Tan, Jr. vs.

CA This rule has been interpreted by this Court in Cueto vs. Collantes as follows: "xxx Once a
G.R. No. 136368. January 16, 2002. decision is rendered by the Court of Appeals a party may appeal therefrom by certiorari by
filing with the Supreme Court a petition within 10 days from the date of entry of such
FACTS: decision (Section 1, Rule 46). The entry of judgment is made after it has become final, i.e.,
Tan executed a deed of absolute sale over a parcel of land in question in favor of spouses upon the expiration of 15 days after notice thereof to the parties (Section 8, Rule 53, as
Magdangal. Simultaneous with the execution of this deed, they entered into another modified by a resolution of the Supreme Court dated October 1, 1945). But, as Chief Justice
agreement where Tan was given one year within which to redeem or repurchase the Moran has said, 'such finality *** is subject to the aggrieved party's right of filing a petition
property. Tan failed to redeem the property until his death. His heirs filed before the RTC a for certiorari under this section,' which means that 'the Court of Appeals shall remand the
suit against the Magdangals for reformation of instrument. The complaint alleged that their case to the lower court for the execution of its judgment, only after the expiration of ten (10)
real intention was to conclude an equitable mortgage. The Magdangals were able to have days from the date of such judgment, if no petition for certiorari is filed within that period.'
Tan's title over the lot in question canceled and to secure in their names a TCT. The heirs of (1 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., p. 950) It would therefore appear that
Tan filed a supplemental complaint. the date of entry of judgment of the Court of Appeals is suspended when a petition for
review is filed to await the final entry of the resolution or decision of the Supreme Court.”
RTC held that: (1) the contract between the parties is not an absolute sale but an equitable
mortgage; and (2) petitioner Tan should pay to the respondents Magdangal "within 120 days The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, amended the rule on finality of
after the finality of this decision P59,200.00 plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum from judgment as provided in section 1, Rule 39.
May 2, 1988, the date the complaint was filed, until paid.
The rationale of the new rule is explained by retired Justice F.D. Regalado as follows:
CA affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. Both parties received the decision of the "1. The term 'final order' is used in two senses depending on whether it is used on
appellate court on October 5, 1995. On March 13, 1996, the clerk of court of the appellate the issue of appealability or on the issue of binding effect. For purposes of appeal,
court entered in the Book of Entries of Judgement the decision and issued the corresponding an order is "final" if it disposes of the action, as distinguished from an interlocutory
Entry of Judgment which, on its face, stated that the said decision "has on October 21, 1995 order which leaves something to be done in the trial court with respect to the
become final and executory." merits of the case. For purposes of binding effect or whether it can be subject of
The respondents Magdangal filed in the trial court a Motion for Consolidation and Writ of execution, an order is 'final' or executory after the lapse of the reglementary period
Possession. They alleged that the 120-day period of redemption of the petitioner has to appeal and no appeal has been perfected.
expired. They reckoned that the said period began 15 days after October 5, 1995, the date
when the finality of the judgment of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court 2. On the aspect of appealability, these revised Rules use the adjective 'final' with
commenced to run. respect to orders and resolutions, since to terminate a case the trial courts issue
orders while the appellate courts and most of the quasi-judicial agencies issue
On the other hand, petitioner filed on March 27, 1996 a motion for execution in the appellate resolutions. Judgment are not so qualified since the use of the so-called
court praying that it "direct the court a quo to issue the corresponding writ of execution in interlocutory judgments is not favored in this jurisdiction, while the categorization
such Civil Case. On April 17, 1996, petitioner deposited with the clerk of court the repurchase of an order or a resolution for purposes of denoting that it is appealable is to
price of the lot plus interest as ordered by the decision. distinguish them from interlocutory orders or resolutions. However, by force of
extended usage the phrase 'final and executory judgment' is sometimes used and
On June 10, 1996, the trial court allowed the petitioner to redeem the lot in question. It ruled tolerated, although the use of 'executory' alone would suffice. These observations
that the 120-day redemption period should be reckoned from the date of Entry of Judgment also apply to the several and separate judgments contemplated in Rule 36, or
in the appellate court or from March 13, 1996. The redemption price was deposited on April partial judgments which totally dispose of a particular claim or severable part of
17, 1996. As aforestated, the Court of Appeals set aside the ruling of the trial court. the case, subject to the power of the court to suspend or defer action on an appeal
from or further proceedings in such special judgment, or as provided by Rule 35 on
ISSUE: What rule should govern the finality of judgment favorably obtained in the trial court the matter of partial summary judgments which are not considered as appealable
by the petitioner? (see Sec. 4, Rule 35 and the explanation therein).
