Cangco v.

Manila Railroad Co
G.R. No. L-12191| October 14, 1918| FISHER, J.:

DOCTRINE: Manila Railroad is liable due to its breach of its contract of carriage with Cangco, not by
reason of vicarious liability due to its employees’ negligence. Thus, it cannot excuse itself from liability by
showing that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. Article 1903 of
the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations
— or to use the technical form of expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa
contractual.

FACTS: Jose Cangco, was in the employment of Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk, with
a monthly wage of P25. He lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is located
upon the line of the defendant railroad company; and in coming daily by train to the company's office in
the city of Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to ride
upon the company's trains free of charge. Upon the occasion in question, the plaintiff arose from his seat in
the second class-car where he was riding and, making, his exit through the door, took his position upon the
steps of the coach, seizing the upright guardrail with his right hand for support.

On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement platform which
begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance away from the company's office and extends along
in front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. As the train slowed
down another passenger who was also an employee of the railroad company, got off the same car, alighting
safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground. When the train had
proceeded a little farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off also, but one or both of his feet came in
contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently
on the platform. His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his
right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the train the car
moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.

The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the railroad station was lighted dimly
by a single light located some distance away, objects on the platform where the accident occurred were
difficult to discern especially to a person emerging from a lighted car. After sometime, he instituted this
proceeding in the Court of First Instance of to recover damages of the defendant company, founding his
action upon the negligence of the servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons
upon the platform and leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from
the company's trains.

RTC RULING: At the hearing in the Court of First Instance, it found the facts substantially as stated, and
drew therefrom his conclusion to the effect that, although negligence was attributable to the defendant by
reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the
cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was
therefore precluded form recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company,
and the plaintiff appealed.

CA RULING: N/A

ISSUE: Whether Manila Railroad can posit the defense that it exercised due diligence of a good father in
the selection and supervision of its employees to escape liability.

RULING:
No. Manila Railroad is liable due to its breach of its contract of carriage with Cangco, not by reason
of vicarious liability due to its employees’ negligence. Thus, it cannot excuse itself from liability by
showing that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. Article 1903
of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual
obligations — or to use the technical form of expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana
and not to culpa contractual.

The liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or omissions of their servants or agents, when
such acts or omissions cause damages which amount to the breach of a contract, is not based upon a mere
presumption of the master's negligence in their selection or control, and proof of exercise of the utmost
diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the master of his liability for the breach of his contract.

Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual obligation

has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon it
members, or which arise from these relations, other than contractual, of certain members of society to
others, generally embraced in the concept of status. The legal rights of each member of society constitute
the measure of the corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in character, which the existence of those
rights imposes upon all other members of society. The breach of these general duties whether due to willful
intent or to mere inattention, if productive of injury, give rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured
party. The fundamental distinction between obligations of this character and those which arise from
contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or
omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists
independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual
relation.

With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or omission, it is
competent for the legislature to elect — and our Legislature has so elected — whom such an obligation is
imposed is morally culpable, or, on the contrary, for reasons of public policy, to extend that liability, without
regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility for the negligence of those person
who acts or mission are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in a position to exercise an absolute
or limited control over them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-
contractual liability — with certain well-defined exceptions — to cases in which moral culpability can be
directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to
exercise due care in the selection and control of one's agents or servants, or in the control of persons who,
by reason of their status, occupy a position of dependency with respect to the person made liable for their
conduct.

The position of a natural or juridical person who has undertaken by contract to render service to another, is
wholly different from that to which article 1903 relates. When the sources of the obligation upon which
plaintiff's cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission, the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to
prove the negligence — if he does not his action fails. But when the facts averred show a contractual
undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to
perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether the breach of the
contract is due to willful fault or to negligence on the part of the defendant, or of his servants or agents.
Proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery.

As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a suing creditor should
assume the burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact upon which his action is based; while
on the contrary, in a case of negligence which presupposes the existence of a contractual obligation,
 if the creditor shows that it exists and that it has been broken, it is not necessary for him to prove
negligence. (Manresa, vol. 8, p. 71 [1907 ed., p. 76]).

As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the breach of a contract to show that the breach was
due to the negligent conduct of defendant or of his servants, even though such be in fact the actual cause of
the breach, it is obvious that proof on the part of defendant that the negligence or omission of his servants
or agents caused the breach of the contract would not constitute a defense to the action.
 —----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

JAPAN AIRLINES v. SIMANGAN

G.R. No. 170141 | April 22, 2008 | J. R.T., Reyes

DOCTRINE: Moral damages are recoverable in suits predicated on breach of a contract of carriage where
it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith, as in this case. Inattention to and lack of care
for the interests of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration, particularly as to their
convenience, amount to bad faith which entitles the passenger to an award of moral damages. What the
law considers as bad faith which may furnish the ground for an award of moral damages would
be bad faith in securing the contract and in the execution thereof, as well as in the enforcement
of its terms, or any other kind of deceit.

FACTS: In 1991, respondent Jesus Simangan decided to donate a kidney to his ailing cousin, Loreto
Simangan, in UCLA School of Medicine in LA, USA. Respondent needed to go to the United States
to complete his preliminary work-up and donation surgery. Hence, to facilitate respondent's travel
to the United States, UCLA wrote a letter to the American Consulate in Manila to arrange for his
visa. In due time, respondent was issued an emergency U.S. visa by the American Embassy in
Manila. Having obtained an emergency U.S. visa, respondent purchased a round trip plane ticket
from petitioner JAL for US$1,485.00 and was issued the corresponding boarding pass. He was
scheduled to a particular flight bound for Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. via Narita, Japan. After
checking in at JAL’s counter, his plane ticket, boarding pass, travel authority and personal articles
were subjected to rigid immigration and security routines. After passing through said immigration
and security procedures, respondent was allowed by JAL to enter its airplane.

While inside the airplane, JAL's airline crew suspected respondent of carrying a falsified travel
document and imputed that he would only use the trip to the United States as a pretext to stay
and work in Japan. The stewardess asked respondent to show his travel documents. Shortly after,
the stewardess along with a Japanese and a Filipino haughtily ordered him to stand up and leave
the plane. Respondent protested, explaining that he was issued a U.S. visa. Just to allow him to
board the plane, he pleaded with JAL to closely monitor his movements when the aircraft stops
over in Narita. His pleas were ignored. He was then constrained to go out of the plane.
Respondent went to JAL's ground office and waited there for three hours. Meanwhile, the plane
took off and he was left behind. Afterwards, he was informed that his travel documents were,
indeed, in order. Respondent was refunded the cost of his plane ticket less the sum of US$500.00
which was deducted by JAL. Subsequently, respondent's U.S. visa was cancelled.

Displeased by the turn of events, respondent filed an action for damages against JAL. He claimed
he was not able to donate his kidney to Loreto; and that he suffered terrible embarrassment and
mental anguish. He prayed that he be awarded P3 million as moral damages, P1.5 million as
exemplary damages and P500,000.00 as attorney's fees. JAL denied the material allegations
of the complaint. It argued, among others, that its failure to allow respondent to fly on his
scheduled departure was due to "a need for his travel documents to be authenticated by the
United States Embassy" because no one from JAL's airport staff had encountered a parole visa
before.

RTC RULING: RTC ordered JAL to pay Sumangan the amount of P1M as moral damages, P500k
as exemplary damages and the amount of P250k as attorney’s fees, plus the cost of suit. The RTC held
that the defendant violated the contract of carriage; that when the plaintiff was ordered out of the
plane under the pretext that the genuineness of his travel documents would be verified it had
caused him embarrassment and besmirched reputation; and that when the plaintiff was finally not
allowed to take the flight, he suffered more wounded feelings and social humiliation for which the
plaintiff was asking to be awarded moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees.

CA RULING: CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modifications. It ordered to pay Sumangan
the reduced sums of P500k as moral damages and P250k as exemplary damages. The award of
attorney’s fees has been deleted. The CA elucidated that since JAL issued to respondent a round
trip plane ticket for a lawful consideration, "there arose a perfected contract between them.”
However, in modifying the award for damages, the CA held that fundamental in the law on
damages is that one injured by a breach of a contract, or by a wrongful or negligent act or omission
shall have a fair and just compensation commensurate to the loss sustained as consequence of
the defendant's act. Being discretionary on the court, the amount, however, should not be palpably
and scandalously excessive. The trial court’s award of P1M as moral damages appeared to be
overblown. No other proof of appellee's social standing, profession, financial capabilities was
presented except that he was single and a businessman. Moral damages are emphatically not
intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of the defendant. They are awarded only to
enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the
moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action. Moreover, the
grant of P500,000.00 as exemplary damages needs to be reduced to a reasonable level. The
award of exemplary damages is designed to permit the courts to mould behavior that has socially
deleterious consequences and its imposition is required by public policy to suppress the wanton
acts of the offender. Hence, the sum of P250,000.00 is adequate under the circumstances. Lastly,
the award for attorney’s fees lacks factual basis.

ISSUE:
1. W/N JAL is guilty of breach of contract of carriage
2. W/N respondent is entitled to moral and exemplary damages
3. W/N JAL is entitled to its counterclaim for damages

RULING:

1. Yes, JAL failed to comply with its obligation under the contract of carriage. JAL did not allow
respondent to fly. It informed respondent that there was a need to first check the authenticity of his
travel documents with the U.S. Embassy. As admitted by JAL, "the flight could not wait for Mr.
Simangan because it was ready to depart.” Since JAL definitely declared that the flight could not
wait for respondent, it gave respondent no choice but to be left behind. The latter was
 unceremoniously bumped off despite his protestations and valid travel documents and
notwithstanding his contract of carriage with JAL.

2. Yes. With reference to moral damages, JAL alleged that they are not recoverable in actions ex
contractu except only when the breach is attended by fraud or bad faith. It is contended that it did
not act fraudulently or in bad faith towards respondent, hence, it may not be held liable for moral
damages. As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated
on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Article 2219 of the Civil
Code. As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in
the death of a passenger, as provided in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206 (3) of the Civil
Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Article
2220. The acts committed by JAL against respondent amounts to bad faith. As found by the RTC,
JAL breached its contract of carriage with respondent in bad faith. JAL personnel summarily and
insolently ordered respondent to disembark while the latter was already settled in his assigned seat.
He was ordered out of the plane under the alleged reason that the genuineness of his travel
documents should be verified.

3. No. The compulsory counterclaim of JAL arising from the filing of the complaint may not be
granted inasmuch as the complaint against it is obviously not malicious or unfounded. It was filed
by respondent precisely to claim his right to damages against JAL. Well-settled is the rule that the
commencement of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the action to
damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate.
 RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILS., INC. (RCPI). v.
COURT OF APPEALS and LORETO DIONELA
G.R. No. L-44748 | August 29, 1986 | J. Paras

DOCTRINE:
There is a clear case of breach of contract by the petitioner in adding extraneous and libelous matters in the
message sent to the private respondent. As a corporation, the petitioner can act only through its employees.
Hence the acts of its employees in receiving and transmitting messages are the acts of the petitioner.

FACTS:
The basis of the complaint against the defendant corporation is a telegram sent through its Manila Office
to the offended party, Loreto Dionela, which says “SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA
DIYAN-WALA-KANG PADALA DITO KAHIT BULBUL MO”. Dionela alleges that the defamatory
words on the telegram sent to him not only wounded his feelings but also caused him undue embarrassment
and affected adversely his business as well because other people have come to know of said defamatory
words.

Defendant corporation as a defense, alleges that the additional words in Tagalog was a private joke between
the sending and receiving operators and that they were not addressed to or intended for plaintiff and
therefore did not form part of the telegram and that the Tagalog words are not defamatory. Nobody other
than the operator manned the teletype machine which automatically receives telegrams being transmitted.

RTC RULING:
The additional words in Tagalog are libelous. Whether or not they were intended for the plaintiff, the effect
on the plaintiff is the same. Any person reading the additional words in Tagalog will naturally think that
they refer to the addressee, the plaintiff. Lastly, the liability of the defendant is predicated not only on
Article 33 of the Civil Code but on the following articles of said Code, Article 19 and 20.

CA RULING:
Affirmed RTC’s ruling. The proximate cause, therefore, resulting in injury to appellee, was the failure of
the appellant to take the necessary or precautionary steps to avoid the occurrence of the humiliating incident.
Negligence here is very patent. This negligence is imputable to appellant and not to its employees.

ISSUES:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that Petitioner-employer should answer
directly and primarily for the civil liability arising from the criminal act of its employee. (NO)
 2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that there was sufficient publication of the
alleged libelous telegram in question, as contemplated by law on libel. (NO)
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that the liability of petitioner-company-
employer is predicated on Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Articles on Human Relations.s
(NO)
4. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in awarding Atty's. fees. (NO)

RULING:
ISSUE #1:
The cause of action of private respondent is based on Articles 19 and 20 of the new Civil Code as well as
respondent’s breach of contract thru negligence of its own employees. RCPI is not being sued for its
subsidiary liability.

ISSUE #2:
The SC held that the fact that a carbon copy of the telegram was filed among other telegrams and left to
hang for the public to see, open for inspection by a third party is sufficient publication.

ISSUE #3:
The action for damages was filed in the lower court directly against respondent corporation not as an
employer subsidiarily liable under the provisions of Article 1161 of the NCC in relation to Art. 103 of the
RPC. The cause of action of the private respondent is based on Arts. 19 and 20 of the NCC. Petitioner is a
domestic corporation engaged in the business of receiving and transmitting messages. Every time a person
transmits a message through the facilities of the petitioner, a contract is entered into. Upon receipt of the
rate or fee fixed, the petitioner undertakes to transmit the message accurately. There is no question that in
the case at bar, libelous matters were included in the message transmitted, without the consent or knowledge
of the sender. There is a clear case of breach of contract by the petitioner in adding extraneous and libelous
matters in the message sent to the private respondent. As a corporation, the petitioner can act only through
its employees. Hence the acts of its employees in receiving and transmitting messages are the acts of the
petitioner.

ISSUE #4:
The SC affirmed the judgment of the CA.
 Syquia v. Court of Appeals
217 SCRA 624 | January 27, 1993 | J. Campos Jr.

DOCTRINE: A pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not preclude the existence of a
culpa aquiliana. In the absence of a stipulation or legal provision to the contrary, the diligence to be
observed in the performance of an obligation is diligence of a good father of a family.

FACTS: Juan, Corazon, Calora, Carlos and Anthony Syquia, the parents and siblings of deceased Vicente
Juan Syquia, filed a complaint against the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. (MMPCI) for the recovery
of damages arising from breach of contract and/or quasi delict.

In their complaint, they alleged that the concrete vault encasing the coffin had a hole approximately three
(3) inches in diameter, and that water was seeping out of it when the remains of Vicente Syquia were about
to be transferred to a new family plot at the said cemetery on Sept. 4, 1978.

When the vault was later opened on Sept. 15 by virtue of an authority from the Municipal Court of
Parañaque, the family, assisted by licensed morticians, found out the coffin had totally been damaged by
water, filth and silt causing the wooden parts to warp and separate, crack the viewing glass panel located
directly above Vicente’s head and torso, and damage Vicente’s clothing and exposed parts.

The Syquias alleged that the MMPCI breached its obligation when it failed to deliver a “waterproof,” and
defect-free concrete vault. Due to MMPCI’S unlawful and malicious breach, the petitioners asked for
P30,000.00 for actual damages, P500,000.00 for moral damages and exemplary damages.

RTC RULING: The trial court dismissed the complaint as there was nothing in the contract that guaranteed
the concrete vault must be waterproof.

The RTC said there could be no quasi-delict because the defendant was not guilty of any fault or
negligence, and that there was a pre-existing contractual relation between the Syquias and the defendant.
The lower court added that the boring of the hole was justified and that the deceased’s father himself chose
the gravesite despite knowledge that the area was constantly sprinkled with water for maintenance purposes.

CA RULING: The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE/s:

1. Whether or not MMPCI is guilty of culpa aquiliana for boring a hole on the vault
2. Whether or not MMPCI is guilty of culpa contractual for its failure to provide a “waterproof” vault

RULING:

1. RULING ON ISSUE #1: NO. Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties
does not preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana (quasi delict), the Court said the MMPCI did
not commit any negligent act to prove there was quasi delict and justify an award of damages
against it.

The law defines negligence as the "omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place." In
the absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the contrary, the diligence to be observed in
the performance of the obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a family.

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict.

Appreciating the explanation of the foreman, the Court said the MMPCI exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family in preventing the accumulation of water inside the vault.

The respondent could not be deemed negligent when it bore a hole in the vault as this was necessary
to prevent the vault from floating during heavy rains. Without the hole, the vault would float and
the grave would be filled with water, and the digging would cave the earth and fill up the grave.
This reason negated the existence of negligence which would have made MMPCI liable for culpa
aquiliana.

2. RULING ON ISSUE #2: NO. There was no breach of contract. There was no stipulation in the
contract entered into by the parties in this case, as well as in the Rules and Regulations of MMPCI
that the concrete vault would be waterproof. Contrary to the argument of petitioners, the word
“sealed” means a closure which cannot be opened without rupture and that serves as a check against
tampering or unauthorized opening. “Sealed” cannot be equated with being “waterproof.”
 FEBTC v. CA

G.R. No. 108164 | February 23, 1995 | J. Vitug

DOCTRINE: The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause
for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort even
where there is a pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. This doctrine, unfortunately,
cannot improve private respondents' case for it can aptly govern only where the act or omission complained
of would constitute an actionable tort independently of the contract. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be
deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract
between two parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that
the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case.

FACTS: Private respondent Luis A. Luna applied for, and was accorded, a FAREASTCARD issued by
petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Company ("FEBTC"). Upon his request, the bank also issued a
supplemental card to private respondent Clarita S. Luna.

Clarita lost her credit card. FEBTC was forthwith informed. In cases of this nature, the bank's internal
security procedures and policy would appear to be to record the lost card, along with the principal card, as
a "Hot Card" or "Cancelled Card" in its master file.

When Luis tendered a despedida lunch for a close friend at the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant of the Hotel
Intercontinental Manila, Luis presented his FAREASTCARD. Naturally, Luis felt embarrassed by this
incident.

Private respondent Luis Luna, through counsel, demanded from FEBTC the payment of damages. Adrian
V. Festejo, a vice-president of the bank, expressed the bank's apologies to Luis. Bank security policy is to
tag the card as hostile when it is reported lost, however, the bank failed to inform him and an overzealous
employee failed to consider that it was the cardholder himself presenting the credit card. Festejo also sent
a letter to the Manager of the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant to assure the latter that private respondents were
"very valued clients" of FEBTC. Still evidently feeling aggrieved, private respondents, filed a complaint
for damages with the RTC.

RTC: Rendered a decision ordering FEBTC to pay private respondents (a) P300,000.00 moral damages;
(b) P50,000.00 exemplary damages; and (c) P20,000.00 attorney's fees.
CA: Affirmed the decision of the trial court. Motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition
for review.

Far East contends that the amounts to be paid to the spouses are excessive. They argue that they should not
be paying moral damages because there was no bad faith on their part in breaching their contract. Mr. Luna
contends that he was embarrassed by the situation which was caused by the bank’s failure to inform him of
the cancellation of his card. thus, he is entitled to damages.

ISSUE: Whether the FEBTC may be held liable for damages.

RULING: No moral and exemplary damages. Petitioner is ordered to pay privates respondents an amount
of P5,000.00 by way of nominal damages.

In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad
faith or with malice in the breach of the contract. The Civil Code provides:

Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should
find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of
contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence. The bank was remiss in indeed
neglecting to personally inform Luis of his own card's cancellation. However, nothing in the findings of the
court can sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to private
respondents. Neither could FEBTC's negligence in failing to give personal notice to Luis be considered so
gross as to amount to malice or bad faith, which implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful
act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that
malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.

The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching
a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort even where there is a
pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. This doctrine, unfortunately, cannot improve
private respondents' case for it can aptly govern only where the act or omission complained of would
constitute an actionable tort independently of the contract. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed
to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract between
two parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that the parties
are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, private
respondents' damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship; without such agreement,
the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an
independent actionable tort.

The Court finds the award of moral damages to be inordinate and substantially devoid of legal basis.

Exemplary or corrective damages, in turn, are intended to serve as an example or as correction for the public
good in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages
are imposed when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. In quasi-delicts,
such damages are granted if the defendant is shown to have been so guilty of gross negligence as to
approximate malice. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the
defendant is found to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.

Given the above premises and the factual circumstances here obtaining, it would also be just as arduous to
sustain the exemplary damages granted by the courts below.

Nevertheless, the bank's failure, even perhaps inadvertent, to honor its credit card issued to private
respondent Luis should entitle him to recover a measure of damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the
Civil Code providing thusly:

Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
 Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology
G.R. No. 156109 | November 18, 2004 | J. Panganiban

DOCTRINE:

Upon enrolment, students and their school enter upon a reciprocal contract. The students agree to
abide by the standards of academic performance and codes of conduct, issued usually in the form
of manuals that are distributed to the enrollees at the start of the school term. Further, the school
informs them of the itemized fees they are expected to pay. Consequently, it cannot, after the
enrolment of a student, vary the terms of the contract. It cannot require fees other than those it
specified upon enrolment.

FACTS:

Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science student at Pangasinan Colleges of
Science and Technology (PCST). During the second semester of school year 2001-2002, she
enrolled in logic and statistics under Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad, respectively, as
teachers. Sometime in February, PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed the “Rave Part and
Dance Revolution,” the proceeds of which were to go to the construction of the school’s tennis
and volleyball courts. Each student was required to pay for two tickets at the price of P100.00
each. The project was allegedly implemented by recompensing students who purchased tickets
with additional points in their test scores; those who refused to pay were denied the opportunity
to take the final examinations.

Regino refused to pay for the tickets. On the scheduled dates of the final examinations in logic
and statistics, her teachers disallowed her from taking the tests. Regino’s pleas ostensibly went
unheeded by Gamurot and Baladad, who unrelentingly defended their positions as compliance
with PCST’s policy.

As a result, Regino filed, as a pauper litigant, a Complaint for damages against PCST, Gamurot
and Baladad (PCST et al.). In her complaint, she prayed from P500,000 as nominal damages,
P500,000 as moral damages; at least P1,000,000 as exemplary damages; P250,000 as actual
damages; plus the costs of litigation and attorney’s fees. PCST et al. filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, contending that the complaint should
have been lodged with the Commission of Higher Education (CHED).

RTC RULING:

The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action

CA RULING:

The case was directly appealed to the Supreme Court

ISSUE:
 1. Whether or not the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies in a civil
action exclusively for damages based on violation of the human relation provisions of the
Civil Code, filed by a student against her former school.

2. Whether or not PCST et al. can be made liable for damages

3. Whether or not the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) has exclusive original
jurisdiction over actions for damages based upon violation of the Civil Code provisions on
human relations filed by a student against the school.

RULING:

1. Petitioner is correct. Petitioner is not asking for the reversal of the policies of PCST.
Neither is she demanding it to allow her to take her final examinations; she was already
enrolled in another educational institution. A reversal of the acts complained of would not
adequately redress her grievances; under the circumstances, the consequences of
respondents' acts could no longer be undone or rectified.

2. Court ruled in favor of Petitioner. PCST et al. can be made liable for damages. In her
Complaint, Regino also charged that PCST et al. “inhumanly punish students x x x by
reason only of their poverty, religious practice or lowly station in life, which inculcated
upon [petitioner] the feelings of guilt, disgrace and unworthiness”; as a result of such
punishment, she was allegedly unable to finish any of her subjects for the second semester
of that school year and had to lag behind in her studies by a full year. The acts of
respondents supposedly caused her extreme humiliation, mental agony and
“demoralization of unimaginable proportions” in violation of Articles 19, 21 and 26 of the
Civil Code.

3. No. Administrative agencies are not courts; they are neither part of the judicial system, nor
are they deemed judicial tribunals. Specifically, the CHED does not have the power to
award damages. Hence, petitioner could not have commenced her case before the
Commission.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGELIO LIGON
G. R. No. 74041 | July 29, 1987 | J. YAP

DOCTRINE: It does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration
that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

FACTS: On October 23, 1983, Fernando Gabat, was riding in a 1978 Volkswagon Kombi owned by his
father, Antonio Gabat, and driven by Rogelio Ligon. While waiting for the traffic light to change, Fernando
Gabat beckoned a cigarette vendor, Jose Rosales to buy some cigarettes from him. While this transaction
was occurring, the traffic light changed to green, and the Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon suddenly moved
forward.

As the Kombi continued to speed towards Quiapo, Rosales clung to the window of the Kombi but apparently
lost his grip and fell down on the pavement. Rosales was rushed by some bystanders to a hospital where he
was treated for multiple physical injuries but died eventually. Following close behind the Kombi at the time
of the incident was a taxicab driven by Prudencio Castillo. As the Kombi did not stop after Rosales fell
down on the pavement, Castillo pursued it. 2 policemen joined the chase until they were able to overtake
the Kombi. The accused were then brought and an Information was subsequently filed against them.

RTC RULING: RTC convicted the accused of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, giving full credence
to the prosecution's version, stating that there can be no doubt that Gabat forcibly took the cigarette box
from Rosales because, otherwise, there could be no reason for the latter to run after the Kombi and hang on
to its window. The court also believed Castillo's testimony that Gabat forcibly removed or pried off the
right hand of Rosales from the windowsill of the Kombi, otherwise, the latter could not have fallen down,
having a ready been able to balance himself on the stepboard.

CA RULING: (none. This was a direct appeal to the SC from the RTC decision convicting Gabat of the
crime charged and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua)

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the accused’ guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt
2. Whether or not a judgment of acquittal automatically extinguishes civil liability

RULING:
1. NO. Considering that the taxicab driver’s testimony is not entirely free from doubt because his
observation of the event could have been mistaken, the Court was not convinced with moral certainty
that the guilt of the accused Fernando Gabat has been established beyond reasonable doubt. The
quantum of proof necessary to sustain Gabat's conviction of so serious a crime as robbery with homicide
has not been met in this case. He is therefore entitled to acquittal on reasonable doubt.

2. NO. It does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability. While
the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a
preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. The judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

Art. 29 of the Civil Code provides that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same
act or omission. This so because the two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One affects
the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender
while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party.

In the instant case, SC found that a preponderance of evidence establishes that Gabat by his act and
omission with fault and negligence caused damage to Rosales and should answer civilly for the damage
done.

Gabat's wilfull act of calling Rosales, the cigarette vendor, to the middle of a busy street to buy two
sticks of cigarettes set the chain of events which led to the death of Rosales. Through fault and
negligence, Gabat (1) failed to prevent the driver from moving forward while the purchase was
completed; (2) failed to help Rosales while the latter clung precariously to the moving vehicle, and (3)
did not enforce his order to the driver to stop. Finally, Gabat acquiesced in the driver's act of speeding
away, instead of stopping and picking up the injured victim. These proven facts taken together are firm
bases for finding Gabat civilly liable under the Civil Code 20 for the damage done to Rosales.
 RUFO MAURICIO CONSTRUCTION v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. L-75357 | November 27, 1987 | J. Paras

DOCTRINE:
The liability of the employer here would not be subsidiary but solidary with his driver (unless said employer
can prove there was no negligence on his part at all, that is, if he can prove due diligence in the selection
and supervision of his driver).

FACTS:
On September 20, 1979, Illustre Cabiliza, being the driver of an Izusu dump truck, bearing Plate No. WD-
224, belonging to and owned by Rufo Mauricio Constructions, hit a Colt Gallant driven and owned by the
late Judge Arsenio Solidum, thereby inflicting injuries upon the said judge which directly caused his death
and further caused damage to the said Colt Gallant in the amount of Php 30,000.00 as well as to the house
owned by Pablo Navarra.

After arraignment and trial on the merits, Cabiliza was convicted of the crime homicide and damage to
property thru reckless imprudence sentencing him an indeterminate penalty of 2 years and 4 months to 6
years.

Cabiliza filed a Notice of Appeal but it was not pursued because he died. A notice of death was filed by his
counsel, Atty. Beltran and in there, he manifested the intention of Rufo Mauricio, as employer of Cabiliza
to proceed with the case on appeal pursuant to his right as employer who is subsidiarily liable.

Eventually, the lower court issued an Order requiring the heirs of Cabiliza to appear and substitute with
respect to the civil aspect of the case. A writ of execution was issued but it remained unsatisfied because
Cabiliza was found insolvent.

The victim’s widow, Mrs. Aurora Solidum, filed a motion for the issuance of a subsidiary writ of execution
against the employer of Cabiliza, Rufo Mauricio and/or Rufo Mauricio Construction Co. and a subsidiary
writ of execution was issued. Hence, this appeal before the IAC.

IAC:
The decision is affirmed but the amount of damages is reduced to P1,082 223.84.
Petitioner contends that the death of the accused-employee wipes out not only the employee’s primary civil
liability but also his employer’s subsidiary liability.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Employer Rufo Mauricio Constructions and/or Rufo Maurico should be released
from the liability.
2. Whether or not Rufo Mauricio and/or Rufo Mauricio Construction should be given a day in court
to resist the damages being claimed by the heirs of the victim.

RULING:

1. No. The death of the accused during the pendency of his appeal or before the judgment of
conviction (rendered against him by the lower court) became final and executory extinguished his
criminal liability meaning his obligation to serve the imprisonment imposed and his pecuniary
liability for fines, but not his civil liability should the liability or obligation arise (not from a crime,
for here, no crime was committed, the accused not having been convicted by final judgment, and
therefore still regarded as innocent) but from a quasi-delict (See Arts. 2176 and 2177, Civil Code),
as in this case.

The liability of the employer here would not be subsidiary but solidary with his driver (unless said
employer can prove there was no negligence on his part at all, that is, if he can prove due diligence
in the selection and supervision of his driver).

2. Yes. Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for hearing. It held that inasmuch as the
employer (petitioner herein) was not a party in the criminal case, and to grant him his day in court
for the purpose of cross-examining the prosecution witnesses on their testimonies on the driver's
alleged negligence and the amount of damages to which the heirs of the victim are entitled, as well
as to introduce any evidence or witnesses he may care to present in his defense, the hearing on the
motion to quash the subsidiary writ of execution must be reopened precisely for the purpose
adverted to hereinabove.
 MARIA BENITA A. DULAY v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 108017 | April 3, 1995 | J. Bidin

DOCTRINE:
Article 2176, where it refers to 'fault or negligence,' covers not only acts 'not punishable by law' but also acts criminal
in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would
be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.

FACTS:

Altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang sa Alabang," Alabang
Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and
killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.

Petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children,
filed an action for damages against Torzuela, Safeguard and Superguard, alleged employers of Torzuela. Petitioners
prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

Respondent’s Argument:

SUPERGUARD filed a motion to dismiss and claimed that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of
his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability
therefor is governed by Article 100 of the RPC. Respondent further alleged that a complaint for damages based on
negligence under Article 2176 cannot lie, since the civil liability applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the private respondent argued that petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature
considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary
liability.

Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against the private respondents is based on their
liability under Article 2180.

RTC RULING: The respondent judge held that the complaint did not state facts necessary or sufficient to constitute
a quasi-delict since it does not mention any negligence on the part of Torzuela in shooting Napoleon Dulay or that the
same was done in the performance of his duties. Respondent judge ruled that mere allegations of the concurring
negligence of the defendants (private respondents herein) without stating the facts showing such negligence are mere
conclusions of law

CA RULING: Affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not Torzuela’ s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Article 2176
of the New Civil Code;

2. Whether or not Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally committed; and

3. Whether or not the liability or respondents is subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code.

RULING:

(1) Yes. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that “whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.” Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176
of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176
covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional.

(2) No. The term “physical injuries” in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death.
It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but
also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide. Although in the Marcia case, it was held that no independent
civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted,
however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence,
whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based
on Article 33 lies.

(3) No. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer
under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee
and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to
prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
 FRANCIS CHUA v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND LYDIA C. HAO
G.R. No. 150793, 19 November 2004, FIRST DIVISION, (Quisimbing, J.)
DOCTRINE:
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate that every man
criminally liable is also civilly liable. When a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1)
the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he has violated; and (2) the
individual member of the society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property has been actually or
directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. An act or omission is felonious
because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because
it caused damage to another.
The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by
law for the commission of the crime. The civil action involves the civil liability arising from the offense
charged which includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for
consequential damages.
FACTS:
Lydia Hao (Hao), treasurer of Siena Realty Corporation, charged Francis Chua (Chua) and his wife,
Elsa Chua, of four counts of falsification of public documents pursuant to Article 172 in relation to Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code.
The City Prosecutor filed an Information for falsification of public document, before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) against Francis Chua but dismissed the accusation against his wife.
MeTC Ruling: Private Prosecutors cannot intervene
During the trial in the MeTC, private prosecutors Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho and Atty. Ariel Bruno
Rivera appeared as private prosecutors. Subsequently, Chua moved to exclude Hao's counsels as private
prosecutors in the case on the ground that Hao failed to allege and prove any civil liability in the case. This
was granted by the MeTC.
RTC Ruling: Reversed MeTC. Private prosecutors may intervene
However, this was reversed by the Regional Trial Court which then allowed the private prosecutors
to intervene in the prosecution of the civil aspect of the criminal case against Chua.

CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC.

This prompted Chua to file a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA). He had argued
that Hao had no authority whatsoever to bring a suit in behalf of the Corporation since there was no Board
Resolution authorizing her to file the suit.
Hao claimed that the suit was brought under the concept of a derivative suit. Shemaintained that
when the directors or trustees refused to file a suit even when there was a demand from stockholders, a
derivative suit was allowed.
The CA ruled in favor of Hao and held that the action was indeed a derivative suit it alleged that
Chua falsified documents pertaining to projects of the corporation and made it appear that the Chua was a
stockholder and a director of the corporation. The corporation was a necessary party to the petition filed
with the RTC and even if Hao filed the criminal case, her act should not divest the Corporation of its right
to be a party and present its own claim for damages.
ISSUES
1. Is the criminal complaint in the nature of a derivative suit?
2. Is Siena Realty Corporation a proper petitioner?
3. Should private prosecutors be allowed to actively participate in the trial the of Criminal Case?
RULING
1. NO. A derivative action is a suit by a shareholder to enforce a corporate cause of action. The
corporation is a necessary party to the suit. And the relief which is granted is a judgment against a third
person in favor of the corporation. Similarly, if a corporation has a defense to an action against it and is not
asserting it, a stockholder may intervene and defend on behalf of the corporation.
Hao asserts that she filed a derivative suit in behalf of the corporation. This assertion is inaccurate.
Not every suit filed in behalf of the corporation is a derivative suit. For a derivative suit to prosper, it is
required that the minority stockholder suing for and on behalf of the corporation must allege in his
complaint that he is suing on a derivative cause of action on behalf of the corporation and all other
stockholders similarly situated who may wish to join him in the suit. It is a condition sine qua non that the
corporation be impleaded as a party because not only is the corporation an indispensable party, but it is also
the present rule that it must be served with process. The judgment must be made binding upon the
corporation in order that the corporation may get the benefit of the suit and may not bring subsequent suit
against the same defendants for the same cause of action. In other words, the corporation must be joined as
party because it is its cause of action that is being litigated and because judgment must be a res adjudicata
against it
In the criminal complaint filed by Hao, nowhere is it stated that she is filing the same in behalf and
for the benefit of the corporation. Thus, the criminal complaint including the civil aspect thereof could not
be deemed in the nature of a derivative suit.
2. YES. Hao claims that the complaint was filed by her not only in her personal capacity, but
likewise for the benefit of the corporation. Additionally, she avers that she has exhausted all remedies
available to her before she instituted the case, not only to claim damages for herself but also to recover the
damages caused to the company.
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, when a trial court commits a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the person aggrieved can file a special civil action
for certiorari. The aggrieved parties in such a case are the State and the private offended party or
complainant.
In a string of cases, the Court consistently ruled that only a party-in-interest or those aggrieved may
file certiorari cases. It is settled that the offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and
personality as "person(s) aggrieved" to file special civil action of prohibition and certiorari.
In Pastor, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, it was held that if aggrieved, even a non-party may institute a
petition for certiorari. In that case, petitioner was the holder in her own right of three mining claims and
could file a petition for certiorari
In the instant case, the recourse of the complainant to the CA was proper. The petition was brought
in her own name and in behalf of the Corporation. Although, the corporation was not a complainant in the
criminal action, the subject of the falsification was the corporation's project and the falsified documents
were corporate documents. Therefore, the corporation is a proper party in the petition for certiorari because
the proceedings in the criminal case directly and adversely affected the corporation.
3. YES. Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate that
every man criminally liable is also civilly liable. When a person commits a crime he offends two entities
namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he has violated;
and (2) the individual member of the society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property has been
actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. An act or omission is
felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but
because it caused damage to another.
The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by
law for the commission of the crime. The civil action involves the civil liability arising from the offense
charged which includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for consequential
damages.
Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal
action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.
Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that: "when a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action."
Hao did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it separately, nor institute
the civil action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus, the private prosecutors can intervene
in the trial of the criminal action.
Chua avers, however, that Hao's testimony in the inferior court did not establish nor prove any
damages personally sustained by her as a result of Chua's alleged acts of falsification. Chua adds that since
no personal damages were proven therein, then the participation of Hao’s counsel as private prosecutors,
who were supposed to pursue the civil aspect of a criminal case, is not necessary and is without basis.
When the civil action is instituted with the criminal action, evidence should be taken of the damages
claimed and the court should determine who are the persons entitled to such indemnity. The civil liability
arising from the crime may be determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive
to have it adjudged or does not reserve the right to institute a separate civil action against the defendant.
Again, neither a waiver nor a reservation was made; nor did the offended party institute a separate
civil action. It follows that evidence should be allowed in the criminal proceedings to establish the civil
liability arising from the offense committed, and the private offended party has the right to intervene
through the private prosecutors.
 Dr. Lumantas v. Calapiz
G.R. No. 163753 | Jan 15, 2014 | J. Bersamin

DOCTRINE: It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
Nevertheless, the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged does not necessarily extinguish his civil
liability.

FACTS: In 1995, Spouses Hilario Calapiz, Jr. and Herlita Calapiz (Spouses Calapiz) brought their 8- year-
old son, Hanz Calapiz (Hanz), to the Misamis Occidental Provincial Hospital, for an e mergency
appendectomy. Hanz was attended to by the Dr. Encarnacion Lumantas (Petitioner), who suggested to the
parents that Hanz also undergo circumcision at no added cost to spare him the pain. With the parents’
consent, the petitioner performed the coronal type of circumcision on Hanz after his appendectomy. On the
following day, Hanz complained of pain in his penis, which exhibited blisters. His testicles were swollen.
The parents noticed that the child urinated abnormally after the petitioner forcibly removed the catheter,
but the petitioner dismissed the abnormality as normal. Hanz was discharged from the hospital over his
parents’ protestations and was directed to continue taking antibiotics. After a few days, Hanz was confined
in a hospital because of the abscess formation between the base and the shaft of his penis. Presuming that
the ulceration was brought about by Hanz’s appendicitis, the petitioner referred him to Dr. Henry Go (Go),
an urologist, who diagnosed the boy to have a damaged urethra. Thus, Hanz underwent cystostomy, and
thereafter was operated on three times to repair his damaged urethra. Unfortunately, the damaged urethra
could not be fully repaired and reconstructed.

Spouses Calapiz brought a criminal charge against the petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting to
serious physical injuries before the RTC of Oroquieta City. In his defense, the petitioner denied the charge.
He contended that at the time of his examination of Hanz, he had found an accumulation of pus at the
vicinity of the appendix two to three inches from the penis that had required immediate surgical operation;
that after performing the appendectomy, he had circumcised Hanz with his parents’ consent by using a
congo instrument, thereby debunking the parents’ claim that their child had been cauterized; that he had
then cleared Hanz once his fever had subsided; that he had found no complications when Hanz returned for
his follow up check-up; and that the abscess formation between the base and the shaft of the penis had been
brought about by Hanz’s burst appendicitis.

RTC RULING: The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner but had ordered him to pay damages.

CA RULING: On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC, sustaining the award of moral damages. It opined that
even if the petitioner had been acquitted of the crime charged, the acquittal did not necessarily mean that
he had not incurred civil liability considering that the Prosecution had preponderantly established the
sufferings of Hanz as the result of the circumcision.z
The petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the petitioner’s civil liability despite his acquittal of the crime
of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries.

RULING: NO. A person may be acquitted in the criminal aspect of his case, but it does not ipso facto
acquit him of the civil aspect of the case.
It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Nevertheless, the
acquittal of an accused of the crime charged does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability.—It is
axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Nevertheless, the acquittal
of an accused of the crime charged does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability. In Manantan v. Court
of Appeals, 350 SCRA 387 (2001), the Court elucidates on the two kinds of acquittal recognized by our law
as well as on the different effects of acquittal on the civil liability of the accused, viz.: Our law recognizes
two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the
ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door
to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot
and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out
of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than
the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second
instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt
of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be
proved by preponderance of evidence only.

The petitioner’s contention that he could not be held civilly liable because there was no proof of his
negligence deserves scant consideration. The failure of the Prosecution to prove his criminal negligence
with moral certainty did not forbid a finding against him that there was preponderant evidence of his
negligence to hold him civilly liable. With the RTC and the CA both finding that Hanz had sustained the
injurious trauma from the hands of the petitioner on the occasion of or incidental to the circumcision, and
that the trauma could have been avoided, the Court must concur with their uniform findings. In that regard,
the Court need not analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings a quo. The Court,
by virtue of its not being a trier of facts, should now accord the highest respect to the factual findings of the
trial court as affirmed by the CA in the absence of a clear showing by the petitioner that such findings were
tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.

Every person is entitled to the physical integrity of his body. Although we have long advocated the view
that any physical injury, like the loss or diminution of the use of any part of one’s body, is not equatable to
a pecuniary loss, and is not susceptible of exact monetary estimation, civil damages should be assessed
once that integrity has been violated. The assessment is but an imperfect estimation of the true value of
one’s body. The usual practice is to award moral damages for the physical injuries sustained. In Hanz’s
case, the undesirable outcome of the circumcision performed by the petitioner forced the young child to
endure several other procedures on his penis in order to repair his damaged urethra Surely, his physical and
moral sufferings properly warranted the amount of P50,000.00 awarded as moral damages.
 Santos vs. Pizarro

G.R. No. 151452 | July 29, 2005 | Tinga, J.

FACTS:

On April 25, 1994, Dionisio Sibayan was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple
Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries in connection with a vehicle collision between a Viron Transit
Bus, which is driven by Sibayan, and a Lite Ace Van. Sibayan was convicted however, there was a
reservation to file a separate civil action, but no pronouncement was made by the municipal trial court in
its decision.

On October 20, 2000, the petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its
Chairman, Virgilio Rondaris, with the RTC of Q.C.

Viron Transit moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of improper service of summons, prescription
and laches and defective certification of non-forum shopping. The petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss
contending that the right to file a separate civil action in the case prescribed in 10 years reckoned from the
finality of the judgment in the criminal action. Since there is no appeal of the decision convicting Sibayan,
the complaint was filed barely 2 years therefore, it was within the prescriptive period.

RTC RULING:

The RTC dismissed the complaint on the principal ground that the cause of action has already prescribed.
According to the trial court, actions based on quasi delict prescribe 4 years from the accrual of the cause of
action. Hence, the fact that petitioners reserved the right to file a separate civil action, the complaint ought
to be dismissed on the ground of prescription.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration pointing out that the complaint is not based on quasi-
delict but on the final judgment of conviction in the criminal case which prescribed 10 years from the
finality of the judgment. Unfortunately, the RTC denied the motion, reiterating that the action has already
prescribed.

CA RULING:

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA however, it dismissed the same for error in the
choice or mode of appeal. It also denied that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration reasoning that even if
the respondent trial court judge committed grave abuse of discretion, certiorari is still not the permissible
remedy as appeal was available to petitioners and they failed to allege that the petition was brough within
the recognized exceptions for the allowance of certiorari in lieu of appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action is based on quasi-delict.

RULING:

Under our RPC, every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil liability arising from the offense is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, subject to three
notable exceptions: 1.) when the injured party expressly waives the right to recover damages from the
accused; 2.) when the offended party reserves his right to have the civil damages determined in a separate
action in order to take full control and direction of the prosecution of his cause; 3.) when the injured party
actually exercises the right to maintain a private suit against the offender by instituting a civil action prior
to the filing of the criminal case.

Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate civil action as a result of the crime
committed by Sibayan. On account of this reservation, the municipal circuit trial court, in its decision
convicting Sibayan, did not make any pronouncement as to the latter’s civil liability.
Predicating their claim on the judgment of conviction and their reservation to file a separate civil action
made in the criminal case, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its
President/Chairman. Petitioners assert that by the institution of the complaint, they seek to recover private
respondents’ civil liability arising from crime. Unfortunately, based on its misreading of the allegations in
the complaint, the trial court dismissed the same, declaring that petitioners’ cause of action was based
on quasi delict and should have been brought within four (4) years from the time the cause of action accrued
from the time of the accident.

The court explained that an act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained
of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code,
intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b)
where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action
under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject
to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant and the similar proscription against double recovery under the Rules
above-quoted.

At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already
prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their
reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is because the prescription of the action ex
quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially
as the latter action had been expressly reserved.

We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the
subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer
becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the crime was in the discharge of the duties of the
employees because Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code operates with controlling force to obviate the
possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment
convicting the employee.

Further, the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription, but instead
allowed the complaint for damages ex delicto to be prosecuted on the merits, considering petitioners’
allegations in their complaint, opposition to the motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration of the
order of dismissal, insisting that the action was to recover civil liability arising from crime.

This does not offend the policy that the reservation or institution of a separate civil action waives the other
civil actions. The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between the same litigants
arising out of the same act or omission of the offender. However, since the stale action for damages based
on quasi delict should be considered waived, there is no more occasion for petitioners to file multiple suits
against private respondents as the only recourse available to them is to pursue damages ex delicto. This
interpretation is also consistent with the bar against double recovery for obvious reasons.

Now the procedural issue. Admittedly, petitioners should have appealed the order of dismissal of the trial
court instead of filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Such procedural misstep, however,
should be exempted from the strict application of the rules in order to promote their fundamental objective
of securing substantial justice. We are loathe to deprive petitioners of the indemnity to which they are
entitled by law and by a final judgment of conviction based solely on a technicality. It is our duty to prevent
such an injustice.

The judgement rendered by the CA is set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.
 LG FOODS CORPORATION v. HON. PHILADELFA B. PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR
G.R. No. 158995 | September 26, 2006 | J. Garcia

DOCTRINE: Civil Case No. 99-10845 is a negligence suit brought under Article 2176 of the Civil Code
to recover damages primarily from the petitioners as employers responsible for their negligent driver
pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Thus,
the employer is liable for damages caused by his employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though the former is not engaged in any business or industry.

FACTS: Charles Vallereja, 7-year old son of Spouses Florentino and Theresa Vallereja, was hit by a Ford
Fiera van owned by petitioners LG Foods Corporation that was driven at that time by their employee,
Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer. Charles died as a result of the accident.

An information for Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide was filed against the driver before
the MTCC of Bacolod City. Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded, the said driver committed
suicide being bothered by conscience and remorse. On account thereof, the MTCC dismissed the criminal
case.

Thereafter, Spouses Vallejera filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners as employers of
deceased driver alleging that as employers, they failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of their employees. In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, petitioners as defendants
denied liability for the death of Charles claiming that they had exercised the required due diligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees, including deceased driver; thus, they pray for the dismissal
of the complaint for lack of cause of action on the part of the spouses Vallejera.

Instead of filing the required memorandum of authorities, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss
principally arguing that the complaint is basically a “claim for subsidiary liability against an employer”

RTC RULING: denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit and set the case for pre-trial. With their
motion for reconsideration having been denied by the same court in its subsequent order, the petitioners
went on certiorari to the CA imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in refusing to
dismiss the basic complaint for damages.

CA RULING: denied the petition and upheld the trial court decision. It said that the civil case filed by the
spouses exacts responsibility for fault or negligence under Art. 2176, Civil Code, that is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, the
liability under the Civil Code is direct and immediate, and not conditioned upon prior recourse against the
negligence employee or prior showing of the latter’s insolvency.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the Spouses Vallejeras’ cause of action is founded on Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, as maintained by petitioners, or derived from Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as ruled by the
lower courts
2. Whether the Spouses’ complaint should have been dismissed for failure of the spouses to make a
reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages when the criminal case against the driver
was filed

RULING:
1. The Spouses’ cause of action is derived from Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

As correctly pointed out by the trial court, the Spouses did not aver basic elements for the subsidiary
liability of an employer under the Revised Penal Code.

Sec. 2, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines cause of action as the “act or
omission by which a party violates the right of another.” Such act or omission gives rise to an
obligation which may come from (a) law, (b) contracts, (c) quasi-contracts, (d) delicts, or (e) quasi-
delicts.

Corollarily, an act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to 2 separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender – (1) civil liability ex delicto and (2) independent civil
liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony [ex. Culpa
contractual or obligations arising from law, intentional torts, and culpa aquiliana] or (b) where the
injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action.
Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender.

Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct or immediate. It is
not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of
insolvency of such employee.

Here, the complaint sufficiently alleged that the death of the couple's 7-yr old son was caused by
the negligent act of the petitioners' driver; and that the petitioners themselves were civilly liable for
the negligence of their driver for failing “to exercise the necessary diligence required of a good
 father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employee, the driver, which diligence,
if exercised, would have prevented said accident.”

All told, Civil Case No. 99-10845 is a negligence suit brought under Article 2176 of the Civil Code
to recover damages primarily from the petitioners as employers responsible for their negligent
driver pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible. Thus, the employer is liable for damages caused by his employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former is not
engaged in any business or industry.

2. The circumstance that no reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages was made when
the criminal case was filed is of no moment for the simple reason that the criminal case was
dismissed without any pronouncement having been made therein. In reality, therefore, it is as if
there was no criminal case to speak of in the first place. And for the petitioners to insist for the
conviction of their driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable for damages is to ask for
the impossible.

In this case, the criminal case against the employee driver was prematurely terminated due to his
death. The civil case instituted by the spouses was filed precisely because no remedy can be
obtained by them against the petitioners with the dismissal of the criminal case against their
driver during the pendency thereof.
 CONSING JR V PEOPLE
G.R. No. 161075 | July 15, 2013 | BERSAMIN, J.

DOCTRINE:

An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party does not raise a prejudicial
question to stop the proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of the defendant for estafa through
falsification. This is because the result of the independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or
innocence of the accused.

FACTS:

Consing loaned from Unicapital Inc. a total of P18,000,000.00, secured by a real estate mortgage constituted
on a parcel of land (property) covered by a TCT registered under the name of de la Cruz. In accordance
with its option to purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to purchase one-half of the property
for a total consideration of P21,221,500.00

Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property, they learned that the title to the property
was really another TCT in the names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng, the parties from whom the
property had been allegedly acquired by de la Cruz. The TCT held by De la Cruz appeared to be spurious.

On its part, Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount of P41,377,851.48 as of April 19, 1999 that
had been paid to and received by de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter ignored the demands. Procedural
points follow:

- Consing filed Civil Case No. 1759 in the Pasig City Regional Trial Court (RTC) (Pasig civil case)
for injunctive relief,
- Unicapital filed a complaint of estafa through falsification of public documents against Consing in
the Makati City Prosecutor's Office (Makati Civil Case).
- Unicapital sued Consing in the RTC in Makati City for the recovery of a sum of money and
damages, with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment
- Consing moved to defer his arraignment in the Makati criminal case on the ground of existence of
a prejudicial question due to the pendency of the Pasig and Makati civil cases.
- The RTC issued an order suspending the proceedings in the Makati criminal case on the ground of
the existence of a prejudicial question, and on March 18, 2001, the RTC denied the Prosecution's
motion for reconsideration.

The State assailed in the CA the last two orders of the RTC in the Makati criminal case via petition for
certiorari.

The CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252, dismissing the petition for certiorari, stating
that the resolution of the issue in the Pasig case, i.e. whether or not private respondent may be held liable
in the questioned transaction, will determine the guilt or innocence of private respondent Consing in both
the Cavite and Makati criminal cases.

ISSUE:

Did the CA err in reversing itself on the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question that warranted the
suspension of the proceedings in the Makati criminal case?

RULING:

No. Consing has hereby deliberately chosen to ignore the firm holding in the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to
the effect that the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 00-120 could not be suspended because the Makati
civil case was an independent civil action, while the Pasig civil case raised no prejudicial question. That
was wrong for him to do considering that the ruling fully applied to him due to the similarity between his
case with Plus Builders and his case with Unicapital.

A perusal of Unicapital's complaint in the Makati civil case reveals that the action was predicated on fraud.
This was apparent from the allegations of Unicapital in its complaint to the effect that Consing and de la
Cruz had acted in a "wanton, fraudulent, oppressive, or malevolent manner in offering as security and later
object of sale, a property which they do not own, and foisting to the public a spurious title." 2 As such, the
action was one that could proceed independently of Criminal Case No. 00-120 pursuant to Article 33 of the
Civil Code, which states as follows:

Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be independently
instituted pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a prejudicial question that will
justify the suspension of a criminal case.

In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the alleged fraud
committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action
under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the
suspension of the criminal case at bar.
 PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and FELIX PANGALANGAN v. PHIL-AMERICAN
FORWARDERS, INC., ARCHIMEDES J. BALINGIT and FERNANDO PINEDA
G.R. No. L-25142 | March 25, 1975 | J. Aquino | d. Employers, Meaning of

DOCTRINE:

ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

xxx xxx xxx

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions. Xxxx

The manager of a corporation owning a truck, the reckless operation of which allegedly resulted in
the vehicular accident from which the damage arose, is not the “manager” contemplated under Article 2180
of the Civil Code. The Court is of the opinion that those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It
may be gathered from the context of Article 2180 that the term “manager” is used in the sense of
“employer”.

FACTS:
Phil-American Forwarders Inc., together with Pineda and Balingit, was sued for damages in an action
based on quasi-delict or culpa aquilina.

In the complaint of the petitioners, it was alleged that on November 24, 1962, Pineda drove recklessly
a freight truck, owned by Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., along the national highway at Sto. Tomas,
Pampanga. The truck bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan, which was owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines, Inc. As a result of the bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not
be used for seventy-nine days, thus depriving the company of earnings amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was
the manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.

Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that he was the employer of
Pineeda, hence, petitioners had no cause of action against him.

RTC RULING:
The CFI of Tarlac dismissed the complaint against Balingit. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise" (dueños
o directores de un establicimiento o empresa) used in article 2180 of the Civil Code, embrace the manager of a
corporation owning a truck, the reckless operation of which allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from
which the damage arose.

RULING:
The Civil Code provides:

ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
 xxx xxx xxx

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.

xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

The Court is of the opinion that those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be
gathered from the context of Article 2180 that the term “manager” is used in the sense of “employer”.

Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened
on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular accident already
mentioned because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer, Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc.

Other argument of petitioners:

They argue that Phil- American Forwarders, Inc. is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out
of its capital stock with a par value of P41,200, Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40,000 and they paid
P10,000 on their subscription, while the other incorporators, namely, Rodolfo Limjuco, Ponciano Caparas and
Rafael Suntay paid P250.25 and P25, respectively.

The Court held that such argument implies that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that
Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil
personality. Such cannot be countenanced in this appeal as it was not raised in the lower court.
 GENSON v. SPS. ADARLE AND MARI-ON, AND IAC
G.R. No. 73928 | August 31, 1987 | J. Gutierrez, Jr.

DOCTRINE: An act which is committed by the servant is considered to be done by the master through him
and therefore in the law of torts, it is assumed that if any wrong is done by the servant, it has been
committed by his master indirectly and so the master is held liable for these wrongs. However, for this
master-servant doctrine to apply, there must be sufficient basis showing malice, bad faith, or gross negligence
on the part of the master in order for the latter be to held liable for the acts of his servant.

FACTS:

Arturo Arbatin was the successful bidder in the sale at public auction of junk and other unserviceable
government property located at the compound of the Highway District Engineer's Office of Roxas City.

Arturo Arbatin (Arturo) hired Respondent Eduardo Adarle (Eduardo) as laborer to gather and take away scrap
iron from the compound of the Highway District Engineer’s Office of Roxas City with a daily wage of P12.00
or about P312.00 a month.

On September 8, 1979, at 4:00am, on a Saturday and a non-working day, while Adarle was tying a cable to a
pile of scrap iron to be loaded on a truck inside the premises of the compound, and while the bucket of the
payloader driven by Ramon Buensalido was being raised, the bucket suddenly fell and hit Adarle on the right
back portion of his head just below the nape of his neck. After Adarle was rushed to the St. Anthony Hospital,
it was found that he suffered a fracture in his vertebral body and his lower extremities were paralyzed.

Adarle filed an action for damages against Arbatin and Buensalido, as well as with Candelario (the civil
engineer), and petitioner Highway District Engineer.

Allegations of Petitioner:
He had no knowledge of or participation in the accident because it happened on a Saturday (a non-working
day), and he was in Iloilo.

RTC:
RTC found the defendants present at the Highway’s compound when the accident occurred with the exception
of the petitioner. It ruled that petitioner is liable for damages since petitioner was supposed to know what his
men do with their government equipment within an area under his supervision. It found all the defendants
liable for damages under Arts. 1172 & 2176 of the NCC.

Defendants were ordered to pay solidarily the plaintiff the ff. amounts:
1. P312 monthly from Sept. 8, 1979 until his release from the hospital; 2) P7,410.63 for hospital
expenses up to Jan. 14, 1980; 3) at least P100K as actual and compensatory damages; 4) P20K as
moral damages; 5) 5K exemplary damages; and, P5K as attorney’s fees.

CA:
On appeal of the petitioner to the CA, the latter ruled that petitioner was present when the accident happened
and that he had given permission to the other defendants to work on a Saturday. It also held that the suit
against petitioner was not a suit against the government, therefore, it should not be dismissed.

ISSUES:

1. WON petitioner was present within the premises when the accident happened.
2. WON there is sufficient basis for the “master-servant” doctrine” in tort law to apply.
3. WON the suit against petitioner is a suit against the government.
RULING:

1. NO. The Court ruled that the appellate court's finding that he was present within the premises when the
accident happened is not supported by evidence.

In this regard, any liability on Genson’s part would be based only on his alleged failure to exercise proper
supervision over his subordinates.

Insofar as work on a Saturday is concerned, and assuming Mr. Genson verbally allowed it, we see nothing
wrong in the petitioner's authorizing work on that day. As a matter of fact, it could even be required that the
hauling of junk and unserviceable equipment sold at public auction must be done on non-working days.

Further, there is no showing from the records that it is against regulations to use government cranes and
payloaders to load items sold at public auction on the trucks of the winning bidder. The items were formerly
government property. Unless the contract specifies otherwise, it may be presumed that all the parties were in
agreement regarding the use of equipment already there for that purpose.

2. NONE.

There is likewise no sufficient basis for the "master-servant" doctrine in tort law to apply. Buensalido was not
working overtime as a government employee. Also, it is doubtful if the district engineer can be considered an
"employer" for purposes of tort liability who may be liable even if he was not there.

Further, no evidence was presented to show that an application for overtime work or a claim for overtime pay
from the district engineer's office was ever filed. There is also no proof that Genson received anything which
could be called "inordinate gain." It is more plausible that
Genson simply wanted to clear his compound of junk and the best time for the winning bidder to do it was on a
non-working day.

Considering that there is no malice, bad faith, or gross negligence on the part of Genson, he cannot be to held
liable for the acts of Buensalido and Arbatin.

3. NO.

The suit against petitioner is not a suit against the government because they are not sued in their official
capacities, and because the accident occurred on a non-working day where the work performed was not
authorized by the government. While the equipment used belongs to the Government, the work was private in
nature, for the benefit of a purchaser of junk.

Petitioner’s liability arose from tort and not from contract. Further, under Art. 2180, the State is liable only for
torts caused by its special agents if there is proof that the tortious inducement was authorized.
 ERNESTO MARTIN V. CA AND MERALCO
G.R. No. 82248 January 30, 1992

DOCTRINE:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

FACTS:
Ernesto Martin was the owner of a private car bearing license plate No. NPA-930. At around 2 o’clock in the
morning of May 11, 1982, while being driven by Nestor Martin, it crashed into a Meralco electric post on
Valley Golf Road, in Antipolo, Rizal. The car was wrecked and the pole severely damaged. Meralco
subsequently demanded reparation from Ernesto Martin, but the demand was rejected. It thereupon sued him
for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, alleging that he was liable to it as the employer of Nestor
Martin. The petitioner’s main defense was that Nestor Martin was not his employee. Meralco did not present
any evidence to prove that Nestor Martin was the employee of Ernesto Martin and Ernesto Martin did
not rebut such allegation.
ISSUE:
WON Ernesto Martin can be held liable.
HELD:
NO. Meralco had the burden of proof, or the duty “to present evidence on the fact in issue necessary to
establish his claim” as required by Rule 131, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Failure to do this was
fatal to its action. As the employment relationship between Ernesto Martin and Nestor Martin could not be
presumed, it was necessary for the plaintiff to establish it by evidence. It was enough for the defendant to deny
the alleged employment relationship, without more, for he was not under obligation to prove this negative
averment. This Court has consistently applied the rule that “if the plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of
proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim,
the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.”

Petition was granted.

Tort
It is important to stress that the complaint for damages was filed by the private respondent against only Ernesto
Martin as alleged employer of Nestor Martin, the driver of the car at the time of the accident. Nestor Martin
was not impleaded.
The action was based on tort under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, providing in part that:

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The above rule is applicable only if there is an employer-employee relationship although it is not necessary
that the employer be engaged in any business or industry. It differs in this sense from Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, which requires that the employer be engaged in an industry to be subsidiarily liable for
the felony committed by his employee in the course of his employment.
 Cuison v. Norton & Harrison Co., 55 Phil. 18

DOCTRINE

Article 1903, paragraphs 4 and 7 of the same Code provides:

Owners or directors of any establishment or business are, in the same way, liable for any damages
caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the service in which employed, or an
occasion of the performance of their duties.

The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons subject thereto prove that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.

FACTS:

On the afternoon of August 9, 1928, Moises Cuison, a boy 7 years of age, the son of the plaintiff, was
on his way to the Santa Mesa School, in the City of Manila, in company with his sister Marciana. As
they came near to the fire station, some large pieces of lumber on a truck which had stopped fell from
it pinning the boy beneath, and causing his almost instant death. The truck in questioned was owned
by Antonio Ora. It was driven by Felix Jose, with Telesforo Binoya as the washing and Francisco
Bautista as the helper, the two latter being youths less than18 years of age. Jose Binoya, and Bautista
were employees of Ora. The truck was rented by Ora to Norton & Harrison Co. On the truck were the
letters "N-H," which were the first letters of the firm name. Ora was in the employ of Norton &
Harrison Co. as a capataz. It was his duty as such employee to direct the loading and transportation
of the lumber. When the accident occurred the lumber had become loosened, and it was to rearrange
it that the truck halted, without, however, there arrangement having been made before the pieces of
lumber had fallen and killed the boy. The father of the boy then filed an action to recover damages in
the amount of P30,000 for the death of his son, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the
defendant.

The most important question of fact to determine was the relationship of Ora to Norton & Harrison
Co., whether he was a servant of the company or an independent contractor. In view of the debatabel
facts found in the record, and in view of the propriety of obtaining as much enlightenment as
possible on the main issue it is evident that Ora was a contractor and an employee at the same time
of Norton & Harrison Co. Reverting now to the law, counsel for neither party has considered it
necessary to assist the court in this regard

ISSUE:

Whether or not defendant is liable.

RULING:

The Penal Code makes provisions for the civil liability of persons criminally liable, and establishes
subsidiary liability for persons and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies and
misdemeanors committed by their servants in the discharge of their duties. In this instance,
recurring to the facts, it should have been mentioned that the two youths, Binoya and Bautista,
pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide through reckless negligence, and were sentenced accordingly.

The basis of civil law liability is not respondeat superior but the relationship of paterfamilias. This
theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligece and not on that of his servant.
Article 1902 of the Civil Code provides:
Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be
liable for the damage so done. Article 1903, paragraphs 4 and 7 of the same Code provides:

Owners or directors of any establishment or business are, in the same way, liable for any damages
caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the service in which employed, or an
occasion of the performance of their duties.

The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons subject thereto prove that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.

It is well to repeat that under the civil law an employer is only liable for the negligence of his
employees in the discharge of their respective duties. The defense of independent contractor would
be a valid one in the Philippines just as it would be in the United States. Here Ora was a contractor,
but it does not necessarily follow that he was an independent contractor. The reason for this
distinction is that the employer retained the power of directing and controlling the work. The
chauffeur and the two persons on the truck were the employees of Ora, the contractor, but Ora, the
contractor, was an employee of Norton & Harrison Co., charged with the duty of directing the
loading and transportation of the lumber. And it was the negligence in loading the lumber and the
use of minors on the truck which caused the death of the unfortunate boy. On the facts and the law,
Ora was not an independent contractor, but was the servant of the defendant, and for his negligence
defendant was responsible.

Conceding that the record discloses a most unusual state of facts, and conceding that the evidence is
not as ample as it should be, nevertheless on the record as it is and on the law as it is, it is incumbent
on the court to rule that error was committed in the lower court in not awarding the father of the
dead boy damages for the wrongful death of his son. It has been the practice of this court in cases of
death through negligence, in the absence of special proof, to allow the sum of P1,000.
 Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Court of Appeals
221 SCRA 389 | April 7 1993 | J. Campos Jr.

DOCTRINE:
An independent contractor is responsible for his own acts and omissions. He alone must bear the
consequences of his negligence, if any, in the conduct of the same. Moreover, failure to establish an employer-
employee relationship, one cannot be held liable for the acts and omissions of the other.
FACTS:
Clarita T. Camacho was the operator of a gasoline station located in Naguilian Road, Bagui City wherein she
sells petitioner Shell’s petroleum products. Sometime in April 1983, respondent requested petitioner to
conduct a hydro-pressure test on the underground storage tanks of the said station in order to determine
whether or not the sales losses she was incurring for the past several months were due to leakages therein.
Petitioner acceded to the said request and on one Jesus "Jessie" Feliciano together with other workers, came to
private respondent's station with a Job Order from petitioner to perform the hydro pressure test.
Feliciano and his men drained the underground storage tank which was to be tested of its remaining gasoline.
After which, they filled the tank with water through a water hose from the deposit tank of private respondent.
At around 2:00 a.m. the following day, private respondent saw that the water had reached the lip of the pipe of
the underground storage tank and so, she shut off the water faucet. At about 6:00 a.m. the customers who had
bought gasoline returned to the station complaining that their vehicles stalled because there was water in the
gasoline that they bought. On account of this, private respondent was constrained to replace the gasoline sold
to the said customers.
However, a certain Eduardo Villanueva, one of the customers, filed a complaint with the police against private
respondent for selling the adulterated gasoline. In addition, he caused the incident to be published in two local
newspapers. Thereafter, petitioner undertook to settle the criminal; complaint filed by Villanueva.
Subsequently, Villanueva filed an Affidavit of Desistance. private respondent filed before the trial court a
complaint for damages against petitioner due to the latter's alleged negligence in the conduct of the hydro-
pressure test in her gasoline station. For its part, petitioner denied liability because, according to it, the hydro-
pressure test on the underground storage tanks was conducted by an independent contractor.
RTC RULING:
The trial court dismissed private respondent's complaint for damages
CA RULING:
Reversed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should be held accountable for the damage to private respondent due to the hydro-
pressure test conducted by Jesus Feliciano.
RULING:
The court ruled in the negative. It is a well-entrenched rule that an employer-employee relationship must exist
before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee. It is likewise firmly settled that the
existence or non-existence of the employeremployee relationship is commonly to be determined by
examination of certain factors or aspects of that relationship. These include: (a) the manner of selection and
engagement of the putative employee; (b) the mode of payment of wages; (c) the presence or absence of a
power to control the putative employee's conduct, 4 although the latter is the most important element.
Feliciano is independently maintaining a business under a duly registered business name, "JFS Repair and
Maintenance Service," and is duly registered with the Bureau of Domestic Trade. He does not enjoy a fixed
salary hut instead charges a lump sum consideration for every piece of work he accomplishes. If he is not able
to finish his work, he does not get paid, as what happened in this case. Further, Feliciano utilizes his own tools
and equipment and has a complement of workers. Neither is he required to work on a regular basis. Instead, he
merely awaits calls from clients such as petitioner whenever repairs and maintenance services are requested.
Moreover, Feliciano does not exclusively service petitioner because he can accept other business but not from
other oil companies. 10 All these are the hallmarks of an independent contractor. Being an independent
contractor, Feliciano is responsible for his own acts and omissions. As he alone was in control over the manner
of how he was to undertake the hydro-pressure test, he alone must bear the consequences of his negligence, if
any, in the conduct of the same. Anent the issue of damages, the same has been rendered moot by the failure of
private respondent to establish an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and Feliciano. Absent
said relationship, petitioner cannot be held liable for the acts and omissions of the independent contractor,
Feliciano.
 De Leon Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-15247 | February 28, 1962 | Bengzon, C.J.

DOCTRINE: The fact of the driver’s negligence gave rise to the presumption that the employer had been
negligent in the selection and supervision of its employees. And petitioner failed to prove that it had exercised
such requisite care and diligence as would relieve it from responsibility.

FACTS:

Respondent suffered as a result of the collision between the passenger jeepney in which she was riding, and
petitioner De Leon Brokerage’s cargo truck recklessly driven by its employee, Luna, and for which the latter
had been prosecuted and convicted of the crime of homicide with physical injuries thru reckless imprudence.In
the criminal action against Luna (and the driver of the passenger jeepney, who was, however, acquitted),
respondent had reserved her right to file a separate civil action.

After a judgment of conviction had been rendered, respondent filed in the court of first instance of Manila, an
action for recovery of damages against Luna and petitioner. As proof of Luna's negligence, she presented
during the hearing the judgment of conviction in the criminal case, and established her claim for actual, moral
and exemplary damages. Defendants, that is, Luna and petitioner, sought to prove by means of the former's
testimony that he was not engaged in the performance of his duties at the time of the accident.

The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC — holding petitioner and
Luna solidarily liable to respondent for the sums of P1,183.70 for actual expenses; P3,000.00 for unpaid
medical fees; P7,000.00 as moral damages; and P1,000.00 as attorney's fees; all amount to earn legal interest
from the filing of the complaint, plus costs.

Seeking reversal of such affirmance by the Appellate Court, De Leon Brokerage Claims that: (1) the
allegations in respondent's complaint were so ambiguous that it was not clear whether she was suing for
damages resulting from a quasi-delict or for civil liability arising from crime,but since the averments therein
are more characteristic of an action of the latter nature, the same, as against petitioner, is premature for failure
to allege the insolvency of its employee; (2) the judgment of conviction Exh. B, is not admissible against it as
evidence of a quasi-delict; (3)the employee, Luna, was not in the discharge of his duties at the time of the
accident; and (4) it cannot be held solidarily liable with Luna for damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the complaint of respondent is based on quasi delict (YES)

RULING:

The Court ruled in the affirmative, She alleged that she suffered injuries because of the carelessness and
imprudence of petitioner's chauffeur who was driving the cargo truck belonging to petitioner, which truck
collided with the passenger jeepney wherein she was riding. Since averment had been made of the employer-
employee relationship and of the damages caused by the employee on occasion of his function, there is a clear
statement of a right of action under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The complaint does not, and did not have
to allege that petitioner did not exercise due diligence in choosing and supervising Luna, because this is a
matter of defense.

Contrary to petitioner's view, respondent is holding it liable for its own lack of car. Her allegation "that the acts
of the defendants above described constitute gross negligence and recklessness", plainly refers to petitioner's
act of employing Luna as driver of its cargo truck, and to Luna's careless manner of driving it.

Respondent did not base her suit on the criminal conviction. This fact, it is true, was alleged in a paragraph
separate from her allegation of Luna's negligence as having been the cause of her injuries; but mention of the
criminal conviction merely tended to support her claim that Luna had been recklessly negligent in driving the
truck. Being evidentiary, the allegation could have been disregarded.

Respondent neither had to wait for the termination of the criminal proceeding nor to reserve in the same her
right to file a separate civil action. She waited for the results of the criminal action because she wanted to be
sure which driver and respective employer she could rightly sue, since both Luna and the driver of the
passenger jeepney were prosecuted. And she reserved because otherwise, the court in the criminal proceeding
would have awarded her indemnity, since the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
is deemed instituted with the criminal action. In such an event, she would no longer be able to file the separate
civil action contemplated by the civil code, not because of failure to reserve the same but because she would
have already received indemnity for her injuries.

Plainly, the reservation made in the criminal action does not preclude a subsequent action based on a quasi-
delict.It cannot be inferred therefrom that respondent had chosen to file the very civil action she had reserved.
The only conclusion that can reasonably be drawn is that she did not want the question of damages threshed
out in the criminal action, but preferred to have this issue decided in a separate civil action.

However, it seems that the petitioner understood quite well that it was being held liable under the civil code. In
its answer, it alleged as an affirmative defense that in the selection and supervision of its employees and
drivers, it had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family — a defense available only to an employer
being sued for a quasi-delict. Petitioner argues that, not knowing the nature of respondent's action and deciding
to play it safe,it put up defense both against a suit for quasi-delict and against an action for civil liability
arising from crime. Yet,it did not aver that the complaint failed to allege that its employee was insolvent — the
defense consistent with an action against an employer for subsidiary liability under the criminal code. What it
alleged was that the complaint failed to state a cause of action as against it,which could not be sustained since
the complaint sufficiently alleges an action based on quasi-delict and the court could validly have granted
respondent's prayer for relief

Considering the judgment of conviction had been admitted without objection, its competency can no longer be
questioned on appeal. It established the fact of Luna's negligence, giving rise to the presumption that the
petitioner had been negligent in the selection and supervision of its employees. And petitioner failed to prove
that it had exercised such requisite care and diligence as would relieve it from responsibility.

But, was Luna in the performance of his duties at the time of the collision? He testified that on the day of the
accident he had been instructed to go to Pampanga, from there to proceed to Nueva Ecija, but that after
unloading his cargo in Pampanga, he at once returned to Manila.However, his reason for immediately
returning to Manilais not clear. He could have returned for purposes of repair. It does not appear that he was on
an errand of his own. In the absence of determinative proof that the deviation was so complete as would
constitute a cessation or suspension of his service, petitioner should be held liable, In fact, the Court of
Appeals disbelieved the alleged violation of instructions.

Since both Luna and petitioner are responsible for the quasi-delict, their liability is solidary, although the latter
can recover from the former whatever sums it pays to respondent
 Valenzuela vs CA
G.R No. 115024 | Feb 7, 1996 | Kapunan J

Doctrine: Emergency Rule allows an individual who finds himself in danger to act without much time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid impending danger, said individual is not guilty of
negligence if he fails to undertake what may appear to be a better solution (unless emergency is brought by his
own negligence)

FACTS
1. In June 24, 1990, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer from her restaurant at
Marcos Highway to her home at Palanza St, Araneta Ave. While travelling along Aurora Blvd, she
notices something wrong with her tires. She stopped at a lighted place where people are to verify if
she had a flat tire and solicit help if necessary. She parked along the sidewalk and put on the
emergency lights
2. She was bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer by Richard Li and registered under the name of
Alexander Commercial Inc. As a result, Valenzuela was thrown against the windshield of the car and
she was brought to UERM Medical Memorial Center, where she got her left leg amputated. She was
confined for 20 days and fitted an artificial leg
3. Defendant’s Version: Richard Li was driving at 55 kph and it was raining hence the vision was
affected. A car on the opposite direction travelling at 80kph with full bright light temporarily blinded
him, causing him to swerve and bump the car. Li did not see the car as it was midnight. There were no
parking lights or early warning device and the area was poorly lighted.

ISSUE/S:
1. W/N Richard Li was negligent? YES
2. W/N Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence (parking in no parking zone)? NO.
3. W/N Alexander Commercial Inc can be held liable? YES (through pater familias embodied in 2180)
RULING:
1. Yes. The court gave more weight to the version of the plaintiff and her witness, who was an owner of
an establishment 10-20m away from accident
 There was only a drizzle, not heavy rain
 Li could have ample time to react on the road conditions. Failure to react might be due to very
fast speed. His claim that he put on the brakes but was not able to avoid the accident, only
shows that he was running very fast.
 Li is under the influence of Alcohol

2. No. It was held that an actor who is confronted with an emergency is not to be held up to the standard
of conduct normally applied to an individual who is in such situation.
 One who is placed in a dangerous situation does not require the same standard of reflective
care
2. Emergency Rule allows an individual who finds himself in danger to act without much time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid impending danger, said individual is not guilty
of negligence if he fails to undertake what may appear to be a better solution (unless emergency is
brought by his own negligence)
 Here, Valenzuela stopped at a lighted place to seek help.
3. It is customary for large companies to provide certain classes of employees with courtesy vehicles.
The privilege serves important business purposes related to the image of success an entity intends to
present to clients and public—to enable employees to reach clients conveniently. Business
transactions may occur at all hours in any sorts of situation.
1) Use of company car principally serves the business and goodwill of the company and only incidentally
the private purpose of an individual. Hence, in providing a car for business use or purpose of
furthering the company’s image, a company owes responsibility to the public to see to it the
employees which the cars are issued to are capable and responsible.
I. Li was an assistant manager, who normally conducts work outside of the office (e.g visiting
prospective buyers and contacting and meeting with clients)
 Claim: Social visit to officemate in Paranaque
 It can be speculated that he and his officemate came from a work related function or
discussed work related strategies
II. Alexander Commercial Inc. was unable to demonstrate that it exercised the care and diligence of a
good father in entrusting a company car to Li.
 No allegations that company took steps to ascertain Li’s driving proficiency and history
 Dulay vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 108017 | April 3, 1995 | J. Bidin

DOCTRINE:

Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that “whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
this Chapter.” The doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts
which are voluntary and intentional.

FACTS:

On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the
“Big Bang Sa Alabang,” Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security
guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay. Petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay,
widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed an action
for damages against Benigno Torzuela and private respondents Safeguard and/or Superguard, alleged
employers of defendant Torzuela.

Respondent Superguard filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state a valid cause
of action. Superguard claimed that Torzuela’s act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and
that since the alleged act of shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is
governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. Superguard further alleged that a complaint for damages
based on negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie,
since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code.

In addition, the respondent argued that petitioners’ filing of the complaint is premature considering that the
conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer’s subsidiary liability.
Respondent Safeguard also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the ground that
defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees.

Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against the private respondents is based on
their liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code. Respondent judge declared that the complaint was
one for damages founded on crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as
distinguished from those arising from, quasi-delict.

RTC RULING:

The complaint against the alternative defendants Superguard Security Corporation and Safeguard Investigation
and Security Co., Inc., must be and (sic) it is hereby dismissed.

CA RULING:

CA Affirmed RTC, dismissing the case of Dulay

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not Torzuela’ s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code;

II. Whether or not Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally committed; and
 III. Whether or not the liability or respondents is subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code.

RULING:

1. Yes. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that “whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.” Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there
is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions
resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts
committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional.

2. No. The term “physical injuries” in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries
causing death. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes
not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide. Although in the
Marcia case, it was held that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the
crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted, however, that Torzuela, the accused in the
case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia
was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.

3. No. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the
master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after
selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency
of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
 TEODORO C. UMALI v. HON. ANGEL BACANI, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch IX of
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan and FIDEL H. SAYNES
G.R. No. L-40570 | January 30, 1976 | ESGUERRA, J.

DOCTRINE:
The negligence of the employee is presumed to be the negligence of the employer because the
employer is supposed to exercise supervision over the work of the employees. This liability of the employer is
primary and direct (Standard Vacuum Oil Co. vs. Tan and Court of Appeals). In fact the proper defense for the
employer to raise so that he may escape liability is to prove that he exercised the diligence of the good father of
the family to prevent damage not only in the selection of his employees but also in adequately supervising
them over their work. This defense was not adequately proven in the case at bar.

FACTS:
Teodoro Umali is the owner and manager of the Alcala Electric Plant. In 1972, a storm hit the
Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan. The banana plants standing on an elevated ground along the barrio road
and near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant were blown down and fell on the electric wire. As a
result, the live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the electric post and the other fell to
the ground under the fallen banana plants.

On the following morning, barrio captain Luciano Bueno, who was passing by, saw the broken
electric wire and so he warned the people in the place not to go near the wire. He also saw Cipriano
Baldomero, a laborer of the Alcala Electric, whom he notified of the broken line. Baldomero could not fix it so
he looked for the lineman instead.

Sometime after, a small boy of 3 years and 8 months old by the name of Manuel Saynes, whose house
is just on the opposite side of the road, went to the place where the broken line wire was and got in contact
with it. The boy was electrocuted and he subsequently died.

Petitioner claims that he could not be liable under the concept of quasi-delict or tort as owner and
manager of the Alcala Electric Plant because the proximate cause of the boy's death electrocution could not be
due to any negligence on his part, but rather to a fortuitous event-the storm that caused the banana plants to fall
and cut the electric line-pointing out the absence of negligence on the part of his employee Cipriano
Baldomero who tried to have the line repaired and the presence of negligence of the parents of the child in
allowing him to leave his house during that time.

Court of First Instance Ruling:

The CFI found the death by electrocution of Manuel Saynes as "due to the fault or negligence of
Umali as owner and manager of the Alcala Electric Plant", although the liability of defendant is mitigated by
the contributory negligence of the parents of the boy "in not providing for the proper and delegate supervision
and control over their son.”

ISSUES:
1. Whether the proximate cause of Manuel’s death is due to a fortuitous event – the storm.
2. Whether Umali should be held liable. (main issue based on the topic)

RULING:
1. NO. The negligence on the part of defendants' employees in the Alcala Electric Plant resulted in the
death of the victim by electrocution. First, there were big and tall banana plants at the place of the incident
standing which were higher than the electric post supporting the electric line, and yet the employees of the
defendant who, with ordinary foresight, could have easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the electric
line would be endangered by banana plants being blown down, did not even take the necessary precaution to
eliminate that source of danger.
 Second, even after the employees of the Alcala Electric Plant were already aware of the possible
damage the storm could have caused their electric lines, they did not cut off from the plant the flow of
electricity along the lines, an act they could have easily done pending inspection of the wires to see if they had
been cut.

Third, employee Cipriano Baldomero was negligent on the morning of the incident because even if he
was already made aware of the live cut wire, he did not have the foresight to realize that the same posed a
danger to life and property, and that he should have taken the necessary precaution to prevent anybody from
approaching the live wire.

The Court does not agree with petitioner's theory that the parents' negligence constituted the proximate
cause of the victim's death because the real proximate cause was the fallen live wire which posed a threat to
life and property due to the series of negligence committed by defendants' employees.

Art. 2179 of the Civil Code provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim in this
case) was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants' lack of due
care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This law may
be availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt him from liability.

2. YES. Petitioner's liability for injury caused by his employees negligence is well defined in par. 4, of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which states:

The owner and manager of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.

The negligence of the employee is presumed to be the negligence of the employer because the
employer is supposed to exercise supervision over the work of the employees. This liability of the employer is
primary and direct. In fact the proper defense for the employer to raise so that he may escape liability is to
prove that he exercised the diligence of the good father of the family to prevent damage not only in the
selection of his employees but also in adequately supervising them over their work. This defense was not
adequately proven in the case at bar.
 Secosa v. Heirs of Erwin Suarez Francisco
GR No. 160039| June 29, 2004 |Ynares-Santiago, J.

DOCTRINE: Based on the foregoing provisions, when an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee,
there instantly arises a presumption that there was negligence on the part of the employer either in the
selection of his employee or in the supervision over him after such selection. The presumption, however,
may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that it exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. Hence, to evade solidary liability for
quasi-delict committed by an employee, the employer must adduce sufficient proof that it exercised such
degree of care.

FACTS:
Erwin Suarez Francisco, an eighteen year old third year physical therapy student of the Manila Central
University, was riding a motorcycle along Radial 10 Avenue, near the Veteran Shipyard Gate in the City of
Manila. At the same time, Petitioner, Raymundo Odani Secosa, was driving an Isuzu cargo truck on the same
road. The truck was owned by petitioner, Dassad Warehousing and Port Services, Inc. Traveling behind the
motorcycle driven by Francisco was a sand and gravel truck, which in turn was being tailed by the Isuzu
truck driven by Secosa.The three vehicles were traversing the southbound lane at a fairly high speed. When
Secosa overtook the sand and gravel truck, he bumped the motorcycle causing Francisco to fall.The rear
wheels of the Isuzu truck then ran over Francisco, which resulted in his instantaneous death. Fearing for his
life, petitioner Secosa left his truck and fled the scene of the collision.

Respondents, the parents of Erwin Francisco, thus filed an action for damages against Raymond Odani
Secosa, Dassad Warehousing and Port Services, Inc. and Dassads president, El Buenasucenso Sy.

RTC RULING:
RTC rendered a decision in favor of herein respondents. WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs jointly and severally:

1.The sum of P55,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;

2.The sum of P20,000.00 for the repair of the motorcycle;

3.The sum of P100,000.00 for the loss of earning capacity;c

4.The sum of P500,000.00 as moral damages;c

5.The sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;c

6.The sum of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees plus cost of suit.

CA RULING:
Petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the appealed decision in toto.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the CA erred when it affirmed the decision of the RTC that petitioner Dassad did not
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. (NO)
2. Whether the CA erred when it affirmed the decision of the RTC in holding petitioner El Buenasenso
Sy solidarily liable with petitioners Dassad and Secosa in violation of the Corporation Law. (YES)

RULING:

(1) Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:

 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done.Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

On the other hand, Article 2180, in pertinent part, states:

The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

Petitioner Dassad Warehousing and Port Services, Inc. failed to conclusively prove that it had exercised the
requisite diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Edilberto
Duerme, the lone witness presented by Dassad Warehousing and Port Services, Inc. to support its position
that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees, testified that he was the one who recommended petitioner Raymundo Secosa as a driver to
Dassad Warehousing and Port Services, Inc.; that it was his duty to scrutinize the capabilities of drivers; and
that he believed petitioner to be physically and mentally fit for he had undergone rigid training and attended
the PPA safety seminar. Petitioner Dassad Warehousing and Port Services, Inc. failed to support the
testimony of its lone witness with documentary evidence which would have strengthened its claim of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees.Such an omission is fatal to its position, on
account of which, Dassad can be rightfully held solidarily liable with its co-petitioner Raymundo Secosa for
the damages suffered by the heirs of Erwin Francisco.

(2) Petitioner El Buenasenso Sy cannot be held solidarily liable with his co-petitioners. It is a settled
precept in this jurisdiction that a corporation is invested by law with a personality separate from that of its
stockholders or members. It has a personality separate and distinct from those of the persons composing it
as well as from that of any other entity to which it may be related. The so-called veil of corporation fiction
treats as separate and distinct the affairs of a corporation and its officers and stockholders.
 Mercury Drug Corporation v. Baking,
G.R. No. 156037 | May 28, 2007I
| SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

DOCTRINE: Manila Railroad is liable due to its breach of its contract of carriage with Cangco, not by reason
of vicarious liability due to its employees’ negligence. Thus, it cannot excuse itself from liability by showing
that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. Article 1903 of the Civil Code
is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations — or to use the
technical form of expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual.

FACTS: Sebastian M. Baking, respondent, went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical check-up. On the
following day, after undergoing an ECG, blood, and hematology examinations and urinalysis, Dr. Sy found
that respondent’s blood sugar and triglyceride were above normal levels. Dr. Sy then gave respondent two
medical prescriptions – Diamicron for his blood sugar and Benalize tablets for his triglyceride.

Respondent then proceeded to petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation to buy the prescribed medicines.
However, the saleslady misread the prescription for Diamicron as a prescription for Dormicum. Thus, what
was sold to respondent was Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet.

Unaware that what was given to him was the wrong medicine, respondent took one pill of Dormicum on three
consecutive days.

On the third day he took the medicine, respondent figured in a vehicular accident. The car he was driving
collided with the car of one Josie Peralta. Respondent fell asleep while driving. He could not remember
anything about the collision nor felt its impact.

Suspecting that the tablet he took may have a bearing on his physical and mental state at the time of the
collision, respondent returned to Dr. Sy’s clinic. Upon being shown the medicine, Dr. Sy was shocked to find
that what was sold to respondent was Dormicum, instead of the prescribed Diamicron.

Thus, on April 14, 1994, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 80 of Quezon City a
complaint for damages against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-20193.

RTC RULING: The Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant ordering
the latter to pay mitigated damages as follows:

1. ₱250,000.00 as moral damages;

2. ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses;

3. plus ½% of the cost of the suit.

CA RULING: It affirmed RTC’s ruling in toto.

ISSUE #1: Whether petitioner was negligent, and if so, whether such negligence was the proximate cause of
respondent’s accident; and
ISSUE #2: Whether the award of moral damages, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and cost of the suit is
justified.

RULING #1: Yes. Petitioner contends that the proximate cause of the accident was respondent’s negligence in
driving his car. The Court disagreed. Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have
occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration
of logic, common sense, policy, and precedent.5

Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had petitioner’s employee been careful in reading Dr.
Sy’s prescription. Without the potent effects of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that respondent
would fall asleep while driving his car, resulting in a collision.

Complementing Article 2176 is Article 2180 of the same Code which states:

ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by
their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions.

RULING #2: Yes. However, the Court modified the award of damages. As regards the award of moral
damages, we hold the same to be in order. Moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant’s wrongful
act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury in the
cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Respondent has adequately
established the factual basis for the award of moral damages when he testified that he suffered mental anguish
and anxiety as a result of the accident caused by the negligence of petitioner’s employee. It reduced the amount
of moral damages from ₱250,000.00 to ₱50,000.00 only.

In addition, we also deem it necessary to award exemplary damages. Article 2229 allows the grant of
exemplary damages by way of example or correction for the public good. As mentioned earlier, the
drugstore business is affected with public interest. Petitioner should have exerted utmost diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees. On the part of the employee concerned, she should have been
extremely cautious in dispensing pharmaceutical products. Due to the sensitive nature of its business,
petitioner must at all times maintain a high level of meticulousness. Therefore, an award of exemplary
damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 is in order.

On the matter of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, it is settled that the reasons or grounds for the
award thereof must be set forth in the decision of the court. Since the trial court’s decision did not give the
basis of the award, the same must be deleted.
 —----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

MERCURY DRUG v. DE LEON

G.R. No. 165622 | October 17, 2008 | J. R.T., Reyes

DOCTRINE: In cases where an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there has been negligence on the part of the employer, either in the selection or
supervision of one’s employees.

FACTS: Respondent Raul T. De Leon was the presiding judge of RTC in Parañaque. On October 17, 1999, he
noticed that his left eye was reddish and had difficulty reading. That evening, he met a friend for dinner, who
at the same time happened to be a doctor, Dr. Charles Milla, and had just arrived from abroad. De Leon
consulted Dr. Milla about his irritated left eye. The latter prescribed the drugs "Cortisporin Opthalmic"
and "Ceftin" to relieve his eye problems. The following morning, De Leon went to Mercury Drug
Store Corporation to buy the prescribed medicines. He showed his prescription to petitioner Aurmela
Ganzon, a pharmacist assistant. At his chambers, De Leon requested his sheriff to assist him in
using the eye drops. As instructed, the sheriff applied 2-3 drops on respondent's left eye. Instead of
relieving his irritation, respondent felt searing pain. He immediately rinsed the affected eye with
water, but the pain did not subside. Only then did he discover that he was given the wrong medicine,
"Cortisporin Otic Solution.”

De Leon returned to the same Mercury Drug branch, with his left eye still red and teary. When he
confronted Ganzon why he was given ear drops, instead of the prescribed eye drops, she did not
apologize and instead brazenly replied that she was unable to fully read the prescription. In fact, it
was her supervisor who apologized and informed De Leon that they do not have stock of the needed
Cortisporin Opthalmic. De Leon wrote to Mercury Drug’s president, Ms. Vivian K. Askuna, about the
incident. It did not merit any response. Instead, two sales persons went to his office and informed
him that their supervisor was busy with other matters. Having been denied his simple desire for a
written apology and explanation, De Leon filed a complaint for damages against Mercury Drug.

Mercury Drug denied that it was negligent and therefore liable for damages. It pointed out that the
proximate cause of De Leon's unfortunate experience was his own negligence. He should have first
read and checked to see if he had the right eye solution before he used any on his eye. Also,
Mercury Drug explained that there is no available medicine known as "Cortisporin Opthalmic" in the
Philippine market. Furthermore, what was written on the piece of paper De Leon presented to
Ganzon was "Cortisporin Solution.” Accordingly, she gave him the only available "Cortisporin
Solution" in the market.

RTC RULING: The RTC ruled in favor of De Leon. It ordered Mercury Drug to pay P153.25 as value of the
medicine, P100k as moral damages, P300k as exemplary damages and P50k plus litigation expenses as
attorney’s fees. The lower court ratiocinated that the proximate cause was defendant Ganzon’s negligence.
She gave a prescription drug to a customer who did not have the proper form of prescription, she did
not take a good look at said prescription, she merely presumed plaintiff was looking for Cortisporin
Otic Solution because it was the only one available in the market and she further presumed that by
merely putting the drug by the counter wherein plaintiff looked at it, paid and took the drug without
any objection meant he understood what he was buying. The RTC ruled that although De Leon may
have been negligent by failing to read the medicine's label or to instruct his sheriff to do so, Mercury
Drug was first to be negligent.

CA RULING: The CA affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

ISSUE: W/N petitioners are guilty of negligence

RULING: Yes, Mercury Drug and Ganzon failed to exercise the highest degree of diligence
expected of them. As active players in the field of dispensing medicines to the public, the highest
degree of care and diligence is expected of them. Druggists must exercise the highest practicable
degree of prudence and vigilance, and the most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with the
reasonable conduct of the business, so that human life may not constantly be exposed to the danger
flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons for harmless medicines. The Court held that in cases
where an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of
law that there has been negligence on the part of the employer, either in the selection or supervision
of one's employees. This presumption may be rebutted by a clear showing that the employer has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family. In this case, Mercury Drug failed to
overcome such presumption. Petitioners Mercury Drug and Ganzon have similarly failed to live up to
high standard of diligence expected of them as pharmacy professionals. They were grossly negligent
in dispensing ear drops instead of the prescribed eye drops to De Leon. Worse, they have once
again attempted to shift the blame to their victim by underscoring his own failure to read the label. As
a buyer, De Leon relied on the expertise and experience of Mercury Drug and its employees in
dispensing to him the right medicine. The Court has ruled that in the purchase and sale of drugs, the
buyer and seller do not stand at arms length. There exists an imperative duty on the seller or the
druggist to take precaution to prevent death or injury to any person who relies on one's absolute
honesty and peculiar learning.

However, the SC found that the amount awarded by the lower court to be excessive. Moral damages have
been reduced from P100k to P50k, exemplary damages from P300k to P25k.
 THE HEIRS OF COMPLETO and ABIAD, v. ALBAYDA, JR.
G.R. No. 172200 | July 6, 2010 | J. Nachura

DOCTRINE:
When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, a legal presumption instantly arises that the employer was
negligent. This presumption may be rebutted only by a clear showing on the part of the employer that he exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.

FACTS:
Albayda ) is a Master Sergeant of the Philippine Air Force, while Completo was the taxi driver of a Toyota Corolla, owned and
operated by Abiad. Albayda and Completo figured in an accident along the intersection of 8th and 11th Streets, VAB. Albayda
filed a complaint for damages before the RTC which stated that Albayda was hospitalized for approximately 7 months. Albayda
manifested his reservation to file a separate civil action for damages against petitioners Completo and Abiad. Moreover,
Albayda further stated that aggravating the physical sufferings, mental anguish, frights, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
and social humiliation resulting from his injuries, his wife abandoned him, he thus demanded moral damages.

Complete, on his part, argued that he was carefully driving the taxicab along 8th Street, when suddenly he heard a strange sound
from the rear right side of the taxicab. When he stopped to investigate, he found Albayda lying on the road and holding his left
leg. He immediately rendered assistance and brought Albayda to the hospital.

Albayda testified that he was riding his bike on his way to the office. He had to stop at the corner of 11th and 8th Streets
because an oncoming taxicab was moving fast. However, the taxicab still bumped the front tire of his bike, hit his left knee and
threw him off until he fell down on the road.

RTC RULING:
Ruled in favor of Albayda and awarded him actual, moral, and attorney’s fees.

CA RULING:
Affirmed RTC but deleted actual damages, added temperate damages, and reduced the amount of moral damages. Moreover, it
ruled that complete and Abiad are solidarity liable to pay Albayda.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA erred in finding that Completo was the one who caused the collision (NO);
2. Whether Abiad failed to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of the family (YES);
3. Whether the award of moral and temperate damages and attorney’s fees to Albayda had no basis (only moral and
temperate damages were awarded)

RULING:
ISSUE #1:
It is a rule in negligence suits that the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence the motorist’s breach
in his duty of care owed to the plaintiff, that the motorist was negligent in failing to exercise the diligence required to avoid
injury to the plaintiff, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury suffered. Article 2176 of the Civil Code
provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict.

It was proven by a preponderance of evidence that Completo failed to exercise reasonable diligence in driving the taxicab
because he was over-speeding at the time he hit the bicycle ridden by Albayda. Such negligence was the sole and proximate
cause of the serious physical injuries sustained by Albayda. Completo did not slow down even when he approached the
intersection of 8th and 11th Streets of VAB. It was also proven that Albayda had the right of way, considering that he reached
the intersection ahead of Completo.

ISSUE #2:
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or
omissions, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees, but the employers’ responsibility shall cease upon proof that they observed all the diligence of a good father of the
family in the selection and supervision of their employees. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-
delict is solidary. The civil liability of the employer for the negligent acts of his employee is also primary and direct, owing to
his own negligence in selecting and supervising his employee.

Abiad testified that before he hired Completo, he required the latter to show his bio-data, NBI clearance, and driver’s license.
Abiad likewise stressed that Completo was never involved in a vehicular accident prior to the instant case. The SC held that the
protestation of Abiad to escape liability is short of the diligence required under the law. Abiad’s evidence consisted entirely of
testimonial evidence, and the unsubstantiated and self-serving testimony of Abiad was insufficient to overcome the legal
presumption that he was negligent in the selection and supervision of his driver.

ISSUE #3:
The SC held that the CA rightfully deleted the award of actual damages because there was no documentary evidence to establish
the amount stated. It further held that temperate damages are reasonable and that Albayda deserves moral damages.
 Reyes v. Doctolero
834 SCRA 1| August 2, 2017 | J. Jardeleza

DOCTRINE: As a general rule, one is only responsible for his own act or omission. The exemption
is when the employer is vicariously liable.

Under section 5 of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when the employee causes damage due to his own
negligence while performing his own duties, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the
employer is negligent. This is rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father
of a family in 1) the selection of employees, and 2) in supervising them. The defense of vicarious
liability, however, would only be available if there exists an employer-employee relationship between
the company and the negligent employee.

FACTS: Petitioners John and Mervin Reyes filed a complaint for damages against security guards
Orico Doctolero and Romeo Avila after the latter injured and fired at the Reyeses while parking at
Makati Cinema Square (MCS) on Jan. 26, 1996.

In their complaint, the Reyeses alleged that the heated altercation arose from Doctolero’s failure to
properly guide John at the basement of MCS which almost resulted in a collision with other vehicles.
They claimed that Doctolero cursed, ran after and shot John in the left leg using his service firearm.
Mervin, who only came to John’s rescue, was shot in the stomach by Avila.

The petitioners also charged Grandeur Security and Services Corporation, the security agency of the
respondents, for its negligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, and MCS for its
negligence in obtaining Grandeur's services. In their complaint, petitioners prayed that all
respondents be ordered, jointly and severally, to pay them actual, moral, and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and litigation costs.

In response, Grandeur argued it exercised the required diligence in the selection and supervision of
its employees. It likewise averred that the shooting incident was caused by the unlawful aggression of
petitioners who took advantage of their "martial arts" skill.

For its part, MCS denied any liability alleging that the injuries sustained by petitioners arose from
the acts of Doctolero and Avila, for whom respondent Grandeur should be solely responsible. It
further argued that MCS had no control over the carpark as it was then being managed by Park Asia
Philippines.

RTC RULING: The Regional Trial Court ruled against respondents Doctolero and Avila, finding
them responsible for the injuries sustained by petitioners. The RTC ordered them to jointly and
severally pay petitioners the following: P344,898.73 as actual damages; P360,000.00 as lost income;
P20,000.00 as school expenses; P300,000.00 as moral damages; P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages; P75,000.00 as attorney's fees; and costs of suit.

The RTC dismissed the complaint against MCS but held Grandeur solidarily liable with respondents
Doctolero and Avila for its failure to prove that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in the supervision of its employees. The RTC later modified its ruling and dismissed the complaint
against Grandeur, and all counterclaims filed by Grandeur.

CA RULING: The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC ruling.

The CA said Grandeur was able to prove with preponderant evidence that it observed the degree of
diligence required in both selection and supervision of its security guards.

As to MCS’s liability, the CA said MCS could not be held liable as indirect employers of the
respondents because an indirect employer only relates to the liability for unpaid wages and, as such,
finds no application to this case involving "imputed negligence" under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
The CA held that the lack of employer-employee relationship between respondents Doctolero and
Avila and respondent MCS bars petitioners' claim against MCS for the former's acts.

ISSUE: Whether Grandeur and MCS may be held vicariously liable for the damages
caused by respondents Doctolero and Avila to petitioners John and Mervin Reyes

RULING: SC ruled in the negative. It said Grandeur and MCS had no vicarious liability for the
negligence of private respondents.
As to MCS’s liability, the SC said MCS could not be faulted since it had no vicarious liability due to
the absence of an employer-employee relationship between it and Grandeur.

As a general rule, an employer could be made vicariously liable for the tort committed by his
employee under paragraph 5 of Article 2180 if there exists an employer-employee relationship.

In this case, however, there is no principal-agency relationship existing between MCS and Grandeur.

Section 8 of the Contract for Guard Services between Grandeur and MCS explicitly provides that 1)
the Grandeur security company is not an agent of the Client (MCS), or employees of the MCS and
the guards to be assigned by Grandeur; and that 2) the MCS shall not be responsible for any and all
claims for personal injury or death that arises of or in the course of the performance of guard duties.

As to the liability of Grandeur:

The Court said Grandeur could likewise not be held liable because it was able to sufficiently prove,
through testimonial and documentary evidence, that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and hiring of its security guards.

Under section 5 of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when the employee causes damage due to his own
negligence while performing his own duties, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the
employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a
family.

The "diligence of a good father" referred to in the last paragraph of Article 2180 means diligence in
the selection and supervision of employees.

To rebut the presumption of negligence, Grandeur must prove two things: first, that it had exercised
due diligence in the selection of respondents Doctolero and Avila; and second, that after hiring
Doctolero and Avila, Grandeur had exercised due diligence in supervising them.

Among the evidence presented by Grandeur that sufficiently established its diligence in the selection
and supervision of employees are various clearances from various government agencies, certificates,
the guards’ favorable test results in medical and psychiatric examinations, formulation of suitable
rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended
for the protection of the public.

Considering such, the Supreme Court affirmed the CA ruling and dismissed the petition.
 TORREON v. APARRA
G.R. No. 188493 | December 13, 2017 | J. Leonen

DOCTRINE: Lack of documentary evidence is not fatal to a claim for the deceased's lost earning capacity.
Testimony from a competent witness familiar with his salary is a sufficient basis to determine the deceased's
income before his death.

Article 2180 provides that an employer is vicariously liable with his employees for any damage they cause
while performing their duties. When an employee's negligence causes injury to another, a presumption against
the employer arises. To avoid liability, the employer must prove he exercised due diligence in selecting as well
as supervising his employees.

FACTS: On November 1, 1989, Vivian's husband, Rodolfo Torreon (Rodolfo), and daughters,
Monalisa Torreon (Monalisa) and Johanna Ava Torreon (Johanna), arrived with Felomina Abellana (Abellana)
at the municipal wharf of Jetafe, Bohol.

They looked for a vehicle that would transport them from the wharf to the poblacion of Jetafe. They were
informed that only the cargo truck, which was also owned and operated by Simolde, would enter the wharf.
Hence, when the same cargo truck returned to the wharf, Rodolfo, Monalisa, Johanna, and Abellana also
boarded it.

While Simolde and Caballes (official driver) were talking, Generoso Aparra, Jr. (Aparra), Simolde's chief
diesel mechanic, started driving the truck. Upon seeing the truck move, Caballes rushed to the truck and sat
beside Aparra. However, instead of taking control of the vehicle, Caballes allowed Aparra to drive.

Shortly thereafter, Aparra maneuvered the truck to the right side of the road to avoid hitting a parked bicycle.
But as he turned, Aparra had to swerve to the left to avoid hitting Marcelo Subiano, who was allegedly
standing on the side of the road. Because the road was only four (4) meters and 24 inches wide, rough, and full
of potholes, Aparra lost control of the truck and they fell off the wharf. Consequently, Rodolfo and Monalisa
died while Johanna and Abellana were injured.

Vivian and Abellana filed a criminal complaint for Reckless Imprudence resulting to Double Homicide,
Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property against Aparra and Caballes. Vivian and Abellana
filed a separate complaint for damages against Simolde, Caballes, and Aparra.

RTC: Regional Trial Court ruled that Caballes and Aparra committed acts constituting a quasi-delict. Since
these acts were the proximate cause of the deaths of Rodolfo and Monalisa and the injuries sustained by
Abellana and Johanna, Simolde, Caballes, and Aparra were held liable for damages.

CA: Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision holding Simolde solidarily liable with Caballes and Aparra.
However, the Court of Appeals deleted the award of actual damages for Rodolfo's loss of earning capacity.
According to the Court of Appeals, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for loss
of earning capacity. Vivian and Abellana filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration which denied the motion.
Hence, this Petition was filed before this Court.

Petitioner Vivian argues that as Rodolfo's employer, Abellana had direct and personal knowledge of the
compensation that he was receiving prior to his death; thus, she is qualified to testify on his income. Petitioner
Vivian cites four (4) reasons why the damages awarded to her should be increased. On the other hand,
respondents argue that there is no sufficient proof to sustain the award of damages.

ISSUE:
 1. Whether or not actual damages for loss of earning capacity should be awarded to petitioner Vivian
B. Torreon
2. Whether or not the value of the other awarded damages should be increased.

RULING:

1. Yes. Nothing in the Rules of Court requires that only documentary evidence is allowed in civil cases. All
that is required is the satisfaction of the quantum of evidence, that is, preponderance of evidence. In
addition, the Civil Code does not prohibit a claim for loss of earning capacity on the basis that it is not
proven by documentary evidence.

Respondents are liable to pay P1,919,700.00 to compensate for the income Rodolfo's heirs would have
received had he lived. On the other hand, Vivian failed to prove the actual damages she suffered for the
death of her daughter, Monalisa. Vivian merely testified as to the funeral and burial expenses she incurred
without producing any receipt or other evidence to support her claim. Consequently, she cannot be
entitled to an award of actual damages on account of Monalisa's loss.

Article 2176 provides “Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.”

Caballes was grossly negligent in allowing Aparra to drive the truck despite being an inexperienced driver.
Aparra's inexperience caused the accident that led to the deaths of Rodolfo and Monalisa. It is undisputed
that the deaths of Vivian's husband and daughter caused damage to her.

In addition to Caballes and Aparra, the law also holds their employer, Simolde, liable. Article 2180
provides that an employer is vicariously liable with his employees for any damage they cause while
performing their duties. When an employee's negligence causes injury to another, a presumption against
the employer arises. To avoid liability, the employer must prove he exercised due diligence in selecting as
well as supervising his employees.

The Civil Code holds Simolde liable for the damages that his actions have caused. Article 2206
specifically applies when a death occurs as a result of a crime or a quasi-delict. Civil or death indemnity is
mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the
crime. Initially fixed at P3,000.00, the amount of the indemnity is currently fixed at P50,000.00. Thus,
respondents are liable to pay Rodolfo's heirs P50,000.00. They are liable to pay another P50,000.00 to
answer for the death of Monalisa.

2. No. Vivian maintains that the amount of moral damages granted her should be increased. Although the
Civil Code grants compensation for the mental anguish suffered by the heirs for the loss of their loved one,
this award is not meant to enrich the petitioner at the expense of the respondents.

The Court of Appeals correctly granted P50,000.00 as moral damages to the heirs of Rodolfo. An award of
P50,000.00 is also awarded to the heirs of Monalisa.

In addition, this Court affirms the award for exemplary damages. Exemplary damages are imposed by way
of example or to correct a wrongful conduct. It is imposed as a punishment for highly reprehensible
conduct, meant to deter serious wrongdoing. The Court of Appeals correctly imposed exemplary damages
against respondents. Each respondent clearly acted with gross negligence. Aparra drove without a license
and jeopardized the life of the cargo truck passengers. Caballes not only allowed Aparra to drive on a
perilous road but he also permitted passengers to board the cargo truck despite knowing that the vehicle
was not designed to transport people. Simolde was also grossly negligent for tolerating his employees'
negligent behaviors. Had Simolde been more diligent in supervising his employees, his driver would not
have allowed passengers to board the truck and his mechanic would not have attempted to drive a vehicle
he was not equipped to handle. Thus, to ensure that such behavior will not be repeated, respondents are
directed to pay P10,000.00 as exemplary damage to the heirs of Rodolfo and Monalisa.

With respect to the award of litigation expenses and attorney's fees, the Civil Code allows attorney's fees
to be awarded if, as in this case, exemplary damages are imposed. In this case, there is no need to impose a
moratory interest. Actual damages to compensate for the deceased's lost earnings are already granted.
Payment for Rodolfo's lost earning capacity should be enough to cover the actual damages suffered by his
heirs.

WHEREFORE, the April 3, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71090
is MODIFIED. Respondents Carmelo T. Simolde, Felix Caballes, and Generoso Aparra, Jr.,
are ORDERED to pay solidarily petitioner Vivian B. Torreon the amounts of:

a. P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Rodolfo Torreon;

b. P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Monalisa Torreon;
c. P1,919,700.00 as actual damages for Rodolfo Torreon's lost earning capacity;
d. P100,000.00 as moral damages composed of P50,000.00 for Rodolfo Torreon's heirs and
P50,000.00 for Monalisa Torreon's heirs;
e. P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
f. P100,000.00 as attorney fees; and
g. P50,000.00 as litigation expenses.

An interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall also be imposed on the total judgment
award computed from the finality of this decision until its actual payment.
 Ortaliz v. Echarri
G.R. No. L-9331 | July 31, 1957 | J. Endencia

DOCTRINE:

ART. 33 of the Civil Code states that, ”In cases of physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence”

FACTS:

In December 1953, Segundino Estanda was driving the Studebaker Sedan car owned by Conrado Echarri when
he hit the son of Jose Ortaliz thereby causing injuries to the child. Estanda was sued and he pleaded guilty.
Ortaliz subsequently sued Echarri as the employer of Estanda for damages for the hospital expenses as well as
for moral damages because of the mental anguish, serious anxiety, and wounded feelings he suffered due to the
incident.

Echarri refused to pay alleging among others that he is not engaged in any business or industry in conjunction
with which he has at any time used the said car, much less on the occasion of the alleged accident, nor was he
had at any time put out the said car for hire; that, under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, it is essential,
in order for an employer to be liable subsidiarily for felonies committed by his employee, that the former be
engaged in some kind of industry, and that the employee had committed the crime in the discharge of his
duties in connection with such industry.

RTC RULING:

Segundino Estanda pleaded guilty to the crime charged and was imprisoned for 5 days.

CA RULING:

The civil case commenced by plaintiff was dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Echarri can be held liable.

RULING:

Yes. The applicable civil code provisions are:

ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omission but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.

and Article 2184 in its last paragraph provides:

If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable.
MR. AND MRS. AMADOR C. ONG, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT
G.R. No. L-7664 | August 29, 1958 | J. BAUTISTA ANGELO

DOCTRINE:
The person claiming damages has the burden of proving that the damages is caused by the fault or negligence
of the person from whom the damage is claimed, or of one of his employees.

FACTS:
Defendant, a government-owned corporation, owns and operates three recreational swimming pools at its
Balara filters, Diliman, Quezon City. On July 5 1952, Dominador Ong and his brothers went to defendant’s
swimming pools. After paying the admission fee, they immediately went to one of the small pools where the
water was shallow. At about 4:35 p.m., Dominador Ong told his brothers that he was going to the locker room
to drink a bottle of coke. Upon hearing this, Ruben and Eusebio went to the bigger pool leaving Dominador in
the small pool.

Not long after, a boy informed a lifeguard that somebody was swimming under water for quite a long time.
The lifeguard immediately jumped into the pool and retrieved the apparently lifeless body of Dominador Ong
from the bottom. He immediately applied manual artificial respiration. The male nurse then came to render
assistance, followed by the sanitary inspector. The artificial manual respiration continued, and when this failed
to revive Ong, they applied the resuscitator until the two oxygen tanks were exhausted. The boy died moments
after. Plaintiffs sought to recover from defendant the sum of P50,000 as damages, P5,000 as funeral expenses,
and P11,000 as attorneys' fees, for the death of their son.

Defendant admits the fact that plaintiffs' son was drowned in one of its swimming pools but avers that his
death was caused by his own negligence or by unavoidable accident. Defendant also avers that it had exercised
due diligence in the selection of, and supervision over, its employees and that it had observed the diligence
required by law under the circumstances.

RTC RULING:
The lower court found that the action of plaintiffs is untenable and dismissed the complaint without
pronouncement as to costs. Plaintiffs took the case on appeal directly to the Supreme Court because the
amount involved exceeds the sum of P50,000.

ISSUE:
Whether the death of minor Dominador Ong can be attributed to the negligence of defendant and/or its
employees so as to entitle plaintiffs to recover damages.

RULING:
NO. Since the present action is one for damages founded on culpable negligence, the principle to be observed
is that the person claiming damages has the burden of proving that the damage is caused by the fault or
negligence of the person from whom the damage is claimed, or of one of his employees.

Appellants tried to prove through the testimony of Andres Hagad, Jr. and Ruben Ong that when they detected
that there was a drowning person in the bottom of the big swimming pool and shouted for the lifeguard, the
latter did not immediately respond to the alarm and his help came late. However, the testimonies of said
witnesses were disregarded as they are belied by their written statements given to the Police Department,
particularly emphasized therein was that after the lifeguard heard the shouts for help, the latter immediately
dived into the pool to retrieve the person under water.

On the other hand, it has been shown that the swimming pools of appellee are provided with a ring buoy, toy
roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. There is on display in a conspicuous place
within the area certain rules and regulations governing the use of the pools. Appellee employs six trained
lifeguards, a nurse, and a sanitary inspector with a clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator. And there are
security guards who are available always in case of emergency.

Hence, appellee cannot be held liable for the drowning or death of its patron, since it had exercised due
diligence in the election of, and supervision over, its employees and that it had observed the diligence required
by law under the circumstances — in that it has taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of
its patrons or prevent accident. which may cause their death.

NOTES:
 The present action is governed by Article 2176 in relation to Article 2080 of the new Civil Code.
The first article provides that "whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damages done." Such fault or negligence is called quasi-delict.
Under the second article, this obligation is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
 The rule is well settled that the owners of resorts to which people generally are expressly or by
implication invited are legally bound to exercise ordinary care and prudence in the management and
maintenance of such resorts, to the end of making them reasonably safe for visitors.
 Although the proprietor of a natatorium is liable for injuries to a patron, resulting from lack of
ordinary care in providing for his safety, without the fault of the patron, he is not, however, in any
sense deemed to be the insurer of the safety of patrons. And the death of a patron within his premises
does not cast upon him the burden of excusing himself from any presumption of negligence.

In this case, appellants also argued that even if it be assumed that the deceased is partly to be blamed for the
unfortunate incident, still appellee may be held liable under the doctrine of "last clear chance" for the reason
that, having the last opportunity to save the victim, it failed to do so.

SC declared that this doctrine is inapplicable, as the doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the
negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the
latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant
notwithstanding his negligence. Or "As the doctrine usually is stated, a person who has the last clear chance or
opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or the negligence of a
third person which is imputed to his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of
the accident."

The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously,
and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been
discovered; at least in cases in which any previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have
contributed to the injury.
 RAMOS v. PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO.
G.R. No. L-22533 | February 9, 1967 | J. Bengzon

DOCTRINE:
The uncontradicted testimony of (the) personnel manager of defendant company, was to the effect that
defendant driver was first hired as a member of the bottle crop in the production department: that when he was
hired as a driver, defendant company had size him by looking into his background, asking him to submit
clearances, and later on, he was sent to the pool house to take the usual driver's examination, consisting of,
first, theoretical examination and second, the practical driving examination, all of which he had undergone, and
that the defendant company was a member of the Safety Council. In view therefore, we are of sense that
defendant company had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the choice or selection of
defendant driver.

FACTS:
Placido and Ramos sued Pepsi-Cola Bottling and Andres Bonifacio as a consequence of a collision involving
the car of Placido Ramos and a tractor-truck and trailer of PEPSI-COLA. At the time of the collision, the said
car was driven by Ramos, son of Placido.

PEPSI- COLA and Bonifacio, solidarily, were ordered to pay the plaintiffs:
P2,638.50 actual damages;
P2,000.00 moral damages;
P2,000.00 as exemplary damages; and,
P1,000.00 attorney's fees with costs.

RTC RULING:
CFI rendered judgment finding Bonifacio negligent and declaring that PEPSI-COLA had not sufficiently
proved that it exercised due diligence of a good father of family to prevent the damage.

CA RULING:
Affirmed the trial court's judgment insofar as it found defendant Bonifacio negligent, but modified it by
absolving defendant PEPSI-COLA from liability, finding that the latter sufficiently proved due diligence in the
selection of its driver Bonifacio.

Appellants, through this Petition for Review contend that defendant PEPSI-COLA failed to show that it had
exercised due diligence in the selection of its driver in question.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not PEPSI-COLA exercised due diligence in the selection of its driver.

RULING:
1. Yes, there is no doubt that PEPSI-COLA exercised the required diligence in the selection of its driver.
In the case of Campo v Camarote, it reiterated the instances where the defendant may have exercised
all diligence of a father of a family:
a. To not be satisfied with the mere possession of a professional driver’s license
b. Carefully examine the applicant for employment as to his:
i. Qualifications
ii. Experience
iii. Record of Service
 Further, as per the uncontradicted testimony of Juan T. Añasco, personnel manager of defendant
company, it was shown that initially, the defendant driver was hired as a member of the bottle crop in
the production department and when he was hired as a driver, the company:
a. Looked into his background
b. Asked him to submit clearances
c. Asked him about his previous experiences
d. Submitted to a physical examination
e. Sent to the pool house to take the usual driver’s examination consisting of:
i. Theoretical examination
ii. Practical driving examination

Lastly, the defendant company was a member of the safety council. Thus, defendant indeed exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the choice or selection of defendant driver. CA decision is
hereby affirmed.

NOTES:
In the case of Bahia v Litonjua, it states that from the old provision in the Civil Code, two things are apparent:

1. That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and

2. That the presumption is juris tantum and not jure et de juris, and consequently may be rebutted.

It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and
supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome
and he is relieved from liability.
 FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 75112| August 17, 1992 | J. Gutierrez Jr.

DOCTRINE:
Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties
does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence
on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has
failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its
employees Funtecha and Allan.

The liability of the employer is, under Article 2180, primary and solidary. However, the employer shall have
recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.

FACTS:
Respondent heirs of Kapunan seek reconsideration in Court’s ruling on October 16, 1990 that the petitioner is
not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for
whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable, and that Funtecha was merely a working
scholar who is not considered an employee of the petitioner.

Student driver's license holder Funtecha requested the driver Allan Masa to take over the vehicle. Funtecha
was allowed to free board in Masa’s residence while he was a student of Filamer Christian Institute. While
driving, Funtecha met with an accident. Upon swerving, they heard a sound as if something had bumped
against the vehicle, but they did not stop to check. Actually, the Pinoy jeep swerved towards the pedestrian,
Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic, and hit him. Allan
affirmed that Funtecha followed his advise to swerve to the right. At the time of the incident at 6:30 P.M. in
Roxas City, the jeep had only one functioning headlight.

Allan testified that he was the driver and at the same time a security guard of the petitioner-school. He further
said that there was no specific time for him to be off-duty and that after driving the students home at 5:00 in
the afternoon, he still had to go back to school and then drive home using the same vehicle.

Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an
act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school. Allan's job demands that he drive home the school
jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Filamer is liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was
not an authorized driver.
2. Whether or not Funtecha is considered as an employee of Filamer.

RULING:
1. Yes. Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a
driver's position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it
being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner.
Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his
janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum
that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the
supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required
diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.
2. Yes. The private respondents assert that the circumstances obtaining in the present case call for the
application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code since Funtecha is no doubt an employee of the petitioner.
The private respondents maintain that under Article 2180 an injured party shall have recourse against
the servant as well as the petitioner for whom, at the time of the incident, the servant was performing
an act in furtherance of the interest and for the benefit of the petitioner. Funtecha allegedly did not
steal the school jeep nor use it for a joy ride without the knowledge of the school authorities. In
learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house, Funtecha
definitely was not, having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for
a "frolic of his own" but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner
school.
CHILD LEARNING CENTER, INC. AND SPOUSES EDGARDO L. LIMON AND SYLVIA S. LIMON
v. TIMOTHY TAGARIO, ASSISTED BY HIS PARENTS BASILIO TAGORIO AND
PROMULGATED: HERMINIA TAGORIO
G.R. No. 150920, 25 November 2005, FIRST DIVISION, (Azcuna, J.)
DOCTRINE:
CLC’s argument that CLC exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employees is not decisive. Due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is
applicable where the employer is being held responsible for the acts or omissions of others under Article 2180
of the Civil Code. In this case, CLC's liability is under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, premised on the fact of
its own negligence in not ensuring that all its doors are properly maintained.
FACTS:
Timothy Tagorio (Timothy) was a student of Marymount, an academic institution operated and
maintained by Child Learning Center, Inc. (CLC). In the afternoon of March 5, 1991, between 1 and 2 p.m.,
Timothy entered the boy's comfort room at the third floor of the Marymount building to answer the call of
nature. He, however, found himself locked inside and unable to get out. Timothy started to panic and so he
banged and kicked the door and yelled several times for help. When no help arrived he decided to open the
window to call for help. In the process of opening the window, Timothy went right through and fell down
three stories. Timothy was hospitalized and given medical treatment for serious multiple physical injuries.
This prompted Timothy and his parents Basilio R. Tagorio and Herminia Tagorio to file An action
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code against CLC, the members of its Board of Directors, namely Spouses
Edgardo and Sylvia Limon, Alfonso Cruz, Carmelo Narciso and Luningning Salvador, and the Administrative
Officer of Marymount School, Ricardo Pilao.
CLC maintained that there was nothing defective about the locking mechanism of the door and that
the fall of Timothy was not due to its fault or negligence. CLC further maintained that it had exercised the due
care and diligence of a good father of a family to ensure the safety, well-being and convenience of its students.
Ruling of the RTC:
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of Timothy. It disregarded the corporate fiction of CLC
and held the Spouses Limon personally liable because they were the ones who actually managed the affairs of
the CLC.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision in toto.
CLC contends that, among others, no direct evidence was presented to prove that the door knob was
indeed defective on the date in question; it did not fail to exercise the due care of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of its employees and thus should not be held liable.
ISSUE:
Is CLC liable for damages?
RULING:
YES. In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a
preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the
defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.
The trial court found that the lock was defective and such was affirmed by the CA.
On the contention of CLC that no evidence was shown to prove that the door know was defective, the
fact, however, that Timothy fell out through the window shows that the door could not be opened from the
inside. That sufficiently points to the fact that something was wrong with the door, if not the door knob, under
the principle of res ipsa loquitor.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an
inference that it would not have happened except for the defendant's negligence; (2) the accident must have
been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged
with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured. CLC is clearly answerable for failure to see to it that the doors of
their school toilets are at all times in working condition. The fact that a student had to go through the window,
instead of the door, shows that something was wrong with the door.
 CLC’s argument that CLC exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employees is not decisive. Due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is
applicable where the employer is being held responsible for the acts or omissions of others under Article 2180
of the Civil Code. In this case, CLC's liability is under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, premised on the fact of
its own negligence in not ensuring that all its doors are properly maintained.
The pronouncement that Timothy climbed out of the window because he could not get out using the
door, negates CLC's other contention that the proximate cause of the accident was Timothy's own negligence.
The injuries he sustained from the fall were the product of a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
intervening cause, that originated from CLC's own negligence
The Court however agreed that there was no basis to pierce CLC's separate corporate personality. To
disregard the corporate existence, the plaintiff must prove: (1) Control by the individual owners, not mere
majority or complete stock ownership, resulting in complete domination not only of finances but of policy and
business practice in respect to a transaction so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no
separate mind, will or existence of its own; (2) such control must have been used by the defendant to commit
fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or a dishonest and unjust
act in contravention of the plaintiff's legal right; and (3) the control and breach of duty must proximately cause
the injury or unjust loss complained of. The absence of these elements prevents piercing the corporate veil. The
evidence on record fails to show that these elements are present,

Philippine National Bank v. Rita Gueco Tapnio, Cecilio Gueco and the Philippine American General
Insurance Company, Inc.
G.R. No. L-27155 | May 18, 1978 | J. Antonio

DOCTRINE:

Under Article 21 of the New Civil Code, "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”

A corporation is liable, therefore, whenever a tortious act is committed by an officer or agent under express
direction or authority from the stockholders or members acting as a body, or, generally, from the directors as
the governing body.

