People of the Philippines vs.

Bonifacio Baltazar
G.R. No. 129380, October 19, 2000
343 SCRA 685

FACTS:
Bonifacio Baltazar reported to the Barangay Captain that there was a foul odor coming from
one of the tombs in the cemetery. Acting on the report, the Tanods found a decomposing
body of a girl who had been missing.

Two years later, Baltazar was charged with murder for killing the victim. During the trial, the
prosecution presented a witness who testified that he passed by the victim and the accused
walking towards the cemetery in the afternoon immediately before the disappearance of the
victim. Another testified that the accused did not attend the burial of the victim.

Based on this circumstantial evidence, the trial court convicted the accused of murder.

ISSUE:
Was the conviction based on circumstantial evidence proper?

RULING:
No. The prosecution presented in evidence only one circumstance indirectly linking the
accused to the crime. For a conviction based on circumstantial evidence to prosper, the
prosecution must establish more than one circumstance indubitably linking the accused to
the commission of the crime. Likewise, the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proved and that the combination of all these circumstances must produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
For a conviction based on circumstantial evidence to stand, it is imperative that there be a
confluence of circumstances. These circumstances which are proved must constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused,
to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. In this case, the web of circumstances
adverted does not constitute an unbroken chain that would fairly lead to the conclusion that it
was accused-appellant who killed the victim.

People of the Philippines vs. Adoracion Sevilla y Joson @ Baby and Joel Gaspar y Cabral
G.R. No. 124077, September 05, 2000
339 SCRA 625

Violation: Section 8, Article II, Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659

FACTS:
The Provincial Officer of the Narcotics Command for the provinces of Aurora and Nueva
Ecija disseminated to his confidential agents a list of suspected drug dealers. Among those
in the list was Adoracion Sevilla who had a warrant for her arrest issued in Criminal Case
No. 1317 for violation of Presidential Decree No. 6425.

In the afternoon of September 15, 1995, the Provincial Officer of NARCOM was informed by
one of his confidential agents of the exact whereabouts of Sevilla. He immediately instructed
one of his men to verify from the Central Intelligence Service (CIS) if the warrant of arrest
issued in Criminal Case No. 1317 was still unserved. On being told that it was still unserved,
he then coordinated with the CIS to effect the arrest of Sevilla. A composite team of four
police officers from NARCOM and CIS was formed and proceeded to arrest Sevilla.

The police officers, who were in civilian clothes, were allowed inside the house by Sevilla
herself who was seated at the sala. After the police officers had introduced themselves and
stated their purpose, they conducted a search and allegedly saw a box containing four (4)
bricks of dried marijuana leaves and flowering tops. They arrested Sevilla and her male
companion, Julio Gaspar

During the trial, the testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution were conflicting such
that the first prosecution witness to take the stand categorically declared that he noticed
Gaspar ‘immediately and instinctively’ carted upstairs a medium-sized carton box when he
learned that they were officers of the law while the other witness later disclosed that it was
only upon receiving instructions from Sevilla that Gaspar carried the carton box upstairs.
They also had conflicting narration on the manner in which entrance was effected in the
house at Bantug Norte, how the warrant of arrest was served on Sevilla, the subsequent
events which happened when Sevilla and Gaspar were taken into custody by the PNP and
NARCOM officers and when and how the surveillance was undertaken on the person of
Sevilla.

ISSUES:

1. Was the search valid?

2. What is the effect if testimonial evidence were conflicting and inconsistent?
3. How should an accused be appraised of his constitutional right?

RULING
1. No. The search conducted by the agents was illegal. There was no probable cause for
conducting an extensive search in the house occupied by appellants. The truthfulness of the
facts in support of probable cause is doubtful and the Court is of the impression that the
search in question was not at all incidental to the lawful arrest of Sevilla but rather, pre-
planned. Therefore, any evidence obtained in the course thereof must be excluded.

2. Conflicting accounts and improbabilities cast doubt over the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses and veracity of their narrations. In People vs. Noay, the Court held that where the
testimonies of key witnesses cannot stand together, the inevitable conclusion is that one or
both must be telling a lie and their story a mere concoction

Moreover, where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations or interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused
and the other consistent with his guilt, the evidence does not meet or hurdle the test of moral
certainty required for conviction. Consequently, the acquittal of appellants is indicated.

3. It was found that the appellants were not clearly informed of their constitutional rights to
remain silent and to independent and competent counsel when they were arrested and
investigated in connection with the offense charged. Simply stating the rights to which the
arrestee is entitled to or reading the same to him did not suffice. Under the rulings of this
Court, the right to be informed of one’s right contemplates the “transmission of meaningful
information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle”. The right to be informed consists of no less than effective
communication which results in a full understanding of what is conveyed.

‘“At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of
the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest if any. He shall be
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement
he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means
by telephone if possible, or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the
arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any
person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or
by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be
valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the
procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence.’

People of the Philippines vs. Raga Sarapida Mamantak and Likad Sarapida Taurak
G.R. No. 174659, July 28, 2008
560 SCRA 298

FACTS:
A mother lost her two-year old son in Manila and recovered him after 16 months from the
two accused in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte. She reported him missing to the authorities and
even informed the public through tv and radio announcements but to no avail. Months after
the disappearance of her son, she received a call from a Muslim woman asking for P30,000
in exchange for her son who was in their custody in Mindanao. With the assistance of the
Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force, the two accused were arrested during the
pay off. One of the accused claimed that she was merely giving the boy refuge when she
took him under her care and the other accused stated that she was only at the pay off point
by coincidence and it was her first time seeing the boy.

ISSUE: Were the testimonies of the two accused credible?

RULING: No. The Court held that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself. The statements of the two accused
did not deserve credence. The factual findings of the trial court, including its assessment of
the credibility of the witnesses and the probative weight thereof, are accorded great, if not
conclusive, value when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

What is the essence of the crime of kidnapping?

It is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty coupled with the intent of the accused to
effect it. If the victim is a minor or if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the
purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention becomes inconsequential.
Elements of Kidnapping:

(1) the offender is a private individual; not either of the parents of the victim or a public officer
who has a duty under the law to detain a person;

(2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty;

(3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal and

(4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present:

(a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days;

(b) it is committed by simulating public authority;

(c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or
threats to kill him are made or

(d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public official.

What is ransom?

Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a
captured person that will release him from captivity. No specific form of ransom is required to
consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom as long as the ransom is intended as a
bargaining chip in exchange for the victim’s freedom. The amount of and purpose for the
ransom is immaterial.

Death Penalty Law

While the penalty for kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any
other person under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is death, RA 9346 has banned the
death penalty and reduced all death sentences to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole. Pursuant to this law, we reduce the penalty imposed on appellants from death to
reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.

Is the award of damages proper?

Yes. When the crime of kidnapping is attended by a demand for ransom, by way of example
or correction, an award for exemplary damages is proper.

G.R. No. 160328 February 04, 2005

TERESITA ALCANTARA VERGARA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review assails the March 28, 2003 decision1 of the Court of Appeals and its
September 30, 2003 resolution2 in CA-G.R. CR No. 25799, which affirmed in toto the June
10, 1992 decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 132, in Criminal Case No.
91-2267, finding petitioner Teresita Alcantara Vergara guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22).

The facts show that on June 13, 1988, Livelihood Corporation (LIVECOR) granted Perpetual
Garments Corporation (PERPETUAL) a continuing credit line in the amount of
P750,000.00.4 The parties agreed that for each availment from the line, PERPETUAL would
execute a promissory note and issue postdated checks corresponding to the amount of the
loan. Petitioner, in her capacity as Vice President and General Manager of PERPETUAL,
signed the credit agreement and all the postdated checks.

One of the checks issued and signed by petitioner was Check No. 019972 for P150,000.00.
When deposited on December 15, 1988, the check was dishonored for insuffiency of funds.5
On the same month, LIVECOR verbally informed petitioner of the dishonor of the check.

On April 1, 1991, LIVECOR charged petitioner with violation of BP 22. The information6
reads:

That on or about the 15th day of Dec. 1988, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make out or draw and issue to Livecor
and represented by Victor Hernandez[,] to apply on account or for value the dated check
described below:

Check No. :019972

Drawn Against :Metro Bank

In the amount of :P150,000.00

Date :Dec. 15, 1988

Payable to :LIVECOR

said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof, she did not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check
upon its presentment for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "DRAWN AGAINST
INSUFFICIENT FUNDS" and, despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the accused failed
to pay said payee the face amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment
thereof within five (5) banking days after receiving notice.

Contrary to law.
The prosecution claims that petitioner failed to pay the full amount of Check No. 019972 or
to make arrangements for its full payment within 5 days from notice of dishonor thereof in
December 1988. Although petitioner made cash and check payments after the dishonor, the
same were treated by LIVECOR as continuing payments of the outstanding loan. The
payments were applied first to the interests and penalties while the rest were applied to the
principal, pursuant to the terms of the agreement. As of February 29, 1992, PERPETUAL’s
total outstanding loan is P610,656.95.7

Petitioner averred that she cannot be charged with violation of BP 22 because she replaced
Check No. 019972 on May 25, 1989, with 6 checks, each for P25,000.00 or for the total
amount of P150,000.00.8 She claimed that from the time of dishonor up to March 1992,
PERPETUAL paid LIVECOR P542,000.00 thus covering the full amount of the dishonored
check.9

On June 10, 1992, the trial court rendered decision finding petitioner guilty of violating BP
22. It ruled, however, that petitioner is not civilly liable to LIVECOR, thus:

Premises considered, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of BP 22. Considering, however, that the borrower is Perpetual Garments
Corporation and there is no agreement that she shall be liable for the loan in her personal
capacity, she shall not be liable to pay the unpaid balance thereof.

