THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 219240, April 04, 2018 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BRYAN GANABA Y
NAM-AY, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
This resolves the appeal of accused-appellant Bryan Ganaba y Nam-ay (accused-appellant)
assailing the 27 August 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), Seventh Division in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 06030 affirming, with modification as to the award of damages, the 9 January
2013 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 172, Valenzuela City, finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape under Article (Art.) 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).

THE FACTS

Accused-appellant was charged with rape in an Information docketed as Criminal Case No.
429-V-09, the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:
That on or about July 1, 2009 in Valenzuela City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of force and
intimidation employed upon the person of AAA, 16 years old (DOB: June 16, 1993), did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the complainant,
against her will and without her consent, thereby subjecting the said minor to sexual abuse
which debased, degraded, and demeaned [her] intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being.

CONTRARY TO LAW
When arraigned, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge against him; hence, trial
proper ensued.

To establish its case, the prosecution presented the victim, AAA, and P/Supt. Bonnie Y. Chua
(Dr. Chua), a medico-legal officer of the Northern Police District Crime Laboratory (crime
laboratory).

PO1 Archie P. Castillano (PO1 Castillano) was no longer put on the witness stand after the
parties stipulated that he would be testifying on his affidavit relative to the arrest of the accused-
appellant.

To prove his defense, the accused-appellant testified.

Version of the Prosecution

AAA had been working at the house of the accused-appellant since 1 June 2009, as nanny to
his four-month-old child. On 1 July 2009, at about 2:30 p.m., while AAA was inside the room
feeding the child, the accused-appellant sneaked in and closed the door and window. AAA did
not notice that the accused-appellant, who was supposed to enter the room only when the
child's mother was around, was behind her wearing only his shorts.

When AAA turned, the accused-appellant held both her arms and mounted her. AAA kicked the
accused-appellant who in turn pinched her left shoulder. When AAA kicked again, the accused-
appellant stood up and got a knife. AAA stood up also and tried to open the door but was unable
to do so as it was locked. The accused-appellant poked the knife at AAA, threatened he would
kill her, dragged her to the bed, mounted her, parted her legs, and inserted his penis into her
vagina.

When his friend arrived at the house, the accused-appellant went out of the room and
proceeded right away to the restroom. AAA immediately left for her brother's house and there
confided what had happened to her.

That same afternoon, AAA proceeded to the barangay where she was advised to report the
incident to the police station. After AAA narrated what had happened to her at the Valenzuela
City police station, POI Castillano and two other police officers arrested the accused-appellant
at his residence.

At around 5:45 p.m. on the same day, AAA was physically examined by Dr. Chua.

Version of the Defense

On 1 July 2009, at about 2:30 p.m., the accused-appellant was at home with his wife Jane, their
son Edison, and a boarder named Erickson. He was watching television.

The accused-appellant claimed that the accusation against him was not true and that he was
implicated by AAA to ask for money. He was told by Jane that AAA asked for P200,000.00 in
exchange for dropping the case against him. Although the accused-appellant and Jane were
only factory workers, that amount of money could be raised by his relatives; but the accused-
appellant did not give in to AAA's demand because nothing happened between him and AAA.

The Ruling of the RTC

The RTC held that the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA by using force and
intimidation. According to the RTC, AAA gave details of her ordeal that took place on 1 July
2009, and that she positively identified the accused-appellant as the person who raped her.
Moreover, AAA's testimony, coupled with the medical findings, confirmed the truth of her
charges.

The RTC found the accused-appellant's denial without merit. It ruled that his denial was
negative and self-serving which pales in comparison with AAA's clear and convincing narration
and positive identification of the accused-appellant.

The fallo of the RTC decision provides:

WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused BRYAN GANABA y NAM-AY guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of rape and in the absence of mitigating and
aggravating circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordered to pay AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P75,000.00 as moral
damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.
Not satisfied with the RTC's ruling, the accused-appellant appealed to the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

The CA ruled that the prosecution had indubitably established that the accused-appellant raped
AAA. It held that the accused-appellant's act was consummated through force, threat, and
intimidation. Moreover, AAA's unrelenting narration of what transpired, accompanied by her
categorical identification of the accused-appellant as the malefactor, established the case for
the prosecution. On the one hand, it held that the defense of denial and alibi offered by the
accused-appellant was weak since he failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the crime scene at the time of its commission.

While the CA affirmed the penalty imposed by the RTC upon the accused-appellant, it found the
need to modify the award of damages; hence, it ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated 9 January 2013 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 172, Valenzuela City is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
Accused-appellant Bryan Ganaba y Nam-ay is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the victim
AAA P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages. The award of damages shall earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. Costs against accused-appellant.
ISSUES
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING ILL MOTIVE ON THE PART OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT AS THE REASON FOR THE FILING OF THE CRIME OF RAPE AGAINST
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
OUR RULING

The appeal has no merit.

The testimony of AAA deserves weight and credence.

Jurisprudence has emphatically maintained that the trial court's evaluation and conclusion on
the credibility of witnesses in rape cases are generally accorded great weight and respect, and
at times even finality, especially after the CA, as the intermediate reviewing tribunal, has
affirmed the findings; unless there is a clear showing that the findings were reached arbitrarily,
or that certain facts or circumstances of weight, substance or value were overlooked,
misapprehended or misappreciated that, if properly considered, would alter the result of the
case.

The Court has amply elucidated on the reason for according weight to the findings of the trial
court, viz:

It is well-settled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a
matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses first hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling
examination. These are important in determining the truthfulness of witnesses and in unearthing
the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. For, indeed, the emphasis, gesture,
and inflection of the voice are potent aids in ascertaining the witness' credibility, and the trial
court has the opportunity and can take advantage of these aids. These cannot be incorporated
in the record so that all that theappellate court can see are the cold words of the witness
contained in transcript of testimonies with the risk that some of what the witness actually said
may have been lost in the process of transcribing. As correctly stated by an American court,
"There is an inherent impossibility of determining with any degree of accuracy what credit is
justly due to a witness from merely reading the words spoken by him, even if there were no
doubt as to the identity of the words. However artful a corrupt witness may be, there is
generally, under the pressure of a skillful cross-examination, something in his manner or
bearing on the stand that betrays him, and thereby destroys the force of his testimony. Many of
the real tests of truth by which the artful witness is exposed in the very nature of things cannot
be transcribed upon the record, and hence they can never be considered by the appellate
court."
Consequently, it was incumbent upon the accused-appellant to present clear and persuasive
reasons to persuade the Court to reverse the lower courts' unanimous determination of her
credibility as a witness in order to resolve the appeal his way. The onus is upon the accused-
appellant to prove those facts and circumstances which the lower courts allegedly failed to
consider and appreciate, and that would fortify his position that they seriously erred in finding
him guilty of the crime charged. The accused-appellant, however, miserably failed to discharge
his burden.

By the distinctive nature of rape cases, conviction usually rests solely on the basis of the
testimony of the victim; provided that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. Thus, the victim's credibility
becomes the primordial consideration in the resolution of rape cases. Noteworthily, both the
RTC and the CA found the testimony of AAA credible and persuasive.

In conjunction thereto, jurisprudence has firmly upheld the guidelines in evaluating the testimony
of a rape victim, viz: first, while an accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to
prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; second, in view of
the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and lastly, the evidence
for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence of the defense.The Court has meticulously applied these
guidelines in its review of the records of this case, but found no reason to depart from the well-
considered findings and observations of the lower courts.

The Court notes that the testimony of AAA was full of convincing details which, in her young
age, could not have been known to her unless these were the truth. "When the offended party is
of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired,
considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be
exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally
badges of truth and sincerity."

A catena of cases sustains the ruling that the conduct of the victim immediately following the
alleged sexual assault is of utmost importance in tending to establish the truth or falsity of the
charge of rape. In this case, after the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her, AAA
immediately left his house and proceeded to her brother's house where she narrated what had
happened to her. On that same day, AAA went to the barangay to report the incident, then to
the police station to give her statements, and subsequently to the crime laboratory to submit
herself to physical examination. The act of AAA in wasting no time in reporting her ordeal to the
authorities validates the truth of her charge against the accused-appellant.
AAA's positive and categorical statement that the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of
her was reinforced by the testimony and medico-legal report of Dr. Chua. The pertinent findings
of Dr. Chua were as follows:

LABIA MINORA: Hyperemic with abrasion at 6 o'clock position.

HYMEN: Deep healed laceration at 5 and 6 o'clock positions.

POSTERIOR FOURCHETTE: Congested.

CONCLUSION: Clear evidence of penetrating trauma/force to the hymen with recent

penetration trauma to the Labia Majora and Minora.
Dr. Chua testified that, based on her findings, her conclusion was that AAA was sexually
abused.Of significance in this case is the legal teaching that while it is settled that a medical
examination of the victim is not indispensable in the prosecution of a rape case, and no law
requires a medical examination for the successful prosecution of the case, the medical
examination conducted and the medical certificate issued are veritable corroborative pieces of
evidence, which strongly bolster the victim's testimony. Together, these pieces of evidence
produce a moral certainty that the accused-appellant indeed raped the victim.

To prove that the RTC erred in according credence to AAA's testimony, the accused-appellant
offered the absurd contention that AAA's testimony can only prove that she had shared an
intimate moment with someone else and not with him. Accused-appellant anchored his
contention in his testimony on the witness stand, viz: that on 1 July 2009, he was at home
watching television with his wife; that AAA was not in his house that day; that he was told by his
wife that AAA had asked P200,000.00 in exchange for her dropping the case against him; and
that he did not give in to the demand of AAA because nothing happened between him and AAA.
In contrast, according to the accused-appellant, was the testimony of AAA where she admitted
that nothing happened between them.

Accused-appellant's contentions have no basis. When AAA affirmed her sworn

statement before the RTC, she clarified and firmly maintained that the accused-appellant had
carnal knowledge of her. Her testimony was as follows:

Q. What happened next after he pinched you on your left shoulder?

A. I kicked him again and he stood up. He took a knife, threatened to kill me. And after that his friend
arrived.

Q. And he went out?

A. I went out of the room, got my slippers, told the matter to my brother and we went to the barangay
but the barangay referred us to the police.

Q. Let us go back to the holding of the knife and his friend has not yet arrived. What happened when
Bryan got that knife?
A. He threatened to kill me if I would tell it to anybody (Papatayin kita pag nagsumbong ka).
Q. What happened next?

A. His friend arrived. When his friend arrived he proceeded to the c.r. Bryan followed him. I
immediately went out of the room and got my pair of slippers and proceeded to our house and
reported the matter to my brother.

