Dominion Insurance Corporation Vs CA
Dominion Insurance Corporation Vs CA
Dominion Insurance Corporation Vs CA
GUEVARRA, and FERNANDO AUSTRIA FACTS: This is an appeal via certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, San Fernando, Pampanga, which ordered petitioner Dominion Insurance Corporation (Dominion) to pay Rodolfo S. Guevarra (Guevarra) the sum of P156,473.90 representing the total amount advanced by Guevarra in the payment of the claims of Dominions clients. On January 25, 1991, plaintiff Rodolfo S. Guevarra instituted Civil Case No. 8855 for sum of money against defendant Dominion Insurance Corporation. Plaintiff sought to recover thereunder the sum of P156,473.90 which he claimed to have advanced in his capacity as manager of defendant to satisfy certain claims filed by defendants clients. In its traverse, defendant denied any liability to plaintiff and asserted a counterclaim for P249,672.53, representing premiums that plaintiff allegedly failed to remit. On August 8, 1991, defendant filed a third-party complaint against Fernando Austria, who, at the time relevant to the case, was its Regional Manager for Central Luzon area. ISSUES: The issues raised are: (1) whether respondent Guevarra acted within his authority as agent for petitioner, and (2) whether respondent Guevarra is entitled to reimbursement of amounts he paid out of his personal money in settling the claims of several insured. HELD:The petition is without merit. By the contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter. The basis for agency is representation. On the part of the principal, there must be an actual intention to appoint or an intention naturally inferrable from his words or actions; and on the part of the agent, there must be an intention to accept the appointment and act on it, and in the absence of such intent, there is generally no agency. A perusal of the Special Power of Attorney would show that petitioner (represented by third-party defendant Austria) and respondent Guevarra intended to enter into a principal-agent relationship. Despite the word special in the title of the document, the contents reveal that what was constituted was actually a general agency. The agency comprises all the business of the principal,[20] but, couched in general terms, it is limited only to acts of administration. A general power permits the agent to do all acts for which the law does not require a special power. Thus, the acts enumerated in or similar to those enumerated in the Special Power of Attorney do not require a special power of attorney. Article 1878, Civil Code, enumerates the instances when a special power of attorney is required. The payment of claims is not an act of administration. The settlement of claims is not included among the acts enumerated in the Special Power of Attorney, neither is it of a character similar to the acts enumerated therein. A special power of attorney is required before respondent Guevarra could settle the insurance claims of the insured.Respondent Guevarras a uthority to settle claims is embodied in the Memorandum of Management Agreement[23] dated February 18, 1987 which enumerates the scope of respondent Guevarras duties and responsibilities as agency manager for San Fernando, Pampanga. The instruction of petitioner as the principal could not be any clearer. Respondent Guevarra was authorized to pay the claim of the insured, but the payment shall come from the revolving fund or collection in his possession. Having deviated from the instructions of the principal, the expenses that respondent Guevarra incurred in the settlement of the claims of the insured may not be reimbursed from petitioner Dominion. This conclusion is in accord with Article 1918, Civil Code, which states that: The principal is not liable for the expenses incurred by the agent in the following cases: (1) If the agent acted in contravention of the principals instructions, unless the latter should wish to avail himself of the benefits derived from the contract; xxx xxx xxx However, while the law on agency prohibits respondent Guevarra from obtaining reimbursement, his right to recover may still be justified under the general law on obligations and contracts.Article 1236, second paragraph, Civil Code, provides: Whoever pays for an other may demand from the debtor what he has paid, except that if he paid without the knowledge or against the will of the debtor, he can recover only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to the debtor. In this case, when the risk insured against occurred, peti tioners liability as insurer arose. This obligation was extinguished when respondent Guevarra paid the claims and obtained Release of Claim Loss and Subrogation Receipts from the insured who were paid. Thus, to the extent that the obligation of the petitioner has been extinguished, respondent Guevarra may demand for reimbursement from his principal. To rule otherwise would result in unjust enrichment of petitioner.