WHEREFORE, the accused is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of P200,000.00 with

subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.10

Dissatisfied, both LIVECOR and petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.

On March 28, 2003, the appellate court dismissed the consolidated appeals and affirmed the
trial court’s decision in all respects. The dispositive portion thereof, reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant appeals are ordered DISMISSED, and the
appealed Decision dated June 10, 1992 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as
to costs.

SO ORDERED.11

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied on September 30, 2003.12 Hence, the
instant petition.

In a Resolution dated December 15, 2004, petitioner was required to file a Reply. However,
to date, no reply was filed. In the interest of justice and speedy disposition of cases, we
resolve to dispense with the filing of said Reply and to decide the case based on the
pleadings filed.
The issue for resolution in this petition for review is whether petitioner should be convicted of
violation of BP 22.

The Solicitor General contends that petitioner’s conviction is proper because all the elements
of violation of BP 22 are present. Petitioner, on the other hand, insists that the full payment
of the value of the dishonored check 2 years prior to the filing of the information justifies her
acquittal. Petitioner argues that her conviction is without basis since the total payments she
made from knowledge of the dishonor of the check in December 1988, up to the filing of the
information on April 1, 1991, far exceeds the value of the bounced check.

It is settled that factual findings of the trial court are accorded great weight, even finality on
appeal, except when it has failed to appreciate certain facts and circumstances which, if
taken into account, would materially affect the result of the case. This exception is present
here.13

In King v. People,14 we ruled thus:

Section 1 of BP 22 defines the offense as follows:

Section 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and issues
any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished
by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not
less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case
exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion
of the court.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who having sufficient funds with the
drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds
or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of
ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the
drawee bank.

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who
actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.

Accordingly, this Court has held that the elements of the crime are as follows:

1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value.

2. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit; or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
3. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient
funds in, or credit with, drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment.15

To hold petitioner liable for violation of BP 22, it is not enough that she issued the check that
was subsequently dishonored for insufficiency of funds. It must also be shown beyond
reasonable doubt that she knew of the insufficiency of funds at the time the check was
issued. Thus:

To hold a person liable under BP 22, it is not enough to establish that a check issued was
subsequently dishonored. It must be shown further that the person who issued the check
knew "at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment." Because this element
involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of the law creates a prima
facie presumption of such knowledge, as follows:

Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds.– The making, drawing and issuance of a
check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit
with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be
prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker
or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or make arrangements for
payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving
notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

In other words, the prima facie presumption arises when a check is issued. But the law also
provides that the presumption does not arise when the issuer pays the amount of the check
or makes arrangement for its payment "within five banking days after receiving notice that
such check has not been paid by the drawee." Verily, BP 22 gives the accused an
opportunity to satisfy the amount indicated in the check and thus avert prosecution.16
(Emphasis ours)

Going through the records of this case, we find that it was not clearly established when the
notice of dishonor was served on petitioner, thus:

Atty. De Jesus:

After you were informed by the bank that the check was dishonored due to insufficient funds,
what did you do next, if any?

Ms. Dalisay:

We informed our client about it and made several demands upon her to redeem the bounced
check.

Q. Did the accused make good the amount of the bounced check?

A. No.17
…

Q. After you were informed by the bank that the check bounced, what did you do next, if
any?

Atty. Arias:

That was already answered. She informed the accused …

Court:

She said the client was informed and demand was made. How were the demands made
upon the accused?

A. Verbally, Your Honor.

Court:

All verbal?

A: All verbal in the case of the subject check but written in the case of the entire loan.18

Even the petitioner was not sure as to when she was notified of the dishonor, thus:

Court:

You did not see the return notice of dishonor. So he was aware that the check was
dishonored. Alright. Prior to, about a week before October 10, 1990, did you ever learn
whether the check in the amount of P150,000.00 marked Exhibit D, was dishonored?

Accused:

Yes, Your Honor.

Court:

When for the first time did you learn that the check was dishonored?

A. When they informed me at my residence in Biñan, Your Honor.

Court:

When?

A. That was a long time ago, Your Honor. They just sent their employee to our house at
Biñan to inform me that my check bounced.

Court:
In what year?

A: That was a long time, Your Honor, maybe 1988.

Court:

You were informed of the dishonor of the check. In what month in 1988?

A. Maybe December 1988, Your Honor.19

To our mind, the above testimonies do not categorically prove exactly when petitioner
received the notice of dishonor. Hence, there was no way of determining when the 5-day
period prescribed in Section 2 of BP 22 would start and end.

In Danao v. Court of Appeals,20 we held that:

… if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the drawer, then the
presumption or prima facie evidence provided in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 cannot arise, since
there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day period.

In the present case, no proof of receipt by petitioner of any notice of non-payment of the
checks was ever presented during the trial. As found by the trial court itself, "(t)he evidence
however is not clear when Macasieb (private complainant) made the demands. There is no
proof of the date when DANAO received the demand letter (Exh. F)."

Obviously, in the instant case, there is no way of determining when the 5-day period
prescribed in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 would start and end. Thus, the presumption or prima
facie evidence of knowledge by the petitioner of the insufficiency of funds or credit at the
times she issued the checks did not arise.

Even assuming that petitioner was properly notified of the dishonor, still, the prima facie
presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds would not arise. Contrary to the claim of
LIVECOR, it appears that an arrangement for the payment of the bounced check was
entered into by the parties. Under the circumstances, we are more inclined to lend credence
to petitioner’s allegation that she replaced the bounced check with 6 checks, each for
P25,000.00, or a total of P150,000.00. For more than 2 years after the dishonor, LIVECOR
accepted the payments made by PERPETUAL without complain.

In addition, it appears that it has been the practice of LIVECOR to allow its client to "redeem"
the dishonored checks and replace them with new ones. Thus:

Atty. Arias:

And it is a matter of procedure in you office, Madam Witness …

Court:
For a while, is that check different from Exhibit F?

Atty. Arias:

The same, Your Honor.

Q: And as a matter of fact, your practice is that whenever payments are made in check or
checks and if these checks bounced, you first send the letter to redeem or to replace those
bounced checks, is that correct?

Ms. Dalisay:

Yes.

Q: And you did that also, when the check of the accused in the amount of P150,000.00
bounced, you sent her a letter to redeem or replace the check, is that not correct?

A: I don’t remember about the P150,000.00. I don’t remember sending her a letter.

Q: But it is a matter of practice that you …

Court:

That has been answered.21

Atty. Arias:

However, your Honor, we want also to establish the fact that whenever a check bounced,
they always asked for replacement or redemption of the check.

Court:

She already admitted that that is a matter of policy.22

The presumption that the issuer has knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is brought into
existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received notice of dishonor and that
within 5 banking days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to
make arrangement for its payment.23 The prosecution is burdened to prove these acts that
give rise to the prima facie presumption.24

Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is
doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses.
The equipoise rule finds application if, as in this case, the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does
not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly
stated, the needed quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is found
lacking.25

In the case at bar, the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of
petitioner considering that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving the
evidentiary facts that would establish the prima facie presumption of knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds. In criminal cases, the prosecution’s cases must rise and fall on the
strength of its own evidence, never on the weakness of the defense.26

Finally, there is no merit in prosecution’s claim that even if the 6 checks be considered
replacement of the dishonored check, petitioner should still be held liable because they did
not cover the entire amount of the dishonored check as 1 of the 6 checks for P25,000.00
also bounced for insufficiency of funds. Note that the replacement check for P25,000.00 was
dishonored in July 1989 but LIVECOR notified PERPETUAL of the dishonor only after 3
years or on March 10, 1992. Petitioner could not thus be blamed for failing to make good
said check due to the negligence of LIVECOR. At any rate, even if the P25,000.00
dishonored check be excluded from the P423,365.00 payments made by petitioner, the
remaining balance thereof is still more than the P150,000.00 dishonored check subject of the
instant case.

In Magno v. Court of Appeals,27 it was held that Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 or the Bouncing
Checks Law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate
public checking account user. It was not intended to shelter or favor nor encourage users of
the system to enrich themselves through the manipulation and circumvention of the noble
purpose and objectives of the law. Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in
criminal law affirms that the primary function of punishment is the protection of the society
against actual and potential wrong doers.

In the case at bar, petitioner could hardly be classified as a menace against whom the
society should be protected. The records show that from December 1988 when petitioner
was informed of the dishonor, to the filing of the information on April 1, 1991, she paid
P423,354.00 to LIVECOR.28 Although petitioner has not yet fully paid the loan, it cannot be
denied that the previous payments fully covered the value of the dishonored check. It would
be unjust to penalize her for the issuance of said check which has been satisfied 2 years
prior to the filing of the criminal charge against her.

Similarly, in gr_ Griffith v. Court of Appeals,29 the conviction of the accused for violation of
BP 22 was found to be unjustified because the case was filed 2 years after private
complainant had collected more than the value of the dishonored check. In acquitting the
accused, we held that there exists no more reason to penalize him for the offense charged,
thus:

While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is the
issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment, we
should not apply penal laws mechanically. We must find if the application of the law is
consistent with the purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex.
(When the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter alone but the spirit
of the law also that gives it life. This is especially so in this case where a debtor’s
criminalization would not serve the ends of justice but in fact subvert it. The creditor having
collected already more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for payment
of rentals, via auction sale, we find that holding the debtor’s president to answer for a
criminal offense under B.P. 22 two years after said collection is no longer tenable nor
justified by law or equitable considerations.

