Mala Prohibita
Loney vs. People
G.R. No. 152644, February 10, 2006
FACTS:
John Loney, Steven Reid, and Pedro Hernandez are officers of the MARCOPPER when in 1994
the tailings pond of the mining site in Marinduque gushed out polluting Boac and Makalupnit
rivers. The Department of Justice charged them of violating the following laws:


1. Water Code of the Philippines
2. National Pollution Control Decree
3. Philippine Mining Act
4. Art 365 of the Revised Penal Code on Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage
to Property
Petitioner sought to quash the information and argued that the 1) DOJ charged them of more than
one offense for a single act; 2) Loney and Reid were not yet officers when the leak happened; 3)
and that the information contains allegations which constitute legal excuse.
CRIME CHARGED:
Violation of the following:
1. Water Code of the Philippines
2. National Pollution Control Decree
3. Philippine Mining Act
4. Art 365 of the Revised Penal Code on Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property
MTC: It ruled that the violation of the PH Mining Act absorbed the charges on the Water Code
and Pollution Control Act. The charge on RPC Art. 365 should be maintained nonetheless. There
can be no absorption because the elements of the charges maintained are different.
CA: The CA said that based on Rule 117, duplicity of the offense is not among the grounds to
quash an information.
ISSUE:
Can mala in se absorb mala prohibita?
HELD:
No. the Supreme Court said mala in se cannot absorb mala prohibita because the elements are
different. The Court also believes it is possible to offend several provisions of law with one act.
Hence, Loney et al can be charged of violating the abovementioned laws.
TICKLER: Election Offense

Arsenia Garcia vs. Court Of Appeals
G.R. No. 157171, March 14, 2006
FACTS:
In 1995, Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., ran for the senatorial elections. Meanwhile, in Alaminos,
Pangasinan, Arsenia Garcia was one of the designated election officers. Herminio R.
Romero, Renato R. Viray, Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera and petitioner Garcia
was accused by Pimentel of violating the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987. Pimentel alleged that
Garcia decreased Pimentel’s vote by around 5,000 votes (from 6,998 to 1,921).
CRIME CHARGED: Election Offense (Sec 27b of RA 6646)

27(b). Any member of the board of election inspector or board of canvassers who
tampers, increases, or decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election or any


member of the board, who refuses, after proper verification and hearing, to credit the
correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.
RTC RULING:
RTC acquitted all accuse for insufficiency of evidence, except petitioner Garcia. On the person
of ARSENIA B. GARCIA, the Court pronounces her GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, of the
crime defined under Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing the votes of Senator
Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881.
CA RULING:
Appealed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, increasing the minimum penalty
imposed by the trial court from six (6) months to one (1) year. Motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied. Hence this appeal.
On appeal, Garcia invoked that the trial court erred in ruling that her defense of good faith was not
properly appreciated. She averred that due to the workload given to her during said elections, she
got fatigued and that caused the error in the tabulation of Pimentel’s votes. Pimentel argued that
the Electoral Reforms Law is a special law hence it is a malum prohibitum law and therefore, good
faith is not a defense.
ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged violation of Garcia of the Electoral Reforms Law is a malum
prohibitum.
HELD: No. Generally, mala in se crimes refer to those felonies in violation of the Revised Penal
Code. However, it must be noted that mala in se are crimes which are inherently immoral. Hence,
even if the crime is punished by a special law, if it is inherently immoral, then it is still a crime
mala in se.
In this case, the said violation of the Electoral Reforms Law is a mala in se crime because it is
inherently immoral to decrease the vote of a candidate. Note also that what is being punished is
the intentional decreasing of a candidate’s votes and not those arising from errors and mistakes.
Since a violation of this special law is a malum in se, good faith can be raised as a defense.
However, Garcia’s defense of good faith was not proven. Facts show that the decreasing of
Pimentel’s vote was not due to error or mistake. It was shown that she willingly handled certain
duties which were not supposed to be hers to perform. That’s a clear sign that she facilitated the
erroneous entry.


Article 4: Proximate Cause Theory and Impossible Crime Doctrine
TICKLER: Heart Attack

Garcia vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 171951, August 28, 2009
FACTS:
The Fozes were having a drinking spree at their apartment when Chy asked them to quiet down to
which Garcia commented that Chy was being arrogant and that one day he would lay a hand on
him. Two days later, the group met again and was advised by Mabbun to stop singing lest they be
told off again which infuriated petitioner who remarked that Chy was really arrogant and he will
not let him live long. A day after, the group decided to drink at a store owned by Chy’s sister,
Esquibel. Chy was about to come out of his house and upon being summoned by Garcia, the latter
suddenly punched him. Chy continued to parry the blows and when he found an opportunity to
escape, he ran home and phoned his wife to call the police regarding the mauling. He also
complained of difficulty in breathing. He was found later unconscious on the kitchen floor,
salivating. Chy was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital.
The OSG alleges that the beating of Chy was the proximate cause of his death. Garcia appeals that
the injuries he caused were not as violent in nature as to have caused the death of Chy. Garcia
asserts that at most, he could be held liable for slight physical injuries because none of the blows
he inflicted on Chy was fatal. The autopsy doctor confirms that the boxing and the striking of the
bottle beer on the victim could not have caused any direct physical effect to cause the heart attack
if the victim’s heart is healthy. What could have caused said heart attack is the victims emotions
concerning the violence inflicted upon him.
CRIME CHARGED: MURDER

RTC RULING: HOMICIDE
CA RULING: HOMICIDE
ISSUE:
Whether the circumstance of having no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed
should be appreciated.
HELD:
YES. Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be incurred "by any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which
he intended." The essential requisites for the application of this provision are: (a) the intended act
is felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended albeit graver wrong
was primarily caused by the actor’s wrongful acts. A person committing a felony is responsible
for all the natural and logical consequences resulting from it although the unlawful act performed
is different from the one he intended; "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he
who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused).
Thus, the circumstance that the petitioner did not intend so grave an evil as the death of the victim
does not exempt him from criminal liability. Since he deliberately committed an act prohibited by


law, said condition simply mitigates his guilt in accordance with Article 13(3) of the Revised Penal
Code. Nevertheless, said circumstance must be appreciated in favour of the petitioner. The fact
that the physical injuries he inflicted on the victim could not have naturally and logically caused
the actual death of the victim, if the latter’s heart is in good condition.
Hence, the circumstance of having no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed
should be appreciated.
TICKLER: Irrigation canal quarrel

Filomeno Urbano vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court and People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988
FACTS:
On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his ricefield. He found the
place where he stored palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano went to
the elevated portion to see what happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre
cutting grass. Javier admitted that he was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel ensued, and
Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg with the back of the bolo.
On October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the
medical expenses of Javier. On November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he
had lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which
infected the healing wound in his palm. He died the following day. Urbano was charged with
homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and on appeal by the Court of Appeals.
Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain who stated that
he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on November 5. The motion was
denied; hence, this petition.
CRIME CHARGED: HOMICIDE

RTC: HOMICIDE
CA: HOMICIDE
ISSUE:
Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latter’s death
HELD:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. -
A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with
its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have


reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom."
If the wound of Javieri inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time,
it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of
tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd dayafter the hacking incident or
more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been
more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from theonset time. The more credible
conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of
tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected
with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death,
his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction,
the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond
reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection
of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was
wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for
failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's
death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the
be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the
occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote
cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though
such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in
the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate
cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances
which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is
the proximate cause."
INSERT PEOPLE VS VILLACORTA
TICKLER: Corolla/Bystander
People vs. Adriano
GR NO. 205228, July 15, 2015
FACTS: On 13 March 2007, at around 8:00 a.m., POI Garabiles and P02 Santos were on their
way to Camp Olivas, Pampanga, riding a motorcycle along Olongapo-Gapan National Road.
While they were at Barangay Malapit San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, a speeding blue Toyota Corolla
(Corolla) heading towards the same direction, overtook them and the maroon Honda CRV car in
front of them.
When the Corolla reached alongside the CRV, the passenger on the front seat of the Corolla shot
the CRV and caused the CRV to swerve and fall in the canal. The Four (4) armed men (accused)
then suddenly alighted the Corolla and started shooting at the driver of the CRV (Cabiedes). During
the shooting, a bystander, Bulanan, who was standing near the road embankment, was hit by a


stray bullet. The four accused hurried back to the Corolla and immediately left the crime scene.
Bothe Cabiedes and Bulanan died from the fatal gun wounds.
The police learned that the Corolla was registered under the name of Rivera, who admitted that he
is the owner of the Corolla but clarified that the Corolla is one of the several cars he owns in his
car rental business, which he leased to Adriano. Later that day, Adriano arrived at Rivera's shop
with the Corolla, where he was identified by P02 Santos and PO 1 Garabiles as one of the four
assailants. He was immediately arrested and brought to the Provincial Special Operations Group.
CRIME CHARGED: 2 counts of MURDER (Cabiedes and Bulanan)
RTC RULING: CONVICTED Adriano for:

