FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 188315. August 25, 2010.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs . ISIDRO FLORES y

LAGUA , accused-appellant.

DECISION

PEREZ , J : p

On appeal is the 29 January 2009 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.

CR-H.C. No. 00726 nding appellant Isidro Flores y Lagua guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two (2) counts of rape.
In 181 Informations, which are similarly worded except for the dates of the
commission of the crime and the age of the complainant, led before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 140, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 to 03-
261, appellant was accused of raping AAA, 2 allegedly committed as follows:
That in or about and sometime during the month of _________, in the City of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being the adopting father of complainant who
was then _________ years of age, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously had carnal knowledge with [AAA] by means of force and intimidation
and against the will of the complainant. 3

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial conference,
the parties stipulated on the following facts: SDTIaE

1. AAA is below fifteen (15) years of age;

2. Appellant is the guardian of AAA; and

3. AAA has been under the care and custody of appellant and his wife since
AAA was one and a half years old. 4

Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The following facts are undisputed:
AAA lived with her adoptive mother, BBB, 5 since she was just a few months old.
6 BBB is married to appellant, who was working abroad for six (6) years. Appellant
came home in 1997 and lived with AAA and BBB. BBB was working as a restaurant
supervisor from 4:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. for six (6) days a week.
Five (5) witnesses testi ed for the prosecution. They are the victim herself,
Marvin Suello (Marvin), PO1 Evangeline Babor (PO1 Babor), P/Sr. Insp. Paul Ed Ortiz
(P/Sr. Insp. Ortiz), and Maximo Duran (Duran).
The prosecution's version of the facts follows —
In February 1999 at around 9:30 p.m., AAA, then 11 years old, was sleeping inside
the house when she felt and saw appellant touch her thighs. AAA could see appellant's
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 face as there was a light coming from the altar. AAA was naturally surprised and she
asked appellant why the latter did such a thing. Appellant did not answer but told her
not to mention the incident to anybody. AAA then saw appellant went back to his bed
and touch his private part. AAA immediately went back to sleep.
The following day, at around the same time, and while BBB was at work, appellant
again touched AAA from her legs up to her breast. AAA tried to resist but appellant
threatened that he will kill her and BBB.
Two (2) weeks after the incident, AAA was already asleep when she suddenly
woke up and saw appellant holding a knife. While pointing the knife at AAA's neck,
appellant removed his shorts, as well as AAA's pajamas. He slowly parted AAA's legs
and inserted his penis into AAA's vagina. Meanwhile, AAA struggled and hit appellant's
shoulders. Appellant was able to penetrate her twice before he got out of the house.
Two (2) days after, appellant again raped her by inserting his organ into AAA's vagina.
AAA recounted that appellant raped her at least three (3) times a week at around the
same time until 15 October 2002, when she was 14 years old. After the last rape
incident, AAA did not go home after school and instead went to the house of her friend,
Marvin. 7
On 16 October 2002, Marvin watched television with AAA from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00
p.m. Afterwards, AAA refused to go home. She told Marvin that appellant would spank
her for going home late. Marvin asked AAA if there were other things that appellant
might have done to her, aside from spanking. At that point, AAA nally cried and
divulged that she has been raped by appellant. Marvin told AAA to file a complaint. 8
AAA stayed at her mother's friend's house and came back on 18 October 2002.
She, together with Marvin, went to Kagawad Ramon Espena to seek assistance. Marvin
went with the Barangay Tanod in apprehending appellant, who at that time, was trying
to escape. 9
PO1 Babor was the duty investigator at the Women's and Children Desk of
Makati Police Station on 18 October 2002. She took down the statements of AAA and
her friend, Marvin. She then referred AAA to the PNP Crime Laboratory to undergo
medico-legal examination. 1 0
P/Sr. Insp. Ortiz con rmed that she conducted the medico-legal examination on
AAA. Results of the examination, as indicated in the medico-legal report, show that the
"hymen is with presence of deep healed laceration at 1 o'clock and shallow healed
laceration at 2 o'clock positions at the time of examination." Said report concluded that
AAA is in a "non-virgin state physically." 1 1 P/Sr. Insp. Ortiz opined that the lacerations
could have been caused by any solid object, like the penis inserted at the genitalia. 1 2 TDEASC