Q. So nothing happened, there was no sex?

A. None, sir.

Q. You gave your sworn statement to the police marked as Exh "A." I will read your sworn statement to
the police given on July 2, 2009 wherein you stated: "Una po, nagpadede po ako ng bata, four
months old na anak ng amo ko, tapos isinarado niya po iyong pintuan at tsaka iyong bintana. Dapat
kami lang ng bata sa higaan, tsaka lang siya pupunta sa higaan pag dumating iyong asawa niya,
tapos tumabi siya sa akin. Ako po ang umalis, tapos sinampal niya ako, bakit daw ako umaalis e
umiiyak yung bata. Pinabalik niya ako sa higaan, bumalik ako noong umalis siya, pumunta siya sa
higaan sa kabila. Bumalik ako, pinadede ko iyong bata, wala akong kamalay-malay na nandyan na
pala siya sa tabi ko. Paglingon ko nakahubad na siya, hinawakan niya ang kamay ko binanda ako sa
pader malapit sa higaan, sinabi kong huwag mong gawin sa akin kasi hindi ako ang asawa mo,
katulong lang ako. Pero ginawa niya pa rin. Hinubaran niya ako, hinawakan niya ang dalawang
kamay ko tapos sinampal pa niya ako. Tapos pinatungan niya po ako, tapos dun, tinadyakan ko siya,
pag pangalawang tadyak kinurot niya ako dito sa may balikat ko. Lumaban ako, tapos pagtayo niya
tumayo na rin ako, bubuksan ko iyong pinto pero hindi mabuksan iyong pinto pag walang susi.
Tapos kumuha siya ng kutsilyo, tinutukan niya ako ng kutsilyo, tinutok niya dito sa noo ko, sinabi
niya sa akin 'sige, sige anong gusto mo papatayin kita ngayon,' hinila niya ako sa higaan. Lumaban
po ako pero hindi ko siya kaya. Tapos pinabuka niya iyong paa ko, pinasok na niya iyong oten niya
sa pekpek ko. Sinampal pa niya ako, napasok niya iyong oten niya, nilabas pasok niya..." Is that not
true?
A. That is true.

Q. So before the friend arrived, was Bryan able to have sex with you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why did you not say before when I asked you? You went once to the friend?

A. When he was already naked, he was able to pin my both hands on the wall, and he parted my
legs and inserted his penis in my vagina and after that he kicked me and he pinched me on my
shoulder.(emphasis supplied)

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Leonen, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

 April 17, 2018

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs / Mesdames:

Please take notice that on April 4, 2018 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the
Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on
April 17, 2018 at 9:15 a.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)
WILFREDO V.
LAPITAN
  Division Clerk of Court

 Rollo, pp. 2-14. Penned by Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting and concurred in by Associate
[1]

Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Mario V. Lopez.

[2]
 Records, pp. 76-78. Penned by Judge Nancy Rivas-Palmones.
[3]
 Article 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. - Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

[4]
 Records, p. 1.

[5]
 Id. at 16.
  The true name of the victim has been replaced with fictitious initials in conformity with
[6]

Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 (Subject: Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation,
Publication, and Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions, and Final Orders
Using Fictitious Names/Personal Circumstances). The confidentiality of the identity of the victim
is mandated by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act); R.A. No. 8505 (Rape Victim Assistance and Protection Act
of 1998); R.A. No. 9208 (Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003); R.A. No. 9262 (Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004); and R.A. No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006).

[7]
 Index of Exhibits, p. 8; Exh. "B."

[8]
 TSN, 19 May 2010, pp. 5-9; TSN, 17 November 2010, p. 2.

[9]
 Id. at 11-14.

[10]
 Id. at 9-11.

[11]
 Index of Exhibits, pp. 6-7; Exh. "A."

 TSN, 19 May 2010, pp. 14-17; TSN, 26 February 2010, pp. 2-4; Index of Exhibits, p. 8; Exh.
[12]

"B."

[13]
 TSN, 8 May 2012, pp. 6-9.

[14]
 Id. at 9-10.

[15]
 Records, p. 78.

[16]
 Id.

[17]
 Id.

[18]
 Rollo, pp. 8-10.

[19]
 Id. at 13-14.

[20]
 CA rollo, p. 41.

[21]
 People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 225743, 7 June 2017.

[22]
 People v. Primavera, G.R. No. 223138, 5 July 2017, citing People v. Sapigao, 614 Phil. 589,
599 (2009).

[23]
 People v. Domingo, supra note 21.

[24]
 People v. Palanay, G.R. No. 224583, 1 February 2017.
[25]
 People v. Garrido, 763 Phil. 339, 347 (2015).

[26]
 People v. Descartin, G.R. No. 215195, 7 June 2017.

[27]
 People v. Cadampog, 472 Phil. 358, 378 (2004).

[28]
 Index of Exhibits, p. 1; Exh. "F."

[29]
 TSN, 26 February 2010, pp. 11-12.

[30]
 People v. Palanay, supra note 24.

[31]
 People v. Deniega, G.R. No. 212201, 28 June 2017.

[32]
 CA rollo, pp. 44-47.

[33]
 Index of Exhibits, pp. 6-7; Exh. "A."

[34]
 TSN, 19 May 2010, pp. 9-14.

[35]
 People v. Pareja, 724 Phil. 759, 773 (2014).

[36]
 People v. Saludo, 662 Phil. 738, 753 (2011), cited in People v. Pareja, id. at 774.

[37]
 People v. Pareja, supra note 35 at 774.

[38]
 Id. at 786.

[39]
 People v. Descartin, supra note 26.

[40]
 Id.

[41]
People v. Palanay, supra note 24.

[42]
 People v. Deniega, supra note 31.

[43]
 People v. Descartin, supra note 26.

[44]
 People v. Primavera, supra note 22.

[45]
 People v. Neverio, 613 Phil. 507, 516 (2009).

[46]
 People v. Hilarion, 722 Phil. 52, 55 (2013).

[47]
 783 Phil. 806 (2016).
 SECOND DIVISION

July 17, 2019

G.R. No. 242947

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
MARIO MANABAT Y DUMAGAY, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal  filed by accused-appellant Mario Manabat y Dumagay
1

(accused-appellant Manabat) assailing the Decision  dated August 2, 2018 (assailed Decision) of the
2

Court of Appeals (CA) Special Twenty Third Division in CA-G.R. CR--HC No. 01781-MIN, which
affirmed the Decision  dated September 5, 2017 of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 8
3

(RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 18353 and 18354, finding accused-appellant Manabat guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise
known as "The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,"  as amended.
4

The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings

As narrated by the CA in the assailed Decision, the essential facts of the instant case are as follows:

The accusatory portion of the Informations under which the accused-appellant was charged reads:

Criminal Case No. 18353

That on June 17, 2013, at 6:30 o'clock in the evening, more or less, infront (sic) [of] ABC Printing
Press, Miputak, Dipolog City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, knowing fully well that unauthorized sale and distribution of dangerous drugs
is punishable by law, without legal authority to sell the same, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously sell, distribute and deliver to a poseur-buyer one (1) small transparent plastic sachet
of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, more popularly known as "Shabu" approximately weighing
0.2079 gram, after receiving marked Five Hundred Peso bill bearing Serial No. TMS 18077 as
payment therefore (sic). Subsequently, said marked money and the sum of One Hundred Fifty
Pesos (P150.00), Philippine Currency which are proceeds of his illegal trade were recovered from
his possession together with one (1) unit Nokia 1280 which he used in his illegal trade.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 18354

That on June 17, 2013 at 6:30 o'clock in the evening, more or less, infront (sic) of ABC Printing
Press, Miputak, Dipolog City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, knowing fully well that unauthorized possession and control of dangerous
drug is punishable by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession and control nine (9) pieces small transparent plastic sachet of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, more popularly known as "Shabu", a form of dangerous drug, approximately weighing
a total of 1.8515 grams, without legal authority to possess the same, in gross (v)iolation of Section
11, Par. 3, Article II of R.A. 9165.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. Thereafter, joint pre-trial and trial of
Criminal Case Nos. 18353 and 18354 ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

To prove the charges against the appellant, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the
following witnesses, namely: PCI Anne Aimee T. Pilayre, POl Gilbert Daabay, PO3 Michael Angcon,
PO2 Lord Jericho N. Barral [(PO2 Barral)] and SPO2 Roy P. Vertudes [(SPO2 Vertudes)]. Their
respective testimonies as summed up by the RTC are as follows:

PCI Anne Aimee T. Pilayre is a Forensic Chemical Officer of the Z.N. Provincial Crime Laboratory
Office (ZNPCLO).

On June 22, 2013, at 10:25 pm, her office received a written request from PNP Dipolog for
laboratory examination and weighing of ten (10) small transparent plastic sachets containing white
crystalline granules believed to be shabu marked MM-01 to MM-09 and MMBB-01, all dated June
17, 2013. The items were received by PO1 Gilbert Daabay, the officer of the day, endorsed to the
evidence custodian and turned over to her for examination on June 18, 2013 at 7:30 in the morning.
They also received a request for drug test on the urine samples from Mario Manabat.

She scrutinized the markings on the specimens and the letter-request to make sure that they
coincide. She conducted physical test (i.e. ocular inspection of the specimens, taking the net weight
of the specimen), the chemical test by taking a representative sample (3%) from each of the
specimen and spotted with a reagent known as Simon's 1, Simon's 2 and Simon's 3 to determine the
presence of dangerous drug. The specimen from the ten (10) sachets turned deep blue in color. This
indicates that that ' (sic) all sachets are positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Finally, she conducted confirmatory test where representative samples of the three sachets were
spotted into a thin layer chromatographic plate. She prepared Chemistry Report No. D-36-2013
which states that "Qualitative examination on the above submitted specimen A-1 to A-10 gave
POSITIVE result to the tests for the presence of Methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug".

The remainder of the samples were then placed back to the original container and sealed.

POl Gilbert Daabay is a regular member of the PNP assigned as Officer-of-the-Day at the Z.N.
Provincial Crime Laboratory Office (ZNPCLO).

On June 17, 2013, he received requests for laboratory examination and weighing and accompanying
items involving Mario Manabat delivered personally by SPO(2) Rey (sic) Vertudes at 22:25 HRS. He
took the gross weights of each item and recorded them on the logbook. He placed the specimen and
documents inside an envelope.
He also received a request for drug test. After Mario filled up the drug consent form, Daabay
accompanied the suspect to the comfort room to get his urine sample. The urine sample was in a
bottle with control number then placed in the refrigerator.