Murder - Cabiedes
Homicide - Bulanan
CA RULING: RTC Ruling Affirmed

Murder - Cabiedes
Homicide - Bulanan
ISSUE: WON the accused is guilty of the death of Bulanan under Art 4 pursuant to the doctrine
of Aberratio Ictus.
HELD: YES. Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the
wrongful act be different from that which is intended. One who commits an intentional felony is
responsible for all the consequences which may naturally or logically result therefrom, whether
foreseen or intended or not. The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine, 'el que es causa de la
causa es causa del mal causado ', or he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
At the outset, Adriano had no intention to kill Bulanan, much less, employ any particular means
of attack. Logically, Bulanan's death was random and unintentional and the method used to kill
her, as she was killed by a stray a bullet, was, by no means, deliberate. Nonetheless, Adriano is
guilty of the death of Bulanan under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to the doctrine
of aberratio ictus, which imposes criminal liability for the acts committed in violation of law and
for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom. While it may not have been
Adriano's intention to shoot Bulanan, this fact will not exculpate him. Bulanan' s death caused by
the bullet fired by Adriano was the natural and direct consequence of Adriano's felonious deadly
assault against Cabiedes.
TICKLER: Discipline of Minor

People vs. Sales
G.R. No. 177218, October 3, 2011.
DEL CASTILLO, J
Facts:
Brothers Noemar and Junior then nine and eight years old, respectively, left their home without
the permission of their parents. They did not return home that night. When their mother, Maria
Litan Sales (Maria), looked for them the next day, she found them in the nearby Barangay of


Magsaysay. Afraid of their father’s rage, Noemar and Junior initially refused to return home but
their mother prevailed upon them. When the two kids reached home at around 8 o’clock in the
evening of September 20, 2002, a furious appellant confronted them. Appellant then whipped them
with a stick which was later broken so that he brought his kids outside their house. Shortly
thereafter, Noemar collapsed and lost consciousness. Maria tried to revive him and when Noemar
remained motionless despite her efforts, she told appellant that their son was already dead.
However, appellant refused to believe her. As there was no vehicle and because another quack
doctor they met at the junction told them that Noemar is already dead, appellant brought his son
back to their house.
CRIME CHARGED: Parricide and slight physical injuries

RTC Ruling: Guilty of committing the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries. In the crime
of parricide, the trial court did not consider the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
against appellant since there is no proof that he planned to kill Noemar. But the trial court
appreciated in his favor the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong.
Court of Appeals’ Ruling: Affirmed

Issue(s): Is there criminal liability under Art. 4?
Held:
Yes Appellant attempts to evade criminal culpability by arguing that he merely intended to
discipline Noemar and not to kill him. However, the relevant portion of Article 4 of the Revised
Penal Code states: Art. 4. Criminal liability.—Criminal liability shall be incurred: By any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended. In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he
intended to commit, it is indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done
to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the perpetrator. Here,
there is no doubt appellant in beating his son Noemar and inflicting upon him physical injuries
committed a felony. As a direct consequence of the beating suffered by the child, he expired.
Appellant’s criminal liability for the death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear. There was error in
appreciating the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong.
Appellant adopted means to ensure the success of the savage battering of his sons. He tied their
wrists to a coconut tree to prevent their escape while they were battered with a stick to inflict as
much pain as possible. Noemar suffered injuries in his face, head and legs that immediately caused
his death. “The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that
actually perpetrated cannot be appreciated where the acts employed by the accused were
reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the victim [Parricide is
committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased
is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or
other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused.]
Appeal denied, judgment affirmed with modifications.


TICKLER: Empty Room, Impossible Crime
SULPICIO INTOD vs COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992
FACTS:
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, with his three companions (Jorge Pangasian,
Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig) went to the house of one Salvador Mandaya and asked the
latter to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, they had a meeting
with Aniceto Dumalagan. Intod told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because
of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany them, otherwise, he would
also be killed. At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Intod and his company, all
armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya
pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, they fired at said room. It turned out,
however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-
law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by
the gun fire. Intod and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness even
testified that before the men left the premises, they shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and
especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if you were not injured".
CRIME CHARGED: Attempted Murder

RTC Ruling : Attempted Murder
CA Ruling: Attempted Murder
ISSUE: Whether the accused is guilty of attempted murder or impossible crime provided under
Article 4, paragraph 2 of the RPC?
HELD: The liability of the accused is that of an impossible crime under Article 4, paragraph 2.
The Revised Penal Code, penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite impossible
or carried out with means which prove inadequate, would constitute a felony against person or
against property. The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies. Under said
article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person or property
because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the
means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. The case at bar belongs to this category.
Accused shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was
not present in said place and thus, the accused failed to accomplish his end.
Respondent relied in American jurisprudence to make the Supreme Court sustain the judgment of
attempted murder against the accused. However, the decisions in said cases cannot be relied upon
to resolve the issue at hand. There is a difference between the Philippine and the American laws
regarding the concept and appreciation of impossible crimes.In the Philippines, the Revised Penal
Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible crimes and made the punishable. Whereas,
in the United States, the Code of Crimes and Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this matter.
What it provided for were attempts of the crimes enumerated in the said Code. Furthermore, in
said jurisdiction, the impossibility of committing the offense is merely a defense to an attempt
charge.


This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The
impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by
itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised
Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal
impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended
crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code,
such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime. To uphold the contention of respondent that
the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause
independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4.
TICKLER: Dishonored Check

Jacinto vs. People
G.R. No. 162540, July 13, 2009
FACTS:
In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known as Baby Aquino, handed Gemma
Jacinto Banco De Oro (BDO) Check No. 0132649 in the amount of P10,000.00. The check was
payment for Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc. Jacinto was then the collector of
Mega Foam. The check was deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband
of Jacqueline Capitle. Jacqueline is the sister of Jacinto. Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another
employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from one of their customers, Jennifer Sanalila. The
customer wanted to know if she could issue checks payable to the account of Mega Foam, instead
of issuing the checks payable to CASH. Said customer had apparently been instructed by
Jacqueline to make check payments to Mega Foam payable to CASH. Around that time,
Ricablanca also received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank, Valenzuela Branch, who
was looking for Generoso. The reason for the call was to inform Generoso that the subject BDO
check had been dishonored.
Ricablanca then phoned Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega Foam, asking the
latter to inform Jacqueline about the phone call from Land Bank regarding the bounced check.
Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca
to ask Aquino to replace the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the
cash and divide it equally into four: for herself, Ricablanca, Jacinto and Jacqueline. Ricablanca,
upon the advise of Mega Foam's accountant, reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam,
Joseph Dyhengco.
Thereafter, Dyhengco talked to Aquino and was able to confirm that the latter indeed handed
Jacinto a BDO check. Verification from company records showed that petitioner never remitted
the subject check to Mega Foam.
Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an
entrapment operation with its agents. Jacinto and Valencia were arrested by NBI agents.
The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified theft against the two and one Jane Doe who was later
identified as Jacqueline Capitle.


The defense denied having taken the subject check.
CRIME CHARGED: Qualified theft

RTC found Jacinto, Valencia and Jacqueline Capitle guilty of the crime of qualified theft
CA found Jacinto and Valencia guilty but Jacqueline was acquitted
*Only Jacinto filed Petition for Review on Certiorari
ISSUE: Whether or not the acussed can be held liable for qualified theft
HELD: No. For a person to be liable for qualified theft, the personal property subject of
the theft must have some value, as the intention of the accused is to gain from the thing
stolen. This is further bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides that the penalty to
be imposed on the accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen.
Jacinto is guilty of an impossible crime. The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act
performed would be an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil
intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was
either inadequate or ineffectual. To be impossible, the act intended by the offender must be by its
nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2)
physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act. Legal impossibility occurs where the
intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. On the other hand, factual
impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control
prevent the consummation of the intended crime.
In this case, Jacinto performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a
crime against property. Jacinto's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking
the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for
the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which was not
rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check being
unfunded, a fact unknown to Jacinto at the time, that prevented the crime from being produced. The
thing unlawfully taken by Jacinto turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the check was
eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said
dishonored check.
As of the time that petitioner took possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had
performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it not been impossible of
accomplishment in this case. Hence, Jacinto is found guilty of an impossible crime.