Duran and another Bantay Bayan member were at the barangay outpost at 2:10
p.m. on 18 October 2002 when they were summoned by Barangay Kagawad Ramon
Espena. Acting on the complaint of AAA, they were directed to proceed to the house of
appellant to invite him for questioning. Duran saw appellant about to board a jeep. They
stopped the jeep and asked appellant to alight therefrom and invited him to the Bantay
Bayan outpost. Appellant voluntarily went with them. Appellant was then brought to the
police station. 1 3
Only appellant testi ed in his defense. While appellant admitted that he was a
strict father to AAA in that he would scold and spank her whenever the latter would ran
away, he denied raping AAA. 1 4 He alleged that AAA has the propensity to make up
stories and was even once caught stealing money from her grandmother. Appellant
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 recalled that on 16 October 2002, AAA asked permission to go out to buy a "project."
She never came home. 1 5
On 27 August 2004, the RTC rendered judgment nding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of 181 counts of rape. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 to 03-261, nding accused ISIDRO FLORES y LAGUA,
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-ONE
(181) counts of RAPE penalized by RA 8353, Chapter 3, Article 266-A, par. 1(a) in
relation to Article 266-B par. 1. Taking into account the minority of [AAA], adopted
daughter of the accused, at the time of rape, and the fact the offender is the
adoptive father of the minor complainant, accused, is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of DEATH for each count of rape , and to pay [AAA] the amount of
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (PHP150,000.00) for moral damages
and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (PHP50,000.00) for exemplary damages for each
count of rape. 1 6

The trial court found that force and intimidation attended the commission of the
crime of rape through the testimony of the victim, which the trial court deemed
"straightforward, consistent and credible." The trial court also established that
appellant is the adoptive father of AAA since 1989 and that AAA was then a minor, as
proven by the birth certi cate, testimonies of witnesses, and admission made by AAA.
1 7 Finally, the trial court dismissed appellant's defense of denial as self-serving and
which cannot prevail over AAA's positive testimony. 1 8
Upon denial of appellant's motion for reconsideration, the case was initially
elevated to the Court of Appeals for its review pursuant to People v. Mateo. 1 9
However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the case in 23 August 2005 for failure of
appellant to le his appellant's brief. 2 0 When the case was brought before us on
automatic review, we set aside the Resolution of the Court of Appeals and remanded it
back for appropriate action and disposition on the ground that review by the Court of
Appeals of the trial court's judgment imposing the death penalty is automatic and
mandatory. 2 1
On 29 January 2009, the Court of Appeals a rmed the nding that AAA was
raped by appellant, but it did so only on two (2) counts.
The fallo of the Decision reads:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision is hereby rendered as
follows:

1. Accused-appellant Isidro Flores y Lagua in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-082 to

03-260, inclusive, is found not guilty on the ground of reasonable doubt
and is hereby acquitted;
2. Accused-appellant Isidro Flores y Lagua in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 and
03-261 is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts
of rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count without eligibility for parole and to pay the victim AAA (to be
identi ed through the Information in this case), the amount of P75,000.00
as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages for each count. 2 2 aIEDAC