At 7:30 of the following day, he turned over the received items to the Forensic Chemist. The turnover
of evidence to Pilayre was duly recorded in the logbook.

PO3 Michael Angcon is the Evidence Custodian of Z.N. Provincial Crime Laboratory Office
(ZNPCLO) responsible for the safekeeping of all evidence and drug specimens submitted to their
office for laboratory examination.

He testified that right after Pilayre conducted laboratory examination of drug specimens; he received
the drug specimens and documents in the instant case. The same pieces of evidence were released
to Pilayre for her Court duties on January 23, 2014.

The said turnover of evidence from Pilayre to Angcon (for safekeeping) and back to Pilayre (for
Court duties) were all duly recorded in the logbook.

PO2 Lord Jericho N. Barral is a regular member of the PNP assigned at Dipolog City Police Station
designated as member of the City Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force (CAIDSOTF).

On June 10, 2013, he received information through a text message from a confidential informant (CI)
that a certain alias Mario is engaged in the selling of prohibited drugs in Estaka, Miputak and other
places in Dipolog City. He and SPO(2) Roy Vertudes referred the matter to the Chief of Police,
PSupt Joven Rendon Parcon, who instructed [them] to conduct [a] buy bust operation. They
complied with such directive. They monitored alias Mario's activities and planned to buy a sachet
of shabu from the suspect.

On June 17, 2013, they decided to conduct [a] buybust operation because alias Mario arrived from
Ozamis and he had already (sic) stocks of shabu. They instructed the CI to negotiate with Mario with
Barral acting as the poseur buyer. The CI agreed. At around 6 pm, the CI texted that he and Mario
are together and that Mario accepted the request. They agreed to meet at ABC Printing Press.

Barral proceeded to the place on board his motorcycle while Vertudes, who acted as back-up,
followed in his four-wheeled tinted vehicle. Barral positioned near the entrance of the printing press
while V ertudes was near El Garaje establishment, a few meter (sic) from the printing press.

At about 6:30 pm, the CI and Mario arrived on board a motorcab. The CI introduced Barral to Mario
as the buyer of shabu. After a short conversation, Mario agreed to sell to Barral. Barral handed a
P500 bill marked money to Mario, who received the same and in turn handed to Barral a sachet
of shabu from inside a small container in his pocket. Mario, placed the P500 inside his wallet. Upon
receiving the shabu, [Barral] immediately held Mario. Vertudes came and assisted Barral in the
arrest of Mario. They informed Mario that they were police officers of Dipolog City Police Station.
Mario was told of his constitutional rights in Visayan dialect.

They called for witnesses to the inventory of items recovered from Mario. Representatives from DOJ,
media and the barangay of Miputak came. Barral conducted body search on Mario in the presence
of the witnesses. After the search, Mario revealed his full name. Confiscated from Mario's
possession were nine (9) pieces small transparent plastic sachets in triangular shape containing
white crystalline granules, one (1) piece P500 bill (marked money), P150 proceeds money, one (1)
unit Nokia cellphone. Barral turned over the one (1) piece small sachet bought by Barral from Mario.
Vertudes made markings on the confiscated items. He also prepared the certificate of inventory and
signed by the witnesses (sic). The sachets of shabu were marked as MM-01 to MM-09 with date and
initial (sic) and the one (1) piece buy-bust shabu was marked BB-01. Photographs were taken during
the conduct of inventory.

In Court, Barral identified Mario Manabat as well as the items recovered from the latter.

xxxx

SPO2 Roy P. Vertudes is a regular member of the PNP and presently assigned at the Regional
Police Holding Administrative Unit in Zamboanga City. He corroborated the testimony of Barral that
they received information that a certain Mario Manabat is engaged in selling shabu in Estaka,
Miputak and other parts in Dipolog City. They informed the Chief of Police, who in turn instructed
them to conduct buy bust operation.

They instructed the CI to contact to (sic) as soon as Mario has available stocks of shabu. On June
17, 2013, the CI sent a text message that Mario has arrived from Ozamis City and he has stocks of
shabu. x x x The CI informed that he and Mario will meet in front of ABC Printing Press in , Gonzales
and Malvar streets. With that information, Barral proceeded to the area on board his motorcycle
while Vertudes drove his four-wheeled tinted vehicle. Vertudes parked near El Garaje. He did not
alight from the vehicle. At 6:30 pm, a passenger motorcab arrived. Two male persons disembarked,
one of them is the CI. Vertudes saw Barral, the CI and another male person conversing about 10 to
15 meters from him. Then, he saw Barral held (sic) the other male person which signifies (sic) that
the transaction was consummated. He rushed to the scene and assisted Barral in handcuffing Mario.
He did not see the exchange of items as it was already dark.

Barral introduced himself to Mario as a police officer and informed him that he was arrested for
selling illegal drugs. Barral also informed Mario of his constitutional rights in Visayan dialect. Mario
had no reaction. After being handcuffed, the witnesses were called. Merlinda Tenorio of DOJ, Edwin
Bation of media, barangay captain Janus Yu and barangay councilor Epifanio Woo arrived. In their
presence, Barral conducted body search on Mario. Items recovered by Barral from Mario's
possession were turned over to Vertudes, the designated inventory officer and custodial officer.
Upon Mario's request, the wallet was returned to him. The recovered items (10 sachets of shabu,
P500 bill, Nokia cellphone and P150 proceeds money) were marked with Vertudes' initial and date of
arrest. Pictures were taken. Mario was then brought to the ZaNorte Medical Center for routine
medical checkup then to the police station. From the time of the inventory until Mario was brought to
the police station, Vertudes kept custody of the drug specimens and other recovered items.

At the police station, he prepared a request for laboratory examination and weighing and request for
drug test. He brought the letter with the items and the accused to the PNP Crime Laboratory.

In Court, Vertudes identified Mario Manabat, the items recovered from him and other documents.

Version of the Defense

The defense, for its part, presented Mario D. Manabat as [its] sole witness. The gist of his testimony
is as follows:

Mario D. Manabat (42 years old, widower, Third Year High School level, a detention prisoner of the
Dipolog City Jail and a resident of Estaka, Dipolog City) testified that there was no buy bust
operation conducted against him as he was just grappled by persons near Casa Jose in the
afternoon of June 17, 2013. Thereafter, he was brought to the boulevard then to the Fish Port then
to the ABC Printing Press, the alleged place of arrest.

xxxx

He recalls that in the morning of June 17, 2013 (a Monday) he was at home fixing a leaking water
pipe. Then he cooked and fed his children. At 1 pm, he went to church to pray for his sick child. He
stayed in church for an hour and then went to the market to buy rice and viand (pancit). From there,
he rode a motorcab going home and instructed the driver to pass by Casa Jose to see his friend
Jonel Sebe, who is also a security guard. While on the way to Casa Jose, he instructed the
motorcab driver to slow down as he would check if Jonel was there. While still in the motorcab, a
motorcycle (with two (2) riders whom he does not know) blocked their way. Another motorcycle
came with two (2) back riders. They alighted and pulled Mario out of the motorcab. Mario did not
alight from the motorcab but a person pointed a gun at him and told him that he is a police officer
and that he should not be scared. For said reason, Mario alighted. He described the police officer as
big and tall and he identified said person as Police Officer Vertudes. He was boarded to (sic) a blue
easy-ride multicab. He was handcuffed.

He was brought to the boulevard, particularly in the barbecue area. He was seated behind the driver.
There were five persons inside the multicab. While on the way to boulevard, he was asked if he
knows a friend or a politician who is using shabu. He replied he does not know anyone because he
does not know about it. He was brought to [Barra!] near the gate of the Fish Port at about 3 pm. He
was frisked and his short pants removed. His wallet and cellphone were taken. They stayed there for
more or less 2 hours. He was then brought to ABC Printing Press on board a military jeep at 6 pm
with three persons accompanying him. Upon arrival at ABC Printing Press, he was seated and a
table from El Garaje establishment was installed. They returned the wallet in his pocket.

He recalls that there were other persons who arrived after 30 minutes. He was searched. Upon their
arrival, Mario was searched by a police officer whom he later knew as Officer Jericho Barral. He took
his wallet and cellphone. He was surprised that they took "something contained in a cellophane",
nine (9) in total. They also took P500 from his pocket, which he denies owning. He insists that he
has only P70 in his possession.

He was shocked upon seeing the nine (9) items displayed on the table. He told the person whom
they called "Chairman" that those were not his and he had nothing to do with it. The "Chairman" did
not reply. Mario told the same thing to the woman but she did not reply too.

He recalls that it was already twilight when the pictures were taken from him. The arresting officer
told him of his rights. He was told that he could secure a lawyer but there was no lawyer during the
search and inventory. He was asked where he got the items but he denies (sic) owning them. They
were placed on him when the vehicle was running. He was brought to the police station.  5

The Ruling of the RTC

After trial on the merits, in its Decision  dated September 5, 2017, the RTC convicted accused-
6

appellant Manabat of the crimes charged. The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 18353, the Court finds the accused MARIO MAN AB AT y Dumagay
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the charge for violation of Sec. 5, Art. II, RA 9165 for selling
0.2079 gram of shabu, and sentences him to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of FIVE
Hundred Thousand (₱500,000.00) pesos;

2. In Criminal Case No. 18354, the Court finds the same accused MARIO MANABAT y Dumagay,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation Sec. 11, Art. II, RA 9165 for possessing 1.8515 grams
of shabu, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Twelve (12) years and one
days as minimum to Twenty (2) years as maximum and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand
(₱300,000.00);

The shabu, cash money, and cellphone used in the commission of the offense are hereby forfeited in
favor of the government to be disposed in accordance with the prescribed rules.

Moreover, he is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

SO ORDERED. 7

In sum, the R TC ruled that the evidence on record was sufficient to convict accused-appellant
Manabat. The R TC did not give credence to accused-appellant Manabat's defense of frame-up as it
deemed the same self-serving and unsubstantiated. It held that the defense of a frame-up could not
stand against the positive testimonies of PO2 Barral and SPO2 Vertudes whose testimonies enjoy
the presumption of regularity. The RTC ultimately held that the prosecution sufficiently discharged its
burden of proving accused-appellant Manabat's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.  8

Feeling aggrieved, accused-appellant Manabat appealed to the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

In the assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of accused-appellant Manabat,
holding that the prosecution was able to prove the elements of the crimes charged.

The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated

05 September 2017 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Dipolog City, in Criminal Case Nos.
18353 and 18354 is AFFIRMED. 9

After carefully reviewing the records of the case, the CA found that:

the prosecution effectively established compliance with the chain of custody rule. Verily, the
prosecution, through testimonial and documentary evidence, was able to account [for] the
continuous whereabouts of the subject saches of shabu, from the time they were seized during the
buy-bust operation up to the time it was presented before the court a quo as proof of the corpus
delicti. 
10

Hence, the instant appeal.

