FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 180269. February 20, 2013.]

JOSE Z. CASILANG, SR., substituted by his heirs,

namely: FELICIDAD CUDIAMAT VDA. DE CASILANG,
JOSE C. CASILANG, JR., RICARDO C. CASILANG,
MARIA LOURDES C. CASILANG, CHRISTOPHER C.
CASILANG, BEN C. CASILANG, DANTE C. CASILANG,
GREGORIO C. CASILANG, HERALD C. CASILANG; and
FELICIDAD Z. CASILANG, MARCELINA Z. CASILANG,
JACINTA Z. CASILANG, BONIFACIO Z. CASILANG,
LEONORA Z. CASILANG, and FLORA Z.
CASILANG, petitioners, vs. ROSARIO Z. CASILANG-
DIZON, MARIO A. CASILANG, ANGELO A. CASILANG,
RODOLFO A. CASILANG, and ATTY. ALICIA B. FABIA, in
her capacity as Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of
Pangasinan and/or her duly authorized
representative, respondents.

DECISION

REYES, J  :p

Before us is a petition for review of the Decision 1 dated July 19,

2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79619, which
reversed and set aside the Decision 2 dated April 21, 2003 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 41, in Civil Case No. 98-02371-
D.
Antecedent Facts
The late spouses Liborio Casilang (Liborio) and Francisca Zacarias
(Francisca) had eight (8) children, namely: Felicidad Casilang (Felicidad),
Ireneo Casilang (Ireneo), Marcelina Casilang (Marcelina), Jacinta Casilang
(Jacinta), Bonifacio Casilang (Bonifacio), Leonora Casilang (Leonora),
Jose Casilang (Jose) and Flora Casilang (Flora). Liborio died intestate on
October 11, 1982 at the age of 83, followed not long after by his wife
Francisca on December 25, 1982. Their son Bonifacio also died in 1986,
survived by his child Bernabe Casilang (Bernabe), while son Ireneo died
on June 11, 1992, survived by his four (4) children, namely: Mario Casilang
(Mario), Angelo Casilang (Angelo), Rosario Casilang-Dizon (Rosario) and
Rodolfo Casilang (Rodolfo), herein respondents.
The estate of Liborio, which left no debts, consisted of three (3)
parcels of land located in Barangay Talibaew, Calasiao, Pangasinan,
namely: (1) Lot No. 4676, with an area of 4,164 square meters; (2) Lot No.
4704, containing 1,164 sq m; and (3) Lot No. 4618, with 897 sq m. CaTcSA
 On May 26, 1997, respondent Rosario filed with the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Calasiao, Pangasinan a complaint for unlawful
detainer, docketed as Civil Case No. 847, to evict her uncle, petitioner
Jose from Lot No. 4618. Rosario claimed that Lot No. 4618 was owned
by her father Ireneo, as evidenced by Tax Declaration (TD) No. 555
issued in 1994 under her father's name. On April 3, 1997, the
respondents executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with
Quitclaim 3 whereby they adjudicated Lot No. 4618 to themselves. In
the same instrument, respondents Mario, Angelo and Rodolfo
renounced their respective shares in Lot No. 4618 in favor of Rosario.
In his Answer, Jose raised the defense that he was the "lawful,
absolute, exclusive owner and in actual possession" of the said lot, and
that he acquired the same "through intestate succession from his late
father." 4 For some reason, however, he and his lawyer, who was from the
Public Attorney's Office, failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial
conference, and Jose was declared in default; thus, the adverse judgment
against him. 5
On February 18, 1998, the MTC rendered judgment finding Rosario
to be the owner of Lot No. 4618, and ordering Jose to remove his house,
vacate Lot No. 4618, and pay Rosario P500.00 in monthly rentals from the
filing of the complaint until she was placed in possession, plus attorney's
fees of P5,000.00, litigation expenses and costs. On March 23, 1998, the
MTC issued a writ of execution; and on August 28, 1998, a Writ of
Demolition 6 was issued.
On June 2, 1998, the petitioners, counting 7 of the 8 children of
Liborio and Francisca, 7 filed with the RTC of Dagupan City a
Complaint, 8 docketed as Civil Case No. 98-02371-D for "Annulment of
Documents, Ownership and Peaceful Possession with Damages" against
the respondents. On June 10, 1998, the petitioners moved for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, which the
RTC however denied on June 23, 1998.
Among the documents sought to be annulled was the 1997 Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition executed by Ireneo's children over Lot No. 4618, as
well as TD No. 555, and by necessary implication its derivatives, TD No.
15177 (for the lot) and TD No. 15176 (for the house), both of which were
issued in 1998 in the name of Rosario Casilang-Dizon. 9  AIaHES

The petitioners alleged in their complaint that all eight (8) children of
Liborio entered into a verbal partition of his estate, pursuant to which Jose
was allotted Lot No. 4618 as his share; that Ireneo never claimed
ownership of Lot No. 4618, nor took possession of it, because his share
was the southwestern 1/5 portion of Lot No. 4676, containing an area of
1,308 sq m, 10 of which he took exclusive possession during his lifetime;
that Jose has always resided in Lot No. 4618 since childhood, where he
built his family's semi-concrete house just a few steps away from his
parents' old bamboo hut; that he took in and cared for his aged parents in
his house until their deaths in 1982; that one of his children has also built a
house on the lot. 11 Jose, said to be the most educated of the Casilang
siblings, worked as an insurance agent. 12 The complete disposition of the
intestate estate of Liborio per the parties' verbal partition appears as
follows:
1. Lot No. 4676, with 4,164 sq m, declared under TD No. 534 in
Liborio's name, 13 was verbally partitioned among Marcelina
(236 sq m), Leonora (1,965 sq m), Flora (655 sq m), and Ireneo,
represented by his children, the herein respondents-defendants
(1,308 sq m), as shown in a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with
Quitclaim dated January 8, 1998, subsequently executed by all
the Casilang siblings and their representatives.
2. Lot No. 4704, with 1,164 sq m, declared under TD No. 276 in
Liborio's name, 14 was divided among Jacinta and Bonifacio,
who died in 1986 and is now represented by his son Bernabe;
and
3. Lot No. 4618, containing 897 sq m, declared since 1994
under TD No. 555 in Ireneo's name, 15 is now the subject of the
controversy below. Jose insists that he succeeded to it per
verbal partition, and that he and his family have always
occupied the same peacefully, adversely and exclusively even
while their parents were alive. 16
For her part, Rosario alleged in her answer with
counterclaim, 17 which she filed on September 15, 1998, that:
a) She is the actual and lawful owner of Lot No. 4618 with
an area of 897 square meters, having acquired the same by way
of a Deed of Extra judicial Partition with Quitclaim dated 3 April
1997 which was duly executed among herein Appellant
ROSARIO and her brothers, namely, MARIO, ANGELO and
RODOLFO, all surnamed CASILANG;  cIEHAC

b) Her ownership over subject property could be traced

back to her late father IR[E]NEO which the latter inherited by way
of intestate succession from his deceased father LIBORIO
sometime in 1992; that the residential house described in herein
Appellee JOSE's complaint is an illegal structure built by him in
1997 without her (ROSARIO's) knowledge and consent; that in
fact, an ejectment suit was filed against Appellee JOSE with the
Municipal Trial Court in Calasiao, Pangasinan in Civil Case No.
847;
c) The subject lot is never a portion of Appellee JOSE's
share from the intestate of his deceased father, LIBORIO; that on
the contrary, the lot is his deceased brother IR[E]NEO's share
from the late LIBORIO's intestate estate; that in fact, the property
has long been declared in the name of the late IR[E]NEO as
shown by Tax Declaration No. 555 long before his children
ROSARIO DIZON, MARIO[,] ANGELO and RODOLFO, all
surnamed CASILANG, executed the Deed of Partition dated 18
February 1998; that Appellee JOSE had actually consumed his
shares which he inherited from his late father, and after a series
of sales and dispositions of the same made by him, he now wants
to take Appellants' property;
d) Appellee JOSE is never the rightful owner of the lot in
question and has not shown any convincing proof of his supposed
ownership; that the improvements introduced by him, specifically
 the structures he cited are the subject of a Writ of Demolition
dated 28 August 1998 pursuant to the Order [dated] 17 August
1998 of the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan;
e) No protestation or objection was ever made by Appellee
JOSE in Civil Case No. 847 (Unlawful Detainer case) where he
was the defendant; that the truth was that his possession of the
subject property was upon the tolerance and benevolence of his
late brother IR[E]NEO during the latter's lifetime and that
Appellant ROSARIO;
f) The RTC Clerk of Court and Ex-officio Provincial Sheriff
would just be doing her job if she and her deputies would
implement the writ of execution/demolition issued by the MTC of
Calasiao, Pangasinan since it is its ministerial duty to do so; 
DAaIEc

g) The Appellees have no cause of action; not having

shown in their complaint the basis, the reason and the very core
of their claim as to why the questioned document should be
nullified. 18 (Citation omitted)
In their reply 19 to Rosario's aforesaid answer, the petitioners
asserted that the MTC committed a grave error in failing to consider a
material fact — that Jose had long been in prior possession under a claim
of title which he obtained by partition.
At the pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. 98-02371-D, the parties
entered into the following stipulations:
1. That the late LIBORIO is the father of FELICIDAD,
MARCELINA, JUANITA, LEONORA, FLORA and IR[E]NEO, all
surnamed CASILANG[;]
2. That the late LIBORIO died in 1982; That the late
LIBORIO and his family resided on Lot [No.] 4618 up to his death
in 1982; That the house of the late LIBORIO is located on Lot
[No.] 4618;
3. That Plaintiff JOSE used to reside on the lot in question
because there was a case for ejectment filed against him;
4. That the house which was demolished is the family
house of the late LIBORIO and FRANCISCA ZACARIAS with the
qualification that it was given to the defendants;
5. That the action involves members of the same family;
and
6. That no earnest efforts were made prior to the institution
of the case in court. 20 
STDEcA

Ruling of the RTC

After a full trial on the merits, the RTC in its Decision 21 dated April
21, 2003 decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants as
follows:
1. Declaring the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with
Quitclaim dated April 3, 1997 null and void;
 2. Declaring plaintiff Jose Z. Casilang Sr. as the lawful
owner and possessor of the subject Lot [No.] 4618 and as such,
entitled to the peaceful possession of the same;
3. Ordering the defendants to pay to plaintiff Jose Z.
Casilang Sr. attorney's fees in the amount of [P]20,000.00 and
litigation expenses in the amount of [P]5,000.00, and to pay the
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 22
The RTC affirmed Jose's ownership and possession of Lot No. 4618
by virtue of the oral partition of the estate of Liborio by all the siblings. In
the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim 23 dated January 8, 1998,
subsequently executed by all the eight (8) Casilang siblings and their legal
representatives — with Ireneo represented by his four (4) children, and
Bonifacio by his son Bernabe — petitioners Jose, Felicidad, Jacinta and
Bernabe, acknowledged that they had "already received their respective
shares of inheritance in advance," 24 and therefore, renounced their
claims over Lot No. 4676 in favor of co-heirs Marcelina, Leonora, Flora and
Ireneo, as follows:
[W]e hereby RENOUNCED, WAIVED AND QUITCLAIM, all our
rights, interests and participations over the WHOLE parcel of
land [Lot No. 4676], left by the late, LIBORIO CASILANG, in
favor of our co-heirs, namely[:] MARCELINA Z. CASILANG-
PARAYNO, LEONORA Z. CASILANG-SARMIENTO, FLORA Z.
CASILANG, MARIO A. CASILANG, ANGELO A. CASILANG,
ROSARIO A. CASILANG-DIZON AND RODOLFO A.
CASILANG[.] 25  llcd

Thus, Jose expressly renounced his share in Lot No. 4676, which
has an area of 4,164 sq m, because he had already received in advance
his share in his father's estate, Lot No. 4618 with 897 sq m:
To the mind of the court, Jose Casilang could have not [sic]
renounced and waived his rights and interests over Lot [No.]
4676 if he believes that Lot [No.] 4618 is not his, while the other
lot, Lot [No.] 470[4], was divided between sister Jacinta
Casilang and brother Bonifacio Casilang[,] Sr., who was
represented by his son. In the same [way] as testified to by
plaintiffs Felicidad Casilang and Jacinta Casilang, they signed
the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim wherein they
waived and renounced their rights and interests over Lot [No.]
4676 because they have already received their share, which is
Lot [No.] 470[4]. 26
The RTC found baseless the claim of Rosario that Lot No. 4618 was
an inheritance of her father Ireneo considering that a tax declaration is not
conclusive proof of ownership. The RTC even noted that the tax
declaration of Ireneo started only in 1994, although he had been dead
since 1992. "Such being the case, the heirs of Ir[e]neo Casilang has [sic]
no basis in adjudicating unto themselves Lot No. 4618 and partitioning the
same by executing the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim." 27
Appeal to the CA
 Undeterred, Rosario appealed to the CA averring that: (1) the lower
court erred in declaring the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim
dated April 3, 1997 as null and void; and (2) the lower court erred in
declaring Jose as the lawful owner and possessor of the subject Lot No.
4618. 28
In the now assailed decision, the CA reversed the RTC by relying
mainly on the factual findings and conclusions of the MTC in Civil Case
No. 847, viz.:
Per the records, the above described property was subject
of Civil Case No. 847 decided by the MTC of Calasiao, First
Judicial Region, Province of Pangasinan which rendered a
judgment, supra, in favor of Appellant ROSARIO ordering herein
Appellee JOSE and all persons claiming rights under him to
vacate the land of Appellant ROSARIO. It was found by the MTC
that the latter is the owner of the subject parcel of land located at
Talibaew, Calasiao, Pangasinan; that the former owner of the
land is the late IRENEO (who died on 11 June 1992), father of
Appellant ROSARIO; that Extra Judicial Partition with Quitclaim
was executed by and among the heirs of the late IRENEO; that
MAURO [sic], ANGELO and RODOLFO, all surnamed
CASILANG waived and quitclaimed their respective shares over
the subject property in favor of Appellant ROSARIO; that Appellee
JOSE was allowed by the late IRENEO during his lifetime to
occupy a portion of the land without a contract of lease and no
rentals being paid by the former; that Appellant ROSARIO
allowed Appellee JOSE to continue occupying the land after the
Extra Judicial Partition with Quitclaim was executed. 29 SHcDAI

