Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982

BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant,

vs.
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J:

In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the Court
of First Instance of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, with "acts unbecoming a judge."

The factual setting of the case is stated in the report dated May 27, 1971 of then Associate Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma of the
Court of Appeals now retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to whom this case was referred on October 28, 1968 for
investigation, thus:

Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte was a complaint for partition filed by Sinforosa R.
Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Priscilla Reyes, plaintiffs,
against Bernardita R. Macariola, defendant, concerning the properties left by the deceased Francisco Reyes,
the common father of the plaintiff and defendant.

In her defenses to the complaint for partition, Mrs. Macariola alleged among other things that; a) plaintiff
Sinforosa R. Bales was not a daughter of the deceased Francisco Reyes; b) the only legal heirs of the deceased
were defendant Macariola, she being the only offspring of the first marriage of Francisco Reyes with Felisa
Espiras, and the remaining plaintiffs who were the children of the deceased by his second marriage with Irene
Ondez; c) the properties left by the deceased were all the conjugal properties of the latter and his first wife,
Felisa Espiras, and no properties were acquired by the deceased during his second marriage; d) if there was any
partition to be made, those conjugal properties should first be partitioned into two parts, and one part is to be
adjudicated solely to defendant it being the share of the latter's deceased mother, Felisa Espiras, and the other
half which is the share of the deceased Francisco Reyes was to be divided equally among his children by his
two marriages.

On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion in Civil Case 3010, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, upon a preponderance of

evidence, finds and so holds, and hereby renders judgment (1) Declaring the plaintiffs Luz R.
Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes as the only
children legitimated by the subsequent marriage of Francisco Reyes Diaz to Irene Ondez; (2)
Declaring the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales to have been an illegitimate child of Francisco
Reyes Diaz; (3) Declaring Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and 1/4 of
Lot 1145 as belonging to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and
Felisa Espiras; (4) Declaring Lot No. 2304 and 1/4 of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to the
spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Irene Ondez in common partnership; (5) Declaring that 1/2
of Lot No. 1184 as belonging exclusively to the deceased Francisco Reyes Diaz; (6)
Declaring the defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, being the only legal and forced heir of her
mother Felisa Espiras, as the exclusive owner of one-half of each of Lots Nos. 4474, 4475,
4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506; and the remaining one-half (1/2) of each of said Lots Nos.
4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No.
1154 as belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (7) Declaring Irene Ondez to be the
 exclusive owner of one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 2304 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of
Lot No. 3416; the remaining one-half (1/2) of Lot 2304 and the remaining one-half (1/2) of
one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (8)
Directing the division or partition of the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz in such a manner as
to give or grant to Irene Ondez, as surviving widow of Francisco Reyes Diaz, a hereditary
share of. one-twelfth (1/12) of the whole estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz (Art. 996 in relation
to Art. 892, par 2, New Civil Code), and the remaining portion of the estate to be divided
among the plaintiffs Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes,
Adela Reyes, Priscilla Reyes and defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, in such a way that the
extent of the total share of plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales in the hereditary estate shall not exceed
the equivalent of two-fifth (2/5) of the total share of any or each of the other plaintiffs and the
defendant (Art. 983, New Civil Code), each of the latter to receive equal shares from the
hereditary estate, (Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528; Diancin vs. Bishop of Jaro, O.G. [3rd
Ed.] p. 33); (9) Directing the parties, within thirty days after this judgment shall have become
final to submit to this court, for approval a project of partition of the hereditary estate in the
proportion above indicated, and in such manner as the parties may, by agreement, deemed
convenient and equitable to them taking into consideration the location, kind, quality, nature
and value of the properties involved; (10) Directing the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales and
defendant Bernardita R. Macariola to pay the costs of this suit, in the proportion of one-third
(1/3) by the first named and two-thirds (2/3) by the second named; and (I 1) Dismissing all
other claims of the parties [pp 27-29 of Exh. C].

The decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack of an appeal, and on October 16, 1963, a project of
partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which is marked Exh. A. Notwithstanding the fact that the project
of partition was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and
defendant, Judge Asuncion approved it in his Order dated October 23, 1963, which for convenience is quoted
hereunder in full:

The parties, through their respective counsels, presented to this Court for approval the
following project of partition:

COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the defendant in the above-entitled case, to this Honorable
Court respectfully submit the following Project of Partition:

l. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and 4506 shall belong exclusively to Bernardita Reyes
Macariola;

2. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 2,373.49 square meters along the eastern part of
the lot shall be awarded likewise to Bernardita R. Macariola;

3. Lots Nos. 4803, 4892 and 5265 shall be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes Bales;

4. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 1,834.55 square meters along the western part of
the lot shall likewise be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes-Bales;

5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided equally among Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita
Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares;

6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 after taking the portions awarded
under item (2) and (4) above shall be awarded to Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes,
Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares, provided, however that the
remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 shall belong exclusively to Priscilla Reyes.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Project of Partition indicated above which is
made in accordance with the decision of the Honorable Court be approved.

Tacloban City, October 16, 1963.

 (SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO Atty. for the Defendant Tacloban City

(SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE Atty. for the Plaintiff Tacloban City

While the Court thought it more desirable for all the parties to have signed this Project of
Partition, nevertheless, upon assurance of both counsels of the respective parties to this Court
that the Project of Partition, as above- quoted, had been made after a conference and
agreement of the plaintiffs and the defendant approving the above Project of Partition, and
that both lawyers had represented to the Court that they are given full authority to sign by
themselves the Project of Partition, the Court, therefore, finding the above-quoted Project of
Partition to be in accordance with law, hereby approves the same. The parties, therefore, are
directed to execute such papers, documents or instrument sufficient in form and substance for
the vesting of the rights, interests and participations which were adjudicated to the respective
parties, as outlined in the Project of Partition and the delivery of the respective properties
adjudicated to each one in view of said Project of Partition, and to perform such other acts as
are legal and necessary to effectuate the said Project of Partition.

SO ORDERED.

Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd day of October, 1963.

(SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION Judge

EXH. B.

The above Order of October 23, 1963, was amended on November 11, 1963, only for the purpose of giving
authority to the Register of Deeds of the Province of Leyte to issue the corresponding transfer certificates of
title to the respective adjudicatees in conformity with the project of partition (see Exh. U).

One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184 or rather one-half thereof with an area
of 15,162.5 sq. meters. This lot, which according to the decision was the exclusive property of the deceased
Francisco Reyes, was adjudicated in said project of partition to the plaintiffs Luz, Anacorita Ruperto, Adela,
and Priscilla all surnamed Reyes in equal shares, and when the project of partition was approved by the trial
court the adjudicatees caused Lot 1184 to be subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E
inclusive (Exh. V).

Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a stenographer in Judge Asuncion's court (Exhs. F, F-1 and
V-1), while Lot 1184-E which had an area of 2,172.5556 sq. meters was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Arcadio
Galapon (Exh. 2) who was issued transfer certificate of title No. 2338 of the Register of Deeds of the city of
Tacloban (Exh. 12).

On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife Sold a portion of Lot 1184-E with an area of around
1,306 sq. meters to Judge Asuncion and his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion (Exh. 11), which particular portion was
declared by the latter for taxation purposes (Exh. F).

On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest in
Lot 1184-E to "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc." (Exit 15 & 16). At the time of said sale
the stockholders of the corporation were Dominador Arigpa Tan, Humilia Jalandoni Tan, Jaime Arigpa Tan,
Judge Asuncion, and the latter's wife, Victoria S. Asuncion, with Judge Asuncion as the President and Mrs.
Asuncion as the secretary (Exhs. E-4 to E-7). The Articles of Incorporation of "The Traders Manufacturing and
Fishing Industries, Inc." which we shall henceforth refer to as "TRADERS" were registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission only on January 9, 1967 (Exh. E) [pp. 378-385, rec.].

Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9, 1968 the instant complaint dated August 6, 1968 alleging four causes
of action, to wit: [1] that respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by
purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him; [2]
that he likewise violated Article 14, paragraphs I and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, by associating himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a
stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte; [3] that respondent was guilty of
coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum by closely fraternizing with a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan
who openly and publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney when in truth and in fact his name does not appear in the
Rolls of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar; and [4] that there was a culpable defiance of the law and utter
disregard for ethics by respondent Judge (pp. 1-7, rec.).

Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September 24, 1968 his answer to which a reply was filed on October 16, 1968 by herein
complainant. In Our resolution of October 28, 1968, We referred this case to then Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma of the Court of
Appeals, for investigation, report and recommendation. After hearing, the said Investigating Justice submitted her report dated
May 27, 1971 recommending that respondent Judge should be reprimanded or warned in connection with the first cause of
action alleged in the complaint, and for the second cause of action, respondent should be warned in case of a finding that he is
prohibited under the law to engage in business. On the third and fourth causes of action, Justice Palma recommended that
respondent Judge be exonerated.

The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 (pp. 481, 477, rec.), complainant herein instituted an action
before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa R. Bales, et al.,
defendants," which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4235, seeking the annulment of the project of partition made pursuant to the
decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and the two orders issued by respondent Judge approving the same, as well as the partition of
the estate and the subsequent conveyances with damages. It appears, however, that some defendants were dropped from the
civil case. For one, the case against Dr. Arcadio Galapon was dismissed because he was no longer a real party in interest when
Civil Case No. 4234 was filed, having already conveyed on March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E to respondent Judge and on
August 31, 1966 the remainder was sold to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. Similarly, the case against
defendant Victoria Asuncion was dismissed on the ground that she was no longer a real party in interest at the time the aforesaid
Civil Case No. 4234 was filed as the portion of Lot 1184 acquired by her and respondent Judge from Dr. Arcadio Galapon was
already sold on August 31, 1966 to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing industries, Inc. Likewise, the cases against
defendants Serafin P. Ramento, Catalina Cabus, Ben Barraza Go, Jesus Perez, Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries,
Inc., Alfredo R. Celestial and Pilar P. Celestial, Leopoldo Petilla and Remedios Petilla, Salvador Anota and Enriqueta Anota
and Atty. Zotico A. Tolete were dismissed with the conformity of complainant herein, plaintiff therein, and her counsel.

On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, who was directed and authorized on
June 2, 1969 by the then Secretary (now Minister) of Justice and now Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile to hear
and decide Civil Case No. 4234, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B. ASUNCION

(1) declaring that only Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Leyte has jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the issue of the legality and validity of the Project of Partition [Exhibit "B"] and the two Orders [Exhibits "C"
and "C- 3"] approving the partition;

(2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias B. Asuncion;

(3) adjudging the plaintiff, Mrs. Bernardita R. Macariola to pay defendant Judge Elias B. Asuncion,

(a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P400,000.00] for moral damages;

(b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P200,000.001 for exemplary
damages;

(c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS [P50,000.00] for nominal damages; and

(d) he sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS [PI0,000.00] for Attorney's Fees.

B. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT MARIQUITA VILLASIN, FOR

HERSELF AND FOR THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED GERARDO VILLASIN —
 (1) Dismissing the complaint against the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of the deceased Gerardo
Villasin;

(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of Gerardo Villasin the cost of
the suit.

C. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT SINFOROSA R. BALES, ET AL., WHO

WERE PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 3010 —

(1) Dismissing the complaint against defendants Sinforosa R. Bales, Adela R. Herrer, Priscilla R. Solis, Luz R.
Bakunawa, Anacorita R. Eng and Ruperto O. Reyes.

D. IN THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT BONIFACIO RAMO —

(1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio Ramo;

(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant Bonifacio Ramo the cost of the suit.

SO ORDERED [pp. 531-533, rec.]

It is further disclosed by the record that the aforesaid decision was elevated to the Court of Appeals upon perfection of the
appeal on February 22, 1971.

WE find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant Bernardita R. Macariola, under her first cause of action, that
respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a
portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010. 'That Article provides:

Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial action, either in
person or through the mediation of another:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an
execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property
and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession
[emphasis supplied].

The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to
the persons disqualified therein. WE have already ruled that "... for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the
property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property" (The Director of Lands vs. Ababa et al.,
88 SCRA 513, 519 [1979], Rosario vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA 641, 646 [1978]).

In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case
No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the
reglementary period; hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation. Moreover, at the time of the sale on
March 6, 1965, respondent's order dated October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the
October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long become final for there was no appeal
from said orders.

Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs, namely,
Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Luz R. Bakunawa after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010. It may be recalled
that Lot 1184 or more specifically one-half thereof was adjudicated in equal shares to Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, Luz
Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and Anacorita Reyes in the project of partition, and the same was subdivided into five lots
denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. As aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Galapon for which he was
issued TCT No. 2338 by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, and on March 6, 1965 he sold a portion of said lot to
respondent Judge and his wife who declared the same for taxation purposes only. The subsequent sale on August 31, 1966 by
spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon of their respective shares and interest in said Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing
and Fishing Industries, Inc., in which respondent was the president and his wife was the secretary, took place long after the
finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and of the subsequent two aforesaid orders therein approving the project of
partition.

While it appears that complainant herein filed on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 an action before the Court of First Instance
of Leyte docketed as Civil Case No. 4234, seeking to annul the project of partition and the two orders approving the same, as
well as the partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances, the same, however, is of no moment.

The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E from Dr. Arcadio Galapon; hence,
after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No. 3010 and his two questioned orders dated
October 23, 1963 and November 11, 1963. Therefore, the property was no longer subject of litigation.

The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of Civil Case No. 4234 can no longer alter, change or affect the aforesaid
facts — that the questioned sale to respondent Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice, was effected and consummated long after
the finality of the aforesaid decision or orders.

Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over one year after the finality of the
decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of partition, and not during the pendency of the
litigation, there was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code.

It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on July 31, 1964 of Lot 1184-E to Dr. Arcadio Galapon by Priscilla Reyes,
Adela Reyes and Luz R. Bakunawa was only a mere scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical transfer of said lot to
respondent Judge as a consideration for the approval of the project of partition. In this connection, We agree with the findings of
the Investigating Justice thus:

And so we are now confronted with this all-important question whether or not the acquisition by respondent of
a portion of Lot 1184-E and the subsequent transfer of the whole lot to "TRADERS" of which respondent was
the President and his wife the Secretary, was intimately related to the Order of respondent approving the
project of partition, Exh. A.

Respondent vehemently denies any interest or participation in the transactions between the Reyeses and the
Galapons concerning Lot 1184-E, and he insists that there is no evidence whatsoever to show that Dr. Galapon
had acted, in the purchase of Lot 1184-E, in mediation for him and his wife. (See p. 14 of Respondent's
Memorandum).

xxx xxx xxx

On this point, I agree with respondent that there is no evidence in the record showing that Dr. Arcadio Galapon
acted as a mere "dummy" of respondent in acquiring Lot 1184-E from the Reyeses. Dr. Galapon appeared to
this investigator as a respectable citizen, credible and sincere, and I believe him when he testified that he
bought Lot 1184-E in good faith and for valuable consideration from the Reyeses without any intervention of,
or previous understanding with Judge Asuncion (pp. 391- 394, rec.).

On the contention of complainant herein that respondent Judge acted illegally in approving the project of partition although it
was not signed by the parties, We quote with approval the findings of the Investigating Justice, as follows:

1. I agree with complainant that respondent should have required the signature of the parties more particularly
that of Mrs. Macariola on the project of partition submitted to him for approval; however, whatever error was
committed by respondent in that respect was done in good faith as according to Judge Asuncion he was
assured by Atty. Bonifacio Ramo, the counsel of record of Mrs. Macariola, That he was authorized by his
client to submit said project of partition, (See Exh. B and tsn p. 24, January 20, 1969). While it is true that such
written authority if there was any, was not presented by respondent in evidence, nor did Atty. Ramo appear to
 corroborate the statement of respondent, his affidavit being the only one that was presented as respondent's
Exh. 10, certain actuations of Mrs. Macariola lead this investigator to believe that she knew the contents of the
project of partition, Exh. A, and that she gave her conformity thereto. I refer to the following documents:

1) Exh. 9 — Certified true copy of OCT No. 19520 covering Lot 1154 of the Tacloban Cadastral Survey in
which the deceased Francisco Reyes holds a "1/4 share" (Exh. 9-a). On tills certificate of title the Order dated
November 11, 1963, (Exh. U) approving the project of partition was duly entered and registered on November
26, 1963 (Exh. 9-D);

2) Exh. 7 — Certified copy of a deed of absolute sale executed by Bernardita Reyes Macariola on October 22,
1963, conveying to Dr. Hector Decena the one-fourth share of the late Francisco Reyes-Diaz in Lot 1154. In
this deed of sale the vendee stated that she was the absolute owner of said one-fourth share, the same having
been adjudicated to her as her share in the estate of her father Francisco Reyes Diaz as per decision of the
Court of First Instance of Leyte under case No. 3010 (Exh. 7-A). The deed of sale was duly registered and
annotated at the back of OCT 19520 on December 3, 1963 (see Exh. 9-e).

In connection with the abovementioned documents it is to be noted that in the project of partition dated
October 16, 1963, which was approved by respondent on October 23, 1963, followed by an amending Order
on November 11, 1963, Lot 1154 or rather 1/4 thereof was adjudicated to Mrs. Macariola. It is this 1/4 share in
Lot 1154 which complainant sold to Dr. Decena on October 22, 1963, several days after the preparation of the
project of partition.

Counsel for complainant stresses the view, however, that the latter sold her one-fourth share in Lot 1154 by
virtue of the decision in Civil Case 3010 and not because of the project of partition, Exh. A. Such contention is
absurd because from the decision, Exh. C, it is clear that one-half of one- fourth of Lot 1154 belonged to the
estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz while the other half of said one-fourth was the share of complainant's mother,
Felisa Espiras; in other words, the decision did not adjudicate the whole of the one-fourth of Lot 1154 to the
herein complainant (see Exhs. C-3 & C-4). Complainant became the owner of the entire one-fourth of Lot
1154 only by means of the project of partition, Exh. A. Therefore, if Mrs. Macariola sold Lot 1154 on October
22, 1963, it was for no other reason than that she was wen aware of the distribution of the properties of her
deceased father as per Exhs. A and B. It is also significant at this point to state that Mrs. Macariola admitted
during the cross-examination that she went to Tacloban City in connection with the sale of Lot 1154 to Dr.
Decena (tsn p. 92, November 28, 1968) from which we can deduce that she could not have been kept ignorant
of the proceedings in civil case 3010 relative to the project of partition.

Complainant also assails the project of partition because according to her the properties adjudicated to her
were insignificant lots and the least valuable. Complainant, however, did not present any direct and positive
evidence to prove the alleged gross inequalities in the choice and distribution of the real properties when she
could have easily done so by presenting evidence on the area, location, kind, the assessed and market value of
said properties. Without such evidence there is nothing in the record to show that there were inequalities in the
distribution of the properties of complainant's father (pp. 386389, rec.).

Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by
purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it was, however, improper for him to have acquired the
same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires that: "A judge's official conduct
should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance
of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach." And as aptly observed by the Investigating Justice:
"... it was unwise and indiscreet on the part of respondent to have purchased or acquired a portion of a piece of property that was
or had been in litigation in his court and caused it to be transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife were ranking
officers at the time of such transfer. One who occupies an exalted position in the judiciary has the duty and responsibility of
maintaining the faith and trust of the citizenry in the courts of justice, so that not only must he be truly honest and just, but his
actuations must be such as not give cause for doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of justice. In this
particular case of respondent, he cannot deny that the transactions over Lot 1184-E are damaging and render his actuations open
to suspicion and distrust. Even if respondent honestly believed that Lot 1184-E was no longer in litigation in his court and that
he was purchasing it from a third person and not from the parties to the litigation, he should nonetheless have refrained from
buying it for himself and transferring it to a corporation in which he and his wife were financially involved, to avoid possible
suspicion that his acquisition was related in one way or another to his official actuations in civil case 3010. The conduct of
respondent gave cause for the litigants in civil case 3010, the lawyers practising in his court, and the public in general to doubt
the honesty and fairness of his actuations and the integrity of our courts of justice" (pp. 395396, rec.).

II

With respect to the second cause of action, the complainant alleged that respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article
14 of the Code of Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a
stockholder and a ranking officer, said corporation having been organized to engage in business. Said Article provides that:

Article 14 — The following cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor can they hold any
office or have any direct, administrative, or financial intervention in commercial or industrial companies
within the limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in which they discharge their duties:

1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department of public prosecution in active service.
This provision shall not be applicable to mayors, municipal judges, and municipal prosecuting attorneys nor to
those who by chance are temporarily discharging the functions of judge or prosecuting attorney.

xxx xxx xxx

5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage in commerce in a determinate territory.

It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of the
commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between
the government and certain public officers and employees, like justices and judges.

Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the governmental
organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897
[1922]). It may be recalled that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative law
including the law on public officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature
of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in
business: hence, political in essence.

It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, with some modifications
made by the "Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," which was extended to the Philippines by the Royal
Decree of August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.

Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the
Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of
sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are
automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.

Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311 [1912]) that:

By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another, either following a conquest
or otherwise, ... those laws which are political in their nature and pertain to the prerogatives of the former
government immediately cease upon the transfer of sovereignty. (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899).

