VOL.

10, FEBRUARY 28, 1964 331

Jorge vs. Mayor

No. L-21776. February 28, 1964.

NICANOR G. JORGE, petitioner, vs. JOVENCIO Q. MAYOR, respondent.

Public officers; "Midnight" appointments rule; Appointment made on December 13,

1961 not covered by Administrative Order No. 2 of the new President.-Administrative
Order No. 2 of President Macapagal covers only all appointments made and released by
former President Garcia after the joint session of Congress that ended on December 13,
1961. In the case at bar, where petitioner's appointment was not only dated
December 13,1961, but there was also no evidence that it was made and released after
said joint session ended on the same day, it is held that said appointment was not validly
revoked by said administrative order.
Same; Same; Exception to Aytona ruling.-Ad interim appointments "so spaced as to
afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the
appointment and the appointee's qualifications" could be validly made even by an
outgoing President under the Aytona ruling.
Same; Abandonment of office; Evidence of official courtesy not incompatible with
right to office.-No abandonment of office may be deduced from an officer's lack of hostile
attitude towards the authorities and the respondent where such conduct was merely
evidence of that courtesy and "delicadeza" to be expected of a man in a high position who
does not wish to obstruct the functions of his office and is in no way incompatible with
his determination to protect his rights.

ORIGINAL PETITION in the Supreme Court. Mandamus and quo warranto.

The facts are stated in the opinion 'of the Court.

Enrique M. Fernando, Ramon Quisumbing, Jr.and Norberto
Quisumbing for petitioner.
Solicitor General for respondent.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Petition for mandamus and quo warranto filed directly in this Court to have
petitioner declared as the sole legally appointed and qualified Director of Lands,
and to require respondent to turn over said office to the petitioner as well as to
desist from holding himself out as "Acting Director, Bureau of Lands".
It is undisputed that petitioner, Nicanor G. Jorge, is a career official in the
Bureau of Lands. He started working there as a Junior Computer in the course
of 98 years
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ANNOTATED
Jorge vs. Mayor

service, from February 1, 1922 to October 31, 1960, and attained the position of
Acting Director, through regular and successive promotions, in accordance with
civil service rules. On June 17, 1961, he was designated Acting Director of the
same Bureau, and on December 13, 1961 was appointed by President Carlos
Garcia. ad interim Director. He qualified by taking the oath of office on the 23rd
December of 1961. His appointment was on December 26, 1961, transmitted to
the Commission on Appointments, and on May 14, 1962, petitioner's ad
interim appointment as Director of Lands was confirmed by the Commission.
Petitioner discharged the duties as Director until on November 14, 1962 he
received a letter from Benjamin Gozon, then Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources of the Macapagal administration, informing him that
pursuant to a letter from the Assistant Executive Secretary Bernal, served on
petitioner on November 13, his appointment was among those revoked by
Administrative Order No. 2 of President Diosdado Macapagal; that the position
of Director of Lands was considered vacant; and that petitioner Jorge
was designated Acting Director of Lands, effective November 13, 1962. Upon
learning- that respondent Mayor, an outsider, had been designated by the
President to be Acting Director of Lands, Jorge protested (in a letter of
November 16, 1962) to the Secretary of Agriculture informing the latter that he
would stand on his rights, and issued office circulars claiming to be the legally
appointed Director of Lands. Finally, on September 2, 1963, he instituted the
present proceedings.
The answer of respondent pleads that the ad interim appointment of
petitioner and its confirmation were invalid, having been duly revoked by
President Macapagal by Administrative Order No. 2 dated December 31, 1961;
that petitioner voluntarily relinquished his position and accepted his
designation as Acting Director, issuing press statements to said effect, and
voluntarily accompanying and introducing respondent to meet officials of the
Bureau as the newly acting- Director of Lands.
The fundamental issue is whether Administrative Order No. 2 of President
Macapagal operated as a valid revocation
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Jorge vs. Mayor

of petitioner's ad interim appointment. We think it has not done so.

The official text of said Administrative Order, as published in the Official
Gazette (vol. 58, page 3, No. 1) is as follows: allows:
"WHEREAS, ad interim appointments were extended and released by President Carlos
P. Garcia after the joint session of Congress that ended on December 13, 1961;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Diosdado Macapagal, President of the Philippines, pursuant
to the authority vested in me by law, do hereby withdraw and recall, and declare without
any further effect, all the said appointments and all communications relative thereto,
including those to the defunct Commission on Appointments.
Done in the City of Manila, this 31st day of December, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and sixty-one and of the Independence of the Philippines, the
sixteenth.
DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL
President of the Philippines

By the President
AMELITO MUTUC
Executive Secretary"