Moreover, noting that the decision in Civil Case No. 847 in favor of
Rosario was issued on February 18, 1998 while the petitioners' complaint
in Civil Case No. 98-02371-D was filed on June 2, 1998, the CA concluded
that the latter case was a mere afterthought:
If the latter has really a strong and valid reason to question the
validity of the Deed of Extra Judicial Partition with
Quitclaim, supra, he could have done it soon after the said Deed
was executed on 3 April 1997. However, curiously enough, it
was only when the MTC ordered his eviction from the subject
property that he decided to file the instant case against the
Appellants. 30
Petition for Review in the Supreme Court
Now in this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners maintain that:
IN UPHOLDING THE LEGALITY [OF] THE DEED OF
EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION AND QUITCLAIM DATED APRIL
3, 1997, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY
VIOLATED THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT OF JOSE Z.
CASILANG[,] SR. AS DIRECT COMPULSORY HEIR. 31
Our Ruling and Discussions
There is merit in the petition.
Inferior courts are empowered to
rule on the question of ownership
 raised by the defendant in an
ejectment suit, but only to resolve
the issue of possession; its
determination is not conclusive on
the issue of ownership.
It is well to be reminded of the settled distinction between a
summary action of ejectment and a plenary action for recovery of
possession and/or ownership of the land. What really distinguishes an
action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action (accion
publiciana) and from a reinvindicatory action (accion reinvindicatoria) is
that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto. Unlawful
detainer suits (accion interdictal) together with forcible entry are the two
forms of ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of real
property. Aside from the summary action of ejectment, accion publiciana or
the plenary action to recover the right of possession and accion
reinvindicatoria or the action to recover ownership which also includes
recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of actions to judicially
recover possession. 32 caHIAS

Under Section 3 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,the Summary

Procedure governs the two forms of ejectment suit, the purpose being to
provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to
possession of the property. They are not processes to determine the actual
title to an estate. If at all, inferior courts are empowered to rule on the
question of ownership raised by the defendant in such suits, only to
resolve the issue of possession and its determination on the ownership
issue is not conclusive. 33 As thus provided in Section 16 of Rule 70:
Sec. 16. Resolving defense of ownership. — When the
defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and
the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding
the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved
only to determine the issue of possession.
It is apropos, then, to note that in contrast to Civil Case No. 847,
which is an ejectment case, Civil Case No. 98-02371-D is for "Annulment
of Documents, Ownership and Peaceful Possession;" it is an accion
reinvindicatoria, or action to recover ownership, which necessarily includes
recovery of possession 34 as an incident thereof. Jose asserts his
ownership over Lot No. 4618 under a partition agreement with his co-heirs,
and seeks to invalidate Ireneo's "claim" over Lot No. 4618 and to declare
TD No. 555 void, and consequently, to annul the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition and Quitclaim executed by Ireneo's heirs.
It is imperative to review the CA's
factual conclusions since they are
entirely contrary to those of the
RTC, they have no citation of
specific supporting evidence, and
are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence, particularly on
the parties' verbal partition, but
 are directly contradicted by the
evidence on record.
It must be noted that the factual findings of the MTC, which the CA
adopted without question, were obtained through Summary Procedure and
were based solely on the complaint and affidavits of Rosario, after Jose
had been declared in default. But since a full trial was had in Civil Case
No. 98-02371-D, the CA should have pointed out the specific errors and
weaknesses in the RTC's factual conclusions before it could rule that Jose
was unable to present "any evidentiary support" to establish his title, and
that his continued possession of Lot No. 4618 was by mere tolerance of
Rosario. At most, however, the CA only opined that it was conjectural for
the RTC to conclude, that Jose had already received his inheritance when
he renounced his share in Lot No. 4676. It then ruled that the RTC erred in
not considering the findings of the MTC in Civil Case No. 847 — that
Jose's possession over subject property was by mere tolerance. Said the
appellate court: cAHIaE

Given the claim of the Appellee that Lot [No.] 4618

was orally given/assigned to him by his deceased father
LIBORIO, or that his claim was corroborated by his sisters (his co-
plaintiffs-Appellees), or that their claim is indubitably tied up with
the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim over Lot No.
4676, still We cannot fully agree with the pronouncement of the
court a quo that Appellee JOSE could not have renounced and
waived his rights and interest over Lot [No.] 4676 if he believes
that Lot [No.] 4618 is not his. Wanting any evidentiary support,
We find this stance as conjectural being unsubstantiated by law or
convincing evidence. At the most and taking the factual or legal
circumstances as shown by the records, We hold that the court a
quo erred in not considering the findings of the MTC in Civil Case
No. 847 ruling that herein Appellee JOSE's possession over
subject property was by mere tolerance. Based as it is on mere
tolerance, Appellee JOSE's possession therefore could not, in
any way, ripen into ownership. 35 (Citations omitted)
By relying solely on the MTC's findings, the CA completely ignored
the testimonial, documentary and circumstantial evidence of the
petitioners, obtained by the RTC after a full trial on the merits. More
importantly, the CA did not point to any evidence of Rosario that Ireneo
had inherited Lot No. 4618 from Liborio. All it did was adopt the findings of
the MTC.
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and unless the case falls
under any of the well-defined exceptions, the Supreme Court will not delve
once more into the findings of facts. In Sps. Sta. Maria v. CA, 36 this Court
stated:
Settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases
brought before it from the Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law. Findings
of fact of the latter are conclusive, except in the following
instances: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when
there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
 based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of
fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts
set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when
the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record. 37 (Citation omitted) 
cDTaSH

In the instant case, the factual findings of the CA and the RTC are
starkly contrasting. Moreover, we find that the CA decision falls under
exceptions (7), (8) and (10) above, which warrants another review of its
factual findings.
The evidence supporting Rosario's claim of sole ownership of Lot
No. 4618 is the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim, which she
executed with her brothers Mario, Angelo and Rodolfo. There is no
question that by itself, the said document would have fully conveyed to
Rosario whatever rights her brothers might have in Lot No. 4618. But what
needs to be established first is whether or not Ireneo did in fact own Lot
No. 4618 through succession, as Rosario claims. And here now lies the
very crux of the controversy.
A review of the parties' evidence
shows that they entered into an oral
partition, giving Lot No. 4618 to
Jose as his share, whereas Rosario
presented no proof whatsoever that
her father inherited Lot No. 4618
from his father Liborio.
Rosario's only proof of Ireneo's ownership is TD No. 555, issued in
his name, but she did not bother to explain why it was dated 1994,
although Ireneo died on June 11, 1992. Liborio's ownership of Lot No.
4618 is admitted by all the parties, but it must be asked whether in his
lifetime Liborio did in fact transmit it to Ireneo, and if not, whether it was
conveyed to him by Liborio's heirs. It is imperative for Rosario to have
presented proof of this transfer to Ireneo, in such a form as would have
vested ownership in him. We find, instead, a preponderance of contrary
evidence.
1. In his testimony, Jose claimed that his parents' bamboo house in
Lot No. 4618 disintegrated from wear and tear; so he took them in to his
semi-concrete house in the same lot, which was just a few steps away,
and he cared for them until they died; shortly before Liborio's death, and in
the presence of all his siblings, his father Liborio assigned Lot No. 4618 to
him as his inheritance; his house was demolished in 1998 as a result of the
ejectment case filed against him; but his family continued to live thereat
after reconstructing the house; Ireneo and his family did not live in Lot No.
4618; although Jose's job as an insurance agent took him around
Pangasinan, he always came home to his family in his house in Lot No.
4618, which he used as his permanent address; only Lot No. 4676 was
included in the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated January 8, 1998
because Lot No. 4618 had already been distributed to Jose, and Lot No.
4704 had already been assigned to Jacinta and Bonifacio as their share in
their father's estate. 38 
aSTAcH

2. Jose's testimony was corroborated by petitioners

Felicidad, 39 Jacinta, 40 Leonora, 41 and Flora, 42 who all confirmed that
their brother Jose has always resided in Lot No. 4618 from his childhood
up to the present, that he took their aged parents into his house after their
bamboo house was destroyed, and he attended to their needs until they
died in 1982. The sisters were also one in saying that their father Liborio
verbally willed Lot No. 4618 to Jose as his share in his estate, and that
their actual partition affirmed their father's dispositions. Jacinta claimed
that she and Bonifacio have since taken possession of Lot No. 4704
pursuant to their partition, and have also declared their respective portions
for tax purposes. 43 Flora corroborated Jacinta on their taking possession
of Lot No. 4704, as well as that Jose built his house on Lot No. 4618 next
to his parents and they came to live with him in their old age. Flora
affirmed that Exhibit "F" correctly reflects their verbal partition of Lot No.
4676, and that she was fully in accord with it. She added that Felicidad and
Marcelina had since constructed their own houses on the portions of Lot
No. 4676 assigned to them. 44 Felicidad mentioned that in their partition,
Ireneo was given a portion of Lot No. 4676, while Lot No. 4704 was divided
between Jacinta and Bonifacio, and Jose alone got Lot No. 4618. Leonora
confirmed that they were all present when their father made his above
dispositions of his estate.
3. Benjamin Lorenzo, a long-time neighbor of the Casilangs testified
that Jose's house stands on Lot No. 4618 and Ireneo did not live with his
family on the said lot but was a tenant in another farm some distance
away. 45
4. For her part, Rosario merely asserted that her father Ireneo
succeeded to Lot No. 4618 from Liborio, as shown in TD No. 555 (Exhibit
"1"); that she and her brothers extra-judicially settled Ireneo's estate, and
that they each waived their shares in her favor; and, that she has been
paying taxes on Lot No. 4618. Rosario admitted, however, that Jose has
lived in the lot since he was a child, and he has reconstructed his house
thereon after its court-ordered demolition. 46 But Rosario on cross-
examination backtracked by claiming that it was her father Ireneo and
grandfather Liborio who built the old house in Lot No. 4618, where Ireneo
resided until his death; he even planted various fruit trees. Yet, there is no
mention whatsoever to this effect by any of the witnesses. Rosario also
contradicted herself when she denied that Jose lived there because his job
as insurance agent took him away often and yet admitted that Jose's
house stands there, which he reconstructed after it was ordered
demolished by the MTC. Inexplicably, Rosario disclaimed knowledge of
Ireneo's share in Lot No. 4676, although she was a signatory, along with
her brothers and all the petitioners, in the deed of partition of the said lot,
whereby she got 1,308 sq m. Rosario also admitted that taxes were paid
on the lot only beginning in 1997, not before. 47 cDECIA
 5. Benjamin Dizon, husband of Rosario, testified that Rosario was
losing appetite and sleep because of the case filed by Jose; that Ireneo
died in another farm; that Ireneo had a house in Lot No. 4618 but Jose
took over the house after he died in 1992. 48 Respondent Angelo,
brother of Rosario, claimed that when he was 13 or 14 years old, he heard
his grandfather tell his father Ireneo that he would inherit Lot No. 4618. On
cross-examination, Angelo insisted that his father had always lived with his
family in his grandfather's house in Lot No. 4618, that Jose did not live
there but was given another lot, although he could not say which lot it was;
he admitted that his grandmother lived with Jose when she died, and
Ireneo's share was in Lot No. 4676. 49
6. On rebuttal, Jose recounted that after his four children were
married, Ireneo lived as a tenant in another farm; that during a
period of illness he lived in Manila for some time, and later resided in
Cagayan with his two married sons; and lastly on his return, worked as a
tenant of the Maningding family for about 10 years in Calasiao, staying in a
hut one kilometer away. Jose also claimed that Ireneo had asked Liborio
for a portion of Lot No. 4676, a lot which is bigger than Lot No. 4618 by
several hundreds of square meters. 50
7. On sur-rebuttal, Rosario claimed that her grandparents, father and
mother lived in Lot No. 4618 when she was a child until she married and
left in 1976; that her uncle Jose asked permission from Liborio to be
allowed to stay there with his family. She admitted that Jose built his house
in 1985, three years after Liborio died, but as if to correct herself, she also
claimed that Jose built his house in Lot No. 4676, and not in Lot No. 4618.
(Contrarily, her aunt Leonora testified that Jose built his house in Lot No.
4618 while their parents were alive.) 51 Moreover, if such was the case,
Rosario did not explain why she filed Civil Case No. 847, if she thought her
uncle built his house in Lot No. 4676, and not in Lot No. 4618. 52 Rosario
also claimed that Ireneo always came home in the evenings to his father
Liborio's house from the Maningding farm, which he tenanted for 10 years,
but obviously, by then Liborio's house had long been gone. Again,
confusedly, Rosario denied that she knew of her father's share in Lot No.
4676.
From the testimonies of the parties, we are convinced that the
conclusion of the RTC is well-supported that there was indeed a
verbal partition among the heirs of Liborio, pursuant to which each of his
eight children received his or her share of his estate, and that Jose's share
was Lot No. 4618.  aSECAD