While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the, laws of the new sovereign
continue in force without the express assent or affirmative act of the conqueror, the political laws do not.
(Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such political laws of the prior sovereignty as are not in
conflict with the constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, may be continued in force if the conqueror
shall so declare by affirmative act of the commander-in-chief during the war, or by Congress in time of peace.
(Ely's Administrator vs. United States, 171 U.S. 220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the case of American and Ocean Ins.
Cos. vs. 356 Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief Justice Marshall said:

On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never been held that the relations of the
inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their relations with their former sovereign
 are dissolved, and new relations are created between them and the government which has
acquired their territory. The same act which transfers their country, transfers the allegiance of
those who remain in it; and the law which may be denominated political, is necessarily
changed, although that which regulates the intercourse and general conduct of individuals,
remains in force, until altered by the newly- created power of the State.

Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: "It is a general principle of the public law that
on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "

There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce
after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently,
Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court
of First Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.

It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge violated paragraph H, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides that:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in
which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any Iaw from having any interest.

Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph because there is no showing that respondent
participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the business of the corporation in which respondent participated has obviously no relation or
connection with his judicial office. The business of said corporation is not that kind where respondent intervenes or takes part in
his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance. As was held in one case involving the application of Article 216 of the
Revised Penal Code which has a similar prohibition on public officers against directly or indirectly becoming interested in any
contract or business in which it is his official duty to intervene, "(I)t is not enough to be a public official to be subject to this
crime; it is necessary that by reason of his office, he has to intervene in said contracts or transactions; and, hence, the official
who intervenes in contracts or transactions which have no relation to his office cannot commit this crime.' (People vs. Meneses,
C.A. 40 O.G. 11th Supp. 134, cited by Justice Ramon C. Aquino; Revised Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol. 11 [1976]).

It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation gained any undue advantage in its business operations by
reason of respondent's financial involvement in it, or that the corporation benefited in one way or another in any case filed by or
against it in court. It is undisputed that there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in
which the corporation was either party plaintiff or defendant except Civil Case No. 4234 entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola,
plaintiff, versus Sinforosa O. Bales, et al.," wherein the complainant herein sought to recover Lot 1184-E from the aforesaid
corporation. It must be noted, however, that Civil Case No. 4234 was filed only on November 9 or 11, 1968 and decided on
November 2, 1970 by CFI Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno when respondent Judge was no longer connected with the corporation,
having disposed of his interest therein on January 31, 1967.

Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same paragraph because there is no provision in both the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions of the Philippines, nor is there an existing law expressly prohibiting members of the Judiciary from engaging or
having interest in any lawful business.

It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as amended, also known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, does not contain any
prohibition to that effect. As a matter of fact, under Section 77 of said law, municipal judges may engage in teaching or other
vocation not involving the practice of law after office hours but with the permission of the district judge concerned.

Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges from engaging in commerce is, as heretofore stated,
deemed abrogated automatically upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to America, because it is political in nature.
Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code against the purchase by judges of a property in
litigation before the court within whose jurisdiction they perform their duties, cannot apply to respondent Judge because the sale
of the lot in question to him took place after the finality of his decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as his two orders
approving the project of partition; hence, the property was no longer subject of litigation.

In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules made pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959
prohibits an officer or employee in the civil service from engaging in any private business, vocation, or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of
department, the same, however, may not fall within the purview of paragraph h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act because the last portion of said paragraph speaks of a prohibition by the Constitution or law on any public officer
from having any interest in any business and not by a mere administrative rule or regulation. Thus, a violation of the aforesaid
rule by any officer or employee in the civil service, that is, engaging in private business without a written permission from the
Department Head may not constitute graft and corrupt practice as defined by law.

On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, We hold
that the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules promulgated thereunder, particularly Section 12
of Rule XVIII, do not apply to the members of the Judiciary. Under said Section 12: "No officer or employee shall engage
directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the Head of Department ..."

It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a member of the Judiciary, is covered by Republic Act No. 296, as
amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7, Article X, 1973 Constitution.

Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss judges was then vested in the President of the Philippines, not in
the Commissioner of Civil Service, and only on two grounds, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency, and upon the
recommendation of the Supreme Court, which alone is authorized, upon its own motion, or upon information of the Secretary
(now Minister) of Justice to conduct the corresponding investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section defines the grounds and
prescribes the special procedure for the discipline of judges.

And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, only the Supreme Court can discipline judges of inferior
courts as well as other personnel of the Judiciary.

It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959: "The Commissioner may, for ... violation of the existing Civil
Service Law and rules or of reasonable office regulations, or in the interest of the service, remove any subordinate officer or
employee from the service, demote him in rank, suspend him for not more than one year without pay or fine him in an amount
not exceeding six months' salary." Thus, a violation of Section 12 of Rule XVIII is a ground for disciplinary action against civil
service officers and employees.

However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service officers or employees subject to the disciplinary authority of
the Commissioner of Civil Service; for, certainly, the Commissioner is not the head of the Judicial Department to which they
belong. The Revised Administrative Code (Section 89) and the Civil Service Law itself state that the Chief Justice is the
department head of the Supreme Court (Sec. 20, R.A. No. 2260) [1959]); and under the 1973 Constitution, the Judiciary is the
only other or second branch of the government (Sec. 1, Art. X, 1973 Constitution). Besides, a violation of Section 12, Rule
XVIII cannot be considered as a ground for disciplinary action against judges because to recognize the same as applicable to
them, would be adding another ground for the discipline of judges and, as aforestated, Section 67 of the Judiciary Act
recognizes only two grounds for their removal, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency.

Moreover, under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the Commissioner of Civil Service who has original and
exclusive jurisdiction "(T)o decide, within one hundred twenty days, after submission to it, all administrative cases
against permanent officers and employees in the competitive service, and, except as provided by law, to have final authority to
pass upon their removal, separation, and suspension and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of
such officers and employees; and prescribe standards, guidelines and regulations governing the administration of discipline"
(emphasis supplied). There is no question that a judge belong to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government
as a Presidential appointee and is therefore not covered by the aforesaid provision. WE have already ruled that "... in
interpreting Section 16(i) of Republic Act No. 2260, we emphasized that only permanent officers and employees who belong to
the classified service come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service" (Villaluz vs. Zaldivar, 15
SCRA 710,713 [1965], Ang-Angco vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619 [1963]).
Although the actuation of respondent Judge in engaging in private business by joining the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, is not violative of the provissions of Article 14 of the Code of Commerce
and Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as well as Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules
promulgated pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959, the impropriety of the same is clearly unquestionable because Canon 25
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics expressly declares that:

A judge should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises which are apt to be involved in
litigation in his court; and, after his accession to the bench, he should not retain such investments previously
made, longer than a period sufficient to enable him to dispose of them without serious loss. It is desirable that
he should, so far as reasonably possible, refrain from all relations which would normally tend to arouse the
suspicion that such relations warp or bias his judgment, or prevent his impartial attitude of mind in the
administration of his judicial duties. ...

WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the
aforesaid corporation and sold their respective shares to third parties, and it appears also that the aforesaid corporation did not in
anyway benefit in any case filed by or against it in court as there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte from the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12, 1966, up to its
incorporation on January 9, 1967, and the eventual withdrawal of respondent on January 31, 1967 from said corporation. Such
disposal or sale by respondent and his wife of their shares in the corporation only 22 days after the incorporation of the
corporation, indicates that respondent realized that early that their interest in the corporation contravenes the aforesaid Canon
25. Respondent Judge and his wife therefore deserve the commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the firm after its
incorporation and before it became involved in any court litigation

III

With respect to the third and fourth causes of action, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor
and acted in disregard of judicial decorum, and that there was culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics. WE
agree, however, with the recommendation of the Investigating Justice that respondent Judge be exonerated because the aforesaid
causes of action are groundless, and WE quote the pertinent portion of her report which reads as follows:

The basis for complainant's third cause of action is the claim that respondent associated and closely fraternized
with Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney (see Exhs. I,
I-1 and J) when in truth and in fact said Dominador Arigpa Tan does not appear in the Roll of Attorneys and is
not a member of the Philippine Bar as certified to in Exh. K.

The "respondent denies knowing that Dominador Arigpa Tan was an "impostor" and claims that all the time he
believed that the latter was a bona fide member of the bar. I see no reason for disbelieving this assertion of
respondent. It has been shown by complainant that Dominador Arigpa Tan represented himself publicly as an
attorney-at-law to the extent of putting up a signboard with his name and the words "Attorney-at Law" (Exh. I
and 1- 1) to indicate his office, and it was but natural for respondent and any person for that matter to have
accepted that statement on its face value. "Now with respect to the allegation of complainant that respondent is
guilty of fraternizing with Dominador Arigpa Tan to the extent of permitting his wife to be a godmother of Mr.
Tan's child at baptism (Exh. M & M-1), that fact even if true did not render respondent guilty of violating any
canon of judicial ethics as long as his friendly relations with Dominador A. Tan and family did not influence
his official actuations as a judge where said persons were concerned. There is no tangible convincing proof
that herein respondent gave any undue privileges in his court to Dominador Arigpa Tan or that the latter
benefitted in his practice of law from his personal relations with respondent, or that he used his influence, if he
had any, on the Judges of the other branches of the Court to favor said Dominador Tan.

Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the judiciary to refrain as much as possible from maintaining
close friendly relations with practising attorneys and litigants in his court so as to avoid suspicion 'that his
social or business relations or friendship constitute an element in determining his judicial course" (par. 30,
Canons of Judicial Ethics), but if a Judge does have social relations, that in itself would not constitute a ground
for disciplinary action unless it be clearly shown that his social relations be clouded his official actuations with
bias and partiality in favor of his friends (pp. 403-405, rec.).

In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, did not violate any law in
acquiring by purchase a parcel of land which was in litigation in his court and in engaging in business by joining a private
corporation during his incumbency as judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, he should be reminded to be more discreet
in his private and business activities, because his conduct as a member of the Judiciary must not only be characterized with
propriety but must always be above suspicion.

WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY REMINDED TO
BE MORE DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.

Fernando, C.J., Abad Santos and Esolin JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I vote for respondent's unqualified exoneration.

BARREDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I vote with Justice Aquino.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I vote for respondent's unqualified exoneration.

BARREDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I vote with Justice Aquino.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner,

vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent.

G.R. No. 83815 February 22, 1991

ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,

vs.
PHILIP ELLA C. JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform; CARLOS DOMINGUEZ, as Secretary of Agriculture;
LOURDES QUISUMBING, as Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports; FULGENCIO FACTORAN, JR., as
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources; VICENTE V. JAYME, as Secretary of Finance; SEDFREY
ORDOÑEZ, as Secretary of Justice; FRANKLIN N. DRILON, as Secretary of Labor and Employment; LUIS SANTOS,
as Secretary of Local Government; FIDEL V. RAMOS, as Secretary of National Defense; TEODORO F. BENIGNO, as
Press Secretary; JUANITO FERRER, as Secretary of Public Works and Highways; ANTONIO ARRIZABAL, as
Secretary of Science and Technology; JOSE CONCEPCION, as Secretary of Trade and Industry; JOSE ANTONIO
GONZALEZ, as Secretary of Tourism; ALFREDO R.A. BENGZON, as Secretary of Health; REINERIO D. REYES, as
Secretary of Transportation and Communication; GUILLERMO CARAGUE, as Commissioner of the Budget; and
SOLITA MONSOD, as Head of the National Economic Development Authority, respondents.

Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83896.
Antonio P. Coronel for petitioners in 83815.

FERNAN, C.J.:p

These two (2) petitions were consolidated per resolution dated August 9, 19881 and are being resolved jointly as both seek a
declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. The
pertinent provisions of the assailed Executive Order are:

Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or
assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position,
hold not more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding
compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards,
councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman.

Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive official of the Executive
Department holds more positions than what is allowed in Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must relinquish the excess
position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two
positions other than his primary position.

Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in government-owned or controlled corporations, at least
one-third (1/3) of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or
assistant secretary.

Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to the
limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,2 which provides as follows:
 Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during
said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested
in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

It is alleged that the above-quoted Section 13, Article VII prohibits public respondents, as members of the Cabinet, along with
the other public officials enumerated in the list attached to the petitions as Annex "C" in G.R. No.
838153 and as Annex "B" in G.R. No. 838964 from holding any other office or employment during their tenure. In addition to
seeking a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284, petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines
further seeks in G.R. No. 83815 the issuance of the extraordinary writs of prohibition and mandamus, as well as a temporary
restraining order directing public respondents therein to cease and desist from holding, in addition to their primary positions,
dual or multiple positions other than those authorized by the 1987 Constitution and from receiving any salaries, allowances, per
diems and other forms of privileges and the like appurtenant to their questioned positions, and compelling public respondents to
return, reimburse or refund any and all amounts or benefits that they may have received from such positions.

Specifically, petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines charges that notwithstanding the aforequoted "absolute and self-
executing" provision of the 1987 Constitution, then Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez, construing Section 13, Article VII in
relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B, rendered on July 23, 1987 Opinion No. 73, series of 1987,5 declaring that Cabinet
members, their deputies (undersecretaries) and assistant secretaries may hold other public office, including membership in the
boards of government corporations: (a) when directly provided for in the Constitution as in the case of the Secretary of Justice
who is made an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council under Section 8, paragraph 1, Article VIII; or (b) if allowed
by law; or (c) if allowed by the primary functions of their respective positions; and that on the basis of this Opinion, the
President of the Philippines, on July 25, 1987 or two (2) days before Congress convened on July 27, 1987: promulgated
Executive Order No. 284.6

Petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines objects to both DOJ Opinion No. 73 and Executive Order No. 284 as they
allegedly "lumped together" Section 13, Article VII and the general provision in another article, Section 7, par. (2), Article I-
XB. This "strained linkage" between the two provisions, each addressed to a distinct and separate group of public officers ––
one, the President and her official family, and the other, public servants in general –– allegedly "abolished the clearly separate,
higher, exclusive, and mandatory constitutional rank assigned to the prohibition against multiple jobs for the President, the
Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and subalterns, who are the leaders of government expected to
lead by example."7 Article IX-B, Section 7, par. (2)8 provides:

Sec. 7. . . . . .

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other
office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

The Solicitor General counters that Department of Justice DOJ Opinion No. 73, series of 1987, as further elucidated and
clarified by DOJ Opinion No. 129, series of 19879 and DOJ Opinion No. 155, series of 1988,10 being the first official
construction and interpretation by the Secretary of Justice of Section 13, Article VII and par. (2) of Section 7, Article I-XB of
the Constitution, involving the same subject of appointments or designations of an appointive executive official to positions
other than his primary position, is "reasonably valid and constitutionally firm," and that Executive Order No. 284, promulgated
pursuant to DOJ Opinion No. 73, series of 1987 is consequently constitutional. It is worth noting that DOJ Opinion No. 129,
series of 1987 and DOJ Opinion No. 155, series of 1988 construed the limitation imposed by E.O. No. 284 as not applying
to ex-officio positions or to positions which, although not so designated as ex-officio are allowed by the primary functions of the
public official, but only to the holding of multiple positions which are not related to or necessarily included in the position of
the public official concerned (disparate positions).

In sum, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being challenged by petitioners on the principal submission that it
adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in the Constitution. According to petitioners, by virtue of
the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution," the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment
in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the
Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and
Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Petitioners further argue that the exception to the prohibition in Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB on the Civil Service
Commission applies to officers and employees of the Civil Service in general and that said exceptions do not apply and cannot
be extended to Section 13, Article VII which applies specifically to the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and
their deputies or assistants.

There is no dispute that the prohibition against the President, Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or
assistants from holding dual or multiple positions in the Government admits of certain exceptions. The disagreement between
petitioners and public respondents lies on the constitutional basis of the exception. Petitioners insist that because of the phrase
"unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" used in Section 13 of Article VII, the exception must be expressly provided in
the Constitution, as in the case of the Vice-President being allowed to become a Member of the Cabinet under the second
paragraph of Section 3, Article VII or the Secretary of Justice being designated an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council under Article VIII, Sec. 8 (1). Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase "unless otherwise
provided in the Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as the
appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned.

The threshold question therefore is: does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet
members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under
Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB which, for easy reference is quoted anew, thus: "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries."

We rule in the negative.

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has
been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption,
and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the
times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason
which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished
thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.11

The practice of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as members of the governing bodies or boards
of various government agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations, became
prevalent during the time legislative powers in this country were exercised by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos pursuant to
his martial law authority. There was a proliferation of newly-created agencies, instrumentalities and government-owned and
controlled corporations created by presidential decrees and other modes of presidential issuances where Cabinet members, their
deputies or assistants were designated to head or sit as members of the board with the corresponding salaries, emoluments, per
diems, allowances and other perquisites of office. Most of these instrumentalities have remained up to the present time.

This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government soon led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who
took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. In fact, the holding of multiple offices in government was
strongly denounced on the floor of the Batasang Pambansa.12 This condemnation came in reaction to the published report of the
Commission on Audit, entitled "1983 Summary Annual Audit Report on: Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations,
Self-Governing Boards and Commissions" which carried as its Figure No. 4 a "Roaster of Membership in Governing Boards of
Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations as of December 31, 1983."

Particularly odious and revolting to the people's sense of propriety and morality in government service were the data contained
therein that Roberto V. Ongpin was a member of the governing boards of twenty-nine (29) governmental agencies,
instrumentalities and corporations; Imelda R. Marcos of twenty-three (23); Cesar E.A. Virata of twenty-two (22); Arturo R.
Tanco, Jr. of fifteen (15); Jesus S. Hipolito and Geronimo Z. Velasco, of fourteen each (14); Cesar C. Zalamea of thirteen (13);
Ruben B. Ancheta and Jose A. Roño of twelve (12) each; Manuel P. Alba, Gilberto O. Teodoro, and Edgardo Tordesillas of
eleven (11) each; and Lilia Bautista and Teodoro Q. Peña of ten (10) each.13

The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes of discontent with the Marcos regime. It was therefore
quite inevitable and in consonance with the overwhelming sentiment of the people that the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
convened as it was after the people successfully unseated former President Marcos, should draft into its proposed Constitution
the provisions under consideration which are envisioned to remedy, if not correct, the evils that flow from the holding of
multiple governmental offices and employment. In fact, as keenly observed by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz during the
deliberations in these cases, one of the strongest selling points of the 1987 Constitution during the campaign for its ratification
was the assurance given by its proponents that the scandalous practice of Cabinet members holding multiple positions in the
government and collecting unconscionably excessive compensation therefrom would be discontinued.

But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the
holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the
Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment
during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself.

Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the
framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other
offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned.

Moreover, such intent is underscored by a comparison of Section 13, Article VII with other provisions of the Constitution on
the disqualifications of certain public officials or employees from holding other offices or employment. Under Section 13,
Article VI, "(N)o Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government . . .". Under Section 5(4), Article XVI, "(N)o member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be
appointed in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government,including government-owned or controlled corporations or
any of their subsidiaries." Even Section 7 (2), Article IX-B, relied upon by respondents provides "(U)nless otherwise allowed by
law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government."

It is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications to hold other office or employment, the prohibition pertains to
an office or employment in the government and government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. In striking
contrast is the wording of Section 13, Article VII which states that "(T)he President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure." In the latter provision, the disqualification is absolute, not being qualified by the phrase "in
the Government." The prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is therefore all-embracing and covers both
public and private office or employment.

Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence provides: "They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries." These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the
President and his official family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the
Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the
1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter
prohibitions.

Such intent of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to be stricter with the President and his official family was also succinctly
articulated by Commissioner Vicente Foz after Commissioner Regalado Maambong noted during the floor deliberations and
debate that there was no symmetry between the Civil Service prohibitions, originally found in the General Provisions and the
anticipated report on the Executive Department. Commissioner Foz Commented, "We actually have to be stricter with the
President and the members of the Cabinet because they exercise more powers and, therefore, more cheeks and restraints on
them are called for because there is more possibility of abuse in their case."14

Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government
during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-
XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section
13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants.

This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot
possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article I-XB of the 1987 Constitution. To construe said
qualifying phrase as respondents would have us do, would render nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of
the framers of the Constitution to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants with respect to holding other offices or employment in the government during their tenure. Respondents'
interpretation that Section 13 of Article VII admits of the exceptions found in Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B would
obliterate the distinction so carefully set by the framers of the Constitution as to when the high-ranking officials of the
Executive Branch from the President to Assistant Secretary, on the one hand, and the generality of civil servants from the rank
immediately below Assistant Secretary downwards, on the other, may hold any other office or position in the government
during their tenure.

Moreover, respondents' reading of the provisions in question would render certain parts of the Constitution inoperative. This
observation applies particularly to the Vice-President who, under Section 13 of Article VII is allowed to hold other office or
employment when so authorized by the Constitution, but who as an elective public official under Sec. 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB
is absolutely ineligible "for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure."
Surely, to say that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" found in Section 13, Article VII has reference to
Section 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB would render meaningless the specific provisions of the Constitution authorizing the Vice-
President to become a member of the Cabinet,15 and to act as President without relinquishing the Vice-Presidency where the
President shall not nave been chosen or fails to qualify.16 Such absurd consequence can be avoided only by interpreting the two
provisions under consideration as one, i.e., Section 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB providing the general rule and the other, i.e.,
Section 13, Article VII as constituting the exception thereto. In the same manner must Section 7, par. (2) of Article I-XB be
construed vis-a-vis Section 13, Article VII.