In sum, considering that the money value of the two checks issued by petitioner has already
been effectively paid two years before the informations against him were filed, we find merit
in this petition. We hold that petitioner herein could not be validly and justly convicted or
sentenced for violation of B.P. 22. Whether the number of checks issued determines the
number of violations of B.P. 22, or whether there should be a distinction between postdated
and other kinds of checks need no longer detain us for being immaterial now to the
determination of the issue of guilt or innocence of petitioner.30

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals dated March 28, 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No. 25799 which affirmed in toto the
June 10, 1992 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 132, in Criminal Case
No. 91-2267, and its September 30, 2003 resolution denying reconsideration thereof, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Teresita Alcantara Vergara is ACQUITTED of the
charge of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 91869

CRUZ, J.:

The subject of this dispute is a 786 sq. m. lot situated in Valencia, Negros Oriental. It has
been occupied since the last World War by both the petitioners and the private respondents,
who now mutually assert adverse claims of exclusive ownership over the property.

The petitioners built their house near the center of the lot while the private respondents built
their house near the western boundary. Both parties made tax payments on the lot in the
name of Alfonsa Ohoy and caused separate surveys to be made on the land.

The petitioners claim the land by virtue of separate sales made by the original owners,
namely, Alfonsa Ohoy, Luciana Ohoy, Porfirio Ohoy and Maria Ohoy, to Candida Favor,
Ceriaco Abiera, Josefa Abiera, and Roberto (or Edilberto) Abiera, the petitioners'
predecessors-in-interest.

For their part, the private respondents claim the same land by inheritance from their mother,
Alfonsa Ohoy, who had in turn acquired it from her mother after the land had been
partitioned among her children.

Both the petitioners and the private respondents say they have occupied and farmed the
disputed land without objection from each other. The petitioners aver that it was they who
gave permission to Calixto Tingcay to build his house on the land after World War II. The
private respondents contend that it was they who gave permission to petitioner Marcelina
Sapu-an to build her house on the land, also after World War II.

In 1962, the petitioners allegedly demolished their old house and began constructing a
bigger one over the private respondent's objections. When their protests were ignored, the
private respondents sued the petitioners for the recovery of the land, with damages.

At the trial, the plaintiffs presented four witnesses, among them Zacarias Villegas, who
testified that his mother, Maria Ohoy, did not own any share in the disputed lot and that it
belonged exclusively to Alfonsa. He also said that he lived with the Tingcays for some time
and that it was really Marcelina Sapu-an who requested permission to live on the land.[1]

They also submitted in evidence (1) tax declarations in the name of Alfonsa Ohoy from 1906
to 1949 and in the name of Calixto Tingcay for 1962; (2) receipts of tax payments made by
them for the period from 1953 to 1979; (3) two private documents dated December 15, 1964,
and March 18, 1947, respectively, evidencing the sale of coconut trees planted thereon, to
third persons; (4) a sworn statement on the current and fair value of the real property; and
(5) a survey of the land made by a geodetic engineer.[2]

The defendants, for their part, presented two witnesses, Josefa Abiera, sister-in-law of
Marcelina Sapu-an, and Ester Abiera Solamillo, one of the petitioners.

Josefa Abiera testified that she witnessed the execution and signing of the deed of sale
disposing of Alfonsa's and Porfirio's shares in the land, on April 2, 1943, for a consideration
of P25.00. Luciana Ohoy also sold her shares in the land to Josefa's parents before the war
broke out. Josefa was already thirty years old at the time this earlier sale took place. She
further declared that Atilano sold Maria Ohoy's share to her and Edilberto Abiera for P5.00
during the evacuation of Valencia.[3]

Ester Solamillo testified that her grandparents, Candida Favor and Ceriaco Abiera, her father
Roberto, and her aunt Josefa, purchased the disputed land in separate transactions with
Luciana, Alfonsa and Porfirio Ohoy, and Maria Ohoy, through her son Atilano. She also said
that the defendants were the ones who introduced the improvements on the land and
enjoyed its fruits. Sometime in 1950, her father, Roberto Abiera, sought the cancellation of
the name of Alfonsa Ohoy in the tax declaration and the entry of their names therein, but the
treasurer's office deferred action, pending the submission of supporting papers.[4]

The defendants also presented (1) two private deeds of sale in their favor; (2) receipts of tax
payments on the land by Teopista and Ester Abiera; and (3) a survey contract of the land
prepared by a surveyor.[5]

After considering the testimonial and documentary evidence of the parties, the trial court[6]
disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants, declaring the plaintiffs as the absolute owners of the
land in question described in paragraph 4 of the Complaint, original and amended, and
ordering the defendants to leave and vacate the property in question within thirty days upon
the finality of this decision.
On appeal, the decision was affirmed by the respondent court.[7] The petitioners then filed a
motion for reconsideration, raising therein the sole issue of prescription of the private
respondents' cause of action. This motion was denied by the appellate court, prompting this
petition.

The petitioners now invoke three grounds for the allowance of the petition.

First, they contend that the respondent court failed or refused to apply to this case the
"equiponderance of evidence" rule, which states:

When the scale shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which
shall incline it to one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant.[8]
Under this principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the
weakness of the defendant's claim. Even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than
that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on his side if such evidence is
insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action.[9]

The petitioners' point is that on the whole, their evidence should be given more credence
than that of the respondents.

The general rule in civil cases is that the party having the burden of proof must establish his
case by a preponderance of evidence. By "preponderance of evidence" is meant that the
evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other.[10]

In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues

involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the
witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing
the facts on which they are testifying, the nature of such facts, the probability or improbability
of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility as far
as the same may legitimately appear at the trial. The court may also consider the number of
witnesses, although the preponderance is not necessarily with the greatest number.[11]

It is settled that matters of credibility are addressed basically to the trial judge who is in a
better position than the appellate court to appreciate the weight and evidentiary value of the
testimonies of witnesses who have personally appeared before him.

Significantly, both the trial court and the respondent court found the credibility of Josefa
Abiera to be highly questionable. As the respondent court observed:

Appellants argue that the nullity of the said deed was not sufficiently established by the
appellees nor had the testimony of Josefa Abiera as to the due execution of the same been
properly impeached. A re-examination of the records of this case strengthens the opinion of
this Court that the testimony of Josefa Abiera as to the fact of sale of the alleged shares of
Porfirio and Alfonsa Ohoy over the subject lot and the due execution of the purported
document evidencing the said sale cannot be given full credence. Not only had the testimony
of the said witness been successfully impeached by the appellees as regards the alleged
sale of the shares of Luciana and Maria Ohoy over the subject lot by a proper showing that
Luciana could not have sold her alleged share in 1936 as testified to by Josefa Abiera (pp.
41-42; t.s.n., May 13, 1982, hearing) because Luciana died in 1921 as evidenced by her
death certificate and that Josefa's testimony to the effect that Maria Ohoy's son, Atilano
Villegas sold Maria's share over the said lot during the war was belied by the uncontroverted
evidence for the appellees that Atilano migrated to Dipolog, Mindanao, during the war and
that the circumstances under which the sale was allegedly perfected rendered Josefa's
testimony highly improbable; e.g. she never met Atilano before the alleged sale took place,
no written authority to sell from Maria Ohoy was presented by the man who introduced
himself as Atilano Villegas and most importantly, all their neighbors evacuated to another
place in the morning of the day when the alleged sale took place for fear of the Japanese
forces who were headed their place but Josefa and Roberto Abiera, the only ones left in the
place, still found time in the afternoon of that day to perfect a contract of sale with a
complete stranger; the unquestionable and substantial interest of Josefa Abiera over the
subject lot as co-owner thereof had also been shown by the appellees as follows:
"ATTY. BRIONES:
Q. Mrs. Abiera, when you last declared in this case on July 25, 1977, and in the latter part of
your testimony, you told the Honorable Court that the property in question is owned in
common between you and your brothers Roberto, Teopisto and Pablo, all surnamed Abiera.
Now, how much of the entire property is owned between you and your aforesaid brother
Roberto, Pablo and Teopisto?
WITNESS:
A. 778 square meters.
Q. I am not asking you on specific figures. I am asking you on the proportion how much of
the entire property is owned by you only including your brothers Roberto, Teopisto and
Pablo?
A. Three-fourths for the four of us.
Q. All right, now, the remaining one-fourth (1/4), who owns the same?
A. Maria Ohoy.
Q. How about ... What happened to that share of Maria Ohoy?
A. It was sold.
Q. Sold to whom?
A. It was sold to me and with my brother Roberto.
Q. Which sale was evidenced by Exhibit "5" of this case, the document executed by Atilano
Villegas?
A. Yes, sir."
In view of Josefa Abiera's dubious credibility and her inclination in favor of the cause for the
appellants, the uncorroborated testimony of Josefa Abiera cannot lend validity to the
purported deed of sale. (p. 13, t.s.n., May 13, 1982, hearing)
It is true that the genuineness and due execution of the two deeds of sale presented in
evidence by the petitioners were not denied by the private respondents under oath, and that
under Rule 8, Section 8, of the Rules of Court, the "genuineness and due execution of the
instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically
denies them." However, this rule applies only to the parties to the document and not, in the
case at bar, to the private respondents. The reason is that they were not parties to the deeds
of sale but merely the heirs of the alleged vendors.
It follows that the unauthenticated deeds of sale cannot serve as valid bases for the
petitioners' claim of ownership over the land in question.