The appellate court found that the guilt of appellant on the rst and last incidents
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 of rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 and 03-261, respectively, was proven by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. 2 3 With respect to the other incidents, according
to the appellate court, the testimony of AAA was merely based on general allegations
that she was raped on the average of three (3) times a week from February 1999 to 15
October 2002. Therefore, the appellate court concluded that her statement is
inadequate and insufficient to prove the other charges of rape. 2 4
On 17 February 2009, appellant led a Notice of Appeal of the Court of Appeals'
Decision. In a Resolution dated 26 October 2009, this Court required the parties to
simultaneously submit their respective Supplemental Briefs. Appellant and the O ce of
the Solicitor General (OSG) both led their Manifestations stating that they will no
longer le any Supplemental Briefs, but instead, they will merely adopt their Appellant's
and Appellee's Briefs, respectively. 2 5
Appellant harps on the failure of AAA to actively defend herself or resist the
alleged assaults. Moreover, considering that the relatives of AAA live only meters away
from her and the frequency of the alleged molestation, appellant proffers that it was
impossible for them not to notice the abuses. Appellant also questions the
appreciation of the circumstances of minority and relationship as basis for the
imposition of the death penalty. He contends that an adopting parent is not included
within the purview of qualifying relationships under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code. Assuming arguendo that an adopting parent may be construed as similar to a
parent, appellant argues that the term "adopting parent" must be given a de nite and
technical meaning in that the process of adoption must rst be undertaken and a
judicial decree to that matter must have been issued. 2 6
The OSG, on the other hand, avers that the positive and categorical testimony of
AAA that appellant sexually abused her, in tandem with the medico-legal report, are
more than su cient to establish appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover,
appellant failed to impute any ill motive on the part of AAA to falsely accuse him of
rape. 2 7
The OSG insists that AAA's failure to report promptly the previous incidents of
rape does not dent her credibility. Appellant's exercise of moral ascendancy over AAA
and that fact that she was under physical threat during those times, could have instilled
fear on AAA from reporting said incidents. 2 8
The OSG moved for modi cation of the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole in light of Republic Act No. 9346. 2 9
After an extensive review of the records, we find no cogent reason to overturn the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
Appellant was charged with 181 counts of rape, all of which were committed
within the span of three (3) years or from February 1999 until 15 October 2002. We are
in full accord with the acquittal of appellant in the 179 counts of rape. Stated otherwise,
we agree with appellant's conviction for two (2) counts of rape.
In rape cases, "the victim's credibility becomes the single most important issue.
For when a woman says she was raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show
that rape was committed; thus, if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the
accused may be convicted on the basis thereof." 3 0
Both the trial court and the appellate court found AAA's testimony credible. The
RTC considered it "straightforward and consistent on material points," while the Court
of Appeals described it as "spontaneous, forthright, clear and free-from-serious
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 contradictions." Well-entrenched is the legal precept that when the "culpability or
innocence of an accused hinges on the issue of the credibility of witnesses, the ndings
of fact of the Court of Appeals a rming those of the trial court, when duly supported
by su cient and convincing evidence, must be accorded the highest respect, even
nality, by this Court and are not to be disturbed on appeal." 3 1 We see no reason in this
case to depart from the principle. Moreover, we give due deference to the trial court's
assessment of AAA's credibility, having had the opportunity to witnesses rsthand and
note her demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. 3 2
Worthy of reiteration is the doctrine that "when the offended party is of tender
age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired,
considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be
exposed if the matter to which she testi ed is not true. When a girl, especially a minor,
says that she has been de led, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape
was inflicted on her." 3 3
Out of the 181 counts of rape charged against appellant, the prosecution was
only able to prove two counts. Applying the ruling in People v. Garcia, 3 4 the Court of
Appeals correctly declared, thus:
As to the other counts of rape (Criminal Cases Nos. 03-082 to 03-260)
imputed against accused-appellant, We nd him not guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as the testimony of AAA was merely based on general allegations that she
was raped by the accused-appellant on the average of three (3) times a week
from February 1999 to 15 October 2002. AAA's bare statement is evidently
inadequate and insu cient to prove the other charges of rape as each and every
charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime and that each of them must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt. On that score alone, the inde nite testimonial
evidence that the victim was raped three times a week is decidedly inadequate
and grossly insu cient to establish the guilt of accused-appellant therefore with
the required quantum of evidence. 3 5 STIcEA

As regards to the rst incident of rape in 1999, AAA recounted how appellant forced
her to have sexual intercourse with him, thus:
Q: What happened after two (2) weeks?

A: I was sleeping when somebody went on top of my head.

Q: Tell us about what time was this when this happened, when you said you
noticed somebody climbing up your bed?
A: 9:30 in the evening.

Q: At that time again, where was your [BBB]?

A: At work, sir.
Q: What happened after you noticed somebody climbing up your bed?

A: I woke up and I saw him holding a bread knife.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Did you know who was this person who climbed your bed and who was
holding a knife?

A: Yes, sir.
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 Q: Who was that person?

A: "Papa"
Q: When you said "Papa," you are referring to the accused?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: What happened next?

A: "Tinusok nya yong kutsilyo sa leeg ko" and he removed his shorts.
Q: At that time, what were you then wearing?
A: Pajama, sir.
Q: What if any did the accused do to what you were wearing then?
A: He undressed me.

Q: Which one did he remove?

A: My pajama.
Q: What about your upper garments?
A: He did not remove.

Q: After you said the accused remove his shorts and removed your pajama,
what happened?

A: He slowly parted my legs.

Q: And then?
A: He inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q: What were you doing, were you resisting when he was doing that?
A: I was resisting but my strength is no match to him. He was strong.

Q: What sort of resistance were you putting up that time?

A: "Hinampas ko po siya sa braso."
Q: What was his response to your act of hitting his arms?
A: "Wag daw po akong papalag at bubutasin nya ang leeg ko." 3 6
Under Article 266-A (d) of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man
having carnal knowledge of a woman who is below 12 years of age. At that time of the
commission of the rst incident of rape, AAA was only 11 years old, as evidenced by her
birth certificate. 3 7
As regards the final incident of rape in 15 October 2002, AAA narrated:
Q: You said this happened always, approximately three (3) times a week, until
when?
A: The last time was in October 15, 2002.
Q: This last incident, describe to us where did it happen again?
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 A: In our house.