Article 6: Stages in the Commission of a Felony
TICKLER: Step-father, Peeping brother

People of the Philippines vs. Freedie Lizada
G.R. Nos. 143468-71 January 24, 2003
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Lizada is the step-father of the private complainant Analia Orillosa. Lizada was
charged with 4 counts of rape committed on or about August 1998 (Crim Case No. 99-171390),
November 1998 (99-171391), October 1998(99-171392), and September 1998 (99-17193). All 4
Information allege that the crime was committed against Analia by embracing her, kissing her,
touching her private parts, removing her skirt and panty, placing himself on top of her trying to
insert his penis into her vagina and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her.
The day after the last rape incident, Analia submitted herself to genitalia examination, the medico-
legal concluded that there was no evident sign of extragenital physical injuries and that the hymen
was intact and orifice small as to preclude complete penetration.
During trial, the collective testimony of private complainant and Rossel (9-year old brother) was
that on November 1998, Lizada was wearing a pair of shorts but was naked from waist up, entered
the room of Analia, went on top of her, held her hands, removed her panty, mashed her breast, and
touched her sex organ. However, Lizada saw Rossel peeping through the door and dismounted.
He then left the room of Analia.
Defendant maintains that the prosecution failed to adduce the required quantum of evidence and
that the physical evidence (medical findings) belies private complainant’s claim of having been
deflowered by accused-appellant on 4 different occasions.
CRIME CHARGED: 4 counts of rape

RTC: Convicted of 4 counts of rape; death penalty (thus automatic review to SC)
ISSUE: Is Lizada guilty of 4 counts of consummated rape?
RULING: No, Lizada is only guilty of 3 counts of consummated rape and 1 attempted rape.
As to the 3 rape incidents (August, October and September), Lizada is guilty of consummated rape
because the fact that the hymen of private complainant remains intact is immaterial. Even the
slightest penetration of the labia by the male organ or the mere entry of the penis into the aperture
constitutes consummated rape. It is sufficient that there be entrance of the male organ within the
labia of the pudendum.
As to the November rape incident, Lizada is guilty only of attempted rape. The essential elements
of an attempted felony are as follows: 1. The offender commences the commission of the felony
directly by overt acts; 2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony; 3. The offenders act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance; 4. The non-
performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his spontaneous
desistance. The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely: (1) That
there be external acts; (2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be
committed.


Further, acts constitutive of an attempt to commit a felony should be distinguished from
preparatory acts which consists of devising means or measures necessary for accomplishment of a
desired object or end.
In light of the facts established by the prosecution, the Court believes that Lizada intended to have
carnal knowledge of private complainant. The overt acts of accused-appellant proven by the
prosecution were not mere preparatory acts. By the series of his overt acts, accused-appellant had
commenced the execution of rape which, if not for his spontaneous desistance, will ripen into the
crime of rape. Although accused-appellant desisted from performing all the acts of execution
however his desistance was not spontaneous as he was impelled to do so only because of the
sudden and unexpected arrival of Rossel. Hence, accused-appellant is guilty only of attempted
rape.
TICKLER: UST Med Student; Basted and Maniac Frat Boy; Adidas Shorts and White T-
Shirt
Baleros vs. People
G.R. No. 138033, February 22, 2006
Garcia, J.
FACTS:
MALOU is a UST Medical Student and a resident of Room 307 at Celestial Marie Building along
A.H. Lacson Street, Sampaloc, Manila.
On the early morning of December 13, 1991, MALOU was awakened by the smell of chemical on
a piece of cloth pressed on her face. She struggled but could not move. Somebody was pinning her
down on the bed, holding her tightly. She wanted to scream for help but the hands covering her
mouth with cloth wet with chemicals were very tight. Still, MALOU continued fighting off her
attacker by kicking him until at last her right hand got free. With this, she was able to grab his sex
organ which she then squeezed. The man let her. Over the intercom, MALOU told S/G Ferolin
that: "may pumasok sa kuarto ko pinagtangkaan ako". Who it was she did not, however, know.
The only thing she had made out during their struggle was the feel of her attacker’s clothes and
weight. His upper garment was of cotton material while that at the lower portion felt smooth and
satin-like. He was wearing a t-shirt and shorts.
The accused, CHITO, was her classmate. He was friendly until a week prior to the attack. CHITO
confided his feelings for her, telling her: "Gusto kita, mahal kita" and she rejected him.
CHITO arrived at the Celestial Marie Building at 1:30 in the early morning of December 13, 1991,
wearing a white t-shirt with Fraternity symbols and black shorts with the brand name “Adidas”
and requested permission to go up to Room 306. During the investigation, LOYLOY (an occupant
of Room 310 and a classmate of CHITO and MALOU) surprisingly found a gray "Khumbella"
bag cloth type inside his unit and surrendered the same to the investigators. When CHRISTIAN
(roommate of LOYLOY and classmate of CHITO and MALOU) saw the gray bag, he knew right
away that it belonged to CHITO as he had seen the latter usually bringing it to school. In their
presence, it was opened and its contents included, among others, a white t-shirt with a Taunu Sigma
Phi sign and a Black Adidas short pants.


Defense: Alibi. He was allegedly in a Christmas gathering at the house of a senior fraternity brother
at Greenhills, San Juan.
Crime Charged: ATTEMPTED RAPE

RTC: Guilty of Attempted Rape
CA: Affirmed the RTC
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of attempted rape.
HELD: The SC ruled in the negative.
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man who has carnal
knowledge or intercourse with a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) By using
force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
(3) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. Under Article 6, in relation to
the aforementioned article of the same code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the
commission of rape directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.
The Court, in People vs. Lamahang, held that "The attempt which the Penal Code punishes is that
which has a logical connection to a particular, concrete offense; that which is the beginning of the
execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and
consummation." Absent the unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the
cause and its effect, as where the purpose of the offender in performing an act is not certain,
meaning the nature of the act in relation to its objective is ambiguous, then what obtains is an
attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, which is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of
the Penal Code.
There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or carnal knowledge in the
present case. The next question that thus comes to the fore is whether or not the act of the petitioner,
i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou, constitutes an overt act of
rape.
According to the SC, it would be too strained to construe petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-
soaked cloth in the mouth of Malou which would induce her to sleep as an overt act that will
logically and necessarily ripen into rape. As it were, petitioner did not commence at all the
performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape Malou. It cannot be
overemphasized that petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to
undress Malou, let alone touch her private part. For what reason petitioner wanted the complainant
unconscious, if that was really his immediate intention, is anybody’s guess.
Dispositive Portion: Accused is liable for unjust vexation. It includes any human conduct which,
although not productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an
innocent person. That Malou, after the incident in question, cried while relating to her classmates


what she perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape proved
beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if not distressed by the acts of petitioner.
People vs Labiaga
G.R. No. 202867, July 15, 2013
Facts:
Version of the prosecution
At around 7:00 p.m. on 23 December 2000, Gregorio Conde, and his two daughters, Judy and
Glenelyn Conde, were in their home at Barangay Malayu-an, Ajuy, Iloilo. Thereafter, Gregorio
stepped outside. Glenelyn was in their store, which was part of their house.
Shortly thereafter, Regie Labiaga alias “Banok”, shot the latter. Gregorio called Judy for help.
When Judy and Glenelyn rushed to Gregorio’s aid, Labiaga shot Judy in the abdomen. The two
other accused, Alias Balatong Barcenas and Demapanag were standing behind the Labiaga.
Labiaga said, "she is already dead," and the three fled the crime scene.
Gregorio and Judy were rushed to the Sara District Hospital. Judy was pronounced dead on arrival
while Gregorio made a full recovery after treatment of his gunshot wound.
Dr. Jose Edwin Figuraexamined Gregorio after the incident. He found that Gregorio sustained only
superficial wound in his right forearm and in his right shoulder.6
Version of the defense

Labiaga contended that he acted in self-defense. Gregorio, armed with a shotgun, challenged him
to a fight. He attempted to shoot appellant, but the shotgun jammed. Appellant tried to wrest the
shotgun from Gregorio, and during the struggle, the shotgun fired. He claimed that he did not know
if anyone was hit by that gunshot.
CRIME CHARGED: Murder and Frustrated Murder

RTC RULING: Murder and Frustrated Murder
CA RULING: Murder and Frustrated Murder
ISSUE: Whether Or Not The Accused Is Liable For Frustrated Murder?
SC RULING:
NO. The SC held that it should be convicted of attempted murder, and not frustrated.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines the stages in the commission of felonies:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies.— Consummated felonies as well as those
which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment
are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.