It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all
the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to
be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.17 Sections bearing on a particular subject should be
considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution18 and one section is not to be allowed
to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.19

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every
word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.20

Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-
President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the
government during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face, the language of
Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the
privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the constitution is
prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation.21 The phrase "unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the
Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII;
or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice
being ex-officiomember of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must
not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required22 by the primary functions of said officials' office.
The reason is that these posts do no comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but
are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials.23 To characterize these posts otherwise would
lead to absurd consequences, among which are: The President of the Philippines cannot chair the National Security Council
reorganized under Executive Order No. 115 (December 24, 1986). Neither can the Vice-President, the Executive Secretary, and
the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice, Labor and Employment and Local Government sit in this Council, which would
then have no reason to exist for lack of a chairperson and members. The respective undersecretaries and assistant secretaries,
would also be prohibited.

The Secretary of Labor and Employment cannot chair the Board of Trustees of the National Manpower and Youth Council
(NMYC) or the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), both of which are attached to his department for
policy coordination and guidance. Neither can his Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries chair these agencies.

The Secretaries of Finance and Budget cannot sit in the Monetary Board.24 Neither can their respective undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries. The Central Bank Governor would then be assisted by lower ranking employees in providing policy
direction in the areas of money, banking and credit.25
Indeed, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended such absurd consequences. A Constitution, viewed as a
continuously operative charter of government, is not to be interpreted as demanding the impossible or the impracticable; and
unreasonable or absurd consequences, if possible, should be avoided.26

To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering positions held without additional
compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the concerned official's
office. The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from official character
merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position." Ex-officio likewise
denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than
that conferred by the office."27 An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office,
and without further warrant or appointment.28 To illustrate, by express provision of law, the Secretary of Transportation and
Communications is the ex-officioChairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority,29 and the Light Rail Transit
Authority.30

The Court had occasion to explain the meaning of an ex-officio position in Rafael vs. Embroidery and Apparel Control and
Inspection Board,31 thus: "An examination of section 2 of the questioned statute (R.A. 3137) reveals that for the chairman and
members of the Board to qualify they need only be designated by the respective department heads. With the exception of the
representative from the private sector, they sit ex-officio. In order to be designated they must already be holding positions in the
offices mentioned in the law. Thus, for instance, one who does not hold a previous appointment in the Bureau of Customs,
cannot, under the act, be designated a representative from that office. The same is true with respect to the representatives from
the other offices. No new appointments are necessary. This is as it should be, because the representatives so designated merely
perform duties in the Board in addition to those already performed under their original appointments."32

The term "primary" used to describe "functions" refers to the order of importance and thus means chief or principal function.
The term is not restricted to the singular but may refer to the plural.33 The additional duties must not only be closely related to,
but must be required by the official's primary functions. Examples of designations to positions by virtue of one's primary
functions are the Secretaries of Finance and Budget sitting as members of the Monetary Board, and the Secretary of
Transportation and Communications acting as Chairman of the Maritime Industry Authority34 and the Civil Aeronautics Board.

If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental, remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise alien
to the primary function of a cabinet official, such additional functions would fall under the purview of "any other office"
prohibited by the Constitution. An example would be the Press Undersecretary sitting as a member of the Board of the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation. The same rule applies to such positions which confer on the cabinet official
management functions and/or monetary compensation, such as but not limited to chairmanships or directorships in government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

Mandating additional duties and functions to the President, Vice-President, Cabinet Members, their deputies or assistants which
are not inconsistent with those already prescribed by their offices or appointments by virtue of their special knowledge,
expertise and skill in their respective executive offices is a practice long-recognized in many jurisdictions. It is a practice
justified by the demands of efficiency, policy direction, continuity and coordination among the different offices in the Executive
Branch in the discharge of its multifarious tasks of executing and implementing laws affecting national interest and general
welfare and delivering basic services to the people. It is consistent with the power vested on the President and his alter egos, the
Cabinet members, to have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices and to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed.35 Without these additional duties and functions being assigned to the President and his official family to sit in the
governing bodies or boards of governmental agencies or instrumentalities in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by their primary functions, they would be supervision, thereby deprived of the means for control and resulting in an
unwieldy and confused bureaucracy.

It bears repeating though that in order that such additional duties or functions may not transgress the prohibition embodied in
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, such additional duties or functions must be required by the primary functions
of the official concerned, who is to perform the same in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law, without receiving any
additional compensation therefor.

The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official
concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that these services
are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. It should be obvious that if, say, the
Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he is actually and in legal
contemplation performing the primary function of his principal office in defining policy in monetary and banking matters,
which come under the jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra
compensation, whether it be in the form of a per them or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism. By
whatever name it is designated, such additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.

It is interesting to note that during the floor deliberations on the proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod to add to Section
7, par. (2), Article IX-B, originally found as Section 3 of the General Provisions, the exception "unless required by the functions
of his position,"36 express reference to certain high-ranking appointive public officials like members of the Cabinet were
made.37 Responding to a query of Commissioner Blas Ople, Commissioner Monsod pointed out that there are instances when
although not required by current law, membership of certain high-ranking executive officials in other offices and
corporations is necessary by reason of said officials' primary functions. The example given by Commissioner Monsod was the
Minister of Trade and Industry.38

While this exchange between Commissioners Monsod and Ople may be used as authority for saying that additional functions
and duties flowing from the primary functions of the official may be imposed upon him without offending the constitutional
prohibition under consideration, it cannot, however, be taken as authority for saying that this exception is by virtue of Section 7,
par. (2) of Article I-XB. This colloquy between the two Commissioners took place in the plenary session of September 27,
1986. Under consideration then was Section 3 of Committee Resolution No. 531 which was the proposed article on General
Provisions.39 At that time, the article on the Civil Service Commission had been approved on third reading on July 22,
1986,40 while the article on the Executive Department, containing the more specific prohibition in Section 13, had also been
earlier approved on third reading on August 26, 1986.41 It was only after the draft Constitution had undergone reformatting and
"styling" by the Committee on Style that said Section 3 of the General Provisions became Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B and
reworded "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position. . . ."

What was clearly being discussed then were general principles which would serve as constitutional guidelines in the absence of
specific constitutional provisions on the matter. What was primarily at issue and approved on that occasion was the adoption of
the qualified and delimited phrase "primary functions" as the basis of an exception to the general rule covering all appointive
public officials. Had the Constitutional Commission intended to dilute the specific prohibition in said Section 13 of Article VII,
it could have re-worded said Section 13 to conform to the wider exceptions provided in then Section 3 of the proposed general
Provisions, later placed as Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B on the Civil Service Commission.

That this exception would in the final analysis apply also to the President and his official family is by reason of the legal
principles governing additional functions and duties of public officials rather than by virtue of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B At
any rate, we have made it clear that only the additional functions and duties "required," as opposed to "allowed," by the primary
functions may be considered as not constituting "any other office."

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to
arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail42 as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear.1âwphi1Debates in the constitutional
convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they
give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes
at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears
upon its face."43 The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in
the framers's understanding thereof.44

It being clear, as it was in fact one of its best selling points, that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-
President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment
in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held
without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their
office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general
rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the
constitution's manifest intent and the people' understanding thereof.

In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions
that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than
two (2) positions in the government and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold
multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
The Court is alerted by respondents to the impractical consequences that will result from a strict application of the prohibition
mandated under Section 13, Article VII on the operations of the Government, considering that Cabinet members would be
stripped of their offices held in an ex-officio capacity, by reason of their primary positions or by virtue of legislation. As earlier
clarified in this decision, ex-officio posts held by the executive official concerned without additional compensation as provided
by law and as required by the primary functions of his office do not fall under the definition of "any other office" within the
contemplation of the constitutional prohibition. With respect to other offices or employment held by virtue of legislation,
including chairmanships or directorships in government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, suffice it to say
that the feared impractical consequences are more apparent than real. Being head of an executive department is no mean job. It
is more than a full-time job, requiring full attention, specialized knowledge, skills and expertise. If maximum benefits are to be
derived from a department head's ability and expertise, he should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without
the distraction of other governmental offices or employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and
energy among too many positions of responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency. Surely the advantages
to be derived from this concentration of attention, knowledge and expertise, particularly at this stage of our national and
economic development, far outweigh the benefits, if any, that may be gained from a department head spreading himself too thin
and taking in more than what he can handle.

Finding Executive Order No. 284 to be constitutionally infirm, the court hereby orders respondents Secretary of Environment
and Natural Resources Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., Secretary of Local Government45 Luis Santos, Secretary of National Defense
Fidel V. Ramos, Secretary of Health Alfredo R.A. Bengzon and Secretary of the Budget Guillermo Carague to immediately
relinquish their other offices or employment, as herein defined, in the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries. With respect to the other named respondents, the petitions have become moot and academic
as they are no longer occupying the positions complained of.

During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto officers and as such entitled to
emoluments for actual services rendered.46 It has been held that "in cases where there is no de jure,officer, a de facto officer,
who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the
emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the
office. This doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it seems unjust that the public should benefit by the
services of an officer de facto and then be freed from all liability to pay any one for such services.47 Any per diem, allowances
or other emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual services rendered in the questioned positions may therefore
be retained by them.

WHEREFORE, subject to the qualification above-stated, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 284 is hereby
declared null and void and is accordingly set aside.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado and
Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Sarmiento and Griño-Aquino, JJ., took no part.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS
OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE,
REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C.
TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003

SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA RAZON-ABAD, petitioners,

ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH
ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners,

WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-in-intervention,
vs.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,

WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN
M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM
BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIÑO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN
GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL
MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAÑON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO
AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON, MANUEL
ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL
DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO,
ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS,
RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR.,
FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO
BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI
LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO
LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO,
DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG,
GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON,
JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO
MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN
CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003

HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES,
ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003

SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners,

WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH
ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003

LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS,
RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO
GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A.
LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN,
MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO,
RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE,
WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNA
CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA,
ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND
NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR., THE
SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA,
ET AL., respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,

vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003

ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND
MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE
LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003

CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003

U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C.
ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO,
DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-
PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND
GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80
HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST
SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003

FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003

NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,

vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION OF THE 86
SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS
SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003

VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003

IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE,
JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE G.
DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN
DRILON, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003

DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON,

PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO
B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF
CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED
MEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE
LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION
INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO,
PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST
PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU
CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER
AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may
appear to be, over the determination by the independent branches of government of the nature, scope and extent of their
respective constitutional powers where the Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its resolution.

Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship
among these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one such today involving the legislature and the judiciary which
has drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.

There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy subject of the instant petitions –
whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of
Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political
question – has resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was brought upon by a political crisis of
conscience.

In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy
spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of
resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence
to, not departure from, the Constitution.

In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the
inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means
prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign
people.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to
temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality.

Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as they are to insure that governmental
power is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and coordination among these
branches where the delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of
governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.

Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:

 ARTICLE XI

Accountability of Public Officers

SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.

SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any
citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business
within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee,
after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days
from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by
the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable
resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each
Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the
House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of
all the Members of the Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold
any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives
adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28,
2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between
these two Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:

11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES

RULE II RULE V

INITIATING IMPEACHMENT BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF

IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS
 Section 2. Mode of Initiating AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL
Impeachment. – Impeachment shall be
initiated only by a verified complaint Section 16. – Impeachment
for impeachment filed by any Member Proceedings Deemed Initiated. – In
of the House of Representatives or by cases where a Member of the House
any citizen upon a resolution of files a verified complaint of
endorsement by any Member thereof or impeachment or a citizen files a
by a verified complaint or resolution of verified complaint that is endorsed by
impeachment filed by at least one-third a Member of the House through a
(1/3) of all the Members of the House. resolution of endorsement against an
impeachable officer, impeachment
proceedings against such official are
deemed initiated on the day the
Committee on Justice finds that the
verified complaint and/or resolution
against such official, as the case may
be, is sufficient in substance, or on the
date the House votes to overturn or
affirm the finding of the said
Committee that the verified complaint
and/or resolution, as the case may be,
is not sufficient in substance.

In cases where a verified complaint or

a resolution of impeachment is filed or
endorsed, as the case may be, by at
least one-third (1/3) of the Members
of the House, impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated at
the time of the filing of such verified
complaint or resolution of
impeachment with the Secretary
General.

RULE V Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of

Impeachment Proceedings. – Within
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT a period of one (1) year from the date
impeachment proceedings are deemed
Section 14. Scope of Bar. – No initiated as provided in Section 16
impeachment proceedings shall be hereof, no impeachment proceedings,
initiated against the same official more as such, can be initiated against the
than once within the period of one (1) same official. (Italics in the original;
year. emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,2 sponsored by Representative Felix William D.
Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo
B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 20038 in
accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
 Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business
within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee,
after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days
from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by
the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but
voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this
effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the
House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint11 was filed with the Secretary General of
the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District,
Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.13

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of
the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution
that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."

In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious
and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress,"14 posits that his
right to bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and
arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of
Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared
unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with
Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the
records of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court
permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are
of transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting
respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for
the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any
Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with
the impeachment trial.

In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of
public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ
of prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has recognized that he has locus standi to bring
petitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the second impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members of the legal profession, pray in their
petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and
transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.

In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as
members of the House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional impeachment
proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act
proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right to be protected against all forms of
senseless spending of taxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the
integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray that
(1) the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be
declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying
and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and
agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner
Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not state what
its nature is, that the filing of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16
and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and
void.

In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of the Philippine Bar Association and of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding
with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by the Code of Professional
Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V
and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the House of
Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House
Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction
which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of succeeding
generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from
conducting further proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this Court declare as unconstitutional the second
impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the
Judiciary.

In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for
Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a
direct and substantial interest in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in
accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of Representatives from transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due course.

In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for Prohibition that respondents
Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any legal power to
do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief
Justice to disburse the (JDF)."

In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofileña, alleging that as professors of law they
have an abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue
"which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from
endorsing and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second impeachment complaint be declared null
and void.

In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the second
impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in
accordance with law and that the House of Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit
thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction" that the
second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in the filing of the second
impeachment complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the
second impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondent House of
Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be
prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any proceedings thereon.

In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and impeachment by
the respondent House of Representatives be declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin
Drilon be prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that they have
accepted the same, that they be prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment trial.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three of the eighteen which were filed before
this Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of
Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate.
Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House
Impeachment Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar
relief. In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a
legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation
of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second
impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried because the House of Representatives
adjourned for lack of quorum,19 and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the
Senate.

Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction which were
filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected their offer.
Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to participate.

Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate
the petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment on
the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at
10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition, this Court called on petitioners and
respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from
committing acts that would render the petitions moot.

Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-
respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much
less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the
Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that
"the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment
proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide
impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the
provisions of Article XI of the Constitution."22

Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a) consolidate them with the earlier
consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c)
include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.

On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating
that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time
of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an
impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal
issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of Representatives.

On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263,
160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground
that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the
petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.

On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave
of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."

On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for
Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed
a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and
160310.

The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's
Petition in Intervention were admitted.

On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator
Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory
issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:

Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at
what time; and whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.

In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:

a) locus standi of petitioners;

b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);

c) political question/justiciability;

d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;

e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;

f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution;
and

g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)

In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant petitions as well as the myriad
arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them
to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from
impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have
been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.

Judicial Review

As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to determine the validity of the
second impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our
present 1987 Constitution:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
(Emphasis supplied)

Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case
of Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present
Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus,
Justice Laurel discoursed:

x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional
organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments
and among the integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was
within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of
their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a
harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided
in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon
governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be
inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government
along constitutional channels,for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere
expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations
and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States
where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the
courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a
period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear
implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of
such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way.
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the
other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to
actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to
the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics
and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner,
the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts
accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to
abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must
reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government.24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different
branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a
necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable."26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly conferred upon the courts by its
Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries." To
be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief
Justice Marshall, to wit:

It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the
constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be
made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.

Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle,
supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and
that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.28(Italics in the original; emphasis
supplied)

In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review
was exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law professor and
former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative branches of our government in fact
effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by
disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter
shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the
laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)

As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of
checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican
form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in
turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its
power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of
government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them."33 To him,
"[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation – or instrument of intervention – of the judiciary in that
balancing operation."34

To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of
government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block
letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the
following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto
Concepcion:

xxx

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
 The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a matter
of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred
considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal
defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a
consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to
order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed
because the government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is
political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper
solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but
it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime. x x x

xxx

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as
well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a
branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to
settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.35 (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself
which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.

First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking
through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:

We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but
that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express
the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms
are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a
lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it
says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts
to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where
the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with
the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38 in this wise:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus,
it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by
its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the
light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The
 object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision
and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words
consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-
Herrera, it declared:

x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given
effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose
of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in
ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this
Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:

x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution
merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect others.When they adopted
subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance
and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document.43 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be

separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular
subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole
purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable
construction, the two can be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will
render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. In still the same case
of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in
order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other
guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear.
Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as
indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk,
much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental
law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation
therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding
thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and jurisprudential application of the power of judicial
review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the
Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review.

Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political action which cannot
assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond
the reach of judicial review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely
excludes the application of judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine constitutional
questions relative to impeachment proceedings.49

In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are outside the scope of judicial review,
respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities, principally the
majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers' decision to allocate to different fora the powers
to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only
legislative check on the judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning relief.51 Respondents
likewise point to deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in cases of
impeachment.

Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American
authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment cases," as
provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues
pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any
grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the
Senate the inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.

Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no
longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is
concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be
beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different
constitutional settings and needs."53 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United
States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the
umbilical cord."

The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that
while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that
granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but
also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part
of any government branch or instrumentality.

There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of
the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment
to the House of Representatives without limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the
exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in
Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and
the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.

Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts
between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that
"whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils
of judicial willfulness and pride."56

But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This
shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it
provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,57"judicially discoverable standards" for
determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.

The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by respondents in support of the argument that the
impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of petitions for writs
of mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of judicial
review.

There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus,
in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether
the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions
and prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened
the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle
the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing
the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative
of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether the House
representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties as provided
in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House
of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v.
Cuenco,65 it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not
detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral
Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his
election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member
of the National Assembly.

Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings
would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to
be allowed to defeat another."67 Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence
that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

Essential Requisites for Judicial Review

As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by
the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota of the case.

x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of
the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.68 (Italics in the original)

Standing

Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of
standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.69

Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not have standing since only the
Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General
Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.

Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded
standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public interest70 and transcendental
importance,71 and that procedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other branches of the
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion
given to them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing transcendental
importance and the well-entrenched rule exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by
seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of
this Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing.

There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of
civil procedure73 while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it
behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to
distinguish it from real party-in-interest.

The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It is
important to note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from
questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three
requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require
a partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in
certain areas.

Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who have
been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or
voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged such
a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."

xxx

On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the party who would be benefited or
injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)

While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of
Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary,
they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights – as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a
class suit; and members of the bar and of the legal profession – which were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional
acts of the House of Representatives.

In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements have been met have
been given standing by this Court.

When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He
must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger
of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It
must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully
entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.77 In fine,
when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of
personal interest.

In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he
has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury
as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest
common to all members of the public.80

At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.81 This Court opts to
grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of
Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.

As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives
as a legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers
and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.83
While an association has legal personality to represent its members,84 especially when it is composed of substantial taxpayers
and the outcome will affect their vital interests,85 the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of
the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to
clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the
petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness,
novelty and weight as precedents.86 It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues
presented by it.

In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous
to fully protect the interests of all concerned87 to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in the suit,88 for a
judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all
members of the class whether or not they were before the court.89 Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be
sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as
a class suit ought to fail. Since petitioners additionallyallege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will
stand.

The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of transcendental importance, while Atty.
Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.

There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants formulated by former
Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case;
(2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised.90 Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of
transcendental importance.

In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able
to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the
public.91 Such liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is totally
eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such interest, it not being one of which courts can take
judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.

With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While
intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the
requirements of the law authorizing intervention.92

In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in
G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the same issues and the same standing, and no objection on the
part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to
Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.

Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R.
No. 160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority
members of the House of Representatives is successful," this Court found the requisites for intervention had been complied
with.

Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310
were of transcendental importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention
with Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional issue of whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief
Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.

Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation the respective motions to intervene were
hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose of making of record and arguing a
point of view that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate
President does will undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of
Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully
ventilate all substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated,
allowed to argue.

Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he
failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to wit:

x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition
do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional
protection against abuses of legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent
COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain
respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.94 (Citations
omitted)

In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of petitioners will result in illegal
disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a
member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.

Ripeness and Prematurity

In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it
is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate
legal proceeding.

The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second impeachment complaint against the
Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is
questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House
of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged
unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.

Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are premature. Amicus curiae former Senate
President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being the
final arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should
first be exhausted.

Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who suggests to this Court to take judicial notice
of on-going attempts to encourage signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines
that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselves when
the Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean maintains that even
assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by
way of a motion to dismiss.

The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself, cure
the House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the
questioned second impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of
the Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries.

Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of Congress before coming to this
Court is shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the
power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise,
as said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy
cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.
Justiciability

In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term "political question," viz:

[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.99(Italics in the original)

Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its
stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the
political question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial review.100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming
political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits
on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive
Secretary102 which raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the
political question doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political question, it
being a question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.

The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases
during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this
Court's power of judicial review and its application on issues involving political questions, viz:

MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual comment that the judiciary is the weakest
among the three major branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive the sword, the judiciary
has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or commands except the power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after
all, reflects the will of God, and is the most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with the body's
indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary.

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a matter of
fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred
considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal
defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a
consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts
to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law
failed because the government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it
is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper
solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but
it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar
are familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to
explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if
I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced on September 22, although the proclamation was dated September 21.
The obvious reason for the delay in its publication was that the administration had apprehended and detained prominent
newsmen on September 21. So that when martial law was announced on September 22, the media hardly published
anything about it. In fact, the media could not publish any story not only because our main writers were already
incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal threat of being the object of
wrath of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22
had not finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon
the proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked
up. One of them was our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution was
taken over by representatives of Malacañang. In 17 days, they finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention had been unable to accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was presented to
the President around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling a plebiscite which suspended
the operation of some provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited discussions, much less public discussions
of certain matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a free discussion on the draft of the
Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word famous by our
colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft of the Constitution was analyzed and
criticized with such a telling effect that Malacañang felt the danger of its approval. So, the President suspended
indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and announced that he would consult the people in a referendum to be held
from January 10 to January 15. But the questions to be submitted in the referendum were not announced until the eve of
its scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then
designated as "citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays came into existence. The questions to be
propounded were released with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a plebiscite
because the answers given in the referendum should be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion
was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of the referendum be suspended. When the motion was
being heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation of the President
declaring that the new Constitution was already in force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the
referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded to the
session room where the case was being heard. I then informed the Court and the parties the presidential proclamation
declaring that the 1973 Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in force.

A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null and void. The main defense put up by
the government was that the issue was a political question and that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.

xxx

The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the
Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified
of any referendum in their respective places of residence, much less did they participate in the alleged referendum.
None of them saw any referendum proceeding.

In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the members of the Court felt that there
had been no referendum.

Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference between a referendum and a
plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was a political question. Whereupon,
they dismissed the case. This is not the only major case in which the plea of "political question" was set up.
There have been a number of other cases in the past.

x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was clearly justiciable.

xxx

x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced the following questions: What is
judicial power? What is a political question?

The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual controversies involving conflicts of
rights which are demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by
a judiciary party. In a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a wife.
The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as such are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we
 cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by
law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity."

This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:

Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
or enforceable . . .

The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of
government, the Supreme Court has, also another important function. The powers of government are generally
considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme
within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a
given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as
well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a
branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction.
This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty
to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.

I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the
subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)

During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial
power, thus:

MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power is not vested in the
Supreme Court alone but also in other lower courts as may be created by law.

MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.

MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?

MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify political questions with
jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.

MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?

MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but where there is a question as to
whether the government had authority or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess
of jurisdiction, that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.

xxx

FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme Court according to the new
numerical need for votes.

On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political question doctrine?

MR. CONCEPCION. No.

FR. BERNAS. It is not.

 MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. .
.

FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away with the political question
doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.

When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial power. But the Gentleman will
notice it says, "judicial power includes" and the reason being that the definition that we might make may not
cover all possible areas.

FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the political question doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political questions are beyond the pale of
judicial power.104 (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a
power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question
doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with
"truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly
political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions."

Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be
maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are
not truly political in nature.

As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of
cases taken jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political following the effectivity of the present Constitution.

In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:

The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into
areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to
decide.106 x x x

In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:

The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution. Moreover,
as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination
of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot
abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away
with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even
if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from
resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political
question.110 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political questions and non-justiciable political
questions, however. Identification of these two species of political questions may be problematic. There has been no clear
standard. The American case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:

x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
 manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to
a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.112(Underscoring supplied)

Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; and
(3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These
standards are not separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens the
conclusion that the others are also present.

The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial review is radically different from our
current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in determining
whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue.

In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to
the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there
are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within
such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present controversy.

These petitions raise five substantial issues:

I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the
Constitution.

II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the
Constitution.

III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is an
unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.

V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound
discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.113

Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high
crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other
high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or
even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond
the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.

Lis Mota

It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided
whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this Court held:

x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also
presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the
 constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question
will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,117 where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and
32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:

It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown
that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an
actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional
question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably
necessary to the decision of the case itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]

Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis
mota or crux of the controversy.

As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second impeachment complaint,
collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In
determining whether one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the
related cannon of adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise
facts to which it is applied."119

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other reasons, the second impeachment complaint
is invalid since it directly resulted from a Resolution120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and
legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on
investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a violation of the
constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of the judiciary.121

Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the
constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the validity of the
second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of
constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader
than is required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners
have raised other grounds in support of their petition which would not be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.

En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already been enunciated by this Court
in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:

The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected.

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited.
Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the
investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the right rights of persons
under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not be compelled to testify
against one's self.123

In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining the original petition of
petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the second impeachment complaint was verified and filed
only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the provisions of
Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
 Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith
proceed.

They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment,
the same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned section in that the "verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all the Members of the House." With the exception of
Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have verified the same merely as a
"Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the "Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:

"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the abovementioned Complaint of
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x"124

Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in order for said second impeachment
complaint to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that
the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives.
Not having complied with this requirement, they concede that the second impeachment complaint should have been calendared
and referred to the House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business
within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee,
after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days
from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by
the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution
to apply, there should be 76 or more representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment complaint
as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that
the Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives
as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being
necessary only from at least one Member whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.

While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the constitutional
issues to the provisions on impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of
the present controversy. Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No.
160262, have raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional
ground as the basis for deciding the instant consolidated petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of the original
petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts presented by the other petitioners as well.

Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the determination of the instant cases is made easier
by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latter's
arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision.

In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant
controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the
second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Judicial Restraint

Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court,
has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review
includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.

On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume
jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to impeachment."125But this argument is very
much like saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of the House
of Representatives are subject to them.

The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined,
because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the
controversy may be referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the
Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant
petitions.127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may
not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."

Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon
the challenge because no other office has the authority to do so.128 On the occasion that this Court had been an interested party
to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and,
as always, with detachment and fairness."129 After all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member of
the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this
reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power
and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in [his] office."130

The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been settled in the case of Abbas v. Senate
Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for
Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the
ground that all of them were interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced the Tribunal's
membership to only its three Justices-Members whose disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This
Court held:

Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of
his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed
mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no
other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire
membership of Senators.

To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it
alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being
expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.

It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution could not have been
unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all Senators—elect, six of whom would inevitably
have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when
once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or
mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose
disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the
fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or
disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his
conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal
interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in
the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership
of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid
adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:

Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is nothing short of pro
tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a
deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction
of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to
the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence. The proposed
 mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it
cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Justices.133 (Italics in the original)

Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its power of judicial review.

In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven pillars" of limitations of the power of
judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:

1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining
because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real,
earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party
beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.'

2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not
the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the
case.'

3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to
be applied.'

4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also
present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus,
if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of
statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state
challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can
be sustained on an independent state ground.

5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by
its operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge
to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the
performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a
suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v.
Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the Commonwealth on behalf
of all its citizens.

6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its
benefits.

7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is
raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible
by which the question may be avoided (citations omitted).

The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:

1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case

2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case

3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground

4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute

5. that the parties are not in estoppel

6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.

As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of judicial review:

1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power

2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement

3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity

4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136

Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the possibility that "judicial review of
impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to
avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and
humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to
remove an impeachable official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its
Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith in the
judiciary.

Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the possibility of the
occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment
cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.

Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.

x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not regarded as settled until the Supreme
Court has passed upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not only juridical effects but also
political consequences. Those political consequences may follow even where the Court fails to grant the petitioner's
prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the
other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent and validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows." 138

Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in the end there were not enough votes either to
grant the petitions, or to sustain respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted which paved the way
for the establishment of the martial law regime.

Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate branches of the government would behave in
a lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no
reason to believe that any of the branches of government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, violence,
chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.

Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit:141

Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public officers], under the guise of religious
or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to
exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the
exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, [public officers] are
guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments by
governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.142

Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure

for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress

Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate"
does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to file" because filing can, as
Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for
impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one
year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of
Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.

The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to statutory construction is, therefore,
in order.

That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually became
an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and explained by Constitutional
Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus
curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of
"initiating" included the act of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it
twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.

"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As
Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the
first action," which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments
of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:

Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle
and an end. The end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those
deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the
filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice.

Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that
impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of impeachment or when the House
reverses a contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment proceedings" are initiated but
rather are "deemed initiated." The language is recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is
an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of
the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:

MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the substantive provisions on
impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these would need some time for Committee
action.

However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution on impeachment proceedings,
copies of which have been furnished the Members of this body. This is borne out of my experience as a member of the
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government which took charge of the last impeachment resolution
filed before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the information of the Committee, the resolution covers several steps
in the impeachment proceedings starting with initiation, action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of
report, voting on the report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the Senate.

xxx

MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of the amendment
submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing
of the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation
starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution
containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the body.

As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on
the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard
 Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of
Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It
only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in
rearranging these words because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the
House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard
Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to
indicate this on record.

xxx

MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My
reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of
the House of Representatives of the United States regarding impeachment.

I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from
lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment proceedings" and the comma (,) and
insert on line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in
"impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-
third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of
Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."

I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of the United States
is concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries
with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25
in the case of the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third of all the Members of the House. I will mention
again, Madam President, that my amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the
uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you, Madam
President.143 (Italics in the original; emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)

This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of
Public Officers.144

It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus curiae brief,
Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as
contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all that the
initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a
resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a
verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."145

Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas, who was also a member of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding,
however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.

During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word "initiate," appearing in the constitutional
provision on impeachment, viz:

Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

xxx

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year,
(Emphasis supplied)

refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."

Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The object in the first sentence is
"impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo
singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal
controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of
all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of
impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must
be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium,
means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not
in the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of
the House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the
processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the
resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further
processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms a
favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one
third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this
point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an impeachable public official is successfully
impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.

Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate
for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the
"impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because
something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its
initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor
proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment
proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate
impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.146 Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the present
Constitution.

Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year," it means that no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the
meaning of "to initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and
sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse
meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.

To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1)
says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of
said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with
"impeachment proceeding."

From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it
is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking
initial action of said complaint.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint
to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with
the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint
has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.

Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if
there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or
(2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules
clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing
and referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use contemporaneous construction as an aid in
the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal opinions
(referring to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this Court's
our deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly recorded utterances of debates and proceedings." Further citing
said case, he states that this Court likened the former members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed
in their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know more about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced
perspectives and disinterestedness.148

Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There are at present only two members of this Court
who participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission – Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide
has not taken part in these proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal opinions
now given by members of the Constitutional Commission, but has examined the records of the deliberations and proceedings
thereof.

Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only
it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption that
Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.

Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry
out the purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were
intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to
make rules, viz:

Section 3. (1) x x x

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any
citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business
within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee,
after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days
from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by
the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to either affirm a favorable
resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each
Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the
House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.

It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress
had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the
Constitution without need of referendum.

In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either House of Congress to interpret its rules and that
it was the best judge of what constituted "disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting Justice
Brandeis in United States v. Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than
members of the Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin,
Joseph & Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the Constitution empowers each house to
determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and
further that there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the
result which is sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all matters of method are open to the determination
of the Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire into
the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that
we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the
United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition of
judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.

Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to view the issues before the Court. It
is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review
congressional rules. It held:

"x x x

"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears
that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:

Rule XV

3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a
quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to
the Speaker with the names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in determining the presence of a
quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)

The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and
not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence of a quorum, nor what
matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the
question is only one of power. The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may
not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to be
attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no
impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no
objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to
make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the
House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."

Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e, whether
they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not
ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method had a reasonable
relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be
defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of separation of powers.154

xxx

In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the political question
defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution
was intentionally cobbled to empower courts "x x x to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not
also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous
power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were
shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the
Executive and the Legislative departments of government.155

xxx

The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere power which it can decline to
exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down any
 act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the checking powers of
this Court against the other branches of government despite their more democratic character, the President and the
legislators being elected by the people.156

xxx

The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of justice. . . to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade
the powers of this court vis-à-vis the other branches of government. This provision was dictated by our experience
under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in
government. x x x

xxx

In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government committed with grave abuse of
discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our
distinct experience as nation, is not merely evolutionary but revolutionary.Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions,
this Court approached constitutional violations by initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987
Constitution, there is a shift in stress – this Court is mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding
out what it should not do but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past
that petrifies the present.

I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new constitutional provision as the case at
bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will not
be true to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power or if
we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has
increasingly emboldened other branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our
courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of
judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable
foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the
experience of foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the violation of
private rights and the Constitution are involved.

Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as basis for arguing that this Court may not decide on
the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution
simply provides that "the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives
no clue whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme
Court concluded that there was a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to the House of
Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard to impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives
since our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be
exercised.

The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is
sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the
House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House
thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."

Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House
Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a
one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice
on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

Conclusion

If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon that takes the center stage of our
individual and collective consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course
this is not to demean the seriousness of the controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have
proven to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical
struggle to articulate what they respectively believe to be the correct position or view on the issues involved. Passions had ran
high as demonstrators, whether for or against the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar
slogans and chants to air their voice on the matter. Various sectors of society - from the business, retired military, to the
academe and denominations of faith – offered suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the official relations of the
governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived resulting instability upon areas of national life.

Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been constituted, this Court was specifically
asked, told, urged and argued to take no action of any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the House of
Representatives of the impeachment complaint against the subject respondent public official. When the present petitions were
knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference was made through what are now the
arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move
that may have a bearing on the impeachment proceedings.

This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the constitutionality of initiating the
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained, the Court
found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial
review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental
law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and
competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of government.
Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had
but for it to pass upon that problem head on.

The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of impeachment has effectively set up a
regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.

This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the
impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule.
Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of
decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two
great branches of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive and
legislative of their own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society upon
the rule of law.

It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings against the Chief
Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the members' interests in ruling on said
issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.

The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held and been entrusted with the judicial power
to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or actions. This Court has dispensed justice
over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or
speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to the law and the facts. Why can it not now be
trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions just because it is the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an
incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a government branch's official act as tested by the
limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking part in a
case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as
likely incapable of impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.

No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of all men
before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its
commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of
legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to
numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and
neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law
than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.

The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once again by this impeachment case against
Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in search for a solution to
what many feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have
found answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it went through this crucible of a democratic
process, if only to discover that it can resolve differences without the use of force and aggression upon each other.

WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by
the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under
paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo and Tinga, JJ., see separate opinion.

Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Vitug, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., see separate concurring opinion.
Quisumbing, J., concurring separate opinion received.
Carpio, J., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., concur in the majority opinion and in the separate opinion of J. Vitug.
Corona, J., will write a separate concurring opinion.
Azcuna, J., concur in the separate opinion.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997.]

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, Petitioner, v. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE

SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; DEFINED. — A constitution is a system of fundamental

laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and
unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental
and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government,
assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed
principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a
supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights
must be determined and all public authority administered.

2. ID.; ID.; DEEMED WRITTEN IN EVERY STATUTE AND CONTRACT. — Under the doctrine
of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or
contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private
persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the
Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in
every statute and contract. Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject
constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by
respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a
basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental
law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.

3. ID.; ID.; CONSIDERED SELF-EXECUTING RATHER THAN NON-SELF-EXECUTING. —

In case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing
. . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered
self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or
whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the
needed implementing statute. (Cruz, Isagani A., Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., pp. 8-10)

4. ID.; ID.; SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS; LEGISLATURE NOT PRECLUDED FROM

ENACTING LAWS ENFORCING PROVISIONS. — Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art.
XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for
purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to
enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for
enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-
executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust
legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further
the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does
not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; A PROVISION MAY BE SELF-EXECUTING IN ONE PART AND NON-SELF-
EXECUTING IN ANOTHER. — Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec.
10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same
section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument is flawed. If the first and third
paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the
formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the
State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second
paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to
give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and
non-self-executing in another.

6. ID.; ID.; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PROVISION ON PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED

FILIPINOS, SELF-EXECUTING. — Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require
any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution
mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that — qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain
specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to
enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance
and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi
jus ibi remedium.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; INCLUDES THE NATIONAL, RESOURCES AND CULTURAL, HERITAGE. —
When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the
cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, EMBRACED THEREIN; FILIPINO FIRST
POLICY PROVISION, APPLICABLE IN SALES OF HOTEL STOCKS. — For more than eight
(8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations
of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our
struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our
national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview
of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who
acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance,
51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice
stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents’ claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is
not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not
the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands.

9. ID.; STATE; SALE BY THE GSIS OF 51% OF ITS SHARE IN MANILA HOTEL CORP., A
STATE ACTION, SUBJECT TO CONSTITUTIONAL COMMAND. — In constitutional
jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are considered "state action" covered
by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a" public function", (2) when the
government is so-significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible
for his action; and. (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that
the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second
and third categories of "state action." Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into
by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional
command.

10. ID.; CONSTITUTION; WHEN THE CONSTITUTION ADDRESSES THE STATE, IT

REFERS TO BOTH PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT. — When the Constitution addresses the State
it refers not only to the people but also to the government as elements of the State. After all,
government is composed of three (3) divisions of power — legislative, executive and judicial.
Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three
(3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is
addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government
instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.

11. ID.; ID.; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; SALE OF

STOCKS OF MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION BY THE GSIS; FILIPINOS ALLOWED TO
MATCH THE BID OF FOREIGN ENTITY. — In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the
highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question
that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino
matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give
life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may
neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is
omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the
basic law.

12. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; FOREIGN BIDDERS WITHOUT CAUSE OF ACTION

AGAINST GSIS BEFORE ACCEPTANCE OF BID. — The argument of respondents that petitioner
is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware from
the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos
and foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no
Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign
entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the bidding
because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong
Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its
earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard
by respondent GSIS of petitioner’s matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.

13. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION, CERTIORARI; FAILURE OF THE GSIS TO EXECUTE
CORRESPONDING DOCUMENTS WHERE PETITIONER HAD MATCHED THE BID PRICE
BY FOREIGN BIDDER, A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — Since petitioner has already
matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is
left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding
guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to
execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter
has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

14. ID.; SUPREME COURT; DUTY BOUND TO MAKE SURE THAT CONTRACTS DO NOT
VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION OR THE LAWS. — While it is no business of the Court to
intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether they are viable or
attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate the Constitution or the laws, or
are not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed
criticism. Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance of a free
society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond
judicial review when the Constitution is involved.

PADILLA, J., concurring opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; PATRIMONY OF THE NATION, CONSTRUED. — A

study of the 1935 Constitution, where the concept of "national patrimony" originated, would show
that its framers decided to adopt the even more comprehensive expression "Patrimony of the Nation"
in the belief that the phrase encircles a concept embracing not only the natural resources of the
country but practically everything that belongs to the Filipino people, the tangible and the material as
well as the intangible and the spiritual assets and possessions of the people. It is to be noted that the
framers did not stop with conservation. They knew that conservation alone does not spell progress;
and that this may be achieved only through development as a correlative factor to assure to the
people not only the exclusive ownership, but also the exclusive benefits of their national patrimony.
Moreover, the concept of national patrimony has been viewed as referring not only to our rich
natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. There is no doubt in my mind that the
Manila Hotel is very much a part of our national patrimony and, as such deserves constitutional
protection as to who shall own it and benefit from its operation. This institution has played an
important role in our nation’s history, having been the venue of many a historical event, and serving
as it did, and as it does, as the Philippine Guest House for visiting foreign heads of state, dignitaries,
celebrities, and others.

2. ID.; ID.; MANILA HOTEL, PART OF OUR NATIONAL PATRIMONY. — There is no doubt in
my mind that the Manila Hotel is very much a part of our national patrimony and, as such, deserves
constitutional protection as to who shall own it and benefit from its operation. This institution has
played an important role in our nation’s history, having been the venue of many a historical event,
and serving as it did, and as it does, as the Philippine Guest House for visiting foreign heads of state,
dignitaries. celebrities, and others.