The parties' verbal partition is

valid, and has been ratified by their
taking possession of their respective
shares.
The validity of an oral partition is well-settled in our jurisdiction.
In Vda. de Espina v. Abaya, 53 this Court declared that an oral partition is
valid:
Anent the issue of oral partition, We sustain
the validity of said partition. "An agreement of partition may be
made orally or in writing. An oral agreement for the partition of the
 property owned in common is valid and enforceable upon the
parties. The Statute of Frauds has no operation in this
kind of agreements, for partition is not a conveyance of property
but simply a segregation and designation of the part of the
property which belong to the co-owners." 54
In Maestrado v. CA, 55 the Supreme Court upheld the partition after
it found that it conformed to the alleged oral partition of the heirs, and that
the oral partition was confirmed by the notarized quitclaims executed by
the heirs subsequently. 56 In Maglucot-Aw v. Maglucot, 57 the Supreme
Court elaborated on the validity of parol partition:
On general principle, independent and in spite of the
statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforce [sic] oral partition
when it has been completely or partly performed.
Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to
partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity will [in] proper
cases[,] where the parol partition has actually been consummated
by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of
ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each,
recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the
parties thereunder. Thus, it has been held or stated in a number
of cases involving an oral partition under which the parties went
into possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly
performed the partition agreement, that equity will confirm such
partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with the
possession in severalty. THIECD

In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol

partition may be sustained on the ground of estoppel of the
parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of
land divided by parol partition as to which possession in severalty
was taken and acts of individual ownership were exercised. And a
court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be
valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the
parties as between each other to hold their respective parts in
severalty.
A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that
the parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by
taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with
respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the
partition.
A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of
part performance, or have stated that a part performance is
necessary, to take a parol partition out of the operation of the
statute of frauds. It has been held that where there was a partition
in fact between tenants in common, and a part performance, a
court of equity would have regard to and enforce such partition
agreed to by the parties. 58
Jose's possession of Lot No. 4618 under a claim of ownership is well
borne out by the records. It is also consistent with the claimed verbal
partition with his siblings, and fully corroborated by his sisters Felicidad,
Jacinta, Leonora, and Flora, who further testified that they each had taken
possession of their own shares and built their houses thereon.
 A possessor of real estate property is presumed to have title thereto
unless the adverse claimant establishes a better right. 59 Moreover, under
Article 541 of the Civil Code, one who possesses in the concept of owner
has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a just title,
and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it. Similarly, Article 433 of
the Civil Code provides that actual possession under a claim of ownership
raises a disputable presumption of ownership. Thus, actual possession
and exercise of dominion over definite portions of the property in
accordance with an alleged partition are considered strong proof of an oral
partition 60 which the Court will not hesitate to uphold. 
TEIHDa

Tax declarations and tax receipts

are not conclusive evidence of
ownership.
It is settled that tax declarations and tax receipts alone are not
conclusive evidence of ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of
ownership, 61 but when coupled with proof of actual possession of the
property, they can be the basis of claim of ownership through
prescription. 62 In the absence of actual, public and adverse possession,
the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove
ownership. 63 We have seen that there is no proof that Liborio, or the
Casilang siblings conveyed Lot No. 4618 to Ireneo. There is also no proof
that Ireneo himself declared Lot No. 4618 for tax purposes, and even if he
or his heirs did, this is not enough basis to claim ownership over the
subject property. The Court notes that TD No. 555 was issued only in
1994, two years after Ireneo's death. Rosario even admitted that she
began paying taxes only in 1997. 64 More importantly, Ireneo never
claimed Lot No. 4618 nor took possession of it in the concept of owner.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated July 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
79619 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated
April 21, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 41 in
Civil Case No. 98-02371-D is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 133345. March 9, 2000.]

JOSEFA CH. MAESTRADO, as substituted by her

daughter LOURDES MAESTRADO-LAVIÑA and CARMEN
CH. ABAYA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, Ninth Division and JESUS C. ROA, JR.,
RAMON P. CHAVES and NATIVIDAD S.
SANTOS, respondents.

[G.R. No. 133324. March 9, 2000.]

JOSEFA CHAVES MAESTRADO and CARMEN CHAVES

ABAYA, petitioners, vs. JESUS C. ROA, JR., RAMON P.
CHAVES and NATIVIDAD S. SANTOS, respondents.

Santiago Cruz & Saarte for Carmen Chaves-Abaya.

Tan Acut & Madrid for Lourdes Maestrado-Lavina.
Quimpo Borja Neri Calejesan & Oclarit Law Office for R. Chaves.
Constantino G. Jarsula and Francis Saturnino C. Juan for N. Santos
and R.P. Chaves.
Teogenes Velez for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

The consolidated cases involved the status of Lot 5872 and the
rights of the contending parties thereto. The said lot which has an area of
57.601 square meters, however, is still registered in the name of the
deceased spouses Ramon and Rosario Chaves. The spouses died
intestate in 1943 and 1944 respectively. They were survived by the
following heirs, namely: Carmen Chaves-Abaya, Josefa Chaves-
Maestrado, Angel Chaves, Amparo Chaves-Roa, Concepcion Chaves-
Sanvictores and Salvador Chaves. The estate of the decedents were
settled in an intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Manila,
but the questioned property was not included because of the existence of
an oral agreement and quitclaim in favor of the petitioners. Six years after
the execution of the quitclaim, respondents discovered that Lot 5872 is still
in the name of the decedent. Because of this non-inclusion, respondents
wrote a letter to their uncle Angel Chaves to inform him that said property,
which they claim to belong to the estate of their deceased grandparents,
was not yet distributed to the concerned heirs. Hence, they requested
Angel Chaves to distribute and deliver it to the heirs. In response,
petitioners filed an action for quieting of title against respondents in the
Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. On April 10, 1985, the trial
court rendered a decision in favor of respondents declaring Lot 5872 still a
common property, hence, should be divided accordingly. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the trial court. Aggrieved by this
decision, herein petitioners filed separate petitions of review questioning
the decision of the Court of Appeals and since the two petitions involved
the same facts and issues, the Court decided to consolidate the same.  cTAaDC

The Court found the petition impressed with merit. The Court ruled
that the appellate court erred in declaring Lot 5872 a common property.
The subject property is no longer a common property of the heirs of
deceased spouses Ramon and Rosario Chaves as Petitioner's ownership
over said property was acquired by reason of the oral partition agreed
upon by the deceased spouses' heirs sometime in 1956. The oral
agreement was confirmed by the notarized quitclaims executed by the said
heirs on August 16, 1977 and September 16, 1977. Thus, said quitclaims
duly confirmed and undeniably established the title of the ownership of the
petitioner over the subject Lot 5872. Accordingly, the petitions were
granted and the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed and set
aside.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; QUIETING OF TITLE; IF THE PLAINTIFF IN AN

ACTION FOR QUIETING OF TITLE IS IN POSSESSION OF THE
PROPERTY BEING LITIGATED, SUCH ACTION IS IMPRESCRIPTIBLE.
— Petitioners are proper parties to bring an action for quieting of title.
Persons having legal as well as equitable title to or interest in a real
property may bring such action and "title" here does not necessarily denote
a certificate of title issued in favor of the person filing the suit. Moreover, if
the plaintiff in an action for quieting of title is in possession of the property
being litigated, such action is imprescriptible. One who is in actual
possession of a land, claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his
possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to
vindicate his right because his undisturbed possession gives him a
continuing right to seek the aid of the courts to ascertain the nature of the
adverse claim and its effects on his title.
2. ID.; LACHES, NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — Although
prescription and laches are distinct concepts, we have held, nonetheless,
that in some instances, the doctrine of laches is inapplicable where the
action was filed within the prescriptive period provided by law. Thus,
laches does not apply in this case because petitioners' possession of the
subject lot has rendered their right to bring an action for quieting of title
imprescriptible and, hence, not barred by laches. Moreover, since laches is
a creation of equity, acts or conduct alleged to constitute the same must be
intentional and unequivocal so as to avoid injustice. Laches operates not
really to penalize neglect or sleeping on one's rights, but rather to avoid
recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable
situation.
3. ID.; PROPERTY; POSSESSION; A POSSESSOR OF REAL
ESTATE PROPERTY IS PRESUMED TO HAVE TITLE THERETO
UNLESS THE ADVERSE CLAIMANT ESTABLISHES A BETTER RIGHT.
— We are convinced, however, that there was indeed
an oral agreement of partition entered into by the heirs/parties. This is the
only way we can make sense out of the actual partition of the
properties of the estate despite claims that a court order provided
otherwise. Prior to the actual partition, petitioners were not in
possession of Lot No. 5872 but for some reason or another, it was
delivered to them. From 1956, the year of the actual partition of the
estate of the deceased Chaves spouses, until 1983, no one among the
heirs questioned petitioners' possession of or ownership over said Lot No.
5872. Hence, we are convinced that there was indeed
an oral agreement of partition among the said heirs and the
distribution of the properties was consistent with such oral agreement. In
any event, the parties had plenty of time to rectify the situation but no such
move was done until 1983. A possessor of real estate property is
presumed to have title thereto unless the adverse claimant establishes a
better right. In the instant case it is the petitioners, being the
possessors of Lot No. 5872, who have established a superior right thereto
by virtue of the oral partition which was also confirmed by the notarized
quitclaims of the heirs.
4. ID.; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; PARTITION;
DEFINED; ORAL PARTITION BY THE HEIRS IS VALID IF NO
CREDITORS ARE AFFECTED. — Partition is the separation, division and
assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may
belong. It may be effected extra-judicially by the heirs themselves through
a public instrument filed before the register of deeds. However, as between
the parties, a public instrument is neither constitutive nor an inherent
element of a contract of partition. Since registration serves as constructive
notice to third persons, an oral partition by the heirs is valid if no creditors
are affected. Moreover, even the requirement of a written memorandum
under the statute of frauds does not apply to partitions effected by the heirs
where no creditors are involved considering that such transaction is not a
conveyance of property resulting in change of ownership but merely a
designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NEITHER A TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
NOR A SUBDIVISION PLAN IS ESSENTIAL TO
THE VALIDITY OF AN ORAL PARTITION. — Nevertheless, respondent
court was convinced that Lot No. 5872 is still common property of the
heirs of the deceased spouses Ramon and Rosario Chaves because the
TCT covering the said property is still registered in the name of the said
deceased spouses. Unfortunately, respondent court was oblivious to the
doctrine that the act of registration of a voluntary instrument is the
operative act which conveys or affects registered land insofar as third
persons are concerned. Hence, even without registration, the contract is
still valid as between the parties. In fact, it has been recently held and
reiterated by this Court that neither a Transfer Certificate of Title nor a
subdivision plan is essential to the validity of an oral partition.
6. ID.; OBLIGATION AND CONTRACTS; QUITCLAIM; VALID IN
CASE AT BAR. — The said notarized quitclaims signed by the heirs in
favor of petitioners are not vitiated by fraud. Hence, they are valid. Since
the oral partition has been duly established, the notarized quitclaims
confirmed such prior oral agreement as well as the petitioners' title of
ownership over the subject Lot No. 5872. More importantly, independent of
such oral partition, the quitclaims in the instant case are valid contracts of
waiver of property rights. The freedom to enter into contracts, such as the
quitclaims in the instant case, is protected by law and the courts are not
quick to interfere with such freedom unless the contract is contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public policy or public order. Quitclaims, being
contracts of waiver, involve the relinquishment of rights, with knowledge of
their existence and intent to relinquish them. The intent to waive rights
must be clearly and convincingly shown. Moreover; when the only proof of
intent is the act of a party, such act should be manifestly consistent and
indicative of an intent to voluntary relinquish a particular right such that no
other reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible. In the instant
case, the terms of the subject quitclaims dated August 16, 1977 and
September 8, 1977 are clear; and the heirs' signatures thereon have no
other significance but their conformity thereto resulting in a valid waiver of
property rights. Herein respondents quite belatedly and vainly attempted to
invoke alleged fraud in the execution of the said quitclaims but we are not
convinced. In other words, the said quitclaims being duly notarized and
acknowledged before a notary public, deserve full credence and are valid
and enforceable in the absence of overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
In the case at bench, it is our view and we hold that the execution of the
said quitclaims was not fraudulent.
7. ID.; ID.; FRAUD; EXPLAINED; CONTRACTS ARE NOT SET
ASIDE MERELY BECAUSE SOLICITATION, IMPORTUNITY,
ARGUMENT, PERSUASION OR APPEAL TO AFFECTION WERE USED
TO OBTAIN THE CONSENT OF THE OTHER PARTY. — Dolo
causante or fraud which attends the execution of a contract is an essential
cause that vitiates consent and hence, it is a ground for the annulment of a
contract. Fraud is never presumed, otherwise, courts would be indulging in
speculations and surmises. It must be established by clear and convincing
evidence but it was not so in the case at bench. A mere preponderance of
evidence is not even adequate to prove fraud. The instances of fraud
allegedly committed in the case at bench are not the kind of fraud
contemplated by law. On the contrary, they constitute mere carelessness
in the conduct of the affairs of the heirs concerned. We have consistently
denied relief to a party who seeks to avoid the performance of an
obligation voluntarily assumed because they turned out to be disastrous or
unwise contracts, even if there was a mistake of law or fact. Moreover, we
do not set aside contracts merely because solicitation, importunity,
argument, persuasion or appeal to affection were used to obtain the
consent of the other party. EHSCcT

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J  : p

Before us are two (2) consolidated petitions for review

on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 dated November 28,
1997 declaring Lot No. 5872, located in Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City,
as common property of the heirs of the deceased spouses, Ramon and
Rosario Chaves, and ordering its equal division among all the co-owners.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 23 of Cagayan de Oro City, which dismissed petitioners' action
against the private respondents for Quieting of Title over the said lot. 
cdasia