Xxx
RULING: Under the present procedure, the prevailing party can secure certified true copies
of the judgment or final order of the appellate court and the entry thereof, and
From 1991-1996, the years relevant to the case at bar, the rule that governs finality of submit the same to the court of origin with and to justify his motion for a writ of
judgment is Rule 51 of the Revised Rules of Court. execution, without waiting for its receipt of the records from the appellate court.
That motion must be with notice to the adverse party, with a hearing when the
circumstances so require, to enable him to file any objection thereto or bring to the
attention of said court matters which may have transpired during the pendency of
 the appeal and which may have a bearing on the execution sought to enforce the should therefore be applied retroactively to pending actions. Hence, the question
judgment.” as to whether an appeal from an adverse judgment should be dismissed for failure
of appellant to file a record on appeal within thirty days as required under the old
It is evident that if we apply the old rule on finality of judgment, petitioner redeemed the rules, which question is pending resolution at the time Batas Bilang 129 took effect,
subject property within the 120-day period of redemption reckoned from the appellate became academic upon the effectivity of said law because the law no longer
court's entry of judgment. The appellate court, however, did not apply the old rule but the requires the filing of a record on appeal and its retroactive application removed the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In fine, it applied the new rule retroactively and we legal obstacle to giving due course to the appeal. A statute which transfers the
hold that given the facts of the case at bar, this is an error. jurisdiction to try certain cases from a court to a quasi-judicial tribunal is a remedial
statute that is applicable to claims that accrued before its enactment but
There is no dispute that rules of procedure can be given retroactive effect. This general rule, formulated and filed after it took effect, for it does not create new nor take away
however, has well-delineated exceptions. We quote author Agpalo: vested rights. The court that has jurisdiction over a claim at the time it accrued
cannot validly try the claim where at the time the claim is formulated and filed the
"9.17. Procedural laws. jurisdiction to try it has been transferred by law to a quasi-judicial tribunal, for even
Procedural laws are adjective laws which prescribe rules and forms of procedure of actions pending in one court may be validly taken away and transferred to another
enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion; they refer to rules of and no litigant can acquire a vested right to be heard by one particular court.
procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer
justice. They include rules of pleadings, practice and evidence. As applied to 9.18. Exceptions to the rule. (DOCTRINE)
criminal law, they provide or regulate the steps by which one who commits a crime The rule that procedural laws are applicable to pending actions or proceedings
is to be punished. admits certain exceptions. The rule does not apply where the statute itself
expressly or by necessary implication provides that pending actions are excepted
The general rule that statutes are prospective and not retroactive does not from its operation, or where to apply it to pending proceedings would impair
ordinarily apply to procedural laws. It has been held that "a retroactive law, in a vested rights. Under appropriate circumstances, courts may deny the retroactive
legal sense, is one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under laws, application of procedural laws in the event that to do so would not be feasible or
or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in would work injustice. Nor may procedural laws be applied retroactively to pending
respect of transactions or considerations already past. Hence, remedial statutes or actions if to do so would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the
statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or independence of the courts."
take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of We hold that section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not be given
a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes." retroactive effect in this case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner.
The general rule against giving statutes retroactive operation whose effect is to Undoubtedly, petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot and this right is a substantive
impair the obligations of contract or to disturb vested rights does not prevent the right. Petitioner followed the procedural rule then existing as well as the decisions of this
application of statutes to proceedings pending at the time of their enactment Court governing the reckoning date of the period of redemption when he redeemed the
where they neither create new nor take away vested rights. A new statute which subject lot. Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of
deals with procedure only is presumptively applicable to all actions - those which Procedure which if applied retroactively would result in his losing the right to redeem the
have accrued or are pending. subject lot. It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive application of this procedural rule with
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to the rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be penalized with the loss of the subject lot when he
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws faithfully followed the laws and the rule on the period of redemption when he made the
are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes redemption. The subject lot may only be 34,829 square meters but as petitioner claims, "it is
may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive the only property left behind by their father, a private law practitioner who was felled by an
application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not assassin's bullet."
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is
the retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. Petitioner fought to recover this lot from 1988. To lose it because of a change of procedure
The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, on the date of reckoning of the period of redemption is inequitous. The manner of exercising
procedural laws. It has been held that "a person has no vested right in any the right cannot be changed and the change applied retroactively if to do so will defeat the
particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his right of redemption of the petitioner which is already vested.
case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure."

Thus, the provision of Batas Bilang 129 in Section 39 thereof prescribing that "no
record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal" is procedural in nature and