There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
In Serrano v. People, we distinguished a frustrated felony from an attempted felony in this

manner:
1.) In a frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should produce
the felony as a consequence; whereas in an attempted felony, the offender merely commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution.
2.) In a frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some cause
independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in an attempted felony, the reason for
the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or accident other than the offender’s own spontaneous
desistance.20
In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound would have been fatal were
it not for timely medical intervention.21 If the evidence fails to convince the court that the wound
sustained would have caused the victim’s death without timely medical attention, the accused
should be convicted of attempted murder and not frustrated murder.
In the instant case, it does not appear that the wound sustained by Gregorio Conde was mortal.
This was admitted by Dr. Edwin Figura, who examined Gregorio after the shooting incident.
Since Gregorio’s gunshot wound was not mortal, we hold that appellant should be convicted of
attempted murder and not frustrated murder.
TICKLER: Frustrated Theft, Tide Detergent

Valenzuela v. People
GR No. 160188, June 21, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner Valenzuela was seen by the security guard Lago wearing an identification card with the
mark "Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU)," hauling a push cart and unloading cases of detergent
of the well-known "Tide" brand outside the supermarket and thereafter returned inside the
supermarket, five minutes later, emerged with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded
these boxes to the same area in the open parking space. Petitioner hailed a taxi, boarded the same
and directed it towards the parking space where Calderon was waiting. The cartons of Tide
Ultramatic were placed inside the taxi.
Lago proceeded to stop the taxi and asked petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner
and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security
guards of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended at the scene.
Petitioner and Calderon both claimed having been innocent bystanders within the vicinity.
Petitioner testified he and his cousin had been at the parking lot when they saw the security guard
Lago fire a shot. The gunshot caused him and the other people at the scene to start running, at
which point he was apprehended by Lago and brought to the security office.
CRIME CHARGED: Consummated Theft


RTC RULING: Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90, convicted both petitioner and
Calderon of the crime of consummated theft.
CA RULING: Affirmed.
(Petitioner argued that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since at the time he was
apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen. However,
in its Decision, the Court of Appeals rejected this contention and affirmed petitioner’s conviction.
Hence the present Petition for Review, which expressly seeks that petitioner’s conviction "be
modified to only of Frustrated Theft.)
ISSUE: Whether the accused was guilty of frustrated theft only since he was never placed in a
position to freely dispose of the stolen articles.
HELD: No. The accused is guilty of consummated theft.
The determination of whether a crime is frustrated or consummated necessitates an initial

concession that all of the acts of execution have been performed by the offender. The critical
distinction instead is whether the felony itself was actually produced by the acts of execution. The
determination of whether the felony was "produced" after all the acts of execution had been
performed hinges on the particular statutory definition of the felony. It is the statutory definition
that generally furnishes the elements of each crime under the Revised Penal Code, while the
elements in turn unravel the particular requisite acts of execution and accompanying criminal
intent.
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.— Theft is committed by any person who, with
intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things,
shall take personal property of another without the latter’s consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same
to the local authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of

another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by
him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field where trespass is
forbidden or which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall
hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather cereals, or other forest or farm products.
Article 308 provides for a general definition of theft, and three alternative and highly idiosyncratic
means by which theft may be committed.


Indeed, we have long recognized the following elements of theft as provided for in Article 308 of
the Revised Penal Code, namely: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property
belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done
without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.42
So, in order to ascertain whether the theft is consummated or frustrated, it is necessary to inquire
as to how exactly is the felony of theft "produced." Parsing through the statutory definition of theft
under Article 308, there is one apparent answer provided in the language of the law — that theft
is already "produced" upon the "tak[ing of] personal property of another without the latter’s
consent."
The ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen is not a constitutive element of
the crime of theft. It finds no support or extension in Article 308, whether as a descriptive or
operative element of theft or as the mens rea or actus reus of the felony. Such factor runs immaterial
to the statutory definition of theft, which is the taking, with intent to gain, of personal property of
another without the latter’s consent.
Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains
possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. Thus, Article 308 of
the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or
consummated.
The adoption of the rule —that the inability of the offender to freely dispose of the stolen property
frustrates the theft — would introduce a convenient defense for the accused which does not reflect
any legislated intent, since the Court would have carved a viable means for offenders to seek a
mitigated penalty under applied circumstances that do not admit of easy classification. It is difficult
to formulate definite standards as to when a stolen item is susceptible to free disposal by the thief.
TICKLER: Frustrated Rape, New People’s Army

People vs Agapito Quinanola
GR No. 126148, May 5, 1999
FACTS:
Catalina Carciller her cousin 15-year-old Rufo Ginto and another male companion named Richard
Diaz, went to attend a dance at around ten o'clock in the evening of 05 March 1994 in Sitio Bangag
Tangil, Dumanjug, Cebu. Catalina was just then fifteen (15) years and four (4) months old.
About an hour later they left the party and were soon on their way home. The three unsuspecting
youngsters stopped momentarily to rest at a waiting shed beside the Tangil Elementary School.
Accused Agapito Quiñanola a.k.a. "Petoy" and accused Eduardo Escuadro a.k.a. "Botiquil" who
were both armed with guns suddenly turned up Quiñanola beaming his flashlight at the trio while
Escuadro stood by focused his attention on Catalina. Quiñonala announced that he and Escuardo
were members of New People's Army ("NPA").


Escuadro brought Diaz and Ginto outside the waiting shed area. He ordered the duo to lie face
down on the ground and then urinated at them. While Escuadro was fixing the zipper of his pants,
Diaz and Ginto were able to escape and ran away. Meanwhile Quiñanola with his gun pointed at
Catalina, forcibly brought her towards the nearby school. Catalina heard a gunfire but Quiñanola
assured her that it was only an exploding firecracker. When Escuadro again showed up, Catalina
asked about her two friends. Quiñanola replied that he had ordered them to go home. Catalina
begged that she herself be allowed to leave. Pretending to agree, they walked the path towards the
road behind the school. Then, unsuspectingly, Quiñanola forced Catalina to sit on the ground.
She resisted but Quiñanola, pointing his gun at her, warned her that if she would not accede to
what he wanted he would kill her. Catalina started to cry. Quiñanola told Escuadro to remove her
denim pants. Catalina struggled to free herself from Escuadro's hold but to no avail. Escuadro
ultimately succeeded in undressing her. Quiñanola unzipped his pants and laid on top of her while
Escuadro held her legs Quiñanola "started to pump, to push and pull" ven as Catalina still tried
desperately to free herself from him. She felt his organ "on the lips of (her) genitalia." When
Quiñanola had satisfied his lust, Escuadro took his turn by placing himself on top of Catalina.
Catalina could feel the sex organ of Escuadro "on the lips of (her) vulva" while he made a push
and pull movement. Quiñanola, who stood by, kept on smoking a cigarette.
Escuadro and Quiñanola scampered immediately after Catalina's ordeal. Failing to find her pair of
pants and panty. Catalina was left wearing her T-shirt and brassieres. Catalina just then sat down,
not knowing what to do, until she finally started to run home fearing that she might be followed.
Upon reaching home, Catalina went upstairs and, afraid that the culprit would still come after her,
hid herself behind the door. Baffled by Catalina's strange behavior, her mother and her elder sister
took turns interrogating her. Catalina finally said that she was raped but she would not reveal the
names of the persons who had committed the dastardly act because of their threat.1âwphi1.nêt
Guillermo Zozobrado learned from his wife, Catalina's sister, that Catalina had been raped. He
promptly repaired to the municipal hall of Dumanjug to report the crime. Policemen were
immediately dispatched to the Carcillers' residence. Still in a state of shock, Catalina initially kept
mum about it; later, when the police officers returned at daytime, she was able to respond to
questions and to disclose that "Petoy," referring to Agapito Quiñanola, and "Botiquil," the other
accused Eduardo Escuadro, were the persons who ravished her. The officers later invited her to
the police station to identify a suspect whom she positively identified to be "Botiquil" or Eduardo
Escuadro.
Living Case Report No. 94-MI-7, 8 prepared by Dr. Tomas P. Refe, medico-legal officer of the
National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI") of Region 7, Central Visayas, who conducted the
physical examination of Catalina on 07 March 1994, showed that there was "no evidence of
extragenital physical injury noted on the body of the Subject."
The report concluded that the hymenal orifice, about 1.8 cms. in diameter, was "so small as to
preclude complete penetration of an average-size adult penis in erection without producing
laceration.


