2023 BAR EXAMINATION

REMEDIAL LAW

1. Rafaelle Beatrice filed an action for recovery of the sum of P2.5 million against Tess
in tne Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Taguig City. Attached to the complaint was the
promissory note, the check issued by Rafaelle Beatrice to Tess covering said amount,
and a copy of the withdrawal slip of Tess from Banco de Otso-Rockwell Branch, Makati
City. In her answer, Tess raised as her compulsory counterclaim the recovery of her
attorney's fees in the amount of P500,000 arising from the case, and a permissive
counterclaim against Rafaelle Beatrice for rescission of a contract of sale involving an
Arturo Luz painting valued at P2 million. Tess paid the filing fees of her permissive
counterclaim. Are the counterclaims within the jurisdiction of RTC of Taguig City?
Discuss your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. The compulsory counterclaim is within the jurisdiction of the RTC of
Taguig City while the permissive counterclaim is not.

Under Rule 6, Sec.7, a compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or

other relief that a defending party may have against an opposing party,
which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the
same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of plaintiff’s
complaint. An original action filed before the RTC, the counterclaim may
be considered compulsory regardless of the amount involved. On the
other hand, a permissive counterclaim is essentially an independent claim
that may be filed separately in another case. This claim must be filed with
the Court having jurisdiction over the amount involved. (PNTC Colleges
vs. Time Realty, G.R. No. 219698, 27 September 2021)(Second Division)
[Hernando, J.] [Under Rule 6]

The counterclaim in the amount of P500,000.00 arises out of the claim

existing in court while the counterclaim of P2 million does not. Thus,
compulsory counterclaim is within the jurisdiction of the RTC regardless of
the amount while the permissive counterclaim is not within the jurisdiction
of the RTC.

2. Trinca borrowed Pl .5 million from Ida. Trinca executed a promissory note promising
to pay Ida in three equal monthly installments. When Trinca failed to pay her obligation,
Ida filed an action for recovery of a sum of money against her in the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasay City. The case was raffled to Judge Risa, who upon reading the
complaint, noticed that Trinca and Ida were neighbors in Barangay 189 in Pasay City
and that there was no prior referral of the case for barangay reconciliation. Hence,
Judge Risa dismissed the case motu proprio for failure to comply with a condition
precedent. Was the dismissal by Judge Risa proper? Explain your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Prior recourse to barangay conciliation is not a jurisdictional
requirement that non-compliance therewith would deprive a court of its
jurisdiction either over the subject matter or over the person of the
defendant. Where, however, the fact of non-compliance with and non-
observance of such procedure has been seasonably raised as an issue
before the court first taking cognizance of the complaint, dismissal of the
action is proper. In this case, the court acquired jurisdiction
 notwithstanding the absence of barangay conciliation. The dismissal
would be proper if Trinca raised as an affirmative defense the failure to
comply with a condition precedent. (Ngo vs. Gabelo et al., G.R. No.
207707, August 24, 2020)(Second Division)[Hernando, J.]

3. Pauline and Regine has a dispute over a 500-square meter parcel of land that they
inherited from their deceased parents, Milcah and James. During the barangay
reconciliation proceedings, both Pauline and Regine agreed to partition the lot in equal
shares. As a result, the title to the property was cancelled and new titles were issued in
favour of Pauline and Regine as to their respective lots. However, Regina discovered
that the lot covered by her title was on the eastern portion rather than the northern
portion, contrary to their agreement. Hence, Regine filed a "Petition for Annulment of
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and Barangay Partition, with Prayer for Judicial
Partition of the Interstate Estate of the Spouses Milcah and James" against Pauline.
After trial, the court rendered judgment in favour of Regine. Pauline then consulted a
newly-minted lawyer, Atty. Terry, who explained to her that there was a misjoinder of
causes of action instead when Regine included both annulment of TCT and the
barangay partition, as well as judicial partition in the petition. Hence, the trial court erred
when it ruled on both causes of action instead of dismissing the petition of Regine. Is
Atty. Terry correct? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Atty. Terry is correct that there was misjoinder of causes of action
however Atty. Terry is incorrect that the trial court should have dismissed
the petition of Regine. Under Section 6, Rule 2 of the Rules explicitly
states that a misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of
an action and that a misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party
or on the initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with separately.
(Unicapital, Inc. vs. Consing, Jr., 705 SCRA 511, 11 September 2013)
(Second Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.]