3. ID.; ID.; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; APPLIED TO SALES OF SHARE OF

STOCKS OF MANILA HOTEL. — "Preference to qualified Filipinos," to be meaningful, must refer
not only to things that are peripheral, collateral, or tangential. It must touch and affect the very "heart
of the existing order." In the field of public bidding in the acquisition of things that pertain to the
national patrimony, preference to qualified Filipinos must allow a qualified Filipino to match or
equal the higher bid of a non-Filipino, the preference shall not operate only when the bids of the
qualified Filipino and the non-Filipino are equal in which case, the award should undisputedly be
made to the qualified Filipino. The Constitutional preference should give the qualified Filipino an
opportunity to match or equal the higher bid of the non-Filipino bidder if the preference of the
qualified Filipino bidder is to be significant at all. While government agencies, including the courts
should re-condition their thinking to such a trend, and make it easy and even attractive for foreign
investors to come to our shores, yet we should not preclude ourselves from reserving to us Filipinos
certain areas where our national identity, culture and heritage are involved. In the hotel industry, for
instance, foreign investors have established themselves creditably, such as in the Shangri-La, the
Nikko, the Peninsula, and Mandarin Hotels. This should not stop us from retaining 51% of the
capital stock of the Manila Hotel Corporation in the hands of Filipinos. This would be in keeping
with the intent of the Filipino people to preserve our national patrimony, including our historical and
cultural heritage in the hands of Filipinos.

VITUG, J., separate opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PROVISION GIVING

PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS, SELF-EXECUTORY. — The provision in our
fundamental law which provides that" (i)n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos" is self-
executory. The provision verily does not need, although it can obviously be amplified or regulated
by, an enabling law or a set of rules.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PATRIMONY INCLUDES CULTURAL HERITAGE OF THE COUNTRY;

MANILA HOTEL, EMBRACED THEREIN. — The term "patrimony" does not merely refer to the
country’s natural resources but also to its cultural heritage. A "historical landmark," to use the words
of Mr. Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr., Manila Hotel has now indeed become part of Philippine heritage.

3. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM; SALE OF ITS

SHARE IN MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, AN ACT OF THE STATE; CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE COMPLIED WITH. — The act of the Government Service
Insurance System ("GSIS"), a government entity which derives its authority from the State, in selling
51% of its share in MHC should be considered an act of the State subject to the Constitutional
mandate.

4. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PREFERENCE TO

QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; DOES NOT REFER TO ALLOWING QUALIFIED FILIPINOS TO
MATCH FOREIGN BID. — On the pivotal issue of the degree of "preference to qualified Filipinos"
I find it somewhat difficult to take the same path traversed by the forceful reasoning of Justice Puno.
In the particular case before us, the only meaningful preference, it seems, would really be to allow
the qualified Filipino to match the foreign bid for, as a practical matter, I cannot see any bid that
literally calls for millions of dollars to be at par (to the last cent) with another. The magnitude of the
bids is such that it becomes hardly possible for the competing bids to stand exactly "equal" which
alone, under the dissenting view, could trigger the right of preference.

MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PREFERENCE TO

QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; FILIPINO BIDDERS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO EQUAL BID OF
FOREIGN FIRM IN SALE OF STOCKS OF MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION. — I take the
view that in the context of the present controversy the only way to enforce the constitutional mandate
that" [i]n the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national patrimony the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos" is to allow petitioner Philippine corporation to equal the
bid of the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad for the purchase of the controlling shares of stocks in the
Manila Hotel Corporation. Indeed, it is the only way a qualified Filipino or Philippine corporation
can be given preference in the enjoyment of a right, privilege or concession given by the State, by
favoring it over a foreign national or corporation. Under the rules on public bidding of the
Government Service and Insurance System, if petitioner and the Malaysian firm had offered the
same price per share, "priority [would be given] to the bidder seeking the larger ownership interest in
MHC," so that if petitioner bid for more shares, it would be preferred to the Malaysian corporation
for that reason and not because it is a Philippine corporation. Consequently, it is only in cases like
the present one, where an alien corporation is the highest bidder, that preferential treatment of the
Philippine corporation is mandated not by declaring it winner but by allowing it "to match the
highest bid in terms of price per share" before it is awarded the shares of stocks. That, to me, is what
"preference to qualified Filipinos" means in the context of this case — by favoring Filipinos
whenever they are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis foreigners.

TORRES, JR., J., separate opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; PATRIMONY OF THE NATION; MANILA HOTEL,

EMBRACED WITHIN THE MEANING THEREOF; SALE OF ITS STOCKS SHOULD BE
LIMITED TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. — Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution should
be read in conjunction with Article II of the same Constitution pertaining to "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies" which ordain — "The State shall develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy, effectively controlled by Filipinos." (Sec. 19), Interestingly, the
matter of giving preference to "qualified Filipinos" was one of the highlights in the 1987
Constitution Commission proceedings. The nationalistic provisions of the 1987 Constitution reflect
the history and spirit of the Malolos Constitution of 1898, the 1935 Constitution and the 1973
Constitution. I subscribe to the view that history, culture, heritage, and tradition are not legislated
and is the product of events, customs, usages and practices. It is actually a product of growth and
acceptance by the collective mores of a race. It is the spirit and soul of a people. The Manila Hotel is
part of our history, culture and heritage. Every inch of the Manila Hotel is witness to historic events
(too numerous to mention) which shaped our history for almost 84 years. The history of the Manila
Hotel should not be placed in the auction block of a purely business transaction, where profit
subverts the cherished historical values of our people. The Filipino should be first under his
Constitution and in his own land.

PUNO, J., dissenting opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; AS A RULE PROVISIONS THEREOF ARE SELF-

EXECUTING. — A Constitution provides the guiding policies and principles upon which is built the
substantial foundation and general framework of the law and government. As a rule, its provisions
are deemed self-executing and can be enforced without further legislative action. Some of its
provisions, however, can be implemented only through appropriate laws enacted by the Legislature,
hence not self-executing. Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-
executing, rather than as requiring future legislation for their enforcement. The reason is not difficult
to discern For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law ratified
by the sovereign people can be easily ignored and nullified by Congress. Suffused with wisdom of
the ages is the unyielding rule that legislative actions may give breath to constitutional rights but
congressional inaction should not suffocate them.

2. ID.; ID.; PROVISIONS ARE NOT SELF-EXECUTING WHERE IT MERELY ANNOUNCES A

POLICY AND EMPOWERS THE LEGISLATURE TO ENACT LAWS TO CARRY THE
POLICY INTO EFFECT. — Contrariwise, case law lays down the rule that a constitutional
provision is not self-executing where it merely announces a policy and its language empowers the
Legislature to prescribe the means by which the policy shall be carried into effect.

3. ID.; ID.; FIRST PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 10, ARTICLE 12 NOT SELF-EXECUTING. —

The first paragraph directs Congress to reserve certain areas of investments in the country to Filipino
citizens or to corporations sixty per cent of whose capital stock is owned by Filipinos. It further
commands Congress to enact laws that will encourage the formation and operation of one hundred
percent Filipino-owned enterprises. In checkered contrast, the second paragraph orders the entire
State to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights and privileges covering the
national economy and patrimony. The third paragraph also directs the State to regulate foreign
investments in line with our national goals and well-set priorities. The first paragraph of Section 10
is not self-executing. By its express text, there is a categorical command for Congress to enact laws
restricting foreign ownership in certain areas of investments in the country and to encourage the
formation and operation of wholly-owned Filipino enterprises.
4. ID.; ID.; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS UNDER
PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3 OF SECTION 10, ARTICLE 12, SELF-EXECUTING. — The second
and third paragraphs of Section 10 are different. They are directed to the State and not to Congress
alone which is but one of the three great branches of our government. Their coverage is also broader
for they cover "the national economy and patrimony" and "foreign investments within [the] national
jurisdiction" and not merely "certain areas of investments." Beyond debate, they cannot be read as
granting Congress the exclusive power to implement by law the policy of giving preference to
qualified Filipinos in the conferral of rights and privileges covering our national economy and
patrimony. Their language does not suggest that any of the State agency or instrumentality has the
privilege to hedge or to refuse its implementation for any reason whatsoever. Their duty to
implement is unconditional and it is now. The second and the third paragraphs of Section 10, Article
XII are thus self-executing.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, PART OF THE NATIONAL PATRIMONY.
— The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of the stocks of the Manila Hotel Corporation
involves the disposition of part of our national patrimony. The records of the Constitutional
Commission show that the Commissioners entertained the same view as to its meaning. According to
Commissioner Nolledo, "patrimony" refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the
cultural heritage of our race. By this yardstick, the sale of Manila Hotel falls within the coverage of
the constitutional provision giving preferential treatment to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights
involving our national patrimony.

6. ID.; STATE; GSIS, EMBRACED WITHIN THE MEANING THEREOF. — The third issue is
whether the constitutional command to the State includes the respondent GSIS. A look at its charter
will reveal that GSIS is a government-owned and controlled corporation that administers funds that
come from the monthly contributions of government employees and the government. The funds are
held in trust for a distinct purpose which cannot be disposed of indifferently. They are to be used to
finance the retirement, disability and life insurance benefits of the employees and the administrative
and operational expenses of the GSIS. Excess funds, however, are allowed to be invested in business
and other ventures for the benefit of the employees. The GSIS is not a pure private corporation. It is
essentially a public corporation created by Congress and granted an original charter to serve a public
purpose. It is subject to the jurisdictions of the Civil Service Commission and the Commission on
Audit. As a state-owned and controlled corporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to the policies spelled
out in the Constitution especially those designed to promote the general welfare of the people. One
of these policies is the Filipino First policy which the people elevated as a constitutional command.

7. ID.; CONSTITUTION; PROVISIONS THEREOF DEEMED INCLUDED IN ALL

LEGISLATIONS AND ALL STATE ACTIONS. — The constitutional command to enforce the
Filipino First policy is addressed to the State and not to Congress alone. Hence, the word "laws"
should not be understood as limited to legislations but all state actions which include applicable rules
and regulations adopted by agencies and instrumentalities of the State in the exercise of their rule-
making power.

8. ID.; ID.; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; STATE

NOT PROHIBITED FROM GRANTING RIGHTS TO FOREIGN FIRM IN THE ABSENCE OF
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. — In the absence of qualified Filipinos, the State is not prohibited from
granting these rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners if the act will promote the weal of the
nation.

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The right of preference of petitioner arises only if it tied the
bid of Renong Berhad. In that instance, all things stand equal, and petitioner, as a qualified Filipino
bidder, should be preferred. It is with deep regret that I cannot subscribe to the view that petitioner
has a right to match the bid of Renong Berhad. Petitioner’s submission must be supported by the
rules but even if we examine the rules inside-out a thousand times, they can not justify the claimed
right. Under the rules, the right to match the highest bid arises only "if for any reason, the highest
bidder cannot be awarded the block of shares . . ." No reason has arisen that will prevent the award to
Renong Berhad. It deserves the award as a matter of right for the rules clearly did not give to the
petitioner as a qualified Filipino the privilege to match the higher bid of a foreigner. What the rules
did not grant, petitioner cannot demand. Our sympathies may be with petitioner but the court has no
power to extend the latitude and longtitude of the right of preference as defined by the rules. We are
duty-bound to respect that determination even if we differ with the wisdom of their judgment. The
right they grant may be little but we must uphold the grant for as long as the right of preference is
not denied. It is only when a State action amounts to a denial of the right that the Court can come in
and strike down the denial as unconstitutional.

10. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; ESTOPPEL; PARTY ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE
WINNING BID OF FOREIGN FIRM FROM BEING AWARE OF THE RULES AND
REGULATIONS OF THE BIDDINGS IT AGREED TO RESPECT. — I submit that petitioner is
estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad. Petitioner was aware of the rules and
regulations of the bidding. It knew that the rules and regulations do not provide that a qualified
Filipino bidder can match the winning bid after submitting an inferior bid. It knew that the bid was
open to foreigners and that foreigners qualified even during the first bidding. Petitioner cannot be
allowed to repudiate the rules which it agreed to respect. It cannot be allowed to obey the rules when
it wins and disregard them when it loses. If sustained, petitioners’ stance will wreak havoc on the
essence of bidding.

PANGANIBAN, J., separate dissenting opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; PATRIMONY OF THE NATION; PREFERENCE TO

QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; LOSING FILIPINO NOT GIVEN RIGHT TO EQUAL THE HIGHEST
FOREIGN BID. — The majority contends the Constitution should be interpreted to mean that, after
a bidding process is concluded, the losing Filipino bidder should be given the right to equal the
highest foreign bid, and thus to win. However, the Constitution [Sec. 10 (2), Art. XII] simply states
that "in the grant of rights . . . covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos." The majority concedes that there is no law defining the extent or
degree of such preference. Specifically, no statute empowers a losing Filipino bidder to increase his
bid and equal that of the winning foreigner. In the absence of such empowering law, the majority’s
strained interpretation, I respectfully submit, constitutes unadulterated judicial legislation, which
makes bidding a ridiculous sham where no Filipino can lose and where no foreigner can win. Only in
the Philippines! Aside from being prohibited by the Constitution, such judicial legislation is short-
sighted and, viewed properly, gravely prejudicial to long-term Filipino interests. In the absence of a
law specifying the degree or extent of the "Filipino First" policy of the Constitution, the
constitutional preference for the "qualified Filipinos" may be allowed only where all the bids are
equal. In this manner, we put the Filipino ahead without self-destructing him and without being
unfair to the foreigner. In short, the Constitution mandates a victory for the qualified Filipino only
when the scores are tied. But not when the ballgame is over and the foreigner clearly posted the
highest score.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges,
and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos, 1 is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain
that the provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement.
Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony
covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution.

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to
the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8
December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding
shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide
management expertise and/or an international marketing/ reservation system, and financial support to
strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. 2 In a close bidding held on 18
September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for
the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state —

I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC —

1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995 (reset to
November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares and
GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC the Management Contract,
International Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other type of contract specified by the
Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for the Manila Hotel . . . .

b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS . . . .

K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER —

The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following
conditions are met

a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995 (reset to
November 3, 1995); and

b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on Privatization)/ OGCC (Office
of the Government Corporate Counsel) are obtained." 3

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution
of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995
matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. 4 In a subsequent letter dated
10 October 1995 petitioner sent a manager’s check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million
Pesos (P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong
Berhad . . . . 5 which respondent GSIS refused to accept.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On
18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from
perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.

On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred to it
by the First Division. The case was then set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.

In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits
that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a
historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud
legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of
independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all
intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues that
since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which
is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of
respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national
economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered
by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies. 7

It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its
business also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has
matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the
Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified
Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match
the highest bid in terms of price per share. 8

Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision
and requires implementing legislation(s). . . . Thus, for the said provision to operate, there must be
existing laws "to lay down conditions under which business may be done." 9

Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term
national patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and
second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner
speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired therein which
make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of the nation.
What is more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS
which possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a
State.chanrobles

Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional
provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares
of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly,
51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the
disposition of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have
questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.

Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1, of the bidding rules which provides that if
for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to
the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders
are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate
that the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any
reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the submission by
petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the
block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid
had not yet taken place.

Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since respondent
GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its
discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as
petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not have an imperative duty
to perform the act required of them by petitioner.

We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and
administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority
from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. 10
It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different
departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which
government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to
which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be
determined and all public authority administered. 11 Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy,
if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by
the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is
null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions
command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely
establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental
machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. 12 A provision which
lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not
self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the
right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-
executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms,
and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. 13

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a
different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate
directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of
constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it
is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have
the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. 14 This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that —

. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when,
or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the
needed implementing statute. 15

Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not self-
executing, as they quote from discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission —

MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of the Committee on
Style. If the wording of "PREFERENCE" is given to "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," can it be
understood as a preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why
do we not make it clear? To qualified Filipinos as against aliens?

THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word
"QUALIFIED?"

MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely "TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" as against whom? As
against aliens or over aliens?

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word "QUALIFIED"
because the existing laws or prospective laws will always lay down conditions under which business
may be done. For example, qualifications on capital, qualifications on the setting up of other
financial structures, et cetera (Emphasis supplied by respondents).

MR RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.

MR. NOLLEDO. Yes. 16

Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear
that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not
precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the
contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature
without the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.

In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the
exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision,
prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of
the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of
the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the
violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in
the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a
remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be
self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily
exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. 17 Subsequent
legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by
itself, fully enforceable.

Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is
implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are
not self-executing. 18 The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing
because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises
fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and
exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph,
then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by
its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional
provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another. 19

Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely
statements of principles and policies, which are basically not self-executing and only placed in the
Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights — are simply not
in point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation 20 speaks of constitutional
provisions on personal dignity, 21 the sanctity of family life, 22 the vital role of the youth in nation-
building, 23 the promotion of social justice, 24 and the values of education. 25 Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance 26 refers to constitutional provisions on social justice and human rights 27 and
on education. 28 Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato 29 cites provisions on the promotion of general
welfare, 30 the sanctity of family life, 31 the vital role of the youth in nation-building 32 and the
promotion of total human liberation and development. 33 A reading of these provisions indeed
clearly shows that they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for
legislation. The very terms of the provisions manifest that they are only principles upon which
legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.

On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it
in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that — qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And
when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take
their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission 34 explains —

The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to our rich
natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts,
sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other
natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people.

We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. 35 When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the
cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was
restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly
Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant
events which have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930’s. It was
the site of the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the
Official Guest House of the Philippine Government it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors
who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality. 36

The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory
of a City. 37 During World War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military Administration
into a military headquarters. When the American forces returned to recapture Manila the hotel was
selected by the Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places for their final stand.
Thereafter, in the 1950’s and 1960’s, the hotel became the center of political activities, playing host
to almost every political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped
numerous international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In
1986 the hotel was the site of a failed coup d’etat where an aspirant for vice-president was
"proclaimed" President of the Philippine Republic.

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures,
loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own
historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily,
Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity
of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and
controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel
and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents’ claim
that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the
outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building
stands. 38

The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in our Constitution also
includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission —

THE PRESIDENT.

Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE.

I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo amendment. And the amendment would
consist in substituting the words "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" with the following: "CITIZENS OF
THE PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE CAPITAL OR
CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH CITIZENS."cralaw virtua1aw library

x x x

MR. MONSOD.

Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we have to raise a question. Suppose it
is a corporation that is 80-percent Filipino, do we not give it preference?
MR. DAVIDE.

The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino. What about a corporation wholly
owned by Filipino citizens?

MR. MONSOD.

At least 60 percent, Madam President.

MR. DAVIDE.

Is that the intention?

MR MONSOD.

Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the preference should only be 100-
percent Filipino.

MR. DAVIDE.

I want to get that meaning clear because "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" may refer only to individuals
and not to juridical personalities or entities.

MR. MONSOD.

We agree, Madam President. 39

x x x

MR. RODRIGO.

Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read again.

MR. NOLLEDO.

The amendment will read: "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS
COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." And the word "Filipinos" here, as intended by the
proponents, will include not only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or entities
fully-controlled by Filipinos. 40

The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus —

MR. FOZ.

Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo to please restate his amendment so
that I can ask a question.

MR. NOLLEDO.

"IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS."cralaw virtua1aw library

MR. FOZ.

In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and a Filipino enterprise is
also qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a preference?

MR. NOLLEDO.

Obviously.

MR. FOZ.

If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be
preferred?

MR. NOLLEDO.

The answer is "yes."cralaw virtua1aw library

MR. FOZ.

Thank you. 41

Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues —

MR NOLLEDO.

Yes, Madam President. Instead of "MUST," it will be "SHALL — THE STATE SHALL GIVE
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." This embodies the so-called "Filipino First" policy.
That means that Filipinos should be given preference in the grant of concessions, privileges and
rights covering the national patrimony. 42

The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the subject
provision was still further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo 43 —

"Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the "Pro-Filipino" bias in all economic concerns. It is
better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy. . . . This provision was never found in previous
Constitutions. . . .

The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who can
make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It
certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or
organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be
counterproductive and inimical to the common good.

In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made
between a "qualified foreigner" and a "qualified Filipino," the latter shall be chosen over the
former."cralaw virtua1aw library

Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent GSIS and
selected as one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with
its own guidelines so that the sole inference here is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of
proven management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another
hotel company, or it has an overall management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate
the Manila Hotel. 44

The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the subject
provision is not self-executory and requires implementing legislation is quite disturbing. The attempt
to violate a clear constitutional provision — by the government itself — is only too distressing. To
adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For,
even some of the provisions of the Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation have
juridical life of their own and can be the source of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the
government a defense that arises out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding
legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt
—

The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the Constitution,
even before Congress acts — provided that there are discoverable legal standards for executive
action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by its own understanding of the constitutional
command and of applicable laws. The responsibility for reading and understanding the Constitution
and the laws is not the sole prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask
Congress, or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every time the executive is confronted by a
constitutional command. That is not how constitutional government operates. 45

Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to
respondent GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. This argument again is
at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the
prior approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly
pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents
GSIS and MHC a "state action." In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the
government are considered "state action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it
engages in is a "public function;" (2) when the government is so-significantly involved with the
private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has
approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its
share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of "state action." Without
doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of
the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command. 46

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government
as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power —
legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is
correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case
the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and
respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning
bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the
winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite
approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on
qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will
be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor
are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee
respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which
are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.

Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it
should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be
nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all
laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the
Constitution lose their reason for being.

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly
submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of
price per share. 47 Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the
block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even
the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction
itself.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the
grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby
exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match
the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should
go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy
provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated
in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it
would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.

This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But
the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny.
These are given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign
jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its
agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution
and the laws of the forum

The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong
Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the
bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But
foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to
match the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was
already preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had
not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality then
to compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the
foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioner’s matching bid did the
latter have a cause of action.

Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award
has been finally made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino
group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any
other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of
the consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable.
Thus we would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the
government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and
parameters for its actions.

Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the
bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of
shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well.
The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided
in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.

The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987
Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced;
so must it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never shun, under
any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked
to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court to impede and diminish,
much less undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and
welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever
such preference is ordained by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could have
not been more appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa —

As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its judgment for that
of the legislature or the executive about the wisdom and feasibility of legislation economic in nature,
the Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for decisions perceived as obstacles to economic
progress and development . . . in connection with a temporary injunction issued by the Court’s First
Division against the sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements
were published in a major daily to the effect that that injunction "again demonstrates that the
Philippine legal system can be a major obstacle to doing business here."cralaw virtua1aw library
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to intervene in
contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether they are viable or attainable, it
is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not
adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It
will never shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism. 48

Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing
further losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-material
values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the expense of
national pride and dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values.
Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance of a free society;
after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial
review when the Constitution is involved. 49

Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican
state, with sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from whom all government authority
emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people must be the goal. The nation-state
can have no higher purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such
basic concept. Protection of foreign investments, while laudable, is merely a policy. It cannot
override the demands of nationalism. 50

The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the
highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of
property in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has hosted many of the
most important events in the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel
where heads of states would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the
dignity of the highest state function to their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel
has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century
Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul — a
place with a history of grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a
country. 51chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red

This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell the
historical landmark — this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia — to a total stranger. For, indeed, the
conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than
mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation’s soul for
some pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from
a qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos if Manila Hotel — and all that it stands for — is
sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the nation’s cultural heritage is
entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if
the national patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino?
This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine
Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of
being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the
Constitution.

WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA

HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51%
of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching
bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary
agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other
acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

SO ORDERED

Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bellosillo. At the same time, I would like to expound a bit
more on the concept of national patrimony as including within its scope and meaning institutions
such as the Manila Hotel.

It is argued by petitioner that the Manila Hotel comes under "national patrimony" over which
qualified Filipinos have the preference, in ownership and operation. The Constitutional provision on
point states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"x x x

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos." 1

Petitioner’s argument, I believe, is well taken. Under the 1987 Constitution, "national patrimony"
consists of the natural resources provided by Almighty God (Preamble) in our territory (Article 1)
consisting of land, sea, and air. 2 A study of the 1935 Constitution, where the concept of "national
patrimony" originated, would show that its framers decided to adopt the even more comprehensive
expression "Patrimony of the Nation" in the belief that the phrase encircles a concept embracing not
only the natural resources of the country but practically everything that belongs to the Filipino
people, the tangible and the material as well as the intangible and the spiritual assets and possessions
of the people. It is to be noted that the framers did not stop with conservation. They knew that
conservation alone does not spell progress; and that this may be achieved only through development
as a correlative factor to assure to the people not only the exclusive ownership, but also the exclusive
benefits of their national patrimony. 3

Moreover, the concept of national patrimony has been viewed as referring not only to our rich
natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. 4

There is no doubt in my mind that the Manila Hotel is very much a part of our national patrimony
and, as such deserves constitutional protection as to who shall own it and benefit from its operation.
This institution has played an important role in our nation’s history, having been the venue of many a
historical event, and serving as it did, and as it does, as the Philippine Guest House for visiting
foreign heads of state, dignitaries, celebrities, and others. 5

It is therefore our duty to protect and preserve it for future generations of Filipinos. As President
Manuel L. Quezon once said, we must exploit the natural resources of our country, but we should do
so with an eye to the welfare of the future generations. In other words, the leaders of today are the
trustees of the patrimony of our race. To preserve our national patrimony and reserve it for Filipinos
was the intent of the distinguished gentlemen who first framed our Constitution. Thus, in debating
the need for nationalization of our lands and natural resources, one expounded that we should "put
more teeth into our laws, and; not make the nationalization of our lands and natural resources a
subject of ordinary legislation but of constitutional enactment." 6 To quote further: "Let not our
children be mere tenants and trespassers in their own country. Let us preserve and bequeath to them
what is rightfully theirs, free from all foreign liens and encumbrances." 7

Now, a word on preference. In my view "preference to qualified Filipinos", to be meaningful, must

refer not only to things that are peripheral, collateral, or tangential. It must touch and affect the very
"heart of the existing order." In the field of public bidding in the acquisition of things that pertain to
the national patrimony, preference to qualified Filipinos must allow a qualified Filipino to match or
equal the higher bid of a non-Filipino; the preference shall not operate only when the bids of the
qualified Filipino and the non-Filipino are equal in which case, the award should undisputedly be
made to the qualified Filipino. The Constitutional preference should give the qualified Filipino an
opportunity to match or equal the higher bid of the non-Filipino bidder if the preference of the
qualified Filipino bidder is to be significant at all.
It is true that in this present age of globalization of attitude towards foreign investments in our
country, stress is on the elimination of barriers to foreign trade and investment in the country. While
government agencies, including the courts should re-condition their thinking to such a trend, and
make it easy and even attractive for foreign investors to come to our shores, yet we should not
preclude ourselves from reserving to us Filipinos certain areas where our national identity, culture
and heritage are involved. In the hotel industry, for instance, foreign investors have established
themselves creditably, such as in the Shangri-La, the Nikko, the Peninsula, and Mandarin Hotels
This should not stop us from retaining 51% of the capital stock of the Manila Hotel Corporation in
the hands of Filipinos. This would be in keeping with the intent of the Filipino people to preserve our
national patrimony, including our historical and cultural heritage in the hands of Filipinos.

VITUG, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I agree with Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo on his clear-cut statements, shared by Mr. Justice
Reynato S. Puno in a well written separate (dissenting) opinion, that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

First, the provision in our fundamental law which provides that" (i)n the grant of rights, privileges,
and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos" 1 is self-executory. The provision verily does not need, although it can obviously
be amplified or regulated by, an enabling law or a set of rules.

Second, the term "patrimony" does not merely refer to the country’s natural resources but also to its
cultural heritage. A "historical landmark," to use the words of Mr. Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr., Manila
Hotel has now indeed become part of Philippine heritage.

Third, the act of the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS"), a government entity which
derives its authority from the State, in selling 51% of its share in MHC should be considered an act
of the State subject to the Constitutional mandate.

On the pivotal issue of the degree of "preference to qualified Filipinos," I find it somewhat difficult
to take the same path traversed by the forceful reasoning of Justice Puno. In the particular case
before us, the only meaningful preference, it seems, would really be to allow the qualified Filipino to
match the foreign bid for, as a practical matter, I cannot see any bid that literally calls for millions of
dollars to be at par (to the last cent) with another. The magnitude of the bids is such that it becomes
hardly possible for the competing bids to stand exactly "equal" which alone, under the dissenting
view, could trigger the right of preference.

It is most unfortunate that Renong Berhad has not been spared this great disappointment, a letdown
that it did not deserve, by a simple and timely advise of the proper rules of bidding along with the
peculiar constitutional implications of the proposed transaction. It is also regrettable that the Court at
times is seen to, instead, be the refuge for bureaucratic inadequacies which create the perception that
it even takes on non-justiciable controversies.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

All told, I am constrained to vote for granting the Petition.

MENDOZA, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I take the view that in the context of the present controversy the only way to enforce the
constitutional mandate that" [i]n the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
patrimony the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos" 1 is to allow petitioner Philippine
corporation to equal the bid of the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad for the purchase of the controlling
shares of stocks in the Manila Hotel Corporation. Indeed, it is the only way a qualified Filipino or
Philippine corporation can be given preference in the enjoyment of a right, privilege or concession
given by the State, by favoring it over a foreign national or corporation.

Under the rules on public bidding of the Government Service and Insurance System, if petitioner and
the Malaysian firm had offered the same price per share, "priority [would be given] to the bidder
seeking the larger ownership interest in MHC," 2 so that if petitioner bid for more shares, it would be
preferred to the Malaysian corporation for that reason and not because it is a Philippine corporation.
Consequently, it is only in cases like the present one, where an alien corporation is the highest
bidder, that preferential treatment of the Philippine corporation is mandated not by declaring it
winner but by allowing it "to match the highest bid in terms of price per share" before it is awarded
the shares of stocks. 3 That, to me, is what "preference to qualified Filipinos" means in the context of
this case — by favoring Filipinos whenever they are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis foreigners.

This was the meaning given in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno 4 to a 1947 statute giving "preference to
Filipino citizens in the lease of public market stalls." 5 This Court upheld the cancellation of existing
leases covering market stalls occupied by persons who were not Filipinos and the award thereafter of
the stalls to qualified Filipino vendors as ordered by the Department of Finance. Similarly, in Vda.
de Salgado v. De la Fuente, 6 this Court sustained the validity of a municipal ordinance passed
pursuant to the statute (R.A. No. 37), terminating existing leases of public market stalls and granting
preference to Filipino citizens in the issuance of new licenses for the occupancy of the stalls. In Chua
Lao v. Raymundo, 7 the preference granted under the statute was held to apply to cases in which
Filipino vendors sought the same stalls occupied by alien vendors in the public markets even if there
were available other stalls as good as those occupied by aliens. "The law, apparently, is applicable
whenever there is a conflict of interest between Filipino applicants and aliens for lease of stalls in
public markets, in which situation the right to preference immediately arises." 8

Our legislation on the matter thus antedated by a quarter of a century efforts began only in the 1970s
in America to realize the promise of equality, through affirmative action and reverse discrimination
programs designed to remedy past discrimination against colored people in such areas as
employment, contracting and licensing. 9 Indeed, in vital areas of our national economy, there are
situations in which the only way to place Filipinos in control of the national economy as
contemplated in the Constitution 10 is to give them preferential treatment where they can at least
stand on equal footing with aliens.

There need be no fear that thus preferring Filipinos would either invite foreign retaliation or deprive
the country of the benefit of foreign capital or know-how. We are dealing here not with common
trades or common means of livelihood which are open to aliens in our midst, 11 but with the sale of
government property, which is like the grant of government largess or benefits. In the words of Art.
XII, sec. 10, we are dealing here with "rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy" and therefore no one should begrudge us if we give preferential treatment to our citizens.
That at any rate is the command of the Constitution. For the Manila Hotel is a business owned by the
Government. It is being privatized. Privatization should result in the relinquishment of the business
in favor of private individuals and groups who are Filipino citizens, not in favor of aliens.

Nor should there be any doubt that by awarding the shares of stocks to petitioner we would be
trading competence and capability for nationalism. Both petitioner and the Malaysian firm are
qualified, having hurdled the pre-qualification process. 12 It is only the result of the public bidding
that is sought to be modified by enabling petitioner to up its bid to equal the highest bid.

Nor, finally, is there any basis for the suggestion that to allow a Filipino bidder to match the highest
bid of an alien could encourage speculation, since all the Filipino entity would then do would be not
to make a bid or make only a token one and, after it is known that a foreign bidder has submitted the
highest bid, make an offer matching that of the foreign firm. This is not possible under the rules on
public bidding of the GSIS. Under these rules there is minimum bid required (P36.67 per share for a
range of 9 to 15 million shares). 13 Bids below the minimum will not be considered. On the other
hand, if the Filipino entity, after passing the pre-qualification process, does not submit a bid, he will
not be allowed to match the highest bid of the foreign firm because this is a privilege allowed only to
those who have "validly submitted bids." 14 The suggestion is, to say the least, fanciful and has no
basis in fact.

For the foregoing reasons, I vote to grant the petition.

TORRES, JR., J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Constancy in law is not an attribute of a judicious mind. I say this as we are confronted in the case at
bar with legal and constitutional issues — and yet I am driven so to speak on the side of history. The
reason perhaps is due to the belief that in the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., a "page of
history is worth a volume of logic."cralaw virtua1aw library

I will, however, attempt to share my thoughts on whether the Manila Hotel has a historical and
cultural aspect within the meaning of the constitution and thus, forming part of the "patrimony of the
nation."cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides :chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

"In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national goals and
priorities."cralaw virtua1aw library

The foregoing provisions should be read in conjunction with Article II of the same Constitution
pertaining to "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" which ordain —

"The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy, effectively controlled by
Filipinos." (Sec. 19).

Interestingly, the matter of giving preference to "qualified Filipinos" was one of the highlights in the
1987 Constitution Commission proceedings, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"MR. NOLLEDO.

The Amendment will read: "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS
COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." And the word "Filipinos" here, as intended by the
proponents, will include not only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities fully
controlled by Filipinos (Vol. III, Records of the Constitutional, p. 608)

MR. MONSOD.

We also wanted to add, as Commissioner Villegas said, this committee and this body already
approved what is known as the Filipino First policy which was suggested by Commissioner de
Castro. So that it is now in our Constitution (Vol. IV, Records of the Constitutional Commission, p.
225).

Commissioner Jose Nolledo explaining the provision adverted to above, said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"MR. NOLLEDO.

In the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

MR. FOZ.

In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and the Filipinos enterprise is
also qualified, will the Filipino enterprise shall be given a preference?

MR. NOLLEDO.

Obviously.
MR. FOZ.

If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be
preferred?

MR. NOLLEDO.

The answer is "yes" (Vol. III p. 616, Records of the Constitutional Commission).

The nationalistic provisions of the 1987 Constitution reflect the history and spirit of the Malolos
Constitution of 1898, the 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitutions. That we have not reneged on
this nationalist policy is articulated in one of the earliest cases, this Court said —

"The ‘nationalistic tendency is manifested in various provisions of the Constitution. . . . It cannot

therefore be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying many of the
provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid or unconstitutional (Ichong, Et. Al. v.
Hernandez, Et Al., 101 Phil. 1155)."cralaw virtua1aw library

I subscribe to the view that history, culture, heritage, and tradition are not legislated and is the
product of events, customs, usages and practices. It is actually a product of growth and acceptance by
the collective mores of a race. It is the spirit and soul of a people.

The Manila Hotel is part of our history, culture and heritage. Every inch of the Manila Hotel is
witness to historic events (too numerous to mention) which shaped our history for almost 84 years.

As I intimated earlier, it is not my position in this opinion, to examine the single instances of the
legal largesse which have given rise to the controversy, as I believe that has been exhaustively
discussed in the ponencia. Suffice it to say at this point that the history of the Manila Hotel should
not be placed in the auction block of a purely business transaction, where profit subverts the
cherished historical values of our people.

As a historical landmark in this "Pearl of the Orient Seas", it has its enviable tradition which, in the
words of philosopher Salvador de Madarriaga, (tradition) is "more of a river than a stone, it keeps
flowing, and one must view the flow in both directions. If you look towards the hill from which the
river flows, you see tradition in the form of forceful currents that push the river or people towards the
future; if you look the other way, you progress."cralaw virtua1aw library

Indeed, tradition and progress are the same, for progress depends on the kind of tradition. Let us not
jettison the tradition of the Manila Hotel and thereby repeat our colonial history.

I grant, of course, that men of the law can see the same subject in different lights.

I remember, however, a Spanish proverb which says — "He is always right who suspects that he
makes mistakes." On this note, I say that if I have to make a mistake, I would rather err upholding
the belief that the Filipino is first under his Constitution and in his own land.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

PUNO, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by the Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
domestic corporation, to stop the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from selling the
controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to a foreign corporation. Allegedly, the sale
violates the second paragraph of section 10, Article XII of the Constitution.

Respondent GSIS is a government-owned and controlled corporation. It is the sole owner of the
Manila Hotel which it operates through its subsidiary, the Manila Hotel Corporation. Manila Hotel
was included in the privatization program of the government. In 1995, GSIS proposed to sell to
interested buyers 30% to 51% of its shares, ranging from 9,000,000 to 15,300,000 shares, in the
Manila Hotel Corporation. After the absence of bids at the first public bidding, the block of shares
offered for sale was increased from a maximum of 30% to 51%. Also, the winning bidder, or the
eventual "strategic partner" of the GSIS was required to "provide management expertise and/or an
international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of the Manila Hotel." 1 The proposal was approved by respondent Committee on
Privatization.

In July 1995, a conference was held where pre-qualification documents and the bidding rules were
furnished interested parties. Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel, a domestic corporation, and Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm with ITT Sheraton as operator, pre-qualified. 2

The bidding rules and procedures entitled "Guidelines and Procedures: Second Pre-qualification and
Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization" provide:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"I. INTRODUCTION AND HIGHLIGHTS

DETERMINING THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER

The party that accomplishes the steps set forth below will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic
Partner and will be awarded the Block of Shares:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

First — Pass the prequalification process;

Second — Submit the highest bid on a price per share basis for the Block of Shares;

Third — Negotiate and execute the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23,
1995.

x x x

IV. GUIDELINES FOR PREQUALIFICATION

A. PARTIES WHO MAY APPLY FOR PREQUALIFICATION

The Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner will be expected to provide management expertise and/or an
international marketing reservation, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of The Manila Hotel. In this context, the GSIS is inviting to the prequalification process
any local and/or foreign corporation, consortium/joint venture or juridical entity with at least one of
the following qualifications:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. Proven management expertise in the hotel industry; or

b. Significant equity ownership (i.e. board representation) in another hotel company; or

c. Overall management and marketing expertise to successfully operate the Manila Hotel.

Parties interested in bidding for MHC should be able to provide access to the requisite management
expertise and/or international marketing/reservation system for The Manila Hotel.

x x x

D. PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS

x x x

E. APPLICATION PROCEDURE
1. DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE AT THE REGISTRATION OFFICE

The prequalification documents can be secured at the Registration Office between 9:00 AM to 4:00
PM during working days within the period specified in Section III. Each set of documents consists of
the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. Guidelines and Procedures: Second Prequalification and Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization

b. Confidential Information Memorandum: The Manila Hotel Corporation

c. Letter of Invitation to the Prequalification and Bidding Conference

x x x

4. PREQUALIFICATION AND BIDDING CONFERENCE

A prequalification and bidding conference will be held at The Manila Hotel on the date specified in
Section III to allow the Applicant to seek clarifications and further information regarding the
guidelines and procedures. Only those who purchased the prequalification documents will be
allowed in this conference. Attendance to this conference is strongly advised, although the Applicant
will not be penalized if it does not attend.

5. SUBMISSION OF PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS

The Applicant should submit 5 sets of the prequalification documents (1 original set plus 4 copies) at
the Registration Office between 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM during working days within the period
specified in Section III.

F. PREQUALIFICATION PROCESS

1. The Applicant will be evaluated by the PBAC with the assistance of the TEC based on the
Information Package and other information available to the PBAC.

2. If the Applicant is a Consortium/Joint Venture, the evaluation will consider the overall
qualifications of the group, taking into account the contribution of each member to the venture

3. The decision of the PBAC with respect to the results of the PBAC evaluation will be final.

4. The Applicant shall be evaluated according to the criteria set forth below:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

a. Business management expertise, track record, and experience

b. Financial capability

c. Feasibility and acceptability of the proposed strategic plan for the Manila Hotel

5. The PBAC will shortlist such number of Applicants as it may deem appropriate.

6. The parties that prequalified in the first MHC public bidding — ITT Sheraton, Marriot
International Inc., Renaissance Hotels International Inc., consortium of RCBC Capital/Ritz Carlton
— may participate in the Public Bidding without having to undergo the prequalification process
again.

G. SHORTLIST OF QUALIFIED BIDDERS

1. A notice of prequalification results containing the shortlist of Qualified Bidders will be posted at
the Registration Office at the date specified in Section III.

2. In the case of a Consortium/Joint Venture, the withdrawal by a member whose qualification was a
material consideration for being included in the shortlist is a ground for disqualification of the
Applicant.

V. GUIDELINES FOR THE PUBLIC BIDDING

A. PARTIES WHO MAY PARTICIPATE IN THE PUBLIC BIDDING

All parties in the shortlist of Qualified Bidders will be eligible to participate in the Public Bidding.

B. BLOCK OF SHARES

A range of Nine Million (9,000,000) to Fifteen Million Three Hundred Thousand (15,300,000)
shares of stock, representing Thirty Percent to Fifty-One Percent (30%-51%) of the issued and
outstanding shares of MHC, will be offered in the Public Bidding by the GSIS. The Qualified
Bidders will have the option of determining the number of shares within the range to bid for. The
range is intended to attract bidders with different preferences and objectives for the operation and
management of The Manila Hotel.

C. MINIMUM BID REQUIRED ON A PRICE PER SHARE BASIS

1. Bids will be evaluated on a price per share basis. The minimum bid required on a price per share
basis for the Block of Shares is Thirty-Six Pesos and Sixty-Seven Centavos (P36.67).

2. Bids should be in the Philippine currency payable to the GSIS.

3. Bids submitted with an equivalent price per share below the minimum required will not
considered.

D. TRANSFER COSTS

x x x

E. OFFICIAL BID FORM

1. Bids must be contained in the prescribed Official Bid Form, a copy of which is attached as Annex
IV. The Official Bid Form must be properly accomplished in all details; improper accomplishment
may be a sufficient basis for disqualification.