This Court has held that a mere tax declaration or a tax assessment, such as the one
presented by the respondents, does not by itself give title and is of little value in proving
one's ownership.[12] It must be noted, nevertheless, that the conclusion of the respondent
court was not premised on such declarations alone for, as it correctly held:

Moreover, the acts of ownership exercised by the appellees over the subject lot such as the
selling of a number of trees to third parties with right of repurchase without objection from the
appellants is very strong evidence in appellee's favor that they indeed are the owners of the
subject lot and possessed it as such.
The petitioners also submit, as their second and third grounds, that the complaint is bound
by the principle of acquisitive prescription and the statute of limitations.

Their contention is that their evidence shows they possessed the subject land in good faith
and with just title and they consequently validly acquired the disputed lot pursuant to Article
1134 of the Civil Code, providing as follows:

Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary
prescription through possession of ten years.
The said period of ten years must, so they maintain, be counted at the earliest from April 2,
1943, when Exh. "4" was executed, or at the latest from the year 1946, when they
commenced possession of the lot in question. Since then and up to the filing of the complaint
by the private respondents on November 20, 1964, a period of at least eighteen years had
elapsed, making the action definitely tardy under the statute of limitations.

The respondent court held that the petitioners' failure to raise the defense of prescription of
the respondents' cause of action precluded them from raising it for the first time on appeal.
Demurring, the petitioners agree that this issue was raised in their answer to the complaint
when they alleged:

2. That from the time this parcel of land was acquired by the predecessors-in-interest of the
defendants, their possession over the same which was continued by the latter, was
continuous, public, peaceful, and in the concept of owner, until this unwarranted civil action
by plaintiffs disturbed their lawful possession.
They also invoke Gicano v. Gegato,[13] where the Court observed that:

What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive
period, be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the
averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence.
The petitioners seem to have confused the terms "acquisitive prescription" and "extinctive
prescription." These concepts are distinguishable as follows:

Adverse possession of real property for the requisite period confers title as effectually as any
paper title, with the exception that such a title cannot be acquired as against a title registered
under the provisions of the Land Registration Act. The statute of limitations is merely a bar to
a right of action and does not operate as a transfer of title at all. The statute of limitations is,
therefore, new matter, which must be specially pleaded.[14]
Ordinary acquisitive prescription is governed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, quoted
above. It requires possession of things in good faith and with just title during the time fixed
by law. The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person
from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof and could transmit his ownership.
For the purpose of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into
possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of
ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any
right. It is well-settled that possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right,
must be adverse and under a claim of title. Possession by license or mere tolerance does
not give rise to acquisitive prescription.

The above requirements have not been satisfactorily met by the petitioners. They could not
have possessed the land in good faith and with just title because as aptly observed by the
respondent court:

A scrupulous examination of the evidence presented by the parties would show that the
plaintiffs and their mother Alfonsa Ohoy have actually resided in the land in question in the
house of Alfonsa Ohoy. That Alfonsa Ohoy had a house in the land in question as early as
1906 is shown by Tax Declaration No. 2824 (Exh. "A" and "16"). At the back side or page 2
of the said tax declaration under the heading "Building and Other Structures" the entry, "Una
casa caña y nipa" valued at P5.00. Plaintiffs' evidence shows that plaintiffs lived with their
mother in the land in question since birth until they evacuated to the mountains during the
Second World War; that after the war they returned to the land in question. The fact that
plaintiffs have a house in the land in question is admitted by defendant Ester Abiera. Thus, in
her testimony on direct examination by their counsel, Ester Abiera unguardedly blurted out
that the plaintiffs have a house in the lot in question even if the question asked was with
respect to the defendants' having a house in the said lot.
The petitioners' contention that the private respondents' cause of action has already
prescribed is also untenable. Actions for the recovery of land are real actions. Extinctive
prescription of such kind of actions is governed by Article 1141 which provides that:

Art. 1141. - Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years. (Emphasis supplied)
The private respondents' submission that their cause of action arose in 1960, when they
objected to the expansion being made by the petitioners, is immaterial. As of now, the 30-
year prescriptive period has not yet expired.

Moreover, what the petitioners alleged, in their answer was not prescription of the plaintiffs'
cause of action but their own alleged ownership over the lot in question by virtue of
acquisitive prescription. That claim was rejected by the respondent court when it recognized
the private respondents as the real owners of the land.

We find that this case turns mainly on questions of fact, which have been correctly
appreciated by both the trial court and respondent court. Their conclusions in favor of the
private respondents are based on the evidence of record and there is no reason for this
Court to reverse or modify them. Absent a convincing showing that the challenged decision
was reached arbitrarily or in disregard of such evidence, our clear and only duty on appeal is
to uphold the courts below. We so affirm.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.

Expertravel and Tours, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals and Korean Airlines
G.R. No. 152392, May 26, 2005

FACTS:

Korean Airlines (KAL), a foreign corporation filed a collection suit against Expertravel and
Tours, Inc. (ETI) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila through its appointed
counsel, Atty. Mario Aguinaldo. He signed and indicated in the attached verification and
certification against forum shopping that he was the resident agent and legal counsel of KAL
and he caused the preparation of the complaint.

ETI filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Atty. Aguinaldo was not
authorized to execute the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping. The motion was
opposed by KAL and Atty. Aguinaldo claimed that he had been authorized to file the
complaint through a resolution of the KAL Board of Directors approved during a special
meeting conducted through a special teleconference. However, he failed to submit a copy of
the said resolution.

ISSUE:

Evidence – Was it proper for the court to take judicial notice of the said teleconference?

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that in this age of modern technology, the courts may take
judicial notice that business transactions may be made by individuals through
teleconferencing. Teleconferencing is interactive group communication (three or more
people in two or more locations) through an electronic medium. In general terms,
teleconferencing can bring people together under one roof even though they are separated
by hundreds of miles. Teleconferencing and videoconferencing of members of board of
directors of private corporations is commonly used in the Philippines to conduct business
transactions or corporate governance.

Judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and
general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The
principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of
notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public
records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not
subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting
to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.
Things of “common knowledge,” of which courts take judicial matters coming to the
knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be
matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and
unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be
found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided,
they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded
as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of
man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as
being matters of common knowledge. Teleconferencing is considered a matter of common
knowledge.

G.R. No. 130683 May 31, 2000

ELIGIO MADRID, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals affirming the
conviction by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Aparri, Cagayan, of petitioner Eligio
Madrid2 and his co-accused Arsenio Sunido of the crime of homicide, for the killing on May
21, 1992 of Angel Sunido in Buguey, Cagayan.

The information against them charged —

That on or about May 21, 1992, in the municipality of Buguey, province of Cagayan, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Arsenio Sunido y Silos and
Eligio (Melencio) Madrid, armed with a sharp pointed instrument, conspiring together and
helping each other, with intent to kill did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab one Angel Sunido and inflicting upon hi[m] stab wounds on his body
which caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned on October 6, 1992, petitioner and Arsenio Sunido pleaded "not guilty" to
the crime charged,3 whereupon trial ensued. The prosecution presented three witnesses,
namely: Remedios Sunido, wife of the victim; Merdelyn Sunido, the victim's daughter; and
Dr. Teddy Unida, medico-legal examiner.

Remedios Sunido adopted as her testimony on direct examination, the affidavit executed by
her at the Buguey Police Station on June 1, 1992. In said affidavit, she narrated that Arsenio
and Angel Sunido were brothers who, previous to May 21, 1992, had a quarrel over a
fighting cock which Arsenio claimed was his. At around 12 noon of May 21, 1992, Angel
Sunido and Jerry Escobar had drinks in the former's house. Under the influence of alcohol,
Angel provoked a fight with Arsenio. As a result, as Angel was walking back to his house
after taking Escobar home, he was stopped by Arsenio and two companions, one of whom
was petitioner. Arsenio's companions held Angel by the arms as Arsenio stabbed him
several times on different parts of the body. Arsenio and his companions afterwards fled
using petitioner's tricycle.4

Remedios Sunido was cross-examined on the basis of her affidavit. She testified that
Arsenio did not pass by their house on May 21, 1992. On further questioning, however, she
testified that Arsenio came to their house at around seven o'clock in the morning of that day
as Angel and some friends were having drinks. It was during that visit that Angel provoked a
quarrel with Arsenio concerning the fighting cock.5 On re-direct examination, it was
stipulated that the family of Angel incurred P4,000.00 as expenses for his death.6

Merdelyn Sunido also executed an affidavit before the police on June 2, 1992.7 She stated
that her father, her uncle Arsenio, and some visitors were drinking in their house on May 21,
1992. The brothers quarrelled over a fighting cock which she claimed Arsenio took from their
yard. Angel then accompanied Jerry Escobar to his home. Because of the bad blood
between the brothers, on his way back from Escobar's house, Angel was attacked by
Arsenio Sunido, with the help of petitioner and an unidentified man, and stabbed Angel to
death.8 On the witness stand, Merdelyn testified that at around noon of May 21, 1992, her
father Angel and the latter's friends, Jerry Escobar and a certain Rudy, were in their house
having drinks.9 At 12 noon, Angel took Jerry Escobar home. Either on the way to or back
from Escobar's house, Angel was stopped by Arsenio Sunido who was with petitioner and
another person. Petitioner and his companion held Angel's hands, raising them upwards,
with petitioner holding him by the right hand, while his companion held Angel by the left
hand. And then, Arsenio started attacking Angel with a knife. After seriously wounding
Arsenio, the three fled. Merdelyn said she witnessed the incident because she was just
approximately five meters away from the place where it happened. 10

The other witness for the prosecution was Dr. Teddy A. Unida, municipal health officer of
Buguey, who conducted the autopsy on the body of Angel Sunido. His findings were
embodied in a medical certificate, 11 which showed the following wounds suffered by Angel
Sunido:

DIAGNOSIS:

1. Incised wound — 6 cm. in length — 1 cm. deep, located at the left temporal region.

2. Stab wound — 3 cm. in length, 8 cm. deep, located at right anterior lower thorax.

3. Stab wound — 4 cm. in length — 6 cm. deep, located at right anterior lower thorax.
Direction — Antero-posterior.

4. Stab wound — 3 cm. in length — 6 cm. deep, located at left anterior lower thorax.
Direction — Antero-posterior.

5. Stab wound — 6 cm. in length — 6 cm. deep, located at the right upper [quadrant] of the
abdomen-anterior. Direction — Antero-posterior.
6. Stab wound — 3 cm. in length — 6 cm. deep, located at left upper [quadrant] of the
abdomen-anterior. Direction — Antero-posterior.