In this case, there was no motion of the party nor initiative from the court
to severe the misjoined causes of action thus there exists no bar in the
simultaneous adjudication on both causes of action.

4. Hannah Corporation (HC) is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Kapitolyo,

Pasig City, Saint Aaron School (SAS), occupied said lot by mere tolerance since 1992
until December 2018. HC informed SAS that beginning January 1, 2019, it will be
charging P 100,000 per month for the use and occupation of the property. SAS refused
to pay the monthly rentals prompting HC to issue a demand letter for the payment of the
amount of P4.8 million, representing the unpaid rentals from January 2019 to December
2022. SAS failed to heed the demand of HC. Hence, HC, which holds business in
Quezon City, filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against SAS in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. SAS filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
of forum shopping since HC had also filed an ejectment case against it before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City. Should the RTC grant the motion to dismiss
on the ground of forum shopping? Explain your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. HC did not violate the rule on forum shopping when it filed the
collection case while the ejectment case is pending. The determinative
factor in the violations of the rule against forum shopping is whether
the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.
 In the instant case, the second and third elements of forum shopping and
litis pendentia are lacking. Thus, there is no identity of rights asserted and
reliefs prayed for between a suit for collection of sum of money and an
ejectment case, and that any judgment rendered in one of these actions
would not amount to res judicata in the other action. Any judgment
rendered in the ejectment case will not amount to res judicata in a civil
case of collection of sum of money for unpaid rent of the same property
and vice versa. Thus, no violation of the forum shopping rule was
committed. (Asis et al. vs. Heirs of Calignawan et al., G.R. No. 242127,
15 September 2021)(SecondDivision) [Hernando,J.]

5. Anjan and Pam were married in 1996. However, in November 2003, Pam left for the
United States (US) due to her alleged irreconcilable differences with Anjan filed a
petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Pam before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati, where he resides. Subsequently, Anjan filed a motion for
issuance of summons by publication because Pam already resided abroad. The RTC
issued an Order dated August 27, 2020 granting the motion and directed the summons
to be served upon Pam by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the CIS.
However, the copies of the order, summons, and complaint were not served at her last
known address. Meanwhile, no answer was filed by Pam.

Thus, the RTC rendered a decision granting the petition, which eventually became final
and executor. Was the August 27, 2020 Order of the RTC proper? Explain your
answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. If the defendant is out of the country like Pam, summons should
be served through substituted service under Section 6, extraterritorial
service under Section 17, or under Section 18 when residents are
temporarily out of the Philippines, Rule 14 of the amended 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. (Sabado vs. Sabado, G.R. no. 214720, 12 May 2021)
(Third Division)[Hernando, J.].

Under Rule 14, Sec. 17, when the defendant does not reside and is not
found in the Philippines and the action affects the personal status of the
plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is property within the
Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the
Philippines by personal service as under Section 6; or as provided for in
international conventions to which the Philippines is a party; or by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for
such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons
and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known
address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem
sufficient. In this case, there was no service made to the last known
address of Pam, thus the Order dated August 27, 2020 directing
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the US is improper.