Q: At about what time?

A: 9:30 in the evening.
Q: Narrate to us how did this incident happen?
A: The same. He went to my bed, holding a bread knife, pointing it to me and
he removed my shorts and he also undressed himself.
Q: Then?
A: And he inserted his sexual organ into my vagina and after the incident, he
left the house. 3 8

Since AAA was already 13 years old at the time of the commission of the last
incident of rape, the applicable rule is Article 266-A (a) which states that rape is
committed by a man having carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat, or
intimidation.
AAA's testimony that she was de led by appellant was corroborated by the medical
ndings of the medico-legal expert. The presence of deep healed and shallow healed
laceration only confirms AAA's claim of rape. SaIEcA

In both rape incidents, the trial court applied Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code
in imposing the penalty of death, which was later modi ed by the Court of Appeals to
reclusion perpetua pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346. Article 266-B provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
"1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
a nity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of
the victim;

xxx xxx xxx

The Court of Appeals appreciated the qualifying circumstances of minority and

relationship in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It relied on the established
fact that AAA was still a minor when she was raped and on the stipulated fact that
appellant is her guardian. One of the instances wherein the crime of rape may be
quali ed is when the victim is a minor AND the accused is her guardian. At this point,
we cannot subscribe to this interpretation and hence, we hold that the Court of Appeals
erred in considering the qualifying circumstance of relationship.
Indeed, it was stipulated during the pre-trial conference that appellant is the
guardian of AAA. However, we cannot simply invoke this admission to consider
guardianship as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape. "Circumstances that
qualify a crime and increase its penalty to death cannot be subject of stipulation. The
accused cannot be condemned to suffer the extreme penalty of death on the basis of
stipulations or admissions. This strict rule is warranted by the gravity and irreversibility
of capital punishment. To justify the death penalty, the prosecution must speci cally
allege in the information and prove during the trial the qualifying circumstances of
minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender." 3 9
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 Jurisprudence dictates that the guardian must be a person who has legal
relationship with his ward. The theory that a guardian must be legally appointed was
rst enunciated in the early case of People v. De la Cruz. 4 0 The issue in said case was
whether the aunt of a rape victim could le a criminal complaint on behalf of her niece,
when the victim's father was still living and residing in the Philippines. The Solicitor-
General contended that the aunt was the legal guardian of the victim, thus, was
competent to sign the information. The Court rejected this contention and ruled as
follow:
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, paragraph 3, is as follows:
"Tampoco puede procederse por causa de estupro, rapto, violacion o
abusos deshonestos, sino en virtud de denuncia de la parte agraviada, o de sus
padres, o abuelos o tutor, ni despues de haberse otorgado al ofensor, perdon
expreso por dichas partes, segun los casos." Without passing at this time on the
question whether the tutor (legal guardian) may le a complaint in the temporary
absence of the parents or grandparents of the offended party, it su ces to say
that we cannot accept the view of the Government that an aunt who has the
temporary custody of a minor in the absence of her father occupies the position
of a tutor (legal guardian). The word "tutor" (guardian) appearing in article 344,
supra, must be given the same meaning as in section 551 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, that is to say, a guardian legally appointed in accordance with the
provisions of Chapter XXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4 1

Garcia was more direct in addressing the issue of when the accused will be
considered a "guardian" as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape. In said case,
appellant therein raped a 12-year-old girl. The victim was left to the care of appellant,
who is the live-in partner of the victim's aunt. The issue of whether appellant is
considered a guardian in the contemplation of the amendment to the law on rape such
that, the victim being a minor, he should be punished with the higher penalty of death
for the nine (9) crimes of rape was answered in the negative by the Court. The
underlying reason behind its ruling was explained in this discourse:
In the law on rape, the role of a guardian is provided for in Article 344 of
the Revised Penal Code, speci cally as one who, aside from the offended party,
her parents or grandparents, is authorized to le the sworn written complaint to
commence the prosecution for that crime. In People vs. De la Cruz, it was held
that the guardian referred to in the law is either a legal or judicial guardian as
understood in the rules on civil procedure.
xxx xxx xxx