FACTS:

Philamgen (Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc.), executed its Bond, with Rita Gueco Tapnio
(Rita Tapnio) as principal, in favor of Philippine National Bank (PNB) to guarantee the payment of Rita
Tapnio's account with said bank. In turn, to guarantee the payment of whatever amount the bonding company
would pay to PNB, both Rita Tapnio and Cecilio Gueco executed the indemnity agreement. Under the terms
and conditions of this indemnity agreement, whatever amount the Philamgen would pay would earn interest at
the rate of 12% per annum, plus attorney's fees in the amount of 15 % of the whole amount due in case of court
litigation. The original amount of the bond was for P4,000.00; but the amount was later reduced to P2,000.00.

As a result, Rita Tapnio was indebted to PNB in the sum of P2,000.00, plus accumulated interests unpaid,
which she failed to pay despite demands. PNB wrote a letter of demand to Philamgen, whereupon, the latter
paid the former on September 18, 1957, the full amount due and owing in the sum of P2,379.91, for and on
account of Rita Gueco's obligation. On the other hand, Philamgen, made several demands, both verbal and
written, upon Rita Tapnio and Cecilio Gueco, but to no avail.

Rita Tapnio admitted all the foregoing facts. However, she claims that when the demand was made upon her
by Philamgen for her to pay her debt to PNB, she told Philamgen that she did not consider herself to be
indebted to PNB at all because she had an agreement with one Jacobo-Nazon whereby she had leased to the
latter her unused export sugar quota for the 1956-1957 agricultural year, consisting of 1,000 piculs at the rate
of P2.80 per picul, or for a total of P2,800.00, which was already in excess of her obligation guaranteed by
Philamgen's bond. According to her, the said lease agreement was with the knowledge of PNB. However, PNB
has placed obstacles to the consummation of the lease, and the delay caused by said obstacles forced 'Nazon to
rescind the lease contract. Hence, Rita Tapnio filed her third-party complaint against PNB to recover from the
latter any and all sums of money which may be adjudged against her and in favor of the plaitiff plus moral
damages, attorney's fees and costs.

RTC RULING:

The Court of First Instance of Manila ordered petitioner PNB, as third-party defendant, to pay respondent Rita
Gueco Tapnio, as third-party plaintiff, the sum of P2,379.71, plus 12% interest per annum from September 19,
1957 until the same is fully paid, P200.00 attorney's fees and costs, the same amounts which Rita Gueco
Tapnio was ordered to pay the Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc., to be paid directly to the
Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. in full satisfaction of the judgment rendered against Rita
Gueco Tapnio in favor of the former; plus P500.00 attorney's fees for Rita Gueco Tapnio and costs

CA RULING:

The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the CFI of Manila.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner PNB is liable for torts.

RULING:

Yes. While petitioner had the ultimate authority of approving or disapproving the proposed lease since the
quota was mortgaged to the Bank, the latter certainly cannot escape its responsibility of observing, for the
protection of the interest of private respondents, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand in approving or disapproving the lease of said sugar quota. The law makes it
imperative that every person "must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith, his petitioner failed to do. Certainly, it
knew that the agricultural year was about to expire, that by its disapproval of the lease private respondents
would be unable to utilize the sugar quota in question. In failing to observe the reasonable degree of care and
vigilance which the surrounding circumstances reasonably impose, petitioner is consequently liable for the
damages caused on private respondents. Under Article 21 of the New Civil Code, "any person who wilfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage." The afore-cited provisions on human relations were intended to expand
the concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral
wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes.

A corporation is civilly liable in the same manner as natural persons for torts, because "generally speaking, the
rules governing the liability of a principal or master for a tort committed by an agent or servant are the same
whether the principal or master be a natural person or a corporation, and whether the servant or agent be a
natural or artificial person. All of the authorities agree that a principal or master is liable for every tort which
he expressly directs or authorizes, and this is just as true of a corporation as of a natural person, A corporation
is liable, therefore, whenever a tortious act is committed by an officer or agent under express direction or
authority from the stockholders or members acting as a body, or, generally, from the directors as the governing
body.”
 16. GUILLERMO v. USON
G.R. No. 198967| March 07, 2016| PERALTA, J.

DOCTRINE:

FACTS: Respondent Crisanto P. Uson began his employment with Royal Class Venture Phils., Inc. as an
accounting clerk.3 Eventually, he was promoted to the position of accounting supervisor, with a salary of
Php13,000.00 a month, until he was allegedly dismissed from employment. Uson filed with the Sub-Regional
of the NLRC a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal, with prayers for backwages, reinstatement, salaries and 13th
month pay, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against Royal Class Venture. The latter did not
make an appearance in the case despite its receipt of summons.

Labor Arbiter Jose G. De Vera rendered a Decision in favor of the complainant Uson and ordering therein
respondent Royal Class Venture to reinstate him to his former position and pay his backwages, 13th month pay
as well as moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Royal Class Venture, as the losing party, did not
file an appeal of the decision9 Consequently, upon Uson's motion, a Writ of Execution was issued to
implement the Labor Arbiter's decision.

An Alias Writ of Execution was issued. But with the judgment still unsatisfied, a Second Alias Writ of
Execution. Due to the fact that the second Alias Writ of Execution remained “unsatisfied”, Uson filed a Motion
for Alias Writ of Execution and to Hold Directors and Officers of Respondent Liable for Satisfaction of the
Decision.

The order held that officers of a corporation are jointly and severally liable for the obligations of the
corporation to the employees and there is no denial of due process in holding them so even if the said officers
were not parties to the case when the judgment in favor of the employees was rendered. Thus, the Labor
Arbiter pierced the veil of corporate fiction of Royal Class Venture and held herein petitioner Jose Emmanuel
Guillermo, in his personal capacity, jointly and severally liable with the corporation for the enforcement of the
claims of Uson.

Guillermo filed, by way of special appearance, a Motion for Reconsideration/To Set Aside the Order, but the
same was denied. Guillermo elevated the matter to the NLRC by filing a Memorandum of Appeal with Prayer
for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, to which the NLRC dismissed and denied the same.

RTC RULING: The Labor Arbiter issued an Order granting Uson's Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of
Execution and rejecting Guillermo's arguments posed in his Comment and Opposition.

CA RULING: The Court of Appeals upheld all the findings of the NLRC.

ISSUE:

2. the twin doctrines of "piercing the veil of corporate fiction" and personal liability of company officers
in labor cases apply.
RULING:

4. It is not in every instance of inability to collect from a corporation that the veil of corporate fiction is
pierced, and the responsible officials are made liable. Personal liability attaches only when, as
enumerated by the said Section 31 of the Corporation Code, there is a wilfull and knowing assent to
patently unlawful acts of the corporation, there is gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs
of the corporation, or there is a conflict of interest resulting in damages to the corporation. The
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is held to apply only in three (3) basic areas, namely: ( 1) defeat
of public convenience as when the corporate fiction is used as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing
obligation; (2) fraud cases or when the corporate entity is used to justify a wrong, protect fraud, or
defend a crime; or (3) alter ego cases, where a corporation is merely a farce since it is a mere alter ego
or business conduit of a person, or where the corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs
are so conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of another
corporation

However, the veil of corporate fiction can be pierced, and responsible corporate directors and officers
or even a separate but related corporation, may be impleaded and held answerable solidarily in a labor
case, even after final judgment and on execution, so long as it is established that such persons have
deliberately used the corporate vehicle to unjustly evade the judgment obligation, or have resorted to
fraud, bad faith or malice in doing so. When the shield of a separate corporate identity is used to
commit wrongdoing and opprobriously elude responsibility, the courts and the legal authorities in a
labor case have not hesitated to step in and shatter the said shield and deny the usual protections to the
offending party, even after final judgment. The key element is the presence of fraud, malice or bad
faith. Bad faith, in this instance, does not connote bad judgment or negligence but imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of a known duty
through some motive or interest or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud

As the foregoing implies, there is no hard and fast rule on when corporate fiction may be disregarded;
instead, each case must be evaluated according to its peculiar circumstances.62 For the case at bar,
applying the above criteria, a finding of personal and solidary liability against a corporate officer like
Guillermo must be rooted on a satisfactory showing of fraud, bad faith or malice, or the presence of
any of the justifications for disregarding the corporate fiction. The records of the present case bear
allegations and evidence that Guillermo, the officer being held liable, is the person responsible in the
actual running of the company and for the malicious and illegal dismissal of the complainant; he,
likewise, was shown to have a role in dissolving the original obligor company in an obvious "scheme
to avoid liability" which jurisprudence has always looked upon with a suspicious eye in order to
protect the rights of labor.

It is also clearly reflected in the records that it was Guillermo himself, as President and General
Manager of the company, who received the summons to the case, and who also subsequently and
without justifiable cause refused to receive all notices and orders of the Labor Arbiter that followed.
This makes Guillermo responsible for his and his company's failure to participate in the entire
proceedings before the said office.
 FELINA RODRIGUEZ-LUNA v. IAC
G.R. No. 62988 | February 28, 1985 | J. Abad Santos

Being engaged in go-kart racing will not merit reduction of one’s life expectancy.

Equity will not be applied if to do so will not serve ends of justice. Father’s liability for damages made by his
son who later become emancipated but is now abroad and could hardly support himself cannot be merely
subsidiary.

FACTS: The petitioners are the heirs of Roberto R. Luna who was killed in a vehicular collision. The collision
took place on January 18, 1970, at the go-kart practice area in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. Those
involved were the go-kart driven by the deceased, a business executive, and a Toyota car driven by Luis dela
Rosa, a minor of 13 years who had no driver's license.

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE RULING: Sentencing the defendants Luis dela Rosa and Jose dela Rosa to
pay, jointly and severally, to the plaintiffs the sum of P1,650,000.00 as unearned net earnings of Roberto Luna,
P12,000.00 as compensatory damages, and P50,000.00 for the loss of his companionship, with legal interest
from the date of this decision; plus attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00, and the costs of suit."

CA RULING: Affirmed in toto that of the trial court. However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by the
defendants-appellants, the Court of Appeals modified its judgment: "WHEREFORE, the decision rendered in
this case is hereby modified insofar as the judgment ordering the defendants to pay, jointly and severally, the
sum of P1,650,000.00 to plaintiffs with legal interest from July 5, 1973, is concerned. In lieu thereof,
defendants are hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the sum of Four Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P450,000.00) as unearned net earnings of Roberto R. Luna, with legal interest thereon from
the date of the filing of the complaint until the whole amount shall have been totally paid. The rest of the other
dispositions in the judgment a quo stand."

Acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by the dela Rosas, the Court of Appeals took into account the fact
that the deceased Roberto R. Luna had been engaged in car racing and manner of life should be one of the
factors affecting the value of mortality table in actions for damages. The court concluded that Luna could not
have lived beyond 43 years. The result was that the 30-year life expectancy of Luna was reduced to 10 years
only.

ISSUE:

4. Whether or not the CA erred in modifying its original decision.

5. Whether or not the father’s liability for damages made by his son is only subsidiary

RULING:

1. The Court ruled in the affirmative. The petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred when by its
resolution of June 19, 1981, it reduced Luna's life expectancy from 30 to 10 years and increased his annual
personal expenses from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00. We sustain the petitioners.
The Court of Appeals, in reducing Luna's life expectancy from 30 to 10 years said that his habit and manner of
life should be taken into account, i.e. that he had been engaged in car racing as a sport both here and abroad - a
dangerous and risky activity tending to shorten his life expectancy. That Luna had engaged in car racing is not
based on any evidence on record. That Luna was engaged in go-kart racing is the correct statement but then
go-kart racing cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts are extremely low slung, low powered
vehicles, only slightly larger than foot-pedaled four wheeled conveyances. It was an error on the part of the
Court of Appeals to have disturbed the determination of the trial court which it had previously affirmed.

Similarly, it was an error for the Court of Appeals to reduce the net annual income of the deceased by
increasing his annual personal expenses but without at the same time increasing his annual gross income. It
stands to reason that if his annual personal expenses should increase because of the "escalating price of gas
which is a key expenditure in Roberto R. Luna's social standing" [a statement which lacks complete basis], it
would not be unreasonable to suppose that his income would also increase considering the manifold sources
thereof. In short, the Court of Appeals erred in modifying its original decision.

2. The Court ruled in the negative. The attorney's fees were awarded in the concept of damages in a quasi-
delict case and under the circumstances interest as part thereof may be adjudicated at the discretion of the
court. (See Art. 2211, Civil Code.) As with the other damages awarded, the interest should accrue only from
the date of the trial court's decision.

The private respondents invoked Elcano vs. Hill (L-24803, May 26, 1977; 77 SCRA 98) where it was held that
Article 2180 of the Civil Code applied to Atty. Marvin Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of
Reginald Hill, his son but since Reginald had attained age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill had
become merely a subsidiary to that of his son. It is now said that Luis dela Rosa, is now married and of legal
age and that as a matter of equity the liability of his father should be subsidiary only.

We are unwilling to apply equity instead of strict law in this case because to do so will not serve the ends of
justice. Luis dela Rosa is abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine courts. Moreover, he does not have any
property either in the Philippines or elsewhere. In fact his earnings are insufficient to support his family.
 Paleyan v. Bangkili
G.R. No. L-22253 | July 30, 1971 | J. Makalintal

DOCTRINE: The appellee here agrees that Article 2180 is applicable in this case, but submits that its
application should be relaxed, considering that her son, although living with her, was already 19 years of age
and hence mature enough to have a mind of his own. This fact is not a legal defense, however, and does not
exempt the appellant from her responsibility as parent and natural guardian. Article 2180 does not provide for
any exemption except proof that the defendant parent "observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage." There is no such proof in this case.

FACTS: Plaintiffs are the widow and children of Balos Paleyan, who was killed by defendant Carlos Bangkili.
At the time of the commission of the offense Carlos Bangkili, a minor of 19 years, was living with his mother,
defendant Victoria Bangkili. As a result of the death of Balos Paleyan and of the wounding of another victim,
Carlos Bangkili was accused of the crime of homicide with less serious physical injuries in Criminal Case No.
898 of the Court of First Instance of Mountain Province. On November 21, 1960, upon his plea of guilty, he
was sentenced accordingly, but the decision made no pronouncement as to the civil indemnity which should be
paid to the heirs of the deceased. On April 3, 1961 the plaintiffs filed the present action for damages against
Carlos Bangkili and his mother, Victoria Bangkili.

RTC RULING: After trial the court a quo rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court hereby orders the dismissal of the complaint against the defendant
Victoria Bangkili and renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Carlos Bangkili and
ordered to pay damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not the mother of Carlos, who had him in her custody at the time he committed the
offense, should be adjudged liable with him for the amount which he was sentenced to pay, considering that he
was then a minor of 19 years.

RULING: YES. While the decision just cited referred to the subsidiary liability of the father whose son had
been sentenced to pay civil indemnity in the criminal case, the reasons given by this Court in applying Article
2180 of the Civil Code hold true with greater cogency in this case, where the allegations in the complaint show
that herein appellee was sued directly under the said provision, in that she "failed and neglected to exercise the
proper care and vigilance over her ward and minor child and as a consequence of such failure and neglect, the
said Carlos Bangkili committed the wrongful act herein complained of." Even more to the point is the case of
Araneta vs. Arreglado, supra. There the minor Dario Arreglado entered a plea of guilty on a charge of
frustrated homicide, but the court suspended proceedings pursuant to Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code in
view of the fact that he was only 14 years of age. A civil suit was thereafter filed by the offended party against
the said accused and his parents for the recovery of damages. The ruling of the lower court holding the said
parents liable was affirmed, although with some modification as to the amount awarded.

The appellee here agrees that Article 2180 is applicable in this case, but submits that its application should be
relaxed, considering that her son, although living with her, was already 19 years of age and hence mature
enough to have a mind of his own. This fact is not a legal defense, however, and does not exempt the appellant
from her responsibility as parent and natural guardian. Article 2180 does not provide for any exemption except
proof that the defendant parent "observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage."
There is no such proof in this case.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed with respect to defendant-appellee Victoria Bangkili,
and she is hereby adjudged liable solidarily with her
co-defendant for the amounts awarded in said judgment, with costs.
 LANUZO v. PING
G.R. No. L-53064 | September 25, 1980 | J. Melencio-Herrera

DOCTRINE: The institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the civil action
based on quasi-delict. And the separate civil action for quasi-delict may proceed independently and
regardless of the result of the criminal case, except that a plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or commission of the defendant.
Art. 2180: “Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
houshold helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even thought the former are not engaged
in any business or industry.”

FACTS: Herein defendant, Mendoza, was driving the truck along national highway of
Nabua, Camarines Sur, because of his reckless negligence, it rammed into the residential house and store
of plaintiff, Felix Lanuzo. It resulted to total amount of P13,000.00 damage. Lanuzo claimed he bacame
destitute as he lost his means of livelihood from his store which used to give him monthly income of
P300.00. Thus, a complaint was file before Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur by Lanuzo against
Salvador Mendoza, the driver and Sy Bon Ping, the owner and operator of the freight truck.
Defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that another action, Criminal Case for
damage of property through reckless imprudence was then pending in the Municipal Court of Nabua,
Camarines Sur between the same parties for the same cause. In answer, plaintiff opposed the dismissal
stressing that he had made an express reservation in the criminal case to institute a civil action for damages
separate and distinct from the criminal suit.

RTC RULING: Denied the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Merit and ordered Sy Bon Ping and
Salvador Mendoza jointly and severally liable.

CA RULING: Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration / New Trial and to Set Aside Order of Default
was Denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Lower Court is correct in holding Salvador Mendoza (employee) and
his employer, Sy Bon Ping, jointly and severally liable.

RULING: Yes. For his own negligence in recklessly driving the truck owned and operated by his
employer, the driver Salvador Mendoza, is primarily liable under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code. On the other
hand, the liability of his employer, Sy Bon Ping, is also primary and direct under Art. 2180 of the same
code. For the failure of the appellant Ping to rebut the legal presumption of his negligence in the selection
and supervision of his employee, he is likewise responsible for the damages caused by the negligent act of
his employee driver Mendoza, and his liability is primary and solidary. The employee, has, by his
negligence (quasi-delict) caused damage to make the employer, likewise, responsible for the tortious act of
the employee, and his liability is, as earlier observed, primary and solidary.
Art. 2180: Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and houshold
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even thought the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
 Malipol v. Tan
G.R. No. L-27730 | January 21, 1974 | Zaldivar, J.

Under Article 218 of the Civil Code, which treats of quasi delicts, the liability of the owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise for damages caused by their employees is primary and direct, not subsidiary. The employer,
however, can demand from his employee reimbursement of the amount which he paid under his liability.

FACTS:

In the evening of February 6, 1965, at about 8:35 o'clock, Pantaleon Malijan, who was walking with his companion
Leonardo Amante on the shoulder of the road in Barrio San Felix, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, was hit by a gasoline tanker and
was thrown to the ground. While he was sprawling on the ground Malijan was run over by the tanker's right wheel that got
detached from its axle. Malijan's companion, with the aid of the barrio captain, brought Malijan to the San Pablo City
Hospital where he died that same night, the cause of death being "possible traumatic cerebral hemorrhage due to vehicular
accident."

The gasoline tanker driven at the time of the accident by Ernesto Labsan, was being used in connection with the gasoline
business of the owner, Lily Lim Tan.

Representations and demands for payment of damage having been ignored by Tan and Labsan, Manipol a complaint in the
CFI Tan and Labsan be condemned to pay, jointly and severally, the damages as specified in said complaint. The petitioners
are the mother and the minor brothers and sisters of the deceased Pantaleon Malijan.

Court of First Instance Ruling

The CFI ruled in favor of the Manipol. CFI stated in its decision appealed from that the driver, Ernesto Labsan, was
primarily liable for the payment of damages adjudged therein, and Lily Lim Tan, being the owner and operator of the
gasoline tanker that figured in the accident, is subsidiarily liable, that is, liable only in case Ernesto Labsan was not able to
pay.

ISSUE: Whether Tan’s liability, being the owner and operator of the gasoline tanker, is subsidiary.

RULING: No, Tan’s liability, being the owner and operator of the gasoline tanker, is not subsidiary.

The action in the instant case was brought not to demand civil liability arising from a crime. The complaint makes no
mention of a crime having been committed, much less of the driver Ernesto Labsan having been convicted of a crime. But
there is an allegation in the complaint that Ernesto Labsan was the authorized driver of the truck that figured in the accident,
which truck was operated by appellant Lily Lim Tan in connection with her gasoline business. The prayer in the complaint,
furthermore, sought to hold Tan and Labsan jointly and solidarily liable for damages. The instant action, therefore, was
based, as the complaint shows, on quasi delict.

Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which treats of quasi delicts, the liability of the owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise for damages caused by their employees is primary and direct, not subsidiary. The employer,
however, can demand from his employee reimbursement of the amount which he paid under his liability. The employer,
Lily Lim Tan, must be held primarily and directly, not subsidiarily, liable for damages awarded in the decision of the lower
court. This is, of course, without prejudice to the right of Lily Lim Tan to demand from her employee Ernesto Labsan
reimbursement of the damages that she would have to pay to Manipol.
 Chan, Jr. v. Iglesia ni Cristo, Inc.
G.R. No. 160283| October 14, 2005 | J. Chico-Nazario

DOCTRINE: There is solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the
nature of the obligation requires solidarity.

FACTS:
Aringay Shell Gasoline Station is owned by John Kam Biak Chan, Jr, located in La Union, which was bounded
on the south by an INC Chapel. Chan procured the services of Dioscoro Yoro for the construction of additional
sewerage and septic tanks of the gas station. Yoro and Chan executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
for the intended digging of septic tank. Par. 4 of the MOA states that: “4. Any damage within or outside the
property of the FIRST PARTY (Chan) incurred during the digging shall be borne by the SECOND PARTY
(Yoro)”

The diggings for the sewerage traversed and penetrated the land belonging to the INC. The foundation of the
chapel was affected as a tunnel was dug directly under it to the damage and prejudice of the INC. A complaint
was filed by the INC against Chan and Teofilo Oller, Chan’s engineer. Yoro was impleaded as a third-party
defendant.

RTC RULING:
RTC adjudged Chan and Yoro solidarily liable to INC, on a 35%-65% basis, respectively, and absolving Oller
from any liability. It was held that the diggings were not intended for the construction of sewerage and septic
tanks but were made to construct tunnels to find hidden treasure. The two were ordered to pay:
4. P633,595.50 - Actual Damages
5. P500,000.00 - Moral Damages
6. P10,000,000.00 - Exemplary Damages
7. P50,000.00 - Attorney’s fees
8. P20,000.00 - Litigation Expenses

CA RULING:
The affirmed the trial court but with modifications:
4. Moral Damages deleted
5. Exemplary damages reduced to P50,000
6. Attorney’s Fees and Litigation expenses reduced to P30,000

Chan argues that the MOA executed between him and Yoro is the law between them and must be given weight
by the courts, which state that any damage within or outside the property of the Chan Incurred during the
digging shall be borne by Yoro.

ISSUE: WON the MOA entered into by Chan and Yoro has the effect of making Yoro solely responsible for
damages to the INC.

RULING: NO. It is vital to underscore the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals as to what was
the real intention of the petitioner and Yoro in undertaking the excavations. Both found that Chan and Yoro
were in quest for hidden treasure and, undoubtedly, they were partners in this endeavor.
Basis of Solidarity
The CA held that the basis of their solidarity is not the Memorandum of Agreement but the fact that they have
become joint tortfeasors. There is solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or when the
law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity.

Based on Art. 2176, the requisites of quasi-delict are the following:

(a) there must be an act or omission;
(b) such act or omission causes damage to another;
(c) such act or commission is caused by fault or negligence; and
(d) there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.

All the requisites are attendant in the instant case. The tortious act was the excavation which caused damage to
the respondent because it was done surreptitiously within its premises and it may have affected the foundation
of the chapel. The excavation on respondent's premises was caused by fault. Finally, there was no pre-existing
contractual relation between Chan and Yoro on the one hand, and the INC on the other.

For the damage caused to INC, Chan and Yoro are jointly liable as they are joint tortfeasors. Verily, the
responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.

As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for
their benefit.

Chan and Yoro cooperated in committing the tort. They even had provisions in their MOA as to how they
would divide the treasure if any is found within or outside Chan’s property line. Thus, the MOA, instead of
exculpating Chan from liability, is the very noose that insures that he be declared as liable.

As to Exemplary Damages

In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.
Surreptitiously digging under the respondent's chapel which may weaken the foundation thereof, thereby
endangering the lives and limbs of the people in worship, unquestionably amounts to gross negligence. For
such tortious act done with gross negligence, the Court feels that the amount awarded by the Court of Appeals
is inadequate. The exemplary damages must correspondingly be increased to P100,000.00.
 PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano,
deceased v. REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said
minor
G.R. No. L-24803 | May 26, 1977 | J. Barredo

DOCTRINE: Pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute.
Thus, "emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's
person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow
money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can
sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."

FACTS: This case is an appeal from the order of the CFI which dismissed the complaint of the spouses Elcano
for recovery of damages from Reginald, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, Marvin,
with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the spouses Elcano,
named Agapito Elcano. When criminally prosecuted, Reginald was acquitted on the ground that his act was not
criminal, because of “lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.”

RTC RULING: The motion to dismiss was first denied by the trial court. It was based on the complaint having
no cause of action against Marvin because he was relieved as guardian of Reginald through emancipation by
marriage. Upon motion for reconsideration of Reginald and Marvin, the order of the trial court was dismissed.
Hence, this appeal.

ISSUES:
4. Whether or not the present civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the
criminal case wherein the action for civil liability was not reversed
5. Whether or not Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code can be applied against
Marvin Hill, notwithstanding that at the time of the occurrence complained of, Reginald, though a
minor, living with and getting subsistence from his father, was already legally married

RULING:

1. No. Under Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt
or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence but
for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.

The acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that
acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

2. Yes. While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil
Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)". However, it is
clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus,
"emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's
person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow
money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can
sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Under Article 2180, "the obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." In this case, Reginald,
although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence.
Therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father.

According to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending child
under Article 2180 is that it is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent
them from causing damage to third persons. On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in
providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of
the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act
that can give rise to judicial litigation.

Article 2180 applies to Marvin Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However,
Reginald is now of age. As a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Marvin Hill has become merely subsidiary
to that of his son.
 Gutierrez v. Gutierrez
G.R. No. 34840 | September 23, 1931 | J. Malcolm

DOCTRINE:
The father is liable for the child’s negligence in handling the automotive. It is uniformly held that the
head of a house, the owner of an automobile, who maintains it for the general use of his family is liable for its
negligent operation by one of his children, whom he designates or permits to run it, where the car is occupied
and being used at the time of the injury for the pleasure of other members of the owner’s family than the child
driving it.

FACTS:
On February 2, 1930, a collision happened between a passenger truck and a private automobile while
attempting to pass each other on the Talon bridge on the Manila South Road in the Municipality of Las Piñas,
Province of Rizal.
Chauffeur Abelardo Velasco drove the truck which was owned by Saturnino Cortez. Bonifacio
Gutierrez, 18 years old, was the one driving the automobile while his mother and several other members of the
Gutierrez family were the passengers at the time of the incident. The collision between the two vehicles
resulted in the fractured right leg of Plaintiff Narciso Gutierrez which requires medical attendance for a
considerable period.

CFI – Manila:
Plaintiff brought the action to this court to recover damages in the amount of P10,000 for physical
injuries as a result of an automobile accident against two defendant teams. The Court ruled for the damages
prayed by the plaintiff.

ISSUE:
Whether the father of the minor Bonifacio, the truck driver and the owner of the truck are liable for
damages caused by the accident.

RULING:
YES.
It is conceded that the collision was caused by negligence pure and simple. It may be explained that
Bonifacio was an incompetent driver and that he was driving at an excessive rate of speed, therefore while
approaching the bridge and the truck, his negligence contributed to the accident.
Since this case is a civil law liability of parties for obligations which arise from fault or negligence,
jurisprudence provide that the head of the house, the owner of an automobile, who maintains it for the general
use of his family is liable for its negligent operation by one of his children, whom he designates or permits to
run it. It has been a theory in law that running the machine by a child to carry other members of the family is
within the scope of the owner’s business, so the father is liable for the negligence of the child because of the
relationship of the master and servant. The liability of the truck driver and owner was based on contract –
contract of carriage – their liability was based on the position of the truck on the bridge, the speed, and the lack
of case of the truck driver.
For the award, the appellee suggests that the amount could justly be raised to ₱16,517, but no appeal
was taken by him from the judgment. The defendants contended that the award of ₱10,00 is excessive. All
facts considered, including actual expenditures and damages for the injury to the leg of the plaintiff, which
may cause him permanent lameness, in connection with other adjudications of this court, lead the court to
conclude that a total sum for the plaintiff of P5,000 would be fair and reasonable.
The difficulty in approximating the damages by monetary compensation is well elucidated by the
divergence of opinion among the members of the court, three of whom have inclined to the view that P3,000
would be amply sufficient, while a fourth member has argued that P7,500 would be none too much.
In consonance with the foregoing rulings, the judgment appealed from was modified, and the plaintiff
had the judgment in his favor against the defendants Manuel Gutierrez, Abelardo Velasco, and Saturnino
Cortez, jointly and severally, for the sum of P5,000, and the costs of both instances.
 24. Sabina Exconde v. Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno
G.R. No. L-10134 | June 29, 1957 | J. Bautista Angelo

DOCTRINE:
● CIVIL LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY THEIR MINOR CHILDREN;
RELIEF FROM LIABILITY. — The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father, and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children
who live with them is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them
which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company,
educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives
them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code).
The only way by which they can relieve themselves of such liability is if they prove that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Article 1903, last
paragraph, Spanish Civil Code).

● LIABILITY OF TEACHERS OR DIRECTOR; INSTITUTIONS AFFECTED. — The civil liability

imposed by Article 1903 of the old Civil Code on teachers or directors of arts and trades for damages
caused by pupils or apprentices under their custody, only applies to an institution of arts and trades
and not to any academic educational institution.

FACTS:
Dante Capuno (son of Delfin Capuno) was accused of double homicide through reckless imprudence
for the death of Isidoro Caperina and Amado Ticzon on March 31, 1949 in the CFI of Laguna. Dante was 15
years old when he committed the crime.

Dante is a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a student of Balintawak Elementary School.
On MArch 31, 1949, he attended a parade in the City of San Pablo upon the instruction of the city school’s
supervisor. Dante and other students boarded a jeep to go to the parade. Then, he took hold of the wheel and
drove it while the driver sat on his left side. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and two of its
passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidoro Caperiña, died as a consequence.

RTC RULING:
During the trial, Sabina Exconde (mother of Isidoro), reserved her right to bring a separate civil action
for damages against the accused. After trial, Dante Capuno was found guilty of the crime charged. Sabina
Exconde filed the present action against Delfin and his son Dante asking for damages in the amount of P2,959
for the death of Isidoro.

Defendants set up the defense that if any one should be held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperiña,
he is Dante Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the time of the accident, the former was not under the
control, supervision and custody of the latter. This defense was sustained.

CA RULING:
The CA affirmed the decision. Then, the case was certified to the SC because it only involves
questions of law.

ISSUE:
 3. Whether Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable with his son Dante, for damages resulting from the
death of Isidoro Caperiña caused by the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno.

RULING:

Yes.

The case comes under Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5, which provides:

"ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not only
for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.

The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages
caused by the minor children who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx

Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their
pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody."

The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is a
necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the
"duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion
to their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation". The
only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.

In this case, Dante Capuno was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and as part of his
extra-curricular activity, he attended the parade in honor of Dr. José Rizal upon instruction of the city school's
supervisor. And it was in connection with that parade that Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and
while driving it, the accident occurred. In the circumstances, it is clear that neither the head of that school, nor
the city school's supervisor, could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not then a
student of an institution of arts and trades as provided for by law.
 FUELLAS v. CADANO
G.R. No. L-14409 | October 31, 1961 | J. Paredes

DOCTRINE: The subsidiary liability of parents arising from the criminal acts of their minor children who
acted with discernment is determined under Article 2180 of the Civil Code and under Article 101 of the
Revised Penal Code. To hold that Article 2180 only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not
obligations which arise from criminal offenses would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere
negligence intervenes, the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her
son, no liability would attach if the damages is caused with criminal intent.

FACTS: Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of petitioner Agapito Fuellas, were both 13 years old. They
were classmates at St. Mary’s High School, Dansalan City.

In the afternoon of Sept. 16, 1954, while Pepito was studying his lessons in the classroom, Rico took the pencil
of Ernesto Cabanok and surreptitiously placed it inside the pocket of Pepito. When Ernesto asked Rico to
return the pencil, it was Pepito who returned it, an act which angered Rico. Then, Rico held the neck of Pepito
and pushed him to the floor.

Villamira, a teacher, separated Rico and Pepito and told them to go home. Rico went ahead, with Pepito
following. When Pepito had just gone down of the school, he was met by Rico, still in an angry mood.
Angelito Aba, a classmate, told the two to shake hands. Pepito extended his hand to Rico. Instead of
accepting Pepito’s offer to shake hands, Rico held Pepito by the neck and with his leg, placed Pepito out
of balance and pushed him to the ground. While Rico was in such position, Pepito cried out, “My arm is
broken.” Rico then got up and went away.

That same evening, Pepito was brought to the Lanao General Hospital for treatment. An X-Ray taken showed
that there was a complete fracture of the radius and ulna of the right forearm which necessitated plaster
casting. More than a month after Pepito’s release from the hospital, the plaster cast was removed. Up to the
last day of hearing of the case, the right forearm of Pepito was seen to be shorter than the left, still in bandage
and could not be fully used.

Hence, two separate actions were filed: (1) a civil action for damages against Agapito, Rico’s father and (2) a
criminal action for serious physical injuries against Rico. They were tried jointly.

TRIAL COURT RULING: Rico was rendered guilty of the criminal case for serious physical injuries. His
father, Agapito was held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the following damages: (1)
medicine - P1,000, (2) moral damages – P6,000, (3) exemplary damages – P2,000, and (4) attorney’s fees –
P600 [total amount: P9,600].

CA RULING: Modified the judgment by reducing the moral damages to P3,000

ISSUE: Whether Agapito Fuellas may be held liable for damages for the deliberate criminal act of his son,
Rico.

RULING: YES.
 Agapito Fuellas’ first argument: The trial court held him liable pursuant to par. 2, Article 2180 of
the Civil Code in connection with Article 2176. In order for the parent to be held liable under these
provisions, the act of the minor must be one wherein fault or negligence is present. In this case, since
there is no fault or negligence on the part of Agapito’s son, but deliberate intent, Articles 2180 and
2176 are not applicable for the existence of deliberate intent in the commission of an act negates the
presence of fault or negligence. Hence, Agapito argued that the CA erred in holding him liable for
damages for the deliberate criminal act of his son.

Here, citing the cases of Araneta v. Arreglado and Exconde v. Capuno, the Court held that the basis of civil
law liability under Article 2180 is the relationship of pater familias in which the liability of the father is based
on his own negligence and not that of his minor son. Thus, if an injury is caused by the fault or negligence of
his minor son, the law presumes that there was negligence on the part of his father.

This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority the parents exercise over their minor children which
imposes upon the former the duty of supporting their children, keeping them in their company, educating them
in proportion to their means and gives them the right to correct and punish them in moderation. The only way
by which the parents can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.

Furthermore, since children do not yet have the capacity to govern themselves, the law imposes upon the
parents and guardians the duty of exercising special vigilance over the acts of their children in order that
damages to third persons due to the ignorance, lack of foresight or discernment of such children may be
avoided. If the parents fail to comply this duty, they should suffer the consequences of their abandonment or
negligence by repairing the damage.
Agapito’s second argument: Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code covers only a situation where a
minor under 15 but over nine years old commits a criminal act without discernment. Hence, Article
101 cannot be applied in his case.

In this case, the Court held that under Article 101 of the RPC, a minor over 15 who acts with discernment is
not exempt from criminal liability, but for some reason, the law is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his
parents should he stand convicted. Hence, resort should be had to the general law, which is the Civil Code.

Here, the particular law that governs is Article 2180, which provides: “The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsibility for damages caused by the minor children who lived in their
company.” To hold that Article 2180 only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not
obligations which arise from criminal offenses would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere
negligence intervenes, the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her
son, no liability would attach if the damages is caused with criminal intent.

Since the responsibility for fault or negligence under Article 2176 upon which this case was instituted, is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability, arising from fault or negligence under the RPC, any
discussion as to the minor’s criminal responsibility was not dealt upon by the Court.
 Cuadra v. Monfort
G.R. No. L-24101 | September 30, 1970 | J. MAKALINTAL

DOCTRINE: In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could have
prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his
parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was
at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under
the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an
innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any
special reason to anticipate, much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed
any trait in the child’s character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame
would be attributed to her parents.

FACTS: Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini
Elementary School in Bacolod City. Their teacher assigned them, together with three other classmates, to weed
the grass in the school premises. While thus engaged Monfort found a plastic headband. Jokingly she said
aloud that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. At
that precise moment the latter turned around to face her friend, and the object hit her right eye. Smarting from
the pain, she rubbed the injured part and treated it with some powder. The next day, the eye became swollen
and it was then that the girl related the incident to her parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor for
treatment. She underwent surgical operation twice, and stayed in the hospital for a total of twenty-three days,
for all of which the parents spent the sum of P1,703.75. Despite the medical efforts, Cuadra completely lost the
sight of her right eye.
In the civil suit instituted by the parents in behalf of their minor daughter against Alfonso Monfort, Maria
Teresa Monfort's father, the defendant was ordered to pay P1,703.00 as actual damages; P20,000.00 as moral
damages; and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs of the suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the parent of Monfort is liable for the act commited by the latter, which caused damage
to another child namely, Cuadra

RULING: No. The relevant provisions of the civil Code provides that:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by provisions of this Chapter.

ART 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company. xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

When the act or omission is that of one person for whom another is responsible, the latter then becomes
himself liable under Article 2180, such as that of the father or the mother under the circumstances above
quoted. The basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is, as in Article 2176, fault or negligence,
which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or omission. The presumption is
merely prima facie and may be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the
last paragraph of Article 2180, which states "that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when
the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage.".

In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could have
prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his
parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child
was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to
be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was
concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however
careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any
mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character which would reflect unfavorably on
her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.
Complaint dismissed.
 CRESENCIO LIBI * and AMELIA YAP LIBI, v. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
FELIPE GOTIONG and SHIRLEY GOTIONG
G.R. No. 70890. September 18, 1992. REGALADO, J.

DOCTRINE: The parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal
offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company,
unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such
damages.

That primary liability is premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to
damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who
acted without discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with
discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected
against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother.

This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the
guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful
offender. However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification,
the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. For civil
liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance with Articles
2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.

FACTS: Respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who, at the time of the
deplorable incident which took place and from which she died on January 14, 1979, was an 18-year old first
year commerce student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu City; while petitioners are the parents of
Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents, and who also died
in the same event on the same date.

For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until
December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly found him to be
sadistic and irresponsible. During the first and second weeks of January, 1979, Wendell kept pestering Julie
Ann with demands for reconciliation but the latter persisted in her refusal, prompting the former to resort to
threats against her. She stayed in the house of a friend in order to avoid him.

On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same
firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was recovered
from the scene of the crime inside the residence of private respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and
D. Jakosalem streets of the same city. They resorted to circumstantial evidence in the first trial. Private
respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter, submitted that Wendell caused her death by shooting
her with the aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit suicide. On the other hand,
Petitioners, puzzled and likewise distressed over the death of their son, rejected the imputation and contended
that an unknown third party.
RTC RULING: judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint for insufficiency of the evidence.
Defendants’ counterclaim is likewise denied for lack of sufficient merit.

CA RULING: Said judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint of therein plaintiffs-appellants was
set aside and another judgment was rendered against defendants-appellees (now petitiones)

ISSUES:
2) Whether or not respondent court correctly reversed the trial court in accordance with established
decisional laws.
3) Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by respondent court to
make petitioners liable for vicarious liability.

RULINGS:
1)Yes. Analyzing the foregoing testimonies of the expert witness and , we agree with respondent court that the
same do not inspire credence as to the reliability and accuracy of the witnesses’ observations, since the visual
perceptions of both were obstructed by high walls in their respective houses in relation to the house of herein
private respondents. On the other hand, witness Manolo Alfonso, testifying on rebuttal, attested without
contradiction that he and his sister, Malou Alfonso, were waiting for Julie Ann Gotiong when they heard her
scream; that when Manolo climbed the fence to see what was going on inside the Gotiong house, he heard the
first shot; and, not more than five (5) seconds later, he heard another shot. Consequently, he went down from
the fence and drove to the police station to report the incident. 15 Manolo’s direct and candid testimony
establishes and explains the fact that it was he whom Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan saw as the "shadow"
of a man at the gate of the Gotiong house.

The Court also rejected petitioners’ effete and unsubstantiated pretension that it was another man who shot
Wendell and Julie Ann. It is significant that the Libi family did not even point to or present any suspect in the
crime nor did they file any case against any alleged "John Doe." Nor can we sustain the trial court’s dubious
theory that Wendell Libi did not die by his own hand because of the overwhelming evidence — testimonial,
documentary and pictorial — the confluence of which point to Wendell as the assailant of Julie Ann, his
motive being revenge for her rejection of his persistent pleas for a reconciliation.

2)Yes. The Court believed that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as
contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2194
of said code which provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or
omission, in this case the minor and the father and, in case of his death of incapacity, the mother, are solidarily
liable. Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article
2180 provides that" (t)he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages.

The Court do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding, the parents liable, but the categorization of
their liability as being subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires a hard second look considering previous
decisions of this court on the matter which warrant comparative analyses. Our concern stems from our readings
that if the liability of the parents for crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children is subsidiary, then the
parents can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damages. On the other hand, if such liability imputed to the parents is
considered direct and primary, that diligence would constitute a valid and substantial defense.
In the instant case, minor son of herein defendants-appellees, Wendell Libi somehow got hold of the key to the
drawer where said gun was kept under lock without defendant-spouses ever knowing that said gun had been
missing from that safety box since 1978 when Wendell Libi had) a picture taken wherein he proudly displayed
said gun and dedicated this picture to his sweetheart, Julie Ann Gotiong; also since then, Wendell Libi was
said to have kept said gun in his car, in keeping up with his supposed role of a CANU agent.

This Court holds that the lower court was not correct in dismissing herein plaintiffs-appellants’ complaint
because as preponderantly shown by evidence, defendants-appellees utterly failed to exercise all the diligence
of a good father of the family in preventing their minor son from committing this crime by means of the gun of
defendants-appellees which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi for they have not regularly checked whether
said gun was still under lock, but learned that it was missing from the safety deposit box only after the crime
had been committed.

In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a felony or a quasi-delict
committed by Wendell Libi, respondent court did not err in holding petitioners liable for damages arising
therefrom. Subject to the preceding modifications of the premises relied upon by it therefor and on the bases of
the legal imperatives herein explained, we conjoin in its findings that said petitioners failed to duly exercise the
requisite diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such damages.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioners.
 TAMARGO v. CA
G.R. No. 85044 | June 03, 1992 | J. Feliciano

DOCTRINE: The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with them is
based on the parental authority vested upon them by the Civil Code. The law assumes that when an
unemancipated child living with its parents commits a tortious act, the parents were negligent in the
performance of their legal and natural duty to supervise the child who is in their custody and control.

FACTS: In 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a 10-year-old minor, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing
injuries which resulted in her death. A civil complaint for damages was consequently filed with the RTC of
Vigan by Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and spouses Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents,
against spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents.

A criminal information for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was also filed against Adelberto. However,
he was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability because he acted without discernment.

Prior to the incident, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto before the CFI of
Ilocos Sur, which was granted after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.

In their Answer, spouses Bundoc claimed that the adopting parents, spouses Rapisura, should be the
indispensable parties to the action, since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the
moment the successful petition for adoption was filed. The Tamargos contended that since Adelberto was then
actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor relinquished by the mere filing
and granting of a petition for adoption.

RTC RULING: The trial court dismissed Tamargo’s complaint, ruling that spouses Bundoc were not
indispensable parties to the action. Tamargo filed an MR, to no avail. In 1988, Tamargo filed a notice of
appeal, which the trial court dismissed, ruling that the notice had been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary
period. Thus, they went to the CA on a petition for mandamus and certiorari.

CA RULING: The CA dismissed the petition, ruling that the Tamargos had lost their right to appeal. The
Tamragos thus filed a Petition for Review before the SC, contending that spouses Bundoc are the
indispensable parties to the action for damages caused by the acts of their minor child, Adelberto.

ISSUE: WON the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned, may be given retroactive
effect to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their adopted child,
for acts committed by the latter when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents.

RULING: NO. Adelberto’s voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of
action on quasi-delict against him. (Art 2176 CC). Moreover, the law imposes civil liability on the father and,
in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives
with them. (Art 2180).

This principle of parental liability is from the concept of vicarious liability, or the doctrine of "imputed
negligence" under American tort law, where a person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also
for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship, and for whom he is responsible. Thus,
parental liability is made a natural consequence of their parental authority, including instructing and
disciplining the child.

The civil liability imposed on parents for the torts of their minor children living with them is based on the
parental authority vested upon them by the Civil Code. The law assumes that when an unemancipated child
living with its parents commits a tortious act, the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and
natural duty to supervise the child who is in their custody and control (Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co., 36 Phil.
768 [1918]).

Parental liability is anchored upon parental authority, coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the
discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. The parental dereliction is only presumed, and can be
overturned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent the damage.

In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occurred when parental authority was
still lodged in spouses Bundoc, the natural parents of Adelberto. Thus, the natural parents who had actual
custody of Adelberto are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

No presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have
arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.

To hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in them, to burden them with liability for a
tortious act that they could not have foreseen and prevented, would be unfair and unconscionable.
 BARTOLOME v. SSS
G.R. No. 192521 | November 12, 2014 | J. Xyz

DOCTRINE: The term “dependent parents” in Article 167(j) of the Labor Code is to be construed to include
all parents whether legitimate or illegitimate whether by nature or adoption.

FACTS:

John Colcol is employed as an electrician by Scanmar Maritime Service, Inc. He was on board since February
2008 in the vessel of Maersk Denville. Moreover, he was enrolled under the Employees’ Compensation
Program (ECP). However, on June 2, 2008, he died while on board the vessel because the steel plates fell unto
him.

According to his records, he was childless and unmarried. He was also adopted by Mr. Cornelio Colcol and his
adoption decree has attained its finality on February 4, 1985. However, he has a sole beneficiary which is his
biological mother, Bernardina Bartolome, herein petitioner. She was claiming benefits under Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 626, but it was denied because they alleged that she was no longer the primary beneficiary.
She was also denied in claiming for the ECC because she was not under Article 167 (j) of PD No. 626.
Thereafter, the case went to the Social Security Commission stating the petitioner is not a dependent parent
because she already gave up John Colcol to adoption.

ISSUE:

III. The Honorable ECC’s Decision is contrary to evidence on record.

IV. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse in denying the just, due and lawful claims of the
petitioner as a lawful beneficiary of her deceased biological son.
V. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in not giving due course/denying
petitioner’s otherwise meritorious motion for reconsideration.

RULING:

The Court rules in favor of Bernardina.

IV. ECC’s factual findings are not consistent with the evidence on record.

According to the ECC, Cornelio was not proven to be dead at the time Bernardina claimed before the ECC.
However, they did not take note of the a crucial piece of evidence presented by Bernardina, Cornelio’s death
certificate. Cornelio died on October 26, 1987. 3 years after the decree of adoption attained finality (February
4, 1985).

Issues II and III. ECC is wrong. Bernardina is entitled to the death benefits of John.
Interpreting the term parents
Rule XV* of the Amended Rules on Employee’s Compensation deviates from Article 167(j) of the Labor
Code.* It interpreted “dependent parents” to refer to “legitimate parents”.

As discussed by Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane in the case of Diaz v. IAC, the term “relatives” must be
construed in its general and inclusive scope. If the law does not distinguish, we must also not distinguish.
Unlike in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code wherein the law expressly qualified the term “collateral”.
Therefore, “relatives” do not only include collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of.

In application, the term “dependent parents” in Article 167(j) of the Labor Code is to be construed to include
all parents whether legitimate or illegitimate whether by nature or adoption. It is also important to note that the
Labor Code itself did not limit the meaning of dependent parents because if such was the intention, they would
have written “legitimate parents” but they did not.

Equal Protection Clause

Consequently, to insist that the position of ECC is correct would be tantamount to transgressing the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. However, equal
protection does not require universal application. Therefore, there can be a classification but it must be valid.
To determine such, the requisites are the following (test of reasonableness): (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane tothe purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. In application, there is no valid classification
because the classification is not germane to the law being implemented.

Therefore, the phrase “illegitimate” in Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employee’s
Compensation must be stricken.

Bernardina is qualified as John’s dependent parent

There is nothing in the rules that the term legitimate parents under the law must have parental authority over
the employee covered by the Employees’ Compensation Program. Even assuming arguendo that ECC did not
commit an error in their interpretation and in setting up their rules, Bernardina can still qualify as John’s
beneficiary because at the time of death of Cornelio, John was still 4 years old, a minor. The parental authority
is reverted in favor of the biological parents.

Under Section 20 of RA No. 8552 or the Domestic Adoption Act:

“Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the parental authority
of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the
adoptee is still a minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee
to each other shall be extinguished.”

The Court applied the provision by analogy regarding restoration of custody guided by cases and the state
policy behind RA No. 8552 which is the best interest of the child. In RA No. 8552, in case the adopter failed or
was incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent while the adoptee is still in his formative years, then also if
the adopter died, as applied by analogy, the biological parent of the adoptee is the best person expected to
perform the role of the parent.

The tie between the adoptee and the biological parent is not entirely severed. It can be gleaned under Article
190 of the Family Code, Article 984 of the Civil Code which was in force at the time of Cornelio’s death. The
provisions show that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child. Even if
the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted
child, it can be deduced from the provisions of intestate succession the policy on the rights of the biological
parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. Therefore, the death of
Cornelio at the time of John’s minority resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the
adopted child.

Documentary Evidence
The address (Brgy. Capurictan, Solsona, Ilocos Norte) indicated in the Death Certificate of John and also
provided in the ECC’s decision was also the same address used by Bernardina in filing her claim. From that
act, it can be assumed that aside from the restored parental authority of th petitioner, that John and his
biological mother lived under one roof. The late Bartolome also named Bernardina as his beneficiary under RA
N. 8282 or the Social Security Law.

Laws mentioned:

Rule XV
RULE XV – BENEFICIARIES
SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary, and determined at the time of
employee’s death.

(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:

(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of the employee’s death until he remarries; and

(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural children, who are unmarried not gainfully
employed, not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is incapacitated and incapable of
self - support due to physicalor mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority; Provided,
further, that a dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary only when
there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit; provided
finally, that if there are two or more acknowledged natural children, they shall be counted from the youngest
and without substitution, but not exceeding five.

(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:

(1) The legitimate parentswholly dependent upon the employee for regular support;
(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not
over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age providedthat he is incapacitated and incapable of self - support
dueto physical or mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority.

Article 167(j)

“Beneficiaries” means the dependent spouse until he/she remarries and dependent children, who are the
primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on
dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants, who are the secondary beneficiaries:
Provided, That the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when
there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit.
 PEOPLE v DARILAY
G.R. Nos. 139751-52 | January 26, 2004 | J. Callejo, Sr.

DOCTRINE: Considering that at the time of the commission of the crime, the appellant was a minor under the
parental authority of his parents, the parents are primarily and directly liable for the damages sustained by the
heirs of the victims.

FACTS:
The Spouses Pascual and Gemma Arganda were the parents of five children, the eldest of whom was Marilyn
who was born on October 24, 1988. The second child, Ailyn, was born on September 14, 1990. The couple and
their children resided in Sitio Magrimpong, Sta. Cruz, Tinambac, Camarines Sur. The couple knew the
appellant, Noel Darilay, their 15-year old barriomate because he and his friends frequented their house.

At 7:30 a.m. on April 19, 1997, Hercules Bon was in the house of his uncle at Magrimpong, Sta. Cruz,
Tinambac, Camarines Sur. At about 8:00 a.m., his cousin, the appellant, arrived. Their friend, Jose Delfino,
also arrived. They had a drinking spree and consumed two bottles of gin. After about thirty minutes, the
appellant left because his father had arrived and was looking for him.

At about 9:00 a.m., Marilyn and Ailyn were asked by their parents to buy tinapa (dried fish) from a store about
half a kilometer away from their residence. Momentarily, they saw the appellant emerge from a catmon tree.
He struck Ailyn twice with a piece of wood on her back and boxed her on the left side of her face. She felt
excruciating pain on her back and face, and all over her body. She fell unconscious. The appellant then struck
Marilyn twice on the back with the piece of wood. He then carried Ailyn to a grassy area and left her there.
When Ailyn regained her bearings, she looked for Marilyn but the appellant and her sister were nowhere to be
found.

Ailyn then rushed back home and told her mother what happened to her and Marilyn. Consequently, Pascual
looked for his daughter but failed to find Marilyn.

At 11:00 a.m. earlier that day, Andres Arganda, the victim's uncle reported the incident to the police station.
SPO1 Teresito Porteza, SPO1 Ernesto Ablaza and PO3 Antonio Pacardo rushed to the scene. With the help of
tanods, they searched for Marilyn in the place where the appellant attacked the girls. About 15 meters away,
they found a yellow-and-white-colored dress, white panties, and a slipper bearing the name of Marilyn. The
dress was torn. In the meantime, Bon went back home and was informed that the appellant was wanted for the
injuries of Ailyn and Marilyn. He looked for the appellant and found him in the house of Jose Delfino.

While the policemen were conducting their investigation, the appellant arrived accompanied by PO3 Antonio
Pacardo. They asked him where Marilyn is, and he told them that she is in Palinao River, at Sitio Palinao,
Binalay, Tinambac. They found Marilyn's body in a grassy area near bushes and trees along the Palinao River.
She was lying face down, her legs spread apart and was completely naked. There was blood on her nose, her
mouth, and her vagina. Her hair was disheveled. The policemen arrested the appellant and had him detained in
jail.

The appellant was then charged with attempted murder and rape with homicide. A joint trial of the two cases
thereafter ensued.
On September 5, 1997, the appellant was arraigned, assisted by counsel, and entered a plea of not guilty to the
crimes charged. The appellant denied killing and raping Marilyn and attempting to kill Ailyn. He claimed that
Hercules Bon and Jose Delfino hit Ailyn and Marilyn and that it was also them who raped and killed Marilyn.
Although he was present when Bon and Delfino committed the crimes, he could do nothing to prevent them.

RTC RULING:
The trial court thereafter rendered a judgement convicting the appellant of rape with homicide in Criminal
Case No. RTC’97-201 and attempted murder in Criminal Case No. RTC'97-202. The court appreciated in
favor of the appellant the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, but sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua for rape with homicide. Further, the accused being a minor, his father Manuel Darilay is ordered to
pay the heirs of Marilyn Arganda and Ailyn Arganda the foregoing civil liabilities under Article 201, P.D. No.
603 as amended (Child and Youth Welfare Code).

ISSUES:
4. Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant for the crimes of attempted
murder and rape with homicide when the guilt of the accused-appellant was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
5. Whether or not the trial court erred in not applying the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
under Article 68, Par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. RTC'97-201
6. Whether or not the parents of the appellant shall be liable in the case at bar.

RULING:
1. The court ruled in the negative. In Criminal Case No. RTC’97-202, the Court ruled that under Article 6 of
the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt to commit a felony when the offender commences the commission
of a felony by direct acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some causes or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance. For one to be criminally liable for a consummated, frustrated or
attempted homicide or murder, there must be, on the part of the accused, an intent to kill the victim. In this
case, the prosecution proved that the appellant intended to kill the victim Ailyn because (a) he used a piece of
wood; (b) he struck Ailyn twice on the back and boxed her on the face; (c) he threw her to the ground and
dragged her to a grassy area; (d) he left Ailyn all by herself. There is evidence on record that the injuries
sustained by Ailyn were mortal and could have caused her death. She recovered from her injuries in less than 5
days but not more than 9 days. Furthermore, the crime was qualified by treachery because Ailyn, who was only
7 years old at the time, could not defend herself against the appellant's physical assault. Hence, the appellant is
guilty of attempted murder.

For Criminal Case No. RTC’97-201, the Court agrees with the appellant that the prosecution failed to adduce
direct evidence to prove that he raped and killed Marilyn on the occasion or by reason of the said crime.
However, direct evidence is not indispensable to prove the guilt of the accused for the crime charged; it may be
proved by circumstantial evidence. In this case, the Court is convinced that , based on the evidence on record
and as declared by the trial court in its decision, the prosecution adduced circumstantial evidence to prove
beyond cavil that it was the appellant who raped and killed Marilyn on the occasion or by reason of the rape.
Hence, he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide, a special complex crime.

2. The Court ruled in the affirmative. As found by the trial court, the appellant was over 9 years but under 15
years old when he committed the crime. The appellant acted with discernment when he committed the same.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the imposable penalty should be reduced by two degrees.
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, rape with homicide is
punishable by death. Reducing the penalty by two degrees, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal, from
which the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be taken. To determine the minimum of the penalty, it
should be reduced by one degree, which is prision mayor. Applying the indeterminate sentence law and taking
into account how the ghastly crime was committed, the appellant should be sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of from 6 years and one day of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to 17
years and 4 months of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.

3. The Court ruled in the affirmative. Considering that at the time of the commission of the crime, the appellant
was a minor under the parental authority of his parents, the Spouses Manuel and Julieta Darilay are primarily
and directly liable for the damages sustained by the heirs of the victims Marilyn and Ailyn Arganda.
Consequently, the Spouses Manuel and Julieta Darilay are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, in Criminal
Case No. RTC'97-201, to pay to the heirs of the victim Marilyn Arganda, the amount of P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; and P28,000.00 as exemplary damages. The prosecution failed to
adduce evidence in support of actual damages; hence, the heirs of the victim are not entitled thereto. They are,
however, entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00.

In Criminal Case No. RTC'97-202, the Spouses Manuel and Julieta Darilay are hereby ordered to pay, jointly
and severally, to Ailyn Arganda, the amount of P25,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
 CICL XXX, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND GLENN REDOQUERIO
G.R. No. 237334 | August 14, 2019 | CAGUIOA, J

DOCTRINE: The parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal
offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company,
unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such
damages. That primary liability is premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with
respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of
age who acted without discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who
acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed
pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Article 101 of the RPC, however, provides that the foregoing
liability of CICL XXX's parents is subject to the defense that they acted without fault or negligence. Thus, the
civil aspect of this case is remanded to the trial court, and it is ordered to implead CICL XXX's parents for
reception of evidence on their fault or negligence.

FACTS: In Quezon City, Philippines, Private complainant Glenn Redoquerio (Redoquerio) was sent by his
mother to buy iced tea from a store. While he was there, Glenn heard somebody say "Yan si Glenn anak ni
Purok Leader na humuli sa atin nuon." He looked back and saw CICL XXX, a minor, 17 years old, with two
others. CICL XXX suddenly poked a gun at the face of Redoquerio, pulled the trigger several times but the
gun did not fire. The others then held the arms of Redoquerio while CICL XXX punched him several times.
Puyo hit the head of Redoquerio with a stone causing the latter to lose consciousness; he was in coma for 7
days.

In questioning his conviction, CICL XXX argues that because he was only seventeen (17) years old at the time
he supposedly committed the crime, then he is presumed to have acted without discernment, and that it was the
burden of the prosecution to prove otherwise. CICL XXX then argues that the prosecution was unable to
discharge its burden.

RULING OF THE RTC: convicted CICL XXX of the crime of Frustrated Murder.
RULING OF THE CA: affirmed the RTC's conviction of CICL XXX.

ISSUES:
3. Whether or not CICL XXX is criminally liable of Frustrated Murder
4. Whether or not CICL XXX is civilly liable (subject issue)

HELD:

3. NO. The Court acquits CICL XXX for the crime of Frustrated Homicide. In the case of Dorado v.
People,15 the Court had the occasion to state that "when a minor above fifteen (15) but below eighteen
(18) years old is charged with a crime, it cannot be presumed that he or she acted with
discernment. During the trial, the prosecution must specifically prove as a separate circumstance that
the CICL XXX committed the alleged crime with discernment." 16
 "The basic reason behind the exempting circumstance is complete absence of intelligence, freedom of
action of the offender which is an essential element of a felony either by dolus or by culpa.

In the present case, neither the RTC nor the CA discussed whether CICL XXX acted with
discernment. The CA, for instance, only noted CICL XXX's age in its discussion of the penalty to be
imposed on him.

Both the RTC and the CA erred in convicting CICL XXX, as they both equated "intent to kill" - which
was admittedly established through the evidence presented by the prosecution - with acting with
discernment, which, on the contrary, was not proved,by the prosecution.

4. YES. While CICL XXX is not criminally liable for his acts because the presumption that he acted
without discernment was not overcome, he is still civilly liable for the injuries sustained by
Redoquerio. It is well-settled that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable x x x. However, it
does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability. Exemption
from criminal liability does not always include exemption from civil liability.

The foregoing liability is imposed upon CICL XXX's parents because Article 101 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that:

Rules Regarding Civil Liability in Certain Cases. - The exemption from criminal
liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision
4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which
shall be enforced subject to the following rules:

First, In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of article 12, the civil liability for acts
committed by an imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of
age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without
discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal
authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their
part.

In Libi v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court interpreted the above provision to mean that the
civil liability of parents for criminal offenses committed by their minor children is direct and
primary.

The Court said: Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, under the foregoing
provision the civil liability of the parents for crimes committed by their minor children is
likewise direct and primary, and also subject to the defense of lack of fault or negligence on their
part, that is, the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family.

Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby rule that the parents are and should be held
primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children
under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former
acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is
premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex
delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted
without discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted
with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be
imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 33 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Article 101 of the RPC, however, provides that the foregoing liability of CICL XXX's parents is
subject to the defense that they acted without fault or negligence. Thus, the civil aspect of this case is
remanded to the trial court, and it is ordered to implead CICL XXX's parents for reception of evidence
on their fault or negligence.
 ORLANDO D. GARCIA, JR., doing business under the name and style COMMUNITY
DIAGNOSTIC CENTER and BU CASTRO v. RANIDA D. SALVADOR and RAMON SALVADOR
G.R. No. 168512 |20 March 2007, THIRD DIVISION| (Ynares-Santiago, J.)
DOCTRINE:
Owners and operators of clinical laboratories have the duty to comply with statutes, as well as rules
and regulations, purposely promulgated to protect and promote the health of the people by
preventing the operation of substandard, improperly managed and inadequately supported clinical
laboratories and by improving the quality of performance of clinical laboratory examinations. Their
business is impressed with public interest, as such, high standards of performance are expected
from them.
FACTS: As a prerequisite for regular employment, Ranida Salvador underwent a medical
examination at the Community Diagnostic Center (CDC). Orlando Garcia, Jr., who is a medical
technologist, conducted the HBs Ag (Hepatitis B Surface Antigen) test. CDC then issued the test
result indicating that Ranida was "HBs Ag: Reactive." When Ranida submitted the test result to Dr.
Sto. Domingo, the Company physician, the latter apprised her that the findings indicated that she is
suffering from Hepatitis B, a liver disease. Thus, the Company terminated Ranida's employment for
failing the physical examination. When Ranida informed her father, Ramon Salvador, about her
ailment, the latter suffered a heart attack and was confined at the Bataan Doctors Hospital. During
Ramon's confinement, Ranida underwent another HBs Ag test at the said hospital and the result
indicated that she is non-reactive. She underwent confirmatory test, and two more HBs Ag Test
which all indicated that she was non-reactive. Eventually, the Company rehired Ranida, but she and
her father Ramon (the Salvadors) filed an Amended Complaint for damages against Garcia and Bu
Castro, the pathologist of CDC.
RTC Ruling: The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that the Salvadors should have
presented the Company physician who interpreted the test result issued by CDC. Likewise, they
should have presented a medical expert to refute the testimonies of Garcia and Castro regarding the
medical explanation behind the conflicting test results on Ranida.
CA Ruling: The Salvadors appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which found Garcia liable for
damages for negligently issuing an erroneous HBs Ag result. On the other hand, it exonerated
Castro for lack of participation in the issuance of the results. After the denial of his motion for
reconsideration, Garcia filed the instant petition. Garcia maintains he is not negligent, thus not liable
for damages, because he followed the appropriate laboratory measures and procedures as dictated
by his training and experience; and that he did everything within his professional competence to
arrive at an objective, impartial and impersonal result.
ISSUE: Whether Garcia is liable for damages to Ranida and Ramon Salvador for issuing an
incorrect HBsAG test result?
RULING: YES. Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another
person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury. For health care providers, the test of the existence of
negligence is: did the health care provider either fail to do something which a reasonably prudent
health care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent
health care provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient; if
yes, then he is guilty of negligence. Thus, the elements of an actionable conduct are: 1) duty, 2)
breach, 3) injury, and 4) proximate causation.
All the elements are present in the case at bar. Owners and operators of clinical laboratories
have the duty to comply with statutes, as well as rules and regulations, purposely promulgated to
protect and promote the health of the people by preventing the operation of substandard, improperly
managed and inadequately supported clinical laboratories and by improving the quality of
performance of clinical laboratory examinations. Their business is impressed with public interest, as
such, high standards of performance are expected from them. In fine, violation of a statutory duty is
negligence.
From The Clinical Laboratory Law (R.A. No. 4688), and Revised Rules and Regulations
Governing the Registration, Operation and Maintenance of Clinical Laboratories in the Philippines
(DOH Administrative Order No. 49-B Series of 1988), it is clear that a clinical laboratory must be
administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician authorized by the Secretary of Health,
like a pathologist who is specially trained in methods of laboratory medicine; that the medical
technologist must be under the supervision of the pathologist or a licensed physician; and that the
results of any examination may be released only to the requesting physician or his authorized
representative upon the direction of the laboratory pathologist.
The Court finds that Garcia failed to comply with these standards. First, CDC is not
administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician as required by law, but by Ma. Ruby
Calderon, a licensed Medical Technologist. Castro's infrequent visit to the clinical laboratory barely
qualifies as an effective administrative supervision and control over the activities in the laboratory.
Second, Garcia conducted the HBsAG test of Ranida without the supervision of Castro. Last, the
disputed HBsAG test result was released to Ranida without the authorization of Castro. Garcia may
not have intended to cause the consequences which followed after the release of the HBsAG test
result. However, his failure to comply with the laws and rules promulgated and issued for the
protection of public safety and interest is failure to observe that care which a reasonably prudent
health care provider would observe. Thus, his act or omission constitutes a breach of duty.
Indubitably, Ranida suffered injury as a direct consequence of Garcia's failure to comply with
the mandate of the laws and rules aforequoted. She was terminated from the service for failing the
physical examination; suffered anxiety because of the diagnosis; and was compelled to undergo
several more tests. All these could have been avoided had the proper safeguards been scrupulously
followed in conducting the clinical examination and releasing the clinical report.
 Pacis v. Morales
G.R. No. 169467 | February 25, 2010| J. Carpio

DOCTRINE: The liability of the employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code
is primary and direct, based on a person's own negligence.

In this case, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good father of a family,
much less the degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as would exempt him from
liability in this case.

FACTS: In 1991, petitioner Alfred Dennis Pacis, a 17-year-old first year student at Baguio Colleges
Foundation, visited Top Gun Firearm[s] and Ammunition[s] Store located at Upper Mabini Street, Baguio
City. The gun store was owned and operated by defendant Jerome Jovanne Morales.

Morales was in Manila when Pacis made his visit to the store. His employee Armando Jarnague, who was the
regular caretaker of the gun store, left earlier and requested sales agents Aristedes Matibag and Jason
Herbolario to look after the gun store. Jarnague entrusted the keys to the two agents, which included the key to
a drawer where an AMT Automag II Cal. 22 Rimfire Magnum was being kept for repair.

It appears that Matibag and Herbolario later brought out the gun from the drawer and placed it on top of the
table. Attracted by the sight of the gun, Alfred Dennis Pacis got hold of the same. Matibag asked Alfred
Dennis Pacis to return the gun. The latter followed and handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the bullet
hitting the young Alfred in the head, instantly killing him.

A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag. He was however acquitted because of the exempting
circumstance of “accident” under Art. 12, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
The same evidence was reproduced for the civil case.

RTC RULING: RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. Court asked him to pay:
(3) P30,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Alfred Pacis;
(4) P29,437.65 as actual damages for the hospitalization and burial expenses incurred by the plaintiffs;
(5) P100,000.00 as compensatory damages;
(6) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
(7) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.

RTC held that the accidental shooting of Alfred was due to the negligence of Morales’ employees. Under the
Civil Code, respondent is liable for the damages caused by Matibag on the occasion of the performance of his
duties.

CA RULING: Upon appeal, the CA reversed the Trial Court’s decision and absolved Morales of liability
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The CA held that there as no employer-employee relationship between
respondent and Matibag. He was not under the control of Morales with respect to the means and methods in
the performance of his work. There can be no employer-employee relationship where the element of control is
absent.
CA also held that even if Morales was considered an employer of Maribag, he still cannot be held liable since
no negligence can be attributed to him since he exercised due diligence in keeping his loaded gun while he was
on a business trip in Manila. He placed it inside the drawer and locked it. It was taken away without his
knowledge and authority.

ISSUE: Whether or not Morales is liable for damages.

RULING: Yes. The liability of the employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code is primary and direct, based on a person's own negligence. The law provides that: “Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

In addition, Article 2180 of the same code provides that: “The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also of those persons for whom one is responsible.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by
their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions.”

Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the "Policy on Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair," a person
who is in the business of purchasing and selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic security and
safety requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will be suspended or
canceled.

In this case, Morales was negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer without
ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the defective gun
should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for repair, respondent should have made
sure that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept a firearm
from another person, until the cylinder or action is open and he has personally checked that the weapon is
completely unloaded.

For failing to insure that the gun was not loaded, Morales himself was negligent. Furthermore, it was not
shown in this case whether respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes him to repair defective
firearms to restore its original composition or enhance or upgrade firearms.

Morales did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good father of a family, much less the
degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as would exempt him from liability in
this case.
 ST. MARTIN POLYCLINIC, INC., v LWV CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION

G.R. No. 217426 | December 04, 2017 | J. Perlas - Bernabe

DOCTRINE: Negligence cannot be presumed; thus, it must be proven by one who alleges it.
FACTS:
LWV is engaged in the business of recruiting Filipino workers for deployment to Saudi, while St. Martin is an
accredited member of the Gulf Coop Council Approved Medical Centers Association authorized to conduct
medical exams of prospective applicants for overseas employment.
In 2008, LWV referred Raguindin, a prospective applicant, to St. Martin for a pre-deployment medical exam,
and after the required exam, he was cleared and found “fit for employment” as evidenced by a medical report.
Subsequently, he was deployed to Saudi and incurred expenses of P84 ,373. 41. But when he underwent
another medical exam with the General Care Dispensary of Saudi, he tested positive for Hepatitis C Virus. The
Ministry of Health of Saudi required a re examination, but it yielded the same result. Consequently, he was
repatriated to the Philippines.
LWV then filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with the MeTC against St. Martin claiming that
the latter was reckless in issuing its Medical Report stating that Raguindin was fit for employment but was
later found out that he was Hepa C positive.
St. Martin contended that Raguindin may have contracted the disease after his medical examination in the
Philippines up to the time of his deployment.
MeTC ruling: ordered St. Martin to pay the amount ot P84, 373.41 as actual damages; P20, 000 as attorney’s
fees and costs of suits.
RTC ruling: affirmed MeTC.
CA: affirmed RTC with modification: deleted actual damages, and instead awarded temperate damages on
P50, 000.

ISSUES:
4. Whether St. Martin was negligent in issuing the Medical Report hence, liable for damages.
5. Whether the Certification of the General Care Dispensary which was written in an unofficial language
be admitted.
RULING:
3. NO. Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another
person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
such other person suffers injury.

While the records of the case show the Certification and the Hepa C Virus Confirmatory Test Report,
however, these only indicate the results of the General Care Dispensary and Ministry of Health’s own
medical exam of Raguindin finding him to be positive for HCV which as conducted only on March
24, 2008, or at least two (2) months after petitioner issued its Medical Report on January 11,
2008.

Hence, even assuming that Raguindin's diagnosis for HCV was correct, the fact that he later tested
positive for the same does not convincingly prove that he was already under the same medical state at
the time St. Martin issued the Medical Report on January 11, 2008. In this regard, it was therefore
incumbent upon LWV to show that there was already negligence at the time the Medical Report was
issued, may it be through evidence that show that standard medical procedures were not carefully
 observed or that there were already palpable signs that exhibited Raguindin's unfitness for deployment
at that time. This is hardly the case when LWV only proffered evidence which demonstrate that
months after St. Martin's Medical Report was issued, Raguindin, who had already been deployed to
Saudi Arabia, tested positive for HCV and as such, was no longer "fit for employment".

In fact, there is a reasonable possibility that Raguindin became exposed to the HCV only after his
medical examination with petitioner on January 11, 2008. Based on published reports from the WHO,
the hepatitis C virus causes both acute and chronic infection. Acute HCV infection is
usually asymptomatic and is only very rarely associated with life-threatening diseases.
The incubation period for HCV is 2 weeks to 6 months, and following initial infection, approximately
80% of people do not exhibit any symptoms. Indisputably, Raguindin was not deployed to Saudi
Arabia immediately after St. Martin’s medical examination and hence, could have possibly contracted
the same only when he arrived thereat.

In light of the foregoing, the CA therefore erred in holding that "had St. Martin more thoroughly and
diligently examined Raguindin, it would likely have discovered the existence of the HCV because it
was contrary to human experience that a newly-deployed overseas worker, such as Raguindin, would
immediately have contracted the disease at the beginning of his deployment.

4. NO. A cursory examination of the subject document would reveal that while it contains English
words, the majority of it is in an unofficial language. Sans any translation in English or Filipino
provided by respondent, the same should not have been admitted in evidence; thus, their contents
could not be given probative value, and deemed to constitute proof of the facts stated therein. The
HCV Confirmatory Test Report issued by the Ministry of Health of Saudi Arabia should have also
been excluded as evidence. Although the same may be considered a public document, being an alleged
written official act of an official body of a foreign country, the same was not duly authenticated in
accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

Mercury Drug Corporation v. Huang

G.R. No. 172122 | June 22, 2007 | C.J. Puno

DOCTRINE: Employer-Employee Relationships; The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code is direct or immediate—it is not conditioned on a prior recourse against the negligent employee, or a
prior showing of insolvency of such employee. It is also joint and solidary with the employee.—The liability of
the employer under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code is direct or immediate. It is not conditioned on a prior recourse
against the negligent employee, or a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. It is also joint and solidary
with the employee. To be relieved of liability, petitioner Mercury Drug should show that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family, both in the selection of the employee and in the supervision of the
performance of his duties. Thus, in the selection of its prospective employees, the employer is required to
examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service records. With respect to the supervision of its
employees, the employer should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and
impose disciplinary measures for their breach. To establish compliance with these requirements, employers
must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.

FACTS: December 20, 1996: A Mercury Drug (MD) six-wheeler truck driven by Rolando Del Rosario and a
Toyota Corolla driven by Stephen Huang were both on C-5 highway, northbound, coming from the general
direction of Alabang going to Pasig City. The car was on the left innermost lane, while the truck was on the
next lane to its right. The truck suddenly swerved to its left and slammed into the front right side of the car.
The collision hurled the car over the island where it hit a lamppost, spun around and landed on the opposite
lane The truck also hit a lamppost, ran over the car and zigzagged towards, and finally stopped in front of
Buellah Land Church.
At the time of the accident, the truck driver had a Traffic Violation Receipt and his driver’s license had been
confiscated because of reckless driving. The car was a total wreck and Stephen Huang sustained massive
injuries which paralyzed for life from his chest down and requires that he have continuous medical and
rehabilitation treatment
The Huangs blame the truck driver for committing gross negligence and reckless imprudence, while the
petitioners allege that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident was Huang’s recklessness.
According to MD, truck driver was on the left innermost lane when the car bumped the truck’s front right tire,
the truck then swerved left, smashed into an electric post, crossed the center island, and stopped on the other
side of the highway. The car then crossed over to the center island and landed on the same portion of C-5.
RTC RULING: found petitioners Mercury Drug and Del Rosario jointly and severally liable to pay
respondents actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.
CA RULING: The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but reduced the award of moral
damages to ₱1,000,000.00. The appellate court also denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners.
3. MD failed to exercise the diligence required in supervising employees
4. Del Rosario negligent in driving the truck at the time of accident
ISSUE:
5. W/N Del Rosario liable - Yes
6. W/N Mercury Drug is liable – Yes, under Art. 2180
RULING:
6. The SC affirmed the findings of the CA
The evidence does not support petitioners’ claim that at the time of the accident, the truck was on the left inner
lane and that it was Huang’s car which bumped the right front side of the truck.
Firstly, Del Rosario could not precisely tell which part of the truck was hit by the car (even though the truck
was snub-nosed and a lot higher than the car). Del Rosario also couldn’t explain why the car landed on the
opposite lane of which was on its left side. He said, “the car did not pass in front of him after it hit him or
under him or over him or behind him”. If the truck were really at the left lane and the car were at its right, and
the car hit the truck at its front right side, the car would not have landed on the opposite side, but would have
been thrown to the right side of the C-5 highway.
Noteworthy is the testimony of Dr. Daza, an expert in the field of physics. He conducted a study based on the
ff. assumptions provided by respondents:
9. Two vehicles collided;
10. One vehicle is ten times heavier, more massive than the other;
11. Both vehicles were moving in the same direction and at the same speed of about 85-90 kph
12. The heavier vehicle was driving at the innermost left lane, while the lighter vehicle was at its right
Dr. Daza testified that given the assumptions, if the lighter vehicle hits the right front portion of the heavier
vehicle, the general direction of the light vehicle after the impact would be to the right side of the heavy
vehicle, not the other way around
The truck is more difficult to move as it is heavier. It is the car, the lighter vehicle, which would move to the
right of, and away from the truck. Very little chance that the car will move towards the opposite side, i.e., to
the left of the truck
He concluded that the general direction of the car after impact would be to the left of the truck – the middle
island against which the car was pinned would slow down the car, and enable the truck to catch up and hit the
car again, before running over it
To support their thesis, the petitioners tried to show damages that the truck sustained at its right side, however
the evidence did not impress. The photos were taken a month after the accident, and an employee who repaired
the truck admitted that there were also damages on the left side. Worse, Del Rosario admitted that after the
impact, he lost control of the truck and failed to apply his brakes. The impact allegedly caused by the car when
it hit the truck could not be so great to cause petitioner to lose all control that he failed to even step on the
brakes. The evidence proves Del Rosario’s negligence as the direct and proximate cause.
 7. Mercury Drug is liable under Art. 2180
To be relieved of liability, MD should show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family, both in
the selection of the employee and in the supervision of the performance of his duties. Thus, in the selection of
its prospective employees, the employer is required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and
service records. With respect to the supervision of its employees, the employer should formulate standard
operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for their breach. To
establish compliance with these requirements, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary
evidence.
In the present case, MD presented testimonial evidence as to its hiring procedure. According to Ms. Caamic of
the recruitment office: Applicants are required to take theoretical and actual driving tests, and a psychological
examination. It was discovered that Del Rosario took those tests when he applied for the position of Delivery
Man, but not when he applied for the position of truck driver. When he was just the delivery man, he only
drove a Galant (sedan).
 Mercury Drug Corporation vs. Huang
G.R. No. 197654 | Augut 30, 2017 | Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE: A judgment that lapses into finality becomes immutable and unalterable. It can neither be
modified nor disturbed by courts in any manner even if the purpose of the modification is to correct perceived
errors of fact or law. Parties cannot circumvent this principle by assailing the execution of the judgment. What
cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.

FACTS:
On April 29, 1997, Stephen Huang and his parents, spouses Richard Huang and Carmen Huang, filed a
complaint for damages based on quasi-delict against Mercury Drug Corporation and Rolando Del Rosario.

Mercury Drug was the registered owner of a 6-wheeler truck driven by Del Rosario, which figured in an
accident with Stephen’s car in 1996. As a result, Stephen suffered serious spinal cord injuries and now
paraplegic.

The RTC rendered a decision fiding Mercury Drug and Del Rosario jointly and severally liable for actual
damages, compensatory damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

The CA also affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification. It reduced the award of moral damages from
4,000,000 pesos to 1,000,000.

On February 1, 2008, Stephen and his parents moved for the execution of the judgment before the RTC of
Makati which was granted.

On Augsust 26, Mercury Drug and Del Rosario moved to quash the Writ of Execution and moved for the
inhibition of Presiding Judge Bibat-Palamos. While the case is pending, the sheriff began to garnish Mercury
Drug and Del Rosario’s bank accounts. Mercury Drug and Del Rosario filed an urgent motion to defer the
implementation of the Writ of Execution however, all 3 motions were denied as well as their motion for
reconsideration.

As a result of the garnishment proceedings, Citibank issued a Manager’s Check in favor of Richard Huang
amounting to 40,434,062 pesos. Subsequently, Stephen and his parents filed a Satisfaction of Judgment before
the RTC.

On December 18, 2008, Mercury Drug and Del Rosario filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA however,
it was denied. Mercury Drug and Del Rosario then filed a Petition for Review for Certiorari.

ISSUE:
7. Whether or not the case falls under any of the exceptions to the Doctrine of Immutability of
Judgments
a. Whether or not a clerical error exists that would warrant the modification of the dispositive
portion of the judgment.
8. Whether or not the monetary awards in dispute should be paid in installments of in lump sum.

RULING:
6. No. The SC held that a final and executory judgment produces certain effects. Winning litigants are
entitled to the satisfaction of the judgment through a writ of execution. On the other hand, courts are
barred from modifying the rights and obligations of the parties, which had been adjudicated upon.
They have the ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment.

It is a fundamental principle that a judgment that lapses into finality becomes immutable and
unalterable. The primary consequence of this principle is that the judgment may no longer be modified
 or amended by any court in any manner even if the purpose of the modification or amendment is to
correct perceived errors of law or fact. This principle known as the doctrine of immutability of
judgment is a matter of sound public policy, which rests upon the practical consideration that every
litigation must come to an end.

The doctrine of immutability of judgment, however, is not an ironclad rule. It is subject to several
exceptions, namely:
● The correction of clerical errors;
● The so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party;
● Void judgments; and
● Whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable.

In this case, there are no clerical errors or ambiguities regarding the computation of life care cost and
loss of earning capacity awarded to respondent Stephen. The amounts indicated in the dispositive
portion of the judgment faithfully correspond to the findings of fact and conclusions of the trial court.

Clerical errors are best exemplified by typographical errors or arithmetic miscalculations. They also
include instances when words are interchanged.

Clerical errors or ambiguities in the dispositive portion of a judgment may result from inadvertence.
These errors can be rectified without violating the doctrine of immutability of judgment provided that
the modification does not affect the substance of the controversy.

The correction of a clerical error is an exception to the general rule that no amendment or correction
may be made by the court in its judgment once the latter had become final.

There being no clerical errors or ambiguities in the dispositive portion or body of the judgment, the
amounts awarded as life care cost and loss of earning capacity stand.
There is no reason to disturb the trial court's findings and conclusions on the matter.

This Court notes that the amendments sought by petitioners affect the very substance of the
controversy. While it appears on the surface of the Petition that they merely seek the clarification of
the judgment, a careful review of petitioners' assertions and arguments reveal their true intention of
appealing the merits of the case. This cannot be done without violating the doctrine on immutability of
judgments. A correction pertaining to the substance of the controversy is not a clerical error.

7. The SC held that In the absence of any directive in the body or in the dispositive portion of the
decision that the judgment award should be amortized or paid in periodic installments, the manner of
its execution shall be subject to the Rules of Court. The manner of execution of judgments for money
is specifically governed by Rule 39, Section 9 of the Rules of Court.

The petition is Denied.

 SPOUSES BERNABE AND SOLEDAD AFRICA v. CALTEX (PHIL) INC.
G.R. No. L-12986 | March 31 1966 | J. Makalintal

DOCTRINE: Presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur – “Where the thing which
caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management defendant or his servants and the
accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or
control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation by defendant, that the
accident arose from want of care.”

FACTS: A fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue,
Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank trick into the underground storage, right at the
opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire spread and burned several
neighboring houses, including the personal properties and effects inside them. Their owners, among them
petitioners Spouses Africa, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and Mateo Boquiren, the first as alleged
owner of the station and the second as its agent in charge of operation. Negligence on the part of both of them
was attributed as the cause of the fire.

RTC RULING:

CA RULING: Both the trial court and the CA found that the petitioners failed to prove negligence and that
respondents had exercised due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees.

ISSUE/S:
4. Whether certain reports on the fire prepared by the Manila Police and FIre Departments and by a
Captain Tinio of the AFP are admissible
5. Whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies
6. Whether Caltex and Boquiren are liable for the damages caused to appellants

RULING:
4) NO. There are 3 requisites for admissibility of evidence under Sec. 35, Rule 123, ROC: (a) that the
entry was made by a public officer, or by another person, specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it
was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had
sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or
through official information.

The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. The facts stated therein were
not acquired by the reporting officers through official information, not having been given by the
informants pursuant to any duty to do so.

5) YES. Citing the case of Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development Co., the CA said: “While it is
the rule xxx that in case of non contractual negligence, or culpa aquiliana, the burden of proof is on
the plaintiff to establish that the proximate cause of his injury was the negligence of the defendant, it
is also a recognized principle that “Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to
be under the management defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course
of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation by defendant, that the accident arose from want of
care.” And the burden of evidence is shifted to him to establish that he has observed due care and
diligence. (San Juan Light & Transit Co. vs. Requena, 224 U.S. 89, 56 L. ed. 68 ). This rule is known
by the name of res ipsa loquitur (the transaction speaks for itself), xxx”

In this case, the gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the
control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The
 persons who knew or could have known how the fire started were appellees and their employees
[Caltex and Boquiren], but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable
inference that the incident happened because of want of care.

6) YES. Under the license agreement the operator would pay Caltex the purely nominal sum of P1.00 for
the use of the premises and all equipment therein. The operator could sell only Caltex products.
Maintenance of the station and its equipment was subject to the approval, in other words control, of
Caltex. The operator could not assign or transfer his rights as license without the consent of Caltex.
Termination of the contract was a right granted only to Caltex but not to the operator. These
provisions of the contract show that the operator was virtually an employee of Caltex, not an
independent contractor. Hence, Caltex should be liable for damages caused to appellants.
VICENTE LAMIS and SANDIGAN PROTECTIVE & INVESTIGATION AGENCY, INC., Petitioners,
vs. DAVID Y. ONG, Respondent.
G.R. No. 148923 | August 11, 2005 | SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

FACTS: Sandigan Protective and Investigation Agency, Inc. (Sandigan), petitioner, was the security agency
providing security services at the Manila Chinese Cemetery. The visiting hours were at 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.
Sandigan instructed the security guards not to allow any one to enter the cemetery from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.
On September 20, 1994, Vicente Lamis, also a petitioner, was the guard assigned at the south gate of the
cemetery for the 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. slot. Around 3:00 in the morning, a Mitsubishi Lancer, with a PSM 679
plate, driven by David Y. Ong, herein respondent, arrived at the south gate of the cemetery. He beeped his car
and continued doing so, but Lamis did not open the gate. Eventually, he went outside the gate and informed
respondent that being beyond visiting hours, he cannot enter the cemetery. Suddenly, respondent accelerated
the speed of his car, trying to enter the cemetery. This irked Lamis. He closed the gate and took a shot gun
entrusted to him by one of the roving guards. About thirty minutes thereafter, respondent’s car returned at full
speed toward the closed gate where Lamis was standing. He fired a warning shot but respondent did not stop
his car. Lamis fired another warning shot. Respondent then alighted from his car. Seeing it was closed, he got
inside the car, but before he could do so, Lamis shot him, hitting his right arm, left hip, and right waist. He
managed to drive to the Chinese General Hospital where he was examined and treated. Thereafter, the hospital
guard reported the incident to the police who immediately conducted an investigation. Petitioner Sandigan
conducted its own investigation but did not turn over to the police the firearm used by Lamis. Vincent filed a
criminal case against Lamis for frustrated homicide and a civil case against Lamis and the security agency for
damages. Lamis, on the other hand, that he shot Vincent for selfdefense. The trial court ruled that Lamis was
negligent thus, ordering him and the security agency liable. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the trial
court’s judgment, holding that the acts of Lamis were not the result of negligence but were deliberate and
intentional. Sandigan, as the employer, also failed to prove that it exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its security guards.

ISSUE: Whether the acts of Lamis and Sandigan were acts of negligence.

RULING: As to LAMIS, NO. His acts were deliberate and intentional. Thus, as said by the Court of Appeals,
Lamis’ contention of self-defense when he shot Vincent with TWO GUNS is barren of merit. However, he
remains liable for shooting Victor Ong. As to Sandigan, YES. The Court emphasized the act of Lamis of
shooting Vincent, which is a deliberate and intentional act, making Lamis and Sandigan jointly and severally
liable. First it did not properly show that it had exercised due diligence in choosing and hiring its security
guards. Further, it failed to adduce in evidence any copy of its Report on the shooting incident involving
appellant Lamis. Neither did it surrender to the police authorities the .38 caliber gun and shotgun used by
appellant Lamis in shooting the appellee. Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that "Whoever by an act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. x x
x." The obligation imposed by this Article is "demandable not only for one’s own wrongful acts or omissions,
but also for those persons for whom one is responsible." Thus, petitioner Sandigan, being the employer of
petitioner Lamis, is likewise liable for damages caused by the latter.
 Hermana R. Cerezo v. David Tuazon
G.R. No. 141538 | March 23, 2004| J. Carpio

DOCTRINE:

Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.

An employer’s liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct, while the employer’s liability based on a
delict is merely subsidiary. The words "primary and direct," as contrasted with "subsidiary," refer to the
remedy provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the character and limits of the obligation.
Although liability under Article 2180 originates from the negligent act of the employee, the aggrieved party
may sue the employer directly. When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the employer has
himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage.

FACTS:

Around noontime of 26 June 1993, David Tuazon (Tuazon) was in his proper lane when Danilo A. Foronda
(Foronda), being then the driver and person in charge of the Country Bus with plate number NYA 241, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously operate the said motor vehicle in a negligent, careless, and
imprudent manner without due regard to traffic rules and regulations, there being a "Slow Down" sign near the
scene of the incident, and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent loss of lives or injuries, his
negligence, carelessness and imprudence resulted to severe damage to the tricycle and serious physical injuries
to Tuazon. As a result, Tuazon was unable to walk and became disabled, with his thumb and middle finger on
the left hand being cut.

On 1 October 1993, tricycle driver Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Hermana R. Cerezo (Mrs.
Cerezo), as owner of the bus line, her husband Attorney Juan Cerezo (Atty. Cerezo), and bus driver Foronda
before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City (RTC).

RTC RULING:

On 30 May 1995, after considering Tuazon’s testimonial and documentary evidence, the RTC ruled in
Tuazon’s favor. The RTC made no pronouncement on Foronda’s liability because there was no service of
summons on him. The RTC did not hold Atty. Cerezo liable as Tuazon failed to show that Mrs. Cerezo’s
business benefited the family, pursuant to Article 121(3) of the Family Code. RTC held Mrs. Cerezo solely
liable for the damages sustained by Tuazon arising from the negligence of Mrs. Cerezo’s employee, pursuant
to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The RTC ordered petitioner Mrs. Cerezo to pay respondent Tuazon actual
damages, loss of earnings, moral damages, and costs of suit.

CA RULING:

In a resolution dated 21 January 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) denied the petition for certiorari and
affirmed the RTC’s order denying the petition for relief from judgment. Likewise, the CA denied Cerezo
spouses’ motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Furthermore, the CA denied the petition for annulment
of the Decision dated 30 May 1995 rendered by RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner Mrs. Cerezo is liable for damages.

RULING:
Yes. Mrs. Cerezo contends that the basis of the present petition for annulment is lack of jurisdiction. Mrs.
Cerezo asserts that the RTC could not validly render judgment since it failed to acquire jurisdiction over
Foronda. Mrs. Cerezo points out that there was no service of summons on Foronda. Moreover, Tuazon failed
to reserve his right to institute a separate civil action for damages in the criminal action. Such contention
betrays a faulty foundation. Mrs. Cerezo’s contention proceeds from the point of view of criminal law and not
of civil law, while the basis of the present action of Tuazon is quasi-delict under the Civil Code, not delict
under the Revised Penal Code.

The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict under Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, or may give rise to an action for a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. An aggrieved party
may choose between the two remedies. An action based on a quasi-delict may proceed independently from the
criminal action. There is, however, a distinction between civil liability arising from a delict and civil liability
arising from a quasi-delict. The choice of remedy, whether to sue for a delict or a quasi-delict, affects the
procedural and jurisdictional issues of the action.

Tuazon chose to file an action for damages based on a quasi-delict. In his complaint, Tuazon alleged that Mrs.
Cerezo, "without exercising due care and diligence in the supervision and management of her employees and
buses," hired Foronda as her driver. Tuazon became disabled because of Foronda’s "recklessness, gross
negligence and imprudence," aggravated by Mrs. Cerezo’s "lack of due care and diligence in the selection and
supervision of her employees, particularly Foronda."

Contrary to Mrs. Cerezo’s assertion, Foronda is not an indispensable party to the case. An indispensable party
is one whose interest is affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and without whom no final resolution of
the case is possible. However, Mrs. Cerezo’s liability as an employer in an action for a quasi-delict is not only
solidary, it is also primary and direct. Foronda is not an indispensable party to the final resolution of Tuazon’s
action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo.

The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where there is a
solidary obligation on the part of debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence,
each debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. There is no merger or renunciation of rights, but
only mutual representation. Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is
indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from either.
Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect damages from Mrs. Cerezo
alone.

Moreover, an employer’s liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct, while the employer’s liability
based on a delict is merely subsidiary. The words "primary and direct," as contrasted with "subsidiary," refer to
the remedy provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the character and limits of the
obligation. Although liability under Article 2180 originates from the negligent act of the employee, the
aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the
employer has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. This is the
fault that the law condemns. While the employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the employee’s
criminal negligence, the employer is also civilly liable directly and separately for his own civil negligence in
failing to exercise due diligence in selecting and supervising his employee. The idea that the employer’s
liability is solely subsidiary is wrong.

The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another), without including the author of
the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial
act committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it cannot be instituted till after the
judgment against the author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action for
responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal action.
 Yonaha v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 112346 | March 29, 1996 | J. Vitug

DOCTRINE: This Court has since sanctioned the enforcement of this subsidiary liability in the same criminal
proceedings in which the employee is adjudged guilty, on the thesis that it really is a part of, and merely an
incident in, the execution process of the judgment. But, execution against the employer must not issue as just a
matter of course, and it behooves the court, as a measure of due process to the employer, to determine and
resolve a priori, in a hearing set for the purpose, the legal applicability and propriety of the employer’s
liability. The requirement is mandatory even when it appears prima facie that execution against the convicted
employee cannot be satisfied.

FACTS: In Criminal Case No. 01106-L, Elmer Ouano was charged with the crime of "Reckless Imprudence
Resulting In Homicide." In Basak, Lapulapu City the aforenamed accused, while driving a Toyota Tamaraw
did then and there unlawfully and feloniously maneuver and operate it in a negligent and reckless manner;
without taking the necessary precaution to avoid injuries to person and damage to property, as a result thereof
the motor vehicle he was then driving bumped and hit Hector Cañete, which caused the latter’s instantaneous
death due to the multiple severe traumatic injuries at different parts of his body. The accused later on pleaded
“guilty.”

A writ of execution was issued for the satisfaction of the monetary award. In his Return of Service, dated 07
May 1992. the MTCC Deputy City Sheriff stated that he had served the writ on accused Elmer Ouano but that
the latter had manifested his inability to pay the money obligation.

Private respondents presented a "motion for subsidiary execution" with neither a notice of hearing nor notice to
petitioner.

RTC RULING: The trial court issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of subsidiary execution. The
sheriff went to petitioner’s residence to enforce the writ, and it was then, allegedly for the first time, that
petitioner was informed of Ouano’s conviction. Petitioner filed a motion to stay and to recall the subsidiary
writ of execution principally anchored on the lack of prior notice to her and on the fact that the employer’s
liability had yet to be established. Private respondents opposed the motion. The trial court denied petitioner’s
motion, and petitioner’s plea for reconsideration of the denial was likewise rejected.

CA RULING: Petitioner promptly elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals for review. The appellate court
initially restrained the implementation of the assailed orders and issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon
the filing of a P10,000.00 bond. Ultimately, however, the appellate court, in its decision of 28 September 1993,
dismissed the petition for lack of merit and thereby lifted the writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:

VI. Whether or not the subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
applies in the present case

RULING:

V. The statutory basis for an employer’s subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code. 5 This Court has since sanctioned the enforcement of this subsidiary liability in the same
criminal proceedings in which the employee is adjudged guilty, 6 on the thesis that it really is a part
of, and merely an incident in, the execution process of the judgment. But, execution against the
employer must not issue as just a matter of course, and it behooves the court, as a measure of due
process to the employer, to determine and resolve a priori, in a hearing set for the purpose, the legal
applicability and propriety of the employer’s liability. The requirement is mandatory even when it
appears prima facie that execution against the convicted employee cannot be satisfied. The court must
convince itself that the convicted employee is in truth in the employ of the employer; that the latter is
engaged in an industry of some kind; that the employee has committed the crime to which civil
liability attaches while in the performance of his duties as such; and that execution against the
employee is unsuccessful by reason of insolvency.

The assumption that, since petitioner in this case did not aver any exculpatory facts in her "motion to
stay and recall," as well as in her motion for reconsideration, which could save her from liability, a
hearing would be a futile and a sheer rigmarole is unacceptable. The employer must be given his full
day in court.

To repeat, the subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
requires (a) the existence of an employer-employee relationship; (b) that the employer is engaged in
some kind of industry; (c) that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have
committed the offense in the discharge of his duties (not necessarily any offense he commits "while"
in the discharge of such duties); and (d) that said employee is insolvent. The judgment of conviction
of the employee, of course, concludes the employer 8 and the subsidiary liability may be enforced in
the same criminal case, but to afford the employer due process, the court should hear and decide that
liability on the basis of the conditions required therefor by law.
 Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 104658 | April 7, 1993 | J. Campos, Jr.

It is a well-entrenched rule that an employer-employee relationship must exist before an employer may be held
liable for the negligence of his employee.

FACTS: Private respondent Clarita T. Camacho (private respondent for short) was the operator of a gasoline
station in Naguilian Road, Baguio City, wherein she sells petitioner Shell's petroleum products. Sometime in
April 1983, private respondent requested petitioner to conduct a hydro-pressure test on the underground
storage tanks of the said station in order to determine whether or not the sales losses she was incurring for the
past several months were due to leakages therein. Petitioner acceded to the said request and on April 27, 1983,
one Jesus "Jessie" Feliciano together with other workers, came to private respondent's station with a Job Order
from petitioner to perform the hydro-pressure test.

At around 5:30 a.m., the following day, private respondent's husband opened the station and started selling
gasoline. But at about 6:00 a.m., the customers who had bought gasoline returned to the station complaining
that their vehicles stalled because there was water in the gasoline that they bought. On account of this, private
respondent was constrained to replace the gasoline sold to the said customers. However, a certain Eduardo
Villanueva, one of the customers, filed a complaint with the police against private respondent for selling the
adulterated gasoline.

Feliciano, who arrived later that morning, did not know what caused the water pollution of the gasoline in the
adjacent storage tank. So he called up Nick Manalo, Superintendent of Shell's Poro Point Installation at San
Fernando, La Union, and referred the matter to the latter. Manalo went up to Baguio in the afternoon to
investigate. Thereafter, he and Feliciano again filled with water the underground storage tank undergoing
hydro-pressure test whereat they noticed that the water was transferring to the other tanks from whence came
the gasoline being sold. Manalo asked permission from Shell's Manila Office to excavate the underground
pipes of the station. Upon being granted permission to do so, Feliciano and his men began excavating the
driveway of private respondent's station in order to expose the underground pipeline. The task was continued
by one Daniel "Danny" Pascua who replaced Feliciano. Pascua removed the corroded pipeline and installed
new independent vent pipe for each storage tank.

Meanwhile, petitioner undertook to settle the criminal complaint filed by Villanueva. Subsequently,
Villanueva filed an Affidavit of Desistance. Thereafter, private respondent demanded from petitioner the
payment of damages in the amount of P10,000.00. Petitioner, instead, offered private respondent additional
credit line and other beneficial terms, which offer was, however, rejected. Subsequently, or on October 12,
1983, private respondent filed before the trial court a complaint for damages against petitioner due to the
latter's alleged negligence in the conduct of the hydro-pressure test in her gasoline station. For its part,
petitioner denied liability because, according to it, the hydro-pressure test on the underground storage tanks
was conducted by an independent contractor.

RTC: The trial court dismissed private respondent's complaint for damages
CA: Reversed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be held accountable for the damage to private respondent due to the
hydro-pressure test conducted by Jesus Feliciano.

RULING: The Court ruled in the negative. It is a well-entrenched rule that an employer-employee
relationship must exist before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee. It is likewise
firmly settled that the existence or non-existence of the employer-employee relationship is commonly to be
determined by examination of certain factors or aspects of that relationship. These include: (a) the manner of
selection and engagement of the putative employee; (b) the mode of payment of wages; (c) the presence or
absence of a power to control the putative employee's conduct, although the latter is the most important
element.

As aptly held by the trial court, petitioner did not exercise control and supervision over Feliciano with
regard to the manner in which he conducted the hydro-pressure test. All that petitioner did, through its
Field Engineer, Roberto Mitra, was relay to Feliciano the request of private respondent for a hydro-pressure
test, to determine any possible leakages in the storage tanks in her gasoline station. The mere hiring of
Feliciano by petitioner for that particular task is not the form of control and supervision contemplated by law
which may be the basis for establishing an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and Feliciano.
The fact that there was no such control is further amplified by the absence of any Shell representative in the
job site at the time when the test was conducted. Roberto Mitra was never there. Only Feliciano and his men
were.

Feliciano is independently maintaining a business under a duly registered business name, "JFS Repair and
Maintenance Service," and is duly registered with the Bureau of Domestic Trade. He does not enjoy a fixed
salary but instead charges a lump sum consideration for every piece of work he accomplishes. If he is not able
to finish his work, he does not get paid, as what happened in this case. Further, Feliciano utilizes his own tools
and equipment and has a complement of workers. Neither is he required to work on a regular basis. Instead, he
merely awaits calls from clients such as petitioner whenever repairs and maintenance services are requested.
Moreover, Feliciano does not exclusively service petitioner because he can accept other business but not from
other oil companies. All these are the hallmarks of an independent contractor.

Being an independent contractor, Feliciano is responsible for his own acts and omissions. As he alone
was in control over the manner of how he was to undertake the hydro-pressure test, he alone must bear the
consequences of his negligence, if any, in the conduct of the same.

Anent the issue of damages, the same has been rendered moot by the failure of private respondent to establish
an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and Feliciano. Absent said relationship, petitioner
cannot be held liable for the acts and omissions of the independent contractor, Feliciano.
 Palafox v. Province of Ilocos Norte
102 Phil 1186 | January 03, 1958 | J. Xyz

DOCTRINE: The general rule is that local government units are not liable for negligent acts of its employees
while they are performing governmental functions or duties.

FACTS: Sabas Torralba was employed as the driver of Ilocos Norte and detailed to the Office of the District
Engineer. While driving his truck, Sabas ran over Proceto Palafox resulting to the latter’s death. Sabas was
prosecuted for homicide through reckless imprudence to which he pleaded guilty. The heirs of Palafox
instituted a civil case against him, the Province, the District Engineer and the Provincial Treasurer.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Province of Ilocos Norte can be held liable.

RULING: NO. The general rule is that local government units are not liable for negligent acts of its employees
while they are performing governmental functions or duties. In this case, the driver was involved in the
construction or maintenance of roads which was a governmental duty. Therefore, the province cannot be held
liable for his negligent act. However tragic and deplorable it may be, the death of Palafox imposed on the
province no duty to pay monetary consideration
 SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA and
HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 89, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, respondents.
[G.R. No. 122191 | October 8, 1998 | J. Quisumbing]

DOCTRINE: STATE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP RULE APPLIES IN THE CASE AT
BAR. — Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti commissi, modern
theories and rules on tort liability have been advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches to arrive at just
results. In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort liability, we find here an occasion to apply the
"State of the most significant relationship" rule, which in our view should be appropriate to apply now, given
the factual context of this case. In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant
relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where
the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered. As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred and lodged in the
Philippines. There is likewise no question that private respondent is a resident Filipina national, working with
petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged here in the business of international air carriage. Thus, the
"relationship" between the parties was centered here, although it should be stressed that this suit is not based
on mere labor law violations. From the records, the claim that the Philippines has the most significant contact
with the matter in this dispute, raised by private respondent as plaintiff below against defendant (herein
petitioner), in our view, has been properly established. Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is
the situs of the tort complained of and the place "having the most interest in the problem."

The Situs is the Philippines where the tort is committed (lex loci delicti commissi), it is in the Philippines
where the defendant allegedly deceived the plaintiff, a citizen residing and working here and the fact that
certain acts or parts of the injury occurred in another country is of no moment, for what is important is the
place where the over-all harm or the totality of the injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human
rights of the plaintiff had lodged.

FACTS: Petitioner Saudia hired private respondent Morada as a flight attendant in 1988, based in Jeddah. On
1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, she went to party with 2 male attendants, and on the following
morning in their hotel, one of the male attendants attempted to rape her. She was rescued by hotel attendants
who heard her cry for help. The Indonesian police arrested the 2. Morada returned to Jeddah, but was asked by
the company to go back to Jakarta and help arrange the release of the 2 male attendants. Morada did not
cooperate when she got to Jakarta.

What followed was a series of interrogations from the Saudi Courts which she did not understand as this was
in their language. In 1993, she was surprised, upon being ordered by SAUDIA to go to the Saudi court, that
she was being convicted of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of
Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition, sentencing her to
five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her,
together with the 2, for what happened in Jakarta.

SAUDIA denied her the assistance she requested, however, because she was wrongfully convicted, Prince of
Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to
Manila, she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being informed of the cause. On
November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint for damages against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi (“Al-
Balawi”), its country manager. SAUDIA ALLEGES: Private respondent’s claim for alleged abuse of rights
occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the existence of a foreign element qualifies the instant
case for the application of the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti commissi
rule.
RTC RULING: Denied the Motion to Dismiss. SAUDIA’s motion for reconsideration is likewise dismissed,
upon the basis of the applicable Philippine law, Article 21 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, is, clearly,
within the jurisdiction of this Court as regards the subject matter, and there being nothing new of substance
which might cause the reversal or modification of the order sought to be reconsidered.

CA RULING: The RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court can validly take cognizance and decide upon the case

RULING: Yes. On the presence of a “Foreign Element” in the case: A factual situation that cuts across
territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more states is said to contain a “foreign element”.
The presence of a foreign element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals and
associations are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth or conception. The forms in which this
foreign element may appear are many. The foreign element may simply consist in the fact that one of the
parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one State
involves properties situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may assume a complex form.

In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is a resident
Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the
employment of Morada with the petitioner Saudia as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many
occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and
vice versa, that caused a “conflicts” situation to arise.

Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the “connecting factor” or “point of
contact” could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the
torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place
where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner
allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she had
honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, “act
with justice, give her due and observe honesty and good faith.” Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she
claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in
our view what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the totality of the alleged injury to the
person, reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff
below (herein private respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the situs of the
alleged tort.
 ALPS Transportation v. Rodriguez
G.R. No. 186732|June 13, 2013| Sereno, CJ.

Doctrine
A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the owner of the
enterprise. Thus, the owner has unlimited personal liability for all the debts and obligations of the business, and
it is against him that a decision for illegal dismissal is to be enforced.

FACTS

Elpidio Rodriguez (Rodriguez) was previously employed as a bus conductor. He entered into an employment
contract with Contract Tours Manpower (Contact Tours) and was assigned to work with ALPS Transportation, a
bus company.

During the course of his employment, Rodriguez was found to have committed irregularities on 26 April 2003,7
12 October 2003, and 26 January 2005. The latest irregularity report dated 26 January 2005 stated that he had
collected bus fares without issuing corresponding tickets to passengers. The report was annotated with the word
"Terminate."

Rodriguez alleged that he was dismissed from his employment on 27 January 2005, or the day after the
issuance of the last irregularity report. However, he did not receive any written notice of termination. He went
back to the bus company a number of times, but it refused to readmit him.

Thereafter, Rodriguez filed before the labor arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of 13th month
pays, and damages against ALPS Transportation and Alfredo Perez, the proprietor of the bus company.

In response to the complaint, ALPS Transportation stated that they did not have any prerogative to dismiss
Rodriguez, as he was not their employee, but that of Contact Tours. In fact, based on their agreement with
Contact Tours, it was supposedly the latter that had the obligation to inform Rodriguez of the contents of the
reports and to decide on the appropriate sanctions. ALPS Transportation further explained that due to the
issuance of the three irregularity reports against Rodriguez, they wrote to Contact Tours and recommended the
termination of respondent’s assignment to them.

During the pendency of the illegal dismissal case before the labor arbiter, ALPS Transportation charged
Rodriguez with theft before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. ALPS Transportation eventually filed an
Affidavit of Desistance and withdrew the criminal charges against Rodriguez.

Labor Arbiter Ruling

LA dismissed the illegal dismissal complaint for lack of merit. It explained that no evidence had been adduced to
support the contention of Rodriguez that the latter had been terminated on 27 January 2005. Moreover, during
the mandatory conference, the representative of Contact Tours manifested that the company had not dismissed
Rodriguez, and that it was in fact willing to reinstate him to his former position. Thus, the labor arbiter concluded
that Rodriguez had not been illegally dismissed, and was actually an employee of Contact Tours, and not of
ALPS Transportation.

NLRC Ruling
The NLRC set aside the decision of the labor arbiter and entered a new one, directing ALSP Transportation to
reinstate Rogriguez to his former position without loss of seniority rights and privileges but without backwages.
NLRC ruled that Contact Tours was a labor-only contractor. Thus, Rodriguez should be considered as a regular
employee of ALPS Transportation.

As regards the claim of illegal dismissal, the NLRC found that Rodriguez failed to prove that his services were
illegally terminated by petitioners, and that he was prevented from returning to work. However, the bus company
likewise failed to prove that he had abandoned his work. Thus, citing previous rulings of this Court, the NLRC
held that in case the parties fail to prove either abandonment or termination, the employer should order the
employee to report back for work, accept the latter, and reinstate the employee to the latter’s former position.
However, an award for backwages is not warranted, as the parties must bear the burden of their own loss.

CA Ruling
CA reversed and set aside the decision of the NLRC. It concluded that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in rendering the assailed decision. CA ruled that, in termination cases, it is the employer who bears
the burden of proving that the employee was not illegally dismissed. Here, the CA found that ALPS
Transportation failed to present convincing evidence that Rodriguez had indeed collected bus fares without
issuing corresponding tickets to passengers. The appellate court held that the irregularity reports were mere
allegations, the truth of which had not been established by evidence.

Moreover, the CA gave no credence to ALPS Transportation’s argument that Rodriguez had not yet been
terminated when he filed the illegal dismissal complaint, as he had not yet received any notice of termination. CA
explained that, before the illegal dismissal complaint was filed, more than six months had lapsed since
respondent was last given a bus assignment by ALPS Transportation. Thus, the CA concluded that the
argument of the bus company was only an excuse to cover up the latter’s mistake in terminating him without due
process of law.
The CA then ordered ALPS Transportation to reinstate Rodriguez and to pay him full backwages,

ISSUES
1. Whether Rodriguez was validly dismissed; and
2. Assuming that Rodriguez was illegally dismissed, whether ALPS Transportation and/or Alfredo Perez is liable
for the dismissal.

RULING TO ISSUE #1
Yes, Rodriguez has been illegally dismissed.
For a dismissal to be valid, the rule is that the employer must comply with both substantive and procedural due
process requirements. Substantive due process requires that the dismissal must be pursuant to either a just or
an authorized cause under Articles 282, 283 or 284 of the Labor Code. Procedural due process, on the other
hand, mandates that the employer must observe the twin requirements of notice and hearing before a dismissal
can be effected.

The Court ruled that the employer failed to prove that the dismissal was due to a just cause.

The Labor Code provides that the burden of proving that the termination of an employee was for a just or
authorized cause lies with the employer. If the employer fails to meet this burden, the conclusion would be that
the dismissal was unjustified and, therefore, illegal.

The Court with Rodriguez’s position that the 26 January 2005 irregularity report, which served as the basis of his
dismissal, may only be considered as an uncorroborated allegation if unsupported by substantial evidence. On
this matter, the Court quote with favor the ruling of the CA:

The nature of work of a bus conductor involves inherent or normal occupational risks of incurring money
shortages and uncollected fares. A conductor’s job is to collect exact fares from the passengers and remit his
collections to the company. Evidence must, therefore, be substantial and not based on mere surmises or
conjectures for to allow an employer to terminate the employment of a worker based on mere allegations places
the latter in an uncertain situation and at the sole mercy of the employer. An accusation that is not substantiated
will not ripen into a holding that there is just cause for dismissal. A mere accusation of wrongdoing or a mere
pronouncement of lack of confidence is not sufficient cause for a valid dismissal of an employee. Thus, the
failure of the petitioners to convincingly show that the respondent misappropriated the bus fares renders the
dismissal to be without a valid cause. To add, jurisprudence dictates that if doubt exists between the evidence
presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.

Thus, the Court ruled that ALPS Transportation have failed to prove that the termination of Rodriguez’s
employment was due to a just cause.

Turning to the issue of procedural due process, both parties are in agreement that Rodriguez was not given a
written notice specifying the grounds for his termination and giving him a reasonable opportunity to explain his
side; a hearing which would have given him the opportunity to respond to the charge and present evidence in his
favor; and a written notice of termination indicating that after considering all the circumstances, management has
concluded that his dismissal is warranted. Clearly, therefore, the inescapable conclusion is that procedural due
process is wanting in the case at bar.

RULING TO ISSUE # 2
Alfredo Perez is liable.
The presumption is that a contractor is a labor-only contractor unless he overcomes the burden of proving that it
has substantial capital, investment, tools, and the like. “While ALPS Transportation is not the contractor itself,
since it is invoking Contact Tours status as a legitimate job contractor in order to avoid liability, it bears the
burden of proving that Contact Tours is an independent contractor.
It is thus incumbent upon ALPS Transportation to present sufficient proof that Contact Tours has substantial
capital, investment, and tools in order to successfully impute liability to the latter. However, aside from making
bare assertions and offering the Kasunduan between Rodriguez and Contact Tours in evidence, ALPS
Transportation has failed to present any proof to substantiate the former's status as a legitimate job contractor.
Hence, the legal presumption that Contact Tours is a labor-only contractor has not been overcome.

As a labor-only contractor, therefore, Contact Tours is deemed to be an agent of ALPS Transportation. Thus, the
latter is responsible to Contact Tours' employees in the same manner and to the same extent as if they were
directly employed by the bus company.

Finally, the CA correctly ruled that since ALPS Transportation is a sole proprietorship owned by petitioner
Alfredo Perez, it is he who must be held liable for the payment of back wages to Rodriguez. A sole proprietorship
does not possess a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the owner of the enterprise. Thus, the
owner has unlimited personal liability for all the debts and obligations of the business, and it is against him that a
decision for illegal dismissal is to be enforced.
Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Salaried Employees Union (MMPSEU) v. Mitsubishi Motors Philippines
Corporation
G.R. No. 175773 | June 7, 2013 | J. Del Castillo

DOCTRINE: Under the collateral source rule, if an injured person receives compensation for his injuries from
a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor, the payment should not be deducted from the damages which he
would otherwise collect from the tortfeasor.

FACTS: The CBA of Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Salaried Employees Union (MMPSEU) and Mitsubishi
Motors Philippines Corporation (MMPC) provides for the hospitalization insurance benefits for the covered
dependents in the amount of P50,000.00.

MMPSEU members Ernesto Calida, Hermie Oabel, and Jocelyn Martin filed claims for reimbursement of
hospitalization expenses of their dependents. MMPC paid only a portion of their hospitalization insurance
claims, not the full amount. Claiming that under the CBA, they are entitled to hospital benefits amounting to
P27,427.10, P6,769.35 and P8,123.80, respectively, which should not be reduced by the amounts paid by
MEDICard and by Prosper, Calida, Oabel and Martin asked for reimbursement from MMPC. However,
MMPC denied the claims contending that double insurance would result if the said employees would receive
from the company the full amount of hospitalization expenses despite having already received payment of
portions thereof from other health insurance providers.

MMPSEU President wrote to the MMPC President demanding full payment of the hospitalization benefits.
MMPC clarified that the claims of the said MMPSEU members have already been paid on the basis of official
receipts submitted. MMPSEU referred the dispute to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board and
requested for preventive mediation.

RULING of Voluntary Arbitrator:

The Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a Decision finding MMPC liable to pay or reimburse the amount of
hospitalization expenses already paid by other health insurance companies. The Voluntary Arbitrator held that
the employees may demand simultaneous payment from both the CBA and their dependents' separate health
insurance without resulting to double insurance, since separate premiums were paid for each contract. He also
noted that the CBA does not prohibit reimbursement in case there are other health insurers.

CA RULING:
The CA found merit in MMPC's Petition for review. It ruled that despite the lack of a provision which bars
recovery in case of payment by other insurers, the wordings of the subject provision of the CBA showed that
the parties intended to make MMPC liable only for expenses actually incurred by an employee's qualified
dependent. In particular, the provision stipulates that payment should be made directly to the hospital and that
the claim should be supported by actual hospital and doctor's bills. These mean that the employees shall only
be paid amounts not covered by other health insurance and is more in keeping with the principle of indemnity
in insurance contracts.

ISSUES:
7. WON the collateral source rule is applicable.
8. WON the CA erred in overturning the decision of the voluntary arbitrator without even giving any
legal or justifiable basis for such reversal.
9. WON Samsel v. Allstate Insurance Co. is applicable, where the Supreme Court of Arizona allowed
the insured to enjoy medical benefits under an automobile policy insurance despite being able to also
recover from a separate health insurer.
10. WON MMPC is also liable for the amounts covered under other insurance policies; otherwise, MMPC
will unjustly profit from the premiums the employees contribute through monthly salary deductions.

RULING:
5. No. Under the collateral source rule, if an injured person receives compensation for his injuries from a
source wholly independent of the tortfeasor, the payment should not be deducted from the damages
which he would otherwise collect from the tortfeasor. US jurisprudence described the rule as "an
established exception to the general rule that damages in negligence actions must be compensatory."

The collateral source rule applies in order to place the responsibility for losses on the party causing
them. Its application is justified so that "the wrongdoer should not benefit from the expenditures made
by the injured party or take advantage of contracts or other relations that may exist between the
injured party and third persons." Thus, it finds no application to cases involving no-fault insurances
under which the insured is indemnified for losses by insurance companies, regardless of who was at
fault in the incident generating the losses. Here, it is clear that MMPC is a no-fault insurer. Hence, it
cannot be obliged to pay the hospitalization expenses of the dependents of its employees which had
already been paid by separate health insurance providers of said dependents.

6. No. The conditions set forth in the CBA provision indicate an intention to limit MMPC's liability only
to actual expenses incurred by the employees' dependents, that is, excluding the amounts paid by
dependents' other health insurance providers.

The condition that payment should be direct to the hospital and doctor implies that MMPC is only
liable to pay medical expenses actually shouldered by the employees' dependents. It follows that
MMPC's liability is limited, that is, it does not include the amounts paid by other health insurance
providers. This condition is obviously intended to thwart not only fraudulent claims but also double
claims for the same loss of the dependents of covered employees.

It is well to note at this point that the CBA constitutes a contract between the parties and as such, it
should be strictly construed for the purpose of limiting the amount of the employer's liability.

7. No. Samsel v. Allstate Insurance Co. is not on all fours with the case at bar. in the case before us, the
dependents' group hospitalization insurance provision in the CBA specifically contains a condition
which limits MMPC's liability only up to the extent of the expenses that should be paid by the covered
employee's dependent to the hospital and doctor. This is evident from the portion which states that
"payment [by MMPC] shall be direct to the hospital and doctor." In contrast, the Allstate automobile
policy expressly gives Allstate the authority to pay directly to the insured person or on the latter's
behalf all reasonable expenses actually incurred.

8. No. To allow reimbursement of amounts paid under other insurance policies shall constitute double
recovery which is not sanctioned by law. To constitute unjust enrichment, it must be shown that a
party was unjustly enriched in the sense that the term unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully. A
claim for unjust enrichment fails when the person who will benefit has a valid claim to such benefit.

Being in the nature of a non-life insurance contract and essentially a contract of indemnity, the CBA
provision obligates MMPC to indemnify the covered employees' medical expenses incurred by their
dependents but only up to the extent of the expenses actually incurred. This is consistent with the
principle of indemnity which proscribes the insured from recovering greater than the loss.
 THE UNITED STATES v. GUILLERMO MAZA
G.R. No. 2436 | November 22, 1905 | J. Johnson

DOCTRINE: Where two or more persons act together in the commission of a crime, whether they act through
the physical volition of one or of all, proceeding severally or collectively, each is in law responsible for the
result the same as though he had acted alone.

FACTS: Guillermo Maza was charged with the crimes of assassination, robbery, assault, and lesiones menos
graves. He was tried by the Court of First Instance of the Province of Batangas, found guilty of the crimes, and
sentenced to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua) with the accessory penalties mentioned in Article 54 of the
Penal Code and to pay the costs. From this decision, Maza appealed to the Supreme Court.

During the time the appeal was pending in the Supreme Court, Maza was detained as a prisoner in the
provincial jail in Batangas. On the 15th of December 1902, while Maza was detained, he, together with other
prisoners, attempted to escape from said jail. In the attempt, he inflicted wounds upon Baltazar Ramirez, by
means of a revolver which he took from the possession of one of the guards in the jail, from which wounds,
Ramirez died. They also took from the guards one revolver, two shotguns, and one rifle. Additionally, they
inflicted wounds upon the alcalde of said carcel, from the effects of which the said alcalde did not recover for
seventeen days.

ISSUE: Whether or not Maza personally inflicted the wounds on Ramirez

RULING:

No. It is argued on behalf of Maza that there was no evidence to show that he personally inflicted the wounds
upon Ramirez which caused the latter's death. The general doctrine, both by the supreme court of Spain and the
courts of the United States, is that "where two or more persons act together in the commission of a crime,
whether they act through the physical volition of one or of all, proceeding severally or collectively, each
individual whose will contributes to the wrongdoing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though
the act or crime done or committed was by himself alone."