Extraterritorial service of summons applies only where the action is in rem

or quasi in rem but not if an action is in personam [Perkin Elmer Singapore
Pte Ltd. v. Dakila Trading Corporation, 556 Phil. 822, 838 (2007)].
(Gesolgon, et al. vs. Cyberone Ph., Inc., et al., G.R. No. 210741,
October 14, 2020) (Second Division)[Hernando, J.]
6. Clarisse and Myra offered Gaita a job as a domestic helper in Indonesia. Clarisse
gave Gaita her plane ticket and luggage to bring on her trip. Upon reaching the airport
of Yogtakarta, Indonesia, she was apprehended by the police for allegedly carrying two
kilograms of heroin inside her luggage. She was then charged before the Indonesian
courts with drug trafficking, and subsequently convicted and sentenced to death by
firing squad. Meanwhile, in the Philippines, Clarisse and Myra. Hence, the People of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion to take the
testimony of Gaita upon written interrogatories under Rule 23 (Disposition Pending
Action) of the Rules of Court. The RTC granted the motion of the OSG. Was the action
of the RTC proper? Discuss your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Nowhere in the present Rules on Criminal Procedure does it state
how a deposition of a prosecution witness who is at the same time
convicted of a grave offense by the final judgment and imprisoned in a
foreign jurisdiction, may be taken to perpetuate the testimony of such
witness. The Rules, in particular, are silent as to how to take testimony of
a witness who is unable to testify in open court because he is imprisoned
in another country.

Depositions, however, are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil

Procedure. Although the rule on deposition by written interrogatories is
inscribed under the said Rule, it may be applied suppletorily in criminal
proceedings so long as there is compelling reason. Although the
deposition is in writing, the trial court judge can still carefully perceive the
reaction and deportment of Gaita as she answers each question
propounded to her both by the prosecution and the defense.

It must be mentioned that a "dying declaration" is one of the recognized

exceptions to the right to confrontation. In this, it will not be amiss to state
that Gaita’s deposition through written interrogatories is akin to her dying
declaration. There is no doubt that Gaita will be answering the written
interrogatories under the consciousness of an impending death – or
execution by a firing squad to be exact. People vs. Sergio and Lacanilao
(G.R. No. 24053, 9 October 2019) (Third Division) [Hernando, J.]

7. Kyna, a resident of Antipolo City, is the registered owner of a house and lot located in
Tondo, Manila with an assessed value of P900,000. Kyna claimed that she allowed
Sarah, her sister-in-law, to stay in the house of compassion. Years later Kyna decided
to distribute the property to her children, so she demanded that Sarah to vacate the
premises. However, Sarah ignored the demand. She even filed a case against Kyna
questioning her ownership of the property and contending that she obtained title over
the property through fraud, deceit, and falsification. On August 23, 2023, before Kyna
leaves and temporarily stays in the United States. If you are the counsel of Kyna, what
action will you file, where, and in what court? Explain briefly.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I will file an action for Unlawful Detainer before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila. An ejectment case, based on the allegation of possession by
tolerance, falls under the category of unlawful detainer. Where the plainti²f
allows the defendant to use his/her property by tolerance without any
contract, the defendant is necessarily bound by an implied promise that
he/she will vacate on demand, failing which, an action for unlawful
detainer will lie. Here, Kyna allowed Sarah to stay out of compassion. This
 was merely out of tolerance that carries the implied promise that should
she be asked to vacate, she will do so. The action for unlawful detainer is
thus the proper action herein.

8. In 2014, Karina filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for change of name
under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court to change her first name, include her middle
name, and correct the spelling of her surname, from “Karen Lapus”, as stated in her
birth certificate, to “Karina Garcia Lapuz”. According to Karina, she has been using the
name “Karina Garcia Lapuz” since childhood. Will the petition of Karina prosper?
Explain your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. With of enactment of R.A. 9048, which amended Articles 376 and 412
of the Civil Code it vested primary jurisdiction over the correction of certain
clerical or typographical errors and changes of first name with the civil
registrar. In 2012, R.A. 10172 expanded the coverage of the summary
administrative procedure provided under R.A. 9048 to include clerical
corrections in the day and/or month in the date of birth, or in the sex
of the person, where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or
typographical error or mistake in the entry. Presently therefore, when
an entry falls within the coverage of R.A. 9048 as amended by R.A.
10172, a person may only avail of the appropriate judicial remedies
under Rule 103 or Rule 108 after the petition in the administrative
proceedings is first filed and later denied. (Bartolome v. Republic, G.R.
No. 243288, August 28, 2019, p. 8; see also Republic v. Gallo, supra note
43, at 595 and Republic v. Sali, 808 Phil. 343, 349-350 (2017); (Santos vs.
Republic et al.,) Failure to comply with the administrative procedure
generally renders the petition dismissible for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies and for failure to comply with the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction.