7. Stab wound — 1 1/2 cm. in length — 3 cm. deep, located at the right side of the
abdomen-lateral. Direction — Right to left.

8. Stab wound — 2 1/2 cm. — 5 cm. deep, located at left lower [quadrant] of the abdomen.
Direction — Antero caudal.

9. Stab wound — 2 cm. in length — 8 cm. deep, located at the left side of the abdomen-
lateral. Direction — Left to right.

Dr. Unida testified that based on these wounds, it could be concluded that the assailant was
in front of the victim and that he used a sharp-edged instrument, like a bolo with a pointed
tip, in killing the latter. It is possible that either the assailant and the victim were in a standing
position facing each other or the victim was lying on the ground with his face upwards. Stab
wound nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 were fatal injuries causing the victim's death in the absence
of medical attendance. As to how many assailants were responsible for the wounds, he said
that judging from the variance in the size and shape of the wounds, it was possible that there
was more than one assailant or that more than one weapon was used. However, Dr. Unida
stressed that there was no certainty as to this because the elasticity of the skin makes it
difficult to conclude exactly what type of instrument was used on the basis of the length of
the stab wounds alone. 12

On the other hand, the defense presented as witnesses Jerry Escobar, 1 petitioner, Arsenio
Sunido and Alipio Valdez.

Jerry Escobar was the person who, according to the wife and daughter of the victim, the
latter took home after having drinks in their house. Jerry testified that he dropped by the
house of Angel Sunido between six and seven o'clock in the morning of May 21, 1992, on
his way to buy chicken feeds. According to Jerry, he and Angel had drinks until 12 o'clock
noon with another persons whom Angel introduced as guests from the Ilocos province. At
around 10 o'clock in the morning, Arsenio Sunido and petitioner arrived in Arsenio's house in
a Tamaraw vehicle. Angel's house was located behind that of Arsenio, approximately 10
meters away. Upon seeing his brother and his companion, Angel provoked Arsenio to a fight
over a fighting cock which Angel claimed belonged to him. He drew a line on the ground with
his knife as he continued to provoke Arsenio. The two brothers then grappled with each
other and fell to the ground. Arsenio was able to land on top of Angel and from this vantage
point was able to wrest the knife with which he stabbed Angel several times. Jerry said he
then ran away. Petitioner was near the Tamaraw vehicle at the time of the incident. Jerry
denied Remedios Sunido's claim that Angel accompanied him (Jerry) to his house. He said
Angel was too drunk to have done so. He further belied Remedios' claim that petitioner held
Angel by the arm while Arsenio stabbed Angel. Jerry said that he was bothered in his
conscience by allegations of other witnesses that Angel took him home. 14 When cross-
examined, Jerry clarified that neither Arsenio nor petitioner drank liquor with them. He only
saw Arsenio and petitioner at around 10 o'clock in the morning when they went to Arsenio's
house on their way to haul palay. It was then that Angel challenged Arsenio to a fight as
Angel took out his knife. Several people witnessed the fight between the two brothers, but no
one intervened because of fear. Jerry further clarified that petitioner ran to the Tamaraw
vehicle when the brothers started fighting. Jerry said that he did not report what he
witnessed to anyone because he was not directly involved in the case. But he decided to
testify and relate what he witnessed as his conscience bothered him. 15

Petitioner testified next. He said he was a businessman with seven children, all of whom
finished college. His business consisted of three rice mills, one located in Maddalero and two
in Cabanbunan, Gonzaga. The manager of the Maddalero rice mill was Arsenio Sunido. On
May 21, 1992, at around 10 o'clock in the morning, Arsenio informed him that they needed to
buy palay, for which reason they got into his Tamaraw jeep, with Arsenio driving. They
proceeded to Arsenio's house in Maddalero. Arsenio parked the vehicle in front of his house.
When Arsenio alighted from the vehicle, Angel ran towards him with a knife. When he saw
this, petitioner said he ran away from the scene and toward the farm. While in hiding, he
heard the brothers arguing. Petitioner denied that he held Angel's hands as Arsenio stabbed
Angel. 16 During cross-examination, petitioner explained that he only knew Angel as the
brother of Arsenio. He reiterated that he ran away because he was frightened by the sight of
the knife. He never saw what happened to the brothers. Nor did he inquire about the
incident. He just heard from other people what had happened since he did not return to
Maddalero until a month later. 17

The other defense witness was Arsenio Sunido, who testified that he managed the rice mill
of petitioner in Maddalero, Buguey, Cagayan. On May 21, 1992, at around 10 o'clock in the
morning, he left his house to see petitioner. He noticed several persons, including Angel,
drinking gin in the yard outside the latter's house. Angel saw him and began challenging him
to a fight. It appears that Arsenio had lost a fighting cock about two weeks before. He
claimed that the fighting cock in Angel's yard belonged to him. Despite provocation from his
brother, Arsenio simply went about his way and left the house to fetch petitioner in Gonzaga,
Cagayan where the latter was residing. Upon arriving in petitioner's house, Arsenio informed
him that they needed money to buy palay. For this reason, petitioner dispatched his
Tamaraw jeepney and accompanied Arsenio to Sta. Teresita where they bought palay. They
then proceeded to Arsenio's house in Maddalero, arriving there at around 11 to 12 o'clock
noon. They were met by Angel Sunido who was drunk. Armed with a knife, Angel rushed
towards Arsenio with intent to kill the latter, saying "I will kill you now." When Angel was
around two meters away from him, Arsenio alighted from the vehicle and charged toward
Angel.

On cross-examination, Arsenio testified that he did not see petitioner anymore during the
incident because the latter ran away. After alighting from the Tamaraw, Arsenio slipped and
fell. A struggle ensued and Arsenio was able to wrest the knife away from Angel. Arsenio
then stabbed Angel several times. When he realized what he did, Arsenio dropped the knife,
wanting to embrace his dead brother for he never really intended to kill him. He immediately
surrendered to Alipio Valdez, the vice mayor, who brought him to the police precinct of
Buguey. 18 On further cross-examination, Arsenio explained that the misunderstanding
between him and his brother arose out of a fighting cock then in Angel's possession. He
claimed that the fighting cock, a breeder, was his but he no longer paid any attention to his
brother's claim, being aware of the latter's temperament. However, on the date in question,
Angel challenged him to a fight as he was leaving his house. When Arsenio returned to his
house, together with petitioner, Angel met them and threatened to kill Arsenio as the latter
was about to alight from the vehicle. With his back against the Tamaraw jeepney, Arsenio
lost his balance and fell down. Angel jumped on him. After taking the knife away from his
brother, Arsenio stabbed Angel. Angel ran towards a mango tree and died there. Arsenio
then went to Vice Mayor Valdez' house and told Valdez that he stabbed his brother. Upon
request of Arsenio, Vice Mayor Valdez accompanied him to the police station. On re-direct
examination, Arsenio reiterated that his brother was an ex-convict, having been convicted of
rape with homicide. He, on the other hand, had never been charged of any crime before the
present case. 19

Alipio Valdez, vice mayor of Buguey, Cagayan, testified that Arsenio went to his house on
May 21, 1992, informing him that he stabbed someone. Since Arsenio was willing to
surrender himself to the proper authorities, hence, Vice Mayor Valdez accompanied him to
the Buguey Police Department. 20 When cross-examined, Valdez repeated that Arsenio
asked for his protection and, thus, he personally accompanied him to the police station. 21

For purposes of rebuttal, Remedios Sunido denied Arsenio's claim that the knife used in
killing Angel belonged to the latter. She explained that it could not have been her husband's
knife because Angel did not carry a knife when he accompanied Jerry home. 22

After trial, the lower court rendered a decision convicting Arsenio Sunido and Eligio Madrid
of the crime of homicide. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of homicide, the penalty for which is reclusion temporal (Art. 249, Revised Penal
Code) attended by evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and availment of
means to weaken the defense (Art. 14, pars. 13 and 15, R.P.C.). There is more than ample
evidence to establish conspiracy. Therefore, the act of one is the act of all (People v.
Noguero, Jr., 218 SCRA 85, 96). The accused are hereby sentenced to serve imprisonment
of nineteen (19) years; seven (7) months; and nine (9) days to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal maximum, including all its accessory, penalties. They are further directed to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased jointly and severally P50,000.00 for the latter's death;
P25,000.00 for moral damages; and P50,000.00 for exemplary damages, there being more
than one aggravating circumstance and considering the manner the crime was committed, to
serve as deterrent to others, with prejudice to the grant of parole or pardon.

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED. 2

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a decision, dated September 17,
1997, affirming the trial court's decision, subject to modifications, viz.:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the
following modification:

1. The accused-appellant Arsenio Sunido is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of

six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender appreciated in his favor thus offsetting the aggravating
circumstance of use of superior strength; and

2. The accused-appellant Madrid is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum with the aggravating
circumstance of the use of superior strength considered against him.

The appealed decision is AFFIRMED in all other aspects.