If two or more persons combine in an intent to perform a criminal act jointly, the guilt of each is the same as if
he had acted alone; and the result is the same if the act is divided into parts and each person proceeds with his
part unaided.
 FILIPINAS BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC. v. AGO MEDICAL & EDUCATIONAL CENTER,
BICOL
CHRISTIAN COLLEGE OF MEDICINE
G.R. No. 141944 | January 17, 2005 | J. Carpio

DOCTRINE:
A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a natural person, it
cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish,
or moral shock. Nevertheless, AMEC’s claim for moral damages falls under Article 2219(7) of the Civil Code.
This provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel, slander, or any other form
of defamation. It does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a natural or juridical person. Therefore, a juridical
person such as a corporation can validly complain for libel or any other form of defamation and claim for
moral damages.

FACTS:
“Exposé” is a radio documentary program aired over DZRC-AM which is owned by Petitioner FBNI.
In two (2) mornings, the program exposed various alleged complaints from students, teachers, and parents
against Respondent AMEC and its administrators. Claiming that the broadcasts were defamatory, AMEC and
Ago, Dean of AMEC’s College of Medicine, filed a complaint for damages against FBNI. FBNI was included
as a defendant because according to AMEC and Ago, FBNI failed to exercise due diligence in the selection
and supervision of its employees, particularly Rima and Alegre.
The complaint further alleged that AMEC is a reputable learning institution, hence, the broadcasts
destroyed its reputation by the malicious imputations. Respondent corporation (AMEC) alleged, among others,
that due to the libelous statements, it is entitled to moral damages.

RTC RULING:
The trial court rendered a Decision finding FBNI and Alegre liable for libel except Rima. In holding
FBNI liable for libel, the trial court found that FBNI failed to exercise diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees.

CA RULING:
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment with modification. The appellate court made
Rima solidarily liable with FBNI and Alegre.

ISSUE:
5. Whether the broadcasts are libelous.
6. Whether AMEC, a corporation, is entitled to moral damages.
7. Whether the award of attorney’s fees is proper

RULING:
(8) YES. Libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act or omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one
who is dead.
Every defamatory imputation is presumed malicious. Rima and Alegre failed to show
adequately their good intention and justifiable motive in airing the supposed gripes of the
students. As hosts of a documentary or public affairs program, they should have presented the
public issues free from inaccurate and misleading information. They had ample time to verify
their sources, but they hardly made a thorough investigation. Alegre testified that he merely went
to AMEC to verify his report from an alleged AMEC official who refused to disclose any
information. Alegre simply relied on the words of the students because they were many and not
because there is proof that what they are saying is true.
 Had the comments been an expression of opinion based on established facts, it is immaterial
that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.
However, their comments were not supported by facts. Therefore, the broadcasts are not
privileged and remain libelous per se.

(9) YES. A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a natural
person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious
anxiety, mental anguish, or moral shock. CA cited Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB, et al. to justify
the award of moral damages. However, the Court’s statement in Mambulao that a corporation
may have a good reputation which, if besmirched, may also be a ground for the award of moral
damages is an obiter dictum.
Nevertheless, AMEC’s claim for moral damages falls under Article 2219(7) of the Civil
Code. This provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel,
slander, or any other form of defamation. It does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a natural or
juridical person. Therefore, a juridical person such as a corporation can validly complain for libel
or any other form of defamation and claim for moral damages.
Moreover, where the broadcast is libelous per se, the law implies damages. In such a case,
evidence of an honest mistake or the want of character or reputation of the party libeled goes only
in mitigation of damages. Neither in such a case is the plaintiff required to introduce evidence of
actual damages as a condition precedent to the recovery of some damages. In this case, the
broadcasts are libelous per se. Thus, AMEC is entitled to moral damages.
However, the award of P300,000 moral damages is unreasonable. The record shows that even
though the broadcasts were libelous per se, AMEC has not suffered any substantial or material
damage to its reputation. Therefore, the award of moral damages was reduced from P300,000 to
P150,000.

(10) NO. AMEC failed to justify satisfactorily its claim for attorney’s fees. It failed to adduce evidence
to warrant the award of attorney’s fees. Moreover, both the trial and appellate courts failed to
explicitly state in their respective decisions the rationale for the award of attorney’s fees. As cited
in the case of Inter-Asia Investment Industries, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, it was held that “It is an
accepted doctrine that the award thereof as an item of damages is the exception rather than the
rule, and counsels’ fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the
court to award attorney’s fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and
equitable justification, without which the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being
improperly left to speculation and conjecture. In all events, the court must explicitly state in the
text of the decision, and not only in the decretal portion thereof, the legal reason for the award of
attorney’s fees.”
 68. Far Eastern Shipping Company v. CA and Philippine Ports Authority
G.R. No. 130068 | October 1, 1998 | J. Regalado

Manila Pilots Association v. Philippine Ports Authority and Far Eastern Shipping Company
G.R. No. 130150 | October 1, 1998 | J. Regalado

DOCTRINES:
6. Maritime and admiralty laws; Rules for compulsory pilotage - prudence required that he, as the pilot
in command, should have made sure that his directions were promptly followed.
7. Article 1207 of the Civil Code provides that there is solidary liability only when the obligation
expressly so states, or when the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity. Plainly,
Customs Administrative Order No. 15- 65 which as an implementing rule has the force and effect of
law, can validly provide for solidary liability.
8. Where a compulsory pilot is in charge of a ship, the master being required to permit him to navigate it,
if the master observes that the pilot is incompetent or physically incapable, then it is the duty of the
master to refuse to permit the pilot to act. But if no such reasons are present, then the master is
justified in relying upon the pilot, but not blindly.
9. There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are
liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or
more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a
single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the
injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence
resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for
the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.

FACTS:
On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, flying under the flagship of the USSR, owned and operated
by the Far Eastern Shipping, arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver, British Columbia. Captain Roberto
Abellana was tasked by the Philippine Port Authority (PPA) to supervise the berthing of the vessel. Senen
Gavino was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association to conduct docking maneuvers for the safe
berthing of the vessel. When the vessel reached the landmark (the big church by the Tondo North Harbor) one-
half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from
the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. The left anchor, with two (2) shackles, were dropped. However,
the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken.

A commotion ensued between the crew members. After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take
hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel was
approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave
the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel
rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier. The vessel sustained damage too.

The Philippine Ports Authority, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for a sum
of money against Far Eastern Shipping Co., Capt. Senen C. Gavino and the Manila Pilots' Association praying
that the defendants therein be held jointly and severally liable to pay the plaintiff actual and exemplary
damages plus costs of suit.

RTC RULING:
Ordered the defendants jointly and severally to pay the PPA the amount of P1,053,300.00 representing
actual damages and costs of the suit

CA RULING:
Affirmed except that it found that there is no employer-employee relationship existing between
Manila Pilots’ Association and Capt. Gavino.
ISSUE:

5. Whether or not FESC, Gavino, and MPA are solidarily liable

RULING:
Capt. Gavino was assigned to pilot MV Pavlodar into Berth 4 of the Manila International Port. Upon
assuming such office as compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to he universally accepted high standards of
care and diligence required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill and knowledge in respect to navigation
in the particular waters over which his license extends superior to and more to be trusted than that of the
master. Tested thereby, we affirm respondent court's finding that Capt. Gavino failed to measure up to such
strict standard of care and diligence required of pilots in the performance of their duties.

Our own evaluation is that Capt. Kabankov's shared liability is due mainly to the fact that he failed to
act when the perilous situation should have spurred him into quick and decisive action as master of the ship. In
the face of imminent or actual danger, he did not have to wait for the happenstance to occur before
countermanding or overruling the pilot. By his own admission, Capt. Kabankov concurred with Capt. Gavino's
decisions, and this is precisely the reason why he decided not to countermand any of the latter's orders.
Inasmuch as both lower courts found Capt. Gavino negligent, by expressing full agreement therewith Capt.
Kabankov was just as negligent as Capt. Gavino.

There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them
are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or
more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single
injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury
and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury
or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage
under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.

Except insofar as their liability is limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or her owners are liable
for all damages caused by the negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those in charge of the vessel.
As a general rule, the owners or those in possession and control of a vessel and the vessel are liable for all
natural and proximate damages caused to persons or property by reason of her negligent management or
navigation.The liability of MPA for damages is not anchored on Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as
erroneously found and declared by the Court a quo but under the provisions of Customs Administrative Order
No. 15-65, supra, in tandem with the by-laws of the MPA. Art. 1207 of the Civil Code provides that there is
solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the nature of the obligation
requires solidarity. Plainly, Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65, which as an implementing rule has the
force and effect of law, can validly provide for solidary liability.

Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which
the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may
be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under circumstances of the case, it may appear
that one of them was culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No
actor’s negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other
actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of
the injury. There is no contribution between the tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are
liable for the total damage. As a general rule, the owners or those in possession and control of a vessel are
liable for all natural and proximate damages caused to persons or property by reason of her negligent
management or navigation.
 WORCESTER v. OCAMPO
G.R. No. 5932 | February 27, 1912 | J. Johnson

DOCTRINE: As a general rule, the term “joint tort feasors” includes all persons who command, instigate,
promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of
it, after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the
same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves.

As such, joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The person injured
may sue all of them, or any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole damage caused by all, and all
together are liable for the whole damage. They are jointly and severally liable for the whole amount.

Hence, a payment in full, by one of the joint tort feasors, of all the damage done, satisfies any claim which may
exist against the others. The release of one of the joint tort feasors, by agreement, generally operates to
discharge all.

FACTS: Dean Worcester, a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior
in the Government of the Philippines, filed a complaint for damages against defendants Martin Ocampo,
Teodoro M. Kalaw, Lope K. Santos, Fidel A. Reyes, Faustino Aguilar, Leoncio G. Liquete, Manuel Palma,
Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Gale Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit as the owners,
directors, writers, editors, and administrators of a daily newspaper known as “El Renacimiento” and “Muling
Pagsilang.”

Worcester alleged that the editorial “Birds of Prey” published in the said newspaper alluded to him as an eagle
that surprises and devours, a vulture than gorges himself on dead and rotten meat, an owl that affects a petulant
omniscience, and a vampire that sucks the blood of a victim until he leaves it bloodless. He said that the
editorial attacked his honesty and reputation not only as a private person but also as a government official. He
further claimed that the editorial had the intention to destroy the confidence of the public in him and for this
reason had made him difficult to perform his job to the point that he had to resign from his office.

The defendants contended that (1) the editorial does not refer to a determinate person, and (2) conceding that it
does refer to Worcester, none of the defendants, except Kalaw, is responsible for the writing, printing, or
publication of the editorial or the damage to Worcester resulting therefrom.

CFI RULING: Ruled in favor of Worcester. Held than an action for libel may be maintained even though the
defamatory publication does not refer to Worcester by name. Furthermore, the editorial is libelous per se as it
charges Worcester with malfeasance in office and other criminal acts such as the “wasting” of public funds for
the purpose of promoting his personal welfare.

Hence, the CFI rendered judgment holding all the defendants, except for Reyes, Aguilar, and Liquete who
were editors of the newspaper but in a subordinate position to the chief editors or directors and merely acted
under the direction of the latter, liable jointly and severally for sustained damages on account of Worcester’s
wounded feelings, mental suffering, and injuries to his standing and position in the sum of P35,000 as well as
P25,000 as punitive damages.

From the said decision, the defendants appealed to the SC.

ISSUES:

3. Whether the defendants may be held jointly and severally as joint tort feasors regardless of their actual
participation in the tort.
4. Whether the amount of damages imposed on account of wounded feelings, mental suffering, and
injury to the reputation of Worcester was correct.
 5. Whether punitive damages were correctly imposed.
6. Whether the lower court erred in overruling the defendants’ motions for suspension as the civil action
for damages could not proceed until the termination of the criminal action for libel.
7. Whether the lower court erred in holding that the defendants Ocampo, Palma, Arellano, Jose, Barretto,
Cansipit, and Lichauco were the proprietors of the newspaper as they were merely donors.

RULING:

b) YES.

As a general rule, joint tort feasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for
their benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had
performed the wrongful act themselves.

As such, each joint tort feasor is not only individually liable for the tort in which he participates, but is also
jointly liable with his tort feasors. If several persons jointly commit a tort, the plaintiff or person injured, has
the election to sue or some of the parties jointly, or one of them separately, because the tort is in its nature a
separate act of each individual. It is not necessary that the cooperation should be a direct, corporeal act, for one
who aided or assisted or counseled, in any way, the commission of a crime, was as much a principal as the one
who inflicted or committed the actual tort.

Hence, joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The person injured may
sue all of them, or any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole damage caused by all, and all together
are liable for the whole damage. They are jointly and severally liable for the whole amount.

Hence, a payment in full, by one of the joint tort feasors, of all the damage done, satisfies any claim which may
exist against the others. The release of one of the joint tort feasors, by agreement, generally operates to
discharge all.

c) Modified the amount of damages [P25,000]

The specific amount of damages to be awarded must depend upon the facts of in each case and the sound
discretion of the court. No fixed or precise rules can be laid down governing the amount of damages in cases of
libel. The amount of damages resulting from a libelous publication to a man’s good name and reputation is
difficult to ascertain. No amount of money can compensate him for his loss.

The enjoyment of a private reputation is a constitutional right. The law recognizes the value of such a
reputation and constantly strives to give redress for its injury. If words are spoken or the publication is made
with the intent to injure the victim, it imposes damages, and in view of all the circumstances of the particular
case, adjudge that the wrongdoer ought to pay as an example to the public and to deter others from doing
likewise, and for punishment for the infliction of the injury.

Hence, the Court modified the amount of damages imposed upon the defendants. The Court held the
defendants jointly and severally liable for the sum of P25,000.

d) Modified the amount of punitive damages [P10,000].

Section 11 of Act No. 277 allows the court, in an action for libel, to render a judgment for punitive damages, in
an amount which the court may think will be a just punishment to the libeler and an example to others.
Exemplary damages in civil actions for libel may always be recovered if the defendants are actuated by malice.
In this case, malice, hatred, and ill will against Worcester are seen throughout the editorial. The editorial not
only attempted to paint Worcester as a villain, but upon every occasion, the defendants resorted to ridicule of
the severest kind.

Upon the question on the amount of punitive damages, the courts must be governed in each case by the
evidence, the circumstances of the case, and their sound discretion. Taking into consideration the fact that
some of the defendants have been prosecuted criminally and have been sentenced, the Court modified the
amount of punitive damages to a sum of P10,000 with an interest of six percent.

e) NO.

The Court has already decided in Ocampo et al. v. Jenkins that a judgment in a criminal prosecution for libel
does not bar a civil action based upon the same acts or transactions. Different rules as to the weight of evidence
necessary to the findings in the two proceedings always exist. In a criminal action for libel, the State must
prove its case by evidence which shows the guilt of the defendant beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil
action, it is sufficient to sustain his cause by a preponderance of evidence only.

f) NO.

The defendants tried to make it appear that the money which they gave for the establishment of the newspaper
was a pure donation. They claimed that it was a donation to the Filipino people. However, they did not state or
attempt to show what particular persons were to manage, control, and direct the enterprise for which the
donation was made.

A donation may be made for the benefit of the public, but in must be made to some definite person or
association. A donation must be made to some definite person or association and the donee must be some
ascertained or ascertainable person or association. A donation made to no person or association could not be
regarded as a donation in law. It could not be more than an abandonment of property.
 Verzosa v. Lim
G.R. No. L-20145 | November 15, 1923 | J. Street

DOCTRINE: Where a collision occurs between two seagoing vessels, caused exclusively by the carelessness
of the navigating officers in charge of one of the vessels, both the owner and the operating company (casa
naviera) directly in charge of the offending vessel are liable for the damage done. The rule that joint
obligations are apportionable unless otherwise specially provided has no application to obligations arising
from tort (ex delicto). Persons who cooperate in the tortious infliction of damage are jointly and severally
liable.

FACTS: This action was instituted in the CFI of the City of Manila by Vicente Versoza and Ruiz, Rementeria
y Compania, as owners of the coastwise vessel Perla, against Silvino Lim and Siy Cong Bieng & Company,
Inc., as owner and agent, respectively, of the vessel Ban Yek, for the purpose of recovering a sum of money
alleged to be the damages resulting to the plaintiffs from a collision, between the two vessels mentioned, it
being alleged that said collision was due to the experience, carelessness and lack of skill on the part of the
captain of the Ban Yek and to his failure to observe the rules of navigation appropriate to the case. The
defendants answered with a general denial, and by way of special defense asserted, among other things, that
the collision was due exclusively to the inexperience and carelessness of the captain and officers of the
steamship Perla; for which reason the defendants in turn, by way of counterclaim, prayed judgment for the
damages suffered by the Ban Yek from the same collision. At the hearing the trial judge absolved the
defendants from the complaint and likewise absolved the plaintiffs from the defendants' counterclaim. From
this judgment both parties appealed.

It appears in evidence that at about 5pm the coastwise steamer Ban Yek left the port of Naga on the Bicol
River, in the Province of Camarines Sur, with destination to the City of Manila. At the time of her departure
from said port the sea was approaching to high tide but the current was still running in through the Bicol River,
with the result that the Ban Yek had the current against her. As the ship approached the Malbong bend of the
Bicol River, another vessel, the Perla, was sighted coming up the river on the way to Naga. While the boats
were yet more than a kilometer apart, the Ban Yek gave two blasts with her whistle, thus indicating an
intention to pass on the left, or to her own port side. In reply to this signal the Perla gave a single blast, thereby
indicating that she disagreed with the signal given by the Ban Yek and would maintain her position on the
right, that is, would keep to the starboard. The Ban Yek made no reply to this signal. As the Perla was
navigating with the current, then running in from the sea, this vessel, under paragraph 163 of Customs Marine
Circular No. 53, had the right of way over the Ban Yek, and the officers of the Perla interpreted the action of
the Ban Yek in not replying to the Perla's signal as an indication of acquiescence of the officers of the Ban Yek
in the determination of the Perla to keep to the starboard.

The river at this point is about two hundred and fifty feet wide, and the courses thus being respectively pursued
by the two vessels necessarily tended to bring them into a head-on collision. When the danger of such an
occurrence became imminent, Captain Garrido of the Perla, seeing that he was shut off by the Ban Yek from
passing to the right, put his vessel to port, intending to avoid collision or minimize its impact by getting farther
out into the stream. An additional reason for this maneuver, as stated by Captain Garrido, is that the captain of
the Ban Yek waived his hand to Garrido, indicating that the latter should turn his vessel towards the middle of
the stream. At about the same time that the Perla was thus deflected from her course the engine on the Ban Yek
was reversed and three blasts were given by this vessel to indicate that she was backing.

Now, it appears that when the engine is reversed, a vessel swings to the right or left in accordance with the
direction in which the blades of the propeller are set; and as the Ban Yek began to back, her bow was thrown
out into the stream, a movement which was assisted by the current of the river. By this means the Ban Yek was
brought to occupy an oblique position across the stream at the moment the Perla was passing; and the bow of
the Ban Yek crashed into the starboard bumpers of the Perla, carrying away external parts of the ship and
inflicting material damage on the hull. To effect the repairs thus made necessary to the Perla cost her owners
the sum of P17,827, including expenses of survey.

ISSUE: Whether or not both the owner (Lim) and the agent (Siy Cong) are solidarily liable for damages.

RULING: Yes. Upon the point of responsibility for the collision we have no hesitancy in finding that the fault
is to be attributed exclusively to the negligence and inattention of the captain and pilot in charge of the Ban
Yek. The Perla undoubtedly had the right of way, since this vessel was navigating with the current, and
the officers in charge of the Perla were correct in assuming, from the failure of the Ban Yek to respond
to the single blast of the Perla, that the officers in charge of the Ban Yek recognized that the Perla had a
right of way and acquiesced in her resolution to keep to the right. The excuse urged for the Ban Yek is that
this vessel is somewhat larger than the Perla and that it was desirable for the Ban Yek to keep on the side of the
long arc of the curve of the river; and in this connection it is suggested that the river is deeper on the outer edge
of the bend than on the inner edge. It is also stated that on a certain previous occasion the Ban Yek on coming
out from this port had gotten stuck in the mud in this bend by keeping too far to the right. Moreover, it is said
to be the practice of ships in navigating this stream to keep nearer the outside than to the inside of the bend.
These suggestions are by no means convincing. It appears in evidence that the river bottom here is composed
of mud and silt, and as the tide at the time of this incident was nearly at its flood, there was ample depth of
water to have accommodated the Ban Yek if she had kept to that part of the stream which it was proper for her
to occupy. We may further observe that the disparity in the size of the vessels was not such as to dominate the
situation and deprive the Perla of the right of way under the conditions stated. Blame for the collision must
therefore, as already stated, be attributed to the Ban Yek.

But while it is thus demonstrated that Silvino Lim is liable for these damages in the character of owner,
it does not necessarily follows that Siy Cong Bieng & Co., as character or agent (casa naviera), is exempt
from liability; and we are of the opinion that both the owner and agent can be held responsible where both are
impleaded together. In Philippine Shipping Co., vs. Garcia Vergara (6 Phil., 281), it seems to have been
accepted as a matter of course that both owner and agent of the offending vessel are liable for the damage
done; and this must, we think, be true. The liability of the naviero, in the sense of charterer or agent, if not
expressed in article 826 of the Code of Commerce, is clearly deducible from the general doctrine of
jurisprudence stated in article 1902 of the Civil Code, and it is also recognized, but more especially as regards
contractual obligations, in article 586 of the Code of Commerce. Moreover, we are of the opinion that both
the owner and agent (naviero) should be declared to be jointly and severally liable, since the obligation
which is the subject of this action had its origin in a tortuous act and did not arise from contract. Article
1137 of the Civil Code, declaring that joint obligations shall be apportionable unless otherwise provided,
has no application to obligation arising from tort.
 Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. v. Tanjangco
556 SCRA 154 | G.R. No. 160795 | June 27, 2008 | NACHURA, J.:

DOCTRINE: In every tort case filed under this provision, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of
evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some
other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the
fault or negligence and the damages incurred.

The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did
the defendant in committing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinary person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is... guilty of negligence.

FACTS: Before the Cuasos constructed their house on Lot 65, a relocation survey was necessary.
As Geodetic Engineer Democrito De Dios (Engr. De Dios), operating under the business name D.M.
De Dios Realty and Surveying, conducted all the previous surveys for the subdivision's developer,
Corinthian referred Engr. De Dios to the Cuasos.

Before, during and after the construction of the said house, Corinthian conducted periodic ocular
inspections in order to determine compliance with the approved plans pursuant to the Manual of Rules
and Regulations of Corinthian. Unfortunately, after the Cuasos constructed their house employing the
services of C.B. Paraz & Construction Co., Inc. (C.B. Paraz) as builder, their perimeter fence
encroached on the Tanjangcos’ Lot 69 by 87 square meters.

No amicable settlement was reached between the parties. Thus, the Tanjangcos demanded that the
Cuasos demolish the perimeter fence but the latter failed and refused, prompting the Tanjangcos to
file with the RTC a suit against the Cuasos for Recovery of Possession with Damages. Eventually, the
Cuasos filed a Third-Party Complaint8 against Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios.

RTC RULING: It rendered a Decision in favor of the Tanjangcos. It ruled that the Cuasos’ perimeter
wall encroached on the land of the Tanjangos by 87 square meters. It, however, ruled that the Cuasos
were builders in good faith, and gave the Tanjangcos the option to sell and the Cuasos the option to
buy the encroaching portion of the land, at a price to be agreed upon by the parties within sixty (60)
days from receipt of the said Decision. In the event that the Cuasos were unable and unwilling to
purchase the said portion, the perimeter wall should be demolished at the latter’s expense. The RTC
also ordered the Cuasos to pay monthly rentals of P2,000.00 commencing from the time of the filing
of the complaint. The RTC likewise held that C.B. Paraz was grossly negligent in not taking into
account the correct boundaries of Cuasos’ lot when it constructed the house.

CA RULING: It reversed and set aside the RTC Decision. It held that the Cuasos acted in bad faith in
land-grabbing the 87 square meter-portion of Lot 69. Correlatively, the CA allowed the Tanjangcos to
exercise the rights granted under the New Civil Code, which include the right to demand the demolition
of the offending perimeter wall after reimbursing the Cuasos the necessary expenses for the
preservation of the encroached area. The Cuasos were ordered to pay monthly rentals of P10,000.00
for the use, enjoyment and occupancy of the lot from 1989 up to the time they vacate the property
considering the location and category of the same. They were, likewise, ordered to pay the
Tanjangcos P100,000.00, as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P150,000.00
as attorney’s fees. The CA also imposed six percent (6%) interest per annum on all the awards.

On the third-party complaints, Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios were all found negligent in
performing their respective duties and so they were ordered to contribute five percent (5%) each, or a
total of fifteen percent (15%) to all judgment sums and amounts that the Cuasos shall eventually pay
under the decision, also with interest of six percent (6%) per annum.
ISSUES:

1) Whether or not there is legal basis for the Court of Appeals to hold petitioner Corinthian
Gardens Association, Inc. liable to pay 5% of the judgment money to Sps. Tanjangco on
account of the encroachment made by Sps. Cuaso[; and]
2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals has legal basis to increase unilaterally and without proof
the amount prayed for in the Complaint, i.e., P2,000.00, as reasonable compensation for the
use and enjoyment of the portion of the lot encroached upon, to P10,000.00.

RULINGS:

1) YES. Corinthian’s failure to prevent the encroachment of the Cuasos’ perimeter wall into Tanjangcos’
property – despite the inspection conducted – constitutes negligence and, at the very least, contributed
to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos.

The instant case is obviously one for tort, as governed by Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.

In every tort case filed under this provision, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of
evidence:(1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some
other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the
fault or negligence and the damages incurred.

Undeniably, the perimeter fence of the Cuasos encroached on the lot owned by the
Tanjangcos by 87 square meters as duly found by both the RTC and the CA in accordance with the
evidence on record. As a result, the Tanjangcos suffered damage in having been deprived of the use
of that portion of their lot encroached upon. Thus, the primordial issue to be resolved in this case is a
negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly done from a lack of ordinary prudence
and may be one which creates a situation involving an unreasonable risk to another because of the
expectable action of the other, a third person, an animal, or a force of nature.

By its Manual of Rules and Regulations, it is reasonable to assume that Corinthian, through
its representative, in the approval of building plans, and in the conduct of periodic inspections of on-
going construction projects within the subdivision, is responsible in insuring compliance with the
approved plans, inclusive of the construction of perimeter walls, which in this case is the subject of
dispute between the Tanjangcos and the Cuasos. It is not just or equitable to relieve Corinthian of any
liability when, by its very own rules, it imposes its authority over all its members to the end that “no
new construction can be started unless the plans are approved by the Association and the appropriate
cash bond and pre-construction fees are paid.” Moreover, Corinthian can impose sanctions for
violating these rules. Thus, the proposition that the inspection is merely a “table inspection” and,
therefore, should exempt Corinthian from liability, is unacceptable. After all, if the supposed inspection
is merely a “table inspection” and the approval granted to every member is a mere formality, then the
purpose of the rules would be defeated. Compliance therewith would not be mandatory, and sanctions
imposed for violations could be disregarded. Corinthian’s imprimatur on the construction of the Cuasos’
perimeter wall over the property of the Tanjangcos assured the Cuasos that everything was in order.

2) YES. Citing Sia v. Court of Appeals [272 SCRA 141, May 5, 1997], petitioners argue that the MTC
may take judicial notice of the reasonable rental or the general price increase of land in order to
determine the amount of rent that may be awarded to them. In that case, however, this Court relied
on the CA's factual findings, which were based on the evidence presented before the trial court. In
determining reasonable rent, the RTC therein took account of the following factors: 1) the realty
assessment of the land, 2) the increase in realty taxes, and 3) the prevailing rate of rentals in the
vicinity. Clearly, the trial court relied, not on mere judicial notice, but on the evidence presented before
it.

Indeed, courts may fix the reasonable amount of rent for the use and occupation of a disputed property.
However, petitioners herein erred in assuming that courts, in determining the amount of rent, could
simply rely on their own appreciation of land values without considering any evidence. As we have
said earlier, a court may fix the reasonable amount of rent, but it must still base its action on the
evidence adduced by the parties.

This Court declared that the reasonable amount of rent could be determined not by mere judicial notice,
but by supporting evidence. Truly, mere judicial notice is inadequate, because evidence is required
for a court to determine the proper rental value. But contrary to Corinthian's arguments, both the RTC
and the CA found that indeed rent was due the Tanjangcos because they were deprived of possession
and use of their property. This uniform factual finding of the RTC and the CA was based on the
evidence presented. Moreover, in Spouses Catungal v. Hao, this Court considered the increase in the
award of rentals as reasonable given the particular circumstances of each case. We noted therein that
the respondent denied the petitioners the benefits, including rightful possession, of their property for
almost a decade. Similarly, in the instant case, the Tanjangcos were deprived of possession and use
of their property for more than two decades through no fault of their own. Thus, we find no cogent
reason to disturb the monthly rental fixed by the CA.

Petition is DENIED.
 Cinco v. Canonoy
G.R. No. L-33171 | May 31, 1979 | J. Melencio-Herrera

DOCTRINE: The jural concept of a quasi-delict is that of an independent source of obligation "not
arising from the act or omission complained, as a felony." Respondents’ liability being predicated on
quasi-delict, the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent court action as provided for in
Art 2177.

FACTS: In 1970, Porfirio Cinco filed a Complaint in the City Court of Mandaue for the recovery of
damages regarding a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot
and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito. Subsequently, a criminal case was also filed
against the driver, Romeo Hilot.

At the pre-trial in the civil case, respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the final
determination of the criminal suit, which the City Court of Mandaue granted.

Cinco’s Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, he elevated the matter on Certiorari to the
CFI of Cebu, alleging that the City Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion in suspending the
civil action.

CFI RULING: In 1970, the CFI dismissed the Petition, on the ground that (1) damage to property is
not one of the instances when an independent civil action is proper; and (2) that Cinco has another
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under the law, which is to submit his claim for damages in the
criminal case.

Cinco’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied, hence this Petition for Review before the SC.

ISSUE: WON the CFI judge gravely abused his discretion in upholding the decision of the city court
suspending the civil action based on quasi-delict until after the criminal action is finally terminated.

RULING: YES. The ultimate facts conclude that the actions contended by Cinco and the defenses
made by the respondents are principally predicated on Articles 32176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code
which is quasi-delictual in nature and character. The actions are:

I. Cinco’s contention (1) that it was the driver’s fault/negligence in driving the jeep which caused the
collision; (2) that he sustained damages because of the collision; (3) that there is a direct causal
connection between the damage he suffered and the fault/negligence of the driver.

II. The defendant’s contention that they observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of
their employees, which is a defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict.

Liability being predicated on quasi-delict, the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent
court action as provided for in Art 2177.

Section 3 (b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court refers to "other civil actions arising from cases not
included in Section 2 of the same rule" in which, "once the criminal action has been commenced, no
civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in
whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered".

The civil action referred to in Section 2(a) and 3(b), Rule 11 of the Rules of Court which should be
suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the criminal offense, and
not the civil action based on quasi-delict.
The jural concept of a quasi-delict is that of an independent source of obligation "not arising from the
act or omission complained, as a felony."

In the case at bar, the cause of action of Cinco is based on quasi-delict. The concept of quasi-delict in
Article 2176 of the NCC is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to
property. It makes no distinction between "damage to persons" and "damage to property".

The word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for the harm done. And
with respect to "harm" it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and property since "harm" is not
limited to personal but also to property injuries.

Thus, the CFI judge gravely abused his discretion in upholding the Decision of the City Court of
Mandaue, suspending the civil action based on a quasi-delict until after the criminal case is finally
terminated.
 ANDAMO v. IAC
G.R. No. 74761 | November 6, 1990 | C.J. Fernan

DOCTRINE: Elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence
of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the
plaintiff.

FACTS: Petitioners are spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo (Spouses Andamo). They are the
owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to Missionaries of
Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation and herein respondent. Within the land of the
respondent, there are constructed waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake which
allegedly inundated and eroded Spouses Andamo’s land, caused a young man to drown, damaged
petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their
laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.

This prompted Spouses Andamo to file a criminal complaint against herein respondent in July 1982
for violation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code. Consequently, petitioners filed a civil action
on February 22, 1983 praying for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.

RTC: Issued an order suspending further hearings in the civil case until after judgment in the criminal
case. In 1984, the RTC dismissed the civil case for lack of jurisdiction because the criminal case was
still unresolved. The Court’s ruling is based under Section 3 (a) Rule III of the Rules of Court.

IAC: Affirmed the trial court’s ruling.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the civil case.

RULING: YES.

It is a well-settled rule that the nature of the action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint
as to constitute the cause of action. In application, the complaint of Spouses Andamo is a civil action
under Articles 2167 and 2177 of the Civil Code which is a quasi-delict.

The elements of a quasi-delict are present:

a. damages suffered by the plaintiff,
b. fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond;
and
c. the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and
the damages incurred by the plaintiff.

The fact that the water and contrivances built by respondent that alleged inundated the petitioner’s
land was deduced in the complaint. This shows the causal connection between the act of the
respondent and the damage sustained by Spouses Andamo. Such action if proven constitutes fault or
negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.

The court is clear on the said matter. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that an owner of a thing
cannot do anything to injure the rights of others (sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas). An owner of a
land may build structure/s to his land so long as it will not cause damage to an adjoining land owner
or to third persons. As ruled in the case of Samson v. Dionisio: any person who without authority
constructs a bank or dike which causes the stopping of the flow of water; therefore, causing loss and
damages to third persons or residents, is liable for damages to the injured party. The only difference
in the cited case is the land involved is a public one.

However, the fact remains that petitioners already sustained and will continuously sustain damages in
the said act of the respondents. Therefore, the act (or omission) of the respondents constitutes fault
or negligence, and the causal connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing
contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.

There is a difference between criminal and civil negligence. The former refers to a violation of the
criminal law while the latter is distinct and independent negligence which is culpa aquliana or quasi-
delict. Article 2176 covers not only acts not punishable law. Such fact is also evident in Article 2177.

Castillo v. CA held that the same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from
a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under
the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the
civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from
which the civil action arose did not exist, in which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry
with it the extinction of the civil liability. Lastly, Azucena v. Potenciano strengthened the independent
character of civil action as to interpret it as subordinate to the result of the criminal action will render
the civil liability’s independent character as also provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code.
 SIBAL v. NOTRE DAME OF GREATER MANILA
G.R. No. 75093 | February 23, 1990 | J. Paras

DOCTRINE: The series of discriminatory and oppressive acts of respondent school against petitioner
invariably makes respondent liable for moral damages under Art. 1701, which prohibits acts of capital
or labor against each other, and Art. 21 on human relations in relation to Art. 2219 No. 10 and Art.
2220, all of the Civil Code.

FACTS: Petitioner Delia R. Sibal was employed as school nurse by private respondent Notre Dame
of Greater Manila starting January 1973. Prior to school year 1976-1977, she was compensated on a
12-month basis, although she worked only during the ten-month period of classes. She was not
required to report for work for the entire Christmas and summer vacations. However, starting on March
10, 1976, respondent's director Fr. Gonzalez, which was later on replaced by Fr. Garcia, asked the
petitioner repeatedly, on separate occasions, to work even during summer, to which the petitioner
declined to.

Further, despite being employed as the school nurse, the petitioner was also assigned to teach health
subjects to 900 students spread out in nineteen (19) sections of the entire high school department.
This situation came about because the two (2) teachers of the health subjects had left the school.
Petitioner, however, was not given compensation for teaching, notwithstanding the fact that other
teachers were duly compensated for extra work done. Thus, the petitioner repeatedly demanded from
Fr. Garcia her compensation for teaching, however, Fr. Garcia adamantly refused to consider
petitioner's demands and threatened to take drastic measures against her if she remained obstinate
in her refusal to follow his order to report for work that summer.

Failing to receive the compensation demanded, May 10, 1982, petitioner filed a complaint for non-
payment of the following; (1) vacation pay for four (4) summer months; (2) compensation for teaching
health subjects; and (3) deficiency in the 13th month pay for 1981. Summons was served on
respondent school on the opening day of classes on June 14, 1982. That very day when petitioner
reported for work, respondent school served petitioner her letter of termination effective immediately
and it also submitted a copy of the termination paper to the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE).
The following day, petitioner filed an amended complaint, adding two more charges: illegal dismissal
and unfair labor practice. For the next four to five weeks, more than 20 teachers and personnel, backed
up by the Faculty Association of respondent school, pressed for the ouster of Fr. Garcia with the
Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports (MECS) by virtue of PD 176 and the following charges:
oppressive behavior, arrogance, contempt for Filipinos in general and Filipino teachers in particular;
unfairness in dealing with personnel; dictatorial conduct; and use of abusive language. Fr. Garcia was
eventually replaced on September 8, 1983.

LABOR ARBITER RULING: Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dated October 8, 1982 awarding to
petitioner separation pay but denied her claim (1) for compensation for teaching Health subject to 19
sections; (2) for moral damages; and (3) negating the existence of unfair labor practice.

NLRC RULING: Affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the award of separation pay instead of reinstatement is the proper remedy
under the circumstances;
2. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to compensation for teaching health subjects; and
3. Whether or not unfair labor practice existed which would entitle petitioner to moral damages.

RULING:
1. The Court ruled in the negative. The Labor Arbiter herself had found that the termination of the
petitioner was not supported by any just cause or reason. Yet, she erroneously ordered
separation pay instead of reinstatement with backwages based on the alleged reason that
petitioner's working relations with the former director, Father Garcia, had become so strained
and deteriorated that it became impossible for them to work harmoniously again. And the
NLRC affirmed such finding which is untrue and merely speculative.

It should be noted that the alleged conflict between the petitioner and the director was strictly
official in nature, the cause of which was the violation of the terms of employment by the latter.
Petitioner's assertion of her right to unpaid salaries and bonus differential was not motivated
by any personal consideration. Rather, she simply claimed benefits which, under the law, she
was entitled to and legally due her. Ironically, however, the director gave her a downright
shabby treatment by terminating her services without prior notice and without first filing a case
against her wherein she could have defended herself.

Significantly, about a month after petitioner's termination on June 14, 1982, more than twenty
teachers and personnel of respondent school, backed by the Faculty Association, petitioned
for the ouster of Director Fr. Garcia for serious charges under P.D. 176. Consequently, Fr.
Garcia was replaced on September 8, 1983. Clearly, therefore, when the assailed NLRC
decision was rendered on April 11, 1986, the alleged "strained relations" or "irritant factors"
which the Labor Arbiter capitalized on had been totally eliminated. Respondent NLRC
obviously failed to consider this and thus perpetuated the error committed by the Labor Arbiter
in her prior decision. The eventual replacement of Fr. Garcia all the more confirmed the
discriminatory and oppressive treatment which he gave petitioner.

2. The Court ruled in the affirmative. The petitioner is entitled to compensation for teaching health
subjects. Although the subject taught is Health and allied to her profession, and is taught during
regular working hours, petitioner's teaching the subject in the classroom and her administering
to the health needs of students in the clinic involve two different and distinct jobs. They cannot
be equated with each other for they refer to different functions. Teaching requires preparation
of lesson plans, examinations and grades, while clinical work entails preparation of clinical
records and treating illnesses of students in school. There can be no doubt that teaching health
subjects is extra work for petitioner, and therefore necessitates extra compensation. After all,
it has been the practice of the school to pay extra compensation to teachers who were given
extra load even during regular working hours.

3. The Court ruled in the affirmative. In arguing for petitioner's entitlement to moral damages, the
Solicitor General has aptly summed up her plight. The Solicitor General has submitted this
valid justification for the award of moral damages under Art. 1701 of the Labor Code:

"Petitioner had been the subject of discrimination for over a year before she was
ultimately dismissed. When she justifiably refused to obey the order to report for work
for two summers, she was not given her vacation pay for both occasions. Unlike her,
the doctor and dentist who worked in the same clinic, were not required to report during
summer and were given their respective vacation pay. Again, petitioner, unlike the
teachers who accepted extra load, was not given extra compensation when she taught
health subjects to 900 students for one year. By withholding such compensation,
respondent school stood to gain at the expense of petitioner, the amount of the salary
which it could have paid to two (2) health teachers. Petitioner's 13th month pay was
likewise underpaid because the basis for computation was only ten months, and not
one year as in the case of other regular office personnel. Finally, petitioner's travails
culminated in her unceremonious termination without due process at the beginning of
the school year on June 14, 1982, by the service of her termination paper antedated
June 11, 1982.”

"The series of discriminatory and oppressive acts of respondent school against

petitioner invariably makes respondent liable for moral damages under Art. 1701,
which prohibits acts of capital or labor against each other, and Art. 21 on human
relations in relation to Art. 2219 No. 10 and Art. 2220, all of the Civil Code”
 BUNAG, JR. vs. CA and CIRILO
G.R. No. 101749 | July 10, 1992 | Regalado, J.
The award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those provided in Article
2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of said
Article 2219, any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages. Article 21 was
adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, and is intended to
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes.
FACTS: Conrado Bunag Jr. and Zenaida Cirilo were sweethearts. On September 8, 1973, Bunag, Jr.
abducted and brought Cirilo to the motel where he deflowered her against her will and consent. Then,
after promising to marry Cirilo, Bunag Jr. brought her to the house of his grandmother in Pamplona,
Las Piñas, where they lived together.

On September 29, 1973, Bunag Jr. left and never returned. Cirilo filed a complaint for damages for
breach of promise to marry against Bunag, Jr. and his father Bunag, Sr., who allegedly condoned and
supported his son’s promise to marry Cirilo.

RTC: After finding that Bunag Jr. had forcibly abducted and raped Cirilo, the trial court rendered a
decision ordering Bunag, Jr. to pay her P80,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages, among others. Bunag, Sr. was absolved from any and all liability.

CA: Bunag Jr. appealed the decision to Court of Appeals, but the appellate court affirmed in toto the
judgment of the trial court. Hence, this petition.

Bunag Jr. filed this petition for review from the decision of the Court of Appeals. Aside from raising
pure questions of fact, which the Supreme Court refused to settle, Bunag Jr. asserted that since the
action involves a breach of promise to marry, the trial court erred in awarding damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in awarding damages.

RULING: NO, the trial court did not err in awarding damages.
It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for breach
of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property
advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to
marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the
wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.
However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those
provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to
paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages.
Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of
moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, and is
intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes.
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting
private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter promising to
marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after
cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary to morals and good
customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which indisputably warrant
and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in relation
to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code.
Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were awarded by the trial court
on the basis of a finding that he is guilty of forcible abduction with rape, despite the prior dismissal of
the complaint therefor filed by private respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office.
Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that
every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In other words, criminal liability will give
rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to
another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Hence, extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere
resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not in
any way affect the right of herein private respondent to institute a civil action arising from the offense
because such preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not carry with it the extinction of the civil
action.
The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings involved are not
between the same parties. Furthermore, it has long been emphasized, with continuing validity up to
now, that there are different rules as to the competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in
criminal and civil proceedings. In a criminal action, the State must prove its case by evidence which
shows the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is sufficient for the
plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance of evidence only. Thus, in Rillon, et al. vs. Rillon, we
stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be first instituted and
prosecuted to final judgment before a civil action based on said offense in favor of the offended woman
can likewise be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment.
 GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES
(G.R. No. 97336, 19 February 1993, Davide Jr. J.)

Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the
giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying
her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to
accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant
to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and
the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that
such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

FACTS: Gonzales, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the trial court a complaint for damages
against Gashem for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said
complaint that she is 22 years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and
reputation duly respected in her community. Gashem, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen and an
exchange medical student here in the Philippines. Gashem courted and proposed to marry her. She
accepted his love on the condition that they would get married. They therefore agreed to get married
after the end of the school semester. Gashem then visited Gonzales' parents in Pangasinan to secure
their approval to the marriage. Gashem forced her to live with him. She was a virgin before she began
living with him. A week before the filing of the complaint, Gashem's attitude towards her started to
change. He maltreated and threatened to kill her. As a result of such maltreatment, she sustained
injuries. Also, during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain a day before the
filing of the complaint, Gashem repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with
him anymore. She then discovered that Gashem is already married to someone living in Bacolod City.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, Gashem claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to
be married with Gonzales. He neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her
to live in his apartment.

RTC RULING: After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, ruled in
favor of Gonzales. The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that Gashem,
through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry Gonzales, which is the reason
why she agreed to live with him. However, Gashem did not fulfill his promise to marry her. Petitioner
appealed the trial court's decision to the CA.

CA RULING: The CA promulgated the challenged decision affirming in toto the trial court's ruling.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar;

RULING: It is Gashem's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed
any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or
proposed marriage to Gonzales; and he has never maltreated her. Finally, Gashem asseverates that
even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to Gonzales and had also
promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable. The mere breach of promise is not
actionable. The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
This notwithstanding, a provision, Article 21, is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict
in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Article 2176
of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict as “whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter”, is limited to negligent acts or omissions and
excludes the notion of willfulness or intent.
In the light of the purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise
to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation
to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a
sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was
only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her
consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of
such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor
and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been
committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

In the instant case, the CA found that it was Gashem's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love
for and promise to marry Gonzales that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to
live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise
these fraud and deception on Gashem's part that made Gonzales' parents agree to their daughter's
living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." In short, Gonzales surrendered her virginity,
the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction.
Gashem could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338
of the Revised Penal Code because Gonzales was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of
the seduction.We are unable to agree with Gashem's alternative proposition to the effect that granting,
for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry Gonzales, the latter is nevertheless also at fault.
According to him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code,
Gonzales cannot recover damages from Gashem. The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for
while indeed, Gonzales may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually
submitted to Gashem in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is
apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out
that Gashem was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with
Gashem. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault."
At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.
 AMELITA CONSTANTINO and MICHAEL CONSTANTINO, the latter represented herein by the
former, his mother and natural guardian, petitioners, vs. IVAN MENDEZ and the HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 57227 | May 14, 1992 | BIDIN, J.:

FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari questioning the decision of the Court of Appeals
which dismissed petitioner’s complaint and set aside the resolution of the then Court of First Instance
of Davao, ordering private respondent: (1) to acknowledge the minor Michael Constantino as his
illegitimate child; (2) to give a monthly support of P300.00 to the minor child; (3) to pay complainant
Amelita Constantino the sum of P8,200.00 as actual and moral damages; and (4) to pay attorney’s
fees in the sum of P5,000 plus costs.

Petitioner filed with the then CFI of Davao an action for acknowledgment, support and damages
against private respondent in June 1975. Petitioner alleges, that sometime in the month of August,
1974, she met respondent at Tony’s Restaurant, where she worked as a waitress; the following day
respondent invited petitioner to dine with him at Hotel Enrico where he was billeted; on the pretext of
getting something, respondent brought petitioner inside his hotel room and through a promise of
marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the latter and repeated whenever respondent
is in Manila even after respondent confessed that he is a married man after their first sexual contact.

In respondent’s answer in August 1975, Ivan admitted that he met petitioner at Tony’s Cocktail Lounge
but denied having sexual knowledge or illicit relations with her. He prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of cause of action.

The trial court rendered a decision, in favor of petitioner. Respondent is to pay for actual and moral
damages, attorney’s fees and the costs of the suit. Both parties filed their separate motion for
reconsideration. Respondent anchored his motion on the ground that the award of damages was not
supported by evidence. Petitioner sought the recognition and support of her son Michael Constantino
as the illegitimate son of Ivan Mendez. The trial court granted petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

On appeal the amended decision was set aside and the complaint was dismissed. Hence, this petition
for review.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO CLAIM FOR DAMAGES BASED ON

ARTICLES 19 & 21

HELD: NO, PETITIONER CANNOT CLAIM FOR DAMAGES BASED ON ARTICLES 19 & 21

According to ART. 19 Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

In the case at bar petitioner was already 28 years old and she admitted that she was attracted to
respondent. Petitioner’s attraction to respondent is the reason why she surrendered her womanhood.
Had petitioner been induced or deceived because of a promise of marriage, she could have
immediately ended her relation with respondent when she knew that respondent was a married man
after their first sexual contact. Her declaration that in the months of September, October and November,
1974, they repeated their sexual intercourse only indicates that passion and not the alleged promise
of marriage was the moving force that made her submit herself to respondent. The Supreme Court
said “Damages could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and
mutual desire” therefore petitioner is not entitled to claim for damages based on articles 19 & 21

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is Dismissed for lack of merit.

 MICHAEL LONDON for and in behalf of his minor son NICHOLAS FREDERICK LONDON v.
BAGUIO COUNTRY CLUB CORPORATION, ANTHONY DE LEON and FRANCIS BASTIANO
SIMALONG
G.R. No. 145436 | October 10, 2002 | J. Vitug
DOCTRINE: It may not be amiss to reiterate that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice; thus, their strict and rigid application that would tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice are well to be avoided. Indeed, the Rules of Civil Procedure on
forum shopping are not always applied with inflexibility.
FACTS: Sometime in 1998, Nicholas London, then 11 years old, assisted by his father Michael, filed
before the Office of the Prosecutor in Baguio City a complaint form Sexual Harassment and/or Child
Abuse and/or Acts of Lasciviousness and Unjust Vexation" against Simalong, a bowling mechanic at
the Baguio Country Club, alleging that while Nicholas was playing video games at the recreation center
club when Simalong who was then drunk, touched Nicholas’s penis.
Later, an information for unjust vexation and a complaint for damages was filed before the RTC in
Baguio against Baguio Country Club, its manager de Leon, and Simalong.
Baguio Country Club moved for its dismissal due to forum shopping as the complaint did not disclose
the existence and status of the unjust vexation case.
RTC ruling: granted the motion to dismiss.
London then filed this petition for review assailing the dismissal of his complaint.
ISSUE: Whether there is forum shopping in this case.
RULING: NONE.
Forum shopping is the institution of 2 or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause
upon the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
For forum shopping to exist, the actions must involve the same transaction, including the essential
facts and circumstances thereof, and must raise identical causes of actions, subject matter and issues.
The mere filing of two or more cases based on the same incident does not necessarily constitute
forum-shopping.
In fine, there should be (a) identity of parties or at least such parties who represent the same interests
in both actions, (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, such relief being founded on the
same circumstances, and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
action under consideration, said requisites being likewise constitutive of the elements of auter action
pendent or litis pendencia.
In this case, both the criminal action and the civil complaint for quasi-delict have arisen from an act of
lasciviousness claimed to have been committed by Simalong against the person of Nicholas Frederick
London, there are, however, material differences between the two actions.
In the criminal case, the real party plaintiff is the "People of the Philippines" and the defendant is
accused Simalong alone. In the civil case, the parties are plaintiff Michael London, for and in behalf of
his minor son Nicholas Frederick London, and the defendants include not only Simalong but also the
Baguio Country Club and its general manager Anthony de Leon. Given the circumstances, a judgment
of conviction or acquittal in the criminal case against Simalong cannot at all be invoked as being one
of res judicata in the independent suit for damages. Hence, Baguio Country Club’s motion to dismiss
which was granted by the RTC is set aside, and the civil case is reinstated.
B.F. METAL (CORPORATION) v. SPS. ROLANDO M. LOMOTAN and LINAFLOR LOMOTAN and
RICO UMUYON
G.R. No. 170813 | April 16, 2008 | J. Tinga | Willful or intentional
In fine, an award of moral damages would require, firstly, evidence of besmirched reputation or
physical, mental or psychological suffering sustained by the claimant; secondly, a culpable act or
omission factually established; thirdly, proof that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the
proximate cause of the damages sustained by the claimant; and fourthly, that the case is predicated
on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code.
However, there is no legal basis in awarding moral damages to Spouses Lomotan whether arising
from the criminal negligence committed by Rivera or based on the negligence of the petitioner under
Article 2180. Article 2220 does speak of awarding moral damages where there is injury to property,
but the injury must be willful and the circumstances show that such damages are justly due. There
being no proof that the accident was willful, Article 2220 does not apply.
FACTS: In the morning of 03 May 1989, respondent Rico Umuyon ("Umuyon") was driving the owner-
type jeep owned by respondents, Spouses Rolando and Linaflor Lomotan ("Spouses Lomotan"). The
jeep was cruising along Felix Avenue in Cainta, Rizal at a moderate speed of 20 to 30 kilometers per
hour. Suddenly, at the opposite lane, the speeding ten-wheeler truck driven by Onofre Rivera overtook
a car by invading the lane being traversed by the jeep and rammed into the jeep. The jeep was a total
wreck while Umuyon suffered "blunt thoracic injury with multiple rib fracture, fractured scapula (L), with
pneumohemothorax," which entailed his hospitalization for 19 days. Also in view of the injuries he
sustained, Umuyon could no longer drive, reducing his daily income from P150.00 to P100.00.
Respondents instituted a separate and independent civil action for damages against petitioner and
Rivera before the RTC. They alleged that Rivera’s gross negligence and recklessness was the
immediate and proximate cause of the accident, and that petitioner failed to exercise the required
diligence in the selection and supervision of Rivera. They prayed for actual, exemplary and moral
damages and attorney’s fees.
RTC RULING: The trial court declared Rivera negligent when he failed to determine with certainty that
the opposite lane was clear before overtaking the vehicle in front of the truck he was driving. It also
found petitioner negligent in the selection and supervision of its employees when it failed to prove the
proper dissemination of safety driving instructions to its drivers. It awarded actual, moral, and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

a) Actual --- i. P130,655.00, for cost of repairing the

Damages owner-type jeep.

ii. P10,167.99 in medical expenses.

iii. P2,850.00 for lost earnings during medical

treatment.

(b) Moral --- P100,000.00

Damages

(c) --- P100,000.00

Exemplary
Damages
 (d) --- P25,000.00
Attorney’s
Fees

CA RULING: The CA affirmed the finding of the trial court that Rivera’s negligences was the proximate
cause of the accident and that petitioner was liable under Art. 2180, NCC for its negligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees. However, it reduced the amount of damages awarded.

(a) Actual - i. P96,700.00 for cost of the owner-

Damages - type jeep
-

ii. P15,000.00 medical expenses

iii. P50,000.00 for loss of earnings

(b) Moral - P100,000.00

Damages -
-

(c) Exemplary - P100,000.00

Damages -
-

(d) Attorney’s - P25,000.00 plus P1,000.00 for every

Fees - Court appearance
-

ISSUE:
1. Whether the reduction of actual damages is proper?
2. whether Spouses Lomotan are also entitled to moral damages?
3. whether the award of exemplary damages and attorneys is warranted?

RULING:
1. Yes. Actual damages are such compensation or damages for an injury that will put the injured
party in the position in which he had been before he was injured. They pertain to such injuries or
losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of measurement. To justify an award of actual
damages, there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss. Credence can be given only to
claims which are duly supported by receipts.

In the instant case, no evidence was submitted to show the amount actually spent for the repair or
replacement of the wrecked jeep. Spouses Lomotan presented two different cost estimates to prove
the alleged actual damage of the wrecked jeep. As correctly pointed out by petitioner, the best
evidence to prove the value of the wrecked jeep is reflected in Exhibit "I," the Deed of Sale showing
the jeep’s acquisition cost at P72,000.00. However, the depreciation value of equivalent to 10% of the
acquisition cost cannot be deducted from it in the absence of proof in support thereof.

2. No. Petitioner argues that the award of moral damages was premised on the resulting physical
injuries arising from the quasi-delict; since only respondent Umuyon suffered physical injuries, the
award should pertain solely to him. Correspondingly, the award of exemplary damages should pertain
only to respondent Umuyon since only the latter is entitled to moral damages, petitioner adds.
Petitioner’s position is meritorious.

In the case of moral damages, recovery is more an exception rather than the rule. Moral damages are
not punitive in nature but are designed to compensate and alleviate the physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar harm unjustly caused to a person. In order that an award of moral damages
can be aptly justified, the claimant must be able to satisfactorily prove that he has suffered such
damages and that the injury causing it has sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219and
2220 of the Civil Code. Then, too, the damages must be shown to be the proximate result of a wrongful
act or omission. The claimant must establish the factual basis of the damages and its causal tie with
the acts of the defendant. In fine, an award of moral damages would require, firstly, evidence of
besmirched reputation or physical, mental or psychological suffering sustained by the
claimant; secondly, a culpable act or omission factually established; thirdly, proof that the
wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the damages sustained by
the claimant; and fourthly, that the case is predicated on any of the instances expressed or
envisioned by Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code. In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict,
(a) when an act or omission causes physical injuries, or (b) where the defendant is guilty of intentional
tort, moral damages may aptly be recovered. In culpa criminal, moral damages could be lawfully due
when the accused is found guilty of physical injuries, lascivious acts, adultery or concubinage, illegal
or arbitrary detention, illegal arrest, illegal search, or defamation.

Undoubtedly, petitioner is liable for the moral damages suffered by respondent Umuyon. Its liability is
based on a quasi-delict or on its negligence in the supervision and selection of its driver, causing the
vehicular accident and physical injuries to respondent Umuyon. However, there is no legal basis in
awarding moral damages to Spouses Lomotan whether arising from the criminal negligence
committed by Rivera or based on the negligence of the petitioner under Article 2180. Article
2219 speaks of recovery of moral damages in case of a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries
or quasi-delicts causing physical injuries, the two instances where Rivera and petitioner are liable for
moral damages to respondent Umuyon. Article 2220 does speak of awarding moral damages
where there is injury to property, but the injury must be willful and the circumstances show
that such damages are justly due. There being no proof that the accident was willful, Article
2220 does not apply.

3. Yes. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Exemplary damages
cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they should be
adjudicated. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show
that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the
question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded.

As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Spouses Lomotan have shown that they are entitled
to compensatory damages while respondent Umuyon can recover both compensatory and moral
damages. To serve as an example for the public good, the Court affirms the award of exemplary
damages in the amount of P100,000.00 to respondents. Because exemplary damages are awarded,
attorney’s fees may also be awarded in consonance with Article 2208 (1).
 ILAO-ORETA v. SPS. RONQUILLO
G.R. No. 172406 | October 11, 2007 | J. Carpio-Morales

DOCTRINE: Negligence can be partly attributed to human frailty which rules out its characterization
as gross.

FACTS: Respondents, spouses Eva Marie Ronquillo (Eva Marie) and Noel Benedicto (Noel) Ronquillo
(the Ronquillo spouses or the spouses) consulted petitioner Dr. Concepcion Ilao-Oreta (Dr. Ilao-Oreta,
an obstetrician-gynecologist-consultant at the St. Luke’s Medical Center, since they had not been
blessed with a child.

Eva Marie agreed with Dr. Ilao-Oreta for her to undergo a laparoscopic procedure which was
scheduled on April 5, 2009 at 2pm. However, Dr. Ilao-Oreta arrived at 10pm because she was
on a return flight from Hawaii.

In this regard, the Ronquillo spouses filed a complaint against Dr. Ilao-Oreta and the St. Luke’s Medical
Center for breach of professional and service contract and for damages before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Batangas City. They prayed for the award of actual damages including alleged loss of
income of Noel while accompanying his wife to the hospital, moral damages, exemplary damages, the
costs.

Defense of Petitioner Dr. Ilao-Oreta: Dr. Ilao-Oreta went on a honeymoon to Hawaii and estimated
that her flight from Hawaii to Manila would only take for about 12 hours. Thus, thought that she would
arrive on time for the scheduled procedure.

RTC: The RTC only awarded Eva Marie actual damages amounting to P9,939 ad costs of suit since
Dr. Ilao-Oreta’s failure to arrive on time was not intentional.

CA: On appeal of the spouses to the CA, the latter found Dr. Ilao-Oreta grossly negligent and
increased the amount of actual damages to P16,069.40, and added P50k for moral damages, P25k
for exemplary damages, and P20k for attorney’s fees. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUES:
1. WON Dr. Ilao-Oreta acted with gross negligence.
2. WON the court erred in awarding exemplary damages.
3. WON the court erred in awarding actual damages.
4. WON the court erred in awarding attorney’s fees.

RULING:

1. NO. The Court held that Dr. Ilao-Oreta’s negligence did not amount to gross negligence,
therefore, eliminating the spouses’ entitlement to damages.

“Gross negligence” implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the
entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort
to avoid them. It is characterized by want or even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation
where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference
to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected.

Petitioner’s failure to take into consideration the time difference between the Philippines and Hawaii
did not present any clear and apparent harm or injury that even a careless person may perceive. Thus,
the act of Petitioner in merely fixing the date of her appointment with respondent Eva, she was not in
the pursuit or performance of conduct which may probably and naturally result in injury.
Further, it must be noted that the only purpose of the scheduled procedure was to determine the real
cause of infertility and not to treat and cure a life-threatening disease. Furthermore, records show that
Petitioner manifested earnest intention to perform the procedure on the scheduled appointment since
she instructed her staff to perform pre-operative treatments. Petitioner even apologized to the
respondents and offered her service on the same date that she wasn’t able to meet them on the
scheduled time.

And while the Court measured the failure of Dr. Ilao-Oreta to meet her clients on the scheduled time
as negligence, considering that she already traveled more than once to the US, the Court concluded
that such failure is not tantamount to gross negligence. The Court considered the fact that Dr. Ilao-
Oreta had just gotten married and was in her honeymoon. Therefore, her negligence can be partly
attributed to human frailty which rules out its characterization as gross.

2. YES, the CA erred in awarding the spouses with exemplary damages since it was not shown
that Dr. Ilao-Oreta acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.

3. NO, the CA did not err in awarding actual damages. However, the SC reduced the same. The
Court held that the alleged P300 spent on fuel consumption and P500 spent on food in the
hospital canteen were unsubstantiated by independent and competent proof. This was
because the evidence supporting it was an unsigned listing and not by a receipt.

With regard to the claim for hospital and medical expenses, the Court held that the only amount
refundable to the spouses was the remaining balance of P2,711.30 from the P5k deposit. The
Court awarded interest on the actual damages at the rate of 6% per annum from the time of
filing of the complaint on May 18, 1999, and at 12% per annum from the finality of judgment,
as ruled in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. CA.

4. YES, the CA erred in awarding the spouses with attorney’s fees since it was not shown that
the spouses were compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect their interest. Records
show that Respondents Spouses did not exert efforts to settle the matter before going to court.
 People vs Castillo Jr.
G.R. No. 121768 | July 21, 1997

DOCTRINE: CRIMINAL LAW; RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE, ELUCIDATED. — A deliberate intent to

do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. What qualifies an
act as one of reckless or simple negligence or imprudence is the lack of malice or criminal intent in the
execution thereof. Otherwise stated, in criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be
unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act done without malice but with lack of foresight,
carelessness, or negligence, and which has harmed society or an individual

FACTS: Domingo Castillo, Jr. (Boyet) and his father Domingo Castillo, Sr. (Domingo) were in the D&G
Restaurant in Norzagaray, Bulacan, drinking beer. After 2 hours of drinking, a group of noisy
customers arrived. Domingo knew about his son’s propensity to get into fights so he asked Boyet to
go home with him. Boyet drove to the direction of their home in Angat, Bulacan. An argument ensued
between the Boyet and his father who were both a bit drunk already because the former kept insisting
that he should or could go back to the restaurant while the latter prevented him from doing so. Boyet
abrupty stopped the pick-up upon nearing their house and the victim alighted therefrom. Holding a
bottle of beer in his right hand, the victim raised both of his hands, stood in front of the pick-up and
said, sige kung gusto mo sagasaan mo ako, hindi ka makakaalis (go ahead, run over me if you want
to leave). Boyet slowly drove the pick-up forward threatening to run over the victim. His father
exclaimed, papatayin mo ba ako? (are you going to kill me?). Boyet backed-up almost hitting an owner
type jeep parked at the side of the road and on board which were 4 people conversing with each other,
including prosecution eyewitness, Ma. Cecilia Mariano. Then at high speed, Boyet drove the pick-up
forward hitting the victim in the process. Not satisfied with what he had done, the appellant put the
vehicle in reverse thereby running over the victim a second time. The appellant then alighted from the
vehicle and walked towards their house.

Arthur Agaran saw the incident and brought the victim to Dolorosa Hospital at Norzagaray where he
died.

Boyet passed off the death of his father as an accident. A suspicion of foul play surfaced when his
sister from the US, Leslie C. Padilla, was given different versions of his death. the NBI made a formal
investigation into the matter. She filed an information alleging parricide against her brother.

RTC found Boyet guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE: W/N Boyet is guilty of Parricide.

RULING: Yes. The Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The prosecution has successfully established the elements of parricide: (1) the death of the deceased;
(2) that he or she was killed by the accused; and (3) that the deceased was a legitimate ascendant or
descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.

The records are bereft of any evidence that the appellant had tried to avoid hitting the victim who
positioned himself in front of the pick-up. On the contrary, Marianos testimony is to the effect that prior
to actually hitting the victim, the appellant was intimidating him by moving the pick-up forward, thus
prompting the victim to exclaim, papatayin mo ba ako?. Worse, the appellant backed-up to gain
momentum, then accelerated at a very fast speed knowing fully well that the vehicle would definitely
hit the victim who was still standing in front of the same.

A man who had not intended to harm his own father would not walk but more likely run in search of
help. Aware of the fact that his fathers life is precariously hanging in the balance, the normal reaction
of a child is to waste no time in trying to save his life. The appellant, on the other hand, did not even
lift a finger to help his own father whose life he had so brutally taken away. It was Agaran and the
other workers who, on their own accord, brought the victim to the hospital. In the light of the foregoing
circumstances, we therefore find it difficult to believe that the appellant did not act with malice. Worth
reiterating here is the rule that evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness, but it must be credible in itself- such as the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.

Ironically, it is the appellant’s testimony that finally clinches his conviction. His testimony reveals that
a certain degree of enmity and resentment characterized his relationship with his parents. The
appellant was the only son of well to do parents. He had never held a days job in his entire life, and
although already a family man himself, he continued to rely solely on his parents support. That he was
a little spoiled is beyond doubt. The appellant admitted that during the previous years, he and his
parents had some differences. As a matter of fact, several days prior to the incident, his father who
wanted him to look for a job had a heart to heart talk with him, and asked him, ganito ka na lang ba?
(will you never change?). Finally, it was the appellant himself who told the court that the incident was
preceded by an argument between him and his father who was determined to prevent him from
returning to the restaurant. But what exactly motivated the appellant to commit so heinous a crime
continues to be beyond the comprehension of this court.

CRIMINAL LAW; RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE, ELUCIDATED. — A deliberate intent to do an unlawful

act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. What qualifies an act as one of
reckless or simple negligence or imprudence is the lack of malice or criminal intent in the execution
thereof. Otherwise stated, in criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional,
it being simply the incident of another act done without malice but with lack of foresight, carelessness,
or negligence, and which has harmed society or an individual.

What qualifies an act as one of reckless or simple negligence or imprudence is the lack of malice or
criminal intent in the execution thereof. Otherwise stated, in criminal negligence, the injury caused to
another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act done without malice but
with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence, and which has harmed society or an individual.
 Paman v. People, 830 SCRA 149

Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, a person driving a vehicle
is presumed negligent if, at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Here, Paman
was violating a traffic regulation, i.e., driving on the wrong side of the road, at the time of the collision.
He is thus presumed to be negligent at the time of the incident, which presumption he failed to
overcome.

FACTS: On October 14, 2004, at about 1:20 p.m., Ursicio Arambala (Arambala) was on board a
motorcycle traversing Roxas Street, Pagadian City towards the direction of the Southern Mindanao
Colleges Main Campus. When he was nearing the intersection of Roxas and Broca Streets in
Pagadian City, a multicab driven by S/Sgt. Cornelio Paman (Paman), a military personnel, crossed his
path and collided with his motorcycle. Arambala was thrown from his motorcycle thus hitting his head
on the road pavement. Emilda Salabit, who was then standing beside the road, saw Arambala being
thrown away after the collision; she went to Arambala and hailed a tricycle and rushed him to the
hospital.

A Computed Tomography Scan report shows that Arambala suffered hematoma at the cerebral portion
of his brain. After his confinement at the Mercy Community Hospital on October 15, 2004, Arambala
was again admitted on October 24, 2004 at the Zamboanga del Sur Provincial Hospital due to erratic
blood pressure and slurring speech caused by the hematoma.

On February 21, 2005, an Information for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in serious
physical injuries, docketed as Criminal Case No. 14034, was filed with the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of Pagadian City against Paman. Paman pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.

After due proceedings, the MTCC, on February 11, 2010, rendered a Judgment finding Paman guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries. On appeal,
however, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed and set aside MTCC’s decision. In acquitting Paman
of the offense charged, the RTC pointed out that Arambala was the cause of the collision since he
already saw the multicab driven by Paman ahead of time; that he had the opportunity to take
precaution to avoid the accident, but he failed to do so. The CA then reversed the RTC’s decision
holding Paman guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries. Paman alleged that
the RTC correctly observed that Arambala, based on his testimony, applied the brakes on his
motorcycle when he saw the multicab; that he should have accelerated his speed instead of hitting the
brakes to avoid the collision, thus, the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Paman is liable.

RULING: A perusal of the records of this case clearly shows that it was Paman who was at fault since
he was driving at the wrong side of the road when the collision happened at the time private
complainant Ararnbala was hit by S/Sgt. Parnan's multicab, he was proceeding to SMC Main to log in
for his attendance. Public respondent, as a consequence, concluded that Ararnbala may have been
in a hurry so he had to over speed. Also, public respondent correlated the presence of skid marks that
Arambala was driving fast.

However, the evidence indubitably shows that before the collision, Arambala's motorcycle was cruising
along its rightful lane when S/Sgt. Paman's multicab suddenly crossed his (Arambala) path coming
from his left side along Broca Street using the wrong lane to cross the said intersection. The accident
would not have happened had S/Sgt. Paman, the multicab driver, stayed on his lane and did not
overtake the vehicle of the private complainant Arambala
Paman's act of driving on the wrong side of the road, in an attempt to overtake the motorcycle driven
by Arambala, and suddenly crossing the path which is being traversed by the latter, is sheer
negligence. It is a settled rule that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking
another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and he should
not proceed if he cannot do so in safety. If, after attempting to pass, the driver of the overtaking vehicle
finds that he cannot make the passage in safety, the latter must slacken his speed so as to avoid the
danger of a collision, even bringing his car to a stop if necessary.20 This rule is consistent with Section
4l(a) of Republic Act No. 4136, as amended, otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code, which provides:

Sec. 41. Restrictions on overtaking and passing. (a) The driver of a vehicle shall not drive to the left
side of the center line of a highway in overtaking or passing another vehicle proceeding in the same
direction, unless such left side is clearly visible, and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance
ahead to permit such overtaking or passing to be made in safety.

Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, a person driving a vehicle
is presumed negligent if, at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Here, Paman
was violating a traffic regulation, i.e., driving on the wrong side of the road, at the time of the collision.
He is thus presumed to be negligent at the time of the incident, which presumption he failed to
overcome. For failing to observe the duty of diligence and care imposed on drivers of vehicles
abandoning their lane, Paman, as correctly held by the CA, must be held liable.
 Prudencio Clemente Jr. v. ESO Nice- Transport Corporation
916 SCRA 170 | August 28, 2019 | J. J.C Reyes Jr.

Negligence is not among the just cause under Article 297 of Labor Code which would validate
respondent's act of terminating the petitioner from employment.

FACTS: ESO-Nice Transport Corporation (respondent) hired petitioner as bus dispatcher in its Baguio
branch. 7 When its Baguio branch operations was audited in August 2013, respondent found out that
numerous collections were not deposited in its bank account. In a letter, the respondent gave the
petitioner 72 hours to explain the following violations:

[a] Unremitted collection of payment of United Van Assoc. — dated August 3, 2013 P15,000.00
[b] Unremitted payment of M. Kaley dated August 2013 — P60,000.00
[c] Other sales

Petitioner also sent a similar letter to Alex Garcia (Garcia), who admitted using the money to pay the
hospitalization bills of his father.

On the next month, respondent called for a meeting to discuss the matter of undeposited collections.
Such was attended by the petitioner and the other concerned employees of the respondent.
Respondent claimed that during the said meeting, the petitioner admitted appropriating for himself
numerous proceeds of the company. Subsequently, respondent claimed that petitioner and Garcia
admitted to having fraudulently taken the undeposited collections in the amount of P56,710.46 and
P665,090.55, respectively. As proof, respondent submitted a document denominated as Eso-Nice
Transport Corp., Undeposited Collections, January 1 to August 31, 2013, which shows the petitioner
and Garcia's handwritten and signed confession dated October 3, 2013.

Subsequently, a Notice of termination was served to petitioner dated October 2013 for having admitted
to the taking of the initial undeposited collections in the amount of P665,090.55. Thereafter,
respondent filed with the Baguio City prosecutor's office a complaint against the petitioner and Garcia
for qualified theft. The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City agreed with the finding of probable cause
by the investigating prosecutor and ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the petitioner.
In the meantime, or on January 10, 2014, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal,
underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay in 2013 and wages for September 15 to 30,
2013 and October 1 to 9, 2013, service incentive leave pay, overtime pay, separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement, full backwages and attorney's fees.

LABOR ARBITER RULING: The Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner had been illegally dismissed given
that respondent failed to show any valid cause for his termination. The Labor Arbiter also concluded
that the signature of the petitioner in the said document where he allegedly admitted to pocketing the
undeposited collections was forged because his handwriting therein was different from his
penmanship in the document where he denied his liability for the missing collections.

NLRC RULING: The NLRC held that other than petitioner's purported admission, respondent
miserably failed to adduce substantial evidence to justify his termination.

CA RULING: The CA ruled that respondent complied with the twinnotice requirement when it gave
the petitioner a chance to be heard and subsequently informed him of his dismissal from employment
for committing qualified theft against it. The CA also found the admission of the petitioner that he failed
to deposit the collections in the amount of P56,710.46 coupled with the findings of probable cause for
Qualified Theft by both the investigating prosecutor and the RTC as valid ground for the respondent
to impose disciplinary action upon the petitioner. However, the CA found the penalty of dismissal
imposed by the respondent upon the petitioner to be not commensurate to the offense committed.
Thus, it ordered petitioner's reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights, but
without backwages or other monetary benefits.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that petitioner was legally dismissed by the respondent.
2. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the petitioner is only entitled to reinstatement but
not to backwages or other monetary benefits.

RULING:

1. Yes. A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that respondent indeed failed to comply
with the due process requirement. The August 22, 2013 Notice given by respondent fell short
of the standards set by the law and jurisprudence. In the said notice, petitioner was made to
explain not only the unremitted collections for August 3, 2013 that was collected from the
United Van Association and the unremitted payment of M. Kaley for August 2013, but also
"other sales." Being made to account for "other sales" without more, clearly does not contain
the required narration of facts and circumstances as would sufficiently apprise the petitioner
of the grounds for which his dismissal was sought and thereby enable him to intelligently
prepare his explanation and defense. In short, the blanket notice, instead of informing the
petitioner of the violation for which his explanation is being required, creates confusion on the
nature of the complaints against him. Negligence, however, is not among the just cause under
Article 297 which would validate respondent's act of terminating the petitioner from
employment. Such being the case, the finding of probable cause for the crime of qualified theft
without more, as discussed above, does not meet the required degree of proof of substantial
evidence as would justify petitioner's dismissal from work.

2. Yes. Given that the petitioner was dismissed without just cause and without due process, he
is entitled to reinstatement, without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent
computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement under Article 294 of the Labor Code. However, considering the strained
relationship now existing between the parties, the grant of separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement is justified.
 Gregorio v. Court of Appeals
599 SCRA 594 | September 11, 2009 | Nachura, J.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the
damages suffered by him; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person to whose
act he must respond; (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the
damages incurred; and (4) that there must be no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.

FACTS: The case arose from the filing of an Affidavit of Complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
(Bouncing Checks Law) by respondent Datuin as officer and upon authority of petitioner Sansio,
against petitioner Gregorio and one Vito Belarmino, as proprietors of Alvi Marketing, allegedly for
delivering insufficiently funded bank checks as payment for the numerous appliances bought by Alvi
Marketing from Sansio. Consequently, she was indicted for three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg.
The MeTC issued a warrant of arrest for her. Gregorio filed before the MeTC a Motion for Deferment
of Arraignment and Reinvestigation, which was granted, alleging that she could not have issued the
bounced checks, since she did not even have a checking account with the bank on which the checks
were drawn, and her signature was different from the signatures appearing on the bounced checks.
In the course of the reinvestigation, Datuin submitted an Affidavit of Desistance stating that Gregorio
was not one of the signatories of the bounced checks subject of prosecution.

Gregorio filed a complaint for damages against Sansio and Datuin before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC). Sansio and Datuin filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint, being one for
damages arising from malicious prosecution, failed to state a cause of action, as the ultimate facts
constituting the elements thereof were not alleged in the complaint.

RTC RULING: The RTC ruled in favor of Gregorio.

CA RULING: The CA rendered a Decision on the certiorari case granting the petition and ordering the
dismissal of the damage suit of Gregorio.

ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint, a civil suit filed by Gregorio, is based on quasi-delict or malicious
prosecution

RULING: Gregorio's civil complaint, read in its entirety, is a complaint based on quasi-delict under
Article 2176, in relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code, rather than on malicious prosecution.

In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff has to prove by a
preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by him; (2) the fault or negligence of the
defendant or some other person to whose act he must respond; (3) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred; and (4) that there must be no pre existing
contractual relation between the parties.

On the other hand, Article 26 of the Civil Code grants a cause of action for damages, prevention, and
other relief in cases of breach, though not necessarily constituting a criminal offense, of the following
rights: (1) right to personal dignity; (2) right to personal security; (3) right to family relations; (4) right
to social intercourse; (5) right to privacy; and (6) right to peace of mind.

A scrutiny of Gregorio’s civil complaint reveals that the averments thereof, taken together, fulfill the
elements of Article 2176, in relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code. It appears that Gregorio’s rights to
personal dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were infringed by Sansio and Datuin
when they failed to exercise the requisite diligence in determining the identity of the person they should
be rightfully accused of tendering insufficiently funded checks. This fault was compounded when they
failed to ascertain the correct address of petitioner, thus depriving her of the opportunity to controvert
the charges, because she was not given proper notice. Because she was not able to refute the charges
against her, petitioner was falsely indicted for three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Although
she was never found at No. 76 Peñaranda St., Legaspi City, the office address of Alvi Marketing as
stated in the criminal complaint, Gregorio was conveniently arrested by armed operatives of the
PARAC-DILG at her city residence at 78 K-2 St., Kamuning, Quezon City, while visiting her family.
She suffered embarrassment and humiliation over her sudden arrest and detention and she had to
spend time, effort, and money to clear her tarnished name and reputation, considering that she had
held several honorable positions in different organizations and offices in the public service, particularly
her being a Kagawad in Oas, Albay at the time of her arrest. There exists no contractual relation
between Gregorio and Sansio. On the other hand, Gregorio is prosecuting Sansio, under Article 2180
of the Civil Code, for its vicarious liability, as employer, arising from the act or omission of its employee
Datuin.

Sansio and Datuin are in error when they insist that Gregorio’s complaint is based on malicious
prosecution. In an action to recover damages for malicious prosecution, it must be alleged and
established that Sansio and Datuin were impelled by legal malice or bad faith in deliberately initiating
an action against Gregorio, knowing that the charges were false and groundless, intending to vex and
humiliate her. As previously mentioned, Gregorio did not allege this in her complaint. Moreover, the
fact that she prayed for moral damages did not change the nature of her action based on quasi-delict.
She might have acted on the mistaken notion that she was entitled to moral damages, considering
that she suffered physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation on account of her indictment and her sudden
arrest.

Verily, Gregorio was only acting within her right when she instituted against Sansio and Datuin an
action she perceived to be proper, given the factual antecedents of the case.
Moral Damages: When awardable; when not
Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claim for actual injury suffered
and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer

EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION v. CALDERON

2004 Dec 14 | G. R. No. 156168
Facts:
Jose Calderon, a prominent businessman, applied and was issued an Equitable International Visa
card which can be used for both peso and dollar transactions within and outside the Philippines. In its
dollar transactions, respondent is required to maintain a dollar account with a minimum deposit of $3,
000.00, the balance shall serve as a credit limit. In one of his trips to Hongkong, together with a friend, he
went to a Gucci Department Store where he tried to purchase several Gucci items (which amounted to
HK$4,030.00 or equivalent to US$523.00) using his Visa card. The saleslady informed him in front of his
friend and other shoppers that the transaction failed because his Visa card was blacklisted. Upon his
return to the Philippines, Calderon filed a complaint for damages claiming he suffered much torment and
embarrassment on account of EBC’s wrongful act of blacklisting/suspending his Visa card while at the
Gucci Store in Hongkong. The trial court ruled in favor of Calderon. On appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling
of the lower court but reducing the moral damages awarded by the latter and justified that EBC was
negligent in not informing Calderon that his credit card was already suspended even before he left for
Hongkong, ratiocinating that petitioner’s right to automatically suspend a cardholder’s privileges without
notice should not have been indiscriminately used in the case of respondent because the latter has already
paid his past obligations and has an existing dollar deposit in an amount more than the required minimum
for credit card at the time he made his purchases in Hongkong.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the respondent is entitled to moral
damages notwithstanding its finding that petitioner’s actions have not been attended with any malice or
bad faith?
Ruling:
Yes. In law, moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury. However, to
be entitled to the award thereof, it is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish
or serious anxiety as a result of the actuations of the other party.
Conditions to be met in order that moral damages may be recovered:
1) Evidence of besmirched reputation, or physical, mental or psychological suffering sustained
by the claimant;
2) A culpable act or omission factually established;
3) Proof that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the
damages sustained by the claimant; and
4) That the case is predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Articles 2219
and 2220 of the Civil Code. (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation vs. Court of Appeals)
 Particularly, in culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages are recoverable only if the
defendant has acted fraudulently or in bad faith, or is found guilty of gross negligence amounting to
bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligations. Verily, the breach must be wanton,
reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppressive or abusive.
In the present case, the CA ruled, and rightly so, that no malice or bad faith attended petitioner’s
dishonor of respondent’s credit card. For, as found no less by the same court, petitioner was justified in
doing so under the provisions of its Credit Card Agreement with respondent, paragraph 3 of which states:
xxx the CARDHOLDER agrees not to exceed his/her approved credit limit, otherwise,
all charges incurred including charges incurred through the use of the extension CARD/S,
if any in excess of credit limit shall become due and demandable and the credit privileges
shall be automatically suspended without notice to the CARDHOLDER in accordance with
Section 11 hereof.
We are thus at a loss to understand why, despite its very own finding of absence of bad faith or
malice on the part of the petitioner, the CA nonetheless adjudged it liable for moral damages to respondent.
Calderon’s card privileges for dollar transactions were suspended because of his past due and
demandable obligations. He made a deposit of US$14,000.00 in his dollar account but did not bother to
request the petitioner for the reinstatement of his credit card privileges for dollar transactions, thus the
same remained under suspension. On account of this, and with the express provision on automatic
suspension without notice under paragraph 3 of the parties’ Credit Card Agreement, there is simply no
basis for holding petitioner negligent for not notifying respondent of the suspended status of his credit
card privileges. And, certainly, respondent could not have justifiably assumed that petitioner must have
reinstated his card by reason alone of his having deposited US$14,000.00 a day before he left for
Hongkong. As issuer of the card, petitioner has the option to decide whether to reinstate or altogether
terminate a credit card previously suspended on considerations which the petitioner deemed proper, not
the least of which are the cardholder’s payment record, capacity to pay and compliance with any
additional requirements imposed by it.
Even on the aspect of negligence, therefore, petitioner could not have been properly adjudged
liable for moral damages.
Unquestionably, respondent suffered damages as a result of the dishonor of his card. There is,
however, a material distinction between damages and injury. To quote from the decision in BPI Express
Card Corporation vs. Court of Appeals:
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury;
and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be
damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a
legal duty. In such cases the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no
remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These
situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he
complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed
to the plaintiff- a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it.
The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in
contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for
that breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause
of the injury. In the situation in which respondent finds himself, his is a case of damnum absque injuria.
 Aznar vs. Citibank, N. A. (Philippines)
G.R. No. 164273 | March 28, 2007 | J. Austria-Martinez

DOCTRINE: Rules on Electronic Evidence

Pertinent sections of Rule 5 read:

Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. – The person seeking to introduce an electronic

document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner
provided in this Rule.

Section 2. Manner of authentication. – Before any private electronic document offered as

authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:

(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the same;
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by
the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the
document; or
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.

Even if examined under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which took effect on August 1, 2001,
and which is being invoked by Aznar in this case, the authentication of Exh. "G" would still be
found wanting.

FACTS: Emmanuel B. Aznar (Aznar), is a holder of a Preferred Master Credit Card (Mastercard)
issued by Citibank with a credit limit of P150,000.00. As he and his wife, Zoraida, planned to take
their two grandchildren, Melissa and Richard Beane, on an Asian tour, Aznar made a total advance
deposit of P485,000.00 with Citibank with the intention of increasing his credit limit to
P635,000.00.

Aznar claims that when he presented his Mastercard in some establishments in Malaysia,
Singapore and Indonesia, Ingtan Tour and Travel Agency in Indonesia (to purchase tickets to Bali)
but the was not honoured for the reason that his card was blacklisted by Citibank. Such dishonor
forced him to buy the tickets in cash. He further claims that his humiliation caused by the denial
of his card was aggravated when Ingtan Agency spoke of swindlers trying to use blacklisted cards.

On August 26, 1994, Aznar filed a complaint for damages against Citibank, docketed as Civil Case
No. CEB-16474 and raffled to RTC Branch 20, Cebu City, claiming that Citibank fraudulently or
with gross negligence blacklisted his Mastercard which forced him, his wife and grandchildren
to abort important tour destinations and prevented them from buying certain items in their tour.
To prove that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard, Aznar presented a computer print-out,
denominated as ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to
him by Ingtan Agency (Exh. "G") with the signature of one Victrina Elnado Nubi (Nubi) which
shows that his card in question was "DECL OVERLIMIT" or declared over the limit.
As a defence, Citibank’s Credit Card Department Head, Dennis Flores, presented Warning
Cancellation Bulletins which contained the list of its cancelled cards covering the period of
Aznar’s trip.

RTC RULING:

On May 29, 1998, RTC Branch 20, Cebu City, through Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos, rendered its
decision dismissing Aznar’s complaint for lack of merit. The trial court held that as between the
computer print-out presented by Aznar and the Warning Cancellation Bulletins presented by
Citibank, the latter had more weight as their due execution and authenticity were duly established
by Citibank. Aznar filed a motion for reconsideration this time through Judge Jesus S. De la Peña
of Branch 10 of Cebu City, the court issued an Order granting Aznar’s motion.

CA RULING:

Thus, Citibank filed an appeal with the CA and its counsel filed an administrative case against
Judge De la Peña for grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and incompetence, claiming
among others that said judge rendered his decision without having read the transcripts. On
January 30, 2004, the CA rendered its Decision granting Citibank’s appeal. Aznar filed a motion
for reconsideration which the CA dismissed in its Resolution dated May 26, 2004. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Exh. "G" qualifies as electronic evidence following the Rules on Electronic
Evidence which provides that print-outs are also originals for purposes of the Best Evidence Rule
hence, should not be excluded as evidence.

RULING: As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, however, such exhibit cannot be
considered admissible as its authenticity and due execution were not sufficiently established by
petitioner.

The prevailing rule at the time of the promulgation of the RTC Decision is Section 20 of Rule 132
of the Rules of Court. It provides that whenever any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by (a) anyone who
saw the document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.

Aznar, who testified on the authenticity of Exh. "G," did not actually see the document executed
or written, neither was he able to provide evidence on the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of Nubi, who handed to him said computer print-out.

Even if examined under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which took effect on August 1, 2001,
and which is being invoked by Aznar in this case, the authentication of Exh. "G" would still be
found wanting.
Pertinent sections of Rule 5 read:

Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. – The person seeking to introduce an electronic

document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner
provided in this Rule.

Section 2. Manner of authentication. – Before any private electronic document offered as

authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:

(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the same;
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by
the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the
document; or
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.

Aznar claims that his testimony complies with par. (c), i.e., it constitutes the "other evidence
showing integrity and reliability of Exh. "G" to the satisfaction of the judge." The Court is not
convinced. Aznar’s testimony that the person from Ingtan Agency merely handed him the
computer print-out and that he thereafter asked said person to sign the same cannot be
considered as sufficient to show said print-out’s integrity and reliability. As correctly pointed out
by Judge Marcos in his May 29, 1998 Decision, Exh. "G" does not show on its face that it was issued
by Ingtan Agency as Aznar merely mentioned in passing how he was able to secure the print-out
from the agency; Aznar also failed to show the specific business address of the source of the
computer print-out because while the name of Ingtan Agency was mentioned by Aznar, its
business address was not reflected in the print-out.

Indeed, Aznar failed to demonstrate how the information reflected on the print-out was
generated and how the said information could be relied upon as true.
 ZENAIDA F. DAPAR alias ZENAIDA D. BIASCAN v. GLORIA LOZANO BIASCAN and MARIO
BIASCAN

G.R. No. 141880 | September 27, 2004 | CALLEJO, SR., J.

DOCTRINE: The mere use of a surname cannot be enjoined; it is the use thereof coupled with the representation
that one is the lawful wife, or the usurpation of the wife’s status, which gives rise to an action for damages.

FACTS: In 1966, Spouses Gloria and Mario Biascan were married in civil rights. They had four children. Mario,
an electrician, worked in Saudi Arabia as an overseas contract worker, where he met Zenaida Dapar, who was
then working as a domestic helper. Zenaida and Mario became lovers, which resulted in the latter’s failure to
give support to his wife and family.

Upon Mario’s return to the country, he joined Zenaida to live in together and they opened a joint account. Mario
returned to Saudi Arabia. He remitted his earnings to Zenaida, and the latter deposited the said amounts in the
joint savings account. These remittances were credited in the said account, as well as others coming from
Zenaida’s relatives who were also working abroad.

A contract to sell was executed, over a parcel of land and a Deed of Sale was executed in favor of the "Sps.
Mario M. Biascan and Zenaida D. Biascan," as vendees. Gloria L. Biascan then filed a complaint against Zenaida
for annulment of title, reconveyance, and damages in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan. Zenaida filed a
Motion to Dismiss.

RTC RULING: The court ruled in favor of Zenaida and dismissed the complaint. It ruled that the law on co-
ownership governed the property relations of Mario and Zenaida. Anent Zenaida’s use of the surname Biascan,
the trial court ruled that Gloria was not entitled to damages since Mario consented thereto.

CA RULING: The appellate court reversed the decision and ruled that the appellee failed to establish that she
contributed money to the purchase price of the house and lot in question. There is no basis to justify her co-
ownership. In the determination of the nature of the property acquired during their live-in partner status, the
controlling factor is the source of the money utilized in the purchase.

Moreover, that there was fraud, deceit and misrepresentation in the acquisition of the property in question,
depriving the lawful wife and the property acquired during the marriage which forms part of the conjugal
partnership between Mario M. Biascan and Gloria Lozano Biascan. Zenaida’s motion for reconsideration was,
likewise, denied.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner is liable to Gloria Biascan for damages for usurpation of the surname of Mario
Biascan

RULING: NO. The usurpation of name under Article 377 of the Civil Code implies some injury to the interests
of the owner of the name. It consists in the possibility of confusion of identity between the owner and the usurper,
and exists when a person designates himself by another name. The elements are as follows: (1) there is an actual
use of another’s name by the defendant; (2) the use is unauthorized; and (3) the use of another’s name is to
designate personality or identify a person.

None of the foregoing exist in the case at bar. Respondent Gloria Biascan did not claim that the petitioner ever
attempted to impersonate her. In fact, the trial court found that respondent Mario Biascan allowed the petitioner
to use his surname.
The very first time that Zenaida Dapar’s name had the surname Biascan was when defendant Mario Biascan had
executed the affidavit of undertaking in connection with his employment in Saudi Arabia, wherein he designated
as his beneficiary Zenaida Dapar Biascan. The undertaking was sworn to by the defendant on April 7, 1982 and
which also showed that his effective date of employment in Saudi Arabia was April 1982 and to expire on
February 1984.
Zenaida appeared to have no participation in the preparation of said document. Moreover, when the contract to
sell and the deed of sale of the property in question were executed, Zenaida Dapar used the surname Biascan and
defendant Mario Biascan did not object to the use of such surname. Also, in the joint bank account with the PNB
Valenzuela, the name Zenaida Dapar Biascan is described as a joint depositor.
Defendant Zenaida Dapar testified that she used the surname Biascan because she was instructed by her co-
defendant to do so and she thought the latter was not married. She only became aware of his civil status a few
years later after their living together in 1981.
The use by Zenaida Dapar of the surname of her co-defendant Mario Biascan was allowed by the latter and in
no case could it be considered usurpation of surname. Accordingly, co-defendant Zenaida Dapar can no longer
be held liable for damages for the use thereof.
The mere use of a surname cannot be enjoined; it is the use thereof coupled with the representation that one is
the lawful wife, or the usurpation of the wife’s status, which gives rise to an action for damages.
 Safeguard Security Agency v. Tangco
G.R. No. 165732|December 14, 2006|AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

DOCTRINE: Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only acts committed with
negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or
negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent.

FACTS:
Evangeline Tangco a duly licensed firearm holder went to ecology bank to renew her time deposit.
Evangeline approached security guard Pajarillo to deposit her firearm. Suddenly, S.G. Pajarillo shot
Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death.

Evangeline's husband together with their six minor children filed with RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City,
a complaint for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard
for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by its
security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

In their Answer, petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint and alleged that Safeguard
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that
Evangeline's death was not due to Pajarillo's negligence as the latter acted only in self-defense.

RTC RULING:
The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillo's claim that he merely
acted in self-defense. It gave no credence to Pajarillo's bare claim that Evangeline was seen roaming
around the area prior to the shooting incident since Pajarillo had not made such report to the head
office and the police authorities. The RTC further ruled that being the guard on duty, the situation
demanded that he should have exercised proper prudence and necessary care by asking Evangeline
for him to ascertain the matter.

The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and severally liable with Pajarillo.
It ruled that while it may be conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of
its employees, particularly of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's
evidence simply showed that it required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not the
supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not only the issuance of regulations
and instructions designed for the protection of persons and property, for the guidance of their servants
and employees, but also the duty to see to it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully
complied with.

CA RULING:
In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the applicable provisions are not
Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on civil
liability arising from felonies under the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE/S:

A. Whether the CA correctly held that respondents, in filing a separate civil action against petitioners
are limited to the recovery of damages arising from a crime or delict, in which case the liability of
Safeguard as employer under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code is subsidiary and the
defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employee is not available to it.

B. Whether Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline;

RULING:

A. The CA erred in ruling that the liability of Safeguard is only subsidiary. Respondents reserved the
right to file a separate civil action and in fact filed the same. It is important to determine the nature of
respondents' cause of action. The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the
complaint as constituting the cause of action. The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern
it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but
rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.

The scope of Article 2176 is not limited to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. In Dulay v.
Court of Appeals, we held:

Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but
also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77
SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that:

Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by
law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or
not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111,
refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even
by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana
includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law."

The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal liability of Pajarillo in the criminal
case but one based on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict which is separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from crime. The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in the civil case is
a quasi-delict not an act or omission punishable by law.

B. YES. Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claim that Evangeline was seen roaming outside the vicinity
of the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. Evangeline's death was merely due
to Pajarillo's negligence in shooting her on his imagined threat that Evangeline will rob the bank.

Garratt v. Dailey
46 Wash 2d 197 (1955)

DOCTRINE: "Character of actor's intention. In order that an act may be done with the intention of
bringing about a harmful or offensive contact or an apprehension thereof to a particular person, either
the other or a third person, the act must be done for the purpose of causing the contact or
apprehension or with knowledge on the part of the actor that such contact or apprehension is
substantially certain to be produced."

FACTS:
The liability of an infant for an alleged battery is presented to this court for the first time. Brian Dailey
(age five years, nine months) was visiting with Naomi Garratt, an adult and a sister of the plaintiff, Ruth
Garratt, likewise an adult, in the backyard of the plaintiff's home, on July 16, 1951. It is plaintiff's
contention that she came out into the backyard to talk with Naomi and that, as she started to sit down
in a wood and canvas lawn chair, Brian deliberately pulled it out from under her. The only one of the
three persons present so testifying was Naomi Garratt. (Ruth Garratt, the plaintiff, did not testify as to
how or why she fell.)

The trial court, unwilling to accept this testimony, adopted instead Brian Dailey's version of what
happened, and made the following findings: "III.... that while Naomi Garratt and Brian Dailey were in
the back yard the plaintiff, Ruth Garratt, came out of her house into the back yard. Some time
subsequent thereto defendant, Brian Dailey, picked up a lightly built wood and canvas lawn chair which
was then and there located in the back yard of the above described premises, moved it sideways a
few feet and seated himself therein, at which time he discovered the plaintiff, Ruth Garratt, about to
sit down at the place where the lawn chair had formerly been, at which time he hurriedly got up from
the chair and attempted to move it toward Ruth Garratt to aid her in sitting down in the chair; that due
to the defendant's small size and lack of dexterity he was unable to get the lawn chair under the plaintiff
in time to prevent her from falling to the ground. That plaintiff fell to the ground and sustained a fracture
of her hip, and other injuries and damages as hereinafter set forth. Hence, this appeal to Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the allegation of Brian's action in moving the chair constituted a battery.

RULING: The Court did not rule on the said issue but the cause is remanded for clarification, with
instructions to make definite findings on the issue of whether Brian Dailey knew with substantial
certainty that the plaintiff would attempt to sit down where the chair which he moved had been, and to
change the judgment if the findings warrant it. It is urged that Brian's action in moving the chair
constituted a battery. A definition (not all-inclusive but sufficient for our purpose) of a battery is the
intentional infliction of a harmful bodily contact upon another.

The rule that determines liability for battery is given in 1 Restatement, Torts, 29, § 13, as:
"An act which, directly or indirectly, is the legal cause of a harmful contact with another's person makes
the actor liable to the other, if
"(a) the act is done with the intention of bringing about a harmful or offensive contact or an
apprehension thereof to the other or a third person, and
"(b) the contact is not consented to by the other or the *201 other's consent thereto is procured by
fraud or duress, and
"(c) the contact is not otherwise privileged."

We have in this case no question of consent or privilege. We therefore proceed to an immediate

consideration of intent and its place in the law of battery. In the comment on clause (a), the
Restatement says:

"Character of actor's intention. In order that an act may be done with the intention of bringing
about a harmful or offensive contact or an apprehension thereof to a particular person, either
the other or a third person, the act must be done for the purpose of causing the contact or
apprehension or with knowledge on the part of the actor that such contact or apprehension is
substantially certain to be produced."

In this connection, we quote another portion of the comment on the "Character of actor's intention,"
relating to clause (a) of the rule from the Restatement heretofore set forth:

"It is not enough that the act itself is intentionally done and this, even though the actor realizes
or should realize that it contains a very grave risk of bringing about the contact or
apprehension. Such realization may make the actor's conduct negligent or even reckless but
unless he realizes that to a substantial certainty, the contact or apprehension will result, the
actor has not that intention which is necessary to make him liable under the rule stated in this
Section."

[3] A battery would be established if, in addition to plaintiff's fall, it was proved that, when Brian moved
the chair, he knew with substantial certainty that the plaintiff would attempt to sit down where the chair
had been. If Brian had any of the intents which the trial court found, in the italicized portions of the
findings of fact quoted above, that he did not have, he would of course have had the knowledge to
which we have referred. The mere absence of any intent to injure the plaintiff or to play a prank on her
or to embarrass her, or to commit an assault and battery on her would not absolve him from liability if
in fact he had such knowledge. Mercer v. Corbin (1889), 117 Ind. 450, 20 N.E. 132, 3 L.R.A. 221.
Without such knowledge, there would be nothing wrongful about Brian's act in moving the chair, and,
there being no wrongful act, there would be no liability.

[4] While a finding that Brian had no such knowledge can be inferred from the findings made, we
believe that before the plaintiff's action in such a case should be dismissed there should be no question
but that the trial court had passed upon that issue; hence, the case should be remanded for clarification
of the findings to specifically cover the question of Brian's knowledge, because intent could be inferred
therefrom. If the court finds that he had such knowledge, the necessary intent will be established and
the plaintiff will be entitled to recover, even though there was no purpose to injure or embarrass the
plaintiff. Vosburg v. Putney, supra. If Brian did not have such knowledge, there was no wrongful act
by him, and the basic premise of liability on the theory of a battery was not established.

TALMAGE v. SMITH
101 Mich. 370 | July 5, 1894 | J. Montgomery

DOCTRINE: The doctrine of transferred intent is based upon the notion that one should not be allowed
to escape liability for wrongdoing simply because someone other than the intended target was injured.
Tort law is not overly preoccupied with intent to cause a specific injury to a specific party - the overriding
concern is with wrongful conduct.

FACTS: On September 17, 1891, some limekilns were burning a short distance from defendant’s
premises, in Portland, Ionia county. Defendant, Charles Smith, had on his premises certain sheds. He
came up to the vicinity of the sheds and saw 6 or 8 boys on the roof of one of them. He claimed that
he ordered the boys to get down, and they at once did so. He then passed around to where he had a
view of the roof of another shed, and saw two boys on the roof. Once again, Smith ordered the boys
to get down. The boys started to go down but before they succeeded in doing so, the defendant took
a stick, 2 inches in width and about 16 inches long, and threw it in the direction of the boys. The stick
hit the plaintiff, Charles Talmage, just above the eye with such force as to inflict an injury which resulted
in the total loss of eyesight.

Defendant contends that he threw the stick without intending to hit anybody. Not knowing the plaintiff
was on the shed, therefore he was not liable.

ISSUE: W/N Talmage is liable

RULING: Yes. The Court held that the plaintiff, in climbing upon the shed, could not have anticipated
the throwing of the stick, and the fact that he was a trespasser did not place him beyond the pale of
the law. The right of the plaintiff to recover was made to depend upon an intention on the part of the
defendant to hit somebody, and to inflict an unwarranted injury upon someone. Under these
circumstances, the fact that the injury resulted to another than was intended does not relieve the
defendant from responsibility.

UNITED STATES (US) v. MAISA

8 Phil. 597 / G.R. No. L-3728 |September 25, 1907 | C.J. Arellano

DOCTRINE:
The fact that the wrongful act was committed upon a person other than the one against whom it was
directed does not excuse the offender from criminal liability for the voluntary commission of a wrongful
act or misdemeanor, following the provisions of paragraph 3 of article 1 of the Penal Code.

FACTS:
It was proven in this case that while Anastasio Maisa and Jose Machon were engaged in a fight, Isaac
Monrayo tried to separate them and gave Maisa a push which caused the latter to fall to the ground,
and on getting up Maisa struck Monrayo in the face, hitting him in the right eye, which became
completely disable. The accused alleged that the blow was aimed at Machon, and not at Monrayo.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Maisa is liable for the injury suffered by Monrayo whom he did not intend to hurt or
injure (YES)

RULING:
Yes. The reason is the doctrine of transferred intent. The Court held that although the wrongful act be
committed against a person other than the one whom it was intended to injure, this fact does not
excuse the offender from criminal liability for the voluntary commission of a wrongful act or
misdemeanor, according to paragraph 3 of article 1 of the Penal Code.

Therefore, the judgment appealed from, whereby the accused is sentenced to two years four months
and one day of prision correccional, and to pay Isaac Monrayo an indemnity of 50 pesos or to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, was affirmed. Further, Maisa is sentenced to pay the
costs of both instances.

People v. Herrera
371 SCRA 480 | December 5, 2001 | J. Ynares Santiago

DOCTRINE: The fact that the accused killed a person other than their intended victim is of no moment.
Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act is different
from that which is intended. One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the
consequences which may naturally or logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not.
The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine, el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado,
or he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused. The accused performed voluntary
acts. The purpose was to kill. Hence, notwithstanding the mistake in the identity of the victim,
the accused is still criminally liable.

FACTS: Enrique Gana was sitting on a steel chair while eating fish balls and cuddling his child around
6:30 pm of May 29, 1986 outside his home in Pasay City when his friend policeman Edgardo Herrera
confronted him and suddenly shot him six times in different parts of his body using his service firearm,
a .38 caliber revolver. After the sixth shot, Herrera casually walked away. Meanwhile, Gana’s neighbor
Corazon Cajipo, who was merely standing and chit chatting 10 meters away from Gana, caught a slug
in her temple. Gana and Cajipo died while being rushed to the hospital.
 As such, Herrera was charged with murder for “willfully, unlawfully and with intent to kill and
qualified with treachery” gunning down Gana, and homicide for the death of Cajipo. On arraignment
on November 7, 1996, the accused entered a plea of not guilty to the crimes charged. The cases were
consolidated and tried jointly.

In his defense, Herrera said he shot Gana several times only as an act of self-defense alleging
that there was unlawful aggression when the victim tried to grab his gun. He also argued that there
was no provocation on his part, treachery nor intent to kill as he was only there to verify about what
transpired two nights before the incident at their friend’s birthday party. He claimed that Gana and his
friends made him drink liquor, kicked, urinated on him and made fun of him when he went unconscious.

RTC RULING: The Regional Trial Court sentenced Herrera with death penalty for murder under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, qualified with treachery and also with the aggravating circumstance
of taking advantage by the accused of his public position.

For Cajipo’s death, Herrera was held guilty of homicide in view of the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage of his public office. Without any mitigating circumstances to offset
it, the RTC sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten years and 1 day
of Prision Mayor as minimum to Seventeen (17) Years, 4 months and one day
of Reclusion Temporal as maximum.

He was also ordered to pay each family of Cajipo and Gana P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death
and P50,000.00 for moral and exemplary damages, and additional P25,000 to Cajipo’s heirs for actual
damages for funeral and burial expenses.

CA RULING: The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court. The CA said
Herrera’s narration of events and alibis of self-defense and self-preservation were “incredible” and
“unconvincing.”

ISSUE/s:

1. Whether or not Court Herrera is liable for killing Cajipo although she was not the intended
victim

OTHER ISSUE/s:

2. Whether of not Herrera is guilty of murder for the death of Gana

3. Whether or not death penalty is justified since he is a public officer

RULING:

1. RULING ON ISSUE #1: YES.

Herrera remains liable for homicide even if Cajipo was not the intended victim.

Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act be different
from that which is intended. One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the
consequences which may naturally or logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not.
The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine, el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado,
or he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused. The accused performed voluntary
acts. The purpose was to kill. Hence, notwithstanding the mistake in the identity of the victim,
the accused is still criminally liable.
However, Herrera could only be liable for homicide for the death of Cajipo, and not murder as the
Office of the Solicitor General would point out.

Although the attack was made in continuous aggression that cannot be broken up to constitute
separate, distinct and independent assaults, the Court may not upgrade the penalty to murder on
account of treachery. It cannot be said that a crime against a victim was qualified by treachery where
he was hurt solely because he was in the wrong place at the wrong time.

2. RULING ON ISSUE #2: YES.

The Court ruled that Herrera is guilty of murder for killing Gana due to the presence of treachery. The
Court said his defense was riddled with loopholes to be believed. The claim of self-defense will not
prosper absent evidence of prior unlawful and unprovoked attack by the victim.

As cited in People v Gadia, to prove self-defense, the following requisites must be present: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it; (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Of these
requisites, the most decisive is that the victim was guilty of unlawful aggression. This is because the
theory of self-defense is based on the necessity on the part of the person being attacked to prevent or
repel the aggression.

2. RULING ON ISSUE #3: NO.

The Court held that the RTC improperly applied the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of
public position and, therefore, the sentence of death penalty is not justified.

The mere fact that accused-appellant is a policeman and used his government issued .38 caliber
revolver to kill Ganan is not sufficient to establish that he misused his public position in the commission
of the crime. There was no showing that accused-appellant took advantage of his being a policeman
to shoot Ganan or that he used his influence, prestige or ascendancy in killing the victim. Herrera
could have shot Ganan even without being a policeman. If the accused could have perpetrated the
crime even without occupying his position, there is no abuse of public position.

The Court, therefore, reduced Herrera’s penalty from death sentence to reclusion perpetua for the
death of Gana.

QUINTO v. ANDRES
G.R. No. 155791 | March 16, 2005 | J. Callejo

DOCTRINE: The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him
and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, to reform and
rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. The sole purpose of the civil action is the
restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he
sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused. While the prosecution must prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged, it is required to prove the
cause of action of the private complainant against the accused for damages and/or restitution.

It is of judicial notice that nowadays persons have killed or committed serious crimes for no reason at
all. However, the absence of any ill-motive to kill the deceased is relevant and admissible in evidence
to prove that no violence was perpetrated on the person of the deceased. In this case, the petitioner
failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part of either respondent to kill the deceased before or
after the latter was invited to join them in fishing.

FACTS: At around 7:30 a.m. on November 13, 1995, eleven-year-old Edison Garcia, a Grade 4
elementary school pupil, and his playmate, Wilson Quinto, who was also about eleven years old, were
at Barangay San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac. They saw respondents Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco
by the mouth of a drainage culvert. Andres and Pacheco invited Wilson to go fishing with them inside
the drainage culvert. Wilson assented. When Garcia saw that it was dark inside, he opted to remain
seated in a grassy area about two meters from the entrance of the drainage system. Respondent
Pacheco had a flashlight. He, along with respondent Andres and Wilson, entered the drainage system
which was covered by concrete culvert about a meter high and a meter wide, with water about a foot
deep.

After a while, respondent Pacheco, who was holding a fish, came out of the drainage system and left
without saying a word. Respondent Andres also came out, went back inside, and emerged again, this
time, carrying Wilson who was already dead. Respondent Andres laid the boys lifeless body down in
the grassy area. Shocked at the sudden turn of events, Garcia fled from the scene.

For his part, respondent Andres went to the house of petitioner Melba Quinto, Wilsons mother, and
informed her that her son had died. Melba Quinto rushed to the drainage culvert while respondent
Andres followed her.

The cadaver of Wilson was buried without any autopsy thereon having been conducted. The police
authorities of Tarlac, Tarlac, did not file any criminal complaint against the respondents for Wilsons
death. Two weeks thereafter, or on November 28, 1995, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
investigators took the sworn statements of respondent Pacheco, Garcia and petitioner Quinto.
Respondent Pacheco alleged that he had never been to the drainage system catching fish with
respondent Andres and Wilson. He also declared that he saw Wilson already dead when he passed
by the drainage system while riding on his carabao.

On February 29, 1996, the cadaver of Wilson was exhumed. Dr. Dominic Aguda of the NBI performed
an autopsy thereon at the cemetery finding that the CAUSE OF DEATH of the victim is Asphyxia by
drowning; traumatic head injuries, contributory. After presenting Garcia, the prosecution presented Dr.
Dominic Aguda, who testified on direct examination that the hematoma at the back of the victims head
and the abrasion on the latters left forearm could have been caused by a strong force coming from a
blunt instrument or object. The injuries in the larynx and trachea also indicated that the victim died of
drowning, as some muddy particles were also found on the lumina of the larynx and trachea. Dr. Aguda
stated that such injury could be caused when a person is put under water by pressure or by force.

On cross-examination, Dr. Aguda declared that the hematoma on the scalp was caused by a strong
pressure or a strong force applied to the scalp coming from a blunt instrument. He also stated that the
victim could have fallen, and that the occipital portion of his head could have hit a blunt object. Dr.
Aguda also declared that the 14x7-centimeter hematoma at the back of Wilsons head could have
rendered the latter unconscious, and, if he was thrown in a body of water, the boy could have died by
drowning. After the prosecution had presented its witnesses and the respondents had admitted the
pictures showing the drainage system including the inside portions thereof the prosecution rested its
case.

RTC RULING: The respondents filed a demurer to evidence which the trial court granted on the ground
of insufficiency of evidence, per its Order dated January 28, 1998. It also held that it could not hold the
respondents liable for damages because of the absence of preponderant evidence to prove their
liability for Wilsons death.
CA RULING: CA affirmed RTC’s decision. The acquittal in this case is not merely based on reasonable
doubt but rather on a finding that the accused-appellees did not commit the criminal acts complained
of. Thus, pursuant to the above rule and settled jurisprudence, any civil action ex delicto cannot
prosper. Acquittal in a criminal action bars the civil action arising therefrom where the judgment of
acquittal holds that the accused did not commit the criminal acts imputed to them.

ISSUES:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE EXTINCTION OF RESPONDENTS CRIMINAL LIABILITY, LIKEWISE,

CARRIES WITH IT THE EXTINCTION OF THEIR CIVIL LIABILITY.
2. WHETHER OR NOT PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD RESPONDENTS
CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF WILSON QUINTO.[16]

RULING:

1. The civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment
in the civil action that the act or omission from where the civil liability may arise does not exist.—
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. However,
the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment
in the civil action that the act or omission from where the civil liability may arise does not exist. A
person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and logical consequences resulting
therefrom although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended—“natural” refers
to an occurrence in the ordinary course of human life or events, while “logical” means that there is
a rational connection between the act of the accused and the resulting injury or damage.—A
person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and logical consequences resulting
therefrom although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. “Natural” refers
to an occurrence in the ordinary course of human life or events, while “logical” means that there is
a rational connection between the act of the accused and the resulting injury or damage. The
felony committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury. Proximate cause is that
cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The proximate legal
cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately, or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor.

2. Insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, the prosecution or the private complainant is
burdened to adduce preponderance of evidence or superior weight of evidence. Although the
evidence adduced by the plaintiff is stronger than that presented by the defendant, he is not
entitled to a judgment if his evidence is not sufficient to sustain his cause of action. The plaintiff
must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of the defendants.

In the present case, we rule that, as held by the trial court and the CA, the prosecution failed to
adduce preponderant evidence to prove the facts on which the civil liability of the respondents
rest, i.e., that the petitioner has a cause of action against the respondents for damages.

The petitioner even failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that either or both the
respondents hit the deceased with a blunt object or instrument, and, consequently, any blunt object
or instrument that might have been used by any or both of the respondents in hitting the deceased.

Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc. (1967)

424 S.W2d 627 | December 27, 1967 | J. Greenhill
DOCTRINE: There can be a battery without an assault, and that actual physical contact is not
necessary to constitute a battery, so long as there is contact with clothing or an object closely identified
with the body.

FACTS: The plaintiff Fisher had been invited by Ampex Corporation and Defense Electronics to a one
day's meeting regarding telemetry equipment at the Carrousel. The invitation included a luncheon.
The luncheon was buffet style, and Fisher stood in line with others and just ahead of a graduate
student of Rice University who testified at the trial. As Fisher was about to be served, he was
approached by Flynn, who snatched the plate from Fisher's hand and shouted that he, a Negro, could
not be served in the club. Fisher testified that he was not actually touched, and did not testify that he
suffered fear or apprehension of physical injury; but he did testify that he was highly embarrassed and
hurt by Flynn's conduct in the presence of his associates. During the pendency of the trial, Flynn died
and thus was substituted by the Carrousel Motor Hotel where the Brass Ring Club is located.
Defendant is a manager at the Brass Ring Club.

The questions before this Court are whether there was evidence that an actionable battery was
committed, and, if so, whether the two corporate defendants must respond in exemplary as well as
actual damages for the malicious conduct of Flynn.

RTC RULING: Ruled in favor of defendant. There was no actual batter because defendant did not
actually touch Fisher.

CA RULING: Affirmed the lower court.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not battery was committed

2. Whether or not the two corporate defendants must answer for exemplary damages for the
malicious conduct of Flynn.

RULING:

1. Yes, battery was committed.

The intentional grabbing of plaintiff's plate constituted a battery. The intentional snatching of an
object from one's hand is as clearly an offensive invasion of his person as would be an actual
contact with the body. To constitute an assault and battery, it is not necessary to touch the plaintiff's
body or even his clothing; knocking or snatching anything from plaintiff's hand or touching anything
connected with his person, when, done is an offensive manner, is sufficient.

Damages for mental suffering are recoverable without the necessity for showing actual physical
injury in a case of willful battery because the basis of that action is the unpermitted and intentional
invasion of the plaintiff's person and not the actual harm done to the plaintiff's body.

2. Yes, the two corporate defendants must answer for exemplary damages for the malicious
conduct of Flynn.

The rule in Texas is that a principal or master is liable for exemplary or punitive damages
because of the acts of his agent, but only if:
(a) the principal authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing him, or
 (c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of
employment, or
(d) the employer or a manager of the employer ratified or approved the act.

The Court said that the present case falls under par. (c). It is undisputed that Flynn was acting in
the scope of employment at the time of the incident; he was attempting to enforce the Club rules
by depriving Fisher of service. It is immaterial whether or not the employer authorized or ratified
Fisher’s action, plaintiff could claim exemplary damage under the said paragraph.

THE UNITED STATES vs. VICENTA LICARTE

G.R. No. 6784 | August 15, 1912 | J. TRENT

DOCTRINE: As the result of ill feeling between two neighboring families, insulting epithets were
directed at the daughter of the defendant, which the latter overheard; The accused thereupon entered
the house and inflicted several minor wounds on the injured party with a bolo which she happened to
be carrying. It was an error, under the circumstances, to hold that the aggravating circumstance of
morada existed.

FACTS: Benita Soyso, sent her small son to the house of the accused for the purpose of obtaining a
bolo which her husband had loaned to the husband of the accused. Neither the accused nor her
husband was there, and on asking Filomena, daughter of the accused, for the bolo, Filomena replied
by saying that she knew nothing about it. Benita Soyso, on hearing this reply, began abusing Filomena,
calling her vile names. The accused and her husband being nearby, heard these insulting words, and
thereupon the accused appeared in front of that of Benita Soyso and demanded of the latter an
explanation of the insult to her daughter Filomena. A quarrel ensued between Benita and the accused
who then entered the house of Benita and began striking her with a short working bolo. As a result of
the wounds inflicted, Benita was incapacitated and required medical attendance for a period of 15
days.

RTC RULING:
It condemned the defendant to four months and one day of arresto mayor and to indemnify the
offended party in the amount of P57, and to subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to the
payment of the costs of the cause, for the crime of lesiones menos graves.
The court below, in fixing the penalty imposed, took into consideration the aggravating circumstance
of morada (dwelling), inasmuch as the crime was committed in the house of the offended party.

ISSUE: Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of morada existed

RULING: NO
In the case at bar the offended party, by calling Filomena vile names, started the trouble. This vile
language was not directed at the accused, but to her daughter. This was, however, a sufficient
provocation to cause the accused to demand an explanation why her daughter was so grossly insulted.
So under these facts, it was error to hold that the aggravating circumstance of morada existed.

The accused was a woman about fifty years of age. She heard her single daughter grossly insulted.
The accused was laboring under great excitement and passion when she entered the house of Benita
and inflicted the wounds. These facts should be considered as a circumstance mitigating the offense.
(Art. 9, No. 7, Penal Code.) There being no aggravating circumstances present, and one mitigating
circumstance, the penalty should have been imposed in its minimum degree.
Article 10 of the Penal Code reads: "The following are aggravating circumstances: xxx xxx xxx "
That the act be committed with insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account
of his rank, age, or sex, or that it be committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has
not given provocation."

DISINI v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

G.R. No. 203335 | February 18, 2014| J. Abad

DOCTRINE:
(Electronic Evidence was not defined in this case)

Pursuant to the Rules on Electronic Evidence:

“Electronic data message” refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic,
optical or similar means.

“Electronic document” refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols
or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is
established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is
received, recorded, transmitted, stored processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes
digitally signed documents and any print-out or output, readable by sight or other means, which
accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. For purposes of these Rules,
the term “electronic document” may be used interchangeably with electronic data message

FACTS:
These involves consolidated petitions seeking to declare several provisions of RA 10175, the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void. Petitioners argued that even though the
Act is the government’s platform in combating illegal cyberspace activities, 21 separate sections of the
Act violate their constitutional rights, particularly the right to freedom of expression and access to
information.

Further, they contend that Congress invalidly delegated its power when it gave the Cybercrime
Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to formulate a national cybersecurity plan
without any sufficient standards or parameters for it to follow.

Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the following provisions of the cybercrime law that regard
certain acts as crimes and impose penalties for their commission as well as provisions that would
enable the government to track down and penalize violators. These provisions are:

a) Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;

b) Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;
c) Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;
d) Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;
e) Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
f) Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;
g) Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;
h) Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;
i) Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;
j) Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;
k) Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175;
l) Section 8 on Penalties;
m) Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;
n) Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;
 o) Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;
p) Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;
q) Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;
r) Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;
s) Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;
t) Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and
u) Section 26(a) on CICC’s Powers and Functions.

Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the RPC
on the crime of libel.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 10175 or Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 is constitutional.

RULING:
It is partly constitutional and unconstitutional.

The following are valid and constitutional:

a) Section 4(a)(1) that penalizes accessing a computer system without right;
b) Section 4(a)(3) that penalizes data interference, including transmission of viruses;
c) Section 4(a)(6) that penalizes cyber-squatting or acquiring domain name over the internet in
bad faith to the prejudice of others;
d) Section 4(b)(3) that penalizes identity theft or the use or misuse of identifying information
belonging to another;
e) Section 4(c)(1) that penalizes cybersex or the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual
activity for favor or consideration;
f) Section 4(c)(2) that penalizes the production of child pornography;
g) Section 6 that imposes penalties one degree higher when crimes defined under the Revised
Penal Code are committed with the use of information and communications technologies;
h) Section 8 that prescribes the penalties for cybercrimes;
i) Section 13 that permits law enforcement authorities to require service providers to preserve
traffic data and subscriber information as well as specified content data for six months;
j) Section 14 that authorizes the disclosure of computer data under a court-issued warrant;
k) Section 15 that authorizes the search, seizure, and examination of computer data under a
court-issued warrant;
l) Section 17 that authorizes the destruction of previously preserved computer data after the
expiration of the prescribed holding periods;
m) Section 20 that penalizes obstruction of justice in relation to cybercrime investigations;
n) Section 24 that establishes a Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC);
o) Section 26(a) that defines the CICC’s Powers and Functions; and
p) Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the Revised Penal Code that penalizes libel.

These provisions are void for being unconstitutional.

a. Section 4 (c) (3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting of unsolicited commercial
communications;
b. Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of traffic data in real-time; and
c. Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block access
to suspected Computer Data.

Section 4(c)(3) prohibits the transmission of unsolicited commercial electronic communications,

commonly known as spams, that seek to advertise, sell, or offer for sale of products and services
unless the recipient affirmatively consents, or when the purpose of the communication is for service
or administrative announcements from the sender to its existing users, or “when the following
conditions are present:

(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for the
recipient to reject receipt of further commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from the same
source;
(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the source of the
electronic message; and
(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include misleading information
in any part of the message in order to induce the recipients to read the message.”

The government argued that unsolicited commercial communications amount to both nuisance and
trespass because they tend to interfere with the enjoyment of using online services and that they enter
the recipient’s domain without prior permission.

The Court first noted that spams are a category of commercial speech, which does not receive the
same level of protection as other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression,” but is nonetheless
entitled to protection.” It ruled that the prohibition on transmitting unsolicited communications “would
deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to
him.” Accordingly, the Court declared Section4(c)(3) as unconstitutional.

The cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and implement a
national cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to the position of the petitioners, the law gave sufficient
standards for the CICC to follow when it provided a definition of cybersecurity.

Further, The Supreme Court cannot draw the meaning of “with due cause” in Section 12 that
authorizes the collection or recording of traffic data in real-time since it does not even bother to relate
the collection of data to the probable commission of a particular crime. “Due cause” is not descriptive
of the purpose for which data collection will be used. The authority that Section 12 gives law
enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks restraint. Also, the preconditions existing in a
warrantless search are not herein provided. The grant o the power to track cyberspace
communications in real time and determine their sources and destinations must be narrowly drawn to
preclude abuses. The contents of the computer data can also constitute speech. Section 19 of the
same Act that authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to suspected Computer
Data.

Section 19 operates a restriction to on the freedom of expression over cyberspace in restricting or

blocking access to computer data because it precludes any judicial intervention and disregards
jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions on speech. Section 19
merely requires that the data to be blocked be found prima facie in violation of any provision of the
Cybercrime law and taking Section 6 into consideration, it can actually be made to apply in relation to
any penal law. It does not take into consideration any of the three tests generally evaluated on restrains
on free speech, making searches and seizure unreasonable.

The Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the correct application of Section 7 that
authorizes prosecution of the offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to
actual cases,

WITH THE EXCEPTION of the crimes of Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both
Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation
of the proscription against double jeopardy because when two different laws define two crimes, prior
jeopardy as to one does not bar prosecution of the other although both offenses arise from the same
fact, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. The
online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already punished under Article 353.
Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes the computer system as another means of publication. Charging
the offender under both laws would be a blatant violation of the proscription against double jeopardy.

Commonwealth v. Silaney, 345 Mass. 135

345 Mass. 135| August 17, 1992 | J. Kirk

DOCTRINE
In the civil case fear, or at least apprehension, was essential to recovery whether the threat was
conditional or absolute. In the criminal case the court held that in the circumstances it was relevant
that the objectively menacing conduct of the defendant, despite an actual inability to do harm,
produced the fear of harm which it was intended to produce, with the same consequential tendency to
provoke a breach of the peace as if he had the actual ability to do harm. "It is the outward
demonstration that constitutes the mischief which is punished as a breach of the peace."

FACTS
The defendant Slaney was found guilty on two indictments, one charging him with assault and battery
by means of a dangerous weapon on Mary Bowen and the other charging him with assault by means
of a dangerous weapon on Joseph A. DeVincentis.

For almost two years before the alleged offense, the defendant, a married man, and Mrs. Bowen, a
married woman separated from her husband, had frequently been in one another's company. Shortly
before the alleged offense there was a change in Mrs. Bowen's attitude toward the defendant.

One night, the defendant went to the Oxford Grille, a restaurant owned by DeVincentis, where Mrs.
Bowen was employed as a waitress. He persistently asked Mrs. Bowen to wait on him and to see him
after work. She refused. The defendant remained on the premises. Toward closing time DeVincentis
asked the defendant not to bother Mrs. Bowen and to leave the place. The defendant left. At 1:15 A.M.
when DeVincentis and Mrs. Bowen left the restaurant and were crossing the street toward a lot where
DeVincentis's car was parked, a car driven by the defendant emerged from a nearby alley at high
speed and stopped in front of the entrance to the lot. The defendant got out of his car, approached
Mrs. Bowen and DeVincentis, and demanded that Mrs. Bowen go with him. During the talk which
followed, DeVincentis explained that he merely was going to take Mrs. Bowen to a nearby taxi stand.
The defendant "threw a punch," which just touched the top of DeVincentis's head. The defendant then
pulled out a gun, pointed it "right at" DeVincentis, and advised him to start praying because he was
going to shoot Mrs. Bowen, DeVincentis, and himself. The defendant was seven or eight feet away
from DeVincentis.

Mrs. Bowen pleaded with him to put the gun away. DeVincentis told him he was "silly," and tried to
move closer to the defendant in order to maneuver into a position to take the gun away from him. The
defendant backed away and, while doing so, the gun was discharged. The bullet pierced Mrs. Bowen's
handbag and dress. She felt a breeze on her right leg but she was not wounded. Police on foot patrol
heard the shot, went to the scene, disarmed the defendant, and placed him under arrest.

DeVincentis testified that he was not afraid at any time; that when he tried to get closer to the defendant
to maneuver to get the gun he was not afraid that he was going to be shot. However, he did not think
it was a joke; he was trying to devise some plan to get the gun; he did not go up to him and grab the
gun because the defendant would have "shot and let go."

ISSUE
Whether or not defendant is guilty on the charge of assault.
RULING
Yes. There could be no doubt that Slaney was able to inflict bodily harm, and that he indicated a
present purpose to do it by his unequivocal words and conduct.

We conclude our consideration of the first grouping of assignments of error with these observations:
The ruling of the judge on the request relating to the element of fear, although harmless in the particular
case, was erroneous, and is inherently harmful to the interests of the Commonwealth. His special
finding that the victims were in a state of apprehension, although warranted, was not necessary to his
conclusion of guilt. His ruling that the defendant was not entitled to a finding of not guilty was manifestly
correct.

In the civil case fear, or at least apprehension, was essential to recovery whether the threat was
conditional or absolute. In the criminal case the court held that in the circumstances it was relevant
that the objectively menacing conduct of the defendant, despite an actual inability to do harm,
produced the fear of harm which it was intended to produce, with the same consequential tendency to
provoke a breach of the peace as if he had the actual ability to do harm. "It is the outward
demonstration that constitutes the mischief which is punished as a breach of the peace."

CARMEN L. MADEJA v. HON. FELIX T. CARO AND EVA ARELLANO-JAPZON

G.R. No. 51183 | December 21, 1983 | J. Abad Santos

DOCTRINE: Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific
provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that
these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical
meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this apparent circumstance in
mind, it is evident that the terms physical injuries' could not have been used in its specific sense as a
crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would
have used terms in the same article - some in their general and another in its technical sense.

FACTS:

An information was filed against Dr. Eva Jafzon (Dr. Jafzon) for homicide through reckless imprudence
for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. Carmen Madeja (Madeja), the widow of the
deceased, reserved her right to file a separate civil action for damages.

During the pendency of the criminal case, Madeja sued Jafzon for damages in the same court. She
alleged that her husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr. Jafzon.

Dr. Jafzon filed a motion to dismiss against the civil case invoking Section 3 (a) of Rule III of the Rules
of Court which reads: "Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. - In all cases not included in
the preceding section the following rules shall be observed: (a) Criminal and civil actions arising from
the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the
civil action can not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. xxx”.

CFI Ruling: The Court of First Instance granted the motion to dismiss of Dr. Jafzon. It held that
pursuant to the abovequoted, the instant civil action may be instituted only after final judgment has
been rendered in the criminal action. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

1. Can Madeja validly file a separate action for civil damages?

 2. Does physical injuries under Art. 33 of the Civil Code constitute physical injuries under the
Revised Penal Code?

RULING

1. YES. Section 2, Rule III of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the
applicable provision. The two enactments state:

"Sec. 2. Independent civil action. - In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34
and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party
during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in
the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." (Rule III, Rules of
Court.)
"Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence." (Civil Code.)

Under Art. 33, The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. This is manifest
from the provision which uses the expressions "criminal action" and "criminal prosecution." As stated
by the Code Commission: “It is true that in many of the cases referred to in the provision cited, a
criminal prosecution is proper, but it should be remembered that while the State is the complainant in
the criminal case, the injured individual is the one most concerned because it is he who has suffered
directly. He should be permitted to demand reparation for the wrong which peculiarly affects him.”

Furthermore, quoting Tolentino: "The general rule is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party reserves his right to institute it separately; and after a criminal
action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted. The
present articles creates an exception to this rule when the offense is defamation, fraud, or physical
injuries. In these cases, a civil action may be filed independently of the criminal action, even if there
has been no reservation made by the injured party; the law itself in this article makes such reservation;
but the claimant is not given the right to determine whether the civil action should be scheduled or
suspended until the criminal action has been terminated. The result of the civil action is thus
independent of the result of the criminal action."

2. NO. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries
defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but consummated, frustrated
and attempted homicide.

The Article in question uses the words 'defamation', 'fraud' and 'physical injuries.' Defamation and
fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal
Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation
and fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the
Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the
terms physical injuries' could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised
Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the same
article - some in their general and another in its technical sense. In other words, the term 'physical
injuries' should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because the
terms used with the latter are general terms.
 People vs. Genosa
G.R. No. 135981 | January 15, 2004, | J. Panganiban

DOCTRINE: Aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense. In the absence of such
aggression, there can be no self-defense – complete of incomplete – on the part of the victim.

FACTS: That Marivic Genosa, the Appellant on the 15 November 1995, attacked and wounded his
husband, which ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant she did not provoke her husband
when she got home that night it was her husband who began the provocation. The Appellant said she
was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her
baby safely. In fact, The Appelant had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was
suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.

The Appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5)
times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. The Apellant said that the reason
why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because 'he was crazy about his recent
girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos.

The Appellant after being interviewed by specialists, has been shown to be suffering from Battered
Woman Syndrome.

The appellant with a plea of self defense admitted the killing of her husband, she was then found guilty
of Parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked while
asleep.

RTC RULING: Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave credence to the
prosecution evidence that appellant had killed the deceased while he was in bed sleeping. Further,
the trial court appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery, because Ben Genosa
was supposedly defenseless when he was killed -- lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed him
with a pipe at the back of his head.

The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic review.

ISSUES:
(1) WoN Marivic Genosa be granted the Justifying circumstance of Self-defense
(2) WoN Marivic Genosa be held liable for the aggravating circumstance of treachery

HELD:

(1) No, since self- defense since the existence of Battered woman syndrome, which the appellant
has been shown to be suffering in the relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of
the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-
defense.

In the present case, however, according to the testimony of the appellant there was a sufficient time
interval between the unlawful aggression of the husband and her fatal attack upon him. She had
already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children's bedroom. During
that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the
danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat
on her life or safety.
Without continuous aggression there can be no self-defense. And absence of aggression does not
warrant complete or incomplete self-defense.

(2) No, There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the
defense that the offended party might make.

The circumstances must be shown as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from
mere inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of evidence. Besides, equally
axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been
forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant.

In the present case, however it was not conclusively shown, that the appellant intentionally chose a
specific means of successfully attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory
act that he might make. To the contrary, it appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her
only at about the same moment when she decided to kill her spouse. In the absence of any convincing
proof that she consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime
in order to ensure its execution, the doubt should be resolved in her favor.

The conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being
two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending her commission of the
offense, her penalty is REDUCED to 6 years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years
8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
 Carandang vs. Valenton
G.R. No. L-8238 | May 25, 1955 | Labrador, J.

FACTS:
Tomas Valenton, Jr. was found guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide committed against Cesar
Carandang. The decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas was rendered on September 1,
1953 and Carandang filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover from Tomas
Valenton, Jr. and his parents, damages, both actual and moral, for the bodily injuries on occasion of
the commission of the crime of frustrated homicide by said accused Tomas Valenton, Jr.

After the defendants submitted their answer, they presented a motion to suspend the trial of the civil
case, pending the termination of the criminal case against Tomas Valenton, Jr. in the Court of Appeals.
The judge ruled that the trial of the civil action must await the result of the criminal case on appeal. A
motion for reconsideration was submitted, but the court denied the same; hence this petition for
certiorari.

Carandang now invokes Article 33 of the new Civil Code. The Code Commission itself states that the
civil action allowed under Article 33 is similar to the action in tort for libel or slander and assault and
battery under American law. However, tge respondents argue that the term "physical injuries" is used
to designate a specific crime defined in the Revised Penal Code and therefore said term should be
understood in its peculiar and technical sense, in accordance with the rules statutory construction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the term “physical injuries” used in Article 33 of the Civil Code means “physical injuries”
in the Revised Penal Code or any physical injury, whether inflicted with the intent to kill or not.

RULING:
Yes. The accused was charged with and convicted of the crime of frustrated homicide, and while it
was found in the criminal case that a wound was inflicted by the defendant on the body of Carandang,
which wound is a bodily injury, the crime committed is not physical injuries but frustrated homicide, for
the reason that the infliction of the wound is attended by the intent to kilL

The Article in question uses the words "defamation", "fraud" and "physical injuries." Defamation and
fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal
Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation
and fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the
Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the
term "physical injuries" could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised
Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the same
article — some in their general and another in its technical sense.

In other words, the term "physical injuries" should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime
of physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms.

The SC finds that the respondent judge committed an error in suspending the trial of the civil case/
and his order to that effect is hereby revoked, and he is hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of
said civil case without awaiting the result of the pending criminal case. With costs against the
defendant-appellees.
 REYNALDA GATCHALIAN v. ARSENIO DELIM and CA
G.R. No. 56487 | October 21, 1991 | J. Feliciano

DOCTRINE: A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that integrity is violated
or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are due and
assessable. Turning to petitioner's claim for moral damages, the long-established rule is that moral
damages may be awarded where gross negligence on the part of the common carrier is shown.

FACTS: Petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded the respondent’s “Thames” mini-bus as a paying
passenger in La Union. On the way, while the bus was running along the Highway, “a snapping sound”
was suddenly heard at one part of the bus and, shortly, thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement flower
pot on the side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle and fell into a ditch. Several passengers,
including petitioner, were injured and were promptly taken to the hospital for medical treatment. Upon
examination, petitioner was found to have sustained several physical injuries on the leg, arm and
forehead.

While injured passengers were confined in the hospital, Adela Lim, wife of respondent, visited them
and later paid for their hospitalization and medical expenses. She also gave petitioner PHP 12.00 to
pay for her transportation in going home from the hospital. However, before respondent’s wife left, she
had the injured passengers sign an already prepared Joint Affidavit which stated, among others, “xxx
that we are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil against the said driver and owner
of the said Thames xxx”

Notwithstanding this, petitioner filed with then CFI La Union an action extra contractu to recover
compensatory and moral damages alleging that the injuries she sustained from the vehicular mishap
left her with a conspicuous white scar on the forehead, generating mental suffering and an inferiority
complex on her part; and that as a result, she had to retire in seclusion and stay away from her friends.
She also alleged that the scar diminished her facial beauty and deprived her of opportunities for
employment. She prayed for awards from (a) loss of employment and other opportunities; (b) cost of
plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her forehead; (c) moral damages: and (d) attorney’s fees.

RTC RULING: Trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that when petitioner signed the Joint
Affidavit, she relinquished any right of action, criminal or civil, that she may have had against
respondent and its driver.

CA RULING: On appeal, CA reversed the trial court’s ruling that there was a valid waiver but affirmed
the dismissal of the case denying petitioner’s claim for damages.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether there was a valid waiver upon the signing of petitioner of the Joint Affidavit
2. Whether respondent successfully proved that he had exercised extraordinary diligence to
prevent the mishap involving the mini-bus
3. Whether petitioner is entitled to actual and moral damages

RULING:

1. NO, there was no valid waiver.

A waiver, to be valid and effective, must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which
leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains
to him. A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not
explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such person.
 Since what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained by
passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence,
it must be construed that such purported waiver to be strictly against the common carrier. For
a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or good
customs. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured passenger,
under circumstances like those in this case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of
extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to render that
standard unenforceable. The SC held that such a purported waiver is offensive to public policy.

2. NO, respondent has not successfully proved that he had exercised extraordinary
diligence to prevent the mishap involving the mini-bus.

In case of death or injuries to passengers, a statutory presumption arises that the common
carrier was at fault or had acted negligently "unless it proves that it had observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." In fact, it has been held that a court need
not even make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier in
order to hold it liable. To overcome this presumption, the common carrier must show to the
court that it had exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent the injuries.

The records before the Court are bereft of any evidence showing that respondent had
exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. Curiously, respondent did not even
attempt, during the trial before the court a quo, to prove that he had indeed exercised the
requisite extraordinary diligence. Upon the other hand, the record yields affirmative evidence
of fault or negligence on the part of the respondent common carrier. Petitioner, in her direct
examination, narrated that shortly before the mishap, a “snapping sound” was suddenly heard
at one part of the bus and an old woman, a passenger, cried out “What happened?” The driver
replied nonchalantly “That is only normal” and the driver did not even stop to check if anything
had gone wrong with the bus. Moreover, the obvious continued failure of respondent to look
after the roadworthiness and safety of the bus, coupled with the driver's refusal or neglect to
stop the mini-bus after he had heard once again the "snapping sound" and the cry of alarm
from one of the passengers, constituted wanton disregard of the physical safety of the
passengers, and hence gross negligence on the part of respondent and his driver.

3. YES, petitioner is entitled to damages.

As to actual or compensatory damages, petitioner claims damages for loss of employment

and the cost of plastic surgery to remove her scar. The CA found that at the time of the accident,
she was no longer employed in a public school since she had been laid off her employment
as a substitute teacher. In view of her employment status as such, the CA held that she could
not be said to have in fact lost any employment after and by reason of the accident and
therefore, not entitled thereto as actual damages.

However, as to the claim for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her forehead,
the SC held that petitioner is entitled thereto. A person is entitled to the physical integrity
of his or her body; if that integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for
which actual or compensatory damages are due and assessable. Petitioner is entitled to
be placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was before the mishap. A scar,
especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her, is a
violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her conditio ante.
If the scar is relatively small and does not grievously disfigure the victim, the cost of surgery
may be expected to be correspondingly modest.
 The SC awarded petitioner PHP 15,000 as actual or compensatory damages to cover the cost
of plastic surgery.

On the other hand, as to the petitioner's claim for moral damages, the long-established
rule is that moral damages may be awarded where gross negligence on the part of the
common carrier is shown. Since it has been concluded that respondent common carrier and
his driver had been grossly negligent in connection with the bus mishap which injured petitioner
and other passengers, and recalling the aggressive maneuvers of respondent, through his
wife, to get the victims to waive their right to recover damages even as they were still
hospitalized for their injuries, petitioner must be held entitled to such moral damages.
Considering the extent of pain and anxiety which petitioner must have suffered as a result of
her physical injuries including the permanent scar on her forehead, the SC awarded petitioner
PHP30,000 as moral damages.

Lastly, petitioner's claim for P1,000.00 as attorney's fees is in fact even more modest.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decisions of the CA as well as of the CFI are reversed and set aside.

Carticiano vs Nuval
G.R. No. 138054 | September 28, 2000 | PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS:
Plaintiff Zacarias Carticiano was on his way home to Imus, Cavite. He was driving his father’s Ford
Laser car. On the same date and time, defendant Nuval’s owner-type Jeep, then driven by defendant
Darwin was traveling on the opposite direction going to Parañaque. When the two cars were about to
pass one another, Darwin veered his vehicle to his left going to the center island of the highway an
occupied the lane which plaintiff Zacarias was traversing. Zacarias’ Ford Laser collided head-on with
Nuval’s Jeep. Darwin immediately fled from the scene. Zacarias suffered multiple fracture. He
underwent a leg operation and physical therapy. Nuval offered P100,000.00 as compensation for the
injuries caused. Plaintiffs refused to accept it. Plaintiffs filed a criminal suit against Darwin and a civil
suit against defendants (Nuval) for damages.

RTC: rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants ordering the latter to pay the
former jointly and severally for the damages suffered by appellees.

CA: Explained that in order to hold an employer liable for the negligent acts of an employee under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it must be shown that the employee was acting within the scope of his
assigned task when the tort complained of was committed.

The employer in this case, RESP Mario Nuval, cannot be held liable for the tort committed by Darwin.
1. Appellants did not present evidence showing that the driver was indeed an employee of the
respondent at the time the accident occurred.
2. Even assuming that Darwin was in fact an employee of Nuval, it was not shown that the former
was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the incident happened.

Thus, the requisites for holding an employer liable for the tort committed by an employee were not
satisfied. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
1. Whether Darwin is an employee of Nuval. YES
2. Whether Nuval is liable for the damages incurred by Darwin in case the latter is proven to be
an employee? YES
RULING:
1. Yes, Darwin is an employee of Nuval. No Proof That Employment Was Terminated. The court
disagrees to RESP’s contention that on the date the accident happened, Darwin was no longer
his employee because the latters services had already been terminated. Nuval adds that
Darwin was hired for a period of only 4-6 days. To substantiate this claim, the former presented
payroll and employment records showing that the latter was no longer his employee. However,
as revealed by the testimonies of the witnesses presented during trial, RESP had other
employees working for him who were not listed in the payroll either.

The rather easy access which Darwin had to the keys to the vehicle of Nuval further weakened the
latter’s cause.
A. Nobody questioned the fact that the former had freely entered the respondent's house where
the keys to the vehicle were kept. The theory of Nuval that Darwin must have stolen the keys
as well as the vehicle is rather far fetched and not supported by any proof whatsoever. It is
obviously an afterthought concocted to present some semblance of a defense.
B. Both respondent and his employees who testified did not act as if the vehicle had been stolen.
He had not reported the alleged theft of his vehicle. Neither did he search nor ask his
employees to search for the supposedly stolen vehicle. In fact, he testified that his employees
had told him that the keys and the vehicle had merely "probably" been stolen by Darwin.

2. Yes, Nuval is liable for thje damages incurred by Darwin under vicarious liability.
Under article 2180 “The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible xxx "Employers shall be
liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.”
The facts established in the case at bar show that Darwin was acting within the scope of the authority
given him when the collision occurred. That he had been hired only to bring respondent’s children to
and from school must be rejected. True, this may have been one of his assigned tasks, but no
convincing proof was presented showing that it was his only task. His authority was to drive Nuval’s
vehicle. Third parties are not bound by the allegation that the driver was authorized to operate the jeep
only when the employer’s children were on board the vehicle. Giving credence to this outlandish theory
would enable employers to escape their legal liabilities with impunity. Such loophole is easy to concoct
and is simply unacceptable.

The claim of respondent that he had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family is not borne
out by the evidence. Neither is it supported by logic. His main defense that at the time of the accident
Darwin was no longer his employee, having been merely hired for a few days, is inconsistent with his
other argument of due diligence in the selection of an employee.

Once a driver is proven negligent in causing damages, the law presumes the vehicle owner equally
negligent and imposes upon the latter the burden of proving proper selection of employee as a
defense.14 Respondent failed to show that he had satisfactorily discharged this burden.

No Proof of Contributory Negligence RESP Nuval’s accusation that PET Zacarias Carticiano is guilty
of contributory negligence by failing to stop his car or to evade the oncoming jeep is untenable. Both
the trial and the appellate courts found that the accident was caused by the fact that Darwin’s jeep
suddenly veered towards Zacarias’ lane when the vehicles were about to pass each other, thus making
it difficult if not impossible for petitioner to avoid the head on collision.
Disposuitive: WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and the trial courts Decision REINSTATED, except that the award of P100,000 for
lost income or opportunities is DELETED
INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES (PHIL.), INC. v. MERLIN J. ARGOS and JAJA
C. PINEDA
G.R. No. 130362 I September 10, 2001 I J. QUISUMBING

DOCTRINE:

Article 33 contemplates an action against the employee in his primary civil liability. It does not apply
to an action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability, because such liability
arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case or when the employee is adjudged
guilty of the wrongful act in a criminal action and found to have committed the offense in the discharge
of his duties.

FACTS:

Petitioner International Flavors and Fragrances (Phils.) Inc., hereafter IFFI, is a corporation organized
and existing under Philippine laws. Respondents Merlin J. Argos and Jaja C. Pineda are the general
manager and commercial director, respectively, of the Fragrances Division of IFFI.

Afterwards, the office of managing director was created to head the corporation's operation in the
Philippines. Hernan H. Costa, a Spaniard, was appointed managing director. When the positions of
the general managers became redundant, respondents agreed to the termination of their services.
They signed a "Release, Waiver and Quitclaim" on December 10, 1993. On the same date, Costa
issued a "Personnel Announcement" which described respondents as "persona non grata" and urged
employees not to have further dealings with them.

On July 1, 1994, respondents filed a criminal complaint for libel resulting in the filing of two Informations
against Costa docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9917 and 9918 with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Taguig, Metro Manila.

On March 31, 1995, respondents filed a civil case for damages filed and docketed as Civil Case No.
65026 at the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, against Costa and IFFI, in its subsidiary
capacity as employer. Herein, petitioner IFFI moved to dismiss the complaint. It alleged that while a
separate civil action for damages may proceed against Hernan H. Costa under Article 33 of the Civil
Code, no such action may proceed against petitioner to enforce its subsidiary liability as employer
under the same article.

RTC RULING:

Initially, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 65026 for respondents' failure to reserve
its right to institute a separate civil action. However, the RTC granted the motion for reconsideration
of the respondents. It also denied the petitioner’s motion to reconsider.

CA RULING:

The appellate court dismissed the petition. It ruled that the allegations of petitioner that the lower court
has gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the orders complained of
has not been substantiated

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondents can sue petitioner for damages based on subsidiary liability in an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code, during the pendency of the criminal libel
cases against petitioner's employee.
RULING:

No, the Court held that respondents' suit based on subsidiary liability of petitioner is premature.

The well-established rule is that the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought
determine the nature of an action. A perusal of the respondents' civil complaint before the regional trial
court plainly shows that respondents is suing IFFI in a subsidiary and not primary capacity insofar as
the damages claimed are concerned.
In instituting the action for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, respondents
seek to enforce a civil liability allegedly arising from a crime. Obligations arising from crimes are
governed by Article 1161 of the Civil Code, which provides that said obligations are governed by penal
laws, subject to the provision of Article 2177 and the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary
Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of Book IV of the Civil Code.

Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code is also pertinent. It provides that every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable. In default of the persons criminally liable, employers engaged in any
kind of industry shall be civilly liable for felonies committed by their employees in the discharge of their
duties.

Article 33 of the Civil Code provides specifically that in cases of defamation, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action proceeds independently of the criminal prosecution and requires only a preponderance of
evidence. In Joaquin vs. Aniceto, 12 SCRA 308 (1964), we held that Article 33 contemplates an action
against the employee in his primary civil liability. It does not apply to an action against the employer
to enforce its subsidiary civil liability, because such liability arises only after conviction of the employee
in the criminal case or when the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act in a criminal action
and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. Any action brought against the
employer based on its subsidiary liability before the conviction of its employee is premature.

The respondents did not raise the claim of primary liability as a cause of action in its complaint before
the trial court. On the contrary, they sought to enforce the alleged subsidiary liability of petitioner as
the employer of Costa, the accused in pending criminal cases for libel, prematurely. In other words,
the respondents did not base their civil action on petitioner IFFI's primary liability under Art. 33 but
claimed damages from IFFI based on its subsidiary liability as employer of Costa.

Hence, the Court reversed and set aside the decision and resolution of the CA. It also ordered the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 65026 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166.

People v. Bisda
G.R. No. 140895 | July 17, 2003

FACTS: Appellants were charged with the felony of kidnapping for ransom committed as follows:

“That on or about the 3rd of September 1998, in the City of Marikina, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping
one another, did there and then willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly kidnap, detain and
deprive ANGELA MICHELLE SORIANO y SAN JUAN of her liberty for six (6) days for the purpose of
extorting ransom from her/or her family.”

When arraigned, the appellants, assisted by counsel, entered separate pleas of not guilty.
 The Evidence for the Prosecution

William Soriano, a training consultant by profession, and his wife Marymae Soriano, had two children:
Kathleen Denise and Angela Michelle. They rented a house at No. 5 Col. Divino St., Concepcion,
Marikina. Five-year-old Angela was in Prep at the Mother of Divine Providence School in Marikina
Heights, Marikina City. The couple employed Lea and Wendy Salingatog as the yayas of their children.
Angela met appellant Jenny Rose Basilan when the latter visited her niece Wendy in the Soriano
residence. Jenny Rose was, thus, no stranger to Angela.

About 11:00 a.m. on September 3, 1998, Angelas classes had just ended and she was on her way to
her school bus which was parked outside the school campus near the exit gate. She was in her school
uniform and wore black shoes. Unknown to Angela, appellants Alma and Jenny Rose were outside of
the school gate waiting for her. When they saw Angela, Alma and Jenny Rose proceeded to the gate
and showed a visitors gate pass to the security guard. They approached the young girl, and told her
that her parents were waiting for her at the Jollibee Restaurant. Angela initially refused to go with the
two women, but because Alma held on to her hand so tightly and poked a knife at her, Angela had no
choice but to go with them. Later on, Angela was made to wear blouse and shorts, yellow t-shirt and
a pair of panties, and was fed spaghetti, was sent to sleep, and served merienda upon waking up.

At one time, Alma and Jenny Rose tied up Angelas hands and feet, and placed scotch tape on her
mouth. Angela was sometimes left alone in the house but the door was kept locked. To pass the time,
Angela watched television and made drawings. Jenny Rose and Alma did not fail to feed and bathe
Angela. Angela did not call her parents through the telephone number of their landlady.

In the meantime, when William arrived home shortly before noon on that day, Lea and Wendy told him
that Angela had not yet arrived home from school. He rushed to the school to fetch Angela, but was
informed by the school security guard that his daughter had already been picked up by two women,
one of whom was registered in the visitors slip as Aileen Corpuz.

The school staff panicked when William demanded to know how unknown persons were able to get
his daughter. He then started calling his friends and relatives to help him locate Angela. He also sought
the help of Rizza Hontiveros, a TV personality who promised to relay his plea to the Presidential Anti-
Organized Crime Task Force. The PAOCTF organized a team headed by then Chief Inspector Ricardo
Dandan with SPO4 Tito Tuanggang, SPO1 Charles Larroza and civilian agent George Torrente, as
members, to conduct surveillance operations and to recover the victim and arrest the culprits. The
team proceeded to the Soriano residence and to Angelas school to conduct an initial investigation.

An Information for kidnapping for ransom was filed against Alma and Jane Doe. Jenny Rose arrived
at the PAOCTF Headquarters in Camp Crame, and proceeded to P02 Joseph Bagsaos office where
she announced that she was one of Almas cohorts. P02 Bagsao took Jenny Roses fingerprints and
entered the data in a fingerprint index card. Jenny Rose was thereafter placed in a police line-up.
Angela, who arrived at the PAOCTF office with her father, identified Jenny Rose as one of her
kidnappers. Police Chief Inspector Atty. Aurelio C. Trampe, Jr., the Legal and Investigation Division
Chief of the PAOCTF, later referred Jenny Rose to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Marikina City,
for preliminary investigation.

The prosecutor later amended the Information by deleting the name Jane Doe and substituting the
name Jenny Rose Basilan y Payan as the second accused.

RTC RULING: The trial court rendered judgment, the decretal portion of which reads:

“…the accused ALMA BISDA y GAUPO and GENEROSA BASILAN y PAYAN are hereby found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom penalized under Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659 and is sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty
of DOUBLE DEATH by lethal injection, the two accused having conspired in the commission thereof.
They are further ordered to pay solidarily the parents of the victim the amount of P100,000.00 as moral
damages, and costs of the suit.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the appellants of kidnapping

RULING:

1. The appellants aver that the prosecution failed to muster proof, beyond reasonable doubt that,
they kidnapped and illegally detained Angela. Angela in fact voluntarily went with them, and
she was free to roam around the house, and to call her parents through the telephone of their
landlady which Angela knew by heart.

There is no proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants conspired to kidnap Angela.
Appellant Bisda avers that she is guilty only of slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the
Revised Penal Code because (a) Angela stayed in her office for only three days; and (b) the
circumstance of a female offender and a female offended party is not one of those included in
the definition of kidnapping or serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the RPC.

The contentions of the appellants are bereft of merit.

Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 reads:

ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall kidnap or
detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death.

I. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose
of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances
above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

For the accused to be convicted of kidnapping or serious illegal detention, the prosecution is
burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely, (1) the
offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives
the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the
commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or
detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c)
any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to
kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.

The general rule is that the prosecution is burdened to prove lack of consent on the part of the
victim. However, where the victim is a minor especially if she is only five years old, lack of
consent is presumed. She is incompetent to assent to seizure and illegal detention.34 In this
 case, Angela was merely five years old when she was kidnapped; thus incapable of giving
consent. The consent of such child could place the appellants in no better position than if the
act had been done against her will. The appellants cannot rely on Angela’s initial willingness
to go along with them to the restaurant.

Although Angela was free to roam around in the dirty house, to draw and to watch television
during the entire period of her detention, and was regularly fed and bathed, the appellants are
nevertheless guilty of kidnapping and illegally detaining the five-year-old child. The prosecution
adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants conspired to kidnap and illegally
detain Angela. The appellants testimonies even buttressed the testimonies of both the victim
and the other witnesses for the prosecution.

Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more
persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. In People v. Pagalasan, this Court
held that conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct
of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had
acted with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two
or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object,
each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other
were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and
a concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy once found, continues until the object of it has been
accomplished unless abandoned or broken up. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by
reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a
view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.

Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their acts and by purposely
engaging in conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result, they are,
in contemplation of law, chargeable with intending that result.

In light of the foregoing facts, there can be no other conclusion than that appellant Bisda
demanded a ransom of P5,000,000 from William Soriano; hence, she is GUILTY of kidnapping
for ransom. Being a conspirator, appellant Basilan is also guilty of the said crime. The penalty
for kidnapping for ransom is death, a single and indivisible penalty. The aggravating
circumstance of use of a motor vehicle under Article 14, paragraph 20 of the Revised Penal
Code was attendant in the commission of the crime.102 However, said circumstance, as well
as the voluntary surrender of appellant Basilan, are inconsequential in the penalties to be
imposed on the said appellants, conformably to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code

PASTOR LERMA v. CIPRIANA DE LA CRUZ

G.R. No. 3287 | March 02, 1907 | J. Carson

One in possession of land, knowing that his claim of title thereto is defective, is liable to the owner for
an amount equal to a reasonable rent therefor during the term of his occupation.

FACTS: The plaintiff alleges that he is the owner of a certain parcel of land in the district of Tondo in
the city of Manila; that on the 1st day of January, 1902, he rented it to one Juan Hernandez; that
Hernandez paid the rent in 1902, but made no further payments thereafter; that Hernandez died in
October, 1904, leaving a wife and several minor children; that after his death, his widow, the defendant
in this action, continued in possession of the land and refuses to pay rent therefor; and that since the
death of her husband she has cut down and disposed of a number of trees growing on the said land
to the great damage of the plaintiff.
The action was brought to recover, first, the rents accrued at the time of the death of Hernandez;
second, rent for the use and occupation of the land since his death; third, damages for the injury to
the land by cutting and disposing of the trees growing thereon.

The defendant denies the existence of the rental contract between her husband and the plaintiff, and
insists that by long occupation he had acquired a prescriptive title to the land, and that she, as his
widow, is entitled to possession as against the plaintiff. A written rental contract was introduced in
evidence and its execution proven by competent witnesses. By the terms of this contract, Juan
Hernandez agreed to rent the land in question from the plaintiff, and to pay therefor an annual rental
of 25 pesos. Counsel for defendant excepted to the admission of this contract and of all evidence
pertaining thereto, but we are of opinion that it was properly admitted under the provisions of section
278 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that: "Where, however, one derives title to real
property from another, the declaration, act, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation
to the property, is evidence against the former."

The evidence touching this rental contract completely disposes of the defendant's claim of prescriptive
title in herself or her predecessors in interest, and the title of the plaintiff is fully sustained by the
testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence of record introduced during the trial of the
case.

The trial judge properly refused to give judgment against this defendant for rents accrued prior to the
death of Hernandez (Willard's Notes to The Civil Code, art. 661), but gave judgment for possession of
the land, and for an amount which in his opinion was a "reasonable rent" for the use and occupation
of the land since the death of Hernandez, and for damages for cutting and disposing of certain trees.

The plaintiff did not ask for possession, nor is there any prayer to that effect in the complaint, and the
judgment must, therefore, be reversed in so far as it undertakes to provide for the restitution of the
land in question to the plaintiff.
ISSUE: Whether or not the widow must be taken to have been in occupation under a continuation of
the rental contract with her husband because of her continued possession of the land after the death
of her husband

RULING: The Court ruled in the negative. There is nothing in the record to sustain this view. She was
not a party to the original contract. She never accepted it as binding upon her, either before or since
the death of her husband, and, on the contrary, claimed the right of possession and denied the title of
the plaintiff. The seventh article of the original rental contract is as follows:

"This contract is strictly personal as to the tenant, terminating with his death, and if his heirs,
or any of them, should desire to continue under this contract, they shall sign a new contract."

No such contract was signed, and there is nothing in the record to sustain a finding that any contract
of renting was ever entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant.

The judgment for an amount which the court finds to be a "reasonable rent" during the occupation of
the defendant and for the value of the trees cut down and disposed of by her should, however, be
sustained in accordance with the terms of article 455 of the Civil Code, which prescribes that "a
possessor in bad faith must pay the profits received and those which the lawful owner might have
received," etc.

A possessor in bad faith (mala fe) is one who is not ignorant of the fact that there exists a defect in his
title, or his mode of acquiring possession. (Art. 433 of the Civil Code.) There is evidence of record
which shows that the defendant was present when her husband entered into the rental contract in
1902, and we are satisfied that she was not ignorant of the defect in her husband's alleged prescriptive
title when she pretended to take possession thereunder.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION V. SPS. JOSE CAMPOS JR.

G.R. No. 143643 | June 27, 2003 | J. Callejo Sr.

DOCTRINE: Nominal damages were correctly awarded. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order
that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. Similarly,
the court may award nominal damages in every case where any property right has been invaded.

FACTS: In 1996, respondents filed with court a quo action for a sum of money and damages and
petitioner, stating that they are owners of a parcel of land found in Bo. San Agustin Dasmariñas, Cavite,
consisting of 66, 819 sq. m. In 1970, Dr. Campos (President of Cavite Electric Cooperative) requested
that the respondents grant the petitioner right-of-way over a portion of the subject property.

This was for the purpose of installing wooden electric posts and transmission lines. Respondents
agreed on the condition that it would be temporary. Petitioner assured that it would be temporary and
the posts would be relocated as soon as the permanent posts and transmission lines have been
installed; however, petitioner kept using the property without compensating petitioners.

In 1994, NPC agents trespassed property and conducted engineering surveys. The caretaker asked
them to leave. 1995, Mr. Raz claiming to be an NPC agent asked Jose Campos Jr. for permission to
enter property and conduct survey to erect an all-steel transmission line tower on a 24-square meter
area. Refused to grant permission, wanted to talk to Chief of Calaca Sub-station. Later in 1995,
petitioners trespassed again and presented a letter of authority allegedly written by Campos Jr.
Caretaker demanded that letter be given for verification, but agents refused. Caretaker ordered them
to leave. December 12, 1995, petitioner instituted an expropriation case involving the property since
in was selected for being compatible with the greatest public good and least private injury, trying to
negotiate with respondents for acquisition but failed to reach an amicable settlement.

Respondents state that there were more suitable or appropriate sites for the transmission lines and
petitioner chose property on a whimsical and capricious manner. It was not the least injurious since
petitioner could be revised to avoid traversing the subject property. Denied negotiating with petitioner
on acquisition of subject property. Being unaware of intention to expropriate, respondents sold it to
Solar Resources Inc. and so respondents stand to lose a substantial amount of money derived from
proceeds of sale. Petitioner contention: It already acquired easement of right-of-way over portion of
the subject property by prescription because the easement had been continuous and apparent for a
period of 23 years (1970-1994). Further invokes section 3(i) of the NPC charter asserting that
respondents already waived their right to institute any action for compensation.

RTC RULING: RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Campos.

CA RULING: CA affirmed decision.

ISSUE: WON nominal and moral damages, attorney’s fees and costs of litigation be awarded to the
respondents

RULING: YES, an award of moral damages would require certain conditions to be met, to wit:
• First, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by
the claimant;
• Second, there must be a culpable act or omission factually established;
 • Third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the Injury
sustained by the claimant; and
• Fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the
Civil Code.

NPC made it appear that it negotiated with the appellees when no actual negotiation took place. This
allegation seriously affected the ongoing sale of the property to Solar Resources, Inc. as appellees
seemed to have sold the property knowing fully well that a portion thereof was being expropriated.

This falls well within Article 21 of the Civil Code. NPC's subterfuge certainly besmirched the reputation
and professionally standing of Justice Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Professor Maria Clara A. Lopez-
Campos, and caused them physical suffering, mental anguish, moral shock and wounded feeling.

Considering the background of the respondent spouses as SC Assoc Justice and a Professor Emerita
of UP College of Law, it does not take too much imagination to conclude that the oppressive and
wanton manner in which NPC sought to exercise its statutory right of eminent domain warranted the
grant of moral damages.

Nominal damages were correctly awarded. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of
the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized,
and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.

Similarly, the court may award nominal damages in every case where any property right has been
invaded.

The petitioner, in blatant disregard of the respondents' proprietary right, trespassed the subject
property and conducted engineering surveys thereon. It even attempted to deceive the respondents'
caretaker by claiming that its agents were authorized by the respondents to enter the property when
in fact, the respondents never gave such authority.

Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

249 SCRA 397 | NO DIGEST MADE | REGALADO, J

1. CIVIL LAW; EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS; QUASI-DELICTS; DOUBLE RECOVERY

OF DAMAGES, NOT VIOLATED IN CASE AT BAR. — It is theorized by petitioner that our affirmance
of the judgment of the trial court, which granted damages for both the "damage proper to the land" and
"rentals for the same property," runs afoul of the proscription in Article 2177 of the Civil Code against
double recovery of damages for the same act. Private respondents, as plaintiffs in the actions filed in
the court below, specifically alleged that as a result of petitioner's dredging operations the soil of the
former's property "became infertile, salty, unproductive and unsuitable for agriculture." They further
averred that petitioner's heavy equipment "used to utilize (private respondent's) land as a depot or
parking lot of these equipment(t) without paying any rent therefor." Petitioner was guilty of two culpable
transgressions on the property rights of private respondents, that is, for the ruination of the agricultural
fertility or utility of the soil of their property and, further, for the unauthorized use of said property as a
dump site or depot for petitioner's heavy equipment and trucks. Consequently, albeit with differing
amounts, damages were correctly awarded both for the destruction of the land and for the unpaid
rentals, or more correctly denominated, for the reasonable value of its use and occupation of the
premises.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DAMAGES; INTEREST THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. — When an obligation not
constituting a loan or forbearance of money is breached, interest on the amount of the damages
awarded may be imposed at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum. No interest shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims unless the same can be established with reasonable certainty. Since the pleadings
of herein private respondents in the trial court did not spell out said amounts with certitude, the legal
interest thereon shall run only from the promulgation of judgment of said court, it being at that stage
that the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained. The actual
base for the computation of such legal interest, however, shall be the amount as finally adjudged by
this Court. Furthermore, when our judgment herein becomes final and executory, the rate of legal
interest shall be twelve percent (12%) from such finality until the satisfaction of the total judgment
account, the interim period being effectively equivalent to a forbearance of credit. By way of
clarification, the judgment rendered by this Court in the instant case shall be understood to mean that
the legal interest to be paid by petitioner is six percent (6%) of the amount due computed from
September 6, 1990 when judgment was rendered by the trial court. Additionally, interest of twelve
percent (12%) shall be imposed on such total amount due upon the finality of the judgment of the
Court herein until the full satisfaction thereof.

RESOLUTION

Petitioner moves for the reconsideration of our judgment promulgated in this case on August 23, 1995
contending that (1) private respondents are permitted thereunder to recover damages twice for the
same act or omission, and (2) the interests adjudged on the awarded damages should be reckoned
from the date of finality of our aforesaid judgment rendered herein. cdasia

We reject the first submission. It is theorized by petitioner that our affirmance of the judgment of the
trial court, which granted damages for both the "damage proper to the land" and "rentals for the same
property," runs afoul of the proscription in Article 2177 of the Civil Code against double recovery of
damages for the same act.

Petitioner overlooks the fact that private respondents, as plaintiffs in the actions filed in the court below,
specifically alleged that as a result of petitioner's dredging operations the soil of the former's property
"became infertile, salty, unproductive and unsuitable for agriculture." They further averred that
petitioner's heavy equipment "used to utilize (private respondents') land as a depot or parking lot of
these equipment(t) without paying any rent therefor." 1

Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court on the
nature and cause of the twin items of damages sustained by private respondents, thus:

The main reason why (private respondents') properties were damaged, as found by the trial court, was
due to the dredging operations undertaken by (petitioner) on the area, which findings are supported
by the testimony of Carlito Castillo, testifying in Civil Case No. 10276, and Teodora Dimaculangan, in
Civil Case No. 10696. . . . Neither has (petitioner) asseverated against (private respondents')
submission that their properties were used by (petitioner) as a dump site for its equipment and trucks,
and proof are the photographs of their properties showing tracks left by truck tires on their properties.
(Parenthetical indication of the parties concerned are made for easy reference.) 2 cdtai

It is, therefore, clearly apparent that petitioner was guilty of two culpable transgressions on the property
rights of private respondents, that is, for the ruination of the agricultural fertility or utility of the soil of
their property and, further, for the unauthorized use of said property as a dump site or depot for
petitioner's heavy equipment and trucks. Consequently, albeit with differing amounts, both courts
correctly awarded damages both for the destruction of the land and for the unpaid rentals, or more
correctly denominated, for the reasonable value of its use and occupation of the premises. There is
consequently no merit in said objection of petitioner.
The second proposition of petitioner is better taken, in light of the reconciliation and clarification
undertaken by the Court of the heretofore imprecise and varying pronouncements on the imposition
of interest in judgments for a sum of money.

In the recent case of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 3 the Court adopted
interpretative rules on the matter of the imposable interest and the accrual thereof. The rules pertinent
to the interest involved in the case at bar are hereunder briefed as applied to the controversy on the
computation and the reckoning date thereof. 4 cdt

When an obligation not constituting a loan or forbearance of money is breached, interest on the
amount of the damages awarded may be imposed at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum. No
interest shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims unless the same can be established with reasonable
certainty. Since the pleadings of herein private respondents in the trial court did not spell out said
amounts with certitude, the legal interest thereon shall run only from the promulgation of judgment of
said court, it being at that stage that the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been
reasonably ascertained.

The actual base for the computation of such legal interest, however, shall be the amount as finally
adjudged by this Court. Furthermore, when our judgment herein becomes final and executory, the rate
of legal interest shall be twelve percent (12%) from such finality until the satisfaction of the total
judgment account, the interim period being effectively equivalent to a forbearance of credit.

ACCORDINGLY, and by way of clarification, the judgment rendered by this Court in the instant case
shall be understood to mean that the legal interest to be paid by petitioner is six percent (6%) of the
amount due computed from September 6, 1990 when judgment was rendered by the trial court.
Additionally, interest of twelve percent (12%) shall be imposed on such total amount due upon the
finality of the judgment of the Court herein until the full satisfaction thereof.

Pearson v. Dodd
410 F2d 701

Doctrine: Conversion is the substantive tort theory which underlay the ancient common law form of
action for trover. A plaintiff in trover alleged that he had lost a chattel which he rightfully possessed,
and that the defendant had found it and converted it to his own use. With time, the allegations of losing
and finding became fictional, leaving the question of whether the defendant had "converted" the
property the only operative one. Conversion has been defined as an intentional exercise of dominion
or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor
may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel

FACTS
On several occasions in June and July 1965, two former employees of Dodd, at times with the
assistance of two members of the Dodd's staff, entered the Dodd 's office without authority and
unbeknownst to him, removed numerous documents from his files, made copies of them, replaced the
originals, and turned over the copies to the defendant Anderson, who was aware of the manner in
which the copies had been obtained. The defendants Pearson and Anderson thereafter published
articles containing information gleaned from these documents."

The District Court ruled that Pearson six newspaper columns concerning Dodd, which were attached
to Dodd's complaint, did not establish liability for the tort of invasion of privacy.

ISSUE #1
Whether Pearson and Anderson improperly intruded into the protected sphere of privacy of Dodd in
obtaining the information on which their columns were based.

ISSUE #2
Whether the information taken from those files falls under the protection of the law of property,
enforceable by a suit for conversion.

RULING TO THE ISSUE #1

Dodd have argued that Pearson 's employees and former employees committed neither conversion
nor trespass nor invasion of privacy, because their actions are privileged by a public policy in favor of
exposing wrongdoing.

Although Dodd complaint charges that Pearson aided and abetted in the removal of the documents,
the undisputed facts, narrowed by the District Judge with the concurrence of counsel, established only
that Pearson received copies of the documents knowing that they had been removed without
authorization. If we were to hold Pearson liable for invasion of privacy on these facts, the Court would
establish the proposition that one who receives information from an intruder, knowing it has been
obtained by improper intrusion, is guilty of a tort. In an untried and developing area of tort law, we are
not prepared to go so far. A person approached by an eavesdropper with an offer to share in the
information gathered through the eavesdropping would perhaps play the nobler part should he spurn
the offer and shut his ears. However, it seems to the Court that at this point it would place too great a
strain on human weakness to hold one liable in damages who merely succumbs to temptation and
listens.

Of course, Pearson did more than receive and peruse the copies of the documents taken from Dodd's
files; they published excerpts from them in the national press. But in analyzing a claimed breach of
privacy, injuries from intrusion and injuries from publication should be kept clearly separate. Where
there is intrusion, the intruder should generally be liable whatever the content of what he learns. An
eavesdropper to the marital bedroom may hear marital intimacies, or he may hear statements of fact
or opinion of legitimate interest to the public; for purposes of liability that should make no difference.
On the other hand, where the claim is that private information concerning plaintiff has been published,
the question of whether that information is genuinely private or is of public interest should not turn on
the manner in which it has been obtained. Of course, both forms of invasion may be combined in the
same case.

The Court have separately considered the nature of Pearson ' publications concerning Dodd and have
found that the matter published was of obvious public interest. The publication was not itself an
invasion of privacy. Since the Court have also concluded that Pearson's role in obtaining the
information did not make them liable to Dodd for intrusion, their subsequent publication, itself no
invasion of privacy, cannot reach back to render that role tortious.

RULING TO THE ISSUE #2

No, it does not.

Conversion is the substantive tort theory which underlay the ancient common law form of action for
trover. A plaintiff in trover alleged that he had lost a chattel which he rightfully possessed, and that the
defendant had found it and converted it to his own use. With time, the allegations of losing and finding
became fictional, leaving the question of whether the defendant had "converted" the property the only
operative one.

The most distinctive feature of conversion is its measure of damages, which is the value of the goods
converted. The theory is that the "converting" defendant has in some way treated the goods as if they
were his own, so that the plaintiff can properly ask the court to decree a forced sale of the property
from the rightful possessor to the converter.

Because of this stringent measure of damages, it has long been recognized that not every wrongful
interference with the personal property of another is a conversion. Where the intermeddling falls short
of the complete or very substantial deprivation of possessory rights in the property, the tort committed
is not conversion, but the lesser wrong of trespass to chattels.

The Second Restatement of Torts has marked the distinction by defining conversion as:

"* [A]n intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the
right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the
chattel."

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A (1) (1965).

Less serious interferences fall under the Restatement's definition of trespass.

Id., § 217: "A trespass to a chattel may be committed by intentionally (a) dispossessing another of the
chattel, or (b) using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another."

The difference is more than a semantic one. The measure of damages in trespass is not the whole
value of the property interfered with, but rather the actual diminution in its value caused by the
interference. More important for this case, a judgment for conversion can be obtained with only
nominal damages, whereas liability for trespass to chattels exists only on a showing of actual damage
to the property interfered with. Here the District Court granted partial summary judgment on the issue
of liability alone, while conceding that possibly no more than nominal damages might be awarded on
subsequent trial. Partial summary judgment for liability could not have been granted on a theory of
trespass to chattels without an undisputed showing of actual damages to the property in question.

"To support an action of trespass to a chattel where the invasion of interests does not result in its
destruction or in a dispossession thereof, it was early held there must be some physical harm to the
chattel or to its possessor. Unlike the action of trespass quare clausum fregit in the case of land, no
action could be maintained for a mere harmless intermeddling with goods. The possessor's proprietary
interest in the inviolability of his personal property did not receive that protection which the similar
interest in the possession of land or the dignitary interest in the inviolability of the person receives. * *
*"
It is clear that on the agreed facts Pearson committed no conversion of the physical documents taken
from Dodd's files. Those documents were removed from the files at night, photocopied, and returned
to the files undamaged before office operations resumed in the morning. Insofar as the documents'
value to appellee resided in their usefulness as records of the business of his office, appellee was
clearly not substantially deprived of his use of them.

The traditional rule has been that conversion will lie only for the taking of tangible property, or rights
embodied in a tangible token necessary for the enforcement of those rights. This overly restrictive rule
has recently been relaxed in favor of the reasonable proposition that any intangible generally protected
as personal property may be the subject matter of a suit for conversion.

The information included the contents of letters to Dodd from supplicants, and office records of other
kinds, the nature of which is not fully revealed by the record. According to the Court none of it amounts
to literary property, to scientific invention, or to secret plans formulated by appellee for the conduct of
commerce. Nor does it appear to be information held in any way for sale by Dodd, analogous to the
fresh news copy produced by a wire service.
Dodd complains, not of the misappropriation of property bought or created by him, but of the exposure
of information either (1) injurious to his reputation or (2) revelatory of matters which he believes he
has a right to keep to himself. Injuries of this type are redressed at law by suit for libel and invasion of
privacy respectively, where defendants' liability for those torts can be established under the limitations
created by common law and by the Constitution.

The Court have held that Dodd is not entitled to summary judgment for invasion of privacy. Dodd
originally sued Pearson for libel but has dropped this claim during the course of the litigation.

Because no conversion of the physical contents of Dodd's files took place, and because the
information copied from the documents in those files has not been shown to be property subject to
protection by suit for conversion, the District Court's ruling that Pearson are guilty of conversion must
be reversed.

Yutuk v. Manila Electric Company

G.R. No. L-13016 | May, 31, 1961 | J. Dizon

DOCTRINE: While moral damages are incapable of pecuniary estimation, they are made recoverable,
if they are proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission; and since these damages
affect the aggrieved party's moral feeling and personal pride, "these should be weighed in the
determination of the indemnity"

FACTS: Appellee Amelia Yukut, a lawyer, occupied the premises located at No. 1, Bay View Drive,
Tambo, Parañaque, Rizal, then recently vacated by one Paul Harrigan. The electric services installed
thereat were retained upon her request, for obvious reasons of convenience. The electric was installed
on an outside wall.

October 13, 1955: Eliseo Jaime, a meter inspector of appellant Meralco, went to Yutuk's residence.
He told the maid that he was a Meralco employee and that he wanted to enter the premises to read
the electric meter.

The maid informed appellee Amelia who was then convalescing from a bronchopneumonia ailment
but appellee directed her maid to tell him that he did not have to enter the premises since the electric
meter was just installed outside.

Subsequently, Jaime asked for a chair but the maid refused his request. Because of that, he left to
borrow a chair from the next door resident and proceeded to disconnect the meter.
Appellee saw Jaime holding what to her appeared to be electrical part so she asked what the trouble
was. Instead of giving a responsive answer, he asked her why she was paying only 50% of her
electric bills.

When she heard this, she mistakenly thought that the latter had come in connection with her
complaint (since lately her electric meter was registering exorbitant consumption), and for this reason
thanked him for having come and at last discovered that the electric meter in the premises was
defective.

However, Jaime replied that the electric meter was not defective but that she was instead stealing
electric current by using a "jumper".

Yutuk indignantly denied the charge and told him to stop insulting her, especially because she was
sick. Jaime, however, told her that he would return the "jumper" and would fix it so that she would
pay much more as a sort of punishment for her being a thief. Because of this incident appellee
suffered a relapse.

November 12, 1955: Meralco sent a letter to Yutuk demanding payment of the sum of P254.40
representing the cost of the electricity allegedly consumed by her but not registered in the electric
meter. Furthermore, she was warned that unless the P254.40 account was paid, the electric service
in her premises would be discontinued.

Because of this demand, Yutuk commenced the present action to secure: (a) an injunction restraining
Meralco from disconnecting the electric service and (b) a judgment denying appellant the right to
collect the sum of P254.40 and ordering it, instead, to pay appellee the sum of P100,000.00 as moral
damages.

Before the filing of the action above, Yutuk had charged Eliseo Jaime with slander in the CFI Rizal
where he was convicted. He, however, appealed to the Court of Appeals.

February 11, 1956: A month after the commencement of the present action and four months since
the alleged discovery of the "jumper" mentioned, appellant filed a criminal complaint for theft of
electricity against appellee in the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. However, it was dismissed
on the ground that the evidence did not establish a prima facie case against appellee.

ISSUE: WON Meralco is liable in damages to Yutuk

RULING: Yes.

Moral damages, under the NCC, include, inter alia, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation (Art. 2217). While these moral
damages are incapable of pecuniary estimation, they are made recoverable, in the amount
determined by the court, provided they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or
omission. As most of these damages affect the aggrieved party's moral feeling and personal pride,
"these should be weighed in the determination of the indemnity’’.

On the other hand, aside from moral, temperate and other damages, exemplary damages are
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good (New Civil code Art. 2229). Of course,
for one to recover exemplary damages, he must first show that he is entitled to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages (Art. 2234).

Appellant claims that nowhere in its answer, defenses and counterclaims is there a categorical
imputation that appellee had placed an unusual connection in the electric meter for her premises in
order to steal current. Perhaps no such categorical imputation was made in black and white but it
cannot be denied that the allegations made herein amount to an indirect but nonetheless clear and
positive imputation that appellee had used a "jumper" in her electric meter for the purpose of making
the same register only, one half of the electric current actually consumed, which in plain words would,
of course, mean "stealing" electric current.

Be that as it may, after appellant filed a complaint for theft of electricity against appellee in the Office
of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, it can no longer deny that it had charged appellee, a lady member
of the Bar, with the commission of that ugly and denigrating criminal offense. Moreover, it did this
with reckless negligence.

The lower court is correct in saying that the defendant was not justified in instituting said criminal
complaint for theft against the plaintiff. The defendant Company, before taking such step, should have
inquired carefully into the matter. The protest against the sketch report submitted by Eliseo Jaime, and
coupled with the administrative charge based on the incident of October 13, 1955, which plaintiff
thereafter filed against said Jaime with defendant Company, should have been sufficient to give
defendant reasonable ground for doubts and induce it to delve further into the case before taking such
action. Furthermore, defendant Company was cognizant of the criminal complaint filed by the plaintiff
against Eliseo Jaime for grave slander.

Furthermore, it appears that the criminal complaint for theft was filed on February 11, 1956 or about
four months after October 13, 1955. Why is it that the defendant had to wait four months before filing
said criminal complaint? This circumstance clearly shows that the defendant had brought said
criminal charge motivated purely by malice and ill-will and as a retaliatory measure for the civil action
filed by the plaintiff in this case.

Also, to protect its rights, the appellant could have filed but did not file any civil suit to recover the
value of the electric current allegedly consumed by appellee; instead it resorted to a criminal charge,
which can only mean that it chose to brandish this weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay — a
clear perversion of the function of criminal processes and of courts of justice.

The dismissal of the complaint for theft, filed by appellant, does not, by itself, show that the latter's
act was wrongful as to make it liable for moral and exemplary damages. We have heretofore held
that the law could

RODRIGO CONCEPCION v. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. NESTOR NICOLAS and ALLEM
NICOLAS
G.R. No. 120706 | January 31, 2000 | J. Bellosillo

DOCTRINE: The violations mentioned in the codal provisions are not exclusive but are merely
examples and do not preclude other similar or analogous acts. Damages therefore are allowable for
actions against a person's dignity, such as profane, insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abusive
language.

FACTS: Sometime in 1985, the spouses Nestor and Allem Nicolas resided at San Joaquin, Pasig City,
in an apartment leased to them by the owner, Florence "Bing" Concepcion, who also resided in the
same compound where the apartment was located. Nestor was then engaged in the business of
supplying government agencies and private entities with office equipment, appliances and other
fixtures on a cash purchase or credit basis. Florence joined this venture by contributing capital.

In July 1985, Rodrigo Concepcion, brother of the deceased husband of Florence, accosted Nestor at
the latter's apartment and accused him of conducting an adulterous relationship with Florence. He
shouted, "Hoy Nestor, kabit ka ni Bing! Binigyan ka pa pala ni Bing ng P100,000.00 para umakyat ng
Baguio. Pagkaakyat mo at ng asawa mo doon ay bababa ka uli para magkasarilinan kayo ni Bing."

As a result of this incident, Nestor felt extreme embarrassment and shame to the extent that he could
no longer face his neighbors. Florence also ceased to do business with him by not contributing capital
anymore so much so that the business venture of the Nicolas spouses declined as they could no
longer cope with their commitments to their clients and customers. Allem also started to doubt Nestor's
fidelity resulting in frequent bickerings and quarrels during which Allem even expressed her desire to
leave her husband. Consequently, Nestor wrote Rodrigo demanding public apology and payment of
damages. Rodrigo ignored the demand; thus, the Nicolas spouses filed a civil suit against him for
damages.

Rodrigo argues that the alleged act imputed to him by the spouses does not fall under Arts. 26 and
2219 of the Civil Code since it does not constitute libel, slander, or any other form of defamation.
Neither does it involve prying into the privacy of another's residence or meddling with or disturbing the
private life or family relation of another. Rodrigo also criticized the CA for not taking into account the
fact that the trial judge who penned the decision was in no position to observe first-hand the demeanor
of the witnesses of the spouses as he was not the original judge who heard the case.

RTC RULING: The Regional Trial Court ordered Rodrigo to pay the spouses Nicolas the sums of
P50,000.00 for moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages and P10,000.00 for attorney's
fees, plus the costs of suit.

CA RULING: The CA affirmed the RTC ruling.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there is basis in law for the award of damages to the Nicolas spouses
2. Whether or not there is basis to review the facts

RULING:

1. Yes. The incident charged of Rodrigo was no less than an invasion on the right of Nestor as a
person. The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the human personality must be
exalted. The sacredness of human personality is a concomitant consideration of every plan for human
amelioration. The touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and civilization of every country, is
how far it dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a person from being unjustly humiliated, in
short, if human personality is not exalted — then the laws are indeed defective. Thus, under Art. 26 of
the Civil Code, the rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of
a person's dignity, personality, privacy, and peace of mind.

It is Rodrigo’s position that the act imputed to him does not constitute any of those enumerated in Arts.
26 and 2219. The violations mentioned in the codal provisions are not exclusive but are merely
examples and do not preclude other similar or analogous acts. Damages therefore are allowable for
actions against a person's dignity, such as profane, insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abusive
language. Under Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages which include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury, although incapable of pecuniary computation, may be recovered if they
are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.

There is no question that Nestor suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
and social humiliation as a proximate result of Rodrigo’s abusive, scandalous, and insulting language.

2. No. The fact alone that the judge who heard the evidence was not the one who rendered the
judgment but merely relied on the record of the case does not render his judgment erroneous or
irregular. Thus, the Court generally will not find any misapprehension of facts as it can be fairly
assumed under the principle of regularity of performance of duties of public officers that the transcripts
of stenographic notes were thoroughly scrutinized and evaluated by the judge himself.

The fact that the case was handled by different judges brooks no consideration at all, for preponderant
evidence consistent with their claim for damages has been adduced by private respondents as to
foreclose a reversal. Otherwise, every time a Judge who heard a case, wholly or partially, dies or
leaves the service, the case cannot be decided, and a new trial will have to be conducted. That would
be absurd; inconceivable.

MEDINA v. CASTRO-BARTOLOME
G.R. No. L-59825 | September 11, 1982 | J. Abad Santos
Where plaintiffs' complaint for damages arising from the alleged disgraceful termination of employment
does not allege any unfair labor practice, theirs is a simple action for damages for tortious acts
allegedly committed by the defendants. Such being the case, the governing statute is the Civil Code
and not the Labor Code.

FACTS: Petitioners Ernesto Medina and Jose Ong, former Plant Manager and Comptroller,
respectively, of respondent Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines, Inc. filed with the Court of First
Instance a complaint for damages against private respondents, alleging, among others, that
respondent company, through its president and chief executive officer, respondent Aboitiz, without
provocation, dismissed and publicly humiliated petitioners.

After conducting a preliminary investigation, the complaint was dismissed since the expression ‘Fuck
you’ and ‘You are both shit to me’ were uttered not to slander but to express anger and displeasure.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the Secretary of Justice and the Deputy Minister of Justice
sustained the petitioners’ complaint, reversing the resolution of the Provincial Fiscal and directing him
to file against defendant Cosme de Aboitiz an Information for Grave Slander.

Petitioners averred the following: Aboitiz did not consider petitioners’ impeccable
performance/qualifications and long years of service to the Company when he dismissed and
slandered them. Said dismissal, could have been done in private; defendants enjoyed dismissing the
plaintiffs because instead of allowing a lesser official to take whatever action was necessary, Aboitiz
himself dismissed the plaintiffs; alleged delay in the use of promotional crowns was true with respect
to the other Plants. This shows that Aboitiz did not really have a strong reason for publicly humiliating
the plaintiffs; defendants were moved by evil motives and an anti-social attitude since the dismissal
was effected on the day that plaintiffs were awarded rings of loyalty to the Company, 5 days before
Christmas and on the day when the employees' Christmas party was held in the Muntinlupa Plant
(when plaintiffs went home and found their family already dressed up for the party, they didn't know
what to do and so they cried); petitioners suffered wounded feelings, sleepless nights, mental torture,
besmirched reputation and other similar injuries, for which the sum of ₱150,000 for each plaintiff
should be awarded as moral damages; and defendants’ disregard of Phil. labor and social legislation,
and to prevent other persons from following their footsteps, the amount of ₱50,000 for each plaintiff
should be awarded as exemplary damages.

On June 4, 1979, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, which motion was denied. While the trial was in progress, private respondents filed another
motion to dismiss dated January 23, 1981, because of amendments to the Labor Code which vested
on Labor Arbiters’ original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving employer-employee relations,
including claims for damages. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction since
jurisdiction over employee-employer relations and claims of workers have been removed from the
Courts of First Instance.

ISSUE: Whether the Labor Code has any relevance to the reliefs sought by the plaintiffs.

RULING: NO. It is evident from the complaint that the plaintiffs have not alleged any unfair labor
practice since theirs is a simple action for damages for tortious acts allegedly committed by defendants.
Therefore, the governing statute is the Civil Code and not the Labor Code.

112. Manila Gas Corporation v. CA and Isidro M. Ongsip

G.R. No. L-44190 | October 30, 1980 | J. Makasiar
(Violation of Personal Dignity)
Evidently, Manila Gas Corporation, in failing to recover its lost revenue caused by the gas meter's
incorrect recording, sought to vindicate its financial loss by filing the complaint for qualified theft against
respondent Ongsip knowing it to be false. It was actually intended to vex and humiliate private
respondent and to blacken his reputation not only as a businessman but also as a person. XXX XXX
XXX Necessarily, indemnification had to be made.

FACTS: Manila Gas Corporation is authorized to conduct and operate the business of servicing and
supplying gas in the City of Manila and its suburbs. Respondent Ongsip applied for gas service
connection for his kitchen and 48-door apartment with petitioner Manila Gas Corporation. As a result,
two 20--gallon capacity water storage heaters were installed and two heavy duty gas burners.The
installations and connections were all done solely by petitioner's employees. There was no significant
change in the meter reading despite additional installations.

On August 17, 1966, at around 1 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner's employee led by Mariano Coronel,
the then Chief of the Distribution Department, went to Ongsip's place. After identifying themselves to
the houseboy therein that they are from the Manila Gas Corporation, but without notifying or in forming
respondent Ongsip, they changed the gas meter and installed new tube connections. At the time the
work was being undertaken, private respondent was taking a nap but he was informed afterwards of
what had taken place by his houseboy.

Ongsip inquired why they were taking pictures of the premises but the employee simply gave him a
calling card with instructions to go to his (Coronel's) office. There, he was informed about the existence
of a by-pass valve or "jumper" in the gas connection and that unless he gave Coronel P3,000.00, he
would be deported. He refused. By the end of August, a reading was made on the new meter and
expectedly, it registered a sudden increase in gas consumption.

A complaint for qualified theft was filed by petitioner against respondent Ongsip. Pending investigation,
petitioner disconnected respondent's gas service for alleged failure to pay his gas consumptions. The
complaint was dismissed by the city fiscal. Ongsip later filed a complaint for moral and exemplary
damages against petitioner based on two causes of action, firstly: the malicious, oppressive and
malevolent filing of the criminal complaint; and, secondly: the illegal closure of respondent Ongsip's
gas service connection without court order and without notice of warning.

RTC RULING:

Dismissed the defendant’s counterclaim. Ordered defendant to pay plaintiff:

(1) P50,000 as moral damages in the first cause of action;
(2) P10,000 as exemplary damages in the first cause of action;
(3) P30,000 as moral damages in the second cause of action;
(4) P5,000 as exemplary damages in the second cause of action;
(5) P10,000 as attorney’s fees; and
(6) The costs of the suit.

CA RULING: Affirmed in toto.

ISSUE: Whether or not the amount of moral and exemplary damages is excessive?

1. Whether or not the filing of criminal complaint was not actuated by malice on the part of
petitioner? (YES)
2. Whether or not the closure of Ongsip's gas service without prior notice constitutes breach of
contract? (YES)
3. Whether or not the amount of moral and exemplary damages is excessive? (YES, SC reduced
it)
RULING:

(1) To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted
by a siniter design to vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated deliberately by the
defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of
submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious
prosecution. In the instant case, however, there is reason to believe that there was malicious
intent in the filing of the complaint for qualified theft. This intent is traceable to that early
afternoon of August 17, 1966, when petitioner's employees, upon being ordered, came to
private respondent's residence and changed the defective gas meter and tube connections
without notice. In other words, respondent Ongsip had no opportunity to observe the works.
Nonetheless, if indeed he had installed an illegal by-pass tube or jumper, he could have easily
asked for its immediate removal soon after his houseboy told him what petitioner's employees
did. As established by the facts, he had not even attempted to refuse entrance to petitioner's
employees headed by Mariano Coronel nor to question their authority upon their return later
that same afternoon with a photographer. Little did he realize that the pictures of the premises
that were being taken would be used as evidence against him.

Evidently, Manila Gas Corporation, in failing to recover its lost revenue caused by the gas
meter's incorrect recording, sought to vindicate its financial loss by filing the complaint for
qualified theft against respondent Ongsip knowing it to be false. It was actually intended to vex
and humiliate private respondent and to blacken his reputation not only as a businessman but
also as a person. Qualified theft is a serious offense indicating moral depravity in an individual.
To be accused of such crime without basis is shocking and libelous. It stigmatized private
respondent causing him emotional depression and social degradation. Petitioner should have
realized that what is believed to be a vindication of a proprietary right is no justification for
subjecting one’s name to indignity and dishonor. One can thus imagine the anguish, anxiety,
shock and humiliation suffered by respondent Ongsip. The fact that the complaint for qualified
theft was dismissed by the Pasay City fiscal is no consolation. The damage had been done.
Necessarily, indemnification had to be made.

(2) Petitioner's act in disconnecting respondent Ongsip's gas service without prior notice
constitutes breach of contract amounting to an independent tort. The prematurity of the action
is indicative of an intent to cause additional mental and moral suffering to private respondent.
This is a clear violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides that "any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages." Moreover, the award of moral
damages is sanctioned by Article 2220 which provides that "willful injury to property may be a
legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances,
such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith".

(3) The trial court awarded P50,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

WE give due consideration to respondent Ongsip's social and financial status as a

businessman and the mental anguish he suffered as a result of the false imputation. However,
We also consider petitioner's financial capability. Petitioner is a public utility corporation whose
primary concern is service to the people, the profit motive being merely secondary. Under the
circumstances, We are of the opinion that the award of moral and exemplary damages should
be reduced to P25,000.00 and P5,000.00, respectively. This award is sanctioned by Article
2234 of the Civil Code.
 People v. Whisenhunt
G.R. No. 123819 | November 14, 2001 | J. Ynares-Santiago

The award of moral damages in murder cases is justified because of the physical suffering and mental
anguish brought about by the felonious acts, and is thus recoverable in criminal offenses resulting in
death. It is true that moral damages are not intended to enrich the victim’s heirs or to penalize the
convict, but to obviate the spiritual sufferings of the heirs.

FACTS: Stephen Mark Whisenhunt was charged with the murder of Elsa Santos-Castillo. Evidence
shows that Whisenhunt and the deceased were lovers. Both of them were married, but they were
estranged from their respective spouses. They both worked at the Apex Motor Corporation where
Whisenhunt was the manager and Elsa was the Associate Personnel Manager. Elsa resigned from
Apex, but she continued her affair with Whisenhunt even after her resignation.

Autopsy results show that the cause of death of Elsa were stab wounds. These were found on her
right breast which penetrated the right lung, and under the left breast which penetrated the diaphragm
and abdominal cavity and the right portion of the liver.

RTC RULING: The trial court convicted Whisenhunt of the crime of murder, sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the deceased actual damage,
moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the award of damages is justified
2. Whether the prosecution was able to present enough circumstantial evidence to support the
conclusion that the accused is guilty of the crime charged
3. Whether the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present
4. Whether the outraging and scoffing at the corpse of the victim was correctly appreciated by
the trial court in the crime of murder

RULING:

1. YES.

As to actual damages, the Court modified the damages awarded by the trial court. Elida Santos, Elsa’s
sister, testified that the funeral expenses was only P50,000. Hence, the trial court erred when it
awarded the amount of P100,000. In determining actual damages, the court cannot rely on mere
assertions, speculations, conjectures, or guesswork but must depend on competent proof and on the
best obtainable evidence of the actual amount of the loss. Actual damages cannot be presumed but
must be duly proved with reasonable certainty.

As to moral damages, the award of moral damages in murder cases is justified because of the physical
suffering and mental anguish brought about by the felonious acts, and is thus recoverable in criminal
offenses resulting in death. It is true that moral damages are not intended to enrich the victim’s heirs
or to penalize the convict, but to obviate the spiritual sufferings of the heirs.

Considering, however, the extraordinary circumstances in this case, particularly the unusual grief and
outrage suffered by the victim’s bereaved family as a result of the brutal and indecent mutilation and
disposal of Elsa’s body, the moral damages to be awarded to them should be more than the normal
amount dictated by jurisprudence. However, the amount of P3,000,000 awarded by the trial court as
moral damages is rather excessive. The reasonable amount is P1,000,000 considering the immense
sorrow and shock suffered by Elsa’s heirs.

The award of attorney’s fees of P150,000 was duly proved, and thus should be affirmed.

2. YES.

Circumstantial evidence may be resorted to in proving the identity of the accused when direct evidence
is not available. The rules on evidence and jurisprudence sustain the conviction of an accused through
circumstantial evidence when the following requisites concur: (1) there must be more than one
circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all
circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.

Here, while it may be true that there was no eyewitness to the death of Elsa, the confluence of the
testimonial and physical evidence against Whisenhunt creates an unbroken chain of circumstantial
evidence that leads to the conclusion that Whisenhunt was the author of the crime, to the exclusion of
all others.

The testimony of Demetrio Ravelo, the “prosecution star witness,” bears the ring of truth and sincerity.
The records show that he did not waver even during lengthy and rigorous cross-examination. In fact,
the trial court gave full faith and credit to his testimony. As to the physical evidence against Whisenhunt,
the findings of the forensic biologist on the examination of the hair samples and bloodstains all confirm
Elsa's death inside accused-appellant's bedroom, the autopsy report revealing that Elsa was stabbed
at least three times on the chest, and Demetrio's testimony that the accused kept the kitchen knife
inside his bedroom, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the accused stabbed Elsa inside the
bedroom or bathroom.

3. NO

Abuse of superiority is present whenever there is inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor
and selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The fact that the victim
was a woman does not, by itself, establish that accused-appellant committed the crime with abuse of
superior strength. There ought to be enough proof of the relative strength of the aggressor and the
victim.

Abuse of superior strength must be shown and clearly established as the crime itself. In this case,
nobody witnessed the actual killing. Nowhere in Demetrio's testimony, and is not indicated in any of
the pieces of physical evidence, that the accused deliberately took advantage of his superior strength
in overpowering Elsa. On the contrary, the Court observed from viewing the photograph of accused
that he has a rather small frame.

4. YES

The mere decapitation of the victim's head constitutes outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim,
thus qualifying the killing to murder. In this case, the accused not only beheaded Elsa. He further cut
up her body like pieces of meat. Then, he strewed the dismembered parts of her body in a deserted
road in the countryside, leaving them to rot on the ground. The sight of Elsa's severed body parts on
the ground, vividly depicted in the photographs offered in evidence, is both revolting and horrifying. At
the same time, the viewer cannot help but feel utter pity for the sub-human manner of disposing of her
remains.
 Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (United States case)
616 P2d 813 | Cal. 1980| J.

Risk of harm to the husband of the patient from a misdiagnosis was reasonably foreseeable, and that
the tortious conduct was directed at the patient and her husband. As a "direct victim," the strict criteria
for negligent infliction of emotional distress need not be fulfilled.

FACTS: The husband brought an action against defendants, a medical center and doctors, for mental
suffering and for loss of consortium caused by the emotional injury to his wife. The husband alleged
that defendants had erroneously diagnosed his wife as suffering from an infectious social disease. A
demurrer was filed by the defendants and the lower court sustained the demurrers to both causes of
action. The husband appealed.

ISSUE: WON the trial court err in dismissing the case by refusing to recognize the husband's cause
of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress in the absence of some physical
consequence and could he recover for loss of consortium where his spouse had suffered a disabling,
nonphysical injury?

RULING: Yes. The court reversed, holding that the lower court's refusal to recognize a cause of action
for negligently inflicted injury in the absence of some physical consequence was incorrect and that a
husband could recover for loss of consortium where his spouse had suffered a disabling, nonphysical
injury. The court held that the lower court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the cause of action for
loss of consortium. The court agreed with the husband that alleged tortious conduct of defendants was
directed to him as well as to his wife. It held that the risk of harm to the husband was reasonably
foreseeable and, thus, defendants owed the husband a duty to exercise due care in diagnosing the
physical condition of his wife. The court also held that the husband was not barred from recovery by
the fact that he suffered no physical injury. Hence, the husband's complaint stated a cause of action
for emotional distress.

MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc

G.R. No. 135306 / January 28, 2003 / BELLOSILLO, J.

FACTS: ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., a local federation of more than
seventy (70) Muslim religious organizations, and individual Muslims ABDULRAHMAN R.T. LINZAG,
IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA, ABDUL RASHID DE GUZMAN, AL-FARED DA SILVA and IBRAHIM B.A.
JUNIO, filed a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class suit in behalf of the Muslim
members nationwide against MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C. LACONSAY, MYLA C. AGUJA
and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., arising from an article published in the 1 August 1992 issue of
Bulgar, a daily tabloid. The article reads:

"ALAM BA NINYO?
Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim?

Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit
na sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong
Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw
na tinatawag nilang 'Ramadan'."

The complaint alleged that the libelous statement was insulting and damaging to the Muslims;
that these words alluding to the pig as the God of the Muslims was not only published out of sheer
ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam, as a
religion in this country, in violation of law, public policy, good morals and human relations; that on
account of these libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Philippines but the entire
Muslim world, especially every Muslim individual in non-Muslim countries.

MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., in their defense, contended
that the article did not mention respondents as the object of the article and therefore were not entitled
to damages; and, that the article was merely an expression of belief or opinion and was published
without malice nor intention to cause damage, prejudice or injury to Muslims.

RTC RULING: Trial court dismissed the complaint holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish their
cause of action since the persons allegedly defamed by the article were not specifically identified.

CA RULING: It reversed the decision of the trial court. It opined that it was "clear from the disputed
article that the defamation was directed to all adherents of the Islamic faith. It stated that pigs were
sacred and idolized as god by members of the Muslim religion. This libelous imputation undeniably
applied to the plaintiff-appellants who are Muslims sharing the same religious beliefs." It added that
the suit for damages was a "class suit" and that ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC.'s religious status as a Muslim umbrella organization gave it the requisite personality to sue and
protect the interests of all Muslims.

ISSUES:
(a) WON there’s existence of the elements of libel. (None)
(b) WON respondents have a right to institute the class suit. (None) and,
(c) WON petitioners are liable for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of
suit. (no)

MAIN ISSUE: Whether or not said statement is libelous which caused emotional distress to
respondents.

RULING: No.

Primarily, an "emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature, i.e., it is a civil action filed
by an individual to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his
character.

It has no application in the instant case since no particular individual was identified in the
disputed article of Bulgar. Also, the purported damage caused by the article, assuming there was any,
falls under the principle of relational harm — which includes harm to social relationships in the
community in the form of defamation; as distinguished from the principle of reactive harm — which
includes injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction of emotional distress.

In their complaint, respondents clearly asserted an alleged harm to the standing of Muslims in
the community, especially to their activities in propagating their faith in Metro Manila and in other non-
Muslim communities in the country.25 It is thus beyond cavil that the present case falls within the
application of the relational harm principle of tort actions for defamation, rather than the reactive harm
principle on which the concept of emotional distress properly belongs.

Moreover, under the Second Restatement of the Law, to recover for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress the plaintiff must show that: (a) The conduct of the defendant was intentional or in
reckless disregard of the plaintiff; (b) The conduct was extreme and outrageous; (c) There was a
causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's mental distress; and, (d) The
plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and severe.
 Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove more than mere worry, anxiety,
vexation, embarrassment, or anger. Liability does not arise from mere insults, indignities, threats,
annoyances, petty expressions, or other trivialities. In determining whether the tort of outrage had
been committed, a plaintiff is necessarily expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount
of criticism, rough language, and to occasional acts and words that are definitely inconsiderate and
unkind; the mere fact that the actor knows that the other will regard the conduct as insulting, or will
have his feelings hurt, is not enough.

Note:
"Extreme and outrageous conduct" means conduct that is so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious,
and utterly intolerable in civilized society. The defendant's actions must have been so terrifying as
naturally to humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff.27 Generally, conduct will be found to be
actionable where the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his
resentment against the actor, and lead him or her to exclaim, "Outrageous!" as his or her reaction. On
the other hand, "Emotional distress" means any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as extreme
grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry, nausea, mental suffering and
anguish, shock, fright, horror, and chagrin. "Severe emotional distress," in some jurisdictions, refers
to any type of severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be generally recognized
and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so, including posttraumatic stress disorder, neurosis,
psychosis, chronic depression, or phobia. The plaintiff is required to show, among other things, that
he or she has suffered emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to
endure it; severity of the distress is an element of the cause of action, not simply a matter of damages.

Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. v. CA

G.R. No. 145428 | July 07, 2004 | J. Callejo, Sr.

Moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage
where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith even if death does not result.

FACTS: In November 1991, Atty. Renato Arroyo bought a ticket from Trans-Asia Shipping Lines for
the voyage of M/V Asia Thailand vessel to Cagayan de Oro City from Cebu City.

At around 5:30pm, Arroyo boarded the vessel, where he noticed that some repair works were being
undertaken on the engine of the vessel. The vessel departed at around 11:00pm with only one engine
running. After an hour, the vessel stopped near Kawit Island. Some passengers demanded to be
returned to Cebu, no longer willing to continue their voyage to Cagayan de Oro. The captain acceded,
and thus the vessel headed back to Cebu.

At Cebu, Arroyo, together with the other passengers, were allowed to disembark. Thereafter, the
vessel proceeded to Cagayan de Oro. The next day, Arroyo boarded the M/V Asia Japan for its voyage
to Cagayan de Oro, likewise a vessel of Trans-Asia.

Arroyo then filed before the trial court a complaint for damages against Trans-Asia, on account of the
latter’s failure to transport him to the place of destination that day. In his complaint, Arroyo alleged that
the engines of the M/V Asia Thailand conked out in the open sea, and for more than an hour it was
stalled, thus causing fear in the passengers.

It sailed back to Cebu City after regaining power, but the passengers were arrogantly told to disembark
without precautions against possible injury, thus exacerbating Arroyo’s mental distress. He further
alleged that by reason of Trans-Asia’s wanton, reckless, and willful acts, he was exposed to danger
and, having been stranded in Cebu City for a day, incurred additional expenses and loss of income.
He then prayed that he be awarded P1.1k, P50k, and P25k as compensatory, moral, and exemplary
damages, respectively.

RTC RULING: The trial court ruled that the action was only for breach of contract, with Articles 1170,
1172, and 1173 of the Civil Code as applicable law — not Article 2180. Article 1170 made a person
liable for damages if, in the performance of his obligation, he was guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay,
or in any manner contravened the tenor thereof. On the other hand, under Article 2201, to be entitled
to damages, the non-performance of the obligation must have been tainted not only by fraud,
negligence, or delay, but also bad faith, malice, and wanton attitude.

CA Ruling: Arroyo appealed to the CA, which reversed the trial court's decision by applying Article
1755 in relation to Articles 2201, 2208, 2217, and 2232 of the Civil Code, and awarded compensatory,
P20k moral, and P10k exemplary damages, plus P5k attorney’s fees and the cost of suit.

It did not, however, allow the grant of damages for the delay in the performance of Trans-Asia’s
obligation, because the requirement of demand in Article 1169 had not been met. Arroyo offered no
evidence to prove that his contract of carriage with Trans-Asia provided for liability in case of delay in
departure.

ISSUE, (as mentioned under Emotional Distress): WON Arroyo is entitled to moral damages.

RULING: YES. Moral damages include moral suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, or similar injury. They may
be recovered in the cases under Article 2219, likewise, if they are the proximate result of, as in this
case, Trans-Asia’s breach of the contract of carriage. Due to a breach of a contract of common carriage,
moral damages may be awarded if the common carrier acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

Arroyo is entitled to moral damages for the mental anguish, fright and serious anxiety he suffered
during the voyage when the vessel's engine broke down and when he disembarked from the vessel
during the wee hours of the morning at Cebu when it returned.

Moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage
where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith even if death does not result.

Trans-Asia is liable for moral and exemplary damages. In allowing its unseaworthy M/V Asia Thailand
to leave the port of origin and undertake the contracted voyage, with full awareness that it was exposed
to perils of the sea, it deliberately disregarded its solemn duty to exercise extraordinary diligence and
acted with bad faith and in a wanton and reckless manner.

Trans-Asia argues that the safety of the vessel and passengers was never at stake because the sea
was "calm" in the vicinity where it stopped. Hence, Arroyo was merely "over-reacting" to the situation.

This, however, cannot exculpate Trans-Asia, nor mitigate its liability. On the contrary, such a claim
demonstrates Trans-Asia’s lack of genuine concern for the safety of its passengers. Even if the sea
was calm, Trans-Asia still should not expect its passengers to act in the manner it desired.

The passengers, in becoming alarmed, anxious, or frightened when the vessel stopped at sea in an
unfamiliar zone at nighttime, is only a proper reaction, considering the many tragedies at sea resulting
in the loss of lives of passengers and damage to property, because common carriers failed in their
duty to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of their obligations.

Other Issues and Rulings:

1. WON the failure of a common carrier to maintain its vessel’s seaworthy condition is
considered a breach of the contract of carriage. (YES)
2. WON this breach of contract of carriage warrants an award of damages for the delay in the
performance of Trans-Asia’s obligation. (NO)

1. YES. Under Article 1733 of the Civil Code, Trans-Asia was bound to observe extraordinary diligence
in ensuring the safety of Arroyo. Thus, Trans-Asia, pursuant to Article 1755, was bound to carry Arroyo
safely as far as human care and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.

The failure of a common carrier to maintain in seaworthy condition its vessel involved in a contract of
carriage is a clear breach of its duty under in Article 1755.

Trans-Asia is liable for moral and exemplary damages. In allowing its unseaworthy M/V Asia Thailand
to leave the port of origin and undertake the contracted voyage, with full awareness that it was exposed
to perils of the sea, it deliberately disregarded its duty to exercise extraordinary diligence and acted
with bad faith and in a wanton and reckless manner.

2. NO. Actual or compensatory damages represent the adequate compensation for pecuniary loss
suffered and for profits the obligee failed to obtain. In contracts or quasi-contracts, the obligor is liable
for all the damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation if he
is guilty of fraud, bad faith, malice, or wanton attitude.

In the case at bar, there was no delay in the commencement of the contracted voyage. If any delay
was incurred, it was after the commencement of the voyage, specifically, when the voyage was
interrupted when the vessel had to stop after the only functioning engine conked out.

As to the rights and duties of the parties strictly arising out of such delay, Article 698 of the Code of
Commerce specifically provides for such a situation, which applies suppletorily under Article 1766.
The cause of the delay or interruption was Trans-Asia’s failure to observe extraordinary diligence.

Thus, Trans-Asia is liable for any pecuniary loss or loss of profits which Arroyo may have suffered by
reason thereof. This, however, assumes that he stayed on the vessel and was with it when it resumed
its voyage; but he did not.

Any further delay in Arroyo’s arrival at the port of destination was caused by his decision to disembark.
His actual/compensatory damages must be proved, but he failed to do so. There is no convincing
evidence that he did not receive his salary nor that his absence was not excused.

However, the award of attorney's fees is improper. Under Article 2208, these are recoverable only in
the concept of actual damages, not as moral damages nor judicial costs. Thus, to merit the award, the
amount thereof must be proven. Moreover, such must be specifically prayed for — as was not done
in this case — and may not be deemed incorporated within a general prayer for "such other relief and
remedy as this court may deem just and equitable."

Notes/Definitions:

Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. In contracts and quasi-contracts, exemplary
damages may be awarded if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner. It cannot be considered as a matter of right; the court has to decide whether or
not they should be adjudicated. Before this court may consider an award for exemplary damages, the
plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages; but it is not
necessary that he prove the monetary value thereof.

Equitable Bank v. Court of Appeals

133 SCRA 138 | NO DIGEST MADE

1. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; MALICIOUS PROSECUTION AS A BASIS THEREFOR; INTENT TO

HARASS EMBARRASS NECESSARY. — The trial court and the Appellate Court erred in holding that
there was malicious prosecution within the meaning of Articles 2217 and 2219(8) of the Civil Code.
The action to collect the P250 was filed with uberrima fides. It was not an act of malevolence designed
to harass or embarrass Contreras. The amount was overdue. The complaint was dismissed before
summons was served on Contreras (See Bagumbayan Corporation vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
G.R. No. 66274, September 30. 1984).

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; GENERALLY REFERS TO UNFOUNDED CRIMINAL PROSECUTION. — Generally,

denuncia falsa or malicious prosecution refers to unfounded criminal actions (Madera vs. Lopez, L-
37105, February 10, 1981, 102 SCRA 700). The term has been expanded to include unfounded civil
suits instituted just to vex and humiliate the defendant despite the absence of a cause of action or
probable cause (Buchanan vs. Vda. de Esteban, 32 Phil. 363, 365).

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTROLLING PRECEDENT IS INHELDER CASE. — Defendant's counterclaim for
damages against what he considers a vexatious and baseless complaint is based on the theory of
malicious prosecution (See RFC vs. Koh, 114 Phil. 456. 461). In this case, Contreras filed in the
municipal court a counterclaim for P80,000 which he announced would be the object of a separate
complaint in the proper forum. His answer was a voluntary appearance because he was not served
with summons. The controlling precedent is found in Inhelder Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 52358, May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 576. It was held therein that the erroneous filing of a collection
suit for P561 did not entitle the defendants to an award of P41,550 as actual and exemplary damages,
the amount adjudged by the Appellate Court. The elements of malice and lack of probable cause were
absent. In the Inhelder case, it appears that on January 28, 1975 Doctor Daniel Panganiban and his
wife mailed a check from Calapan, Oriental Mindoro to Inhelder Corporation in Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila in payment of his debt of P561. Inhelder acknowledged receipt of the check in its letter of
February 19, 1975. Ignorant of such payment, Inhelder's lawyer filed in the municipal court of
Mandaluyong on February 12, 1975 an action for the collection of P561. Panganiban's defense was
payment. The municipal court in its order of May 14, 1975 dismissed the action Then, the Panganibans
in turn sued Inhelder in the Court of First Instance of Calapan for malicious prosecution. The Mindoro
court awarded them gargantuan damages of P212,550 which was reduced by the Appellate Court to
P41,550. This Court dismissed the complaint. The award of damages was reversed and set aside.

4. ID.; ID.; NOT RECOVERABLE FOR UNSUCCESSFUL SUITS FILED IN GOOD FAITH. — As
observed by Chief Justice Fernando, the expenses and annoyance of litigation form part of the social
burden of living in a society which seeks to attain social control through law (Dioquino vs. Laureano,
L-25906, May 28, 1970, 33 SCRA 65, 72 citing Petroleum Exploration vs. Public Service Commission,
304 US 209). A long catena of cases supports the proposition that moral damages are not recoverable
for unsuccessful suits filed in good faith R & B Sutery & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R. No. 64515, June 22, 1984 and other cases cited. With respect to the award for exemplary
or corrective damages, the same is likewise devoid of any legal and factual basis. The Court has found
that Contreras' claim of malicious prosecution is more imaginary than real. The bank's last contention
is that Contreras was the one motivated by malevolence or ill-will in bringing this action. Therefore,
the bank's counterclaim for moral damages of P25,000 and litigation expenses of P10,000 should be
allowed. The dictates of justice do not sanction that contention. As a rule, there should be no penalty
on the right to litigate. The bank's counterclaim is dismissed.
 PEOPLE v. CABALQUINTO
G.R. No. 167693 | September 19, 2006 | J. Tinga

NOTE: There are 2 parts to this case: first is the discussion of the Court on whether or not it is proper
to post the full text of decisions sexual abuse cases and similar on the Supreme Court Web Page and
second is the application of the decision of the first part to the case at bar.

PART I

FACTS: This case presents an opportunity for the Court not only to once again dispense due requital
for the sufferings of a child who has been defiled by her own father, but also to effectuate the provisions
of Republic Act No. 7610 (RA 7610), otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children Against
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, and its implementing rules, RA 9262, otherwise
known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004, and its implementing
rules, and our ownRule on Violence Against Women and their Children. The provisions on
confidentiality of these enactments uniformly seek to respect the dignity and protect the privacy of
women and their children.

It is worth mentioning in this connection that the Court has resolved to refrain from posting in its Internet
Web Page the full text of decisions in cases involving child sexual abuse in response to a letter from
a mother of a child abuse victim addressed to the Chief Justice expressing anxiety over the posting of
full text decisions of the Supreme Court on its Internet Web Page. The mother submitted that
confidentiality and the best interest of the child must prevail over public access to information and
pleaded that her daughter's case, as well as those of a similar nature, be excluded from the Web Page.

The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), National Press Club (NPC), Philippine Press Institute (PPI), Kapisanan ng mga
Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) and the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to
comment on the matter at hand.

The position of the OSG in its Comment is noteworthy. The OSG submits that the posting of
the full text of decisions in cases involving child abuse on the Supreme Court Web Page violates the
right to privacy of the aggrieved parties. In order to determine whether the subject matter upon which
the right to privacy being invoked falls within the constitutionally-protected zone of privacy, it must be
shown that the person's expectation of privacy is reasonable. The reasonableness of such expectancy
depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of
privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.

According to the OSG, the fact that the aggrieved child may have consented, through a parent
or guardian, to a public hearing of the case does not negate the expectation of privacy which the child
may later invoke because child victims cannot be presumed to have intended their initial agreement
to extend beyond the termination of their case to the posting of the decision reached by the Court on
the Web Page. Moreover, such an expectation of privacy is reasonable considering the various
statutes and rules which reveal the intention of the State to maintain the confidentiality of information
pertaining to child abuse cases.

In conclusion, the OSG suggests the adoption of a system of coding which could include the
use of pseudonyms in cases of a similar nature. Short of withdrawing the full text of decisions in such
cases from the Web Page, the OSG proposes that the Court instead replace the material information,
such as the name of the child-victim, in its decisions.
 The DSWD, KBP and NPC imparted the same sentiment.

ISSUE: Whether or not it is proper to post the full text of decisions of sexual abuse case and similar
cases on the Supreme Court Web Page.

RULING: Yes, however, taking all the opinions of the OSG, DSWD, KBP and NPC into account and
in view of recent enactments which unequivocally express the intention to maintain the confidentiality
of information in cases involving violence against women and their children, in this case and henceforth,
the Court shall withhold the real name of the victim- survivor and shall use fictitious initials instead to
represent her. Likewise, the personal circumstances of the victims-survivors or any other information
tending to establish or compromise their identities, as well those of their immediate family or household
members, shall not be disclosed.

PART II

A child of her tender years cannot be expected to be able to recount the details of her torment with
exactitude.

FACTS: ABC testified that she is the common-law wife of Cabalquinto and that they have four children,
namely: Melvin, Joper, the child-victim AAA, and Jovelie. At around 8:45 p.m. of November 13, 1998,
she was on her way home to No. 149 Interior Alley, Balingasa, Balintawak, Quezon City, and saw her
sons Melvin and Joper outside the house, and her youngest daughter Jovelie playing with a cousin.
As she was approaching the house, she noticed that the door was closed although the lights were on.
Since there is a half-inch gap between the door and the wall, she peeped through the gap and saw
Cabalquinto lying face down making pumping motions on their daughter, AAA, who was lying
underneath him with her panties pulled down. When she heard Cabalquinto tell AAA to open her legs
("ibuka mo"), she kicked and pounded the door. Cabalquinto immediately lay down. AAA then stood
up and opened the door. ABC entered the room and confronted Cabalquinto who only denied her
accusation. She then asked AAA what her father did to her. AAA did not say anything but looked pale.

After regaining her composure, she went to her sister-in-law Virgie, who lived on the second
floor of the house, and confided to the latter. At around 10:00 o'clock that night, she went to her sister's
house in Novaliches to seek advice. Her sister told her to report the matter to the barangay officials.
The barangay officials, in turn, told her to go to the police, which she did the following day, November
14, 1998.

AAA's Salaysay was taken by the police and they were referred to the CPU of PGH. Because
there was no doctor on duty, she and AAA returned to the CPU on November 16, 1998. AAA was
examined by a doctor and a medical certificate was issued. They returned to the police station where
she executed her Salaysay. They then proceeded to the fiscal's office to lodge a complaint.

It should be mentioned that in herSinumpaang Salaysay dated November 14, 1998, AAA
stated that her father had raped her seven (7) times since her mother left for abroad. She said that
she distinctly remembered having been raped by her father on November 8, 1998, her friend's birthday;
August 16, 1998 during the fiesta; and on November 13, 1998, the day before her statement was taken.
However, she said no longer remembered the exact dates of the other incidents.

RTC RULING: On February 18, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, convicted
Melchor Cabalquinto (Cabalquinto) on two (2) counts for the rape of his eight-year old daughter, AAA.

CA RULING: The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court and added an award of
P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not Melchor Cabalquinto is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.

RULING: The Court ruled in the affirmative. Cabalquinto's claim that there are material inconsistencies
between the testimonies of AAA and ABC with regard to whether AAA cried out as she was being
raped because while AAA testified that she shouted twice, ABC stated that she did not see AAA
struggle nor hear her call out, is unconvincing.

AAA was firm and unwavering in her narration of her traumatic experience. During cross
examination, she remained steadfast in her assertion that her father inserted his penis inside her
genitals and raped her, even demonstrating what she understood of the word rape by forming a circle
with her fingers and moving her middle finger inside and out indicating sexual intercourse.

ABC's testimony of what she witnessed regarding the act of rape corroborates AAA's account.
The inconsistency between the testimony of AAA and her mother pertains merely to a circumstance
that is of little consequence to the question of whether rape was actually committed. Whether AAA
cried out or not does not discount rape.

It should be emphasized that AAA was but eight (8) years old when the rapes happened. A
child of her tender years cannot be expected to be able to recount the details of her torment with
exactitude.

NESTOR N. PADALHIN and ANNIE PADALHIN vs. NELSON D. LAVIÑA

G.R. No. 183026 | November 14, 2012 | REYES, J.

There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or
injuring another. When the objective of the actor is illegitimate, the illicit act cannot be concealed under
the guise of exercising a right.”

FACTS: Respondent Nelson Laviña and petitioner Nestor Padalhin were both Filipino diplomats
assigned in Kenya as Ambassador and Consul General, respectively.
In the course of their stay in Kenya, the residence of Laviña was raided twice by Kenyan
officials and in both instances Laviña and his wife were not present at home. Prior to the raids,
Bienvenido Pasturan (Pasturan) delivered messages to the Filipino household helpers in the
ambassador’s residence instructing them to allow the entry of an officer who would come to take
photographs of the ivory souvenirs kept therein.
In addition to the Kenyan raids, a team from the DFA (DFA team) led by Manalo, with Ebdalin
and Dizon entered Laviña’s residence without a search warrant, court order or letter from the DFA
Secretary.
Laviña subsequently filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against Nestor and his
wife, petitioner Annie, some of Laviña’s maids, Pasturan, and the members of the DFA team. The RTC
rendered a Decision ordering Nestor to pay Laviña P500,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as
nominal damages, P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, P150,000.00 as attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses, and costs of suit for the former’s participation in the first raid conducted in the Ambassador’s
residence.
RTC RULING: RTC held that Nestor admitted in his sworn affidavit that he caused the taking of
pictures of the raw elephant tusks in Laviña’s official residence, and that the invasion of the diplomatic
residence of the plaintiff in Kenya and the taking of photographs of the premises and the elephant
tusks inside the residence upon order of defendant Nestor Padalhin without the knowledge and
consent of the plaintiff were done by the said defendant in bad faith. The intention to malign Laviña is
shown by the fact that Nestor Padalhin even went to the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
reported the raw elephant tusks of Ambassador Laviña. The RTC however absolved Nestor from
liability for the second raid, as Laviña’s testimony on the latter was not based on his personal
knowledge.
CA RULING: Both Laviña and Nestor appealed to the CA, which affirmed and modified the RTC
decision, holding that Nestor abused his rights in violation of Art. 19, NCC. The CA, quoting Sen.
Tolentino, said that the “Test of Abuse of Right. – Modern jurisprudence does not permit acts which,
although not unlawful, are anti-social. There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is exercised for
the only purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. When the objective of the actor is illegitimate, the
illicit act cannot be concealed under the guise of exercising a right.” Nestor’s participation in the
invasion of plaintiff- appellant’s diplomatic residence and his act of ordering an employee to take
photographs of what was inside the diplomatic residence without the consent of the plaintiff- appellant
were clearly done to prejudice the latter.
The CA reduced the award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses to P 75,000.00. Hence
the petition.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC and CA erred in finding that Nestor’s participation in the raid conducted on
Laviña’s residence was proven by clear and substantial evidence as to warrant the award of moral,
exemplary and nominal damages and attorney’s fees in Laviña’s favor.
RULING: No.
As already exhaustively discussed by both the RTC and the CA, Nestor himself admitted that
he caused the taking of the pictures of Lavina's residence without the latter's knowledge and consent.
Nestor reiterates that he did so sans bad faith or malice. However, Nestor's surreptitious acts negate
his allegation of good faith. If it were true that Lavina kept ivories in his diplomatic residence, then, his
behavior deserves condemnation. However, that is not the issue in the case at bar. Nestor violated
the New Civil Code prescriptions concerning the privacy of one's residence and he cannot hide behind
the cloak of his supposed benevolent intentions to justify the invasion. Hence, the award of damages
and attorney's fees in Lavina's favor is proper.

THE UNITED STATES vs. VICENTE CALIMAG (1909)

G.R. No. 4852 February 1, 1909 EN BANC Willard, J

Article 392 of the Penal Code, in so far as it provides for the imposition of a fine only in the case of a
diversion of public property by a public official to his own use, is repealed by Act No. 1740.

FACTS:
On and prior to December 2, 1907, Vicente Calimag was municipal treasurer of the town of
Solana, Province of Cagayan, and also deputy provincial treasurer, receiving as salary for the former
position P25 per month and for the latter P10 per month. On the said date, to wit, December 2, 1907,
the district auditor for that district examined the books and cash of Calimag and informed him that
there was a difference between the amount for which accused was responsible and the amount
counted by said district auditor of P49.04. The auditor asked Calimag how this occurred, and he said
that it was for the reason that he had to advance his salary of P10 a month from July to November,
P50. The auditor then told him to get the money, and he went out and within ten minutes returned with
P50, which he put upon the desk in front of the auditor. This was done before the examination was
concluded. The auditor counted the P50 as a part of the money on hand and certified that the accounts
of the accused were correct. Calimag was convicted in the court below of a violation of Act No. 1740
and sentenced to two months’ imprisonment. From that judgment he has appealed. It was proven at
the trial that Calimag had no authority to pay himself his salary of P10 a month as deputy to the
provincial treasurer, and it must be considered that he had made personal use of the funds of the
Government.

ISSUE: Whether Art. 392 of the RPC applies to this case

RULING:
If this case had arisen prior to the enactment of Act No. 1740, it would have fallen under the
provisions of article 392 of the Penal Code, and the punishment inflicted would have been a fine of
from 5 to 25 per cent of the amount appropriated. (U. S. v. Coates, 4 Phil. Rep., 581; U. S. v. Valencia,
8 Phil. Rep., 729.) The offense, however, was committed after the enactment of Act No. 1740. The
first and fourth sections of that Act are as follows:

SECTION 1. Any bonded officer or employee of the Insular Government, or of any provincial
or municipal government, or of the city of Manila, and any other person who, having charge, by reason
of his office or employment, of Insular, provincial, or municipal funds or property, or of funds or property
of the city of Manila, or of trust or other funds by law required to be kept or deposited by or with such
officer, employee, or other person, or by or with any public office, treasury, or other depositary, fails or
refuses to account for the same, or makes personal use of such funds or property, or of any part
thereof, or abstracts or misappropriates the same, or any part thereof, or is guilty of any malversation
with reference to such funds or property, or through his abandonment, fault, or negligence, permits
any other person to abstract, misappropriate, or make personal use of the same, shall, upon conviction,
be punished by imprisonment for not less than two months nor more than ten years and, in the
discretion of the court, by a fine of not more than the amount of such funds and the value of such
property."

"SEC. 4. Articles three hundred and ninety, three hundred and ninety-one, and three hundred
and ninety-two of the Penal Code of the Philippine Islands, in so far as the same may be in conflict
with this Act, are hereby to that extent only repealed."

If the only law applicable to the case is Act No. 1740, the judgment must be affirmed, for the
minimum penalty imposed upon a person who makes personal use of the funds of the Government is
two months’ imprisonment. There is nothing in the law which indicates that this penalty may be
changed into a fine in case the defendant restores the money to the treasury. It has been suggested,
however, that this is not the only law now applicable to the case, but that article 392 of the Penal Code
is still in force. This suggestion is due to the peculiar wording of section 4 of Act No. 1740 above
quoted. It seems to have been the opinion of the legislative body that articles 390, 391, and 392 of the
Penal Code were not wholly repealed and that some part of them still remains. It may be difficult to
point out just what part is left of these three articles, but this court has already decided that article 392
has been entirely repealed.

The purpose of the Act was the formal repeal of article 392 as to the distinctions and
subdistinctions stated in said article and maintains the leading idea of the crime, distinguishing it from
that of estafa committed by a private person. This result necessarily seems to follow from the fact that
article 392 apparently supposes that the money misappropriated is returned and almost all of the
article is devoted to a statement of the penalties which shall be imposed in such a case. The only part
of the article which does not suppose a return of the money is the second paragraph, which says that
if restitution be not made, the penalties prescribed in article 390 shall be imposed on him. It is difficult
to believe that the Commission, with their attention directed especially to article 392 and to the fact
that its main object was to provide for a fine in case the money was returned, would not have expressly
excepted the article from the repealing clause if it had been its intention to preserve that feature of the
law.
 Read: A Straightjacket Rule in Malicious Prosecution Cases
774 SCRA 694 | NO DIGEST MADE

TONY N. FIGUEROA and ROGELIO J. FLAVIANO

v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 159813 | August 9, 2006 | J. Garcia

DOCTRINE: While it is true that a publication's libelous nature depends on its scope, spirit and motive
taken in their entirety, the article in question as a whole explicitly makes mention of private complainant
Rivera all throughout. It cannot be said that the article was a mere general commentary on the alleged
existing state of affairs at the aforementioned public market because Rivera was not only specifically
pointed out several times therein but was even tagged with derogatory names.

FACTS:
Rivera filed an information for libel against Figueroa and Flaviano who were columnists of People’s
Daily Forum for having published “Footprints” with malicious intent of impeaching the honesty, integrity,
character as well as the reputation and the social standing of Aproniano Rivera and with intent to cast
dishonor, discredit and contempt upon him, which newspaper was read throughout Davao City. The
contents were:

Bangkerohan public market these days is no different from the US Times Square. Bullies,
thugs, hooligans and gyppers roam with impunity, some using organizational clout as a ploy
to keep themselves from obvious exposure. Some leeches, like a certain Aproniano "Rey"
Rivera, our sources say, are lording it over like the city's sprawling vegetable and meat
complex has become an apportioned bailiwick.

"Rivera, apparently a non-Visayan pseudobully flaunting with his tag as president of a vendor's
federation, has intimated a good number of lowly hawkers. This is a confirmed fact, our
sources believe. And our independent eveasdroppers [sic] have come with a similar perception
of a man who continues to lead a federation when, in the first place, he has no business being
in Davao or in Bankerohan.

"Often, Mr. "Re" (King?) Rivera strolls the stretches which criss-cross the Bankerohan confines
with the arrogance of a tribal chieftain; the only differences, however, are that: he uses no G-
strings, speaks in some strange Luzon lingo and twang, and has no solid leadership. Our
reports have finely outlined the mechanics of Rivera's tactics despite assertions the man is
nothing but a paper tiger conveniently propped up by federation members loyal to his
sometime indecent role as a sachem.

"This man, the sources add, is backed by powerful city government hooligans who, it was
reported, have direct hand in the planned manipulation in the distribution of stalls to privileged
applicants. Even if he has reportedly sold his interest in the public market, which should be
reason enough for him to resign from his position, Rivera still carries the false aura of
intimidating poor vendors and imposing his insensible remarks about what must be done about
the governance of Bangkerohan.

"Sometimes its hard to compel a man with Rivera's mind about the nuances of honorable
resignation. May iba d'yan na pakapalan na lang ng mukha!"
 "Rivera, however, must be consoled in knowing he's not alone with his dirty antics. Romy
Miclat, a president of a meat vendors group in Bankerohan, and his board member, Erning
Garcia, have tacitly followed the way of the thugs, floating little fibs to gullible victims. Our
moles have gathered the due are seeling [sic] the new public market stalls for P9,000 with the
assurances that the buyer gets a display area ordinarily occupied by two applicants. A lot more
have fallen prey to the scheme, and more the blindly swallowing all the books the two are
peddling.

"This dilemma has been there for so long, but the city hall, RCDP, and the city council have
continuously evaded the vicious cabal of men out to derail the raffling of the stalls to applicants.
Some believe strongly this is odd, but they can only whimper at their helplessness against
power-brokers who have taken over the dominance of Bangkerohan. One of the likely victims
in this filthy machination are the sinapo vendors who have become explosively furious over
the snafu they are facing because of the manipulation of stalls inside Bangkerohan.

"Insiders continuously tell of woeful tales about how they have been given runarounds by many
so-called public servants, but they have maintained their composures quite curiously. They
are talking, however, of anger which, our sources say, may end up with a bloody retaliation.
This probability is looming more lucid every day the officials handling the Bangkerohan stall
mess are condoning their plight. Even politicos are oddly silent about the whole controversy
for some unknown reasons. It looks like the alleged schemes perpetrated by Rivera, Miclat
and Garcia will remain unperturbed, no thanks to power-brokers."

RTC ruling: both of them are guilty and were ordered to pay jointly and solidarily the amount of
P50,000.00 as moral damages to Rivera and the amount of P10,000.00 by way of attorney's fees with
costs.

CA ruling: affirmed RTC ruling.

FIGUEROA et al: the article was not directed at the private character of Aproniano Rivera but on the
sorry state of affairs at the Bankerohan Public Market.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the column entitled “Footprint” of the People’s Daily Forum is libelous or defamatory
to Rivera.
2. Whether the award of moral damages and attorney’s fees is proper.
3. Whether the published article is within the purview of privileged communication.

RULING:

1. YES. While it is true that a publication's libelous nature depends on its scope, spirit and motive
taken in their entirety, the article in question as a whole explicitly makes mention of private
complainant Rivera all throughout. It cannot be said that the article was a mere general
commentary on the alleged existing state of affairs at the aforementioned public market
because Rivera was not only specifically pointed out several times therein but was even
tagged with derogatory names. Indubitably, this name-calling was, as correctly found by the
two courts below, directed at the very person of Rivera himself.

If, as argued, the published article was indeed merely intended to innocently present the
current condition of the Bankerohan Public Market, there would then be no place in the article
 for the needless name-calling which it is wrought full of. It is beyond comprehension how
calling Rivera a "leech," "a paper tiger," a "non-Visayan pseudobully" with the "arrogance of a
tribal chieftain" save for his speaking in "some strange Luzon lingo and twang" and who "has
no business being in Davao or Bankerohan" can ever be regarded or viewed as comments
free of malice. As it is, the tag and description thus given Rivera have no place in a general
account of the situation in the public market, and cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be
construed to be anything other than what they really are: defamatory and libelous in nature,
and definitely directed at the private character of complainant Rivera. For indeed, no logical
connection can possibly be made between Rivera's Luzon origin and the conditions of the
Bankerohan Public Market. Doubtless, the words used in the article reek of venom towards
the very person of Rivera.

Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means injuring a person's character, fame or
reputation through false and malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation or
to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in the complainant or to excite
derogatory feelings or opinions about him. It is the publication of anything which is injurious to
the good name or reputation of another or tends to bring him into disrepute.

In the light of the numerable defamatory imputations made against complainant Rivera as a
person, the article in dispute, even taken, as urged, in its totality, undeniably caused serious
damage to his character and person and clearly injurious to his reputation.

2. YES. Article 2219(7) of the Civil Code is express in stating that moral damages may be
recovered in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. From the very publication
and circulation of the subject defamatory and libelous material itself, there can be no doubt as
to the resulting wounded feelings and besmirched reputation sustained by complainant Rivera.
The branding of defamatory names against him most certainly exposed him to public contempt
and ridicule.

Rivera, when he read the subject publication, was embarrass on what was written against him,
made more unpleasant on the occasion of the reunion of his son-in-law, who just arrived from
the United States for the first time, was confronted of the above-defamatory publication. He
was worried and depressed, about the comments against him, affecting his credibility and
personality, as representative of many market organizations in Davao City.

Having been exposed to embarrassment and ridicule occasioned by the publication of the
subject article, Rivera is entitled to moral damages and attorney's fees.

3. NO. Rivera cannot be considered a public officer. Being a member of the market committee
did not vest upon him any sovereign function of the government, be it legislative, executive or
judicial. the operation of a public market is not a governmental function but merely an activity
undertaken by the city in its private proprietary capacity. Furthermore, Rivera's membership in
the market committee was in representation of the association of market vendors, a non-
governmental organization belonging to the private sector. Thus, it is not covered by privileged
communication.

TIBURCIO GUITA v. CA and LUZ SORIANO HAGUISAN & CESAR BENEDICTO HAGUISAN
G.R. No. L-60409 | November 11, 1985 | J. Plana

As to the generality of the statement of mental unfitness to work, suffice it to say that the
certification should be read and construed as a whole. So viewed, it is clear that the statement
can refer only to unfitness to work as security guard, for it was that position, and no other, from which
Haguisan was separated. The said position was the only subject matter of the certification.

FACTS:
Cesar Haguisan was employed as security guard of the Marinduque Mining Corporation in
Sipalay, Negros Occidental. All MMIC guards were subject to psychiatric examination.

The psychiatric examination of Haguisan was conducted by Dr. Rena Nora and she concluded
that Haguisan has borderline mental capacity with mild to moderate memory impairment and poor
calculating ability x x x and is psychiatrically unfit for the job position of security guard but may be hired
in other departments. Thereafter, Haguisan was terminated.

Subsequently, Haguisan requested from petitioner Guita, MMIC Administrative Officer, a

certification regarding his MMIC service, as he was then looking for another job. Guita obliged, and
gave a certification which indicated that Haguisan worked in MMIC from August 21, 1956, up to
February 23, 1971, with a monthly rate of P371.06, after he was found mentally unfit to work.

Haguisan filed a complaint for damages against Tiburcio Guita, Dr. Rena Nora, Emilio Santos
(MMIC Sipalay general manager) and Roberto Abendaño (MMIC chief security guard). The suit was
based on the allegedly false and derogatory statements regarding Haguisan's mental state which,
according to plaintiffs, were not only designed to ease Haguisan out of MMIC but also to ruin his
chances of obtaining employment elsewhere.

RTC RULING:
Dismissed. The trial court found no malice in preparation of the psychiatric report or the
subsequent certification issued on the basis thereof.

CA RULING:
Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal except as to herein petitioner Guita, who was ordered
to pay Cesar Haguisan the sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages and costs upon the finding that it
was "mean and malicious on the part of Guita to unqualifiedly certify that Haguisan was 'mentally unfit
to work', without clarifying, as Dr. Nora had done in her report.

ISSUE:
Whether Haguisan is entitled to moral damages on the basis of psychiatric report and
certification.

RULING:
No.

Moral damages may be awarded to compensate one for diverse injuries such as mental
anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. It is however not enough
that such injuries have arisen; it is essential that they have sprung from a wrongful act or omission of
the defendant which was the proximate cause thereof.

Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission. (Civil Code, Article 2217.)

In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that in the absence of a wrongful act or
omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded...
In this case, it was not proved that Guita issued the certificate wrongfully or maliciously.

In the trial court, Haguisan tried to prove that Guita was motivated by malice or bad faith when
he made the certification. The trial judge rejected the testimony of plaintiffs (private respondents) and
their witnesses as "without the earmarks of truth". This factual finding deserves the highest respect
and ought not to be disturbed, in accordance with settled jurisprudence on the matter. There is nothing
in the record indicating that the trial court has committed any reversible error in its evaluation of the
credibility of the witnesses.

Going to the certification itself, private respondents' claim for damages is based on the
statement in Guita's certification that Haguisan was "employed by MMIC as security guard ... from
August 21, 1956 up to the date of his separation on February 23, 1971 ..., after he was found mentally
unfit to work.” It would seem that the underlined portion is a reasonably fair statement based on the
professional findings in the psychiatric report.

As to the generality of the statement of mental unfitness to work, suffice it to say that
the certification should be read and construed as a whole. So viewed, it is clear that the statement
can refer only to unfitness to work as security guard, for it was that position, and no other, from which
Haguisan was separated. The said position was the only subject matter of the certification.

Other notes:

Diagnosis of Haguisan:

He has admitted to frequent "absent minded spells" in the last few years. ... Calculating ability
is poor, indicating poor concentration and memory. ... With memory for design test, he made
six mistakes which is interpreted as borderline for motor-perceptual skill impairment ... . His
profile shows that of a poorly adjusted individual both in his personal adjustments and his
social adjustment ...

Impression: Borderline mental capacity with mild to moderate memory impairment and poor
calculating ability...

Most of above factors noted were not in satisfactory levels and tests also indicated significant
impairment of mental functioning.

ARAFILES v. PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC.,

G.R. No. 150256 | March 25, 2004 | J. Carpio-Morales

DOCTRINE: The presentation of the news item that may have been in a sensational manner is not
per se illegal. In determining the manner in which a given event should be presented as a news item
and the importance to be attached thereto, newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion.

FACTS: Respondent Romy Morales (Morales) is a reporter of People’s Journal Tonight while
Petitioner Catalino Arafiles (Arafiles) is a director of National Institute Of Atmospheric Science (NIAS).

Morales was at the Western Police District (WPD) Headquarters when Emelita Arcillano (Emelita), an
employee of the NIAS, lodged a complaint against Arafiles for forcible abduction with attempted rape.
Emelita, in her sworn statement, stated that she was forcibly abducted by Arafiles on March 14, 1987
at Plaza Miranda, was forced into his car, and was raped at the Flamingo Hotel. Emelita further stated
that she was instructed by Arafiles not to inform anyone about the incident, otherwise, Arafiles will kill
her and her sister, and dismiss her from work. Arafiles again abducted Emelita while the latter was on
United Nations, Ave. Arafiles attempted to rape Emelita but apparently the bellboy informed Arafiles
that someone was looking for the two of them, after which, Arafiles rushed his way out of the hotel.

Thereafter, Patrolman Chio made an entry in the Police Blotter regarding the incident by which the
same was perused by Morales. Morales interviewed Emelita for the purpose of reporting the same in
the People’s Journal Tonight. Morales also attempted to verify the incident with Arafiles, however, the
former failed to contact the latter. Morales wrote an article about the incident which became the
Newspaper’s headline.

Arafiles filed a complaint for damages against Morales, Editor Buan, Jr., and President Villareal, Jr.,
alleging that the published article ruined her reputation as a director of NIAS and led to deferring his
promotion to Deputy Administrator of PAGASA.

Defense of Respondents:
Since the news item was sourced from the Police Blotter, which is a public document, the publication
of the incident falls within the protective constitutional provision of freedom of the press.

RTC:
The RTC ruled in favor of Arafiles and orders the respondents to pay him solidarily P1M as nominal
damages, P50k as exemplary damages, P1M as moral damages, P50k as attorney’s fees, and costs
of suit. Respondents filed a MR but it was denied.

CA:
On appeal of the respondents to the CA, respondents used the defense of doctrine of fair comment
which means that in order that a discreditable imputation to a public official be actionable, it must either
be a false allegation of fact or comment based on a false supposition.

The CA reversed and set aside the Ruling of the RTC, and held that Arafiles failed to prove by a
preponderance of evidence that respondents were motivated by a sinister intent to cause harm and
injury to him.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in holding that the publication of the news item was not attended with
malice, thus, free respondents of liability for damages.

RULING:

It must be noted that the complaint instituted by petitioner is one for damages under Art. 33 of the CC:

In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, shall require
only preponderance of evidence.

Article 33 contemplates a civil action for the recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to the purely
criminal aspect of the case. A civil action for libel under this article shall be instituted and prosecuted
to final judgment and proved by preponderance of evidence separately from and entirely independent
of the institution, pendency or result of the criminal action because it is governed by the provisions of
the NCC and not by the RPC governing the criminal offense charged and the civil liability arising
therefrom.

In actions for damages for libel, the published work alleged to contain libelous material must be
examined and viewed as a whole in order to ascertain the meaning of a published article. The
headlines of a newspaper must also be read in connection with the language which follows.
The argument of Arafiles that the news item can be branded as a “malicious sensationalization” of
narration of fabricated facts since the police blotter plainly shows that there was only one count of
abduction and rape reported by Emelita fails because in the interview of Emelita by Morales she
reported that the rape incident occurred on March 14, 1987 and was again abducted on April 13, 1987.

The SC held that while the presentation of the news item subject of petitioner's complaint may have
been in a sensational manner, it is not per se illegal.

Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, the Court do not consider
that the respondents had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press. The newspapers
should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform
their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and [editors] usually
have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should
not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of
words.

MVRS Publication vs. Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines

G.R. No. 135306 January 28, 2003

Doctrine: Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's
character, fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure
reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite
derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. It is the publication of anything which is injurious to
the good name or reputation of another or tends to bring him into disrepute. Defamation is an invasion
of a relational interest since it involves the opinion which others in the community may have, or tend
to have, of the plaintiff.

The rule in libel is that the action must be brought by the person against whom the defamatory
charge has been made. In the American jurisdiction, no action lies by a third person for
damages suffered by reason of defamation of another person, even though the plaintiff suffers
some injury therefrom. For recovery in defamation cases, it is necessary that the publication
be "of and concerning the plaintiff." Even when a publication may be clearly defamatory as to
somebody, if the words have no personal application to the plaintiff, they are not actionable by
him. If no one is identified, there can be no libel because no one's reputation has been injured

Facts: Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Philippines, a local federation of more than seventy (70) Muslim
religious organizations, and individual Muslims. Respondent Islamic Da’wah filed a claim for damages
against Petitioner MVRS Publication, Inc. due to an article published by the petitioner which constitute
a libelous statement which is insulting or damaging to the Muslims, stating that the pig was the God
of the Muslims. Respondent Islamic Da’wah alleged that the articles was published out of sheer
ignorance as well as with the intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and disparage the Muslim and Islam,
as a religion in this country, in violation of the law, public policy, good morals, and human relations.
The tabloid provided these statements;

“baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim?”

“Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit na sila
pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam”

“Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at sinasamba pa”

On the other hand, Petitioner MVRS contended that the article did not mention Respondents Islamic
Da’wah as the object of the article and therefore not entitled for damages. Likewise they contended
that the said article was merely an expression of belief or opinion and was published without malice
nor intention to cause damage, prejudice or injury to Muslims.

Issue: W/N the said article published by Petitioner MVRS constitutes as an insult to the Muslim
Community.

Ruling: NO. The SC granted the petition filed by Petitioner MVRS.

Defamation means the offense of injuring a person’s character, fame or reputation through false and
malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure reputations or to diminish the esteem, respect,
good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. It
is the publication of anything which is injurious to the good name or reputation of another or tends to
bring him into disrepute. Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opinion
which others in the community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiffs.

It must be stressed that the words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per
se and mere words of general abuse however, opprobrious, ill-natured or vexatious, whether written
or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for
special damages. The fact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by
itself.

Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or
identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of
a class, no member of such class has a right of action without impairing the equally demanding right
of free speech and expression, as well as of the press, under the Bill of Rights.

In the present case, there was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured by the Bulgar
Article. Since the persons allegedly defamed could not be identifiable, Respondents Islamic Da ‘wah
has no cause of action, hence, they cannot sue for a class allegedly disparaged. Respondents must
have a cause of action in common with the class to which they belong to in order for the case to
prosper.

The rule in libel is that the action must be brought by the person against whom the defamatory
charge has been made. In the American jurisdiction, no action lies by a third person for
damages suffered by reason of defamation of another person, even though the plaintiff suffers
some injury therefrom. For recovery in defamation cases, it is necessary that the publication
be "of and concerning the plaintiff." Even when a publication may be clearly defamatory as to
somebody, if the words have no personal application to the plaintiff, they are not actionable by
him. If no one is identified, there can be no libel because no one's reputation has been injured.

Navarrete v. Generoso
325 SCRA 540

The doctrine of privileged communication has a practical purpose. As enunciated in the case of Deles
vs. Aragona, Jr.:

The privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those engaged in the public service
and in the enactment and administration of law, as for the promotion of public welfare, the
purpose being that members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers and witnesses
 may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective functions without incurring the risk
of a criminal prosecution or an action for damages.

FACTS: Petitioner Atty. Antonio Navarrete is one of the defendants in a civil case filed byprivate
respondent Leonila Generoso for the annulment of a deed of sale executed over her property on the
ground that her purported signature therein was forged. Accordingly, the aforecited Deed of Sale with
Right of Repurchase was prepared and notarized by petitioner. Petitioner claims that the statements
made by private respondent in her Amended Complaint and her testimonies in the course of the trial
falsely and maliciously slandered him. Petitioner likewise insists that private respondent

Generoso alluded to him when she said the words "stupid", "bastards", "swindlers", and "plunderers"
while testifying on the Deed of Sale. Hence, in his counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the payment of
moral damages and attorney’s fees by private respondent. The RTC dismissed the case against
petitioner and granted his prayer for the award of damages. Nevertheless, when the case was
appealed to the CA, it modified the decision and deleted said award of damages. Petitioner now assails
the denial of his right to recover moral damages and attorney’s fees from private respondent

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in deleting the award of moral damages and attorney’s fees to petitioner

RULING: It is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements made in the course of judicial
proceedings are absolutely privileged. This absolute privilege remains regardless of the defamatory
tenor and the presence of malice if the same are relevant, pertinent or material to the cause in hand
or subject of the inquiry.Thus, the person making these statements such as a judge, lawyer or witness
does not thereby incur the risk of being found liable thereon in a criminal prosecution or an action for
the recovery of damages.

The doctrine of privileged communication has a practical purpose. As enunciated in the case of Deles
vs. Aragona, Jr.:

The privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those engaged in the public service
and in the enactment and administration of law, as for the promotion of public welfare, the
purpose being that members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers and witnesses
may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective functions without incurring the risk
of a criminal prosecution or an action for damages.

In determining the issue of relevancy of statements made in judicial proceedings, courts have adopted
a liberal attitude by resolving all doubts in favor of relevancy. In People vs. Aquino, we emphasized
that "it is the rule that what is relevant or pertinent should be liberally considered to favor the writer,
and the words are not to be scrutinized with microscopic intensity".

In this case, the allegations made by private respondent in her Amended Complaint stand the test of
relevancy. The words "forging", "malicious and fraudulent" and "falsified" are clearly pertinent to the
cause of action of private respondent, which is to annul the Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase
wherein private respondent's signature was forged by an impostor, and to recover damages resulting
from such forgery.

Court finds that the terms used by the private respondent in her pleading and in her testimony cannot
be the basis for an award of moral damages and attorney's fees in favor of petitioner. As stated earlier,
the words "forging", "falsified", "malicious" and "fraudulent" in the Amended Complaint are
unmistakably relevant to private respondent's cause of action which is to annul the Deed of Sale where
her signature was forged. The words "stupid", "bastards", "swindlers", and "plunderers" uttered by
private respondent did not specifically pertain to petitioner to sufficiently identify him as the object of
defamation, such identifiability being an element of a libelous imputation. We believe that neither
petitioner's good name and reputation nor his high standing in the profession have been damaged by
these utterances.

RAMON A. SYHUNLIONG v. TERESITA D. RIVERA

G.R. No. 200148 | June 4, 2014 | Reyes J.

Text message falls within the ambit of a qualified privileged communication under Article 354 of the
Revised Penal Code which [negates] the existence of malice in — a private communication made by
any person to another in the performance of any legal, [moral] or social duty.

FACTS: Syhunliong is the President of BANFF Realty and Development Corporation (BANFF) and
Rivera used to be the Accounting Manager of the same Corporation. About three years, Rivera
tendered her resignation to be effective on February 3, 2006 but actually continued working for BANFF
until March the same year.
Sometime in April of 2006, Rivera called Lumapas to request for the payment of her remaining salaries,
benefits and incentives. Lumapas informed Rivera that her benefits would be paid, but the check
representing her salaries was still unsigned, and her incentives were put on hold by Syhunliong.

Rivera sent the following text message to one of BANFF's official cellular phones held by Lumapas:

I am expecting that[.] [G]rabe talaga sufferings ko dyan hanggang pagkuha ng last pay ko. I don't
deserve this [because] I did my job when I [was] still there. God bless ras[.]

[S]ana yung pagsimba niya, alam niya real meaning. Minutes later, Rivera once again texted another
message, which reads: Kailangan release niya lahat [nang] makukuha ko diyan including incentive up
to the last date na nandyan ako para di na kami abot sa labor.

Subsequently, on December of 2006, Rivera filed before the National Labor Relations Commission a
complaint against Syhunliong for underpaid salaries, 13th to 16th month and incentive pay, gratuities
and tax refund in the total sum of Php698,150.48.

Pending the resolution of the aforecited labor case, Syhunliong instituted against Rivera a complaint
for libel, the origin of the instant petition.

RTC RULING: The RTC denied Rivera’s Motion to Quash and the RTC thereafter issued an Order on
June 18, 2009 denying Rivera's motion for reconsideration to the foregoing.

CA RULING: On July 11, 2011, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision27 directing the
dismissal of the information for libel filed against Rivera. The CA favorably considered her argument
that when the facts in an information fail to charge an offense, the said ground can be invoked by the
accused in a motion to quash filed even after arraignment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in ordering the outright dismissal of Criminal
Case on the putative ground that the allegedly libelous text messages were privileged communication.

RULING: The court ruled in the negative.

Prescription of the crime is already a compelling reason for this Court to order the dismissal of the libel
information, but the Court still stresses that the text message which Rivera sent to Lumapas falls
within the purview of a qualified privileged... communication.
"The rule on privileged communication means that a communication made in good faith on any subject
matter in which the communicator has an interest, or concerning which he has a duty, is privileged if
made to a person having a corresponding duty."

In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified privileged communication under
Article 354, No. 1, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person who made the communication
had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at... least, had an interest to protect,
which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is
addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who
has the power to furnish the protection sought;... and (3) the statements in the communication are
made in good faith and without malice.
In the case at bar, it was Lumapas who informed Rivera of either the delay or denial of the latter's
claims for payment of salaries, benefits, and incentives by Syhunliong. Rivera expressed through the
subject text message her grievances to Lumapas. At that time, Lumapas was the best person, who
could help expedite the release of Rivera's claims.

Prescinding from the above, the Court thus finds no error in the CA's declaration that Rivera's text
message falls within the ambit of a qualified privileged communication since she was speaking in
response to duty to protect her own interest and not out of an intent to... injure the reputation of
Syhunliong. Besides, there was no unnecessary publicity of the message beyond [that] of conveying
it to the party concerned.

Manuel v. People
G.R. No. 165842 | November 29, 2005 | Callejo, Sr. J.

Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to do an act which, in

consequence of such misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor immoral, but which is in
fact a criminal offense, he has a right of action against the person so inducing him for damages
sustained by him in consequence of his having done such act.

FACTS: Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaña when he met private complainant Tina B. Gandalera
in Dagupan City, who at the time was only 21 years old while Eduardo was 39. Eduardo proposed
marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to
Baguio City to meet Tina’s parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single.

Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996. They were married on
April 22, 1996. It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was "single." Eventually, Manuel
started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Eduardo left and
stopped giving her financial support.

Thereafter, Tina learned that Eduardo had been previously married. Eduardo further testified that he
declared he was "single" in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that his
first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to seek the nullification of his first
marriage before marrying Tina.

Eduardo claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she threatened to commit
suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He
visited her in jail after three months and never saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing
that his first marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20
years.
RULING OF THE RTC: The court rendered judgment finding Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of bigamy. And directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina Gandalera the amount of
₱200,000.00 by way of moral damages.

RULING OF THE CA: The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not Eduardo is liable for damages in favor of private complainant

RULING:

The Court ruled in the affirmative. The law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in
all cases where the aggrieved party has suffered mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury arising out of an act or
omission of another, otherwise, there would not have been any reason for the inclusion of specific acts
in Article 2219 and analogous cases.

Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which the
offender may be ordered to pay moral damages to the private complainant/offended party.
Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to the private complainant for moral damages under Article 2219
in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.

The private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s chicanery and heartless deception,
the fraud consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he
maintained the appearance of being a lawful husband to the private complainant, who changed her
status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes and support of a single
man she could have married lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man
who it turned out was not her lawful husband.

The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his
marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the
latter. That she did not sustain any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages. .

The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they undermine and
subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society.

Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she is not barred
from claiming moral damages. Besides, even considerations of public policy would not prevent her
from recovery. As held in Jekshewitz v. Groswald:

Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to do an act which, in

consequence of such misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor immoral, but which is in
fact a criminal offense, he has a right of action against the person so inducing him for damages
sustained by him in consequence of his having done such act. Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816.
In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the court said that a false
representation by the defendant that he was divorced from his former wife, whereby the plaintiff was
induced to marry him, gave her a remedy in tort for deceit. It seems to have been assumed that the
fact that she had unintentionally violated the law or innocently committed a crime by cohabiting with
him would be no bar to the action, but rather that it might be a ground for enhancing her damages.
The injury to the plaintiff was said to be in her being led by the promise to give the fellowship and
assistance of a wife to one who was not her husband and to assume and act in a relation and condition
that proved to be false and ignominious. Damages for such an injury were held to be recoverable.
Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her cause of action upon any transgression
of the law by herself but upon the defendant’s misrepresentation. The criminal relations which followed,
innocently on her part, were but one of the incidental results of the defendant’s fraud for which
damages may be assessed.

Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter into the marriage relation have been
maintained in other jurisdictions. Considerations of public policy would not prevent recovery where the
circumstances are such that the plaintiff was conscious of no moral turpitude, that her illegal action
was induced solely by the defendant’s misrepresentation, and that she does not base her cause of
action upon any transgression of the law by herself. Such considerations distinguish this case from
cases in which the court has refused to lend its aid to the enforcement of a contract illegally on its face
or to one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause
of action is founded.

TANJANCO vs. CA
December 17, 1966 | J. J.B.L. Reyes

Petitioner(s): Apolonio Tanjanco

Respondent(s): Hon. Court of Appeals and Araceli Santos

Doctrine: In a breach of promise to marry, when there is no seduction, but voluntariness and mutual
passion, plaintiff cannot claim for damages and defendant is free from liability under Art. 21, on the
basis that breach of promise to marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction.

CASE SUMMARY
Trigger Word(s): breach of promise to marry; Voluntariness and Mutual Passion

FACTS: TANJANCO promised SANTOS of marriage, hence, the latter consented and acceded to his
pleas for carnal knowledge. For 1 year, TANJANCO succeeded in having carnal knowledge with
SANTOS while promising to marry her. SANTOS conceived a child as a result and had to resign from
her job. However, TANJANCO refused to marry SANTOS. SANTOS brought action to compel
TANJANCO to recognize the unborn child, give support for her and her baby, and pay damages.
TANJANCO argued that breach of promise to marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction.

HELD: TANJANCO is not liable for damages under Art. 21, NCC. The CA’s basis on its decision is
wrong because the example refers to a MINOR who has been SEDUCED. The essential feature is
seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it
connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part
of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. IN THIS CASE, both parties are of age. For 1 whole
year, SANTOS, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with
repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. There is here
voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered
exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have
again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged
promises of marriage, and would have cut chart all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did
not intend to fulfill his promises.

FACTS
• Dec. 1957 – Petitioner Apolinario TANJANCO courted private respondent Araceli SANTOS.
o Both are of age.
• TANJANCO expressed and professed his undying love and affection for SANTOS who also in
due time reciprocated the tender feelings
 • In consideration of TANJANCO’s promise of marriage, SANTOS consented and acceded to
his pleas for carnal knowledge.
• Regularly until Dec. 1959, TANJANCO succeeded in having carnal knowledge with SANTOS
while promising to marry her.
• SANTOS conceived a child as a result and had to resign from her job as secretary in IBM
Philippines, Inc. (where she was receiving P230 a month) to avoid embarrassment.
o She was unable to support herself and her baby.
• Due to TANJANCO’s refusal to marry nor support SANTOS, she suffered mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation.
• SANTOS brought action to compel TANJANCO to recognize the unborn child, give support of
not less than P430 a month for her and her baby, and pay damages.
• CFI: dismissed, for failure to state a cause of action.
• CA: ruled that no cause of action was shown to compel recognition of a child as yet unborn,
nor for 'its, support, but decreed that the complaint did state a cause of action for damages,
premised on Article 21, NCC.
o set aside the dismissal and remanded to CFI.
• TANJANCO’s arguments:
o Breach of promise to marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction, based on the cases
of Estopa v. Piansay (1960), Hermosisima v. CA (1962), and De Jesus v. SyQuia.

ISSUE #1 – W/N TANJANCO is liable under Art. 21, NCC – NO

HELD:
• CA based its decision on the example by the Code Commission to the Legislature to support
the original draft of the Civil Code.
• HOWEVER, CA erred in using this as basis because the example refers to a MINOR who has
been SEDUCED.
o The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse,
or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit,
enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which
the woman has yielded
o Seduction
▪ US v. Buenaventura – There must in all cases be some sufficient promise or
inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other
inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from
mutual desire, there is no seduction.
▪ She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some
species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do
have that effect, and which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the
sexual embraces of her seducer
▪ American jurisprudence:
▪ The enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury;
and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover.
▪ It is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire or
curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the
needed opportunity for the commission of the act.
IN THIS CASE, both TANJANCO and SANTOS are of age.
• For 1 whole year, from 1958-1959, SANTOS, a woman of adult age, maintained
intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse.
• Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction.
• There is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions
and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much
 less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage,
and would have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend
to fulfill his promises

RULING: CA Decision REVERSED. CFI Decision AFFIRMED.

VERCELES vs. POSADA

G.R. No. 159785 | April 27, 2007 | J. Quisumbing

DOCTRINE:
The caption is not determinative of the nature of a pleading. In a string of cases we made the following
rulings. It is not the caption but the facts alleged which give meaning to a pleading. Courts are called
upon to pierce the form and go into the substance thereof.19 In determining the nature of an action, it
is not the caption, but the averments in the petition and the character of the relief sought, that are
controlling.

FACTS:
Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada (Clarissa), a young lass from the barrio of Pandan, Catanduanes,
sometime in 1986 met a close family friend, petitioner Teofisto I. Verceles, mayor of Pandan. He then
called on the Posadas and at the end of the visit, offered Clarissa a job.

Clarissa accepted the petitioner's offer and worked as a casual employee in the mayor’s office starting
on September 1, 1986. From November 10 to 15 in 1986, with companions Aster de Quiros, Pat del
Valle, Jaime and Jocelyn Vargas, she accompanied petitioners to Legaspi City to attend a seminar on
town planning. They stayed at the Mayon Hotel.

On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., petitioner fetched Clarissa from "My Brother’s Place"
where the seminar was being held. Clarissa avers that he told her that they would have lunch at Mayon
Hotel with their companions who had gone ahead. When they reached the place her companions were
nowhere. After the petitioner ordered food, he started making amorous advances on her. She panicked,
ran and closeted herself inside a comfort room where she stayed until someone knocked. She said
she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the mayor, she kept the incident to herself. She went
on as a casual employee. One of her tasks was following-up barangay road and maintenance projects.

On December 22, 1986, on orders of petitioner, she went to Virac, Catanduanes, to follow up funds
for barangay projects. At around 11:00 a.m. the same day, she went to Catanduanes Hotel on
instructions of petitioner who asked to be briefed on the progress of her mission. They met at the lobby
and he led her upstairs because he said he wanted the briefing done at the restaurant at the upper
floor.

Instead, however, petitioner opened a hotel room door, led her in, and suddenly embraced her, as he
told her that he was unhappy with his wife and would "divorce" her anytime. He also claimed he could
appoint her as a municipal development coordinator. She succumbed to his advances. But again she
kept the incident to herself.

Sometime in January 1987, when she missed her menstruation, she said she wrote petitioner that she
feared she was pregnant. In another letter in February 1987, she told him she was pregnant.

Clarissa explained the petitioner used an alias "Ninoy" and addressed her as "Chris," probably
because of their twenty-five (25)-year age gap. In court, she identified petitioner’s penmanship which
she claims she was familiar with as an employee in his office.
Clarissa presented three other handwritten letters sent to her by the petitioner, two of which were in
his letterhead as mayor of Pandan. She also presented the pictures6 petitioner gave her of his youth
and as a public servant, all bearing his handwritten notations at the back.

Clarissa avers that on March 3, 1987, petitioner, aware of her pregnancy, handed her a letter and
₱2,000 pocket money to go to Manila and to tell her parents that she would enroll in a CPA review
course or look for a job. In June 1987, petitioner went to see her in Manila and gave her another
₱2,000 for her delivery. When her parents learned of her pregnancy, sometime in July, her father
fetched her and brought her back to Pandan. On September 23, 1987,7 she gave birth to a baby girl,
Verna Aiza Posada.

Clarissa’s mother, Francisca, corroborated Clarissa’s story. She said they learned of their daughter’s
pregnancy through her husband’s cousin. She added that she felt betrayed by petitioner and shamed
by her daughter’s pregnancy.

The Posadas filed a Complaint for Damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite before the RTC,
Virac, Catanduanes against petitioner on October 23, 1987

RTC RULING: On January 4, 1995, the trial court issued a judgment in their favor

CA RULING: Verceles appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment with modification,
specifying the party to whom the damages was awarded.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not paternity and filiation can be resolved in an action for damages with
support pendente lite
2. Whether or not the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada as the illegitimate child of petitioner was
proven
3. Whether or not respondents are entitled to damages.

RULING:
1. As to the award for damages, petitioner argues Clarissa could not have suffered moral
damages because she was in pari delicto, being a willing participant in the "consensual carnal
act" between them. In support of his argument that the issue on filiation should have been
resolved in a separate action, petitioner cited the case of Rosales v. Castillo Rosales where
we held that the legitimacy of a child which is controversial can only be resolved in a direct
action.

Could paternity and filiation be resolved in an action for damages? On this score, we find the
petitioner's stance unmeritorious. The caption is not determinative of the nature of a pleading.
In a string of cases we made the following rulings. It is not the caption but the facts alleged
which give meaning to a pleading. Courts are called upon to pierce the form and go into the
substance thereof. In determining the nature of an action, it is not the caption, but the
averments in the petition and the character of the relief sought, that are controlling.

2. Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code are the rules for establishing filiation. They are as
follows:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
 (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on
the same evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the
action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

The letters, one of which is quoted above, are private handwritten instruments of petitioner
which establish Verna Aiza’s filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the
array of evidence presented by respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to
us, are convincing, and irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioner’s illegitimate
child.

3. NO. cannot rule that respondents are entitled to damages. Article 2219 24of the Civil Code
which states moral damages may be recovered in cases of seduction is inapplicable in this
case because Clarissa was already an adult at the time she had an affair with petitioner.

Neither can her parents be entitled to damages. Besides, there is nothing in law or
jurisprudence that entitles the parents of a consenting adult who begets a love child to
damages. Respondents Constantino and Francisca Posada have not cited any law or
jurisprudence to justify awarding damages to them.

Pe v. Pe
G.R. No. L-17396, [May 30, 1962] | DIGEST FROM HIGHER YEAR | BAUTISTA ANGELO, J p:

1. DAMAGES; ACTS CONTRARY TO MORALS. — Defendant won Lolita's affection thru an ingenious
scheme or trickery and seduced her to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by
the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him
how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was allowed
free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the
two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but
in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affair reached
the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing
Lolita. Plaintiff even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national.
Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental
home, Held; The wrong defendant has caused Lolita and her family is indeed immeasurable
considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New
Civil Code.

FACTS: Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of her
disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married man
and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the town of Gasan,
Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying with her parents in the
same town. Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of
Lolita's father. Because of such fact and the similarity in their family name, defendant became close
to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a member of their family. Sometime in 1952, defendant
frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary.
The two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine trysts not only in the town
of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. They exchanged love notes
with each other the contents of which reveal not only their infatuation for each other but also the extent
to which they had carried their relationship. The rumors about their love affairs reached the ears of
Lolita's parents sometime, in 1955, and since then defendant was forbidden from going to their house
and from further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who
is a Chinese national. The affair between defendant and Lolita continued nonetheless.

Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their residence at 54B
España Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. After she left,
her brothers and sisters checked up her thing and found that Lolita's clothes were gone. However,
plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece of paper inside Lolita's aparador. Said note, written on a
small slip of paper approximately 4" by 3" in size, was in a handwriting recognized to be that of
defendant's. In English it reads:

Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and that's 13th of this month and we will have a date
on the 14th, that's Monday morning at 10 a.m.
Reply Love

The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI but up to the present
there is no news or trace of her whereabouts.

Plaintiffs brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover moral,
compensatory, exemplary and corrective damages in the amount of P94,000.00 exclusive of attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation. Defendant, after denying some allegations contained in the complaint,
set up as a defense that the facts alleged therein, even if true, do not constitute a valid cause of action.
After trial, the lower court, after finding that defendant had carried on a love affair with one Lolita Pe,
an unmarried woman, being a married man himself, declared that defendant cannot be held liable for
moral damages it appearing that plaintiffs failed to prove that defendant, being aware of his marital
status, deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection. So it rendered decision dismissing
the complaint.
Plaintiffs brought this case on appeal before this Court on the ground that the issues involved are
purely of law.

ISSUE: Whether plaintiffs are entitled to damages

DECISION: The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead, to
any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter
to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented
the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of
the frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was allowed free access because he was a
collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with
each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita
used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affairs reached the knowledge of
her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs
even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless,
defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed,
no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately,
but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of
having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable
considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new
Civil Code.

Estopa v. Piansay,
109 Phil. 640|September 30, 1960|Bengzon, J.

Facts: This is an appeal from the decision of the Negros Occidental court of first instance awarding to
plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 by way of moral damages, P2,000.00 as exemplary damages and
P1,000.00 as attorney's fees.

The plaintiff Erlinda Estopa, a beautiful girl of twenty-three, residing in Bago, Negros Occidental, with
her widowed mother, Felicidad Estopa, stated that she fell in love and submitted herself completely to
the defendant Loreta Piansay, Jr., sometime in September, 1957, after a courtship that lasted for a
couple of months during which period the defendant consistently promised and succeeded to make
her believe in him that he was going to marry her; that sometime in December, 1957, the plaintiff was
informed reliably that defendant was backing out from his promise of marriage so she demanded
defendant's compliance to his promise in order to vindicate her honor, and plaintiff went to the extent
of asking the help of defendant's parents, but all her efforts were in vain. Finally, realizing that her
efforts were futile but knowing that her cause was not completely lost, she decided to file her complaint,
not to compel defendant to marry her, but to demand from him a compensation for the damages that
she sustained. No other claims of damages was petitioned, she merely alleged "social humiliation,
mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feeling and moral shock."

Issue: Whether or not Estopa can claim damages due to the breach of promise to marry.

Ruling: No, as plaintiff has no right to moral damages, she may not demand exemplary damages.
While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is
entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of
whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. (Art. 2234, New Civil Code)

We have today decided that in this jurisdiction, under the New Civil Code, the mere breach of a promise
to marry is not actionable. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, Supra, 631); and we have reversed the
Cebu court's award for moral damages in breach of promise suit. Consistently with such ruling, Loreta
Piansay, Jr. may not be condemned to pay moral damages, in this case. Therefore, as plaintiff is not
entitled to any damages at all, there is no reason to require Piansay, Jr. to satisfy attorney's fees.

Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer & Plywood, Inc.

G.R. No. L-38088 | August 30, 1974| CASTRO, J.

DOCTRINE: The "right" of the respondents to dismiss Quisaba should not be confused with
the manner in which the right was exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal was
done anti-socially or oppressively, as the complaint alleges, then the respondents violated article 1701
of the Civil Code which prohibits acts of oppression by either capital or labor against the other, and
article 21, which makes a person liable for damages if he wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, the sanction for which, by way of
moral damages, is provided in article 2219, no. 10.

The case at bar is intrinsically concerned with a civil (not a labor) dispute; it has to do with an alleged
violation of Quisaba's rights as a member of society, and does not involve an existing employee-
employer relation within the meaning of section 2(1) of Presidential Decree No. 21. The complaint is
thus properly and exclusively cognizable by the regular courts of justice, not by the National Labor
Relations Commission.

FACTS: Petitioner Jovito N. Quisaba filed with the Court of First Instance of Davao a complaint for
moral damages, exemplary damages, termination pay and attorney's fees against the Sta. Ines-Melale
Veneer & Plywood, Inc. and its vice-president. The complaint avers that Quisaba, for eighteen years
prior to his dismissal, was in the employ of the defendant corporation; that on January 11, 1973 the
respondent Robert Hyde instructed him to purchase logs for the company's plant; that he refused on
the ground that the work of purchasing logs is inconsistent with his position as internal auditor; that on
the following day Hyde informed him of his temporary relief as internal auditor so that he could carry
out immediately the instructions thus given, and he was warned that his failure to comply would be
considered a ground for his dismissal; that on January 16, 1973 he responded with a plea for fairness
and mercy as he would be without a job during an economic crisis; that he was demoted from a position
of dignity to a servile and menial job; that the defendants did not reconsider their "clever and
subterfugial dismissal" of him which for all purposes constituted a "constructive discharge;" and that
because of the said acts of the defendants, he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock and social humiliate on. The complaint does not pray for
reinstatement or payment of backwages.

The Commission's disclaimer of jurisdiction (that it has no jurisdiction on matter involving moral,
exemplary and other related damages including attorney's fees, arising out of employee-employer
relationship) notwithstanding, the court a quo, in an order of September 18, 1973, granted the motion
to dismiss on the ground that the complaint basically involves an employee-employer relation. Hence,
the present recourse.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said dismissal by the court on the ground that the complaint basically
involves an employee-employer relation is proper.

RULING: No. Although the acts complained of seemingly appear to constitute "matters involving
employee-employer relations" as Quisaba's dismissal was the severance of a pre-existing employee-
employer relation, his complaint is grounded not on his dismissal per se as in fact he does not ask for
reinstatement or backwages, but on the manner of his dismissal and the consequent effects of such
dismissal.

Civil law consists of that "mass of precepts that determine or regulate the relations ... that exist
between members of a society for the protection of private interests.

The "right" of the respondents to dismiss Quisaba should not be confused with the manner in which
the right was exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal was done anti-socially or
oppressively, as the complaint alleges, then the respondents violated article 1701 of the Civil Code
which prohibits acts of oppression by either capital or labor against the other, and article 21, which
makes a person liable for damages if he wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, the sanction for which, by way of moral damages,
is provided in article 2219, no. 10.

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cages:
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, ....
The case at bar is intrinsically concerned with a civil (not a labor) dispute; it has to do
with an alleged violation of Quisaba's rights as a member of society, and does not
involve an existing employee-employer relation within the meaning of section 2(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 21. The complaint is thus properly and exclusively cognizable
by the regular courts of justice, not by the National Labor Relations Commission.
ACCORDINGLY, the order of September 18, 1973 is set aside, and this case is hereby ordered
remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings in accordance with law.

SINGAPORE AIRLINES v. PANO

G.R. No. L-47739 | June 22, 1983 | J. Melencio-Herrera

DOCTRINE: Petitioner seeks protection under the civil laws and claims no benefits under the Labor
Code. The primary relief sought is for liquidated damages for breach of a contractual obligation. The
other items demanded are not labor benefits demanded by workers generally taken cognizance of in
labor disputes, such as payment of wages, overtime compensation or separation pay. The items
claimed are the natural consequences flowing from breach of an obligation, intrinsically a civil dispute.

FACTS: On August 21, 1974, private respondent Carlos E. Cruz was offered employment by petitioner
as Engineer Officer with the opportunity to undergo a “conversion training course,” which he accepted.
An express stipulation in the offer provides that Cruz is required to enter into a bond with SIA for a
period of 6 years. Cruz was also tasked to provide a name for his surety. Further, it was stipulated that
Cruz shall agree to remain in the service of SIA for a period of 5 years from the date of commencement
of training. In case Cruz leaves the service of the company during the period of 5 years or will be
dismissed or terminated by the company for misconduct, Cruz and his surety bind themselves jointly
and severally to pay SIA liquidated damages. However, they are not to pay liquidated damages in the
following situations:

1. Lose his license to operate as a Flight Engineer due to medical reasons which can in no way be
attributable to any act or omission on his part;
2. is unable to continue in employment with the Company because his employment pass or work
permit, as the case may be, has been withdrawn or has not been renewed due to no act or omission
on his part;
3. has his services terminated by the Company as a result of being replaced by a national Flight
Engineer;
4. has to leave the service of the Company on valid compassionate grounds stated to and accepted
by the Company in writing.

Cruz signed the Agreement with his co-respondent, B. E. Villanueva, as surety. Claiming that Cruz
had applied for "leave without pay" and had gone on leave without approval of the application during
the second year of the period of five years, petitioner filed suit for damages against Cruz and his
surety, Villanueva, for violation of the terms and conditions of the aforesaid Agreement. In his Answer,
Cruz denied any breach of contract contending that at no time had he been required by petitioner to
agree to a straight service of five years and that he left the service on "valid compassionate grounds
stated to and accepted by the company", so that no damages may be awarded against him.

ISSUE: W/N the case is a civil case cognizable by the Courts of Justice or a labor case cognizable by
the Labor Arbiters

RULING: It is a civil case. While seemingly petitioner's claim for damages does from employer-
employee relations, in essence, petitioner's claim for damages is grounded on the "wanton failure and
refusal" without just cause of private respondent Cruz to report for duty despite repeated notices
served upon him of the disapproval of his application for leave of absence without pay. This, coupled
with the further averment that Cruz "maliciously and with bad faith" violated the terms and conditions
of the conversion training course agreement to the damage of petitioner removes the present
controversy from the coverage of the Labor Code and brings it within the purview of Civil Law. Clearly,
the complaint was anchored not on the abandonment per se by private respondent Cruz of his job —
as the latter was not required in the Complaint to report back to work — but on the manner and
consequent effects of such abandonment of work translated in terms of the damages which petitioner
had to suffer.

LIM and TAHA v. PONCE DE LEON and MADDELA

G.R. No. L-22554 | August 29, 1975 | J. Martin

DOCTRINE: There can be no question that without the proper search warrant, no public official has
the right to enter the premises of another without his consent for the purpose of search and seizure.
No amount of incriminating evidence whatever its source, will supply the place of such warrant.

FACTS:
Taha sold to a certain Alberto a motor launch. Thereafter, Alberto filed a complaint alleging that after
the sale, Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from him, hence, defendant Fiscal Ponce De Leon
filed with the CFI Palawan an information for Robbery with Force and Intimidation upon persons
against Taha.

Defendant Fiscal Ponce De Leon ordered defendant Maddela, the detachment commander, to
impound and take custody of the motor launch. Ponce De Leon explained that its subsequent sale to
a third party, plaintiff Lim, cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the same. Maddela, as
ordered, seized the motor launch from plaintiff Lim.

As a result, plaintiffs Taha and Lim filed a complaint for damages against defendants Ponce De Leon
and Maddela. They alleged that Maddela entered the premises of Lim without a search warrant and
then and there took away the hull of the motor launch without his consent; that he effected the seizure
upon order of Fiscal Ponce de Leon who knew fully well that his office was not vested with authority
to order the seizure of a private property; that said motor launch was purchased by Lim from Taha.

Defendants, on their answer, argued that the taking of the motor launch even without a warrant was
because of Fiscal Ponce de Leon's alleged inherent power to order the seizure of a personal property
which is the corpus delicti of a crime, he being a quasi judicial officer who has the control of the
prosecution and the presentation of the evidence in the criminal case.

RTC RULING:
Upheld the validity of the the seizure of the motor launch on the ground that the authority to impound
evidences or exhibits or corpus delicti in a case pending investigation is inherent in the Provincial
Fiscal who controls the prosecution and who introduces those exhibits in the court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon had the power to order the seizure
of the motor launch in question without a warrant of search and seizure even if the same was
admittedly the corpus delicti of the crime (NO)
2. Whether or not defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiffs-appellants for damages
allegedly suffered by them granting that the seizure of the motor launch was unlawful (YES).

RULING:

ISSUE NO. 1:
No. The SC held that under the Constitution, the power to issue a search warrant is vested in a judge
or magistrate and in no other officer and no search and seizure can be made without a proper warrant.
At the time the act complained of was committed, there was no law or rule that recognized the authority
of Provincial Fiscals to issue a search warrant much less to order without warrant the seizure of a
personal property even if it is the corpus delicti of a crime.

The SC further held that the fact that a thing is a corpus delicti of a crime does not justify its seizure
without a warrant. No amount of incriminating evidence whatever its source, will supply the place of
such warrant.

ISSUE NO. 2:
Yes. Article 32provides that any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: the rights to be secure in one's
person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. While Artile 2219
provides that moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: Illegal search.

In this case, plaintiff Lim is entiled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee
responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary damages is also awarded. However, plaintiff Taha is not
entitled to recover any damage since the ownership was already transferred to Lim.

The Court held that to be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is enough that there was a
violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should have
acted with malice or bad faith. Hence, defendant Fiscal Ponce De Leon is liable. However, Maddela
is not liable because as a subordinate officer, he was only led to believe that there was a legal basis
and authority to impound the launch.

Sison v. Court of Appeals

492 SCRA 497 | June 26, 2006 | J. Carpio

DOCTRINE: As a general rule, the performance of an official act or duty which necessarily involves
the exercise of judgment cannot be compelled by mandamus. It is available to compel action, when
refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment in a
particular manner. However, this rule admits exceptions. Mandamus is the proper remedy in cases
where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of authority.

FACTS: Dr. Concepcion Lim-Tan, proprietor of Leona O. Lim Memorial Hospital (LLMH) and
administrator of Paulina Lim Memorial Hospital (PLMH), filed a civil case for mandamus and damages
in the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City against petitioner Godofredo Sison, deputy administrator
of Social Security System Region 6, for his delay in facilitating the payment of hospital claims under
the Medical Care “Medicare” program.

The claims, premised on Medicare Circular No. 258, s. of 1988 ("Circular No. 258"), were supposedly
for the medical care services extended by the hospitals to persons who represented themselves as
SSS members or their dependents. Medicare claims on behalf of LLMH amounted to P1,654,345 while
those on behalf of PLMH amounted to P765,861.95 from August 1988 to April 1989.

In the cases she filed, Dr Lim asked the petitioner to pay not only the Medicare claims, but also the
interest on the claims, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees and costs of the suit.

In his defense, Sison said there was suspension of payment due to allegations of fraud and tampering.
He also argued that he could not be made liable since he was a public officer.
RTC RULING: The Court found Sison guilty for his inaction as he merely suspended payment of the
claims but did not file the corresponding cases within the prescribed 90-day period. It ordered Sison
to pay the claims worth P1.53 million and interest.

CA RULING: The CA upheld the trial court’s decision but modified the amount due since Sison was
not in bad faith. Applying, PMCC Res. No. 89-2074, it ordered respondent, in his official capacity, to
pay only 80 percent or P1,936,165.50 of the total P2,420,206.90 claims. CA found no basis for the
award of moral and exemplary damages but allowed attorney’s fees and costs of the suit.

ISSUE:

1) Whether or not petitioner may be held liable and compelled by mandamus to pay respondent’s
claims
2) Whether or not award of moral damages is justified

RULING:

ISSUE #1: YES. Petitioner is liable.

As a general rule, the performance of an official act or duty which necessarily involves the exercise of
judgment cannot be compelled by mandamus. It is available to compel action, when refused, in
matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment in a particular
manner. However, this rule admits exceptions. Mandamus is the proper remedy in cases where there
is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority. Such exemption
applies to this case.

While the petitioner's office has the discretionary authority to withhold payment of fraudulent claims,
such exercise of discretionary authority to approve and deny claims is not absolute.

In this case, petitioner can only deny a patently wrongful hospital claim. In case of doubtful claims,
Circular No. 258 gives the petitioner only two options: (1) file a case within 90 days and suspend
payment or (2) pay within 90 days and subject the claim to pre-audit in case of doubtful claims.
Payment of the claim does not prevent the petitioner from filing a case at a later time.

The petitioner failed to exercise any of these options thus making him liable.

The Court added that petitioner’s allegations of violation of Medicare laws and regulations are causes
of action which are separate and distinct from the present case. These, however, do not excuse
petitioner from acting on respondent’s claims with dispatch.

The Court affirmed the CA ruling as to the payment of 80 percent of the Medicare claims.

ISSUE #2:

NO. Since Sison was not in bad faith, the Court did not award moral damages and deleted the
attorney’s fees.

Instead, it held Sison personally liable for litigation fees and exemplary damages of P20,000 to serve
as a reminder for other public officials that they should serve the public with utmost efficiency. Although
petitioner’s inordinate delay may be explained by petitioner’s desire to prevent dissipation of
government funds, petitioner’s acts only serve to perpetuate the negative image of corruption in the
government bureaucracy. As a public official, petitioner ought to have acted with the highest degree
of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill.
Also, the government’s inaction would put the financial standing of participating hospitals in a
precarious position. Instead of placing a premium on participation in the government’s Medicare
program, petitioner effectively punished an accredited provider by refusing to provide payment for
services already rendered.

JAVELLANA v. TAYO
G.R. No. L-18919 | December 29, 1962 | J. Barrera

DOCTRINE: The award of moral damages to a councilor as a consequence of the municipal mayor’s
refusal to perform his official duties, is proper under Article 27 of the new Civil Code.

FACTS: The petitioners are duly elected and qualified members of the Municipal Council of the
Municipality of Buenavista, Province of Iloilo, and that the respondent at the time the acts hereinbelow
complained of took place, was and still is the duly-elected and qualified Mayor of the Municipality of
Buenavista, Province of Iloilo where he resides and may be served with summons.

On February 8, 1960 the Municipal Council of the Municipality of Buenavista, Iloilo, unanimously
approved Resolution No. 5, Series of 1960, which set the regular sessions of the Municipality Council
of Buenavista on every first and third Wednesday of every month, and which resolution was duly
approved by the respondent, in his capacity as Mayor. At the time and place set for the regular session
of the Municipal Council, the Mayor, Vice-Mayor, 2 Councilors, and the Secretary were absent. The
petitioners were the only councilors who were present and therefore they proceeded to elect among
themselves a temporary presiding officer and acting secretary.

At the time and place designated in Resolution No. 5, series of 1960, dated February 8, 1960 above
referred to, the petitioners acting as duly elected and qualified councilors were present and again, in
view of the absence of the Mayor, Vice-Mayor said to councilor and the Secretary proceeded to elect
a temporary presiding officer and temporary secretary from among them, and did business as a
Municipal Council of Buenavista. The following proceedings were held by petitioners again because
of the absence of respondent.

When the minutes of the proceedings of the Municipal Council were presented to the respondent for
action, the respondent Mayor refused to act upon said minutes, or particularly to approve or disapprove
the resolution as approved by the municipal Council, the Mayor declaring the sessions above referred
to as null and void and not in accordance with.

The petitioners made repeated demands for payment of their per diems to the respondent Mayor for
the latter’s signature, but that the respondent refused to affix his signature. The respondent brought
the matter to the attention of the Provincial Board, of the Province of Iloilo, questioning the legality of
the minutes but was returned, informing the Mayor that the said minutes is legal and despite the
resolution of the Provincial Board, the Mayor refused and still refuses to recognize the validity of the
acts of the Municipal Council and the legality of its regular session held in his absence.

RTC RULING: The sessions held by the petitioner during the absence of the respondent Mayor were
perfectly valid and legal. The attendance of the Mayor is not essential to the validity of the session as
long as there is quorum constituted in accordance with law. Petitioners here claim moral damages
pursuant to the provisions of Article 2219, in connection with Article 21 and Article 27 of the new Civil
Code. Only petitioner Exequiel Golez was presented as a witness who prove moral damages he
suffered as a consequence of the refusal the respondent Susano Tayo to perform his official duty. As
such, of all the petitioners, only Exequiel Golez is entitled receive moral damages in the sum of
P100.00
ISSUE: Whether or not the sessions held by the Council were valid

RULING: Yes. The sessions held by petitioners were valid. The Trial Court held after perusal of all the
records of this case has reached the conclusion that the sessions held by the petitioner during the
absence of the respondent Mayor were perfectly valid and legal. The attendance of the Mayor is not
essential to the validity of the session as long as there is quorum constituted in accordance with the
law. To declare that the proceedings of the petitioners were null and void is to encourage recalcitrant
public officials who would frustrate valid session for political end or consideration. Consequently,
pursuant to Section 2221 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides:

SEC. 2221. Quorum of council — Enforcing Attendance of absent members. — The majority
of the council elected shall constitute a quorum to do business; ....

There was a quorum to do business in all the sessions in question. The term "quorum" has
been defined as that number of members of the body which, when legally as assembled in
their proper places, will enable the body to transact its proper business, or, in other words, that
number that makes a lawful body and gives it power to pass a law or ordinance or do any other
valid corporate act.

Lastly, appellant contests the award of moral damage to appellee councilor Exequiel Golez. We find
said award proper under Article 27 of the new Civil Code, 3 considering that according to the trial court,
he (Golez) was able to prove that he suffered the same, as a consequence of appellant's refusal to
perform his official duty, notwithstanding the action taken by the Provincial Fiscal and the Provincial
Board upholding the validity of the session in question.

Tenchavez v. Escano
15 SCRA 355 (M. R. denied in 17 SCRA 674) | DIGEST FROM HIGHER YEAR

FACTS: 27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry
got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer
before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the
couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-
maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos
college student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their
vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicenta’s parents. However after translating the said letter
to Vicenta’s dad , he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu
while Pastor went back to work in Manila. Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single
and when it was approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor
which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She
then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo
Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8,
1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded
Vicenta from joining her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the
Philippines.

DECISION: Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give
recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a
violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizenswho can
afford divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband
is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez.

In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between
Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee
entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by
one spouse entitled the other for damages. WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby
modified as follows; (1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal
separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño; (2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to
pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees; (3)
Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his
wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

ELENITA LEDESMA SILVA, ET AL. vs. ESTHER PERALTA

G.R. No. L-13114 | November 25, 1960 | En Banc
Resolution on the MR | August 29, 1961| J. REYES, J.B.L

FACTS: Saturnino Silva, then an American citizen and US Army officer, was married to one Prescilla
Isabel of Australia. He was deployed in the Philippines during the enemy occupation.
In 1944, Esther Peralta who, believing that Silva was single, accepted his marriage proposal; and the
two were married in 1945. No documents of marriage were prepared nor executed, allegedly because
there were no available printed forms for the purpose. The lovers lived together as husband and wife,
and from such a child, named Saturnino Silva, Jr., was born. While in the States to receive medical
treatment, Saturnino divorced Priscilla Isabel and later, in 1948, contracted marriage with plaintiff
Elenita Ledesma Silva. Upon his return to the Philippines, appellee Esther Peralta demanded support
for their child, and, upon his refusal, instituted a suit for support.

Thereupon, Elenita moved to enjoin Esther from representing herself as wife of Saturnino and prayed
for the award of moral damages for the humiliation and distress she suffered upon learning his
husband had a child. Defendant’s answer contains both specific denials and counterclaims for actual
damages and fees due to harassment and moral damages caused by Silva’s marital relation with
defendant, without disclosing to her that he was married; and his subsequent refusal to acknowledge
their offspring.

No evidence was offered, other than the testimonies of the defendant herself and her counsel, Atty.
Juan Quijano, to prove any such alleged marriage, although there is convincing proof that the
defendant and Saturnino Silva, for a time, actually lived together as common-law husband and wife.

RTC RULING:
The trial court found for Esther. (the dispositive portion was in Spanish)
• Direct appeal to SC on both questions of fact and law from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Davao, the amount involved being more than P2000,000.00.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a marriage actually took place between Silva and Peralta (NO)
2. Whether or not Elenita Ledesma is entitled to an award of moral damages (NO)
3. Whether or not Esther Peralta is entitled to damages because of Saturnino’s affair and
abandonment (YES)
4. Whether or not the maintenance of a child is a proper element of damages (YES)

RULING:
1. NO, All the foregoing circumstances, coupled with the admitted fact that no marriage
documents of any kind prior to, during or after the marriage were ever prepared or executed
by anybody, and that a vigorous denial of the supposed marriage was made by Saturnino
Silva, the alleged consort, lead to the conclusion that no marriage had really taken place. In
view of the non-existence of appellee’s marriage with Saturnino Silva and the latter’s actual
marriage to plaintiff Ledesma,, it is not proper for Esther to continue representing herself as
the wife of Saturnino. Article 370 of the Civil Code of the Philippines authorizes a married
woman to use the surname of her husband; impliedly, it also excludes others from doing
likewise.

2. NO, Esther Peralta was forbidden from representing herself as Mrs. Saturnino Silva as it was
proved that she was not legally married to him. But an award of damages in the Elenita’s favor
would require a further finding that the assumption of the disputed status by Esther Peralta
was made in bad faith or through culpable negligence and no such finding has been made in
the decision. Elenita Silva’s claim for damages was not adequately proved.

3. YES, no great effort is needed to discern that Esther Peralta would never have agreed to live
maritally with appellant Silva nor beget a child by him had not Silva concealed that he was
already married; and in that case appellee Peralta would not have been compelled to relinquish
her employment to attend to the litigation filed to obtain for the child the support that Silva
refused. Wherefore, Esther’s loss of employment is ultimately a result of Silva’s deception and
she should be indemnified therefor.

Silva’s act in hiding from the appellee that he could not legally marry her, because he already
had an Australian wife, was not mere negligence, but actual fraud (dolo) practiced upon the
appellee. Consequently, he should stand liable for any and all damages arising therefrom,
which included the expense of maintaining the offspring and the expenses of litigation to
protect the child’s rights, and the loss of the mother’s own earnings. This is a liability that flows
even from Articles 1902 and 1107 (par. 2) of 1889 (Arts. 2176 and 2202 of the New Code).

From the 1961 Resolution:

• Esther Peralta would not have consented to the liaison had there been no concealment of
Silva's previous marriage, or that the birth of the child was a direct result of this connection.
That Esther had to support the child because Silva abandoned her before it was born is
likewise patent upon the record, and we can not see how said appellant can be excused from
liability therefor.

• Silva's seduction and subsequent abandonment of appellee and his illegitimate child were
likewise the direct cause for the filing of the support case in Manila, and in order to prosecute
the same, appellee had to quit her employment in Davao. While the case could have been
filed in Davao, we do not believe that this error in selecting a more favorable venue (due to
her unfamiliarity with the technicalities of the law) should be allowed to neutralize the appellant
Silva's responsibility as the primary causative factor of the prejudice and damage suffered by
appellee.

4. YES, Although it was argued that the maintenance of the child cannot be considered as an
element of damage because of the child's case for support was dismissed, thid contention fails
to take into account the action there was for support as an acknowledged natural child, and
that under the Civil Code of1889 (the law in force when the child was born), the right of natural
children to be supported by their father depended exclusively on the recognition by the father
of his paternity; the rule being that —the mere fact of birth gave no legal right to the child, and
 imposed no legal duty upon the father, except, perhaps, in cases arising under the criminal
law.

In the support case, the real issue was whether the child had been duly recognized, the support
of being a mere consequence of the recognition. Therefore, the failure of the child's action for
support did not adjudge that he was not the defendant's child, but that the defendant never
recognized him as such. That the decision of the Court of Appeals) rejecting the child's action
did not declare him without right to support under all circumstances. The very fact that the child
was not allowed to collect support from the father (appellant therein) merely emphasizes the
account of his birth and rearing, which, in turn, was a direct consequence of appellant's tortious
conduct.

"ART. 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or
negligence shall be liable for the damage so done."

"ART. 1107. In case of fraud (dolo) the debtor shall be liable for all losses and damages which clearly
arise from the failure to fulfill the obligation."

Other issues (for recit purposes):

• Income tax deductions are not reasonable basis for damages allowed for a child's
maintenance.
o The individual income tax deduction for a child does not constitute a reasonable basis
for an award of damages for his maintenance, since this is fixed for an entirely different
purpose (to arrive at the net taxable income) and merely represents the amount that
the state is willing to exempt from taxation.

• Appellants also contend that the claim for pecuniary damages has prescribed, because
they date back to 1945.
o The defense of prescription was not invoked by appellants in the lower court
against the claim for pecuniary damages, and this defense must be regarded as
waived in relation to the same.

• Damages resulting from a tort are measured in the same manner as those due from a
contractual debtor in bad faith, since he must answer for such damages whether he had
foreseen them or not, just as he must indemnify not only for damnum emergens but also
for lucrum cessans as required by Art. 1106.

GELUZ v. COURT OF APPEALS & OSCAR LAZO

G.R. No. L-16439 | July 20, 1961 | J. Reyes, J.B.L.

DOCTRINE: The minimum award for the death of a person does not cover the case of an unborn
foetus that is not endowed with personality and incapable of having rights and obligations.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the
injured, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to the parents or heirs of an unborn child.
FACTS: In 1950, Nita Villanueva became pregnant by Oscar Lazo, her present husband, before they
were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent and acting on the advice of
her aunt, she had herself aborted by a physician, Antonio Geluz.

After her marriage with Oscar Lazo, she again became pregnant and because she is employed in
COMELEC and found it inconvenient, she had herself aborted by the same physician.

Less than 2 years later, she again became pregnant. Accompanied by her sister and niece, Nita again
aborted a two-month-old foetus. At that time, Nita’s husband, Oscar Lazo, was in the province thus,
he did not know nor consent to the abortion.

Oscar Lazo filed a complaint against Antonio Geluz because he aborted the foetus without his consent
as husband.

RTC RULING: The trial court ruled in favor of Oscar Lazo and awarded damages in the sum of P3,000
upon the provisions of the Article 2206 of the Civil Code.

CA RULING: Sustained the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover
damages from the physician who caused the same.

RULING: No. The Court ruled that the foetus lacked juridical personality pursuant to Article 40 of the
Civil Code. Further, American jurisprudence opined that recovery cannot be had for the death of an
unborn child.

This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages
must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of
the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity.

Because the parents cannot expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would
normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes
hominis that was the foetus, i.e. on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the
disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ. Code, Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages,
if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230).

Supreme Court likewise averred that there is no basis for an award of moral damages because of
Oscar’s indifference to the previous abortions of his wife. It was shown that he was unconcerned with
the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. His worry was only directed at obtaining from the
doctor a large money payment. The decision is reversed and the complaint dismissed.
Hernandez v. Dolor
G.R. No. 160286| July 30, 2004 | J. YNARES-SANTIAGO

Under Article 2206, the "spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish for the death of the deceased." The reason
for the grant of moral damages has been explained, thus:

. . . the award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of the spiritual
status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. The intensity of the
pain experienced by the relatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity of affection for him and
bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the offender.
FACTS: Lorenzo Menard Boyet Dolor, Jr. was driving an owner-type jeepney owned by her mother,
Margarita, towards Anilao, Batangas. As he was traversing the road, his vehicle collided with a
passenger jeepney driven by petitioner Juan Gonzales and owned by his copetitioner Francisco
Hernandez. Boyet and his passenger died. Passengers also on board the owner-type jeep, which was
totally wrecked, suffered physical injuries. The collision also damaged the passenger jeepney of
Francisco Hernandez and caused physical injuries to its passengers.

Respondents commenced an action for damages alleging that driver Juan Gonzales was guilty of
negligence and lack of care and that the Hernandez spouses were guilty of negligence in the selection
and supervision of their employees. Petitioners countered that the proximate cause of the death and
injuries sustained by the passengers of both vehicles was the recklessness of Boyet who was driving
in a zigzagging manner under the influence of alcohol.

Petitioners also alleged that Gonzales was not the driver-employee of the Hernandez spouses as the
former only leased the jeepney on a daily basis. Hernandez spouses further claimed that even if an
employer-employee relationship is found to exist between them, they cannot be held liable because
as employers they exercised due care in the selection and supervision of their employee.

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of respondents.

CA affirmed with modifications.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sps. Hernandez are solidarily liable with Juan Gonzales, although it is of record
that they were not in the passenger jeepney when the accident occurred.

RULING: YES. They are still answerable under several provisions of the Civil Code namely Article
2180 and Article 2176. While the above provisions do not expressly provide for the solidary liability,
they should be read in consonance with Article 2180 – one can be liable for the acts or omission of
another whom he is responsible for, meaning that an employer is accountable for the actions of his
employees. Article 2194 categorically states that responsibility of two or more persons who are liable
for quasi-delict is solidary. The Hernandez spouses maintained that Julian Gonzales is not their
employee because the latter pays them daily for the use of the jeepney. They argued that they are
practicing a lease agreement using the “boundary system”.

SC held that there exists an employer-employee relationship because by agreeing with spouses
Hernandez, there would be a violation of the Public Service Law and the riding public is placed at the
mercy of reckless and irresponsible drivers because most drivers are in no position to pay for damages
when accidents occur.

Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the defendant.
They are awarded to allow the former to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to
alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone due to the defendant's culpable action and must,
perforce, be proportional to the suffering inflicted.

Truly, the pain of the sudden loss of one's offspring, especially of a son who was in the prime of his
youth, and who holds so much promise waiting to be fulfilled is indeed a wellspring of intense pain
which no parent should be made to suffer. While it is true that there can be no exact or uniform rule
for measuring the value of a human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by a precise
mathematical calculation, we hold that the Court of Appeals' award of moral damages of P100,000.00
each to the Spouses Dolor and Spouses Valmocina for the death of their respective sons, Boyet Dolor
and Oscar Valmocina, is in full accord with prevailing jurisprudence.

JEROME CASTRO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

 G.R. No. 180832 | July 23, 2008 | (J. Corona)

At most, Castro could have been liable for damages under Article 26 of the Civil Code:
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they
may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,...
prevention and other relief:... x x x xxx xxx
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

FACTS: Reedley International School (RIS) prohibited Justin Albert, Albert Tan’s (Tan) son from
participating in the graduation ceremonies. However, Justin Albert was able to participate in such due
to the decision of the Dep-Ed that the unreasonable sanctions violated due process.

After the graduation ceremonies, Tan met Bernice C. Ching (Ching), a fellow parent at RIS. The former
an intimated that he was contemplating a suit against the officers of RIS in their personal capacities.

This prompted Ching to telephone Jerome Castro (Castro) telling him of such plan. Before they hung
up, Castro told Ching: Okay, you too, take care and be careful talking to [Tan], that's dangerous.

Tan came to know of such remark because Ching informed him of such. Insulted, Tan filed a complaint
for grave oral defamation.The prosecution essentially tried to establish that Castro depicted Tan as a
"dangerous person.".

MeTC Ruling: The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) found Castro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
grave oral defamation

RTC Ruling: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the factual findings of the MeTC. However, in
view of the animosity between the parties, it found Castro guilty only of slight oral defamation. But
because Tan filed his complaint only on August 21, 2003 (or almost five months from discovery), the
RTC ruled that prescription had already set in and thus acquitted Castro on that ground.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA).

CA Ruling: The CA reinstated the MeTC decision. It found that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it misapprehended the totality of the circumstances and found Castro guilty only of
slight oral defamation.

Tan now contends that the CA erred in taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari inasmuch as the
OSG raised errors of judgment but failed to prove that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, double jeopardy attached when the RTC acquitted him.

ISSUE: Did the CA err in taking cognizance of the case?

RULING:

1. YES. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.[13] This
constitutional mandate is echoed in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused has

been convicted or acquitted or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint
or in information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal
 of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for
the offense charged or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.

Thus, an acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or appellate court, is final and unappealable on the
ground of double jeopardy. The only exception is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion or, when there was mistrial. The rationale behind this exception is that a judgment rendered
by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion was issued without jurisdiction. It is, for this reason,
void. Consequently, there is no double jeopardy.

In this case, the OSG merely assailed the RTC's finding on the nature of petitioner's statement, that
is, whether it constituted grave or slight oral defamation. The OSG premised its allegation of grave
abuse of discretion on the RTC's "erroneous" evaluation and assessment of the evidence presented
by the parties.

What the OSG therefore questioned were errors of judgment (or those involving misappreciation of
evidence or errors of law). However, a court, in a petition for certiorari, cannot review the RTC’s
evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65
petition as a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction

At most, Castro could have been liable for damages under Article 26 of the Civil Code:

Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they
may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,...
prevention and other relief:... x x x xxx xxx
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

Castro was reminded that, as an educator, he is supposed to be a role model for the youth. As such,
he should always act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.

So Ping Bun v. Court of appeals, 314 SCRA 751

G.R. No. 120554 | September 21, 1999 | J. QUISUMBING

DOCTRINE: Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. One becomes liable in an action for
damages for a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset
if (a) the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with,
(b) the invasion is substantial, (c) the defendant's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and (d) the
invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under general
negligence rules.

The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of
the third person of the existence of contract; and (3) interference of the third person is without legal
justification or excuse.

FACTS: In 1963, Tek Hua Trading Co. entered into lease agreements with lessor Dee C. Chuan and
Sons, Inc. involving four (4) premises in Binondo, which the former used to store textiles. The
agreements were for one (1) year, with provisions for month-to-month rental should the lessee
continue to occupy the properties after the term. In 1976, Tek Hua Trading Co. was dissolved, and the
former members formed Tek Hua Enterprises Corp., herein respondent. So Pek Giok, managing
partner of the defunct company, died in 1986. Petitioner So Ping Bun, his grandson, occupied the
warehouse for his own textile business, Trendsetter Marketing. On March 1, 1991, private respondent
Tiong sent a letter to petitioner, demanding that the latter vacate the premises. Petitioner refused, and
on March 4, 1992, he requested formal contracts of lease with DCCSI. The contracts were executed.
Private respondents moved for the nullification of the contract and claimed damages.

RTC RULING: The petition was granted by the trial court.

CA RULING: The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court. On motion for reconsideration, the appellate
court modified the decision by reducing the award of attorney's fees from five hundred thousand
(P500,000.00) pesos to two hundred thousand (P200,000.00) pesos.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether So Ping Bun is guilty of tortuous interference of contract
(2) Whether private respondents are entitled to attorney’s fees

RULING:

(1) Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damages are the recompense
or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. One becomes liable in an action for
damages for a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment
of asset if (a) the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment
interfered with, (b) the invasion is substantial, (c) the defendant's conduct is a legal cause of
the invasion, and (d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and
actionable under general negligence rules.

The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of
the third person of the existence of contract; and (3) interference of the third person is without legal
justification or excuse. Petitioner's Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to execute lease contracts in
its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived respondent corporation of the latter's property right.
Clearly, and as correctly viewed by the appellate court, the three elements of tort interference above-
mentioned are present in the instant case.

Authorities debate on whether interference may be justified where the defendant acts for the sole
purpose of furthering his own financial or economic interest. One view is that, as a general rule,
justification for interfering with the business relations of another exists where the actor's motive is to
benefit himself. Such justification does not exist where his sole motive is to cause harm to the other.
Added to this, some authorities believe that it is not necessary that the interferer's interest outweigh
that of the party whose rights are invaded, and that an individual acts under an economic interest that
is substantial, not merely de minimis, such that wrongful and malicious motives are negatived, for he
acts in self-protection. Moreover justification for protecting one's financial position should not be made
to depend on a comparison of his economic interest in the subject matter with that of others. It is
sufficient if the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives.
Where there was no malice in the interference of a contract, and the impulse behind one's conduct
lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives, a party cannot be a malicious
interferer. Where the alleged interferer is financially interested, and such interest motivates his
conduct, it cannot be said that he is an officious or malicious intermeddler.

In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner So Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI to lease the warehouse
to his enterprise at the expense of respondent corporation. Though petitioner took interest in the
property of respondent corporation and benefited from it, nothing on record imputes deliberate
wrongful motives or malice on him. Petitioner argues that damage is an essential element of tort
interference, and since the trial court and the appellate court ruled that private respondents were not
entitled to actual, moral or exemplary damages, it follows that he ought to be absolved of any liability,
including attorney's fees.

While we do not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic interest to intrude into existing
contracts at the expense of others, however, we find that the conduct herein complained of did not
transcend the limits forbidding an obligatory award for damages in the absence of any malice. The
business desire is there to make some gain to the detriment of the contracting parties. Lack of malice,
however, precludes damages. But it does not relieve petitioner of the legal liability for entering into
contracts and causing breach of existing ones. The respondent appellate court correctly confirmed the
permanent injunction and nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI and Trendsetter
Marketing, without awarding damages. The injunction saved the respondents from further damage or
injury caused by petitioner's interference.

(2) Lastly, the recovery of attorney's fees in the concept of actual or compensatory damages, is
allowed under the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. One such
occasion is when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with
third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest. But we have consistently held that
the award of considerable damages should have clear factual and legal bases. In connection
with attorney's fees, the award should be commensurate to the benefits that would have been
derived from a favorable judgment. Settled is the rule that fairness of the award of damages
by the trial court calls for appellate review such that the award if far too excessive can be
reduced. This ruling applies with equal force on the award of attorney's fees. In a long line of
cases we said, "It is not sound policy to place in penalty on the right to litigate. To compel the
defeated party to pay the fees of counsel for his successful opponent would throw wide open
the door of temptation to the opposing party and his counsel to swell the fees to undue
proportions."

Considering that the respondent corporation's lease contract, at the time when the cause of action
accrued, ran only on a month-to-month basis whence before it was on a yearly basis, we find even the
reduced amount of attorney's fees ordered by the Court of Appeals still exorbitant in the light of
prevailing jurisprudence. Consequently, the amount of two hundred thousand (P200,000.00) awarded
by respondent appellate court should be reduced to one hundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos as
the reasonable award or attorney's fees in favor of private respondent corporation.

Excellent Essentials International Corp. vs. Extra Excel International Philippines, Inc.
G.R. No. 192797 | April 18, 2018 | Martires, J.

FACTS: Excel International and Excel Philippines entered an exclusive rights contract where Excel
Philippines was granted exclusive rights to distribute E. Excel products in the Philippines.

Over the span of 4 years, Excel International experienced intra-corporate struggle over the control of
the corporation and the operation of its various exclusive distributors in Asia. Eventually, the conflict
between the principal stakeholders of Excel International, Jua-Hwa Stewart and Jau-Fei Chen, took a
turn and Stewart succeeded in gaining control over the company.

Subsequently, Stewart, in her capacity as president of Excel International, revokes Excel Philippines’
exclusive rights contract and appointed Excellent Essentials as its new exclusive distributor in the
Philippines.

Despite the revocation, Excel Philippines continued its operation in violation of the new exclusive
distributorship agreement. Thus, Excel International demanded that Excel Philippines cease from
selling, importing, distributing, or advertising, directly or indirectly, any, and all of E. Excel products.
With its demand unheeded, Excel International and Excellent Essentials filed a complaint for injunction
and damages against Excel Philippines.

RTC RULING: The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Excel Philippines and enjoined Excellent
Essentials from (1) interfering with Excel Philippines’ exclusive right to distribute; (2) claiming,
publishing, and announcing that Excel Philippines has ceased to be Excel International’s exclusive
distributor in the Philippines; (3) intimidating, enticing, or persuading Excel Philippines’ agents to
abandon the company; and (4) infringing and using its products, packaging, and promotional materials,
the trademarks, logos, designs, and other intellectual property that Excel International has exclusively
licensed to Excel Philippines.

Aggrieved, Excellent Essentials filed a motion for reconsideration however, it was denied.

Prior to this, Excel International and Excel Philippines filed a joint motion for a judgment based on their
compromise agreement without prejudice to the continuation of the case with respect to Excellent
Essentials and Excel Philippines.

The RTC approved the compromise agreement and dismissed the claims and counterclaims of both
parties accordingly.

CA RULING: The CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision and issued a preliminary injunction
saying that it was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

The CA ruled that Excel Philippines’ title or right over the contested exclusive distributorship of E.
Excel’s products cannot be said to be clear and unmistakable since there is a cloud of doubt in said
right in view of the revocation of the same by Excel International and the subsequent grant of an
Exclusive Rights Contract in favor of Excellent Essentials. The issuance by Excel International of the
two documents should already put the court a quo on guard as to the veracity of Excel Philippines’
claim of exclusive distributorship. The court a quo should be more, so, be wary since both parties claim
validity of their respective Exclusive Rights Contract.

On the issue of damages, the court is not convinced that Excel Philippines will suffer irreparable injury
to warrant the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: Whether or not Excellent Essentials was guilty of tortious interference.

RULING: Yes. Under the Principle of Relativity of contracts, only those who are parties to a contract
are liable to its breach. Under Article 1314 of the Civil Code, however, any third person who induces
another to violate his contract shall be liable to damages to the other contracting party. The said
provision of law embodies what we often refer to as tortuous or contractual interference.

In So Ping Bun v. CA, the court laid out the elements of tortuous interference:
(1) existence of a valid contract;
(2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of contract; and
(3) interference of the third person is without legal justification or excuse.

Prior to the revocation of its exclusive distributorship, Excel International had an existing contract with
Bright Vision where they agreed to set up a corporation to exclusively distribute E. Excel products
within the Philippines. This corporation turned out to be Excel Philippines who was given the
irrevocable and exclusive right to distribute, market, and/or sell. Under its agreement with Bright Vision,
Excel Philippines' exclusive distributorship right was irrevocable and may only be modified, transferred,
or terminated upon the mutual consent of both parties. This agreement was effective from 22 May
1995 until 21 May 2005.

The relationship between Excel International and Excel Philippines took an unexpected turn when
Stewart unilaterally revoked Excel Philippines' right and conferred it to Excellent Essentials. Although
Stewart's actions were considered unlawful by the Utah Court, Excellent Essentials was able to set up
shop and disrupt Excel Philippines' distribution of E. Excel products in the Philippines. At this point,
Excel International had already breached its contractual obligations by unilaterally revoking Excel
Philippines' exclusive distributorship even if it was prohibited from doing so under the 22 May 1995
agreement. Stewart, as Excel International's interim president, was bound by the company's grant of
exclusive distributorship to Excel Philippines and the conditions that came with it.

Having established the first element of tortuous interference, we now must determine if Excellent
Essentials had knowledge of Excel Philippines' exclusive right. On this score, the court notes that the
exclusive distributorship right was granted to Excellent Essentials before it existed. This circumstance
suggests that even before Excellent Essentials was organized, its incorporators had the preconceived
plan to maneuver around Excel Philippines. Further, there is evidence showing that Excellent
Essentials' incorporators were officers of and/or affiliated with Excel Philippines. In fact, these
incorporators remained at work with Excel Philippines during this me and started to pirate its
supervisors, employees, and agents to join Excellent Essentials' multi-level marketing system.

Under these circumstances, we can conclude that those behind Excellent Essentials not only had
knowledge that Excel International had the obligation to honor Excel Philippines' exclusive right, but
also conspired with Stewart to undermine Excel Philippines.

On the last element, therefore, we cannot ascribe to Excellent Essentials' claim that it was not guilty
of malice or bad faith. A duty which the law of torts is concerned with is respect for the property of
others, and cause of action ex delicto may be predicated by an unlawful interference by any person of
the enjoyment of the other of his private property.

To sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant must have acted with malice or must have
been driven by purely impure reasons to injure plaintiff; otherwise, his act of interference cannot be
justified. We further explained that the word induce refers to situations where a person causes another
to choose one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation.

Contrary to Excellent Essentials' argument in the instant pe on, its participation in the scheme
against Excel Philippines transgressed the bounds of permissible financial interest. Its mere corporate
existence played an important factor for Stewart to revoke Excel Philippines' exclusive right to
distribute E. Excel products in the Philippines. For without it, or the participation of its incorporators,
Excel International would not have the means to connect with the marketing network Excel Philippines
established. Excellent Essentials became the vessel for the breach of Excel International's contractual
undertaking
with Excel Philippines.

The petition is DENIED.

THE UNITED STATES v. VICENTE MANUEL

G.R. No. L-1999 | December 27, 1906 | J. Carson

DOCTRINE: The true test of unfair competition is whether certain goods have been clothed with an
appearance which is likely to deceive the ordinary purchaser exercising ordinary care, and not whether
a certain limited class of purchasers with special knowledge not possess by the ordinary purchaser
could avoid mistake by the exercise of this special knowledge.

FACTS: Defendant, Vicente Manuel, manufactured and sold a number of bottles of aerated waters in
bottles identical in form and appearance with those used by A. S. Watson and Co., Limited, with the
trademark of that firm blown on the side in the same manner in which it is blown on their bottles, there
being no reasonable doubt that the bottles used by the defendant were bottles which had been
formerly used by A. S. Watson and Co., Limited in their business as manufacturers and vendors of
aerated waters. On the bottles sold by the defendant there were pasted labels with his name and the
kind of aerated water contained therein, the printed matter contained in these labels being different
from that contained in the bottles sold by A. S. Watson and Co., Limited, and the general appearance
of the respective labels not being strikingly similar or dissimilar, though a comparative examination
develops a number of points of difference in size, shape, and color. It does not expressly appear on
either label whether the name printed thereon is that of the manufacturer of the aerated water
contained therein or that of a dealer engaged in the business of buying and selling such waters.

The evidence tended to prove that the aerated waters sold by A. S. Watson and Co., Limited, have a
wide reputation for excellence of the Philippine Islands, and that great care and attention to detail are
exercised in their manufacture, with a view to the production of a wholesome and pleasant beverage,
and that to this end distilled water is used exclusively in their preparation; and there is evidence in the
record which tends to prove that the aerated waters sold by the defendant were unwholesome and of
inferior quality, and that distilled water had been used in their manufacture.

RTC ruling: the trial court convicted the accused of "unfair competition," and sentenced him to pay a
fine of $50, gold, and the costs of the trial, and to subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and
nonpayment of the fine.

ISSUE: Whether defendant is liable for unfair competition

RULING: YES. Section 7 of Act No. 666, defined unfair competition as —

"Any person who in selling his goods shall give them the general appearance of goods of
another manufacturer or dealer, either in the wrapping of the packages in which they are
contained or the devices or words thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance, which
would be likely to influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of a
manufacturer or dealer other than the actual manufacturer or dealer, and who clothes the
goods with such appearance for the purpose of deceiving the public and defrauding another
of his legitimate trade, or any subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor
engaged in selling such goods with a like purpose, shall be guilty of unfair competition . . . ,
and in order that the action shall lie under this section, actual intent to deceive the public and
defraud a competitor shall affirmatively appear on the part of the person sought to be made
liable, but such intent may be inferred from similarity in the appearance of the goods as packed
or offered for sale to those of complaining party."

The court ruled that the defendant, in selling his aerated waters in bottle with the design blown on the
side as described above, gave his goods the general appearance of aerated waters manufactured by
A. S. Watson and Co., Limited, in the devices and words used on the bottles in which they were
contained, in a way that the goods offered were those of A. S. Watson and Co., Limited; and that the
similarity in appearance of the goods offered for sale by the defendant to those of A. S. Watson and
Co., Limited, was such as to justify the inference that the defendant actually intended to deceive the
public and defraud the said A. S. Watson and Co., Limited.

The true test of unfair competition is whether certain goods have been clothed with an appearance
which is likely to deceive the ordinary purchaser exercising ordinary care, and not whether a certain
limited class of purchasers with special knowledge not possess by the ordinary purchaser could avoid
mistake by the exercise of this special knowledge.

Counsel for the defendant insist that the use of different labels pasted on the bottles forbids the
inference of an intent to device the public or defraud A. S. Watson and Co., Limited, but an ocular
examination of the labels and the device blown on the bottles does not sustain his contention. For
while it is true that a cautious purchaser who was acquainted with the English language need not have
been deceived if he took the pains to read the printed matter on the label, nevertheless the difference
in the general appearance of the labels is not sufficient to protect from mistake the ordinary purchaser
who is unacquainted with the English language, unless he took the extraordinary precaution of having
with him a sample of the label of A. S. Watson and Co., Limited, with which to make a direct
comparison, on each occasion when he bought a bottle of aerated water; by far the most striking and
noticeable characteristics of the bottles of aerated waters sold by A. S. Watson and Co., Limited, is
the evidence blown on the side, upon seeing which the ordinary purchaser might well be excused from
a too careful scrutiny of the wording of the much less noticeable and less easily remembered label,
printed in a language known to but a small percentage of the residents in Manila and the Philippine
Islands.

The evidence or record sustains the findings of the trial court and we find no error in the proceedings
prejudicial to the rights of the accused.

NBI MICROSOFT CORPORATION & LOTUS DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. JUDY C. HWANG,
BENITO KEH & YVONNE K. CHUA/BELTRON COMPUTER PHILIPPINES INC., et.al
G.R. No. 147043 | June 21, 2005 | CARPIO, J.

FACTS: Petitioner Microsoft Corporations, a corporation based in the United States, owns the
copyright and trademark to several software. The respondents are the officials of a domestic
corporation Beltron Computer Philippines, Inc. The two entered into a Licensing Agreement that
Beltron, for a fee, to reproduce and install no more than one copy of software on each Customer
System hard disk in object code form to end users.

However, Microsoft terminated the agreement for non-payment of royalties. Afterwards, Microsoft
learned that respondents were illegally copying and selling Microsoft software. For this reason,
Microsoft hired a private investigator with the assistance of NBI. Two persons pose as representatives
of a computer shop, bought computer hardware and software from respondents. The CPU contained
pre-installed Microsoft Windows 3.1 and MS-DOS software. Sacriz and Samiano were not given the
Microsoft end-user license agreements, users manuals, registration cards or certificates of authenticity
for the articles they purchased.

On Nov. 17 1995, Microsoft applied for search warrants against respondents. After approval, the NBI
searched the premises of Beltron and TMTC and seized several computer-related hardware, software,
accessories, and paraphernalia. Among these were 2,831 pieces of CD-ROMs containing Microsoft
software. The respondents Keh and Chua denied the charges against them. Nevertheless, DOJ State
Prosecutor Ong recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit and insufficiency of
evidence. Microsoft filed a petition for certiorari for the resolution of the Department of Justice,
dismissing the case for lack of merit against respondents for copyright infringement and unfair
competition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are liable for copyright infringement and unfair competition

RULING:
Yes, sect. 5 of PD 49 enumerates the rights vested exclusively on the copyright owner. Contrary to
the DOJ’s ruling, copyright infringement is not merely the unauthorized manufacturing of intellectual
works but rather the unauthorized performance of any of the acts covered by sect 5. Therefore, any
person who performs any of the acts under sect. 5 without obtaining the copyright owner's prior
consent renders himself civilly and criminally liable for copyright infringement. Being the copyright and
trademark owner of Microsoft software, Microsoft acted well within its rights in filing the complaint
based on the evidence obtained from respondents.

Furthermore, some of the counterfeit CD-ROMs bought from respondents were installer CD-ROMs
containing Microsoft software only or both Microsoft and non-Microsoft software. These articles are
counterfeit per se because Microsoft does not (and could not have authorized anyone to) produce
such CD-ROMs. The copying of the genuine Microsoft software to produce these fake CD-ROMs and
their distribution are illegal even if the copier or distributor is a Microsoft licensee. The Court finds that
the 12 CD-ROMs (installer and non-installer) and the CPU with pre-installed Microsoft software Sacriz
and Samiano bought from respondents and the 2,831 Microsoft CD-ROMs seized is enough to support
a finding of probable cause to indict respondents for copyright infringement. On the other hand, the
illegality of the non-installer CD-ROMs purchased from respondents and of the Microsoft software pre-
installed in the CPU is shown by the absence of the standard features accompanying authentic
Microsoft products, namely, the Microsoft end-user license agreements, users manuals, registration
cards or certificates of authenticity.

DEL MONTE CORPORATION and PHILIPPINE PACKING CORPORATION v. COURT OF

APPEALS and SUNSHINE SAUCE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
G.R. No. L-78325 I January 25, 1990 I J. CRUZ

DOCTRINE:

(1) Infringement of trademark is the unauthorized use of a trademark, whereas unfair competition is
the passing off of one's goods as those of another.

(2) In infringement of trademark fraudulent intent is unnecessary whereas in unfair competition

fraudulent intent is essential.

(3) In infringement of trademark the prior registration of the trademark is a prerequisite to the action,
whereas in unfair competition registration is not necessary

FACTS:

Petitioner Del Monte Corporation is a foreign company organized under the laws of the United States
and not engaged in business in the Philippines. On the other hand, petitioner Philippine Packing
Corporation (Philpack) is a domestic corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippines. On
April 11, 1969, Del Monte granted Philpack the right to manufacture, distribute and sell in the
Philippines various agricultural products, including catsup, under the Del Monte trademark and logo.

On October 27,1965, Del Monte authorized Philpack to register with the Philippine Patent Office the
Del Monte catsup bottle configuration, for which it was granted Certificate of Trademark
Registration ]by the Philippine Patent Office under the Supplemental Register. On November 20,
1972, Del Monte also obtained two registration certificates for its trademark "DEL MONTE" and its
logo.

On April 17, 1980, respondent Sunshine Sauce Manufacturing Industries was issued a Certificate of
Registration by the Bureau of Domestic Trade, to engage in the manufacture, packing, distribution and
sale of various kinds of sauce, identified by the logo Sunshine Fruit Catsup. This logo was later
registered in the Supplemental Register. The product itself was contained in various kinds of bottles,
including the Del Monte bottle, which the private respondent bought from the junk shops for recycling.

Having received reports that the private respondent Sunshine Sauce Manufacturing Industries
(Sunshine) was using its exclusively designed bottles and a logo confusingly similar to Del Monte's,
Philpack warned it to desist from doing so on pain of legal action. Thereafter, Philpack and Del Monte
filed a complaint against the private respondent for infringement of trademark and unfair competition,
with a prayer for damages and the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati. In its answer, Sunshine alleged that it had long ceased to use the Del Monte bottle
and that its logo was substantially different from the Del Monte logo and would not confuse the buying
public to the detriment of the petitioners.

RTC RULING:

The RTC of Makati dismissed the complaint. It held that there were substantial differences between
the logos or trademarks of the parties; that the defendant had ceased using the petitioners' bottles;
and that in any case the defendant became the owner of the said bottles upon its purchase thereof
from the junk yards. Furthermore, the complainants had failed to establish the defendant's malice or
bad faith, which was an essential element of infringement of trademark or unfair competition.

CA RULING:

The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is infringement of trademark and unfair competition committed by the private
respondent.

RULING:

Yes. The Court held that to arrive at a proper resolution, it is important to bear in mind the following
distinctions between infringement of trademark and unfair competition:

(1) Infringement of trademark is the unauthorized use of a trademark, whereas unfair competition
is the passing off of one's goods as those of another.
(2) In infringement of trademark fraudulent intent is unnecessary whereas in unfair competition
fraudulent intent is essential.
(3) In infringement of trademark the prior registration of the trademark is a prerequisite to the
action, whereas in unfair competition registration is not.

It has been correctly held that side-by-side comparison is not the final test of similarity. Such
comparison requires a careful scrutiny to determine in what points the labels of the products differ, as
was done by the trial judge. The ordinary buyer does not usually make such scrutiny nor does he
usually have the time to do so.

The question is not whether the two articles are distinguishable by their label when set side by side
but whether the general confusion made by the article upon the eye of the casual purchaser who is
unsuspicious and off his guard, is such as to likely result in his confounding it with the original. As
observed in several cases, the general impression of the ordinary purchaser, buying under the
normally prevalent conditions in trade and giving the attention such purchasers usually give in buying
that class of goods is the touchstone.
It has also held that the most successful form of copying is to employ enough points of similarity to
confuse the public with enough points of difference to confuse the courts.

Even if the labels were analyzed together it is not difficult to see that the Sunshine label is a colorable
imitation of the Del Monte trademark. The predominant colors used in the Del Monte label are green
and red-orange, the same with Sunshine. The word "catsup" in both bottles is printed in white and the
style of the print/letter is the same. Although the logo of Sunshine is not a tomato, the figure
nevertheless approximates that of a tomato.

As previously stated, the person who infringes a trade mark does not normally copy out but only makes
colorable changes, employing enough points of similarity to confuse the public with enough points of
differences to confuse the courts. When as in this case, Sunshine chose, without a reasonable
explanation, to use the same colors and letters as those used by Del Monte though the field of its
selection was so broad, the inevitable conclusion is that it was done deliberately to deceive.

Despite the many choices available to it and notwithstanding that the caution "Del Monte Corporation,
Not to be Refilled" was embossed on the bottle, Sunshine still opted to use the petitioners' bottle to
market a product which Philpack also produces. This clearly shows the private respondent's bad faith
and its intention to capitalize on the latter's reputation and goodwill and pass off its own product as
that of Del Monte.

As Sunshine's label is an infringement of the Del Monte's trademark, law and equity call for the
cancellation of the private respondent's registration and withdrawal of all its products bearing the
questioned label from the market. With regard to the use of Del Monte's bottle, the same constitutes
unfair competition.

However, the damage prayed for cannot be granted because the petitioner has not presented
evidence to prove the amount thereof. Accordingly, petitioners can only be awarded with nominal
damages in the amount of Pl,000.00.

Shang Properties Realty Corporation (formerly The Shang Grand Tower Corporation)
v. St. Francis Development Corporation
G.R. No. 190706 | July 21, 2014 | J. Perlas-Bernabe

DOCTRINE: A geographically descriptive term can indicate any geographic location on earth, such as
continents, nations, regions, states, cities, streets and addresses, areas of cities, rivers, and any other
location referred to by a recognized name. A geographical significance of a term is its primary
significance and where the geographical place is neither obscure nor remote, a public association of
the goods with the place may ordinarily be presumed from the fact that the applicant’s own goods
come from the geographical place named in the mark.

FACTS: Respondent – a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business and the developer
of the St. Francis Square Commercial Center, filed separate complaints against petitioners before the
IPO - Bureau of Legal Affairs. The following complaints were:

(a) an intellectual property violation case for unfair competition, false or fraudulent declaration,
and damages arising from petitioners’ use and filing of applications for the registration of
the marks “THE ST. FRANCIS TOWERS” and “THE ST. FRANCIS SHANGRI-LA PLACE,”
(b) an inter partes case opposing the petitioners’ application for registration of the mark “THE
ST. FRANCIS TOWERS” for use relative to the latter’s business, particularly the
construction of permanent buildings or structures for residential and office purposes
 (c) an inter partes case opposing the petitioners’ application for registration of the mark “THE
ST. FRANCIS SHANGRI-LA PLACE,”

In its complaints, respondent alleged that it has used the mark “ST. FRANCIS” to identify its numerous
property development projects located at Ortigas Center, such as the aforementioned St. Francis
Square Commercial Center, a shopping mall called the “St. Francis Square,” and a mixed-use realty
project plan that includes the St. Francis Towers. Respondent added that as a result of its continuous
use of the mark “ST. FRANCIS” in its real estate business, it has gained substantial goodwill with the
public that consumers and traders closely identify the said mark with its property development projects.
Accordingly, respondent claimed that petitioners could not have the mark “THE ST. FRANCIS
TOWERS” registered in their names, and that petitioners’ use of the marks “THE ST. FRANCIS
TOWERS” and “THE ST. FRANCIS SHANGRI-LA PLACE” in their own real estate development
projects constitutes unfair competition as well as false or fraudulent declaration.

Petitioners denied committing unfair competition and false or fraudulent declaration, maintaining that
they could register the mark “THE ST. FRANCIS TOWERS” and “THE ST. FRANCIS SHANGRI-LA
PLACE” under their names. They contended that respondent is barred from claiming ownership and
exclusive use of the mark “ST. FRANCIS” because the same is geographically descriptive of the goods
or services for which it is intended to be used.

BLA RULING: The BLA rendered a decision in the IPV Case, and found that petitioners committed
acts of unfair competition against respondent by its use of the mark “THE ST. FRANCIS TOWERS”
but not with its use of the mark “THE ST. FRANCIS SHANGRI-LA PLACE.” It, however, refused to
award damages in the latter’s favor, considering that there was no evidence presented to substantiate
the amount of damages it suffered due to the former’s acts. The BLA found that “ST. FRANCIS,” being
a name of a Catholic saint, may be considered as an arbitrary mark capable of registration when used
in real estate development projects as the name has no direct connection or significance when used
in association with real estate.

The BLA neither deemed “ST. FRANCIS” as a geographically descriptive mark, opining that there is
no specific lifestyle, aura, quality or characteristic that the real estate projects possess except for the
fact that they are located along St. Francis Avenue and St. Francis Street (now known as Bank Drive),
Ortigas Center. In this light, the BLA found that while respondent’s use of the mark “ST. FRANCIS”
has not attained exclusivity considering that there are other real estate development projects bearing
the name “St. Francis” in other areas

In the St. Francis Towers IP Case, the BLA rendered a Decision denying petitioners’ application for
registration of the mark “THE ST. FRANCIS TOWERS.” Excluding the word “TOWERS” in view of
petitioners’ disclaimer thereof, the BLA ruled that petitioners cannot register the mark “THE ST.
FRANCIS” since it is confusingly similar to respondent’s “ST. FRANCIS” marks which are registered
with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). It held that respondent had a better right over the
use of the mark “ST. FRANCIS” because of the latter’s appropriation and continuous usage thereof
for a long period of time

Lastly, the BLA held in the St. Francis Shangri-La IP Case, allowing petitioners’ application for
registration of the mark “THE ST. FRANCIS SHANGRI-LA PLACE.” It found that respondent cannot
preclude petitioners from using the mark “ST. FRANCIS” as the records show that the former’s use
thereof had not been attended with exclusivity.

IPO Director-General RULING: Then IPO Director-General Adrian S. Cristobal, Jr. affirmed the rulings
of the BLA, but reversed the BLA’s finding that petitioners committed unfair competition through their
use of the mark “THE ST. FRANCIS TOWERS,” thus dismissing such charge. He found that
respondent could not be entitled to the exclusive use of the mark “ST. FRANCIS,” even at least to the
locality where it conducts its business, because it is a geographically descriptive mark, considering
that it was petitioners’ as well as respondent’s intention to use the mark “ST. FRANCIS” in order to
identify, or at least associate, their real estate development projects/businesses with the place or
location where they are situated/conducted, particularly, St. Francis Avenue and St. Francis Street
(now known as Bank Drive), Ortigas Center.

CA RULING: The CA found petitioners guilty of unfair competition not only with respect to their use of
the mark “THE ST. FRANCIS TOWERS” but also of the mark “THE ST. FRANCIS SHANGRI-LA
PLACE.” Accordingly, it ordered petitioners to cease and desist from using “ST. FRANCIS” singly or
as part of a composite mark, as well as to jointly and severally pay respondent a fine in the amount of
P200,000.00.

The CA did not adhere to the IPO Director-General’s finding that the mark “ST. FRANCIS” is
geographically descriptive, and ruled that respondent – which has exclusively and continuously used
the mark “ST. FRANCIS” for more than a decade, and, hence, gained substantial goodwill and
reputation thereby – is very much entitled to be protected against the indiscriminate usage by other
companies of the trademark/name it has so painstakingly tried to establish and maintain. Further, the
CA stated that even on the assumption that “ST. FRANCIS” was indeed a geographically descriptive
mark, adequate protection must still be given to respondent pursuant to the Doctrine of Secondary
Meaning

ISSUE:

2. Whether or not petitioners are guilty of unfair competition in using the marks “THE ST.
FRANCIS TOWERS” and “THE ST. FRANCIS SHANGRI-LA PLACE.”

RULING:

2. The petition is meritorious.

The statutory attribution of the unfair competition concept is well-supplemented by

jurisprudential pronouncements. In the recent case of Republic Gas Corporation v. Petron
Corporation, the Court has echoed the classic definition of the term which is “‘the passing off
(or palming off) or attempting to pass off upon the public of the goods or business of one
person as the goods or business of another with the end and probable effect of deceiving the
public.’ Passing off (or palming off) takes place where the defendant, by imitative devices on
the general appearance of the goods, misleads prospective purchasers into buying his
merchandise under the impression that they are buying that of his competitors. [In other words],
the defendant gives his goods the general appearance of the goods of his competitor with the
intention of deceiving the public that the goods are those of his competitor.”

The “true test” of unfair competition has thus been “whether the acts of the defendant have the
intent of deceiving or are calculated to deceive the ordinary buyer making his purchases under
the ordinary conditions of the particular trade to which the controversy relates.” Based on the
foregoing, it is therefore essential to prove the existence of fraud, or the intent to deceive,
actual or probable, determined through a judicious scrutiny of the factual circumstances
attendant to a particular case.

Here, the Court finds the element of fraud to be wanting; hence, there can be no unfair
competition. The CA’s contrary conclusion was faultily premised on its impression that
respondent had the right to the exclusive use of the mark “ST. FRANCIS,” for which the latter
had purportedly established considerable goodwill. What the CA appears to have disregarded
or been mistaken in its disquisition, however, is the geographically-descriptive nature of the
mark “ST. FRANCIS” which thus bars its exclusive appropriability, unless a secondary
meaning is acquired.

As deftly explained in the U.S. case of Great Southern Bank v. First Southern Bank:
“descriptive geographical terms are in the ‘public domain’ in the sense that every seller
should have the right to inform customers of the geographical origin of his goods. A
‘geographically descriptive term’ is any noun or adjective that designates geographical location
and would tend to be regarded by buyers as descriptive of the geographic location of origin of
the goods or services. A geographically descriptive term can indicate any geographic
location on earth, such as continents, nations, regions, states, cities, streets and addresses,
areas of cities, rivers, and any other location referred to by a recognized name. In order to
determine whether or not the geographic term in question is descriptively used, the following
question is relevant: (1) Is the mark the name of the place or region from which the goods
actually come? If the answer is yes, then the geographic term is probably used in a
descriptive sense, and secondary meaning is required for protection.”

In other words, it is not enough that a geographically-descriptive mark partakes of the name
of a place known generally to the public to be denied registration as it is also necessary to
show that the public would make a goods/place association – that is, to believe that the
goods for which the mark is sought to be registered originate in that place.

Under Section 123.234 of the IP Code, specific requirements have to be met in order to
conclude that a geographically-descriptive mark has acquired secondary meaning, to wit:
(a) the secondary meaning must have arisen as a result of substantial commercial use
of a mark in the Philippines; (b) such use must result in the distinctiveness of the mark
insofar as the goods or the products are concerned; and (c) proof of substantially
exclusive and continuous commercial use in the Philippines for five (5) years before the
date on which the claim of distinctiveness is made.

Cognizant of the foregoing, the Court disagrees with the CA that petitioners committed unfair
competition due to the mistaken notion that petitioner had established goodwill for the mark
“ST. FRANCIS” precisely because said circumstance, by and of itself, does not equate to fraud
under the parameters of Section 168 of the IP Code as above-cited. In fact, the records are
bereft of any showing that petitioners gave their goods/services the general appearance that
it was respondent which was offering the same to the public. Neither did petitioners employ
any means to induce the public towards a false belief that it was offering respondent’s
goods/services. Nor did petitioners make any false statement or commit acts tending to
discredit the goods/services offered by respondent. Accordingly, the element of fraud which is
the core of unfair competition had not been established.

In the case at hand, the parties are business competitors engaged in real estate or property
development, providing goods and services directly connected thereto. The “goods” or
“products” or “services” are real estate and the goods and the services attached to it or directly
related to it, like sale or lease of condominium units, offices, and commercial spaces, such as
restaurants, and other businesses. For these kinds of goods or services there can be no
description of its geographical origin as precise and accurate as that of the name of the
place where they are situated. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 TIFFANY (NJ) INC. and TIFFANY and COMPANY v. eBay, Inc.
600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010) | SACK, Circuit Judge:

For contributory trademark infringement liability to lie, a service provider must have more than a
general knowledge or reason to know that its service is being used to sell counterfeit goods. Some
contemporary knowledge of which particular listings are infringing or will infringe in the future is
necessary.

"Dilution by blurring" is an "association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and
a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark." On the other hand, "dilution by
tarnishment" is an "association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous
mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark."

FACTS: eBay (Defendant) is an Internet marketplace that permits registered sellers to sell various
items to registered buyers without eBay ever taking possession of the item. eBay is a very successful
company that makes its money by charging sellers to list goods and charging a percentage of the final
sale price. eBay also makes money through its ownership of PayPal, which charges a percentage and
small flat fee for eBay users to process purchases. Tiffany (Plaintiff), a world-famous jeweler, sells its
goods exclusively through its own retail stores, catalogue, and website. It does not sell overstock,
discontinued, or discontinued merchandise. Plaintiff learned of counterfeit Tiffany sales on eBay
(Defendant) and alerted Defendant about the problem. eBay initiated a variety of anticounterfeit sales
measures, including a fraud engine, a notice-and-takedown system so rights holders could complete
a Notice of Claimed Infringement Form and request the takedown of a particular sellers allegedly
counterfeit goods, and cancellation of seller accounts of repeat offenders. Plaintiff also put a buyers’
notice on the eBay (Defendant) site informing buyers of the potential danger in purchasing Tiffany
products on the second-hand market. Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant, claiming inter alia, eBay’s
(Defendant) conduct constituted direct and contributory trademark infringement, trademark dilution,
and false advertising. The district court found for eBay (Defendant) on all counts. Plaintiff appealed.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not eBay is liable for contributory trademark infringement

2. Whether or not eBay is guilty of trademark dilution

RULING:

1. The Court ruled in the negative. Contributory trademark infringement is a judicially created doctrine
that derives from the common law of torts.

The Supreme Court most recently dealt with the subject in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives
Laboratories, Inc. There, the plaintiff, Ives, asserted that several drug manufacturers had induced
pharmacists to mislabel a drug the defendants produced to pass it off as Ives'. According to the Court,
"if a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, or if it continues
to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark
infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributorily responsible for any harm done as a result
of the deceit." Inwood's test for contributory trademark infringement applies on its face to
manufacturers and distributors of goods. Courts have, however, extended the test to providers of
services.

The Seventh Circuit applied Inwood to a lawsuit against the owner of a swap meet, or "flea market,"
whose vendors were alleged to have sold infringing Hard Rock Cafe T-shirts. The court "treated
trademark infringement as a species of tort," and analogized the swap meet owner to a landlord or
licensor, on whom the common law "imposes the same duty . . . [as Inwood] impose[s] on
manufacturers and distributors." Speaking more generally, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Inwood's
test for contributory trademark infringement applies to a service provider if he or she exercises
sufficient control over the infringing conduct.

In the case at hand, the Inwood test applies. The district court concluded that "while eBay clearly
possessed general knowledge as to counterfeiting on its website, such generalized knowledge is
insufficient under the Inwood test to impose upon eBay an affirmative duty to remedy the problem."
We agree with the district court. For contributory trademark infringement liability to lie, a service
provider must have more than a general knowledge or reason to know that its service is being used
to sell counterfeit goods. Some contemporary knowledge of which particular listings are infringing or
will infringe in the future is necessary.

2. The Court ruled in the negative. "Dilution by blurring" is an "association arising from the similarity
between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous
mark." It can occur "regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition,
or of actual economic injury." Dilution by blurring refers instead to "'the whittling away of [the]
established trademark's selling power and value through its unauthorized use by others.'"

In contrast to dilution by blurring, "dilution by tarnishment" is an "association arising from the similarity
between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark."
This "generally arises when the plaintiff's trademark is linked to products of shoddy quality, or is
portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context likely to evoke unflattering thoughts about the
owner's product." New York State law also "provide[s] for protection against both dilution by blurring
and tarnishment." The state law is not identical to the federal one, however. New York "does not[, for
example,] require a mark to be 'famous' for protection against dilution to apply." Nor are the factors
used to determine whether blurring has occurred the same. "Most important to the distinction here,
New York law does not permit a dilution claim unless the marks are 'substantially' similar."

The district court rejected Tiffany's dilution by blurring claim on the ground that "eBay never used the
TIFFANY Marks in an effort to create an association with its own product, but instead, used the marks
directly to advertise and identify the availability of authentic Tiffany merchandise on the eBay website."
The court concluded that "just as the dilution by blurring claim fails because eBay has never used the
[Tiffany] Marks to refer to eBay's own product, the dilution by tarnishment claim also fails." We agree.
There is no second mark or product at issue here to blur with or to tarnish "Tiffany."

Tiffany argues that counterfeiting dilutes the value of its product. Perhaps. But insofar as eBay did not
itself sell the goods at issue, it did not itself engage in dilution. Tiffany argued unsuccessfully to the
district court that eBay was liable for contributory dilution. Assuming without deciding that such a cause
of action exists, the court concluded that the claim would fail for the same reasons Tiffany's
contributory trademark infringement claim failed. Id. Tiffany does not contest this conclusion on appeal.
We therefore do not address it.

LA SOCIEDAD “GERMINAL” VS NUBLA

G.R. No. L-3538 | January 25, 1908 | J. Mapa

DOCTRINE: The loss which such sales, of very little importance, indeed, may have caused the
appellant can not be determined by its own account books, which were offered for the sole purpose of
showing a decrease in the sale of its own cigarettes, without previously establishing by evidence of
another sort, which has not been attempted nor even offered, that such decrease in the sale was
entirely and necessarily due to the express acts of the defendant - the only ones for which he should
be held liable under the law. Therefore, the judge committed no error by refusing to admit in evidence
the books in question.
FACTS: The judgment contains the following conclusions of facts:

1. The evidence adduced shows that the plaintiff has been using a certain trade-mark and drawing,
under which to place on the market and sell his cigarettes; that it had the exclusive right to the use of
said trade-mark and drawing; that some time before this action was commenced there appeared for
sale on the market certain cigarettes manufactured by the cigarette factory "La Intimidad," presented
in a like-form, and with a trade-mark and drawing similar to that used by the plaintiff, and that the
manner in which they were offered, the trade-mark, and drawings were so nearly like those of the
plaintiff that the public was almost deceived on buying them.

2. It is evident that the plaintiff had the exclusive right the use of the drawing and the trade-mark used
by it, and that the trade-mark in question, "La Intimidad", is a violation of the rights of the plaintiff.

3. There was also some evidence, not very satisfactory, tending to show that this defendant had sold
some cigarettes in the manner above described, but this was positively denied by the defendant, and
he was not contradicted.

4. Whatever may be the case in this respect, no loss on account of such sale has been proven, nor
have the profits thereby obtained by the defendant been shown.

ISSUE: WON the judge committed an error by refusing to admit in evidence the books in question.

RULING: No. The complaint charges that the defendant Nubla made and sold the cigarettes. In his
decision the judge held that the interest which Nubla had in the sale thereof was not proven, while
nothing was said as to their manufacture. No error has been assigned by the appellant based on such
omission; it simply limits itself to pointing out as erroneous the opinion of the court that Nubla had no
interest in the sale. As a matter of fact, it states nothing in its brief regarding the interest which Nubla
might have in the manufacture of the said cigarettes; its claim in connection with this matter must
therefore be considered as abandoned.

Under these circumstances the is no way to hold Nubla liable for the loss which, on account of the
manufacture of such cigarettes, the appellant may have suffered, but only that caused by his proven
interest in the sale thereof, and even this should be limited to such sales as he actually made as shown
by the evidence. The loss which such sales, of very little importance, indeed, may have caused the
appellant can not be determined by its own account books, which were offered for the sole purpose of
showing a decrease in the sale of its own cigarettes, without previously establishing by evidence of
another sort, which has not been attempted nor even offered, that such decrease in the sale was
entirely and necessarily due to the express acts of the defendant - the only ones for which he should
be held liable under the law. Therefore, the judge committed no error by refusing to admit in evidence
the books in question.

Inasmuch as the amount of the loss suffered by the appellant by reason of the illegal and fraudulent
acts of competition carried out by the defendant has not been proven, no amount can be awarded.

Del Rosario vs Quiogue (1910)

DIGEST FROM HIGHER YEAR

Facts: Petronillo del Rosario is the owner of La Funeraria Paz, an undertaker’s establishment. The
original establishment is located at alzada de Bilibid, now Nos. 533 and 535 Calle Paz, in the district
of Santa Cruz, for nine years previous to the entry or registration of said name.
At the present time the main establishment on the Calzada de Bilibid is located upon other premises
on the same street, now named Paz. The original premises is now occupied by Vicente Quiogue,
operating a similar undertaker’s establishment named, “La Nueva Funenaria Paz”.

These facts have actually deceived those who, intending to send their orders to "La Funeraria Paz" of
Petronilodel Rosario, inadvertently employed "La Nueva Funeraria Paz" of Vicente Quiogue, and the
said establishment thus succeeded in obtaining benefits which should have gone to the real
establishment whose services were sought. Petronilo del Rosario filed and actionfor the issuance of a
preliminary injunction and another final one, prohibiting Vicente Quiogue from using the name
"Funeraria Paz" in his above-mentioned establishment, and in addition asked that the latter be
adjudged to pay P500 as losses and damages, and the costs.

The court below granted the two injunctions with the costs against the defendant, but dismissed the
claim for an indemnity for losses and damages, for the reason that they were not proven.

Issue: Whether or not Del Rosario is entitled to damages

Ruling: In accordance with the above provision, the defendant can not be prevented from using the
word "Funeraria," a generic name of the trade. As the name "Paz," it does not appear that it is a
"geographical name of the place of production or origin of an article". “Paz" is a name which has been
used by the plaintiff to designate his establishment, not necessarily taken from the name of the street
on which it is situated at the present time

The trial court correctly concluded that the use of the words "Funeraria Paz" answered no other
purpose than that of making it easy to mistake the defendant's establishment for that of the plaintiff
formerly located in the same place. The addition of "La Nueva" was nothing more than a trick employed
by the defendant in order to covertly appropriate the trade name of the plaintiff; that the very fact of
adding "La Nueva" to the prominent words "Funeraria Paz" on the sign shows how fully convinced he
was that, without such an addition, he could not use the said sign which he now considers as a "generic
name of the place of production or origin" referred to in said Act No. 666; that the lowering of rates,
together with all the circumstances set forth, tended to establish a competition in bad faith; and that
the results are as shown by the defendant in his claim for damages by reason of the preliminary
injunction, which prevented him for obtaining such beneficial results.

Universal Rubber Products vs CA (1984)

DIGEST FROM HIGHER YEAR

Facts: Converse Rubber Corporation and Edwardson Manufacturing Corporation filed an unfair
competition case against Universal Rubber Products. In view of this, they prayed to the Judge for the
issuance of subpoena deuces tecum to compel Universal Rubber to produce to court sales invoices,
sales books and ledgers where are recorded the sales from the time the corporation started
manufacturing and selling shoes.

Universal Rubber contends that the subpoena is unreasonable and oppressive. It also shows no good
cause because the books and documents are not relevant to the case of unfair competition.

Issue: Whether or not the issuance of the "subpoena ducestecum" is proper in a suit for unfair
competition

Ruling: Yes. It is proper. As a general rule, on obtaining an injunction for infringement of a trademark,
complainant is entitled to an accounting and recovery of defendant's profits on the goods sold under
that mark, as incident to, and a part of, his property right, and this rule applies in cases of unfair
competition. In such case, the infringer or unfair trader is required in equity to account for and yield up
his gains.

In recovering the loss suffered by the aggrieved party due to unfair competition," Sec. 23 of R.A. 166
grants the complainant three options within which to ascertain the amount of damages recoverable,
either (1) the reasonable profit which the complaining party would have made, had the defendant not
infringed his said rights; or (2) the profit which the defendant actually made out of the infringement; or
(3) the court may award as damages a reasonable percentage based upon the amount of gross sales
of the defendant of the value of the services in connection with which the mark or tradename was
issued in the infringement of the rights of the complaining party. In giving life to this remedial statute,
We must uphold the order of the court a quo denying the motion. of the petitioner to quash the
"subpoena ducestecum" previously issued against the petitioner. In a suit for unfair competition, it is
only through the issuance of the questioned "subpoena ducestecum " that the complaining party is
afforded his full rights of redress.

UNITED STATES v. ROMAN VALERO

G.R. No. 5611 | March 12, 1910 | J. Moreland

DOCTRINE: A person threatened another that unless he voted for a certain man for the office of
member of the Assembly he would find himself at the point of a gun and would learn that he who
threatened was the one who governed in Jamindan, the threatener being at the time municipal
president of Jamindan, is guilty of the crime of attempting to prevent a voter "from freely and fully
exercising his right to] vote as defined in section 30 of Act No. 1582.

FACTS: In July 1907, Valero was then municipal president of Jamindan, made an inspection of the
barrio of San Juan accompanied by two policemen armed with rifles. He entered the house of Gregorio
Maximo, with whom he spoke concerning the election which was to be held during that month. He
requested Maximo to vote for Jose Altavas for member of the Assemble. Maximo answered that he
could not do so because he had already promised to vote for Hugo Vidal. Valero became furious and
sought to intimidate Maximo, threatening that if he voted for anybody but Altavas he would find himself
at the point of a gun, that he would learn that Valero was the one who governed in Jamindan. He used
other threatening language also.

Days after the election, Maximo was taken from his house by a couple of Constabulary and another
man by the name of Biloy, a cousin of Valero, at the instigation of Valero. Valero ordered the
Constabulary to punish Maximo, and, after they had bound him to a tree, they proceeded to maltreat
and beat him.

CFI RULING: Valero was convicted of a violation of section 30 of the Election Law by the CFI of the
Province of Capiz, and sentenced to pay a fine of P200, to imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs of the trial. He appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the threats proved were sufficient under the law to justify a conviction.

RULING: Yes. The Court did not deem argument necessary to demonstrate that the court was right
in his conclusions of law. The Court simply call attention to the language of section 30 of Act No. 1582,
the terms of which are too clear to require comment:
"Any person who, by any wrongful means, shall prevent or attempt to prevent any voter from freely
and fully exercising his right to vote, . . . shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than thirty
days nor more than one year, or by a fine of not less that two hundred pesos nor more than five
hundred pesos or both, in the discretion of the court."
 ROGELIO ABERCA, RODOLFO BENOSA, NESTOR BODINO, NOEL ETABAG, DANILO DE LA
FUENTE, BELEN DIAZ-FLORES, MANUEL MARIO GUZMAN, ALAN JAZMINEZ, EDWIN LOPEZ,
ALFREDO MANSOS, ALEX MARCELINO, ELIZABETH PROTACIO-MARCELINO, JOSEPH
OLAYER, CARLOS PALMA, MARCO PALO, ROLANDO SALUTIN, BENJAMIN SESGUNDO,
ARTURO TABARA, EDWIN TULALIAN and REBECCA TULALIAN v. MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER,
COL. FIDEL SINGSON, COL. ROLANDO ABADILLA, COL. GERARDO B. LANTORIA, COL.
GALILEO KINTANAR, LT. COL. PANFILO M. LACSON, MAJ. RODOLFO AGUINALDO, CAPT.
DANILO PIZARRO, 1LT. PEDRO TANGO, 1LT. ROMEO RICARDO, 1LT. RAUL BACALSO,
MSGT. BIENVENIDO BALABA, and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, National Capital Judicial
Region, Branch XCV (95), Quezon City
G.R. No. 69866 | April 15, 1988 | J. Yap

DOCTRINE: When the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-delict) arises from or
out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or authority
arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be
brought within one (1) year.

FACTS: This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights
and liberties of petitioners by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known
as Task Force Makabansa (TFM), ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes
against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT
plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila." Petitioners allege, among others, that complying with said
order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial
search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number
of purely personal items belonging to petitioners; that petitioners were arrested without proper warrants
issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and
lawyers; that petitioners were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military
men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order
to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of
petitioners’ constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract
information and incriminatory statements from petitioners and to terrorize, harass and punish them,
said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by respondents.

On January 17, 1981, the President issued Proclamation No. 2045 lifting martial law but providing for
the continued suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in view of the remaining dangers
to the security of the nation. The proclamation also provided "that the call to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion shall
continue to be in force and effect."

A motion to dismiss was filed by the respondents, through their counsel, alleging that petitioners may
not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit
because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. The respondents also
postulate the view that as public officers, they are covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit
for acts done in the performance of official duties or functions.

RTC RULING: The RTC granted the motion to dismiss.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the respondents were correct in invoking the doctrine of state immunity from
suit
2. Whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action
for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights
and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution.
 3. Whether or not a superior officer under the notion of respondeat superior can be answerable
for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person whose constitutional
rights and liberties have been violated

RULING:

1. No. The cases invoked by respondents involved acts done by officers in the performance of official
duties within the ambit of their powers. No one can be held legally responsible in damages or otherwise
for doing in a legal manner what he had authority, under the law, to do.

Their duty as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines cannot be construed as a blanket
license or a roving commission untrammeled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress
upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution.

2. No. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right
and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their
constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention.
What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ
of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for damages are explicitly
recognized in P.D. No. 1755 which amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following to
its text: "However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-delict) arises
from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or
authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same
must be brought within one (1) year."

3. No. The doctrine of respondeat superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and
agent or to master and servant (i.e., employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship exists
between superior officers of the military and their subordinates.

The decisive factor in this case is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or employee
or person "directly" or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties
of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one directly responsible) who must answer for
damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or
injury caused to the aggrieved party.

By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires added
meaning and assumes a larger dimension. Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are
directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.

MHP GARMENTS, INC. v. CA

G.R. No. 86720 | September 02, 1994 | J. Puno

The constitutional protection of our people against unreasonable search and seizure is not merely a
pleasing platitude. It vouchsafes our right to privacy and dignity against undesirable intrusions
committed by any public officer or private individual. An infringement of this right justifies an award for
damages.

FACTS: On February 22, 1983, petitioner MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of
the Philippines, the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies,
badges, and insignias. In their Memorandum Agreement, MHP was given the authority to "undertake
or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other
scouting supplies." Sometime in October 1983, MHP received information that private respondents
were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority. Larry de Guzman (“Larry”), an
employee of MHP, was then tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance and to make a report to
the Philippine Constabulary (PC).

On October 25, 1983, at about 10:30 A.M., Larry, Captain Renato M. Peñafiel, and 2 other
constabulary men of the Reaction Force Battalion went to the stores of respondents at the Marikina
Public Market. Without any warrant, they seized the boy and girl scouts’ pants, dresses, and suits on
display at respondents' stalls. The seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed private respondents.
Receipts were issued for the seized items and the items were then turned over to MHP for safekeeping.

A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed against private respondents but during its
pendency, Larry exacted from respondent Lugatiman ₱3,100.00 to be dropped from the complaint.
However, after the preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the complaint
against all the private respondents and ordered the return of the seized items. The seized items were
not immediately returned despite demands. Private respondents had to go personally to petitioners'
place of business to recover their goods, and even then, not all the seized items were returned, and
the other items returned were of inferior quality. Private respondents filed a civil case for sums of
money and damages against MHP and Larry (note: the PC officers were not sued for damages).

RTC RULING: Ruled in favor of the private respondents.

CA RULING: Affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the CA erred in imputing liability for damages to petitioners who did not effect the
seizure;
2. Whether the CA erred in finding that the seizure was done in a tortious manner but
penalized the petitioners who did not commit the act of confiscation.

RULING:

1. NO. While the members of the PC raiding team should have been included in the complaint
for violation of the private respondents' constitutional rights, still, the omission will not
exculpate petitioners. Despite the sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a warrant and
seized the goods of private respondents. They took the risk of a suit for damages in case the
seizure would be proved to violate the right of private respondents against unreasonable
search and seizure. In this case, the search and seizure were clearly illegal since there was
no probable cause for the seizure.

The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee who did not do anything
to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts’ items. By standing by and apparently assenting
thereto, he was liable to the same extent as the officers themselves. In the case of Lim v.
Ponce de Leon, the court ruled for the recovery of damages for violation of constitutional rights
and liberties from a public officer or private individual. The nature of Article 32 is that the wrong
may be civil or criminal, it is not necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith.
To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of such provision which is the
effective protection of individual rights.

As cited in the case of Aberca v. Ver, the court held that in Art. 32, the law speaks of an officer
or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional
 rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one directly responsible)
who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to
answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. It should nonetheless be
made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are
directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression of joint tortfeasors.

2. NO. The CA correctly granted damages to private respondents. Petitioners were indirectly
involved in transgressing the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and
seizure: first, they instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum
Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies;
second, under Letter of Instruction No. 1299, petitioners miserably failed to report the unlawful
peddling of scouting goods to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines for the proper application of a
warrant; and third, if petitioners did not have a hand in the raid, they should have filed a third-
party complaint against the raiding team for contribution or any other relief, in respect of
respondents' claim for Recovery of Sum of Money with Damages. Again, they did not.

156. Eli Lui and Leo Rojas v. Sps. Eulogio and Paulina Matillano
G.R. No. 141176 | May 27, 2004 | J. Callejo, Sr.

FACTS: Sometime in September 1987, then seventeen-year-old Elenito Lariosa visited his aunt,his
father’s older sister, Paulina Lariosa Matillano, at Lily Street, Poblacion Bansalan, Davao delSur.
Lariosa was employed as a laborer at the Davao United Products Enterprise store, with amonthly
salary of P800.00. The store was owned by Leong Shiu Ben and King Kiao and waslocated at the
corner of Monteverde and Gempesaw Streets, Davao City. Lariosa was tasked toclose the store during
lunchtime and after store hours in the afternoon. Ben himself opened thestore in the mornings and
after lunchtime. Adjacent to the said store was another store owned byKiao’s son, Eli Lui, who also
happened to be Ben’s nephew. Aside from Lariosa, Ben and Kiaoemployed Maximo Pagsa and Rene
Malang.

On October 17, 1988, Lariosa was taken ill and was permitted to take the day off. He went to
thehouse of his aunt, Paulina Matillano, and her husband Eulogio Matillano in Bansalan City, wherehe
rested until the next day, October 18, 1988. Lariosa reported for work the day after, or onOctober 19,
1988, but Kiao told him that his employment was terminated. Lariosa was not paidhis salary for the
month of October. Kiao warned Lariosa not to report the matter to theDepartment of Labor. Lariosa
decided to return to Bansalan without retrieving his things fromKiao’s house.

Ben informed his nephew, Eli Lui, that he had lost P45,000.00 in cash at the store. Ben
reportedthe matter to NBI Senior Agent Ruperto Galvez, and forthwith executed an affidavit wherein
healleged that after Lariosa’s employment was terminated on October 19, 1988, he discovered thathe
had lost P45,000.00 in cash. He suspected that Lariosa was the culprit because the latter, as aformer
employee, had a duplicate key to the side door of the United Products Enterprise Store.

An incident occurred wherein Lui mauled Lariosa and tried to force the latter to admit that he
hadstolen Ben’s money. Lariosa refused to do so. Lui then brought Lariosa to the comfort room of
thestore and pushed his face into the toilet bowl, in an attempt to force him into confessing to thecrime.
Lariosa still refused to admit to anything. Lui then made a telephone call to theMetrodiscom (PNP)
based in Davao City.

Sgt. Alberto Genise of the Metrodiscom (PNP) issued Mission Order No. MRF-A-004-88
datedNovember 6, 1988, directing Pat. Leo Rojas "to follow up a theft case committed in Davao
Cityfrom 12:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m." Rojas was directed to coordinate with the nearest PNPheadquarters
and/or stations. He was authorized to carry his firearm for the mission. He then left the police station
on board a police car and proceeded to the corner of Magsaysay andGempesaw Streets.

In search of the allegedly missing amount of P45,000.00 owned by the employer, the residence
of a relative of the suspect was forcibly open by the authorities by kicking the kitchen door to gain entry
into the house. Thereafter, they confiscated different personal properties therein which were allegedly
part of those stolen from the employer. They were in possession of amission order but later on claimed
that the owner of the house gave his consent to the warrantless search.

An information was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, charging Lariosa with
robbery with force upon things. The RTC in this case acquitted Lariosa of the crime charged on
reasonable doubt. The trial court held that Lui procured Lariosa’s confession through force and
intimidation,in connivance with police authorities.

Lariosa’s parents on the other hand, as well as Paulina Matillano, filed a complaint for
robbery,violation of domicile, unlawful arrest and/or arbitrary detention against Leo Rojas, Eli Lui, et
al.

RTC RULING: The RTC ordered the dismissal of the complaint for plaintiffs’ failure to prove their
claims. The trialcourt also dismissed the defendants’ counterclaims. The trial court gave credence to
thecollective testimonies of the defendants, that plaintiff Paulina Matillano voluntarily allowed themto
enter her house, and that the latter voluntarily turned over the subject items to them.

CA RULING: The CA reversed the RTC.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Paulina Matillano consented to the petitioners’ entry into her house, as well as
to the taking of the clothes, shoes and pieces of jewelry owned by her and her family - NO
2. Whether or not the petitioners are liable for damages to the respondents - YES, petitioners are
liable for moral and exemplary damages

RULING: The evidence of the respondents show that the petitioners, Tan and Mendoza, guns drawn
and with the handcuffed Lariosa in tow, kicked the kitchen door and barged into the house of the
respondents. They proceeded to the sala where respondent Paulina Matillano was. Over hervehement
protests, and because of petitioner Lui’s warning that she might be harmed,respondent Paulina
Matillano was forced to accompany the petitioner and his cohorts to the second floor of their house.

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived
expressly or impliedly. BUT A WAIVER BY IMPLICATION CANNOT BE PRESUMED. There must be
clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right. There must be proof of the
following:

1. that the right exists;

2. that the person involved had knowledge, either constructive or actual, of the existence
of said right;
3. that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

Finally, the waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently in order that the said
isto be valid.

In this case, the petitioners failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, that
respondentPaulina Matillano waived her right against unreasonable search and seizure by consent
thereto, either expressly or impliedly. Admittedly, respondent Paulina Matillano did not object to the
opening of her wooden closet and the taking of their personal properties. However, such failure to
object or resist did not amount to an implied waiver of her right against unreasonable search and
seizure. The petitioners were armed with handguns; petitioner Lui threatened and intimidated her.
Respondent Eulogio Matillano, her husband, was out of the house when the petitioner and his cohorts
conducted the search and seizure. He could, thus, not have waived his constitutional right.

The search was therefore held illegal and the members of the searching party held liable for
damages in accordance with the doctrine laid down in Lim vs. Ponce de Leon and MHP Garments vs.
CA:

“ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties
of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages.
“x x x
(9) the rights to be secure in one’s persons, house, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
xxx
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudged."

"ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
"x x x
"(6) Illegal search;
"(1) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

"Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights have been violated
orimpaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible
therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also be awarded."

***Mission Order does not authorize an illegal search.

APARICIO v. ANDAL
G.R. No. 86587-93 | July 25, 1989 | J. Sarmiento

DOCTRINE: Under Article 32 of the Civil Code, judges are excluded from liability, provided their acts
or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code and other penal statute. Here, the acts of
Judge Andal in denying the motion for inhibition and proceeding with the trial of the criminal and civil
cases pending before his court were done in a regular manner and were considered as his official acts,
thus, he is not answerable for damages.

FACTS: Atty. Lolito Aparicio filed a Motion for Inhibition requesting Judge Ermelindo Andal of RTC
Branch 27, 11th Judicial Region, with Station at Tandag, Surigao del Sur to inhibit himself from trying,
hearing, or in any manner acting in any of the cases in which Aparicio is involved.

Aparicio contended that there is an existing state of hostility between him and Judge Andal
which sparked off by the filing of him of petitions for certiorari and administrative cases against
the latter, prior to the filing of the Motion for Inhibition. He theorizes that the Judge in refusing to
inhibit himself, Judge Andal violated his constitutional rights to due process, equal protection of the
law, access to the court, and speedy disposition of cases, making the Judge civilly liable under Art. 32
of the Civil Code.
Further, Aparicio asserted that because of Judge Andal’s refusal to inhibit himself, he and his family
suffered mental anguish and incurred expenses for which they must be compensated.

On the other hand, Judge Andal contended that the motion for inhibition did not cite any valid grounds
to justify his inhibition. He said that he does not normally resent the filing of certiorari cases against
him as he has neither the reason nor the luxury of time to entertain such a feeling. Moreover, he was
so preoccupied with his case load to even think about it. He stressed that he has nothing personal
against Aparicio as he does not know the latter personally.

RTC RULING: Judge Andal denied the Motion for Inhibition.

ISSUE:

1. Whether Judge Andal can be held civilly liable for damages under Art. 32 of the Civil Code in
relation to the constitutional provision that all public officers must at all times be accountable
to the people
2. Whether Judge Andal acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when he denied Aparicio’s Motion for Inhibition

RULING:

1. NO.

Under Article 32 of the Civil Code, judges are excluded from liability, provided their acts or omissions
do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code and other penal statute. Here, the acts of Judge Andal
in denying the motion for inhibition and proceeding with the trial of the criminal and civil cases pending
before his court were done in a regular manner and were considered as his official acts, thus, he is
not answerable for damages.

Moreover, whenever and wherever a judge of a court of superior jurisdiction exercises judicial
functions, he will not be personally liable in civil damages for the result of his actions. The test of
judicial liability is not jurisdiction, but such liability depends wholly upon the nature of the question
which is being determined when the error complained of is committed by the court. If such question is
one the determination of which requires the exercise of judicial functions, the judge is not liable.

2. NO.

The Motion for Inhibition cited no valid ground. Therefore, there is no doubt that the denial of the said
motion was not whimsical or capricious nor was the said denial intended to spite Aparicio, but was
done in the valid and judicious exercise of the function and duty as judge. Moreover, all of the orders
issued by Judge Andal appeared to have been issued in accordance with law and nowhere was there
a showing of any outward manifestation of the supposed state of hostility between Judge Andal and
Aparicio as to warrant the inhibition of the former.

Furthermore, the mere filing of an administrative case against Judge Andal is not a ground for
disqualifying him from hearing the case, for if on every occasion the party apparently aggrieved would
be allowed to either stop the proceedings in order to await the final decision on the desired
disqualification, or demand the immediate inhibition of the judge on the basis alone of his being so
charged, many cases would have to be kept pending or perhaps there would not be enough judges to
handle all the cases pending in all the courts.
 U.S. v. Anaban, 13 Phil. 398
13 Phil. 398| March 31, 1909| J. ARELLANO

The peaceful recovery of property by the owners, from one not entitled to continue in possession
thereof, and with the consent of the possessor, does not constitute a criminal offense.

If the defendants are really guilty, if they have committed the crime of robbery encuadrilla, with the
aggravating circumstance of nocturnity being present. The letter shows that the defendants went to
Selpang for the purpose of looking for something, not to steal, and this is what was communicated to
the secretary

FACTS: That on the night of Thursday October 4, 1906, the six defendants, accompanied by other
persons, invaded the dwelling house of one Guiled, located in the sitio of Selpang, Baguio, said Guiled
being a councilor for the barrio of Taloy of the municipality of Baguio; that the defendants demanded
from Guiled the payment of a fine of P20 because they found a horse in the vicinity of his house, and
the payment of said fine being refused, Maniguay and Bombon, two of the defendants, bound him,
while the other defendants, who had remained on the ground floor of the house, in obedience to the
orders give by the former, seized and carried away three pigs. Cimbay, the wife of Guiled, on seeing
her husband bound and fearing that they would all be killed, jumped out of the window and proceeded
to the house of Lateng, ex-councilor of the same barrio. Ogues, who lived nearest to the house of
Guiled, having heard the squealing of the pigs, had left his own house, and had seen the events as
they occurred at Guiled’s house, also went to the house of ex-councilor Lateng and confirmed the
statement of Cimbay. These three, Lateng, Cimbay and Ogues, the same night or at daybreak of the
following morning, proceeded to the house of Guiled.

This defendant says that, from the month of January of that year, he was the president of the
settlement (rancheria) of Pugo. "We went there in search of a horse that was lost. At noon we arrived
at the house of Guiled and thought it better that we first see the councilor of the barrio. This we did;
we went to see Guiled and I asked him to help us in the search. In the company of Palos, we
endeavored to find the horse and followed its tracks, and, after a while, we found the animal tied near
the house of Guiled; we then untied ist; from there we led the horse to the house of Guiled and
requested him to furnish us with a certificate showing that the animal was found at his place. He
replied: ’How can I furnish you with the certificate? No one here knows how to write. After a while our
said companion returned and told us that there were three pigs in a pen. We went to the place where
the pigs were and I recognized one of them as being my own and the other two as the property of
Capitan Bayasang and Sabong, respectively. Having made this discovery I went to Guiled and asked
him from whom he obtained the animals and he replied that he had acquired them from one Martin,
and asked him to allow me to take the animals to my house, he assented. And said, moreover, that
he would come along with us to the town in order to see Martin and recover from him the money he
had paid for the pigs, and besides that he had also to collect P9 that Martin owed him

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant’s recovery of the property constitutes an offense.

RULING: Peaceful Recovery of Property Not an Offense. — The peaceful recovery of property by the
owners, from one not entitled to continue in possession thereof, and with the consent of the possessor,
does not constitute a criminal offense.

There is one very important point in the case. Lateng sent Licao, an Igorot, to Baguio to give
information as to what had happened in the house of Guiled. Licao testified that he was sent by Lateng,
Cimbay, and Ogues. Licao left Taloy on Friday morning and reached Baguio in the afternoon. Licao
testified that he left Baguio on Friday night, spent the night at Atab, and then proceeded to Pugo, in
compliance with the instructions he received from Sales. To judge by the inconsistencies found in his
answers, while testifying during the taking of the evidence in rebuttal, this witness must have been
greatly harassed. It appears that his testimony was controlled by the dominant idea that he did not go
farther than Atab, in which place, it first appears he slept twice, but later he says he remained there
only once, on Friday night; it must have been another controlling idea in his testimony that he did not
reach Pugo until Sunday, and that he slept in his house on Saturday night, not taking into account the
serious happening at the house of his councilor and not taking any pains in delivering at once the letter
to Guiled. The letter and the testimony of the witness throw much light on the two versions which
appear from the records in regard to the facts which really happened, on Thursday and Friday, the 4th
and the 5th of October, 1906. If the defendants are really guilty, if they have committed the crime of
robbery encuadrilla, with the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity being present.

The letter shows that the defendants went to Selpang for the purpose of looking for something, not to
steal, and this is what was communicated to the secretary. It is unnatural and improbable that Guiled,
after having been abused by the people from Pugo, should have sent to them the very letter which is
the reply to the complaint he made against them. Guiled must have been really present at Pugo on
Saturday; he must have received Sales’ letter there, and from thence he must have left for Baguio,
perhaps for fear of being complained of. On arrival at Baguio, and if he had made any complaint of
that abuse and robbery encuadrilla with arms, the municipal would have necessarily referred him to
the court of the justice of the peace for the preliminary investigation. Said proceeding could not have
lasted until 18th day of October. The justice of the peace stated that he remembered that the
defendants testified that they had gone to Selpang to look for some horses, and the testimony of
Anaban during the preliminary investigation having been produced by the defense, it appears in every
way consistent with the testimony which, in regard to their trip to Selpang, he and his companions
have so uniformly given. The innocence of the defendants is evident.

United States vs Brobst (1909)

DIGEST FROM HIGHER YEAR

Facts: James L. Brobst and another American named Mann were engaged in work on a mine located
in the municipality of Masbate, where they gave employment to a number of native laborers. Mann
discharged one of the laborers, named Simeon Saldivar, warned him not to come back on the
premises and told Brobst not to employ Salidvar again as he was a thief. A few days afterwards,
Saldivar went to the mine to look for work. Brobst, when he caught sight of Salidvar, ordered him off
the place. As Saldivar made no move to leave, Brobst became enraged and struck Salidvar with a
powerful blow with his closed fist on the left side, just over the lower ribs. On being struck, Salidvar
threw up his hands, staggered, and without saying a word, went away in the direction of his sister’s
house, which stood about 200 yards away. Saldivar died as he reached the door of the house. A
criminal complaint for homicide was filed against Brobst. Brobst argues that since he had a perfect
right to eject the deceased from the mining property, he cannot be held criminally liable for
unintentional injuries inflicted in the lawful exercise of his right.

Issue: Whether Brobst is criminally liable

Decision: Yes. We are satisfied that the evidence of record leaves no room for reasonable doubt that
the defendant struck Saldivar a powerful body blow with his closed fist; and that whatever authority
the defendant may have had to eject the deceased from the mining property and to use physical force
to that end in case of need, the blow thus struck was far in excess of such authority, and was, therefore,
unlawful, and can not be excused or justified as an exercise of necessary force in the exercise of a
right. The defendant's own testimony does not indicate that there was any danger to be apprehended
from Saldivar, and there is nothing in the record which would indicate that the defendant had
reasonable ground to believe that he would offer a violent or even a substantial resistance to an
attempt to expel him from the mining property. We are satisfied also that the deceased came to his
death as a result of the blow inflicted by the defendant. Two or three days prior to his death he was
employed as a laborer in defendant's mine; his sister testified that on the morning of the day he died,
he left her house in apparent good health and went to the mines to look for work; a short time
afterwards he received a violent blow on his lower left side, a region of the body where many of the
vital organs are located; and immediately thereafter, he stared up the short trail leading to his sister's
house, and died as he reached the door. In the absence of evidence of any intervening cause, we
think there can be no reasonable doubt that his death resulted from the blow. (Syllabus: The right to
use force or violence in the expulsion of an intruder upon one’s premises, when it exists, is strictly
limited to the use of such a degree of force as may be necessary under all the circumstances, to obtain
the end in view; and the use of excessive force is unlawful.)

Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. v. Espino, Jr.

G.R. No. L-48250 | December 18, 1979 | J. Guerrero

DOCTRINE: The purpose of moral damages is essentially indemnity or reparation, both punishment
or correction. Moral damages are not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant.

FACTS: In 1970, Jose J. Espino, Jr., an executive of Procter and Gamble and his wife and their two
daughters went to shop at Grand Union’s South Supermarket in Makati. While his wife was at the
groceries, Jose browsed other parts of the market, where he picked up a “rat tail file”. Jose and his
wife saw the maid of his aunt. While talking to the maid, Jose stuck the file into the front breast pocket
of his shirt.

At the check-out counter, Jose paid for his wife's purchases, but he forgot to pay for the file. As he
was leaving, he was approached by a guard of the market who said that he had something in his
pocket that he hadn't paid for. Jose apologized and went back to the cashier to pay for the file, but the
guard stopped him and led him to the rear of the market, saying that it was procedure to do so. Jose
protested, and customers saw the commotion.

Inside a cubicle, Jose was directed to a table, where he explained what had happened to a man in
front of the desk, who asked Jose to make a brief statement, along with his personal data. Upon
bringing Jose back inside the market, the guard directed Jose and his wife to the office of Nelia Santos-
Fandino, who accused Jose of stealing the file. Jose explained the incident stating that they were
regular customers of the market, to no avail.

Jose fished out a P5 bill to pay for the P3.85 file, but Fandino took the entire amount and said they
were fining Jose for P5 for stealing the file. Jose and his wife objected that he was not a criminal,
asking for the P5 bill back. People were staring at Jose the entire time.

Thus, Jose filed a complaint in the CFI of Pasig, praying for moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, costs of the suit and the return of the P5.00 fine.

CFI RULING: At the trial, Jose expressed his embarrassment and humiliation. However, the CFI
dismissed his complaint. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the CFI’s judgment, granting
damages prayed for, in the amount of P75k moral damages, and P25k for exemplary damages.

Thus, the present petition for certiorari before the SC.

ISSUE: WON Jose Espino is entitled to moral and exemplary damages.

RULING: YES. The totality of the facts and circumstances show that Jose did not intend to steal the
file, and him picking up the file from the open shelf was not criminal, nor done with malice, for he took
the item with the intention of buying and paying for it.
The false accusation charged against Jose after detaining and interrogating him by the guards, and
the manner in which he was subjected, shouting at him, imposing upon him a fine, threatening to call
the police and in the presence of many people which caused him humiliation, sufficiently rendered
Grand Union liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

It is against morals, good customs and public policy to humiliate, embarrass and degrade the dignity
of a person. Everyone must respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons (Article 26, Civil Code). And one must act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith (Article 19, Civil Code).

Therefore, Jose Espino is entitled to damages. However, the award of P75k for moral damages and
P25k for exemplary damages is unconscionable and excessive.

While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary to adjudicate moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or
exemplary damages, the assessment of such damages, except liquidated ones, is left to the discretion
of the court, according to the circumstances of each case (Art. 2216, New Civil Code).

In the case at bar, Jose’s act of omission contributed to the occurrence of his injury, and such
contributory negligence is a factor that can reduce the damages that he may recover (Art. 2214, New
Civil Code). Moreover, that many people were present is a coincidence in a supermarket, which is a
public place. It is therefore not intentional to humiliate or embarrass him.

The purpose of moral damages is essentially indemnity or reparation, both punishment or correction.
Moral damages are not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant. The award
of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo
ante and, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted (Justice JBL Reyes, on Pangasinan
Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Legaspi).

Exemplary or corrective damages are penal in nature, imposed by way of correction for the public
good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages (Art. 2229, New Civil
Code). Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide whether or
not they could be adjudicated (Art. 2223, New Civil Code).

Thus, the SC awarded moral damages in the amount of P5k. However, the SC did not grant the award
of exemplary damages.

Grand Union acted in good faith in trying to protect and recover their property, a right which the law
accords to them. And since a person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right or office exempts him from civil or criminal liability, Grand Union may not be punished by imposing
exemplary damages against it.

PEOPLE v. IGNACIO
G.R. No. 134568 | February 10, 2000 | J. Panganiban

DOCTRINE: Voluntary surrender is not appreciated even if the accused submits himself to the
members of the barangay tanod who, by their presence in his house, precluded his escape.

FACTS:

Version of the Prosecution

On January 11, 1997 at Divisoria, Dimasalang, Masbate, at 9:00 a.m., Jessie Lacson (Jessie) and
Edwin Lacson (Edwin) were gathering shells by the seashore. The work made them thirsty so they
went to a fishpond to get young coconuts. The said fishpond was owned by Cleto “Milagring” Cortes
while Eugelio “Loloy” Ignacio (Eugelio) was the caretaker.

When the two went to the fishpond, Jessie got one young coconut and went ahead to the dike in order
to open the coconut. However, Eugelio, coming out of his house, saw Jessie as he reached the dike.
He did not see Edwin because he was behind some coconut trees.

Edwin heard Eugelio shouted at Jessie to put the young coconut which Jessie did but then Eugelio
fired his homemade shotgun at Jessie hitting him on the left portion of his breast. According to Edwin,
Eugelio was standing 40 meters away from Jessie while Edwin was standing 6 meters away from his
friend. Fortunately, when Eugelio cranked his homemade shotgun and aimed it at Edwin, it did not fire.
This prompted Edwin to immediately leave the place and report the incident to Jessie’s parents.

Edwin went to the house of Carlito Alcover, their Barangay Tanod and reported the shooting. Carlito
went to Eulogio's house, failed to find him there, but waited. After three (3) minutes, Eulogio arrived,
carrying his homemade shotgun. Then, Barangay Tanods Atel Lachica and Rodolfo Gulpan came by.
Carlito asked Eulogio to surrender, which he heeded. Carlito asked Eulogio why he fired his long gun
at Jessie. Eulogio answered that Jessie stole some young coconuts. Thereafter, they brought Eulogio
to the police precinct. The homemade shotgun was surrendered to SPO3 Arturo Hernando.

Meanwhile, Helen Alcovindas went to Dominador Lacson, Jessie's father, who was gathering coconut
fruits in another plantation. She told Dominador that Eulogio shot Jessie. Dominador ran towards the
fishpond, saw Jessie's dead body, and brought it to the clinic of Dr. Alino. Per examination by Dr.
Ernesto Tamayo, Municipal Health Officer of Dimasalang, Masbate, the victim suffered from a single
gunshot wound fatally injuring the heart.

Version of the defense

On January 9, 1997, Eugelio was informed by his neighbor, Gil Aristotles that there was a theft incident
in the fishpond that he administered. At the date of the incident, he saw Jessie and Edwin coming out
of his house with a basket. According to him, there were 28 pieces of crabs stocked in his house. Upon
seeing the two, they immediately fled. Eugelio ordered them to stop but they did not heed to the said
order. This prompted Eugelio to fire his gun, without intent to kill, towards the two who were 50 meters
away from him.

He informed Kagawad Gil Aristotles about the said incident. He also reported to Barangay Tanod
Saratiel Lachica.

RTC RULING: The Court qualified the crime to treachery. Eugelio failed to prove by credible, clear
and convincing evidence that he acted in lawful defense of his property. Thus, there is no legal reason
for him to shoot the victim.

ISSUE:

I. The lower court gravely erred in convicting accused-appellant of murder.

II. The lower court gravely erred in finding that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was
attendant in the case at bar.

III. The lower court gravely erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.
RULING:

The appeal has no merit.

I. In order to prove that his act should be justified as a lawful defense to property rights, the
accused has the burden of proving the unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and
the reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it. It can be deduced
from the facts that the first requisite was not proven because the victim did not attack
Eugelio. He did not see Jessie steal the crabs. He merely suspected him of stealing.
Moreover, even assuming unlawful aggression was present. In the case, there is still no
necessity to shoot the victim because Jessie was already running away when hit.

II. The trial court is correct. The element of “deliberately and consciously adopted any means
to kill” was present and it can be deduced from Edwin’s testimony. Accordingly, upon
shouting at Jessie and Edwin, the two already stopped and faced Eugelio. Jessie, an
unarmed minor was facing Eugelio at that time he was shot. This was affirmed by Dr.
Ernesto Tamayo when he testified that the entry point of the gunshot wound was at the
chest. Moreover, A killing is qualified by treachery when the accused employs means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. There was no more reason for him to shoot the
victim and that his act of killing the minor was so unexpected and surprising.

III. The trial court is correct. There was no voluntary surrender. In order that the mitigating
circumstance may be appreciated, the defense must clearly satisfy three requisites:
a. the offender has not been actually arrested;
b. the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and
c. the surrender is voluntary.
There must be intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities because of an
acknowledgment of guilt or because of a wish to spare them the trouble and the expense
concomitant to the search and the capture of the accused. In application to the case at
hand, Eugelio was forced to give himself up to the authorities because the barangay tanod
were already inside his house. He cannot anymore escape.
 PICART v. SMITH
G.R. No. L-12219 | March 15, 1918 | J. Street

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence.

FACTS: The occurrence which gave rise to the institution of this action took place on December 12,
1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union. It appears that upon the occasion in
question the plaintiff was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across,
the defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten
or twelve miles per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his
horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he
gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was
not observing the rule of the road.

The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being
perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely
up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason
he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. As the
automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road
for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side.
The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop.
When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other
side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside
of the railing where it was then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity
to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the
railing. In so doing, it was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb
was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. As a result of its injuries
the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and
required medical attention for several days.

RTC RULING: Absolved the defendant from liability.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner above described was
guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done;

RULING: The Court ruled in the affirmative. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence
in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use
that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed
to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence
of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in
the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the
man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.

Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence is clearly
established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would, in our opinion, have
recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have
foreseen harm to the horse and rider as a reasonable consequence of that course. Under these
circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent
negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the
defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is
immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not
contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by
an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair
chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GLENN DE LOS SANTOS, accused-

appellant.
G.R. No. 131588 | March 27, 2001 | Davide, JR., C.J.

The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage
results to the person or property of another is this: Could a prudent man, in the position of the person
to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of
the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or
to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes
negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this
prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.

Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but rather the result of a single
act of reckless driving, GLENN should be held guilty of the complex crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries.

FACTS: In the early morning of October 05, at Maitum Highway, the accused De Los Santos drove
an Isuzu Elf and killed and inflicted mortal wounds to the members of the PNP, undergoing a Special
Training Course, wearing black T-shirts and black short pants, performing an "Endurance Run" of 35
kilometers coming from their camp in Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, heading to Regional Training
Headquarters in Camp Alagar, running in a column of 3, with a distance of two feet, more or less, from
one trainee to another, thus forming three lines, with a length of 50 meters from the 1st man to the last
man.

They were unable to defend themselves, because the accused ran or moved his driven vehicle on the
direction of the backs of the PNP joggers in spite of the continuous warning signals made by six of the
joggers, who were at the rear echelon of said run, acting as guards, by continuously waving their
hands at the accused for him to take the left lane of the highway, going to the City proper, but which
accused failed and refused to heed.

Instead, he proceeded to operate his driven vehicle on high speed directly towards the joggers, thus
forcing the rear guards to throw themselves to a nearby canal, to avoid injuries, then hitting, bumping,
or ramming the first 4 victims, causing the bodies to be thrown towards the windshields of said Isuzu
Elf, breaking said windshield, and upon being aware that bodies of the victims flew on the windshield
of his driven vehicle, instead of applying his brake, continued to travel on a high speed, this time putting
off its headlights, thus hitting the succeeding joggers on said 1st line, as a result thereof the following
were killed.

RTC RULING: The RTC convicted De Los Santos of the complex crime of multiple murder, multiple
frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder, with the use of motor vehicle as the qualifying
circumstance. Hence, this automatic review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the complex crime of multiple murder, multiple
frustrated murder, and multiple attempted murder.

RULING: No, the accused is not guilty of the complex crime of multiple murder, multiple frustrated
murder and multiple attempted murder.

From the convergence of circumstances, we are inclined to believe that the tragic event was more a
product of reckless imprudence than of a malicious intent on GLENN's part.

First, as testified to by prosecution rebuttal witness Olarita, the place of the incident
was "very dark," as there was no moon. And according to PAG-ASA's observed weather report
within the vicinity at the time the event took place, the sky was overcast, i.e., there was
absolutely no break in the thick clouds covering the celestial dome globe; hence, there was no
way for the moon and stars to be seen. Neither were there lampposts that illuminated the
highway.

Second, the jogging trainees and the rear guards were all wearing black T-shirts, black
short pants, and black and green combat shoes, which made them hard to make out on that
dark and cloudy night. The rear guards had neither reflectorized vests or gloves nor flashlights
in giving hand signals.

Third, GLENN was driving on the proper side of the road, the right lane. On the other
hand, the jogging trainees were occupying the wrong lane, the same lane as GLENN's vehicle
was traversing. Worse, they were facing the same direction as GLENN's truck such that their
backs were turned towards the oncoming vehicles from behind.

Fourth, no convincing evidence was presented to rebut GLENN's testimony that he

had been momentarily blinded by the very bright and glaring lights of the oncoming vehicle at
the opposite direction as his truck rounded the curve. He must have been still reeling from the
blinding effect of the lights coming from the other vehicle when he plowed into the group of
police trainees.

Indeed, as pointed out by appellant, instinct tells one 'to stop or swerve to a safe place the moment he
sees a cow, dog, or cat on the road, in order to avoid bumping or killing the same"; and more so if the
one on the road is a person. It would therefore be inconceivable for GLENN, then a young college
graduate with a pregnant wife and three very young children who were dependent on him for support,
to have deliberately hit the group with his truck.

We are convinced that the incident, tragic though it was in light of the number of persons killed and
seriously injured, was an accident and not an intentional felony. It is significant to note that there is no
shred of evidence that GLENN had an axe to grind against the police trainees that would drive him
into deliberately hitting them with intent to kill. GLENN's offense is in failing to apply the brakes, or to
swerve his vehicle to the left or to a safe place the moment he heard and felt the first bumping thuds.
Had he done so, many trainees would have been spared.

A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious,
careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible
for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except
through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and property, and those of his fellow
beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury.

The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage
results to the person or property of another is this: Could a prudent man, in the position of the person
to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of
the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or
to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes
negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this
prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.

GLENN showed an inexcusable lack of precaution. Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that
reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which
material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration (1) his employment or occupation;
(2) his degree of intelligence; (4) his physical condition; and (3) other circumstances regarding persons,
time and place.

GLENN, being then a young college graduate and an experienced driver, should have known to apply
the brakes or swerve to a safe place immediately upon hearing the first bumping thuds to avoid further
hitting the other trainees.

By his own testimony, it was established that the road was slippery and slightly going downward; and,
worse, the place of the incident was foggy and dark. He should have observed due care in accordance
with the conduct of a reasonably prudent man, such as by slackening his speed, applying his brakes,
or turning to the left side even if it would mean entering the opposite lane (there being no evidence
that a vehicle was coming from the opposite direction). It is highly probable that he was driving at high
speed at the time. And even if he was driving within the speed limits, this did not mean that he was
exercising due care under the existing circumstances and conditions at the time.

Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but rather the result of a single
act of reckless driving, GLENN should be held guilty of the complex crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF

APPEALS, RODRIGO ARNAIZ, REGINA LATAGAN, RICARDO GENERALAO AND PAMPANGA
SUGAR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC., CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. 159270, August 22, 2005, SECOND DIVISION , CALLEJO, SR., J.

The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage
results to the person or property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the position of the person
to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of
the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or
to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes
negligence.

FACTS: In 1991, the Mount Pinatubo eruption heavily damaged the national bridges along Abacan-
Angeles and Sapang Maragul via Magalang, Pampanga. Pampanga Sugar Development Company,
Inc. (PASUDECO) and the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA), where the latter was allowed to enter and pass through the NLEX going to its milling factory.
PASUDECO furnished the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), the franchisee that
operates and maintains the toll facilities in the North and South Luzon Toll Expressways, with a copy
of the MOA. In a Letter, the PNCC informed PASUDECO that it interposed no objection to the MOA.
At about 6:30 a.m., Rodrigo S. Arnaiz was driving his Toyota Corolla along the NLEX at about 65
kilometers per hour. He was with his sister Regina Latagan, and his friend Ricardo Generalao. As the
vehicle ran over the scattered sugarcane, it flew out of control and turned turtle several times. Arnaiz,
Latagan and Generalao filed a complaint for damages against PASUDECO and PNCC in the RTC.
They alleged, inter alia, that through its negligence, PNCC failed to keep and maintain the NLEX safe
for motorists when it allowed PASUDECO trucks with uncovered and unsecured sugarcane to pass
through it; that PASUDECO negligently spilled sugarcanes on the NLEX, and PNCC failed to put up
emergency devices to sufficiently warn approaching motorists of the existence of such spillage; and
that the combined gross negligence of PASUDECO and PNCC was the direct and proximate cause
of the injuries sustained by Latagan and the damage to Arnaiz's car.

RTC RULING: rendered a decision in favor only of Latagan; held PASUDECO solely liable for
damages

CA RULING: affirmed the RTC decision with a modification that PASUDECO and PNCC be solidarily
liable to Latagan In its Petition for Review on Certiorari, the petitioner insists that the respondents
failed to prove that it was negligent in the operation and maintenance of the NLEX. It maintains that it
had done its part in clearing the expressway of sugarcane piles, and that there were no more piles of
sugarcane along the road when its men left Km. 72; only a few scattered sugarcanes flattened by the
passing motorists were left.

ISSUE: Whether or not PNCC was negligent

RULING: Yes. There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b)
fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c)
the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages
incurred by the plaintiff. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided
by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing
of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do. It also refers to the failure to observe
that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstance justly demand, whereby another
person suffers injury. The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby
injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the
position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a
reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to
refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failure
to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the
admonition born of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.

In the case at bar, it is clear that the petitioner failed to exercise the requisite diligence in maintaining
the NLEX safe for motorists. The lighted cans and lane dividers as warnings on the highway were
removed even as flattened sugarcanes lay scattered on the ground. The highway was still wet from
the juice and sap of the flattened sugarcanes. The petitioner should have foreseen that the wet
condition of the highway would endanger motorists passing by at night or in the wee hours of the
morning.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47699, dated April 29, 2003, is AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.

Agusan del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Balen,

605 SCRA 469 | DIGEST NOT MADE – FROM GOOGLE

Facts of the Case: ANECO installed an electric post in Ata-atahon, Nasipit, agusan del Norte, with
its main distribution line of 13, 000 kilovolts traversing Angelita Balen’s residence. Balen’s father even
protested the installation with the District Engineer’s Office and with ANECO, but his protest was not
heeded. On July 25, 1992, Balen, Hercules Lariosa and Celestino Exclamado were electrocuted while
removing the TV antenna from Balen’s residence. The antenna pole touched ANECO’s main
distribution line which resulted in their electrocution. Exclamado died instantly, while Balen and
Lariosa suffered extensive third degree burns. Balen and Lariosan then lodged a complaint for
damages against ANECO. The RTC decided in favor of respondents and against ANECO. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the RTC ruling.

Issue: Whether or not ANECO was negligent, and thus, must be held liable for damages for injuries
suffered by the respondents.

Ruling of the Court: The Supreme Court ruled that ANECO’s negligence was the proximate cause
of the injuries sustained by respondent. ANECO should have reasonably foreseen that, even if it
complied with the clearance requirements under the Philippine Electrical Code in installing the subject
high tension wires above MIGUEL BALEN’s house, still a potential risk existed that people would get
electrocuted, considering that the wires were not insulated. Moreover, it was found that ANECO failed
to heed the complaint of Balen’s father about the installation of the line. The proximate cause of the
electrocution of respondents was ANECO’s installation of its main distribution line of high voltage over
the house of Balen, without which the accident would not have occurred.

CAGAYAN ELECTRIC COOP v RAPANAN and TANGONAN

G.R. No. 199886 | December 3, 2014 | J. Villarama

The proximate cause of the mishap was the negligence of Camilo. Had Camilo driven the motorcycle
at an average speed, the three passengers would not have been thrown off from the vehicle towards
the shoulder and eventually strangulated by the electric wires sitting thereon. Moreover, it was also
negligent of Camilo to have allowed two persons to ride with him and for Rapanan to ride with them
when the maximum number of passengers of a motorcycle is two including the driver.

When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages.

FACTS: On October 31, 1998 at around 9PM, the motorcycle which was driven Camilo Tangonan and
with his companions Rapanan and Coloma figure in a mishap along the national highway of
Maddalero, Buguey, Cagayan, where they suffered injuries.

In 2000, Rapanan and Mary Gine Tangonan filed a complaint for damages against CAGELCO alleging
that while the victims were traversing the national highway, they were struck and electrocuted by a live
tension wire from one of the electric posts owned by CAGELCO, and that the mishap was due to
CAGELCO’s negligence when it failed to fix and change said live tension wire despite being
immediately informed by residents in the area that it might pose an immediate danger to persons,
animals and vehicles passing along the national highway.
Mary Gine prayed for:

a. P 50, 000 civil indemnity

b. P 25, 000 burial expenses
c. P 1,584,000 indemnity for loss of earning capacity
d. P 100,000 moral and exemplary damages.
e. 30 % of the attorney’s fees.

Rapanan, on the other hand, prayed for ₱10,000 for his medical treatment, ₱50,000 moral and
exemplary damages, and 30% of the attorney’s fees.
MARY GINE: testified that she is not married to Camilo but were merely live-ins, and it was her who
paid for the funeral expenses of Camilo.

RAPANAN: that when they were riding the motorcycle, they saw a dangling wire from an electric post
and because of a strong wind that blew, they got wounded by said dangling wire; that he suffered
physical injuries and was hospitalized for seven days, in which he have spent around P10,000 for the
medicines.

CAGELCO: the typhoons that struck its areas of responsibility caused some of its electric poles to fall
and high-tension wires to cut-off which caused the brownouts. That it cannot be faulted for negligence
if there were electric wires dangling along the national road since they were caused by typhoons.

RTC: dismissed the complaint for damages on the ground that the proximate cause of the incident is
the negligence and imprudence of Camilo in driving the motorcycle. It further held that Mary Gine has
no legal personality to institute the action since she is merely the common law wife of Camilo.

CA: reversed RTC decision and held CAGELCO liable for quasi-delict.

To the plaintiff-appellant Allan Rapanan:

1. temperate damages in the amount of ₱10,000.00; and
2. moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00;

To the legal heirs of the deceased Camilo Tangonan:

1. indemnity for death in the amount of ₱50,000.00;
2. indemnity for loss of earning capacity in the amount of ₱1,062,000.00;
3. temperate damages in the amount of ₱20,000.00; and
[4.] moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00.

To both the plaintiff-appellant Allan Rapanan and the legal heirs of the deceased Camilo Tangonan:
1. exemplary damages in the amount [of] ₱50,000.00; and
2. attorney’s fees amounting to 20% of the total amount adjudged.

ISSUE: Whether CAGELCO’s negligence in the maintenance of its facilities the proximate cause of
Camilo’s death and Rapanan’s injury.

RULING: NO. Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of
another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that "whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is a quasi-delict."

Under this provision, the elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are: (1) damages to the
plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose acts the
defendant must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such
negligence and the damages.

The presence of the first element is undisputed because the unfortunate incident brought about the
death of Camilo and physical injuries to Rapanan. As to the second and third elements, they are
lacking, thus, precluding the award of damages in favor of respondents.
CAGELCO’s employee testified that their electric poles along the highways, including the one where
the mishap took place, were erected about four to five meters from the shoulder of the road. Also,
another employee that after the typhoons hit Cagayan, he together with his co-employees, after
checking the damage to the electric lines, rolled the fallen electric wires and placed them at the foot
of the electric poles so as to prevent mishaps to pedestrians and vehicles passing by. Their testimonies
were corroborated by what was recorded in the Police Blotter of the Buguey Police Station, Buguey,
Cagayan after it was investigated.

Thus, there is no negligence on the part of CAGELCO that was allegedly the proximate cause
of Camilo’s death and Rapanan’s injuries. At the time of the mishap, said wires were quietly sitting
on the shoulder of the road, far enough from the concrete portion so as not to pose any threat to
passing motor vehicles and even pedestrians. Hence, if the victims of the mishap were strangled by
said wires, it can only mean that either the motorcycle careened towards the shoulder or even more
likely, since the police found the motorcycle not on the shoulder but still on the road, that the three
passengers were thrown off from the motorcycle to the shoulder of the road and caught up with the
wires. As to how that happened cannot be blamed on CAGELCO but should be attributed to
Camilo’s over speeding as concluded by the police after it investigated the mishap.

The foregoing shows that the motorcycle was probably running too fast that it lost control and started
tilting and sliding eventually which made its foot rest cause the skid mark on the road. Therefore, the
mishap already occurred even while they were on the road and away from CAGELCO’s electric wires
and was not caused by the latter as alleged by respondents. It just so happened that after the
motorcycle tilted and slid, the passengers were thrown off to the shoulder where the electric wires
were.

This Court hence agrees with the trial court that the proximate cause of the mishap was the
negligence of Camilo. Had Camilo driven the motorcycle at an average speed, the three passengers
would not have been thrown off from the vehicle towards the shoulder and eventually strangulated by
the electric wires sitting thereon. Moreover, it was also negligent of Camilo to have allowed two
persons to ride with him and for Rapanan to ride with them when the maximum number of passengers
of a motorcycle is two including the driver. This most likely even aggravated the situation because the
motorcycle was overloaded which made it harder to drive and control. When the plaintiffs own
negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.

Assuming arguendo that CAGELCO was indeed negligent, the appellate court erred in awarding
damages in favor of Camilo' s legal heirs since they were not imp leaded in the case. It should be
noted that it was Mary Gine, the common law wife of Camilo, who is the complainant in the case. As
a mere common law wife of Camilo, she is not considered a legal heir of the latter, and hence, has no
legal personality to institute the action for damages due to Camilo' s death.

RUKS KONSULT AND CONSTRUCTION v. ADWORLD SIGN AND ADVERTISING

CORPORATION and TRANSWORLD MEDIA ADS, INC.
G.R. No. 204866 | January 21, 2015 | J. Perlas-Bernabe

Jurisprudence defines negligence as the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided
by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing
of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. It is the failure to observe for the
protection of the interest of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.

FACTS: In its complaint for damages filed before the RTC against Transwold and Comark Intl. Corp.,
Adworld alleged that it is the owner of a 75 ft. x 60 ft. billboard structure located at EDSA which was
misaligned and its foundation impaired when, on August 11, 2003, the adjacent billboard structure
owned by Transworld and used by Comark collapsed and crashed against it. Resultantly, on August
19, 2003, Adworld sent Transworld and Comark a letter demanding payment for the repairs of its
billboard as well as loss of rental income but said demand was unheeded. Hence, Adworld filed a
complaint.

TRANSWORLD’S POSITION: Transworld averred that the collapse of its billboard structure was due
to extraordinarily strong winds that occurred instantly and unexpectedly, and maintained that the
damage caused to Adworld’s billboard structure was hardly noticeable. Transworld likewise filed a
Third-Party Complaint against Ruks, the company which built the collapsed billboard structure in the
former’s favor.1âwphi1 It was alleged therein that the structure constructed by Ruks had a weak and
poor foundation not suited for billboards, thus, prone to collapse, and as such, Ruks should ultimately
be held liable for the damages caused to Adworld’s billboard structure.

RUKS’: Ruks admitted that it entered into a contract with Transworld for the construction of the latter’s
billboard structure, but denied liability for the damages caused by its collapse. It contended that when
Transworld hired its services, there was already an existing foundation for the billboard and that it
merely finished the structure according to the terms and conditions of its contract with the latter.

RTC RULING: RTC ruled in Adworld’s favor and declared Transworld and Ruks jointly and severally
liable to Adworld for actual damages. The RTC found both Transworld and Ruks negligent in the
construction of the collapsed billboard as they knew that the foundation supporting the same was weak
and would pose danger to the safety of the motorists and the other adjacent properties, and yet, they
did not do anything to remedy the situation.

CA RULING: CA denied Ruks’s appeal and affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It adhered to the RTC’s
finding of negligence on the part of Transworld and Ruks which brought about the damage to Adworld’s
billboard.

ISSUE: WON Ruks is jointly and severally liable with Transworld for damages sustained by Adworld.

RULING: Yes. Transworld and Ruks committed acts resulting in the collapse of the former’s billboard,
which in turn, caused damage to the adjacent billboard of Adworld.

Jurisprudence defines negligence as the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided
by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing
of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. It is the failure to observe for the
protection of the interest of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.

In this case, the CA correctly affirmed the RTC’s finding that Transworld’s initial construction of its
billboard’s lower structure without the proper foundation, and that of Ruks’s finishing its upper structure
and just merely assuming that Transworld would reinforce the weak foundation are the two (2)
successive acts which were the direct and proximate cause of the damages sustained by Adworld.
Worse, both Transworld and Ruks were fully aware that the foundation for the former’s billboard was
weak; yet, neither of them took any positive step to reinforce the same. They merely relied on each
other’s word that repairs would be done to such foundation, but none was done at all. Clearly, the
foregoing circumstances show that both Transworld and Ruks are guilty of negligence in the
construction of the former’s billboard, and perforce, should be held liable for its collapse and the
resulting damage to Adworld’s billboard structure. As joint tortfeasors, therefore, they are solidarily
liable to Adworld.

OTHER NOTES: What are joint tortfeasors?

"[j]oint tortfeasors are those who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance,
cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or approve of it after it is done, if done for their
benefit. They are also referred to as those who act together in committing wrong or whose acts, if
independent of each other, unite in causing a single injury. Under Article 2194 of the Civil Code, joint
tortfeasors are solidarily liable for the resulting damage. In other words, joint tortfeasors are each liable
as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act
themselves." In People v. Velasco, it was held:

Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause
without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of
the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although
under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and
that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not same.

There is no contribution between joint [tortfeasors] whose liability is solidary since both of them
are liable for the total damage.1âwpWhere the concurrent or successive negligent acts or
omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct
and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what
proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury.

GARCIA-RUEDA v. PASCASIO
G.R. No. 118141 | September 05, 1997 | J. Romero

As protector of the people, the Office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty "to act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials" and "to investigate any act
or omission of any public official when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient."

FACTS: This is a special civil action case under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Leonila
Rueda against public respondent Office of the Ombudsman for its failure to uphold the existence of
probable cause to hold public respondents City Prosecutors liable for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019.

The records reveal that Florencio V. Rueda, husband of herein petitioner, underwent surgical operation
at the UST Hospital for the removal of a stone blocking his ureter. He was attended by a surgeon, Dr.
Domingo Antonio, Jr. and an anaesthesiologist, Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes. However, six hours after
the surgery, Florencio died of complications of unknown cause.

Petitioner sought the help of the NBI to conduct an autopsy on her husband's body and its finding was
that Florencio's death was due to lack of care by the attending physician in administering anaesthesia.

Office of the Prosecutor: A formal complaint for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was then
filed before the Manila City Prosecutors Office. In said office, petitioner's case was transferred from
one prosecutor to another who came out with contradictory recommendations (“ping-pong” style).

Initially the case was assigned to Prosecutor Ismael but he inhibited himself because he was related
to the counsel of one of the doctors. The case was re-raffled to Prosecutor Leono who was disqualified
since he disregarded law & jurisprudence regarding the preliminary investigation. The case was
referred to Prosecutor Carisma, who issued a Resolution recommending that only Dr. Reyes be held
criminally liable and that the complaint against Dr. Antonio be dismissed.
Assistant City Prosecutor Sioson recommended that the case be re-raffled since Prosecutor Carisma
was partial to the petitioner. So the case was transferred to Prosecutor Dimagiba who endorsed that
the complaint against Dr. Reyes be dismissed and an Information be filed against Dr. Antonio.

While a pending MR was filed by petitioner, the case was assigned again to Prosecutor Gualberto who
recommended that Dr. Reyes be included in the criminal information. Thereafter, the case was
transferred to Senior State Prosecutor Arizala, wherein the latter resolved to exonerate Dr. Reyes from
any wrongdoing. Aggrieved petitioner filed graft charges against Prosecutors Guerrero, Macaraeg and
Arizala for manifest partiality in favor of Dr. Reyes in the Office of the Ombudsman.

Office of the Ombudsman: The Ombudsman, however, dismissed the complaint for lack of evidence.
In fine, petitioner assails the exercise of the discretionary power of the Ombudsman to review the
recommendations of the government prosecutors and to approve and disapprove the same. Petitioner
faults the Ombudsman for, allegedly in grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUES:
1. WON the Court can review the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman. (NO)
2. WON respondent Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion in deciding against filing the
necessary information against public respondents of the Office of the City Prosecutor. (NO)

RULING:

1. NO.

The general rule is that: In the exercise of its investigative power, the courts will not interfere with the
discretion of the fiscal or the Ombudsman to determine the specificity and adequacy of the averments
of the offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint if he finds it to be insufficient in form and
substance or if he otherwise finds no ground to continue with the inquiry; or he may proceed with the
investigation of the complaint if, in his view, it is in due and proper form.

While the Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be
filed, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman's action when there is an abuse of
discretion.

2. NO. The SC held that, in exercising discretion under the circumstances, the Ombudsman
acted within his power and authority in dismissing the complaint against the Prosecutors and
the Court will not interfere with the same.

"Grave abuse of discretion" has been defined as "where a power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of
positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or in contemplation of law.

However, the SC discussed that being the proper investigating authority, the Ombudsman should have
inquired into the successive transfer of the case from one prosecutor to another which could hardly
qualify as "standard operating procedure."

Here, the NBI pronounced after conducting an autopsy that there was negligence on the part of the
attending physicians in administering the anaesthesia. The fact of want of competence
or diligence is evidentiary in nature, the veracity of which can best be passed upon after a full-blown
trial. Clearly, the City Prosecutors are not in a competent position to pass judgment on such a technical
matter, especially when there are conflicting evidence and findings. The bases of a party's accusation
and defenses are better ventilated at the trial proper than at the preliminary investigation.
4 Elements of Medical Negligence:
1) Duty – since the services of the doctors were employed by the patient, a physician-patient
relationship was created, thus, creating a duty on the part of the doctors to use level of care in
treating the patient’s condition.
2) Breach - The breach of these professional duties of skill and care, or their improper
performance, by a physician surgeon whereby the patient is injured in body or in health,
constitutes actionable malpractice.
3) Injury - In the event that any injury results to the patient from want of due care or skill during
the operation, the surgeons may be held answerable in damages for negligence.
4) Proximate Causation – whether the doctor's actions in fact caused the harm to the patient and
whether these were the proximate cause of the patient's injury

In this case, the disregard of medical precautionary measures was not sufficiently explained by the
Ombudsman and the City Prosecutors. On the facts given, there was injury resulting to the patient due
to the want of due care during the operation. The Court noted that the allegation of negligence and
malpractice on the part of the doctors was not baseless since there was enough basis to link the
breach of professional duties and improper performance by the doctors

Still, the Court ruled that the correct remedy is to file an appeal with the Secretary of Justice assailing
the Resolution of the City Prosecutors.

Thus, the petition is dismissed without prejudice to the filing of an appeal by the petitioner with the
Secretary of Justice (SOJ). The petition is dismissed, without prejudice to the filing of an appeal by
the petitioner with the SOJ assailing the dismissal of her criminal complaint by the respondent City
Prosecutors.

GARCIA-RUEDA v. AMOR
G.R. No. 116938 | September 20, 2001 | J. Pardo

A prosecutor, being a quasi-judicial official, exercises discretion in determining whether a probable

cause exist. The error that might be committed by the prosecutor may not necessarily cause undue
injury to any party. To constitute this element of the offense, the act must cause specific quantified
injury to any party by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such party with the
public officer acting with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, causing
undue injury to petitioner.

FACTS: Petitioner's husband, Engr. Florencio Rueda, Jr., undergone an operation at the Santo Tomas
University Hospital for the removal of a stone in his ureter. After the surgery, he manifested seizures
and his body temperate and blood pressure arose. His doctors, Dr. Antonio and Dr. Balatbat-Reyes,
administered emergency treatment, however, being unsuccessful, the patient died.

Upon the findings of the NBI who conducted the autopsy and found that the patient died of malignant
hyperthermia, it recommended the to petitioner file criminal charges against the surgeon Dr. Antonio
and the anesthesiologist, Dr. Balatbat- Reyes for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

Office of the Prosecutor: However, Assistant City Prosecutor Dimagiba (ACP Dimagiba)
recommended the filing of information against Dr. Antonio, Jr. only, and the dismissal of the complaint
against Dr. Balatbat-Reyes. The ACP Dimagiba filed with the RTC an information against Dr. Antonio
for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
Office of the Ombudsman: Petitioner posited that the dismissal of the case against Dr. Balatbat-
Reyes, despite overwhelming evidence on her criminal liability, is a violation of RA No. 3019, Sec.
3(e). Thus, petitioner filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against Prosecutor Dimagiba.
This was dismissed by the Graft Investigation Officer II which was approved by the Head of the Office
of the Ombudsman. Petitioner filed a MR but it was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether respondent officials of the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused their discretion
in finding that there was no evidence sufficient to warrant the prosecution of respondent assistant city
prosecutor Dimagiba for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 [e].

RULING: NO. Respondent prosecutor Dimagiba did not cause any undue injury to petitioner in
dismissing petitioner's charges against Dr. Balatbat-Reyes. The prosecutor, as a quasi-judicial official,
exercises discretion to determine whether probable cause exists sufficient to sustain the charge
against Dr. Reyes. In the performance of the duties of her office as prosecutor, respondent assistant
city prosecutor Dimagiba may err. However, such error may not necessarily cause undue injury to any
party.

To constitute this element of the offense, the act of respondent must cause specific quantified injury
to any party by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such party with the public
officer acting with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

In the absence of evidence showing that the act of respondent assistant city prosecutor in dismissing
the charge against Dr. Reyes was done in evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, causing
undue injury to petitioner, the charge of violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3[e], would not prosper.

The Court dismisses the petition for lack of merit.

LUCAS, et al. vs. DR. PROSPERO MA. C. TUAÑO

586 SCRA 173

In a medical negligence suit, the patient or his heirs, in order to prevail, is required to prove by
preponderance of evidence that the physician failed to exercise that degree of skill, care, and learning
possessed by other persons in the same profession; and that as a proximate result of such failure, the
patient or his heirs suffered damages. There is breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, or the
improper performance of such duty, by the attending physician when the patient is injured in body or
in health constitutes the actionable malpractice.

FACTS: Herein petitioner, Peter Lucas, first consulted respondent, Dr. Tuaño, on a complaint of
soreness and redness on his right eye. The respondent, after a series of examinations, found that the
former was suffering from conjunctivitis or “sore eyes” and prescribed the use of the Spersacet-C.
However, after the petitioner’s condition seemed to have worsened, he sought for the respondent’s
second finding wherein the latter said that his condition had progressed to Epidemic Kerato
Conjunctivitis (EKC), a viral infection. The respondent then prescribed the use of Maxitrol, a steroid-
based eye drop. The petitioner’s condition worsened overtime, yet he obediently complied with all the
prescriptions and orders of the respondent. Four months later and after the petitioner suffered from
significant swelling of his right eyeball, headaches, nausea and blindness on this right eye, he sought
for the opinion of another doctor, Dr. Aquino. Dr. Aquino found that the petitioner had been suffering
from glaucoma and needed to undergo laser surgery, lest he might suffer from total blindness. After
reading the literature on the use of the medicine Maxitrol, Fatima, one of the petitioners herein and
Peter Lucas’ wife, read that one of the adverse effects of prolonged use of steroid-based eye drops
could possibly be glaucoma. Peter, Fatima, and their two children instituted a civil case for damages
against herein respondent for medical malpractice.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners amply proved that Dr. Tuaño failed to exercise diligence in the
performance of his duty as petitioner Peter Lucas’ physician.

RULING: No. Absent a definitive standard of care or diligence required of Dr. Tuaño under the
circumstances, the Court has no yardstick upon which to evaluate the attendant facts of the case at
hand to be able to state with confidence that the acts complained of, indeed, constituted negligence
and, thus, should be the subject of pecuniary reparation. In medical negligence cases, also called
medical malpractice suits, there exist a physician-patient relationship between the doctor and the
victim. But just like any other proceeding for damages, four essential (4) elements i.e., (1) duty; (2)
breach; (3) injury; and (4) proximate causation, must be established by the plaintiff/s. All the four (4)
elements must co-exist in order to find the physician negligent and, thus, liable for damages. As the
physician has the duty to use at least the same level of care as that of any other reasonably competent
physician would use in the treatment of his patient, said standard level of care, skill and diligence must
likewise be proven by expert medical testimony, because the standard of care in a medical malpractice
case is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of experts in the field. The same is outside the ken of
the average layperson. There is breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, or the improper performance
of such duty, by the attending physician when the patient is injured in body or in health [and this]
constitutes the actionable malpractice. Hence, proof of breach of duty on the part of the attending
physician is insufficient. Rather, the negligence of the physician must be the proximate cause of the
injury.

Dela Torre v. Imbuido, 736 SCRA 655

G.R. No. 192973, September 29, 2014

The Court emphasized in Lucas, et al. v. Tuaño that in medical negligence cases, there is a physician-
patient relationship between the doctor and the victim, but just like in any other proceeding for
damages, four essential elements must be established by the plaintiff, namely: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3)
injury; and (4) proximate causation. All four elements must be present in order to find the physician
negligent and, thus, liable for damages.

The critical and clinching factor in a medical negligence case is proof of the causal connection between
the negligence and the injuries. The claimant must prove not only the injury but also the defendant's
fault, and that such fault caused the injury. A verdict in a malpractice action cannot be based on
speculation or conjecture. Causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based
upon competent expert testimony.

FACTS: At around 3:00pm of February 3, 1992, Carmen was brought to Divine Spirit General
Hospital’s operating room for her caesarian section operation, which was to be performed by Dr.
Nestor. By 5:30pm, of the same day, Pedrito was informed by his wife’s delivery of a baby boy. In the
early morning of February 4, 1992, Carmen experienced abdominal pains and difficulty in urinating.
She was diagnosed to be suffering from urinary tract infection (UTI), and was prescribed medication
by Dr. Norma. On February 10, 1992, Pedrito noticed that Carmen’s stomach was getting bigger, but
Dr. Norma dismissed the patient’s condition as mere fratulence. When Carmen’s stomach still grow
bigger despite medications, Dr. Norma advised Pedrito of the possibility of a second operation on
Carmen. Dr. Norma, however, provided no details on its purpose and the doctor who would perform
it. At around 3:00pm on February 12, 1992 Carmen had her second operation. Later in the evening,
Dr. Norma informed Pedrito that “everything was going on fine with his wife.” The condition of Carmen,
however, did not improve. It instead worsened that on February 13, 1992, she vomited dark red blood.
At 9:30pm of the same day, Carmen died. Per her death certificate upon information provided by the
hospital, the immediate cause of Carmen’s death was cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebro
vascular accident, hypertension and chronic nephritis induced by pregnancy. An autopsy report
prepared by Dr. Partilano, medico-legal officer designate of Olongapo City, however, provided that the
cause of Carmen’s death was shock due to peritonitis severe with multiple intestinal adhesions; status
post caesarian section and exploratory laparotomy. Pedrito claimed in his complaint that the
respondents failed to exercise the degree of diligence required of them as members of the medical
profession, and were negligent for practicing surgery on Carmen in the most unskilled, ignorant, and
cruel manner.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents were liable for medical malpractice that resulted to Carmen’s
death.

RULING: No. Medical malpractice or, more appropriately, medical negligence, is that type of claim
which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional
which has caused bodily harm. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient, or his or her
family as in this case, must prove that healthcare provider, in most cases, a physician, either failed to
do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did
something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused
injury to the patient.

The Court emphasized in Lucas, et al. v. Tuaño that in medical negligence cases, there is a physician-
patient relationship between the doctor and the victim, but just like in any other proceeding for
damages, four essential elements must be established by the plaintiff, namely: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3)
injury; and (4) proximate causation. All four elements must be present in order to find the physician
negligent and, thus, liable for damages.

It is settled that a physician’s duty to his patient relates to his exercise of the degree of care, skill and
diligence which physicians in the same general neighborhood, and in the same general line of practice,
ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases. There is breach of this duty when the patient is injured
in body or in health. Proof of this breach rests upon the testimony of an expert witness that the
treatment accorded to the patient failed to meet the standard level of care, skill and diligence. To justify
an award of damages, the negligence of the doctor must be established to be the proximate cause of
the injury.

For the trial court to give weight to Dr. Partilano’s report, it was necessary to show first Dr. Partilano’s
specialization and competence to testify on the degree of care, skill and diligence needed for the
treatment of Carmen’s case. Considering that it was not duly established that Dr. Partilano practiced
and was an expert on the fields that involved Carmen’s condition, he could not have accurately
identified the said degree of care, skill and diligence and the medical procedure, that should have been
applied.

Moreover, while Dr. Patilano opined that Carmen died of peritonitis which could be due to the poor
state of the hospital equipment and medical supplies used during her operation, there was no sufficient
proof that any such fault actually attended the surgery of Carmen, caused her illness and resulted in
her death. It is also significant that the Chief of the Medico-Legal Division of the PNP Crime Laboratory
Service, Dr. Torres, testified before the trial court that based on the autopsy report issued by Dr.
Patilano, the latter did not comply with the basic autopsy procedure when he examined the cadaver
of Carmen. Dr. Patilano did not appear to have thoroughly examined Carmen’s vital organs such as
her heart, lungs, uterus and brain during the autopsy. His findings were then inconclusive on the issue
of the actual cause of Carmen's death, and the claim of negligence allegedly committed by the
respondents.

As the Court held in Spouses Flores v. Spouses Pineda, et al., the critical and clinching factor in a
medical negligence case is proof of the causal connection between the negligence and the injuries.
The claimant must prove not only the injury but also the defendant's fault, and that such fault caused
the injury. A verdict in a malpractice action cannot be based on speculation or conjecture. Causation
must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony,
which the Court finds absent in the case at bar.

NOEL CASUMPANG v. NELSON CORTEJO

G.R. No. 171127 | March 11, 2015 | J. Brion

It is a medical malpractice suit, an action available to victims to redress a wrong committed by medical
professionals who caused bodily harm to, or the death of, a patient. As the term is used, the suit is
brought whenever a medical practitioner or health care provider fails to meet the standards demanded
by his profession, or deviates from this standard, and causes injury to the patient. The elements of
medical negligence are: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4) proximate causation.

FACTS: On April 22, 1988, at about 11:30 in the morning, Mrs. Jesusa Cortejo brought her 11-year
old son, Edmer Cortejo (Edmer), to the Emergency Room of the San Juan de Dios Hospital (SJDH)
because of difficulty in breathing, chest pain, stomach pain, and fever.

After taking Edmer's medical history, Dr. Livelo took his vital signs, body temperature, and blood
pressure. Based on these initial examinations and the chest xray test that followed, Dr. Livelo
diagnosed Edmer with "bronchopneumonia. "

Edmer's blood was also taken for testing, typing, and for purposes of administering antibiotics.
Afterwards, Dr. Livelo gave Edmer an antibiotic medication to lessen his fever and to loosen his
phlegm. Mrs. Cortejo did not know any doctor at SJDH. She was thereafter assigned to Dr. Noel
Casumpang (Dr. Casumpang), a pediatrician also accredited with Fortune Care. Using only a
stethoscope, he confirmed the initial diagnosis of "Bronchopneumonia."

At that moment, Mrs. Cortejo recalled entertaining doubts on the doctor's diagnosis. She immediately
advised Dr. Casumpang that Edmer had a high fever, and had no colds or cough but Dr. Casumpang
merely told her that her son's "bloodpressure is just being active," and remarked that "that's the usual
bronchopneumonia, no colds, no phlegm."

Still suspicious about his son's illness, Mrs. Cortejo again called Dr. Casumpang's attention, but simply
nooded. Edmer vomited "phlegm with blood streak" prompting the respondent (Edmer's father) to
request for a doctor at the nurses' station.

(Dr. Miranda), although aware failed to examine the blood specimen because the respondent washed
it away. Dr. Miranda conducted a physical check-up.

The blood test results came, Dr. Miranda advised Edmer's parents that the blood test results showed
that Edmer was suffering from "Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever." By request Edmar was to be transported
to Makati Medical Center.

Dr. Casumpang immediately gave the attending physician the patient's clinical history and laboratory
exam results. Upon examination, the attending physician diagnosed "Dengue Fever Stage IV" that
was already in its irreversible stage. Subsequently, Edmer died and this prompted his parents to file a
case against SJDH and the Doctors.

RTC RULING: RTC ruled in favor of the respondent, and awarded actual and moral damages, plus
attorney's fees and costs. Also, held SJDH solidarily liable with the petitioning doctors for damages
based on the following findings of facts: first, Dr. Casumpang, as consultant, is an ostensible agent of
SJDH because before the hospital engaged his medical services, it scrutinized and determined his
fitness, qualifications, and competence as a medical practitioner; and second, Dr. Miranda, as resident
physician, is an employee of SJDH because like Dr. Casumpang, the hospital, through its screening
committee, scrutinized and determined her qualifications, fitness, and competence before engaging
her services; the hospital also exercised control over her work.

CA RULING: In its decision dated October 29, 2004, the CA affirmed en toto the RTC's ruling, finding
that SJDH and its attending physicians failed to exercise the minimum medical care, attention, and
treatment expected of an ordinary doctor under like circumstances.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioning doctors had committed "inexcusable lack of precaution" in
diagnosing and in treating the patient.
2. Whether or not the petitioner hospital is solidarily liable with the petitioning doctors.
3. Whether or not there is a causal connection between the petitioners' negligent act/omission
and the patient's resulting death.
4. Whether or not the lower courts erred in considering Dr. Rodolfo Tabangcora Jaudian as an
expert witness.

RULING:

1. Yes. In the present case, expert testimony is crucial in determining first, the standard medical
examinations, tests, and procedures that the attending physicians should have undertaken in the
diagnosis and treatment of dengue fever; and second, the dengue fever signs and symptoms that the
attending physicians should have noticed and considered. We find that Dr. Casumpang, as Edmer's
attending physician, did not act according to these standards and, hence, was guilty of breach of duty.
In the present case, evidence on record established that in confirming the diagnosis of
bronchopneumonia, Dr. Casumpang selectively appreciated some and not all of the symptoms
presented and failed to promptly conduct the appropriate tests to confirm his findings. In sum, Dr.
Casumpang failed to timely detect dengue fever, which failure, especially when reasonable prudence
would have shown that indications of dengue were evident and/or foreseeable, constitutes negligence.
As to Dr. Miranda’s liability, the court ruled that Dr. Miranda was not independently negligent . Although
she had greater patient exposure, and was subject to the same standard of care applicable to
attending physicians, Based on her statements we find that Dr. Miranda was not entirely faultless.
Nevertheless, her failure to discern the import of Edmer's second bleeding does not necessarily
amount to negligence as the respondent himself admitted that Dr. Miranda failed to examine the blood
specimen because he washed it away. In addition, considering the diagnosis previously made by two
doctors, and the uncontroverted fact that the burden of final diagnosis pertains to the attending
physician (in this case, Dr. Casumpang), we believe that Dr. Miranda's error was merely an honest
mistake of judgment influenced in no small measure by her status in the hospital hierarchy; hence,
she should not be held liable for medical negligence.

2. Yes. Despite the absence of employer-employee relationship between SJDH and the petitioning
doctors, SJDH is not free from liability. As a rule, hospitals are not liable for the negligence of its
independent contractors. However, it may be found liable if the physician or independent contractor
acts as an ostensible agent of the hospital. This exception is also known as the "doctrine of apparent
authority.

3. No. Dr. Jaudian's testimony strongly suggests that due to Dr. Casumpang's failure to timely
diagnose Edmer with dengue, the latter was not immediately given the proper treatment. In fact, even
after Dr. Casumpang had discovered Edmer's real illness, he still failed to promptly perform the
standard medical procedure. Furthermore, Dr. Casumpang failed to timely diagnose Edmer with
dengue fever despite the presence of its characteristic symptoms; and as a consequence of the
delayed diagnosis, he also failed to promptly manage Edmer's illness. Had he immediately conducted
confirmatory tests, (i.e., tourniquet tests and series of blood tests) and promptly administered the
proper care and management needed for dengue fever, the risk of complications or even death, could
have been substantially reduced.

4. We find that Dr. Jaudian is competent to testify on the standard of care in dengue fever cases.
Although he specializes in pathology, it was established during trial that he had attended not less than
30 seminars held by the Pediatric Society, had exposure in pediatrics, had been practicing medicine
for 16 years, and had handled not less than 50 dengue related cases. As a licensed medical
practitioner specializing in pathology, who had practical and CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021
cdasiaonline.com relevant exposure in pediatrics and dengue related cases, we are convinced that
Dr. Jaudian demonstrated sufficient familiarity with the standard of care to be applied in dengue fever
cases. Furthermore, we agree that he possesses knowledge and experience sufficient to qualify him
to speak with authority on the subject.

ROSIT vs.. DAVAO DOCTORS HOSPITAL AND DR. ROLANDO G. GESTUVO

G.R. No. 210445 | December 07, 2015 | Velasco, Jr. J.

The Doctrine of Informed consent evolved into a general principle of law that a physician has a duty
to disclose what a reasonably prudent physician in the medical community in the exercise of
reasonable care would disclose to his patient as to whatever grave risks of injury might be incurred
from a proposed course of treatment, so that a patient, exercising ordinary care for his own welfare,
and faced with a choice of undergoing the proposed treatment, or alternative treatment, or none at all,
may intelligently exercise his judgment by reasonably balancing the probable risks against the
probable benefits. There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action
based upon the doctrine of informed consent: "(1) the physician had a duty to disclose material
risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and
proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to treatment she otherwise
would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment.

FACTS: Petitioner Rosit figured in a motorcycle accident. The X-ray soon taken the next day at the
Davao Doctors Hospital (DDH) showed that he fractured his jaw. Rosit was then referred to Dr.
Gestuvo, a specialist in mandibular injuries, subsequently operated on Rosit. During the operation, Dr.
Gestuvo used a metal plate fastened to the jaw with metal screws to immobilize the mandible. As the
operation required the smallest screws available, Dr. Gestuvo cut the screws on hand to make them
smaller. Dr. Gestuvo knew that there were smaller titanium screws available in Manila, but did not
inform Rosit supposing that the latter would not be able to afford the same.

Following the procedure, Rosit could not properly open and close his mouth and was in pain. X-rays
done on Rosit two (2) days after the operation showed that the fracture in his jaw was aligned but the
screws used on him touched his molar. Given the X-ray results, Dr. Gestuvo referred Rosit to Dr.
Pangan, a dentist. The latter opined that another operation is necessary since the operation conducted
on his mandible was improperly done.

Rosit demanded that Dr. Gestuvo reimburse him for the cost of the operation and the expenses he
incurred in Cebu (where the operation was performed) amounting to P140,000, as well as for the
P50,000 that Rosit would have to spend for the removal of the plate and screws that Dr. Pangan
installed. Dr. Gestuvo refused to pay.

Thus, Rosit filed a civil case for damages and attorney's fees with the RTC against Dr. Gestuvo and
DDH.
The RTC freed DDH from liability on the ground that it exercised the proper diligence in the selection
and supervision of Dr. Gestuvo, but adjudged Dr. Gestuvo negligent. Unlike the RTC, the CA ruled
that the res ipsa loquitur principle is not applicable and that the testimony of an expert witness is
necessary for a finding of negligence.

ISSUE: Whether or not Dr. Gestuvo is guilty of negligence for depriving the petitioner of the
opportunity to make an informed consent (YES)

RULING: The Court ruled in the affirmative. The Court held that what is more damning for Dr. Gestuvo
is his failure to inform Rosit that such smaller screws were available in Manila, albeit at a higher price.

Li v. Soliman made the following disquisition on the relevant Doctrine of Informed Consent in relation
to medical negligence cases, to wit:

The doctrine of informed consent within the context of physician-patient relationships

goes far back into English common law. x x x From a purely ethical norm, informed
consent evolved into a general principle of law that a physician has a duty to disclose
what a reasonably prudent physician in the medical community in the exercise of
reasonable care would disclose to his patient as to whatever grave risks of injury might
be incurred from a proposed course of treatment, so that a patient, exercising ordinary
care for his own welfare, and faced with a choice of undergoing the proposed treatment,
or alternative treatment, or none at all, may intelligently exercise his judgment by
reasonably balancing the probable risks against the probable benefits.

There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action based
upon the doctrine of informed consent: "(1) the physician had a duty to disclose material
risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and
proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to treatment she
otherwise would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed
treatment." The gravamen in an informed consent case requires the plaintiff to "point to
significant undisclosed information relating to the treatment which would have altered her
decision to undergo it."

The four essential elements above are present here.

First, Dr. Gestuvo clearly had the duty of disclosing to Rosit the risks of using the larger screws for the
operation. This was his obligation as the physician undertaking the operation.

Second, Dr. Gestuvo failed to disclose these risks to Rosit, deciding by himself that Rosit could not
afford to get the more expensive titanium screws.

Third, had Rosit been informed that there was a risk that the larger screws are not appropriate for the
operation and that an additional operation replacing the screws might be required to replace the same,
as what happened in this case, Rosit would not have agreed to the operation. It bears pointing out that
Rosit was, in fact, able to afford the use of the smaller titanium screws that were later used by Dr.
Pangan to replace the screws that were used by Dr. Gestuvo.

Fourth, as a result of using the larger screws, Rosit experienced pain and could not heal properly
because one of the screws hit his molar. This was evident from the fact that just three (3) days after
Dr. Pangan repeated the operation conducted by Dr. Gestuvo, Rosit was pain-free and could already
speak. This is compared to the one (1) month that Rosit suffered pain and could not use his mouth
after the operation conducted by Dr. Gestuvo until the operation of Dr. Pangan.
Without a doubt, Dr. Gestuvo is guilty of withholding material information which would have been vital
in the decision of Rosit in going through with the operation with the materials at hand. Thus, Dr.
Gestuvo is also guilty of negligence on this ground.

CITY OF MANILA v. TEOTICO

January 29, 1968 | J. Concepcion

Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by,
any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other
public works under their control or supervision.

CASE SUMMARY

Trigger Word(s): nabasag salamin

FACTS: Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within
a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. As he stepped down
from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted
catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole
breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. This also resulted
to several bodily injuries. He then filed a claim for damages against the Cty of Manila. Upon MFR, the
City of Manila raised the issue of which law governed the case, Section 4 of the Manila City Charter
(RA 409), or Article 2189 of the Civil Code.

HELD: Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to
attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either
"control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national
highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City
of Manila.

FACTS
• Genaro Teotico was a practicing public accountant, a businessman, and a professor at the
University of the East. He held responsible positions in several business firms and was a
member of several civic organizations.
• On January 27, 1958, Teotico was waiting for a jeep at loading and unloading zone at the
corner of Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila.
• He managed to hail a jeepney. As he was walking towards the jeepney to board it, he fell into
an uncovered and unlighted manhole (also called a catch basin).
• His head hit the rim of the manhole, causing his eyeglasses to break. The broken pieces of
his glasses pierced his left eyelid.
• Bystanders brought him to the Philippine General Hospital, after which, he was brought home.
• Aside from his wounded eyelid, his other injuries were
o Contusions on his left thigh, left upper arm, right leg and upper lip
o Abrasion on his right infra-patella region
o Allergic reaction to the anti-tetanus injections given to him at the hospital.
• Teotico filed a complaint for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city
health officer, city treasurer, and chief of police.
• CFI Manila ruled in favor of Teotico. CA affirmed and additionally sentenced the City to pay
damages worth P6750.00
• The City of Manila moved to reconsider, raising the issue of which law governed the case,
Section 4 of the Manila City Charter (RA 409), or Article 2189 of the Civil Code.
Relevant provisions:

RA 409, Section 4: The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property
arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the
provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal
Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.

Civil Code, Article 2189: Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death
of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.

ISSUES + HELD

ISSUE #1: What provision of law governs the present case—RA 409 (Charter of Manila) or the
Civil Code (Art 2189) → Civil Code
• CA applied the Civil Code provision. SC agreed.
• Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of
Manila for: "damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city officers
"to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence" of
the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions."
• Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making
"provinces, cities and municipalities liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by
any person by reason" — specifically — "of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other-public works under their control or supervision." In other words,
said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object
thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular.
• Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to
attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality
have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were,
therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control
or supervision" by the City of Manila
• The determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under the control or supervision of
the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection with the
maintenance of said road, which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative, is
one of fact, and the findings of said Court thereon are not subject to our review.

ISSUE #2: W/N the City was negligent and may be held liable for the accident which allegedly
took place on a national highway → YES
• That the accident occurred on a national highway or that the City was not negligent are both
questions of facts not made in the Answer of the City. It was made for the first time in its motion
to reconsider the CA’s decision. Questions of fact cannot be set up for the first time on appeal,
much less on motion for reconsideration.
• Teotico alleged in his complaint (both original and amended) that his injuries were due to the
defective condition of a street under the supervision and control of the City.
o In its Answer, the City alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have been
constantly kept in good condition and regularly inspected and the storm drains and
manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers concerned" who
"have been ever vigilant and zealous in the performance of their respective functions
and duties as imposed upon them by law,” impliedly admitting that it indeed had P.
Burgos avenue under its control and supervision.
 • Under Article 2189, it is not necessary that the defective roads or streets belong to the province,
city or municipality for liability to attach. What the Article only requires is control or supervision.
• Article 2189 of the Civil Code is further supported by Section 18x of the Manila City Charter,
which, inter alia, says that the City has the legislative power and responsibility to provide
suitable protection against injury to persons or property, and that it must construct and repair
ditches, drains, sewers, and culverts.
o Section 18x has not been withdrawn nor restricted by RA 917 or EO 113, both of which
the City relies upon.
o RA 917 governs the disposition or appropriation of highway funds and giving of aid to
provinces, chartered cities and municipalities in the construction of roads and streets
within their respective boundaries.
o EO 113 implements the provisions of RA 917 and provides that the construction,
maintenance and improvement of roads shall be done by Highway District Engineers
and Highway City Engineers under the supervision of the Commissioner of Public
Highways.

DAMAGES AWARDED – YES

1. P 6,750

RULING: Decision affirmed.

NOTES ON ARGUMENTS:

Petitioner’s (Teotico) arguments:

• He was prevented from engaging in his customary occupation for 20 days. As a result, he has
lost income of P1000.00 (P50.00 daily).
• He was subjected to humiliation and ridicule by his business associates and friends.
• While he was being treated, he was under constant fear and anxiety for the welfare of his
minor children because he was their sole support.
• He had to pay a private practitioner P1400.00 to treat him for his allergic reaction to the anti-
tetanus shots from PGH.
• Because of the filing of this case, he is obligated to pay his counsel P2000.00.

City of Manila’s arguments:

CFI and CA
• It has always been the policy of the Storm Drain Section (under the Office of the City Engineer
of Manila) that whenever any reports are received of the loss of manhole covers, the manholes
are immediately attended to either by replacing the cover or by covering the manhole with steel
matting.
• Oral and documentary evidence that the Storm Drain Section, Office of the City Engineer of
Manila, received a report of the uncovered condition of the manhole Teotico fell into on January
24, 1958, but that it was covered on the same day.
• Another report that the iron cover of the same manhole was missing on January 30, 1958, but
that the cover was replaced the next day.
• The Storm Drain Section never received a report that the manhole was uncovered from
January 25 to January 29 (recall that Teotico fell into the manhole on January 27).
• Stealing of iron manhole covers was rampant because of the scrap iron business, which was
lucrative at the time.
• The Office of the City Engineer had already filed complaints in court regarding the rampant
theft of the covers
• In order to prevent the theft, the City has changed the position and layout of Manila’s manholes
by constructing them under the sidewalks, covered by concrete cement covers, with openings
on the side of the gutter.
 o These changes were being undertaken by the city whenever funds were available.
Supreme Court
• Section 4 of the Manila City Charter should prevail over the Civil Code because the former is
a special law intended exclusively for Manila, while the Civil Code is a general law applicable
to the entire Philippines.
• The City cannot be held liable to Teotico for damages because
o The accident occurred in a national highway
o It was not negligent

JIMENEZ vs. CITY OF MANILA

G.R. No. 71049 | May 29, 1987 | J. Paras

For the liability under Article 2189 of the Civil Code to attach, it is not necessary that the defective
public works belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said
article requires is that the province, city or municipality has either "control or supervision" over the
public building in question.

Exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family is a defense against liability on the basis of a
quasi-delict.

FACTS: In the morning of August 15, 1974 he, together with his neighbors, went to Sta. Ana public
market to buy "bagoong" at the time when the public market was flooded with ankle deep rainwater.
After purchasing the "bagoong" he turned around to return home but he stepped on an uncovered
opening which could not be seen because of the dirty rainwater, causing a dirty and rusty 4-inch nail,
stuck inside the uncovered opening, to pierce the left leg of plaintiff-petitioner penetrating to a depth
of about one and a half inches.

After administering first aid treatment at a nearby drugstore, his companions helped him hobble home.
He felt ill and developed fever and he had to be carried to Dr. Juanita Mascardo. Despite the medicine
administered to him by the latter, his left leg swelled with great pain. He was then rushed to the
Veterans Memorial Hospital where he had to be confined for twenty (20) days due to high fever and
severe pain.

Upon his discharge from the hospital, he had to walk around with crutches for (15) days. His injury
prevented him from attending to the school buses he is operating. As a result, he had to engage the
services of one Bienvenido Valdez to supervise his business for an aggregate compensation of (P900).

Petitioner sued for damages the City of Manila and the Asiatic Integrated Corporation under whose
administration the Sta. Ana Public Market had been placed by virtue of a Management and Operating
Contract.

The lower court dismissed the complaint. CA held the Asiatic Integrated Corporation liable for
damages but absolved respondent City of Manila. Hence this petition.

Both defendants do not deny that plaintiff was in fact injured. However, Asiatic Integrated Corporation
tries to minimize the extent of the injuries, claiming that it was only a small puncture and that as a war
veteran, plaintiff's hospitalization at the War Veteran's Hospital was free.

For its part, the City of Manila’s defenses are

1) Under the Management and Operating Contract, Asiatic Integrated Corporation assumed all
responsibility for damages which may be suffered by third persons for any cause attributable
to it
 2) Art. 1, Sec. 4 of RA 409 as amended (Revised Charter of Manila) which provides:
The City shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising
from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other City Officer, to enforce
the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said
Mayor, Municipal Board, or any other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce
said provisions.
3) Plaintiff Jimenez should not have gone to the market to buy bagoong on a rainy day

RTC RULING: The lower court dismissed the complaint.

CA RULING: CA held the Asiatic Integrated Corporation liable for damages but absolved respondent
City of Manila.

ISSUE: Whether or not City of Manila should be jointly and severally liable with Asiatic Integrated
Corporation for the injuries petitioner suffered

RULING: Yes; Art. 2189.

This issue has been laid to rest in the case of City of Manila v. Teotico (1968) where the Supreme
Court squarely ruled that RA No. 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of
Manila for "damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of city officers" to enforce
the provisions of said Act, "or any other law or ordinance or from negligence" of the City "Mayor,
Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions."

Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides that:

Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by
any person by reason of defective conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other
public works under their control or supervision. constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces,
cities and municipalities ... liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by
reason" — specifically — "of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and
other public works under their control or supervision."

In the same suit, the Supreme Court clarified further that under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not
necessary for the liability therein established to attach, that the defective public works belong to the
province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the
province, city or municipality has either "control or supervision" over the public building in question.

In the case at bar, there is no question that the Sta. Ana Public Market, despite the Management and
Operating Contract between respondent City and Asiatic Integrated Corporation remained under the
control of the former. As evidenced by:

1) Contract between the City and Asiatic (prior approval of the City of Manila is needed before
the program of improvement, rehabilitation and reconstruction of the public market may be
made by Asiatic; if the present employees/personnel of the city public market will be
discharged by Asiatic;)
2) Fact of supervision and control of the City over subject public market was admitted by Mayor
Ramon Bagatsing in his letter to Secretary of Finance Cesar Virata.
3) The City employed a market master for the Sta. Ana Public Market whose primary duty is to
take direct supervision and control of that particular market, more specifically, to check the
safety of the place for the public
As a defense against liability on the basis of a quasi-delict, one must have exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family. (Art. 1173 of the Civil Code)

The contention of respondent City of Manila that petitioner should not have ventured to go to Sta. Ana
Public Market during a stormy weather is indeed untenable. It is the duty of the City of Manila to
exercise reasonable care to keep the public market reasonably safe for people frequenting the place
for their marketing needs.

While it may be conceded that the fulfillment of such duties is extremely difficult during storms and
floods, it must however, be admitted that ordinary precautions could have been taken during good
weather to minimize the dangers to life and limb under those difficult circumstances.

For instance, the drainage hole could have been placed under the stalls instead of on the
passageways. Even more important is the fact, that the City should have seen to it that the openings
were covered. Sadly, the evidence indicates that long before petitioner fell into the opening, it was
already uncovered, and (5) months after the incident happened, the opening was still uncovered.

Moreover, while there are findings that during floods the vendors remove the iron grills to hasten the
flow of water, there is no showing that such practice has ever been prohibited, much less penalized
by the City of Manila. Neither was it shown that any sign had been placed thereabouts to warn
passersby of the impending danger.

Petitioner had the right to assume that there were no openings in the middle of the passageways and
if any, that they were adequately covered. Had the opening been covered, petitioner could not have
fallen into it. Thus the negligence of the City of Manila is the proximate cause of the injury suffered,
the City is therefore liable for the injury suffered by the petitioner.

Thus, City of Manila and Asiatic Integrated Corporation being joint tort-feasors are solidarily liable
under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.

THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
LAURA BIGLANG-AWA, METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM
(MWSS), and KWOK CHEUNG,
G.R. No. 121920 | August 9, 2005 | GARCIA, J.

Jurisprudence teaches that for liability to arise under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, ownership of the
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works, is not a controlling factor, it being
sufficient that a province, city or municipality has control or supervision thereof.

FACTS: Under a "Contract For Water Service Connections" entered into by and between the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and Kwok Cheung as sole proprietor of K.C.
Waterworks System Construction (KC, for short), the former engaged the services of the latter to install
water service connections.

In 1988, KC was given a Job Order by the South Sector Office of MWSS to conduct and effect
excavations at the corner of M. Paterno and Santolan Road, San Juan, Metro Manila, a national road,
for the laying of water pipes and tapping of water to the respective houses of water concessionaires.

KC dispatched five (5) of its workers under Project Engineer Battad, Jr. to conduct the digging
operations. The digging operations started at 9 o’clock in the morning and ended at about 3 o’clock in
the afternoon. The workers dug a hole one (1) meter wide and 1.5 meters deep, after which they
refilled the excavated portion of the road with the same gravel and stone excavated from the area. At
that time, only ¾ of the job was finished in view of the fact that the workers were still required to re-
excavate that particular portion for the tapping of pipes for the water connections to the
concessionaires.

Meanwhile, between 10 o’clock and 11 o’clock in the evening of 31 May 1988, Priscilla Chan was
driving her Toyota Crown car at a speed of thirty (30) kilometers per hour. With her was Assistant City
Prosecutor Laura Biglang-awa. The road was flooded as it was then raining hard. Suddenly, the left
front wheel of the car fell on a manhole where the workers of KC had earlier made excavations. The
humerus on the right arm of Prosecutor Biglang-awa was fractured. Thereupon, Priscilla Chan
contacted Biglang-awa’s husband who immediately arrived at the scene and brought his wife to the
Cardinal Santos Hospital.

According a police officer, he did not see any barricades at the scene when he arrived less than an
hour later. A Traffic Accident Investigation Report was thereafter prepared and signed by Pfc. Ramos.

At the hospital, the attending physician, after having performed a close reduction and application of
abduction splint on Biglang-awa, placed a plastic cast on her right arm. Barring complications, the
injury she suffered was expected to heal in four (4) to six (6) weeks. After some time, the plastic cast
was removed. Biglang-awa sustained no deformity and no tenderness of the area of the injury but she
could not sleep on her right side because she still felt pain in that portion of her body. A Medical
Certificate on her injuries was issued by Dr. Antonio Rivera.

Biglang-awa filed before the Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages against MWSS, the
Municipality of San Juan and a number of San Juan municipal officials. Later, Biglang-awa amended
her complaint twice. In her second amended complaint, she included KC as one of the defendants.

RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT: After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of
Biglang-awa adjudging MWSS and the Municipality of San Juan jointly and severally liable to her.

RULING OF THE CA: Affirmed with modifications.

ISSUE: Whether the Municipality of San Juan is liable for the injury.

RULING: YES. Jurisprudence teaches that for liability to arise under Article 2189 of the Civil Code,
ownership of the roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works, is not a controlling
factor, it being sufficient that a province, city or municipality has control or supervision thereof.

At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established
to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either
"control or supervision" over said street or road. x x x

San Juan's argument that per Section 149 of LGC 1983 it has only control or supervision over
municipal roads is erroneous. Nowhere in this section is its control or supervision modified by the term
"municipal road". Neither can it be inferred that the same provision only applies to activities to be
performed in municipal roads.

The municipality's liability for injuries caused by its failure to regulate the drilling and excavation of the
ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes, attaches regardless of whether the drilling
or excavation is made on a national or municipal road, for as long as the same is within its territorial
jurisdiction.
The use of Section 8 of Ordinance 82-01 is likewise unfounded. Such Ordinance makes the excavator
liable for injury or death or damages caused by non-completion of works or failure to implement
precautionary measures. However, nowhere in said Ordinance does it state that municipalities in Metro
Manila are exempt from liabilities caused by their own negligent acts. Therefore, nothing prevents the
municipality from being liable by the application of other laws.

CAEDO et al vs. YU KHE THAI and RAFAEL BERNARDO

G.R. No. L-20392| December 18, 1968| Makalintal, J.

In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the
vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed
that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations
at least twice within the next preceding two months.

Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the owner of the
vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise
of due diligence.

FACTS: Plaintiff Caedo was driving his Mercury car at about 5:30 in the morning of March 24, 1958
along E. de los Santos Ave., in the vicinity of San LorenzoVillage bound for the airport. Several
members of his family were in the car. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac car of
defendant Yu Khe Thai driven by his driver Rafael Bernardo. The two cars were traveling at a moderate
speed with their headlights on. Ahead of the Cadillac was a caretela. Defendant’s driver did not notice
it until he was about eight (8) meters away. Instead of slowing down behind the caretela defendant’s
driver veered to the left with the intention of passing by the caretela but in doing so its rear bumper
caught the ream of thecaretela’s left wheel wrenching it off. Defendant’s car skidded obliquely to the
other end and collided with the on-coming vehicle of the plaintiff. The plaintiff on his part, slackened
his speed and tried to avoid the collision by veering to the right but the collision occurred just the same
injuring the plaintiff and members of his family. Plaintiff brought an action for damages against both
the driver and owner of the Cadillac car. There was no question that defendant’s driver was negligent
and liable.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant Yu Khe Thai, owner of the car, who was inside the car, solidarily
liable with the driver under Art. 2184, of the Civil Code.

RULING: The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code. Under the said provision, if the causative
factor was the driver’s negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if
he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. The basis of the master’s liability
in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that
ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by
him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.

Negligence on the part of the owner, if any, must be sought in the immediate setting and circumstances
of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave
him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. We do not see that such negligence
may be imputed. The car, as has been stated, was not running at an unreasonable speed. The road
was wide and open, and devoid of traffic that early morning. There was no reason for the car owner
to be in any special state of alert. He had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver. He
became aware of the presence of the carretela when his car was only twelve meters behind it, but
then his failure to see it earlier did not constitute negligence, for he was not himself at the wheel. And
even when he did see it at that distance, he could not have anticipated his driver’s sudden decision to
pass the carretela on its left side in spite of the fact that another car was approaching from the opposite
direction. The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to
assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. The thought that entered his mind, he said,
was that if he sounded a sudden warning it might only make the other man nervous and make the
situation worse. It was a thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of that due diligence required
by law to prevent the misfortune. We hold that the imputation of liability to Yu Khe Thai, solidarily with
Rafael Bernardo, is an error.

Gelisan v. Alday
G.R. No. L-30212| September 30, 1987| PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Gelisan, the registered owner is liable. It is settled in our jurisprudence that if the property
covered by a franchise is transferred or leased to another without obtaining the requisite approval, the
transfer is not binding upon the public and third persons.

However, Gelisan, has a right to be indemnified by Roberto Espiritu for the amount that he may be
required to pay as damages for the injury caused to Benito Alday, since the lease contract in question,
although not effective against the public for not having been approved by the Public Service
Commission, is valid and binding between the contracting parties.

The Court has consistently considered the registered owner/operator of a public service vehicle to be
jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages incurred by passengers or third persons as a
consequence of injuries sustained in the operation of said vehicles.

FACTS: Defendant Bienvenido Gelisan is the owner of a freight. Then, defendant Bienvenido Gelisan
and Roberto Espiritu entered into a contract under which Espiritu hired the same freight truck of
Gelisan for the purpose of hauling rice, sugar, flour and fertilizer within the limits of the City of Manila.
It is also agreed that Espiritu shall bear and pay all losses and damages attending the carriage of the
goods to be hauled by him. The truck was taken by a driver of Roberto Espiritu. Plaintiff Benito Alday,
a trucking operator had a contract to haul the fertilizers of the Atlas Fertilizer Corporation from Pier 4,
North Harbor, to its Warehouse in Mandaluyong. Alday met Espiritu at the gate of Pier 4 and the latter
offered the use of his truck with the driver and helper at 9 centavos per bag of fertilizer. The offer was
accepted by plaintiff Alday and he instructed his checker Celso Henson to let Roberto Espiritu haul
the fertilizer. Espiritu made two hauls of 200 bags of fertilizer per trip. The fertilizer was delivered to
the driver and helper of Espiritu with the necessary way bill receipts. Espiritu, however, did not deliver
the fertilizer to the Atlas Fertilizer bodega at Mandaluyong. The signatures appearing in the way bill
receipts Exhibits A and B of the Alday Transportation admittedly not the signature of any representative
or employee of the Atlas Fertilizer Corporation. Roberto Espiritu could not be found, and plaintiff
reported the loss to the Manila Police Department. Roberto Espiritu was later arrested and booked for
theft.

Benito Alday was compelled to pay the value of the 400 bags of fertilizer, in the amount of P5,397.33,
to Atlas Fertilizer Corporation so that he (Alday) filed a complaint against Roberto Espiritu and
Bienvenido Gelisan with the Court of First Instance of Manila for the recovery of damages suffered by
him thru the criminal acts committed by the defendants. The defendant, Roberto Espiritu failed to file
an answer and was, accordingly, declared in default. The defendant, Bienvenido Gelisan, upon the
other hand, disowned responsibility.

RTC RULING: After trial, the Court of First Instance of Manila ruled that Roberto Espiritu alone was
liable to Benito Alday, since Bienvenido Gelisan was not privy to the contract between Espiritu and
Alday.
CA RULING: On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals, citing the case of Montoya vs. Ignacio, 3
found that Bienvenido Gelisan is likewise liable for being the registered owner of the truck; and that
the lease contract, executed by and between Bienvenido Gelisan and Roberto Espiritu, is not binding
upon Benito Alday for not having been previously approved by the Public Service Commission.
Accordingly, it sentenced Bienvenido Gelisan to pay, jointly and severally with Roberto Espiritu, Benito
Alday the amount of P5,397.30, with legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint; and to pay
the costs. Roberto Espiritu, in turn, was ordered to pay or refund Bienvenido Gelisan whatever amount
the latter may have paid to Benito Alday by virtue of the judgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Gelisan is liable.

RULING: Yes. The petition is without merit. The judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals, which is
sought to be reviewed, is in accord with the facts and the law on the case and we find no cogent
reason to disturb the same. The Court has invariably held in several decisions that the registered
owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences
incident to its operation or that may be caused to any of the passengers therein. 5 The claim of the
petitioner that he is not liable in view of the lease contract executed by and between him and Roberto
Espiritu which exempts him from liability to third persons, cannot be sustained because it appears that
the lease contract, adverted to, had not been approved by the Public Service Commission. It is settled
in our jurisprudence that if the property covered by a franchise is transferred or leased to another
without obtaining the requisite approval, the transfer is not binding upon the public and third persons.

Bienvenido Gelisan, the registered owner, is not however without recourse. He has a right to be
indemnified by Roberto Espiritu for the amount that he may be required to pay as damages for the
injury caused to Benito Alday, since the lease contract in question, although not effective against the
public for not having been approved by the Public Service Commission, is valid and binding between
the contracting parties.

The Court also did not find merit in the petitioner's contention that his liability is only subsidiary. The
Court has consistently considered the registered owner/operator of a public service vehicle to be jointly
and severally liable with the driver for damages incurred by passengers or third persons as a
consequence of injuries sustained in the operation of said vehicles.

GAID v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 171636 | April 7, 2009 | J. Tinga

In order to establish a motorist's liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be
shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or
damages complained of. Thus, negligence that is not a substantial contributing factor in the
causation of the accident is not the proximate cause of an injury. Art. 2719 of the Civil Code
states that when the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury,
he cannot recover damages.

FACTS: Petitioner Norman A. Gaid was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. On October 2001, petitioner was driving his passenger jeepney along a 2 lane road where
the Laguindingan National High School is located. At the time several students were coming out of the
school premises. Meanwhile, a 14 year old student, Michael Dayata, was seen flagging down
petitioner’s jeepney from the left side of the road. Petitioner stated he was driving at no more than 15
kph. Petitioner, who was driving the jeepney on the right lane, did not see the victim flag him down.
He also failed to see him go near the jeepney at the left side. Gaid was focused on the road ahead. In
Dayata's haste to board the jeep which was then running, his feet somehow got pinned to the left rear
tire and a strong impact was heard coming from the jeep. Dayata was then seen lying on the ground
and caught in between the rear tires. Petitioner felt that the left rear tire of the jeepney had bounced
and the vehicle tilted to the right side.

MCTC RULING: It found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The lower
court held petitioner negligent in his driving considering that the victim was dragged to a distance of
5.70 meters from the point of impact. He was also scored for "not stopping his vehicle after noticing
that the jeepney's left rear tire jolted causing the vehicle to tilt towards the right.”

RTC RULING: Affirmed in toto the decision of the MCTC.

CA RULING: Exonerated petitioner from the charge of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide on
the ground that he was not driving recklessly at the time of the accident. However, the appellate court
still found him to be negligent when he failed "to promptly stop his vehicle to check what caused the
sudden jotting of its rear tire."

ISSUE: W/N petitioner was negligent

RULING: No. The SC held that petitioner must be acquitted at least on reasonable doubt. In this case,
the lower courts zeroed in on the fact that petitioner did not stop the jeepney when he felt the bouncing
of his vehicle, a circumstance which the appellate court equates with negligence. Petitioner contends
that he did not immediately stop because he did not see anybody go near his vehicle at the time of the
incident. Assuming petitioner has been negligent, it must be shown that his negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident. In order to establish a motorist's liability for the negligent operation
of a vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and
the injuries or damages complained of. Thus, negligence that is not a substantial contributing factor in
the causation of the accident is not the proximate cause of an injury. The head injuries sustained by
Dayata at the point of impact proved to be the immediate cause of his death, as indicated in the post-
mortem findings. His skull was crushed as a result of the accident. Had petitioner immediately stopped
the jeepney, it would still not have saved the life of the victim as the injuries he suffered were fatal.
The prosecution was not able to establish that the proximate cause of the victim's death was
petitioner's alleged negligence.

UNITED STATES (U.S.) v. ZABALA

6 Phil 431 | G.R. No. 3045 | September 08, 1906 | J. Tracey

One who, with the sole motive of destroying his own property, starts thereon a fire which, extending
to the house of a neighbor, consumes both buildings, is not guilty of the crime of arson, but may be
punished for reckless negligence under Article 568 of the Penal Code.

FACTS: The accused, dissatisfied with his inheritance and with a vague notion of forcing a
readjustment of his relations with his brother, and while intoxicated, set fire to his own house, his
exclusive property. The fire consumed not only his residence the adjoining one belonging to a relative,
valued at 40 pesos. The neighbor’s house was at the time vacant, but in his own house there was
itself and his son.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of arson (NO)

RULING: In the opinion of the majority of the court he is not criminally liable for the fire set to his own
house nor did be intend or foresee the burning of the house of his neighbor; consequently his act
cannot constitute the crime of arson. It does, however, fall within the terms of article 568 of the Penal
Code, punishing as reckless negligence (imprudencia temeraria) an act which if actuated by malice
would have constituted a grave crime.
The sentence of the court below is reversed and the defendant, for the crime of criminal negligence
(imprudencia temeraria), is sentenced to six months imprisonment (arresto mayor), the indemnification
of 40 pesos to Mariano Tandoc, and, in case of failure to pay, to the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment, with cost.

YHT Realty Corporation v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 126780 | February 17, 2005 | J. Tinga

Article 2180 provides that owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter
are employed or on the occasion of their functions. If an employee is found negligent, it is presumed
that the employer was also negligent in selecting and/or supervising him for it is hard for the victim to
prove the negligence of such employer.

Article 2003. The hotel-keeper cannot free himself from responsibility by posting notices to the effect
that he is not liable for the articles brought by the guest. Any stipulation between the hotel-keeper and
the guest whereby the responsibility of the former as set forth in Articles 1998 to 2001 is suppressed
or diminished shall be void.

FACTS: Private Respondent Maureen Mcloughlin, an Australian businessman-philanthropist, stayed

at Tropicana Copacabana apartment hotel owned by petitioner YHT Corporation upon his arrival from
Australia. The hotel was recommended by Mcloughlin’s friend Tan. As his usual practice, he would
rent a safety box for his valuables. Two keys can open such safety deposit boxes—one for the guest,
the other to kept by the management. Should a third party wish to open the deposit box, only the
registered guest could request the hotel, and the latter would assign an employee to accompany him
to open the boxes.

On December 12, 1987, before leaving for a brief trip to Hongkong, McLoughlin took some items from
the safety box which includes the following: an envelope containing US$5,000.00, another envelope
containing AUS$10,000.00, his passports and his credit cards. The other items were left in the deposit
box. When he arrived in Hongkong, he found out that a few dollars were missing. Since he had no
idea whether somebody else had tampered with his safety deposit box, he thought that it was just a
result of bad accounting.

After returning to Manila, he checked out of Tropicana and left for Australia. When he arrived in
Australia, he discovered that the envelope with US$10,000.00 was short of $5,000. He also noticed
that the jewelry which he bought in Hongkong and stored in the safety deposit box upon his return to
Tropicana was also missing, except for a diamond bracelet.

Mcloughlin confronted the hotel employees who admitted that it was his friend Tan who opened the
safety deposit boxes using the key assigned to Mcloughlin. Tan later admitted she opened the box
with the assistance of the hotel employees. One of the employees also divulged it was Tan stole the
keys while Mcloughlin was sleeping at the hotel.

Respondent held the hotel liable for losses but Lopez denied any liability citing a waiver under the
“Undertaking For the Use of Safety Deposit Box” which exempts the hotel from any liability arising
from any loss in the contents of/or use of the safety deposit box.

RTC RULING: The trial court rendered judgement in favor of McLoughlin and found that his allegations
as to the fact of loss and as to the amount of lost were sufficiently proven. The trial court also found
the defendants acted with gross negligence in the performance and exercise of their duties and
obligations as innkeepers and were therefore liable to answer for the losses incurred by McLoughlin.
The trial court also ruled that paragraphs (2) and (4) of the "Undertaking For The Use Of Safety Deposit
Box" are not valid for being contrary to the express mandate of Article 2003 of the New Civil Code and
against public policy.

CA RULING: The CA affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

ISSUE/s:

1. Whether or not the hotel could still be made liable in case of loss of rented safety deposit boxes
despite a “waiver” exempting them from liability
2. Whether or not hotel is guilty of tort warranting payment of damages
3. Whether the award of damages is proper

RULING on ISSUE # 1: YES.

The Supreme Court said paragraphs (2) and (4) of the “undertaking” of the safety deposit boxes
manifestly contravene Article 2003 of the Civil Code as it allows Tropicana to be released from liability
arising from any loss in the contents and/or use of the safety deposit box for any cause whatsoever.

Art. 2003 of the NCC provides that the hotel-keeper cannot free himself from responsibility by posting
notices to the effect that he is not liable for the articles brought by the guest. Any stipulation between
the hotel-keeper and the guest whereby the responsibility of the former as set forth in Articles 1998 to
2001 is suppressed or diminished shall be void.

The Court said such undertaking was intended to bar any claim against Tropicana (YHT Corporation)
for any loss of the contents of the safety deposit box whether or not negligence was incurred by
Tropicana or its employees. The New Civil Code expressly provides that the responsibility of the hotel-
keeper shall extend to loss of, or injury to, the personal property of the guests even if caused by
servants or employees of the keepers of hotels or inns as well as by strangers, except as it may
proceed from any force majeure.

The Court also cited Article 2180 which provides that owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. If an employee is found
negligent, it is presumed that the employer was also negligent in selecting and/or supervising him for
it is hard for the victim to prove the negligence of such employer.

RULING on ISSUE #2: YES.

Tort liability can exist even if there is already contractual relations. The act that breaks the contract
may also be tort.

YHT Corporation was guilty of concurrent negligence in allowing Tan, who was not the registered
guest, to open the safety deposit box of McLoughlin, even assuming that the latter was also guilty of
negligence in allowing another person to use his key.

Given the fact that the loss of McLoughlin's money was consummated through the negligence of
Tropicana's employees in allowing Tan to open the safety deposit box without the guest's consent,
both the assisting employees and YHT Realty Corporation itself, as owner and operator of Tropicana,
should be held solidarily liable pursuant to Article 2193.

RULING ON ISSUE #3. YES. CA’s ruling on award of damages is proper.

The Court said the award of P50,000 for moral damages, P10,000 as exemplary damages and
P200,000 representing fees is reasonable.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 19 October
1995 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioners are directed, jointly and severally, to pay private respondent
the following amounts:

(1) US$2,000.00 and AUS$4,500.00 or their peso equivalent at the time of payment; (2) ₱308,880.80,
representing the peso value for the air fares from Sydney to Manila and back for a total of eleven (11)
trips; (3) One-half of ₱336,207.05 or ₱168,103.52 representing payment to Tropicana Copacabana
Apartment Hotel; (4) One-half of ₱152,683.57 or ₱76,341.785 representing payment to Echelon
Tower; (5) One-half of ₱179,863.20 or ₱89,931.60 for the taxi or transportation expense from
McLoughlin's residence to Sydney Airport and from MIA to the hotel here in Manila, for the eleven (11)
trips; (6) One-half of ₱7,801.94 or ₱3,900.97 representing Meralco power expenses; (7) One-half of
₱356,400.00 or ₱178,200.00 representing expenses for food and maintenance; (8) ₱50,000.00 for
moral damages; (9) ₱10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (10) ₱200,000 representing attorney's
fees.

ISAAC v. MENDOZA
G.R. No. L-2820 | June 21, 1951 | J. Bengzon

Where a copy of a court's directive or auto is sent by registered mail to an attorney of record and the
latter refuses to claim such registered matter despite the notices given him by the postmaster, the
attorney is deemed to have received the copy of such directive or auto, under Rule 27, section 8 of
the Rules of Court.

A client is bound by the acts, even mistakes of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique; but if
the client is prejudiced by the attorney's negligence or misconduct he may recover damages.

Unless the appellant files a motion to set aside the order of default, on any of the grounds enumerated
in Rule 38, he has no standing in court nor the right to appeal.

FACTS: Fausto Isaac, plaintiff, sold to Leopoldo Mendoza, defendant, a parcel of land in Pili,
Camarines Sur, reserving the right to repurchase within four years. The sale took place in February
1944. After liberation, the seller offered to redeem, but defendant objected, saying the redemption was
premature. Hence this litigation instituted in the court of first instance of said province, in February
1946, to compel re-transfer.

The defendant failed to answer. Consequently, he was declared in default. The court rendered
judgment requiring the defendant to execute a deed of re-sale of the land, to receive the amount of
P90 Philippine currency which Fausto Isaac had consigned in court, and to pay damages.

Leopoldo Mendoza submitted a petition to set aside the judgment alleging that his attorney Jorge C.
Briones had not received notice of the court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the complaint, he had
reason to believe the time to answer had not expired.

CFI RULING: Denied petition to set aside.

ISSUE: Whether defendant should suffer for his lawyer’s shortcoming.

RULING: Yes. The client is bound by the acts, even mistakes of his counsel in the realm of procedural
technique 1; but if the client is prejudiced by the attorney’s negligence or misconduct he may recover
damages.

It appears from the record that, duly summoned, defendant through Attorney Briones filed a motion to
dismiss, which was overruled by order of April 8, 1946. At the bottom of that order there is a notation
that copy had been furnished Attorney Briones by ordinary mail. On February 8, 1947, the plaintiff filed
his motion for default, asserting that, defendant’s motion to dismiss had been denied and that so far,
defendant had interposed no answer. On February 15, 1947 the court issued an auto suspending
consideration of plaintiff’s motion and giving the defendant a period of ten days within which to reply
thereto, if he so desired. Copy of this directive was sent by registered mail to Attorney Briones, but the
latter "refused to claim the registered letter despite the notices given him by the postmaster." And
according to an affidavit submitted to the court, Attorney Peñas for the plaintiff, had again and again
reminded Briones that the time was come for the answer.

According to the rules, Attorney Briones is deemed to have received the copy of the auto of February
15, 1947 which he declined to accept from the mails (Rule 27 section 8). That order was sufficient to
advise him of the rejection of his previous motion of dismissal, supposing he had not actually received
the copy of the order of April 8, 1946, which had been forwarded to him by ordinary mail.

Cang v. Cullen, 605 SCRA 391

G.R. No. 163078 | November 25, 2009 | J. Nachura

When an employee causes damage due to hisown negligence while performing his own duties, there
arises the juris tantum presumption that his employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of
observance of the diligence of a good father of a family.

FACTS: Nardo was operating a taxi when Saycon, who was travelling on a motorcycle without
protective headgear, veered into his lane and bumped him. After the impact, Nardo drove back to help
Saycon, two traffic enforcers ordered Nardo to take Saycon to the hospital. No sketch of the accident
was done by the enforcers. Saycon claims that it was Nardo that sideswept him and that Nardo tried
to speed away until he was flagged down by peace officers. Cullen, the employer of Saycon,
shouldered the hospital expenses of Saycon and is now claiming damages from Nardo and Cang, the
owner of the taxi.

RTC RULING: RTC dismissed the case. The CA reversed the RTC decision claiming thatthe RTC did
not give credit to a witness’ account of the accident.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in awarding damages to respondent.

RULING: YES. Saycon was operating the motor vehicle as a student-driver without being
accompanied by a duly licensed driver. Article 2185 provides that it is presumed that a person driving
a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
Negligence is conduct that creates an undue risk of harm to others. It is the failure to observe that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance that circumstances justly demand.

To determine whether there is negligence in a given situation, the Supreme Court laid down this test:
Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, the person is guilty of
negligence. Saycon was negligent since he should not have been driving alone. The law requires that
the holder of a student-driver’s permit should be accompanied by a duly licensed driver when operating
a motor vehicle. Further, he was not wearing a helmet and he was speeding. All these prove that he
was negligent.

Neither can Cullen as Saycon’s employer be entitled to claim damages. Cullen was negligent in the
selection and supervision of her employee. When an employee causes damage due to his own
negligence while performing his own duties, there arises the juris tantum presumption that his
employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a
family. The fact that Saycon was driving alone is proof enough that Cullen was negligent. Either she
did not know that he only had a student’s permit or she allowed him to drive alone knowing this
deficiency.

DR. IDOL L. BONDOC vs. MARILOU R. MANTALA

G.R. No. 203080| November 12, 2014 | J. VILLARAMA, JR.

A doctor's duty to his patient is not required to be extraordinary. The standard contemplated for doctors
is simply the reasonable average merit among ordinarily good physicians, i.e., reasonable skill and
competence. Petitioner not only committed a dereliction of duty, but also transgressed the ethical
norms of his profession when he failed to render competent medical care with compassion and respect
for his patient's dignity.

FACTS: Respondent was admitted at the OMPH on April 3, 2009. She was due to deliver her fifth
child and was advised by the Municipal Health Office for a cesarean section because her baby was
big and there was excessive amniotic fluid in her womb. In her complaint-affidavit, respondent alleged
that inside the delivery room of OMPH, she was attended to by petitioner who instructed the midwife
and assistants to press down on respondent's abdomen and even demonstrated to them how to insert
their fingers into her vagina. Thereafter, petitioner and his assistants went out of the delivery room.

Hours later, petitioner returned to the delivery room. No longer able to bear the pain, respondent
requested him to perform a cesarean section but this was not done. The midwife and the younger
assistants again pressed down on her abdomen causing excruciating pain on her ribs and made her
very weak. They repeatedly did this pressing until the baby and placenta came out.

When she regained consciousness, she was already at the recovery room. She learned that an
operation was performed on her by petitioner to remove her ruptured uterus, that she lost her
reproductive capacity, and that her baby was stillborn. The next day, she was transferred to a ward.
She noticed her very swollen vulva and her surgical wound open with liquid squirting from it. She was
discharged notwithstanding that the suture on her wound needs to be fixed and she still has a cough.
2 days after, the opening in her wound widened and was re-stitched petitioner.

Respondent thereafter filed a complaint for grave misconduct against petitioner. On April 23, 2010,
petitioner submitted a manifestation that he had resigned as Medical Officer of OMPH effective March
5, 2010. He thus posited that the administrative case is now rendered moot and academic.

Office of the Deputy Ombudsman: Found petitioner administratively liable. It held that by fully
entrusting to his subordinates the task of handling respondent's complicated delivery, petitioner
exhibited an improper or wrongful conduct and dereliction of duty as medical practitioner. Petitioner
was meted the penalty of DISMISSAL in the Government Service.

COURT OF APPEALS: Affirmed OMB. CA concurred that petitioner should have chosen to stay in
the delivery room and personally attend to the patient as he is the most competent person to render
medical service in view of respondent's critical condition.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of grave misconduct, warranting his dismissal from the
service (YES)

RULING: Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. It
generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or
intentional purpose. The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent.

To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the

performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. On the other hand, when the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule are
manifest, the public officer shall be liable for grave misconduct.

In deliberately leaving the respondent to a midwife and two inexperienced assistants despite knowing
that she was under prolonged painful labor and about to give birth to a macrosomic baby by vaginal
delivery, petitioner clearly committed a dereliction of duty and a breach of his professional obligations.
The gravity of respondent's condition is highlighted by the expected complications she suffered — her
stillborn baby, a ruptured uterus that necessitated immediate surgery and blood transfusion, and vulvar
hematomas.

A doctor's duty to his patient is not required to be extraordinary. The standard contemplated for doctors
is simply the reasonable average merit among ordinarily good physicians, i.e., reasonable skill and
competence. Petitioner thus not only committed a dereliction of duty, but also transgressed the ethical
norms of his profession when he failed to render competent medical care with compassion and respect
for his patient's dignity.

A grave offense cannot be mitigated by the fact that the accused is a first time offender or by the length
of service of the accused. 30 While in most cases, length of service is considered in favor of the
respondent, it is not considered where the offense committed is found to be serious or grave. When
an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment of such officer or
employee but the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the public's faith and
confidence in the government.

• Polyhydramnios is an abnormal condition occurring in pregnancy, characterized by

excessive amniotic fluid (the fluid surrounding the baby in the uterus). Apart from protecting
the baby from any external impact by providing a cushioning effect, the clear or slightly
yellowish fluid plays a vital role in proper fetal development as well. However, increased levels
of the fluid can cause various complications during different stages of pregnancy and childbirth.
Intra-amniotic pressure is markedly elevated in most patients with severe hydramnios. The
incidence of cesarean section is also increased as a result of unstable lie and placental
abruption, which may occur with the rapid decrease in intrauterine pressure that accompanies
membrane rupture.

• One of the known causes and risk factors of polyhydramnios is fetal macrosomia (having a
baby too large for the gestational age). According to medical authorities, a macrosomic infant
poses a different set of complications. The incidences of shoulder dystocia, 19 birth injuries,
perinatal death, and low Apgar scores are increased in macrosomic infants. In these cases,
careful attention to the patient, potential risk factors, clinical progress, and fetal size should
allow obstetricians to reduce the occurrence of maternal and neonatal morbidity. Vaginal
delivery of the macrosomic infant is associated with an increased incidence of birth trauma.
The question whether to perform cesarean section thus arises.
 • Article II, Section 1 of the Code of Medical Ethics of the Medical Profession in the
Philippines states:
A physician should attend to his patients faithfully and conscientiously. He should
secure for them all possible benefits that may depend upon his professional skill and
care. As the sole tribunal to adjudge the physician's failure to fulfill his obligation to his
patients is, in most cases, his own conscience, violation of this rule on his part is
discreditable and inexcusable.

E.M. WRIGHT v. MANILA ELECTRIC R. R. & LIGHT CO.

G.R. No. 7760 | October 1, 1914 | J. Moreland

Mere intoxication is not negligence, nor does the mere fact of intoxication establish a want of ordinary
care. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence.

It is the general rule that it is immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care or
prudence can be imputed to him, and no greater degree of care is required to be exercised by an
intoxicated man for his own protection than by a sober one. If one's conduct is characterized by a
proper degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial whether he is drunk or sober.

FACTS: The defendant Manila Electric Railroad is a corporation engaged in operating an electric
street railway in the city of Manila and its suburbs. The plaintiff’s residence in Caloocan fronts on the
street along which defendant's tracks run, so that to enter his premises from the street plaintiff is
obliged to cross defendant's tracks.

In one night, plaintiff drove home in a calesa to enter his premises. Unfortunately, the horse stumbled,
leaped forward and fell which resulted to the collision of the vehicle with the rails. Plaintiff also suffered
injuries.

It is undisputed that at the point where plaintiff crossed the tracks on the night in question not only the
rails were above-ground, but that the ties upon which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-
half of their depth out of the ground, thus making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more
above the level of the street.

It is admitted that the defendant was negligent in maintaining its tracks as described, but it is contended
that the plaintiff was also negligent in that he was intoxicated to such an extent at the time of the
accident that he was unable to take care of himself properly and that such intoxication was the primary
cause of the accident.

RTC RULING: Both parties are negligent but that the plaintiff's negligence was not as great as
defendant's thus, plaintiff was awarded damages in the amount of P1,000.00.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff, being intoxicated, is negligent.

RULING: No. Mere intoxication is not negligence, nor does the mere fact of intoxication establish a
want of ordinary care. If a person's conduct is characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence,
it is immaterial whether he is drunk or sober.

The conclusion that if he had been sober, he would not have been injured is not warranted by the facts
as found. It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle under the
conditions described. A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not only the rails but a portion of the
ties themselves aboveground stumbling by reason of the unsure footing and falling, the vehicle
crashing against the rails with such force as to break a wheel, this might be sufficient to throw a person
from the vehicle no matter what his condition.

A street-car company which maintains its tracks in the public highway, at a point where they are
crossed by travelers, in such condition that the rails and a considerable portion of the ties are above
the level of the street, is negligent and is responsible to a person who, having to pass over said tracks
at right angles with a vehicle in the nighttime, is injured by reason of the condition of the tracks, he
using ordinary care and prudence in making the crossing.

ALEKO E. LILIUS V. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY

G.R. No. 39587 | March 24, 1934 | J. VILLA-REAL

However, in order that a victim of an accident may recover indemnity for damages from the person
liable therefor, it is not enough that the latter has been guilty of negligence, but it is also necessary
that the said victim has not, through his own negligence, contributed to the accident, inasmuch as
nobody is a guarantor of his neighbor's personal safety and property, but everybody should look after
them, employing the care and diligence that a good father of a family should apply to his own
person, to the members of his family and to his property, in order to avoid any damage.

FACTS: This case originated from a complaint filed by Aleko E. Lilius et al., praying, under the facts
therein alleged, that the Manila Railroad Company be ordered to pay to said plaintiffs, by way of
indemnity for material and moral damages suffered by them through the fault and negligence of the
said defendant entity's employees, the sum of P50,000 plus legal interest thereon from the date of the
filing of the complaint, with costs.

Lilius was driving with his wife and daughter for sightseeing in Pagsanjan Laguna. It was his first time
in the area and he was entirely unacquainted with the conditions of the road and had no knowledge of
the existence of a railroad crossing. Before reaching the crossing in question, there was nothing to
indicate its existence and, it was impossible to see an approaching train. At about seven or eight
meters from the crossing the plaintiff saw an autotruck parked on the left side of the road. Several
people, who seemed to have alighted from the said truck, were walking on the opposite side. He
slowed down and sounded his horn for the people to get out of the way. With his attention thus
occupied, he did not see the crossing but he heard two short whistles. Immediately afterwards, he saw
a huge black mass fling itself upon him, which turned out to be locomotive No. 713 of the MRC’s train.
The locomotive struck the plaintiff’s car right in the center. The 3 victims were injured and were
hospitalized.

Lilus filed a case against MRC in the CFI. Answering the complaint, it denies each and every allegation
thereof and, by way of special defense, alleges that the Lilius, with the cooperation of his wife and co
plaintiff, negligently and recklessly drove his car, and prays that it be absolved from the complaint.

The CFI decided in favor of Lilius. The 2 parties appealed said decision, each assigning errors on said
judgment.

ISSUE

1. Whether or not Manila Railroad Company is liable for damages

2. Whether or not the sums of money fixed by the court a quo as indemnities for damages proper
a. Injuries sutained by Lilius
b. for injuries sustained by wife and child
c. for loss of domestic service of wife to husband
RULING

1. YES. Upon examination of the oral as well as of the documentary evidence, this court is of the
opinion that the accident was due to negligence on the part of the defendant-appellant
company alone, for not having had on that occasion any semaphore at the crossing to serve
as a warning to passers-by of its existence in order that they might take the necessary
precautions before crossing the railroad; and, on the part of its employees — the flagman and
switchman, for not having remained at his post at the crossing in question to warn passers-by
of the approaching train

Although it is probable that the defendant-appellant entity employed the diligence of a good
father of a family in selecting its aforesaid employees, however, it did not employ such
diligence in supervising their work and the discharge of their duties. The diligence of a good
father of a family, which the law requires in order to avoid damage, is not confined to the
careful and prudent selection of subordinates or employees but includes inspection of their
work and supervision of the discharge of their duties.

2. Second Issue:
a. With respect to the plaintiffs’ appeal, the first question to be decided is that raised by Lilius
relative to the insufficiency of the sum of P5,000 which the trial court adjudicated to him by
way of indemnity for damages consisting in the loss of his income as journalist and author as
a result of his illness. As to the amount of P10,000 claimed by Lilius as damages for the loss
of his wife’s services in his business, which services consisted in going over his writings,
translating them into foreign languages and acting as his secretary, in addition to the fact that
such services formed part of the work whereby he realized a net monthly income of P1,500,
there is no sufficient evidence of the true value of said services nor to the effect that he needed
them during her illness and had to employ a translator to act in her stead.

b. Taking into consideration the fact that the wife — in the language of the court, which saw
her at the trial — “young and beautiful and the big scar, which she has on her forehead caused
by the lacerated wound received by her from the accident, disfigures her face and that the
fracture of her left leg has caused a permanent deformity which renders it very difficult for her
to walk”, and taking into further consideration her social standing, neither is the sum
adjudicated to her for patrimonial and moral damages, excessive.

As to the indemnity in favor of the child neither is the same excessive, taking into consideration
the fact that the lacerations received by her have left deep scars that permanently disfigure
her face and that the fractures of both her legs permanently render it difficult for her to walk
freely, continuous extreme care being necessary in order to keep her balance in addition to
the fact that all of this unfavorably and to a great extent affect her matrimonial future.

c. Lilius also seeks to recover the sum of P2,500 for the loss of what is called Anglo-Saxon
common law “consortium” of his wife, that is, “her services, society and conjugal
companionship”, as a result of personal injuries which she had received from the accident now
under consideration.

Under the law and the doctrine of this court, one of the husband’s rights is to count on his
wife’s assistance. This assistance comprises the management of the home and the
performance of household duties. However, nowadays when women, in their desire to be more
useful to society and to the nation, are demanding greater civil rights and are aspiring to
become man’s equal in all the activities of life, marriage has ceased to create the presumption
that a woman complies with the duties to her husband and children, which the law imposes
 upon her, and he who seeks to collect indemnity for damages resulting from deprivation of her
domestic services must prove such services. In the case under consideration, apart from the
services of his wife as translator and secretary, the value of which has not been proven, Lilius
has not presented any evidence showing the existence of domestic services and their nature,
rendered by her prior to the accident, in order that it may serve as a basis in estimating their
value.

Furthermore, inasmuch as a wife’s domestic assistance and conjugal companionship are

purely personal and voluntary acts which neither of the spouses may be compelled to render,
it is necessary for the party claiming indemnity for the loss of such services to prove that the
person obliged to render them had done so before he was injured and that he would be willing
to continue rendering them had he not been prevented from so doing

ROGELIO E. RAMOS v. CA
GR No. 124354 | April 11, 2002 | J. Kapunan

The Captain-of-the-Ship Doctrine was discussed in McConnell v. Williams (65 A 2d 243 [1949]), where
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated that under this doctrine, a surgeon is likened to a captain
of the ship, in that it is his duty to control everything going on in the operating room.

FACTS: Erlinda Ramos (Erlinda) was advised to undergo cholecystectomy, an operation for the
removal of a stone in the gallbladder. Her Surgeon was Dr. Hosaka.

The operation was scheduled for June 17, 1985 at 9:00 in the morning at De Los Santos Medical
Center (DLSMC). Since neither Erlinda nor her husband, Rogelio Ramos (Rogelio), knew of any
anesthesiologist, Dr. Hosaka recommended to them the services of Dr. Gutierrez.

Erlinda was prepared for her operation as early as 7:30AM. Herminda Cruz (Cruz), then Dean of the
College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center, was allowed to accompany her inside the operating
room.

However, Dr. Hosaka did not arrive on the schedule time, instead, he arrived 3 hours late. Inside the
operating room, Cruz saw Dr. Gutierrez trying to intubate the Erlinda. Cruz heard Dr. Gutierrez utter:
"ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan." Cruz noticed a bluish
discoloration of Erlinda's nailbeds on her left hand. Cruz then heard Dr. Hosaka instruct someone to
call Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist.

Erlinda was transferred to the Intensive Care Unit at around 3PM. The doctors explained to Rogelio
that his wife had bronchospasm. Erlinda stayed in the ICU for a month. She was released from the
hospital only four months later or on November 15, 1985. Since the ill-fated operation, Erlinda
remained in comatose condition until she died on August 3, 1999.

RTC RULING: This prompted petitioners to file a civil case for damages against respondents. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in the former’s favor holding that private respondents were negligent
in the performance of their duties.

CA RULING: On appeal by private respondents, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
decision and directed petitioners to pay their "unpaid medical bills" to private respondents.

However, on December 29, 1999, the Supreme Court found respondents liable for the following
damages: 1) P1,352,000.00 as actual damages computed as of the date of promulgation of the
decision plus a monthly payment of P8,000.00 up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or
miraculously survives; 2) P2,000,000.00 as moral damages, 3) P1,500,000.00 as temperate damages;
4) P100,000.00 each exemplary damages and attorney's fees; and 5) the costs of the suit.

Dr. Hosaka mainly contends that the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine. should not apply alleging that the
trend in United States jurisprudence has been to reject said doctrine in light of the developments in
medical practice. He points out that anesthesiology and surgery are two distinct and specialized fields
in medicine and as a surgeon, he is not deemed to have control over the acts of Dr. Gutierrez. Hence,
this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Is Dr. Gutierrez liable for negligence?
2. Is Dr. Hosaka liable for negligence under the Captain of the Ship doctrine?
3. Is DLSMC liable for the negligence of Dr. Guiterrez and Dr. Hosaka?

RULING:

1. YES. The conduct of a preanesthetic/preoperative evaluation prior to an operation, whether elective

or emergency, cannot be dispensed with. Such evaluation is necessary for the formulation of a plan
of anesthesia care suited to the needs of the patient concerned.

Nonetheless, Dr. Gutierrez omitted to perform a thorough preoperative evaluation on Erlinda. As she
herself admitted, she saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation itself, one hour before
the scheduled operation. She auscultated the patient's heart and lungs and checked the latter's blood
pressure to determine if Erlinda was indeed fit for operation. However, she did not proceed to examine
the patient's airway. Had she been able to check Erlinda's airway prior to the operation, Dr. Gutierrez
would most probably not have experienced difficulty in intubating the former, and thus the resultant
injury could have been avoided.

Gutierrez' act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled operative
procedure was, therefore, an act of exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility. The
measures cautioning prudence and vigilance in dealing with human lives lie at the core of the
physician's centuries-old Hippocratic Oath. Her failure to follow this medical procedure is, therefore, a
clear indicia of her negligence.

The Court also did not believe Dr. Guiterrez’s allegation that Erlinda had an allergic reaction. An
allergic reaction is something which is not usual response and it is further qualified by the release of a
hormone called histamine and histamine has an effect on all the organs of the body. So histamine has
multiple effects on the body such as: redness; tearing of the eyes; swelling, very crucial swelling
sometimes of the larynges which is your voice box main airway,

The Court did not also give credence to Dr. Guiterrez’s contention that she successfully intubated
Erlinda. The synopsis provided by Dr. Guiterrez in narrating what happened in the Operating Room
was made only after Erlinda was taken out of the operating room, contrary to the standard practice
that every act of the anesthesiologist must be recorded immediately. Moreover, the synopsis
presented could not account could not account for at least ten (10) minutes of what happened during
the administration of anesthesia on Erlinda. As pointed out by Dr. Estrella, an amicus curiae in this
case, there was a ten-minute gap in Dr. Gutierrez' synopsis, i.e., the vital signs of Erlinda were not
recorded during that time. The absence of these data is particularly significant because, as found by
the trial court, it was the absence of oxygen supply for four (4) to five (5) minutes that caused Erlinda's
comatose condition.

The injury incurred by Erlinda does not normally happen absent any negligence in the administration
of anesthesia and in the use of an endotracheal tube. The instruments used in the administration of
anesthesia, including the endotracheal tube, were all under the exclusive control of private
respondents Dr. Gutierrez and Dr. Hosaka. In Voss vs. Bridwell, which involved a patient who suffered
brain damage due to the wrongful administration of anesthesia, and even before the scheduled
mastoid operation could be performed, the Kansas Supreme Court applied the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, reasoning that the injury to the patient therein was one which does not ordinarily take place
in the absence of negligence in the administration of an anesthetic, and in the use and employment of
an endotracheal tube.

2. YES. The Court held that that there is a trend in American jurisprudence to do away with the Captain-
of-the-Ship doctrine does not mean that it will ipso facto follow said trend. Due regard for the peculiar
factual circumstances obtaining in this case justify the application of the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine.

From the facts on record it can be logically inferred that Dr. Hosaka exercised a certain degree of, at
the very least, supervision over the procedure then being performed on Erlinda.

First, it was Dr. Hosaka who recommended to petitioners the services of Dr. Gutierrez. In effect, he
represented to petitioners that Dr. Gutierrez possessed the necessary competence and skills. Drs.
Hosaka and Gutierrez had worked together since 1977. Whenever Dr. Hosaka performed a surgery,
he would always engage the services of Dr. Gutierrez to administer the anesthesia on his patient.

Second, Dr. Hosaka himself admitted that he was the attending physician of Erlinda. Thus, when
Erlinda showed signs of cyanosis, it was Dr. Hosaka who gave instructions to call for another
anesthesiologist and cardiologist to help resuscitate Erlinda.

Third, it is conceded that in performing their responsibilities to the patient, Drs. Hosaka and Gutierrez
worked as a team. Their work cannot be placed in separate watertight compartments because their
duties intersect with each other.

That they were working as a medical team is evident from the fact that Dr. Hosaka was keeping an
eye on the intubation of the patient by Dr. Gutierrez, and while doing so, he observed that the patient's
nails had become dusky and had to call Dr. Gutierrez's attention thereto. The Court also notes that
the counsel for Dr. Hosaka admitted that in practice, the anesthesiologist would also have to observe
the surgeon's acts during the surgical process and calls the attention of the surgeon whenever
necessary

It is equally important to point out that Dr. Hosaka was remiss in his duty of attending to petitioner
Erlinda promptly, for he arrived more than three (3) hours late for the scheduled operation. Dr. Hosaka
scheduled two procedures on the same day, just thirty minutes apart from each other, at different
hospitals.

Dr. Hosaka's irresponsible conduct of arriving very late for the scheduled operation of petitioner Erlinda
is violative, not only of his duty as a physician "to serve the interest of his patients with the greatest
solicitude, giving them always his best talent and skill," but also of Article 19 of the Civil Code which
requires a person, in the performance of his duties, to act with justice and give everyone his due.

3. NO. It has been consistently held that in determining whether an employer-employee relationship
exists between the parties, the following elements must be present: (1) selection and engagement of
services; (2) payment of wages; (3) the power to hire and fire; and (4) the power to control not only
the end to be achieved, but the means to be used in reaching such an end

DLSMC does not engage the services of the consultants. As explained by respondent hospital, that
the admission of a physician to membership in DLSMC's medical staff as active or visiting consultant
is first decided upon by the Credentials Committee thereof, which is composed of the heads of the
various specialty departments such as the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Pediatrics,
Surgery with the department head of the particular specialty applied for as chairman. The Credentials
Committee then recommends to DLSMC's Medical Director or Hospital Administrator the acceptance
or rejection of the applicant physician, and said director or administrator validates the committee's
recommendation. Similarly, in cases where a disciplinary action is lodged against a consultant, the
same is initiated by the department to whom the consultant concerned belongs and filed with the
Ethics Committee consisting of the department specialty heads. The medical director/hospital
administrator merely acts as ex-officio member of said committee.

Neither is there any showing that it is DLSMC which pays any of its consultants for medical services
rendered by the latter to their respective patients. Moreover, the contract between the consultant in
respondent hospital and his patient is separate and distinct from the contract between respondent
hospital and said patient. The first has for its object the rendition of medical services by the consultant
to the patient, while the second concerns the provision by the hospital of facilities and services by its
staff such as nurses... and laboratory personnel necessary for the proper treatment of the patient.

Further, no evidence was adduced to show that the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda was due to a
failure on the part of respondent DLSMC to provide for hospital facilities and staff necessary for her
treatment.

ON MODIFICATION OF DAMAGES:

The Court deemed it necessary to modify the award of damages to petitioners in view of the
supervening event of petitioner Erlinda's death. In the assailed Decision, the Court awarded actual
damages of One Million Three Hundred Fifty Two Thousand Pesos (P1,352,000.00) to cover the
expenses for petitioner Erlinda's treatment and care from the date of promulgation of the Decision up
to the time the patient expires or survives.

In addition thereto, the Court awarded temperate damages of One Million Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P1,500,000.00) in view of the chronic and continuing nature of petitioner Erlinda's injury and
the certainty of further pecuniary loss by petitioners as a result of said injury, the amount of which,
however, could not be made with certainty at the... time of the promulgation of the decision.

However, subsequent to the promulgation of the Decision, the Court was informed by petitioner
Rogelio that petitioner Erlinda died on August 3, 1999. In view of this supervening event, the award of
temperate damages in addition to the actual or... compensatory damages would no longer be justified
since the actual damages awarded in the Decision are sufficient to cover the medical expenses
incurred by petitioners for the patient. Hence, only the amounts representing actual, moral and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit should be awarded to petitioners.

Marikina Autoline Transport Corporation v. People, 486 SCRA 284

G.R. No. 152040 | March 31, 2006 | J. CALLEJO, SR

The sudden emergency rule was enunciated by this Court in Gan v. Court of Appeals,23 thus: One
who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger and is required to act without time to consider the best
means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to
adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method unless the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.

FACTS: Erlinda V. Valdellon is the owner of a two-door commercial apartment located at No. 31
Kamias Road, Quezon City. The Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation (MALTC) is the owner-
operator of a passenger bus with Plate Number NCV-849. Suelto, its employee, was assigned as the
regular driver of the bus.

At around 2:00 p.m. on October 3, 1992, Suelto was driving the aforementioned passenger bus along
Kamias Road, Kamuning, Quezon City, going towards Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). The
bus suddenly swerved to the right and struck the terrace of the commercial apartment owned by
Valdellon located along Kamuning Road. Valdellon demanded payment of P148,440.00 to cover the
cost of the damage to the terrace. The bus company and Suelto offered a P30,000.00 settlement
which Valdellon refused.

Valdellon filed a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property against
Suelto. Valdellon also filed a separate civil complaint against Suelto and the bus company for
damages. Suelto maintained that, in an emergency case, he was not, in law, negligent. Both the trial
court and the CA ruled in against herein petitioners.

RTC RULING: The trial court rendered judgment finding Suelto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, and ordered MALTC and Suelto to pay, jointly
and severally, P150,000.00 to Valdellon, by way of actual and compensatory damages, as well as
attorney’s fees and costs of suit.

CA RULING: AFFIRMED the decision of RTC with the modification that the sum of P150,000.00 as
compensation sustained by the plaintiff-appellee for her damaged apartment be reduced to
P100,000.00 without pronouncement as to costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sudden emergency rule applies in the case at bar.

RULING: No. It was the burden of petitioners herein to prove petitioner Suelto’s defense that he acted
on an emergency, that is, he had to swerve the bus to the right to avoid colliding with a passenger
jeep coming from EDSA that had overtaken another vehicle and intruded into the lane of the bus. The
sudden emergency rule was enunciated by this Court in Gan v. Court of Appeals,23 thus:

One who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger and is required to act without time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been
a better method unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own
negligence.

In relation thereto, Article 2185 of the New Civil Code provides that "unless there is proof to the
contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent, if at the time of
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation." By his own admission, petitioner Suelto violated the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code when he suddenly swerved the bus to the right, thereby causing
damage to the property of private respondent.

However, the trial court correctly rejected petitioner Suelto’s defense, in light of his contradictory
testimony vis-à-vis his Counter-Affidavit submitted during the preliminary investigation:

It is clear from the photographs submitted by the prosecution (Exhs. C, D, G, H & I) that the commercial
apartment of Dr. Valdellon sustained heavy damage caused by the bus being driven by Suelto. "It
seems highly improbable that the said damages were not caused by a strong impact. And, it is quite
reasonable to conclude that, at the time of the impact, the bus was traveling at a high speed when
Suelto tried to avoid the passenger jeepney." The damages could not have been caused except by a
speeding bus. Had the accused not been speeding, he could have easily reduced his speed and come
to a full stop when he noticed the jeep. Were he more prudent in driving, he could have avoided the
incident or even if he could not avoid the incident, the damages would have been less severe.

In addition to this, the accused has made conflicting statements in his counter-affidavit and his
testimony in court. In the former, he stated that the reason why he swerved to the right was because
he wanted to avoid the passenger jeepney in front of him that made a sudden stop. But, in his
testimony in court, he said that it was to avoid a passenger jeepney coming from EDSA that was
overtaking by occupying his lane. Such glaring inconsistencies on material points render the testimony
of the witness doubtful and shatter his credibility. Furthermore, the variance between testimony and
prior statements renders the witness unreliable. Such inconsistency results in the loss in the credibility
of the witness and his testimony as to his prudence and diligence.

As already maintained and concluded, the severe damages sustained could not have resulted had the
accused acted as a reasonable and prudent man would. The accused was not diligent as he claims
to be. What is more probable is that the accused had to swerve to the right and hit the commercial
apartment of the plaintiff because he could not make a full stop as he was driving too fast in a usually
crowded street.

Petitioner Suelto’s reliance on the sudden emergency rule to escape conviction for the crime charged
and his civil liabilities based thereon is, thus, futile.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The joint decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is AFFIRMED WITH THE MODIFICATION that petitioner Suelto
is sentenced to pay a fine of P55,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Petitioners are ORDERED to pay to Erlinda V. Valdellon, jointly and severally, the total amount of
P55,000.00 by way of actual damages, and P20,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.

Poblete v. Fabros
G.R. No. L-29803, [September 14, 1979] | NO DIGEST MADE

This is an action for damages, arising from a vehicular accident, filed by the plaintiff Godofredo Poblete
as owner of the damaged taxicab, against the driver and owner of the allegedly offending vehicle,
Donato Fabros and Godofredo de la Cruz, respectively. prcd

After trial on the merits, and the case submitted for decision, the trial court, the Court of First Instance
of Davao, Judge Vicente Cusi, Jr., presiding, dismissed the case on the ground that from the allegation
of the complaint, the action is one to hold Donato Fabros, as the employer of the allegedly negligent
driver, Godofredo de la Cruz, subsidiarily liable for the damage caused the plaintiff, and is, therefore,
premature, there having been no criminal action filed against the driver who had died during the
pendency of the case at bar, and, in effect, states no cause of action. A motion for reconsideration
was filed to the order of dismissal, but to no avail. Hence, this appeal.

The question raised is whether on the basis of the allegation of the complaint, the action is one to
enforce the subsidiary liability of the employer of the negligent driver as provided in Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, as held by the court a quo, or it is an action based on quasi-delict. In the first
case, the action would be premature and would, accordingly, be wanting in a cause of action before a
judgment of conviction has been rendered against the negligent driver, for, while a separate civil action
may be filed for damages arising from the criminal offense of the accused for criminal negligence,
upon proper reservation of said action (Section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court), the same may not be
heard separately in advance or ahead of the criminal action. While in the second case, the action,
being for liability based on quasi-delict, not for liability arising from crime, may proceed independently
from the criminal action. It is also for a different purpose, the liability sought to be imposed on the
employer being a primary and direct liability, not merely subsidiary. Civil liability for quasi-delict and
that arising out of a crime are clearly different and distinct from each other, as lucidly demonstrated
and discussed in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al., 78 Phil. 607.

Examining the allegations of the complaints, to determine what is made the basis thereof for the relief
sought, which is to impose a "joint and several" liability on the defendants (p. 5 Record on Appeal;
Page 26, Rollo), there is absolutely no reason to exclude and rule out, as the court a quo did, the fact
that the action is one based on quasi delict, and hold, as again the court did, that the action is based
on the criminal offense of negligence, as defined in the Revised Penal Code, committed by the driver
alone, and concluding that the purpose of the action is to impose the subsidiary liability on the employer
as provided in the same Code.

The court a quo said:

"As it is, the complaint really states no cause of action against Donato Fabros in his capacity as
employer of Godofredo de la Cruz. Stated differently, the complaint against Donato Fabros is
premature, because he is only subsidiarily liable under the Penal Code. His subsidiary liability should
not be litigated in the civil action against de la Cruz. It follows that the third-party complaint that he
filed is also premature."

From the above observation of the Court, it is crystal clear that the court itself has found that the
employer-employee relation of the two defendants has been sufficiently alleged; otherwise, it would
have no basis for saying that the complaint is "against Donato Fabros in his capacity as employer of
Godofredo de la Cruz." The defendant Donato Fabros has himself correctly perceived the basis of the
complaint against him, as one based on quasi-delict, for instead of filing a motion for a bill of particulars
if he deemed the allegations vague or ambiguous, he interposed in his answer the defense of a "due
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection, employment and supervision of his driver." (Page
8, Record on Appeal; Page 26, Rollo) Cdpr

In the second place, in alluding to the subsidiary liability of the employer, Donato Fabros, the court a
quo has, likewise, found sufficiently alleged negligence as the basis for the action. The complaint
expressly and clearly alleges that the accident was "due solely to the gross negligence, carelessness
and unskillful driving of defendant Godofredo de la Cruz" (Page 3, Record on Appeal, Page 20, Rollo).

With the allegation of negligence against the driver, Godofredo de la Cruz, and that of an employer-
employee relation between him and his co-defendant, Donato Fabros, the complaint clearly and
unmistakably makes out a case based on quasi-delict, as explicitly provided in Article 2180 of the Civil
Code which, inter alia, provides:

". . . The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions."

What needs only to be alleged under the aforequoted provision is that the employee (driver) has, by
his negligence (quasi-delict) caused damage to make the employer, likewise, responsible for the
tortious act of the employee, and his liability is, as earlier observed, primary and solidary. (Bachrach
Motor Co. vs. Gamboa, L-10296, May 21, 1957; Malipol vs. Tan, 55 SCRA 202; Barredo vs. Garcia
and Almario, 73 Phil. 607; Vinluan vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 16 SCRA 742; Anuran, et al. vs. Buño,
et al. 17 SCRA 224)

It is such a firmly established principle, as to have virtually formed part of the law itself, that the
negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer.
This is the presumed negligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. The theory of
presumed negligence, in contrast with the American doctrine of respondeat superior, where the
negligence of the employee is conclusively presumed to be the negligence of the employer, is clearly
deducible from the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides that the
responsibility therein mentioned shall cease if the employers prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damages (12 Manresa, 657; Balica vs. Litonjua and Leynes, 30
Phil. 624; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil. 768), as observed in the same cases just cited.
LLpr

From what has been said, the error of the court a quo in dismissing the case on his mistaken notion
that the action is based on crime, not quasi-delict, becomes very patent. How the court concluded that
the action is to enforce the subsidiary liability of Donato Fabros as the employer of the negligent driver
Godofredo de la Cruz is inconceivable, with the plain and explicit prayer of the complaint to declare
the defendants "jointly and severally" liable for damages, a concept antagonistic to that of subsidiary
liability. The death of defendant, Godofredo de la Cruz, the driver, is therefore, no hindrance to the
present action, at least as against the employer, Donato Fabros, taking its course to final judgment,
which the court a quo should have rendered, the trial of the case having been terminated, instead of
dismissing the case, without even a motion to dismiss, with the evidence, in all probability, supportive
of an action on quasi-delict, which the pleadings, both the complaint and the answer, raised as the
specific issue involved and as joined by said pleadings.

A word of advice at least as a reminder, may be meet at this juncture, for judges to give a deeper study
and reflection in the disposition of cases, so that undue delay which could very well be avoided, as in
this case, had the judge been more circumspect and analytical, would not cause injustice to litigants,
under the familiar maxim that justice delayed is justice denied, which should constantly sound its stern
warning to all dispensers of justice.

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal dated April 17, 1968 is hereby set aside, and let this case be
remanded to the court of origin for the rendition of the judgment on the merits based on the evidence
adduced during the trial. This judgment shall be immediately executory upon its promulgation.

JOSE PILAPIL v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALATCO TRANSPORTATION COMPANY

G.R. No. 52159 | December 22, 1989 | J. Padilla

It is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a transportation company makes it an
insurer of the passenger's safety, but that its liability for personal injuries sustained by its passenger
rests upon its negligence, its failure to exercise the degree of diligence that the law requires.

A tort committed by a stranger which causes injury to a passenger does not accord the latter a cause
of action against the carrier. The negligence for which a common carrier is held responsible is the
negligent omission by the carrier's employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same
could have been foreseen and prevented by them. Further, it is to be noted that when the violation of
the contract is due to the wilful acts of strangers, as in the instant case, the degree of care essential
to be exercised by the common carrier for the protection of its passenger is only that of a good father
of a family.

FACTS: Petitioner Jose Pilapil, a paying passenger, boarded respondent’s bus. While the said bus
was on the way to Naga City, an unidentified man, a bystander along the national highway, hurled a
stone at the left side of the bus, which hit the petitioner above his left eye. Respondent’s personnel
brought the petitioner to the hospital where he was confined and treated. However, despite the number
of doctors that petitioner went to to have his left eye treated, petitioner still partially lost vision in his
left eye and sustained a permanent scar above the left eye. Hence, petitioner instituted before the CFI
Camarines Sur an action for recovery of damages sustained as a result of the stone throwing incident.
RTC RULING: court a quo rendered judgment ordering defendant transportation company to pay
damages and to reimburse him for his medical expenses and attorney’s fees

CA RULING: on appeal, CA reserved and set aside the court a quo’s ruling.

ISSUE: Whether the nature of the business of a transportation company requires the assumption of
certain risk such as the stoning in this case so as to make it liable for injuries

RULING: NO.

Under Article 1733 of the Civil Code, common carriers are required to observe extraordinary
diligence for the safety of the passenger transported by them, according to all the circumstances of
each case. The requirement is restated in Article 1755: “A common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.” Further, in case of death of or
injuries to passengers, the law presumes said common carriers to be at fault or to have acted
negligently.

While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport
of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does not, however,
make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers. Article 1755 of the Civil Code
qualifies the duty of extraordinary care, vigilance and precaution in the carriage of passengers by
common carriers to only such as human care and foresight can provide. What constitutes compliance
with said duty is adjudged with due regard to all the circumstances. Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in
creating a presumption of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier when its passenger is
injured, merely relieves the latter, for the time being, from introducing evidence to fasten the
negligence on the former, because the presumption stands in the place of evidence. Being a mere
presumption, however, the same is rebuttable by proof that the common carrier had exercised
extraordinary diligence as required by law in the performance of its contractual obligation, or that the
injury suffered by the passenger was solely due to a fortuitous event. In fine, we can only infer from
the law the intention of the Code Commission and Congress to curb the recklessness of drivers and
operators of common carriers in the conduct of their business.

Thus, it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a transportation company
makes it an insurer of the passenger's safety, but that its liability for personal injuries sustained
by its passenger rests upon its negligence, its failure to exercise the degree of diligence that
the law requires.

The presumption of fault or negligence against common carriers is only a disputable

presumption. In this case, the injury sustained by the petitioner was in no way due to any defect in
the means of transport or in the method of transporting or to the negligent or willful acts of private
respondent's employees, and therefore involving no issue of negligence in its duty to provide safe and
suitable cars as well as competent employees. The presumption is rebutted and the carrier is not
and ought not to be held liable.

While as a general rule, common carriers are bound to exercise extraordinary diligence in the safe
transport of their passengers, it would seem that this is not the standard by which its liability is to be
determined when intervening acts of strangers directly cause the injury, while the contract of carriage
exists.

Article 1763 provides –

Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account
of the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's
 employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission.

Clearly under the above provision, a tort committed by a stranger which causes injury to a
passenger does not accord the latter a cause of action against the carrier. The negligence for
which a common carrier is held responsible is the negligent omission by the carrier's employees to
prevent the tort from being committed when the same could have been foreseen and prevented by
them. Further, under the same provision, it is to be noted that when the violation of the contract is due
to the wilful acts of strangers, as in the instant case, the degree of care essential to be exercised by
the common carrier for the protection of its passenger is only that of a good father of a family.

WHEREFORE, appealed judgment is affirmed.

Custodio v. Court of Appeals

GR No. 116100 | February 9, 1996 | REGALADO, J.

FACTS: Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a 2 door apartment. The property is surrounded by other
immovables. When Mabasa bought the land, there were tenants who were occupying the property,
and there were supposed two different passageways. First passageway with an approximate 1 meter
wide and 20 meters distance to P. Burgos Street. The second about 3 meters wide and 26 meters
away.

When Mabasa went to see the premises after one of the tenants vacated, he saw that there had been
built an adobe fence in the apartment in the first passageway that made it narrower. The Santoses
first constructed the said adobe fence . Defendant Morato constructed her own adobe fence and even
extended said fence that entirely closed the said passage way. The remaining tenants vacated
thereafter.

The case was brought to the trial court and ordered the Custodios and the Santoses to give Mabasa
a permanet ingress and eggress to the public street and asked Mabasa to pay Custodios and Santoses
for damages.

Issue:
1. Whether or not Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way
2. Whether or not the CA erred in awarding damages.

Ruling:

1. Yes, Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way. A person has a right to the natural use and
enjoyment of his own property, according to his pleasure, for all the purposes to which such property
is usually applied.

2. Yes. The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages.
To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by
the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage
without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy
allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.

An injury is an illegal invasion of a legal right, any loss, hurt and harm resulting from the injury is
damage. Damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
In this case, the petitioners merely constructed an adobe wall which was in keeping with and is a valid
exercise of their rights as the owner of their respective properties—i.e. there was no abuse of right as
provided for in Article 21 of the New Civil Code and where the following requisites must concur: (1)
defendant acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should
be willful and; (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. None of these requisites was present in
this case.

As a general rule, there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a
lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to
another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. When the owner of property makes use
thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as fencing or enclosing
the same as in this case, nobody can complain of having been injured, because the inconvenience
arising from said use can be considered as a mere consequence of community life.

In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be not
only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.

**damnum absque injuria (Latin for “loss or damage without injury”) is a phrase expressing the principle
of tort law in which some person (natural or legal) causes damage or loss to another, but does not
injure them.

SERGIO AMONOY v. Spouses JOSE GUTIERREZ and ANGELA FORNIDA

G.R. No. 140420 I February 15, 2001 I J. PANGANIBAN

Under the principle of damnum absque injuria, the legitimate exercise of a person's rights, even if it
causes loss to another, does not automatically result in an actionable injury. The law does not
prescribe a remedy for the loss. However, this principle does not apply when there is an abuse of a
person's right, or when the exercise of this right is suspended or extinguished pursuant to a court order.
Indeed, in the availment of one's rights, one must act with justice, give their due, and observe honesty
and good faith.

FACTS: Petitioner Sergio Amonoy was the counsel of the successors of the deceased Julio Cantolos
for the settlement of the latter’s estate. On January 1965, the lots were adjudicated to Asuncion
Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda. On January 20, 1965, Pasamba and Formilda executed a deed of
real estate mortgage on the said two (2) lots adjudicated to them, in favor of petitioner Amonoy to
secure the payment of his attorney’s fees. However, on August 6, 1969, after the taxes had been paid,
the claims settled and the properties adjudicated, the estate was declared closed and terminated.

When Pasamba and Formilda died, Formilda was succeeded by the Spouses Jose Gutierrez and
Angela Fornida (respondents). On January 21, 1970, petitioner Amonoy filed for the closure of the two
(2) lots alleging the non-payment of attorney’s fees. The herein respondents denied the allegation,
however, judgment was rendered in favor of petitioner Amonoy. The subject lots were foreclosed for
failure to pay the attorney’s fees. Petitioner Amonoy was able to buy the lots by auction where the
house of the respondents was situated.

On petitioner Amonoy’s motion of April 24, 1986, orders were implemented for the demolition of
structures in the said lots, including herein respondents’ house. On September 27, 1985, David
Formilda petitioned to the Supreme Court for a TRO for the suspension of the demolition, which was
granted, but the houses have already been demolished. However, by the time the Supreme Court
promulgated the abovementioned Decision, respondents' house had already been destroyed,
supposedly in accordance with a Writ of Demolition ordered by the lower court. Thus, a Complaint for
damages in connection with the destruction of their house was filed by the respondents against
petitioner Amonoy before the RTC on December 15, 1989. On the other hand, petitioner invokes the
principle of damnum absque injuria in arguing that he is not liable for the demolition of respondents'
house. He maintains that he was merely acting in accordance with the Writ of Demolition ordered by
the RTC.

RTC RULING: In its January 27, 1993 Decision, the RTC dismissed the complaint for damages of the
respondents.

CA RULING: On appeal, the CA set aside the lower court's ruling and ordered petitioner to pay
respondents P250,000 as actual damages. It also denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the
petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in deciding that the petitioner is liable to the
respondents for damages.

RULING: Yes. The Court held that damnum absque injuria finds no application to this case.

Well-settled is the maxim that damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of a person's rights is a
loss without injury- damnum absque injuria - for which the law gives no remedy. In other words, one
who merely exercises one's rights does no actionable injury and cannot be held liable for damages.

It is true that petitioner commenced the demolition of respondents' house on May 30, 1986 under the
authority of a Writ of Demolition issued by the RTC. But the records show that a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO), enjoining the demolition of respondents' house, was issued by the Supreme Court on
June 2, 1986. The CA also found, based on the Certificate of Service of the Supreme Court process
server, that a copy of the TRO was served on petitioner himself on June 4, 1986.

Petitioner, however, did not heed the TRO of this Court. The Court agrees with the CA that he
unlawfully pursued the demolition of respondents' house well until the middle of 1987. Although the
acts of petitioner may have been legally justified at the outset, their continuation after the issuance of
the TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of his right. Indubitably, his actions were tainted with bad
faith. Had he not insisted on completing the demolition, respondents would not have suffered the loss
that engendered the suit before the RTC. Verily, his acts constituted not only an abuse of a right, but
an invalid exercise of a right that had been suspended when he received thae TRO from this Court on
June 4, 1986. By then he was no longer entitled to proceed with the demolition.

In Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. CA, the Court discussed the concept of abuse of rights as follows:

"Artilce 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse
of rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of
one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the
following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; recognizes the primordial
limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth
in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed
for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible."

Clearly, the demolition of respondents' house by petitioner, despite his receipt of the TRO, was not
only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right. In insisting on his alleged right, he wantonly
violated this Court's Order and wittingly caused the destruction of respondents’ house.

Obviously, petitioner cannot invoke damnum absque injuria, a principle premised on the valid exercise
of a right. Anything less or beyond such exercise will not give rise to the legal protection that the
principle accords. And when damage or prejudice to another is occasioned thereby, liability cannot be
obscured, much less abated.

In the ultimate analysis, petitioner's liability is premised on the obligation to repair or to make whole
the damage caused to another by reason of one's act or omission, whether done intentionally or
negligently and whether or not punishable by law.

United Coconut Planters Bank v. Basco

437 SCRA 325 | NO DIGEST MADE – FROM GOOGLE

Facts: Respondent Basco had been employed with petitioner UCPB for 17 years and also worked as
an underwriter with Coco Life, a subsidiary of UCPB. Respondent was terminated of his employment
with the bank for grave abuse of discretion and authority and breach of trust as Bank Operations
Manager and thereafter filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The FVP of UCPB issued a
memorandum to its Security Department instructing it not to allow respondent access to all bank
premises. Respondent’s counsel requested for reconsideration but petitioner bank informed him that
the request could not be granted. Sometime after, respondent went to petitioner’s Makati branch to
receive a check and deposit money for a friend. Respondent alleges that while waiting for his
transaction, two security guards approached him and told him to leave the premises. Respondent
pleaded that he be allowed to finish his transactions before leaving and was allowed. Thereafter,
respondent was motioned by a bank employee to get the check he was to receive but the security
guard tapped and prevented him from approaching. The bank employee then walked towards the
respondent to hand him the check. Because of tremendous humiliation and embarrassment,
respondent instituted this action for damages against petitioner with the RTC. The trial court ruled in
favor of respondent. CA affirmed but deleted the awards for moral and exemplary damages.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner bank abused its right when it issued, through petitioner Ongsiapco,
the Memorandum barring the respondent access to all bank premises;

Ruling: YES. We agree with the respondent bank that it has the right to exclude certain individuals
from its premises or to limit their access thereto as to time, to protect, not only its premises and records,
but also the persons of its personnel and its customers/clients while in the premises. After all, by its
very nature, the business of the petitioner bank is so impressed with public trust; banks are mandated
to exercise a higher degree of diligence in the handling of its affairs than that expected of an ordinary
business enterprise. Banks handle transactions involving millions of pesos and properties worth
considerable sums of money. The banking business will thrive only as long as it maintains the trust
and confidence of its customers/clients. Indeed, the very nature of their work, the degree of
responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of officials and employees of the bank is far greater
than those of ordinary officers and employees in the other business firms. Hence, no effort must be
spared by banks and their officers and employees to ensure and preserve the trust and confidence of
the general public and its customers/clients, as well as the integrity of its records and the safety and
well being of its customers/clients while in its premises. For the said purpose, banks may impose
reasonable conditions or limitations to access by non-employees to its premises and records, such as
the exclusion of non-employees from the working areas for employees, even absent any imminent or
actual unlawful aggression on or an invasion of its properties or usurpation thereof, provided that such
limitations are not contrary to the law. [General Rule]

On its face, the Memorandum barred the respondent, a stockholder of the petitioner bank and one of
its depositors, from gaining access to all bank premises under all circumstances. The said
Memorandum is all-embracing and admits of no exceptions whatsoever. Moreover, the security guards
were enjoined to strictly implement the same.
We agree that the petitioner may prohibit non-employees from entering the working area of the ATM
section. However, under the said Memorandum, even if the respondent wished to go to the bank to
encash a check drawn and issued to him by a depositor of the petitioner bank in payment of an
obligation, or to withdraw from his account therein, or to transact business with the said bank and
exercise his right as a depositor, he could not do so as he was barred from entry into the bank. Even
if the respondent wanted to go to the petitioner bank to confer with the corporate secretary in
connection with his shares of stock therein, he could not do so, since as stated in the Memorandum
of petitioner Ongsiapco, he would not be allowed access to all the bank premises. The said
Memorandum, as worded, violates the right of the respondent as a stockholder or a depositor of the
petitioner bank, for being capricious and arbitrary.

(STANFILCO) DOLE PHILIPPINES v. DOLE REYNALDO B. RODRIGUEZ

G.R. No. 174646 | August 22, 2012 | J. Peralta

Under the principle of damnum absque injuria, the legitimate exercise of a person’s rights, even if it
causes loss to another, does not automatically result in an actionable injury.

FACTS: Respondent Liborio Africa (Africa) is the registered owner of a banana plantation containing
an area of 17.0829 hectares situated in General Santos City. On November 1, 1966, Africa entered
into a Farm Management Contract (FMC) with his Farm Manager Alfonso Yuchengco (Yuchengco) for
the development, cultivation, improvement, administration, and general management of the above-
described property as an agricultural development project, more particularly for the purpose of planting
and growing bananas and/or other crops and of marketing the products and fruits thereof. The contract
was established for a period often (10) years from the date of execution thereof. The same was later
extended for a total period of twenty-five (25) years, or up to November 1, 1991.

On October 2, 1967, the parties amended the FMC by giving Yuchengco the right to assign, convey,
or transfer its rights under the contract to any person or entity, provided due notice is given to Africa.
On December 4, 1967, Yuchengco-assigned his rights as farm manager to Checkered Farms, Inc.
(Checkered Farms).

Checkered Farms, for its part, undertook to allow petitioner to introduce installations and
improvements on the land and to dismantle and remove all non-permanent installations and
improvements it has introduced upon the expiration of the period of the contract, provided that
petitioner has the option to leave them on the land without cost to Checkered Farms.

On February 10, 1992, Rodriguez sent a letter to petitioner demanding the payment of the bananas
harvested during the interim administration of petitioner and protesting the "unwarranted and wanton
destruction of the farm." Petitioner, however, refused to heed the demand.

Respondents also alleged that petitioner's staff, acting under the direct supervision of Epelepsia who
has been working directly with the instructions of Bulaun, all performing under the administrative and
operational responsibility of Murillo, stealthily, treacherously and ruthlessly raided the subject
plantation destroying the facilities therein which makes them liable for damages. These acts, which
are contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, allegedly made petitioner liable for damages.
Respondents also demanded indemnity for damages suffered from petitioner's act of depriving the
former from using the water facilities installed in the plantation that resulted in the spoilage of
respondents' plants. Respondent likewise accused petitioner of knowingly and fraudulently operating
and harvesting within respondents' premises, making it liable for damages. Lastly, respondents prayed
for the payment of moral, exemplary and nominal damages plus litigation expenses.
In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims, petitioner admitted its contractual relationship with
Africa but alleged that Rodriguez duped and fraudulently misled petitioner into believing that he was
the owner of the subject plantation where in fact it was owned by Africa. Petitioner alleged that he was
the owner of the irrigation system on the subject plantation. Thus, it has the right to remove them after
the expiration of its contract with Africa. It added that the removal of the irrigation system from the
subject plantation was a valid exercise of its rights as owner of the irrigation system and an exercise
of the right to dismantle and remove the same under the Exclusive Purchasing Agreement with
Checkered Farms. It denied respondents' accusation that the dismantling took place at nighttime and
with the aid of armed men. Petitioner also denied causing the destruction of standing crops or the
canals.

RTC: Rendered a Decision in favor of respondents and against petitioner.

CA: On June 1, 2006, the CA modified the RTC decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the principle of damnum absque injuria applies in this case.

RULING: The Court ruled in the negative. On the damages resulting from the dismantling and removal
of the facilities and improvements introduced by petitioner on the subject plantation, we find a cogent
reason to sustain the CA's conclusions on respondents' entitlement to such claims but find sufficient
ground to modify the amounts awarded. It is settled that petitioner was given the right to dismantle the
improvements introduced on the subject plantation as clearly provided for in its contract with
Checkered Farms, thus:

The PLANTER [Checkered Farms] shall, among other things, undertake and perform the
following:

Xxxx

f. Allow the COMPANY [petitioner] to dismantle and remove all non-permanent installations
and improvements it has introduced on the land upon the expiration of the period of this
Agreement provided, that [petitioner] at its option may leave them on the land, without cost to
[Checkered Farms].

On the basis of the above contractual provision, petitioner insists that it cannot be held liable for
damages' allegedly suffered by respondents based on the principle of damnum absque injuria. We do
not agree.

Under the principle of damnum absque injuria, the legitimate exercise of a person's rights, even if it
causes loss to another, does not automatically result in an actionable injury. The law does not
prescribe a remedy for the loss. This principle, however, does not apply when there is an abuse
of a person's right as in this case. While we recognize petitioner's right to remove the improvements
on the subject plantation, it, however, exercised such right arbitrarily, unjustly and excessively resulting
in damage to respondents' plantation. The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless
be in accordance with the proper norm. When the right is exercised arbitrarily, unjustly or
excessively and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible.

In this case, evidence presented by respondents shows that as a result of the diggings made by
petitioner in order to remove the pipes, banana plants were uprooted. Some of these plants in fact had
fruits yet to be harvested causing loss to respondents. After the removal of said pipes, petitioner failed
to restore the plantation to its original condition by its failure to cover the diggings with soil. As found
by the CA, the Damage Report submitted by Angel Flores stated that there was ground destruction
because diggings were done indiscriminately without concern for the standing banana plants. He even
added that the destruction of the ground was extensive.

It is noteworthy that petitioner was given the right to remove only the improvements and facilities that
were "non-permanent" instead of giving it the unqualified right to remove everything that it introduced
to the plantation. Though not specifically stated in the contract, the reason for said qualification on
petitioner's right of removal is the imperative need to protect the plantation from unnecessary
destruction that may be caused by the exercise of the right. If permanent structures were allowed to
be removed, damage to the plantation would not be avoided. This qualified right should have given
petitioner the necessary warning to exercise its right with caution with due regard to the other
structures in the plantation and most especially the banana plants and fruits therein. If petitioner was
able to consider cutting the pipes underneath the roads within the plantation so as not to destroy said
roads, why did it not take into consideration the banana plants and fruits that would be destroyed by
reason thereof? Petitioner would not have been unduly prejudiced had it waited for the bananas to be
harvested before removing the pipes. Clearly, petitioner abused its right.

THE ORCHARD GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB, INC. V. ERNESTO YU

G.R. No. 191033 | January 11, 2016 | J. Peralta

FACTS: The events leading to these consolidated cases began with a game of golf. Yu and Yuhico
were set to play golf at the Orchard Golf and Country Club with one more member of the club.
Unfortunately, this other member cancelled at the last minute. Because of the Club’s policy, which
prohibited “twosomes” from teeing off on weekends and public holidays before 1pm, petitioners
requested management to look for another player to join them. When a third player could not be found,
petitioners requested that they be allowed to play.

The Club refused, but they played anyway, in violation of the Club’s rules. As a result, an incident
report was filed with the Club’s Board of Directors. The Board resolved to suspend both members for
3 months.

Petitioners filed complaints with the Securities Investigation and Clearing Department of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, at that time the tribunal vested by law with jurisdiction to hear and decide
intra-corporate controversies. The SICD-SEC issued a TRO effective for 20 days, restraining the Club
from implementing the suspension. 2 days before the TRO would lapse, however, the SEC issued
guidelines wherein parties would be allowed to file their cases before August 8, 2000 but any
provisional remedies the SEC granted them were to be effective only until that date.

On August 7, 2000, the SIDC-SEC issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondents from
implementing the suspensions. Two months later, the Board resolved it was going to implement the
suspension as the August 8 cut-off had already lapsed. Petitioners filed a petition for indirect contempt
with the RTC of Dasmariñas, Cavite. The RTC restored the writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents
appealed with the CA, which reversed the RTC’s decision and the petitioner’s suspension was finally
implemented.

Meanwhile petitioners filed a motion ad cautelam in the RTC of Imus, Cavite, praying for the issuance
of a TRO and/or writ of injunction to enjoin respondents from implementing the suspension orders.
The RTC issued the TRO.

It was after this issuance that the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration with the CA. The CA
denied the motion and thus the first case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
The respondents questioned the order of the Imus RTC with a motion for reconsideration, which the
RTC denied. The respondents turned to the CA, which issued a TRO that enjoined the RTC from
implementing the writ of preliminary injunction. The petitioners then filed the second case with the
Supreme Court, questioning the CA’s TRO.

ISSUE:

1. Did the SEC guidelines shorten the life span of the writs of preliminary injunction issued by the
SEC–SICD, thereby making them effective only until August 8, 2000?

2. Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction by issuing a TRO
against the Imus, Cavite RTC and enjoining the implementation of its writ of preliminary injunction
against respondents?

RULING:

1. YES. Petitioners contend that the guidelines could not have possibly limited the effectivity of
their writs for two reasons: (1) the intention of the guidelines was to cover applications for
such writs and provisional remedies made on or after August 1, 2000 and (2) in any event, the
guidelines were void for lack of publication. The petitioners’ contentions have no merit. The
guidelines were clear and categorical, such that there simply was no need for petitioners’
extended interpretation. Under the guidelines, the parties were allowed to file their cases
before August 8, 2000 but any provisional remedies the SEC granted them were to be effective
only until that date. On the 2nd contention, the court ruled that interpretative regulations and
those merely internal in nature regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public need not be published. The guidelines were clear that they were meant for the
information of the officers of the SEC only. No doubt, the guidelines were meant to serve as
an advisory to all SEC officers to refrain from accepting new cases because of the impending
transfer of jurisdiction to the regular courts.

The issuance or recall of a preliminary writ of injunction is an interlocutory matter that remains
at all times within the control of the court or quasi-judicial body that issued it. Thus, petitioners
could not rightfully claim a vested right to an injunctive writ.

2. “The TRO issued by the CA on March 26, 2002 has long lapsed, its lifetime under Rule 58 of
the Rules of Court being only 60 days. Respondents themselves admit that the CA allowed its
TRO to lapse. Because there is nothing that will now stop the Imus, Cavite RTC from
implementing its writ of preliminary injunction against respondents, there is no need for us to
issue any order enjoining respondents from implementing petitioners’ suspension. This
petition, as a result, has become moot and academic.”

Carbonell v. Metrobank
825 SCRA 1 | NO DIGEST MADE – FROM GOOGLE

FACTS: The petitioners alleged that they had experienced emotional shock, mental anguish, public
ridicule, humiliation, insults and embarrassment during their trip to Bangkok, Thailand because of the
respondent's release to them of five US$ 100 bills that turned out to be counterfeit.

They withdrew US$ l, 000.00 in US$ 100 notes from their dollar account at the respondent's Pateros
branch. While in Bangkok, they had exchanged five US$ 100 bills into Baht, but only four of the
US$ 100 bills had been accepted by the foreign exchange dealer because the fifth one was "no good."
Because of currency’s rejection, they had asked a companion to exchange the same bill at Norkthon
Bank in Bangkok, thereat the dollar bill was declared “fake, and was confiscated by the bank teller.
On the next day, they had been confronted by the shop owner at the hotel lobby because their four
US$ 100 bills had turned out to be counterfeit after they had bought jewelry.

Upon the petitioners’ return to the Philippines, they had confronted the manager of the respondent's
Pateros branch on the fake dollar bills, but the latter had insisted that the dollar bills she had released
to them were genuine, for the bills were certified by Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) after
examination. They had demanded moral damages of ₱10 Million and exemplary damages.

Prior to the filing of the suit in the RTC, the petitioners had two meetings with the respondent's
representatives. In the course of the two meetings, the latter's representatives reiterated their
sympathy and regret over the troublesome experience that the petitioners had encountered, and
offered to reinstate US$500 in their dollar account, and, in addition, to underwrite a round-trip all-
expense-paid trip to Hong Kong, but they were adamant and staged a walk-out.

The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. The petitioners appealed, but the CA ultimately promulgated
its assailed decision affirming the judgment of the RTC with the modification of deleting the award of
attorney's fees.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA gravely erred in affirming the judgment of the RTC.

HELD: No. The court affirmed with the judgment of the RTC. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal
right, damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense
or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations
are often called dmimum absque injuria.

In every situation of damnum absque injuria, therefore, the injured person alone bears the
consequences because the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act that does not
amount to a legal injury or wrong. For instance, in BP I Express Card Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
the Court turned down the claim for damages of a cardholder whose credit card had been cancelled
after several defaults in payment, holding therein that there could be damage without injury where the
loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty towards the plaintiff. In such situation, the
injured person alone should bear the consequences because the law afforded no remedy for damages
resulting from an act that did not amount to a legal injury or wrong. Indeed, the lack of malice in the
conduct complained of precluded the recovery of damages.

Here, although the petitioners suffered humiliation resulting from their unwitting use of the counterfeit
US dollar bills, the respondent, by virtue of its having observed the proper protocols and procedure in
handling the US dollar bills involved, did not violate any legal duty towards them. Being neither guilty
of negligence nor remiss in its exercise of the degree of diligence required by law or the nature of its
obligation as a banking institution, the latter was not liable for damages. Given the situation being one
of damnum absque injuria, they could not be compensated for the damage sustained.

Latonio v. McGeorge Food Industries, Inc.

G.R. No. 206184 | December 06, 2017 | J. Peralta

To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by
the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage
without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy
allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.
FACTS: On September 17, 2000, the petitioners, spouses Ed Dante (Ed) and Mary Ann Latonio (Mary
Ann): accompanied their eight-month-old child Ed Christian to a birthday party at the McDonald's
Restaurant, Ayala Center, Cebu City.

During the party and as part of the birthday package, McDonald's presented two mascots- "Birdie" and
"Grimace" to entertain and dance for the guests. Respondent Tyke Philip Lomibao (Lomibao) was the
person inside the "Birdie" mascot suit.

After the mascots danced, guests had their pictures taken with them. Intending to have her child's
photo taken with the mascots, Mary Ann placed Ed Christian on a chair in front of the mascot "Birdie."
The mascot positioned itself behind the child and extended its "wings" to give a good pose for the
camera.

As photos were about to be taken, Mary Ann released her hold of Ed Christian. Seconds later, the
child fell head first from the chair onto the floor.

Several guests attended Ed Christian. Meanwhile, the employees of respondent McDonald's Cebu
Golden Food (Cebu Golden Food) assisted Sps. Latonio in giving first aid treatment to Ed Christian.
Sps. Latonio, nevertheless, remained and continued with the party and left only after the party was
over.

On the same day, Mary Ann called Cebu Golden Food to inform them that their doctor advised them
to get an x-ray examination on Ed Christian. Cebu Golden Food then assured her that they were willing
to shoulder the expenses for the x-ray examination of Ed Christian. Later, McDonald's reimbursed
Mary Ann for the expenses incurred relative to the x-ray examination. It further offered to pay the
expenses for the CT scan to be conducted on Ed Christian.

For some time, nothing was heard from Sps. Latonio. Nonetheless, a staff of Cebu Golden Food visited
the Latonios in their residence to follow up the results of the CT scan test. The staff was met by the
brother of Mary Ann, who allegedly repeatedly shouted at them saying that they would file a case
against Cebu Golden Food. Thus, Cebu Golden Food reported the incident to their licensor, McGeorge
Food Industries, Inc.

McGeorge sent its Field Service Director, together with its lawyer, to meet with the Latonios and their
lawyers to assure them that McDonald's was ready to assist in whatever medical attention would be
required of Ed Christian.

During the meeting, McGeorge agreed to contact a neurologist for consultation to ensure Ed
Christian's health. McGeorge conferred and consulted with two neurosurgeons at the St. Luke's
Medical Center and the Makati Medical Center, who both recommended to first study the x-ray results
and CT scan to determine the extent of the injury sustained by the baby.

Thereafter, McGeorge relayed the doctor's requirement to the Latonios who initially agreed to give
McGeorge copies of the x-ray and CT scan results. However, the Latonios had a change of heart and
informed McGeorge that they had decided against lending them the x-ray and CT scan results and
other related medical records.

Instead, Latonios sent a Letter to McGeorge demanding compensation in the amount of Fifteen Million
Pesos (P15,000,000.00).

As their demand remained unheeded, the Latonios caused the publication of the accident in the local
newspaper, Sun Star Cebu with a headline "Food outlet sued for P9 M damages". Simultaneously, the
Latonios also instituted a complaint for damages and attorney's fees against McGeorge.
RTC Ruling: RTC ruled in favor of Sps. Latonio. The trial court held that Cebu Golden Food is liable
because the proximate cause of Ed Christian's fall is the negligence of their employee, Lomibao.

CA Ruling: CA reversed the trial court's decision and held that Ed Christian's mother, Mary Ann, is
liable because the proximate cause of the child's fall was Mary Ann's act of leaving her eight-month-
old child, Ed Christian, in the "hands" of Lomibao who was at the time wearing the Birdie mascot
costume.

ISSUE: Whether Cebu Golden Food is liable for damages.

RULING: No, Cebu Golden Food is not liable for damages.

In this case, there is no dispute that Sps. Latonio suffered damages because of Ed Christian's fall.
However, as to the issues on negligence and proximate cause, the CA and the RTC gave contradicting
findings.

As the action is predicated on negligence, the relevant law is Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which
states that:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there was no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.

The Court disagree to the findings of the RTC in declaring that the proximate cause of Ed Christian's
fall and the resulting injury was Lomibao's act of holding the baby during the party which was
purportedly prohibited under the rules and policy of the establishment.

The testimony of Mary Ann herself on cross-examination is telling. Thus:

Q. And when you said that you informed the mascot, what exact words did you use?
A. I tap him on his side and then I called him that I am going to have the taking of pictures with my
baby.
Q. Now did you wait for the mascots to make a reply?
A. He was looking at me and he look at my face.
Q. Did he make a reply?
A. No, Ma'am.
Q. Did you see his eyes looking at you?
A. No, Ma'am.
Q. And at the time you already observed that the person was wearing a thick leather suit?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you actually see the body of the person who lift (sic) your baby then?
A. No.
Q. Did you see the hands inside the costume?
A. Of course, I cannot see the hands.
Q. Did you see the arms of the person inside the mascot?
A. I cannot because he is (sic) wearing a costume.

COURT
Q. You were not sure that when you handed the baby it was firmly held by the mascot?
A. I placed the baby in front of the mascot.
Q. You were not aware about the hands when you turned over the baby because it was a mascot?
A. I was sure because I can feel the hands and my baby was standing in front of him; and he is doing
like this (witness demonstrating).
ATTY. ABELLA
Q. Did you see the eyes of the person inside the mascot costume?
A. No.
Q. Were you aware if there were openings for the eyes of the person inside the mascot?
A. Yes, I was aware.
Q. The eyes in this mascot costume actually had no opening?
A. Yes, no opening.
COURT
Q. You entrusted the baby even if there was no opening of the eyes?
A. There was an opening of the costume near the mouth. If the mascot cannot see, then how can he
play with the kids?
Q. You said that you told the mascot that you were leaving the baby to him?
A. I pat him.
Q. Did you see the ears of the person inside the mascot?
A. No.
Q. Did you even know if there was an opening for the ears at the person wearing the mascot costume?
A. No, but I was nearer the mascot.

The Court agree with the CA that despite Mary Ann's insistence that she made sure that her baby was
safe and secured before she released her grasp on Ed Christian, her own testimony revealed that she
had, in fact, acted negligently and carelessly, to wit:

Q. Now when you said that you made sure that the mascot was holding your baby, what action did
you do to insure that?
A. When I saw that the mascot was holding my baby so I make (sic) a motion to my husband for the
picture taking so I left beside. I backed off a little bit.
Q. I will not risk my baby if I am not sure that the mascot was not inserting his hands over my baby
when I left the scene. The (sic) I am sure that the baby was already safe in the hands of the mascot.
Q. When you say that you make (sic) sure you just relied on your sight?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q: Did you check what part of your child's body was in contact in any part of the mascot's body? A:
Partly it was here on the waist of the child until (sic) the armpit.
Q: Now you said that you move (sic) further to the side from where your baby was standing, is that
your testimony?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Can you tell us or can you give us any reason why you move (sic) to the side?
A: Because I motioned my husband already that he would take a picture of the baby and the mascot
before I left and I am so sure that the baby is securely (sic) with the mascot holding the baby.[19]
Q: And your child at that time was eight (8) months old?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: He cannot stand on his own?
A: He can stand but he has to have support.
Q: He cannot walk on his own at that time?
A: At that time with support."

To the Court, what is more in accord with human experience and dictates of reason is that a diligent
mother would naturally ensure first and foremost the safety of her child before releasing her hold on
him. Such is not the case here. Mary Ann Latonio, in placing Ed Christian on a chair and expecting a
bird mascot to ensure the child's safety, utterly failed to observe the degree of diligence expected of
her as a mother of an eight- month-old baby.

Clearly, based on the foregoing, Mary Ann's negligence was the proximate cause of Ed Christian's fall
which caused him injury. Proximate cause is defined as - that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting
first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable
result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first
event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

Here, it is beyond dispute that the cause of Ed Christian's fall is traceable to the negligent act of Mary
Ann of leaving him in the "hands" of Lomibao who was wearing the Birdie mascot suit. The Court noted
that "hands" and "wings" were used interchangeably during the testimonies of the witnesses, thus,
causing confusion. However, it must be stressed that while indeed Lomibao has hands of his own, at
the time of the incident he was wearing the Birdie mascot suit. Suffice it to say that the Birdie mascot
suit has no hands but instead has wings. Lomibao cannot possibly hold or grasp anything while
wearing the thick Birdie mascot suit. In fact, even if he wanted to hold Ed Christian or anything, he
could not possibly do so because he was wearing the Birdie mascot suit which does not even have
hands or fingers to be able to hold or grasp firmly.

Thus, all the aforementioned circumstances lead the Court to no other conclusion than that the
proximate cause of the injury sustained by Ed Christian was due to Mary Ann's own negligence.

All told, in the absence of negligence on the part of Cebu Golden Foods and Lomibao, as well as their
management and staff, they cannot be made liable to pay for the damages prayed for by the petitioners.

To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by
the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage
without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy
allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.

Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which cause damage or
loss to another, but which violate no legal duty to such other person, and consequently create no
cause of action in his favour. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person
alone. The law affords no remedy resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or
wrong.

L.S. MOON & CO. VS. HARRISON

Whatever may be the rule as to the personal liability of a Governor, after a law been finally declared
unconstitutional, he is not personally liable in damages for the exercise of discretionary power under
a law before it has been declared unconstitutional.

FACTS: The defendants, pursuant to Act No. 2868 of the Philippine Legislature and pursuant to
Executive Orders No. 56 and 67 issued by authority of said Act, have seized the said 2,330½ kilos of
Siam rice of plaintiff and deprived him of it, for the purpose of distribution to the public at large; that
said seizure was made without compensation to plaintiff, although defendants have promised to pay
there for at the rate of P16.25, Philippine currency, a cavan and no more, which price is below the
reasonable value of the rice and is unjust; that payment at said rate does not constitute just
compensation and a seizure under the circumstances alleged constitutes a confiscation of private
property contrary to the fundamental and organic law of the Philippine Islands and an invasion of those
constitutional rights that no one may be deprived of his property except by due process of law and
with just compensation; that the just and reasonable value of the rice seized as aforesaid in Manila at
the time of said seizure was with respect to the Siam rice mentioned P26.32 per cavan.

The complaint is against the Honorable Francis Burton Harrison as Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands. The alleged acts of Jakosalem and Lukban were committed by them as agents and servants
of the Governor-General.

(Hon. Dionisio Jakosalem is the duly appointed, qualified and acting Secretary of Commerce and
Communications and the official designated by executive order of the said Govern-General as the
executive in charge of rice, its sale and distribution in the Philippine Islands; that the said Justo Lukban
is the duly appointed, qualified and acting Mayor of the city of Manila, and, as such, designated by the
said Governor-General and Secretary of Commerce and Communications as their assistant in charge
for the city of Manila of rice, its sale and distribution)

Issues:

1. Whether or Not the enforcement of Act No. 2868 is valid.

2. Whether or not the Chief Executive may refuse to enforce a law on the ground that in his
opinion it is unconstitutional.

RULING:

1. Yes, it is assumed that in the commission of the alleged acts, the Governor-General was acting
in his official capacity, and was engaged in the performance of a duty enjoined upon him by
the Legislature of the Philippine Islands. It is now contended that the law in question is
unconstitutional and void. At the time of the alleged acts, he was exercising the discretionary
power which was vested in him as Governor-General.

There is a legal presumption that any law enacted by the Legislature is valid, and the Governor-
General had a legal right to assume that Act No. 2868 was valid. It was neither his official
province nor duty to say whether the Act was or was not constitutional.

2. No. Otherwise, he will be violating the doctrine of separation of powers because by doing so,
he will be claiming the power to interpret the law, not merely to implement it.

By the organic law, it is the duty of the legislature to make the law; of the executive to enforce;
and of the courts to construe the law. The courts only have the power to declare a law
unconstitutional. In the very nature of things, it is not the duty of the Governor to say whether
a law is or is not constitutional. It is his duty to enforce the law until such time as it has legally
been declared unconstitutional.

In the instant case, Act No. 2868 was enacted by the Legislature. By its terms and provisions,
certain duties were thrust upon the Governor-General. He had a legal right to assume that the
law was valid, and in the exercise of his discretion, he undertook to enforce the law and to
carry out its terms and provisions.

The acts of the defendants were official and discretionary, and they had a legal right to assume
that the law was valid. In the commission of the alleged acts, they were acting for, and
representing, the Government of the Philippine Islands under a law enacted by its Legislature.
RAMON FAROLAN as ACTING COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, and GUILLERMO PARAYNO,
as CHIEF OF CUSTOMS INTELLIGENCE and INVESTIGATION DIVISION vs. SOLMAC
MARKETING CORPORATION, and COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 83589 | March 13, 1991 | J. Sarmiento

It is the duty of the Court to see to it that public officers are not hampered in the performance of their
duties or in making decisions for fear of personal liability for damages due to honest mistake. Whatever
damage they may have caused as a result of such an erroneous interpretation, if any at all, is in the
nature of a damnum absque injuria. Mistakes concededly committed by public officers are not
actionable absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence
amounting to bad faith.

FACTS: Ramon Farolan was then the Acting Commissioner of Customs while Guillermo Parayno was
then the Acting Chief, Customs Intelligence and Investigation Division. Solmac Marketing Corporation
was the assignee, transferee, and owner of an importation of Clojus Recycling Plastic Products of
202,204 kilograms of what is technically known as polypropylene film, valued at US$69,250.05.

Polypropylene is a substance resembling polyethylene which is one of a group of partially crystalline

lightweight thermoplastics used in making fibers, films, and molded and extruded products. Without
defect, polypropylene film is sold at a much higher price as prime quality film. Once rejected as
defective due to blemishes, discoloration, defective winding, holes, etc., polypropylene film is sold at
a relatively cheap price without guarantee or return, and the buyer takes the risk as to whether he can
recover an average 30% to 50% usable matter. This latter kind of polypropylene is known as OPP film
waste/scrap, and this is what SOLMAC claimed the Clojus shipment to be.

The subject importation, consisting of 17 containers, arrived in December 1981. Upon application for
entry, the Bureau of Customs (BOC) asked SOLMAC for its authority from any government agency to
import the goods described in the bill of lading. SOLMAC presented a Board of Investment (BOI)
authority for polypropylene film scrap. However, upon examination of the shipment by the National
Institute of Science and Technology (NIST), it turned out that the Clojus shipment was not OPP film
scrap, as declared by SOLMAC, but oriented polypropylene, the importation of which is restricted, if
not prohibited, under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 658-B. Parayno and Farolan withheld the release
of the subject importation.

Parayno wrote the BOI asking for the latter's advice on whether the subject importation may be
released. A series of exchange of correspondence between the BOI and the BOC, on one hand, and
between SOLMAC, and the BOI and the BOC, on the other, ensued. The BOI agreed that the subject
imports may be released but that holes may be drilled on them by the Bureau of Customs prior to their
release.

SOLMAC filed an action for mandamus and injunction with the RTC. It prayed for the unconditional
release of the subject importation. It also prayed for actual damages, exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees.

Even before the RTC rendered its decision, the Clojus shipment of Oriented Polypropylene
(OPP) was already released to SOLMAC in its capacity as assignee of the same.

RTC RULING: The RTC ordered the release of the subject importation immediately without drilling of
holes, subject only to the normal requirements of the customs processing.

CA RULING: The CA modified the RTC judgment by ordering Farolan and Parayno solidarily, in their
personal capacity, to pay SOLMAC temperate damages in the sum of P100,000 exemplary damages
in the sum of P50,000 and P25,000 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Farolan and Parayno can be held liable, in their personal and private capacities,
for damages to SOLMAC

RULING: No. It was on the strength of the finding that the subject importation was not OPP film scraps
but oriented polypropylene that Farolan and Parayno withheld the release of the subject importation
for being contrary to law.

When a public officer takes his oath of office, he binds himself to perform the duties of his office
faithfully and to use reasonable skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the benefit of the public.
Thus, in the discharge of his duties, he is to use that prudence, caution, and attention which careful
men use in the management of their affairs. In the case at bar, prudence dictated that Farolan and
Parayno first obtain from the BOI the latter's definite guidelines regarding the disposition of the various
importations of OPP and PP then being withheld at the BOC. As public officers, Farolan and Parayno
had the duty to see to it that the law they were tasked to implement, i.e., LOI 658-B, was faithfully
complied with.

But even granting that Farolan and Parayno committed a mistake in withholding the release of the
subject importation because indeed it was composed of OPP films scraps, contrary to the evidence
submitted by the NIST that the same was pure oriented OPP, nonetheless, it is the duty of the Court
to see to it that public officers are not hampered in the performance of their duties or in making
decisions for fear of personal liability for damages due to honest mistake. Whatever damage they may
have caused as a result of such an erroneous interpretation, if any at all, is in the nature of a damnum
absque injuria. Mistakes concededly committed by public officers are not actionable absent any clear
showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. After all,
"even under the law of public officers, the acts of Farolan and Parayno are protected by the
presumption of good faith."

In the same vein, the presumption, disputable though it may be, that an official duty has been regularly
performed applies in favor of Farolan and Parayno. Omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta.
(All things are presumed to be correctly and solemnly done.) It was SOLMAC’s burden to overcome
this juris tantum presumption. It has not been able to do so.

MIGUEL “LUCKY” GUILLERMO and AV MANILA CREATIVE PRODUCTION CO., v. PHILIPPINE

INFORMATION AGENCY and DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS
G.R. No. 223751 | January 05, 2017 | J. Leonen

In determining the sufficiency of a cause of action for resolving a motion to dismiss, a court must
determine, hypothetically admitting the factual allegations in a complaint, whether it can grant the
prayer in the complaint.

FACTS: On December 10, 2010, Miguel "Lucky" Guillermo (Guillermo) and AV Manila Creative
Production, Co. (AV Manila) filed a Complaint 3 for a sum of money and damages before the Regional
Trial Court of Marikina City, against Respondents Philippine Information Agency (PIA) and Department
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) for the “Joyride” project, and advocacy campaign. The
purpose of the project and campaign was to counteract the public’s negative perception of the
performance of the outgoing Arroyo Administration. After all the deliverables had been delivered by
the Petitioners under the said Project, and despite several demands made by them, no payments were
made by the PIA unto which Guillermo was instructed to send the billings directly.

The Complaint attempted to lay down the elements of a contract between the petitioners on one hand,
and respondents on the other, on which to enforce the claim. Thus, it alleged a series of
communications, meetings, and memoranda, all tending to show that petitioners agreed to complete
and deliver the “Joyride” project and that respondents agreed to pay ₱25,000,000.00 as consideration.
The Office of the Solicitor General moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a cause of action
(and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies).

RTC RULING: Granted the Office of the Solicitor General’s Motion to Dismiss, finding that, although
a contract existed between petitioners and Acting Secretary Domingo of the DPWH, this contract was
not binding on the government of the Philippines. Because of absence of legal requirements for
entering into a contract with the government, petitioners could not file a complaint for specific
performance against the government. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied.

CA RULING: Affirmed the RTC’s Order dismissing petitioners’ Complaint. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration, but the same was denied.

ISSUE: Whether the Complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

RULING: YES. A cause of action should not merely be “stated but importantly, the statement thereof
should be “sufficient.” The test in a motion to dismiss based on such ground is whether the complaint
alleges facts that are true would justify the relief sought. The ultimate facts and not the legal
conclusions or evidentiary facts are considered for the purpose of applying the test. As per Sec. 1,
Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, the complaint only needs to allege the ultimate facts or the essential facts
constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. To sufficiently state a cause of action, the Complaint should
have alleged facts showing that the trial court could grant its prayer based on the strength of its factual
allegations.

To support the Complaint for a sum of money and damages, Petitioners attempted to lay down the
elements of a contract, but what is involved in the contract is the expenditure of public funds. If the
contract does exist, it is still not sufficient to establish that the RTC could grant its prayer since it lacks
the additional requisites of a valid contract involving public expenditure under the Administrative Code
of 1987. The Code expressly prohibits the entering into contracts involving the expenditure of public
funds unless two prior requirements are satisfied: first, there must be an appropriation law authorizing
the expenditure required in the contract; and second, there must be attached to the contract a
certification by the proper accounting official and auditor that funds have been appropriated by law
and such funds are available. Failure to comply with any of these two requirements renders the
contract void. The Complaint, however, completely ignored the foregoing requisites for the validity of
contracts involving the expenditure of public funds. Thus, the RTC could not order the enforcement of
the alleged contract on the basis of the Complaint, and the Complaint was properly dismissed for
failure to state a cause of action.

However, also included in the provision under the Administrative Code, the petitioners are not without
recourse if they are able to prove a contract was entered into. Section 48 of the Code provides that
the officers who entered into the said contract would be personally liable to the government or to the
contracting party for damages:

SECTION 48. Void Contract and Liability of Officer. — Any contract entered into contrary to
the requirements of the two (2) immediately preceding sections shall be void, and the officer
or officers entering into the contract shall be liable to the Government or other contracting party
for any consequent damage to the same extent as if the transaction had been wholly between
private parties.
 200. E. Razon Inc v. CA and Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corporation
G.R. No. 50242 | May 21, 1988 | J. Gutierrez Jr.
(Assumption of the risk and the Principle of Volenti Non Fit Injuria)

The provision in the management contract regarding the declaration of the actual invoice value “before
the arrival of the goods” must be understood to mean a declaration before the arrival of the goods in
the custody of the arrastre operator, whether it be done long before the landing of the shipment at port,
or immediately before turn-over thereof to the arrastre operator’s custody.

FACTS: A civil case was filed by respondent Pioneer Insurance as insurer-subrogee, to recover from
either or both defendants, jointly and severally, the sum of P21.937.75 representing the invoice value,
freight costs and other importation expenses of three (3) cases of radio and phonograph parts short-
delivered from a total of eighty-six (86) cases of said articles from Kobe, Japan, shipped aboard the
SS "Don Jacinto II" of the defendant Northern Lines, Inc., for delivery to the consignee MGM Importers
Corporation at Manila. The total shipment was insured by Pioneer.

On November 14, 1969, the shipment was discharged from the carrying vessel into the custody of E.
Razon, Inc., one of the arrastre operators in the Port of Manila, charged with the obligation of handling,
custody and delivery of all cargo discharged at the government piers of Manila. The shipment was
delivered to its consignee, MGM Importers with losses and damages valued at P21.937.75

On December 12, 1969, E. Razon certified that out of 86 cases of radio parts loaded on board the SS
"DON JACINTO H" under Bill of Lading No. KM-18, only 83 cases had been delivered to the consignee.
Defendants Northern Lines and E. Razon, Inc. admitted, among others, that (a) the entire shipment of
86 radio parts were unloaded from the vessel "DON JACINTO II" unto the custody of E. Razon as
shown by... the Statement of Deliveries and the cargo receipts; (b) E. Razon certified that out of 86
cases only 83 cases had been delivered to the consignee; (c) on November 25, 1969, the consignee,
MGM Importers, filed a formal claim for the missing cases; and (d) Plaintiff Pioneer indemnified the
consignee in the sum of P21,937.75.

RTC RULING: The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered its decision ordering defendant E. Razon
to indemnify plaintiff Pioneer the sum of P10,899.28 with legal interest and dismissing the case against
defendant Northern Lines, leaving the controversy against E. Razon, Inc. alone.

CA RULING: Affirmed CFI.

The respondent argues that “under the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code, for purposes of
clearing cargo from the Bureau of Customs, the Invoice, Packing List, Bill of Lading and other
documents must be submitted for processing and computation of... customs duties, arrastre charges,"
satisfying the condition of exception to the P2.000 limitation of liability of the arrastre operator.

ISSUE: The sole issue raised by the petitioner is the general limitation of its liability to P2,000 per case
lost or destroyed as provided in Paragraph or Clause XX of the Revised Management Contract it had
entered into with the Bureau of Customs

RULING: Rule in favor of respondents.

Under the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code, for purposes of clearing cargo from the Bureau
of Customs, the Invoice, Packing List, Bill of Lading and other documents must be submitted for
processing and computation of customs duties, arrastre charges," satisfying the condition of exception
to the P2,000 limitation of liability of the arrastre operator.
Indeed, the provision in the management contract regarding the declaration of the actual invoice value
“before the arrival of the goods” must be understood to mean a declaration before the arrival of the
goods in the custody of the arrastre operator, whether it be done long before the landing of the
shipment at port, or immediately before turn-over thereof to the arrastre operator’s custody. What is
essential is knowledge beforehand of the extent of the risk to be undertaken by the arrastre operator,
as determined by the value of the property committed to its care that it may define its responsibility for
loss or damage to such cargo and to ascertain compensation commensurate to such risk assumed.

Having been duly informed of the actual invoice value of the merchandise under its custody and having
received payment of arrastre charges based thereon, E. Razon, Inc., as arrastre operator, cannot in
justice insist on a limitation of its liability, under the contract, to less than the value of each undelivered
case or package consigned to MGM Importers, Inc. The lower courts' judgment finding the petitioner
liable for the full declared value of the three (3) undelivered cases in question must be upheld.

MCKEE v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. 68102-03 | July 16, 1992 | J. Davide, Jr.

The doctrine of last clear chance states that the contributory negligence of the injured party will not
defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable
care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such
cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences thereof.

FACTS: Between nine and 10 in the morning of January 8, 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along
MacArthur Highway, between Angeles City and San Fernando, Pampanga, a head-on-collision took
place between and International cargo truck, Loadstar owned by Jaime Tayag and Rosalina Manalo
and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort Car driven by Jose Koh. The collision resulted in the
deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee, and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee,
Christopher Koh McKee, and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.

Jose Koh was the father of Araceli Koh Mckee, the mother of minors George, Christopher, and Kim
Koh McKee. Loida Bondoc was the baby sitter of a 1 ½ year old Kim. At the time of the collision, Kim
was seated on the lap of Loida Bondoc who was at the front passenger’s seat of the car while Araceli
and her two sons were seated at the car’s back seat.

Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with 200 cavans of rice weighing
about 10,000 kilos, was traveling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando, Pampanga, and was
bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San
Fernando.

When the northbound car was about ten (10) meters away from the southern approach of the
bridge, two (2) boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car.
The boys were moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side
or turn back.

Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then
switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to
his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the
lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge.

As a result of the accident, two civil cases were filed for the death and physical injuries sustained by
the victims boarding the Ford Escort, as well as the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in
multiple homicide and physical injuries and damage to property against Galang. During the trial,
evidence was presented showing that the driver of the truck was speeding resulting in the presence
of skid marks under the truck.

TRIAL COURT RULING: As to the criminal case, Judge Capulong rendered a decision finding Galang
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. As to the civil case, Judge Mario Castañeda dismissed the two civil
cases and awarded moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees to Tayag and Manalo,
the truck owners.

CA RULING: On appeal, the CA affirmed Galang’s conviction in the criminal case and reversed the
decision in the civil cases, ordering the payment of damages for the death and physical injuries of the
McKee family. On motion for reconsideration, the CA set aside its decision and ruled in favor of the
truck owners.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Jose Koh was negligent
2. Whether or not Jose Koh’s negligence was the proximate cause of the collision
3. Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance applies in this case

RULING:

1. NO.

Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a
prudent and reasonable man would not do. It is the want of care required by the circumstances. Where
the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of
ordinary care under the circumstances.

Here, it is manifest that no negligence can be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary
prudent person would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away from
where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. Moreover, Jose Koh’s entry into
the lane of the truck was necessary in order to avoid a greater peril – death or injury to the two boys.

Furthermore, under the emergency rule1 and considering the sudden intrusion of the two boys into the
lane of the car, Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in the given situation to avoid hitting them.
It is clear that he was not guilty of negligence.

2. NO

Proximate cause is “that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.” Here,
the proximate cause of the collision is the over speeding of the truck showing its negligence.

First, the entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision had the latter
heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go
back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of the road, which was

1
"one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the
best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to
adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence."
the proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full
speed towards the car.

Second, the truck driver's negligence becomes more apparent in view of the fact that the road is 7.50
meters wide while the car measures 1.598 meters and the truck, 2.286 meters, in width. This would
mean that both car and truck could pass side by side with a clearance of 3.661 meters to spare.
Furthermore, the bridge has a level sidewalk which could have partially accommodated the truck. Any
reasonable man finding himself in the given situation would have tried to avoid the car instead of
meeting it head-on.

The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that his truck was running at
30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a
bridge 52 is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a
vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.

3. YES

The doctrine of last clear chance states that the contributory negligence of the injured party will not
defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable
care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such
cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences thereof.

In this doctrine, the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the
defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might
have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. In other
words, the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed
him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person may recover.

The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent
negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to
do so, is made liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of
the plaintiff.

Applying the foregoing doctrine, it was the truck driver’s negligence which was the proximate cause of
the collision. As employers of the truck driver, the truck owners are, under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent
flows from the negligence of their employee. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage 2. However, the answers of the truck
owners did not interpose this defense. Neither did they attempt to prove it.

Bustamante v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 89880 | February 6, 1991 | J. MEDIALDEA

The doctrine broadly states that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the
negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and
prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff’s
negligence. The doctrine does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier

2
The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees.
to enforce its contractual obligations. It cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors as a test
of whether only one of them should be held liable to the injured person by reason of his discovery of
the latter’s peril and it cannot be involved as between defendants concurrently negligent. The case at
bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought ICGV | 50
by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles.
Therefore, the respondent court erred in absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from liability.

FACTS: A truck and a passenger bus sideswept each other, causing the deaths of the passengers of
the bus. This is the way the collision happened: The bus, driven by Susulin, was traversing an inclined
road when the driver saw from 30 meters away an approaching truck (driven by Montesiano), going
very fast and the front wheels wiggling. The bus driver also observed that the truck was heading
towards his lane. Not minding this circumstance due to his belief that the truck driver was merely joking,
Susulin shifted from 4th to 3rd gear in order to give more power and speed to the bus, which was
ascending the inclined part of the road, in order to overtake a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a
person along the shoulder of the highway. While the bus was in the process of overtaking or passing
the hand tractor and the truck was approaching the bus, the two vehicles sideswiped each other at
each other's left side. The heirs of the victims filed for damages.

RTC RULING: The RTC awarded damages, saying that the negligent acts of both drivers were the
cause of the accident, thus their liability must be solidary.

CA RULING: The driver and owner of the truck appealed to the CA, which was denied at first, but was
granted on MFR, absolving the defendants based on the doctrine of last clear chance, saying that the
bus driver had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, and that his negligence was the proximate
cause of the same.

ISSUE: WON the CA was correct in absolving the driver and owner of the truck (answered by WON
CA correctly applied the doctrine of last clear chance)

RULING: NO. The doctrine of last clear chance applies only between the negligent parties. It does not
apply in a case wherein a victim (who is an outsider to the cause of the accident) demands liability
from the negligent parties. Reasoning: The doctrine of last clear chance, stated broadly, is that the
negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it
appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious
consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff’s negligence. In other words, the doctrine of
last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of
peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery. As the doctrine is usually stated,
a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the
negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law
solely responsible for the consequences of the accident (Sangco). A negligent defendant is held liable
to a negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril,
if he, aware of the plaintiff's peril, or according to some authorities, should have been aware of it in the
reasonable exercise of due case, had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an
accident (Am. Jur). As against 3rd persons, a negligent actor can’t defend by saying that another had
negligently failed to take action which would have avoided injury.

LBC Air Cargo, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

241 SCRA 619 | NO DIGEST MADE – FROM GOOGLE

Facts: At about 11:30 am of 15 Nov 1987, Rogelio Monterola was traveling on board his Suzuki
motorcycle towards Mangaggoy on the right lane along a dusty road in Bislig, Surigao del Sur. At about
the same time, a cargo van of LBC, driven by petitioner herein, Tano, Jr., was coming from the opposite
direction on its way to Bislig Airport. When Tano was approaching the airport entrance on his left, he
saw two vehicles racing against each other from the opposite direction. Tano stopped the van and
waited for the 2 vehicles to pass by. The dust made the visibility extremely bad. Instead of waiting
Tano started to make a sharp left turn and when he was about to reach the center of the right lane,
the motorcycle driven by Monterola suddenly emerged from the dust and smashed head-on against
the LBC van. Monterola died.

Issue: WON the negligence of Monterola is the proximate cause of the accident.

Ruling: The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of petitioner Tano, who, despite poor
visibility, hastily executed a left turn w/o waiting for the dust to settle.

Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of "last clear chance." In the instant case, the victim was
travelling along the lane where he was rightl supposd to be. The incident occured in an instant. No
apreciable time had elapsed that could have afforded the victim a last clear opportunity to avoid the
collision. However, the deceased was contributorily negligent in evidently speeding.

The SC agrees w the CA that there was contributory negligence on the victim's part that warrants a
mitigation of petitioner's liability for damages

Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court

148 SCRA 353 | NO DIGEST MADE – FROM GOOGLE

Facts: At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975, private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his
way home from cocktails and dinner meeting with his boss. He was proceeding down General Lacuna
Street when he saw a Ford dump truck parked askew, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic, with
no lights or early warning reflector devices. The truck was driven earlier by Armando Carbonel, a
regular driver of the petitioner company. Dionisio tried to swerve his car to the left, but it was too late.
He suffered some physical injuries and nervous breakdown. Dionision filed an action for damages
against Carbonel and Phoenix Insurance. Petitioners countered the claim by imputing the accident to
respondent’s own negligence in driving at high speed without curfew pass and headlights, and while
intoxicated. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent.

Issue: Whether the collision was brought about by the way the truck was parked, or by respondent’s
own negligence

Held: We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass
during the night of the accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have
such a pass during that night. It is the petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut off his
headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the police in the police
precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the intersection. We
believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than that offered by private
respondent Dionisio, i.e., that he had his headlights on but that, at the crucial moment, these had in
some mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although he succeeded in switching
his lights on again at "bright" split seconds before contact with the dump truck. We do not believe that
this evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so heavily under the influence of liquor as to
constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of reckless imprudence. The conclusion we draw
from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private respondent Dionisio was negligent the
night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster than he should have been.
Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General
Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the
road lane.
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the
legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent
manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel.
The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the
truck driver's negligence.

The distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners would have us adopt have
already been "almost entirely discredited. If the defendant has created only a passive static condition
which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of
causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part
in producing the result it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations,
particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active forces which have
gone before. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not
necessarily affect liability. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but
the distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the
type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of
apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction
between "cause" and "condition" which is important but the nature of the risk and the character of the
intervening cause.

We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition"
was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The improper parking of the dump truck created an
unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created
this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in
point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient
intervening or independent cause.

The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and important
part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass.
Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope original risk, and hence of the defendant's
negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this
category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility. Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk
and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic
becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the car is negligently driven; and
one who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility
when another negligently drives into it. We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was
"only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's
"lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such
damages are subject to mitigation by the courts.

Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The common
law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been
negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do
so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has
to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar
to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose
negligence - the plaintiff's or the defendant's - was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. The
relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or
omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental
importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity
of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. Our law on quasi-delicts
seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the members of
society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.

We believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on
a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award
of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by
private respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and
Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former. The award of exemplary damages and
attorney's fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to
reimbursement from Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced award of
damages made by the respondent appellate court.

Bank of America NT & SA v. Philippine Racing Club

594 SCRA 301 | NO DIGEST MADE – FROM GOOGLE

Facts: Plaintiff-appellee PRCI is a domestic corporation which maintains several accounts with
different banks in the Metro Manila area. Among the accounts maintained was Current Account No.
58891-012 with defendant-appellant BA (Paseo de Roxas Branch). The authorized joint signatories
with respect to said Current Account were plaintiff-appellees President (Antonia Reyes) and Vice
President for Finance (Gregorio Reyes). On or about the 2nd week of December 1988, the President
and Vice President of plaintiff-appellee corporation were scheduled to go out of the country in
connection with the corporations business. In order not to disrupt operations in their absence, they
pre-signed several checks relating to Current Account No. 58891-012. The intention was to insure
continuity of plaintiff-appellees operations by making available cash/money especially to settle
obligations that might become due. These checks were entrusted to the accountant with instruction to
make use of the same as the need arose. The internal arrangement was, in the event there was need
to make use of the checks, the accountant would prepare the corresponding voucher and thereafter
complete the entries on the pre-signed checks. It turned out that on December 16, 1988, a John Doe
presented to defendant-appellant bank for encashment a couple of plaintiff-appellee corporations
checks (Nos. 401116 and 401117) with the indicated value of P110,000.00 each. It is admitted that
these 2 checks were among those presigned by plaintiff-appellee corporations authorized signatories.

Issue: Whether or not the checks are valid.

Held: Yes. There is no dispute that the signatures appearing on the subject checks were genuine
signatures of the respondents authorized joint signatories; namely, Antonia Reyes and Gregorio
Reyes who were respondents President and Vice-President for Finance, respectively. Both pre-signed
the said checks since they were both scheduled to go abroad and it was apparently their practice to
leave with the company accountant checks signed in black to answer for company obligations that
might fall due during the signatories absence.

A material alteration is defined in Section 125 of the NIL to be one which changes the date, the sum
payable, the time or place of payment, the number or relations of the parties, the currency in which
payment is to be made or one which adds a place of payment where no place of payment is specified,
or any other change or addition which alters the effect of the instrument in any respect.

In the case at bar, extraordinary diligence demands that petitioner should have ascertained from
respondent the authenticity of the subject checks or the accuracy of the entries therein not only
because of the presence of highly irregular entries on the face of the checks but also of the decidedly
unusual circumstances surrounding their encashment. Respondents witness testified that for checks
in amounts greater than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) it is the companys practice to ensure
that the payee is indicated by name in the check. This was not rebutted by petitioner. Indeed, it is
highly uncommon for a corporation to make out checks payable to CASH for substantial amounts such
as in this case. If each irregular circumstance in this case were taken singly or isolated, the banks
employees might have been justified in ignoring them. However, the confluence of the irregularities on
the face of the checks and circumstances that depart from the usual banking practice of respondent
should have put petitioners employees on guard that the checks were possibly not issued by the
respondent in due course of its business. Petitioners subtle sophistry cannot exculpate it from behavior
that fell extremely short of the highest degree of care and diligence required of it as a banking institution.

Petitioners contention would have been correct if the subject checks were correctly and properly filled
out by the thief and presented to the bank in good order. In that instance, there would be nothing to
give notice to the bank of any infirmity in the title of the holder of the checks and it could validly presume
that there was proper delivery to the holder. The bank could not be faulted if it encashed the checks
under those circumstances. However, the undisputed facts plainly show that there were circumstances
that should have alerted the bank to the likelihood that the checks were not properly delivered to the
person who encashed the same. In all, we see no reason to depart from the finding in the assailed CA
Decision that the subject checks are properly characterized as incomplete and undelivered
instruments thus making Section 15 of the NIL applicable in this case.

PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC v. BAESA

G.R. No. 79050-51 | November 14, 1989 | J. Cortes

For the doctrine of “last clear chance” to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the person who
allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril or should,
with exercise of due care, have been aware of it.

FACTS: The spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their children Harold Jim, Marcelino and Maricar,
together with spouses David Ico and Fe O. Ico with their son Erwin Ico and seven other persons, were
aboard a passenger jeepney on their way to a picnic at Malalam River, Ilagan, Isabela, to celebrate
the fifth wedding anniversary of Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa when a speeding Pantranco North Express
Inc. (PANTRANCO) bus from Aparri, on its regular route to Manila, encroached on the jeepney's lane
while negotiating a curve, and collided with it.

As a result of the accident David Ico, spouses Ceasar Baesa and Marilyn Baesa and their children,
Harold Jim and Marcelino Baesa, died while the rest of the passengers suffered injuries. The jeepney
was extensively damaged. After the accident the driver of the PANTRANCO Bus, Ambrosio Ramirez,
boarded a car and proceeded to Santiago, Isabela. From that time on up to the present, Ramirez has
never been seen and has apparently remained in hiding.

Maricar Baesa through her guardian Francisca O. Bascos and Fe O. Ico for herself and for her minor
children, filed separate actions for damages arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO.

In its answer, PANTRANCO, aside from pointing to the late David Ico's alleged negligence as the
proximate cause of the accident, invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision
of its driver, Ambrosio Ramirez.

RTC RULING: On July 3, 1984, the CFI of Pangasinan rendered a decision against PANTRANCO
awarding the total amount of Two Million Three Hundred Four Thousand Six Hundred Forty-Seven
(P2,304,647.00) as damages, plus 10% thereof as attorney's fees and costs to Maricar Baesa in Civil
Case No. 561-R, and the total amount of Six Hundred Fifty Two Thousand Six Hundred Seventy-Two
Pesos (P652,672.00) as damages, plus 10% thereof as attorney's fees and costs to Fe Ico and her
children
CA RULING: On appeal, the cases were consolidated and the Court of Appeals modified the decision
of the trial court by ordering PANTRANCO to pay the total amount of One Million One Hundred Eighty-
Nine Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty Seven Pesos (P1,189,927.00) as damages, plus Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as attorney's fees to Maricar Baesa, and the total amount of Three
Hundred Forty-Four Thousand Pesos (P344,000.00) plus Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as
attorney's fees to Fe Ico and her children, and to pay the costs in both cases.

PANTRANCO filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeal's decision, but on June 26,
1987, it denied the same for lack of merit. PANTRANCO then filed the instant petition for review.
Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for not applying the doctrine of the "last clear chance" against
the jeepney driver. Petitioner claims that under the circumstances of the case, it was the driver of the
passenger jeepney who had the last clear chance to avoid the collision and was therefore negligent in
failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence his then existing opportunity to avoid the harm.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the doctrine of “last clear chance'' applies in the case at bar.
2. Whether or not PANTRANCO is liable as an employer.
3. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in fixing the damages for the loss of earning capacity
of the deceased victims

RULING:

1. The Court ruled in the negative. Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the doctrine of "last
clear chance" finds no application in this case. For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary
to show that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware
of the existence of the peril or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it. One
cannot be expected to avoid an accident or injury if he does not know or could not have known
the existence of the peril. In this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David
Ico knew of the impending danger. When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was
encroaching on his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his
right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus to its own lane upon
seeing the jeepney approaching from the opposite direction. As held by this Court in the case
of Vda. De Bonifacio v. BLTB, G.R. No. L-26810, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 618, a motorist
who is properly proceeding on his own side of the highway is generally entitled to assume that
an approaching vehicle coming towards him on the wrong side, will return to his proper lane
of traffic. There was nothing to indicate to David Ico that the bus could not return to its own
lane or was prevented from returning to the proper lane by anything beyond the control of its
driver. Leo Marantan, an alternate driver of the Pantranco bus who was seated beside the
driver Ramirez at the time of the accident, testified that Ramirez had no choice but to swerve
the steering wheel to the left and encroach on the jeepney's lane because there was a steep
precipice on the right. However, this is belied by the evidence on record which clearly shows
that there was enough space to swerve the bus back to its own lane without any danger.

Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that the negligence of petitioner's driver in
encroaching into the lane of the incoming jeepney and in failing to return the bus to its own
lane immediately upon seeing the jeepney coming from the opposite direction was the sole
and proximate cause of the accident without which the collision would not have occurred.
There was no supervening or intervening negligence on the part of the jeepney driver which
would have made the prior negligence of petitioner's driver a mere remote cause of the
accident.
2. The Court ruled in the affirmative. On the issue of its liability as an employer, petitioner claims
that it had observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage, conformably
to the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. It is argued by the petitioner that unless
proven otherwise, it is presumed that petitioner observed its usual recruitment procedure and
company policies on safety and efficiency.

The Court finds the above contention unmeritorious.

The finding of negligence on the part of its driver Ambrosio Ramirez gave rise to the
presumption of negligence on the part of petitioner and the burden of proving that it exercised
due diligence not only in the selection of its employees but also in adequately supervising their
work rests with the petitioner [Lilius v. Manila Railroad Company, 59 Phil. 758 (1934); Umali v.
Bacani, G.R. No. L-40570, June 30, 1976, 69 SCRA 623]. Contrary to petitioner's claim, there
is no presumption that the usual recruitment procedures and safety standards were observed.
The mere issuance of rules and regulations and the formulation of various company policies
on safety, without showing that they are being complied with, are not sufficient to exempt
petitioner from liability arising from the negligence of its employee. It is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the erring driver, the recruitment procedures
and company policies on efficiency and safety were followed. Petitioner failed to do this. Hence,
the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the finding of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that the evidence presented by the petitioner, which consists mainly of the
uncorroborated testimony of its Training Coordinator, is insufficient to overcome the
presumption of negligence against petitioner.

3. The Court ruled in the negative. The Court finds that the Court of Appeals committed no
reversible error in fixing the amount of damages for the loss of earning capacity of the
deceased victims. While it is true that private respondents should have presented documentary
evidence to support their claim for damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased
victims, the absence thereof does not necessarily bar the recovery of the damages in question.
The testimony of Fe Ico and Francisca Bascos as to the earning capacity of David Ico, and the
spouses Baesa, respectively, are sufficient to establish a basis from which the court can make
a fair and reasonable estimate of the damages for the loss of earning capacity of the three
deceased victims. Moreover, in fixing the damages for loss of earning capacity of a deceased
victim, the court can consider the nature of his occupation, his educational attainment and the
state of his health at the time of death.

However, it should be pointed out that the Court of Appeals committed an error in fixing the
compensatory damages for the death of Harold Jim Baesa and Marcelino Baesa. Respondent
court awarded to plaintiff (private respondent) Maricar Baesa Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00) as "compensatory damages for the death of Harold Jim Baesa and Marcelino
Baesa.” In other words, the Court of Appeals awarded only Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(P15,000.00) as indemnity for the death of Harold Jim Baesa and another Fifteen Thousand
Pesos (P15,000.00) for the death of Marcelino Baesa. This is clearly erroneous. In the case of
People v. de la Fuente, G.R. Nos. 63251-52, December 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 518, the
indemnity for the death of a person was fixed by this Court at Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00). Plaintiff Maricar Baesa should therefore be awarded Sixty Thousand Pesos
(P60,000.00) as indemnity for the death of her brothers, Harold Jim Baesa and Marcelino
Baesa or Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) for the death of each brother.
 GREGORIO ANURAN, MARIA MALIGAYA, LAPAZ LARO, ET AL. v. PEPITO BUÑO, PEDRO
GAHOL, LUISA ALCANTARA, GUILLERMO RAZON, ANSELMO MALIGAYA and CEFERINA
ARO
G.R. Nos. L-21353 and L-21354 | 1966 May 20 | Bengzon C.J.

The principle of “last clear chance” would call for application only in a suit between the owners and
drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from
the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent
driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of
negligence.

FACTS: A passenger jeepney owned by Pedro Gahol and Luisa Alcantara and driven by Pepito Buño,
overloaded with (14-16 passengers), was parked on the road. The jeepney was parked to let a
passenger alight in such a way that 1/2 of its width (the left wheels) was on the asphalt pavement of
the road and the other half, on the right shoulder of the road. Then, a speeding motor truck, owned by
Anselmo Maligaya and Ceferina Aro, driven by Guillermo Razon, negligently bumped it from behind.
As a result, three passengers died and two others suffered injuries that required their confinement at
the Provincial Hospital for many days.

Suits were instituted by the representatives of the dead and of the injured, to recover consequently
damages against the driver and the owners of the truck and also against the driver and the owners of
the jeepney

RULING OF CFI: The CFI absolved the driver of the jeepney and its owners, but it required the truck
driver and the owners to make compensation.

RULING OF CA: Upon appeal, the CA affirmed exoneration of the jeepney.

ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance can apply so that truck driver, guilty of greater
negligence which was the efficient cause of the collision, will be solely liable

RULING: NO. The principle of "last clear chance" would call for application only in a suit between the
owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to
exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was
likewise guilty of negligence.

Upon further and more extended consideration of the matter, we have become convinced that error of
law was committed in releasing the jeepney from liability. It must be remembered that the obligation
of the carrier to transport its passengers safely is such that the New Civil Code requires "utmost
diligence" from the carriers (Art. 1755) who are "presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they have observed extraordinary diligence" (Art. 1756). In this
instance, this legal presumption of negligence is confirmed by the Court of Appeals' finding that the
driver of the jeepney in question was at fault in parking the vehicle improperly. It must follow that the
driver — and the owners — of the jeepney must answer for injuries to its passengers.

WILLIAM TIU, doing business under the name and style of “D’ Rough Riders,” and VIRGILIO
TE LASPIÑAS , petitioners, vs . PEDRO A. ARRIESGADO, BENJAMIN CONDOR, SERGIO
PEDRANO and PHILIPPINE PHOENIX SURETY AND INSURANCE, INC. , respondents.
[G.R. No. 138060. September 1, 2004.] SECOND DIVISION, CALLEJO, SR., J.
Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the principle of last clear chance is inapplicable in the instant
case, as it only applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles. It does not
arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations,
for it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver and its owner on the ground that the other
driver was likewise guilty of negligence.

FACTS: At about 10:00 p.m. of March 15, 1987, the cargo truck marked “Condor Hollow Blocks and
General Merchandise” was loaded with firewood. Upon reaching Sitio Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela,
Cebu, just as the truck passed over a bridge, one of its rear tires exploded. The driver, Sergio Pedrano,
then parked along the right side of the national highway and removed the damaged tire to have it
vulcanized at a nearby shop. Pedrano left his helper, Jose Mitante, Jr. to keep watch over the stalled
vehicle, and instructed the latter to place a spare tire six fathoms away behind the stalled truck to
serve as a warning for oncoming vehicles. At about 4:45 a.m., D’ Rough Riders passenger bus, driven
by Virgilio Te Laspiñas was cruising along the national highway of Sitio Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela,
Cebu. The passenger bus was also bound for Cebu City, and had come from Maya, Daanbantayan,
Cebu. Among its passengers were the Spouses Pedro A. Arriesgado and Felisa Pepito Arriesgado,
who were seated at the right side of the bus, about three (3) or four (4) places from the front seat.

As the bus was approaching the bridge, Laspiñas saw the stalled truck, which was then about 25
meters away. He applied the breaks and tried to swerve to the left to avoid hitting the truck. But it was
too late; the bus rammed into the truck’s left rear. The impact damaged the right side of the bus and
left several passengers injured. Pedro Arriesgado lost consciousness and suffered a fracture in his
right colles. His wife, Felisa, was brought to the Danao City Hospital. She was later transferred to the
Southern Island Medical Center where she died shortly thereafter. Respondent Arriesgado then filed
a complaint for breach of contract against the petitioners, D’ Rough Riders bus operator William Tiu
and his driver, Virgilio Te Laspiñas. Petitioners filed a Third-Party Complaint against respondent
Benjamin Condor, the registered owner of the cargo truck; and respondent Sergio Pedrano, the driver
of the truck. They alleged that petitioner Laspiñas was negotiating the uphill climb along the national
highway of Sitio Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela, in a moderate and normal speed. It was further
alleged that the truck was parked in a slanted manner, its rear portion almost in the middle of the
highway, and that no early warning device was displayed. Petitioner Laspiñas promptly applied the
brakes and swerved to the left to avoid hitting the truck head-on, but despite his efforts to avoid
damage to property and physical injuries on the passengers, the right side portion of the bus hit the
cargo truck’s left rear.

RTC RULING: ruled in favor of Arriesgado. The trial court ruled that if petitioner Laspiñas had not been
driving at a fast pace, he could have easily swerved to the left to avoid hitting the truck, thus, averting
the unfortunate incident. It then concluded that petitioner Laspiñas was negligent. The trial court also
ruled that the absence of an early warning device near the place where the truck was parked was not
sufficient to impute negligence on the part of respondent Pedrano, since the tail lights of the truck were
fully on, and the vicinity was well lighted by street lamps.

CA RULING: affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification of reduction of damages.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners should be held liable

RULING: YES. Petitioner Laspiñas was negligent in driving the Ill-fated bus. Since he saw the stalled
truck at a distance of 25 meters, petitioner Laspiñas had more than enough time to swerve to his left
to avoid hitting it; that is, if the speed of the bus was only 40 to 50 kilometers per hour as he claimed.
As found by the Court of Appeals, it is easier to believe that petitioner Laspiñas was driving at a very
fast speed, since at 4:45 a.m., the hour of the accident, there were no oncoming vehicles at the
opposite direction. Petitioner Laspiñas could have swerved to the left lane with proper clearance, and,
thus, could have avoided the truck. Instinct, at the very least, would have prompted him to apply the
breaks to avert the impending disaster which he must have foreseen when he caught sight of the
stalled truck. Indeed, petitioner Laspiñas’ negligence in driving the bus is apparent in the records. By
his own admission, he had just passed a bridge and was traversing the highway of Compostela, Cebu
at a speed of 40 to 50 kilometers per hour before the collision occurred. The maximum speed allowed
by law on a bridge is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving
a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.

Further, it is undisputed that the respondent and his wife were not safely transported to the destination
agreed upon. In actions for breach of contract, only the existence of such contract, and the fact that
the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination
are the matters that need to be proved. This is because under the said contract of carriage, the
petitioners assumed the express obligation to transport the respondent and his wife to their destination
safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all circumstances. Any injury suffered
by the passengers in the course thereof is immediately attributable to the negligence of the carrier.
Upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arises, and it becomes
the duty of a common carrier to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his
passengers. It must be stressed that in requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from common
carriers and in creating a presumption of negligence against them, the law compels them to curb the
recklessness of their drivers. As correctly found by the trial court, petitioner Tiu failed to conclusively
rebut such presumption. The negligence of petitioner Laspiñas as driver of the passenger bus is, thus,
binding against petitioner Tiu, as the owner of the passenger bus engaged as a common carrier.

The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance Is Inapplicable in the Case at Bar. Contrary to the petitioner’s
contention, the principle of last clear chance is inapplicable in the instant case, as it only applies in a
suit between the owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger
demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations, for it would be inequitable
to exempt the negligent driver and its owner on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of
negligence. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff
who has also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the
casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law of last
clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory
negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in
Article 2179 of the Civil Code. Thus, petitioner Tiu cannot escape liability for the death of respondent
Arriesgado’s wife due to the negligence of petitioner Laspiñas, his employee, on this score.
Respondents Pedrano and Condor were likewise Negligent. In Phoenix Construction, Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court ruled that the improper parking of a dump truck without any
warning lights or reflector devices created an unreasonable risk for anyone driving within the vicinity,
and for having created such risk, the truck driver must be held responsible.

In this case, both the trial and the appellate courts failed to consider that respondent Pedrano was
also negligent in leaving the truck parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices to alert
oncoming vehicles, and that such failure created the presumption of negligence on the part of his
employer, respondent Condor, in supervising his employees properly and adequately. The petitioners
were correct in invoking respondent Pedrano’s failure to observe Article IV, Section 34(g) of the Rep.
Act No. 4136, which provides:

(g) Lights when parked or disabled. — Appropriate parking lights or Rares visible one hundred meters
away shall be displayed at a corner of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked on highways or in
places that are not well-lighted or is placed in such manner as to endanger passing traffic.

The manner in which the truck was parked clearly endangered oncoming traffic on both sides,
considering that the tire blowout which stalled the truck in the first place occurred in the wee hours of
the morning. The Court can only now surmise that the unfortunate incident could have been averted
had respondent Condor, the owner of the truck, equipped the said vehicle with lights, Rares, or, at the
very least, an early warning device. Hence, we cannot subscribe to respondents Condor and
Pedrano’s claim that they should be absolved from liability because, as found by the trial and appellate
courts, the proximate cause of the collision was the fast speed at which petitioner Laspiñas drove the
bus. To accept this proposition would be to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of
law that a man must respond for the foreseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission.
Indeed, our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to
allocate them among its members. To accept this proposition would be to weaken the very bonds of
society.

DISPOSITIVE: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS: (1) Respondent Philippine
Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc. and petitioner William Tiu are ORDERED to pay, jointly and
severally, respondent Pedro A. Arriesgado the total amount of P13,113.80; (2) The petitioners and the
respondents Benjamin Condor and Sergio Pedrano are ORDERED to pay, jointly and severally,
respondent Pedro A. Arriesgado P50,000.00 as indemnity; P26,441.50 as actual damages;
P50,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P20,000.00 as attorney’s
fees. SO ORDERED.

Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 138569, September 11, 2003 | NO DIGEST MADE – FROM GOOLE

Solidbank’s tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they return the passbook
only to the depositor or his authorized representative. The tellers know, or should know, that the rules
on savings account provide that any person in possession of the passbook is presumptively its owner.

Facts: Solidbank is a domestic banking corporation while private respondent L.C. Diaz and Company,
CPA’s (“L.C. Diaz”), is a professional partnership engaged in the practice of accounting and which
opened a savings account with Solidbank. Diaz through its cashier, Mercedes Macaraya , filled up a
savings cash deposit slip and a savings checks deposit slip. Macaraya instructed the messenger of
L.C. Diaz, Ismael Calapre, to deposit the money with Solidbank and give him the Solidbank passbook.
Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the two deposit slips and the passbook. The
teller acknowledged receipt of the deposit by returning to Calapre the duplicate copies of the two
deposit slips. Since the transaction took time and Calapre had to make another deposit for L.C. Diaz
with Allied Bank, he left the passbook with Solidbank. When Calapre returned to Solidbank to retrieve
the passbook, Teller No. 6 informed him that somebody got the passbook. Calapre went back to L.C.
Diaz and reported the incident to Macaraya. The following day,, L.C. Diaz through its Chief Executive
Officer, Luis C. Diaz, called up Solidbank to stop any transaction using the same passbook until L.C.
Diaz could open a new account followed by a formal written request later that day. It was also on the
same day that L.C. Diaz learned of the unauthorized withdrawal the day before of P300,000 from its
savings account. The withdrawal slip bore the signatures of the authorized signatories of L.C. Diaz,
namely Diaz and Rustico L. Murillo. The signatories, however, denied signing the withdrawal slip. A
certain Noel Tamayo received the P300,000.

L.C. Diaz demanded from Solidbank the return of its money but to no avail. Hence, L.C. Diaz filed a
Complaint for Recovery of a Sum of Money against Solidbank with the Regional Trial Court. After trial,
the trial court rendered a decision absolving Solidbank and dismissing the complaint. Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not Solidbank must be held liable for the fraudulent withdrawal on private
respondent’s account.
Held: Solidbank’s tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they return the
passbook only to the depositor or his authorized representative. The tellers know, or should know, that
the rules on savings account provide that any person in possession of the passbook is presumptively
its owner. If the tellers give the passbook to the wrong person, they would be clothing that person
presumptive ownership of the passbook, facilitating unauthorized withdrawals by that person. For
failing to return the passbook to Calapre, the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz, Solidbank and
Teller No. 6 presumptively failed to observe such high degree of diligence in safeguarding the
passbook, and in insuring its return to the party authorized to receive the same. However, L.C. Diaz
was guilty of contributory negligence in allowing a withdrawal slip signed by its authorized signatories
to fall into the hands of an impostor. Thus, the liability of Solidbank should be reduced. Hence, the
liability of Solidbank for actual damages was reduced to only 60%, the remaining 40% was borne by
private respondent.

The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on
simple loan. There is a debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and its depositor. The bank is
the debtor and the depositor is the creditor. The law imposes on banks high standards in view of the
fiduciary nature of banking. RA 8791 declares that the State recognizes the “fiduciary nature of
banking that requires high standards of integrity and performance.” This new provision in the general
banking law, introduced in 2000, is a statutory affirmation of Supreme Court decisions holding that
“the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having
in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship.”

PNR v BRUNTY and GARCIA

G.R. No. 169891 | November 2, 2006 | J. Callejo

Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a
prudent and reasonable man would not do.

The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of
one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to
do so, is chargeable with the loss.

FACTS: Rhoda Brunty, the daughter of Ethel Brunty and an American citizen, came to the Philippines
for a visit sometime in 1980. Before her departure, she and her Filipino host Garcia went to Baguio on
board a Mercedes Benz sedan driven by Mercelita. It was about 12 midnight and by then, the PNR
train driven by Reyes was on its way to Tutuban.

When the car where Brunty, et al were riding was already approaching the railroad crossing at 2AM in
Moncada, Tarlac, Mercelita driving at approximately 70 km/hr, they drove past a vehicle, unaware of
the railroad track up ahead and they were about to collide with the PNR train. Mercelita died at the
scene, Garcia suffered injuries, and Rhoda Brunty was rushed to the hospital but was declared dead
on arrival.

In 1981, Ethel Brunty demanded from PNR payment of actual, compensatory, and moral damages,
but the latter did not respond.

Brunty and Garcia then filed a complaint against PNR before RTC Manila, alleging that the death of
Mercelita and Brunty, plus the injuries suffered by Garcia were the direct and proximate result of the
gross and reckless negligence of PNR in not providing the necessary equipment at the railroad
crossing in Moncada, Tarlac. They pointed out that there was no flagbar or red light signal to warn
motorists who were about to cross the railroad track, and that the flagman or switchman was only
equipped with a hand flashlight. They likewise averred that PNR failed to supervise its employees in
the performance of their respective tasks and duties, more particularly the pilot and operator of the
train.

They prayed for the payment of the following damages:

1) ₱200,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages to plaintiff Ethel Brunty;

2) ₱2,800,000.00 for compensatory damages to plaintiff Ethel Brunty representing lost or
unearned income of Rhonda Brunty;
3) Such amounts of moral and exemplary damages as may be warranted by the evidence
adduced, to plaintiff Ethel Brunty;
4) At least ₱64,057.61 as actual damages representing medical expenses to plaintiff Juan
Manuel M. Garcia and at least ₱1,000,000.00 as unearned or lost income of said plaintiff;
5) At least ₱72,760.00 as actual damages representing cost of the Mercedes Benz car to plaintiff
Juan Manuel M. Garcia;
6) Such amounts of moral and exemplary damages as may be warranted by the evidence
adduced, to plaintiff Juan Manuel M. Garcia; and
7) Attorney’s fees equivalent to at least 15% of the total award to plaintiffs herein

PNR: that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family not only in the selection but also in the
supervision of its employees; that it had the right of way on the railroad crossing in question, and that
it has no legal duty to put up a bar or red light signal in any such crossing. It insisted that there were
adequate, visible, and clear warning signs strategically posted on the sides of the road before the
railroad crossing. It countered that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident was Mercelita’s
negligence, and that he had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. The driver disregarded the
warning signs, the whistle blasts of the oncoming train and the flashlight signals to stop given by the
guard.

RTC: ordered PNR to pay:

a. P 30, 000 for the death of Rhoda
b. P 1 million for moral and actual damages due the heirs of Rhoda.
c. P 72,760.00 for damages sustained by the Mercedes Benz
d. P 50, 000 for attorney’s fees.

CA: affirmed RTC decision with modification: death indemnity of P 50, 000.

ISSUES:

1. Whether PNR is negligent.

2. Whether Mercelita was guilty of contributory negligence.
3. Whether the doctrine of last chance is applicable here.

RULING:

1. YES. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing
of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.

Article 2176. Whoever, by act or omission, causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
 existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter.

In a long line of cases, the Court held that in order to sustain a claim based on quasi-delict,
the following requisites must concur: (1) damage to plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission,
of which defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond was guilty; and (3)
connection of cause and effect between such negligence and damage.

Here, there was negligence on the part of PNR. Considering the circumstances prevailing at
the time of the fatal accident, the alleged safety measures installed by the PNR at the railroad
crossing is not only inadequate but does not satisfy well-settled safety standards in
transportation.

An examination of the photographs of the railroad crossing at Moncada, Tarlac presented as

evidence by PNR itself would yield the following:

(1) absence of flagbars or safety railroad bars; (2) inadequacy of the installed warning signals;
and (3) lack of proper lighting within the area.

Thus, even if there was a flagman stationed at the site as claimed by PNR, it would still be
impossible to know or see that there is a railroad crossing/tracks ahead, or that there is an
approaching train from the Moncada side of the road since one’s view would be blocked by a
cockpit arena. Also, a vehicle coming from the Moncada side would have difficulty in knowing
that there is an approaching train because of the slight curve, more so, at an unholy hour as
2:00 a.m. Thus, it is imperative on the part of the PNR to provide adequate safety equipment
in the area.

2. Contributory negligence is the conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal
cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to
conform for his own protection. To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must
be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or
signs of an impending danger to health and body. To prove contributory negligence, it is still
necessary to establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the negligence of the
party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is contributory only when it
contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its occurrence.

While it was established that Mercelita was then driving the Mercedes Benz at a speed of 70
km/hr and, in fact, had overtaken a vehicle a few yards before reaching the railroad track,
Mercelita should not have driven the car the way he did however, while his acts contributed to
the collision, they nevertheless do not negate PNR’s liability. Pursuant to Article 2179 of the
NCC, the only effect such contributory negligence could have is to mitigate liability, which,
however, is not applicable in this case.

3. NO. The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the
negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss.

Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering
damages caused by the supervening negligence of defendant, who had the last fair chance to
prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Since the proximate cause of
the injury is that of PNR’s, the doctrine is not applicable in this case.
 As the heirs of Rhonda Brunty undeniably incurred expenses for the wake and burial of the
latter, we deem it proper to award temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 pursuant
to prevailing jurisprudence. This is in lieu of actual damages as it would be unfair for the victim’s
heirs to get nothing, despite the death of their kin, for the reason alone that they cannot
produce receipts.

PNR is ordered to pay:

a. P 50, 000 for the death of Rhoda

b. P 500, 000 for moral due the heirs of Rhoda.
c. P 25, 000 for temperate damages in lieu of actual damages
d. P 72,760.00 for damages sustained by the Mercedes Benz
e. P 50, 000 for attorney’s fees.

No damages, however, were awarded for the injuries suffered by Garcia, yet, the latter never
interposed an appeal before the CA nor even before the SC.

GLAN PEOPLE'S LUMBER AND HARDWARE, GEORGE LIM, FABIO S. AGAD, FELIX LIM and
PAUL ZACARIAS y INFANTE v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, CECILIA ALFEREZ
VDA. DE CALIBO, Minors ROYCE STEPHEN, JOYCE JOAN, JANISE MARIE, JACQUELINE
BRIGITTE JOCELINE CORAZON, JULIET GERALDINE, JENNIFER JILL, all surnamed CALIBO,
represented by their mother, CECILIA A. VDA. DE CALIBO
G.R. No. 70493 | May 18, 1989 | J. Narvasa

From these facts the logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what judicial doctrine
has appropriately called the last clear chance to avoid the accident, while still at that distance of thirty
meters from the truck, by stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away from the truck, either of which
he had sufficient time to do while running at a speed of only thirty kilometers per hour. In those
circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity of avoidance, not merely rely on a supposed
right to expect, as the Appellate Court would have it, the truck to swerve and leave him a clear path.

FACTS: Engineer Orlando T. Calibo, Agripino Roranes, and Maximo Patos were on the jeep owned
by the Bacnotan Consolidated Industries, Inc., with Calibo at the wheel, as it approached from the
South Lizada Bridge going towards the direction of Davao City at about 1:45 in the afternoon of July
4,1979. At about that time, the cargo track, loaded with cement bags, GI sheets, plywood, driven by
defendant Paul Zacarias y Infants, coming from the opposite direction of Davao City and bound for
Glan, South Cotabato, had just crossed said bridge. At about 59 yards after crossing the bridge, the
cargo truck and the jeep collided as a consequence of which Engineer Calibo died while Roranes and
Patos sustained physical injuries. Zacarias was unhurt. As a result of the impact, the left side of the
truck was slightly damaged while the left side of the jeep, including its fender and hood, was
extensively damaged. After the impact, the jeep fell and rested on its right side on the asphalted road
a few meters to the rear of the truck, while the truck stopped on its wheels on the road.

A complaint for damages was filed by the heirs of Engineer Calibo, his widow and minor children
(private respondents) against Felix Agad, George Lim, and Felix Lim, co-owners of the Glan People’s
Lumber and Hardware.

RTC RULING: The trial court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The plaintiffs failed
to establish by preponderance of evidence the negligence, and thus the liability, of the defendants,
based on the following findings:
 1. Moments before its collission with the truck being operated by Zacarias, the jeep of the
deceased Calibo was "zigzagging."

4. That there were skid marks left by the truck's tires at the scene, and none by the jeep,
demonstrates that the driver of the truck had applied the brakes and the jeep's driver had not;
and that the jeep had on impact fallen on its right side is indication that it was running at high
speed.

5. Even if it be considered that there was some antecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias
shortly before the collision, in that he had caused his truck to run some 25 centimeters to the
left of the center of the road, Engr. Calibo had the last clear chance of avoiding the accident
because he still had ample room in his own lane to steer clear of the truck, or he could simply
have braked to a full stop.

CA RULING: Reversed.

ISSUE: WON petitioners are entitled to damages.

RULING: No.

Although it was not disputed that the truck overrode the painted stripe by twenty-five (25) centimeters,
it was still at least eleven (11) centimeters away from its side of the true center line of the road and
well inside its own lane when the accident occurred. By this same reckoning, since it was
unquestionably the jeep that rammed into the stopped truck, it may also be deduced that it (the jeep)
was at the time travelling beyond its own lane and intruding into the lane of the truck by at least the
same 11-centimeter width of space. Nor was the Appellate Court correct in finding that Paulino
Zacarias had acted negligently in applying his brakes instead of getting back inside his lane upon
spying the approaching jeep. Being well within his own lane, as has already been explained, he had
no duty to swerve out of the jeep's way as said Court would have had him do.

Both drivers, as the Appellate Court found, had had a full view of each other's vehicle from a distance
of one hundred fifty meters. Both vehicles were traveling at a speed of approximately thirty kilometers
per hour. The private respondents have admitted that the truck was already at a full stop when the
jeep plowed into it. And they have not seen fit to deny or impugn petitioners' imputation that they also
admitted the truck had been brought to a stop while the jeep was still thirty meters away. From these
facts the logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what judicial doctrine has
appropriately called the last clear chance to avoid the accident, while still at that distance of
thirty meters from the truck, by stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away from the truck,
either of which he had sufficient time to do while running at a speed of only thirty kilometers
per hour. In those circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity of avoidance, not
merely rely on a supposed right to expect, as the Appellate Court would have it, the truck to
swerve and leave him a clear path.

The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid and complete a defense to accident liability
today as it did when invoked and applied in the 1918 case of Picart vs. Smith wherein the Court ruled:

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of
antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have
already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to
discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent
acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant
succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these
circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending
 harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior
negligence of the other party.

LADECO v. ANGALA
G.R. No. 153076 | June 21, 2007 | J. Carpio

Moral damages are awarded to allow a plaintiff to obtain means, diversion, or amusement that will
serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone due to the defendant's culpable action.

FACTS: On 4 May 1993, at about 2:45 p.m., a Datsun crewcab driven by Apolonio Deocampo
(Deocampo) bumped into a 1958 Chevy pick-up owned by Michael Raymond Angala (respondent)
and driven by Bernulfo Borres (Borres).

Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (LADECO) owned the crewcab which was
assigned to its manager Manuel Mendez (Mendez). Deocampo was the driver and bodyguard of
Mendez. Both vehicles were running along the street of Davao City heading north towards Lanang,
Davao City. The left door, front left fender, and part of the front bumper of the pick-up were damaged.
Respondent filed an action for Quasi-Delict, Damages, and Attorney's Fees against LADECO, its
administrative officer Henry Berenguel (Berenguel) and Deocampo.

Allegations of Respondent: Respondent alleged that his pick-up was slowing down to about 5-10
kilometers per hour (kph) and was making a left turn preparatory to turning south when it was bumped
from behind by the crewcab which was running at around 60 to 70 kph. The crewcab stopped 21
meters from the point of impact. Respondent testified that Borres made a signal because he noticed
a blinking light while looking at the speedometer. Respondent sent a demand letter to LADECO for
the payment of the damages but he did not receive any reply. Thus, respondent filed the case against
LADECO, Berenguel, and Deocampo.

Allegations of Petitioner: Deocampo alleged that he did not see any signal from the pick-up. He
testified that he tried to avoid the pick-up but he was unable to avoid the collision. Deocampo stated
that he did not apply the brakes because he knew the collision was unavoidable, and admitted that he
only stepped on the brakes after the collision.

RTC: RTC ordered the defendants to solidarily pay the plaintiffs the ff sums: 23,200 (actual damages);
10,000 (moral damages); 10,000 (attorney’s fees); and, cost of suit. It found that the crewcab was
running very fast while following the pick-up and that the crewcab's speed was the proximate cause
of the accident. It ruled that Deocampo had the last opportunity to avoid the accident. It also found
that Berenguel was not liable because he was not the owner of the crewcab. LADECO and Deocampo
filed a MR but it was denied.

CA: On appeal to the CA, the latter affirmed RTC’s decision and sustained its finding that Deocampo
was negligent. It applied the doctrine of last clear chance and ruled that Deocampo had the
responsibility of avoiding the pick-up. It also sustained the solidary liability of LADECO and Deocampo.
It ruled that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the negligence of the driver is presumed to be the
negligence of the owner of the vehicle. Petitioners filed a MR but it was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

1. Who between Borres and Deocampo is negligent in this case?

2. Can the doctrine of last clear chance be applied in this case?
3. WON Petitioners are solidarily liable.
4. WON respondent is entitled to damages awarded.
RULING:

1. Both drivers are negligent.

Borres was at the outer lane when he executed a U-turn. Following Section 45 (b) of RA 4136,
Borres should have stayed at the inner lane which is the lane nearest to the center of the highway.
However, Deocampo was equally negligent. Borres slowed down the pick-up preparatory to executing
the U-turn. Deocampo should have also slowed down when the pick-up slowed down. Deocampo
admitted that he noticed the pick-up when it was still about 20 meters away from him.

Vehicular traffic was light at the time of the incident. The pick-up and the crewcab were the only
vehicles on the road. 14 Deocampo could have avoided the crewcab if he was not driving very fast
before the collision. Further, the crewcab stopped 21 meters from the point of impact. It would not
have happened if Deocampo was not driving very fast.

2. YES.

The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of
one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to
do so is chargeable with the loss.

In this case, Deocampo had the last clear chance to avoid the collision. Since Deocampo was driving
the rear vehicle, he had full control of the situation since he was in a position to observe the vehicle in
front of him. Deocampo had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him.

A U-turn is done at a much slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning, compared to running
straight ahead. Deocampo could have avoided the vehicle if he was not driving very fast while following
the pick-up. Further, Deocampo admitted that he only stepped on the brakes after the collision.

3. YES. LADECO failed to show any proof how it exercised due diligence in the supervision and
selection of its employees. Therefore, LADECO is solidarily liable with Deocampo.

4. YES, respondent is entitled only to moral damages.

Moral damages are awarded to allow a plaintiff to obtain means, diversion, or amusement that will
serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone due to the defendant's culpable action. The
trial court found that respondent, who was on board the pick-up when the collision took place, suffered
shock, serious anxiety, and fright when the crewcab bumped his pick-up. Indeed, respondent
sufficiently showed that he suffered shock, serious anxiety, and fright which entitle him to moral
damages.

On the award of attorney’s fees, the SC held that the RTC and the CA failed to give justification for its
award since it must be based on findings of fact and of law.

BPI v. SPOUSES QUIAOIT, et al., Respondents.

G.R. No. 199562, January 16, 2019

The doctrine of last clear chance, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude
a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising
reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff
notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. The doctrine necessarily assumes negligence on the part of
the defendant and contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and does not apply except upon
that assumption. Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him
from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the last
fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Moreover, in situations
where the doctrine has been applied, it was defendant's failure to exercise such ordinary care, having
the last clear chance to avoid loss or injury, which was the proximate cause of the occurrence of such
loss or injury.

Nature of Action: This is an Action for Collection of Sum of Money against the Bank of the Philippines
Islands by Ana C. Gonzales, et al., due to the encashment of check amounted to USD 20,000.00 of
which some dollar bills received by the former were counterfeit.

Facts: Fernando V. Quiaoit (Fernando) maintains peso and dollar accounts with the Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI) Greenhills-Crossroads Branch (BPI Greenhills). Fernando, through Merlyn
Lambayong (Lambayong), encashed BPI Greenhills Check for US$20,000.

In a complaint filed by Fernando and his wife Nora L. Quiaoit (Nora) against BPI, they all alleged that
lambayong did not count the $20,000 that she received because the money was placed in a large
Manila Envelope. They also alleged that BPI did not inform Lambayong that the dollar bills were
marked with its “chapa” and the bank did not issue any receipt containing the serial number of the bills.
Lambayong delivered the dollar bills to the spouses Quiaoit in $100 denomination in $10,000 per
bundle. Nora then purchased a plane ticket for their travel abroad, using part of the $20,000 bills
withdrawn from BPI.

The spouses Quiaoit left the Philippines for Jerusalem and Europe. The spouses Quiaoit alleged that
they were placed in a shameful and embarrassing situation when several banks in Madrid, Spain
refused to exchange some of the $100 bills because they were counterfeit. Nora was also threatened
that she would be taken to the police station when she tried to purchase an item in a shop with the
dollar bills. While the spouses where still abroad, they asked their daughter Maria Isabel, who was
employed with BPI Makati, to relay their predicament to BPI Greenhills. However Ana Gonzales, the
branch manager failed to resolve their concern or give them a return call. When the spouses returned
they personally complained to Gonzales.

Issue: Whether or not BPI exercised due diligence in handling the withdrawal of the US dollar bills.

Held: Yes, the High Court held that BPI failed to exercise the highest diligence that is not only expected
but required of a banking institution.

It is well-settled that the diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family.
Banks are required to exercise the highest degree of difference n its banking transaction.

In releasing the dollar bills without listing down their serial numbers, BPI failed to exercise the highest
degree of care and diligence required of it. Likewise, BPI had the

last clear chance to prove that al the dollar bill it issued to the spouses Quiaoit were genuine and that
the counterfeit bills did not come from it if only it listed down the serial numbers of the bills.

The doctrine of last clear chance, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not
preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff
notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. The doctrine necessarily assumes negligence on the part
of the defendant and contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and does not apply except
upon that assumption. Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude
him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the
last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Moreover, in
situations where the doctrine has been applied, it was defendant's failure to exercise such ordinary
care, having the last clear chance to avoid loss or injury, which was the proximate cause of the
occurrence of such loss or injury.

The spouses are entitled to moral damages. In this case, it was established that the spouses Quiaoit
suffered serious anxiety, embarrassment, humiliation, and even threats of being taken to police
authorities for using counterfeit bills. Hence, they are entitled to the moral damages awarded by the
trial court and the Court of Appeals.

Nevertheless, we delete the award of exemplary damages since it does not appear that BPI's
negligence was attended with malice and bad faith. We sustain the award of attorney's fees because
the spouses Quiaoit were forced to litigate to protect their right. We agree with the Court of Appeals
that the action of BPI is the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the spouses Quiaoit. Proximate
cause is defined as the cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces injury and without which the result would not have occurred. The doctrine
of last clear chance, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery
for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care
and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's
negligence.

Read: Laconic Rules on Waivers and Quitclaims - 748 SCRA 687

*SEE PDF IN DRIVE*

PEOPLE v. BILLABER
G.R. Nos. 114967-68 | January 26, 2004 | Tinga, J.

Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that, "In no case may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused."

FACTS: Private complainant Elizabeth Genteroy was introduced to accused Crispin Billaber by her
friends. The accused told Genteroy that he could help her acquire the necessary papers and find her
a job as a seamstress in the United States for a fee of ₱40,000.00.

Sometime in the same month, Genteroy introduced the accused to private complainant Raul Durano.
The accused offered Durano a job as his (the accused’s) personal driver in the US. The accused
charged Durano a fee of ₱18,000.00 for the processing of his papers. Durano paid the accused
₱18,000.00. Durano asked for a receipt, but the accused said it was not necessary since they will
leave together within a month.

Private complainant Genteroy also paid the accused ₱10,000.00. The accused offered her to pay the
balance of ₱30,000.00 at the airport, or settle the amount in the US.

Meanwhile, Genteroy introduced the accused to private complainant Tersina Onza, a seamstress.
Onza accepted the accused’s offer of managing a dress shop which he owns in California. Onza gave
₱10,000.00 to the accused since it was needed by the accused. Just like with the other private
complainants, the accused, despite demand, did not issue Onza a receipt.

Thereafter, the accused instructed the three private complainants, Genteroy, Durano and Onza, to
meet him on 23 July 1992 at the airport, but the accused, however, failed to show up. Durano chanced
upon the accused at the canteen of Emilio Aguinaldo College in Manila. A commotion ensued when
Durano tried to stop the accused from leaving the canteen.

The RTC charged Billaber of illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa. In the illegal recruitment
case, the Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
₱100,000.00, plus the costs. The accused is further ordered to pay actual damages to the
complainants, Raul Durano, Elizabeth Genteroy and Tesina Onza the sums of ₱18,000.00,
₱10,000.00 and ₱10,000.00, respectively, with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6% per annum
from the date of filing these criminal cases, July 27, 1992, until the amount shall have been fully paid

ISSUE: Whether or not there was double recovery of damages

RULING:

The Court ruled in the affirmative.

The trial court erred in awarding private complainants Genteroy and Onza the amount of ₱10,000.00
each as actual damages in the illegal recruitment case. Previously, the MeTC in the estafa cases
Genteroy and Onza filed ordered appellant to pay private complainants the same amounts. Section
1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that, "In no case may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused."

The rate of six percent (6%) per annum as interest imposed on the actual damages of ₱18,000.00
awarded to private complainant Durano is also erroneous. As the amount of P18,000.00 given by
Durano in consideration of his placement constitutes a loan or forbearance of money, the rate of
interest should be twelve percent (12%) per annum in line with this Court’s pronouncement in
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:

II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual or compensatory damages,
the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing.
Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In
the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default,
i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil
Code.
 Sealoader Shipping Corporation v. Grand Cement Manufacturing Corporation
638 SCRA 488 | NO DIGEST MADE – FROM GOOGLE

FACTS: Sealoader Shipping Corporation (Sealoader) is a domestic corporation engaged in the

business of shipping and hauling cargo from one point to another using sea-going inter-island barges.
Grand Cement Manufacturing Corporation (now Taiheiyo Cement Philippines, Inc.), on the other hand,
is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling cement through its
authorized distributors and, for which purposes, it maintains its own private wharf in San Fernando,
Cebu, Philippines.

Sealoader executed a Time Charter Party Agreement with Joyce Launch and Tug Co., Inc. (Joyce
Launch), a domestic corporation, which owned and operated the motor tugboat M/T Viper. By virtue
of the agreement, Sealoader chartered the M/T Viper in order to tow the formers unpropelled barges.
Subsequently, Sealoader entered into a contract with Grand Cement for the loading of cement clinkers
and the delivery thereof to Manila. Sealoaders barge, the D/B Toploader, arrived at the wharf of Grand
Cement tugged by the M/T Viper. The D/B Toploader, however, was not immediately loaded with its
intended cargo as the employees of Grand Cement were still loading another vessel, the Cargo Lift
Tres.

On April 4, 1994, Typhoon Bising struck the Visayas area, the D/B Toploader was, at that time, still
docked at the wharf of Grand Cement. In the afternoon of said date, as the winds blew stronger and
the waves grew higher, the M/T Viper tried to tow the D/B Toploader away from the wharf. The efforts
of the tugboat were foiled, however, as the towing line connecting the two vessels snapped. This
occurred as the mooring lines securing the D/B Toploader to the wharf were not cast off. The following
day, the employees of Grand Cement discovered the D/B Toploader situated on top of the wharf,
apparently having rammed the same and causing significant damage thereto.

Grand Cement filed a Complaint for Damages against Sealoader; Romulo Diantan, the Captain of the
M/T Viper; and Johnny Ponce, the Barge Patron of the D/B Toploader. On the amended complaint,
Sealoader filed a cross claim against Joyce Launch.

The RTC found defendants guilty of negligence, which caused damage to the [Grand Cements] wharf.
The defendants negligence can be shown from their acts or omissions, thus: they did not take any
precautionary measure as demanded or required of them in complete disregard of the public storm
signal or warning; the master or captain or the responsible crew member of the vessel was not in the
vessel, hence, nobody could make any move or action for the safety of the vessel at such time of
emergency or catastrophe; and the vessel was not equipped with a radio or any navigational
communication facility, which is a mandatory requirement for all navigational vessels.

On the second issue: Re: Damages. As the defendants are guilty of negligence, [Grand Cement] is
entitled to recover damages from them. Even the failure of the defendants to equip their vessel with
the communication facility, such as radio, such failure is undisputedly a negligence. Had defendants
been mindful enough to equip their vessel with a radio, a responsible crew member of the vessel would
have been informed through the radio of the incoming typhoon and the notice from the [Grand Cement]
about the said typhoon would have been of no concern to the defendant and/or the responsible crew
members of the vessel. The safety of the vessel and the avoidance of injury or damage to another
should be the primary concern of the defendants and/or the crew members themselves.

The damage to Grand Cements private wharf was caused by the negligence of both defendants
Sealoader and Joyce Launch as well as their employees, who are the complements of the barge
Toploader and the tugboat M/T Viper.
Before the appellate court, Sealoader argued that the RTC erred in: (1) finding that the damage to the
wharf of Grand Cement was caused by the negligence of Sealoader; (2) holding Sealoader liable for
damages despite the fact that it was Grand Cement that had the last clear chance to avert the damage;
(3) not holding that Grand Cement was negligent for not loading the vessel on time; and (4) giving
credence to the afterthought testimony of Grand Cements rebuttal witness.

The Court of Appeals held that like Sealoader, Grand Cement did not take any precaution to avoid the
damages wrought by the storm. Grand Cement waited until the last possible moment before informing
Sealoader and Joyce about the impending storm. In fact, it continued loading on another vessel (Cargo
Lift 3) until 2:15 p.m. of April 4, 1994 or roughly just before the storm hit. It is no wonder that Sealoader
did not immediately move away from the pier since the owner of the pier, Grand Cement, was
continuing to load another vessel despite the fast approaching storm. In totality, we find that Grand
Cement also did not exercise due diligence in this case and that its conduct contributed to the damages
that it suffered.

Article 2179 of the New Civil Code states that where the plaintiffs negligence was only contributory,
the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff
may recover damages, the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. Contributory negligence
is conduct on the part of the plaintiff which falls below the standard to which he should conform for his
own protection and which is legally contributing cause, cooperating with the negligence of the
defendant in bringing about the plaintiffs harm.

Due to its contributory negligence, Grand Cement must carry part of the brunt of the damages. This
Court finds it equitable that Grand Cement should bear FIFTY PER CENT (50%) or half of the actual
damages. The other pronouncements of the court regarding attorneys fees, litigation expenses and
cost of suit shall, however, not be disturbed.

ISSUE: Who among the parties in this case, should be liable for the damage sustained by the wharf
of Grand Cement.

HELD: RTCs decision is sustained.

CIVIL LAW: negligence

The Court holds that Sealoader had the responsibility to inform itself of the prevailing weather
conditions in the areas where its vessel was set to sail. Sealoader cannot merely rely on other vessels
for weather updates and warnings on approaching storms, as what apparently happened in this case.
Common sense and reason dictates this. To do so would be to gamble with the safety of its own vessel,
putting the lives of its crew under the mercy of the sea, as well as running the risk of causing damage
to the property of third parties for which it would necessarily be liable.

Be that as it may, the records of the instant case reveal that Grand Cement timely informed the D/B
Toploader of the impending typhoon.

The Court finds that the evidence proffered by Sealoader to prove the negligence of Grand Cement
was marred by contradictions and are, thus, weak at best. We therefore conclude that the contributory
negligence of Grand Cement was not established in this case.
 REBULTAN vs. DAGANTA
G.R. No. 197908 | July 04, 2018 | J. Jardeleza

In interpreting Section 42(a) and (b) of R.A. No. 4136, the Court said in Caminos, Jr. that the vehicle
making a turn to the left is under the duty to yield to the vehicle approaching from the opposite lane
on the right. Further, the driver who has a favored status is not relieved from the duty of driving with
due regard for the safety of other vehicles and from refraining from an "arbitrary exercise of such right
of way." Applying Caminos, Jr., it is apparent that it is the Kia Ceres which had the right of way. The
jeepney driver making a turn on the left had the duty of yielding to the vehicle on his right, the
approaching Kia Ceres driven by Lomotos. Thus, the CA erred in holding that it was Viloria, as the
jeepney's driver, who had the right of way.

Further, the accident would have been avoided had Viloria, the jeepney driver, carefully approached
and made a left turn in the intersection, with due regard to the right of way accorded in favor of Lomotos
or anyone coming from the latter's direction. Regardless of whether Lomotos was overspeeding,
Viloria ought to have exercised the prudence of a diligent driver in making a turn at a danger zone.
This omission on his part constituted negligence.

FACTS: On February 15, 2000, the heirs of Rebultan, Sr. (petitioners) filed a complaint for damages
against Viloria, and Spouses Edmundo and Marvelyn P. Daganta (spouses Daganta) as the owners
of the jeepney (collectively, respondents). Petitioners prayed for compensation for the loss of life and
earning capacity of Rebultan, Sr., actual and moral damages, attorney's and appearance fees, as well
as other just and equitable reliefs.

In their answer with counterclaims, respondents alleged that it was the driver of the Kia Ceres who
was negligent, and who should be held responsible for the death of Rebultan, Sr. and the damages to
the motor vehicles. As counterclaim, respondents sought the payment of: (1) P123,550.00 for the
repair of the jeepney; (2) P700.00 per day beginning May 3, 1999 as lost income of Viloria; (3)
P20,000.00 and P1,000.00 per hearing, as attorney's and appearance fees, respectively; and (4)
P5,000.00 as miscellaneous expenses.

Subsequently, respondents spouses Daganta filed a third-party complaint[14]against Lomotos.

Lomotos denied liability and prayed for the dismissal of the third-party complaint. As counterclaim, he
sought the payment for moral damages, appearance fees, and attorney's fees.

RTC RULING: After trial, the RTC issued its Decision dated July 24, 2008 finding Viloria negligent in
driving the jeepney which led to the death of Rebultan, Sr. Spouses Daganta were found vicariously
liable as the employers of Viloria. Together, they were held solidarily liable to pay the heirs of Rebultan,
Sr. the following sums: (a) P71,857.15 as actual damages; (b) P50,000.00 as moral damages; (c)
P1,552.731.72 as loss of earning capacity; and (d) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees. The RTC concluded
that Viloria's continuous driving even when turning left going to a street is the proximate cause of the
accident. It dismissed the third-party complaint against Lomotos.

Respondents appealed the Decision before the CA but only as to the finding of negligence on the part
of Viloria. They no longer appealed the dismissal of the third-party complaint.

CA RULING: In its Assailed Decision, the CA reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the complaint.
It ruled that it was Lomotos (not Viloria) who was negligent. Under Section 42(a) and (b), Article III,
Chapter IV of Republic Act No. 4136[20] (R.A. No. 4136), Viloria had the right of way, being the driver
of the vehicle on the right, and because he had already turned towards the left of the intersection. This,
according to the CA, is the import of the ruling in Caminos, Jr. v. Peoplewhich it found squarely
applicable to this case. It held that Lomotos, being in violation of a traffic regulation, is presumed to be
negligent under Article 2185 of the Civil Code. There being no negligence on the part of Viloria, the
spouses Daganta's vicarious liability cannot be imposed. The CA noted that while respondents filed a
third-party complaint against Lomotos, it cannot reverse its dismissal because respondents did not
appeal the same.

The CA likewise denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether Viloria was negligent in driving the jeepney at the time of the collision. (YES)

RULING: Section 42(a) and (b) of R.A. No. 4136 states:

ARTICLE III Right of Way and Signals

Sec. 42. Right of Way. –

(a) When two vehicles approach or enter an intersection at approximately the same time, the driver of
the vehicle on the left shall yield the right of way to the vehicle on the right, except as otherwise
hereinafter provided. The driver of any vehicle traveling at an unlawful speed shall forfeit any right of
way which he might otherwise have hereunder.

(b) The driver of a vehicle approaching but not having entered an intersection, shall yield the right of
way to a vehicle within such intersection or turning therein to the left across the line of travel of such
first-mentioned vehicle, provided the driver of the vehicle turning left has given a plainly visible signal
of intention to turn as required in this Act.

In interpreting Section 42(a) and (b) of R.A. No. 4136, the Court said in Caminos, Jr. that the vehicle
making a turn to the left is under the duty to yield to the vehicle approaching from the opposite lane
on the right. Further, the driver who has a favored status is not relieved from the duty of driving with
due regard for the safety of other vehicles and from refraining from an "arbitrary exercise of such right
of way."

Applying Caminos, Jr., it is apparent that it is the Kia Ceres which had the right of way. The jeepney
driver making a turn on the left had the duty of yielding to the vehicle on his right, the approaching Kia
Ceres driven by Lomotos. Similarly with Vehicle A in Caminos, Jr., the jeepney does not have the right
of way. Additionally, the Court does not find the CA's conclusion that the jeepney was already at the
intersection, making him the favored driver, to be supported by the records. Thus, the CA erred in
holding that it was Viloria, as the jeepney's driver, who had the right of way.

Nevertheless, Lomotos was negligent. Similar to Caminos, Jr., records show that Lomotos drove the
Kia Ceres at an unlawful speed. Traffic Accident Report No. 99002 supports that Lomotos was guilty
of "overspeeding," and his error is listed as driving "too fast." This was corroborated by respondents'
witness, Ronald Vivero, who relayed that the Kia Ceres was approaching fast and that it made a loud
screech due to its break which indicated the high speed at which it approached the intersection. Thus,
the CA's conclusion that Lomotos was negligent at the time of the collision was affirmed.

Records support the claim that Viloria, while driving the jeepney, was also committing a traffic violation.
As found by the RTC, Viloria's admission that he did not look to his right and continuously drove,
despite being required by law to give way, confirms that he is negligent in making a turn. He further
admitted that he did not bother to look at the south to see if there were other vehicles. In fact, his
penchant for disregarding traffic rules is shown by how he approached the intersection. Just a short
distance from approaching the intersection, he was reported to have overtaken a mini-bus as
evidenced by the Traffic Accident Report No. 99002.

It is apparent to this Court that the accident would have been avoided had Viloria, the jeepney driver,
carefully approached and made a left turn in the intersection, with due regard to the right of way
accorded in favor of Lomotos or anyone coming from the latter's direction. Regardless of whether
Lomotos was overspeeding, Viloria ought to have exercised the prudence of a diligent driver in making
a turn at a danger zone. This omission on his part constituted negligence.

The concurring negligence of Lomotos, as the driver of the Kia Ceres wherein Rebultan, Sr. was the
passenger, does not foreclose the latter's heirs from recovering damages from Viloria. As early as
1933, in Junio v. Manila Railroad Co., we already clarified that the contributory negligence of drivers
does not bar the passengers or their heirs from recovering damages from those who were at fault.

As long as it is shown that no control is exercised by the passenger in the concept of a master or
principal, the negligence of the driver cannot be imputed to the passenger and bar the latter from
claiming damages. Lomotos acted as the designated driver of Rebultan, Sr. in his service vehicle
provided by the DENR. Thus, the real employer of Lomotos is the DENR, and Rebultan, Sr. is merely
an intermediate and superior employee or agent. While it may be inferred that Rebultan, Sr. had
authority to give instructions to Lomotos, "no negligence may be imputed against a fellow employee
although the person may have the right to control the manner of the vehicle's operation."

In sum, both drivers were negligent when they failed to observe basic traffic rules designed for
the safety of their fellow motorists and passengers. This makes them joint tortfeasors who are
solidarity liable to the heirs of the deceased. However, since the dismissal of the third-party
complaint against Lomotos was not appealed by respondents, and Lomotos is not party to the case,
the Court has no authority to render judgment against him.

Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co.

G.R. No. L-4977 | March 22, 1910 | CARSON, J.

As a rule, the owners of premises, whereon things attractive to children are exposed, or upon which
the public are expressly or impliedly permitted to enter or upon which the owner knows or ought to
know children are likely to roam about for pastime and in play, "must calculate upon this, and take
precautions accordingly." In such cases the owner of the premises cannot be heard to say that
because the child has entered upon his premises without his express permission he is a trespasser to
whom the owner owes no duty or obligation whatever.

However, the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of
the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that
he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and
appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury
which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have
been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true
that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving
the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal
cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.

FACTS: In 1905, David Taylor, 15 years old, the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the
average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics, together with
Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the
purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who promised to make them a cylinder
for a miniature engine.

They walked across the open space in where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its
furnaces. They found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. These
caps are approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached
to it 2 long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity and were
intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a
considerable explosive power. After some discussion as to the ownership of the caps, and their right
to take them, the boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and
carried them home.

After crossing the footbridge, they met Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went to the
home of the Manuel. The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. They trust the ends
of the wires into an electric light socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap with a
stone and failed. Manuel looked for a hammer, but could not find one. Then they opened one of the
caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and David
held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing
more or less serious injuries to all three.

Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became frightened
and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded,
and David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his
right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by surgeons.

An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a
minor, by his father, his nearest relative.

RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT: The trial court held Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company
liable.

ISSUE: Is the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company liable for damages incurred by a minor
within its company premises.

RULING: NO. To establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence: (1)
Damages to the plaintiff; (2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some
person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty; and (3) The connection of cause and effect between
the negligence and the damage.

In this case, the accident could not have happened if the fulminating caps had not been left exposed
at the point where they were found, or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping them in an
appropriate place; but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not,
for his own pleasure and convenience, entered upon the defendant's premises, and strolled
around thereon without the express permission of the defendant, and had he not picked up and
carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its premises, and had he not thereafter
deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a match to its contents.

As a rule, the owners of premises, whereon things attractive to children are exposed, or upon which
the public are expressly or impliedly permitted to enter or upon which the owner knows or ought to
know children are likely to roam about for pastime and in play, "must calculate upon this, and take
precautions accordingly." In such cases the owner of the premises cannot be heard to say that
because the child has entered upon his premises without his express permission he is a trespasser to
whom the owner owes no duty or obligation whatever.

The owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent the child from entering his premises at
a place where he knows or ought to know that children are accustomed to roam about of to which their
childish instincts and impulses are likely to attract them is at least equivalent to an implied license to
enter, and where the child does enter under such conditions the owner's failure to take reasonable
precautions to guard the child against injury from unknown or unseen dangers, placed upon such
premises by the owner, is clearly a breach of duty, responsible, if the child is actually injured, without
other fault on its part than that it had entered on the premises of a stranger without his express
invitation or permission.

However, the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of
the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that
he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and
appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury
which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have
been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true
that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving
the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal
cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.

Applying the Roman Law quod quis ex culpa suadamnumsentit, non intelligitursentire, or “the just thing
is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own fault, and that he cannot
demand reparation therefor from another”, the plaintiff cannot now recover damages for his own fault.

Lambert v. Heirs of Ray Castillon

452 SCRA 285| February 23, 2005| Ynares-Santiago, J.

When the plaintiff's negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury
being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate
the damages to be awarded. The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who
is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear
the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages
actually caused by his negligence.

FACTS: In the evening of January 13, 1991, Ray Castillon visited the house of his brother Joel
Castillon at Tambo, Iligan City and borrowed his motorcycle. He then invited his friend, Sergio Labang,
to roam around Iligan City. Ray drove the motorcycle with Sergio as the backrider.

At around past 10:00 p.m., after eating supper at Hona's Restaurant and imbibing a bottle of beer,
they traversed the highway towards Tambo at a high speed. Upon reaching Brgy. Sto. Rosario, they
figured in an accident with a Tamaraw jeepney, owned by petitioner Nelen Lambert and driven by
Reynaldo Gamot, which was traveling on the same direction but made a sudden left turn. The incident
resulted in the instantaneous death of Ray and injuries to Sergio.

Respondents, the heirs of Ray Castillon, thus filed an action for damages with prayer for preliminary
attachment against the petitioner Nelen Lambert.

RTC RULING: The RTC rendered a decision in favor of herein private respondents but reduced
petitioner's liability by 20% in view of the contributory negligence of Ray.

CA RULING: Affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether Lambert is liable for damages

RULING: YES. It is apparent that Reynaldo Gamot did not keep a lookout for vehicles or persons
following him before proceeding to turn left. He failed to take into account the possibility that others
may be following him. He did not employ the necessary precaution to see to it that the road was clear.
Clearly, the abrupt and sudden left turn by Reynaldo, without first establishing his right of way, was
the proximate cause of the mishap which claimed the life of Ray and injured Sergio. Proximate cause
is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The cause of the
collision is traceable to the negligent act of Reynaldo for, as the trial court correctly held, without that
left turn executed with no precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have happened.

The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his
own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his
own negligence. The defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his
negligence. The determination of the mitigation of the defendant's liability varies depending on the
circumstances of each case.

In the case at bar, it was established that Ray, at the time of the mishap: (1) was driving the motorcycle
at a high speed; (2) was tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney; (3) has imbibed one or two bottles of beer;
and (4) was not wearing a protective helmet.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. HEIRS OF NOBLE CASIONAN

G.R. NO. 165969| November 27, 2008| REYES, R.T., J.

There is contributory negligence when the party's act showed lack of ordinary care and foresight that
such act could cause him harm or put his life in danger. It is an act or omission amounting to want of
ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with the defendant's negligence, is
the proximate cause of the injury.

The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his
own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his
own negligence. If indeed there was contributory negligence on the part of the victim, then it is proper
to reduce the award for damages. Here, there is none.

The violation of a statute is not sufficient to hold that the violation was the proximate cause of the injury,
unless the very injury that happened was precisely what was intended to be prevented by the statute.

FACTS: A trail leading to Sangilo, Itogon, existed in Dalicno and this trail was regularly used by
members of the community. Sometime in the 1970's, petitioner NPC installed high-tension electrical
transmission lines of 69 kilovolts (KV) traversing the trail. Eventually, some of the transmission lines
sagged and dangled reducing their distance from the ground to only about eight to ten feet. This posed
a great threat to passersby who were exposed to the danger of electrocution especially during the wet
season.

As early as 1991, the leaders of Ampucao, Itogon made verbal and written requests for NPC to institute
safety measures to protect users of the trail from their high tension wires. In a letter in 1995, Engr.
Banayot informed Itogon Mayor Pacalso that NPC had installed nine additional poles on their Beckel-
Philex 60 KV line. They likewise identified a possible rerouting scheme with an estimated total cost of
1.7 million pesos to improve the distance from its deteriorating lines to the ground.

Then, in the same year, Noble and his co-pocket miner, Melchor Jimenez, were at Dalicno. They cut
two bamboo poles for their pocket mining. One was 18 to 19 feet long and the other was 14 feet long.
Each man carried one pole horizontally on his shoulder: Noble carried the shorter pole while Melchor
carried the longer pole. Noble walked ahead as both passed through the trail underneath the NPC
high tension transmission lines on their way to their work place.
As Noble was going uphill and turning left on a curve, the tip of the bamboo pole he was carrying
touched one of the dangling high tension wires. Melchor, who was walking behind him, narrated that
he heard a buzzing sound when the tip of Noble's pole touched the wire for only about one or two
seconds. Thereafter, he saw Noble fall to the ground. Melchor rushed to Noble and shook him but the
latter was already dead. Their co-workers heard Melchor's shout for help and together they brought
the body of Noble to their camp.

Police investigators who visited the site of the incident confirmed that portions of the high tension wires
above the trail hung very low, just about eight to ten feet above the ground. They noted that the
residents, school children, and pocket miners usually used the trail and had to pass directly underneath
the wires.

After learning of the electrocution, NPC repaired the dangling and sagging transmission lines and put
up warning signs around the area. Consequently, the heirs of the deceased Noble filed a claim for
damages against the NPC before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Benguet. In its answer, NPC
denied being negligent in maintaining the safety of the high tension transmission lines. It averred that
there were danger and warning signs installed but these were stolen by children. Excavations were
also made to increase the necessary clearance from the ground to about 17 to 18 feet but some towers
or poles sank due to pocket mining in the area. At the trial, NPC witnesses testified that the cause of
death could not have been electrocution because the victim did not suffer extensive burns despite the
strong 69 KV carried by the transmission lines. NPC argued that if Noble did die b y electrocution, it
was due to his own negligence. Petitioner contends that the mere presence of the high tension wires
above the trail did not cause the victim's death. Instead, it was Noble's negligent carrying of the
bamboo pole that caused his death. It insists that Noble was negligent when he allowed the bamboo
pole he was carrying to touch the high tension wires. This is especially true because other people
traversing the trail have not been similarly electrocuted. Petitioner further faults the victim in engaging
in pocket mining, which is prohibited by the DENR in the area.

RTC RULING: The RTC decided in favor of respondents and declared the petitioner guilty of quasi-
delict with the death of Noble Casionan.

CA RULING: The CA sustained the findings of fact of the trial court but reduced the award of moral
damages from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00. The CA further disallowed the award of attorney's fees
because the reason for the award was not expressly stated in the body of the decision.

ISSUE:

1. ISSUE #1: Whether the award for damages should be deleted in view of the contributory
negligence of the victim
2. ISSUE #2: Whether the award for unearned income, exemplary, and moral damages should
be deleted for lack of factual and legal bases.

RULING:

1. RULING TO ISSUE #1: No. Petitioner cannot excuse itself from its failure to properly maintain the
wires by attributing negligence to the victim. In Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this
Court held that the responsibility of maintaining the rails for the purpose of preventing derailment
accidents belonged to the company. The company should not have been negligent in ascertaining that
the rails were fully connected than to wait until a life was lost due to an accident. Moreover, it found
no contributory negligence on Noble's part. Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of
the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. On the other hand, contributory negligence
is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered,
which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection. There is
contributory negligence when the party's act showed lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act
could cause him harm or put his life in danger. It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary
care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with the defendant's negligence, is the
proximate cause of the injury.

The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his
own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his
own negligence. If indeed there was contributory negligence on the part of the victim, then it is proper
to reduce the award for damages. This is in consonance with the Civil Code provision that liability will
be mitigated in consideration of the contributory negligence of the injured party. Article 2179 of the
Civil Code is explicit on this score: When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory,
the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff
may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

In this case, the trail where Noble was electrocuted was regularly used by members of the community.
There were no warning signs to inform passersby of the impending danger to their lives should they
accidentally touch the high tension wires. Also, the trail was the only viable way from Dalicon to Itogon.
Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply doing what was ordinary routine to other workers in the
area.

Petitioner further faults the victim in engaging in pocket mining, which is prohibited by the DENR in the
area. In Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that the violation of a statute is not sufficient
to hold that the violation was the proximate cause of the injury, unless the very injury that happened
was precisely what was intended to be prevented by the statute. In said case, the allegation of
contributory negligence on the part of the injured party who violated traffic regulations when he failed
to register his bicycle or install safety gadgets thereon was struck down. That the pocket miners were
unlicensed was not a justification for petitioner to leave their transmission lines dangling.

RULING TO ISSUE #2: The damages awarded and deleted by the CA were affirmed by the Court.

PCIB v. CA
G.R. No. 121413 | January 29, 2001 | J. Quisumbing

Invoking the doctrine of comparative negligence, both PCIBank and Citibank failed in their respective
obligations and both were negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees resulting in
the encashment of the Citibank checks. Thus, both are held equally liable for the loss of the proceeds
if said checks by Ford in favor of the CIR.

FACTS: On October 1977, plaintiff Ford drew and issued a Citibank Check No. SN-04867 in the
amount of P4,746,114.41, in favor of the CIR as payment of plaintiff’s percentage or manufacturer’s
sales taxes for the 3rd quarter of 1977. The aforesaid check was deposited with the defendant
PCIBank and was subsequently cleared at the Central Bank. Upon presentment with the defendant
Citibank, the proceeds of the check was paid to IBAA as collecting or depository bank. The proceeds
of the same Citibank check of the plaintiff was never paid to or received by the payee thereof, the CIR.
As a consequence, upon demand of the CIR, the plaintiff was compelled to make a second payment
to the Bureau of Internal Revenue of its percentage/manufacturers' sales taxes for the third quarter of
1977. It is further admitted by defendant Citibank that during the time of the transactions in question,
plaintiff had been maintaining a checking account with defendant Citibank, said check was a crossed
check with the phrase “Payee’s Account Only” and that defendant Citibank paid the full face value of
the check in the amount of P4,746,114.41 to the defendant, PCIBank. On December 1977, plaintiff's
Citibank Check No. SN-04867, together with the Revenue Tax Receipt No. 18747002, was deposited
with defendant PCIBank, through its Ermita Branch. The latter accepted the check and sent it to the
Central Clearing House for clearing on the same day, with the indorsement at the back "all prior
indorsements and/or lack of indorsements guaranteed." Thereafter, defendant IBAA presented the
check for payment to defendant Citibank and the latter paid the face value of the check in the amount
of P4,746,114.41. Consequently, the amount of P4,746,114.41 was debited in plaintiff's account with
the defendant Citibank and the check was returned to the plaintiff. Upon verification, plaintiff
discovered that its Citibank Check No. SN-04867 in the amount of P4,746,114.41 was not paid to the
CIR. Hence, in separate letters dated October 26, 1979, addressed to the defendants, the plaintiff
notified the latter that in case it will be re-assessed by the BIR for the payment of the taxes covered
by the said checks, then plaintiff shall hold the defendants liable for reimbursement of the face value
of the same. Both defendants denied liability and refused to pay. It was found that the said check was
encased by unauthorized persons. In an investigation by the NBI, it revealed that the subject Citibank
check was recalled by Godofredo Rivera, the General Ledger Accountant of Ford. He purportedly
needed to hold back the check because there was an error in the computation of the tax due to the
BIR. With Rivera's instruction, PCIBank replaced the check with two of its own Manager's Checks.
Alleged members of a syndicate later deposited the two MCs with the Pacific Banking Corporation.

RTC RULING: Ordered Citibank and PCIBank to pay the plaintiff the amount of P4,746,114.41
representing the face value of the check.

CA RULING: Ordered PCIBank to pay the plaintiff the amount of P4,746,114.41, representing the face
value of the check.

ISSUE: W/N PCIBank and Citibank are liable for the check

RULING: Yes. PCIBank failed to verify the authority of Mr. Rivera to negotiate the checks. The neglect
of PCIBank employees to verify whether his letter requesting for the replacement of the Citibank Check
No. SN-04867 was duly authorized, showed lack of care and prudence required in the circumstances.
Furthermore, it was admitted that PCIBank is authorized to collect the payment of taxpayers in behalf
of the BIR. As an agent of BIR, PCIBank is duty bound to consult its principal regarding the
unwarranted instructions given by the payor or its agent. PCIBank also has the responsibility to make
sure that the check in question is deposited in Payee’s account only and its clearing stamp appearing
the back of the questioned checks stating that ALL PRIOR INDORSEMENTS AND/OR LACK OF
INDORSEMENTS GUARANTEED should render PCIBank liable because it made it pass through the
clearing house and therefore Citibank had no other option but to pay it. However, Citibank as drawee
bank was likewise negligent in the performance of its duties. Citibank failed to establish that its
payment of Ford's checks were made in due course and legally in order. Citibank must likewise answer
for the damages incurred by Ford on Citibank Checks Numbers SN 10597 and 16508, because of the
contractual relationship existing between the two. Citibank, as the drawee bank breached its
contractual obligation with Ford and such degree of culpability contributed to the damage caused to
the latter. Thus, invoking the doctrine of comparative negligence, both PCIBank and Citibank failed in
their respective obligations and both were negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees
resulting in the encashment of Citibank Check Nos. SN 10597 and 16508. Both banks are ordered to
share the loss on a 50/50 ratio.

CITY OF MANILA v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

179 SCRA 423 | November 15, 1989 | J. Paras

Under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner City of Manila is liable for the tortious act
committed by its agents who failed to verify and check the duration of the contract of lease.
FACTS: The late Vivencio was buried in Lot No. 159, Block No. 194 of the North Cemetery, which lot
was leased by the Manila City to Irene Sto. Domingo, his widow, for the period from June 6, 1971 to
June 6, 2021 (50 years). Full payment of the rental therefor of P50.00 is evidenced by the said receipt
and no other document was executed to embody such lease over the burial lot in question.

Believing in good faith and in accordance with Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 1975, prescribing
uniform procedure and guidelines in the processing of documents pertaining to and for the use and
disposition of burial lots, the subject lot was leased to the bereaved family for five years only. Subject
lot was certified on January 25, 1978 as ready for exhumation. On the basis of such certification, the
authorities of the North Cemetery then headed by defendant Helmuth, authorized the exhumation and
removal from subject burial lot the remains of the late Vivenci and placed the bones and skull in a bag
or sack and kept the same in the depository. Subsequently, the subject lot was leased to another
lessee.

Irene and her family was shocked of the transfer and according to her, , it was just impossible to locate
the remains of her late husband in a depository containing thousands upon thousands of sacks of
human bones. Hence, she filed an action for damages against the defendants.

RTC RULING: Ordered the defendants to give plaintiffs the right to make use of another single lot
within the North Cemetery for a period of forty-three (43) years four (4) months and eleven (11) days,
corresponding to the unexpired term of the fully paid lease sued upon; and to search without let up
and with the use of all means humanly possible, for the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr.
and thereafter, to bury the same in the substitute lot.

CA RULING: Modified the RTC ruling and added that plaintiff are entitled for damages for breach of
contract, moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

ISSUES:

1. WON the operations and functions of a public cemetery are a governmental or proprietary
function (proprietary)
2. WON the IAC erred in holding petitioners herein responsible for the alleged torts of their
subordinate officials and employees, inspite of the provisions of section 4 of the republic act
no. 409 (revised charter of manila) and other applicable jurisprudence on the subject
exempting the petitioners from damages from the malfeasance or misfeasance of their officials
and employees (NO)
3. WON the intermediate appellate court erred in awarding damages against the petitioners
herein, notwithstanding their good faith and their lack of knowledge or consent to the removal
of the skeletal remains of the late vivencio (YES)

RULING:

ISSUE #1: The resolution of this issue is essential to the determination of the liability for damages of
the petitioner city. Petitioners (plaintiffs) alleged that since the City is a political subdivision in the
performance of its governmental function, it is immune from tort liability which may be caused by its
public officers and subordinate employees.

The City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such endowed with the faculties of municipal
corporations to be exercised. It may sue and be sued, and contract and be contracted with. The Court
declared that with respect to proprietary functions the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can
be held liable to third persons ex contractu. Further, the SC ruled that the maintenance of cemeteries
are also recognized as municipal or city activities of a proprietary character.
ISSUE #2: Under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner City of Manila is liable for the
tortious act committed by its agents who failed to verify and check the duration of the contract
of lease. The contention of the petitioner-city that the lease is covered by Administrative Order No. 5,
series of 1975 dated March 6, 1975 of the City of Manila for five (5) years only beginning from June 6,
1971 is not meritorious for the said administrative order covers new leases.

The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or employer must answer civilly for the negligence
or want of skill of its agent or servant in the course or line of his employment, by which another who is
free from contributory fault, is injured. Municipal corporations under the conditions herein stated, fall
within tile operation of this rule of law, and are liable accordingly, to civil actions for damages when
the requisite elements of liability co-exist.

ISSUE #3: The SC held that all things considered, even as the Court commiserates with plaintiffs for
the unfortunate happening complained of and untimely desecration of the resting place and remains
of their deceased dearly beloved, it finds the reliefs prayed for by them lacking in legal and factual
basis.

Far Eastern Shipping Company v. CA and Philippine Ports Authority

G.R. No. 130068 | October 1, 1998 | J. Regalado

There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are
liable for the total damage.

Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although
acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third
person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of
them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or
damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage
under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.

FACTS: On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, flying under the flagship of the USSR AND owned
and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the Port of Manila from
Vancouver, British Columbia. The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port as its
berthing space. The Philippine Port Authority tasked Captain Roberto Abellana to supervise the
berthing of the vessel. Meanwhile, the Manila Pilots' Association (MPA) assigned Capt. Senen Gavino
to conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel at Berth No. 4.

Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with the
master of the vessel Victor Kavankov beside him. After Kavankov conducted a briefing with Gavino
about the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted the anchor from the quarantine
anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International Port.

The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers. -When the vessel reached the
landmark (the big church by the Tondo North Harbor) which is half a mile from the pier, Gavino ordered
the personnel to stop the engine, and drop the anchor when the vessel was already about 2,000 feet
from the pier. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor with
two shackles was also dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. A commotion
ensued between the crew members. A brief conference ensued between Kavankov and the crew
members. When Gavino inquired about the commotion, Kavankov assured Gavino that everything
was fine. However, when Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines
half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel was approaching the
pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino then gave the "full-
astern" code. Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel
rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier. The vessel also sustained
damage.

Kavankov then filed his sea protest while Gavino submitted his report to the chief pilot who referred
the report to the Philippine Ports Authority. Abellana likewise submitted his report of the incident.

The Philippine Ports Authority filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for a sum of
money against Far Eastern Shipping Co., Capt. Senen Gavino and the Manila Pilots' Association
praying that the defendants therein be held jointly and severally liable to pay the plaintiff actual and
exemplary damages plus costs of suit.

RTC RULING: RTC ordered the defendants to jointly and severally pay the PPA the amount of
P1,053,300.00 representing actual damages and costs of the suit.

CA RULING: The CA Affirmed but noted the absence of employer-employee relationship between
Manila Pilots’ Association and Capt. Gavino.

ISSUE: WON both the pilot and the master were negligent

HELD: YES. The Court affirmed the CA ruling and held Capt. Gavino and FESC are solidarily liable.

AS TO THE LIABILITY OF PILOT (CAPT. GAVINO)

The Court said Capt. Gavino was negligent based on his very slow response time (4 minutes) when
the anchor did not hold ground and the vessel continued moving fast.

As an expert, he must be alert and responsive.

A pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly qualified and licensed to conduct a vessel in or out of ports
or in certain waters. He is an expert expected to know the seabed. He is charged to perform his duties
with extraordinary care and diligence because the safety of people and property on the vessel and on
the dock are at stake.

AS TO THE LIABILITY OF MASTER (CAPT. KAVANKOV)

The Court found Kavankov liable for negligence.

In compulsory pilotage, the pilot momentarily becomes the master of the vessel.

The master, however, may intervene or countermand the pilot if he thinks there is danger to the
vessel due to the incompetence of the pilot or in certain cases.

Based on Capt. Kavankov’s testimony, he never sensed danger even when the anchor did not take
hold and the vessel was already approaching the dock too fast. Kavankov blindly trusted the pilot and
even lacked the awareness and mindfulness in sensing danger. This is negligence on his part. He
was right beside the pilot during the docking so he could see and hear everything that the pilot was
seeing and hearing, yet, there was no initiative on his part to respond.

The master’s negligence translates to the unseaworthiness of the vessel, and therefore, Far Eastern
Shipping Company was deemed negligent, too.
CONCURRENT TORTFEASORS
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are
liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or
more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a
single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the
injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted
in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the
resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.

As a general rule, negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury.
It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff's,
is the proximate cause of the injury.

Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries, person is not relieved from liability
because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the person
charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great
an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured.

It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his
negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. Where
several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the
injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery
may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the
case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured
person was not the same.

No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the
negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though
his acts were the sole cause of the injury.

Disposition Petition denied. CA affirmed. Capt. Gavino and FESC are solidarily liable.

PERTINENT RULES on PILOTAGE

• The Port of Manila is within the Manila Pilotage District which is under compulsory pilotage
pursuant to Section 8, Article III of Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No. 03-85:

SEC. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service. — For entering a harbor and anchoring thereat,
or passing through rivers or straits within a pilotage district, as well as docking and
undocking at any pier/wharf, or shifting from one berth or another, every vessel
engaged in coastwise and foreign trade shall be under compulsory pilotage.

• In case of compulsory pilotage, the respective duties and responsibilities of the compulsory
pilot and the master have been specified by the same regulation:

SEC. 11. Control of vessels and liability for damage. — On compulsory pilotage
grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing the service to a vessel shall be responsible for the
damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports due to his negligence or
fault. He can only be absolved from liability if the accident is caused by force majeure
or natural calamities provided he has exercised prudence and extra diligence to
prevent or minimize damage.
The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage grounds whereby he can
countermand or overrule the order or command of the Harbor Pilot on board. In such event, any
damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports by reason of the fault or negligence of the
Master shall be the responsibility and liability of the registered owner of the vessel concerned without
prejudice to recourse against said Master

Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pilots shall be determined by competent
authority in appropriate proceedings in the light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case.

SEC. 32. Duties and responsibilities of the Pilot or Pilots' Association. — The duties and
responsibilities of the Harbor Pilot shall be as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

f) a pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes his work as
a pilot thereof until he leaves it anchored or berthed safely; Provided, however, that his responsibility
shall cease at the moment the Master neglects or refuses to carry out his order.

Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 issued twenty years earlier likewise provided in Chapter I
thereof for the responsibilities of pilots:

Par. XXXIX. — A Pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes
control thereof until he leaves it anchored free from shoal; Provided, That his responsibility shall cease
at the moment the master neglects or refuses to carry out his instructions.

xxx xxx xxx

Par. XLIV. — Pilots shall properly and safely secure or anchor vessels under their control when
requested to do so by the master of such vessels.
 VESTIL v. IAC
G.R. No. 74431 | November 6, 1989 | J. Cruz

Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost"
and so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that as the petitioners also contend,
the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only
of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged
provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was attacked
and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.

FACTS: Theness, a three-yearl old child, was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the
petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil. She was rushed to the
Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead" and
administered an anti-rabies vaccine. She was discharged after nine days but was re-admitted one
week later due to "vomiting of saliva." The following day, the child died. The cause of death was
certified as broncho-pneumonia.

Her parents, the Uys, sued the Vestils for damages, holding them liable as possessors of the dog,
Andoy.

On their part, the Vestils allege that the dog was tame and had merely been provoked, although no
one had seen it bite Theness. Additionally, she had died of broncho-pneumonia, which had no
correlation to dog bites. Anyway, she (Purita) could not be held liable because the dog does not belong
to her but to Vicente Miranda, her father. She is not the sole owner of the unpartitioned property, there
are other heirs. There are also other occupants of the house that maintain themselves out of a common
fund, they do not pay rent because of their relation to her father but do occupy the property.

RTC RULING: Dismissed the complaint.

CA RULING: Reversed the RTC. It ruled that Theness had died due to the dog bites. Under Article
2183 of the Civil Code, the Vestils are liable for damages as possessor of the property and the dog.

ISSUE: Whether the Vestils are liable for damages.

RULING: Yes. Article 2183 reads as follows: The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use
of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This
responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault
of the person who has suffered damage.

The petitioner’s contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog is not
acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should
"escape or be lost" and so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that as the
petitioners also contend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The
law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury.
As for the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time
she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.

According to Manresa, the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the
negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the
damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses
animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause.
 Afialde v. Hisole, 85 Phil. 67
G.R. No. L-2075 | November 29, 1949 | J. Reyes

The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may cause,
even if such animal should escape from him or stray away.

This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of
the person who may have suffered it.

FACTS: Deceased Loreto Afialda was employed by the defendant spouses as caretaker of their
carabaos at a fixed compensation. On March 21, 1947, while he was tending the animals, he was
gored by one of them and consequently died of his injuries. Thus, herein appellant, Loreto’s elder
sister who depended on him for support, filed the action for damages. The complaint was dismissed
by the trial court upon granting a motion to dismiss filed by spouses Hisole. Subsequently, the plaintiff
had taken the present appeal.

RTC RULING: The lower court took the view that under the above-quoted provision of the Civil Code,
the owner of an animal is answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage
caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable only if he had been negligent or at
fault under article 1902 of the same code.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendants may be held liable for damages when damage is caused to the
animal’s caretaker.

RULING: Under Article 1905 of the old Civil Code, the owner of an animal is answerable only for
damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner
would be liable only if he had been negligent or at fault under Article 1902 of the same code. In the
case at hand, the animal was in custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his
work as such. Thus, it was his business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to
anyone, including himself. Being injured by the animal under those circumstances, was one of the
risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the
consequences. Deceased does not fall within the ambit of “stranger”, which is significant for the claim
for damages under the said article.

Moreover, under the said circumstances, the action should not come under Article 1905 of the Civil
Code but under the labor laws, i.e. Workmen’s Compensation Act. The complaint contained no
allegation as to constitute liability under the Civil Code nor the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Hence,
it alleges no cause of action.

TRINIDAD DE AYALA ET AL. vs. ANTONIO M. BARRETTO ET AL

G.R. No. 9966 | February 14, 1916 | J. TRENT

One who settles in a district which has a natural watercourse, especially beneficial for transportation
purposes, or who remains, while in the march of events his chosen neighborhood, although at first
largely residential, becomes a trading or manufacturing center, must submit to the ordinary
annoyances and discomforts which are incidental to the reasonable and general conduct of such
business.

FACTS: The twenty-two plaintiffs are either residents or property owners on Calle General Solano.
Twelve of them are actual residents of the street and of these twelve, six are lessees of property
owned by other plaintiffs. This street connects Echague and Aviles Streets. All three parallel the Pasig
River. Echague is almost wholly given over to industrial enterprises, and Aviles also has some factories,
etc., upon it, including the San Miguel Brewery. General Solano has long been a fashionable residence.
At the present day, however, some of these residences are being used for other purposes. There are
now upon this street a coal yard, a warehouse, and a cigarette factory, all very near the proposed
location of the defendant's brewery, and there are also a public school and a club on the street. Just
across the river is located the large power plant of the electric railroad and light company. The street
is used by all kinds of freight vehicles and a double street-car track traverses its entire length.

Plaintiffs thus filed a suit for a permanent injunction against the erection and operation of a combined
brewery and ice plant on Calle General Solano in the city of Manila, on the ground that it will be a
nuisance.

RTC: Denied the relief prayed for.

ISSUE: Whether or not the erection and operation of a combined brewery and ice plant is a nuisance

RULING: SC found that the locality surrounding the site of the proposed plant has not sufficiently the
impress of a residential district as to justify us in holding that the plant will be incongruous with its
surroundings. This conclusion is made easier in view of the fact that another brewery is in fact closer
to several of the plaintiffs. than that of the defendant will be.

The law of nuisance affords no rigid rule to be applied in all instances. It is elastic. It undertakes to
require only that which is fair and reasonable under all circumstances. One who settles in a district,
which possesses natural resources of a special kind, cannot prohibit the development of those
resources merely because it may interfere in some degree with personal satisfaction or aesthetic
enjoyment. No one can move into a quarter given over to foundries and boiler shops and demand the
quiet of a farm. On the other hand, the noisy or noisome factory cannot with immunity invade territory
stamped by use for residence.

The preponderating weight of the evidence is to the effect that the new brewery will be operated with
a minimum of offense to nearby residents, that in view of the semi-industrial character of the locality,
what noise, etc., is produced, cannot be held to be unreasonable. It is possible that plaintiffs, or some
of them, might prove damages by reason of property depreciation. But at all events, this is not a proper
case for the issuance of extra-ordinary remedy of injunction.

VELASCO v. MANILA ELECTRIC CO.

G.R. No. L-18390 | August 6, 1971 | J. Reyes, J.B.L.

The general rule is that everyone is bound to bear the habitual or customary inconveniences that result
from the proximity of others, and so long as this level is not surpassed, he may not complain against
them. But if the prejudice exceeds the inconveniences that such proximity habitually brings, the
neighbor who causes such disturbance is held responsible for the resulting damage, being guilty of
causing nuisance.

FACTS: Velasco bought from the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation 3 adjoining lots. These
lots are within an area zoned out as a “first residence” district by the City Council of Quezon City.
Velasco then sold the 2 lots to Meralco and built his house on the third lot, which was farthest from the
street-corner.

Appellee company, Manila Electric Co started the construction of the sub-station, 10 to 20 meters from
Velasco’s house, without prior building permit or authority from the Public Service Commission. The
company built a stone and cement wall at the sides along the streets but along the side adjoining the
appellant's property it put up a sawale wall but later changed it to an interlink wire fence.
Velasco filed a complaint for the abatement of nuisance averring that the sound, which unceasingly
emanates from the substation, constitutes an actionable nuisance under Article 694 of the Civil Code.
He also claims that he is entitled to recover compensatory, moral and other damages to his health and
business in the amount of P487,600.00.

RTC RULING: Dismissed the case finding that the sound of the substation was unavoidable and did
not constitute nuisance; that it could not have caused the diseases of anxiety neurosis, pyelonephritis,
ureteritis, lumbago and anemia; and that the items of damage claimed by plaintiff were not adequate
proved.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the sound constitutes an actionable nuisance.

2. Whether or not the city engineer is solidarily liable.

RULING:

1. Yes. The decision is reversed wherein Manila Electric Company is ordered to either transfer
its substation or reduce its noise at the property line to an average of 40-50 decibels. Damages
is also reduced to P20,000 and P5,000 for attorney’s fees.

It was ruled that based on impartial and objective evidence, it points to the sound emitted by
the appellee's substation transformers being of much higher level than the ambient sound of
the locality. The measurements taken by Dr. Almonte, who is not connected with either party,
and is a physician to boot (unlike appellee's electrical superintendent), appear more reliable
(SC mentioned that in damages, medical evidence prevails over expert evidence).

The conclusion must be that, contrary to the finding of the trial court, the noise continuously
emitted, day and night, constitutes an actionable nuisance for which the appellant is entitled
to relief, by requiring the appellee company to adopt the necessary measures to deaden or
reduce the sound at the plaintiff's house, by replacing the interlink wire fence with a partition
made of sound absorbent material, since the relocation of the substation is manifestly
impracticable and would be prejudicial to the customers of the Electric Company who are being
serviced from the substation.

Further, an American Jurisprudence ruled that the average readings along the fence was only
44 decibels but, because the sound from the sub-station was interminable and monotonous,
the court authorized an injunction and damages. In the present case, the three readings along
the property line are 52, 54 and 55 decibels. Plaintiff's case is manifestly stronger.

2. No. The City Engineer is not solidarily liable. It was not the City Engineer's duty to require the
Meralco to secure a permit before the construction but for Meralco to supply for it as per
Section 1, Ordinance No. 1530 of Quezon City. It is not true that he even defended its
construction as he even wrote Meralco to submit the plan and pay permit fees. Moreover, there
is no law or ordinance specifying that it is the city engineer's duty to initiate the removal or
demolition of, or for the criminal prosecution of, those persons who are responsible for the
nuisance.
 Iloilo Cold Storage Co. v. Municipal Council
G.R. No. 7012 | March 26, 1913 | J. TRENT

Nuisances may be divided into two classes: Nuisances per se and nuisances per accidens. The former
are recognized as nuisances under any and all circumstances. The latter are such only because of
the special circumstances and conditions surrounding them.

A nuisance which affects the immediate safety of persons or property, or which constitutes an
obstruction to the streets and highways under circumstances presenting an emergency, may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. But, in any case, the declaration of the
municipal council that the thing or act is a nuisance is not conclusive. The owner of the alleged
nuisance has the right to test the validity of the action of the council in a court of law

FACTS: According to the pleadings, the plaintiff, upon authority granted by the defendant, constructed
an ice and cold storage plant in the city of Iloilo. Some time after the plant had been completed and
was in operation, nearby residents made complaints to the defendant that the smoke from the plant
was very injurious to their health and comfort.

Thereupon the defendant appointed a committee to investigate and report upon the matters contained
in said complaints. The committee reported that the complaints were well-founded.

Upon receipt of this resolution and order, the plaintiff commenced this action in the Court of First
Instance to enjoin the defendant from carrying into effect the said resolution. “That the defendants
intend and threaten to require compliance with said resolution administratively and without the
intervention of the court, and by force to compel the closing and suspension of operations of the
plaintiff’s machinery and consequently of the entire plant, should the plaintiff not proceed with the
elevation of the smokestacks to one hundred feet, which the plaintiff maintains it is not obliged to do
and will not do.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution alone issued by the municipal council is sufficient to label and
abate the supposed nuisance in this case

RULING: No. There are two kinds of nuisances: nuisances per se and per accidens. The former are
recognized as nuisances under any and all circumstances. The latter are such only because of the
special circumstances and conditions surrounding them. The former may be abated even by private
individuals however the latter is different; it needs a determination of the facts which is a judicial
function.

The question of nuisance can conclusively be decided, for all legal uses, by the established courts of
law or equity alone, and that the resolution of officers, or of boards organized by force of municipal
charters, cannot, to any degree, control such decision. City Council cannot, by a mere resolution or
motion, declare any particular thing a nuisance which has not theretofore been pronounced to be such
by law, or so adjudged by judicial determination.

In the present case it is certain that the ice factory of the plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is a
legitimate industry, beneficial to the people and conducive to their health and comfort. The resolution
is obviously not enough to abate the property of the plaintiff.

NOTES: A nuisance is, according to Blackstone, "Anything that worketh hurt, inconvenience, or
damage." They arise from pursuing particular trades or industries in populous neighborhoods; from
acts of public indecency, keeping disorderly houses, and houses of ill fame, gambling houses, etc.
 TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS v. CA
GR No. 94759 | January 21, 1991 | J. Gancayco

It must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants
from pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a
business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid
injury to the health of the residents of the community from the emissions in the operation of the
business.

FACTS: Petitioner, a domestic private corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of charcoal
briquette, received a letter dated February 16, 1989 from private respondent acting mayor Pablo N.
Cruz, ordering the full cessation of the operation of the petitioner's plant at Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The
letter likewise requested Plant Manager Mr. Armando Manese to bring with him to the office of the
mayor on February 20, 1989 the following: a) Building permit; b) Mayor's permit; c) Region III-Pollution
of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit; and of other document.

In compliance with said undertaking, petitioner commenced to secure "Region III-Department... of

Environmental and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit.

Petitioner also sent its representatives to the office of the mayor to secure a mayor’s permit, however,
the same was not entertained.

On April 6, 1989, without previous and reasonable notice upon petitioner, respondent acting mayor
ordered the Municipality's station commander to padlock the premises of petitioner's plant, thus
effectively causing the stoppage of its operation.

This prompted petitioner instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with preliminary
injunction against private respondent with the RTC.
RTC Ruling:

It initially issued a preliminary injunction. However, the same was set aside after finding it evaluated
the evidence consisting of a report essentially stating that the plant produces fumes which are
hazardous to the health of the people as well as a letter containing complaints about the smoke coming
out of the plant of the petitioner.
CA Ruling:

In due course the petition was denied for lack of merit by the appellate court.

ISSUE: Was the denial of a writ of preliminary injunction proper?

RULING: YES. The well-known rule is that the matter of issuance a writ preliminary injunction is
addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and its action shall nut be disturbed on
appeal unless it is demonstrated that it acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or
otherwise, in grave abuse of its discretion.

The Court held that the following circumstances justify the non issuance of the preliminary injunction:

a. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining whether
there is a pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of
a business is essentially addressed to the then National Pollution Control Commission of the
Ministry of Human Settlements, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as
much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his police
power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise
 close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to
the health of the residents of the community from the emissions in the operation of the
business.

b. The Acting Mayor called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted by the fumes of
its plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health
of the residents in the area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further
order

c. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made the
fumes emitted by the plant of petitioner goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no
proper air pollution device has been installed.

d. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta. Maria, but instead
presented a building permit issued by an official of Makati

e. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then National
Pollution Control Commission on December 15, 1987, the permit was good only up to May 25,
1988. Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate its permit much less to install
any device to control the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the
community.

All these factors justify the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction by the trial court and the
appellate court correctly upheld the action of the lower court.

Ramcar, Inc. v. Millar

6 SCRA 517 | NO DIGEST MADE – FROM GOOGLE

Facts: Ramcar operates and maintain an auto repair and body building shop. The six others resided
near the shop brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to abate the establishment as
a nuisance because of the activity of repairing and building bodies of motor vehicles which involves
tools and machineries which gives rise to too much noise and annoyance. The respondents repeatedly
complained to the city authorities for the closure of the shop however the city authorities were at
loggerheads as to whether the immediate vicinity where the business of Ramcar is located in the
residential zone. The trial court dismissed the complaint and Millar, et al appealed to CA which
reversed the trial courts decision. Ramcar brought the decision to the SC.

Issue: Whether or not Ramcar, Inc. permit to operate as a garage entitles it to conduct its business
and thatthe said business is not a nuisance according to Ordinance No 2906 .

The said ordinance restricts the kind of business , buildings and establishment that may be built
oncommercial zones and the enumeration of permitted activities includes Garage and gasoline service
station

Held: The business of body building is not a nuisance per se; it becomes a nuisance only on the
account ofthe location. To abate it, it is not necessary to remove the buildings and structure built in the
place where itis presently located, as these, or parts thereof may be utilized for pursuits that are not
forbidden by law orordinance.

A body building shop is not within the purview of garage which designates a shop for storing, repairing
andservicing motor vehicles, being merely a modern substitute for the ancient livery stable. The term
repairpresupposes for decay, dilapidation, injury or partial destruction of repaired element, for example
broken ordamaged parts of a structural whole to their original condition cannot apply to building or
remodelling ofbodies or structures. Whether a particular thing is a nuisance is a question of fact and
is properly within thejurisdiction of the CA whose findings of fact that the noise created by the use of
tools is in violation ofzoning ordinance is conclusive. Sec 18 of RA 904 grants legislative powers to
municipal board to declare,prevent and provide for the abatement of nuisances inaction by the board
does not preclude the ultimatecase tried before them. The award of damages arising from a nuisance
authorized under Article 697 and2196 of the Civil Code.

City of Manila v. Garcia, et. al.

19 SCRA 413 | NO DIGEST MADE – FROM GOOGLE

Facts: City of Manila is owner of parcels of land. Shortly after liberation from 1945 to 1947, defendants
entered upon these premises without plaintiff's knowledge and consent. They built houses of second-
class materials, again without plaintiff's knowledge and consent, and without the necessary building
permits from the city. There they lived thru the years to the present.

Mayor Fugoso give the Respondents a written permits labeled "lease contract" — to occupy specific
areas in the property upon conditions therein set forth. For their occupancy, defendants were charged
nominal rentals.

City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's directive to clear squatters' houses on city property, gave each
of defendants thirty (30) days to vacate and remove his construction or improvement on the premises
for the purpose of expansion of Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. Trial court directed
defendants to vacate the premises and to pay the rentals.

Issue: Whether or not the houses and constructions by the respondent were public nuisance.

Held: Yes. In the situation thus obtaining, the houses and constructions aforesaid constitute public
nuisance per se. And this, for the reason that they hinder and impair the use of the property for a badly
needed school building, to the prejudice of the education of the youth of the land. They shackle the
hands of the government and thus obstruct performance of its constitutionally ordained obligation to
establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public education, and more, to "provide at
least free public primary instruction".

The public nuisance could well have been summarily abated by the city authorities themselves, even
without the aid of the courts.

ESTATE OF GREGORIA FRANCISCO v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et. al.

G.R. No. 95279 | July 25, 1991 | J. Melencio-Herrera

While the Sangguniang Bayan may provide for the abatement of a nuisance (Local Government Code,
Sec. 149), it can not declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. The
nuisance can only be adjudged by judicial determination. Municipal councils do not have the power to
find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can
they authorize the extra judicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which, in its nature,
situation or use is not such. These things must be determined in the ordinary courts of law.

FACTS: Litigated herein is a quonset building situated in Port Area, Strong Boulevard, Isabela, Basilan,
which was ordered demolished by respondent Municipal Mayor, Benjamin Valencia. Respondent
municipal employees implemented the demolition, for which reason they are also impleaded.
The quonset was constructed by the American Liberation Forces in 1944. It was purchased in 1946
by Gregoria Francisco, who died in 1976. It stands on a lot owned by the Philippine Ports Authority
and faces the municipal wharf. By virtue of Proclamation No. 83 issued by President Elpidio Quirino,
said land was declared for the exclusive use of port facilities.

On May 8 1989 the Philippine Ports Authority of Zamboanga issued to Tan Gin San, surviving spouse
of Gregoria Francisco, a permit to occupy the lot where the building stands for a period of one year,
to expire on 31 December 1989. The permittee was using the quonset for the storage of copra.

Respondent Mayor (Benjamin Valencia), through respondent Municipal Action Officer, notified Tan
Gin San by mail to remove or relocate its quonset building, citing Zoning Ordinance No. 147 of the
municipality; noting its antiquated and dilapidated structure; and stressing the “clear-up campaign on
illegal squatters and unsanitary surroundings along Strong Boulevard.” This was followed by another
letter of 19 May 1989 of the same tenor. Since the notifications remained unheeded by the petitioner,
Respondent Mayor ordered the demolition. Aggrieved, petitioner sought a Writ of Prohibition with
Injunction and Damages before the Regional Trial Court of Basilan,

Respondents justify the demolition in the exercise of police power and for reasons of health, safety
and general welfare. It also relies on Ordinance No. 147 entitled “An Ordinance Establishing
Comprehensive Zoning Regulations for the Municipality of Isabela.”

RTC RULING: Trial Court 1 denied the Writ of Prohibition and upheld the power of respondent Mayor
to order the demolition without judicial authority, adverting to Zoning Ordinance No. 147 of the
Municipality of Isabela, Basilan.

CA RULING: CA reversed the trial court’s decision and issued a writ of prohibition stating that
respondent Mayor was not vested with power to order summarily, and without any judicial proceeding,
the demolition of the quonset building, which was not a nuisance per se, and that petitioner is in legal
possession of the land on which the building stands by virtue of the permit issued by the Philippine
Ports Authority.
However, CA reversed itself stating that "although Municipal Mayor Valencia initially issued an order
of demolition without judicial process, the deficiency was remedied when petitioner filed a petition for
prohibition and injunction and was heard on oral argument after respondent officials filed their answer."

ISSUE: Whether Respondent Mayor could summarily, without judicial process, order the demolition
of petitioner's quonset building

RULING: NO.
Ordinance 147 should not be interpreted as authorizing the summary removal of a non-conforming
building by the municipal government. It must be struck down for being in contravention of the
requirements of due process, as originally held by the respondent Court.

Moreover, the enforcement and administration of the provisions of the Ordinance resides with the
Zoning Administrator. It is said official who may call upon the City Fiscal to institute the necessary
legal proceedings to enforce the provisions of the Ordinance. And any person aggrieved by the
decision of the Zoning Administrator regarding the enforcement of the Ordinance may appeal to the
Board of Zoning Appeals.

Violation of a municipal ordinance neither empowers the Municipal Mayor to avail of extra-judicial
remedies. On the contrary, the Local Government Code imposes upon him the duty “to cause to be
instituted judicial proceedings in connection with the violation of ordinances.”
Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of
nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects
the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law
of necessity. The storage of copra in the quonset building is a legitimate business. Quonset building
is a legitimate business. By its nature, it can not be said to be injurious to rights of property, of health
or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing
conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without
judicial intervention.

In the case of Monteverde v. Generoso, the court ruled:

"The provincial governor, district engineer or district health officer is not authorized to destroy
private property consisting of dams and fishponds summarily and without any judicial
proceedings under the pretense that such private property constitutes a nuisance. A dam or a
fishery constructed in navigable rivers is not a nuisance per se. A dam or fishpond may be a
nuisance per accidens where it endangers or impairs the health or depreciates property by
causing water to become stagnant."

While the Sangguniang Bayan may provide for the abatement of a nuisance (Local Government Code,
Sec. 149), it can not declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. The
nuisance can only be so adjudged by judicial determination.

In the case of Iloilo Cold Storage v. Municipal Council, the court ruled:
"Municipal councils do not have the power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance
when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can they authorize the extra judicial
condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which, in its nature, situation or use is not
such. These things must be determined in the ordinary courts of law. In the present case, …
the ice factory of the plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is a legitimate industry …If it be in fact
a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere
resolution of the board. The petitioner is entitled to a fair and impartial hearing before a judicial
tribunal."

Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and quonset building by virtue of a permit from the
Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) when demolition was effected. It was not squatting on
public land. Its property was not of trifling value. It was entitled to an impartial hearing before a tribunal
authorized to decide whether the quonset building did constitute a nuisance in law. There was no
compelling necessity for precipitate action. It follows then that respondent public officials of the
Municipality of Isabela, Basilan, transcended their authority in abating summarily petitioner's quonset
building. They had deprived the petitioner of its property without due process of law. The fact that
petitioner filed a suit for prohibition and was subsequently heard thereon will not cure the defect, as
opined by the Court of Appeals, the demolition having been a fait accompli prior to hearing and the
authority to demolish without a judicial order being a prejudicial issue.

WHEREFORE, assailed CA decision is set aside and remanded to the RTC

Telmo vs. Bustamante

G.R. No. 182567 | July 13, 2009 | NACHURA, J.

FACTS: The case arose from the Complaint filed by respondent Bustamante before the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon against petitioner Telmo, Municipal Engineer of Naic,
CaviteRespondent is a co-owner of a real property in Brgy. Halang, Naic, Cavite. Petitioner is the
owners of the parcel of land located at the back of respondent’s lot. When his lot was transgressed by
the construction of the Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay Road, respondent offered for sale the remaining lot to
respondent. The latter refused.

Respondent then put up concrete poles on his lot. However, petitioner and his men destroyed the
concrete poles. Respondent complained that he and his co-owners did not receive any just
compensation from the government when it took a portion of their property for the construction of the
Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay Road. Worse, they could not enjoy the use of the remaining part of their lot
due to the abusive, Illegal, and unjust acts of petitioner. The office of the Deputy Ombudsman found
petitioner administratively liable.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, wherein he elaborated that he just performed his official
duties when he summarily removed the concrete posts erected by respondent to enclose the property.
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon denied the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
● Whether or not respondent’s concrete posts were in the nature of a nuisance per se.
● Whether or not petitioner is authorized by the municipal mayor or by the court to abate public
nuisance or nuisance per se.

RULING: Respondent’s concrete posts were not in the nature of a nuisance per se. Petitioner
contends that respondent’s concrete posts were in the nature of a nuisance per se, which may be the
subject of summary abatement sans any judicial proceedings. The Supreme Court disagreed.

A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity.31 Evidently, the concrete posts summarily
removed by petitioner did not at all pose a hazard to the safety of persons and properties, which would
have necessitated immediate and summary abatement. What they did, at most, was to pose an
inconvenience to the public by blocking the free passage of people to and from the national road.

Petitioner is not authorized by the municipal mayor or by the court to abate public nuisance or nuisance
per se. Petitioner likewise maintains that his authority to perform the assailed official act sprang from
Section 23 of the Revised Philippine Highway Act. He posits that this provision is particularly
implemented by Department Order No. 52, Series of 2003 of the Department of Public Works and
Highways for the Removal of Obstructions and Prohibited Uses within the Right-of-Way of National
Roads.

Department Order No. 52 directs all District Engineers to immediately remove or cause the removal
of all obstructions and prohibited uses within the right-of-way of all national roads in their respective
jurisdictions. These obstructions and prohibited uses include, among others, all kinds of private,
temporary and permanent structures, such as buildings, houses, shanties, stores, shops, stalls, sheds,
posts, canopies, billboards, signages, advertisements, fences, walls, railings, basketball courts,
garbage receptacles, and the like. The Department Order requires the District Engineers to issue
notices to the concerned persons to remove the obstructions and prohibited uses within the right-of-
way, and shall follow through prompt compliance with these notices and full implementation of the
Order. It further provides that appropriate sanctions will be taken against those who fail to comply with
its provisions.

Gauging the action of petitioner based on the guidelines set by Department Order No. 52, from which
he claims his authority, we cannot but conclude that petitioner went beyond the scope of his official
power because it is the concerned District Engineer of the Department of Public Works and Highways
who should have ordered respondent to remove the concrete posts. The petitioner failed to show that
he was duly authorized by the District Engineer to implement the Department Order in Naic, Cavite.
More importantly, even assuming that petitioner had been duly authorized to order the removal of the
concrete posts of respondent, he failed to prove that he issued the required notice to respondent to
remove the said structures before he did the removal himself. Note that petitioner, in fact, admitted in
his pleadings that he summarily removed the said post.

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., petitioner, v. JAC LINER, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 148339 I February 23, 2005 I J. CARPIO MORALES

(1) The operation of terminals is a legitimate business which, by itself, cannot be said to be injurious
to the rights of property, health, or comfort of the community. But even assuming that terminals are
nuisances due to their alleged indirect effects upon the flow of traffic, at most they are nuisance per
accidens, not per se.

(2) Unless a thing is nuisance per se, however, it may not be abated via an ordinance, without judicial
proceedings.

(3) Nuisance per se is refers to one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and
may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity

FACTS: Respondent, JAC Liner, Inc., a common carrier operating buses which ply various routes to
and from Lucena City, assailed, via a petition for prohibition and injunction against the City of Lucena,
its Mayor, and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Lucena City, City Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778 as unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the
same constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a
violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies.

These ordinances, by granting an exclusive franchise for twenty five years, renewable for another
twenty five years, to one entity for the construction and operation of one common bus and jeepney
terminal facility in Lucena City, to be located outside the city proper, were professedly aimed towards
alleviating the traffic congestion alleged to have been caused by the existence of various bus and
jeepney terminals within the city.

Respondent, who had maintained a terminal within the city, was one of those affected by the
ordinances. On the other hand, petitioner, Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., claiming legal interest
as the grantee of the exclusive franchise for the operation of the common terminal, was allowed to
intervene in the petition before the trial court.

RTC RULING: By Order of March 31, 1999, the RTC rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered, as

follows:

1. Declaring City Ordinance No. 1631 as valid, having been issued in the exercise
of the police power of the City Government of Lucena insofar as the grant of
franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., to construct, finance,
establish, operate and maintain common bus-jeepney terminal facility in the City of
Lucena;

2. But however, declaring the provision of Sec. 4(c) of Ordinance No. 1631 to the
effect that the City Government shall not grant any third party any privilege and/or
concession to operate a bus, mini-bus and/or jeepney terminal, as illegal and ultra
 vires because it contravenes the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as "The Local Government Code";

3. Declaring City Ordinance No. 1778 as null and void, the same being also an ultra
vires act of the City Government of Lucena arising from an invalid, oppressive and
unreasonable exercise of the police power, more specifically, declaring illegal
[sections 1(b), 3(c) and 3(e)];

4. Ordering the issuance of a Writ of Prohibition and/or Injunction directing the

respondents public officials, the City Mayor and the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Lucena, to cease and desist from implementing Ordinance No. 1778 insofar as said
ordinance prohibits or curtails petitioner from maintaining and operating its own bus
terminal subject to the conditions provided for in Ordinance No. 1557, Sec. 3, which
authorizes the construction of terminal outside the poblacion of Lucena City; and
likewise, insofar as said ordinance directs and compels the petitioner to use the
Lucena Grand Central Terminal Inc., and furthermore, insofar as it declares that no
other terminals shall be situated, constructed, maintained or established inside or
within the City of Lucena; and furthermore,

5. The Motion to Dismiss filed by the Intervenor, Lucena Grand Central Terminal
Inc., dated October 19, 1998, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

CA RULING: By Decision of December 15, 2000, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the
challenged orders of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the terminals are nuisance per se.

RULING: No. The Court held that the operation of terminals is a legitimate business which, by itself,
cannot be said to be injurious to the rights of property, health, or comfort of the community. But even
assuming that terminals are nuisances due to their alleged indirect effects upon the flow of traffic, at
most they are nuisance per accidens, not per se. Unless a thing is nuisance per se, however, it may
not be abated via an ordinance, without judicial proceedings, as was done in the case at bar.

In Estate of Gregoria Francisco v. Court of Appeals, this Court held:

“Respondents cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the
abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a
nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property
and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity (Monteverde v.
Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1982]). The storage of copra in the quonset building is a
legitimate business. By its nature, it cannot be said to be injurious to rights of
property, of health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens
it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a
nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.”

In Pampanga Bus Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Tarlac where the appellant-municipality similarly argued
that the terminal involved therein is a nuisance that may be abated by the Municipal Council via an
ordinance, this Court held: "Suffice it to say that in the abatement of nuisances the provisions of the
Civil Code (Articles 694-707) must be observed and followed. This appellant failed to do."
 Cruz v. Pandacan Hiker’s Club, Inc.,
778 SCRA 385 | NO DIGEST MADE – FROM GOOGLE

FACTS: Herein petitioner, Natividad Cruz, was the Punong Barangay or Chairperson of Barangay 848,
Zone 2, City of Manila. In one occasion, she approached person playing basketball in the basketball
court, saying:

“Bakit nakabukas ang (basketball) court? Wala kayong karapatang maglaro sa court na 'to,
barangay namin ito! xxx xxx xxx Wala kayong magagawa. Ako ang chairman dito. Mga
walanghiya kayo, patay gutom! Hindi ako natatakot! Kaya kong panagutan lahat!”

She gave an order to the other petitioner, Barangay Tanod Benjamin dela Cruz, to destroy the
basketball ring by cutting it up with a hacksaw which Dela Cruz promptly complied with. The acts of
petitioners prompted the filing of a Complaint (for Malicious Mischief, Grave Misconduct, Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Abuse of Authority) before the Prosecutor's Office
and the Office of the Ombudsman by the group that claims to be the basketball court's owners, herein
respondents Pandacan Hiker's Club, Inc. and its president Priscila Ilao.

Cruz alleged that the basketball court affected the peace in the barangay and was the subject of many
complaints from residents asking for its closure. She alleged that the playing court blocked jeepneys
from passing through and was the site of rampant bettings and fights involving persons from within
and outside the barangays. She claimed that innocent persons have been hurt and property had been
damaged by such armed confrontations, which often involved the throwing of rocks and improvised
“molotov” bombs. She also averred that noise from the games caused lack of sleep among some
residents and that the place's frequent visitors used the community's fences as places to urinate.

The Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint filed by Ilao, et al. finding that the act of
destroying the basketball ring was only motivated by Cruz and Dela Cruz performing their sworn duty,
as defined in the Local Government Code. It found the act to be a mere response to the clamor of
constituents. The office found that though the cutting of the ring was “drastic,” it was done by the
barangay officials within their lawful duties, as the act was only the result of the unauthorized removal
of and failure to return the steel bar and padlock that were earlier placed thereon.

The appellate court reversed the Ombudsman’s Decision stating that Cruz and Dela Cruz performed
an abatement of what they thought was a public nuisance but did the same without following the proper
legal procedure, thus making them liable for said acts. Moreover, it held Cruz to be without the power
to declare a thing a nuisance unless it is a nuisance per se. It declared the subject basketball ring as
not such a nuisance and, thus, not subject to summary abatement. The court added that even if the
same was to be considered a nuisance per accidens, the only way to establish it as such is after a
hearing conducted for that purpose. Thus, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a nuisance which the Barangay Chairperson may summarily abate.

HELD: There is a nuisance when there is “any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of
property, or anything else which: (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or (2) annoys
or offends the senses; or (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or (4) obstructs or
interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders
or impairs the use of property.” But other than the statutory definition, jurisprudence recognizes that
the term “nuisance” is so comprehensive that it has been applied to almost all ways which have
interfered with the rights of the citizens, either in person, property, the enjoyment of his property, or
his comfort.
A nuisance is classified in two ways: (1) according to the object it affects; or (2) according to its
susceptibility to summary abatement. As for a nuisance classified according to the object or objects
that it affects, a nuisance may either be: (a) a public nuisance, i.e., one which “affects a community or
neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger
or damage upon individuals may be unequal”; or (b) a private nuisance, or one “that is not included in
the foregoing definition” which, in jurisprudence, is one which “violates only private rights and produces
damages to but one or a few persons.”

A nuisance may also be classified as to whether it is susceptible to a legal summary abatement, in

which case, it may either be: (a) a nuisance per se, when it affects the immediate safety of persons
and property, which may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity; or, (b) a nuisance
per accidens, which “depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a
question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide
whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance;” it may only be so proven in a hearing
conducted for that purpose and may not be summarily abated without judicial intervention.

In the case at bar, none of the tribunals below made a factual finding that the basketball ring was a
nuisance per se that is susceptible to a summary abatement. And based on what appears in the
records, it can be held, at most, as a mere nuisance per accidens, for it does not pose an immediate
effect upon the safety of persons and property, the definition of a nuisance per se. Culling from
examples cited in jurisprudence, it is unlike a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight
because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people; nor is it like
pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs which are inherently pernicious and
which may be summarily destroyed; nor is it similar to a filthy restaurant which may be summarily
padlocked in the interest of the public health. A basketball ring, by itself, poses no immediate harm or
danger to anyone but is merely an object of recreation. Neither is it, by its nature, injurious to rights of
property, of health or of comfort of the community and, thus, it may not be abated as a nuisance without
the benefit of a judicial hearing. But even if it is assumed, ex gratia argumenti, that the basketball ring
was a nuisance per se, but without posing any immediate harm or threat that required instantaneous
action, the destruction or abatement performed by petitioners failed to observe the proper procedure
for such an action which puts the said act into legal question.

KNIGHTS OF RIZAL v. DMCI HOMES

G.R. No. 213948 | April 25, 2017 | J. Carpio

It can easily be gleaned that the Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per se. The Torre de Manila project
cannot be considered as a “direct menace to public health or safety.” Not only is a condominium project
commonplace in the City of Manila, DMCI-PDI has, according to the proper government agencies,
complied with health and safety standards set by law.

FACTS: DMCI Project Developers, Inc. (DMCI-PDI) acquired a lot in the City of Manila, located near
Taft Avenue, Ermita, beside the former Manila Jai-Alai Building and Adamson University. The lot was
earmarked for the construction of DMCI-PDI’s Torre de Manila condominium project. The Building
Official issued to DMCI-PDI a Building Permit, allowing it to build a “49-Storey w/Basement & 2
penthouse Level Residential Condominium” on the property

However, the City Council of Manila later issued Resolution No. 121 enjoining the Office of the Building
Official to temporarily suspend the Building Permit of DMCI-PDI, citing that “the Torre de Manila
Condominium, based on their development plans, upon completion, will rise up high above the back
of the national monument, to clearly dwarf the statue of our hero, and with such towering heights,
would certainly ruin the line of sight of the Rizal Shrine from the frontal Roxas Boulevard vantage point.”
When consulted by the Building Official, the City of Manila’s City Legal Officer stated that there is “no
legal justification for the temporary suspension of the Building Permit issued in favor of DMCI-PDI
since the construction lies outside the Luneta Park and is simply too far to be a repulsive distraction
or have an objectionable effect on the artistic and historical significance of the Rizal Monument.” He
also pointed out that there is no showing that the area of subject property has been officially declared
as an anthropological or archeological area. Neither has it been categorically designated by the
National Historical Institute as a heritage zone, a cultural property, a historical landmark or even a
national treasure.

The Manila Zoning Board of Adjustments and Appeals (MZBAA) issued Zoning Board Resolution No.
06, Series of 2013, recommending the approval of DMCI-PDI’s application for variance.

The City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 5, Series of 2014, where it essentially ratifies and
confirms all previously issued permits, licenses and approvals issued by the City Council of Manila for
Torre de Manila.

The Knights of Rizal (KOR) a “civic, patriotic, cultural, non- partisan, non-sectarian and non-profit
organization” created under Republic Act No. 646 filed a Petition for Injunction seeking a permanent
injunction against the construction of DMCI- PDI’s Torre de Manila condominium project. The KOR
contends that the project is a nuisance per se because the despoliation of the sight view of the Rizal
Monument is a situation that ‘annoys or offends the senses’ of every Filipino who honors the memory
of the National Hero Jose Rizal. The KOR also claims that the Torre de Manila project violates the
NHCP’s Guidelines on Monuments Honoring National Heroes, Illustrious Filipinos and Other
Personages, which state that historic monuments should assert a visual “dominance” over its
surroundings, as well as the country’s commitment under the International Charter for the
Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites (Venice Charter).

ISSUE: Whether or not Torre de Manila is a nuisance per se.

RULING: The Court ruled in the negative. The Court recognizes two kinds of nuisances. The first,
nuisance per se, is one “recognized as a nuisance under any and all circumstances, because it
constitutes a direct menace to public health or safety, and, for that reason, may be abated summarily
under the undefined law of necessity.” The second, nuisance per accidens, is that which “depends
upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be
abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing in law
constitutes a nuisance.”

The Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per se. The Torre de Manila project cannot be considered as a
“direct menace to public health or safety.” Not only is a condominium project commonplace in the City
of Manila, DMCI-PDI has, according to the proper government agencies, complied with health and
safety standards set by law. DMCI-PDI has been granted the permits and clearances prior to starting
the project.

On the other hand, the KOR now claims that the Torre de Manila is a nuisance per accidens. A
nuisance per accidens is determined based on its surrounding conditions and circumstances. These
conditions and circumstances must be well established, not merely alleged. The authority to decide
when a nuisance exists is an authority to find facts, to estimate their force, and to apply rules of law to
the case thus made. This Court is no such authority. It is not a trier of facts. It cannot simply take the
allegations in the petition and accept these as facts, more so in this case where these allegations are
contested by the respondents. The task to receive and evaluate evidence is lodged with the trial courts.
The question, then, of whether the Torre de Manila project is a nuisance per accidens must be settled
after due proceedings brought before the proper Regional Trial Court. The KOR cannot circumvent
the process in the guise of protecting national culture and heritage.
NOTES: Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, business,
condition of property, or anything else which: (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others;
(2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs
or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders
or impairs the use of property.

NORTH GREENHILLS ASSOCIATION ,INC. V. ATTY. MORALES

G.R. No. 222821 | August 9, 2017 | J. Mendoza

Whether there was payment or otherwise is irrelevant to the main issues considering that the pleadings
filed by the parties essentially reflected an admission of membership of Atty. Morales in the association.
The failure to raise the issue of unpaid association dues in this case or its dismissal if properly raised
will not be a bar to the filing of the appropriate separate action to collect it.

FACTS: Atty. Morales has been a long time resident of North Greenhills Subdivision; his house is
located alongside Club Filipino and adjacent to McKinley Park, a park/open space/playground area
owned by North Greenhills Association. He built a personal access door to the park, allowing him to
go directly to the park. In June 2003, NGA started constructing a pavilion or kiosk occupying the side
of the park adjacent to the residence of Atty. Morales. Part of the design was a public restroom
intended to serve the needs of park guests and members of NGA. Said restroom was constructed
alongside the concrete wall separating the house of Atty. Morales from the park.

Disagreeing with the decision of NGA, Atty. Morales filed a complaint with the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board. He complained that the restroom being constructed by the NGA was a nuisance
per accidens. NGA disagrees, and held that as the absolute owner of the park, it had the absolute
right to fence the property and impose reasonable conditions for its use; the construction of the
restroom was for the use of all members, including Atty. Morales; Atty. Morales’s use of his personal
access could not ripen into prescription; and sought to collect from Atty. Morales his membership dues
which the NGA alleged had been unpaid for a long time.

RTC RULING: The HLURB ruled in favor of Atty. Morales, ordering NGA to relocate the restroom, and
the obstruction to Atty. Morales’s access door. The HLURB Board affirmed with modification the
Arbiter’s ruling, which the Office of the President again affirmed. NGA elevated the case to the
Supreme Court.

CA RULING: On appeal to the CA, it affirmed the OP ruling and ruled that the restroom being
constructed was a nuisance per accidens. It opined that the construction of the restroom not only
endangered the health of Atty. Morales, but the members of his household who may contract diseases
from the waste emanating from the restroom.

ISSUE: WON the CA correctly ruled that the counterclaim of NGA against Atty. Morales for unpaid
association dues was a permissive counterclaim.

RULING: A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or any relief, which a defending party
may have against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected
with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiffs complaint. It is
compulsory in the sense that it is within the jurisdiction of the court, does not require for its adjudication
the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and will be barred in the
future if not set up in the answer to the complaint in the same case. Any other counterclaim is
permissive.
The Court has held that the compelling test of compulsoriness characterizes a counterclaim as
compulsory if there should exist a logical relationship between the main claim and the counterclaim.
The Court further ruled that there exists such a relationship when conducting separate trials of the
respective claims of the parties would entail substantial duplication of time and effort by the parties
and the court; when the multiple claims involve the same factual and legal issues; or when the claims
are offshoots of the same basic controversy between the parties.

The criteria to determine whether the counterclaim is compulsory or permissive are as follows:

(a) Are issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same?
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claim absent the compulsory rule?
(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as defendant's
counterclaim?
(d) Is there any logical relations between the claim and the counterclaim?

A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory. Otherwise,
the same is permissive.

Here, the main issues in the complaint are limited only to the propriety of barring Atty. Morales from
accessing the park through the side door and whether the restroom constructed by NGA is a nuisance
per se. On the other hand, the counterclaim is simply concerned with collecting from Atty. Morales his
unpaid association dues for the past thirty (30) years. Suffice it to state that payment or non-payment
of association dues are distinct matters that do not relate to whether the main cause of Atty. Morales
against NGA was proper. Whether there was payment or otherwise is irrelevant to the main issues
considering that the pleadings filed by the parties essentially reflected an admission of membership of
Atty. Morales in the association. The failure to raise the issue of unpaid association dues in this case
or its dismissal if properly raised will not be a bar to the filing of the appropriate separate action to
collect it.

Halili v. Lacson
93 Phil. 772 | NO DIGEST MADE

NUISANCE; SUMMARY REMOVAL OF PUBLIC NUISANCE WITHIN SCOPE OF LAW. — It

appearing that petitioners occupied the premises inside the Palomar Compound without the
knowledge, authority or consent of the City of Manila, although later two of them succeeded in securing
from the city mayor written permission wherein they agreed to occupy the premises subject to the
condition that they will remove the structure they had erected and vacate the premises within such
time as may be specified in a notice to be issued by the city engineer; and considering that said
structures constitute an obstruction to the use by the public of the parks, plazas, streets, and sidewalks
that are affected by them, they constitute a public nuisance within the meaning of Articles 694 and 695
of the new Civil Code, which can be ordered demolished by the city authorities pursuant to section
1122 of the Revised Ordinance of the City of Manila No. 1600; (Sitchon, et al. vs. Aquino, supra, p.
458).

Farrales v. City Mayor of Baguio

44 SCRA 239 | NO DIGEST MADE – FROM GOOGLE

FACTS: Plaintiff was the holder of a municipal license to sell liquor and sari-sari goods. When the
temporary building where she had her stall was demolished in order that the city might construct a
permanent building, Plaintiff was ordered to move her goods to another temporary place until the
permanent building was completed. Instead, Plaintiff built a temporary shack at one end of the Rice
Section, Baguio City Market without seeking prior permit from any city official. When the police
threatened to demolish the shack, Plaintiff sought an injunction before the CFI which asked her that
she present proper permit. Upon failure of petitioner to comply with the order, the CFI denied the
petition for injunction, and the police then demolished the shack.

ISSUES:
(1) WON the shack or temporary stall was a nuisance;
(2) WON the police officers are liable for damages in extrajudicially abating the nuisance.

RULING: Judgment Affirmed.

(1) The SC held that the shack was a nuisance. In the first place she had no permit to put up the
temporary stall in question in the precise place where she did so. In the second place, its location on
the cement passageway at the end of the Rice Section building was such that it constituted an
obstruction to the free movement of people.

(2) According to Article 707 of the CC, a public official extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be liable
for damages in only two cases: (a) if he causes unnecessary injury; or (b) if an alleged nuisance is
later declared by the courts to be not a real nuisance.
In the case at bar, no unnecessary injury was caused to the appellant, and not only was there no
judicial declaration that the alleged nuisance was not really so but the trial court found that it was in
fact a nuisance. Indeed it may be said that the abatement thereof was not summary, but through a
judicial proceeding. The denial of petitioner’s petition for injunction was in effect an authority for the
police to carry out the act which was sought to be enjoined.

DONALD MEAD v. HON. MANUEL A. ARGEL

G.R. No. 41958 | July20, 1982 | J. Vasquez

Under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3931, a court action involving the determination of the existence
of pollution may not be initiated until and unless the Commission has so determined the existence of
what in the law is considered pollution.

FACTS: Petitioner Donald Mead and a certain Isaac Arivas were then the president and general
manager, respectively of the Insular Oil Refinery Co. (INSOIL). On or about the 23 rd day of August
1972, and for some time prior and subsequent thereto, in the municipality of Malabon, province of
Rizal , they conspired and confederated together and mutually helped and aided one another, to drain
or allow to seep into such waterway the industrial and other waste matters discharged due to the
operation of INSOIL. This has caused the pollution of such waterway with the resulting damage and/or
destruction to the living plants in the vicinity and providing hazard to health and property in the same
vicinity.

On March 11, 1975, Mead and Arivas were charged by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal with a violation
of Section 9, in relation to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3931 also known as “An Act Creating a
National Water And Air Pollution Control Commission.”

The case was assigned to Branch XXXV of the CFI of Rizal (Caloocan City) presided over by the
respondent Judge.

On August 11, 1975, Mead filed a motion to quash on the ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction
and that the Provincial Prosecutor has no legal personality to file the said information. It was denied
by the respondent Judge as well as the Motion for Reconsideration by Mead, hence, this petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction to annul the said orders of the respondent Judge.
ISSUE: Whether or not a Provincial Fiscal has the authority to file an information for a violation of
Republic Act No. 3931, entitled "An Act Creating a National Water and Air Pollution Control
Commission."

RULING: No. Under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3931, it is expressly directed that on matters not
related to nuisance "no court action shall be initiated until the Commission shall have finally ruled
thereon." This provision leaves little room for doubt that a court action involving the determination of
the existence of pollution may not be initiated until and unless the Commission has so determined the
existence of what in the law is considered pollution.

Hence; in the case at bar, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal lacked the authority to file the information
charging the Petitioner with a violation of the provision of Republic Act No. 3931 there being no prior
finding or determination by the Commission that the act of the petitioner had caused pollution in any
water or atmospheric air of the Philippines. The filing of the information for the violation of Section 9
of the law is, therefore, premature and unauthorized. Concommittantly, the respondent Judge is
without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense charge therein.|||

Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 3931 (“An Act Creating a National Water and Air Pollution Control
Commission”), prohibits the act of throwing, running, draining or otherwise disposing into any of the
water and/or atmospheric air of the Philippines, any organic or inorganic matter or substance “that
shall cause pollution of such waters or atmospheric air.”

The power to determine the existence of pollution is vested by the law in the Commission as provided
under Section 6. Section 8 contains explicit provisions as to the authority of the Commission to
determine the existence of pollution and to take appropriate court actions to abate or prevent the same.
The determination of the existence of pollution requires investigation, public hearings and the
collection of various information relating to water and atmospheric pollution. It requires specialized
knowledge of technical and scientific matters which are not ordinarily within the competence of Fiscals
or of those sitting in a court of justice.

However, a Fiscal may still file an Information for violation of the said law if the Commission had made
a finding or determination that the law or any of its orders had been violated.

JARCO MARKETING CORPORATION, LEONARDO KONG, JOSE TIOPE and ELISA PANELO
vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CONRADO C. AGUILAR and CRISELDA R. AGUILAR
G.R. No. 129792 | December 21, 1999 | C.J. Davide, Jr.

A child under nine years of age must be conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence
as a matter of law.

FACTS: Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City. Leonardo
Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the store's branch manager, operations manager, and
supervisor, respectively. Conrado and Criselda Aguilar are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth
Aguilar.

On 9 May 1983, Criselda and Zhieneth were at the 2nd floor of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City.
Criselda was signing her credit card slip at the payment and verification counter when she felt a sudden
gust of wind and heard a loud thud. She then beheld her daughter Zhieneth on the floor, her young
body pinned by the bulk of the store's gift-wrapping counter/structure.
Zhieneth was quickly rushed to the Makati Medical Center where she was operated on. The next day,
Zhieneth lost her speech. The injuries she sustained took their toll on her young body. She died 14
days after the accident on the hospital bed. She was six years old.

After the burial of their daughter, spouses Aguilar demanded upon petitioners the reimbursement of
the hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral expenses which they had incurred. Petitioners
refused to pay. Consequently, spouses Aguilar filed a complaint for damages wherein they sought the
payment of P157,522.86 for actual damages, P300,000 for moral damages, P20,000 for attorney's
fees and an unspecified amount for loss of income and exemplary damages.

Petitioners denied any liability for the injuries and consequent death of Zhieneth. They claimed that
Criselda was negligent in exercising care and diligence over her daughter by allowing her to freely
roam around in a store filled with glassware and appliances. Zhieneth too, was guilty of contributory
negligence since she climbed the counter, triggering its eventual collapse on her. Petitioners also
emphasized that the counter was made of sturdy wood with a strong support; it never fell nor collapsed
for the past fifteen years since its construction.

Spouses Aguilar asserted that Zhieneth should be entitled to the conclusive presumption that a child
below 9 years is incapable of contributory negligence. And even if Zhieneth, at 6 years old, was already
capable of contributory negligence, still it was physically impossible for her to have propped herself on
the counter. She had a small frame (four feet high and seventy pounds), and the counter was much
higher and heavier than she was. Also, the testimony of one of the store's former employees, Gerardo
Gonzales, who accompanied Zhieneth when she was brought to the emergency room of the Makati
Medical Center belied petitioners' theory that Zhieneth climbed the counter. Gonzales claimed that
when Zhieneth was asked by the doctor what she did, Zhieneth replied, "Nothing, I did not come near
the counter and the counter just fell on me."

RTC RULING: The RTC ruled that the proximate cause of the fall of the counter on Zhieneth was her
act of clinging to it and that Criselda's negligence contributed to Zhieneth's accident. The RTC
reasoned that the counter was situated at the end or corner of the 2nd floor as a precautionary
measure hence, it could not be considered as an attractive nuisance. The counter was higher than
Zhieneth. It has been in existence for fifteen years. Its structure was safe and well-balanced. Zhieneth,
therefore, had no business climbing on and clinging to it.

CA RULING: The CA reversed the RTC judgment. It found that petitioners were negligent in
maintaining a structurally dangerous counter. The counter was shaped like an inverted "L" with a top
wider than the base. Thus, the counter was defective, unstable, and dangerous; a downward pressure
on the overhanging portion or a push from the front could cause the counter to fall. Two former
employees of petitioners had already previously brought to the attention of the management the
danger the counter could cause. But the latter ignored their concern.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the death of Zhieneth was attributable to negligence
2. Whether or not, in case of a finding of negligence, if it is attributable to petitioners for
maintaining a defective counter or to Criselda and Zhieneth for failing to exercise due and
reasonable care while inside the store premises

RULING:

1. No. The tragedy which befell Zhieneth was no accident and that Zhieneth's death could only be
attributable to negligence.
An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant.
It is "a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human agency,
or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is
unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens."

On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is "the failure to observe,
for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury."

Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other. Accident
occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of any
person, and which could not have been prevented by any means suggested by common prudence.

The test in determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the landmark case of Picart v.
Smith, thus: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence.

Anent the negligence of Zhieneth, the conclusive presumption that favors children below nine years
old should be applied in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. In our jurisdiction, a person
under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment, and is, on that
account, exempt from criminal liability. The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal
liability obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that
he has acted with discernment. Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and require
discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by
analogy, conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence; and that the presumption of lack of
discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child over nine but under fifteen years of age
is a rebuttable one, under our law. The rule, therefore, is that a child under nine years of age must be
conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. v. GUILLERMO BALANDAN, ANSELMA ANILA and THE

COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-3422 | January 13, 1952 | J. Bengzon

The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as
natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and
its location.

FACTS: This is an appeal by certiorari, from a decision of the Court of Appeals requiring Hidalgo
Enterprises, Inc. to pay Guillermo Balandan and his wife, damages in the sum of ₱2,000 for the death
of their son Mario.

Petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. was the owner of an ice-plant factory in Laguna. Within the
premises of the factory were two installed two tanks full of water, nine-feet deep, for cooling purposes
of its engine. The tanks were not provided with any kind of fence or top covers and its edges were
barely a foot high from the surface of the ground. Their wide gate entrance, without a guard assigned,
was continually open where motor vehicles hauling ice and persons buying said commodity passed.
On April 16, 1948, plaintiff’s son, Mario Balandan, who is barely 8 years old, while playing with other
boys of his age, entered the factory premises through the gate, to take a bath in one of the said tanks.
Mario sank to the bottom of the tank and died of ‘asphyxia secondary to drowning.’

CFI and CA RULING: Petitioner maintained an attractive nuisance (the tanks) and neglected to adopt
the necessary precautions to avoid accident to persons entering its premises. The doctrine of attractive
nuisance is applied when a person who keeps dangerous instruments or appliances on his premises
that are likely to attract children in play and fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from
playing with or resorting to them is liable to a child of tender years who is injured as a result, even if
the child is technically a trespasser on the premises.

ISSUE: Whether a body of water is an attractive nuisance.

RULING: NO. As explained by the Indiana Appellate Court, there is always the risk of drowning in the
bodies of water, may it be natural or artificial, so children are warned about this danger from an early
age, and if a private property owner builds an artificial pool on his own land, he is simply copying
nature's job without introducing any new danger, thus, s/she is not liable for creating such.

Since petitioner's tanks are not classified as an attractive nuisance, the question whether the petitioner
had taken reasonable precautions becomes immaterial. And the other issue submitted by petitioner –
that the parents of the boy were guilty of contributory negligence precluding recovery, because they
left for Manila on that day leaving their son under the care of no responsible individual — needs no
further discussion. The appealed decision is reversed and the Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. is absolved
from liability.

244. Central Shipping Co Inc v. Insurance Company of North America

G.R. No. 150751 | September 20, 2004 | J. Panganiban
(Doctrine of Limited Liability)

Doctrine does not apply to situations in which the loss or the injury is due to the concurrent negligence
of the shipowner and the captain. It has already been established that the sinking of M/V Central Bohol
had been caused by the fault or negligence of the ship captain and the crew, as shown by the improper
stowage of the cargo of logs. “Closer supervision on the part of the shipowner could have prevented
this fatal miscalculation.” As such, the shipowner was equally negligent. It cannot escape liability by
virtue of the limited liability rule.

FACTS: July 25, 1990, Central Shipping received on board its vessel 276 pieces of round logs and
undertook to transport said shipment to Manila for delivery to Alaska Lumber Co. The cargo was
insured for P3m against total loss. While on voyage, the vessel completely sank.

Insurance Company alleged that the total loss of the shipment was caused by the fault and negligence
of the petitioner. The consignee, Alaska presented a claim for the value of the shipment against the
petitioner but the latter failed and refused to settle the claim, hence being the insurer, Insurance
company paid and now seeks to be subrogated by the shipping company. The shipping company
argues that the ship was seaworthy and properly manned, putting defense that the proximate cause
of the sinking vessel and the loss was a natural disaster which could have not been foreseen.

RTC RULING: The RTC favored the insurance company.

CA RULING: The CA affirmed the RTC ruling.

ISSUE:
 1. Whether the carrier is liable for the loss of the cargo
2. Whether the doctrine of limited liability applies in this case

RULING:

(1) Liability for lost cargo: From the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,
common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence over the goods they transport,
according to all the circumstances of each case. In the event of loss, destruction or
deterioration of the insured goods, common carriers are responsible; that is, unless they can
prove that such loss, destruction or deterioration was brought about -- among others -- by flood,
storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or calamity. In all other cases not
specified under Article 1734 of the Civil Code, common carriers are presumed to have been
at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence.

In the present case, petitioner has not given the Court sufficient cogent reasons to disturb the
conclusion of the CA that the weather encountered by the vessel was not a storm as
contemplated by Article 1734(1). Established is the fact that between 10:00 p.m. on July 25,
1990 and 1:25 a.m. on July 26, 1990, M/V Central Bohol encountered a south western
monsoon in the course of its voyage.

(2) The doctrine of limited liability under Article 587 of the Code of Commerce is not applicable to
the present case. This rule does not apply to situations in which the loss or the injury is due to
the concurrent negligence of the ship owner and the captain. It has already been established
that the sinking of M/V Central Bohol had been caused by the fault or negligence of the ship
captain and the crew, as shown by the improper stowage of the cargo of logs. Closer
supervision on the part of the ship owner could have prevented this fatal miscalculation. As
such, the ship owner was equally negligent. It cannot escape liability by virtue of the limited
liability rule.

PADILLA v. UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION

G.R. No. 214805 | December 14, 2017 | J. Del Castillo

The Court held in the case of Nutrimix Feeds Corporation c. Court of Appeals that the manufacturer
or seller of animal feeds cannot be held liable for any damage allegedly caused by the product in the
absence of proof that the product was defective. The defect of the product requires evidence that there
was no tampering with, or changing of the animal feeds. The Court explained that “[i]n the sale of
animal feeds, there is an implied warranty that it is reasonably fit and suitable to be used for the
purpose which both parties contemplated.”

FACTS: For various years, Universal Robina Corporation (URC), a corporation engaged in the
manufacture and sale of various agro-industrial products, sold/supplied on credit day-old chicks and
poultry feeds to complainants (poultry farmers Eduardo Pineda, Simpilcio Ortiz Luis, Jose Bantigue,
Azucena Vergare, Eduardo Guingon, Marianito Padilla, and Alfredo Javaluyas) who, in turn,
provided the labor, poultry house, electricity and water facilities to care and grow these chicks until
they are ready for harvest after 50 days. If the purchases on credit were greater than the value of the
chickens harvested, complainants paid the balance to URC, but if it were otherwise, complainants
received their respective paybacks or earnings.

Here, documents entitled Continuing Credit Accommodation with Real Estate Mortgage (CCAREM)
were executed by the parties whereby URC agreed to extend a continuous credit accommodation in
favor of each complainant, for the latter's purchases of day-old chicks, poultry feeds, and other
agricultural products from the former, while each complainant put up a real estate mortgage.

However, sometime in 1993, complainants informed URC of the stunting or slow growth and
high mortality rate of the chickens. They claimed that URC supplied them with low quality feeds
with high aflatoxin content and class B or junior day-old chicks. Meanwhile, the stunted
chickens that failed to meet the standard target weight for harvest were rejected by URC and
were beheaded. As a result, complainants incurred outstanding obligations.

Hence, complainants filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against URC. The complainants
claimed that they incurred losses and sustained damages from the stunting/slow growth of the
chickens as a result of the low-quality feeds with high aflatoxin content and class B or junior day-old
chicks supplied by URC in evident bad faith. Since the stunting and eventual condemnation/death of
the chickens was due to URC's fault, complainants claimed that their obligation to pay URC was
extinguished.

RTC RULING: Ruled in favor of the complainants, declaring their obligation to pay URC extinguished
because they were not guilty of negligence in the care of the chicks as to hold them liable for the loss.

CA RULING: Ruled in favor of URC. Held that there was no credible evidence, except mere self-
serving claims, that URC supplied contaminated poultry feeds which affected the growth of the broiler
chicks. No veterinarians or nutritionists were presented to prove petitioners’ claims.

The CA therefore ruled that petitioners should bear the loss of the broiler chickens and are liable to
pay URC their outstanding obligations plus interest and attorney's fees in accordance with the
provisions of the CCAREM.

ISSUE: Whether there is sufficient evidence to establish URC’s fault or negligence for the
defective/stunted growth of the broiler chickens as would extinguish petitioners’ obligation under the
CCAREM.

RULING: NO. The Court held in the case of Nutrimix Feeds Corporation c. Court of Appeals that the
manufacturer or seller of animal feeds cannot be held liable for any damage allegedly caused by the
product in the absence of proof that the product was defective. The defect of the product requires
evidence that there was no tampering with, or changing of the animal feeds. The Court explained that
“[i]n the sale of animal feeds, there is an implied warranty that it is reasonably fit and suitable to be
used for the purpose which both parties contemplated.”

In this case, URC maintained that it is unlikely that it supplied its customers with defective poultry
feeds because if it were, it would have not passed quality control. Further, there was evidence showing
the possibility of tampering with the poultry feeds in the hands of the poultry farmers. On cross-
examination, William Lim, the National Sales Manager of URC, testified that there were instances that
the poultry farmers bought other ingredients from other sources and added them to the feeds.

In light of the ruling in Nutrimix, it is incumbent on petitioners to establish the liability of URC on the
basis of breach of implied warranty. No evidence, however, was adduced. They even failed to dispute
Lim's testimony that the feeds passed quality control and of the possibility that other ingredients from
other sources were mixed to the feeds.

There was nothing in the records, except self-serving claims, which proves that URC delivered low
quality feeds tainted with high aflatoxin and other harmful components. There were no
veterinarians/nutritionists or any other credible evidence. There were no veterinarians/nutritionists or
any other credible evidence presented by petitioners to confirm that the poultry feeds supplied by URC
were contaminated or affected the growth of the broiler chicks.

Furthermore, the documentary evidence proffered by petitioners, to wit: 1) Notices of Auction Sale 52
of the properties mortgaged under the CCAREMs, 2) Certifications of the Clerks of Court of RTC
Gapan and Cabanatuan City stating that Notary Public Jacoba had no notarial commission, and 3)
Condemnation Mortality Rate Reports showing the number of disposed/condemned broiler chickens,
do not prove any liability on URC of its alleged supply of defective feeds.

Central Shipping Co. Inc. v. Insurance Company of North America

G.R. NO. 150751 | September 20, 2004 | J. PANGANIBAN

Doctrine of Limited Liability does not apply to situations in which the loss or the injury is due to the
concurrent negligence of the shipowner and the captain. It has already been established that the
sinking of M/V Central Bohol had been caused by the fault or negligence of the ship captain and the
crew, as shown by the improper stowage of the cargo of logs. “Closer supervision on the part of the
shipowner could have prevented this fatal miscalculation.” As such, the shipowner was equally
negligent. It cannot escape liability by virtue of the limited liability rule.

FACTS: On July 25, 1990 at Puerto Princesa, Palawan, Central Shipping Company received on board
its vessel, the M/V ‘Central Bohol’, 376 pieces [of] Philippine Apitong Round Logs and undertook to
transport said shipment to Manila for delivery to Alaska Lumber Co., Inc.
“The cargo was insured for P3,000,000.00 against total loss under Insurance Company of North
America’s Marine Cargo Policy No. MCPB- 00170. The vessel completely sank. Due to the sinking of
the vessel, the cargo was totally lost. The consignee, Alaska Lumber Co. Inc., presented a claim for
the value of the shipment to Central Shipping but the latter failed and refused to settle the claim, hence
Insurance company, being the insurer, paid said claim and now seeks to be subrogated to all the rights
and actions of the consignee as against Central Shipping. Central Shipping raised as its main defense
that the proximate and only cause of the sinking of its vessel and the loss of its cargo was a natural
disaster, a tropical storm which neither Central Shipping nor the captain of its vessel could have
foreseen.

RTC RULING: Central Shipping Liable. RTC was unconvinced that the sinking of M/V Central
Bohol had been caused by the weather or any other caso fortuito. It noted that monsoons, which were
common occurrences during the months of July to December, could have been foreseen and provided
for by an ocean-going vessel.

CA RULING: Affirmed RTC. Given the season of rains and monsoons, the ship captain and his crew
should have anticipated the perils of the sea. The CA found no merit in petitioner’s assertion of the
vessel’s seaworthiness. It held that the Certificates of Inspection and Drydocking were not conclusive
proofs thereof. In order to consider a vessel to be seaworthy, it must be fit to meet the perils of the
sea.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether the carrier is liable for the loss of the cargo; and
(2) whether the doctrine of limited liability is applicable.

RULING:

(1) Liability for lost cargo: From the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, common
carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence over the goods they transport, according to all
the circumstances of each case. In the event of loss, destruction or deterioration of the insured goods,
common carriers are responsible; that is, unless they can prove that such loss, destruction or
deterioration was brought about -- among others -- by flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other
natural disaster or calamity. In all other cases not specified under Article 1734 of the Civil Code,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove
that they observed extraordinary diligence.

In the present case, petitioner has not given the Court sufficient cogent reasons to disturb the
conclusion of the CA that the weather encountered by the vessel was not a storm as contemplated by
Article 1734(1). Established is the fact that between 10:00 p.m. on July 25, 1990 and 1:25 a.m. on July
26, 1990, M/V Central Bohol encountered a south western monsoon in the course of its voyage.

(2) Doctrine of Limited Liability: The doctrine of limited liability under Article 587 of the Code of
Commerce is not applicable to the present case. This rule does not apply to situations in which the
loss or the injury is due to the concurrent negligence of the ship owner and the captain. It has already
been established that the sinking of M/V Central Bohol had been caused by the fault or negligence of
the ship captain and the crew, as shown by the improper stowage of the cargo of logs. Closer
supervision on the part of the ship owner could have prevented this fatal miscalculation. As such, the
ship owner was equally negligent. It cannot escape liability by virtue of the limited liability rule.

Edgar Cokaliong Shipping Lines, Inc. v. UCPB General Insurance Co. Inc.
404 SCRA 706

December 11, 1991: Nestor Angelia (shipper and consignee) delivered to the petitioner Edgar
Cokaliong Shipping Lines, Inc. (now Cokaliong Shipping Lines), a cargo consisting of one (1) carton
of Christmas decor and two (2) sacks of plastic toys, to be transported on board the M/V Tandag from
Cebu City for Tandag, Surigao del Sur. This cargo is under Bill of Lading No. 58, in the amount of
P6,500.00.

Zosimo Mercado (another shipper and consignee) likewise delivered cargo to petitioner consisting of
two (2) cartons of plastic toys and Christmas decor, one (1) roll of floor mat and one (1) bundle of
various or assorted goods. This is under Bill of Lading No. 59, valued in the amount of P14,000.00

Feliciana Legaspi (owner of the goods) insured the cargo, covered by BOL Nos. 59 and No. 58, with
the UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc., [respondent]. No. 59 was insured for P100,000 while No. 58
for P50,000. [*Note that both amounts are far from the actual and declared value in the BOLs issued
by Cokaliong]

After the vessel had passed by the MandaueMactan Bridge, fire ensued in the engine room, and,
despite earnest efforts of the officers and crew of the vessel, the fire engulfed and destroyed the entire
vessel resulting in the loss of the vessel and the cargoes therein.

Feliciana Legaspi filed a claim, with [respondent], for the value of the cargos insured. The latter
approved the claim. For Bill of Lading No. 59, Legaspi received from UCPB P99,000.00 while for No.
58, P60,338.00.

UCPB as subrogee of Legaspi, filed a complaint anchored on torts against petitioner, with the RTC of
Makati City, for the collection of the total principal amount of P148,500.00. Respondent alleged that
the loss of the cargo was due to the negligence of the petitioner

Petitioner alleged that: (a) It was cleared by the Board of Marine Inquiry of any negligence in the
burning of the vessel; and (b) it cannot be held liable for the loss of the cargo beyond the value thereof
declared in the Bill of Lading.
ISSUES:
(1) Is petitioner liable for the loss of the goods? YES
(2) If it is liable, what is the extent of its liability? According to what was reflected in the Bill of
Lading

HELD:

(1) Petitioner’s argument: the cause of the loss of the goods, subject of this case, was force majeure.
It adds that its exercise of due diligence was adequately proven by the findings of the Philippine Coast
Guard.

SC: We are not convinced. The uncontroverted findings of the Philippine Coast Guard show that the
M/V Tandag sank due to a fire, which resulted from a crack in the auxiliary engine fuel oil service tank.
The crack was located on the side of the fuel oil tank, which had a mere two-inch gap from the engine
room walling, thus precluding constant inspection and care by the crew

Having originated from an unchecked crack in the fuel oil service tank, the fire could not have been
caused by force majeure. Broadly speaking, force majeure generally applies to a natural accident,
such as that caused by a lightning, an earthquake, a tempest or a public enemy.

Hence, fire is not considered a natural disaster or calamity. It does not fall within the category of an
act of God unless caused by lighting or by other natural disaster or calamity. It may even be caused
by the actual fault or privity of the carrier.

Peril of fire is not comprehended within the exceptions in Article 1734; Article 1735 applies (please
see provision)

Where loss of cargo results from the failure of the officers of a vessel to inspect their ship frequently
so as to discover the existence of cracked parts, that loss cannot be attributed to force majeure, but
to the negligence of those officials.

Ensuring the seaworthiness of the vessel is the first step in exercising the required vigilance. Petitioner
did not present sufficient evidence showing what measures or acts it had undertaken to ensure the
seaworthiness of the vessel. It failed to show when the last inspection and care of the auxiliary engine
fuel oil service tank was made, or some other evidence to establish that it had exercised extraordinary
diligence. It merely stated that constant inspection and care were not possible, and that the last time
the vessel was dry-docked was in November 1990.

(2) Respondent’s contention: petitioner’s liability should be based on the actual insured value of the
goods, subject of this case.

Petitioner’s: its liability should be limited to the value declared by the shipper/consignee in the Bill of
Lading. SC: Petitioner should not be held liable for more than what was declared by the
shippers/consignees as the value of the goods in the bills of lading. Ratio: The records show that the
Bills of Lading covering the lost goods contain the stipulation that in case of claim for loss or for damage
to the shipped merchandise or property, [t]he liability of the common carrier x x x shall not exceed the
value of the goods as appearing in the bill of lading. A stipulation that limits liability is valid as long as
it is not against public policy. Following provisions apply in the present case:

Art. 1749. A stipulation that the common carriers liability is limited to the value of the goods appearing
in the bill of lading, unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value, is binding. Art. 1750. A
contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by the owner or shipper for the loss, destruction, or
deterioration of the goods is valid, if it is reasonable and just under the circumstances, and has been
freely and fairly agreed upon.

Pursuant to the afore-quoted provisions of law, it is required that the stipulation limiting the common
carriers liability for loss must be reasonable and just under the circumstances, and has been freely
and fairly agreed upon.

In the present case, the stipulation limiting petitioner’s liability is not contrary to public policy.

The shippers/consignees may recover the full value of the goods by the simple expedient of declaring
the true value of the shipment in the Bill of Lading. Other than the payment of

a higher freight, there was nothing to stop them (Legaspi, et.al) from placing the actual value of the
goods therein.

In fact, they committed fraud against the common carrier by deliberately undervaluing the goods in
their Bill of Lading, thus depriving the carrier of its proper and just transport fare.

Concededly, the purpose of the limiting stipulation in the Bill of Lading is to protect the common carrier.
Such stipulation obliges the shipper/consignee to notify the common carrier of the amount that the
latter may be liable for in case of loss of the goods. The common carrier can then take appropriate
measures -- getting insurance, if needed, to cover or protect itself. This precaution on the part of the
carrier is reasonable and prudent.

Zulueta v. Nicolas
102 Phil. 944 | NO DIGEST MADE

1. PUBLIC OFFICERS; REFUSAL TO PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTY WITHOUT JUST CAUSE; DUTY
OF THE FISCAL TO PROSECUTE OR NOT, CRIMES. — The refusal of the fiscal to prosecute when
after an investigation he finds no sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case is not a refusal,
without just cause, to perform an official duty. The fiscal has sure the legal duty to prosecute crimes
where there is enough evidence to justify such action. But it is equally his duty not to prosecute when
after an investigation he has become convinced that the evidence available is not enough to establish
a prima facie case.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; AUTHORITY OF FISCAL TO DETERMINE WHETHER A "PRIMA FACIE" CASE
EXISTS. — The fiscal is not bound to accept the opinion of the complainant in a criminal case as to
whether or not a prima facie case exists. Vested with authority and discretion to determine whether
there insufficient evidence to justify of the corresponding information, and having control of the
prosecution of a criminal case, the fiscal cannot be subjected to dictation from the offended party.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LIABILITY FOR RESULTING INJURIES. — As a general rule, a public prosecutor,
being a quasi-judicial officer empowered to exercise discretion or judgment, is not personally liable for
resulting injuries when acting within the scope of his authority, and in the line of his official duty (42
Am. Jur., sec. 21, p. 256)

This is an appeal taken by plaintiff from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing
his complaint for damages on the ground of lack of cause of action.

Plaintiff instituted the present action on May 19, 1954 against the defendant provincial fiscal of Rizal
to recover moral and pecuniary damages in the sum of P10,000. The complaint in substance alleges
that on May 6, 1954, the defendant fiscal conducted an investigation of a complaint for libel filed by
herein plaintiff against the provincial governor of Rizal and the staff members of the Philippine Free
Press; that after said investigation the fiscal "rendered an opinion" that there was no prima facie case;
that the alleged libelous statements were made in good faith and for the sole purpose of serving the
best interests of the public; and that in consequence the fiscal absolved the said governor and the
Free Press staff from the crime of libel.

The only question for determination is whether plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action.

The present action is based on article 27 of the new Civil Code, which provides that "any person
suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects without just
cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter."
But as we said in Bagalay vs. Ursal, * 50 Off. Gaz. 4231, this article "contemplates a refusal or neglect
without just cause by a public servant or employee to perform his official duty." Refusal of the fiscal to
prosecute when after an investigation he finds no sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case
is not a refusal, without just cause, to perform an official duty. The fiscal has for sure the legal duty to
prosecute crimes where there is enough evidence to justify such action. But it is equally his duty not
to prosecute when after an investigation he has become convinced that the evidence available is not
enough to establish a prima facie case. The fiscal is not bound to accept the opinion of the complainant
in a criminal case as to whether or not a prima facie case exists. Vested with authority and discretion
to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the filing of the corresponding information
and, having control of the prosecution of a criminal case, the fiscal cannot be subjected to dictation
from the offended party (People vs. Liggayu, et al., 97 Phil., 865, 51 Off. Gaz., 5644; People vs. Natoza,
100 Phil., 533, 53 Off. Gaz., 8099). Having legal cause to refrain from filing an information against the
persons whom the herein plaintiff wants him to charge with libel, the defendant fiscal cannot be said
to have refused or neglected without just cause to perform his official duty. On the contrary, it would
appear that he performed it.

A contrary rule would be fraught with danger. Says the learned trial Judge on this point:

"Es altamente peligroso senter un precedente judicial haciendo responsable por daños al Fiscal
Provincial de Rizal, aqui demandado, por rehusar este de presentar querella si racionalmente y de
buene fe, dicho Fiscal es o era de opinion en el ejercicio de su sana discrecion de que no existian
motivos para presentar una querella; de sentar este peligroso procedimiento o precedente judicial
contra los fiscales seria poner a estos en una situacion que en el cumplimento de su obligacion y en
el ejercicio de su sana discrecion estuviesen siempre amenazados de una demanda civil si su opinion
fuese contraria a la del denunciante, como una espada de Damocles pendiente en todo tiempo sobre
sus cabezas. Si el denunciante en aquel asunto criminal de libelo, demandante en la presente causa,
no estuviere conforme con la opinion o conclusion a que ha llegado el Fiscal Provincial de Rizal,
demandado en esta causa, opinion o conclusion hecha con entera buena fe y en al ejercicio sano de
sus facultades discrecionales, todavia queda al demandante otros recursos que nuestras leyes
proveen para la proteccion o ejercicio de sus derechos."

It may not be amiss to state here that, as a general rule, a public prosecutor, being a quasi-judicial
officer empowered to exercise discretion or judgment, is not personally liable for resulting injuries when
acting within the scope of his authority, and in the line of his official duty. (42 Am. Jur. sec. 21 p. 256).
As was said in the case of Mendoza vs. De Leon (33 Phil. 508, 513) —

"Nor are officers or agents of the Government charged with the performance of governmental duties
which are in their nature legislative, or quasi judicial, liable for the consequences of their official acts,
unless it be shown that they act willfully and maliciously, and with the express purpose of inflicting
injury upon the plaintiff."

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
 Ateneo de Manila University v. Court of Appeals
145 SCRA 100 | NO DIGEST MADE – FROM GOOGLE

Facts: In a letter-complaint dated December 13, 1967 addressed to Rev. William Welsh S.J., Dean of
Men, Dean of Resident Students, and Chairman of the Board of Discipline, College of Arts and
Sciences, Ateneo de Manila, Carmelita Mateo, a waitress in the cafeteria of Cervini Hall inside the
university campus charged Juan Ramon Guanzon, son of private respondents Romeo Guanzon and
Teresita Regalado, and a boarder and first year student of the university with unbecoming conduct
committed on December 12, 1967 at about 5:15 in the evening at the Cervini Hall’s cafeteria. that Mr.
Guanzon struck the complainant in the left temple. The university conducted an investigation of the
slapping incident. On the basis of the investigation results, Juan Ramon was dismissed from the
university. The dismissal of Juan Ramon triggered off the filing of a complaint for damages by his
parents against the university in the Court stating that Juan Ramon was expelled from school without
giving him a fair trial in violation of his right to due process and that they are prominent and well known
residents of Bacolod City, with the unceremonious expulsion of their son causing them actual, moral,
and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees. After due trial, the lower court found for the
Guanzons and ordered the university to pay them P92.00 as actual damages; P50,000.00 as moral
damages; P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees and to pay the costs of the suit. Upon appeal to the Court of
Appeals by the university, the trial court’s decision was initially reversed and set aside. The complaint
was dismissed. However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by the Guanzons, the appellate court
reversed its decision and set it aside through a special division of five. In the resolution issued by the
appellate court, the lower court’s decision was reinstated. The motion for reconsideration had to be
referred to a special division of five in view of the failure to reach unanimity on the resolution of the
motion, the vote of the regular division having become 2 to 1.

Issue: Whether the petitioner deprived the respondent due process in the administrative proceeding?

Held: No, the respondent was accorded administrative due process in his dismissal cases according
to the minimum standards laid down by the Court to meet the demands of procedural due process are:

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against
them;
(2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel,
if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by
the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

When the letter-complaint was read to respondent, he admitted the altercation with the waitress and
his slapping her on the face. petitioner did not stop with the admission. The Board of Discipline was
made up of distinguished members of the faculty and there is nothing in the records to cast any doubt
on their competence and impartiality insofar as this disciplinary investigation is concerned. respondent
himself appeared before the Board of Discipline. He admitted incident, then begged to be excused so
he could catch the boat for Bacolod City. Juan Ramon, therefore, was given notice of the proceedings;
he actually appeared to present his side; the investigating board acted fairly and objectively; and all
requisites of administrative due process were met.
 COJUANGCO, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 119398 | July 2, 1999 | J. Panganiban

Under Article 32 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad
faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioner,
even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of one's duties.

FACTS: Petitioner Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. is a known businessman-sportsman owning-several

racehorses which he entered in the sweepstakes races between the periods covering March 6, 1986
to September 18, 1989. Several of his horses won the races on various dates, landing first, second or
third places, respectively, and winning prizes together with the 30% due for trainer/grooms.

Petitioner then sent letters of demand to the defendants for the collection of the prizes due him. And
respondents consistently replied that the demanded prizes are being withheld on advice of
Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz of the Presidential Commission on Good Government. Finally on
January 30, 1991, this case was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. But before receipt of
the summons on February 7, 1991, Presidential Commission on Good Government advised
defendants that 'it poses no more objection to the remittance of the prize winnings' to petitioner.
Immediately, this was communicated to Atty. Estelito Mendoza by Private Respondent Fernando
Carrascoso, Jr."

RTC RULING: The trial court ruled that Respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO)
and its then chairman, Respondent Fernando O. Carrascoso Jr., had no authority to withhold the
subject racehorse winnings of petitioner, since no writ of sequestration therefor had been issued by
the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). It held that it was Carrascoso's
unwarranted personal initiative not to release the prizes. Having been a previous longtime associate
of petitioner in his horse racing and breeding activities, he had supposedly been aware that petitioner's
winning horses were not ill-gotten. The trial court held that, by not paying the winnings, Carrascoso
had acted in bad faith amounting to the prosecution and harassment of petitioner and his family. It
thus ordered the PCSO and Carrascoso to pay in solidum petitioner's claimed winnings plus interests.
It further ordered Carrascoso to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.

CA RULING: The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court regarding bad faith on the
part of Carrascoso, the Court of Appeals held that the former PCSO chairman was merely carrying
out the instruction of the PCGG in regard to the prize winnings of petitioner. It noted that, at the time,
the scope of the sequestration of the properties of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and his
cronies was not well-defined.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal of respondent Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO)
2. Whether the appeal of respondent Carrascoso, Jr. should have been dismissed for his failure
to file an appeal brief
3. Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review and reverse the judgment on a cause
of action which was not appealed from by the respondents
4. Whether the award for damages against respondent Carrascoso, Jr. is warranted by evidence
and the law.
5. Whether or not Respondent Carrascoso may still be held liable under Article 32 of the Civil
Code. (issue related to the topic)

RULING:
1. (Being related, the first two issues will be discussed jointly). The Court ruled in the affirmative
on the first issue and negative on the second issue. Petitioner contends that the appeal filed
 by the PCSO before Respondent Court of Appeals should have been dismissed outright. The
appealed RTC decision ruled on two causes of action: (1) a judgment against both PCSO and
Carrascoso to jointly and severally pay petitioner his winnings plus interest and income; and
(2) a judgment against Carrascoso alone for moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney's fees and costs. The PCSO, through the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel (OGCC), appealed only the second item: "the impropriety of the award of
damages . . . ." This appealed portion, however, condemned only Carrascoso, not the PCSO.
Technically, petitioner claims, PCSO could not have appealed the second portion of the RTC
Decision which ruled against Carrascoso only, and not against the government corporation.

Petitioner further avers that Carrascoso failed to file his own appeal brief; accordingly, his
appeal should have been dismissed.

The representation of the OGCC on behalf of the PCSO and Mr. Carrascoso is pursuant to its
basic function to "act as the principal law office of all government-owned or controlled
corporations, their subsidiaries, other corporate offsprings and government acquired asset
corporations and . . . [to] exercise control and supervision over all legal departments or
divisions maintained separately and such powers and functions as are now or may hereafter
be provided by law." The OGCC was therefore duty-bound to defend the PCSO because the
latter, under its charter, is a government- owned corporation. The government counsel's
representation extends to the concerned government functionary's officers when the issue
involves the latter's official acts or duties.

Granting that upon his separation from the government, Carrascoso ceased to be entitled to
the legal services of the government corporate counsel, this development does not
automatically revoke or render ineffective his notice of appeal of the trial court's Decision. The
filing of an appellant's brief is not an absolute requirement for the perfection of an appeal.
Besides, when noncompliance with the Rules of Court is not intended for delay or does not
prejudice the adverse party, the dismissal of an appeal on a mere technicality may be stayed
and the court may, at its sound discretion, exercise its equity jurisdiction. The emerging trend
in our jurisprudence is to afford every party- litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and
just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.

What is important is that Respondent Carrascoso filed his notice of appeal on time and that
his counsel before the lower court, who was presumed to have continued representing him on
appeal, had filed an appeal brief on his behalf. The Manifestation of Carrascoso before the
Court of Appeals that he intended to hire the services of another counsel and to file his own
brief did not ipso facto effect a change of counsel under the existing rules of procedure.The
former counsel must first file a formal petition withdrawing his appearance with the client's
consent, and the newly appointed attorney should formally enter his appearance before the
appellate court with notice to the adverse party. But other than Carrascoso's manifestation of
his intention to hire a counsel of his own, the requisites for a change of counsel were not fully
complied with. Nevertheless, as stated earlier, even an effective change of attorney will not
abrogate the pleadings filed before the court by the former counsel.

All in all, the Court held that the appellate court committed no reversible error in not dismissing
the appeal, since this matter was addressed to its sound discretion, and since such discretion
was exercised reasonably in accordance with the doctrine that cases should, as much as
possible, be decided on their merits.

2. The Court ruled in the negative. Petitioner is correct in asserting that the entire RTC judgment
was not appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals. The errors assigned in the appellants' Brief,
as quoted earlier, attacked only the trial court's (1) conclusion that "defendants-appellants
 acted in bad faith" and (2) award of damages in favor of herein petitioner. In short, only those
parts relating to the second cause of action could be reviewed by the CA.

Respondent Court could not therefore reverse and set aside the RTC Decision in its entirety
and dismiss the original Complaint without trampling upon the rights that had accrued to the
petitioner from the unappealed portion of the Decision. It is well-settled that only the errors
assigned and properly argued in the brief, and those necessarily related thereto, may be
considered by the appellate court in resolving an appeal in a civil case. The appellate court
has no power to resolve unassigned errors, except those that affect the court's jurisdiction over
the subject matter and those that are plain or clerical errors.

Having said that, the Court noted, however, that Respondent Court in its Decision effectively
recognized the confines of the appeal, as it stated at the outset that "this appeal shall be limited
to the damages awarded in the [RTC] decision other than the claims for race winning prizes."
The dispositive portion of the Decision must be understood together with the aforequoted
statement that categorically defined the scope of Respondent Court's review. Consequently,
what the assailed Decision "reversed and set aside" was only that part of the appealed
judgment finding bad faith on the part of herein Private Respondent Carrascoso and awarding
damages to herein petitioner. It did not annul the trial court's order for Respondent PCSO to
pay Petitioner Cojuangco his racehorse winnings, because this Order had never been
assigned as an error sought to be

3. The Court ruled in the negative. Petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing
the trial court's finding that Respondent Carrascoso acted in bad faith in withholding his
winnings. We do not think so.

Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty
due to some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.

The Court does not believe that the above judicially settled nature of bad faith characterized
the questioned acts of Respondent Carrascoso. On the contrary, the Court believes that there
is sufficient evidence on record to support Respondent Court's conclusion that he did not act
in bad faith.

Carrascoso's decision to withhold the petitioner's winnings could not be characterized as

arbitrary or whimsical, or even the product of ill will or malice. He had particularly sought from
PCGG a clarification of the extent and coverage of the sequestration order issued against the
properties of petitioner. He had acted upon the PCGG's statement that the subject prizes were
part of those covered by the sequestration order and its instruction "to hold in a proper bank
deposits [sic] earning interest the amount due Mr. Cojuangco." Besides, EO 2 had just been
issued by then President Aquino, "freez[ing] all assets and properties in the Philippines [of]
former President Marcos and/or his wife, . . . their close friends, subordinates, business
associates, . . ."; and enjoining the "transfer, encumbrance, concealment, or dissipation
[thereof], under pain of such penalties as prescribed by law." It cannot, therefore, be said that
Respondent Carrascoso, who relied upon these issuances, acted with malice or bad faith.

The extant rule is that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary
damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing of
bad faith, malice or gross negligence. Attorney's fees and expenses of litigation cannot be
imposed either, in the absence of a clear showing of any of the grounds provided therefore
under the Civil Code. The trial court's award of these kinds of damages must perforce be
deleted, as ruled by the Court of Appeals.
4. The Court ruled in the affirmative. Under Article 32 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary that
the public officer acted with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a
violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or
good faith in the performance of one's duties.

The Court held that the petitioner's right to the use of his property was unduly impeded. While
Respondent Carrascoso may have relied upon the PCGG's instructions, he could have further
sought the specific legal basis therefore. A little exercise of prudence would have disclosed
that there was no writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the racehorse winnings of
petitioner. There was apparently no record of any such writ covering his racehorses either.
The issuance of a sequestration order requires the showing of a prima facie case and due
regard for the requirements of due process. The withholding of the prize winnings of petitioner
without a properly issued sequestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights
without due process of law.

Article 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of nominal damages to a plaintiff whose
right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or
recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered. The court may
also award nominal damages in every case where a property right has been invaded. The
amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, with the relevant
circumstances taken into account.