9. William and several other persons were charged with violation of the Anti- Hazing
Act. During their arraignment, William and his co-accused pleaded not guilty to the
charge that they unlawfully subjected Carding Cruz to hazing. The information was later
amended by adding the suffix “III” to the name “Carding Cruz”. Trial ensued without the
accused having been re-arraigned on the amended information. After the accused were
convicted by the trial court, William appealed contending that this right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated when he was not re-
arraigned after the amendment of the information. Is William correct? Discuss.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, William is not correct. Any amendment to an information which only
states with precision something which has already been included in the
original information, and therefore, adds nothing crucial for conviction of
the crime charged is only a “formal amendment” that can be made at any
time. It does not alter the nature of the crime, affect the essence of the
offense, surprise, or divest the accused of an opportunity to meet the new
accusation.
Further, Second arraignment is not required for a formal amendment. This
is so because a formal amendment does not charge a new offense, alter
the prosecution's theory, or adversely affect the accused's substantial
rights. (Villarba vs. CA, G.R. No. 227777, 15 June 2020)(Third Division)
[Leonen, J.].
10. Angel was charged with Murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). After trial,
the court convicted her of Homicide due to the absence of the qualifying circumstance
of treachery. She then filed a notice of appeal and applied for bail with the RTC before
transmittal of the records to the Court of Appeals. The prosecution opposed the
application, contending that the RTC has no jurisdiction to act on the application for bail.
The RTC granted the application for bail on the ground that the prosecution failed to
prove the five bail-negating circumstances.

Did the RTC have jurisdiction to act on the application for bail filed by Angel?
Discuss your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the RTC did not have jurisdiction to act on the application for bail filed
by Angel. Under Rule 114 Section 5, if the decision of the trial court
convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-
bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and
resolved by the appellate court. Here, Angel was charged with Murder but
was convicted by the RTC for Homicide. Hence, the application for bail by
Angel must be filed with and reviewed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the
RTC did not have jurisdiction to act on the application for bail filed by
Angel. (Last sentence of the codal provision of Sec. 5, Rule 114, 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure)

11. On October 18, 2021, a warrant of arrest was issued against Erica. At 11:00 p.m. on
October 30, 2021, police officers arrested Erica at her house pursuant to the arrest
warrant. Before arraignment, Erica moved to quash the information on the grounds that
the warrant was served at nighttime and beyond ten days from its issuance. Is the
position of Erica tenable? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the position of Erica is not tenable. Unless specifically provided in the
warrant, the same remains enforceable until it is executed, recalled or
quashed. The ten-day period provided under this Rule is only a directive to
the officer executing the warrant to make a return to the court. However, it
is natural to assume that an arresting officer, who under the law is given
only ten (10) days to serve an arrest warrant, would serve it as soon as
possible [Bangayan vs. Butacan, 345 SCRA 301(22 November 2000)].
(People vs. Givera, G.R. No. 132159, 18 January 2001)(Second
Division)[Mendoza, J.].

That Erica was served with the warrant at nighttime and beyond the ten
day period is of no moment. Section 6, Rule 113 provides that an arrest
can be made at anytime of the day or night. In Colorado vs. Agapito
[526 SCRA 250 (3 July 2007)], complainant faulted respondent for having
been arrested on a Friday, causing him to languish in jail for two days and
two nights. The Supreme Court held that it was of no moment that the
warrant of arrest was issued by respondent on a Friday, because it is clear
in the Rules that an arrest may be made on any day regardless of what
day the warrant of arrest was issued. Nowhere in the Rules or in any
jurisprudence can it be found that a warrant of arrest issued on a Friday is
prohibited. Thus, respondent cannot be held administratively liable for this
particular matter. He did not commit grave abuse of authority for issuing
the warrant of arrest on a Friday, the same not being prohibited by law.
 Hence, the position of Erica is not tenable.