Against the evidence submitted by the prosecution, the accused, in their defense, interposed alibi,
ill motive on the part of an "uncle" of the complainant, and insufficient identification.
The court found the two accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "frustrated
rape".
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused are guilty of frustrated rape
HELD:
NO.
In the context it is used in the Revised Penal Code, "carnal knowledge" unlike its ordinary
connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily require that the vagina be penetrated or that
the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured. The crime of rape is deemed consummated
even when the man's penis merely enters the labia or lips of the female organ or, as once so said
in a case, by the "mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the
sexual act."
Let it be said once again that, as the Revised Penal Code presently so stands, there is no such crime
as frustrated rape. In People vs. Orita, the Court has explicitly pronounced:
Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim,
he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense
have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed
the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated.
We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential.
Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of
the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant
conviction.
Of course, We are aware of our earlier pronouncement in the case of People vs. Eriñia, 50 Phil.
998 [1927] where, We found the offender guilty of frustrated rape there being no conclusive
evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended party. However, it appears that this is
a "stray" decision inasmuch as it has not been reiterated in Our subsequent decisions.
Each appellant is liable for two counts of consummated rape on account of a clear conspiracy
between them shown by their obvious concerted efforts to perpetrate, one after the other, the crime.
Each of them therefore is responsible not only for the rape committed personally by him but also
for the rape committed by the other as well.
People V. Orande
G.R. Nos. 141724-27, November 12, 2003
FACTS:
Orande was the common law husband of Jessica's mother Girlie. Appellant, a pedicab driver,
started living with Girlie and her three children sometime in 1993. To earn a living, Girlie sold


fish at the Paco Market, buying her stock from the Navotas fish market late at night and sometimes
in the early hours of the morning.
The first incident of rape occured when Jessica (9 yrs and 4months old) was then watching
television while her brothers and sisters were sleeping beside her. Appellant armed with a knife,
grabbed Jessica's right hand and lasciviously jabbed her palm with his finger. He ordered her to
undress which she obeyed out of fear. Appellant then removed his pants, placed himself on top of
complainant and succeeded in partially penetrating her..
The second rape occurred When Jessica (11 yrs and 3 months old) and her siblings were left in the
house watching television. Soon after, appellant arrived and sent the children, except Jessica, to
play outside. Left alone with Jessica, appellant removed his clothes, pulled out a balisong and
ordered Jessica to undress. Appellant reached his orgasm shortly after penetrating her slightly. He
stood up with semen still dripping from his penis.
The third rape is when Jessica was 12 years and 6 months old. She arrived from school at around
11:00 a.m. While she was changing her clothes, appellant ordered Jessica's brother and sister to
visit their mother at the Paco Market and sent his children to play outside the house. Thereafter,
he placed himself on top of her, partially penetrated her until he ejaculated.
The last rape is when Jessica was at home with her siblings who were all asleep. Appellant told
Jessica that they would again do what they did before but she refused, saying that she might get
pregnant. Appellant brandished his balisong and threatened to kill her. His penis slightly penetrated
her vagina. Jessica pushed him away and told him she wanted to sleep.
A teacher of Jessica, Mrs. Adoracion Mojica, noticed the

unusual treatment of Jessica by appellant. When confronted by Mrs. Mojica, Jessica
admitted that appellant had raped her several times. Mrs. Mojica called up Jessica
’s aunt, Mrs. Antonina de la Cruz, and narrated to her what Jessica had confesse
d. Mrs. De la Cruz then accompanied Jessica to the police station to file a com
plaint and to the Philippine General Hospital (PGH), Child Protection Unit, to be
examined. Complainant charged appellant with raping her four times between Januar
y 1994 and November 1996. Incidentally, prior to the filing of the aforementioned
cases, Jessica also filed a criminal case against her mother, Girlie de la Cruz C
astro, and the appellant for child abuse.
For his defense, appellant advanced denial and alibi. Appellant argued that since Jessica
disapproved of his relationship with her mother, she had the motive to falsely accuse him of raping
her. Further, he pointed out the improbability of the alleged first and fourth incidents of rape
inasmuch as the make-up of the room made it impossible for Jessica's siblings not to wake up
during the commission of the crime. Appellant further contended that Jessica's failure to cry out
for help, knowing that her mother's relatives were in the same house, made her story of rape
unbelievable.
CRIME CHARGED:
2 simple rape


1 statutory rape
1 frustrated rape
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in convicting accused with the crime of frustrated rape.
HELD: Yes.
In the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his
victim, he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essent
ial elements of the offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be d
one by the offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to produce
the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. In a long line of cases, We have s
et the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not
essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Ent
ry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or lac
eration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attem
pted if there is no penetration of the female organ because not all acts of execut
ion was performed. The offender merely commenced the commission of a felony d
irectly by overt acts. Taking into account the nature, elements and manner of exe
cution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceiva
ble how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed. The victim testified t
hat she felt pain and her vagina bled, indisputable indications of slight penetration
or, at the very least, that the penis indeed touched the labia and not merely str
oked the external surface thereof. Thus, the appellant should be found guilty of (c
onsummated) rape and not merely frustrated or attempted rape.
People vs Pareja
GR No. 188979, September 5, 2012
FACTS:
At around 3:30 a.m. of June 16, 2003, AAA was sleeping beside her two-year old nephew, BBB,
on the floor of her sister’s room, when the appellant hugged her and kissed her nape and neck.
AAA cried, but the appellant covered her and BBB with a blanket. The appellant removed AAA’s
clothes, short pants, and underwear; he then took off his short pants and briefs. The appellant went
on top of AAA, and held her hands. AAA resisted, but the appellant parted her legs using his own
legs, and then tried to insert his penis into her vagina. The appellant stopped when AAA’s cry got
louder; AAA kicked the appellant’s upper thigh as the latter was about to stand up. The appellant
put his clothes back on, and threatened to kill AAA if she disclosed the incident to anyone.
Immediately after, the appellant left the room. AAA covered herself with a blanket and cried. On
the same day, AAA went to the house of her older sister, DDD, and narrated to her what happened.
Thereafter, AAA and her two siblings went to the Women and Children’s Desk and reported the
incident. The accused Christopher Pareja was then charged of the crime of rape.
The accused argued that the lower courts erred in convicting him for the crime of rape e, as the
prosecution failed to prove even the slightest penetration of his penis into the victim’s vagina.
CRIME CHARGED: Rape


RTC Ruling: Rape
CA Ruling: Rape
ISSUE: Whether or not the rape was consummated.
HELD: No.
The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of consummated rape. It instead convicted him of attempted rape, as the
evidence on record show the presence of all elements of the said crime.
Rape is consummated by the slightest penile penetration of the labia majora or pudendum of the
female organ.” Without any showing of such penetration, there can be no consummated rape; at
most, it can only be attempted rape [or] acts of lasciviousness. The prosecution failed to present
sufficient and convincing evidence to establish the required penile penetration. AAA’s testimony
did not establish that the appellant’s penis touched the labias or slid into her private part. Aside
from AAA’s testimony, no other evidence on record, such as a medico-legal report, could confirm
whether there indeed had been penetration, however slight, of the victim’s labias. In the absence
of testimonial or physical evidence to establish penile penetration, the appellant cannot be
convicted of consummated rape.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that there is an attempt when the offender
commenced the commission of the crime directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of
execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In
People v. Publico,29 we ruled that when the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with
the intent to penetrate, attempted rape is committed; otherwise, the crime committed is merely acts
of lasciviousness.
In the present case, the appellant commenced the commission of rape by the following overt acts:
kissing AAA’s nape and neck; undressing her; removing his clothes and briefs; lying on top of
her; holding her hands and parting her legs; and trying to insert his penis into her vagina. The
appellant, however, failed to perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of
rape by reason of a cause other than his own spontaneous desistance, i.e., the victim's loud cries
and resistance. The totality of the appellant’s acts demonstrated the unmistakable objective to
insert his penis into the victim’s private parts.
As the prosecution failed to present sufficient and convincing evidence to establish the required
penile penetration which is required in the consummation of the crime of rape, Pareja is only
convicted of the crime of attempted rape.
TICKER: Tent, AAA & BBB

Norberto Cruz vs. People
G.R. No. 166441, October 08, 2014
FACTS:
Petitioner Norberto Bartolome and his wife were engaged in the selling of plastic wares and glass
wares in different municipalities around the country. Norberto and his wife employed AAA and
BBB to help them in selling their wares in Bangar, La Union which was then celebrating its fiesta.