SO ORDERED. 24

Petitioner assigns the following issues in his petition:

1. Did the Cagayan RTC bolt so far from SC bearings

(a) in not satisfying the constitutional standard of clear and distinct articulation of the facts
and law in trial court decision writing?

(b) in not correctly interpreting Sec. 1, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence by saying
it heard the prosecution witnesses' testimonies even when all the prosecution offered for
Remedios and Merdelyn's direct examination were their affidavits and in setting aside the
requirement of oral testimony for direct examination (which, unlike affidavits, gives occasion
for judicial observation of witness deportment?

(a) in failing to apply the SC's time gap test?

(b) in disregarding the SC's natural tendency rule?

(c) in glossing over the SC's unacceptable identification test?

(d) in ignoring the SC's common experience standard?

(e) in passing over the SC's motive test?

(f) in neglecting the relative's contra-testimony test pointed out by the SC?

(g) in not making a statement versus physical evidence comparison ordained by the SC?

(h) in not applying the SC's chronology test?

(i) in overlooking the no hide, no appearance, no surrender factors pointed out by the SC?

(j) in slighting the victim of identification by association possibility singled out in a SC

decision before?

(k) in not applying the SC's equipoise test in favor of petitioner?

(l) in not adhering to the SC's search for truth standard?

(m) in not recognizing the operative legal effect of a plea of self-defense by co-accused
Arsenio Sunido in that he alone owned up to the killing?

2. Did the Court of Appeals so far sanction all those 15 departures by the Cagayan RTC as
to call for the Supreme Court's exercise of the power of supervision? 25

As is often the case, the question here is whether the prosecution evidence is sufficient to
prove beyond reasonable doubt petitioner's guilt. In general, we adhere to the principle that
the assessment made by the trial judge of the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on
appeal. 26 Having heard the testimony of the witnesses and observed their demeanor on the
witness stand, the judge is in a better position to determine the issue of credibility. 27
However, where there is a showing that some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance which would have affected the result of the case have been overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied, we will not hesitate to make our own evaluation of the
evidence. 28 Such is the case here.

First. The trial court's decision, for all its length — 23 pages — contains no analysis of the
evidence of the parties nor reference to any legal basis in reaching its conclusion. It contains
nothing more than a summary of the testimonies of the witnesses of both parties. The only
discussion of the evidence is be found in the following paragraphs:

Their testimony convinced the Court. On the other hand, accused's evidence bears the
indicia of fabrication. Defense witnesses from their demeanor, manner of testifying and
evasive answers were far from credible.

From the evidence on record, the Court believes and so hold that the prosecution has
satisfactorily proved the accused [guilty] beyond reasonable doubt. Prosecution's witnesses
testified in a straightforward manner.

Considering the circumstances immediately prior to the commission of the crime, and the
manner the same was committed, the Court believes that the aggravating circumstances of
evidence premeditation and abuse of superior strength, as well as availment of means to
prevent the deceased from defending himself were sufficiently established. The severality,
location and severity of the injuries inflicted as well as their nature, proved that there were
more than one assailants. Murder should have been the proper offense charged. However,
we can only convict the accused for homicide. 29

The decision does not indicate what the trial court found in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses to consider the same "straightforward" when, as will presently be shown, they are
in fact contradictory and confused. Nor does the decision contain any justification for the
appreciation of aggravating circumstances against the accused, much less some basis for
finding conspiracy among them.

In view of the weight given to its assessment of a witness' credibility on appeal, the trial court
should exert effort to ensure that its decisions present a comprehensive analysis or account
of the factual and legal findings which would substantially address the issues raised by the
parties.

Art. VIII, §14 of the Constitution provides:

No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based.

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of decision of the court shall be refused
due course or denied without stating the basis therefor.

In the same vein, Rule 120, §2 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Form and contents of judgments. — The judgment must be written in the official language,
personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly
and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon
which the judgment is based.

If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense
constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances attending the commission thereof, if there are any; (b) the participation of the
accused in the commission of the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory
after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (d) the civil liability or damages
caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there
is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate action has been reserved or
waived.

In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist, the judgment shall make a finding on the civil liability of the accused
in favor of the offended party.

The decision fails to comply with these constitutional and statutory requirements. As we said
in our decision in People v. Bugarin: 30

The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they must set forth
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based serves many functions. It
is intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the
decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the finding of
facts or the rulings on points of law with which he disagrees. More than that, the requirement
is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the
processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge,
preventing him from deciding by ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by
the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment
on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the
power of reason for sustained public confidence in the justness of his decision. The decision
of the trial court in this case disrespects the judicial function.
Second. The Court of Appeals sustained petitioner's conviction on the strength of the
testimonies given by Remedios and Merdelyn Sunido. No independent evidence, however,
incriminating petitioner on the death of Arsenio Sunido has been presented by the
prosecution. Although they claimed that petitioner held the victim's right hand while Arsenio
stabbed him, their testimony should have been given the strictest scrutiny in view of the fact
that Remedios and Merdelyn Sunido are the wife and daughter, respectively, of the victim.
31

In fact, Merdelyn Sunido gave contradictory accounts of how her father was stabbed by
Arsenio while petitioner allegedly held the victim. These contradictions raise doubts on
whether she really witnessed the incident and on the part allegedly played by petitioner.
More specifically, the contradictions and inconsistencies relate to the following questions:
Did Arsenio go to the victim's house in the morning of May 21, 1992? Did the victim provoke
his brother Arsenio into a quarrel? Was there or was there not a quarrel? When was the
victim attacked by Arsenio and the latter's companions, which allegedly included petitioner,
while allegedly taking Jerry Escobar to his house or after he had done so and the victim was
returning to his house? After the incident, what vehicle did the assailant use while fleeing,
Arsenio's Tamaraw vehicle or a tricycle?

In her affidavit before the Buguey police which formed her direct examination, Merdelyn
stated:

Q04 — Why did your uncle Arsenio Sunido, stab your father?

A — Before the incident my uncle Arsenio Sunido, came to our house and forcibly took the
rooster (fighting cock) inside our poultry and there when my father Angel Sunido arrived my
mother told him that his rooster place[d] inside our poultry was taken by his brother Arsenio,
so on May 21, 1992, my father and uncle Arsenio and some visitors have drinking session at
our residence and there not long after, my father inquire my uncle regarding the rooster
which was taken by my uncle which begun their quarrel and after the drinking spree, my
father accompanied his friend Jerry Escobar to his house and when my father return that
was the time when when (sic) Melencio Madrid and one companion hold my father while
uncle Arsenio Sunido stabbed several times that causes his death along the road near the
house of my uncle. 32

However, Merdelyn also testified and her testimony is shot through and through with
contradictions and inconsistencies, as the following portions of the transcript of stenographic
notes show:

Q: Let us make it clear, you said that your father accompanied Jerry Escobar to their house,
in whose house did your father came from?

A: From our house, sir.

Q: Now, when your father accompanied Jerry Escobar to their house, what happened next?

A: He was met by Melecio Madrid, a companion.

Q: And you said they met your father, what did these Melecio Madrid and a companion do?

A: They held my father, sir.

Q: How did they hold your father?

A: Witness raised her both arms.

Q: Now, you said these 2 persons naming Melecio Madrid and a companion held the hands
of your father, what hand when this Mel Madrid held?

A: Left hand, sir.

Q: What hand also did the [companion] of Melecio Madrid hold?

A: Right hand, sir.

Q: When these 2 persons Melecio Madrid and a companion held the hands of your father
upward, what happened next?

A: My uncle stabbed my father, sir.

Q: Was your father hit?

A: Yes, sir. 3

But when on cross-examination, Merdelyn testified:

Q: You said a while ago that while your father [was] accompanying Gerry Escobar in going
home, two persons one was Melecio Madrid and unidentified person accosted your father,
am I correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: That was the time when they were still going to the house of Gerry Escobar as alleged by
you a while ago, am I correct?

A: No, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Did you ever see your uncle Arsenio Sunido between 7:00 o'clock in the morning and
immediately before the alleged stabbing incident?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where was your uncle at the time when you saw him?
A: Outside their house.

Q: Did your father do anything when you saw your uncle Arsenio Sunido?

A: There was, sir.

Q: What did your father do?

A: He inquired about a lost chicken.

Q: Then, what did your father do after asking Arsenio Sunido about a lost rooster?

A: Nothing.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: He did not even provoke his brother Arsenio Sunido?

A: He did not sir, he only inquired a lost chicken.

Q: You want to impress the Court that your father did not provoke Arsenio Sunido, is that
what you mean?

A: Yes, sir. 34

On whether Arsenio went to the victim's house in the morning of May 21, 1992 and the
brothers had an altercation, Merdelyn made statements even more irreconcilable from the
previous ones she made, manifesting a tendency to improvise and embellish her story when
confronted with her inconsistencies. To quote:

Q: Considering that you insist that your uncle Arsenio Sunido was present in your house in
that morning of May 21, 1992, as appearing in your affidavit and you also insist during the
direct and cross-examination that your uncle Arsenio Sunido was not there present, which is
correct now, your statement in your affidavit or your statement in the direct-examination and
in the cross-examination?

A: My statement in the affidavit, sir.

Q: So what is correct then was the one incorporated in the affidavit and you confirmed that
the brothers Arsenio Sunido and your father quarrelled each other?

A: He just informed him something, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

Q: Did they quarrel?

A: No, sir.

ATTY. BULSECO:

Q: So you are again changing your answer in your affidavit particularly as appearing in
paragraph 8 that your uncle quarrelled with your father?

A: No, sir.

Q: Which is correct then, they quarreled or they did not quarrel?

A: They quarrelled, sir.

Q: How long did your father and your uncle quarrel each other?