The pertinent facts are the following:

These consolidated cases involve the status of Lot No. 5872 and the
rights of the contending parties thereto. The said lot which has an area of
57.601 square meters, however, is still registered in the name of the
deceased spouses Ramon and Rosario Chaves. The spouses Ramon and
Rosario died intestate in 1943 and 1944, respectively. They were survived
by the following heirs, namely: Carmen Chaves-Abaya, Josefa Chaves-
Maestrado, Angel Chaves, Amparo Chaves-Roa, Concepcion Chaves-
Sanvictores and Salvador Chaves.
To settle the estate of the said deceased spouses, Angel Chaves
initiated intestate proceedings 3 in the Court of First Instance of Manila and
was appointed administrator of said estates in the process. An inventory of
the estates was made and thereafter, the heirs agreed on a project of
partition. Thus, they filed an action for partition 4 before the Court of First
Instance of Misamis Oriental. The court appointed Hernando Roa,
husband of Amparo Chaves-Roa, as receiver. On June 6, 1956, the court
rendered a decision approving the project of partition. However, the
records of said case are missing and although respondents claimed
otherwise, they failed to present a copy of said decision. cda

This notwithstanding, the estate was actually divided in this wise: (1)

Lot No. 3046 situated in Bulalong, Cagayan de Oro City, consisting of 44
hectares of coconut land was distributed equally among four (4) heirs,
namely: (a) Concepcion Chaves-Sanvictores; (b) Angel Chaves; (c)
Amparo Chaves-Roa; and (d) Ramon Chaves, while (2) Lot Nos. 5925,
5934, 1327 and 5872, all located in Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City and
consisting of an aggregate area of 14 hectares was distributed equally
between petitioners (a) Josefa Chaves-Maestrado; and (b) Carmen
Chaves-Abaya.
 At the time of the actual partition, Salvador Chaves had already
died. His share was given to his only son, Ramon, who is the namesake of
Salvador's father. In 1956, the year the partition case was decided and
effected, receiver Hernando Roa delivered the respective shares of said
heirs in accordance with the above scheme. Subsequently, Concepcion
sold her share to Angel, while Ramon sold his share to Amparo. Hence,
one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 3046 went to Angel and the other half to Amparo.
Significantly, Lot No. 5872 was not included in any of the following
documents: (1) the inventory of properties of the estate submitted to the
court in the proceedings for the settlement of said estate; (2) the project of
partition submitted to the court for approval; (3) the properties receiver
Hernando Roa had taken possession of, which he listed in the
"Constancia" submitted to the court; and (4) the court order approving the
partition. Decedent Ramon Chaves acquired Lot No. 5872 from Felomino
Bautista, Sr. but he subsequently delivered it to the spouses Hernando
Roa and Amparo Chaves-Roa. 5 It was thereafter delivered to petitioners
during the actual partition in 1956, and petitioners have been in possession
of the same since then.
As to the omission of Lot No. 5872 in the inventory and project of
partition, the parties offer different explanations. Respondents claim that
due to the series of transactions involving the said lot, the heirs were
unsure if it belonged to the decedents' estate at all. As a result, they
deferred its inclusion in the inventory of the properties of the estate and its
distribution pending the investigation of its status. In fact, administrator
Angel Chaves filed a motion in the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate to include the said lot in the inventory but the court did not act on it.
Petitioners, on the other hand, insist that the omission was inadvertent and
the inaction of the court on the motion was due to the compromise
agreement entered into by the heirs. 6
Petitioners' thesis consists of the existence of an oral partition
agreement entered into by all heirs soon after the death of their parents.
The proposed project of partition was allegedly based on it but the court's
order of partition failed to embody such oral agreement due to the
omission of Lot No. 5872. For some reason, however, the actual partition
of the estate conformed to the alleged oral agreement.  Cdpr

Petitioners claim that they failed to notice the non-inclusion of Lot

No. 5872 in the court's order. They only realized such fact after the death
in 1976 of Silvino Maestrado, the husband of petitioner Josefa. They
discovered among Silvino's belongings, the partition order and found out
that Lot No. 5872 was not included therein. 7
In an effort to set things right, petitioners prepared a quitclaim to
confirm the alleged oral agreement. On August 16, 1977, Angel,
Concepcion and Ramon signed a notarized quitclaim in favor of
petitioners. Amparo was unable to sign because she had an accident and
had passed away on the following day. It was her heirs who signed a
similarly worded and notarized quitclaim on September 8, 1977. 8
Respondents dispute the voluntariness of their consent or the
consent of their predecessors-in-interest to the quitclaims. Ramon claims
to have been betrayed by his lawyer, Francisco Velez, who is the son-in-
law of petitioner Josefa Maestrado. He allegedly signed the quitclaim
without reading it because his lawyer had already read it. He believed that
since his lawyer was protecting his interests, it was all right to sign it after
hearing no objections from said lawyer. On the other hand, Angel signed
the quitclaim "out of respect" for petitioners. On the other hand,
Concepcion signed because she was misled by alleged
misrepresentations in the "Whereas Clauses" of the quitclaim to the effect
that the lot was inadvertently omitted and not deliberately omitted due to
doubts on its status. 9
Six (6) years after the execution of the quitclaims, respondents
discovered that Lot No. 5872 is still in the name of the deceased spouses
Ramon and Rosario Chaves. Thus, on October 14, 1983, respondent
Ramon Chaves, sole heir of Salvador Chaves, and respondent Jesus Roa,
son of Amparo Chaves-Roa, wrote a letter to their uncle Angel Chaves to
inform him that said property, which they claim to belong to the estate of
their deceased grandparents, has not yet been distributed to the
concerned heirs. Hence, they requested Angel Chaves to distribute and
deliver it to the heirs. 10 On October 24, 1983, respondent Natividad
Santos, daughter and attorney-in-fact of Concepcion Chaves-Sanvictores,
also wrote a similar letter to Angel Chaves. On December 1, 1983, Angel
Chaves transmitted the said letters to petitioner Carmen Abaya and
requested her to respond.  cda

In response, petitioners filed, on December 22, 1983, an action for

Quieting of Title 11 against respondents in the Regional Trial Court of
Cagayan de Oro. On April 10, 1995, the trial court rendered its Decision in
favor of respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"In view of these facts, the court therefore considers the
property, Lot 5872 still common property. Consequently, the
property must be divided in six (6) parts, there being six heirs. But
since the group of Jesus Roa already quitclaimed in favor of
plaintiffs and the same is true with Angel Chaves, the defendants
Natividad Santos and Ramon Chaves shall receive one-sixth (1/6)
each out of Lot 5872 and the balance will be divided equally by
the plaintiffs Josefa Chaves-Maestrado represented by her
daughters and the other half to Carmen Chaves-Abaya.
With no other pronouncements.
SO ORDERED."
The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which in a
Decision, promulgated on November 28, 1997, sustained the said Decision
of the trial court, in this wise:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the
Decision dated April 10, 1995 subject of the appeal, is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against the plaintiffs-appellants. 
cdasia

SO ORDERED."
On May 29, 1998, petitioner Lourdes Maestrado-Lavina, in
substitution of her deceased mother, Josefa Chaves-Maestrado, filed a
petition for review on certiorari with this Court. 12 Petitioner Carmen
Chaves-Abaya also filed her own petition for review on certiorari on June
1, 1998. 13 Since the two petitions involve the same facts and issues, we
decided in a Resolution 14 to consolidate the said cases.
Petitioner Maestrado-Lavina assigns the following errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DECLARING LOT 5872 AS
STILL COMMON PROPERTY, THEREBY EFFECTIVELY
NULLIFYING THE VERBAL PARTITION AGREEMENT
REACHED AND IMPLEMENTED BY THE
CHILDREN/HEIRS OF DECEDENTS RAMON AND
ROSARIO CHAVES WAY BACK IN 1956;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DECLARING LOT 5872 AS
STILL COMMON PROPERTY UPON ITS CONCLUSION
THAT THE SIGNATURES OF RESPONDENTS ON THE
DULY NOTARIZED QUITCLAIMS WERE OBTAINED
THROUGH FRAUD;
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS LEGAL
CONCLUSION THAT, ON THE BASIS ALONE OF THE
CLAIMS THAT (A) RAMON CHAVES SIGNED THE
QUITCLAIM WITHOUT READING IT; AND THAT (B)
ANGEL CHAVES SIGNED THE QUITCLAIM OUT OF
RESPECT, THERE WAS FRAUD AS WOULD VITIATE
RESPONDENTS CONSENT TO THE QUITCLAIMS;
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONERS
HAVE NO CAPACITY TO SUE FOR QUIETING OF TITLE
OR REMOVAL OF CLOUD THEREON ON THE BASIS
ALONE THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOT THE
REGISTERED OWNERS OF LOT 5872;
V. IT BEING UNDISPUTED THAT THE FACTS GIVING RISE TO
CLOUD ON JOSEFA'S AND CARMEN'S OWNERSHIP
OVER LOT 5872 SURFACED ONLY IN 1983 AND
PETITIONERS FILED THE CORRESPONDING ACTION
TO QUIET TITLE OR REMOVE CLOUD THEREON ALSO
IN 1983, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT
PETITIONERS ARE GUILTY OF LACHES. 15
Petitioner Carmen Chaves-Abaya, on the other hand, assigns the
following errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
CLEAR ERROR IN THE INTERPRETATION OF LAW IN
HOLDING THAT THERE WAS FRAUD IN OBTAINING
THE CONSENT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT RAMON P.
CHAVES AND CONCEPCION CHAVES SANVICTORES,
THE MOTHER OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT NATIVIDAD
SANTOS, TO THE DEEDS OF QUITCLAIM;
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE ACTION FOR QUIETING OF TITLE WAS NOT
 BROUGHT BY THE PERSON IN WHOSE NAME THE
TITLE IS ISSUED;
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
RULING THAT PETITIONERS WERE GUILTY OF
LACHES FOR HAVING SLEPT ON THEIR RIGHTS FOR
MORE THAN 25 YEARS. 16
We grant the consolidated petitions, the same being impressed with
merit. 
prLL

First. Petitioners are proper parties to bring an action for quieting of

title. Persons having legal as well as equitable title to or interest in a real
property may bring such action and "title" here does not necessarily denote
a certificate of title issued in favor of the person filing the suit. 17 Moreover,
if the plaintiff in an action for quieting of title is in possession of the
property being litigated, such action is imprescriptible. 18 One who is in
actual possession of a land, claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until
his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to
vindicate his right because his undisturbed possession gives him a
continuing right to seek the aid of the courts to ascertain the nature of the
adverse claim and its effects on his title. 19
Although prescription and laches are distinct concepts, we have
held, nonetheless, that in some instances, the doctrine of laches is
inapplicable where the action was filed within the prescriptive period
provided by law. 20 Thus, laches does not apply in this case because
petitioners' possession of the subject lot has rendered their right to bring
an action for quieting of title imprescriptible and, hence, not barred by
laches. Moreover, since laches is a creation of equity, acts or conduct
alleged to constitute the same must be intentional and unequivocal so as
to avoid injustice. 21 Laches operates not really to penalize neglect or
sleeping on one's rights, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do
so would result in a clearly inequitable situation. 22
In the case at bench, the cloud on petitioners' title to the subject
property came about only on December 1, 1983 when Angel Chaves
transmitted respondents' letters to petitioners, while petitioners' action was
filed on December 22, 1983. Clearly, no laches could set in under the
circumstances since petitioners were prompt and vigilant in protecting their
rights.
Second. Lot No. 5872 is no longer common property of the heirs of
the deceased spouses Ramon and Rosario Chaves. Petitioners'
ownership over said lot was acquired by reason of the oral partition agreed
upon by the deceased spouses' heirs sometime before 1956. That oral
agreement was confirmed by the notarized quitclaims executed by the said
heirs on August 16, 1977 and September 8, 1977, supra.
It appeared that the decision in Civil Case No. 867, which ordered
the partition of the decedents' estate, was not presented by either party
thereto. The existence of the oral partition together with the said quitclaims
is the bone of contention in this case. It appeared, however, that the actual
partition of the estate conformed to the alleged oral partition despite a
contrary court order. Despite claims of private respondents that Lot No.
5872 was mistakenly delivered to the petitioners, nothing was done to
rectify it for a period of twenty-seven (27) years from 1983. 
cdrep