The Issue

For resolution of the Court is the sole issue of whether the RTC and CA erred in convicting accused-
appellant Manabat of the crimes charged.
 The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious. The Court acquits accused-appellant Manabat for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Accused-appellant Manabat was charged with the crimes of illegal sale and possession of
dangerous drugs, defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, respectively, of Article II of RA
9165.

In order to convict a person charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section
5, Article II of RA 9165, the prosecution is required to prove the following elements: (1) the identity of
the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment therefor.  11

On the other hand, illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 has
the following elements: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be
a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the drug.  12

In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State bears not only the burden of proving these elements,
but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime. In drug cases, the dangerous drug
itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law.   While it is true that a buy-bust operation is
13

a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and
distributors,   the law nevertheless also requires strict compliance with procedures laid down by it
14

to ensure that rights are safeguarded.

In this connection, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165,   the applicable law at the time of the
15

commission of the alleged crimes, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow to
maintain the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence. The provision requires that: (1) the
seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and
(2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the
accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a
representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ),
all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

This must be so because with the very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment
procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana or
grams of heroin can be planted in pockets of or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the
secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great.  16

Section 21 of RA 9165 further requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical inventory of the
seized items and the photographing of the same immediately after seizure and confiscation. The
said inventory must be done in the presence of the aforementioned required witness, all of whom
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The phrase
"immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical inventory and photographing of
the drugs were intended by the law to be made immediately after, or at the place of
apprehension. It is only when the same is not practicable that the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 allow the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-
bust team reaches the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team.   In this connection, this also means that the three required witnesses should
17

already be physically present at the time of apprehension - a requirement that can easily be
complied with by the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature,
a planned activity. Verily, a buy-bust team normally has enough time to gather and bring with it the
said witnesses.

As held in the fairly recent case of People v. Tomawis,   the Court explained that the presence of
18

the three witnesses must be secured not only during the inventory but more importantly at
the time of the warrantless arrest. It is at this point in which the presence of the three witnesses is
most needed, as it is their presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that would belie any
doubt as to the source, identity, and integrity of the seized drug, viz.:

The presence of the witnesses from the DOJ, media, and from public elective office is necessary to
protect against the possibility of planting, contamination, or loss of the seized drug. Using the
language of the Court in People v. Mendoza , without the insulating presence of the representative
19

from the media or the DOJ and any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the
drugs, the evils of switching, "planting" or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-
busts conducted under the regime of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their
ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the subject
sachet that was evidence of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the
incrimination of the accused.20

The presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the inventory but more
importantly at the time of the warrantless arrest. It is at this point in which the presence of the
three witnesses is most needed, as it is their presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that
would belie any doubt as to the source, identity, and integrity of the seized drug. If the buy-bust
operation is legitimately conducted, the presence of the insulating witnesses would also controvert
the usual defense of frame-up as the witnesses would be able testify that the buy-bust operation and
inventory of the seized drugs were done in their presence in accordance with Section 21 of RA 9165.

The practice of police operatives of not bringing to the intended place of arrest the three witnesses,
when they could easily do so - and "calling them in" to the place of inventory to witness the inventory
and photographing of the drugs only after the buy-bust operation has already been finished - does
not achieve the purpose of the law in having these witnesses prevent or insulate against the planting
of drugs.

To restate, the presence of the three witnesses at the time of seizure and confiscation of the drugs
must be secured and complied with at the time of the warrantless arrest; such that they are required
to be at or near the intended place of the arrest so that they can be ready to witness the inventory
and photographing of the seized and confiscated drugs "immediately after seizure and
confiscation".  (Emphasis in the original)
21

Based from the foregoing, the Court holds that the buy-bust operation was not conducted in
accordance with law.

First, it is not disputed whatsoever that the witnesses were called and eventually arrived at the
scene of the crime only after the accused-appellant was already apprehended by PO2 Barral.
On cross-examination, PO2 Barral readily admitted that during the apprehension of accused-
appellant Manabat, the witnesses were not present:

Q You mean to say that during the arrest, the witnesses did not arrive yet?

A Not yet, sir. 22

Further, as testified by SPO2 Vertudes, the buy-bust team did not contact the witnesses at all before
the team arrived at the place of the buy-bust operation. The witnesses were contacted only after
accused-appellant Manabat was already arrested and handcuffed:

Q Before you proceeded to ABC Printing Press you did not yet contact the witnesses from the DOJ,
the media and from the elected officials of the barangay right?

A Not yet, sir.

Q Only after Mario was arrested and handcuffed that you did contact those witnesses, correct?

A Yes, sir. 23

In fact, the Court notes that the prosecution offered conflicting testimonies as regards the time of
arrival of the witnesses.

According to PO2 Barral, the witnesses arrived "[m]ore or less ten minutes"  after they were called.
24

To the contrary, when SPO2 Vertudes was asked as to when the witnesses arrived, he first
answered "three to five minutes sir."  But when pressed as to the veracity of his answer, considering
25

that the buy-bust was conducted on a Sunday, SPO2 Vertudes eventually admitted that the arrival of
the witnesses was completed "[f]ifteen to thirty minutes. "26

Further creating doubt as to the presence of the witnesses during the buy-bust operation is the
admission of PO2 Barral on cross-examination that the photographs of the inventory do not show the
presence of the witnesses, except for Councilor Epifanio Woo:

Q The witnesses are not shown in these pictures during the search, right?

A No, sir.

Q All these pictures are also taken close up?

A Yes, sir.

Q No witnesses are shown in this picture, right?

A None, sir.

xxxx

Q In the pictures marked as Exhibits "X-9" and "X-16", there is a person with fatigue short pants?

A Yes, sir.

Q You know who is this person?

A Yes, sir. Councilor Epifania Woo. He is also shown here. 27

If the witnesses were indeed present during the entire photographing and inventory of the evidence,
obviously, it would have been easy and effortless on the part of the buy-bust team to take
photographs of the other witnesses. Yet, this was not done, creating some doubt in the mind of the
Court as to the presence of the required witnesses during the buy-bust operation.

The apprehending team cannot justify its failure to ensure the availability of the witnesses during the
apprehension of accused-appellant Manabat, considering that the buy-bust operation was
conducted seven days after the day it received information about accused-appellant and was
instructed to conduct the buy-bust operation. Simply stated, the apprehending team had more than
enough time to ensure that all the mandatory procedures for the conduct of the buy-bust operation
would be sufficiently met.

Second, the Certificate of Inventory that was produced by the prosecution was irregularly executed.

To reiterate, Section 21 of RA 9165 requires that the copies of the inventory should be signed
by all the following persons: (a) accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public
official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice
(DOJ).

The Certificate of Inventory  itself reveals that the document was not signed by accused-
28

appellant Manabat or by his counsel or representative. Upon perusal of the records of the instant
case, the prosecution did not acknowledge such defect. Nor did the prosecution provide any
explanation whatsoever as to why accused-appellant Manabat was not able to sign the Certificate of
Inventory.

Concededly, Section 21 of the IRR of RA 9165 provides that "noncompliance of these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures
and custody over said items." For this provision to be effective, however, the prosecution must first
(1) recognize any lapse on the part of the police officers and (2) be able to justify the same.   In this
29

case, the prosecution neither recognized, much less tried to justify, the police officers'
deviation from the procedure contained in Section 21, RA 9165.

Third, the Court notes that the marking of the plastic sachets allegedly recovered was irregularly
done.

Under the 1999 Philippine National Police Drug Enforcement Manual,  the conduct of buy-bust
30

operations requires the following:

Anti-Drug Operational Procedures

Chapter V. Specific Rules

xxxx

B. Conduct of Operation: (As far as practicable, all operations must be officer led)

1. Buy-Bust Operation - [I]n the conduct of buy-bust operation, the following are the procedures to be
observed:

a. Record time of jump-off in unit's logbook;

b. Alertness and security shall at all times be observed:

c. Actual and timely coordination with the nearest PNP territorial units must be made;

d. Area security and dragnet or pursuit operation must be provided[;]

e. Use of necessary and reasonable force only in case of suspect's resistance[;]

f. If buy-bust money is dusted with ultra violet powder make sure that suspect ge[t] hold of the same
and his palm/s contaminated with the powder before giving the pre-arranged signal and arresting the
suspects;

g. In pre-positioning of the team members, the designated arresting elements must clearly and
actually observe the negotiation/transaction between suspect and the poseur-buyer;

h. Arrest suspect in a defensive manner anticipating possible resistance with the use of deadly
weapons which maybe concealed in his body, vehicle or in a place within arms' reach;

i. After lawful arrest, search the body and vehicle, if any, of the suspect for other concealed evidence
or deadly weapon;

j. Appraise suspect of his constitutional rights loudly and clearly after having been secured with
handcuffs;

k. Take actual inventory of the seized evidence by means of weighing and/or physical counting, as
the case may be;

1. Prepare a detailed receipt of the confiscated evidence for issuance to the possessor (suspect)
thereof;

m. The seizing officer (normally the poseur-buyer) and the evidence custodian must mark the
evidence with their initials and also indicate the date, time and place the evidence was
confiscated/seized;

n. Take photographs of the evidence while in the process of taking the inventory, especially during
weighing, and if possible under existing conditions, the registered weight of the evidence on the
scale must be focused by the camera; and

o. Only the evidence custodian shall secure and preserve the evidence in an evidence bag or in
appropriate container and thereafter deliver the same to the PNP CLG for laboratory examination.  31

In the instant case, as incontrovertibly revealed by the photographs of the plastic sachets allegedly
retrieved from accused-appellant Manabat, only the date and initials of the seizing officers were
inscribed on the specimens. The time and place of the buy-bust operation were not indicated in
the markings, in clear contravention of the PNP's own set of procedures for the conduct of buy-bust
operations.

At this juncture, it is well to point-out that while the RTC and CA were correct in stating that denial is
an inherently weak defense, it grievously erred in using the same principle to convict accused-
appellant Manabat. Both the RTC and CA overlooked the long-standing legal tenet that the starting
point of every criminal prosecution is that the accused has the constitutional right to be presumed
innocent.   And this presumption of innocence is overturned only when the prosecution has
32

discharged its burden of proof in criminal cases and has proven the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt,   by proving each and every element of the crime charged in the information, to
33

warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included
therein.  Differently stated, there must exist no reasonable doubt as to the existence of each and
34

every element of the crime to sustain a conviction.