Two tents were fixed in order that they will have a place to sleep. At around 1:00 o'clock in the
morning, AAA and BBB went to sleep. Less than an hour later, AAA was awakened when she felt
that somebody was on top of her. Norberto was mashing her breast and touching her private part.
AAA realized that she was divested of her clothing and that she was totally naked. Norberto
ordered her not to scream or she'll be killed. AAA tried to push Norberto away and pleaded to have
pity on her but her pleas fell on deaf ears. She fought back and kicked Norberto twice. Norberto
was not able to pursue his lustful desires. Norberto offered her money and told her not to tell the
incident to her mother otherwise, she will be killed. AAA went out of the tent to seek help from
the house boy but she failed to wake him up. Thirty minutes later, when AAA returned to their
tent, she saw Norberto touching the private parts of BBB. AAA saw her companion awake but her
hands were shaking. When she finally entered the tent, Norberto left and went outside.
Crime charged: Attempted Rape (with respect to AAA) & Acts of Lasciviousness (with respect
to BBB)
RTC Ruling: Petitioner was found guilty of both crimes.
CA Ruling: Petitioner was found guilty with respect to the crime of attempted rape but was
acquitted with respect to the crime of acts of lasciviousness due to insufficiency of evidence.
Petitioner argued that the record does not indicate if he himself was also naked, or that his penis
was poised to penetrate her.
ISSUE:
Is the petitioner guilty of the crime of attempted rape?
HELD:
NO. In attempted rape, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not perform all the acts
of execution of having carnal knowledge. Accepting that intent, being a mental act, is beyond the
sphere of criminal law, that showing must be through his overt acts directly connected with rape.
He cannot be held liable for attempted rape without such overt acts demonstrating the intent to lie
with the female. In short, the State, to establish attempted rape, must show that his overt acts,
should his criminal intent be carried to its complete termination without being thwarted by
extraneous matters, would ripen into rape.
The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia with his
hands and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and effectively ended his
designs on her. Yet, inferring from such circumstances that rape, and no other, was his intended
felony would be highly unwarranted. This was so, despite his lust for and lewd designs towards
her being fully manifest. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or "susceptible of double
interpretation," as Justice Recto put in People v. Lamahang, supra, such that it was not permissible
to directly infer from them the intention to cause rape as the particular injury. Verily, his felony
would not exclusively be rape had he been allowed by her to continue, and to have sexual congress
with her, for some other felony like simple seduction (if he should employ deceit to have her yield
to him) could also be ultimate felony. As a rule, preparatory acts are not punishable under the
Revised Penal Code for as long as they remained equivocal or of uncertain significance, because
by their equivocality no one could determine with certainty what the perpetrator's intent really was.


The information charged that the petitioner "remove[d] her panty and underwear and la[id] on top
of said AAA embracing and touching her vagina and breast." With such allegation of the
information being competently and satisfactorily proven beyond a reasonable doubt, he was guilty
only of acts of lasciviousness, not attempted rape. His embracing her and touching her vagina and
breasts did not directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack of evidence showing his erectile
penis being in the position to penetrate her when he was on top of her deterred any inference about
his intent to lie with her. At most, his acts reflected lewdness and lust for her.


Article 8: Conspiracy – Kinds and Distinctions
INSERT People vs Pagalasan
TICKLER: Deep ravine/ Gang Rape

People Vs. Larranaga
G.R. No. 138874-75, February 3, 2004
FACTS:
On the night of July 16, 1997, victims Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong failed to come home on the
expected time. Two days after, a young woman was found dead at the foot of a cliff. Her pants
were torn, her t-shirt was raised up to her breast and her bra was pulled down. Her face and neck
were covered with masking tape and attached to her left wrist was a handcuff. The woman was
identified as Marijoy.
After almost ten months, accused Davidson Rusia surfaced and admitted before the police having
participated in the abduction of the sisters. He identified appellants Francisco Juan Larrañaga,
Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño, Ariel Balansag, James Anthony Uy, and James
Andrew Uy as co-perpetrators in the crime. Rusia provided the following before the trial court:
1) That at 10:30 in the evening of July 16, 1997, he met Rowen and Josman and told him to ride
with them in a white car. Following them were Larrañaga, James Anthony and James Andrew who
were in a red car. Josman stopped the white car in front of the waiting shed where the sisters
Marijoy and Jacqueline were standing and forced them to ride the car. Rusia taped their mouths
while Rowen handcuffed them jointly.
2) That after stopping by a safe house, the group thereafter headed to the South Bus Terminal
where they met Alberto and Ariel, and hired the white van driven by the former. They traveled
towards south of Cebu City, leaving the red car at the South Bus Terminal.
3) That after parking their vehicles near a precipice, they drank and had a pot session. Later, they
started to rape Marijoy inside the vehicle, and thereafter raped Jaqueline.
4) That Josman instructed Rowen and Ariel to bring Marijoy to the cliff and push her into the
ravine.
The claims of Rusia were supported by other witnesses. He was discharged as an accused and
became a state witness. Still, the body of Jacqueline was never found. The trial court found the
other appellants guilty of two crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and sentenced
each of them to suffer the penalties of two (2) reclusion perpetua. The appellants assailed the said
decision, arguing inter alia, that court erred in finding that there was conspiracy.
ISSUES:
Whether or not there was conspiracy.
HELD:
Yes. From the evidence of the prosecution, there is no doubt that all the appellants conspired in
the commission of the crimes charged. Their concerted actions point to their joint purpose and
community of intent. Well settled is the rule that in conspiracy, direct proof of a previous
agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It may be deduced from the mode and manner by


which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such
point to a joint design and community of interest. Otherwise stated, it may be shown by the conduct
of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime.
Appellants' actions showed that they have the same objective to kidnap and detain the Chiong
sisters. Rowen and Josman grabbed Marijoy and Jacqueline from the vicinity of Ayala Center.
Larrañaga, James Andrew and James Anthony who were riding a red car served as back-up of
Rowen and Josman. Together in a convoy, they proceeded to Fuente Osmeña to hire a van, and
thereafter, to the safehouse of the "Jozman Aznar Group" in Guadalupe, Cebu where they initially
molested Marijoy and Jacqueline. They headed to the South Bus Terminal where they hired the
white van driven by Alberto, with Ariel as the conductor. Except for James Andrew who drove the
white car, all appellants boarded the white van where they held Marijoy and Jacqueline captive. In
the van, James Anthony taped their mouths and Rowen handcuffed them together. They drank and
had a pot session at Tan-awan. They encircled Jacqueline and ordered her to dance, pushing her
and ripping her clothes in the process. Meanwhile, Larrañaga raped Marijoy, followed by Rowen,
James Anthony, Alberto, and Ariel. On other hand, Josman and James Andrew raped Jacqueline.
Upon Josman's order, Rowen and Ariel led Marijoy to the cliff and pushed her. After leaving Tan-
awan, they taunted Jacqueline to run for her life. And when Rusia got off from the van near Ayala
Center, the appellants jointly headed back to Cebu City.
Clearly, the argument of Rowen, Ariel and Alberto that they were not part of the "conspiracy" as
they were merely present during the perpetration of the crimes charged but not participants therein,
is bereft of merit. To hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be
shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must
be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design
and purpose. Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular
purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of
the purpose intended. As shown by the evidence for the prosecution, Rowen, Ariel and Alberto
were not merely present at the scene of the crime.
People vs. Garchitorena

G.R. No. 175605, August 2009
FACTS:
Dulce Borero testified that she was selling balut with her brother Mauro Biay when she was called
by accused Jessie Garcia. She said that when her brother Mauro approached Jessie, the latter
twisted the hand of her brother behind his back and Jessie’s companions- accused Arnold
Garchitorena and Joey Pamplona began stabbing her brother Mauro repeatedly with a shiny bladed
instrument. Joey was at the right side of the victim and was strangling Mauro from behind. Witness
saw her brother Mauro struggling to free himself while being stabbed by the three (3) accused.,
until her brother slumped facedown on the ground. Arnold then instructed his two co-accused to
run away. The accused-appellants denied the charge against them. Specifically, Pamplona denied
that he participated in the stabbing of Mauro Bay, Garcia interposed the defense of alibi, while
Garchitorena interposed the defense of insanity.
CRIME CHARGED: Murder with the qualifying aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength.