It would not be logical to say that the word "guardian" in the third
paragraph of Article 344 which is mentioned together with parents and
grandparents of the offended party would have a concept different from the
"guardian" in the recent amendments of Article 335 where he is also mentioned in
the company of parents and ascendants of the victim. In Article 344, the inclusion
of the guardian is only to invest him with the power to sign a sworn written
complaint to initiate the prosecution of four crimes against chastity, while his
inclusion in the enumeration of the offenders in Article 335 is to authorize the
imposition of the death penalty on him. With much more reason, therefore, should
the restrictive concept announced in De la Cruz, that is, that he be a legal or
judicial guardian, be required in the latter article.
The Court notes from the transcripts of the proceedings in Congress on
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 this particular point that the formulators were not de nitive on the concept of
"guardian" as it now appears in the attendant circumstances added to the original
provisions of Article 335 of the Code. They took note of the status of a guardian
as contemplated in the law on rape but, apparently on pragmatic considerations
to be determined by the courts on an ad hoc basis, they agreed to just state
"guardian" without the quali cation that he should be a legal or judicial guardian.
It was assumed, however, that he should at the very least be a de facto guardian.
Indeed, they must have been aware of jurisprudence that the guardian envisaged
in Article 335 of the Code, even after its amendment by Republic Act No. 4111,
would either be a natural guardian, sometimes referred to as a legal or statutory
guardian, or a judicial guardian appointed by the court over the person of the
ward.
They did agree, however, that the additional attendant circumstances
introduced by Republic Act No. 7659 should be considered as special qualifying
circumstances speci cally applicable to the crime of rape and, accordingly,
cannot be offset by mitigating circumstances. The obvious ratiocination is that,
just like the effect of the attendant circumstances therefore added by Republic
Act No. 4111, although the crime is still denominated as rape such circumstances
have changed the nature of simple rape by producing a quali ed form thereof
punishable by the higher penalty of death.
xxx xxx xxx

The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous

relation or the solemnity of judicial appointment which impresses upon the
guardian the lofty purpose of his o ce and normally deters him from violating its
objectives. Such considerations do not obtain in appellant's case or, for that
matter, any person similarly circumstanced as a mere custodian of a ward or
another's property. The duciary powers granted to a real guardian warrant the
exacting sanctions should he betray the trust.
In results, therefore, that appellant cannot be considered as the guardian
falling within the ambit of the amendatory provision introduced by Republic Act
No. 7659. He would not fall either in the category of the "common-law spouse of
the parent of the victim" in the same enumeration, since his liaison is with respect
to the aunt of [AAA]. Since both logic and fact conjointly demonstrate that he is
actually only a custodian, that is, a mere caretaker of the children over whom he
exercises a limited degree of authority for a temporary period, we cannot impose
the death penalty contemplated for a real guardian under the amendments
introduced by Republic Act No. 7659, since he does not t into that category. 4 2
TaDSHC

People v. De la Cuesta 4 3 adhered to Garcia when it ruled that the mere fact that
the mother asked the accused to look after her child while she was away did not
constitute the relationship of guardian-ward as contemplated by law. 4 4
Garcia was further applied by analogy in People v. Delantar 4 5 where it was held
that the "guardian" envisioned in Section 31 (c) of Republic Act No. 7610 is a person
who has a legal relationship with a ward. In said case, accused was charged for
violation of Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 when he pimped an 11 year
old child to at least two clients. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish
liation albeit it considered accused as a de facto guardian. However, this was not
su cient to justify the imposition of the higher penalty pursuant to the ruling in Garcia.
In addition, the Court construed the term "guardian" in this manner:
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 Further, according to the maxim noscitur a sociis, the correct construction
of a word or phrase susceptible of various meanings may be made clear and
speci c by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it
is associated. 8 7 Section 31(c) of R.A. No. 7610 contains a listing of the
circumstances of relationship between the perpetrator and the victim which will
justify the imposition of the maximum penalty, namely when the perpetrator is an
"ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second
degree of consanguinity or a nity." It should be noted that the words with which
"guardian" is associated in the provision all denote a legal relationship. From this
description we may safely deduce that the guardian envisioned by law is a person
who has a legal relationship with a ward. This relationship may be established
either by being the ward's biological parent (natural guardian) or by adoption
(legal guardian). Appellant is neither AAA's biological parent nor is AAA's adoptive
father. Clearly, appellant is not the "guardian" contemplated by law. 4 6