It is worth emphasizing that this burden of proof never shifts. Indeed, the accused need not
present a single piece of evidence in his defense if the State has not discharged its onus. The
accused can simply rely on his right to be presumed innocent.

In this connection, the prosecution therefore, in cases involving dangerous drugs, always has the
burden of proving compliance with the procedure outlined in Section 21. As the Court stressed
in People v. Andaya: 35

We should remind ourselves that we cannot presume that the accused committed the crimes they
have been charged with.  The State must fully establish that for us. If the imputation of ill motive
1âшphi1

to the lawmen is the only means of impeaching them, then that would be the end of our dutiful
vigilance to protect our citizenry from false arrests and wrongful incriminations. We are aware that
there have been in the past many cases of false arrests and wrongful incriminations, and that should
heighten our resolve to strengthen the ramparts of judicial scrutiny.

Nor should we shirk from our responsibility of protecting the liberties of our citizenry just
because the lawmen are shielded by the presumption of the regularity of their performance of
duty. The presumed regularity is nothing but a purely evidentiary tool intended to avoid the
impossible and time-consuming task of establishing every detail of the performance by
officials and functionaries of the Government. Conversion by no means defeat the much
stronger and much firmer presumption of innocence in favor of every person whose life,
property and liberty comes under the risk of forfeiture on the strength of a false accusation of
committing some crime.  (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
36

To stress, the accused can rely on his right to be presumed innocent. It is thus immaterial, in this
case or in any other cases involving dangerous drugs, that the accused put forth a weak defense.

To reiterate, breaches of the procedure outlined in Section 21 committed by the police officers, left
unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt against the accused as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti would have
been compromised.  As the Court explained in People v. Reyes:
37 38

Under the last paragraph of Section 21(a), Article II of the IRRofR.A. No. 9165, a saving mechanism
has been provided to ensure that not every case of non-compliance with the procedures for the
preservation of the chain of custody will irretrievably prejudice the Prosecution's case against the
accused. To warrant the application of this saving mechanism, however, the Prosecution
must recognize the lapse or lapses, and justify or explain them. Such justification or
explanation would be the basis for applying the saving mechanism. Yet, the Prosecution did
not concede such lapses, and did not even tender any token justification or explanation for
them. The failure to justify or explain underscored the doubt and suspicion about the integrity
of the evidence of the corpus delicti. With the chain of custody having been compromised, the
accused deserves acquittal. 39

Lastly, it was an error for the RTC to convict accused-appellant Manabat by relying on the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duties supposedly extended in favor of the police
officers. The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty cannot overcome the
stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.  Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence
40
will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent.  As the Court, in People v.
41

Catalan,  reminded the lower courts:

42

Both lower courts favored the members of the buy-bust team with the presumption of regularity in
the performance of their duty, mainly because the accused did not show that they had ill motive
behind his entrapment.

We hold that both lower courts committed gross error in relying on the presumption of regularity.

Presuming that the members of the buy-bust team regularly performed their duty was patently bereft
of any factual and legal basis. We remind the lower courts that the presumption of regularity in
the performance of duty could not prevail over the stronger presumption of innocence
favoring the accused. Otherwise, the constitutional guarantee of the accused being
presumed innocent would be held subordinate to a mere rule of evidence allocating the
burden of evidence. Where, like here, the proof adduced against the accused has not even
overcome the presumption of innocence, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty
could not be a factor to adjudge the accused guilty of the crime charged.

Moreover, the regularity of the performance of their duty could not be properly presumed in
favor of the policemen because the records were replete with indicia of their serious lapses.
As a rule, a presumed fact like the regularity of performance by a police officer must be
inferred only from an established basic fact, not plucked out from thin air. To say it differently,
it is the established basic fact that triggers the presumed fact of regular performance. Where there is
any hint of irregularity committed by the police officers in arresting the accused and thereafter,
several of which we have earlier noted, there can be no presumption of regularity of performance in
their favor.   (Emphasis supplied)
43

In this case, the presumption of regularity cannot stand because of the buy-bust team's disregard of
the established procedures under Section 21 of RA 9165 and the PNP's own Drug Enforcement
Manual.

In sum, the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for the apprehending team's deviation
from the rules laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165. The integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus
delicti have thus been compromised. In light of this, accused-appellant Manabat must perforce be
acquitted.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated
August 2, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01781-MIN is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant MARIO MANABAT y
DUMAGAY is ACQUITTED of the crimes charged on the ground of reasonable doubt, and
is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention unless he is being lawfully held for
another cause. Let an entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent of the San Ramon Prison and Penal
Farm, Zamboanga City, for immediate implementation. The said Superintendent
is ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision the action he
has taken.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio (Chairperson), J. Reyes, Jr., and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.

Perlas-Bernabe, J., on official leave.

Footnotes

1
 See Notice of Appeal dated September 3, 2018; rollo, pp. 19-21.

 Rollo, pp. 3-18. Penned by Associate Justice Ruben Reynaldo G. Roxas with Associate
2

Justices Edgardo T. Lloren and Walter S. Ong concurring.

3
 CA rollo, pp. 32-40. Penned by Presiding Judge Ric S. Bastasa.

 Titled "AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF

4

2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425. OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE

DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June 7, 2002.

5
 Rollo, pp. 4-10.

6
 CA rollo, pp. 32-40. Penned by Presiding Judge Ric S. Bastasa.

7
 Id. at 40.

8
 Id. at 38-39.

9
 Rollo, p. 18.

10
 Id. at 13-14.

11
 People v. Opiana, 750 Phil. 140, 147 (2015).

12
 People v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 198875 (Notice), June 4, 2014.

13
 People v. Guzon, 719 Phil. 441, 450-451 (2013).

14
 People v. Mantalaba, 669 Phil. 461,471 (2011).

15
 The said section reads as follows:

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
 the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]

 People v. Santos, 562 Phil. 458,471 (2007), citing People v. Tan, 401 Phil. 259, 273
16

(2000).

 IRR of RA 9165, Art. II, Sec. 21 (a).

17

 G.R. No. 228890, April 18, 2018, accessed at

18

<http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64241>.

 736 Phil. 749 (2014).

19

 Id. at 764.
20

 Supra note 18.
21

 TSN dated October 25, 2016, p. 16.

22

 TSN dated March 2, 2017, p. 21.

23

 TSN dated October 25, 2016, p. 16.

24

 TSN dated March 2, 2017, p. 22.

25

 Id.
26

 TSN dated October 25, 2016, pp. 18-19.

27

 Records, p. 96.
28

 See People v. Alagarme, 754 Phil. 449, 461 (2015).

29

 Philippine National Police Drug Enforcement Manual, PNPM-D-O-3-1-99 [NG], the

30

precursor anti-illegal drug operations manual prior to the 2010 and 2014 AIDSOTF Manual.

 Id; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

31

 CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 14(2). "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
32

presumed innocent until the contrary is proved x x x."

 The Rules of Court provides that proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a
33

degree of proof as excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral
certainty is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind. (RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Sec. 2)

 See People v. Belocura, 693 Phil. 476, 503-504 (2012).

34

 745 Phil. 237 (2014).

35
  Id. at 250-251.
36

 See People v. Sumili, 753 Phil. 342, 350 (2015).

37

 797 Phil. 671 (2016).

38

 Id. at 690. (Emphasis supplied)

39

 People v. Mendoza, 736 Phil. 749, 770 (2014).

40

 People v. Catalan, 699 Phil. 603, 621 (2012).

41

 699 Phil. 603 (2012).

42

 Id. at 621.
43
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 192123               March 10, 2014

DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

This appeal is taken by a physician-anesthesiologist who has been pronounced guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of
Appeals (CA). He had been part of the team of anesthesiologists during the surgical pull-through
operation conducted on a three-year old patient born with an imperforate anus. 1

The antecedents are as follows:

Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 1992  with an imperforate anus. Two days after
2

his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large intestine
out through the abdominal wall,  enabling him to excrete through a colostomy bag attached to the
3

side of his body.4

On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-
through operation.  Dr. Leandro Resurreccion headed the surgical team, and was assisted by Dr.
5

Joselito Luceño, Dr. Donatella Valeña and Dr. Joseph Tibio. The anesthesiologists included Dr.
Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel Razon and petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum (Dr. Solidum).  During the
6

operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia,  and went into a coma.  His coma lasted for two
7 8

weeks,  but he regained consciousness only after a month.  He could no longer see, hear or move.
9 10 11

Agitated by her son’s helpless and unexpected condition, Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz) lodged a complaint
for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with the City Prosecutor’s Office of
Manila against the attending physicians. 12

Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutor’s Office filed an information solely against Dr.
Solidum,  alleging: –
13

That on or about May 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then an
anesthesiologist at the Ospital ng Maynila, Malate, this City, and as such was tasked to administer
the anesthesia on three-year old baby boy GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO, represented by his
mother, MA. LUZ GERCAYO, the former having been born with an imperforate anus [no anal
opening] and was to undergo an operation for anal opening [pull through operation], did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail and neglect to use the care and diligence as the best of
his judgment would dictate under said circumstance, by failing to monitor and regulate properly the
levels of anesthesia administered to said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO and using 100% halothane
and other anesthetic medications, causing as a consequence of his said carelessness and
negligence, said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO suffered a cardiac arrest and consequently a defect
called hypoxic encephalopathy meaning insufficient oxygen supply in the brain, thereby rendering
said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO incapable of moving his body, seeing, speaking or hearing, to
his damage and prejudice.

Contrary to law. 14

The case was initially filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, but was transferred to the RTC
pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997),  where it was
15

docketed as Criminal Case No. 01-190889.

Judgment of the RTC

On July 19, 2004, the RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr. Solidum guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries,  decreeing:
16

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of arresto mayor as
minimum to ONE (1) YEAR, ONE (1) MONTH and TEN (10) DAYS of prision correccional as
maximum and to indemnify, jointly and severally with the Ospital ng Maynila, Dr. Anita So and Dr.
Marichu Abella, private complainant Luz Gercayo, the amount of ₱500,000.00 as moral damages
and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.

Accordingly, the bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is hereby CANCELLED.

SO ORDERED. 17

Upon motion of Dr. Anita So and Dr. Marichu Abella to reconsider their solidary liability,  the RTC
18

excluded them from solidary liability as to the damages, modifying its decision as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Dr. Fernando Solidum, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1)
year, one (1) month and ten (10) days of prision correccional as maximum and to indemnify jointly
and severally with Ospital ng Maynila, private complainant Luz Gercayo the amount of ₱500,000.00
as moral damages and ₱100,000 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.