12. An information for Corruption of Public Officials was filed against Bel. Assistant City
Prosecutor Chi, the investigating prosecutor, certified in the information that the same
was filed with the prior authority of Jill, the City Prosecutor. After the presentation of
evidence by both parties, the trial court motu proprio dismissed the case on the ground
that Chi does not have the authority to prosecute the case because the information
does not bear the signature of Jill or any other indication that she approved the same.
The trial court explained that the lack of authority to file an information is a jurisdictional
defect that cannot be cured. Is the trial court correct? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. It is sufficient for the validity of the Information of Complaint, as the
case may be, that the Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor
recommending for the filing of the same in court bears the imprimatur of
the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor whose approval is required by
Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 5180 and is adopted under Sec.4, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court. In this case, since information was certified by the
investigating prosecutor, thus the trial court was incorrect in motu proprio
dismissing the case. (Villa Gomez vs. People, G.R. No. 216824, 10
November 2020)(En Banc)[Gesmundo, J.][Now CJ]

13. Raisa filed a case for support against Ton on behalf of their 9-year-old daughter,
Rox. During trial, Rox was presented as a witness. The counsel of Ton invoked the rule
on the incompetence of Rox to testify against her father given her tender age. The trial
court allowed Rox to testify. Is the trial court correct? Explain briefly.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Under Rule 130, Sec. 21, all persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
In this case, the tender age of Rox by itself is not a sufficient basis to
render her incompetent so long as she has the ability to perceive,
remember and tell the truth in court.

Thus, under the Rules of Court, a child may be a competent witness,

unless the trial court determines upon proper showing that the child's
mental maturity is such as to render him incapable of perceiving the facts
respecting which he is to be examined and of relating the facts truthfully
[Section 21(b), Rule 130, Rules of Court.]. The testimony of the child of
sound mind with the capacity to perceive and make known the perception
can be believed in the absence of any showing of an improper motive to
testify [People vs. Gacho, 124 SCRA 677 (23 September 1983)]. Once it
is established that the child fully understands the character and nature of
an oath, the testimony is given full credence.

14. In a criminal case for Murder filed against Erika, the prosecution presented Chelle
as an eyewitness to the killing of Ly. Chelle testified that while the three of them were on
board a boat, Erika shot Ly with a .45 caliber pistol and threw both the gun and the body
of Ly into the sea. Efforts to retrieve the gun and the body of Ly were unsuccessful.
Evidence was likewise introduced to prove that Ly was thrown in a shark-infested area.
Erika consulted her nephew, Ted, a recent law school graduate who is reviewing for the
Bar examinations. Confident of an acquittal, Ted recommended that Erika file a
demurrer to evidence because: 1) there is no corpus delicti due to the failure to recover
the gun and the body of Ly; and 2) the prosecution failed to prove that Erika fired the
gun due to the lack of a paraffin test. Is Ted correct? Discuss.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. In People vs. Briones, G.R. No. 226486, 22 January 2020, citing
People vs. Tuniaco, the Supreme Court ruled that the presentation of the
murder weapon is not indispensable to prove the corpus delicti, as its
physical existence is not an element of murder. To prove the corpus
delicti, the prosecution only needs to show that: (a) a certain result has
been established and (b) some person is criminally responsible for it.
Further, in the same case the Supreme Court citing People vs. De
Guzman, ruled that paraffin testing is conclusive only as to the presence
of nitrate particles in a person, but not as to its source, such as firing from
a gun. By itself, paraffin testing only indicates a possibility, not infallibility,
that a person has fired a gun.