RTC Ruling: GUILTY
CA Ruling: GUILTY
ISSUE: Was there conspiracy in the instant case?
HELD: Yes. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential, for conspiracy may
be inferred from the acts of the accused prior to, during or subsequent to the incident.Such acts
must point to a joint purpose, concert of action or community of interest. Hence, the victim need
not be actually hit by each of the conspirators for the act of one of them is deemed the act of all.
In this case, conspiracy was shown because accused-appellants were together in performing the
concerted acts in pursuit of their common objective. Garcia grabbed the victims hands and twisted
his arms; in turn, Pamplona, together with Garchitorena, strangled him and straddled him on the
ground, then stabbed him. The victim was trying to free himself from them, but they were too
strong. All means through which the victim could escape were blocked by them until he fell to the
ground and expired. The three accused-appellants prior act of waiting for the victim outside affirms
the existence of conspiracy, for it speaks of a common design and purpose.
Where there is conspiracy, as here, evidence as to who among the accused rendered the fatal blow
is not necessary. All conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the intent and the
character of their participation, because the act of one is the act of all.
TICKLER: Closing of the Door

People vs. Carandang, Milan and Chua
GR No. 175926, February 29, 2000
FACTS:
The prosecution evidence culled from the testimonies of the witnesses yielded the following
version of the facts: In the afternoon of April 5, 2001, the drug enforcement unit of La Loma
Police Station 1 received a request for assistance from the sister of accused Milan regarding a drug
deal that would allegedly take place in her house at Calavite St., Brgy.Salvacion, QC. The
commander instructed SPO2 Wilfredo Red to talk to Milan’s sister. Thereafter, SPO2 Red formed
a team with him as team leader. They received further instructions from the station commander
then proceeded to Calavite Street. When the team reached the place they alighted from the vehicle
and surrounded Milan’s house. SPO1 Montecalvo’s group went to the left side of the house, while
SPO2 Red’s group proceeded to the right. The two groups eventually met at the back of the house
near Milan’s room. The door to Milan’s room was open, enabling the police officers to see
Carandang, Milan and Chua inside. SPO2 Red told the group that the persons inside the room
would not put up a fight, making them confident that nothing violent would erupt. However, when
the group introduced themselves as police officers, Milan immediately closed the door. PO2
Alonzo and SPO2 Red pushed the door open, causing it to fall and propelling them inside the
room. PO2 shouted “Walang Gagalaw!” Suddenly, gunshots rang, hitting PO2 Alonzo and SPO2
Red who dropped to the floor one after the other, due to suddenness of the attack they were not
able to return fire and were instantly killed by the barrage of gunshots. SPO1 Montecalvo, who
was right behind SPO2 Red, was still aiming his firearm at the assailants when Carandang shot


and hit him. Montecalvo fell to the ground, SPO1 Estores heard Chua say to Milan, “Sugurin mo
na!” Milan lunged towards Montecalvo, but the latter was able to fire his gun and hit Milan. SPO1
Estores went inside the house and pulled Montecalvo out. Reinforcement came; SPO1 Montecalvo
was brought to the Chinese General Hospital. He sustained a mortal wound on his neck.
The defense presented the three accused as witnesses testifying as follows: Carandang claims that
he had no firearm during the incident, and that it was the police officers who fired all the shots.
Milan and Chua also testified as to their respective defenses.
CRIME CHARGED: 2 counts of Murder of PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red

1 count of Frustrated Murder of SPO1 Montecalvo
RTC: 2 counts of Murder

1 count of Frustrated Murder
The killing of PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red qualified by treachery and acting with conspiracy with
each other
CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC

2 counts of Murder
1 count of Frustrated Murder
Issue: Is there conspiracy among the appellants in the case at bar?
Held: Yes. Conspiracy exists when 2 or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Evidence need not establish the actual agreement
among the conspirators showing a preconceived plan or motive for the commission of the crime.
Proof of concerted actions before, during and after the crime, which demonstrates their unity of
design and objective, is sufficient. When conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all
regardless of the degree of participation of each.
In the case at bar, the conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired with Carandang was established
by their acts (1) before Carandang shot the victims (Milan’s closing the door when the police
officers introduced themselves, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush), and (2) after the shooting
(Chua’s directive to Milan to attack SPO1 Montecalvo and Milan’s following such instruction).
Contrary to the suppositions of appellants, these facts are not meant to prove that Chua is a
principal by inducement or that Milan’s act of attacking SPO1 Montecalvo was what made him a
principal by direct participation. Instead, these facts are convincing circumstantial evidence of the
unity of purpose in the minds of the three. As co-conspirators, all three are considered principals
by direct participation.
The rapid turn of events cannot be considered to negate a finding of conspiracy. Unlike evident
premeditation, there is no requirement for conspiracy to exist that there be a sufficient period of
time to elapse to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection. Instead, conspiracy arises
on the very moment the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the subject felony.


TICKLER: Conspiracy in Bukidnon
People vs. Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi (Deceased) and Alfemio
Malogsi
G.R. No. 201860, January 22, 2014
FACTS:
On July 11, 1993 at about 7:30 in the evening, Ronie Dacion, stepson of victim Pionio Yacapin,
saw accused Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi and Alfemio Malogsi helping
each other and with the use of firearms and bolos, shot to death his stepfather in their house at
Barangay Salucot, Talakag, Bukidnon. Witnesses (Eddie and Nenita, stepson and wife of victim
respectively) for the prosecution corroborates the testimony of Ronie Dacion.
The accused were charged with murder in the Information dated July 16, 1993. The indictment
reads—
That on or about the 11th day of July 1993, at 7:30 in the evening more or less at barangay
Salucot, municipality of Talakag, province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping with (sic) one another, with intent to kill, by means of treachery,
armed with guns and bolos, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally attack,
assault and sho[o]t PIONIO YACAPIN, hitting his back and left leg, inflicting wounds that
cause[d] his death thereafter.
Accused plead not guilty to the crime. The accused interposed alibi and denial. A paraffin test
which was also conducted on all of the four accused yielded negative result.
After trial was concluded, a guilty verdict was handed down by the trial court finding appellants
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murdering Pionio Yacapin
Crime Charged: Murder

RTC: Murder
CA: Murder
ISSUES:
1. WON the accused can be held liable for the qualifying aggravating circumstance of abuse
of superior strength even if it was not alleged in the information.
2. WON there was conspiracy.
HELD:
1. Yes.
The lower court appreciated treachery, which was alleged in the information, as an
aggravating circumstance which qualified the offense to murder. This is proper considering
that, even if abuse of superior strength was properly alleged and proven in court, it cannot serve
to qualify or aggravate the felony at issue since it is jurisprudentially settled that when the
circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in
the latter.
Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended


party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning,
done in a swift and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting
victim no chance to resist or escape.
Treachery, which was alleged in the information, was duly proven by the
prosecution. The Court notes, in particular, the testimony of Nenita Yacapin who declared that
when the victim was making a fire in the kitchen, she heard shots and she saw the barrel of the
gun inserted on the bamboo split walling of their house. Exhibit "B", the anatomical chart
certified by the Philippine National Police (PNP) personnel, shows the relative location of the
gunshot wounds sustained by the victim. The chart indicates that the victim was shot from
behind. Clearly, the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself
or to retaliate.
2. Yes.
SC reiterated its ruling in People v. Nelmida:
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and then decide to commit it. It arises on the very instant the plotters
agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. Once
established, each and every one of the conspirators is made criminally liable for the crime
actually committed by any one of them. In the absence of any direct proof, the agreement to
commit a crime may be deduced from the mode and manner of the commission of the offense
or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community
of interest. As such, it does not matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as each of the actors
incurs the same criminal liability, because the act of one is the act of all.
SC affirmed the decision of CA.
INSERT PEOPLE VS OCTA
TICKLER: Conspiracy, Fraternity Rumble, UP Diliman, Masked Men, Baseball Bats and
Lead Pipes
People v. Danilo Feliciano, Jr. et al.
GR No. 196735, May 5, 2014
Leonen, J.
FACTS:
On December of 1994, seven members of the Sigma Rho fraternity, while eating lunch at the
canteen of UP Diliman, were attacked by several (15-20) masked men (heads covered with either
handkerchiefs or shirts) carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some sustained injuries while
Dennis Venturina died of traumatic head injuries. An information for murder was filed against
several members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity (herein defendants) of Venturina. Separate
infromations were also filed against them for the attempted murder of Mangrobang, Gaston, and
Lachica, and the frustrated murder of Natalico and Fortes. Only 11 of the accused stood in trial
since one of the accused, Guerrero, remained at large. During the trial, members of the Sigma Rho
fraternity identified the attackers as members of Scintilla Juris. The prosecution argued that based
on the testimonies of members of Sigma Rho fraternity who were attacked, they were able to
identify the attackers because some were not wearing masks while others had their masks fell off.