We are convinced, however, that there was indeed

an oral agreement of partition entered into by the heirs/parties. This is the
only way we can make sense out of the actual partition of the
properties of the estate despite claims that a court order provided
otherwise. Prior to the actual partition, petitioners were not in
possession of Lot No. 5872 but for some reason or another, it was
delivered to them. From 1956, the year of the actual partition of the
estate of the deceased Chaves spouses, until 1983, no one among the
heirs questioned petitioners' possession of or ownership over said Lot No.
5872. Hence, we are convinced that there was indeed
an oral agreement of partition among the said heirs and the
distribution of the properties was consistent with such oral agreement. In
any event, the parties had plenty of time to rectify the situation but no such
move was done until 1983.
A possessor of real estate property is presumed to have title thereto
unless the adverse claimant establishes a better right. 23 In the instant
case it is the petitioners, being the possessors of Lot No. 5872, who have
established a superior right thereto by virtue of the oral partition which was
also confirmed by the notarized quitclaims of the heirs.
Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in
common among those to whom it may belong. 24 It may be effected extra-
judicially by the heirs themselves through a public instrument filed before
the register of deeds. 25
However, as between the parties, a public instrument is neither
constitutive nor an inherent element of a contract of partition. 26 Since
registration serves as constructive notice to third persons,
an oral partition by the heirs is valid if no creditors are
affected. 27 Moreover, even the requirement of a written memorandum
under the statute of frauds does not apply to partitions effected by the heirs
where no creditors are involved considering that such transaction is not a
conveyance of property resulting in change of ownership but merely a
designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir. 28
Nevertheless, respondent court was convinced that Lot No. 5872 is
still common property of the heirs of the deceased spouses Ramon and
Rosario Chaves because the TCT covering the said property is still
registered in the name of the said deceased spouses. Unfortunately,
respondent court was oblivious to the doctrine that the
act of registration of a voluntary instrument is the operative act which
conveys or affects registered land insofar as third persons are
concerned. Hence, even without registration, the contract is still valid as
between the parties. 29 In fact, it has been recently held and reiterated by
this Court that neither a Transfer Certificate of Title nor a subdivision plan
is essential to the validity of an oral partition. 30
In sum, the most persuasive circumstance pointing to the existence
of the oral partition is the fact that the terms of the actual partition and
distribution of the estate are identical to the sharing scheme in the oral
partition. No one among the heirs disturbed this status quo for a period of
twenty-seven (27) years.
Finally. The said notarized quitclaims signed by the heirs in favor of
petitioners are not vitiated by fraud. Hence, they are valid.  cdtai

Since the oral partition has been duly established, the notarized
quitclaims confirmed such prior oral agreement as well as the petitioners'
title of ownership over the subject Lot No. 5872. More importantly,
independent of such oral partition, the quitclaims in the instant case are
valid contracts of waiver of property rights.
The freedom to enter into contracts, such as the quitclaims in the
instant case, is protected by law 31 and the courts are not quick to interfere
with such freedom unless the contract is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public policy or public order. 32 Quitclaims, being contracts of
waiver, involve the relinquishment of rights, with knowledge of their
existence and intent to relinquish them. 33 The intent to waive rights must
be clearly and convincingly shown. Moreover, when the only proof of intent
is the act of a party, such act should be manifestly consistent and
indicative of an intent to voluntarily relinquish a particular right such that no
other reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible. 34
In the instant case, the terms of the subject quitclaims dated August
16, 1977 and September 8, 1977 are clear; and the heirs' signatures
thereon have no other significance but their conformity thereto resulting in
a valid waiver of property rights. 35 Herein respondents quite belatedly and
vainly attempted to invoke alleged fraud in the execution of the said
quitclaims but we are not convinced. In other words, the said quitclaims
being duly notarized and acknowledged before a notary public, deserve full
credence and are valid and enforceable in the absence of overwhelming
evidence to the contrary. 36 In the case at bench, it is our view and we hold
that the execution of the said quitclaims was not fraudulent.  LLjur

Fraud refers to all kinds of deception, whether through insidious

machination, manipulation, concealment or misrepresentation to lead
another party into error. 37 The deceit employed must be serious. It must
be sufficient to impress or lead an ordinarily prudent person into error,
taking into account the circumstances of each case. 38 Silence or
concealment, by itself, does not constitute fraud, unless there is a special
duty to disclose certain facts. 39 Moreover, the bare existence of
confidential relation between the parties, standing alone, does not raise the
presumption of fraud. 40
Dolo causante or fraud which attends the execution of a contract is
an essential cause that vitiates consent and hence, it is a ground for the
annulment of a contract. 41 Fraud is never presumed, otherwise, courts
would be indulging in speculations and surmises. 42 It must be established
by clear and convincing evidence but it was not so in the case at bench. A
mere preponderance of evidence is not even adequate to prove fraud. 43
The instances of fraud allegedly committed in the case at bench are
not the kind of fraud contemplated by law. On the contrary, they constitute
mere carelessness in the conduct of the affairs of the heirs concerned. We
have consistently denied relief to a party who seeks to avoid the
performance of an obligation voluntarily assumed because they turned out
to be disastrous or unwise contracts, even if there was a mistake of law or
fact. 44 Moreover, we do not set aside contracts merely because
solicitation, importunity, argument, persuasion or appeal to affection were
used to obtain the consent of the other party. 45
In a nutshell, the quitclaims dated August 16, 1977 and September
8, 1977 in the case at bench are valid, duly confirmed and undeniably
established the title of ownership of the petitioners over the subject Lot No.
5872. LLphil

WHEREFORE, the instant consolidated petitions are GRANTED.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 28, 1997, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioners' action praying for the
quieting of their title of ownership over Lot No. 5872, located in
Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro, is granted. Costs against respondents.  cdrep

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 157476. March 16, 2011.]

VENANCIO GIVERO, EDGARDO GIVERO and FLORIDA

GAYANES, petitioners, vs. MAXIMO GIVERO and
LORETO GIVERO, respondents.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J  : p

The petitioners appeal the adverse decision promulgated on

October 4, 2002, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
decision rendered against them on November 12, 1993 by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 55, in Irosin, Sorsogon (RTC). 2
The dispute involves a portion of Lot No. 2618 of the
Matnog Cadastre (with an area of 5,000 square meters, more or less) that
the petitioners, particularly Venancio Givero, have claim ed to belong to
them, but which claim was denied by the respondents who have
insisted that the whole of Lot No. 2618, consisting of 12,952 square
meters, more or less, was the share of their late father Rufino Givero, a
brother of Venancio, pursuant to the oral partition among 11 children
(including Venancio and Rufino) made by the spouses Teodorico
Givero and Severina Genavia.
The antecedents are culled from the findings of fact of the RTC,
which the CA affirmed without modification.
The original owners of Lot No. 2618 were Teodorico and
Severina who respectively died in 1917 and 1958. During their
marriage, they acquired properties located in Barangay Balocawe and
Barangay Gadgaron, both in the Municipality of Matnog, Sorsogon.
They had 11 children, namely; Calixta, Timoteo, Eustaquia, Dorotea,
Mamerto, Venancio, Luciano, Ines, Gabriel, Maria, and Rufino, all
surnamed Givero. In his lifetime, Teodorico orally partitioned the
properties among their children by pointing to them their respective
shares. According to Luciano and Maria, who both testified at the trial,
the grown-up children received and occupied the shares assigned to
them, but the rest could receive their shares only after Teodorico's
death in 1917, with Severina delivering their shares. The last to receive
his share was Rufino Givero, the youngest child. ICAcHE

The properties situated in Barangay Balocawe were shared by six

brothers and sisters, namely: Venancio, Gabriel, Luciano, Calixta,
Eustaquia and Dorotea. The properties found in Barangay Gadgaron
were shared by the remaining five brothers and sisters. The Barangay
Gadgaron properties were divided into two by the highway going
towards the direction of the poblacion of Matnog, Sorsogon. The
portion found on the left side of the highway going towards the direction
of the poblacion was the share of Rufino, and the portions on the right
side were allocated to Mamerto, Timoteo, Ines, and Maria. Thus, all the
children of Teodorico and Severina came into full possession of their
perspective shares in accordance with the oral partition made by
Teodorico during his lifetime.
The property in question was part of Lot No. 2618 partitioned to
Rufino. The respondents (plaintiffs below) were the children of Rufino
who had died in 1942, survived at his death by his wife Remedios and
their three sons, namely: Juan, Maximo, and Loreto. Juan, being
already deceased, was survived by his wife and children. Rufino and
Remedios, with their children, had occupied Lot No. 2618 until the
Japanese occupation, when they relocated to the poblacion of Matnog.
Although Rufino, being a soldier, had been away during the war,
Remedios periodically visited the property. In 1945, after the war had
ended, she and her children returned to and stayed on Lot No. 2618. In
1952, she let Venancio build a house on Lot No. 2618 for the use of his
children who were then going to school in the poblacion of Matnog,
considering that Lot No. 2618 was nearer to the poblacion than
Venancio's house in Barangay Balocawe.
In March 1982, however, Venancio started to assert
ownership of the disputed portion of Lot No. 2618 by declaring it in his
name for taxation purposes, and erecting a barbed wire fence around it.
His actuations impelled the respondents to commence on October 15,
1987 in the RTC this action for quieting of title to and recovery of real
property and damages against the petitioners.
 The respondents alleged in their complaint that Lot No. 2618 had
been delivered to them as Rufino's share in the estate of Teodorico
through a deed of donation executed by Severina in their favor as
Rufino's heirs, thereby making them the pro indiviso owners; that they
had been in continuous, peaceful, public, and adverse
possession of the property for 45 years; that the defendants (namely,
petitioners Venancio, his daughter Florida Givero-Gayanes and a
relative Edgardo Givero) had been only permitted by Remedios to build
a small house of light materials on a portion of Lot No. 2618; and that
later on, Venancio, without any right, had enclosed the 5,000-square
meter portion with barbed wire, and had declared the portion under his
name for taxation purposes. 3
In their answer, the petitioners maintained that Teodorico and
Severina had not partitioned their estate among their 11 children; that
the Barangay Balocawe properties of Teodorico and Severina had been
levied and auctioned for realty tax delinquency; that Venancio had
become the owner of the Barangay Balocawe properties by
virtue of redemption, but had given shares to his brothers and sisters
out of magnanimity, retaining only a portion corresponding to the
amount he had paid for the redemption; that Venancio had retained a
share in the Barangay Gadgaron properties, which was the portion in
dispute, because that portion had been his rightful share in the
estate of his father; that Venancio had allowed the respondents to stay
on the properties because they were his nephews; that the
deed of donation executed by Severina after the death of Teodorico in
favor of the respondents through their mother was void because
Severina was not the real owner but a mere usufructuary under the
provisions of the old Civil Code; and that at the most, the respondents
would be entitled to only 1/11 portion of the Barangay Gadgaron
properties. 4 
DaEATc

In its decision, the RTC held in favor of the respondents,

explaining:
Having disposed of the legal issues on
the validity of the oral partition of the estate of Teodorico Givero
and Severina Genavia, let us proceed to the factual issue on the
claim of the defendant Venancio Givero that the portion of the
property in question occupied by him and his co-defendants
belonged to him as his rightful share in the estate of his father
which he started to occupy and possess as owner in 1952.
There are proven facts in this case which belie this claim of
Venancio Givero. His brother Luciano and sister Maria, who have
no reason to perjure against their brother Venancio were positive
in their testimony that the property in question is the share of their
brother Rufino and that the share of Venancio is found in
Balocawe. This testimony of witnesses Maria and Luciano is
corroborated by the judicial admission made by Venancio Givero
in his answer that the Balocawe properties were divided among
some of his brothers and sisters, retaining for himself 7,580 sq.
meters under Title No. P-9542. His payment of the tax
delinquency of said property, granting the same is true, did not
make him the owner of said property. The properties in Balocawe
remained under co-ownership and his right is limited to compel
his other co-heirs to contribute to the preservation of the thing
owned in common. (Art. 395, Old Civil Code). Venancio Givero
was aware of this as shown by the fact that he partitioned the
Balocawe properties among his other co-owners. Again, he
claims that he had been in open, adverse, and public possession
of this portion of the property in question since 1952. However, on
April 20, 1980, Myrna Hallig Manalo, a granddaughter of
Venancio, bought 225 sq. meters of the land in question within the
area claimed by Venancio Givero (Exh. "2") from Remedios vda.
de Givero with the conformity of the plaintiffs. If indeed his claim
of ownership since 1952 was adverse, open and public, why was
this fact not known to the members of his family even in the year
1980? But the most telling evidence against this claim of
ownership by Venancio Givero is the unrebutted testimony of
plaintiff Maximo Givero to the effect that this property claimed by
Venancio Givero is within the original area of 12,952 in the Deed
of Donation Exh. "A". Thus:
q .What is the actual area claimed by the defendant?
a. 1/2 hectare actually occupied by the defendant
q. Is this from the original area from 12,952 sq. meters or
outside?
a. It is within that area.
(TSN April 6, 1989 p. 15)
In his testimony, Venancio Givero admitted that the share
of his brother Rufino, was given to his widow, Remedios vda. de
Givero in the form of a donation. And in fact, when this donation
was made in 1956 (Exh. "A"), Venancio Givero was a witness to
said transaction. Having participated in the delivery of the share of
Rufino Givero to his heirs and knowing the metes and bounds of
said property, he is estopped from claiming ownership of any
portion of that property. (Art. 1431, 1432, and 1433, NCC).
From the testimonies of Remedios vda. de Givero and
Maximo Givero, it is clear that this property which corresponds to
the share of Rufino Givero when cadastrally surveyed was
designated as Lot No. 2618 and the area increased to 21,736 sq.
meters. This is the property which belong to the plaintiffs Maximo
Givero and Loreto Givero as well as the heirs of their deceased
brother, Juan Givero. From the evidence presented, it appears
that some portions of this property had been sold by Remedios
vda. de Givero with the consent of the plaintiffs. The sales made
are valid and not null and void as claimed by the defendants.  AIHaCc

