Petitioners: First Division

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 56011. October 31, 1984.]
ELMER PEREGRINA, ADELAIDA PEREGRINA and CECILIA

PEREGRINA, petitioners, vs. HON. DOMINGO D. PANIS,
Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Zambales &
Olongapo City, Branch III, PROCOPIO SANCHEZ and
CARMELITA SANCHEZ, respondents.
Europa & Dacanay Law Office for petitioner.

Abelardo M. Aportadera for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1508;

CONCILIATION PROCESS AT THE BARANGAY LEVEL, CONDITION PRECEDENT
FOR THE FILING OF COMPLAINT COURT. — Morata vs. Go. 125 SCRA 444
(1983), and Vda. de Borromeo vs. Pogoy, 126 SCRA 217 (1983) have held
that P.D. No. 1508 makes the conciliation process at the Barangay level a
condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in Court. Non-compliance
with that condition precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's
cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the
ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity (Royales vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court 127 SCRA 470 [1984]). The condition is analogous to
exhaustion of administrative remedies (Gone vs. District Engineer, 66 SCRA
335 [1975]), or the lack of earnest efforts to compromise suits between
family members (Versoza vs. Versoza, 26 SCRA 78 [1968]), lacking which the
case can be dismissed. (Sections. [g] & [j], Rule 16, Rules of Court.) The
parties herein fall squarely within the ambit of P.D. No. 1508. They are
actual residents in the same barangay and their dispute does not fall under
any of the excepted cases.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIOR REFERRAL TO THE UPON FOR CONCILIATION
PROCEEDINGS WAS CALLED FOR; CASE AT BAR. — Respondent judge erred
in reconsidering his previous Order of dismissal on the ground that the
provisional remedy of attachment was seasonably filed. Not only was the
application for that remedy merely an afterthought to circumvent the law,
but also, fundamentally, a Writ of Attachment is not available in a suit for
damages where the amount, including moral damages, is contingent or
unliquidated. (Salas vs. Adil, 90 SCRA 121 [1979]). Prior referral to the Lupon
for conciliation proceedings, therefore, was indubitably called for.
DECISION
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MELENCIO-HERRERA, J : p
Respondent Court's assumption of jurisdiction, without prior

conciliation proceedings between the parties in the Lupon Tagapayapa, is
questioned in this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction. We issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining, respondent
Judge from taking further action in the case pending resolution of the
controversy.
The Complaint filed below by the SPOUSES Procopio and Carmelita
Sanchez against PETITIONERS Elmer, Adelaida and Cecilia, all surnamed
Peregrina, is a civil action for damages for alleged disrespect for the dignity,
privacy and peace of mind of the SPOUSES under Article 26 of the Civil Code,
and for alleged defamation under Article 33 of the same Code.
Admittedly, the parties are actual residents of the same barangay in
Olongapo City. In fact, they are neighbors. Unquestionably, too, no
conciliation proceedings were filed before the Lupon. It is not surprising then
that the Complaint is silent regarding compliance with the mandatory
requirement, nor does it allege that the dispute falls within the excepted
cases. 1
PETITIONERS, as defendants below, moved for the dismissal of the
Complaint. Before filing an Opposition, the SPOUSES applied for a Writ of
Preliminary Attachment. Thereafter, the SPOUSES presented their Opposition
claiming that, under Section 6(3) of P.D. No. 1508, the parties may go
directly to the Courts if the action is coupled with a provisional remedy such
as preliminary attachment. LLphil
In resolving the Motion to Dismiss, respondent Judge at first, dismissed

the Complaint for failure of the SPOUSES to comply with the pre-condition for
amicable settlement under P.D. No. 1508, stating that the application for a
provisional remedy was merely an afterthought. On motion for
reconsideration by the SPOUSES, however, respondent Judge denied
PETITIONERS' Motion to Dismiss on the ground that under Rule 57, Section 1
of the Rules of Court, the application for attachment can be made at the
commencement of the action or any time thereafter. PETITIONERS now
assail that Order of denial before us.
We uphold PETITIONERS. Section 3 of P.D. No. 1508 specifically
provides:
"Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the
same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the
Lupon of said barangay . . . "
It is also mandated by Section 6 of the same law:

"SECTION 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint.
— No complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter
within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall
be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for
adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before
the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement
has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat
Secretary, attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the
settlement has been repudiated . . . "
Thus, Morata vs. Go, 125 SCRA 444 (1983), and Vda. de Borromeo vs.
Pogoy, 126 SCRA 217 (1983) have held that P.D. No. 1508 makes the
conciliation process at the Barangay level a condition precedent for the filing
of a complaint in Court. Non-compliance with that condition precedent could
affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his
complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action or
prematurity. 2 The condition is analogous to exhaustion of administrative
remedies, 3 or the lack of earnest efforts to compromise suits between
family members, 4 lacking which the case can be dismissed. 5
The parties herein fall squarely within the ambit of P.D. No. 1508. They
are actual residents in the same barangay and their dispute does not fall
under any of the excepted cases. 6
It will have to be held, therefore, that respondent Judge erred in
reconsidering his previous Order of dismissal on the ground that the
provisional remedy of attachment was seasonably filed. Not only was the
application for that remedy merely an afterthought to circumvent the law,
but also, fundamentally, a Writ of Attachment is not available in a suit for
damages where the amount, including moral damages, is contingent or
unliquidated. 7 Prior referral to the Lupon for conciliation proceedings,
therefore, was indubitably called for. cdphil
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge's Order, dated November 17, 1980, is

SET ASIDE, and the Complaint in Civil Case No. 2946-0 for damages is
DISMISSED, without prejudice. The Temporary Restraining Order heretofore
issued is hereby made permanent. No costs.
Teehankee, Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Sections 2 and 6, P.D. No. 1508.
2. Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 127 SCRA 470 (1984).

3. Gone vs. District Engineer, 66 SCRA 335 (1975).
4. Versoza vs. Versoza, 26 SCRA 78 (1968).

5. Sections (g) & (j), Rule 16, Rules of Court.
6. "Section 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. — . . .
However, the parties may go directly to court in the following cases:
(1) Where the accused is under detention;
(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling
for habeas corpus proceedings;
(3) Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary

injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendente
lite; and
(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the Statute of

Limitations.
7. Salas vs. Adil, 90 SCRA 121 (1979).

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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 56011. October 31, 1984.]

ELMER PEREGRINA, ADELAIDA PEREGRINA and CECILIA

Europa & Dacanay Law Office for petitioner.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1508;

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Respondent Court's assumption of jurisdiction, without prior

In resolving the Motion to Dismiss, respondent Judge at ﬁrst, dismissed

It is also mandated by Section 6 of the same law:

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge's Order, dated November 17, 1980, is

1. Sections 2 and 6, P.D. No. 1508.

2. Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 127 SCRA 470 (1984).

4. Versoza vs. Versoza, 26 SCRA 78 (1968).

(3) Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary

(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the Statute of

7. Salas vs. Adil, 90 SCRA 121 (1979).

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