On the other hand, the defendants posited that based on the witnesses they presented, the attackers
cannot be identified because all of them were wearing masks at the time of the rumble.
Crime Charged: Murder of Venturina, Attempted Murder of Mangrobang, Gaston, and

Lachica, and Frustrated Murder of Natalico and Fortes. (with allegations of conspiracy)
RTC: Murder of Venturina. Attempted Murder of Mangrobang, Gaston, and Lachica, and
Natalico and Fortes. No Frustrated Murder. However, the trial court acquitted five defendants.
The prosecution witnesses were able to identify their attackers. No evil motive on the part of Sigma
Rhoans to convict members of the Scintilla Juris because each eyewitness only identified one or
two attackers.
CA: Murder of Venturina and Attempted Murder of Natalico and Fortes only. The CA
reasoned that because Lachica and Mangrobang were no longer chased by the attackers, they
voluntarily desisted from pursuing them and from inflicting harm to them. The wound inflicted on
Gaston was too shallow.
ISSUE: Is there conspiracy (Art. 8)? Is the CA correct in modifying the decision of the trial court?
HELD: Yes. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that “conspiracy and proposal to
commit felony are punishable only in the cases in which the law specifically provides a penalty
therefor. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. There is proposal when the person who has
decided to commit a felony proposes its execution to some other person or persons”.
The decision of the CA is erroneous. The trial court found that there was conspiracy among the
accused and the CA sustained this. Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching liability to
all of the accused, regardless of their degree of participation, thus: Once an express or implied
conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and
character of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime or crimes
perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the
act of all.
The liabilities of the accused-appellants m this case arose from a single incident wherein the
accused-appellants were armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, all in agreement to do the highest
amount of damage possible to the victims. The intent to kill was already present at the moment of
attack and that intent was shared by all of the accused-appellants alike when the presence of
conspiracy was proven. It is, therefore, immaterial to distinguish between the seriousness of the
injuries suffered by the victims to determine the respective liabilities of their attackers. What is
relevant is only as to whether the death occurs as a result of that intent to kill and whether there
are qualifying, aggravating or mitigating circumstances that can be appreciated.
TICKLER: Shabu Mayor

People vs Morilla
GR 189833, February 5, 2014
FACTS:


Mayor Ronnie Mitra (Panukulan, Quezon) and Javier Morilla were caught in flagrante delicto
while transporting shabu on board a Starex van (driven by Mayor) and an ambulance (driven by
Morilla). On a checkpoint at Real, Infanta Quezon, the Starex van was able to pass; however,
police officers ordered the ambulance to stop. Policemen then ordered Morilla to open the rear
door of the car for inspection of several sacks which according to Morilla are narra wooden tiles.
The contents turned to be methamphetamine hydrochloride and this discovery prompted police
officers to chase the Starex van. They were able to stop Mayor Mitra and asked him of his
knowledge of Morilla driving the ambulance loaded with shabu. On plain view, operatives noticed
that his van was also loaded with sacks like the ones found in the ambulance. Taken together, they
carry a total of approximately 503.68 kilos of shabu.
On trial, both accused argued that they have no knowledge of the contents of the vehicle.
Morilla further alleged that he only acted based on the instructions of the Mayor and hence, cannot
be imputed to be a member of the alleged organized/ syndicated group as the Information alleged
him to be. Trial court found conspiracy between Morilla and Mitra holding that they have the
common intent to transport illegal drugs.
(There were two other accused charged namely Dequilla and Yang but for failure of the
prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, they were acquitted. The trial court
ruled that being mere passengers of the vehicle does not prove that they are also conspirators.)
CRIME CHARGED: Illegal transport of methamphetamine hydrochloride (Violation of RA

6245 or Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972)
RTC Ruling: GUILTY of Illegal transport of methamphetamine hydrochloride
CA Ruling: GUILTY of Illegal transport of methamphetamine hydrochloride
ISSUE: Is there a conspiracy to commit the offense charged?
HELD:
Yes. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit. (Article 8, RPC). To determine conspiracy, there
must be a common design to commit a felony.
The argument of Morilla that mere act of driving the ambulance does not establish that he was part
of the syndicated group is misplaced. In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually
came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The assent
of the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of some complete whole. In this
case, the totality of the factual circumstances leads to a conclusion that Morilla conspired with
Mayor Mitra in a common desire to transport the dangerous drugs. If indeed he was not involved
in conspiracy with Mayor Mitra, he would not have told the police officers that he was with the
mayor. The very act of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride is malum prohibitum since
it is punished as an offense under a special law. The fact of transportation of the sacks containing
dangerous drugs need not be accompanied by proof of criminal intent, motive or knowledge.
Hence, the petition is DENIED.



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CRIMINAL

LAW REVIEW: CASE DIGESTS

TICKLER: Car repair shop, Mancor, Corazon Teng

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT RULING: Guilty of violation of Batas Pambansa 22.

4F (2016-2017) Prosecutor Victoria C. Garcia 1

4F (2016-2017) Prosecutor Victoria C. Garcia 2

TICKLER: Gunshot to ear and nape

CRIME CHARGED: Frustrated homicide

ISSUE: Is there intent to kill?

4F (2016-2017) Prosecutor Victoria C. Garcia 3

TICKLER: Land lady

Crime Charged: (Silent)

ISSUE: Whether or not Alfredo had intent to kill Alexander.

HELD: Yes, there was intent to kill.

4F (2016-2017) Prosecutor Victoria C. Garcia 4

TICKLER: Hollow Block Murder Charge

Crime Charged: Attempted Murder

4F (2016-2017) Prosecutor Victoria C. Garcia 5

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners’ intent to kill was duly established.

CRIME CHARGED: HOMICIDE for 35 Aquilans

4F (2016-2017) Prosecutor Victoria C. Garcia 6

4F (2016-2017) Prosecutor Victoria C. Garcia 7

Issue: Is Ah Chong guilty of homicide?

TICKLER: Marinduque, MarCopper Mining Company, Tailing Ponds Leak, Absorption of

4F (2016-2017) Prosecutor Victoria C. Garcia 8

TICKLER: Election Offense

CRIME CHARGED: Election Offense (Sec 27b of RA 6646)

4F (2016-2017) Prosecutor Victoria C. Garcia 9

4F (2016-2017) Prosecutor Victoria C. Garcia 10

TICKLER: Heart Attack

CRIME CHARGED: MURDER

4F (2016-2017) Prosecutor Victoria C. Garcia 11

TICKLER: Irrigation canal quarrel

CRIME CHARGED: HOMICIDE

4F (2016-2017) Prosecutor Victoria C. Garcia 12

INSERT PEOPLE VS VILLACORTA

4F (2016-2017) Prosecutor Victoria C. Garcia 13

CRIME CHARGED: 2 counts of MURDER (Cabiedes and Bulanan)

RTC RULING: CONVICTED Adriano for:

CA RULING: RTC Ruling Affirmed

TICKLER: Discipline of Minor

4F (2016-2017) Prosecutor Victoria C. Garcia 14

CRIME CHARGED: Parricide and slight physical injuries

Court of Appeals’ Ruling: Affirmed

Appeal denied, judgment affirmed with modifications.

4F (2016-2017) Prosecutor Victoria C. Garcia 15

CRIME CHARGED: Attempted Murder

4F (2016-2017) Prosecutor Victoria C. Garcia 16

TICKLER: Dishonored Check

4F (2016-2017) Prosecutor Victoria C. Garcia 17

The defense denied having taken the subject check.

CRIME CHARGED: Qualified theft

4F (2016-2017) Prosecutor Victoria C. Garcia 18

TICKLER: Step-father, Peeping brother

CRIME CHARGED: 4 counts of rape

ISSUE: Is Lizada guilty of 4 counts of consummated rape?

4F (2016-2017) Prosecutor Victoria C. Garcia 19

4F (2016-2017) Prosecutor Victoria C. Garcia 20