There are sufficient evidences showing that the defendant

Venancio Givero through the execution of a Deed of Ratification
and Confirmation of Ownership (Exh. "11") was able to declare in
his name for taxation purposes a portion of the property in
question (Exh. "12"). The issuance of said tax declaration No. 13-
178 in the name of Venancio Givero as owner, cast a cloud on the
title of the plaintiffs and their other co-heirs. This is an error which
should be corrected by having this tax declaration and other
subsequent tax declarations that may have been issued,
cancelled by the Office of the Provincial Assessor.
 Because of these acts of the defendants, the plaintiffs were forced
to bring this case to Court and should be entitled to attorney's
fees and other litigation expenses. (Art. 2208 (11) NCC). 5  
and decreeing, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment:
1. Finding the plaintiffs the owner of Lot No.
2618, of the Matnog cadastre, the property in question;
2. Ordering the defendants to vacate the premises
and to remove whatever improvements they may have
introduced on said property; and perpetually enjoining
them from further molesting the plaintiffs in the
possession of the property in question.
3. Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to
pay the plaintiffs as damages the amount of P5,000.00
representing attorney's fees and other litigation expenses.
4. Ordering the Office of the Provincial Assessor to
cancel TD No. 13-178 in the name of Venancio Givero,
entered in the real property roll for 1982 and for this
purpose the plaintiffs are ordered to furnish said office a
copy of this Decision for the guidance and
compliance of that office.
SO ORDERED. 6
On appeal, the petitioners urged that the donation by Severina in
favor of Rufino's heirs contradicted the respondents' claim that
an oral partition of Teodorico's estate had taken place during
Teodorico's lifetime, for there would have been no need for the donation
had such partition inter vivos really taken place. Thus, the petitioners
concluded that the respondents' right to the disputed portion was solely
based on the deed of donation that was void due to the donor not being
the owner of the property. 7
On October 4, 2002, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Hence, this appeal.  caHCSD

The petitioners submit that the respondents did not

preponderantly establish that the oral partition by Teodorico had
actually taken place; that had the partition been really made, there
would have been no need for Severina to still convey the disputed
portion through donation; that the CA's finding that the Barangay
Balocawe properties had remained under co-ownership discredited its
pronouncement on the validity of the oral partition by Teodorico. 8
The petition for review lacks merit.
Firstly, what the petitioners assail in this appeal is the evaluation
of the credibility of the testimonies of Luciano and Maria, Venancio's
brother and sister, who affirmed their own participation in the oral
partition by Teodorico. Furthermore, the petitioners insist that the
respondents did not preponderantly establish the existence of the oral
partition.
 The petitioners thereby raise factual issues. However, the Court
may not review all over again the findings of fact of the RTC, especially
as such findings were affirmed by the CA. This appeal is brought under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, 9 whose Section 1 restricts the review
only to questions of law, viz.:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party
desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or
resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law,
may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review
on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth. (1a, 2a) 10
The restriction of the review to questions of law emanates from
the Court's not being a trier of facts. As such, the Court cannot
determine factual issues in appeals taken from the lower courts. As the
consequence of the restriction, the Court accords high respect, if not
conclusive effect, to the findings of fact by the RTC, when affirmed by
the CA, 11 unless there exists an exceptional reason to disregard the
findings of fact, like the following, namely: 12
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, or conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd,
or impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the
issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;  DaAIHC

(g) When the CA's findings are contrary to those by the trial

court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence
on record; or
(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.
 None of the exceptions has any application herein. Besides, the
findings of fact upheld by the CA are entirely consistent with the
established facts.
And, secondly, the contention of the petitioners, that the
respondents were inconsistent and self-contradictory by reason of their
insistence, on the one hand, on the donation of the property from
Severina, and, on the other hand, on the oral partition by Teodorico,
has no substance and merit.
The supposed inconsistency and self-contradiction are imaginary,
not real. In this regard, the CA rendered the following erudite and
irrefutable explanation, to wit:
In the case at bar, it is clear from the testimonies of Maria
and Luciano Givero, sister and brother, respectively, of appellant
Venancio Givero, that the properties were assigned to each of the
11 children even prior to their father's death, with their parents
pointing to them their respective shares. With respect to the
shares of the younger children, however, it appears from Maria's
testimony that the properties were administered by their mother,
Severina, while they were not yet old enough to handle the same.
This was the reason why Severina appeared to be the one who
delivered and conveyed to the other children their shares to the
inheritance, which included the share of the youngest son, Rufino,
which share was actually delivered to the latter's heirs as he
predeceased Severina. Clearly, therefore, the fact that it was
Severina who actually conveyed the properties to the said
heirs of Rufino does not in anyway contradict the fact that
the partition was actually made by Teodorico prior to his
demise. The basis of their ownership to the property is
indubitably the right vested on their said predecessor-in-
interest at the time of Teodorico's death. The
existence of the Deed of Donation is evidently a mere
surplusage which does not affect the right of Rufino's heirs
to the property. 13 ADCEcI

The foregoing explanation by the CA was appropriate. It

recognized a practical solution to the suspended
implementation of the oral partition. The use of the deed of donation to
implement the oral partition was a matter of choice on the part of the
parties to the transaction, for there might have been other feasible ways
under our laws by which Severina as the family matriarch could have
implemented the delivery of Rufino's share just as effectively and
efficiently. What was important was that the just intention behind the
delivery ensured the validity of the implementation. Thus, whether or
not Severina had the right to transfer the share was a matter too
inconsequential for consideration by the Court. In this instance,
substance, not form, was held to prevail by the CA. Besides, we, as a
Court of law, justice and equity, cannot permit prolonged unfairness and
uncertainty to be suffered by the respondents and the family of their
deceased brother Juan as the ultimate heirs of Rufino. The
avoidance of that unfairness and uncertainty was visibly the reason for
the intervention of their uncle Luciano and aunt Maria as witnesses
testifying against Venancio, their own brother, to favor the respondents
 on the question of the oral partition. Plainly, therefore, the CA
committed no reversible error.
WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review on certiorari, and
affirm the decision promulgated on October 4, 2002.
Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 6311. October 24, 1911.]

IRENE GREGORIO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ELENA COSIO

ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Francisco Dominguez for appellant.

Crispin Oben for appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. PARTITION. — Held: Under the facts stated in the opinion,

that the estate of Celedonio Cosio having been divided in 1866 could
 not be divided again in 1906, even though at the time of the first
partition some of the heirs were minors.

DECISION

JOHNSON, J  : p

On the 6th of November, 1906, the plaintiff and appellant

commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Laguna against the defendants for the purpose of securing the partition
of two parcels of land described in the first paragraph of the complaint.
It was alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff as well as the
defendants were heirs of Celedonio Cosio.
Upon the 10th of December, 1906, the attorney for the
defendants presented a motion in which it was stated that there were
some other heirs of Celedonio Cosio who were not made parties to the
action, and prayed that the said other persons should be made parties
to the present action; which motion, upon due consideration, was
granted. Some of the additional parties answered, alleging that they
had no interest whatever in the partition of the lands in question. Other
defendants answered, alleging that all of the property of Celedonio
Cosio had been divided among his heirs soon after his death, which
occurred in 1866.
On the 25th of November, 1908, the plaintiff presented an
amended complaint including Ruperto Salva, Juana Salva, Silvestre
Gregorio and Constancia Calacas, as plaintiffs, and Antonio Cosio and
Jesus Cosio, as additional defendants, alleging that they were all heirs
of the said Celedonio Cosio, and asked for a partition of six parcels of
land which were particularly described in paragraph one of the said
amended complaint.
Upon the 19th of January, 1909, Mr. Crispin Oben, attorney for
the nine defendants, filed an amended answer, in which he alleged that
all of the lands in question had been divided among the heirs of
Celedonio Cosio, deceased, at the time of his death, and prayed that
the defendants be absolved from any liability under the complaint
presented in said cause.
After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause,
the Hon. Vicente Jocson, judge, found that the lands in question had
been divided in accordance with the contention of the defendants and
absolved them from any liability under the complaint, with costs against
the plaintiff.
From that judgment the plaintiff appealed and made two
assignments of error in this court.
The plaintiff and appellant in his brief in this court admitted that at
the time of the death of the said Celedonio Cosio in 1866, or soon
thereafter, his property had been divided among his heirs. (See brief of
appellant, pp. 3 and 5). There was an attempt made to show that some
 of the heirs of Celedonio Cosio, or at least one of the said heirs, at the
time said partition of the property in question was made, was a minor
and that, therefore, said partition was illegal. Even granting that one of
the heirs was a minor at the time said partition took place, that minor is
the only person who can avail himself of the right to have said partition
declared illegal. It is not alleged that the ancestors of the present
plaintiff were minors at the time said partition was made.
There was also an attempt made during the trial of the cause to
show that some of the persons who shared in the partition of the
property of Celedonio Cosio in 1866 were natural children and had
never been legitimized. That contention may or may not be true. It is
true, however, that all of the persons who shared in the partition of the
estate, were treated as brothers and sisters, children of the said
Celedonio Cosio. It is also shown that the heirs at the time of the
partition of the said estate in 1866, took possession of their respective
shares and that they and their descendants have been in possession
thereof ever since. This action was commenced in 1906. It seems to us
that after the expiration of forty years it is pretty late for common heirs to
ask for the partition of an estate, which they themselves admit was
divided among the heirs, upon the ground that at the time the partition
took place some of them were either minors or were illegitimate,
especially when no complaint is made by such minor or his
descendants.
Upon a full consideration of all of the facts contained in the
record, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the lower court
should be affirmed with costs. So ordered.
Torres, Mapa, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.
ON MOTION FOR A REHEARING.
DECEMBER 15, 1911.
JOHNSON, J.:

In the original decision it was stated that the plaintiff and

appellant had admitted in his brief that the property of Celedonio Cosio
had been divided among his heirs at the time of his death in 1866, or
soon thereafter. The appellant now, in his motion for a rehearing,
makes the statement that he did not intend to admit that
the property of Celedonio Cosio had been divided among the heirs in
1866, and that a careful reading of his brief will show that no such
admission was intended. It is possible that the brief of the plaintiff and
appellant is not subject to the interpretation given it in the original
decision; we have, therefore, reexamined the evidence for the
purpose of determining anew what such evidence shows.
The plaintiff presented several witnesses who swore positively
that the partition had not been made. On the other hand, the
defendants presented several witnesses who swore just as positively
that the partition had been made. In addition to the declarations of the
witnesses of the defendants upon this question, they presented some
documentary evidence which seems to indicate that
a partition of the property in question had taken place. The defendants
presented Exhibit 1 (see record, pp. 26-29) which shows that one
Ignacio Pamilacan, as judicial administrator of the estate of Tomas
Cosio, had brought an action in the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Laguna, for the purpose of recovering the
possession of three parcels of land located in the barrio of San Juan, in
the municipality of Santa Cruz, together with certain personal property.
(Tomas Cosio was one of the sons of the said Celedonio Cosio.) In the
decision filed in that action by the Hon. Ignacio Villamor, it was said that
"The proofs presented by the plaintiff during the trial of the cause
demonstrate that the property belongs to the estate of the deceased
Tomas Cosio, having been inherited from his deceased father," etc.
This action was known as cause No. 420 in the Court of. First
Instance of the Province of Laguna. It was commenced on the
13th of November, 1905.
The defendants also presented Exhibit 3, in support of their
contention that the property of Celedonio Cosio had been divided
among his heirs. (Record, pp. 35-37.) By reference to this exhibit, it will
be seen that on the 9th day of August, 1905, Maria Cosio presented a
petition in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Laguna for the
appointment of an administrator of the estate of Tomas Cosio. In said
petition Maria Cosio alleged that the said Tomas Cosio died intestate;
that at the time of his death he was possessed of three parcels of land
and certain carabaos; that the said lands had been acquired by him by
inheritance from his deceased father, Celedonio Cosio, thus indicating
that there had been a partition of the property of the said Celedonio
Cosio. The said Maria Cosio was a daughter of Celedonio Cosio and a
sister of the said Tomas Cosio.
By reference to Exhibit No. 2 (pp. 30-34) it will be seen from the
inventory presented by the administrator of the estate of Tomas Cosio,
that the lands included therein constituted some of the lands described
in the amended petition of the plaintiff herein. (See bill of exceptions,
pp. 26, 27.) (See decision of this court in the case of Cosio vs. Pili, (10
Phil. Rep., 72) for facts confirmatory of some of the facts contained in
the foregoing exhibits.)
The said Maria Cosio, mentioned in exhibit 3 above, who alleged
that the property described in said exhibit had been inherited by Tomas
Cosio from his father Celedonio Cosio, was the mother of the plaintiff
and appellant herein. (Brief of appellee, p. 4.) The declarations of Maria
Cosio in said petition (Exhibit 3) by reason of the fact that she was the
daughter of Celedonio Cosio, should be given some credit. There
seems to have been no reason for making a false declaration in said
exhibit.
The lower court, in its decision, among other things, made the
following statements which we believe are supported by the Proof:
"(1) The plaintiff has adduced evidence attempting to prove
that the property specified in her amended complaint belonged to
the deceased Celedonio Cosio, successor in interest of the herein
plaintiff and defendants, but this evidence is
merely oral testimony, not so sufficiently clear that the court can
decide whether it really was not partitioned; because the
 witnesses themselves have been unable to specify in a clear way
the location of this property, in whose possession it is, and the
nature of it; but weighing this evidence all together I am inclined to
believe that of the property now claimed part is in the
possession of persons who have not been made parties to this
suit and part is in the possession of Elena Cosio.
"(2) It appears, moreover, by defendant's Exhibit No. 3,
that it was Maria Cosio, mother of one of the present plaintiffs in
this suit, Irene, who really requested the appointment of an
administrator for the deceased Tomas Cosio, and that according
to said request all the property owned by Tomas Cosio at his
death, among which that now in litigation is included, belonged to
said Tomas Cosio by inheritance from his father, Celedonio Cosio
(Exhibit No. 3 of the defendants).
"(3) The action taken by Maria
Cosio when alive conclusively demonstrates the bad faith of Irene
Gregorio, and the latter can not impugn the action taken by her
deceased mother, which constitutes a recognition of the
ownership of the property of Tomas Cosio that has passed on to
his heirs.
"Summing up, then, the plaintiffs' evidence: they have not
substantiated their averment that the property they claim was
Celedonio Cosio's and that it is still pro indiviso, for some of this
property is in the possession of other persons and can hardly be
recovered when these persons have not even been sued for it.
"Nor have the plaintiffs succeeded in showing clearly the
degrees of relationship of all the defendants, for their testimony in
this respect is ambiguous and incomplete, just as it is with
reference to the property they say was Celedonio Cosio's, all
which argues against the credibility of these witnesses for the
plaintiffs."
After a careful reexamination of the facts, with special reference
to the allegations made in the motion for a rehearing, we are still of the
opinion that the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed, and
that the motion for a rehearing should be denied. So ordered.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 143297. February 11, 2003.]