Be that as it may, this qualifying circumstance of being a guardian was not even
mentioned in the Informations. What was clearly stated was that appellant was the
"adopting father" of AAA, which the prosecution nonetheless failed to establish.
For failure of the prosecution to prove the qualifying circumstance of
relationship, appellant could only be convicted for two (2) counts of simple rape, and
not qualified rape.
We likewise reduce the Court of Appeals' award of civil indemnity from
P75,000.00 to P50,000.00 and moral damages from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00 in line
with current jurisprudence. 4 7 The award of exemplary damages in the amount of
P25,000.00 should be increased to P30,000.00 pursuant to People v. Guillermo. 4 8
While no aggravating circumstance attended the commission of rapes, it was
established during trial that appellant used a deadly weapon to perpetrate the crime.
Hence, the award of exemplary damages is proper.
WHE RE FO RE , the decision dated 29 January 2009 convicting Isidro Flores y
Lagua of the crime of rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 and 03-261 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION in that he is held guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two counts of simple rape only and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each count. He is also ordered, for each count of rape, to pay the
victim civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, and exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro and Del Castillo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1.Penned by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos with Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña III
and Sesinando E. Villon, concurring. Rollo, pp. 2-24.

2.The victim's real name is withheld to protect her privacy, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9262 or
the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2000 and People v.
Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, 19 September 2006, 502 SCRA 419, 425-426.
3.Records, pp. 1-341.
4.Id. at 362.
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 5.Likewise, the personal circumstances of the victims-survivors or any other information
tending to establish or compromise their identities, as well as those of their immediate
family or household members, shall not be disclosed per Cabalquinto.
6.TSN, 2 April 2003, p. 5.
7.TSN, 24 April 2003, pp. 2-11.

8.TSN, 26 February 2003, pp. 6-7.

9.Id. at 5-8.
10.TSN, 4 June 2003, pp. 4-6.
11.Records, p. 350.

12.TSN, 4 June 2003, p. 24.

13.TSN, 5 June 2003, pp. 5-7.
14.TSN, 3 July 2003, pp. 7-8.
15.TSN, 17 July 2003, pp. 3-14.
16.CA rollo, p. 26.

17.Id. at 25.
18.Id. at 26.

19.G.R. Nos. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640.

20.CA rollo, p. 31.

21.Id. at 40.

22.Rollo, p. 23.
23.Id. at 18.

24.Id. at 21.

25.Id. at 36-37 and 39-40.

26.CA rollo, pp. 80-85.

27.Id. at 125-128.
28.Id. at 128-129.

29.Id. at 133-134.

30.People v. Paculba, G.R. No. 183453, 9 March 2010 citing People v. Mingming, G.R. No.
174195, 10 December 2008, 573 SCRA 509, 532; People v. Capareda, 473 Phil. 301, 330
(2004); People v. Galido, G.R. Nos. 148689-92, 30 March 2004, 426 SCRA 502, 516.

31.People v. Guillera, G.R. No. 175829, 20 March 2009, 582 SCRA 160, 168 citing Siccuan v.
People, G.R. No. 133709, 28 April 2005, 457 SCRA 458, 463-464.
32.People v. Malate, G.R. No. 185724, 5 June 2009, 588 SCRA 816, 825 citing People v.
Bantiling, 420 Phil. 849, 862-863 (2001).

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 33.People v. Cadap, G.R. No. 190633, 5 July 2010 citing Llave v. People, G.R No. 166040, 26
April 2006, 488 SCRA 376, 400; People v. Corpuz, G.R. No. 168101, 13 February 2006,
482 SCRA 435, 448; People v. Bidoc, G.R. No. 169430, 21 October 2006, 506 SCRA 481,
495.
34.346 Phil. 475 (1997).

35.Rollo, p. 21.

36.TSN, 24 April 2003, pp. 5-8.

37.Records, p. 351.

38.Id. at 11.
39.People v. Dalipe, G.R. No. 187154, 23 April 2010 citing People v. Ibarrientos, G.R. Nos.
148063-64, 17 June 2004, 432 SCRA 424, 440.

40.59 Phil. 531 (1934).

41.Id. at 532.

42.People v. Garcia, supra note 34 at 500-503.

43.363 Phil. 425 (1999).

44.Id. at 433.

45.G.R. No. 169143, 2 February 2007, 514 SCRA 115.

46.Id. at 139-140.
47.People v. Ofemiano, G.R. No. 187155, 1 February 2010; People v. Pabol, G.R. No. 187084, 12
October 2009, 603 SCRA 522, 532; People v. Gragasin, G.R. No. 186496, 25 August 2009,
597 SCRA 214, 233; People v. Arcosiba, G.R. No. 181081, 4 September 2009, 598 SCRA
517, 536.
48.G.R. No. 177138, 26 January 2010.

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