2. During the Public Bidding, the Qualified Bidder will submit the Official Bid Form, which will
indicate the offered purchase price, in a sealed envelope marked "OFFICIAL BID."cralaw virtua1aw
library

F. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

During the Public Bidding, the following documents should be submitted along with the bid in a
separate envelop marked "SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS" :chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. WRITTEN AUTHORITY TO BID (UNDER OATH)

If the Qualified Bidder is a corporation, the representative of the Qualified Bidder should submit a
Board resolution which adequately authorizes such representative to bid for and in behalf of the
corporation with full authority to perform such acts necessary or requisite to bind the Qualified
Bidder.

If the Qualified Bidder is a Consortium/Joint Venture, each member of the Consortium/Joint Venture
should submit a Board resolution authorizing one of its members and such member’s representative
to make the bid on behalf of the group with full authority to perform such acts necessary or requisite
to bind the Qualified Bidder.

2. BID SECURITY

a. The Qualified Bidder should deposit Thirty-Three Million Pesos (P33,000.00), in Philippine
currency as Bid Security in the form of:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

i. Manager’s check or unconditional demand draft payable to the "Government Service Insurance
System" and issued by a reputable banking institution duly licensed to do business in the Philippines
and acceptable to GSIS; or

ii. Standby-by letter of credit issued by a reputable banking institution acceptable to the GSIS.

b. The GSIS will reject a bid if :chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

i. The bid does not have a Bid Security; or

ii. The Bid Security accompanying the bid is for less than the required amount

c. If the Bid Security is in the form of a manager’s check or unconditional demand draft, the interest
earned on the Bid Security will be for the account of GSIS.

d. If the Qualified Bidder becomes the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner, the Bid Security will be
applied as the downpayment on the Qualified Bidder’s offered purchase price.

e. The Bid Security of the Qualified Bidder will be returned immediately after the Public Bidding if
the Qualified Bidder is not declared the Highest Bidder.

f. The Bid Security will be returned by October 23, 1995 if the Highest Bidder is unable to negotiate
and execute with GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation
System Contract or other types of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for
The Manila Hotel.

g. The Bid Security of the Highest Bidder will be forfeited in favor of GSIS if the Highest Bidder,
after negotiating and executing the Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation
System Contract or other types of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for
The Manila Hotel, fails or refuses to:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

i. Execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS not later than October 23, 1995; or

ii. Pay the full amount of the offered purchase price not later than October 23, 1995; or

iii. Consummate the sale of the Block of Shares for any other reason.

G. SUBMISSION OF BIDS

1. The Public Bidding will be held on September 7, 1995 at the following location:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

New GSIS Headquarters Building

Financial Center, Reclamation Area

Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, Metro Manila

2. The Secretariat of the PBAC will be stationed at the Public Bidding to accept any and all bids and
supporting requirements. Representatives from the Commission on Audit and COP will be invited to
witness the proceedings.

3. The Qualified Bidder should submit its bid using the Official Bid Form. The accomplished
Official Bid Form should be submitted in a sealed envelope marked "OFFICIAL BID."cralaw
virtua1aw library

4. The Qualified Bidder should submit the following documents in another sealed envelope marked
"SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS"

a. Written Authority Bid

b. Bid Security

5. The two sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL BID" and "SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS"
must be submitted simultaneously to the Secretariat between 9:00 AM and 2:00 PM, Philippine
Standard Time, on the date of the Public Bidding. No bid shall be accepted after the closing time.
Opened or tampered bids shall not be accepted.

6. The Secretariat will log and record the actual time of submission of the two sealed envelopes. The
actual time of submission will also be indicated by the Secretariat on the face of the two envelopes.

7. After Step No. 6, the two sealed envelopes will be dropped in the corresponding bid boxes
provided for the purpose. These boxes will be in full view of the invited public.

H. OPENING AND READING OF BIDS

1. After the closing time of 2:00 PM on the date of the Public Bidding, the PBAC will open all
sealed envelopes marked "SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS" for screening, evaluation and
acceptance. Those who submitted incomplete/insufficient documents or document/s which is/are not
substantially in the form required by PBAC will be disqualified. The envelope containing their
Official Bid Form will be immediately returned to the disqualified bidders.

2. The sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL BID" will be opened at 3:00 PM. The name of the
bidder and the amount of its bid price will be read publicly as the envelopes are opened.

3. Immediately following the reading of the bids, the PBAC will formally announce the highest bid
and the Highest Bidder.

4. The highest bid will be determined on a price per share basis. In the event of a tie wherein two or
more bids have the same equivalent price per share, priority will be given to the bidder seeking the
larger ownership interest in MHC.

5. The Public Bidding will be declared a failed bidding in case:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. No single bid is submitted within the prescribed period; or

b. There is only one (1) bid that is submitted and acceptable to the PBAC.

I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC

1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995 or the
Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the
Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with GSIS/MHC the Management Contract,
International Marketing/ Reservation System Contract or other type of contract specified by the
Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for The Manila Hotel. If the Highest Bidder is intending to
provide only financial support to The Manila Hotel, a separate institution may enter into the
aforementioned contract/s with GSIS/MHC.
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS, a copy of
which will be distributed to each of the Qualified Bidder after the prequalification process is
completed.

2. In the event that the Highest Bidder chooses a Management Contract for The Manila Hotel, the
maximum levels for the management fee structure that GSIS/MHC are prepared to accept in the
Management Contract are as follows :chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. Basic management fee: Maximum of 2.5% of gross revenues.(1)

b. Incentive fee: Maximum of 8.0% of gross operating profit (1) after deducting undistributed
overhead expenses and the basic management fee.

c. Fixed component of the international marketing/reservation system fee: Maximum of 2.0% of

gross room revenues.(1) The Applicant should indicate in its Information Package if it is wishes to
charge this fee.

Note (1): As defined in the uniform system of account for hotels.

The GSIS/MHC have indicated above the acceptable parameters for the hotel management fees to
facilitate the negotiations with the Highest Bidder for the Management Contract after the Public
Bidding.

A Qualified Bidder envisioning a Management Contract for The Manila Hotel should determine
whether or not the management fee structure above is acceptable before submitting their
prequalification documents to GSIS.

J. BLOCK SALE TO THE OTHER QUALIFIED BIDDERS

1. If for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this
to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified are
willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.

2. The order of priority among the interested Qualified Bidders will be in accordance with the
equivalent price per share of their respective bids in the Public Bidding, i.e. first and second priority
will be given to the Qualified Bidders that submitted the second and third highest bids on the price
per share basis, respectively, and so on.

K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER

The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following
conditions are met:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. Execution of the necessary contract with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995; and

b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP/OGCC are obtained.

I. FULL PAYMENT FOR THE BLOCK OF SHARES

1. Upon execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC, the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner
must fully pay, not later than October 23, 1995, the offered purchase price for the Block of Shares
after deducting the Bid Security applied as downpayment.

2. All payments should be made in the form of a Manager’s Check or unconditional Demand Draft,
payable to the "Government Service Insurance System," issued by a reputable banking institution
licensed to do business in the Philippines and acceptable to GSIS.

M. GENERAL CONDITIONS
1. The GSIS unconditionally reserves the right to reject any or all applications, waive any formality
therein, or accept such application as maybe considered most advantageous to the GSIS. The GSIS
similarly reserves the right to require the submission of any additional information from the
Applicant as the PBAC may deem necessary.

2. The GSIS further reserves the right to call off the Public Bidding prior to acceptance of the bids
and call for a new public bidding under amended rules, and without any liability whatsoever to any
or all the Qualified Bidders, except the obligation to return the Bid Security.

3. The GSIS reserves the right to reset the date of the prequalification/bidding conference, the
deadline for the submission of the prequalification documents, the date of the Public Bidding or
other pertinent activities at least three (3) calendar days prior to the respective deadlines/target dates.

4. The GSIS sells only whatever rights, interest and participation it has on the Block of Shares.

5. All documents and materials submitted by the Qualified Bidders, except the Bid Security, may be
returned upon request.

6. The decision of the PBAC/GSIS on the results of the Public Bidding is final. The Qualified
Bidders, by participating in the Public Bidding, are deemed to have agreed to accept and abide by
these results.

7. The GSIS will be held free and harmless from any liability, suit or allegation arising out of the
Public Bidding by the Qualified Bidders who have participated in the Public Bidding." 3

The second public bidding was held on September 18, 1995. Petitioner bidded P41.00 per share for
15,300,000 shares and Renong Berhad bidded P44.00 per share also for 15,300,000 shares. The
GSIS declared Renong Berhad the highest bidder and immediately returned petitioner’s bid security.

On September 28, 1995, ten days after the bidding, petitioner wrote to GSIS offering to match the
bid price of Renong Berhad. It requested that the award be made to itself citing the second paragraph
of Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution. It sent a manager’s check for thirty-three million pesos
(P33,000,000.00) as bid security.

Respondent GSIS, then in the process of negotiating with Renong Berhad the terms and conditions
of the contract and technical agreements in the operation of the hotel, refused to entertain petitioner’s
request.

Hence, petitioner filed the present petition. We issued a temporary restraining order on October 18,
1995.

Petitioner anchors its plea on the second paragraph of Article XII, Section 10 of the Constitution 4
on the "National Economy and Patrimony" which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"x x x

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

x x x"

The vital issues can be summed up as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Whether section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution is a self-executing provision
and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;

(2) Assuming section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII is self-executing, whether the controlling shares
of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;
(3) Whether GSIS is included in the term "State," hence, mandated to implement section 10,
paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution;

(4) Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it failed to give preference to petitioner, a qualified
Filipino corporation, over and above Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of the
controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation;

(5) Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning the sale of the shares to Renong Berhad, a
foreign corporation.

Anent the first issue, it is now familiar learning that a Constitution provides the guiding policies and
principles upon which is built the substantial foundation and general framework of the law and
government. 5 As a rule, its provisions are deemed self-executing and can be enforced without
further legislative action. 6 Some of its provisions, however, can be implemented only through
appropriate laws enacted by the Legislature, hence not self-executing.

To determine whether a particular provision of a Constitution is self-executing is a hard row to hoe.

The key lies on the intent of the framers of the fundamental law oftentimes submerged in its
language. A searching inquiry should be made to find out if the provision is intended as a present
enactment, complete in itself as a definitive law, or if it needs future legislation for completion and
enforcement. 7 The inquiry demands a micro-analysis of the text and the context of the provision in
question. 8

Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-executing, 9 rather than as
requiring future legislation for their enforcement. 10 The reason is not difficult to discern. For if they
are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law ratified by the sovereign people
can be easily ignored and nullified by Congress. 11 Suffused with wisdom of the ages is the
unyielding rule that legislative actions may give breath to constitutional rights but congressional
inaction should not suffocate them. 12

Thus, we have treated as self-executing the provisions in the Bill of Rights on arrests, searches and
seizures, 13 the rights of a person under custodial investigation, 14 the rights of an accused, 15 and
the privilege against self-incrimination. 16 It is recognized that legislation is unnecessary to enable
courts to effectuate constitutional provisions guaranteeing the fundamental rights of life, liberty and
the protection of property. 17 The same treatment is accorded to constitutional provisions forbidding
the taking or damaging of property for public use without just compensation. 18

Contrariwise, case law lays down the rule that a constitutional provision is not self-executing where
it merely announces a policy and its language empowers the Legislature to prescribe the means by
which the policy shall be carried into effect. 19 Accordingly, we have held that the provisions in
Article II of our Constitution entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" should generally
be construed as mere statements of principles of the State. 20 We have also ruled that some
provisions of Article XIII on "Social Justice and Human Rights," 21 and Article XIV on "Education
Science and Technology, Arts, Culture and Sports" 22 cannot be the basis of judicially enforceable
rights. Their enforcement is addressed to the discretion of Congress though they provide the
framework for legislation 23 to effectuate their policy content. 24

Guided by this map of settled jurisprudence, we now consider whether Section 10, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution is self-executing or not. It reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

"Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the
national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as
Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will
encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities."cralaw virtua1aw library

The first paragraph directs Congress to reserve certain areas of investments in the country 25 to
Filipino citizens or to corporations sixty per cent 26 of whose capital stock is owned by Filipinos. It
further commands Congress to enact laws that will encourage the formation and operation of one
hundred percent Filipino-owned enterprises. In checkered contrast, the second paragraph orders the
entire State to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights and privileges covering the
national economy and patrimony. The third paragraph also directs the State to regulate foreign
investments in line with our national goals and well-set priorities.

The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing. By its express text, there is a categorical
command for Congress to enact laws restricting foreign ownership in certain areas of investments in
the country and to encourage the formation and operation of wholly-owned Filipino enterprises. The
right granted by the provision is clearly still in esse. Congress has to breathe life to the right by
means of legislation. Parenthetically, this paragraph was plucked from section 3, Article XIV of the
1973 Constitution. 27 The provision in the 1973 Constitution affirmed our ruling in the landmark
case of Lao Ichong v. Hernandez, 28 where we upheld the discretionary authority of Congress to
Filipinize certain areas of investments. 29 By reenacting the 1973 provision, the first paragraph of
section 10 affirmed the power of Congress to nationalize certain areas of investments in favor of
Filipinos.

The second and third paragraphs of Section 10 are different. They are directed to the State and not to
Congress alone which is but one of the three great branches of our government. Their coverage is
also broader for they cover "the national economy and patrimony" and "foreign investments within
[the] national jurisdiction" and not merely "certain areas of investments." Beyond debate, they
cannot be read as granting Congress the exclusive power to implement by law the policy of giving
preference to qualified Filipinos in the conferral of rights and privileges covering our national
economy and patrimony. Their language does not suggest that any of the State agency or
instrumentality has the privilege to hedge or to refuse its implementation for any reason whatsoever.
Their duty to implement is unconditional and it is now. The second and the third paragraphs of
Section 10, Article XII are thus self-executing.

This submission is strengthened by Article II of the Constitution entitled "Declaration of Principles

and State Policies." Its Section 19 provides that" [T]he State shall develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." It engrafts the all-important
Filipino First policy in our fundamental law and by the use of the mandatory word "shall," directs its
enforcement by the whole State without any pause or a half-pause in time.

The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of the stocks of the Manila Hotel Corporation
involves the disposition of part of our national patrimony. The records of the Constitutional
Commission show that the Commissioners entertained the same view as to its meaning. According to
Commissioner Nolledo, "patrimony" refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the
cultural heritage of our race. 30 By this yardstick, the sale of Manila Hotel falls within the coverage
of the constitutional provision giving preferential treatment to qualified Filipinos in the grant of
rights involving our national patrimony. The unique value of the Manila Hotel to our history and
culture cannot be viewed with a myopic eye. The value of the hotel goes beyond pesos and centavos.
As chronicled by Beth Day Romulo, 31 the hotel first opened on July 4, 1912 as a first-class hotel
built by the American Insular Government for Americans living in, or passing through, Manila while
travelling to the Orient. Indigenous materials and Filipino craftsmanship were utilized in its
construction. For sometime, it was exclusively used by American and Caucasian travelers and served
as the "official guesthouse" of the American Insular Government for visiting foreign dignitaries.
Filipinos began coming to the Hotel as guests during the Commonwealth period. When the Japanese
occupied Manila, it served as military headquarters and lodging for the highest-ranking officers from
Tokyo. It was at the Hotel and the Intramuros that the Japanese made their last stand during the
Liberation of Manila. After the war, the Hotel again served foreign guests and Filipinos alike.
Presidents and kings, premiers and potentates, as well as glamorous international film and sports
celebrities were housed in the Hotel. It was also the situs of international conventions and
conferences. In the local scene, it was the venue of historic meetings, parties and conventions of
political parties. The Hotel has reaped and continues reaping numerous recognitions and awards
from international hotel and travel award-giving bodies, a fitting acknowledgment of Filipino talent
and ingenuity. These are judicially cognizable facts which cannot be bent by a biased mind.

The Hotel may not, as yet, have been declared a national cultural treasure pursuant to Republic Act
No. 4846 but that does not exclude it from our national patrimony. Republic Act No 486, "he
Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act," merely provides a procedure whereby a
particular cultural property may be classified a "national cultural treasure" or an "important cultural
property." 32 Approved on June 18, 1966 and amended by P.D. 374 in 1974, the law is limited in its
reach and cannot be read as the exclusive law implementing section 10, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. To be sure, the law does not equate cultural treasure and cultural property as
synonymous to the phrase "patrimony of the nation."cralaw virtua1aw library

The third issue is whether the constitutional command to the State includes the respondent GSIS. A
look at its charter will reveal that GSIS is a government-owned and controlled corporation that
administers funds that come from the monthly contributions of government employees and the
government. 33 The funds are held in trust for a distinct purpose which cannot be disposed of
indifferently. 34 They are to be used to finance the retirement, disability and life insurance benefits
of the employees and the administrative and operational expenses of the GSIS. 35 Excess funds,
however, are allowed to be invested in business and other ventures for the benefit of the employees.
36 It is thus contended that the GSIS’ investment in the Manila Hotel Corporation is a simple
business venture, hence, an act beyond the contemplation of section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of
the Constitution.

The submission is unimpressive. The GSIS is not a pure private corporation. It is essentially a public
corporation created by Congress and granted an original charter to serve a public purpose. It is
subject to the jurisdictions of the Civil Service Commission 37 and the Commission on Audit. 38 As
a state-owned and controlled corporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to the policies spelled out in the
Constitution especially those designed to promote the general welfare of the people. One of these
policies is the Filipino First policy which the people elevated as a constitutional command.

The fourth issue demands that we look at the content of the phrase "qualified Filipinos" and their
"preferential right." The Constitution desisted from defining their contents. This is as it ought to be
for a Constitution only lays down flexible policies and principles which can be bent to meet today’s
manifest needs and tomorrow’s unmanifested demands. Only a constitution strung with elasticity can
grow as a living constitution.

Thus, during the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Nolledo brushed
aside a suggestion to define the phrase "qualified Filipinos." He explained that present and
prospective "laws" will take care of the problem of its interpretation, viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"x x x

THE PRESIDENT.

What is the suggestion of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word "QUALIFIED?"

MR. RODRIGO.

No, no, but say definitely "TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" as against whom? As against aliens over
aliens?

MR. NOLLEDO.

Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word "QUALIFIED" because the existing
laws or the prospective laws will always lay down conditions under which business may be done, for
example, qualifications on capital, qualifications or the setting up of other financial structures, et
cetera.
MR. RODRIGO.

It is just a matter of style.

MR. NOLLEDO.

Yes.

MR. RODRIGO.

If we say, "PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," it can be understood as giving preference

to qualified Filipinos as against Filipinos who are not qualified.

MR. NOLLEDO.

Madam President, that was the intention of the proponents. The committee has accepted the
amendment.

x x x"

As previously discussed, the constitutional command to enforce the Filipino First policy is addressed
to the State and not to Congress alone. Hence, the word "laws" should not be understood as limited
to legislations but all state actions which include applicable rules and regulations adopted by
agencies and instrumentalities of the State in the exercise of their rule-making power. In the case at
bar, the bidding rules and regulations set forth the, standards to measure the qualifications of bidders
Filipinos and foreigners alike. It is not seriously disputed that petitioner qualified to bid as did
Renong Berhad. 39

Thus, we come to the critical issue of the degree of preference which GSIS should have accorded
petitioner, a qualified Filipino, over Renong Berhad, a foreigner, in the purchase of the controlling
shares of the Manila Hotel. Petitioner claims that after losing the bid, this right of preference gives it
a second chance to match the highest bid of Renong Berhad.

With due respect, I cannot sustain petitioner’s submission. I prescind from the premise that the
second paragraph of section 10, Article XII of the Constitution is pro-Filipino but not anti-alien. It is
pro-Filipino for it gives preference to Filipinos. It is not, however, anti-alien per se for it does not
absolutely bar aliens in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony. Indeed, in the absence of qualified Filipinos, the State is not prohibited from granting
these rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners if the act will promote the weal of the nation.

In implementing the policy articulated in Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution, the stellar task
of our State policy-makers is to maintain a creative tension between two desiderata — first, the need
to develop our economy and patrimony with the help of foreigners if necessary, and, second, the
need to keep our economy controlled by Filipinos. Rightfully, the framers of the Constitution did not
define the degree of the right of preference to be given to qualified Filipinos. They knew that for the
right to serve the general welfare, it must have a malleable content that can be adjusted by our
policy-makers to meet the changing needs of our people. In fine, the right of preference of qualified
Filipinos is to be determined by degree as time dictates and circumstances warrant. The lesser the
need for alien assistance, the greater the degree of the right of preference can be given to Filipinos
and vice versa.

Again, it should be stressed that the right and the duty to determine the degree of this privilege at any
given time is addressed to the entire State. While under our constitutional scheme, the right primarily
belongs to Congress as the lawmaking department of our government, other branches of government,
and all their agencies and instrumentalities, share the power to enforce this state policy. Within the
limits of their authority, they can act or promulgate rules and regulations defining the degree of this
right of preference in cases where they have to make grants involving the national economy and
judicial duty. On the other hand, our duty is to strike down acts of the State that violate the policy.
To date, Congress has not enacted a law defining the degree of the preferential right. Consequently,
we must turn to the rules and regulations of respondents Committee on Privatization and GSIS to
determine the degree of preference that petitioner is entitled to as a qualified Filipino in the subject
sale. A tearless look at the rules and regulations will show that they are silent on the degree of
preferential right to be accorded a qualified Filipino bidder. Despite their silence, however, they
cannot be read to mean that they do not grant any degree of preference to petitioner for paragraph 2,
Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution is deemed part of said rules and regulations. Pursuant to
legal hermeneutics which demand that we interpret rules to save them from unconstitutionality, I
submit that the right of preference of petitioner arises only if it tied the bid of Renong Berhad. In that
instance, all things stand equal, and petitioner, as a qualified Filipino bidder, should be preferred.