Spouses VIRGILIO and MICHELLE CASTRO, MOISES B.

MIAT and ALEXANDER V. MIAT, petitioners, vs. ROMEO
V. MIAT, respondent.

Antonio C. Gorospe for petitioners.

Pantaleon Law Office for private person.

SYNOPSIS
 Spouses Moises and Concordia Miat bought two (2) parcels of land
during their marriage. The first is located at Wawa La Huerta, Airport
Village, Parañaque, Metro Manila and covered by TCT No. S-33535. The
second is located at Paco, Manila (Paco property), and covered by TCT
No. 163863. Concordia died on April 30, 1978. They had two (2) children:
Romeo and Alexander. While at Dubai, United Arab Emirates, Moises
agreed that the Parañaque and Paco properties would be given to Romeo
and Alexander. However, when Moises returned in 1984, he renegotiated
the agreement with Romeo and Alexander. He wanted the
Parañaque property for himself but would leave the Paco property to his
two (2) sons. They agreed. Romeo and Alexander lived on the
Paco property. They paid its realty taxes and fire insurance premiums.
Romeo and Alexander orally divided the Paco property between
themselves. Later, however, Alexander sold his share to Romeo.
Alexander was given P6,000.00 as downpayment. Moises ran into financial
difficulties and he mortgaged for P30,000.00 the Paco property to the
parents of petitioner Virgilio Castro. He informed Romeo and Alexander
that he would be forced to sell the Paco property if they would not redeem
the mortgage. Eventually, Moises proceeded to sell the property to the
petitioners-spouses Castro. Moises got one-third (1/3) of the proceeds
while Alexander received the remaining two-thirds (2/3). Romeo did not get
a single centavo but was given the right to till their Nueva Ecija property.
Romeo filed an action to nullify the sale between Moises and the Castro
spouses; to compel Moises and Alexander to execute a
deed of conveyance or assignment of the Paco property to him upon
payment of the balance of its agreed price; and to make them pay
damages. The trial court ordered Alexander V. Miat to execute a
deed of sale of his share in the property upon payment by Romeo of the
balance of the purchase price in the sum of P36,750.00 and for Romeo V.
Miat to recognize as valid the sale of Moises' share in the Paco property.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court nullified
the sale entered into between Moises Miat and spouses Virgilio and
Michelle Castro and ordered Moises Miat and Alexander Miat to execute a
deed of conveyance over the Paco property in favor of Romeo Miat, upon
payment by Romeo Miat of the balance of the purchase price in the
sum of P36,750.00. Hence, the present petition.
The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
According to the Court, the Paco property is clearly a
conjugal property since it was acquired by onerous title during the
marriage of Moises and Concordia and out of their common fund. Moises
did not bring the property into their marriage, hence it has to be considered
as conjugal under the law. The Court also held that the petitioners-spouses
Castro were not buyers in good faith. Petitioner Virgilio Castro admitted in
his testimony that Romeo told him that Moises had given the
Paco property to them. In fact, they consulted a Judge on who had the
right to the property —Moises or Romeo. Virgilio Castro is further aware
that Romeo is in possession of the property, they being neighbors. A
purchaser is fully aware of another person's possession of the lot he
purchased cannot successfully pretend to be an innocent purchaser for
value. The Court also upheld the validity of the oral partition between
Moises and his sons. Its validity was established by the
testimony of Ceferino Miat, brother of Moises, that before Concordia died,
there was an agreement that the Parañaque property would go to Moises,
while the Paco property would go to Romeo and Alexander. It was
reiterated at the deathbed of Concordia. When Moises returned to Manila
for good, the agreement was affirmed in front of the extended Miat family
members. Initially, Romeo and Alexander orally divided the
Paco property between them. Later, Alexander sold his share to
Romeo.  aSIHcT

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND

AND WIFE; CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTY; PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY ONEROUS
TITLE DURING THE MARRIAGE OUT OF THE COMMON FUND IS
CLEARLY A CONJUGAL PROPERTY; CASE AT BAR. — The records
show that the Paco property was acquired by onerous title during the
marriage out of the common fund. It is clearly conjugal property.
Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that
"all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife." This article does not require proof that the property was
acquired with funds of the partnership: The presumption applies
even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not
appear. Petitioners' reliance on Lorenzo vs. Nicolas is misplaced. That
case involved two (2) parcels of land that Magdalena Clemente purchased
on installment and started paying for when she was not yet married to
Manuel Lorenzo. When she married Manuel Lorenzo she continued to pay
the installments in her own name. Upon completion of payment, the
deed of final conveyance was executed in her sole favor and the land was
registered in the exclusive name of Magdalena Clemente. The Court ruled
that the two (2) parcels of land were the paraphernal
properties of Magdalena Clemente, thus: ". . . the fact that all receipts for
installments paid even during the lifetime of the late husband Manuel
Lorenzo were issued in the name of Magdalena Clemente and that the
deed of sale or conveyance of parcel no. 6 was made in her name in
spite of the fact that Manuel Lorenzo was still alive shows that the two
parcels of land belonged to Magdalena Clemente." (italics supplied) In the
case at bar, Moises and Concordia bought the Paco property during their
marriage — Moises did not bring it into their marriage, hence it has to be
considered as conjugal.
2. ID.; SUCCESSION; PARTITION;
VALIDITY OF ORAL PARTITION UPHELD; REASONS FOR ITS
ENFORCEABILITY. — In ruling in favor of its validity which we affirm, the
appellate court relied on a portion of Moises' letter to Romeo. Ceferino
Miat, brother of Moises, testified that before Concordia died, there was an
agreement that the Parañaque property would go to Moises while the
Paco property would go to Romeo and Alexander. This was reiterated at
the deathbed of Concordia. When Moises returned to Manila for good, the
agreement was affirmed in front of the extended Miat family members.
Initially, Romeo and Alexander orally divided the Paco property between
them. Later, Alexander sold his share to Romeo. We also hold that the oral
partition between Romeo and Alexander is not covered by the Statute of
Frauds. It is enforceable for two reasons. Firstly, Alexander accepted the
six thousand (P6,000.00) pesos given by Romeo as downpayment for the
purchase of his share in the Paco property. Secondly, Romeo and his
witnesses, Ceferino Miat and Pedro Miranda, who testified regarding the
sale of Alexander's share to Romeo, were intensely questioned by
petitioner's counsel.
3. ID.; SPECIAL CONTRACTS; SALES; PETITIONERS-SPOUSES'
ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF RESPONDENT'S ADVERSE CLAIM OVER
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY NEGATED THEIR CLAIM THAT THEY ARE
BUYERS IN GOOD FAITH. — The appellate court also correctly held that
the petitioners-spouses Castro were not buyers in good faith. A purchaser
in good faith is one who buys property and pays a full and fair price for it at
the time of the purchase or before any notice of some other person's claim
on or interest in it. The rule is settled that a buyer of real property, which is
in the possession of persons other than the seller, must be wary and
should investigate the rights of those in possession. Otherwise, without
such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as buyer in good faith. This
finding of the appellate court that the Castro spouses were not buyers in
good faith is supported by evidence. Petitioner Virgilio Castro admitted in
his testimony that Romeo told him that Moises had given the Paco
property to them. In fact, they consulted Judge Anunciacion on who had
the right to the property — Moises or Romeo. As well pointed out by the
appellate court: "In the case at bench, the said spouses have actual
knowledge of the adverse claim of plaintiff-appellant. The most protuberant
index that they are not buyers in good faith is that before the sale, Virgilio
Castro talked with Romeo Miat on the supposed sale. Virgilio testified that
together with Romeo, Alexander and Moises Miat, they went to Judge
Anunciacion of Manila in order to find out if Romeo has a right over the
property. Romeo told Virgilio in that meeting that Romeo has a right over
the Paco property by virtue of an oral partition and assignment. Virgilio
even admitted that he knew Romeo was in possession of the title and
Romeo then insisted that he is the owner of the property. . . . "Virgilio
Castro is further aware that plaintiff is in possession of the property, they
being neighbors. A purchaser who was fully aware of another person's
possession of the lot he purchased cannot successfully pretend to be an
innocent purchaser for value." It is abundantly clear that the petitioners-
spouses Castro did not buy the Paco property in good faith. They have no
right to the property. 
acITSD

DECISION

PUNO, J  :p

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision rendered by

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 43053, entitled "Romeo V. Miat
vs. Spouses Virgilio and Michelle Castro, Moises B. Miat and Alexander V.
Miat," dated November 29, 1999. 1
The evidence shows that the spouses Moises and Concordia Miat
bought two (2) parcels of land during their coverture. The first is located at
Wawa La Huerta, Airport Village, Parañaque, Metro Manila 2 and covered
by TCT No. S-33535. 3 The second is located at Paco, Manila, 4 and
covered by TCT No. 163863. 5 Concordia died on April 30, 1978. They had
two (2) children: Romeo and Alexander.
 