A: A long while, sir.

Q: You said that Gerry Escobar and one Rudy stayed in your house from 6:00 o'clock in the
morning up to 11:00 o'clock on May 21, 1992, but they only started drinking at 11:00 o'clock
in the morning is that correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And from that period of time, was your uncle present?

A: He was not there present, sir. 35

Thus, in her affidavit dated June 2, 1992, 36 Merdelyn testified that her uncle, Arsenio
Sunido, joined Angel Sunido, Jerry Escobar and a certain Rudy in drinking liquor at Angel's
house. But, several times during her cross-examination, Merdelyn testified that her uncle
was not present during her father's drinking session with his friends. 37 When confronted
with the discrepancy in her affidavit and her testimony, Merdelyn answered that her
statement in her affidavit was the truth, that her uncle was indeed in their house in the
morning of May 21, 1992, 38 only to deny later that her uncle was in their house from six
o'clock to 11 o'clock in the morning. 39 That was not the end of her answer to the question.
In the next breath, Merdelyn asserted her uncle was present at the drinking session,
although he stayed for a short while only at around 10:30 in the morning of that date. 40

Merdelyn showed the same tendency to vacillate between two contradictory statements with
regard to the quarrel which arose between her father and her uncle. In her affidavit,
Merdelyn stated that during the drinking session, her father inquired about the rooster which
Arsenio had taken, thus provoking a quarrel between the two brothers. 41 But when asked
later whether her father and uncle had an altercation over the same subject matter, Merdelyn
denied that they had. When asked again whether her father and uncle quarrelled, Merdelyn
later replied that they, in fact, quarrelled for a long while. 42
Even the vehicle allegedly used by Arsenio Sunido and petitioner in fleeing from the scene of
the crime is uncertain. Merdelyn narrated in her affidavit that after the incident, petitioner
took a tricycle to escape. 4 However, nowhere in her testimony did she mention the tricycle.
Instead, she said she saw petitioner's Tamaraw jeepney parked in front of Arsenio's house.
44 Considering that Merdelyn testified that she was only five meters away from the place
where her father was allegedly stabbed, 45 she could not have failed to notice that petitioner
alighted from a jeepney.

Even more telling is the inconsistency in Merdelyn's testimony when Arsenio Sunido,
allegedly with the assistance of petitioner and another companion, attacked Angel. In her
affidavit, Merdelyn narrated that her father was attacked while returning to their house after
accompanying Jerry Escobar home. 46 However, on the stand, Merdelyn changed her story
and testified that it was on the way to Jerry Escobar's house that her father was assaulted.
47 Several times more after this in her testimony, Merdelyn vacillated as to the actual time
her father was attacked, whether before or after Angel allegedly brought Jerry Escobar
home. 48

Inconsistencies on negligible details do not destroy the truth of a witness' testimony, so long
as they refer only to collateral or incidental matters. But by no means can the inconsistencies
and contradictions in Merdelyn's testimony be characterized as trivial or insignificant. Her
propensity to make contradictory statements reflects her own uncertainty as to the actual
events leading to her father's death. It is clear that she speaks not from memory or
experience. She cannot even give a definite chronology of the events that transpired before
her father was killed. We are convinced that she was simply fashioning her story and making
spur-of-the-moment improvisations in an attempt to render her testimony credible. Instead of
so doing, she exhibited a disposition to fabricate that makes her testimony unworthy of belief
and credence.

We have held that sworn statements executed before police officers are usually incomplete
and, therefore, contradictions in the sworn statement of a witness and her testimony are
frequently brushed aside as inconsequential so long as they refer to minor and reconcilable
matters. But this rule does not apply when the discrepancies touch on substantial matters as
in the case at bar. 49

Further eroding Merdelyn's testimony is her recital of petitioner's participation in the killing of
her father. She claimed that petitioner and another person held the victim by raising his
arms, with petitioner holding the right hand while his companion held the left hand of the
victim. 50 Petitioner is an old man, almost 64 years old. 51 It taxes one's credulity to be told
that petitioner could hold the much younger victim so that the latter could be more easily
attacked by Arsenio. It is noteworthy that no attempt was even made to identify the third
person who allegedly held the other arm of the victim to facilitate the attack by Arsenio.
Merdelyn did not even describe his appearance. Indeed, the information 52 only mentions
Arsenio Sunido and Eligio Madrid as having conspired to kill Angel Sunido. No mention was
made of this mysterious man, even as a John Doe, leading us to think that he exists only as
a figment of Merdelyn and Remedios Sunido's imagination.

Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a trustworthy witness but
must likewise be credible in itself. While there is no hard and fast rule to determine the
truthfulness of one's testimony, that which conforms, however, to the quotidian knowledge,
observation and experience of man is often deemed to be reliable. 5

Nor can the testimony of Remedios Sunido be given credence any more than Merdelyn's
testimony can be believed. In lieu of direct examination in court, the prosecution presented
the affidavit which Remedios executed before the police on June 1, 1992. 54 In said
affidavit, Remedios stated:

Q — Why said Arsenio [Sunido], your brother in-law stab his brother, your husband which
caused his death?

A — They have a misunderstanding in connection with a chicken only.

Q — When and where this incident happened?

A — On May 21, 1992, at 12:00 o'clock noon more or less at Brgy. Maddalero, Buguey,
Cagayan particularly at the road east of our house.

Q — Will you narrate in brief [surrounding] circumstances how the incident happened?

A — That prior to the incident, my husband and his brother Arsenio [Sunido] have a quarrel
regarding to the chicken which we placed inside our poultry, because my brother in-law
Arsenio [Sunido] claimed to be the owner, however, on that day they just stop [their] quarrel,
but on May 21, 1992, we have a visitor and have a drinking spree and thereafter my
husband Angel [Sunido] is under the [influence] of liquor he made provocation to his brother
Arsenio [Sunido] and there they begun [their] quarrel.

Q — After that what happened next if any?

A — After they have finished their drinking spree with [our] visitor he went and accompanied
him in their [residence] and there when my husband came back that was the time that my
brother in-law Arsenio [Sunido] together with his companion took hold and stab my husband
several times causing his death.

Q — Do you know the companion of Arsenio [Sunido] at that time?

A — One only of them whom I know his name MELENCIO MADRID while the other I don't
know his name, but they are both resident[s] of Casiitan, Gonzaga, Cagayan.

Q — What was the participation of the companion of Arsenio [Sunido] at that time?

A — They took hold of my husband where Arsenio [Sunido] stab my husband several times,
on the different parts of his body.

Q — After that what happened next if any?

A — I saw him ride on the [tricycle] of Melecio Madrid and they went away.55
But during her cross-examination, Remedios Sunido testified as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. BULSECO:

Q: You said in your affidavit that on May 21, 1992, your husband and visitor have a drinking
spree, and you said that Arsenio Sunido was not there, how did he provoke Angel Sunido?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And you also said that they begun their quarrel there, is that correct?

A: Yes, sir.

COURT:

Q: When did your husband provoke your brother-in-law?

A: It was May, sir.

Q: What date?

A: May 22, sir.

Q: Are you sure that your husband was stabbed on May 21, 1992 in what occasion?

A: There was no occasion, sir.

Q: Is it not a fact that at the time of the drinking spree your husband provoked your brother-
in-law?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Therefore, your brother-in-law was also present in the drinking spree?

A: No, sir. He was in their house he did not participate in the drinking spree.

Q: In what particular place did your husband provoke your brother-in-law?

A: In our backyard, sir.

Q: And this was after the drinking session?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Why your husband provoked your brother-in-law?

A: Because of the chicken, sir.

Q: When your husband provoked your brother-in-law, were your visitors still around?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who was that visitor?

A: Cousin, sir.

Q: What is the name?

A: Jerry Escobar and one companion, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. BULSECO:

Q: You stated in your affidavit, that one of the accused Eligio Madrid allegedly held your
husband when the accused Arsenio Sunido stabbed your husband, is it not a fact that
immediately prior to the stabbing incident, you saw Melencio Madrid and Arsenio Sunido
inside a tamarao jeepney?

A: No, sir.

Q: How far were you when you saw Eulogio Madrid held your husband and Arsenio Sunido
allegedly stabbed your husband?

A: 7 to 10 meters away, sir.

Q: And you were beside your house at that time, is it not?

A: No, sir.

Q: Will you please tell the Honorable Court then where was the accused allegedly came
from before the stabbing incident?

A: From their house, sir.

Q: For how long a time did you learn that your late husband provoked Arsenio Sunido?

A: I did not witness, sir.56

When further questioned during her re-direct examination, Remedios Sunido related:

FISCAL MIGUEL:
Q: In your answer to question No. 8, that there was a quarrel between your husband and
your brother-in-law regarding with a chicken, when was the quarrel started?

A: May 21, 1992, sir.

Q: What time?

A: I cannot remember, sir.

Q: Was it before your husband started drinking or after?

A: After, sir.

Q: How many times did your husband provoke your brother-in-law?

A: Only once, sir.

Q: You said that the quarrel started in connection with a chicken, what was the chicken all
about that start the quarrel?

A: My brother-in-law claimed that the chicken was his own, sir.

Q: And when your brother-in-law claimed that the chicken was his own, what did your
husband tell him if [you] know?

A: He told me why he took his chicken, sir.

Q: And this confrontation between your husband and your brother-in-law was in Ma[y] 21,
1992?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And this started what you called the provocation in the part of your husband?

A: It was not a provocation, sir.

Q: What do you mean then?

A: He insisted claiming the chicken, sir.

COURT:

Q: Who insisted?