Petitioner Jorge's ad interim appointment is dated December 13, 1961, but

there is no evid8nce on record that it was made and released after the joint
session of Congress that ended on the same day. It is a matter of contemporary
history, of which this Court may take judicial cognizance, that the session ended
late in the night of December 13, 1961, and, therefore, after regular office hours.
In the absence of competent evidence to the contrary, it is to be presumed that
the appointment of Jorge was made before the close of office hours, that being
the regular course of business. The appointment, therefore, was not included in,
nor intended to be covered by, Administrative Order No. 2, and the same stands
unrevoked. Consequently, it was validly confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments, and thereafter, the office never became vacant.
It is an error to consider petitioner's cases as within the purview of our ruling
in the Aytona vs. Castillo case (L19313, Jan. 20, 1962). If in that case this Court
refused to interfere with the application of the Chief Executive's Administrative
Order No. 2, it was because the circumstances of the appointments therein
involved rendered it
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334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
Jorge vs. Mayor

doubtful whether the appointees' equitable rights could be invoked,

"considering the rush conditional appointments, hurried maneuvers and other

happenings detracting from that degree of good faith, morality and propriety which form
the basic foundation of claims to equitable relief."

There is certainly no parity between the appointment of petitioner on December

13, 1961 and the confused scramble for appointments in and during the days
immediately preceding the inauguration of the present administration. For
aught that appears on the record before us, the appointment of petitioner Jorge
was the only one made in that day, and there is nothing to show that it was not

"so spaced as .to afford ford ord some assurance of deliberate action and careful
consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications."

that could be validly made even by an outgoing President under the Aytona
ruling (Castillo vs. Aytona, L-19313, Jan. 20, 1962; Merners vs. Liwag, L-20079,
Sept. 30, 1963; Gillera vs. Fernandez, L-20741, Jan, 31, 1964).
If anyone is entitled to the protection of the civil service provisions of the
Constitution, particularly those against removals without lawful cause, it must
be the officers who, like herein petitioner, entered the Civil Service in their
youth, bent on making a career out of it, gave it the best years of their lives and
grew gray therein in the hope and expectation that they would eventually attain
the upper reaches and levels of the official hierarchy, not through political
patronage, but through loyalty, merit, and faithful and unremitting toil.
In Lacson vs. Romero, 84 Phil. 740, this Court had occasion to voice its concern
for these civil servants:

"x x x. To hold that civil service officials hold their office at the will of the appointing
power subject to removal or forced transfer at any time, would demoralize and
undermine and eventually destroy the whole Civil Service System and structure. The
country would then go back to the days of the old Jacksonian Spoils System under which
a victorious Chief Executive, after the elections could., if so minded, sweep out of office,
civil service employees differing in political color or affiliation from him, and sweep in his
political followers and adherents, especially those who have given him help, political or

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Jorge vs. Mayor

otherwise. A Chief Executive running for reelection may even do this before election time
not only to embarrass and eliminate his' political enemies from office but also to put his
followers in power so that with their official influence they could the better help him and
his party in the elections. As may be gathered from the report of the Committee of the
Constitutional Convention which we have reproduced at the beginning of this opinion,
the framers of our Constitution, at least the Civil Service Committee thereof, condemned
said spoils system and purposely. and deliberately inserted the constitutional prohibition
against removal except for cause, which now forms the basis of this decision."

In common with the Gillera appointment sustained by this Court less than a
month ago, Jorge's appointment is featured by a recognition of his tenure by the
Macapagal administration itself, since he was allowed to hold and discharge
undisturbed his duties as de jureDirector of Lands for nearly eleven months; it
was only in mid-November of 1962 that the attempt was actually made to
demote him and appoint a rank outsider in his place in the person of respondent
Mayor.
As to the alleged voluntary acquiescence and relinquishment by petitioner of
his position as de jureDirector of Lands, the evidence is that he did protect
against his demotion in letters to the Secretary of Agriculture and in office
circulars. That he did not immediately adopt a hostile attitude towards the
authorities, and the respondent herein, was merely evidence of that courtesy
and "delicadeza" to be expected of a man in a high position who does not wish to
obstruct the functions of the office, and is in no way incompatible with his
determination to protect his right. It must also be remembered that the
precedent case of the former Chairman of the National Science Board,
suspended indefinitely on charges that were subsequently found to be false, did
not encourage precipitate action, and was a reminder of the .unpleasant
consequences of defying the administration. At any rate, "abandonment of an
office by reason of acceptance of another, in order to be effective and binding,
should spring from and be accompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice,
either to keep the old office or renounce it for another" (Teves vs. Sindiong, 81
Phil. 658), and the record is unconvincing that

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Semon vs. Marcos

the alleged acts of acquiescence, mostly equivocal in character, were freely and
voluntarily accomplished.
WHEREFORE, the writs applied for are granted, and the petitioner Nicanor
G. Jorge is declared to be the duly appointed, confirmed, and qualified Director
of Lands, and the respondent, Jovencio Q. Mayor, is required to turn over said
office to the petitioner and to desist from holding himself out as "Acting Director
of Lands". Respondent shall pay the costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Regala and Makalintal,

JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., concurs in part and dissents in part for reasons
stated in his concurring opinion in the Aytona case.
Paredes, J., concurs in the result.
Padilla, J., dissents in separate opinion.
Dizon, J., concurs and dissents in a separate opinion.

Petition granted.