While at Dubai, United Arab Emirates, Moises agreed that the

Parañaque and Paco properties would be given to Romeo and
Alexander. 6 However, when Moises returned in 1984, he renegotiated the
agreement with Romeo and Alexander. He wanted the Parañaque property
for himself but would leave the Paco property to his two (2) sons. They
agreed. 7
It appears that Moises and Concordia bought the Paco property on
installment basis on May 17, 1977. 8 However, it was only on December
14, 1984 that Moises was able to pay its balance. 9 He secured the title
over the property in his name as a widower. 10 According to Romeo,
Moises violated the agreement that their (Romeo's and Alexander's)
names would be registered in the title once the balance was paid. 11 Upon
demand, Moises gave the owner's duplicate of the Paco property title to
Romeo.
Romeo and Alexander lived on the Paco property. They paid its
realty taxes and fire insurance premiums. 12 In early August 1985,
Alexander and his first wife left the house for personal reasons. In April
1988, Alexander agreed to sell to Romeo his share in the Paco property for
P42,750.00. 13 He received a partial payment of P6,000.00 from
Romeo, 14 Nonetheless, he never executed a deed of assignment in favor
of Romeo, as he "had lots of work to do and had no time and . . . there
[wa]s nothing to worry [as] the title [wa]s in [Romeo's] possession." 15
In February 1988, Romeo learned from his godmother in his
wedding, Mrs. Rosalina Castro, mother of petitioner Virgilio Castro, that
she had given Moises P30,000.00 as downpayment for the sale by Moises
of the Paco property to her son Virgilio. 16
On December 1, 1988, Romeo was brought by petitioner Virgilio
Castro to the chambers of Judge Anunciacion of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila where the status of the Paco property was
discussed. 17 On December 16, 1988, he received a letter from petitioner
Castro's lawyer asking for a conference. Romeo was informed that the
Paco property had been sold to Castro by Moises by virtue of a deed of
sale dated December 5, 1988 18 for ninety-five thousand (P95,000.00)
pesos. 19
Ceferino Miat, brother of petitioner Moises, 20 testified that even
before the death of Concordia 21 there was already an agreement that the
Paco property would go to Romeo and Alexander. 22 This was reiterated at
the deathbed of Concordia. 23 When Moises returned to Manila for good,
the agreement was reiterated 24 in front of the extended Miat family
members. 25 Initially, Romeo and Alexander orally 26 divided the Paco
property between themselves. 27 Later, however, Alexander sold his share
to Romeo. 28 Alexander was given P6,000.00 as downpayment. This was
corroborated by Pedro Miranda and Virgilio Miat. Miranda worked with
Moises at the Bayview Hotel and the Hotel Filipinas. 29 His wife is the
cousin of Romeo and Alexander. 30 Virgilio is the brother of Moises.
Moises confirmed that he and his wife Concordia bought the Paco
property on installment from the Fraval Realty, Inc. There was still a
balance of P12,000.00 on the lot at the time of his wife's death. 31 He paid
P3,500.00 in 1981 32 and P8,500.00 in 1984. 33 He registered the title in his
name. Romeo then borrowed the title as he was going to mortgage it to his
friend Lorenzo. 34
Later, Moises ran into financial difficulties and he mortgaged for
P30,000.00 the Paco property to the parents of petitioner Virgilio
Castro. 35 He informed Romeo and Alexander that he would be forced to
sell the Paco property if they would not redeem the mortgage. He
accompanied his children to the Manila City Hall to discuss its sale with a
judge and a lawyer. Also present in the meeting were petitioner Virgilio
Castro and his parents. After the conference, he proceeded to sell the
property to the petitioners-spouses Castro. 36
Alexander testified that after the sale, his father got one-third (1/3) of
the proceeds while he received two-thirds (2/3). Romeo did not get a single
centavo but was given the right to till their Nueva Ecija property. 37 From
his share of the proceeds, Alexander intended to return to Romeo the
P6,000.00 given him earlier by the latter. He considered the money to be a
personal debt due Romeo, not Romeo's downpayment of his share in the
Paco property. 38
The buyer of the property, petitioner Virgilio P. Castro, testified that
he informed Romeo that his father Moises was selling the Paco property.
Romeo replied: "Bahala siya." 39 The second time he informed Romeo
about the pending sale was when he brought Romeo, Alexander and
Moises to Judge Anunciacion to "consult him [as to] who has [the] right
over the [Paco] property." 40 He further declared that he "went to the
Metropolitan Trial Court because [he] wanted to be sure whether [he] could
buy the property." 41 During the meeting, he was told by Romeo that the
Paco property was already given to him (Romeo) by Moises. He admitted
knowing that the title to the Paco property was in the
possession of Romeo. 42 However, he proceeded with the sale. Moises
assured him that he would be able to get the title from Romeo. 43
These events precipitated the case at bar. Romeo filed an action to
nullify the sale between Moises and the Castro spouses; to compel Moises
and Alexander to execute a deed of conveyance or assignment of the
Paco property to him upon payment of the balance of its agreed price; and
to make them pay damages. 44
After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision, 45 which in
its dispositive portion states as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby
orders the following: 1) Defendant Alexander V. Miat to execute a
 deed of sale of his share in the property upon payment by plaintiff
Romeo of the balance of the purchase price in the
sum of P36,750.00; 2) Plaintiff Romeo V. Miat to recognize as
valid the sale of defendant Moises' share in the house and lot
located at No. 1495-C Fabie Estate, Paco, Manila; 3) the
dismissal of defendants' counter-claim; and 4) defendants to pay
the costs of suit."
Both parties appealed to Court of Appeals. On November 29, 1999,
the appellate Court modified the Decision as follows: 46
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED as
follows:
(1) The deed of sale entered into between defendants-
appellants Moises Miat and spouses Virgilio and Michelle Castro
is hereby NULLIFIED.
(2) Defendant-appellants Moises Miat and Alexander Miat
are ordered to execute a deed of conveyance over the
Paco property with TCT No. 16383 (sic) in favor of plaintiff-
appellant Romeo Miat, upon payment by Romeo Miat of the
balance of the purchase price in the sum of P36,750.00.
(3) Defendants-appellants are ordered, jointly and
severally, to pay plaintiff-appellant attorney's fees in the
amount of P30,000.00 and to pay the costs of suit."
Reconsideration was denied on May 17, 2000.
Hence, this petition where the petitioners assign the following errors:
"THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED AND DID PETITIONERS AN INJUSTICE IN MODIFYING
OR REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
DATED MARCH 17, 1993 WHICH ORDERED RESPONDENT
ROMEO MIAT TO RECOGNIZE AS VALID THE DEED OF SALE
ENTERED INTO BETWEEN PETITIONERS MOISES MIAT AND
SPS. VIRGILIO AND MICHELLE CASTRO PERTAINING TO
PETITIONER MOISES MIAT'S SHARE IN THE HOUSE AND
LOT LOCATED IN PACO, MANILA, WHEN IT DECLARED SAID
DEED OF SALE NULLIFIED.
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY
ERRED IN AFFIRMING OR UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURT'S
DECISION ORDERING ALEXANDER MIAT AND INCLUDING
MOISES MIAT TO EXECUTE A DEED OF CONVEYANCE
OVER THE PACO PROPERTY WITH TCT NO. 16383 IN
FAVOR OF ROMEO MIAT UPON PAYMENT BY THE
LATTER OF THE BALANCE OF THE PURCHASE PRICE IN
THE SUM OF P36,750.00.
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN FURTHER ORDERING PETITIONERS TO PAY
RESPONDENT, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, ATTORNEY'S
FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF P30,000.00 AND AFFIRMING THE
COURT A QUO'S ORDER FOR THE PETITIONERS TO PAY
THE COST OF SUIT." 47
The issues can be simplified thus:
 1. Whether the Paco property is conjugal or capital;
2. Whether there was a valid oral partition covering the
said property; and
3. Whether the spouses Castro were buyers in good faith.
I
The petitioners contend that the Paco property is the
capital property of Moises. They allege that the spouses Moises and
Concordia purchased the property on installment basis in 1977 but stress
that it was Moises who paid the balance of twelve thousand (P12,000.00)
pesos in 1984. At that time, Concordia had long been dead. She died in
1978.
We disagree.
Since Moises and Concordia were married before the
effectivity of the Family Code, the provisions of the New Civil Code apply.
Article 153(1) of the New Civil Code 48 provides as follows:
"The following are conjugal partnership property:
(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at
the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for
the partnership, or for only one of the spouses; . . . ."
The records show that the Paco property was acquired by onerous
title during the marriage out of the common fund. It is clearly
conjugal property.
Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It
provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife." This article does not require proof that
the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption
applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does
not appear. 49
Petitioners' reliance on Lorenzo vs. Nicolas 50 is misplaced. That
case involved two (2) parcels of land that Magdalena Clemente purchased
on installment and started paying for when she was not yet married to
Manuel Lorenzo. When she married Manuel Lorenzo she continued to pay
the installments in her own name. Upon completion of payment, the
deed of final conveyance was executed in her sole favor and the land was
registered in the exclusive name of Magdalena Clemente. The Court ruled
that the two (2) parcels of land were the paraphernal
properties of Magdalena Clemente, thus:
". . . the fact that all receipts for installments paid even
during the lifetime of the late husband Manuel Lorenzo were
issued in the name of Magdalena Clemente and that the
deed of sale or conveyance of parcel no. 6 was made in her name
in spite of the fact that Manuel Lorenzo was still alive shows that
the two parcels of land belonged to Magdalena
Clemente." 51 (italics  supplied)
 In the case at bar, Moises and Concordia bought the
Paco property during their marriage — Moises did not bring it into their
marriage, hence it has to be considered as conjugal.
Likewise, Jovellanos vs. Court of Appeals 52 cited by the petitioners
is inapropos. In said case, Daniel Jovellanos, while he was still married to
his first wife, Leonor Dizon, entered into a "contract of lease and
conditional sale" with Philamlife. He continued paying the rental after the
death of his first wife and during the subsistence of his marriage with his
second wife, Anette Jovellanos. He completed the payment during the
existence of his second marriage. The Court ruled that
the property belonged to the conjugal partnership with the second wife as
Daniel Jovellanos "acquired ownership thereof only upon full
payment of the said amount hence, although he had been in
possession of the premises since September 2, 1955, it was only on
January 8, 1975 that the Philamlife executed the deed of absolute sale
thereof in his favor . . . . Since as early as 1967, he was already married to
Annette H. Jovellanos, this property necessarily belonged to his conjugal
partnership with his second wife." 53 In the case at bar, Moises and
Concordia executed a Deed of Sale with Mortgage. The contract is
one of sale — the title passed to them upon delivery of the
Paco property. 54 In fine, title was gained during the conjugal partnership.
II
The next issue is whether the oral partition between Moises and his
sons, Romeo and Alexander, involving the said property is valid. In ruling
in favor of its validity which we affirm, the appellate court relied on a
portion of Moises' letter to Romeo, which reads as follows: 55
"KAYA PAG-USAPAN LANG NINYONG MABUTI ANG
ANONG BALAK AT GUSTO NINYONG PAGHATI SA BAHAY,
AT YAN AY PAGPAPASIYAHAN KO KONG (sic) MAKAKABUTI
SA INYONG DALAWA. AT WALA AKONG HIGIT NA
PAPABURAN SA INYONG DALAWA PAREHO KAYONG
MAHAL SA AKIN, HINDI AKO TULAD SA IBANG MAGULANG
NA HINDI PAREHO ANG PAGTINGIN SA MGA ANAK. ANG
BAHAY  56 AY PARA SA INYONG DALAWA, LALO NA
NGAYONG MAY ASAWA NA KAYONG PAREHO. . . ." [All caps
in the original]
Ceferino Miat, brother of Moises, testified that before Concordia
died, there was an agreement that the Parañaque property would go to
Moises while the Paco property would go to Romeo and Alexander. This
was reiterated at the deathbed of Concordia. When Moises returned to
Manila for good, the agreement was affirmed in front of the extended Miat
family members. Initially, Romeo and Alexander orally divided the Paco
property between them. Later, Alexander sold his share to Romeo.
This agreement was attested to by the extended Miat Family
members in a document marked as Exhibit "D," which reads as follows: 57
"Pebrero 18, 1989
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY
SA MGA KINAUUKULAN,
 Kami, na nakalagda sa ibaba, ay nanunumpa sa harapan
ng Punong Barangay, na si G. REYNALDO P. WONG:
Na kami ay mga saksi sa kasunduan nina G. MOISES B.
MIAT, asawa ng yumao na, na si Gng. CONCORDIA
VALENZUELA MIAT, at mga anak nitong sina G. ROMEO V.
MIAT at G. ALEXANDER V. MIAT:
Na ang kasunduan ay ang mga sumusunod:
1) Na ang pag-aaring lupa (132 sq. m.) ng mag-asawa
(MOISES at CONCORDIA) sa Airport Village sa
Parañaque, Metro Manila ay mapupunta kay G.
MOISES B. MIAT;
2) Na ang pag-aaring lupa at bahay (70 sq. m.) ng mag-
asawa ring nabanggit ay sa magkapatid na ROMEO
at ALEXANDER mapupunta at ito ay nasa address
na 1495-C FABIE, PACO, MANILA.
MGA SUMUMPA:  58
       
  (Sgd.)   (Sgd.)
1) Ceferino B. Miat 6) Lorenzo C. Valenzuela
(kapatid ni Moises)(kapatid ni Concordia)    
  (Sgd.)   (Sgd.)
2) Avelina J. Miat 7) Patricio C. Valenzuela
(asawa ni Ceferino)(kapatid ni Concordia)    
  (Sgd.)   (Sgd.)
3) Virgilio Miat 8) Victor C. Valenzuela
(kapatid ni Moises)(kapatid ni Concordia)    
  (Sgd.)   (Sgd.)
4) Aurea Miat-Joson 9) Elsa P. Miranda
(kapatid ni Moises)    
  (Sgd.)    
5) Jose A. Joson    
(asawa ni Aurea)    
(Sgd.)
REYNALDO P. WONG
Kapitan ng Barangay
Sta. Maria, Licab, N.E." (italics supplied)
The consideration for the grant to Romeo and Alexander of the Paco
property was best expressed by Moises himself in his letter to Romeo,
which reads as follows:
"Labis akong nagpapasalamat at nauunawaan ninyo ang
mga pagkakamali ko at mga kasalanan kong nagawa sa inyong
mag-iina, huwag kayong mag-alala at lahat nang naipundar
namin nang (sic) inyong nanay ay sa inyong dalawang
magkapatid mapupunta." 59
We also hold that the oral partition between Romeo and Alexander
is not covered by the Statute of Frauds. It is enforceable for two reasons.
Firstly, Alexander accepted the six thousand (P6,000.00) pesos given by
Romeo as downpayment for the purchase of his share in the Paco
property. Secondly, Romeo and his witnesses, Ceferino Miat and Pedro
Miranda, who testified regarding the sale of Alexander's share to Romeo,
were intensely questioned by petitioners' counsel. 60
In the recent case of Pada-Kilario vs. Court of Appeals, we held: 61
"[N]o law requires partition among heirs to be in writing and
be registered in order to be valid. The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule
74 of the Revised Rules of Court that a partition be put in a public
document and registered, has for its purpose the protection of
creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The
object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It
follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with
the prescribed formalities is not undermined when no creditors
are involved. Without creditors to take into consideration, it is
competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for
distribution thereof in a manner and upon a plan different from
those provided by the rules from which, in the first place, nothing
can be inferred that a writing or other formality is essential for the
partition to be valid. The partition of inherited property need not be
embodied in a public document so as to be effective as regards
the heirs that participated therein. The requirement of Article 1358
of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the creation,
transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over
immovable property, must appear in a public instrument, is only
for convenience, non-compliance with which does not affect the
validity or enforceability of the acts of the parties as among
themselves. And neither does the Statute of Frauds under Article
1403 of the New Civil Code apply because partition among heirs
is not legally deemed a conveyance of real property, considering
that it involves not a transfer of property from one to the other but
rather, a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that
an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and
receives the inheritance. . . ."
III
The appellate court also correctly held that the petitioners-spouses
Castro were not buyers in good faith. A purchaser in good faith is one who
buys property and pays a full and fair price for it at the time of the purchase
or before any notice of some other person's claim on or interest in it. The
rule is settled that a buyer of real property, which is in the possession of
persons other than the seller, must be wary and should investigate the
rights of those in possession. Otherwise, without such inquiry, the buyer
can hardly be regarded as buyer in good faith. 62
This finding of the appellate court that the Castro spouses were not
buyers in good faith is supported by evidence. Petitioner Virgilio Castro
admitted in his testimony that Romeo told him that Moises had given the
Paco property to them. In fact, they consulted Judge Anunciacion on who
had the right to the property — Moises or Romeo. As well pointed out by
the appellate court:
"In the case at bench, the said spouses have actual
knowledge of the adverse claim of plaintiff-appellant. The most
protuberant index that they are not buyers in good faith is that
before the sale, Virgilio Castro talked with Romeo Miat on the
supposed sale. Virgilio testified that together with Romeo,
 Alexander and Moses Miat, they went to Judge Anunciacion of
Manila in order to find out if Romeo has a right over the property.
Romeo told Virgilio in that meeting that Romeo has a right over
the Paco property by virtue of an oral partition and assignment.
Virgilio even admitted that he knew Romeo was in possession of
the title and Romeo then insisted that he is the owner of the
property.
xxx xxx xxx
"Virgilio Castro is further aware that plaintiff is in
possession of the property, they being neighbors. A purchaser
who was fully aware of another person's possession of the lot he
purchased cannot successfully pretend to be an innocent
purchaser for value." 63
It is abundantly clear that the petitioners-spouses Castro did not
buy the Paco property in good faith. They have no right to the property.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. CV
No. 43053 is affirmed. Costs against petitioners.  SHIcDT

SO ORDERED.