15. While relaxing one Sunday afternoon, Kesh suddenly felt sick. While she was on the
verge of losing consciousness, Kesh called for Robert, her personal nurse, who was
told: “Call Dr. Nancy forthwith!” Robert asked Kesh about what happened and Kesh
further relayed: “I’m probably going to meet my Creator! I ate the instant noodles
prepared by my husband last night and I think he put poison in it!” The following day,
Kesh passed away. The certificate of death issued by the medico-legal officer who
conducted the autopsy reflected the cause of her death as aneurysm or rupture of a
blood vessel. Later, the husband of Kesh was prosecuted for Murder. During trial and
apart from the medico-legal certificate, the prosecution also offered in evidence the
testimony of Robert to prove the utterance of Kesh. Is the statement of Kesh
admissible as a dying declaration?
Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. For a dying declaration to constitute as an exception to the hearsay
evidence rule [(See Espineli vs. People, G.R. No. 179535, 9 June 2014;
See also Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.)], four (4) conditions
must concur: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration
was made, the declarant is conscious of his impending death; (c) the
declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in
a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is
the victim (People vs. Salafranca, 666 SCRA 501 (22 February 2012)).
[People vs. Palanas, 759 SCRA 318 (17 June 2015)(First Division)
[Perlas-Bernabe, J.]; People vs. Rarugal alias “Amay Bisaya,” G.R.
No. 188603 (16 January 2013)(First Division) [Leonardo-De Castro,
J.].] This is because a dying declaration is an evidence of the highest
order; it is entitled to the utmost credence on the premise that no person
who knows of his impending death would make a careless and false
accusation [People vs. Sanchez, 622 SCRA 548 (29 June 2010);
People vs. Cortezano, 425 Phil. 696 (2002); People vs. Cabtalan, 666
SCRA 174 (15 February 2012); People vs. Cerilla, 564 Phil. 230
(2007)].

Further, the declaration was made in extremity, when the party is at the
point of death and when every motive of falsehood is silenced and the
mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth,
 the law deems this as a situation so solemn and awful as creating an
obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered in court
[Citing United States vs. Gil, 13 Phil. 530 (1909); People vs. Saliling,
161 Phil. 559 (1976)]. (People vs. Palanas, G.R. No. 214453, 17 June
2015)(First Division) [Perlas-Bernabe, J.].(Rule 130, Sec. 38, RROE)

In this case, all the requisites are present, thus the statement of Kesh is
admissible as a dying declaration.

16. Vangie filed an action for compulsory recognition with prayer for support against
Jay, her putative father. During trial, she presented and identified the following
documents on the witness stand: 1) the birth certificate of Vangie reflecting Jay as the
father of Vangie per information supplied by the mother of Vangie, but was unsigned by
Jay; and 2) letters from the siblings of Jay, addressed to private schools where Vangie
was enrolled, which attested that Jay is the father of Vangie and that he regularly
supports her education. Rule on the admissibility and sufficiency of the documents
as evidence of acts or declarations about pedigree. Explain briefly.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As to admissibility, the birth certificate is admissible while the letters from
the siblings of Jay are not. An act or declaration about pedigree is
admissible when: (a) the actor or declarant is dead or unable to testify; (b)
the act or declaration is made by a person related to the subject by birth or
marriage; (c) the relationship between the declarant or the actor and the
subject is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration; and (d)
the act or declaration was made ante litem motam, or prior to the
controversy.20 (Tandog, et al. vs. Macapagal, et al., G.R. No. 144208,
11 September 2007)(First Division)[Sandoval- Gutierrez, J.].

Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but
also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship
[See Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 277 (3 March 2004); Co vs.
Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692 (30
July 1991); Board of Commissioners (CID) vs. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA 854
(31 May 1991)], support or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is
on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of
the child. (Herrera vs. Alba, G.R. No. 148220, 15 June 2005)(First
Division)[Carpio, J.].