Accordingly, the bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled. 19

Decision of the CA

On January 20, 2010, the CA affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum,  pertinently stating and ruling:
20

The case appears to be a textbook example of res ipsa loquitur.

x x x [P]rior to the operation, the child was evaluated and found fit to undergo a major operation. As
noted by the OSG, the accused himself testified that pre-operation tests were conducted to ensure
that the child could withstand the surgery. Except for his imperforate anus, the child was healthy.
The tests and other procedures failed to reveal that he was suffering from any known ailment or
disability that could turn into a significant risk. There was not a hint that the nature of the operation
itself was a causative factor in the events that finally led to hypoxia.

In short, the lower court has been left with no reasonable hypothesis except to attribute the accident
to a failure in the proper administration of anesthesia, the gravamen of the charge in this case. The
High Court elucidates in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals 321 SCRA 584 –

In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent
upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its
fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care.

Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to
the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to
an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily
required to show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred. When the doctrine is
appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or omission
complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant
without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to res
ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which
the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him.

The lower court has found that such a nexus exists between the act complained of and the injury
sustained, and in line with the hornbook rules on evidence, we will afford the factual findings of a trial
court the respect they deserve in the absence of a showing of arbitrariness or disregard of material
facts that might affect the disposition of the case. People v. Paraiso 349 SCRA 335.

The res ipsa loquitur test has been known to be applied in criminal cases. Although it creates a
presumption of negligence, it need not offend due process, as long as the accused is afforded the
opportunity to go forward with his own evidence and prove that he has no criminal intent. It is in this
light not inconsistent with the constitutional presumption of innocence of an accused.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the modified decision of the lower court is affirmed.

SO ORDERED. 21

Dr. Solidum filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied his motion on May 7, 2010. 22

Hence, this appeal.

Issues

Dr. Solidum avers that:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE

LOWER COURT IN UPHOLDING THE PETITIONER’S CONVICTION FOR THE CRIME
CHARGED BASED ON THE TRIAL COURT’S OPINION, AND NOT ON THE BASIS OF
THE FACTS ESTABLISHED DURING THE TRIAL. ALSO, THERE IS A CLEAR
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS WHICH IF CORRECTED, WILL RESULT TO THE
ACQUITTAL OF THE PETITIONER. FURTHER, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN
 AFFIRMING THE SAID DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT, AS THIS BREACHES THE
CRIMINAL LAW PRINCIPLE THAT THE PROSECUTION MUST PROVE THE
ALLEGATIONS OF THE INFORMATION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, AND NOT ON
THE BASIS OF ITS PRESUMPTIVE CONCLUSION.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF RES

IPSA LOQUITOR (sic) WHEN THE DEFENSE WAS ABLE TO PROVE THAT THERE IS NO
NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AND NO OVERDOSING IN THE
APPLICATION OF THE ANESTHETIC AGENT BECAUSE THERE WAS NO 100%
HALOTHANE ADMINISTERED TO THE CHILD, BUT ONLY ONE (1%) PERCENT AND
THE APPLICATION THEREOF, WAS REGULATED BY AN ANESTHESIA MACHINE.
THUS, THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR (sic)
CONTRADICTED THE ESTABLISHED FACTS AND THE LAW APPLICABLE IN THE
CASE.

III.

THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IS NOT JUSTIFIED

THERE BEING NO NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER. ASSUMING
THAT THE CHILD IS ENTITLED TO FINANCIAL CONSIDERATION, IT SHOULD BE ONLY
AS A FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, BECAUSE THERE WAS NO NEGLIGENCE, AND NO
OVERDOSING OF ANESTHETIC AGENT AND AS SUCH, THE AWARD IS SO
EXCESSIVE, AND NO FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS. 23

To simplify, the following are the issues for resolution, namely: (a) whether or not the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur was applicable herein; and (b) whether or not Dr. Solidum was liable for criminal
negligence.

Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

Applicability of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur

Res ipsa loquitur is literally translated as "the thing or the transaction speaks for itself." The doctrine
res ipsa loquitur means that "where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the
management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care."  It is simply
24

"a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of common knowledge and experience, the very
nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the
person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of some explanation by the
defendant who is charged with negligence. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human
experience and on the basis of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be
deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself.

Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge." 25
Jarcia, Jr. v. People  has underscored that the doctrine is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a
26

mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The doctrine, when applicable to the facts and
circumstances of a given case, is not meant to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof
of culpable negligence against the party charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall be
prima facie evidence thereof, and helps the plaintiff in proving a breach of the duty. The doctrine can
be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and
not readily available.
27

The applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases was significantly and
exhaustively explained in Ramos v. Court of Appeals,  where the Court said –
28

Medical malpractice cases do not escape the application of this doctrine. Thus, res ipsa loquitur has
been applied when the circumstances attendant upon the harm are themselves of such a character
as to justify an inference of negligence as the cause of that harm. The application of res ipsa loquitur
in medical negligence cases presents a question of law since it is a judicial function to determine
whether a certain set of circumstances does, as a matter of law, permit a given inference.

Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a
physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure,
when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony
is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. The reason is that the
general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only to such matters clearly within the
domain of medical science, and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind
which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts. Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons
of skill and experience are competent to testify as to whether a patient has been treated or operated
upon with a reasonable degree of skill and care. However, testimony as to the statements and acts
of physicians and surgeons, external appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by
any one may be given by non-expert witnesses. Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is
applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the
patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can
determine the proper standard of care. Where common knowledge and experience teach that a
resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference
of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without
medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it
occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the
particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and
management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the
standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under usual
and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him.

Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following situations: leaving of a
foreign object in the body of the patient after an operation, injuries sustained on a healthy part of the
body which was not under, or in the area, of treatment, removal of the wrong part of the body when
another part was intended, knocking out a tooth while a patient’s jaw was under anesthetic for the
removal of his tonsils, and loss of an eye while the patient plaintiff was under the influence of
anesthetic, during or following an operation for appendicitis, among others.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa loquitur has been measurably enlarged, it
does not automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden
of proof to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is
not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending
upon the circumstances of each case. It is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases
where a layman is able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, that the
consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care
had been exercised. A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results, and the
occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered
followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. It must be conceded that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which
involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The physician or surgeon is not
required at his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular
scientific treatment did not produce the desired result. Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not available in a
malpractice suit if the only showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not
accomplished. The real question, therefore, is whether or not in the process of the operation any
extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of the routine performance occurred which is beyond
the regular scope of customary professional activity in such operations, which, if unexplained would
themselves reasonably speak to the average man as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward
consequence. If there was such extraneous intervention, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be
utilized and the defendant is called upon to explain the matter, by evidence of exculpation, if he
could.

In order to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the following essential requisites must first be
satisfied, to wit: (1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive control of
the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution of the person injured.
29

The Court considers the application here of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inappropriate. Although it
should be conceded without difficulty that the second and third elements were present, considering
that the anesthetic agent and the instruments were exclusively within the control of Dr. Solidum, and
that the patient, being then unconscious during the operation, could not have been guilty of
contributory negligence, the first element was undeniably wanting. Luz delivered Gerald to the care,
custody and control of his physicians for a pull-through operation. Except for the imperforate anus,
Gerald was then of sound body and mind at the time of his submission to the physicians. Yet, he
experienced bradycardia during the operation, causing loss of his senses and rendering him
immobile. Hypoxia, or the insufficiency of oxygen supply to the brain that caused the slowing of the
heart rate, scientifically termed as bradycardia, would not ordinarily occur in the process of a pull-
through operation, or during the administration of anesthesia to the patient, but such fact alone did
not prove that the negligence of any of his attending physicians, including the anesthesiologists, had
caused the injury. In fact, the anesthesiologists attending to him had sensed in the course of the
operation that the lack of oxygen could have been triggered by the vago-vagal reflex, prompting
them to administer atropine to the patient.30

This conclusion is not unprecedented. It was similarly reached in Swanson v. Brigham,  relevant
31

portions of the decision therein being as follows:

On January 7, 1973, Dr. Brigham admitted 15-year-old Randall Swanson to a hospital for the
treatment of infectious mononucleosis. The patient's symptoms had included a swollen throat and
some breathing difficulty. Early in the morning of January 9 the patient was restless, and at 1:30 a.m.
Dr. Brigham examined the patient. His inspection of the patient's air passage revealed that it was in
satisfactory condition. At 4:15 a.m. Dr. Brigham received a telephone call from the hospital, advising
him that the patient was having respiratory difficulty. The doctor ordered that oxygen be
administered and he prepared to leave for the hospital. Ten minutes later, 4:25 a.m., the hospital
called a second time to advise the doctor that the patient was not responding. The doctor ordered
that a medicine be administered, and he departed for the hospital. When he arrived, the physician
who had been on call at the hospital had begun attempts to revive the patient. Dr. Brigham joined
him in the effort, but the patient died.

The doctor who performed the autopsy concluded that the patient died between 4:25 a.m. and 4:30
a.m. of asphyxia, as a result of a sudden, acute closing of the air passage. He also found that the air
passage had been adequate to maintain life up to 2 or 3 minutes prior to death. He did not know
what caused the air passage to suddenly close.

It is a rare occurrence when someone admitted to a hospital for the treatment of infectious
mononucleosis dies of asphyxiation. But that is not sufficient to invoke res ipsa loquitur. The fact that
the injury rarely occurs does not in itself prove that the injury was probably caused by someone's
negligence. Mason v. Ellsworth, 3 Wn. App. 298, 474 P.2d 909 (1970). Nor is a bad result by itself
enough to warrant the application of the doctrine. Nelson v. Murphy, 42 Wn.2d 737, 258 P.2d 472
(1953). See 2 S. Speiser, The Negligence Case – Res Ipsa Loquitur § 24:10 (1972). The evidence
presented is insufficient to establish the first element necessary for application of res ipsa loquitur
doctrine. The acute closing of the patient’s air passage and his resultant asphyxiation took place
over a very short period of time. Under these circumstances it would not be reasonable to infer that
the physician was negligent. There was no palpably negligent act. The common experience of
mankind does not suggest that death would not be expected without negligence. And there is no
expert medical testimony to create an inference that negligence caused the injury.

Negligence of Dr. Solidum

In view of the inapplicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court next determines whether
the CA correctly affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum for criminal negligence.

Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury.  Reckless imprudence, on the other hand, consists of voluntarily doing or
32

failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable
lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act. 33

Dr. Solidum’s conviction by the RTC was primarily based on his failure to monitor and properly
regulate the level of anesthetic agent administered on Gerald by overdosing at 100% halothane. In
affirming the conviction, the CA observed:

On the witness stand, Dr. Vertido made a significant turnaround. He affirmed the findings and
conclusions in his report except for an observation which, to all intents and purposes, has become
the storm center of this dispute. He wanted to correct one piece of information regarding the dosage
of the anesthetic agent administered to the child. He declared that he made a mistake in reporting a
100% halothane and said that based on the records it should have been 100% oxygen.

The records he was relying on, as he explains, are the following:

(a) the anesthesia record – A portion of the chart in the record was marked as Exhibit 1-A
and 1-B to indicate the administration at intervals of the anesthetic agent.

(b) the clinical abstract – A portion of this record that reads as follows was marked Exhibit
3A. 3B – Approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes through the operation, patient was noted to
have bradycardia (CR = 70) and ATSO4 0.2 mg was immediately administered. However,
the bradycardia persisted, the inhalational agent was shut off, and the patient was ventilated
 with 100% oxygen and another dose of ATSO4 0.2 mg was given. However, the patient did
not respond until no cardiac rate can be auscultated and the surgeons were immediately told
to stop the operation. The patient was put on a supine position and CPR was initiated.
Patient was given 1 amp of epinephrine initially while continuously doing cardiac massage –
still with no cardiac rate appreciated; another ampule of epinephrine was given and after 45
secs, patient’s vital signs returned to normal. The entire resuscitation lasted approximately 3-
5 mins. The surgeons were then told to proceed to the closure and the child’s vital signs
throughout and until the end of surgery were: BP = 110/70; CR = 116/min and RR = 20-22
cycles/min (on assisted ventilation).

Dr. Vertido points to the crucial passage in the clinical abstract that the patient was ventilated with
100% oxygen and another dose of ATSO4 when the bradycardia persisted, but for one reason or
another, he read it as 100% halothane. He was asked to read the anesthesia record on the
percentage of the dosage indicated, but he could only sheepishly note I can’t understand the
number. There are no clues in the clinical abstract on the quantity of the anesthetic agent used. It
only contains the information that the anesthetic plan was to put the patient under general
anesthesia using a nonrebreathing system with halothane as the sole anesthetic agent and that 1
hour and 45 minutes after the operation began, bradycardia occurred after which the inhalational
agent was shut off and the patient administered with 100% oxygen. It would be apparent that the
100% oxygen that Dr. Vertido said should be read in lieu of 100% halothane was the pure oxygen
introduced after something went amiss in the operation and the halothane itself was reduced or shut
off.

The key question remains – what was the quantity of halothane used before bradycardia set in?

The implication of Dr. Vertido’s admission is that there was no overdose of the anesthetic agent, and
the accused Dr. Solidum stakes his liberty and reputation on this conclusion. He made the
assurance that he gave his patient the utmost medical care, never leaving the operating room except
for a few minutes to answer the call of nature but leaving behind the other members of his team Drs.
Abella and Razon to monitor the operation. He insisted that he administered only a point 1% not
100% halothane, receiving corroboration from Dr. Abella whose initial MA in the record should be
enough to show that she assisted in the operation and was therefore conversant of the things that
happened. She revealed that they were using a machine that closely monitored the concentration of
the agent during the operation.

But most compelling is Dr. Solidum’s interpretation of the anesthesia record itself, as he takes the
bull by the horns, so to speak. In his affidavit, he says, reading from the record, that the quantity of
halothane used in the operation is one percent (1%) delivered at time intervals of 15 minutes. He
studiedly mentions – the concentration of halothane as reflected in the anesthesia record (Annex D
of the complaint-affidavit) is only one percent (1%) – The numbers indicated in 15 minute increments
for halothane is an indication that only 1% halothane is being delivered to the patient Gerard
Gercayo for his entire operation; The amount of halothane delivered in this case which is only one
percent cannot be summated because halothane is constantly being rapidly eliminated by the body
during the entire operation.

In finding the accused guilty, despite these explanations, the RTC argued that the volte-face of Dr.
Vertido on the question of the dosage of the anesthetic used on the child would not really validate
the non-guilt of the anesthesiologist. Led to agree that the halothane used was not 100% as initially
believed, he was nonetheless unaware of the implications of the change in his testimony. The court
observed that Dr. Vertido had described the condition of the child as hypoxia which is deprivation of
oxygen, a diagnosis supported by the results of the CT Scan. All the symptoms attributed to a failing
central nervous system such as stupor, loss of consciousness, decrease in heart rate, loss of usual
acuity and abnormal motor function, are manifestations of this condition or syndrome. But why would
there be deprivation of oxygen if 100% oxygen to 1% halothane was used? Ultimately, to the court,
whether oxygen or halothane was the object of mistake, the detrimental effects of the operation are
incontestable, and they can only be led to one conclusion – if the application of anesthesia was
really closely monitored, the event could not have happened. 34

The Prosecution did not prove the elements of reckless imprudence beyond reasonable doubt
because the circumstances cited by the CA were insufficient to establish that Dr. Solidum had been
guilty of inexcusable lack of precaution in monitoring the administration of the anesthetic agent to
Gerald. The Court aptly explained in Cruz v. Court of Appeals  that:
35

Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his
patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the
profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the
profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. In the recent case of
Leonila Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L. Pacasio, et. al., this Court stated that in accepting a case, a
doctor in effect represents that, having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and
surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of
his patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably
competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect of
medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to establish not only the standard of care of
the profession but also that the physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls below such
standard. Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are
determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is
usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation.

In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant's
negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on
the part of the surgeon as well as a causal connection of such breach and the resulting death of his
patient. In Chan Lugay v. St Luke's Hospital, Inc., where the attending physician was absolved of
liability for the death of the complainant’s wife and newborn baby, this Court held that:

"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the ‘injury for
which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection
between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by
intervening efficient causes.’ In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the
injury. For, ‘negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the
proximate cause of the injury complained of.’ And ‘the proximate cause of an injury is that cause,
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.’"

An action upon medical negligence – whether criminal, civil or administrative – calls for the plaintiff to
prove by competent evidence each of the following four elements, namely: (a) the duty owed by the
physician to the patient, as created by the physician-patient relationship, to act in accordance with
the specific norms or standards established by his profession; (b) the breach of the duty by the
physician’s failing to act in accordance with the applicable standard of care; (3) the causation, i.e.,
there must be a reasonably close and causal connection between the negligent act or omission and
the resulting injury; and (4) the damages suffered by the patient. 36

In the medical profession, specific norms or standards to protect the patient against unreasonable
risk, commonly referred to as standards of care, set the duty of the physician to act in respect of the
patient. Unfortunately, no clear definition of the duty of a particular physician in a particular case
exists. Because most medical malpractice cases are highly technical, witnesses with special medical
qualifications must provide guidance by giving the knowledge necessary to render a fair and just
verdict. As a result, the standard of medical care of a prudent physician must be determined from
expert testimony in most cases; and in the case of a specialist (like an anesthesiologist), the
standard of care by which the specialist is judged is the care and skill commonly possessed and
exercised by similar specialists under similar circumstances. The specialty standard of care may be
higher than that required of the general practitioner.
37

The standard of care is an objective standard by which the conduct of a physician sued for
negligence or malpractice may be measured, and it does not depend, therefore, on any individual
physician’s own knowledge either. In attempting to fix a standard by which a court may determine
whether the physician has properly performed the requisite duty toward the patient, expert medical
testimony from both plaintiff and defense experts is required. The judge, as the trier of fact,
ultimately determines the standard of care, after listening to the testimony of all medical experts.
38

Here, the Prosecution presented no witnesses with special medical qualifications in anesthesia to
provide guidance to the trial court on what standard of care was applicable. It would consequently be
truly difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether the first three elements of a negligence and
malpractice action were attendant.

Although the Prosecution presented Dr. Benigno Sulit, Jr., an anesthesiologist himself who served
as the Chairman of the Committee on Ethics and Malpractice of the Philippine Society of
Anesthesiologists that investigated the complaint against Dr. Solidum, his testimony mainly focused
on how his Committee had conducted the investigation.  Even then, the report of his Committee was
39

favorable to Dr. Solidum,  to wit:

40

Presented for review by this committee is the case of a 3 year old male who underwent a pull-thru
operation and was administered general anesthesia by a team of anesthesia residents. The patient,
at the time when the surgeons was manipulating the recto-sigmoid and pulling it down in preparation
for the anastomosis, had bradycardia. The anesthesiologists, sensing that the cause thereof was the
triggering of the vago-vagal reflex, administered atropine to block it but despite the administration of
the drug in two doses, cardiac arrest ensued. As the records show, prompt resuscitative measures
were administered and spontaneous cardiac function re-established in less than five (5) minutes and
that oxygen was continuously being administered throughout, unfortunately, as later become
manifest, patient suffered permanent irreversible brain damage.

In view of the actuations of the anaesthesiologists and the administration of anaesthesia, the
committee find that the same were all in accordance with the universally accepted standards of
medical care and there is no evidence of any fault or negligence on the part of the
anaesthesiologists.

Dr. Antonio Vertido, a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, was also
presented as a Prosecution witness, but his testimony concentrated on the results of the physical
examination he had conducted on Gerald, as borne out by the following portions of his direct
examination, to wit:

FISCAL CABARON Doctor, what do you mean by General Anesthetic Agent?

WITNESS General Anesthetic Agent is a substance used in the conduction of Anesthesia and in this
case, halothane was used as a sole anesthetic agent.
Q Now under paragraph two of page 1 of your report you mentioned that after one hour and 45
minutes after the operation, the patient experienced a bradycardia or slowing of heart rate, now as a
doctor, would you be able to tell this Honorable Court as to what cause of the slowing of heart rate
as to Gerald Gercayo?

WITNESS Well honestly sir, I cannot give you the reason why there was a bradycardia of time
because is some reason one way or another that might caused bradycardia.

FISCAL CABARON What could be the possible reason?

A Well bradycardia can be caused by anesthetic agent itself and that is a possibility, we’re talking
about possibility here.

Q What other possibility do you have in mind, doctor?

A Well, because it was an operation, anything can happen within that situation.

FISCAL CABARON Now, this representation would like to ask you about the slowing of heart rate,
now what is the immediate cause of the slowing of the heart rate of a person?

WITNESS Well, one of the more practical reason why there is slowing of the heart rate is when you
do a vagal reflex in the neck wherein the vagal receptors are located at the lateral part of the neck,
when you press that, you produce the slowing of the heart rate that produce bradycardia.

Q I am pro[p]ounding to you another question doctor, what about the deficiency in the supply of
oxygen by the patient, would that also cause the slowing of the heart rate?

A Well that is a possibility sir, I mean not as slowing of the heart rate, if there is a hypoxia or there is
a low oxygen level in the blood, the normal thing for the heart is to pump or to do not a bradycardia
but a … to counter act the Hypoxia that is being experienced by the patient

(sic).

Q Now, you made mention also doctor that the use of general anesthesia using 100% halothane and
other anesthetic medications probably were contributory to the production of hypoxia.

A Yes, sir in general sir. 41

On cross-examination, Dr. Vertido expounded more specifically on his interpretation of the

anesthesia record and the factors that could have caused Gerald to experience bradycardia, viz:

ATTY. COMIA I noticed in, may I see your report Doctor, page 3, will you kindly read to this
Honorable court your last paragraph and if you will affirm that as if it is correct?

A "The use of General Anesthesia, that is using 100% Halothane probably will be contributory to the
production of Hypoxia and - - - -"

ATTY COMIA And do you affirm the figure you mentioned in this Court Doctor?

WITNESS Based on the records, I know the - - -

Q 100%?

A 100% based on the records.

Q I will show you doctor a clinical record. I am a lawyer I am not a doctor but will you kindly look at
this and tell me where is 100%, the word "one hundred" or 1-0-0, will you kindly look at this Doctor,
this Xerox copy if you can show to this Honorable Court and even to this representation the word
"one hundred" or 1-0-0 and then call me.

ATTY. COMIA Doctor tell this Honorable Court where is that 100, 1-0-0 and if there is, you just call
me and even the attention of the Presiding Judge of this Court. Okay, you read one by one.

WITNESS Well, are you only asking 100%, sir?

ATTY. COMIA I’m asking you, just answer my question, did you see there 100% and 100 figures, tell
me, yes or no?

WITNESS I’m trying to look at the 100%, there is no 100% there sir.

ATTY. COMIA Okay, that was good, so you Honor please, may we request also temporarily,
because this is just a xerox copy presented by the fiscal, that the percentage here that the
Halothane administered by Dr. Solidum to the patient is 1% only so may we request that this portion,
temporarily your Honor, we are marking this anesthesia record as our Exhibit 1 and then this 1%
Halothane also be bracketed and the same be marked as our Exhibit "1-A".

ATTY. COMIA Doctor, my attention was called also when you said that there are so many factors
that contributed to Hypoxia is that correct?

WITNESS Yes, sir.

Q I remember doctor, according to you there are so many factors that contributed to what you call
hypoxia and according to you, when this Gerald suffered hypoxia, there are other factors that might
lead to this Hypoxia at the time of this operation is that correct?

WITNESS The possibility is there, sir.

Q And according to you, it might also be the result of such other, some or it might be due to
operations being conducted by the doctor at the time when the operation is being done might also
contribute to that hypoxia is that correct?

A That is a possibility also.

ATTY. COMIA How will you classify now the operation conducted to this Gerald, Doctor?

WITNESS Well, that is a major operation sir.

Q In other words, when you say major operation conducted to this Gerald, there is a possibility that
this Gerald might [be] exposed to some risk is that correct?

A That is a possibility sir.

Q And which according to you that Gerald suffered hypoxia is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q And that is one of the risk of that major operation is that correct?

A That is the risk sir. 42

At the continuation of his cross-examination, Dr. Vertido maintained that Gerald’s operation for his
imperforate anus, considered a major operation, had exposed him to the risk of suffering the same
condition.  He then corrected his earlier finding that 100% halothane had been administered on
43

Gerald by saying that it should be 100% oxygen. 44

Dr. Solidum was criminally charged for "failing to monitor and regulate properly the levels of
anesthesia administered to said Gerald Albert Gercayo and using 100% halothane and other
anesthetic medications."  However, the foregoing circumstances, taken together, did not prove
45

beyond reasonable doubt that Dr. Solidum had been recklessly imprudent in administering the
anesthetic agent to Gerald. Indeed, Dr. Vertido’s findings did not preclude the probability that other
factors related to Gerald’s major operation, which could or could not necessarily be attributed to the
administration of the anesthesia, had caused the hypoxia and had then led Gerald to experience
bradycardia. Dr. Vertido revealingly concluded in his report, instead, that "although the
anesthesiologist followed the normal routine and precautionary procedures, still hypoxia and its
corresponding side effects did occur." 46

The existence of the probability about other factors causing the hypoxia has engendered in the mind
of the Court a reasonable doubt as to Dr. Solidum’s guilt, and moves us to acquit him of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. "A reasonable doubt of guilt," according to
United States v. Youthsey: 47

is a doubt growing reasonably out of evidence or the lack of it. It is not a captious doubt; not a doubt
engendered merely by sympathy for the unfortunate position of the defendant, or a dislike to accept
the responsibility of convicting a fellow man. If, having weighed the evidence on both sides, you
reach the conclusion that the defendant is guilty, to that degree of certainty as would lead you to act
on the faith of it in the most important and crucial affairs of your life, you may properly convict him.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not proof to a mathematical demonstration. It is not proof beyond
the possibility of mistake.

We have to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not immediately exempt him from civil
liability.  But we cannot now find and declare him civilly liable because the circumstances that have
1âwphi1

been established here do not present the factual and legal bases for validly doing so. His acquittal
did not derive only from reasonable doubt. There was really no firm and competent showing how the
injury to Gerard had been caused. That meant that the manner of administration of the anesthesia
by Dr. Solidum was not necessarily the cause of the hypoxia that caused the bradycardia
experienced by Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly liable would be to speculate on
the cause of the hypoxia. We are not allowed to do so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation
but on competent evidence.

Liability of Ospital ng Maynila

Although the result now reached has resolved the issue of civil liability, we have to address the
unusual decree of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, of expressly holding Ospital ng Maynila civilly
liable jointly and severally with Dr. Solidum. The decree was flawed in logic and in law.

In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed instituted with
the criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged.  It is puzzling, therefore, how
48

the RTC and the CA could have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly and severally liable with Dr.
Solidum for the damages despite the obvious fact that Ospital ng Maynila, being an artificial entity,
had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower courts thereby acted capriciously and
whimsically, which rendered their judgment against Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Not surprisingly, the flawed decree raises other material concerns that the RTC and the CA
overlooked. We deem it important, then, to express the following observations for the instruction of
the Bench and Bar.

For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence, its fundamental right to
be heard was not respected from the outset. The R TC and the CA should have been alert to this
fundamental defect. Verily, no person can be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or
proceeding in which he was not made a party. Such a rule would enforce the constitutional
guarantee of due process of law.

Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability would be
properly enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary liability
seems far-fetched here. The conditions for subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng Maynila should
first be complied with. Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, Ospital ng Maynila
must be shown to be a corporation "engaged in any kind of industry." The term industry means any
department or branch of art, occupation or business, especially one that employs labor and capital,
and is engaged in industry.  However, Ospital ng Maynila, being a public hospital, was not engaged
49

in industry conducted for profit but purely in charitable and humanitarian work.  Secondly, assuming
50

that Ospital ng Maynila was engaged in industry for profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an
employee of Ospital ng Maynila acting in the discharge of his duties during the operation on Gerald.
Yet, he definitely was not such employee but a consultant of the hospital. And, thirdly, assuming that
civil liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an employee (which did not happen here), the
execution against him was unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES AND SETS
ASIDE the decision promulgated on January 20, 2010; ACQUITS Dr. Fernando P. Solidum of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries; and MAKES no pronouncement
on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
 Imperforate anus is a defect that is present from birth (congenital) in which the opening to
the anus is missing or blocked. The anus is the opening to the rectum through which stools
leave the body. http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlinepluslencylarticlelOOI I 47.html. Visited on
March 3, 2014.

2
 Rollo, p. 55.

3
 http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ostomy.html. Visited on March 3, 2014.

4
 Rollo, p. 10.

5
 Id. at 53.

6
 Id. at p. 10.

 Bradycardia is an abnormally slow heart rate of less than 60 beats per minute. A normal
7

heartbeat is between 60 and 100 beats per minute.

http://www.intelihealth.com/IH/ihtIH/c/9339/23653.html. Visited on March 3, 2014.

8
 Rollo, p. 55.

9
 Id.

10
 Id. at 11.

11
 Id.

12
 Id.

13
 Id. at 51A-52.
  Id. at 51A.
14

 Id. at 53.
15

 Id. at 53-81.
16

 Records, p. 539.
17

 Id. at 551-554.
18

 Id. at 561.
19

 Rollo, pp. 10-21; penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña III (retired), with Associate
20

Justice Sesinando E. Villon and Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante concurring.

 Id. at 12-21.
21

 Id. at 22.
22

 Id. at 30-31.
23

 Jarcia, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 187926, February 15, 2012, 666 SCRA 336, 351.
24

 Ramos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124354, December 29, 1999, 321 SCRA 584, 599.
25

 Supra note 24, at 352.

26

 Id.
27

 Supra note 25, at 600-603.

28

 Reyes v. Sisters of Mercy Hospital, G.R. No. 130547, October 3, 2000, 341 SCRA 760,
29

771.

 Records, p. 110.
30

 571 P.2d 217, 18 Wash. App. 647; Wash. Ct. App. 1917.
31

 Gaid v. People, G.R. No. 171636, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 489, 497.
32

 Id. at 495.
33

 Rollo, pp. 87-91.

34

 G.R. No. 122445, November 18, 1997, 282 SCRA 188, 200-202.
35

 Flamm, Martin B., Medical Malpractice and the Physician Defendant, Chapter 11, Legal
36

Medicine, Fourth Edition (1998), pp. 123-124, American College of Legal Medicine, Mosby,
Inc., St. Louis, Missouri.
  Id. at 123-124.
37

 Id. at 124.
38

 TSN of December 1, 1999.

39

 Records, p. 110.
40

 TSN of November 11, 1997, pp. 16-31.

41

 TSN of November 11, 1997, pp. 44-53.

42

 TSN of December 10, 1997, pp. 2-3.

43

 Id. at 5-10.
44

 Rollo, p. 51.
45

 TSN of December 10, 1997, p. 13.

46

 91 Fed. Rep. 864, 868.

47

 Section 1, Rule 111, Rules of Court.

48

 Regalado, Criminal Law Conspectus, First Edition (2000), National Book Store, Inc., p. 263.
49

 Id. at 264.
50
 CLJ 5 (EVIDENCE)

SUBMITTED BY: JOSHUA S. VISAYA

SECTION: BS CRIM 3-C
PROFESSOR: ANTONIO D. TORRES