It is with deep regret that I cannot subscribe to the view that petitioner has a right to match the bid of
Renong Berhad. Petitioner’s submission must be supported by the rules but even if we examine the
rules inside-out a thousand times, they can not justify the claimed right. Under the rules, the right to
match the highest bid arises only "if for any reason, the highest bidder cannot be awarded the block
of shares . . ." No reason has arisen that will prevent the award to Renong Berhad. It qualified as a
bidder. It complied with the procedure of bidding. It tendered the highest bid. It was declared as the
highest bidder by the GSIS and the rules say this decision is final. It deserves the award as a matter
of right for the rules clearly did not give to the petitioner as a qualified Filipino the privilege to
match the higher bid of a foreigner. What the rules did not grant, petitioner cannot demand. Our
sympathies may be with petitioner but the court has no power to extend the latitude and longitude of
the right of preference as defined by the rules. The parameters of the right of preference depend on a
galaxy of facts and factors whose determination belongs to the province of the policy-making
branches and agencies of the State. We are duty-bound to respect that determination even if we differ
with the wisdom of their judgment. The right they grant may be little but we must uphold the grant
for as long as the right of preference is not denied. It is only when a State action amounts to a denial
of the right that the Court can come in and strike down the denial as unconstitutional.

Finally, I submit that petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad.
Petitioner was aware of the rules and regulations of the bidding. It knew that the rules and
regulations do not provide that qualified Filipino bidder can match the winning bid after submitting
an inferior bid. It knew that the bid was open to foreigners and that foreigners qualified even during
the first bidding. Petitioner cannot be allowed to repudiate the rules which it agreed to respect. It
cannot be allowed to obey the rules when it wins and disregard them when it loses. If sustained,
petitioners’ stance will wreak havoc on the essence of bidding. Our laws, rules and regulations
require highest bidding to raise as much funds as possible for the government to maximize its
capacity to deliver essential services to our people. This is a duty that must be discharged by
Filipinos and foreigners participating in a bidding contest and the rules are carefully written to attain
this objective. Among others, bidders are prequalified to insure their financial capability. The
bidding is secret and the bids are sealed to prevent collusion among the parties. This objective will
be undermined if we grant petitioner the privilege to know the winning bid and a chance to match it.
For plainly, a second chance to bid will encourage a bidder not to strive to give the highest bid in the
first bidding.

We support the Filipino First policy without any reservation. The visionary nationalist Don Claro M.
Recto has warned us that the greatest tragedy that can befall a Filipino is to be an alien in his own
land. The Constitution has embodied Recto’s counsel as a state policy and our decision should be in
sync with this policy. But while the Filipino First policy requires that we incline to a Filipino, it does
not demand that we wrong an alien. Our policy makers can write laws and rules giving favored
treatment to the Filipino but we are not free to be unfair to a foreigner after writing the laws and the
rules. After the laws are written, they must be obeyed as written, by Filipinos and foreigners alike.
The equal protection clause of the Constitution protects all against unfairness. We can be pro-
Filipino without unfairness to foreigners.

I vote to dismiss the petition.

PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

 I regret I cannot join the majority. To the incisive Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S.
Puno, may I just add:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. The majority contends the Constitution should be interpreted to mean that, after a bidding process
is concluded, the losing Filipino bidder should be given the right to equal the highest foreign bid, and
thus to win. However, the Constitution [Sec. 10 (2), Art. XII] simply states that "in the grant of rights
. . . covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos." The majority concedes that there is no law defining the extent or degree of such
preference. Specifically, no statute empowers a losing Filipino bidder to increase his bid and equal
that of the winning foreigner. In the absence of such empowering law, the majority’s strained
interpretation, I respectfully submit, constitutes unadulterated judicial legislation, which makes
bidding a ridiculous sham where no Filipino can lose and where no foreigner can win. Only in the
Philippines!

2. Aside from being prohibited by the Constitution, such judicial legislation is short-sighted and,
viewed properly, gravely prejudicial to long-term Filipino interests. It encourages other countries —
in the guise of reverse comity or worse, unabashed retaliation — to discriminate against us in their
own jurisdictions by authorizing their own nationals to similarly equal and defeat the higher bids of
Filipino enterprises solely, while on the other hand, allowing similar bids of other foreigners to
remain unchallenged by their nationals. The majority’s thesis will thus marginalize Filipinos as
pariahs in the global marketplace with absolutely no chance of winning any bidding outside our
country. Even authoritarian regimes and hermit kingdoms have long ago found out that unfairness,
greed and isolation are self-defeating and in the long-term, self-
destructing.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red

The moral lesson here is simple: Do not do unto others what you do not want others to do unto you.

3. In the absence of a law specifying the degree or extent of the "Filipino First" policy of the
Constitution, the constitutional preference for the "qualified Filipinos" may be allowed only where
all the bids are equal. In this manner, we put the Filipino ahead without self-destructing him and
without being unfair to the foreigner.

In short, the Constitution mandates a victory for the qualified Filipino only when the scores are tied.
But not when the ballgame is over and the foreigner clearly posted the highest score.

Endnotes:

1. See Sec. 10, par. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.

2. Par. I. Introduction and Highlights; Guidelines and Procedures: Second Prequalifications and Public Bidding of the MHC
Privatization; Annex "A," Consolidated Reply to Comments of Respondents; Rollo, p. 142.

3. Par. V. Guidelines for the Public Bidding, id., pp. 153-154.

4. Annex "A," Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Temporary Restraining Order; Rollo, pp. 13-14.

5. Annex "B," Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Temporary Restraining Order; id., p. 15.

6. Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Temporary Restraining Order, pp. 5-6; id., pp. 6-7.

7. Consolidated Reply to Comments of Respondents, p. 17; id., p. 133.

8. Par. V. J. 1, Guidelines for Public Bidding, Guidelines and Procedures: Second Prequalifications and Public Bidding Of the
MHC Privatization, Annex "A," Consolidated Reply to Comments of Respondents; id., p. 154.
9. Respondents’ Joint Comment with Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order, p. 9; Rollo, p. 44.

10. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 138 (1803).

11. 11 Am Jur. 606.

12. 16 Am Jur. 2d 281.

13. Id., p. 282.

14. See Note 12.

15. Cruz, Isagani A., Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., pp. 8-10.

16. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 3, 22 August 1986, p. 608.

17. 16 Am Jur 2d 283-284.

18. Sec. 10, first par., reads: The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the
national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The
Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by
Filipinos.

Sec. 10, third par., reads: The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction
and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.

19. State ex rel. Miller v. O’Malley, 342 Mo. 641, 117 SW2d 319.

20. G.R No. 91649, 14 May 1991, 197 SCRA 52.

21. Sec. 11, Art. II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies), provides that [t]he State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights.

22. Sec. 12, Art. II, provides that [t]he State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as
a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the government.

23. Sec. 13, Art. II, provides that [t]he State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and
protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and
nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

24. Sec. 1, Art. XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights), provides that [the] Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment
of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.

To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and its increments.

Sec. 2, Art. XIII, provides that [t]he promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic opportunities
based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.

25. Sec. 2, Art. XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports), provides that [T]he State shall:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

(1) Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system of education relevant to the needs of the people
and society;

(2) Establish and maintain a system of free public education in the elementary and high school levels. Without limiting the
natural right of parents to rear their children, elementary education is compulsory for all children of school age;

(3) Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan programs, subsidies, and other incentives which shall be
available to deserving students in both public and private schools, especially to the underprivileged;

(4) Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning, independent, and out-of-school study programs particularly those
that respond to community needs; and

(5) Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in civics, vocational efficiency, and other skills.

26. G.R No. 115455, 25 August 1994, 235 SCRA 630.

27. See Note 25.

28. Sec. 1, Art. XIV, provides that [t]he State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels
of education and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.

29. G.R No. 118910, 17 July 1995.

30. Sec. 5, Art. II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies), provides that [t]he maintenance of peace and order, the
protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the
people of the blessings of democracy.

31. See Note 23.

32. See Note 24.

33. Sec. 17, Art. II, provides that [t]he State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to
foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and development.

34. Nolledo, Jose N., The New Constitution of the Philippines Annotated, 1990 ed., p. 72.

35. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 1986 ed., p. 1656.

36. The guest list of the Manila Hotel includes Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the Duke of Windsor, President Richard Nixon of
U.S.A., Emperor Akihito of Japan, President Dwight Eisenhower of U.S.A., President Nguyen Van Thieu of Vietnam, President
Park Chung Hee of Korea, Prime Minister Richard Holt of Australia, Prime Minister Keith Holyoake of New Zealand, President
Lyndon Johnson of U.S.A., President Jose Lopez Portillo of Mexico, Princess Margaret of England, Prime Minister Malcolm
Fraser of Australia, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone of Japan, Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau of Canada, President
Raul Alfonsin of Argentina, President Felipe Gonzalez of Spain, Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita of Japan, Prime Minister
Hussain Muhammad Ershad of Bangladesh, Prime Minister Bob Hawke of Australia, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone of
Japan, Premier Li Peng of China, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah of Brunei, President Ramaswami Venkataraman of India, Prime
Minister Go Chok Tong of Singapore, Prime Minister Enrique Silva Cimma of Chile, Princess Chulaborn and Mahacharri
Sirindhorn of Thailand, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama of Japan, Sultan Azlan Shah and Raja Permaisuri Agong of
Malaysia, President Kim Young Sam of Korea, Princess Infanta Elena of Spain, President William Clinton of U.S.A., Prime
Minister Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia, King Juan Carlos I and Queen Sofia of Spain, President Carlos Saul Menem of
Argentina, Prime Ministers Chatichai Choonhavan and Prem Tinsulanonda of Thailand, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto of
Pakistan, President Vaclav Havel of Czech Republic, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf of U.S.A., President Ernesto Perez Balladares
of Panama, Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius of Lithuania, President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani of Iran, President Askar
Akayev of Kyrgyztan, President Ong Teng Cheong of Singapore, President Frei Ruiz Tagle of Chile, President Le Duc Anh of
Vietnam, and Prime Minister Julius Chan of Papua New Guinea, see Memorandum for Petitioner, pp. 16-19.

37. Authored by Beth Day Romulo.

38. See Note 9, pp. 15-16; Rollo, pp. 50-51.

39. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 3, 22 August 1986, p. 607.

40. Id., p. 612.

41. Id., p. 616.

42. Id., p. 606.

43. Nolledo, J.N., The New Constitution of the Philippines Annotated, 1990 ed., pp. 930-931.

44. Bidders were required to have at least one of the these qualifications to be able to participate in the bidding process; see
Note 2.

45. Memorandum of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., p. 6.

46. Id., pp. 3-4.

47. See Note 8.

48. Keynote Address at the ASEAN Regional Symposium on Enforcement of Industrial Property Rights held 23 October 1995
at New World Hotel, Makati City.

49. Speech of Senior Associate Justice Teodoro R. Padilla at the Induction of Officers and Directors of the PHILCONSA for
1996 held 16 January 1996 at the Sky-Top, Hotel Intercontinental, Makati City.

50. Memorandum of Authorities submitted by former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, p. 5.

51. 8 March 1996 issue of Philippine Daily Inquirer, p. B13.

PADILLA, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Article XII, Section 10, par. 2, 1987 Constitution

2. Padilla, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Volume III, p. 89.

3. Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 11th ed., p. 112

4. Nolledo, The New Constitution of the Philippines, Annotated, 1990 ed, p. 72.

5. Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 1.

6. Laurel, Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention (1934-1935), p. 507.

7. Id., p. 562.

VITUG, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Second par., Section 10, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.

MENDOZA, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Art. XII, Sec. 10, second paragraph.

2. GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES: SECOND PREQUALIFICATION AND PUBLIC BIDDING OF THE MHC
PRIVATIZATION (hereafter referred to as GUIDELINES), Part. V, par. H(4).

3. Id.

4. 83 Phil. 242 (1949).

5. RA. No. 37, sec. 1.

6. 87 Phil. 343 (1950)

7. 104 Phil. 302 (1958).

8. Id. at 309

9. For an excellent analysis of American cases on reverse discrimination in these areas, see GERALD GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 780-819 (1991).

10. Art 11, sec. 19: "The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos." (Emphasis added)

11. See Villegas v. Hiu Chiung Tsai Pao Ho, 86 SCRA 270 (1978) (invalidating an ordinance imposing a flat fee of P500 on
aliens for the privilege of earning a livelihood)

12. Petitioner passed the criteria set forth in the GUIDELINES, Part IV, par. F(4), of the GSIS relating to the
following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. Business management expertise, track record, and experience

b. Financial capability

c. Feasibility and acceptability of the proposed strategic plan for The Manila Hotel

13. GUIDELINES, Part V, par. C (1) (3) in relation to Part I.

14. Id., Part V, par. V (1).

PUNO, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Introduction and Highlights, Guidelines and Procedures: Second Pre-qualification and Public Bidding of the MHC
Privatization, Annex "A" to Petitioner’s Consolidated Reply to Comments of Respondents, Rollo, p. 142.

2. The four bidders who previously pre-qualified for the first bidding, namely, ITT Sheraton, Marriot International, Inc.,
Renaissance Hotel International, Inc., and the consortium of RCBC and the Ritz Carlton, were deemed prequalified for the
second bidding.

3. Annex "A" to the Consolidated Reply to Comments of Respondents, Rollo, pp. 140-155.

4. Former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando and Commissioner Joaquin Bernas were invited by the Court as amicus curiae to
shed light on its meaning.

5. Lopez v. de los Reyes, 55 Phil. 170, 190 [1930].

6. 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, Sec. 139 p. 510 [1979 ed.]; 6 R.C.L. Sec. 52 , p. 57[1915]; see also Willis v. St. Paul
Sanitation Co., 48 Minn. 140, 50 N.W. 1110, 31 A.J.R. 626, 16 L.R.A. 281 [1892]; State ex rel. Schneider v. Kennedy, 587 P.
2d 844, 225 Kan 13 [1978].

7. Willis v. St. Paul Sanitation, supra, at 1110-1111; see also Cooley, A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations 167, vol. 1
[1927].

8. 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sec. 48, p. 100.

9. Cooley, supra, at 171; 6 R.C.L. Sec. 53, pp. 57-58; Brice v. McDow, 116 S.C. 324, 108 S.E. 84, 87 [1921]; see also
Gonzales, Philippine Constitutional Law p. 26 [1969].

10. 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sec. 48, p. 101.

11. Way v. Barney, 116 Minn. 285, 133 N.W. 801, 804 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 648, Ann. Cas. 1913 A, 719 [1911]; Brice v. McDow,
supra, at 87; Morgan v. Board of Supervisors, 67 Ariz. 133, 192 P. 2d 236, 241 [1948]; Gonzales, supra.

12. Ninth Decennial Digest Part I, Constitutional Law, (Key No. 28), p. 1638.

13. Article III, Section 2; see Webb v. de Leon, 247 SCRA 652 [1995]; People v. Saycon, 236 SCRA 325 [1994]; Allado v.
Diokno, 232 SCRA 192 [1994]; Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 [1984]; Yee Sue Kuy v. Almeda, 70 Phil. 141 [1940];
Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689 [1938]; and a host of other cases.

14. Article III, Section 12, pars. 1 to 3; People v. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]; People v. Bandula, 232 SCRA 566 [1994];
People v. Nito, 228 SCRA 442 [1993]; People v. Duero, 104 SCRA 379 [1981]; People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465 [1985]; and a
host of other cases.

15. Article III, Section 14; People v. Digno, 250 SCRA 237 [1995]; People v. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676 [1995]; People v. Colcol,
219 SCRA [1993]; Borja v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 [1977]; People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59 [1971]; and a host of other cases.

16. Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 [1985]; Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663 [1968]; People v. Otadura, 86 Phil.
244 [1950]; Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 Phil. 485 [1937]; and a host of other cases.

17. Harley v. Schuylkill County, 476 F. Supp. 191, 195-196 [1979]; Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. St. 79, 56 Atl. 327, 99 A.S.R.
783, 63 L.R.A. 534 [1903]; see Ninth Decennial Digest Part I, Constitutional Law, (Key No. 28), pp. 1638-1639.

18. City of Chicago v. George F. Harding Collection, 217 N.E. 2d 381, 383, 70 Ill. App. 2d 254 [1966]; People v. Buellton Dev.
Co., 136 P. 2d 793, 796, 58 Cal. App. 2d 178 [1943]; Bordy v. State, 7 N.W. 2d 632, 635, 142 Neb. 714 [1943]; Cohen v. City
of Chicago, 36 N.E. 2d 220, 224, 377 Ill. 221 [1941].

19. 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, Sec. 143, p. 514; 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law, Sec. 48, p. 100; 6 R.C.L. Sec. 54, p. 59;
see also State ex rel. Noe v. Knop La. App. 190 So. 135, 142 [1939]; State ex rel. Walker v. Board of Comm’rs. for Educational
Lands and Funds, 3 N.W. 2d 196, 200, 141 Neb. 172 [1942]; Maddox v. Hunt, 83 P. 2d 553, 556, 83 Okl. 465 [1938].

20. Article II, Sections 11, 12 and 13 (Basco v. Phil. Amusements and Gaming Corporation, 197 SCRA 52, 68 [1991]); Sections
5, 12, 13 and 17 (Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 246 SCRA 540, 564 [1995]).

21. Article XIII, Section 13 (Basco, supra).

22. Article XIV, Section 2 (Basco, supra);

23. Kilosbayan v. Morato, supra, at 564.

24. Basco v. Phil. Amusements and Gaming Corporation, supra, at 68.

25. Congress had previously passed the Retail Trade Act (R.A. 1180); the Private Security Agency Act (R.A. 5487; the law on
engaging in the rice and corn industry (R.A. 3018, P.D. 194), etc.

26. Or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe.

27. Article XIV, section 3 of the 1973 Constitution reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 3. The Batasang Pambansa shall, upon recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority, reserve to
citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations wholly owned by such citizens, certain traditional areas of
investments when the national interest so dictates."cralaw virtua1aw library

28. 101 Phil. 1155 [1957].

29. See Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines 450, vol. II [1988]. The Lao Ichong case upheld the
Filipinization of the retail trade and implied that particular areas of business may be Filipinized without doing violence to the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.

30. Nolledo, The New Constitution of the Philippines, Annotated, 1990 ed., p. 72. The word "patrimony" first appeared in the
preamble of the 1935 Constitution and was understood to cover everything that belongs to the Filipino people, the tangible and
the material as well as the intangible and the spiritual assets and possessions of the nation (Sinco, Philippine Political Law,
Principles and Concepts [1962 ed.], p. 112; Speech of Delegate Conrado Benitez defending the draft preamble of the 1935
Constitution in Laurel, Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, vol. III, p. 325 [1966]).

31. Commissioned by the Manila Hotel Corporation for the Diamond Jubilee celebration of the Hotel in 1987; see The Manila
Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City.

32. Section 7 of R.A. 4846 provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Sec. 7. In the designation of a particular cultural property as a "national cultural treasure," the following procedure shall be
observed:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) Before the actual designation, the owner, if the property is privately owned, shall be notified at least fifteen days prior to the
intended designation, and he shall be invited to attend the deliberation and given a chance to be heard. Failure on the part of the
owner to attend the deliberation shall not bar the panel to render its decision. Decision shall be given by the panel within a week
after its deliberation. In the event that the owner desires to seek reconsideration of the designation made by the panel, he may do
so within thirty days from the date that the decision has been rendered. If no request for reconsideration is filed after this period,
the designation is then considered final and executory. Any request for reconsideration filed within thirty days and subsequently
again denied by the panel, may be further appealed to another panel chairmanned by the Secretary of Education with two
experts as members appointed by the Secretary of Education. Their decision shall final and binding.

(b) Within each kind or class of objects, only the rare and unique objects may be designated as "National Cultural Treasures."
The remainder, if any, shall be treated as cultural property.

x x x."cralaw virtua1aw library

33. P.D. 1146, Sec. 5; P.D. 1146, known as "The Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977" amended
Commonwealth Act No. 186, the "Government Service Insurance Act" of 1936.

34. Beronilla v. Government Service Insurance System, 36 SCRA 44, 53 [1970]; Social Security System Employees
Association v. Soriano, 7 SCRA 1016, 1023 [1963].

35. Id., Secs. 28 and 29.

36. Id., Sec. 30.

37. Constitution, Article IX (B), section 2 (1).

38. Constitution, Article IX (D), section 2 (1).

39. It is meet to note that our laws do not debar foreigners from engaging in the hotel business. Republic Act No. 7042, entitled
the "Foreign Investments Act of 1991" was enacted by Congress to "attract, promote and welcome . . . foreign investments . . .
in activities which significantly contribute to national industrialization and socio-economic development to the extent that
foreign investment is allowed by the Constitution and relevant laws." The law contains a list, called the Negative List,
specifying areas of economic activity where foreign participation is limited or prohibited. Areas of economic activity not
included in the Negative List are open to foreign participation up to one hundred per cent (Secs. 6 and 7). Foreigners now own
and run a great number of our five-star hotels.