In this case, the birth certificate being a public document can be admitted
as evidence while the letters are considered hearsay and therefore
inadmissible. As to the sufficiency both documents are insufficient
because the unsigned birth certificate does not prove that Jay recognized
Vangie as his daughter. The letters from the siblings of Jay being hearsay
is not sufficient to prove filiation.

17. The Supreme Court suspended Atty. Irish for one year in an administrative case
filed against her for Gross Misconduct. During the e²fectivity of her suspension, Janet
appointed her as attorney-in-fact in an execution sale arising from a civil case that she
previously handled. At the execution sale, Atty. Irish took part in the bidding and
negotiations as regards the payment of the judgment award. Atty. Elvie, the opposing
counsel in the civil case, questioned the appearance by Atty. Irish during the execution
sale because of her suspension. Atty. Irish argued that she was merely acting as an
attorney-in-fact of Janet, which was not tantamount to the practice of law.
Do you agree with Atty. Irish? Explain your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, I do not agree with Atty. Irish as her participation in the execution sale
was tantamount to practice of law. Although anyone may be an attorney-
in-fact, the appointment of Atty. Irish as one in the execution sale was
done because of the legal knowledge of Atty. Irish. Thus, her acts of
taking part in the bidding and negotiations as regards the payment of the
judgment award would entail the application of her knowledge in the law
which constitutes practice of law. In all, Atty. Irish committed unauthorized
practice of law during the period of her suspension.

18. Kiko engaged the services of Atty. Benito for an ejectment case against illegal
settlers occupying his property in Caloocan City. After one of their hearings, Kiko
hurriedly walked to his car. When Atty. Benito asked him where he was headed, Kiko
responded, "Uwi na ako, Attorney! Galit si misis kasi nakalimutan ko anniversary
namin." At that time, the marriage of Kiko was on the rocks. Kiko eventually won the
ejectment case against the illegal settlers, which also marked the termination of his
retainership agreement with Atty. Benito. A few months later, Kiko received summons in
a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by his wife, Nena, through her
counsel, Atty. Benito, who signed the petition.

Is Atty. Benito guilty of representing conflicting interests? Explain.

Yes, Atty. Benito is guilty of representing conflicting interests. A conflict of

interest exists where a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two
opposing parties, like when the lawyer performs an act that will injuriously
affect his first client in any matter in which he represented him, or when
the lawyer uses any knowledge he previously acquired from his first client
against the latter. Here, Kiko was the client of Benito in the ejectment
case. The property which Benito recovered for Kiko is part of the absolute
community of property that will be adjudicated in the declaration of nullity
of marriage filed by Nena. Nena's interest is therefore adverse to that of
Kiko's. Benito will then be representing conflicting interests.

19. Romy filed an administrative complaint against Judge Ferdie with the Office of the
Ombudsman in relation to the Bribery he allegedly committed as a Presiding Judge of a
Regional Trial Court. After investigation, the Ombudsman found him guilty of Grave
Misconduct and imposed the penalty of dismissal from service.

May the Ombudsman dismiss Judge Ferdie? Explain.

No, the Ombudsman may not dismiss Judge Ferdie. Maceda v. Vasquez
teaches that Article VIII, Section 6 exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel. By virtue of
this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and
court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's
certificates of service to this Court for determination of whether said
certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court
has the necessary records to make such a determination. Where a
criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from
their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said
complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said
judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative
duties.
20.Edsel A. Flores, a resident of Bacoor City, Cavite, sold to Joel R. Vargas, a resident
of Binondo, Manila, a parcel of land located in Bacoor City, Cavite. The parcel of
land had an area of 500 square meters, and was covered by a clean Original Certificate
of Title No. 1234567 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Cavite. The purchase price
amounts to ₱ 8 million. The parties agreed that the seller shall bear the capital gains
tax, real estate tax, and documentary stamp tax, while the buyer shall bear the
rest of the expenses. Prepare a notarized deed of absolute sale.