A: My husband, sir. 57

As can be seen, Remedios Sunido's testimony, like that of her daughter Merdelyn, is replete
with inconsistencies and contradictions that render its veracity doubtful. Her answers
oftentimes are not responsive to the questions propounded to her. She even committed a
mistake as to the date when the provocation was made by her husband, stating a date which
is a day after he died.

Moreover, in her affidavit, she stated that petitioner took a tricycle in escaping after the
incident. But, as stated earlier, it has already been proven that petitioner used a Tamaraw
jeepney for transportation. Considering that Remedios testified that she was only seven to
10 meters away from the place where her husband was attacked, she could not have failed
to notice what type of vehicle petitioner was using if she actually witnessed the event.
Remedios' dubious narrative of her husband's killing fails to convince us. The tenor of her
testimony suggests that it is based not on what she remembers but more on what she
imagines to have occurred at the time her husband was killed. In People v. Lucero, we held
that the unnatural and contradictory testimony of a witness, coupled with substantial
discrepancies between his testimony and his sworn statement, makes him unreliable as a
witness. 58

Likewise, the considerable length of time which lapsed before Merdelyn and Remedios
Sunido made their statements before the police puts into question the claim that they
actually witnessed the killing of Angel Sunido. It is true that delay in reporting a crime, if
adequately explained, is not sufficient to cast doubt on the truthfulness of a witness'
testimony as, for instance, the delay may be explained by the natural reticence of most
people and their abhorrence to get involved in a criminal case. 59

But the eyewitnesses involved in this case are the wife and daughter of the victim. One
would naturally expect that they would not be anxious to help the police arrest the person or
persons responsible for the killing of their loved one. Instead of doing so, however,
Remedios and Merdelyn Sunido only made their statements to the police on June 1, 1992 60
and June 2, 1992, 61 respectively, more than one week after the incident they allegedly
witnessed. This fact is made even more strange by the statements of Remedios and
Merdelyn Sunido that not long after the incident, Barangay Councilman Amor de los Santos
arrived followed by members of the Buguey Police. 62 In a similar case where a daughter
delayed in reporting to the proper authorities who was responsible for her father's death, the
Court held:

. . . She had a very early opportunity to do so because the police officers of the town were
there at the scene of the crime, where she was also, just two hours after her father was shot
and killed. The most natural reaction of a witness to such an incident, indeed a res gestae,
would have been to tell her mother about it, and subsequently the police authorities, who
had, as earlier adverted to, responded to the summons for help two hours after the reported
murder. Human nature would have compelled her to declare that she had seen, and in fact,
could identify, the assailant of her father. But she withheld that vital information from
everybody for an unreasonable length of time (at least four days after the commission of the
crime, by her own statement), which makes her testimony suspect. Teresita's testimony
smacks of fabrication and, therefore, can not support a
conviction. 6
The testimonies of Merdelyn and Remedios Sunido do not prove beyond reasonable doubt
that petitioner participated in the killing of Angel Sunido. We cannot accept such testimonies
as establishing the guilt of petitioner. As we said in People v. Comesario: 64

. . . An accused enjoys the presumption of innocence. He need not prove what is legally
presumed. If he so desires he may present evidence on his behalf, but no matter how weak
it is, he still deserves an acquittal. This is because the prosecution must not rely on the
weakness of the evidence for the defense but on the strength of its own evidence. Unless
the prosecution has overturned the presumption of innocence, acquittal is inevitable.

Indeed, Arsenio Sunido admitted that he was solely responsible for the death of his brother
Angel Sunido. Thus, he testified:

Q: What time did you arrive in Maddalero particularly on May 21, 1992?

A: Between 11:00 o'clock to 12:00 o'clock.

Q: What unusual incident if any that transpired just immediately after you arrived at
Maddalero, Buguey, Cagayan between 11:00 to 12:00 of May 21, 1992?

A: At that time we arrived the place, we noticed the deceased already provoking.

Q: To whom was he provoking?

A: Anybody that passes-by at that time.

Q: And when you noticed that he was provoking anybody that passes-by, what happened?

A: Because he was very near where we were, he met us with the intention of stabbing us
with his knife.

Q: Were there persons present when he attempted to stab you?

A: There were other people sir, one is Jerry Escobar who was with him in drinking.

Q: Can you tell the Court the identity or names of the other persons present when the
deceased attempted to stab you?

A: I can name some of them, sir.

Q: Can you name to this Honorable Court?

A: Rudy who is from Ilocos; Gerry Escobar; I can not identify the others.

Q: How far were you in relation to Angel Sunido at the first time he attempted to stab you?

A: Four (4) meters away from me, sir.

Q: You said you drove the Tamaraw jeepney, where did you park the Tamaraw jeepney in
relation to the house of Angel Sunido?

A: Near my yard, sir.

Q: And how far that passenger jeepney in relation to you when Angel Sunido attempted to
inflict injuries to you?

A: Around five (5) meters only.

Q: And what did you do when he attempted to stab you?

A: Both of us with Eligio Madrid alighted from the Tamaraw.

COURT:

Q: What did he threaten you with?

A: "Immuco" knife with 8 inches more or less long.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: You demonstrate how he threatened you with that knife?

A: Witness demonstrated rushing towards me (Court Interpreter) saying "I will kill you now"
patayenka tatta, with the knife swining in an upward motion (Witness assuming that he is
Angel Sunido). And with the knife with his right hand in downward motion directed towards
me (Court Interpreter).

APP MIGUEL:

Q: How far did the deceased reach you?

A: About two (2) meters.

Q: Now, when he reached two meters away from you, you said you alighted from the
Tamaraw jeepney, is that right?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You alighted towards him or away from him?

A: When I alighted from the Tamaraw jeepney I moved back.

Q: Does the Tamaraw jeepney have a door?

A: Its an open door.

Q: You jumped using that open door while stopped driving?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And necessarily your movement was towards the deceased or when you alighted from
the Tamaraw jeepney your direction was towards the deceased?

A: Yes, sir, I have no other choice.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

Cross-examination?

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. BULSECO, JR.:

Q: At that precise moment, when you alighted from the Tamaraw jeepney where was Eligio
Madrid seated?

A: At the right side.

Q: You want to impress the Court, before he alighted he was seated right beside you, is that
right?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What happened after you alighted?

A: I did not see Mr. Eligio Madrid because he ran away.

Q: My point is, you said that you alighted from the Tamaraw jeepney when the deceased
was going towards you with a knife, after alighting from that Tamaraw jeepney, what
happened next?

A: When I was retreating I kept my watch on him.

COURT:

Q: You retreated towards the Tamaraw jeepney, is that right?

A: Yes because I was encircled and after that I [slipped] and fell.

Q: And after you fell down facing upward, what happened next?
A: When I fell, I kept on anticipating what move would he do next and that was the time I was
able to [grab] him, sir.

Q: Was he dr[u]nk at that time?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, when you were anticipating the attempt, what happened next?

A: After wrested possession of the knife from him, I lost my cool. I have a mental block-out
and stabbed him.

Q: How many times did you stab him?

A: I cannot recall anymore.

Q: Now, when you first stabbed him, was he on top of you or you were on top of him?

A: He was on top, sir.

Q: And he was very drunk?

A: Thats what I noticed, sir.

Q: Did you not push him when you were able to wrestle possession of the knife?

A: I did not know how many times I stabbed him because I have a mental block out.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

Q: Now, were you lying down at all times when you kept on stabbing your brother?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: There was never anytime that you were standing?

A: None. When I got back my senses I dropped the knife.

Q: My question is, in all these nine (9) stab wounds that you inflicted, was there any time that
you were standing?

A: None that I know, of these where I stabbed my brother while in standing position.

ATTY. BULSECO, JR.:

Q: And after recovering your senses, what did you do if any?

A: After stabbing my brother I wanted to embrace him for the reason that I did not really
intend to kill him.

Q: And what happened next?

A: After dropping the knife I immediately surrendered myself to Vice-Mayor Alipio Valdez.

COURT:

Q: On that same date?

A: Yes, sir. 65

Arsenio Sunido's testimony is credible. There was animosity between him and the deceased
concerning the loss of a fighting cock. The deceased provoked him and he reacted by
stabbing the victim. The quarrel was thus between brothers. There is nothing in the record to
suggest that petitioner had any part in that quarrel. He was Arsenio's employer. He had no
reason to feel aggrieved by the loss of the fighting cock. And if, as the prosecution tried to
prove, Arsenio had merely been provoked by the deceased who was then drunk, how could
Arsenio and petitioner have conspired to commit the crime? The fact is that petitioner and
Arsenio happened to drop by Angel's house because they were buying palay to mill.
Petitioner was the owner of three rice mills, and Arsenio was the manager of one of the rice
mills. Whatever business ties existed between Arsenio and petitioner have no bearing on the
fight between the brothers Angel and Arsenio. Not having participated in any manner in the
fight between the brothers, petitioner cannot be held responsible for Angel's death.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and petitioner is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide.

SO ORDERED.

Office of the Court Administrator vs Bermejo

A.M. No. P-05-2004 March 14, 2008

FACTS:
Respondent colluded with another person to impersonate her in taking the Civil Service
Eligibility Examination. During the examination, Bermejo used another name in taking the
test while the other took the same exam using Bermejo’s name.

ISSUE:
Is a certified copy of the Seat Plan of the examination admissible in evidence?

RULING:
Yes. A duly accomplished Civil Service Form is a public document which is admissible in
evidence. Respondent in this case, fails to refute the documentary evidence proving the fact
in issue, against her. It is a settled rule that the duly accomplished form of the Civil Service is
an official document of the Commission, which, by its very nature, is considered in the same
category as that of a public document, admissible in evidence without need of further proof.
As an official document, the entries thereof made in the course of official duty are prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein.