Destroy Res

DESTROYERS
Other Titles in ABC-CLIO’s

WEAPONS AND WARFARE SERIES
Air Defense, Shannon A. Brown

Aircraft Carriers, Hedley Paul Wilmott
Ancient Weapons, James T. Chambers
Artillery, Jeff Kinard
Ballistic Missiles, Kev Darling
Battleships, Stanley Sandler
Cruisers and Battle Cruisers, Eric W. Osborne
Helicopters, Stanley S. McGowen
Machine Guns, James H. Willbanks
Medieval Weapons, James T. Chambers
Military Aircraft in the Jet Age, Justin D. Murphy
Military Aircraft, 1919–1945, Justin D. Murphy
Military Aircraft, Origins to 1918, Justin D. Murphy
Pistols, Jeff Kinard
Rifles, David Westwood
Submarines, Hedley Paul Wilmott
Tanks, Spencer C. Tucker
DESTROYERS
AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THEIR IMPACT
Eric W. Osborne
Santa Barbara, California Denver, Colorado Oxford, England

Copyright © 2005 by Eric W. Osborne
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,

stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Osborne, Eric W.
Destroyers : an illustrated history of their impact / Eric W. Osborne.
p. cm. — (Weapons and warfare series)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 1-85109-479-2 (hardback : alk. paper) — ISBN 1-85109-484-9 (eBook)
1. Destroyers (Warships)—History. I. Title. II. Series.
V825.O83 2005
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CONTENTS
Preface and Acknowledgments vii
Introduction to Encyclopedias of Weapons and Warfare Series,

Spencer C. Tucker xi
chapter one
The Technological Revolution Leading to the
Development of Destroyers, 1750–1860 1
chapter two
From Experimental Vessel to Warship, 1860–1918 23
chapter three
Advancements during the Interwar Years
and World War II, 1919–1945 69
chapter four
The Cold War and After, 1946–2004 117
Destroyers and Frigates of the World 181
v
vi CONTENTS
Glossary 277
Selected Bibliography 281
Index 287
About the Author 306

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The destroyer, a comparatively small vessel of great speed and

moderate armament, is one of the most recent additions to world
navies, but it has evolved to become the most numerous and impor-
tant type of surface combatant in the forces of the world’s major
maritime powers in the present day. Even so, far fewer studies are
released on the development of this type of ship than the larger war-
ships such as battleships and aircraft carriers. This fact is partly the
result of the sense of glamour that surrounds the larger, more pow-
erful vessels. Many of these studies examine the history of warships
in general where destroyers are dealt with in only a single chapter
that, through the nature of these works, is a relatively small part of a
larger whole. These works, although many are of good quality, have
three chief drawbacks that detract from their usefulness in high-
lighting the history and importance of the destroyer. First, the cover-
age oftentimes centers on technological development and does not
take political developments or foreign policy in individual countries
that effect the development of the destroyers into account. As a re-
sult, readers are left with a history of destroyers that is detached
from the events that govern their construction. Second, these works
do not provide detailed information on the performance of destroy-
ers in battle and how their design changed on the basis of that expe-
rience. Oftentimes, the reader is provided only with a summary of
the combat roles of destroyers, without specific examples that lead
to a better understanding overall. Last, these books fail to incorpo-
rate information about how these ships were operated and the peo-
ple who crewed them. Destroyers, like all warships, are communi-
ties where people work constantly to make their vessels as effective
as possible in conditions that have been far from comfortable until
recent years. Without the inclusion of the human element, the
reader cannot fully appreciate the rigors of life at sea and its impact
vii
viii PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
on the performance of the destroyer. Other works that focus solely

on destroyers seek to address these problems with more in-depth ex-
amination, but most deal with specific time periods of the de-
stroyer’s history, such as the performance of U.S. destroyers in
World War II. These studies, although far more detailed, are also of
limited value for those who seek a complete history of these vessels.
This work seeks to remedy the problem of coverage through the
use of secondary sources to include technological, wartime, social,
and diplomatic and political histories as part of a larger whole that
examines the development of the destroyer from its inception to the
modern day.
Chapter 1 serves as a background to the introduction of the de-
stroyer and has two sections. The first is a history of the sloop in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries during the Age of Fighting Sail,
being the period when warships were propelled by sails. The sloop,
also known as the corvette, of this era is oftentimes viewed as the
forerunner of the modern destroyer. This section includes discus-
sion on the technological aspects of sloops and life at sea. It also
showcases the duties of sloops through examples from wars of the
era. The roles included scouting, commerce protection through act-
ing as an escort for merchantmen and hunting down commerce
raiders, preying on enemy commerce, and courier service through
delivering dispatches. The second section entails a discussion of
technological development in the nineteenth century that effectively
ended the Age of Fighting Sail and ultimately made possible the cre-
ation of the destroyer.
Chapters 2–4 discuss important innovations in design and
changes in the roles of destroyers that mark watersheds in their de-
velopment. Chapter 2 covers the period from the introduction of
the first torpedo boat destroyer in 1882 to 1914, by which time the
destroyer was the most numerous type of warship in world navies.
The technological developments and consequent changes in ship-
board life were enormous in this period. Destroyers became in-
creasingly large and expensive and much more effective as war-
ships. The increase in size allowed them to operate for much longer
periods at sea and thereby provide more effective protection for bat-
tle fleets on extended operations in time of war. Sailors in this pe-
riod had to endure harsh conditions aboard their small vessels while
increasingly specializing in certain technical subjects to properly
and efficiently man the ship. By 1914, destroyers were charged with
protecting battle fleets from torpedo attacks and launching assaults
of their own.
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ix
Chapter 3 examines the era from 1914, the beginning of World

War I, to the conclusion of World War II in 1945. One of three cen-
tral themes is an examination of the technological changes in de-
stroyer design and the additional duties that were charged to them
as a result of technological change in naval warfare as a whole. By
the end of World War II, the importance of destroyers had expanded
far past their previous roles or those of their antecedent, the sloop of
the Age of Fighting Sail. Destroyers served as escorts for convoys
against submarine attacks, light gun support for amphibious opera-
tions, antiaircraft (AA) batteries to protect larger vessels from air-
craft attacks, and minor surface combatants. A second key subject is
the impact of international law on destroyer development that lim-
ited their size and armament. Last, I continue the examination of
shipboard life in a time when the destroyer became an increasingly
more complicated weapons system. By the end of World War II, the
men who crewed destroyers were charged with a multitude of tasks
that were vital to the function of the world’s battle fleets.
Chapter 4 treats the evolution of the destroyer from 1945, the
end of World War II, to the present day. This period is a confirma-
tion of the continued importance of these ships. The dawn of the
missile age and computerized systems led to a renaissance in de-
stroyer design and cemented its place as the backbone of world
navies. One of the chief reasons behind the importance of destroy-
ers in the postwar era was the fact that they were cheaper surface
combatants to build than cruisers and aircraft carriers. Destroyers,
although smaller, retained the weapons and systems necessary for
the strategic requirements of the world’s major powers. This section
also details the further changes in training for sailors who were
brought on by the missile and computer ages. Today’s sailors, who
enjoy shipboard conditions that are far improved from those of the
past, must be more knowledgeable than their counterparts from the
middle twentieth century. The conclusion stresses the great impor-
tance of these vessels not only as tools for war but also as instru-
ments of peace through the projection of power overseas by the
Great Powers.
The final part of this work is a reference section that contains the
design specifications and fate of the most important destroyers built.
Each entry includes a picture, description, and major characteristics.
The technical specifications include the dimensions of the hull, ar-
mor, armaments, means of propulsion, crew complement, the num-
ber of each vessel built, and a description of the fate of each de-
stroyer. This information provides more detailed information than
x PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
that included in the text and serves to strengthen the reader’s under-
standing of the appearance and mechanics of the destroyer.
I owe a great debt of gratitude to a multitude of people whose
support has made this work possible. The professional assistance
and encouragement of Spencer C. Tucker, aside from the opportu-
nity he has given to me to write for this series, has been invaluable. I
would also like to thank Alicia Merritt, senior acquisitions editor at
ABC-CLIO, and the publishing house’s editorial staff for their con-
sistently helpful guidance.
In addition to the aid of professionals, this work was possible due
to the help of family and friends. The encouragement of Iana, my
wife, has been invaluable. Combined with her efforts has been the
unwavering and ever-present support of my parents, Dr. and Mrs.
Larry Osborne, my brother, Jack E. Osborne, and my extended family.
Eric W. Osborne
INTRODUCTION TO
ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF WEAPONS
AND WARFARE SERIES
Weapons both fascinate and repel. They are used to kill and
maim individuals and to destroy states and societies, and occasion-
ally whole civilizations, and with these the greatest of man’s cultural
and artistic accomplishments. Throughout history tools of war have
been the instruments of conquest, invasion, and enslavement, but
they have also been used to check evil and to maintain peace.
Weapons have evolved over time to become both more lethal and
more complex. For the greater part of man’s existence, combat was
fought at the length of an arm or at such short range as to represent
no real difference; battle was fought within line of sight and seldom
lasted more than the hours of daylight of a single day. Thus individ-
ual weapons that began with the rock and the club proceeded
through the sling and boomerang, bow and arrow, sword and axe, to
gunpowder weapons of the rifle and machine gun of the late nine-
teenth century. Study of the evolution of these weapons tells us
much about human ingenuity, the technology of the time, and the
societies that produced them. The greater part of technological de-
velopment of weaponry has taken part in the last two centuries, es-
pecially the twentieth century. In this process, plowshares have been
beaten into swords; the tank, for example, evolved from the agricul-
tural caterpillar tractor. Occasionally, the process is reversed and
military technology has impacted society in a positive way. Thus
modern civilian medicine has greatly benefitted from advances to
save soldiers’ lives, and weapons technology has impacted such
areas as civilian transportation or atomic power.
xi
xii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
SERIES INTRODUCTION
Weapons can have a profound impact on society. Gunpowder

weapons, for example, were an important factor in ending the era of
the armed knight and the Feudal Age. They installed a kind of rough
democracy on the battlefield, making “all men alike tall.” We can
only wonder what effect weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
might have on our own time and civilization.
This series will trace the evolution of a variety of key weapons sys-
tems, describe the major changes that occurred in each, and illus-
trate and identify the key types. Each volume begins with a descrip-
tion of the particular weapons system and traces its evolution, while
discussing its historical, social, and political contexts. This is fol-
lowed by a heavily illustrated section that is arranged more or less
along chronological lines that provides more precise information on
at least 80 key variants of that particular weapons system. Each vol-
ume contains a glossary of terms, a bibliography of leading books on
that particular subject, and an index.
Individual volumes in the series, each written by a specialist in
that particular area of expertise, are as follows:
Ancient Weapons
Medieval Weapons
Pistols
Rifles
Machine Guns
Artillery
Tanks
Battleships
Cruisers and Battle Cruisers
Aircraft Carriers
Submarines
Military Aircraft, Origins to 1918
Military Aircraft, 1919–1945
Military Aircraft in the Jet Age
Helicopters
Ballistic Missiles
Air Defense
Destroyers
We hope that this series will be of wide interest to specialists, re-

searchers, and even general readers.
Spencer C. Tucker
Series Editor
DESTROYERS
CHAPTER 1
The Technological
Revolution Leading to
the Development of
Destroyers, 1750–1860
The destroyer is a vessel whose roles have changed markedly

since its development in the late nineteenth century. In general, a
destroyer is designed as a small, lightly protected and armed warship
capable of high speed. The type, unlike other ships such as battle-
ships and cruisers, is a relatively new weapons system in the history
of naval warfare. Few precedents exist in the Age of Fighting Sail, al-
though some naval historians equate sloops, also known as corvettes,
as forerunners of the destroyer. Sloops were designed principally to
act as escorts for merchantmen, commerce raiders, and scouts. In
an era when long-range communication, such as radio, did not exist,
sloops were also used to carry dispatches between overseas bases
and information from these to the naval leadership of their respec-
tive countries. Destroyers eventually counted the first three of these
duties of sloops, but primarily the role of escort, among the myriad
of roles that have been attached to them over the course of naval
history from the late nineteenth century, when the modern destroyer
was created, to the present day.
In the eighteenth century, sloops were small, fast warships that
mounted a battery of light guns on a single gun deck. These vessels
1
2 DESTROYERS
ranked low on the ratings system of the day that gauged the fighting
capacity of vessels. First-rate vessels—those that were the eigh-
teenth century equivalent of a modern battleship—mounted 100
guns or upward; second rate between 90 and 98 guns; third rate,
64–74; fourth rate, 50–60; fifth rate, 32–44; and sixth rate, 20–28.
Small frigates normally carried between 24 and 30 guns while larger
ones mounted 50–60 cannons. Sloops mounted between 8 and 24
guns, meaning that the larger vessels of the type fell into the sixth
rate. Smaller sloops fell outside the ranking system.
The weapons carried by sloops were normally cast-iron, smooth-
bore, muzzle-loading cannons. The alternative to iron in this era was
bronze, which had the advantage of being easier to cast. It also better
withstood the shock of firing due to its greater elasticity. Bronze can-
nons, however, were immensely expensive to produce and conse-
quently fell out of favor. They could be four times as expensive as a
piece made of iron. Whether they were made from iron or bronze,
naval cannons were capable of firing a variety of projectiles. Solid
shot, being a solid, round ball of iron, was designed to inflict damage
to the hull of an enemy vessel. Oftentimes, hits from this type of pro-
jectile did not produce holes large enough to sink a vessel. They were
more of a danger to the crews of warships in the Age of Fighting Sail
as they splintered wood upon impact, producing deadly projectiles
that could kill crewmen. This effect was preferable to sinking a ship,
as most navies of this era preferred instead to capture vessels to in-
corporate the prize into their own force. To that end, a further type of
projectile, known as chain shot, was designed to strike at the rigging
of an enemy ship with the object of dismasting it, rendering the ves-
sel incapable of maneuver and easy prey for capture. Chain shot, as
with all types of shot, weighed approximately the same as round shot
of the same size of gun for which it was being used. A typical chain
shot consisted of two balls of equal size attached by a length of chain.
Once fired, the chain between the two balls could slice though a ves-
sel’s rigging. Vessels in the Age of Fighting Sail also carried shot for
close-range actions designed to kill the crew of the opposing ship.
Grapeshot consisted of a collection of small balls contained in a
stand enclosed in canvas. Once fired, the balls would separate from
the stand to form a deadly hail of projectiles. Another type of close-
range, antipersonnel weapon was canister shot, which comprised
scrap metal or musket balls packed into a canister. Like grapeshot,
this type, once fired, would produce a deadly, tightly packed group of
projectiles. All of these were fired through inserting a charge of gun-
powder into the weapon along with the projectile.
THE TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION LEADING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF DESTROYERS 3
Sloops carried cannons on the main deck. These guns were

placed on carriages and sighted through ports cut into the sides of
the hull. The dominant gun carriage employed in a sloop was known
as a truck carriage for its four free-moving wheels that were neces-
sary due to the recoil of the weapon once fired. To prevent the larger
guns from recoiling into their crews, they were lashed by heavy
ropes, known as breeching, to the hull. These ropes were also neces-
sary at times other than combat. The pitching and rolling motion of
a sloop in a heavy sea necessitated ropes to keep the guns in place.
Otherwise, a cannon might roll down the length of the main deck,
wreaking havoc and sometimes death. Sloops also carried lighter an-
tipersonnel guns on the main deck where they were attached to the
bulwarks, or rails, of the hull. These were commonly known as
swivel guns due to the mount on which they were placed that al-
lowed the operator of the weapon to turn it by hand.
The size of these weapons varied among the world’s great naval
powers largely because officials disagreed over which type of gun
proved best in combat. By the outbreak of the French Revolution
and the Napoleonic Wars (1793–1815), many sloops of the British
Royal Navy employed 6-pounder guns as their primary armament.
In this age, guns were rated by the weight of the ball that they fired
rather than the diameter of the bore. A 6-pounder, consequently,
fired a solid shot that weighed 6 pounds. The 6-pounder guns of the
British Navy varied in size from 6 feet to 8 feet, 6 inches long. They
weighed between 17 and 22 hundredweight (cwt), meaning that
their weight varied from 1,904 pounds to 2,464 pounds. By compar-
ison, the main armament of some frigates of the Royal Navy, being
the predecessors of modern-day cruisers, was the 12-pounder gun
that measured between 7 feet and 9 feet long and weighed between
2,352 pounds and 3,808 pounds.1 In addition to these guns, some
sloops of the late eighteenth century, and especially the early nine-
teenth century, carried a relatively new weapon called the car-
ronade. This weapon was named after the Carron Company of Scot-
land that produced a prototype model in 1776. These were short
pieces that had a large muzzle bore. They were particularly useful in
smaller ships like sloops due to their lighter weight. In the British
Navy, the typical carronade of sloops was the 24-pounder that
weighed 1,456 pounds as opposed to the 1,904 pounds of the small-
est 6-pounder long gun.2 Carronades were designed to fire heavy
shot at close range to smash through the hulls of opposing vessels.
Their chief drawback in battle was shorter range against regular
long guns.
4 DESTROYERS
Regardless of the type, guns were carried to sea on an extremely

complex weapons system comprising two major parts: hull and rig-
ging. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the hulls of sloops
exceeded 100 feet in length and displaced between 400 and 600
tons. These ships were constructed entirely of wood, the dominant
material being oak due to its extreme strength and, consequently, its
ability to resist cannon fire. Some sloops, however, were also built
with fir and teak. The first step in the construction was to lay down
the keel, the backbone of a ship. It was the lowest piece of timber in
the hull and extended the length of the hull down the centerline.
The keel did not consist of one piece of wood. Instead, it was made
of several pieces that overlapped. These were attached together by
joints known as scarphs. Once the keel was finished, shipbuilders
began to construct the frame, which was composed of giant ribs that
were attached to the keel. These, like the keel itself, were made out
of several pieces of timber joined together. The decks were then
constructed on longitudinal frames within the ribs. These frames as
well as the decks themselves had to be made of the strongest mat-
erial available to support the ship’s ordnance. This process was fol-
lowed by the fitting of hull planks to the outside of the hull as the
skin of the vessel. To prevent leaking, these planks were sealed using
a combination of rope and pitch inserted into the cracks. Beginning
in the 1770s, the hulls of sloops were fitted with a copper sheathing
below the waterline to prevent rotting. An equally important use for
sheathing was to curtail the growth of marine organisms such as
barnacles on the hull that created excess drag on the ship and con-
sequently impeded speed.
The layout of the hull varied according to the type of sloop. All
versions had two decks, one being the main deck where the arma-
ment was placed, the other (lower) deck intended for the storage of
supplies and crew accommodations. Beyond this universal construc-
tion, some large sloops had quarterdecks and forecastles. A quarter-
deck is a deck in the stern portion of a vessel that is situated higher
than the main deck and, in the Age of Fighting Sail, was usually re-
served for officers. It was designated also as an area for conducting
official and ceremonial functions. A forecastle is a deck in the bow
of a ship that is, like the quarterdeck, raised higher than the main
deck. This area can be used to accommodate crew members. A more
common hull configuration, however, was the flush deck, being a
hull that simply has the main deck as its highest deck.
Coupled with the hull was the rigging. Mounted on giant masts,
the sails of the vessel provided the mode of propulsion by harnessing
the wind. Sloops carried either three or two masts depending on the
size of the ship. Ship-rigged sloops were those with three masts, be-
ing the foremast, or mast in the forward part of the hull; the main-
mast located amidships; and the mizzenmast sited in the stern. Brig-
rigged sloops, with two masts, carried them forward amidships and
aft amidships. These masts were, like the other parts, made out of
several pieces joined together and rested on giant blocks of wood in
the bottom of the hull. The largest was the mainmast in ship-rigged
sloops. Masts were held in place at first by rope, but in the early
nineteenth century this practice gave way to the use of iron bands.
Attached to these giant masts were cross yards from which sails,
made of canvas, were hung to catch the wind. The rigging of sloops
could yield speeds in excess of 14 knots.
Daily life for the sailors who manned these vessels was demand-
ing and harsh. These men constantly drilled to ensure maximum ef-
ficiency in combat. This practice was especially necessary given the
lack of formal training prevalent among seamen. Although many of
the ordinary sailors in the Age of Fighting Sail were recruited from
the merchant service, there were also a great number of individuals
with no experience at sea. These men included foreigners in search
of a living in the employ of another country’s navy, prisoners, con-
scripts in the case of navies such as that of France, and civilians
seized for the service by means of impressment. The work of im-
pressments entailed the use of so-called press gangs composed either
of sailors already in naval service or men who were specifically em-
ployed for the job. The unfortunate individuals captured by such
groups, as well as all other new seamen, had little or no knowledge
of how to operate a warship. Practical experience through drill at
sea was also important for officers, as there were few naval schools
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Those that did
exist, like Britain’s Royal Naval College at Portsmouth, founded in
1729, did not enjoy high enrollment until the nineteenth century
due to the aversion of officers to formal studies.
The conditions under which the officers and crews worked and
lived offered very little comfort at the end of a trying day of work.
The best-disposed of the crew was, of course, the captain, who en-
joyed a cabin located in the stern of a sloop that spanned the beam
of the hull. The best-disposed sloop commanders were those who
had charge of a sloop that possessed a quarterdeck. In these vessels,
the captain’s cabin was located underneath the quarterdeck and had
windows that enclosed the rear, sternmost portion of the room. In
flush-decked vessels, the commander’s cabin oftentimes did not
6 DESTROYERS
have stern windows, as the cabin was located on the lower deck. Of-
ficers also had their own cabins, which were small and placed on
either side of the vessel on the lower deck. Oftentimes, the rooms
allotted to the officers were no more than canvas curtains cordoning
off an area for the individual. Some were more elaborately built, be-
ing canvas stretched over wooden beams to create makeshift walls.
Aside from these accommodations, sloops were very cramped ves-
sels; most of the interior space was filled with the ship’s equipment
and stores. In sloops, the lesser officers and men consequently slept
in hammocks strung from beams on the lower deck. The crews also
ate their meals on this level. This lower deck was generally lacking
in natural light.
Adding to this discomfort was the state of the vessel itself. Crew-
men lived in a constantly damp and dirty environment where rats
and other vermin were commonplace. Many of these unwelcome
passengers made their presence known when the crew ate their
meals. Oftentimes, their bread, stored in casks below decks, was
moldy and inundated with weevils. These insects were so prevalent
that crews took it as commonplace to break apart a biscuit at its
center, where most of the weevils were, and simply scrape them out
with a knife. Equally poor was the meat, which was procured from
local slaughterhouses before a ship set sail and then stored in casks.
Meat was frequently infested with worms over the course of a voy-
age and, although it could be eaten, was certainly no comfort to the
crew. Salting the meat before packaging it, which became a com-
mon practice to make it last longer, could extend the life of food, but
crewmen oftentimes could not taste the meat due to the heavy salt.
Indeed, the poor diet of the crew was a major reason for a variety of
potentially fatal illnesses. One of these was scurvy, which resulted
from a lack of vitamin C in the diet and persisted through most of
the Age of Fighting Sail. This disease quickly produced bleeding
gums and would oftentimes open previously healed wounds.
Hygiene was sometimes a problem for those who manned sloops
in the Age of Fighting Sail. The toilets of these ships, known as
heads, were originally made up of planks with a hole in the center
that were located at the sides of the vessel in the bow. Later, heads
were placed in the bow below decks with sluices that led out of the
ship. Sometimes, officers and crew alike used these facilities, which
were uncomfortable as the pitching motion of a sloop or heavy
winds made them difficult to use. The result was that in periods of
heavy seas the bilge of a sloop, being the lowermost portions of the
hull, might contain human excrement, as the men could not relieve
themselves in the heads. In many sloops, this arrangement might be

alleviated for officers through the use of chamber pots contained in
their living quarters on the lower deck. This, however, was little bet-
ter than the head due to the same problem of the pitching and
rolling motion of the vessel. Only the captain, who sometimes had a
toilet within his cabin, was better off than the rest. Even he, how-
ever, had to endure the foul stench that sometimes arose from the
ship while at sea. This was particularly a problem when sloops, as
well as any other vessel, were in stormy seas when men could not re-
lieve themselves in the head due to the pitching motion. Often-
times, crewmen would relieve themselves in the hold in these condi-
tions. The smell could also be bad when at anchor in a harbor after
protracted periods at sea. Ships that were not well-cleaned did not
benefit from the wind generated from the ship’s movement through
the seas, as ventilation in the hull of a sailing vessel was oftentimes
poor. Consequently, the odor was not carried away.
Bathing in these conditions offered little comfort. Due to the lack
of fresh water aboard, the officers and men all washed with salt-
water. The sailors, however, did not bathe frequently, which added
to the poor hygiene onboard. Oftentimes, when they did, they only
had the opportunity to wash their hands and faces, and soap was not
a required part of a ship’s stores in the Age of Fighting Sail. Clothing
regularly went unwashed. This state of affairs contributed to the
spread of fleas and lice. As with the lack of a proper nutritional diet,
this problem could prove deadly, as lice carried typhus.
Many of these conditions were partially alleviated either at the
outbreak or during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars.
Food became more tolerable owing to better storage, and hygiene
was somewhat improved. Medical problems like scurvy were also
dealt with, as in the case of the British Royal Navy in 1795, when
lemons and oranges became a mandated part of a sailor’s diet. Even
so, conditions in cruising warships remained harsh well past the Age
of Fighting Sail.
In addition to all these hardships, sailors had to endure a rigid
system of discipline where infractions were often dealt with through
a variety of painful, sometimes fatal punishments. Many of these
were given to officers and men through a court-martial, a hearing in
port where a panel of officers deliberated the fate of an individual
accused of either breaking a captain’s disciplinary code, in the case
of lesser officers and ordinary seamen, or behaving poorly in battle.
One common punishment was flogging, where an individual was
tied down and whipped on his back. In the British Royal Navy at the
8 DESTROYERS
end of the eighteenth century, convicted people could be sentenced

to between 100 and 1,000 lashes. These lashings could dreadfully
injure a person to the point of death. This practice was also com-
mon while at sea, where offenses that warranted flogging included
drunkenness, sleeping on duty, neglect of duty, disobedience, and
theft. Another punishment at sea was keelhauling, where an individ-
ual would be tied to a rope, weighted down, and dragged under-
neath the keel of a ship from one side of the vessel to the other. The
chances of surviving keelhauling were slight. In addition to flogging,
which carried with it a chance of death and keelhauling that virtu-
ally ensured it, officers and men alike had to be wary of the death
penalty. Among the reasons for capital punishment were cowardice
in battle and mutiny. The method varied based on the rank of the
convicted individual. Seamen were oftentimes hanged from the rig-
ging of a ship; officers were shot.
Nevertheless, despite the rigid discipline and poor conditions, a
well-trained crew ensured that a sloop would have both the speed
and the effective firepower to successfully accomplish its vital roles.
These were exhibited in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries through the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars and
other conflicts that took place in the same period. Perhaps the most
important role was commerce protection. Sloops traveled with con-
voys of merchantmen to keep them sailing in an orderly fashion as a
group and to ward off potential commerce raiders. As larger frigates
were oftentimes used to raid commerce, sloops could be accompa-
nied by frigates on this duty. This task was especially vital to Great
Britain, which relied on a large portion of its wartime supply from
overseas.
Sloops were also used as parts of squadrons tasked with hunting
down commerce raiders. One case took place in the War of 1812
that pitted the United States against Great Britain. The United
States, as it did not possess a fleet large enough to meet that of
Britain in a pitched engagement, used its vessels to prey on Britain’s
merchant shipping with the object of causing economic hardship
that might damage its war effort materially or sap its population’s
will to fight. One of these commerce raiders was the frigate Essex
under the command of Captain David Porter. Essex raided British
shipping in the South Atlantic and off the Pacific coast of South
America. From 12 December 1812 to 13 July 1813, Porter captured
15 vessels of varying types that were primarily part of the British Pa-
cific whaling fleet.3 On 28 March 1814, off the coast of Valparaiso,
Chile, Essex engaged the British frigate Phoebe and the sloop
Cherub that had been dispatched to hunt down Essex. In the open-
ing phase of the battle, Cherub closed to short range at the stern of
Essex and fired broadsides into the U.S. vessel. The sloop, however,
later was forced to bear off as the fire from Essex proved damaging.
Nevertheless, the long guns of Cherub and Phoebe reduced Essex to
shambles, as the U.S. vessel was armed largely with shorter-range
carronades and could not close to proper range. As a result, Porter
was forced to surrender his vessel.
Sloops also were used as commerce raiders. An example occurred
during the Napoleonic Wars with the operations between 1798 and
1800 of the sloop Netley. Armed with 24-pounder carronades, Netley
cruised in the English Channel off the French coast and also off the
coasts of Spain and Portugal. Netley employed its high speed to run
down merchantmen—either enemy ships or neutral vessels violating
Britain’s blockade of France—and forced them to surrender. Once
the vessel had hauled down its colors, the sloop sent a boarding
party that commandeered the merchantmen and all of its cargo as
prizes of war. The vessel and cargo subsequently was sold to the
profit of the officers and captain of Netley.
Sloops were also used during the French Revolution and the
Napoleonic Wars in a corollary to commerce raiding: the imposition
of blockades. In the Age of Fighting Sail, this consisted of deploying
a cordon of warships around the coastline of an enemy power to pre-
vent the entrance or exit of merchantmen carrying supplies. Great
Britain was the principal user of this tactic and first employed a sys-
tematic blockade in the 1756–1763 Seven Years’ War. During the
French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, the British attempted to
deny France and its allies the use of the sea through a blockade of
the entire coastline of those parts of Europe under the control of
French revolutionary forces and later Napoleon. There were two ob-
jectives to this operation. The first was to starve France’s war effort
and consequently generate hardship for the people under French
rule. The second was to prevent the warships of France and its allies
from leaving their ports to prey on British shipping.
At the opening of the conflict in 1793, the British employed an
open blockade strategy. While Britain’s ships-of-the-line remained in
a state of readiness in port, a squadron of frigates sailed within vi-
sual range of French ports. They were accompanied by sloops and
smaller vessels such as cutters and schooners. Sloops, but mostly
frigates, overhauled any merchantman they encountered to ascer-
tain their destination and the nature of their cargo. If the cargo was
proven to be contraband—meaning goods that could be used for
10 DESTROYERS
military purposes by the French—the ship and cargo could be

seized. In the case of enemy warships leaving port, sloops, schoon-
ers, and cutters dispatched the information to the battle fleet, which
would sortie and attempt to destroy the enemy while at sea. This lat-
ter duty was later altered by the adoption of a close blockade strat-
egy that did not greatly involve sloops. This plan entailed having
ships-of-the-line sail at a distance farther out from French ports.
Sloops figured most heavily in coastal blockades, as the shallow
draft of these ships—being the depth of water to which a vessel’s
hull sinks as it floats—allowed them to maintain station in shallow
depths of water that could not be traversed by larger warships.
Britain’s blockading effort produced economic hardships for France.
Although it did not force France to surrender, the blockade had out-
standing results and led Napoleon in late 1807 to establish his Con-
tinental System as a reprisal to the British action. This system was
an embargo of British goods entering Europe. The Continental Sys-
tem created great economic hardship for European people under
the control of Napoleon and ultimately led to the rebellion of Russia
in 1810 against the system. Napoleon’s attempt to force Russia to
heel led to his 1812 invasion of Russia, which proved a crushing de-
feat for the French emperor. Although the role of blockade did not
translate to destroyers of the modern era, it was a very important
role for its predecessor, the sloop, during the Age of Fighting Sail.
Regardless of the duty, the lives of sailors in battle in the Age of
Fighting Sail bordered on the horrific. Solid shot not only damaged a
ship but also killed and badly wounded members of the crew. The
wooden sides and fittings of a ship when hit by solid shot splintered
and created a hail of additional projectiles. A direct hit on a human
being by such shot was almost always fatal. Sailors oftentimes had
arms and legs ripped off of their bodies when hit by solid shot. Others
were decapitated by the projectile. Sometimes, a solid shot would lit-
erally cleave an individual in half. The effects of grapeshot were
equally as terrible. The relatively small balls of this type of projectile
could sweep a ship’s main deck of personnel. Some of these unfortu-
nate sailors were almost obliterated by the damage caused by the
multiple balls. Chain shot, if it was fired too low, also proved devas-
tating to human beings, as it could slice several men in half rather
than the masts that they were intended to destroy. If it cut through a
mast, the crew had to contend with huge pieces of wood plummeting
to the main deck. Adding to these threats was the possibility of fire,
as solid shot could be heated beforehand. The potential effect on a
wooden warship was devastating. Not only could the crew be inciner-
ated, the ship’s magazine—being the storage area for powder and
shot—could blow up and obliterate everyone aboard. All told, the
decks of a sloop in the Age of Fighting Sail might literally have blood
running down their length as a result of combat. The experience of
combat in this era is well described by one seaman who related a bat-
tle where “the whole scene grew indescribably confused and horrible;
it was like some awfully tremendous thunderstorm, whose deafening
roar is attended by incessant streaks of lightening, carrying death in
every flash and strewing the ground with the victims of its wrath:
only, in our case, the scene was rendered more horrible than that, by
the presence of torrents of blood which dyed our decks.”4
Many wounded seamen who survived the nightmarish experience
of combat were confronted with being permanently crippled or dy-
ing from their wounds. Surgeons of the Age of Fighting Sail ex-
tracted splinters, set broken bones, and on many occasions ampu-
tated limbs. Oftentimes, the impact of an object severely damaged
limbs to the point where the only way to provide a chance of survival
for the wounded patient was to remove them. This procedure was
also a distinct possibility for a badly wounded sailor given the state
of medical science, which did not permit for overly complex recon-
structive surgery. Amputation did not always ensure survival. Many
subsequently died of shock or loss of blood in the operation. Aside
from these horrors, seamen had to contend with the fact that med-
ical science had not progressed far enough in the Age of Fighting
Sail concerning infection. Many died due to the festering of a
wound or fever from infection.
Sailors also suffered when their ship foundered from damage sus-
tained in battle. This occurrence was rare, as the buoyancy of wood
permitted a large amount of flooding before a warship was in danger
of foundering. When it did occur, many sailors never made it off of
their vessels, as they were trapped below decks, particularly if the
vessel capsized. Others died in the water through exposure to the ele-
ments, which was a particular danger in areas of the Atlantic Ocean.
The period spanning the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars
was the golden age of warfare in the Age of Fighting Sail and per-
haps the greatest contests that showcased the roles of the sloop.
These conflicts, however, also represent the last great war at sea for
sailing sloops and, indeed, all vessels of the Age of Fighting Sail. The
years directly following the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars
were the beginning of an era of enormous technological innovation
that transformed naval warfare, ended the Age of Fighting Sail, and
made the modern-day destroyer possible.
12 DESTROYERS
Steam propulsion was the first innovation of the new age. The po-
tential advantage of a vessel equipped with steam engines was enor-
mous. A warship that possessed them was not limited in its maneu-
vering in combat by the wind, whose direction changed on a regular
basis. The concept of steam propulsion was not new in the early
nineteenth century. James Watt, a British inventor, produced the
first moderately efficient steam engine in 1769. Even so, Watt’s cre-
ation did not herald a revolution in naval propulsion overnight due
to the fact that harnessing the power of steam was impeded by tech-
nological problems. Early steam engines were heavy and conse-
quently could not be fitted easily inside a wooden-hulled warship.
Such a weighty propulsion plant left little space for guns, stores, and
crew. If the weight of the engine, weapons, supplies, and crew ex-
ceeded the buoyancy provided by the hull, the vessel would sink. Ex-
acerbating this problem were the more conservative-minded naval
officials of the period, who maintained that sails were far more reli-
able than the new invention of steam propulsion. Consequently, the
first use of a steam engine in a vessel was not until 1783 when a
French nobleman, the Marquis Jouffroy d’Abbans, financed an un-
armed steamer named the Pyroscaphe in a trip up the River Sâone.
Others followed d’Abbans by launching steam-powered merchant
vessels and, occasionally, warships. One of the earliest examples of a
steam-engine warship came in 1793 in Great Britain when the Earl
of Stanhope envisioned a vessel using steam-driven paddles. This ex-
perimental craft was the Kent, which proved to be a failure. By 1797
the ship’s engine, after having suffered repeated breakdowns and
yielding poor performance, was removed. Attempts to incorporate
steam propulsion in warships also resulted in failure. In 1813, U.S.
inventor Robert Fulton submitted plans to the U.S. government for a
steam-powered warship. With the authorization of Congress in 1814,
Fulton oversaw construction of Demologos. Commissioned into the
U.S. Navy in June 1815, the hull of this vessel, composed of two sep-
arate hulls joined together in the configuration of a catamaran,
measured 153 feet, 2 inches by 56 feet and displaced 2,475 tons.
The armament consisted of 24 32-pounder guns. It was fitted with a
steam engine in one of its hulls, while the other housed a boiler. De-
spite the groundbreaking design, Demologos was not a success. The
propulsion plant, which delivered its power to one large paddle wheel
housed between the two hulls, could produce a maximum speed of
only 5 knots. This low speed obviated the vessel’s use as a viable war-
ship. The low speed meant the ship was never completed for service.
It probably never went to sea after its trial, being its test run.
The early experiments with steam power made its use in warships
a dubious proposition. Aside from mechanical unreliability and in-
ability to produce high speed was the glaring deficiency of fuel con-
sumption. A tremendous amount of fuel—coal at the time—was
necessary to steam short distances in the early steam-powered ships.
One such early vessel, Rhadamanthus, which was laid down in 1831
as one of the British Royal Navy’s early steamers, is an example of
the problem. This vessel was small, displacing only 813 tons, and
shipped both a steam engine and sails for propulsion. On 21 April
1833, Rhadamanthus left Plymouth, England, and became the first
British steamship to cross the Atlantic Ocean. By the time it
reached the island of Madeira to recoal, it had consumed 320 tons.5
This high consumption was only a fraction of what might have been
consumed had the vessel not made part of the journey through the
use of sails. The problem of fuel inefficiency is more evident
through a calculation that revealed that Rhadamanthus required
188 tons of coal to steam for 10 days.6
Yet another problem handicapped steamers like Rhadamanthus.
Early boilers were not well-machined and were subject to blowing
up if too much steam pressure was built up. This possibility posed a
threat, as boilers were seated at the bottom of the hull. The explo-
sion of a boiler could blow a hole in the bottom of the hull or the
sides below the waterline and cripple or sink the ship. Aside from
material damage, the explosion could also be costly in human life by
killing engineers and stokers who worked the engines and boilers.
Further compounding the inefficiency of early steam vessels was
transferring the power of the engines to the water to propel the ship.
The earliest machinery to accomplish this task was the paddle wheel,
giant wheels containing blades that were much like those of a water
mill and were connected to the engine plant and dipped into the sea.
Normally one was mounted on each side amidships. The paddle
wheel had numerous weaknesses when applied to warships. Fore-
most was the general inefficiency of the wheel, as the action of the
large blades hitting the water expended power that could otherwise
be used to propel the ship. There were attempts to correct this prob-
lem, such as the invention of the cycloidal wheel in 1833 that re-
placed the large blades of the wheel with narrower, staggered ones.
Such innovations proved unable to fully surmount the problem.
In addition, in a stormy, rough sea a ship had the tendency to
pitch and roll, and one of the wheels might consequently be far out
of the water while the other was far more deeply submerged than
normal. Such a situation would put an enormous amount of strain
14 DESTROYERS
on the machinery as one wheel encountered far more drag from the
water than the other. Finally, the paddle wheel had drawbacks in
battle. As warships of the age still mounted weaponry on their sides,
the paddle wheel in most cases decreased the number of guns that
could be mounted on the ship. The wheels also proved vulnerable
targets for enemy fire. Although most naval powers attempted to
protect them by encasing the upper halves in armored boxes, the
wheels could still be shot away and the vessel disabled.
Despite the drawbacks of steam propulsion and the paddle wheel,
the world’s major naval powers could not afford to ignore the steam
engine. The British warship Rhadamanthus and others like it were
invaluable, as the potential of steam power was great. In 1832, the
year before its voyage across the Atlantic Ocean, Rhadamanthus had
proved the value of steam power in a blockade of the Netherlands
coast in support of French operations to expel Dutch troops from
Belgium. The vessel was able to stay on station regardless of chang-
ing wind patterns. Aside from this practical consideration, it was
better in the long run to embrace the new system rather than be left
behind by other powers.
Before 1840, most steamers were small dispatch boats. British
vessels such as Rhadamanthus were the order of the day. Indeed,
France had set the precedent for this vessel in 1829 with the launch
of Sphinx, its first steam-powered warship, at the port of Brest. The
hull of Sphinx measured 151 feet, 6 inches by 26 feet, 4 inches and
displaced 777 tons. Its engine, produced in Great Britain (the
French did not start building their own steam plants until 1848),
was capable of a maximum speed of 7 knots. The vessel also was
equipped with sails. French shipyards over the next 10 years
launched 23 warships that mirrored the design of Sphinx. Other
naval powers such as Russia, the third largest naval power of the
early nineteenth century, were slow to adopt steam power despite
the recognized potential.
These early steam-powered vessels on the whole possessed so lit-
tle armament that they could hardly be considered viable warships.
The launch of the British warship Gorgon in 1837 marked a noted
departure from the dearth of weaponry. Originally rated as a first-
class paddle sloop but considered by many to be a frigate, it was a
wooden-hulled warship that measured 178 feet by 37.5 feet and dis-
placed 1,111 tons. The ship mounted two 10-inch smoothbore can-
nons, the size being the diameter of the gun barrel, and four 32-
pounder cannons. Its steam engines and paddle wheels produced a
speed of 10 knots. The portion of the paddle wheels above water was
enclosed in lightly armored boxes to protect them from enemy fire.

Typical of all steam-powered warships of the early age of steam,
Gorgon was also equipped with sails because of the tremendous
amount of coal needed to fuel the engines. British naval officials
evaluated Gorgon as a good design, which led the British to con-
struct larger vessels resembling it.
Construction on paddle wheel warships proceeded apace after
1837 by some of the world’s maritime powers. Sloops comprised a
large portion of the production programs of these powers. By 1860,
France possessed 56 paddle wheel sloops, making it the largest force
in the world. Great Britain operated 36 and the Austrian Empire
(later the Austro-Hungarian Empire) maintained 13. The United
States possessed two paddle wheel sloops.7
These ships, however, were approaching obsolescence by 1860
due to another innovation in propulsion that had a tremendous im-
pact on warship design. The invention of the screw propeller
negated the disadvantages that the paddle wheel posed to steam-
powered warships. Technical plans for such a system had existed
since the late eighteenth century. A step forward toward a viable
screw propeller occurred in 1800 when English inventor Edward
Shorter patented a two-blade propeller that was attached to a shaft.
The device was fitted into a transport ship in 1802, with the shaft
being cranked by some 10 seamen. The top speed attained was only
1.5 knots, but the test did show the viability of screw propulsion.
Shorter’s work was taken farther by Englishman Francis Petit
Smith and John Erickson, a Swedish-born inventor. In 1836, these
two individuals, working independently of one another, produced
designs for steam propulsion plants that used screw propellers.
Smith’s design led to the construction of the Francis Smith, which
was equipped with a single screw propeller. The hull of this diminu-
tive vessel measured 31 feet, 11 inches by 5 feet, 6 inches and dis-
placed 6 tons. Due to its size, the vessel spent most of its successful
career after launching in late 1836 on the canal system that ran
through the British Isles. Erickson’s design produced the Francis B.
Ogden, which was only slightly larger than Smith’s craft. Launched
in 1837, the vessel measured only 45 feet by 8 feet, which classified
it as a launch. It possessed two screw propellers that each measured
5 feet, 2 inches in diameter. Upon its first trial, the Francis B. Ogden
attained a speed of 10 knots.
Larger ships soon followed those of Smith and Erickson. Smith’s
work attracted considerable attention in the British Admiralty, the
administrative board of the Royal Navy, but it was not yet inclined to
16 DESTROYERS
decide whether to adopt the screw propeller for warships. In 1838,

the British Admiralty called for a further demonstration of the screw
propeller in a vessel of larger size. This led to the construction in the
same year of Archimedes.
Launched in October 1838, the ship measured 125 feet by 22
feet, 6 inches and displaced 237 tons. It shipped a steam engine and
propeller along with a sailing rig in case the engine broke down. Be-
tween April and May 1840, Archimedes proved the superiority of the
propeller over the paddle wheel in a series of races across the En-
glish Channel against paddle wheel ships. Despite the fact that one
paddle wheel vessel was faster than Archimedes under certain
weather conditions, the naval officer in charge of the races attrib-
uted this to the larger size and greater weight of the screw-propelled
ship versus its paddle-wheeled competitor. His conclusion was that
the propeller was in fact equal if not superior to the paddle wheel in
speed and performance. On 3 April 1845, reinforcement for this
conclusion was provided by a test between the screw-propelled
steamship Rattler and the paddle-wheel equipped Alecto. The two
vessels were lashed together stern to stern in a tug-of-war. Alecto
first dragged Rattler along at a speed of 2 knots, but only due to the
fact that Rattler had not started its engine. Once it did so, Rattler
was soon towing Alecto at a speed of 2.8 knots despite Alecto’s
propulsion plant being pushed to its operational limit. This experi-
ment became much more famous than the trials of Archimedes, but
in truth the British Royal Navy and other powers had already made
their decision concerning the propeller. Paddle wheel warships re-
mained in service well after the tests involving Archimedes. Even so,
the British along with the world’s other naval powers turned away
from paddle wheels in favor of screw-propelled warships.
Besides its proven superiority over the paddle wheel in terms of
speed, the propeller had other advantages that the world’s navies
seized upon. First, the propeller obviated the problem of reduced
firepower that was inherent to paddle wheel ships. As the propeller
was mounted under the stern, ships that used it had an unob-
structed broadside and could thus mount more weaponry than pad-
dle wheelers. Second, the propeller was far less vulnerable to enemy
fire. In practical terms, the propeller also had the distinct advantage
of being able to be fitted to preexisting sailing warships.
The major maritime powers thus embarked on a program of ac-
quiring steam-powered, screw-propelled warships. A portion of
these craft were converted ships from the Age of Fighting Sail, being
old ships-of-the-line and frigates. Others were newly built, such as
the French Le Napoleon that was launched in 1850 as the world’s

first purpose-built, steam-powered, screw-propelled ship-of-the-line.
In terms of warships the size of a sloop, the majority represented
new construction. An example is a unit of the six-ship Jason-class of
wooden screw corvettes. Jason, completed in 1860, measured 225
feet by 40 feet, with a draft of 8 inches by 19 feet, and displaced
2,431 tons. It was armed primarily with 20 8-inch muzzle-loading
smoothbore guns. The vessel’s steam engine could produce a maxi-
mum speed of 12 knots. This velocity could be supplemented by the
vessel’s sailing rig. Like all vessels of this period, sails were still re-
tained owing to the high fuel consumption of the engines. By the
time of the completion of Jason, the screw sloop, or corvette, was an
integral part of battle fleets in several navies. Great Britain pos-
sessed 48 of them, while France operated 34 such vessels. Russia
counted 26, which dwarfed the number of the United States, with
6. Other countries possessed still fewer screw-propelled, steam-
powered sloops and corvettes than the United States.8
While naval powers incorporated the newest advances in propul-
sion into battle fleets, another innovation was the advent of iron-
hulled vessels. The concept of iron as a material for ship construc-
tion was not new. Iron canal boats had been in use since the late
eighteenth century, as many involved in maritime affairs recognized
its superior strength over wood and its ability to better weather the
elements. The first oceangoing iron ship was the British-built Aaron
Manby that entered service in 1822. Constructed in sections of iron
plates riveted to an iron frame, this paddle wheel steamer was rela-
tively small, measuring only 106 feet, 9 inches by 17 feet, 2 inches
and displacing 116 tons. Its size allowed for commercial travel be-
tween London and Paris, as it could steam laden with goods across
the English Channel and travel via the Thames River to London and
the River Seine to Paris. The vessel’s career is a testimony to the ad-
vantages of iron construction. Its hull suffered little damage despite
numerous groundings in shallow waters that would have caused
great damage to wooden ships. The hull also required very little
maintenance.
Given these advantages, iron was subsequently applied to warship
construction as naval officials took note of the strength of iron and
its potential to withstand enemy fire far better than the wooden
walls of the past. The first application of iron to warship construc-
tion was the British gunboat Nemesis. Laid down in 1839 and com-
pleted in January 1840, the iron hull of Nemesis measured 184 feet
by 29 feet and displaced 660 tons. This structure was revolutionary
18 DESTROYERS
for its composition and for the fact that it incorporated watertight
compartments, making the vessel the first warship fitted with this
innovation. The vessel’s means of propulsion consisted of a steam
engine connected to paddle wheels on each side of the ship and a
sail rig of two masts. Its armament originally consisted of two 32-
pounder cannons and four 6-pounders. A crew of 60–90 officers
and men manned the ship. This vessel was not designed as an
oceangoing craft but rather one capable of shore and river opera-
tions. Nemesis proved its worth in these capacities during the
1841–1843 First China War, a British imperial conflict. The vessel
was hit numerous times by enemy fire, but everything simply rico-
cheted off its hull. In one engagement, Nemesis was hit 14 times
without significant damage. Even so, there was a major problem
with ships built solely of iron that hampered its use in larger war-
ships. Iron proved brittle, especially in cold weather, which meant
that it could be a liability in war, as it had a tendency to crack upon
the impact of larger projectiles.
Between 1840 and 1860, despite this difficulty, experimentation
continued with iron-hulled warships. In 1842, U.S. inventor Robert
L. Stevens endeavored to produce the world’s first seagoing iron-
clad. Known as the Stevens Battery, it was never completed, but
other nations pursued Stevens’s goal. The world’s first significant
iron warship was the British-built paddle wheel steam frigate
Guadeloupe, built in 1842 and ordered by Mexico. Although many
of the iron-hulled, steam-powered warships proceeding Guadeloupe
were frigates and still larger craft, the world’s naval powers did ex-
tend iron construction to smaller ships. Great Britain’s first iron-
hulled sloops—termed corvettes at the time—were the three vessels
of the Volage class launched between 1870 and 1875. Other naval
powers produced iron-hulled steam sloops at the same time as the
launch of the Volage-class units.
The delay between the appearance of Guadeloupe and vessels like
those of the Volage class was the result of a temporary, generally
worldwide, cessation in the construction of iron-hulled warships in
the 1850s as concerns over the brittle nature of iron could not be
overcome. This cessation ended due to two technological innova-
tions that posed threats to wooden-walled vessels. The first was
posed by guns that fired shells rather than solid shot. Indeed, the
danger posed by shells to wooden walls had spurred the first use of
iron for the hulls of warships. Tests of this ordnance were con-
ducted by the British and the French between the middle eigh-
teenth century and early nineteenth century. Beginning in the
1820s, thanks to the work of French Colonel Henri Paixhans, who

developed the first truly reliable shell gun, the shell began to sup-
plant shot. Shells were much more destructive than shot to wooden
vessels. Round, solid balls of shot had the tendency to produce a
clean hole that could be patched. A shell, on the other hand, was de-
signed to lodge in the hull of a ship and then explode, creating an ir-
regular size hole that could be patched only with great difficulty.
The growing interest of naval powers in shell guns in the follow-
ing years necessitated the use of iron in the construction of war-
ships. Iron was also necessary given the rise of another threat to
wooden-hulled ships: rifled guns. Cutting grooves into the gun tube
of a cannon produced spin on the projectile fired. In 1742 English-
man Benjamin Robins pioneered work in rifled guns. By the 1850s,
rifled, muzzle-loading guns had gained favor due to their longer
range and greater accuracy, although production remained low due
to the higher pressure, over that of smoothbore cannon, created by
rifled guns when fired. The extra stress created by the higher pres-
sure was the result of the gun tubes of rifled guns being slightly
smaller than the smoothbore variety to help produce the spin on the
projectile.
The Crimean War (1853–1856) reinforced the need for iron in
ship construction in order to counter the power of the shell gun and
rifled guns. It also was the first large-scale conflict that tested in
battle the new naval technology that had appeared since the end of
the Napoleonic Wars. This war pitted Great Britain, France, the Ot-
toman Empire, and Sardinia against Russia. The fundamental
causes of hostilities were the Russian efforts to expand into the Ot-
toman Empire’s European possessions, something opposed by other
European powers as it upset the balance of power in the region. The
naval Battle of Sinope that occurred on 30 November 1853 proved
the value of shell guns against wooden-hulled ships, as all of the
warships involved were constructed of wood. A Russian force that
employed both solid shot and shell virtually annihilated an Ottoman
squadron that was equipped with only solid shot. This battle re-
newed world interest in iron-hulled vessels. The power of the shell
gun also generated interest in iron armor. France was the first to de-
velop viable armored vessels when it built floating batteries for use
in the Crimean War. These batteries were wooden-hulled vessels
with iron bolted to their sides. On 17 October 1855, three of these
ships were used in the bombardment of Russian forts in the Black
Sea. The iron resisted most of the hits registered on the floating
batteries.
20 DESTROYERS
The Crimean War made the construction of corvettes like Volage

possible by signaling a definitive end to the era of wooden-walled
vessels and cementing iron construction—another technological in-
novation that led to the modern destroyer—as the new production
method. It also generated greater interest in the use of iron for ar-
mor. The first manifestation appeared in August 1860 with the com-
pletion of the screw frigate Gloire, which had iron bolted to a
wooden hull. Great Britain followed in December 1860 with the
iron-hulled screw frigate Warrior. This concept would lead in the fu-
ture to protection that would at times be used on sloops and later on
destroyers.
Sloops were able to showcase new naval technology during the
U.S. Civil War (1861–1865), which occurred on the heels of the age
of the wooden-walled vessel. Warships the size of sloops participated
in the conflict in various duties for the Union. The Union strategy to
defeat the Confederacy, proposed by General Winfield Scott and ac-
cepted by President Abraham Lincoln, became known as the Ana-
conda Plan. The scheme rested on two operations to compel surren-
der. On 19 April 1861, President Lincoln declared a blockade of the
coastline of the Confederate States of America to deny it any sup-
plies from overseas. Among the vessels employed in this task were
sloops. One of the more powerful vessels of the Union blockading
force was the screw sloop Niagra, while the five screw sloops of the
Hartford class also greatly enhanced the effort. Not only were these
vessels useful in maintaining the blockade in deep waters off the
Confederate coast; their shallow drafts also made it possible for
them to patrol waters close offshore. The blockade proved effective
in stemming overseas commerce. In the first year of the conflict,
800 vessels arrived in Southern ports as opposed to 6,000 in the last
year of peace.9 Although the blockade did not force the Confederacy
from the war, it did lead to shortages in equipment and supplies
such as artillery and medicines.
The second aspect of the Anaconda Plan in which sloops took
part were coastal and river operations, as General Scott envisioned
the capture of key strongholds on the tributaries of the Mississippi
River and on the great river itself to split the Confederacy in two
and to garner launching-off points for ground assaults deep into
Confederate territory. An example of this duty is the April 1862
Union operation to capture New Orleans, the Confederacy’s largest
city and its most vital port. The Union naval force tasked with de-
feating the Confederate forces defending New Orleans—two forts
and gunboats on the river—consisted of 17 ships commanded by

Commodore David G. Farragut. Eight of these ships, and the most
powerful of Farragut’s force, were classed as either steam sloops or
steam corvettes. They were vital to the Union victory over Confeder-
ate defenses and the subsequent capture of New Orleans, a grave
blow to the Confederate war effort.
Aside from duties arising from the Anaconda Plan, sloops also en-
gaged in the role of commerce protection. The Union used screw
sloops to hunt down Confederate commerce raiders. On 19 June
1864, the Union steam sloop Kearsarge engaged the Confederate
raider Alabama outside the port of Cherbourg, France, and sunk the
Confederate vessel.
The U.S. Civil War proved to be the last instance where sloops
were used in a major conflict in the roles assigned to them during
the Age of Fighting Sail. Further technological innovation rendered
the sloop an obsolete craft and paved the way for its successor, the
destroyer. Although the technological innovations of the first half of
the nineteenth century made a modern warship like the destroyer
possible, the additional innovation of the self-propelled torpedo in
the second half of the nineteenth century led naval officials to the
new warship’s development. The creation of the self-propelled tor-
pedo heralded the age of the destroyer, a vessel that assumed some
of the roles of the sloop, as well as new roles dictated by changes in
naval warfare.
ENDNOTES
1. Brian Lavery, Nelson’s Navy: The Ships, Men, and Organisation,

1793–1815 (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1989), 80,82.
2. Ibid., p. 84.
3. Allan Millet and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Mili-
tary History of the United States of America (New York: Free Press, 1994), p.
102.
4. Dean King and John Hattendorf, eds., Every Man Will Do His Duty:
An Anthology of Firsthand Accounts from the Age of Nelson, 1792–1815
(New York: Henry Holt, 1997), p. 307.
5. David K. Brown, Before the Ironclad: Development of Ship Design,
Propulsion, and Armament in the Royal Navy, 1815–1860 (London: Con-
way Maritime Press, 1990), p. 8.
6. Spencer C. Tucker, Handbook of 19th Century Naval Warfare
(Gloucestershire, UK: Sutton Publishing, 2000), p. 53.
22 DESTROYERS
7. James L. George, History of Warships: From Ancient Times to the

Twenty-First Century (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998), p. 65.
8. Ibid.
9. Spencer C. Tucker, A Short History of the Civil War at Sea (Wilming-
ton, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2002), p. 19.
CHAPTER 2
From Experimental Vessel

to Warship, 1860–1918
The production of the self-propelled torpedo, which ultimately led

to the creation of the destroyer, was the result of decades of develop-
ment. Since the late eighteenth century during the Age of Fighting
Sail, experiments had been under way to produce a submerged
weapon that could explode in proximity to or against a vessel’s hull.
Inventors hoped that the detonation of such a device would produce
a hole below the waterline and lead to flooding that would sink the
ship. Modern underwater warfare, and the path of development to-
ward the torpedo, originated in 1778 during the American Revolu-
tionary War. Locked in an imperial war with the American colonies,
Great Britain’s navy vastly outnumbered the paltry forces of the
colonists. To offset this disadvantage at a relatively cheap price, U.S.
inventor David Bushnell created floating mines designed to detonate
upon impact with a solid object such as a warship’s hull. They con-
sisted essentially of kegs of powder that also contained a flintlock
mechanism that would release upon the shock of the keg hitting the
hull, detonating the mine. These early mines were limited in their
use due to the technology of the age. They were defensive weapons,
as they had no motive power of their own. One type relied on cur-
rents in inland waterways to sink enemy vessels at anchor. The draw-
back of using the flow of water as motive power was evident, how-
ever, upon their first use in the Revolutionary War. On 5 January
1778, David Bushnell released his floating mines down the
Delaware River to destroy British ships that rode at anchor down-
23
24 DESTROYERS
river. The river, however, moved so slowly that the mines took more
than a week to arrive at the British position, by which time many of
the warships had moved. Another model was the stationary mine,
which was anchored by a chain. This mine had the obvious draw-
back of requiring an enemy craft to pass over its position. In addition
to their having little offensive capability, these weapons also could be
employed only in shallow waters such as coastal areas and rivers.
Experiments with varying types of mines continued in the early
nineteenth century in Europe and the United States. In 1801 dur-
ing the French Napoleonic Wars, U.S. inventor Robert Fulton at-
tempted to convince Napoleon, the emperor of France, to buy his
floating mines by arguing that the best way to defeat Great Britain,
one of the emperor’s principal enemies, was to prevent the passage
into and out of the country’s ports. While Napoleon rejected the
scheme, the undaunted Fulton was able to convince the British to
invest in his weapons. Attempts in late 1804 and the subsequent
year, however, failed for essentially the same reason as Bushnell’s at-
tempt with floating mines: the weapon was at the mercy of the cur-
rents. Fulton was able to demonstrate to the British government the
destructive potential of an underwater weapon on 15 October 1805,
when he successfully detonated a mine against a vessel captured by
the British. The force of the explosion tore the hull of the vessel in
half, making it the first ship of large size to be destroyed by a mine.
Despite this success, the British withdrew their support of Fulton.
The problem of motive power remained one of the chief drawbacks
of the weapon, which continued to render it largely a defensive
weapon.
Attempts to increase offensive potential produced mines that
were attached to vessels that could propel them toward a target.
These were the earliest torpedoes. Two types predominated by the
middle nineteenth century. The first was the towed mine, attached
to the stern of a vessel by a rope or chain. The second became
known as the spar torpedo, which consisted of a mine attached to
the end of a wooden beam that projected a little more than 30 feet
over the bow of the ship that employed it. Spar torpedoes showcased
the potential of an offensive mine in the U.S. Civil War (1861–
1865). The value of this type, however, was dubious. If an attacking
vessel was successful in detonating a spar torpedo against the hull of
an enemy ship, the nearby blast could easily damage the hull of the
attacking warship. The ramifications of this problem were evident
through the experience of the Confederate submarine H. L. Hunley.
On 17 February 1864, H. L. Hunley, armed with a spar torpedo,
FROM EXPERIMENTAL VESSEL TO WARSHIP 25
sank the Union steam sloop Housatonic, giving it the dubious dis-
tinction of being the first warship destroyed by a submarine in his-
tory. The explosion, however, probably damaged the H. L. Hunley’s
hull, and it sank while trying to return to shore with the loss of its
crew.
Naval officials of the great maritime powers in subsequent years
believed that further development of the torpedo was necessary to
make it a viable weapon of naval warfare. This development oc-
curred in 1868 with the introduction of the Whitehead self-pro-
pelled torpedo. In 1865, Captain Giovanni Luppis of the Austrian
Navy had plans for a remote-controlled craft fitted with a spar tor-
pedo. An attacker could afford to lose the small boat provided that it
was unmanned. Luppis’s lack of success led him to solicit the help
of British engineer Robert Whitehead, who in 1867 produced an
improvement on the Austrian officer’s idea. His invention dispensed
with the remote-controlled craft through the inclusion of propulsion
machinery and the explosive charge in one casing. His torpedo con-
sisted of a metal tube in which a 300-pound explosive charge was
housed in the front. Behind it was enclosed a compartment full of
compressed air, stored at a pressure of 370 pounds per square inch,
that drove a motor that could produce a maximum speed of 7 knots.
Although the range of this weapon was only 200 yards at this maxi-
mum speed and only 300 yards at a reduced velocity, this develop-
ment was an enormous improvement that addressed the old prob-
lem of motive power for an underwater weapon. In 1868,
Whitehead showcased improved designs of torpedoes of both 14
inches and 16 inches in diameter that could travel up to 700 yards
at the maximum speed of 7 knots. This convinced the British of the
military potential of Whitehead’s torpedo, and they bought the
rights to Whitehead’s invention.
British naval officials then faced the question of what type of ves-
sel should be used to deploy the new weapon. A committee set up in
1872 to examine the question produced three ideas. The first envi-
sioned the construction of very small launches that could be stored
on the decks of capital ships—at this time meaning battleships—and
deployed in battle. A second proposal was fitting torpedo tubes into
the hulls of conventional warships such as battleships and cruisers.
This latter proposal found favor, and by 1880 many warships of the
British Royal Navy carried torpedoes as part of their armament.
More important for the history of the destroyer, however, was the last
suggestion, which called for the construction of specialized smaller
boats designed to mount torpedoes as their principal armament.
26 DESTROYERS
In the early 1870s the British pursued the development of ships

that conformed to the committee’s third proposal while other naval
powers, such as France, procured variants of Whitehead’s torpedo
and did the same. The efforts of the British would eventually lead to
the first destroyer. As with most naval powers at this time, the envi-
sioned vessel was intended for coastal defense against battle fleets
supporting an invasion of the homeland. The small size of the vessel
would not allow for the storage of large quantities of coal for fuel or
provisions needed for operations in the open sea. In addition, the
tiny craft would not be able to keep station in rough waters. The
first British warship designed specifically for torpedo attack was
Vesuvius, completed in 1874. The hull of Vesuvius measured only 90
feet by 22 feet by 8.5 feet, displaced 245 tons, and was fitted with
only one torpedo tube, located in the bow below the waterline, that
fired a 16 inch–diameter torpedo. To mask the ship’s approach
against an opposing vessel and thereby allow it to close within tor-
pedo range, Vesuvius had a very low freeboard, meaning that the hull
did not rise very high out of the water. It also was built without a
funnel so as not to produce a silhouette on the horizon. Smoke from
its engines was expelled out of vents on the sides of the hull.
This novel design, however, was not very successful. The draft—
the measurement of a how low a ship rode in the water—was rather
deep and consequently produced a large amount of drag. As a result,
the ship’s steam engine could produce a maximum speed of only 9.7
knots. Most newer battleships of this period, which were deemed
the principal prey of a ship like Vesuvius, were capable of faster
speeds. An example is the British Neptune, launched in 1874 and
completed in 1881, which could attain a maximum speed of 14.22
knots. Vesuvius, consequently, could not viably attack the warships it
was designed to destroy. A lightly armed, unprotected ship like Vesu-
vius had to rely on speeds in excess of its opponent not only to run
the enemy down and enable a torpedo attack but also to flee in the
face of large guns that could destroy it.
The British answer to the problem of speed came in 1877 with the
launching of Lightning, the Royal Navy’s first torpedo boat. Although
France built the world’s first torpedo boat a year earlier, Lightning is
indicative of the design of these craft. The vessel, which measured
87 feet by 10 feet, 8 inches by 5 feet, 2 inches, was smaller than
Vesuvius in the interest of greater speed. The hull of Lightning is rep-
resentative of a very important technological innovation that is still
in use today: steel hulls. As a building material, steel had been used
for centuries in weapons and some tools. The advantages were that it
was stronger and lighter than iron. The prohibitively expensive

process of smelting steel, however, obviated its use in large construc-
tion jobs such as ships. This state of affairs began to change in the
middle nineteenth century. A step forward in reducing the cost came
in 1856 when Henry Bessemer devised a new furnace to produce
steel from iron. By the early 1860s, the price of steel consequently
dropped to the point that it was being used in limited quantities on
warships. Variations in the quality of the steel produced from Besse-
mer’s process, however, hindered its widespread employment. In
1865, this problem was surmounted by a new smelting process de-
veloped by Frenchman Pierre Martin, who created a furnace based
on an 1857 design by German inventor Sir William Siemens for a
gas furnace. The quality of the steel from Martin’s furnace was bet-
ter than that of the past and further lowered the cost of the material.
In 1878, steel became still cheaper through another advance by in-
ventors Sidney Thomas and Percy Gilchrist.
These improved methods collectively led to a greater use of steel
in warship construction. The French initially led the way in the use
of cheaper steel through the completion in 1878 of Redoutable, the
world’s first steel-hulled battleship. Other nations such as Great
Britain, with vessels like Lightning, followed the French example.
The steel-hulled warships that resulted led to a virtual end to hull
construction using iron. By the early 1880s, most naval powers
would shift the majority of construction to steel. Aside from the ad-
vantage of steel, Lightning’s shallow draft as well as its very small
displacement of only 32.5 tons proved significant, as its engine
could produce a maximum speed of 19 knots. The steam propulsion
plant of this craft, as with most warships in this period, was the
compound engine. This plant was a great improvement over the
early steamship period. Instead of a single, large, reciprocating pis-
ton, the engine used one high-pressure and two low-pressure cylin-
ders. These greatly increased the power generated by the burning of
coal in the boilers while requiring less coal to produce it.
The first viable version of the compound engine was patented in
1853 and mounted in some ships as experiments, but these had
been largely unsuccessful. The key reason was that the engines were
still made of iron that could not easily withstand the added pres-
sures produced by the new process. The use of steel, however, re-
moved this problem and signaled a step toward more powerful, fuel-
efficient engines that would eventually make the retention of sails
an unnecessary feature on warships. Steam was provided by the
ship’s coal-fired locomotive boilers. The original armament of Light-
28 DESTROYERS
ning consisted of two cages, each containing a torpedo, that could

be lowered down the sides. This very tiny craft was intended to fire
torpedoes after steering the ship directly at the target to offer the
smallest silhouette and thus make it harder for enemy gunners to hit
it. Essentially a steam launch, the vessel was manned by a crew of
only 15 officers and men.
Although Lightning and others like it were still designed primarily
for coastal defense, the destructive potential of the torpedo boat be-
gan to increase in subsequent years and caused a great deal of con-
cern in British naval circles. Great Britain, the largest naval power
in the world at the time, based the power of its fleet on the battle-
ship. This large and expensive warship was designed to engage in
gunnery duels with ships of generally equal strength. It was vulner-
able, however, to torpedo attacks below the waterline. British offi-
cials recognized that the torpedo boat, being a cheap and small
craft, could destroy the mightiest ships afloat with its torpedoes. By
the early 1880s, this possibility was substantially greater owing to
advances in weapons technology. One version of the torpedo at the
close of the 1870s could travel at 18 knots with a maximum range of
600 yards. This advance was only the beginning of subsequent in-
creases in speed, range, and destructive power.
Equally alarming to the British was the fact that other naval pow-
ers were building far more seaworthy hulls for torpedo boats, en-
abling them to function outside coastal waters. Russia and France,
Britain’s chief naval rivals, were building such vessels in large num-
bers. British officials considered war versus these two powers as the
highest probability by the late 1880s. French torpedo boats were in-
creasingly capable of operating in the English Channel and formed
part of France’s naval strategy at the time, which was shaped by the
Jeune École (Young School) school of thought. This idea was the
product of the introduction of the torpedo and originated in 1869
with the work of a French captain, Baron Louis-Antoine-Richild
Grivel. He believed that naval warfare consisted of three distinct
types: on the open seas between battle fleets comprised of capital
ships, coastal warfare, and guerre de course. The latter—a war on
commerce—was advocated by Grivel in the event of war with Great
Britain. In his view, France could not contest the British on the high
seas through a pitched battle between capital ships because of
British numerical superiority. France’s economy was not strong
enough to produce battleships in a quantity to equal that of Great
Britain. Attempts to achieve parity had failed during the 1850s and
1860s.
Grivel realized, however, that France possessed one strength that

Britain did not, and it dictated the proper naval strategy for France.
Although France was completely self-sufficient in the production of
foodstuffs for its population, Britain was increasingly dependent on
food from overseas. Grivel therefore recommended a guerre de
course with a fleet comprised of small craft and cruisers rather than
battleships to starve Britain into submission in the event of war.
This concept also held true for British imports of raw materials for
industry, as a large portion was garnered from overseas. Grivel’s be-
lief was adopted by Admiral Theophile Aube, who in 1886 became
France’s minister of marine. France subsequently embarked on the
construction of torpedo boats, cruisers, and submarines to this end.
By the 1880s, Grivel’s theory appeared to hold particular weight
given the further decline of Britain’s agricultural sector, as by this
point the country relied on the majority of its food supply from over-
seas. Indeed, by 1891 Britain imported 80 percent of its annual
foodstuffs.1 The ideas of the Jeune École were particularly threaten-
ing given this fact. The strategy of the Jeune École also carried some
weight given that by 1880 Britain was responsible for 26 percent of
the world’s industry, being the leader in production of pig iron and
steel.2 This industrial strength allowed Britain to maintain its large
navy. A large number of torpedo boats employed in time of war
might disrupt that valuable trade. By 1885, rivals of Britain pos-
sessed torpedo craft in numbers that might make such a disruption
possible. The torpedo boat fleets of the allied navies of France and
Russia numbered 115 and 50 at this time.3 Many of these had lim-
ited seagoing ability.
Great Britain consequently pursued an idea to combat the torpedo
boats of its rivals. Beginning in the early 1880s, as the threat posed
by the torpedo boat assumed alarming proportions, British naval offi-
cials advocated the concept of the torpedo boat catcher. This vessel
was designed to protect the capital ships of the battle fleet against
torpedo boat attacks and evolved into the destroyer as a distinct type
of warship. An example of an early catcher is the Swift, launched in
1885. This vessel was classed as a torpedo boat but was larger and
more heavily armed than preceding warships. The hull measured 153
feet, 8 inches by 17 feet, 6 inches by 9 feet, 6 inches and displaced
152 tons. Although it carried three 14-inch torpedo tubes, one being
fixed in the bow while the other two were carried on deck, Swift was
also armed with four 3-pounder guns to attack enemy torpedo boats.
Spurred on in 1885 by an imperial crisis with Russia over Afghani-
stan, work moved forward toward a larger version of Swift. These ves-
30 DESTROYERS
sels were Rattlesnake and its three sister ships. Completed in 1888,
the hulls measured 200 feet by 23 feet by 10 feet, 4 inches and dis-
placed 550 tons. Each ship was armed with one breech-loading 5-
inch gun and six 3-pounder weapons to attack enemy torpedo boats.
The inclusion of the breech-loading weapon represents a further
technological innovation in naval warfare that became a permanent
feature on warships. Breechloaders had been in existence for cen-
turies and were first tried at sea aboard the French battleship Gloire
in 1858, but the French and other navies had reverted to the use of
muzzle loaders owing to the poor seal between gun and breech,
which allowed gases to escape while firing and could lead to the
bursting of the gun. Advances in breechloaders in the 1870s led to
the readoption of the weapon. This type of gun was far more de-
structive than the old muzzle loaders, as it could be loaded far more
quickly.
In addition to its guns, Rattlesnake and its sister ships were also
armed with four 14-inch torpedo tubes. Unlike later torpedo boat
catchers, these ships also incorporated a .75-inch protective deck of
armor to shield machinery and engines from plunging gunfire. They
were manned by a crew of 66 officers and men. The maximum
speed of 19.25 knots was provided by a new engine, yet another of
the many technological innovations of the day. First introduced in
the mid-1870s and perfected in 1881, this development was known
as the triple-expansion engine. Its giant pistons compressed steam
from the boilers in three stages. This process increased the power of
the engine. Triple-expansion engines could generate steam pres-
sures of 60 pounds per square inch as opposed to compound en-
gines that produced between 25 and 30 pounds per square inch.
The new propulsion plant also consumed less fuel due to greater ef-
ficiency. The result was that a ship equipped with the triple-expan-
sion engine could steam greater distances without the need to re-
coal and could keep station against the increasingly seaworthy boats
of opposing navies.
Although armed with torpedoes, Rattlesnake and craft of the
same design became known in the British service as torpedo gun-
boats (designation: TGB). Between 1892 and 1894, Britain built an-
other three classes of TGB that numbered 32 boats. Each class was
progressively larger; maximum speeds ranged from 18 to 19 knots.
An example is a vessel of the Dryad class that measured 250 feet pp
(the length of a ship from the perpendicular bulkhead in the bow to
that of the stern) by 30 feet, 6 inches by 11 feet, 6 inches and dis-
placed 1,070 tons. It was armed with five 18-inch torpedo tubes,
two 4.7-inch guns, four 6-pounders, and one machine gun. The ves-
sel’s triple-expansion engine produced a maximum speed of 18.2
knots. The crew complement was 120 officers and men.
These first torpedo boat catchers, despite being an innovative de-
sign, proved ineffective due to a host of problems. The biggest was
that the vessels were too slow to hunt down the torpedo boats they
were designed to destroy. For instance, French torpedo boats
launched in 1887 were capable of a maximum speed of 20 knots.
The early torpedo boat catchers were also still limited in range de-
spite the increase in size and were not very seaworthy owing to their
lightly built hulls and low freeboards. Finally, the torpedo boat
catchers were unreliable. Their locomotive boilers strained to pro-
duce the steam necessary to attain high speeds and the vibration of
the reciprocating triple-expansion engines could shake fragile hulls
apart. With the exception of speed, problems would continue to
plague destroyers up to World War I.
Despite such shortcomings, however, the need to pursue better
designs received further reinforcement from experiences of torpedo
attacks around the world. In the 1891 Chilean civil war, the battle-
ship Blanco Encalada was sunk by the torpedo boat Almirante
Lynch. This case merely reinforced the threat of the torpedo to big
surface warships and was the first time that a self-propelled torpedo
sank an armored vessel. Further reinforcement was provided at the
same time by the alarming numbers of torpedo boats in world
navies. By 1890, Great Britain had 186 torpedo boats, but France
and Russia operated 220 and 152, respectively. Other powers also
had high numbers of the craft. Germany possessed 143, while Italy
maintained 129 torpedo boats.4 These craft were increasingly sea-
worthy and carried torpedoes of increasing range.
This environment led the British in 1892 to establish a new de-
sign committee to examine designs of the torpedo boat catcher.
Called in March 1892 by Admiral John Fisher, Third Sea Lord and
controller of the navy, who placed great faith in technological inno-
vation, it was tasked with the job of producing a ship capable of a
maximum speed of 27 knots. This vessel became known as a torpedo
boat destroyer (designation: TBD); the name was subsequently
shortened to destroyer by the turn of the century. Basically an en-
larged torpedo boat, its primary purpose remained defense of the
battle fleet against torpedo attack, but as a portent of the future the
idea existed that this vessel could also assume the torpedo boat’s
role of mounting torpedo attacks. These warships therefore main-
tained a mixed armament of guns and torpedoes.
32 DESTROYERS
The British Admiralty contracted with private shipyards to pro-

duce vessels of the type specified by the committee. In all, about
110 destroyers were produced by private firms between 1892 and
1902, testimony to the importance attached to them. Indeed, the
large number of contracts absorbed such a large portion of naval
spending in Britain that delays were experienced in the production
of more powerful ships. The building program of 1893–1894 is an
example, where construction was delayed on the two protected
cruisers of the Powerful class, which would become the largest ves-
sels of their type at the time of completion.
The two private yards that met with the most success were the
firms of Yarrow and Thornycroft. The former produced what many
scholars identify as the world’s first destroyers. These were Havock
and Hornet, which were both laid down in 1892 and completed in
1894. They measured 185 feet by 18 feet, 6 inches by 7 feet, 3
inches and displaced 275 tons. The principal armament consisted of
one 12-pounder gun mounted aft and three 3-pounder guns distrib-
uted throughout the rest of the ship.
These guns were of a relatively new, quick-firing type. The con-
cept stemmed from an 1881 British Admiralty advertisement for a
gun that could fire an unprecedented 12 shots per minute. This
weapon functioned in much the same way as small arms on land
that fired cartridges. Both the propellant and the shell were encased
in one body rather than the past method of loading shells and pro-
pellant separately into guns, meaning that the reload time for the
weapon was much shorter. Quick-firing guns were necessary for de-
stroyers to riddle opposing torpedo boats before they could attack
with torpedoes. The guns were in completely exposed positions
without shields for the gun crews, which would remain common
practice in most navies until the years directly before World War I.
The ships also carried three 18-inch torpedo tubes, one being fit-
ted in the bow; the other two were single launchers sited on the
main deck. As an indication of the importance attached to gunnery,
however, the deck tubes could be replaced by more guns. In
essence, if torpedo tubes were replaced, the vessel would not have a
torpedo armament owing to the unsatisfactory bow tube. Naval offi-
cials deemed it problematic following the launching of the vessels,
as the destroyer proved faster than the torpedo at the time, meaning
that the ship could run over its own weapon once fired. It was also
exposed to enemy gunfire, as the method of torpedo attack consisted
of a head-on approach. A hit on the bow torpedo tube presented the
possibility of the torpedo detonating and destroying the ship. The
top speed was 26.7 knots, only a fraction below the Admiralty’s re-
quirement and thus acceptable, and was provided partially through
an early effort to streamline the hull. This innovation was the turtle-
back bow, distinguished by the main deck forward being a rounded
shape in order for seawater to cascade over it as the vessel, which
maintained a low freeboard, plowed through the water.
Besides being the first destroyers, one of the ships, Hornet, repre-
sents an example of destroyers as a testing ground for new technol-
ogy. Destroyers, being cheap and quick to build, would oftentimes
be used in this capacity in subsequent years. Unlike Havock,
equipped with locomotive boilers, Hornet was fitted with new water-
tube boilers, a design that was pioneered by France. Instead of the
old boilers that burned coal to heat air in copper tubing that subse-
quently heated water and produced the steam that drove the en-
gines, the water tube reversed the process. These boilers contained
the water within the tubing itself that passed through the fires of the
boiler. Steam pressure was consequently contained in the tubing
rather than outside and thus reduced the risk of a boiler explosion.
The results were twofold. First, the thickness of the boiler shell
could be reduced and thus saved weight. Also, steam pressure could
be increased more rapidly. This meant that a ship equipped with wa-
ter-tube boilers could raise steam much faster and increase its speed
in a much shorter amount of time. These advantages constituted a
great increase in the effectiveness of destroyers, which relied on
speed to intercept torpedo boats. If used offensively in torpedo at-
tacks, the destroyer would also benefit from being able to conduct
faster attacks, thus giving the opposing gun crews less time to react,
and being exposed for a lesser amount of time to the guns of a
slower opponent. The time necessary to build a ship with water-tube
boilers was longer, so Havock was technically the world’s first de-
stroyer, being launched five months before its sister ship. Despite
this drawback, the water-tube boiler proved a success. Although the
maximum speed of Hornet was only a fraction higher than its loco-
motive-boilered counterpart, the vessel was more reliable.
Both Havock and Hornet represented a far more viable solution to
the threat of the torpedo boat than past designs of the torpedo boat
catchers. This fact was proven during the 1894 fleet training ma-
neuvers of the Royal Navy, during which Havock overtook two tor-
pedo boats. On the basis of this success, these two ships proved to
be the first of a series of destroyers that have become known as the
26-knotters. Thornycroft’s answer to Yarrow’s vessels, Daring and
Decoy, were slightly faster but similarly armed. All subsequent de-
34 DESTROYERS
signs from private yards of this type were generally the same in di-
mension, speed, and armament to satisfy the requirements of the
Admiralty. Even so, these destroyers were still not fast enough to
catch some of the latest French-built torpedo boats. An example is
Forban, launched in 1895; it could attain a maximum speed of 29
knots.
As a result, the British continued to develop the design of the de-
stroyer with the chief requirement being speed. This effort led to
new groups of destroyers. The first of these were known as the 27-
knotters, totaling 36 vessels that were completed between 1895 and
1901. The 27-knotters were followed by the still faster 30-knotters
that eventually numbered 65 triple expansion–engined warships.
These were built primarily by those private firms that had enjoyed
success through construction of units of the past types. The 30-
knotters, completed between 1896 and 1902, possessed larger hulls
to house the more powerful machinery needed to attain the extra
knots sought by the Admiralty. An example of them is a design by
Thornycroft that led to the launching in 1897 of some of the first of
the type. The hull of Desperate displaced 310 tons, measured 210
feet by 19 feet, 6 inches by 7 feet and, like the previous type, was
unarmored. It was armed with one 12-pounder gun, five 6-pounder
weapons, and two 18-inch torpedo tubes. The triple-expansion en-
gines of the craft produced a maximum speed of 30 knots. Crew
complement consisted of 63 officers and men. Other firms built
similar vessels of the same armament that accommodated an identi-
cal number of people. The chief differences between them lay in
their hull dimensions.
Despite being great improvements over the old torpedo boat
catchers and TGBs of the Rattlesnake type, both the 27-knotters
and 30-knotters shared many of the design problems of their prede-
cessors. Due to the great emphasis on speed, these vessels were
lightly built and their engines strained to meet the requirements of
the Admiralty. Oftentimes, these vessels ran their trials lightly
loaded, as it was the only way to attain the necessary speed that
would lead the Admiralty to purchase the vessels from their private
manufacturers. If a destroyer failed to meet its designed speed, the
ship might still be purchased, but with financial penalties based on
how far short the speed fell from that specified.
As the engines were very lightly built to save weight, the strain at
high speed oftentimes led to mechanical failure. This should not be
surprising, as oftentimes the boilers needed nonstop stoking to the
point where the furnaces glowed white-hot and the stokers needed
colored glasses to protect their eyes from the heat and extreme light.
The vibration of the triple-expansion engines, despite having been
balanced to reduce the problem in 1892, received the steam from
the boilers and produced enormous strain on the flimsy hulls. Their
hull plating was only .125 inches thick, which meant that the shak-
ing motion of the engine could tear or warp the plates and lead to
flooding that might sink the ship. One of the most striking examples
of the problem of great propulsion power in a light hull is that of the
destroyer Chamois. The propeller of this ship flew off its shaft dur-
ing trials, sliced into the thin plating of the stern, and produced
flooding that sank the vessel.
Rather than strange misfortunes like that suffered by Chamois,
the majority of the strain on a destroyer’s hull was the product of
day-to-day operations at sea. In rough seas, crewmen reported that
the entire hull would visibly flex; either the deck or the keel, being
the spine or bottom of the ship, could warp or split from the stress.
Other accounts mention that plates would sometimes rupture or
water would seep through the hull at the joints where each plate
met the other. As these ships also still possessed low freeboards,
crashing seas could easily damage the bridge and equipment
mounted on the main deck. The conning position of these ships,
which housed the wheel and telegraphs to communicate to the en-
gine room, was normally surrounded by thin plate that was just as
susceptible to the pounding seas as the hull.
The actual bridge from which the commander directed the opera-
tion of the ship was enclosed by canvas, which could easily be swept
away by the sea as water traveled over the turtleback bow and
crashed into it. In many instances, the forward section of the ship
might completely submerge, leading some commanders to navigate
from a secondary control position in the aft portion of the vessel. A
specific example of this action comes from the experience of Com-
mander Roger Keyes, who began his career as a destroyer captain
and later became a noted commander of World War I. Keyes related
that the bridge of one of his destroyer commands was oftentimes
submerged feet deep in water as the ship plowed through heavy
seas.5
In addition to these problems of seaworthiness, the small hull of a
destroyer did not allow for the storage of appreciable amounts of
fuel and provisions for the crew, resulting in a ship that had to port
frequently for replenishment. The early destroyers, consequently,
were still ships that could not operate for long periods of time at sea
with the battle fleets that they were primarily meant to defend.
36 DESTROYERS
Added to all of these drawbacks was the fact that, despite being
quicker, the 30-knotters were still only fractionally faster than
France’s fastest torpedo boats. The Admiralty was aware of this fact
and commissioned work on 33-knot destroyers, but these were fail-
ures due to technological limitations posed by the triple-expansion
engine. The 30-knotters proved to be near the limit of the capacity
of the existing propulsion machinery. Three 33-knot destroyers were
built, but none of them achieved the desired speed. Indeed, two of
these spent more than a year running trials to attain the specified 33
knots while the strain on the engines of one of the destroyers during
trials led to serious damage of the machinery.
A further technological innovation held the promise of breaking
the threshold of speed set by triple-expansion engines and of reliev-
ing some of the structural problems experienced in the early destroy-
ers that resulted from their use. As with the 27-knotters, the 30-
knotters were also used as a proving ground for advances in
propulsion and machinery. A subset of the latter type were equipped
with turbine engines rather than the old reciprocating type. Invented
by British engineer Charles Parsons, the turbine engine consisted of
steam being passed from the boilers through a series of nozzles,
where it gained velocity as it was pushed through them. This steam
then passed through an engine that consisted of a series of blades at-
tached to a rotor, which subsequently turned it and produced
propulsion for the craft. The turbine made its debut on 26 June
1897, aboard Turbina, a 103-foot yacht, at the Naval Review at Spit-
head that was part of Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee. While naval
vessels slowly steamed in a line-ahead formation—a straight line
composed of vessels—as part of the naval review, Turbina broke from
the group and steamed the length of the review line. Boats were dis-
patched to try and stop Turbina, captained by Parsons himself, but
none could match the new craft’s 34-knot speed. This display took
place in front of Queen Victoria and assembled nobility from Eu-
rope, as well as high-ranking naval officials at the celebration.
The display of Turbina led the Admiralty to commission with pri-
vate shipyards for the construction of destroyers equipped with the
turbine engine. The result was the commission in 1900 of Viper, the
first naval vessel in the world equipped with turbine engines. The
hull of Viper measured 210 feet, 3.5 inches (pp) by 21 feet and dis-
placed 344 tons. Like its predecessors, it was armed with one 12-
pounder gun, five 6-pounder weapons, and two 18-inch torpedo
tubes. The turbine engines produced an impressive maximum speed
of 33.75 knots. In the same year, a second vessel, Cobra, was pur-
chased by the Admiralty from another firm. In addition to the new

turbine engine, this ship is significant as an example of the techno-
logical innovation of electricity. Introduced in the 1870s, electrical
lighting in destroyers had previously been limited to machinery
spaces. Cobra had electrical lighting throughout, which would be-
come a common feature for destroyers along with the use of elec-
tricity to power systems. At the time, however, the significance of
electricity paled in comparison to the introduction of the turbine.
The introduction of the turbine engine was a great advance and
had several positive aspects to recommend its future use, but there
were also drawbacks that impeded its being immediately embraced
as the propulsion system of the future. These engines were far more
reliable than the triple-expansion type, whose huge pistons generally
shook apart themselves and the hull of the destroyer after extended
use at high speeds. The turbine was also obviously faster. Even so,
early turbines suffered from poor fuel efficiency. Viper consumed 6
tons of coal an hour simply to maintain 22 knots.6 Such consump-
tion meant that the boilers had to be fed at a very quick pace to
maintain speed. A reflection of this fact presents itself in a proposal
that Cobra needed a 59-man engine room staff, with 48 of them
stokers. This requirement was indeed a daunting problem given that
the entire crew complement of the reciprocating-engine destroyers
was 63 officers and men. The Admiralty gave weight to this problem
by contracting for a third turbine vessel, Velox, equipped with tur-
bines for its highest speed and triple-expansion engines for normal
cruising. Adding to the problem of fuel consumption was the fact
that turbine engines could not be reversed so that the ship could
back up. Instead, the only solution was to fit ships with separate tur-
bines for generating propulsion ahead and in reverse.
These turbine vessels also suffered, as their predecessors did,
from lightly built hulls to attain high speed, which ultimately de-
tracted from their seaworthiness. In very few instances are the early
problems of light hulls and seaworthiness better seen than through
the operations of Viper and Cobra. On 3 August 1901, during fleet
maneuvers, Viper was caught in poor weather conditions and struck
a reef that lay near one of the islands in the English Channel. The
collision ripped the bottom out of the hull, and the vessel was
deemed a total loss. Cobra had an existence that was of greater
brevity. Weeks after the demise of Viper, Cobra encountered heavy
seas two hours after leaving port. The result was that the ship buck-
led amidships and broke in half with the loss of most of its crew. The
loss of both ships was entirely unrelated to the introduction of the
38 DESTROYERS
turbine, but their brief careers, particularly that of Cobra, called

into question the British practice of speed as the ultimate consider-
ation for destroyers at the expense of structural integrity.
The technical problems resulting from the design of early destroy-
ers led to severe mechanical wear and considerable danger to ships
and crews. Life aboard destroyers was a hard and dangerous affair
given the nature of small ships being pressed to their limits. Seasick-
ness was common aboard these craft as they pitched and rolled. In
addition to simple nausea was the generally unhealthy conditions
aboard that could make life miserable. These vessels possessed no
inside insulation on the sides, meaning that the interior could be
cold. Oftentimes, the cold produced condensation inside the hull.
The discomfort of breathing while in these surroundings was magni-
fied by the low freeboard. These vessels did not possess a great deal
of ventilation because water pouring over the deck could pour down
the ventilation shafts and flood the ship. All told, this was a perfect
environment for contracting tuberculosis, and the contraction rate
of it among destroyers was indeed high.
Little relief was experienced in climates that were warm or hot, as
the ships became a furnace. The suffering of crew members was not
alleviated by amenities aboard the ship, as they possessed none. The
small size of the hulls led to little space for officers and men to eat
and sleep. Those crewmen lying down in bunks, which were stowed
to save space when not in use, who did try to rest could rarely do so
owing to the pitching and rolling, the noise and vibration of the en-
gines (with the exception of the turbine ships), and the heat they
produced. Even the basic necessity of relieving one’s self and wash-
ing were difficult. Although officers had a toilet, the men of the first
destroyers made use of an open earth-closet erected in the fore sec-
tion. This improved somewhat in types such as the 27-knotters and
later classes that included toilets for the crew, but even then there
was little relief. Most washing for crewmen consisted of using a
bucket of water on the main deck. Little distraction was provided in
the face of these conditions. Once again owing to the size of the
hull, these ships lacked facilities such as libraries and barber shops
that were found on bigger ships of the era.
Life while in port offered little comfort. A universal procedure for
destroyers and large warships alike was the process of refueling with
coal. Although this was a dirty business on any ship, the small size of
destroyers made it doubly harsh. Coal was hauled in bags onto the
decks of destroyers and dumped down chutes to the bunkers that
held the ore. This process created clouds of coal dust that blanketed
all the exterior and interior surfaces of the craft and choked the
sailors. In these conditions, it is not surprising that the Admiralty of-
fered hard-lying money, an appropriately named compensatory pay,
to destroyer crews in addition to regular wages.
This money was considered necessary due not only to poor living
conditions in general but also to the destroyer’s light construction,
which placed crewmen in far more danger. The reciprocating triple-
expansion engines of the majority of these ships posed the most se-
vere problem. As the ships reached full speed and the machinery
strained, stokers and other engine-room personnel would hurriedly
try to pour oil on the machinery to lubricate it and avoid a break-
down. One individual described this as a situation where one would
“pour on the oil and trust in Providence.”7 Breakdowns could lead to
catastrophic situations as the machinery commenced to tear itself
and the ship apart as it continued to move. One destroyer of this pe-
riod experienced a piston punching through its keel, and another
had a piston break loose and launch itself through the main deck.
Aside from the problem of maintaining machinery, destroyer crews
also faced the horrible possibility of a collision with another vessel
that could slice through the light hull. In some cases, collisions re-
sulted in the ship being completely carved in half by larger warships.
Despite all the difficulties, the value of the destroyer was recog-
nized by the British and all the other naval powers of the era. Na-
tions consequently embarked on destroyer production in the wake
of the launching of Britain’s first craft. By 1892, France had experi-
mented heavily with the torpedo and built large numbers of torpedo
boats as a consequence of Jeune École thought. Among the types
pursued by the French, in tandem with the continued construction
of torpedo boats, was a design for a ship that was much like the
British Havock. France’s first true destroyers were the four ships of
the Durandal class that were launched between 1899 and 1900.
The hull of Durandal measured 188 feet, 8 inches by 20 feet, 8
inches by 10 feet, 5 inches and displaced 296 tons; its appearance
resembled that of the British boats through its turtleback bow. Its
armament consisted of one 2.5-inch gun and six 1.8-inch weapons
as well as two 15-inch torpedo tubes. Like all of France’s first de-
stroyers, the ship was equipped with triple-expansion engines that
produced a maximum speed of 26 knots.
The intended use of the Durandal-class destroyers was ambigu-
ous owing to chaos in the strategic planning of French naval offi-
cials by the turn of the century. The influence of the Jeune École
had declined somewhat, but debate raged between advocates of it
40 DESTROYERS
and traditionalists who based naval power on numbers of capital

ships. As a result, the intended purpose of the early destroyers wa-
vered between the Jeune École’s commerce warfare and the concept
of protection of battleships as succeeding ministers of marine pur-
sued their own policy on how best to combat Britain in time of war.
Nevertheless, the general value of torpedo craft did not waver and
resulted in the launching between 1899 and 1902 of another three
classes of destroyers that numbered a total of 32 ships. Regardless
of their purpose, these ships and the torpedo boats in existence con-
tinued to pose a threat to Britain.
Russia, one of the principal builders of torpedo boats, also turned
to the procurement of destroyers. Between 1899 and 1902, the Rus-
sians contracted for seven classes of destroyers that numbered 44
vessels. Only two of these, however, were indigenous Russian de-
signs. The majority of Russia’s first destroyers were built in British,
French, and German yards to the designs of private shipyards in the
respective countries. The majority of these craft were fast but lim-
ited in range in the same way as destroyers of other countries. An ex-
ample is Pruitki, known more commonly as Sokol, designed by the
private British firm Yarrow. At the time of its completion in 1895,
this vessel was one of the fastest with a maximum speed of 30.2
knots. This craft employed weaponry similar to British vessels, but it
was also equipped with a ram in the bow to run down opposing ves-
sels. Russian-built destroyers were slower, averaging around 26
knots. They were marked by the inclusion of mine-laying machinery,
which was a feature that would become common to many domesti-
cally constructed Russian destroyers in subsequent years. This rep-
resents a belief shared by some other powers in the expansion of
roles for destroyers in war. In Russian naval circles, they could not
only be used in the traditional context of defense against torpedo
boats and the newer idea of launching torpedo attacks; they could
also be employed as minelayers.
Other powers built fewer vessels than the British, French, and
Russians. The United States had possessed at the close of the U.S.
Civil War (1861–1865) a fleet of 671 warships, second only to
Great Britain. The end of the American conflict, however, resulted
in the scrapping of many of these vessels and a low level of naval ex-
penditure as Americans reverted to the belief in a navy being used
for coastal defense. A large navy was therefore deemed unnecessary.
In addition, available funds after the war were devoted to the army
and the development of the western frontier of the North American
continent. By the late 1870s, the U.S. Navy consisted of a collection
of obsolete warships, a fleet smaller than that of Chile. Experimen-

tation with torpedo boats did not occur until 1887 with a wooden-
hulled craft that was followed by a conventional steel-hulled model
in 1900.
Destroyers, due to a lack of funding and a concentration on bat-
tleship construction, followed later, in the late 1890s. The first U.S.
destroyer, although officially classed as a torpedo boat, was Farragut.
Completed in 1899, its hull measured 214 feet by 20 feet, 8 inches
by 6 feet and displaced 279 tons. It was armed with four 6-pounder
guns and two 18-inch torpedo tubes. The triple-expansion engines
yielded a maximum speed of 30 knots. Only two other one-ship
classes were commissioned before 1902, suggesting that they were
experimental craft. A third was not commissioned until 1908 due to
serious problems with its propulsion machinery. At best, these ves-
sels can be regarded as providing useful experience for future de-
stroyer production that would greatly improve the performance of
destroyers around the world.
The bulk of the remaining destroyer production of the world in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries came from coun-
tries that were new naval powers in comparison to the British,
French, Russians, and Americans. The first of these—and a growing
threat to British naval supremacy in the late nineteenth century—
was Germany. Although constituted as a unified nation only in 1871
and possessing a history as a land-based military power, Germany
was one of the forerunners in experimentation with torpedo tech-
nology. Its first ships were designed for coastal defense to prevent
amphibious invasions, an example being spar torpedo boats in the
early 1870s followed in 1876 by the torpedo cruiser Zieten. By the
1880s, Germany was commissioning a host of torpedo boats for
coastal defense that were built in German as well as British yards.
Germany’s first destroyer, completed in 1898, was D10 and was de-
signed and built by the British shipyard Thornycroft. As such, it
closely resembled the British 30-knotter type.
Subsequent destroyer production took place in an atmosphere of
radical revision of Germany’s naval strategy. The succession of
Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1890 had begun this course as he believed in
the policy of Weltpolitik (world power), referring to the projection of
German influence around the globe. The policy contributed to the
buildup of a navy for Germany and was further influenced by the
ideas of U.S. naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan, who wrote that to
be considered a true world power a nation must possess a fleet that
can command the seas. The appointment of Admiral Alfred von Tir-
42 DESTROYERS
pitz as secretary of the state for the navy, who was also a believer in
an oceangoing navy, in 1897 led to new naval building programs to
this end. In 1898, Germany passed the First Naval Law that dealt
primarily with the construction of capital ships. Destroyers were in-
cluded in the 1900 Second Naval Law that called for a fleet com-
prising 38 battleships, 20 armored cruisers, 38 light cruisers, and 96
destroyers by 1920. These plans heralded the beginning of a naval
arms race with Great Britain that would be one factor leading to the
outbreak of World War I.
The first of these destroyers, and Germany’s first domestically
built units, were the 12 destroyers of the German S.90 class. Con-
structed by the German firm Schichau between 1898 and 1901,
these ships were unlike the British models in two respects. First, the
armament resembled an enlarged torpedo boat. It was composed of
three 17.7-inch torpedo tubes and three 1.9-inch guns. The light
gun armament was due to the fact that Germany emphasized the
role of torpedo attacks on capital ships for destroyers rather than de-
fense versus opposing torpedo boats. Second, the Germans focused
on the production of more strongly built hulls at the expense of
some speed to provide greater seaworthiness. The result was a vessel
whose triple-expansion engines produced a maximum speed of 26.5
knots.
These ships were, however, far better sea boats than their British
counterparts due in part to the use of a raised forecastle instead of a
turtleback bow. This greatly increased the freeboard, meaning that
water did not cascade over the bow with the same ferocity as on
turtleback boats. It also allowed for the storage of greater provisions
and better crew accommodations. This hull configuration, which
was also being developed in the United States, would soon make a
great impression on other naval powers. Between 1901 and 1902,
three more classes were built for a total of 20 additional ships.
These were generally armed in the same manner and were slow in
relation to their British rivals.
Japan also embarked on the construction of destroyers. Following
the 1853 arrival of a U.S. naval force under the command of Com-
modore Matthew Perry, the Japanese looked to transforming their
country from a largely medieval one into a modern industrialized na-
tion to combat Western influence that threatened their security.
Naval construction was at first difficult owing to internal instability,
a result of quickly implemented reforms. A proposed naval construc-
tion plan in 1873 was consequently shelved, and the first orders for
a new naval program were not placed until two years later. The ma-
jority of these first ships were built through contracts with foreign
shipyards, as those of the Japanese were not yet very advanced and
the economy was still in the process of industrialization.
In 1879 the Japanese contracted for four torpedo boats with the
British shipyard Yarrow. Others followed with various firms as the
Japanese embraced the ideas of the French Jeune École on the
value of small craft armed with torpedoes. These vessels also found
favor with Japanese government officials because they were cheap
to build and offered the possibility of a weaker naval power success-
fully combating a more powerful enemy. An 1896 10-year naval ex-
pansion bill heralded the beginning of the domestic Japanese de-
stroyer program. This legislation called for 23 destroyers and
eventually led to the construction by 1902 of four classes that com-
prised 15 ships. All of them were British designs and thus resembled
British craft. An example is the two-ship Shirakumo class. The Shi-
rakumo measured 216 feet by 20 feet, 9 inches by 6 feet and dis-
placed 342 tons. It was armed with two 12-pounder guns, four 6-
pound pieces, and two 18-inch torpedo tubes. Possessing a
turtleback bow, its triple-expansion engines produced a maximum
speed of 31 knots.
Italy also pursued the construction of vessels armed with torpe-
does. Like Germany and Japan, the country was still in the process
of becoming a modern industrialized power in the second half of the
nineteenth century. Following the process of Italian unification that
began in the early 1860s, naval construction was low. The Italian
Navy had suffered a serious defeat to the Austrians in the 1866 Bat-
tle of Lissa during the Austro-Prussian War. This loss brought dis-
favor on the navy and a decline in naval expenditures. By the early
1880s, the budget of the Italian Navy was still below that before the
Battle of Lissa. Nevertheless, the Italians did invest in torpedo
technology.
In 1878 the Italians procured their first torpedo boat from
Thornycroft of Britain and constructed their first craft seven years
later. Due to Italy’s geographic position, small craft like torpedo
boats were desirable, as they did not experience as many problems
with seaworthiness. The Mediterranean Sea encounters far less
stormy weather than areas such as the North Sea and the Pacific
Ocean. In addition, the size of the Mediterranean obviated some of
the problems of endurance, as there were smaller areas of operation.
Despite the interest in torpedo boats, however, the Italians were
latecomers in the production of destroyers. Capital ships were under
construction in Italian shipyards in the late nineteenth century, but
44 DESTROYERS
Italian constructors had little experience with small craft. As a re-

sult, the first Italian destroyer, Fulmine, was an experimental vessel.
Commissioned in 1900 on a purely Italian design and in an Italian
shipyard, it was not deemed successful. The hull of Fulmine meas-
ured 203 feet, 11.5 inches by 21 feet by 7 feet, 6.5 inches and dis-
placed 293 tons. It was armed with five 2.2-inch guns and three 14-
inch torpedo tubes. Its designed speed was 26.5 knots, but its
triple-expansion engine could produce a maximum speed of only 24
knots.
Following this unsuccessful design, the Italians turned to foreign
constructors. The six-ship Lampo class, commissioned between
1900 and 1902, was designed and built by the German firm
Schichau. Although these warships were built by one of the best de-
stroyer firms in the world, they proved generally unseaworthy. Even
so, Italian constructors were able to use them to garner experience
in destroyer design. The result was a joint venture with the British
firm Thornycroft that produced the Nembo-class destroyers. This
six-ship group, the first two being launched in 1901, measured 210
feet by 19 feet, 6 inches by 7 feet, 6 inches and displaced 325 tons.
These first two vessels mounted one 3-inch gun, five 2.2-inch guns,
and two 14-inch torpedo tubes. Their engines produced an impres-
sive maximum speed of 30.2 knots. With these vessels, Italy was
edging toward the construction of new, successful destroyer designs
that were entirely the product of domestic shipyards.
The Austro-Hungarian Empire, the other naval power in the
Mediterranean, was also in the process of building a modern navy
that included destroyers. Although primarily a land-based power, it
had a navy that had proven itself in the 1866 Battle of Lissa, and
construction proceeded for new vessels in the wake of that engage-
ment. The empire’s first torpedo boat was launched in 1875, and
Austria-Hungary did turn to the procurement of destroyers in the
late nineteenth century, but these resembled the British torpedo
boat catchers of the mid-1880s more than actual destroyers. Seven
vessels were launched between 1887 and 1896 and were built by
German, British, and Austro-Hungarian yards. All were experimen-
tal craft, as the empire’s destroyer knowledge was still limited. They
were as a whole heavier and slower than those of other nations. Me-
teor, launched in 1887, is a good example of the design characteris-
tics of these ships. Built by Schichau, this vessel’s hull measured
187 feet by 22 feet by 8 feet, 6 inches and displaced 435 tons. Its ar-
mament consisted of nine 1.8-inch guns and two 17.7-inch torpedo
tubes, while the triple-expansion engine could produce a maximum
speed of only 17.5 knots. This low speed is primarily the reason why
these vessels cannot be considered true destroyers. The state of Aus-
tro-Hungarian production would improve with time, but these ves-
sels exhibited the fact that the empire had much ground to cover to
produce a ship comparable to those of other navies.
By the turn of the twentieth century, the combat role attached to
the destroyer began to change in the face of technological advances.
The original mission of the destroyer, with the notable exceptions of
the French and Germans, who viewed them from an early stage as
offensive warships, was to hunt down and destroy enemy torpedo
boats that attempted to launch torpedo attacks against the battle-
ships of a fleet. New destroyers, however, were far better craft over-
all than the torpedo boats that they were designed to destroy. The
result was a move away from the production of torpedo boats in fa-
vor of construction only of destroyers. Their torpedoes allowed them
to assume the offensive duty of the torpedo boat while retaining
their original function as defensive units against opposing torpedo
craft. Destroyers became progressively better vessels in light of this
shift and would consequently become one of the most important
units of every nation’s battle fleet.
Further advancement in the design of destroyers had been initi-
ated in part by the Germans with the introduction of the raised fore-
castle. Throughout the period between 1902 and 1914, other naval
powers pursued similar improvements. One of these was the United
States, which built ships of the same hull configuration as the Ger-
mans. Naval constructors in the United States had been working on
improving seaworthiness at the same time as those in Germany and
produced the same innovation. The five ships of the Bainbridge
class were all commissioned in 1902 and were the first multiple-unit
class of destroyer in the U.S. Navy. The hulls measured 250 feet by
23 feet, 7 inches by 6 feet, 6 inches and displaced 420 tons. Their
armament consisted of two 3-inch guns, five 6-pounder weapons,
and two 18-inch torpedo tubes. Equipped with the raised forecastle,
the triple-expansion engine of this ship produced a maximum speed
of 29 knots. Like the Germans, U.S. constructors saw a slight de-
crease in speed as acceptable in exchange for greater seaworthiness
and habitability that would enable these ships to travel to far-flung
U.S. bases like those in the Pacific Ocean.
Significantly, these vessels still lacked the seaworthiness neces-
sary to remain at sea for extended operations. They were, however,
able to project U.S. power by traveling to distant possessions. The
vessels of this class spent the majority of their careers based in the
46 DESTROYERS
U.S. possession of the Philippines. The Bainbridge class was the be-
ginning of a great increase in U.S. destroyer production that focused
primarily on craft designed for the role of defense against torpedo
attacks, as the battleship was the mainstay of the U.S. Navy. The 11
additional units, of five classes, that were commissioned by 1903
were generally similar to the Bainbridge class in terms of armament,
although three of the groups were a reversion to the turtleback bow
arrangement.
Subsequent vessels became progressively larger in the continuing
quest for greater seaworthiness. In 1908 and 1909, the five-ship
Smith class was launched. Each unit measured 293 feet, 8 inches by
26 feet by 8 feet and displaced 700 tons. The armament consisted of
five 3-inch guns and three 18-inch torpedo tubes. These vessels
were the first U.S. destroyers equipped with turbine engines and
could steam at a maximum speed of 28 knots. The proceeding 10
ships of the Paulding class, launched between 1909 and 1910, were
virtual repeats of the Smith class. The key difference was the use of
oil-fired boilers rather than those that used coal. These ships are
therefore significant as the first U.S. destroyers to employ this fuel.
All subsequent destroyer classes employed oil rather than coal. Fol-
lowing a repeat class of 11 ships launched between 1910 and 1912,
the United States produced the first of what became known as the
1,000 tonners. These vessels were built especially for seaworthiness
and endurance. The first group of the 1,000 tonners was the Cassin
class comprising eight ships. The hull of Cassin measured 305 feet,
5 inches by 30 feet, 2 inches and displaced 1,010 tons. It mounted
four 4-inch guns and eight 18-inch torpedo tubes, making it the
most heavily armed type of U.S. destroyer to date. To stay at sea for
the longest time possible, Cassin was equipped with reciprocating
engines for cruising and turbines when it was necessary to attain the
ship’s maximum speed of 29 knots. The final class of six ships that
were laid down before the outbreak of World War I in August 1914
were merely improvements on the design of the previous group. Two
of these were launched before the beginning of the conflict. The
Cassin class and those similar to it represent the culmination of a
tremendous effort to make destroyers more seaworthy vessels capa-
ble of extended operations at sea with battle fleets. Other navies em-
barked on the same course.
Great Britain, in the midst of a naval arms race with Germany, al-
tered its construction plans for destroyers in much the same way as
the United States. By the early twentieth century, British naval offi-
cials realized that the emphasis on speed at the cost of seaworthi-
ness, endurance, and habitability had produced vessels that could

not fulfill their desired function. Indeed, the emphasis on high
speed had always been unrealistic, as the first British destroyers
could attain their maximum speed while on trials only in calm
weather conditions. These conclusions were concretely reached fol-
lowing a 1901 visit of British destroyers to the German naval base of
Wilhelmshaven. While there, the British saw firsthand the raised
forecastle hull configuration of the S.90 class, and this led designers
to pursue the same course to make British vessels more seaworthy.
In 1902, the British laid down the first of the River-class destroy-
ers. These ships are considered by most scholars as the world’s first
oceangoing destroyers. Although the German S.90 class and the
U.S. Bainbridge class preceded the British ships, the River class
proved to be the most seaworthy and with the greatest endurance.
The units of this 34-ship class were generally similar to one another,
slight differences occurring from the fact that the British contracted
with six different shipyards to build them. Completed between 1904
and 1905, the hull of the first set of these ships measured 233 feet,
4 inches by 23 feet, 6 inches by 9 feet, 8 inches and displaced 550
tons. Their original armament was the same as the previous 30-
knotters, being one 12-pounder gun, five 6-pounder guns, and two
18-inch torpedo tubes. Equipped with the raised forecastle, these
ships could attain a maximum speed of 26 knots. This power was
provided, with the exception of one unit equipped with turbines,
through a reversion to triple-expansion engines, as vessels like the
previous Viper were still in the experimental stage.
The reduction in speed was deemed acceptable given the advan-
tages that it presented. First, these ships were able with their raised
forecastles to maintain their highest speed in a seaway. In reality,
this velocity was the same as the 30-knotters given that they could
steam indefinitely at their highest speeds. The loss of some power in
favor of a larger, stronger hull also allowed improvements in the
structure of the bridge, which was in the process of becoming a
properly enclosed superstructure rather than being enclosed par-
tially by canvas. In addition, the surrender of some power decreased
mechanical breakdowns as the triple-expansion engines of the units
were no longer pushed to enormous limits to produce speeds almost
in excess of their ability. Finally, the raised forecastle and internal
arrangement of the hulls of the River-class units allowed for ship-
ping 132 tons of coal, a great improvement. All told, these ships had
a cruising radius of 2,000 miles. All other naval powers, given these
advantages, would after 1904 incorporate design features of the
48 DESTROYERS
River class into their own ships. Great Britain was once again billed
as the world’s leading destroyer designer.
Subsequent British destroyer development followed along the
lines of the River class, although there were some notable excep-
tions in the years directly following that group’s completion. These
were the result of John Fisher, First Sea Lord of the Admiralty.
Throughout his 1904–1910 term in office, Fisher experimented
with destroyer design and ultimately their combat role. Always a be-
liever in employing the latest technological innovations, Fisher over-
saw the next three destroyer designs, which produced mixed results.
The smallest were the 36-ship Cricket-class destroyers. Launched
between 1906 and 1909, their hulls measured 180 feet by 17 feet, 6
inches by 6 feet and displaced 255 tons. They were armed with two
12-pounder guns and three 18-inch torpedo tubes. Their engines
represented a return to turbines, a feature of all future British de-
stroyer classes of this age, and these could produce a maximum
speed of 26 knots. This feature is a reflection of Fisher’s belief in
employing new technology.
A further example of this is the use of oil-fired boilers rather than
coal-fired ones. This feature made the Cricket-class destroyers the
first in the world to use oil fuel. Despite this advance, these ships
were of limited value. Fisher had intended them to be coastal de-
stroyers that supplemented the second class of larger ships. As a re-
sult, these craft were not very seaworthy and were a sharp contrast
to the destroyer production programs of other countries. The larger
counterparts of the Cricket class also suffered somewhat from
Fisher’s direction. The first of these were the 12 units of the Tribal
class. Launched between 1907 and 1909, the dimensions and dis-
placements varied because the British continued the practice of
contracting with private shipyards. One unit, Afridi, will suffice as
an example of these ships. Its hull measured 250 (pp) by 24 feet, 6
inches by 10 feet and displaced 855 tons.
Owing to Fisher’s belief in the efficacy of large-caliber guns,
Afridi mounted two 4-inch guns, three 12-pounders, and two 18-
inch torpedo tubes. Its oil-fired turbine engines could produce a
maximum speed of 33 knots. The principal problem with these ves-
sels was their armament. Although the smaller guns were a quick-
firing model, the largest guns were regular breechloaders as the
technology had not progressed to the point where guns of this size
could be made effectively with the quick-firing advance. Since
British destroyers were primarily designed to ward off torpedo at-
tacks, the rate of fire was crucial to sinking enemy vessels before
they closed into torpedo range. This defect, however, was a slight
one in comparison to the one-ship Swift class.
Swift represents not only Fisher’s desire for a large vessel to lead
destroyers into battle but also his belief that larger destroyers could
assume the duties of light cruisers. These roles include commerce
protection and scouting. The hull of this ship measured 353 feet, 9
inches by 34 feet, 2 inches by 10 feet, 6 inches and displaced a very
large 2,170 tons. It was armed with four 4-inch breechloaders and
two 18-inch torpedo tubes. Its maximum speed was 35 knots. This
vessel proved a technological failure. Fisher wanted a ship that
could reach 36 knots, as he was a firm believer in speed as an ad-
vantage in battle, but Swift could not attain it. Indeed, while the
ship was launched in 1907 and completed sometime later, the Ad-
miralty did not accept the ship until 1920. In addition, the high fuel
consumption and low seaworthiness of the craft made it impossible
to assume the duties of a light cruiser. Swift was an extreme design
and was not attempted again, but the concept of the destroyer
leader would persist, and new vessels would be constructed with
this task in mind.
Following the construction of two more River-class destroyers
that represented a reversion to the use of turtleback bows, the Admi-
ralty returned to designs that more closely matched that of the
River-class destroyers. Sixteen ships of the Beagle class were
launched between 1909 and 1910 and were a more heavily armed
version of the Rivers. They are primarily significant for the fact that
they were the last British destroyers to use coal rather than oil. This
reversion was a result of fears in the British government over the
availability of oil from the Middle East in time of war. Between 1910
and 1914, the British designed five more classes of destroyers, with
85 units being complete before the outbreak of war. The last of
these, the M class, as all of the vessels in the class had names begin-
ning with “M,” is a prime example of the state of British destroyer
technology by World War I. Only one unit, Miranda, was launched
by August 1914. Its hull measured 269 feet, 6 inches by 25 feet, 7.5
inches by 9 feet, 6 inches and displaced 850 tons. Its gun armament
consisted of three 4-inch guns, which were now a new quick-firing
model. The larger, uniform gun armament was the result of the Ad-
miralty’s belief that the old 12-pounder gun was too small because
the size of gunnery weapons had increased substantially by this
time. These guns had small shields mounted around them to protect
the crew from flying splinters that were generated by exploding
shells. They could not resist a direct hit, however, from even light
50 DESTROYERS
naval ordnance. Nevertheless, the practice of using gun shields

would eventually become a standard practice for most navies. In ad-
dition to its guns, the ship also carried four 21-inch torpedo tubes in
twin launchers on the main deck. The vessel’s turbines could pro-
duce a maximum speed of 35 knots.
The M-class vessels would see substantial service in World War I
against the naval forces of Germany, Britain’s chief rival in the years
directly preceding the conflict. Four more classes of German de-
stroyers comprising a total of 12 ships were launched between 1903
and 1905, and these possessed the same armament as the S.90s and
only a slight increase in speed. These destroyers formed part of the
ambitious naval building program launched by the Naval Laws that
had by the early twentieth century achieved substantial results.
By 1905, the Germans had created a navy so large that it sur-
passed that of France and rivaled the United States, which by that
time was the second largest navy in the world. Sixteen more classes
of destroyers followed from 1905 to 1914 for a total of 88 units
launched by August 1914, each being improved versions of the pre-
ceding type. Other units from the last of these classes were
launched shortly after the beginning of hostilities. These vessels
generally mounted fewer, slightly smaller guns than their British
counterparts as a reflection of the continued German belief in the
primary role of destroyers as being for launching a torpedo attack.
Several of the types employed triple-expansion engines rather than
turbines that comprised most of the destroyer production in other
navies in the last nine years of peace.
Many of these were either coal-powered or employed both coal
and oil fuel. They also had the unusual feature of a second auxiliary
rudder placed beneath the bow in case the other was rendered inop-
erable in combat. The last class of destroyer in the process of
launching in peacetime, the S.31 class, is indicative of all of these
traits. The hull of S.31 measured 261 feet, 2 inches by 27 feet, 4
inches by 9 feet, 2 inches and displaced 802 tons. It mounted three
3.45-inch guns, six 19.7-inch torpedo tubes, and 24 mines. This lat-
ter weapon represents the German belief that these vessels could as-
sume the role of minelayer in addition to its primary mission. Its tur-
bine engines, a standard feature in German vessels by 1914, could
produce a maximum speed of 33.5 knots. The type was also the first
in the German Navy to switch completely to the use of oil fuel.
Other navies did not produce such large numbers of destroyers as
the United States, Great Britain, and Germany in the years before
World War I. From 1902 to 1908, the French Navy, which had been
eclipsed in numbers by Germany in 1905, launched 23 more de-

stroyers. The relatively small number in comparison to other naval
powers was partially the result of construction delays that plagued
French shipyards in this period. These destroyers were not well-
suited to action at sea as their hulls were very lightly built. This de-
sign aspect was the result of a French belief at the time that destroy-
ers were primarily coastal defense vessels.
The one significant French destroyer class in this period was the
Branlebas class. The 10 ships of this group, launched between 1907
and 1908, were equipped with deck armor. This was a very unusual
feature in destroyers due to their relatively small hulls in compari-
son to capital ships that did not allow for such an increase in
weight. Nevertheless, the French were among the most technologi-
cally innovative of the age and managed to incorporate it. Their ar-
mor consisted of .75-inch steel plating over the deck that covered
the propulsion machinery of the craft. This feature was designed to
protect against small-caliber plunging shellfire that could punch
through the deck and disable the destroyer. The feat was particularly
impressive, as the maximum speed of the units of this class was 27.5
knots.
These ships, however, were also too small to maintain station at
sea. In an attempt to catch up with the larger destroyer designs of
other powers, the French next launched the Spahi class comprising
seven vessels. Launched between 1908 and 1912, the hull of Spahi
measured 212 (pp) by 19 feet, 10 inches by 7 feet, 7 inches, dis-
placed 550 tons, and was powered by a triple-expansion engine that
could generate 28 knots. It mounted six 2.5-inch guns and three
17.7-inch torpedo tubes. The idea of the armored deck was dis-
carded. Two similar classes comprising six destroyers were launched
afterward that were virtual repeats of the Spahi class, although the
units of the Chasseur class are significant for being the first turbine-
powered and completely oil-fueled French destroyers. The final two
peacetime classes of 18 ships were larger versions and carried heav-
ier guns, but their value was limited. The ships carried only two 3.9-
inch guns and had weak hulls that made their use in heavy seas a
problem.
Russia built a much larger number of destroyers between 1902
and 1914 than France, which was Russia’s ally following the conclu-
sion of a formal alliance between the two powers in 1894. From
1903 to 1905, the Russians contracted for 66 more destroyers that
were largely built by German and French firms. The large output
was in part the result of Russia’s need to maintain more than one
52 DESTROYERS
fleet to protect its vast geographic area, but it was also necessary
due to the onset of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905). This con-
flict stemmed from a clash of imperial interests between Russia and
Japan on the Asian mainland, principally Korea. The war proved
devastating for the Russians, who lost the bulk of their fleet, includ-
ing 21 destroyers, in the first defeat of a modern European power by
an Asian nation. By the conclusion of the war, Russia had slipped
from third to sixth on the list of the world’s most powerful navies.
Subsequent destroyer production before World War I was only able
to address wartime losses. As a result, the Russian destroyer fleet by
1914 was only slightly larger than that of France.
The first new Russian destroyer was not ordered until 1909 in
part because of the diversion of resources to combat popular unrest
over the strain caused by the war. It, like all future destroyers, was
designed and built solely in a domestic shipyard. This vessel, Novik,
was launched in 1911 and was a continuation of the Russian ten-
dency to build larger destroyers like the U.S. 1,000 tonners. Its hull
measured 336 feet, 3 inches by 31 feet, 3 inches by 9 feet, 10
inches and displaced 1,280 tons. It was armed with four 4-inch
guns, eight 18-inch torpedo tubes, and 60 mines in keeping with the
Russian belief in using destroyers as minelayers. Its turbine engines
produced a maximum speed of 36 knots. Due to its propulsion
plant, this destroyer is significant for Russia as the first to use both
turbines and oil fuel. The other group produced before the war, the
nine-ship Bespokoiny class, was a variation of Novik. A difference,
however, was the inclusion of two 1.8-inch guns. These were for use
against enemy aircraft. The development of the airplane, while still
in its infancy, had already gotten the attention of Russian naval offi-
cials due to the potential of air attack. World War I would provide a
proving ground for antiaircraft armament such as that carried on
these Russian craft.
Japan continued to build destroyers as part of its naval expansion
program, but most of the units launched between 1902 and 1914
continued to be either ships contracted in British shipyards or those
built in Japan to a British design. This was in part the result of the
great degree of cooperation between Japan and Britain that was the
result of the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance, a defensive agreement.
By 1909, the Japanese had 39 new destroyers at their disposal that
remained a rather small design like those of the past. The next class,
however, represented a Japanese move toward larger destroyers in-
corporating the most modern technology available. The two ships of
the Umikaze class, launched between 1910 and 1911, possessed
hulls that measured 323 feet, 3 inches by 28 feet, 1 inch by 9 feet

and displaced 1,030 tons. As a result of their size and the incorpora-
tion of the raised forecastle, these are the first oceangoing destroy-
ers of the Japanese Navy. They were armed with two 4.7-inch guns,
five 3.1-inch weapons, and four 18-inch torpedo tubes. These ships
were the first in Japanese service to employ turbines rather than
triple-expansion engines. The turbines could produce a maximum
speed of 33 knots. Only one other class of two ships was produced
during the war, and these were scaled-down versions of the Umikaze
class that were of limited value. Due to their smaller hulls, the ships
were primarily capable only of coastal defense. These two ships of
the Sakura class, however, are significant as they were the first de-
stroyers built in a Japanese shipyard to a domestic design. This be-
came standard practice in the years after World War I.
Italy, in the wake of its previous failure to produce an effective,
domestically designed and built destroyer, looked for guidance from
the British shipyard Thornycroft. A joint Italian-British design pro-
duced the six Nembo-class destroyers. Built entirely in Italy and
launched between 1901 and 1904, these ships measured 210 feet
by 19 feet, 6 inches by 7 feet, 6 inches and displaced 325 tons each.
Most were armed with five 2.2-inch guns and four 14-inch torpedo
tubes. These were followed by six more classes leading up to the war
that comprised 20 ships and were all built in Italy to indigenous de-
signs. The last four units were variations of the six-ship Indomito
class launched between 1912 and 1913. The hull of Indomito meas-
ured 239 feet, 6 inches by 24 feet by 7 feet, 11 inches and displaced
672 tons. It was armed with one 4.7-inch gun, four 3-inch guns, and
two 17.7-inch torpedo tubes. Indomito was the first destroyer for
Italy to mount oil-fuel turbines. These could produce a maximum
speed of 30 knots.
The Austro-Hungarian Navy built only one destroyer in the first
five years of the twentieth century because the empire’s shipbuilders
were still experimenting with destroyer designs. This ship, the
British-built Huszar, is significant as Austria-Hungary’s first true de-
stroyer. Its hull measured 224 feet, 4 inches by 20 feet, 6 inches by
6 feet, 3 inches, displaced about 390 tons, and mounted triple-ex-
pansion engines that generated a maximum speed of 28.5 knots. It
was armed initially with one 2.5-inch gun, seven 1.8-inch weapons,
and two 17.7-inch torpedo tubes. The Austro-Hungarians subse-
quently turned to domestic production of this design and produced
another 12 warships. These were followed by the six ships of the
Tatra class, all being launched by late 1913. Not only were these
54 DESTROYERS
the empire’s first destroyer design since Fulmine; they were also the
first large destroyers for the fleet. The hull of Tatra was 273 feet, 11
inches by 25 feet, 7 inches by 9 feet, 10 inches and displaced 850
tons. It was the first destroyer for the empire that used turbine en-
gines, which could produce a maximum speed of 32.6 knots.
Mounted on this hull were two 3.9-inch guns, six 2.5-inch guns,
and four 17.7-inch torpedo tubes.
By the outbreak of World War I on 1 August 1914, the destroyer
was the most numerous type of warship in the navies of the mar-
itime powers. Great Britain led the world with 228 destroyers in ser-
vice. Germany operated 154 vessels and thereby had the second-
greatest destroyer power. Russia possessed 105 destroyers, but many
of these were of older designs. The other powers possessed fewer
ships, but they would prove no less significant in the conflict that
was about to unfold: France maintained 84 destroyers, although
many of these were not capable of service in open seas; the United
States operated 54, most being modern ships; Japan followed closely
with 50; Italy had 32; and Austria-Hungary maintained 26.8 All told,
the combatant powers of World War I possessed 703 destroyers.
These would prove invaluable not only in the primary tasks envi-
sioned for them in the prewar years but also in new roles. By the end
of the conflict, destroyers would be multi-role vessels that per-
formed more duties than any other type of warship.
Destroyers throughout their history to this point had changed lit-
tle in one aspect: Everyday life continued to be harsher than for
sailors aboard bigger ships. The raised forecastles of destroyers had
allowed for less cramped living and eating quarters, but amenities
such as libraries on bigger ships were still impossible. All but the
newest destroyers in operation by World War I continued to have
electrical lighting in only the engine room areas, making the lives of
officers and crewmen alike a dreary one after sunset, when only oil
lamps were available.9 Even these had to be used sparingly due to
the threat of fire if the pitching and rolling in heavy seas broke one.
Food remained much as it was in the age of sail in terms of quality. A
common description by sailors of the meat of this era was that it re-
sembled a piece of wood.
One of the few amenities aboard that had changed markedly for
the better were toilet facilities. In most of the destroyers produced
in the twentieth century, both officers and crewmen used enclosed
toilets located below deck. Some ships had facilities for the officers
equipped with washbasins while the crew still had to bathe on deck.
Despite rough conditions, these ships were seen by young officers
and crewmen as the first step in a career. There were never any
shortages of men who volunteered specifically for destroyer duty
given this fact. In addition, the discipline aboard was on the whole
not as harsh as on bigger ships. Even the newest destroyers only had
about 70 men aboard, while the newest battleships carried a com-
plement of more than 1,000 officers and ratings. As a result, there
was a sense of camaraderie in destroyers lacking in larger ships.
Each individual knew the other as part of a close-knit community
where all shared the same hardships. These men also bonded as part
of the romantic air in the public sphere that surrounded destroyer
men, who were seen as brave, tough, and dedicated to their duty de-
spite adverse conditions.
Another aspect of life for sailors—recruitment and education—
did change substantially by the outbreak of war. This did not appear
until the early twentieth century. Before this time, the educational
methods of some naval powers were ancient. The best example was
France, whose naval training consisted of largely experience rather
than schooling. Although the manning of the navy was partly volun-
tary and some soldiers in the army were conscripted into service, the
majority of France’s sailors were procured through the Inscription
Maritime. This was established in 1681 during the age of King
Louis XIV; the legislation enrolled all French sailors between the
ages of 18 and 50 years. Most of these men saw five to seven years
of service beginning at 20 years old. These men garnered almost all
of their knowledge from experience aboard ship.
Although the recruitment methods differed somewhat than
France, Great Britain and the United States pursued the same gen-
eral method. Not until the twentieth century was detailed schooling
really stressed. The change occurred here as a consequence of the
vast number of technological innovations by the turn of the nine-
teenth century that made much more specific training necessary for
the sake of efficiency in combat. Examples are numerous. One is
the case of Russia, which by the turn of the century sought individ-
uals with prior technical training. By 1900, 60 percent of the con-
scripts in Russia’s navy were already experienced in some form of
factory work to transition easily to operating machinery on board
warships. When contrasted to the 2 percent of individuals with fac-
tory training in the army, it is clear that the Russians considered in-
dividuals with prior technical education as a necessity at sea.10
Other navies pursued the same course, including the greatest
naval power at the time. The British increasingly screened incoming
recruits to identify their aptitude for special skills. To supplement
56 DESTROYERS
the numbers of skilled individuals, all navies by the end of the first
decade of the twentieth century had specialized schools for the
training of regular sailors in specific tasks such as engineering, gun-
nery, torpedoes, and damage control. The education of officers went
up in tandem with that of the ratings. British naval schools were
founded at Osborne and Dartmouth while specialized schools that
were already in existence grew in importance and attendance. An ex-
ample is HMS Vernon, the Royal Navy’s torpedo school that became
an independent institution in 1876. By the opening of the war, the
training of destroyer men, like those in other navies, consisted in
most powers of specialized training on land followed by on-site
training aboard ship.
Despite the great numbers of destroyers produced from the 1880s
to 1914, these ships had little opportunity to distinguish themselves
in combat at sea. The Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), sparked by
the Japanese desire to imperially expand into the Korean Peninsula,
involved only torpedo boats. Similarly, the 1898 Spanish-American
War saw almost no usage of destroyers despite the fact that the
Spanish had a few craft at the Battle of Santiago Bay. Destroyers ex-
perienced their first combat during the 1900 Boxer Uprising in
China. This was an anti-foreigner revolt directed against an array of
imperial powers that by this time had greatly diminished Chinese
sovereignty in favor of their own interests. Numerous imperial pow-
ers dispatched destroyers as part of naval forces to quell the rebel-
lion and rescue diplomats trapped in the Chinese capital of Peking
(Beijing) by the Boxers. Even in this case, however, destroyers were
not used in their roles of torpedo defense or torpedo attack.
The one instance where destroyers participated in their intended
roles was the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905). This was sparked
by the Russian desire in early 1904 for a warm-water port in the Far
East. The Chinese province of Manchuria, China itself, and Korea
were possible sites. Russian interference in the region infuriated the
Japanese since the Russians had forced them out of the same areas
after the Sino-Japanese War on the pretext of protecting the peoples
that populated them. The performance of destroyers in the naval as-
pect of this war, however, was not considered very successful by the
combatants and the naval officials of other powers that acted as ob-
servers. The 8 February 1904 Japanese assault on the Russian naval
base Port Arthur involved destroyers, but no Russian warships were
sunk by the torpedo attacks conducted by the Japanese. In the 10
August 1904 Battle of the Yellow Sea, the opposing Russian and Jap-
anese fleets operated eight and 17 destroyers, respectively. Like the
previous engagement, there were no ships sunk by torpedoes. The

largest battle of the war, the 27 May 1905 Battle of Tsushima, saw
limited success, but it was not during the contest itself. In the clos-
ing hours of the battle, Japanese destroyers torpedoed crippled
Russian battleships that were by this point dead in the water. The
only other duty that destroyers fulfilled in this battle was one that
was a minor and unenvisioned role: the offloading of survivors from
sinking ships. The best example is the Russian use of a destroyer to
rescue the wounded Admiral Zinovi Petrovich Rozhdestvenski from
his crippled flagship, the battleship Suvarov.
These disappointing showings had not discouraged any of the
great powers from building destroyers. The development of destroy-
ers in the early twentieth century was spurred in part by the naval
arms race between Great Britain and Germany, which was only one
source of rising tensions in Europe. Since the unification of Ger-
many in 1871, Europe had polarized into two alliances: the Triple
Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy; and the Triple En-
tente of Great Britain, France, and Russia. On 1 August 1914,
events in the Balkans precipitated a chain of events that brought
these two coalitions, with the exception of neutral Italy, into the
conflict that became World War I. This war provided the first major
test of destroyers as a modern weapons system since the Russo-Jap-
anese War. Unlike that conflict, the participation of destroyers
would prove vital to the naval aspect of World War I, as they were
involved in almost every major operation of the war at sea both in
their traditional roles and new ones that arose from necessity in
time of war.
It is therefore fitting that the first shot of the naval war was fired
on 5 August 1914 by the British destroyer Lance as it sank the Ger-
man minelayer Konigin Luise. Further use quickly followed when
destroyers composed the bulk of forces involved in the first full-
scale naval engagement of World War I. Although the British had in
the prewar years stressed the traditional role of torpedo defense for
their destroyers, they were employed for surface engagement on 28
August 1914, at the Battle of Helgoland Bight. The British chose to
strike a German naval force at the island of Helgoland, which
guarded the approaches to the anchorages of the German High Seas
Fleet. Arrayed against the German force of a few light cruisers and
nine destroyers was a British force of 31 destroyers and two light
cruisers that was later augmented by the arrival of capital ships. The
resulting engagement had a profound effect on the entire war at sea.
In exchange for suffering serious damage to one light cruiser and
58 DESTROYERS
two destroyers, the British sank three German light cruisers and two
destroyers. One of the sunken German cruisers, Mainz, was crip-
pled by a destroyer’s torpedo attack. These losses led to Kaiser Wil-
helm II being far less willing to risk his fleet in a major action. He
subsequently imposed severe restrictions on the operational move-
ments of the German High Seas Fleet where the commander in
chief was required to ask for the consent of the kaiser before engag-
ing in a clash with British naval forces. Wilhelm’s action largely re-
moved the possibility of a major fleet engagement that had been pre-
dicted by both sides in the period leading up to the war. As a result,
smaller vessels, particularly destroyers, became some of the princi-
pal combatants in the war at sea.
The only exception to the kaiser’s rule—and for that matter the
one opportunity in World War I that destroyers had to serve in both
the fleet capacities of torpedo defense and attack—was the 31
May–1 June 1916 Battle of Jutland. This engagement proved to be
the only major clash of battle fleets between the opposing sides. De-
stroyers formed the majority of the warships deployed in both fleets:
of 151 British warships, 80 were destroyers; the Germans operated
63 destroyers in a fleet that numbered 101 vessels.11 Both the
British and German vessels launched torpedo attacks against the
capital ships of their enemy and tried to defend against the same by
sinking the opposing destroyers. The results of these attacks were,
like the Russo-Japanese War, not very successful. Only one large
vessel, the German predreadnought Pommern, was sunk by torpe-
does during the Battle of Jutland. The effort of attacking and de-
fending craft, however, provided some of the most savage fighting of
the engagement.
Examples are numerous, but one of the more celebrated ones is
the British destroyer Shark. This vessel was smothered by enemy fire
and eventually crippled. Damage to the ship’s engines rendered it
dead in the water. The experience of Shark’s crew is a testimony both
to the bravery of those who manned destroyers and the horrors that
could be experienced aboard them in battle. Catastrophic damage
was caused to Shark, as it lay motionless, by heavy-caliber guns that
ripped into its unarmored hull. One shell from such a weapon blew
the forward gun completely over the side of the ship and killed the
gun crew. Shark’s captain ultimately fell victim to the explosions that
wracked his ship and lost a portion of his leg. Finally, enemy destroy-
ers employed in the role of defending capital ships from torpedo ves-
sels closed in on Shark and scored a torpedo hit on the ship, whose
light hull immediately broke in two and sank with the loss of all but
five of the crew. Many of those who died in the sinking were proba-
bly trapped within the hull of their sinking ship. Such an experience
is certainly an awful one, where any light that illuminated the inte-
rior of the ship is extinguished and men struggle to find a hatch on
the main deck as an avenue for escape. Even if successful, a sailor
would still be subjected to many dangers while adrift in the sea.
These include oil slicks from their ship that may be set ablaze, ma-
rine predators such as sharks, and simple exposure to the elements.
Although vessels such as Shark were generally not successful in
their mission of launching torpedo attacks, the mere threat posed by
destroyers proved to be a pivotal feature of the engagement. By
nightfall, after having suffered heavy damage at the hands of the
British, the German commander in chief, Admiral Reinhard Scheer,
ordered his destroyers to launch a torpedo attack against the British
battle fleet while he executed a retreat. The order probably saved a
great portion of the German fleet from destruction and forced the
British commander in chief, Admiral John Jellicoe, to turn away
from the impending attack. The result was a loss of contact between
the two fleets and an end to the majority of the fighting, with the ex-
ception of some skirmishes. Destroyers, despite their lack of success
in launching torpedo attacks, had proven successful in defense and
their destructive potential realized by the opposing fleets. They were
also proven as an integral part of battle fleet operations. The losses
of both sides exhibit the heavy use of destroyers. The British lost 14
warships, eight destroyers, while five German destroyers were sunk
out of their total of 11 destroyed vessels.
The destroyer, however, proved far more important in duties other
than the fleet operations for which they had been designed. The
most important was that of commerce protection, being an old duty
of sloops in the Age of Fighting Sail. In this role, destroyers acted as
a counter to the threat posed by the submarine. Like the destroyer,
World War I proved to be the first great proving ground for this type
of submersible. Germany put these vessels to good use, as they were
well aware of the fact that Great Britain relied on overseas sources
for its food supply and the majority of its munitions. The Germans
believed that the use of submarines against British commerce could
starve the country into submission and thereby lead to a German
victory.
Destroyers proved to be the best weapon against submarines.
They were difficult to hit using torpedoes, the submarine’s primary
weapon, owing to their shallow drafts, meaning that their hulls did
not extend very low into the water and torpedoes could conse-
60 DESTROYERS
quently pass under them without detonating. The ships also had the
advantage of being extremely maneuverable and speedy. These at-
tributes were necessary to run down an enemy submarine. As tor-
pedo attacks in this era were primarily made on the surface or at
shallow depth, destroyers would attempt to ram the submarine,
break open its hull, and sink it. The possibility of ramming sub-
marines was foreseen by some navies in the years before the war.
Several U.S. destroyers were fitted with reinforced bows to ram sub-
marines. In effect, destroyers proved to be a floating missile on the
surface of the sea against attack from an enemy below it.
Even so, despite these attributes for submarine hunting, the de-
stroyer was not an ideal weapons system for this task. In the first
years of the war, there was no method of detecting an enemy subma-
rine other than lookouts who might sight a surfaced vessel or its
periscope. In addition, the use of ramming as the principal weapon
against submarines was problematic, as it could cause as much
damage to the attacker as the victim. In 1916, the destroyer came
into its own as a more effective antisubmarine vessel with the ad-
vent of the depth charge. Pioneered by Great Britain, this weapon
was a steel drum 18 inches in diameter and 30 inches long that
weighed 400 pounds. Of this weight, 300 pounds consisted of high
explosive contained in the drum. The depth charge was detonated
by a device known as a hydrostatic pistol. This was pressure-sensi-
tive and could be adjusted to fire at a certain depth, the range of the
first depth charges being between 25 and 300 feet, and thus deto-
nate the charge. These depth charges could either be rolled off racks
on the stern or fired from mortars that could project them some 40
yards from the ship. This latter device became known as a depth
charge thrower (DCT). Although a depth charge had to explode
within 40 feet of the hull of a submarine to cause significant dam-
age, the destroyer now had a viable weapon for use against what be-
came its greatest enemy.
Upon the introduction of the convoy system in 1917, destroyers
became escort vessels that patrolled the waters around convoys,
which are groups of merchant ships in search of submarines. That
same year, crude underwater listening devices known as hy-
drophones entered service. This innovation could not provide a pre-
cise bearing or range to a target but could detect the presence of a
submerged vessel. Oftentimes, its value was reduced by the sounds
of the destroyer that carried it. Nevertheless, hydrophones enabled
destroyers to become more effective in their newfound role.
Equipped with depth charges and hydrophones, destroyers allowed
convoys to continue to arrive in British ports and thus keep the

country in the war. A very large number of these were U.S. destroy-
ers following the April 1917 U.S. entry into the war as an allied
member of the Triple Entente. By war’s end, the destroyer had ac-
counted for a large portion of the 178 German submarines sunk in
the conflict.
In addition to escorting merchant convoys, destroyers also acted
as protection for troop carriers. During the opening days of the war,
destroyers oversaw the transportation of the British Expeditionary
Force (BEF) to France. Throughout the conflict, British destroyers
continued to protect supply routes in the English Channel from
both submarine attacks and assaults by German destroyers. The de-
stroyers offered sterling service in this role. By the end of the con-
flict, only one transport was sunk by the Germans, and that vessel
was empty at the time.
The protection of troop movements in the narrow waters of the
channel meant that a corollary duty was coastal defense. On 3 No-
vember 1914, two British destroyers encountered a force of German
capital ships en route to bombard the British port city of Yarmouth.
The presence of these vessels unnerved the Germans and led them
to bombard Yarmouth for a shorter time than was planned and at a
greater range, thus reducing the damage to the city and the loss of
civilian life.
Destroyers were also used in the North Sea and in the Mediter-
ranean as gunfire support ships. In the case of the former, British
destroyers bombarded German Army units in the first days of the
war as they advanced through Belgium. British and French destroy-
ers in subsequent months were used in the same capacity. The 1915
Dardenelles campaign provided further use of destroyers for gunfire
support. This operation was mounted by Britain and France to force
open a supply route to Russia through the Dardenelles Strait that
leads into the Black Sea. Standing in the way of the effort was
Turkey, which had become a member of the Triple Alliance, also
known as the Central Powers, in December 1914. The campaign
centered on an allied amphibious assault on the straits with the ob-
ject of occupying the area while the Turks attempted to stave off the
effort. Allied destroyers were used to bombard Turkish positions due
to the threat posed to larger ships by Turkish torpedo attacks, which
destroyers had a better chance of surviving given their shallow
drafts.
The combat roles alone for destroyers give them a claim to being
the most important vessels of the naval war, but this case is aug-
62 DESTROYERS
mented by the variety of noncombat duties that fell to them. De-

stroyers were at times used as troop transports themselves, as in the
case of the 1915 Dardenelles campaign in which seven destroyers
were packed with troops of the allied amphibious force and towed
boats full of more men. Destroyers were also given the ignominious
task of torpedoing crippled vessels of their own fleet to prevent cap-
ture by enemy units. An example is the German battle cruiser Lut-
zow, which was so badly damaged during the 1916 Battle of Jutland
that a destroyer had to torpedo the crippled vessel. In this situation,
an additional role attached to destroyers was the rescue of those
crewmen still aboard a sinking vessel. Destroyers were also used to
search for survivors after the sinking of a warship. Upon the de-
struction of the British battle cruiser Invincible, a British destroyer
was dispatched to retrieve any crewmen who may have escaped.
The myriad uses for destroyers in World War I necessitated the
construction of a large number of additional destroyers during the
war. Great Britain built the most destroyers for its large battle fleet
and as convoy escorts. The British built 329 additional units during
the conflict, but among the new destroyers to enter service were
those procured from other powers that were under construction in
British shipyards. Four destroyers similar to the M class that were
being built for Greece were bought by the Admiralty. An additional
four units that were under construction for Turkey were seized upon
that country’s joining the war as a Central Power. Last, the Admi-
ralty purchased a destroyer under construction for Portugal.
British construction would comprise two types of destroyers: reg-
ular destroyers and large flotilla leaders. Those of the former cate-
gory were the most numerous. The first British destroyers to enter
service were the remaining units of the M class, numbering 12
ships, that had been under construction at the outbreak of the war.
These were followed by 90 more M-class vessels, these being or-
dered and launched between 1915 and 1916 in the interest of
launching more destroyers as quickly as possible by dispensing with
the process of making a new design. The chief difference between
these and the first batch was the incorporation of a 40mm pom-pom
gun that was designed to fire explosive shells high into the air. This
weapon was meant for use against airplanes. The airplane, although
it was still a new weapon of war, was recognized by many naval offi-
cials for its destructive potential against warships. The incorpora-
tion of antiaircraft guns would soon become standard practice.
Repeating designs with slight improvements would be the trend
for British construction of regular destroyers. The R class of 51 de-
stroyers, launched between 1916 and 1917, was consequently a vir-

tual duplication of the past. Four more classes constructed during
the war were largely similar. The last of these, the S class, is repre-
sentative of British destroyer design by the end of the war. The hull
of a unit in this group measured 276 feet by 26 feet, 8 inches by 9
feet and displaced 1,075 tons. Mounted on the ship was an arma-
ment consisting of three 4-inch guns, quick-firing guns, one 40mm
pom-pom gun, four 21-inch torpedo tubes, and depth charges. The
engines could produce a maximum speed of 36 knots.
In addition to these destroyers, the British built several much
larger ships known as flotilla leaders, the term flotilla referring to a
group of destroyers. Despite the poor performance of Admiral John
Fisher’s Swift in the prewar years, the British realized the need for
large destroyers of high speed that could serve as command ships.
Following the purchase of the four-ship Faulknor class that had
been under construction for Chile, the British built the Lightfoot
class of seven ships launched between 1915 and 1916. These ves-
sels are indicative of British flotilla leaders. The hull of Lightfoot
measured 324 feet, 10 inches by 31 feet, 9 inches by 12 feet and
displaced 1,440 tons. The larger hull stemmed partly from the need
for greater crew accommodation that was necessary for a command
ship. The bridge area was also more heavily built for coordination of
the flotilla. Finally, Lightfoot carried wireless radio for communica-
tions. This innovation, first used during the 1905 Battle of
Tsushima during the Russo-Japanese War, came into its own during
World War I. The vessel mounted a heavier gun armament than
most regular destroyers, four 4-inch guns, and a smaller torpedo
battery of four 12-inch tubes. For its size, the ship’s turbines were
able to deliver an impressive speed of 34.5 knots. Four more classes
of flotilla leaders followed, the largest being the Scott class that
measured more than 332 feet long and displaced 1,580 tons.
Every one of the regular destroyers and flotilla leaders was eagerly
accepted by the British Royal Navy in its efforts to have enough de-
stroyers to participate in fleet actions, escort convoys, and perform
the other tasks that had fallen to these vessels. In the case of de-
stroyers that were badly damaged in battle, the British made every
effort to return them to service as quickly as possible rather than de-
claring them constructive losses. One example is the case where two
British destroyers, Nubian and Zulu, were crippled. The bow of the
former broke off, while the latter lost its stern to a mine explosion.
Once in dock, the remaining halves of the two ships were welded to-
gether to make a new vessel named Zubian.
64 DESTROYERS
The destroyer program of the United States, which ranked as the

second largest, was, like that of Britain, a reflection of the grave
need for allied destroyers. As war had raged in Europe in the years
before 1917, the then-neutral United States had continued the pro-
duction of destroyers built for torpedo defense. Two units of the pre-
war O’Brien class were launched in 1915 followed by a continuation
of the 1000-tonner type that numbered 12 ships in two classes. The
entry of the United States into the war in April 1917 led to a signifi-
cant change in the U.S. destroyer program. As a result of war and
the threat posed by Germany’s submarine campaign, U.S. destroyers
were built increasingly for antisubmarine warfare (ASW). Construc-
tion revolved in this period around the famous flush-deckers. These
vessels dispensed with the raised forecastle of earlier models, mean-
ing that the main deck was a single, long, flat structure. This was
meant to create a more seaworthy hull. The first of the flush-deckers
were the six ships of the Caldwell class launched in the months fol-
lowing the U.S. entry into the war. The hull of Caldwell measured
315 feet, 7 inches by 30 feet, 6 inches by 8 feet, 10 inches, displaced
1,120 tons, and carried turbine engines that produced a maximum
speed of 30 knots. The ship was armed with four 4-inch guns, two 1-
pound AA guns, and 12 21-inch torpedo tubes. This class served as a
basis for two mass-produced groups of destroyers. The Wickes and
Clemson classes comprised about 300 ships, but not all of them were
launched by the close of the war. Like the British, the Americans
opted for producing large numbers of destroyers in the fastest time
possible. The best way to accomplish this goal was the use of only a
few designs.
Germany, the principal naval combatant opposing Britain and the
United States, launched 11 classes of destroyers during the war that
numbered some 95 vessels. The majority of these were launched be-
fore 1916, as in that year German naval construction turned to sub-
marines. Most of these vessels possessed similar displacements that
averaged between 822 and 960 tons. The last destroyers launched
were the three ships of the H.145 class. Launched in 1917 and
1918, these exhibit a German trend toward larger, more heavily
armed destroyers. Even so, the Germans continued to place the
highest importance on torpedo attack. The hull of H.145 measured
277 feet, 3 inches by 27 feet, 7 inches by 11 feet, 2 inches and dis-
placed 990 tons. The ship mounted four 4.1-inch guns, six 19.7-
inch torpedo tubes, and 24 mines. Its turbines generated a maxi-
mum speed of 34 knots.
Along with the H.145 class and its predecessors were several for-
eign vessels seized during the course of the war that augmented
Germany’s force. Like the British, the Germans were one of the
leading prewar destroyer designers and builders and had contracts
placed in domestic yards by other countries. On the outbreak of war,
the Germans seized two classes of destroyers that each comprised
four vessels. One of these groups was intended for Argentina, while
the other was bound for the Netherlands. Plans existed for the pro-
duction of an additional seven classes of destroyers that had led to
the beginning of construction on some units, but these were incom-
plete at the end of the war in November 1918. An additional group
that was in the planning stages was cancelled upon Germany’s
defeat.
The other great maritime powers of World War I also produced
destroyers, but not in the numbers of the three most powerful naval
combatants. Upon the outbreak of World War I, Japan was an ally of
Great Britain through the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Naval Alliance. On
23 August 1914, the Japanese honored this agreement and declared
war as a member of the allied powers. The Anglo-Japanese Naval Al-
liance had been entered into by the British so that, in the event of
war against Britain, the Japanese would protect British holdings in
the Pacific while the British focused their fleet strength closer to
home. The Japanese deemed destroyers as absolutely necessary to
fleet operations given the commitment in this alliance. The result
was a construction program that continued the prior Japanese prac-
tice of building large destroyers with heavy torpedo armaments.
During the war, the Japanese launched six classes of ships that to-
taled 28 units. The best example of the Japanese design is the two-
ship Tanikaze class. Tanikaze measured 336 feet, 6 inches by 29 feet
by 9 feet, 3 inches, displaced 1,300 tons, and carried turbine en-
gines that could drive the ship at 37.5 knots. Its armament consisted
of three 4.7-inch guns and six 21-inch torpedo tubes. This design
would be improved upon in later years when Japan would launch
some of the largest destroyers in the world.
Italy, which in 1915 became an allied power, largely neglected the
construction of large warships in favor of smaller vessels needed to
defend allied interests against submarines and the Austro-Hungar-
ian fleet in the Mediterranean. The Italians pursued the construc-
tion of regular destroyers and flotilla leaders to this end. In the for-
mer category, the Italians built three classes totaling 20 ships. The
La Masa–class vessels are indicative of Italian design during the war.
Measuring 241 feet, 2 inches by 24 feet by 9 feet, 4 inches, displac-
ing 785 tons, and capable of 30 knots, these ships were armed with
66 DESTROYERS
six 4-inch guns and four 17.7-inch torpedo tubes. They also carried
a fairly heavy AA armament of two 40mm guns and two 6.5mm ma-
chine guns. The inclusion of AA armament was a common feature
in Italian destroyers of the World War I era. Finally, the vessel was
also armed with 10 mines. The flotilla leaders proved to be large and
fast. The Italians built 10 of these type in three classes. The
Mirabello class proved the largest, displacing 1,784 tons.
France produced fewer than Japan and Italy. French naval con-
struction declined rapidly as a whole due to the strain placed on the
country by the war. The Western Front lay on French soil in re-
source-rich areas of the country. The material that was still at
French disposal was directed to the army to repel the invading Ger-
mans. Plans for several large destroyers were consequently shelved,
and the French were able to build only one group of destroyers to
supplement their prewar fleet. Of the three Enseigne Roux–class
ships, only two were launched. Like their predecessors, they were
lightly armed. As France needed more destroyers for convoy escort
duties primarily in the Mediterranean, and domestic yards could not
provide the necessary ships, the French turned to other outlets. One
of these was contracting for ships in Japan. This produced the 12-
ship Arabe class whose units were all launched in 1917. Arabe and
its sisters were built as quickly as possible to meet French needs.
Otherwise unremarkable, they were equipped with triple-expansion
engines rather than turbines. The rest of France’s wartime destroyer
production came at the expense of other powers. Four destroyers be-
ing built in France for Argentina were requisitioned, and eight
Greek coastal defense destroyers were seized by French authorities.
Imperial Russia’s destroyer program was also greatly affected by
the war. Russia was still in the process of rearming following the
Russo-Japanese War and continued upon the outbreak of World
War I with its prewar program. Construction proceeded on four
classes of destroyers totaling 37 ships between 1914 and 1917, but
many of these, including all nine ships of one class, were never com-
pleted. Mounting economic hardship produced by the war hindered
production. Ultimately, the Communist-led 1917 Russian Revolu-
tion that toppled the czarist government led to a standstill in naval
construction. The last group of destroyers launched in the war, the
Kerch class, is an example of the problem. Of the eight ships under
construction, two were not launched until 1924.
The Austro-Hungarian Empire fared the worst of the naval pow-
ers in terms of destroyer output, although destroyers were important
as patrolling vessels in the confines of the Adriatic Sea. Despite the
need for destroyers, production lagged. The first destroyer to enter

the empire’s service during the war was consequently a destroyer be-
ing built for China as a prototype for a larger class of vessels. Austro-
Hungarian wartime output consisted of four additional Tatra-class
destroyers that possessed minor improvements over prewar prede-
cessors. Plans for another four ships were under way, but these were
cancelled owing to a shortage of resources that was only one facet of
the decline of the empire’s economy due to the pressures of war.
Regardless of the degree of success experienced by individual na-
tions in the construction of destroyers during World War I, the de-
stroyer was the warship built in the greatest numbers as every naval
power recognized the need for such craft. When the type was first
introduced in the late nineteenth century, it had been intended only
for the purpose of protecting capital ships from torpedo attacks.
Later, the vessel had taken on the additional duty of torpedo attack,
but the roles for the destroyer were still limited to fleet operations at
the dawn of war. By the end of the conflict in November 1918 with
the Armistice that led to the surrender of the Central Powers, these
were, despite their importance, only a few among an incredible
number of roles. The vast use of destroyers in World War I is indi-
cated by the losses experienced in the conflict: Britain lost the most
with 51 ships destroyed; the German High Seas Fleet lost 48 de-
stroyers; 14 Russian vessels were sunk; France lost 11 destroyers;
three Austro-Hungarian vessels were sunk; and the United States
and Japan each lost one.12 A fitting tribute to the extensive service of
these vessels was the transport of the German naval delegation to
Britain in 1918 during the surrender of the German High Seas Fleet
as a stipulation of the peace agreement. This diplomatic step brought
to a close a devastating war. From it had emerged the destroyer as a
proven, multi-role warship whose importance would not diminish in
the postwar world.
ENDNOTES
1. Arthur Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British

Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880–1905 (Hamden, CT: Ar-
chon Books, 1964), p. 85.
2. Jon Tetsuro Sumida, In Defense of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Tech-
nology, and British Naval Policy, 1889–1914 (Boston: Unwin, Hyman,
1989), p. 8.
68 DESTROYERS
3. Peter Charles Smith, Hard Lying: The Birth of the Destroyer, 1893–
1913 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1971), p. 17.
4. James L. George, The History of Warships: From Ancient Times to the
5. David K. Brown, Warrior to Dreadnought: Warship Development,
1860–1905 (London: Chatham Publishing, 1997), p. 140.
6. David Lyon, The First Destroyers (London: Chatham Publishing,
1996), p. 30.
7. Brown, Warrior to Dreadnought, p. 11.
8. George, The History of Warships, p. 139.
9. John Wells, The Royal Navy: An Illustrated Social History (Gloucester-
shire, UK: Alan Sutton, 1994), p. 81.
10. Ronald H. Spector, At War at Sea: Sailors and Naval Combat in the
Twentieth Century (New York: Viking, 2001), p. 33.
11. Spencer C. Tucker, The Great War, 1914–1918 (Bloomington: Indi-
ana University Press, 1998), p. 113.
12. George, The History of Warships, p. 139.
CHAPTER 3
Advancements during the

Interwar Years and
World War II, 1919–1945
The naval officials of the great powers faced a world that had
been changed dramatically by World War I. The naval competition
between Great Britain and Germany had ended with Germany’s de-
feat and the surrender of the majority of its battle fleet to the victo-
rious Allied powers. Austria-Hungary also ceased to be a maritime
force, as the peace agreement with this defeated Central Power re-
quired the surrender of its fleet and deprived the empire of its ports
through territorial terms that destroyed the empire itself. Finally,
Russia, which had withdrawn from the war before its conclusion,
was removed from the naval scene in the years immediately follow-
ing 1918 because the Bolshevik revolution had toppled the govern-
ment and the country was largely in chaos as imperial forces fought
Communists for political control.
Destroyer construction for some years after World War I was thus
in large part the product of the victorious powers. Rather than being
new designs, most of the destroyers launched immediately after the
war were World War I–era vessels that were in the process of com-
pletion upon the close of hostilities. Despite the fact that the de-
stroyer had proven its importance in World War I, few politicians
wished to consider the construction of new warships in the atmos-
phere of war-weariness that prevailed.
Great Britain, the largest producer of destroyers during World
69
70 DESTROYERS
War I, possessed a huge surplus. In addition to the 228 destroyers in

operation by August 1914, the British had produced more than 300
new vessels. The British subsequently did not begin building de-
stroyers based on new designs until the late 1920s; significant was
the fact that the British economy had been severely strained by the
war. Indeed, between 1919 and 1922 about 111 destroyers that
were deemed unfit to serve were sold for scrap. The process of
scrapping amounts to a peacetime contribution for destroyers, being
ships whose roles were to this point in time solely those of war.
Ships were sold by the government to private firms, where they were
dismantled over the course of several months and their steel and
machinery sold on the open market. The fittings of the vessels were
first removed, although in the case of destroyers these were few
given the relatively Spartan living conditions aboard. Their guns and
superstructures were then dismantled, and scrapping crews subse-
quently cut down the hulls deck by deck until reaching the keel.
The process of selling ships for scrap was beneficial to govern-
ments in two respects: The government profited from the sale of the
ship itself as well as through a reduction of operating costs for the
fleet, as there were fewer vessels to maintain in battle readiness.
This second positive aspect was important as part of British at-
tempts to improve their battered economy by demobilizing the mili-
tary. Despite the lack of new designs and the scrapping of many de-
stroyers, the numbers of ships swelled slightly with the addition of
the last of Britain’s wartime construction projects. This included
four flotilla leaders launched between December 1918 and Septem-
ber 1920. In addition to these were 32 destroyers of other classes
that had been laid down during the conflict. Many of these consti-
tuted one class that had been ordered in January 1918. As a sign of
the times, 38 units of the projected 53-ship group of January 1918
were cancelled in November 1918, soon after the issuance of the
Armistice. Politicians in London did not consider such a large num-
ber of new destroyers in peacetime to be necessary.
The United States, like Britain, possessed a very large surplus of
destroyers. Although the U.S. Navy operated only 54 destroyers in
August 1914, by the end of the war U.S. shipyards had produced an
additional 109. In the estimation of U.S. naval officials, there was
little need to commence new designs given the size of this fleet. In-
deed, some scrapping commenced immediately after the war, al-
though the 15 ships that went to the scrap yard pales in comparison
to British actions. The thinking of naval officials concerning new
designs was merely reinforced by the fact that some units of the
ADVANCEMENTS DURING THE INTERWAR YEARS AND WORLD WAR II 71
mass-produced Wickes class were still under construction and only

5 of the 156 Clemson-class destroyers were complete. Only six of
this latter group were cancelled by the government. The remaining
145 ships were launched between December 1918 and early 1921,
which effectively doubled the size of the destroyer fleet of the U.S.
Navy. Further designs seemed an ineffective use of funds in the face
of so many new ships, although their design would soon become
obsolete.
The destroyer production of Japan stands in sharp contrast to that
of the two leading naval powers in the immediate postwar world.
The Japanese continued to pursue a program of naval expansion
that placed a tremendous burden on their country given the limited
resources of the home islands and the relatively poor condition of
the economy. This course led to the 15 Minekaze-class destroyers.
Launched between 1919 and 1921, these vessels were more heavily
armed than their predecessors. The hull of Minekaze measured 336
feet, 6 inches by 29 feet, 8 inches by 9 feet, 6 inches and displaced
1,345 tons. It was armed with four 4.7-inch guns, two 7.7mm ma-
chine guns, six 21-inch torpedo tubes, and 20 mines. The vessel was
capable of the very high speed of 39 knots. In addition to these ves-
sels were the 21 Momi-class destroyers that were launched over the
course of the first four years of peace. These mounted less arma-
ment and were viewed by most naval officials as being good only for
coastal defense due to their poorer seaworthiness. Nevertheless,
these vessels, combined with the Minekaze-class units, represented
a substantial increase in Japan’s destroyer fleet. The rise in numbers
did not go unnoticed in the United States, where politicians were
aware of guarding U.S. Pacific interests against any possible future
interference by Japan. By 1922, it was clear that Japan had become
a powerful naval force.
The only other naval power to launch new destroyers in the im-
mediate postwar years was Italy. Although these 14 ships—compris-
ing three classes that were launched between 1919 and 1923—were
based on the old Indomito, they were important in terms of their im-
pact on future events in the Mediterranean. These ships contributed
to the growth of a new naval arms race between Italy and France for
influence in the Mediterranean. Significantly for destroyer produc-
tion, it would revolve primarily around the construction of smaller
craft.
This arms race, however, would not occur for some years follow-
ing the launch of the first new Italian destroyers. In the aftermath of
World War I, France was in no condition to immediately mount a
72 DESTROYERS
new program of naval construction. Not only were French resources

drained by wartime expenditure, but the economy was badly
strained by the war effort. The French did in 1920 draw up plans for
12 new destroyers, but these never materialized. These ships were
sorely needed at this time, however, to replace those destroyers that
were worn out by years of wartime service. Between 1919 and 1921,
the French government scrapped 20 such vessels. In 1922 the gov-
ernment finally approved a new naval construction program that in-
cluded destroyers, but it would take some years before this legisla-
tion produced new warships.
The lack of destroyer production in France was the same situa-
tion as that experienced by the other major combatants of World
War I. Different factors in each country other than war-weariness or
poor economic conditions were the cause. In the case of Russia, the
turmoil of the Bolshevik revolution had sparked a civil war that pit-
ted Communists against all those who were opposed to either the
end of imperial Russia or the establishment of a society ruled by
workers. By late 1920, the Bolsheviks under Vladimir Lenin had tri-
umphed over their enemies. The conflict, however, had largely de-
stroyed the Russian Navy. A large portion of the fleet had remained
loyal to the czar and did not return following Lenin’s victory. As a re-
sult, the new Soviet Union’s navy consisted of a small collection of
obsolete ships. New naval construction was not considered immedi-
ately after the civil war, as Lenin’s new Soviet government turned its
resources to the consolidation of power within the country. In addi-
tion, the navy was held in ill repute by the Soviets not only because
of its actions in the civil war but also due to the 1921 Kronstadt
mutiny in which sailors at that Baltic naval base revolted against So-
viet rule. In light of these conditions, Lenin relegated the remaining
naval units to control by the army and for the sole use of coastal de-
fense. It would remain as a denuded and impotent force throughout
Lenin’s tenure.
Germany also experienced a massive decline in the fortunes of its
navy, but this situation and the lack of destroyer production was the
result of defeat in World War I rather than a revolution. As part of
the Armistice that went into effect on 11 November 1918, Germany
was required to surrender the bulk of its High Seas Fleet to the al-
lied powers. The battle fleet was to be interned at the British Royal
Navy base of Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands at the extreme
northern tip of the British Isles. By May 1919, the Treaty of Ver-
sailles, the formal peace treaty between the allies and Germany, was
nearing completion. One clause stated that Germany would lose the
bulk of its fleet to the allies as war reparations. The consequence

was the German decision to scuttle its interned fleet rather than
suffer this inglorious surrender. On 21 June 1919, the German war-
ships at Scapa Flow were scuttled by their crews. Among the vessels
sunk were 50 destroyers, being the largest number of warships sunk
that day.
The self-destruction of the High Seas Fleet, however, was only
the beginning of Germany’s naval woes after the war. The Treaty of
Versailles imposed restrictions on the composition of the future
navy such that the force left to the new Weimar Republic was com-
prised of obsolete units that were good only for coastal defense. Six-
teen destroyers were included as part of the new navy. Four of these
had to be kept in reserve, as the treaty stipulated that a maximum of
only 12 destroyers could be in service at any one time. New naval
construction was limited to the replacement of vessels deemed too
old and worn out to operate. Article 190 of the Treaty of Versailles
set the rules for such replacement in terms of destroyers. It stated
that new destroyers could be built to a maximum displacement of
800 tons and that units could not be replaced until 15 years had
passed since the date of the previous ship’s launch. In sum, new de-
stroyer production lay some time away for Germany.
Whereas the Germans could at least look to future naval con-
struction, Austria-Hungary could not. Little need be said about Aus-
tria-Hungary. Its defeat as a Central Power led to the disintegration
of the empire at the Paris Peace Conference through the establish-
ment of new states carved from its territory and the enlargement of
other nations. Austria, the heart of the former empire, became a
landlocked state. Units of the former Austro-Hungarian Navy were
either given to the victorious powers as war reparations or trans-
ferred to Yugoslavia, being one of the new artificial states created at
Austro-Hungarian expense.
New destroyer construction after 1922 took place within the con-
text of the conditions created by World War I as war-weary powers
faced another naval arms race. By 1921, the U.S. government
greatly desired a conference to deal with strategic concerns that had
arisen in the wake of the war. Diplomatic relations between the
United States, which had become one of the most powerful navies
through its construction during the war, and Great Britain, the
greatest naval power since 1815, had steadily deteriorated as the
two powers began to vie for naval supremacy. Neither nation, how-
ever, desired a new arms race. U.S. politicians realized that the cost
would be enormous because the United States needed to maintain
74 DESTROYERS
forces in both the Atlantic and Pacific owing to the fact that the
1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance remained in force.
The British, by contrast, did not want to engage in a new compe-
tition given the state of their postwar economy. The result was the
1921–1922 Washington Naval Conference that included represen-
tatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan.
The goal of the meeting was to prevent a future naval arms race,
which was viewed by many as a cause of World War I. The resulting
Washington Naval Treaty dealt primarily with the limitation of the
aggregate tonnage of capital ships, being battleships and aircraft
carriers, that each naval power could possess. It also stipulated re-
strictions on the size of new capital ships. Legislation on smaller
warships like destroyers was contemplated through a U.S. proposal
to extend the overall tonnage restrictions to smaller craft, but this
was rejected by the French. In their view, the high cost of the
French Army made destroyers, cruisers, and submarines necessary
for national defense, as they were cheaper to build. As a result, the
treaty signed in 1922 did not impede the construction of warships
smaller than capital ships. Tonnage for capital ships was placed at
525,000 tons each for Great Britain and the United States, 315,000
tons for Japan, and 175,000 tons each for France and Italy.
Despite not having directly affected destroyer development, the
Washington Naval Treaty was important for the future of the ship
type. The treaty actually encouraged the production of smaller ships
like destroyers to supplement battle fleets that had reached their
limits in capital-ship tonnage. The numbers of destroyers subse-
quently built would not equal that of the pre–World War I era due to
the impoverished world economy resulting from the war and eco-
nomic depression in the late 1920s and early 1930s, but construc-
tion did move forward. The new destroyers that appeared after the
treaty were warships that for the most part incorporated merely re-
fined and improved versions of the technology that had either ex-
isted before the war or been produced during it. The big exception
was the advent of sonar devices to detect and plot the position of en-
emy submarines. Although the first sonar set was produced in 1918,
the system was not included in destroyers until the early 1920s.
This production took place amid a debate concerning the proper
roles of destroyers that was generated by the numerous functions
that the ship type had assumed in the war. The crux of the differ-
ence in the opinion among the world’s naval officials was whether
torpedoes or guns should be emphasized. Some naval officials advo-
cated dispensing with torpedoes altogether given the disappointing
effect of torpedo attacks at the 1916 Battle of Jutland and in the war
overall. The antisubmarine role, despite the heavy use of destroyers
as escorts against submarines in World War I, was generally de-
emphasized. Regardless of this debate over wartime use, destroyers
were seen by all naval powers as important ships of war, and con-
struction of destroyers began in many naval powers soon after the
signing of the treaty.
France was among the first to begin new construction. Although
the army still received priority over the navy, the French were ready
to move forward with their 1922 naval construction plan. This pro-
gram was considered necessary given Italian production that threat-
ened French power in the Mediterranean. The results fall into two
different types of destroyers. The first of these were conventional
destroyers. The 12-ship Bourrasque class, being the first French
postwar design, was launched between 1924 and 1925, while the 14
L’Adroit-class vessels were launched from 1926 to 1929 and were
merely improved versions of the first group. The hull of L’Adroit
measured 351 feet, 8 inches by 32 feet, 3 inches by 14 feet, 1 inch
and displaced 1,378 tons. They were more heavily armed than in the
past, mounting four 5.1-inch guns, two 37mm AA weapons, two
13.2mm AA guns, and six 21.7-inch torpedo tubes. The turbine en-
gines could produce a maximum speed of 33 knots.
The second type of destroyer marked a tendency for even larger
and more heavily armed craft than either of the conventional de-
signs. Between 1923 and 1924, the French launched the six ships of
Chacal class (known also as the Jaguar class). These ships were
among the superdestroyers, meaning destroyers of a particularly
large size that mounted very heavy armament. The ships measured
more than 415 feet long, displaced 2,126 tons, and were armed with
five 5.1-inch guns and six 21.7-inch torpedo tubes. Such dimen-
sions and armament were huge for a destroyer and were indeed un-
precedented. The next group of six Guépard-class vessels were gen-
erally similar, but were the first of the French 2,400-ton designs.
The last destroyers launched by the end of 1930 were the first two
units of the Aigle class comprising six ships. Aigle measured 421
feet, 7 inches by 38 feet, 10 inches by 16 feet, 4 inches and dis-
placed 2,441 tons. It was armed with five 5.5-inch guns, four 37mm
and four 13.2 mm AA weapons, and six 21.7-inch torpedo tubes.
The vessel was capable of a maximum speed of 36 knots.
Italy was also an early producer of destroyers after 1922 as it con-
tinued its program that had been embarked upon in the months af-
ter World War I. The country’s naval rivalry with France deepened
76 DESTROYERS
after 1922 with the rise to power of Benito Mussolini and his fascist
party. One of the facets of Mussolini’s plan to increase Italy’s influ-
ence in the world was overseas expansion. A large navy was a neces-
sity to further that ambition. Mussolini in the years after his rise to
prominence devoted a large amount of resources to naval construc-
tion. The need for numbers led to the production between 1925 and
1927 of 16 ships in three classes that were improvements on World
War I designs.
More significant was the launching between 1928 and 1929 of
the 12 Navigatori-class destroyers. These vessels were Italy’s first
and only superdestroyers. Navigatori measured 352 feet by 33 feet,
5 inches by 11 feet, 2 inches, displaced 1,900 tons, and could steam
at 38 knots. It was armed with six 4.7-inch guns and, unlike destroy-
ers of previous eras, these were not contained in single mounts. In-
stead the armament was carried in three dual-piece mounts, one
each being sited in the bow and the stern and the third amidships.
The vessel also shipped two 40mm and four 13.2mm AA guns along
with six 21-inch torpedo tubes. These vessels, with their maximum
speed of 38 knots, were faster than their French equivalents and
were deemed a serious threat by French naval officials. Supplement-
ing these vessels in 1930 were the first two units of the four-ship
Freccia class, which were smaller ships designed to operate with the
fastest capital ships of Italy’s fleet.
Japan followed closely behind France and Italy in terms of the
speedy construction of destroyers after 1922. Following the end of
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in the early 1920s, the Japanese came
to rely totally on their own technology and shipbuilding techniques,
as they could no longer rely on British aid. Construction beginning
in the mid-1920s would yield Japanese destroyers that engendered
respect around the world. The Japanese plan revolved around larger
destroyers, as Tokyo pursued a policy of quality over quantity in part
due to Japan’s more limited resources. The production of destroyers
seemed a good use of naval funds given the 1922 Washington Naval
Treaty. Not only was Japan at its tonnage limit in capital ships; its
ceiling was less than those of the United States and Great Britain.
Japanese naval officials viewed the production of powerful destroy-
ers as a good method to supplement the power of their smaller bat-
tle fleet. In addition, destroyers were also necessary as part of
Japan’s strategic requirements. In February 1923, Japanese military
officials had created a secret list of potential future enemies in
which the United States was number one. Destroyers were envi-
sioned as vessels that needed to be of sufficient size and endurance
to operate for extended periods in the vast expanses of the Pacific in

defense of Japanese interests against a potential enemy with a larger
battle fleet, such as the United States.
Destroyers, in the event of war, were seen not only for battle fleet
defense but also for the protection of Japanese overseas commerce
and for commerce warfare. Japanese destroyers were consequently
powerful. The first 12 Mutsuki-class ships, launched between 1925
and 1927, were merely derivatives of the preceding Kamikaze class,
but their armament was extremely potent given the torpedoes
mounted on the type. These destroyers were the first in the world to
mount the 24-inch torpedo, which was pioneered by the Japanese.
Known in World War II as the Long Lance, its existence at the time
was a state secret. The weapon was an awesome improvement over
the torpedoes of other navies. The weapon’s warhead, 795 pounds of
explosive, was twice that of a 21-inch torpedo. In addition, its range
was greatly increased over prior models. The 21-inch torpedo could
run at a maximum speed of 35 knots while reaching its maximum
range of about 5,687 yards. The Long Lance could also travel at 35
knots but was capable of a maximum range of 10,936 yards. Range
increased with reduction in speed. In the case of the Long Lance,
the weapon could travel as far as 22,000 yards at lower velocities.
These powerful ships, however, paled in comparison to Japan’s
superdestroyers. These 20 ships of the Fubuki class were launched
between 1927 and 1930 and represent a design coup for the Japa-
nese that was acknowledged by naval officials in all other major
maritime powers. The hull of Fubuki measured 388 feet, 6 inches
by 34 feet by 10 feet, 6 inches, displaced 1,750 tons, and carried
turbine engines that could produce a maximum speed of 38 knots.
At the time of its launch, this ship and its sister ships were the best-
armed destroyers in the world. The main gun armament of Fubuki
consisted of six 5-inch guns that were housed in three twin-gunned
turrets rather than mounts protected by gun shields. One of these
turrets was located forward, while the other two were sited in the
stern. This arrangement, which would be repeated in future Japa-
nese designs, made the Fubuki class the first destroyers in the world
to use turrets.
The turret had existed since the U.S. Civil War (1861–1865),
when it was employed in the Union warship Monitor, but it had
never been shipped on a hull as small as that of a destroyer. A turret
is an enclosed gun house that protects the gun crew from enemy
fire. In the case of Fubuki, the light armor of the gun house was
strong enough to withstand splinters from explosions and worked
78 DESTROYERS
against smoke and poison gas. This turret sat on top of a barbette, a
French invention in existence since 1867. A barbette is simply a
large turntable on which the guns were placed that could swivel, at
this point through the use of steam or electrical power, and thus
provide a large arc of fire. The barbette extended below the main
deck and encased the loading machinery and magazines, the later
being normally in the bottom of the ship for the sake of protection
from enemy fire. Ammunition and the powder with which to fire it
was passed from the lowest level of the barbette via hoists to the tur-
ret, where the crews loaded and fired the guns.
The guns of Fubuki were controlled from a position placed on top
of the bridge that was known as director control. Pioneered by the
British in the years leading up to World War I, this system was in
wide use by the end of the conflict but reached destroyers later than
larger ships due to the size and weight of the machinery. Director
control was a range-finding center that housed electronic equip-
ment that calculated an enemy vessel’s range, course, and speed.
This information was used to aim the guns, which could be fired
from this location. In addition to the armament itself and the range-
finding equipment that greatly increased its accuracy, later units of
the Fubuki class were equipped with turrets that could elevate the
guns up to 75 degrees in the air as opposed to the 40 degrees of
prior vessels of the type. These proved to be among the world’s first
dual-purpose guns that were designed both to combat surface tar-
gets and to provide AA fire. Supplementing the fine gun armament
of the Fubuki class was a torpedo armament of nine 24-inch tubes,
two 13mm AA guns, and depth charges. The heavy torpedo arma-
ment was a reflection of the priority placed by the Japanese on de-
stroyers as torpedo attack vessels.
The stir created in international circles by the heavy armament of
these vessels was heightened by the fact that these ships were truly
all-weather vessels that were superior to most foreign destroyers.
For the first time in a destroyer, the bridge was completely enclosed
to keep the bridge crew protected in rough weather and thereby in-
crease efficiency. The Fubuki class was not a perfect design, how-
ever, as the addition of an enclosed bridge, director control, and tur-
reted guns made the ship very top-heavy and unstable. Also, to save
weight the hull and bridge structure were very lightly built. Indeed,
the bridge was composed of aluminum rather than steel. As a result,
the hull and superstructure were slightly weak, and there would be
instances of plates buckling during the careers of the Fubuki-class
ships. Nevertheless, Japan had created a ship that subsequently
shaped considerations of destroyer design in many countries toward

large destroyers with heavy armament.
Great Britain, among the largest naval powers in the world, was
one of the last to embark on new construction in the wake of the
1922 Washington Naval Treaty. The country continued at first to rely
on its surplus of World War I era destroyers while dispensing with
those units considered too old to effectively function. Not until the
late 1920s did the British perceive a need for appreciable numbers of
new vessels. Even so, the period before this time was marked by the
peacetime use of destroyers as testing platforms for new technology.
The growth of the airplane as a new weapon in World War I led to ex-
perimentation that, in the case of the Royal Navy, revolved around
the use of planes as scouts for battle fleets. In 1923 and 1928, the
destroyers Stronghold and Thanet had their forward guns removed in
lieu of the construction of aircraft catapults on their forecastles.
This era was also not wholly devoid of experimentation with de-
stroyer design. Two destroyers, Amazon and Ambuscade, were
launched in 1926 as prototypes for new ships. These led to the 19
ships of the A and B class that were launched between 1929 and
1930. These letter designations referred to ships of the same class,
some bearing names beginning with “A” while others bore names
beginning with “B.” They were essentially enlarged and better-
armed versions of the last British World War I–era designs. An A-
class or B-class destroyer measured 323 feet by 32 feet, 3 inches by
12 feet, 3 inches, displaced between 1,337 and 1,360 tons, and car-
ried turbine engines that produced a maximum speed of 35.25
knots. The heaviest pieces of their gun armament represented a
technological innovation. These were four 4.7-inch quick-firing
guns, these vessels being the first armed with weapons of this cal-
iber that were quick-firers. This battery was also innovative through
a design improvement based on World War I experience. The gun
shields that surrounded them extended farther down toward the
deck to protect the crews from splinters that could fly underneath
from explosions and cut off their feet. Unlike the past, these shields
also extended around the gun more fully on the sides, thus affording
better protection. Although these shields were still proof only
against splinters, the improvement was a sound one and was stan-
dard in most navies. In addition to this armament, the ships also
carried two 40mm pom-pom guns for use against aircraft and eight
21-inch torpedo tubes. Supplementing the ships of the A and B
class was one flotilla leader launched in 1929 that was essentially an
enlarged ship of the same type.
80 DESTROYERS
The British return to destroyer production was not matched by

the United States, the other large naval power, after the 1922 Wash-
ington Naval Treaty. Until 1934, U.S. politicians continued to rely
on the nation’s huge surplus of World War I–era destroyers despite
the fact that these vessels by this date were obsolete.
This lack of destroyer production was also a continuing trend in
the Soviet Union. That country was still trying to recover from the
effect of the civil war, and the navy, beyond acting as a coastal de-
fense force, was still considered a low priority. A naval program was
authorized in 1926, but it called only for the construction of small
coastal craft and the refurbishment of the obsolete units remaining
from the old czarist fleet.
By 1930, most of the world’s navies had returned to the produc-
tion of destroyers. The designs were, unlike capital ships, unfettered
by any treaty restrictions. Those vessels built after 1930, however,
constituted a new phase in the development of destroyers where the
parameters of their design were set by international law. Diplomats
of the signatory powers of the Washington Treaty realized in the
years after its implementation that the agreement had done little to
prevent worldwide naval competition due to its exclusion of limits
on smaller craft like destroyers. In 1927, plenipotentiaries of the
great naval powers had met at the Geneva Conference to try and
correct this problem, but the effort resulted in failure. The talks
deadlocked because the United States and Great Britain could not
reach agreement on the number of cruisers, which was another type
of ship largely unaddressed by the Washington Treaty, that would be
allowable for each navy. The next conference, however, produced
compromise on this issue and also placed for the first time limits on
destroyer design and the amount of destroyer tonnage allowable for
each signatory country.
The London Conference, which met between 21 January and 22
April 1930, created legislation that limited the displacement and ar-
mament of destroyers as well as cruisers and submarines. The re-
sulting London Naval Treaty stated that the majority of destroyers
could be built to a maximum 1,500 tons of standard displacement—
the weight of the ship fully equipped—but without fuel. A further
clause stipulated that each naval power that signed the treaty could
fill 16 percent of its overall destroyer tonnage with vessels that dis-
placed up to 1,850 tons standard displacement. These destroyers,
regardless of displacement, could mount a maximum caliber of 5-
inch guns. In addition to these design stipulations, the talks also set
the maximum tonnage of the signatory powers at 150,000 tons each
for the United States and Great Britain and 105,000 tons for Japan,
which translated into a 10:10:7 ratio, respectively. Notably, the
French and Italians refused to sign this treaty due to the restriction
on destroyers. Both powers deemed such restrictions as running
counter to their naval planning, which relied heavily on the use of
destroyers. Indeed, destroyers constituted the majority of the naval
arms race in the Mediterranean Sea between the two powers.
The result of the London Treaty was that all of the signatory pow-
ers between 1930 and 1934 built destroyers up to the maximum of
the design limitations. Great Britain is the first example of this
trend, as the British produced three classes of destroyers in this pe-
riod that conformed to the tonnage restrictions of the treaty. Two of
these classes, the C and D class and the E and F class, were similar
to one another and comprised a total of 30 warships. The first was
an enlarged version of the A and B class while the second group fol-
lowed from their predecessors’ design. An E and an F-class vessel
displaced between 1,350 tons and 1,405 tons and carried four 4.7-
inch guns in single mounts protected by gun shields. These attrib-
utes were well within the stipulations of the London Treaty. The
third class of two ships became the first newly designed British
flotilla leaders since World War I. These vessels were merely en-
larged E- and F-class boats that displaced between 1,460 tons and
1,495 tons and carried an additional 4.7-inch gun. Like the smaller
destroyers, these still conformed to the lower tonnage limit of the
treaty as well as the gun armament limit.
The United States, given rising concerns in Washington over Jap-
anese imperial expansion in Asia that posed a threat to U.S. Pacific
interests, returned to destroyer production with the nine Farragut-
class ships. These vessels, being the first produced to a post–World
War I design, were launched between 1934 and 1935. The hull of
Farragut measured 341 feet, 3 inches by 34 feet, 3 inches by 11 feet,
7 inches and displaced 1,358 tons. It was armed with five 5-inch
guns in single mounts. Only the two forward weapons were enclosed
in gun houses. These weapons, like vessels such as Fubuki, were
placed on dual-purpose mounts that would become a standard fea-
ture in U.S. destroyers. Farragut also carried four .5-inch weapons
for use against enemy aircraft and eight 21-inch torpedo tubes. The
vessel’s turbine engines could produce a maximum speed of 36.5
knots. Like the British ships, these vessels conformed to the London
Treaty. They were built for endurance to operate for extended peri-
ods in the expanses of the Pacific Ocean and thus are a reflection of
the growing U.S. concern over Pacific holdings in light of the Japa-
82 DESTROYERS
nese threat. The Farragut class proved to be the benchmark for all
future U.S. destroyer designs in the years before World War II.
Japan’s construction of destroyers between 1930 and 1934 took
place in the context of the government’s decision to pursue imperial
expansion. In 1931, Japanese forces invaded and conquered the
Chinese province of Manchuria. Also, plans were in existence in the
early 1930s that called for the seizure of areas in Southeast Asia and
the East Indies, which were rich in oil and raw materials that were
necessary to sustain a Japanese economy that was increasingly de-
voted to the production of military equipment. A strong navy was
necessary to realize the goals set forth in these plans. Destroyers
constituted a large part of the subsequent construction effort.
The first new group of four Akatsuki-class ships was launched be-
tween 1931 and 1932 and was generally similar to Fubuki. A key
difference was the use of electric welding to attach the hull plates to
the frame rather than rivets of steel that nailed them to the beams.
This method was billed as a weight-saving measure and became
standard practice in subsequent decades in all the world’s navies.
Nevertheless, at this time the use of welding proved a problem
through several instances of separations of hull plates from beams.
The proceeding Hatsuharu class of six ships was the first built to
conform to the London Treaty. Hatsuharu’s hull measured 359 feet,
3 inches by 32 feet, 10 inches by 9 feet, 11 inches, displaced 1,490
tons, and was powered by turbines capable of 36.5 knots. The arma-
ment consisted of five 5-inch dual-purpose guns, two 13mm AA
weapons, nine 24-inch torpedo tubes, and 14 depth charges.
The destroyers built in France in the wake of the London Treaty
were far larger than those of the signatory powers, as the French,
having refused to sign it, were unfettered by any limitation on de-
sign. As a result, France continued its program of constructing su-
perdestroyers. Between 1931 and 1932 the French launched the six
ships of the 2,441-ton Vauquelin class that mounted a primary ar-
mament of five 5-inch guns and seven 21.7-inch torpedo tubes.
These were followed by the six Le Fantasque–class vessels.
Launched between 1934 and 1935, these warships were some of
the most impressive destroyers of their day. The hull of Le Fantasque
measured a colossal 434 feet, 4 inches by 40 feet, 6 inches by 16
feet, 5 inches and displaced 2,569 tons. It carried five 5-inch guns
in single mounts protected by gun shields, four 37mm and four
13.2mm AA weapons, nine 21.7-inch torpedo tubes, and 50 mines.
Its turbine engines produced a maximum speed of 37 knots, making
the vessel, as well as its sister ships, some of the fastest in the world.
Indeed, Le Terrible once reached a speed over 45 knots. This incred-

ible achievement made it the fastest ship of its day and one of the
quickest of all time. Due to their size, these vessels border on being
light cruisers rather than destroyers.
Italy, France’s chief naval rival, continued to try to equal or sur-
pass the strength of the French fleet. The effort of the Italians, how-
ever, did not rest on building large destroyers like those of their
competitor. Despite not being a signatory to the London Treaty, the
Italians built smaller destroyers whose design specifications were
below that of the agreement it had spurned. The four-ship Folgore
class, launched in 1931, were units that displaced only 1,220 tons
and were armed with four 4.7-inch guns housed in two twin-gunned
mounts. One was located in the bow while the other was placed in
the stern. They also carried six 21-inch torpedo tubes, an assort-
ment of AA weapons, and two depth charge throwers. The follow-on
four Maestrale-class ships were larger, similarly armed vessels.
Destroyer production between 1930 and 1934, despite being in
part regulated by an international agreement designed to preserve
peace, took place against the backdrop of the looming possibility of
another war. By 1934, Japanese expansion had already raised con-
cern, but a fresh challenge had also appeared by this time in Eu-
rope. In 1933, Adolf Hitler and his fascist party, the Nazi Party, had
been elected to power in Germany with a platform that called for
the destruction of the Treaty of Versailles as the path to a restoration
of German power. Amid these tensions, the arms limitations began
to fall apart. In August 1934, in keeping with their new expansionist
goals in the Pacific, the Japanese announced their intention to abro-
gate the Washington Treaty. Although the United States and Great
Britain continued to build within the guidelines of the treaty in an
attempt to foster goodwill, the Japanese declaration dealt a grave
blow to the spirit of arms control.
By extension, the Japanese action also threatened the framework
created by the London Treaty. A subsequent attempt to further re-
strict naval production through the Second London Conference,
which met from December 1935 to March 1936, was ultimately a
failure. The Japanese, demanding parity with Great Britain and the
United States in tonnage numbers of all warship types, walked out
of the meeting upon being rebuffed. Their departure crippled the
talks, despite some agreement by the other powers on issues other
than destroyers. With the London Treaty set to expire at the end of
1936, all powers knew that the very real possibility existed of a new
naval arms race.
84 DESTROYERS
As this sequence of events unfolded, the United States continued

to produce destroyers that conformed to the London Treaty. The
high number of destroyers launched between 1935 and 1939 was
spurred by rising world tensions and continued to include primarily
large destroyers capable of extended operations in the Pacific. The
first of these were eight ships of the Porter class, launched between
1935 and 1936, that filled the U.S. need for flotilla leaders. These
can be classed as the first U.S. superdestroyers. The hull of Porter
measured 381 feet, 1 inch by 37 feet by 13 feet, displaced 1,834
tons, and housed engines capable of 37 knots. Its armament con-
sisted of eight 5-inch guns in four twin-gunned mounts that were
fully enclosed by gun houses. Two of these were located in the bow
while the other two were sited in the stern. As a result of this arma-
ment and the ship’s tonnage, Porter conformed to the London Treaty
at a time that corresponded with the breakdown of the Second Lon-
don Conference. The ship was also armed with eight 1.1-inch and
two .5-inch AA guns as a reflection of the growing threat posed by
the airplane. Finally, the vessel carried eight 21-inch torpedo tubes.
The Porter type was followed by six more classes launched up to
the end of 1939 that yielded 52 new destroyers. The last of these,
the Sims class, is an example of regular U.S. destroyer design upon
the outbreak of war in Europe. The hull of Sims measured 348 feet,
4 inches by 36 feet by 12 feet, 10 inches and displaced 1,764 tons.
It was armed with five 5-inch guns, four .5-inch AA weapons, and
eight 21-inch torpedo tubes. The vessel’s engines generated a maxi-
mum speed of 35 knots. In addition to ships of these general design
specifications, the United States continued the production of su-
perdestroyers. The Somers-class ships displaced 2,047 tons and car-
ried an impressive primary armament of eight 5-inch guns and 12
21-inch torpedo tubes. The large displacement of these ships is evi-
dence of the fact that by the time of their launching between 1937
and 1938 the United States had accepted the fact that the era of
arms limitation was over. By this point, it was also clear to many that
global conflict was once again a real possibility.
Great Britain, like the United States, continued to conform to the
disarmament treaties for a few years after 1934 despite the Japanese
declaration that they would abrogate the Washington Treaty. This
policy of increased naval expenditure was also the result of the in-
creasing threat posed by Hitler’s Germany to peace in Europe. The
first destroyers were the 24 ships of the G, H, and I class. These
ships were launched between 1935 and 1937 and conformed to the
London Treaty. They displaced 1,335–1,370 tons and were princi-
pally armed with four 4.7-inch guns in single mounts equipped with
gun shields and eight 21-inch torpedo tubes. Three additional ves-
sels were merely enlarged versions to act as flotilla leaders.
After 1936, with the expiration of the London Treaty, the num-
bers of British destroyers greatly increased as part of a hurried re-
armament program. Britain’s only superdestroyer type, the Tribal
class, was part of this effort. The Tribal class was a reaction to the
Japanese Fubuki-class destroyers, which had greatly impressed
British naval officials. These ships were designed specifically to
combat Fubuki-class vessels in the Pacific in case of war with Japan,
which would threaten Britain’s Eastern empire. Sixteen Tribal-class
destroyers were launched between 1937 and 1941, the lion’s share
in 1937. The hull of a Tribal-class ship measured 377 feet by 36
feet, 6 inches by 13 feet, displaced 1,854 tons, and was powered by
turbine engines that generated speeds between 36.25 and 36.5
knots. A unit of the type was armed with eight 4.7-inch guns in
twin-piece mounts that were protected by gun shields. It also car-
ried four 40mm pom-pom AA weapons and four 21-inch torpedo
tubes. Ships of this design were not produced in very large numbers
owing to the expense incurred in the construction of larger vessels.
The result was the smaller, 24-ship J, K, and N class, of which 16
ships were ready by the opening of war in September 1939. These
displaced 1,690 tons and mounted a primary armament of six 4.7-
inch guns and 10 21-inch torpedo tubes.
Japan, the other signatory of the London Treaty, remained true to
its stipulations on destroyers in the years between 1934 and 1936
despite the fact that the Japanese government had renounced the
Washington Treaty. The embodiment of this fact is the 10-ship Shi-
ratsuyu class, whose units displaced 1,685 tons and mounted five 5-
inch guns. The expiration of the London Treaty in 1936, however,
led the Japanese to launch ships that signaled the end of Japan’s ad-
herence to treaties concerning destroyers.
Between 1936 and 1937, the Japanese launched 10 Asashio-class
destroyers that displaced 1,961 tons. Their gun armament was the
same as the Fubuki class, and they also carried eight 24-inch tor-
pedo tubes. The decision to construct a similar class of 18 Kagero-
class ships led to the launching of 10 units of the group by the out-
break of war in Europe. All were slightly less unstable at sea than
prior models in part due to the damage suffered by many destroyers
of the fleet in a typhoon. In 1935, units of the Imperial Japanese
Navy were caught in a storm that placed many of the earlier destroy-
ers in danger of capsizing and led to their reconstruction between
86 DESTROYERS
1935 and 1937 to include more ballast to keep the vessels stable.
Overall, by September 1939 the Japanese destroyer fleet was one of
the most powerful in the world.
France continued its destroyer production in keeping with past
programs that were never subject to the London Treaty. In the case
of France, this yielded one more class of ship that was the largest
superdestroyer ever built. Launched between 1936 and 1937, the
two ships of the Mogador class displaced an incredibly large 2,884
tons each. The hull of Mogador measured 451 feet, 1 inch by 41
feet, 7 inches by 15 feet and contained turbine engines that could
generate a maximum speed of 39 knots. The ship was armed with
eight 5.5-inch guns in four twin mounts that were fully enclosed by
gun houses. Two of these were located in the bow while the other
two were placed in the stern. It also carried 10 21.7-inch torpedo
tubes and a collection of AA armament.
Italy responded to the output of French destroyers with vessels
that remained smaller than those of their Mediterranean rival. The
four-ship Oriani class was simply a repetition of the previous type,
but the final group of destroyers launched before the outbreak of
war in Europe was built to a new design that became the most suc-
cessful of all Italian types. In 1937 and 1938, the Italians launched
12 Soldati-class destroyers. Soldati measured 350 feet by 33 feet, 7
inches by 11 feet, 6 inches, displaced between 1,690 tons and 1,820
tons, and housed turbines that produced 38 knots. It mounted five
4.7-inch guns, six 21-feet torpedo tubes, two depth charge throwers,
and 12 13.2mm AA weapons.
In addition to these conventional destroyers, the Italians in the
years leading up to World War II were among the pioneers of a new
type of ship that would evolve into the escort destroyer. Between
1934 and 1937, the Italians launched 37 smaller destroyers that
were intended to augment the strength of the Italian Navy while at
the same time not costing as much to build as regular destroyers.
The final group, the Pegaso class, serves as an example of the type.
Pegaso measured only 293 feet and displaced a small 840 tons. In
essence, the ship was an enlarged torpedo boat. Its armament con-
sisted of only two 3.9-inch guns, four 18-inch torpedo tubes, and
eight 13.2mm AA weapons. Significantly, the ship also mounted six
depth charge throwers, making it a vessel best suited for ASW. This
small type of vessel, although it was not designed specifically for
ASW and therefore is not considered an escort destroyer, was a por-
tent of the future of destroyer production due to its very large ASW
capability.
In addition to the destroyer production of those naval powers that

represented the victors of World War I, the period between 1935 and
September 1939 saw the return of two former maritime forces. The
first of these, and the cause of much anxiety among other nations,
was Germany. In May 1935, Hitler repudiated the Treaty of Ver-
sailles in keeping with his goal to once again make Germany a world
power. This course was given legitimacy by Great Britain. Rather
than enforce Versailles, in June 1935, as part of its policy of appease-
ment to avoid war, the British openly violated the treaty by signing a
naval pact that allowed for a German fleet that was 35 percent the
size of the Royal Navy. Both of these actions ultimately counted for
little, because by May 1935 construction was already well under way
on new destroyers that violated the peace agreement.
The first class of German destroyer built since World War I was
the 1934 class that served as the blueprint of all subsequent de-
stroyer construction for Nazi Germany. Four of these ships were
launched in 1935, and each measured 391 feet, 5 inches by 37 feet
by 13 feet, 1 inch, with a displacement of 1,625 tons. Unlike the
German craft of the World War I era, these ships mounted a larger
gun armament. A unit of the 1934 class mounted five 5-inch guns in
single mounts protected by gun shields. Two each were sited on the
bow and stern while the fifth was located aft amidships. The vessel
also carried eight 21-inch torpedo tubes, and an assortment of AA
guns. Like all subsequent destroyer types and many of those in the
past, 1934-class vessels were designed to ship mines if necessary.
One drawback of this class that extended to later designs was its
engines. German engineers incorporated a new high-pressure steam
propulsion plant that was intended to produce greater power output.
This machinery was designed to yield a maximum speed of 38.2
knots, but such velocity was rarely attained, and the plant was sub-
ject to frequent breakdowns. An additional negative aspect was the
fact that these ships were rather unstable in a seaway. As a result,
Germany was not the successful destroyer producer that it had been
in the years before World War I. These problems were duplicated in
an improved 1934 class of 12 ships that were launched between
1936 and 1937. The following class, however, was an improvement.
Although the six 1936-class ships retained the problematic high-
pressure steam propulsion plant, they were designed with a new fea-
ture to help correct problems with seaworthiness. This was the clip-
per bow, a feature that marked some capital ships of the German
Navy and had been tried by other powers. Clipper bows, named af-
ter fast sailing ships of the nineteenth century, were those where the
88 DESTROYERS
sides of the bow flared out to better plow through the water and
thereby help the ship maintain its speed in a seaway. These ships
were consequently much better seafaring boats. The hull of one of
these ships measured 404 feet, 2 inches by 38 feet, 8 inches by 13
feet, 1 inch and displaced 1,811 tons. Its armament and engines
were virtually the same as the 1934 class, but the clipper bow en-
abled the possibility of a maximum 40 knots. By September 1939,
the German Navy had made a relatively quick return to the family of
destroyer powers. All of these vessels, which were originally known
simply by their pennant numbers, were eventually named after fa-
mous German naval figures of World War I.
The Soviet Union was the other former naval power to revive its
destroyer production program in the years leading up to World War
II. In the late 1920s, a massive industrialization program was under-
taken that proved crucial to the desire of premier Joseph Stalin,
Lenin’s successor, for a large battle fleet. By the early 1930s, Stalin
attached importance to re-establishing his country as a naval power
to expand Soviet influence. The need for a large fleet was also justi-
fied in the late 1930s by German rearmament. Included as part of
the 1933 Soviet naval reconstruction program was authorization for
49 destroyers. This legislation produced three classes of destroyers
by the outbreak of war.
The first of these was the one-ship Opytnyi class that when
launched in 1935 was the first Russian destroyer design since World
War I. This vessel was intended as an experimental ship, and its
poor performance exhibited the fact that the ability of Russian ship-
yards to design destroyers had declined since the Communist
takeover. Stalin consequently looked to foreign shipyards for the
next class of vessels. Although the 31-ship Gnevnyi class was con-
structed entirely in Russian yards, the design was an Italian one. Be-
tween 1936 and late 1939, the Russians were able to launch 22
units of the class. The hull of Gnevnyi measured 370 feet, 7 inches
by 22 feet, 6 inches by 13 feet, 5 inches, displaced 1,855 tons, and
was powered by engines that generated 37 knots. It was armed with
four 5.1-inch guns in single mounts housed in gun shields. Two
each were located in the bow and stern. The ships also carried two
3-inch guns, six 21-inch torpedo tubes, two 45mm and four .5-inch
guns for AA defense, and 56 mines. The latter weapon represented a
continuation from czarist times of the Russian belief in destroyers
serving as minelayers. Supplementing this heavily armed and nu-
merous group were the Storozhevoi-class destroyers that signaled a
return to wholly Russian designs. These vessels were large, displac-
ing 2,192 tons, and possessed similar armament to the previous

class. Sixteen of these ships were launched by the end of 1939. Like
Germany, Russia had quickly resurrected its destroyer force.
As in the case of technology, many other aspects of the destroyers
built in the prewar period were much like those of earlier days. The
first example of this is the education of the crews of destroyers. The
instruction of officers and men became more specialized in keeping
with the trend that started at the turn of the twentieth century, but
there were few radical changes in the systems that were put in place
at this time. In addition, the everyday lives of the men who operated
destroyers only slightly improved from the days of World War I, as
the hulls of the destroyers became larger. Bathrooms complete with
washbasins were a standard feature on destroyers in this period. Liv-
ing quarters had expanded, as did the wardrooms where crewmen
ate and spent a portion of their off-duty time. The habitability of
these areas was increased not only due to the greater dimensions of
these areas but also through a reduction in the pitching and rolling
motion of many destroyers. Although certainly not as comfortable as
capital ships of the day, the surroundings of destroyer men were cer-
tainly better than those of the pre–World War I era.
Unlike the years leading up to World War I, destroyers in the in-
terwar years did not have the opportunity to participate in large
naval actions. Their duties in this period consisted mainly of being
dispatched in peacetime crisis situations. One of the early examples
took place in 1922 when British destroyers were used to screen the
evacuation of the Greek Army during a war that pitted Greece
against Turkey. Further duties such as this one were undertaken in
the late 1930s as part of the worsening situation in Europe. During
the 1936–1939 Spanish civil war, British and German destroyers
cruised off the Spanish coast. German destroyers were officially ear-
marked for patrol duties in this conflict despite the fact that Hitler
was giving open aid to Spanish fascist forces under Francisco
Franco. British destroyers were also not directly involved in keeping
with the British government’s desire to remain clear of any action
that may result in war. The British vessels did, however, provide hu-
manitarian assistance to the Spanish nationalists fighting Franco’s
forces and to British citizens trapped in Spain. Destroyers of the
Royal Navy, sporting red, white, and blue identification bands of
paint, oftentimes evacuated Spanish nationalists and British citizens
to the French port of Marseilles. These destroyers were employed
for two and a half years in this duty, which could pose significant
danger to the ships despite Britain’s neutrality.
90 DESTROYERS
These duties, despite their value, were not regarded as being typi-
cal for destroyers. All naval powers recognized that these ships were
almost exclusively vessels of war and had built their destroyer fleets
of the interwar period with this in mind. The value that naval offi-
cials attached to them is evident from the number of operational de-
stroyers in the navies of the belligerent powers of World War II soon
after the outbreak of war. By the beginning of 1940, Great Britain
possessed 247 destroyers of varying age. The United States operated
149 vessels and Japan had 116 destroyers. Italy counted 90 craft in
the service of its navy. France maintained 66 destroyers while the
Soviet Union was close behind with 64 ships. Germany operated 37
destroyers.1
These numbers do not do justice to the true size of the world’s de-
stroyer fleet, as smaller naval powers are not included. Over the pe-
riod between late 1918 and the beginning of 1940, other European
powers had produced a significant number of destroyers. The
Netherlands launched 8 vessels; Norway launched 3 small destroy-
ers that some scholars label as frigates; Poland operated 4 destroy-
ers; Spain counted 13 such vessels in its navy; and Sweden operated
12 destroyers. Other powers around the world also counted destroy-
ers as a principal portion of their forces. Argentina had 12 destroy-
ers by late 1939 while Chile operated 6 destroyers. Even the Near
East country of Turkey, having been in existence only after World
War I, operated four destroyers.2
In general, these smaller powers, with their modest financial re-
sources, relied on destroyers due to their relatively low construction
costs. Whether the destroyers were built in large naval powers or
lesser maritime nations, debate had been constant over their pri-
mary purpose in the period between the end of World War I and the
beginning of World War II. These duties included destroyers in their
old roles of torpedo attack and defense, light gunfire support for am-
phibious operations, and to a lesser extent antisubmarine warfare.
All of these roles were proven important once the world was plunged
into a new, extremely destructive war.
Destroyers had been constructed throughout the 1930s in an at-
mosphere of ever-increasing world tensions created by nations that
were bent on territorial expansion. In 1935, Benito Mussolini
launched a war of imperial aggrandizement through the invasion of
Ethiopia. Two years later Japanese imperial aggression in China that
had begun in 1931 finally produced war between the Japanese and
Chinese. These two conflicts, while greatly troubling to the world
community, paled in comparison to the situation that subsequently
developed in Europe. By 1939, Europe, after only 20 years of peace,

was on the brink of all-out war. Hitler sought territorial expansion in
Europe as a path to restoring Germany as a world power. The fragile
peace in Europe was finally shattered on 1 September 1939, when
the German Army invaded Poland. Great Britain and France, having
given a guarantee to the Polish government to militarily intervene in
the event of German aggression against that country, declared war
on Nazi Germany.
The outbreak of hostilities once again turned the Atlantic Ocean
and North Sea into the setting for a naval conflict. The nature of
this conflict was dictated by the composition of the Kriegsmarine,
the German Navy. Unlike World War I, the German Navy was quite
small and unprepared for war. In 1939, Germany had adopted a
construction program known as the Z Plan that called for a large
fleet comprised primarily of 4 aircraft carriers, 8 battleships, 5 battle
cruisers, 8 heavy cruisers, 13 light cruisers, and 48 destroyers. This
plan, however, had been set for completion in 1948, and conse-
quently the outbreak of war found the Kriegsmarine with only a few
ships of the program ready for service. Germany possessed only 2
battle cruisers of the Scharnhorst class, 5 heavy cruisers of the
Deutschland and Hipper classes, 6 light cruisers, and 22 destroyers,
while 2 battleships of the Bismarck class were nearing completion.
The small size of this surface fleet dictated the strategic goals of
Germany in the war at sea. Hitler envisioned all German surface
forces, in combination with submarines, as primarily commerce
raiders to starve Great Britain of overseas supplies in much the
same way as World War I. British and French efforts, until the fall of
France in 1940 that removed the French Navy as a factor in the war,
focused on the protection of commerce.
Although most naval powers had looked to destroyers in the inter-
war years as torpedo or gun craft, the antisubmarine warfare role
(ASW) proved to be the role in which destroyers were most heavily
employed in the Atlantic.
The Battle of the Atlantic for the Allies revolved around the pro-
tection of British commerce. Upon the Allies’ reinstituting the con-
voy system that had proven so successful in World War I, British,
Canadian, French, and later U.S. destroyers guarded against tor-
pedo attack by German submarines, known as U-boats, that were
dispatched to prey on merchant shipping. The primary weapon of
destroyers versus submarines at the outbreak of war remained the
depth charge. It was little changed from the model used in World
War I, except that the device carried a larger explosive charge and
92 DESTROYERS
could travel to depths of as much as 1,500 feet. The effectiveness of

this weapon was greatly increased by the addition on Allied destroy-
ers of sonar. This underwater detection device was first developed in
1918 through the Allied Submarine Detection Investigation Com-
mittee (ASDIC, the original term for the device used by the British).
The United States later labeled it sonar (sound, navigation, and
ranging). Although an experimental set had existed at the close of
World War I, it was not until the mid-1920s that units had come
into operational use. By 1940, most navies possessed the device and
had installed it on their ASW warships, which were in large part de-
stroyers. The sonar of the World War II era consisted of machinery
that transmitted sound waves through the water that bounced off
the hull of a submerged craft and returned to the destroyer. The op-
erator of the set was then able to establish the range and bearing of
the submarine so the commander could bring his ship to the proper
position to begin a depth charge attack. This represented a great im-
provement over hydrophones that could not provide such data.
In addition to sonar, Allied destroyers became deadlier ASW craft
with the introduction of the Hedgehog. Developed by the British
and operational at sea by January 1942, the Hedgehog consisted of a
launcher that was fitted forward of a destroyer’s bridge. This device
fired ordnance ahead of the attacking craft rather than behind in
the case of depth charges. It was essentially a mortar that housed 24
bomblets in individual tubes. Each held 31 pounds of high explo-
sives. When fired, the bombs spread out in a pattern 130 feet in di-
ameter. These bombs fell into the water some 215 yards ahead of
the attacking vessel. Only direct contact between the bomb and the
hull of a submarine would cause detonation of the device. Those
that missed simply sank to the ocean floor. Although the chance of
sinking a U-boat with the Hedgehog was considered low, this
weapon did destroy 50 submarines by the end of war and was used
in tandem with depth charges.
These 50 represent only a small portion of the German sub-
marines sunk in the war. Their loss was the result of a variety of at-
tacks, but the destroyer was a crucial weapon that accounted for a
large percentage of German losses. The sinking of so many U-boats
led to the defeat of Germany in the Battle of the Atlantic. This ASW
role, however, was certainly not free of danger for Allied destroyers
that were subjected to the same possibility of torpedo attack as the
merchantmen they escorted. An example is the case of the U.S. de-
stroyer Reuben James. Although the United States was a neutral
power until the attack on Pearl Harbor in late 1941, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt had authorized U.S. naval forces to escort

British merchant vessels arriving and leaving the United States.
Reuben James was an old Clemson-class vessel that was part of U.S.
forces that escorted British convoys to Iceland, where British naval
units took over the task. On 31 October 1941, Reuben James and
four other destroyers were escorting a convoy of 44 merchant ships
to Iceland when the vessel was hit by a torpedo fired from the Ger-
man submarine U-562. The force of the explosion devastated the
light hull of the ship, which broke in half following a magazine ex-
plosion. The bow section subsequently sank immediately while the
aft portion foundered in about 20 minutes. Out of a crew of 160 of-
ficers and men, only 45 survived. Reuben James has the question-
able distinction of being the first U.S. warship sunk in World War II.
The impact of destroyers as ASW craft on World War II in the
Battle of the Atlantic was profound, as it enabled Britain to remain
in the war against the Axis (Germany, Italy, and Japan). Ultimately,
Britain would serve as the staging point for the invasion of German-
controlled Western Europe in 1944 with the Normandy landings.
Each vessel was vital to the effort. The actions of one destroyer while
serving as a convoy escort greatly aided overall Allied victory in the
Battle of the Atlantic. On 9 May 1941, the British destroyer Bulldog
was employed, as were almost all of Britain’s destroyers, in convoy
protection when U-110 launched a torpedo attack on the convoy.
Bulldog and two other ASW vessels raced at full speed to the site
where the torpedoes were probably fired; once there, a pattern of
depth charges damaged the submerged German submarine and
forced it to the surface. Bulldog subsequently opened fire with its
guns; although due to inaccurate fire it caused little damage, it did
induce the crew to evacuate their vessel so quickly that they did not
scuttle the ship. The commander of Bulldog ceased fire upon seeing
this event, as he sensed a great opportunity to board the U-boat. The
boarding party managed to procure equipment and, significantly, the
vessel’s confidential code books for its Enigma code machine.
The Enigma device, created by Arthur Scherbius in the mid-
1920s, encoded German communiqués. Although the British had
been able to break some of the German codes thanks to research
procured by the Poles before their country fell to Germany in 1939,
the codes for the U-boats had been difficult to decipher. The codes
seized by Bulldog were valid only through the month of June, but
during the period between then and their seizure the British were
able to conduct research using them that broke the German ciphers
in general. For the remainder of the war, the Allies were able to read
94 DESTROYERS
Axis communiqués and thus defend against sorties of U-boats and

surface raiders against merchantmen in the Battle of the Atlantic.
The ASW role of destroyers was only one of the large number of
duties performed in the Atlantic Ocean and North Sea. Throughout
the war at sea they also served as escorts for capital ships and vari-
ous other naval forces as well as in their basic duty as surface com-
batants. In April 1940 the British destroyer Glowworm, acting as an
escort for minelayers bound for Norway, encountered the German
heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper. The subsequent action failed to pro-
duce a torpedo hit on the German vessel, and the British com-
mander, whose destroyer was greatly outgunned by the Hipper,
elected to ram. The result was the loss of the Glowworm from dam-
age sustained in the collision and from enemy gunfire. Of the 149
officers and men of the British vessel, only 31 survived the action
and the sinking. Admiral Hipper suffered a 120-foot-long hole in its
side, forcing the ship to return to Germany for repairs.
The following 1940 German invasion of Norway provided several
instances where destroyers were able to function in their original
roles of torpedo attacks and defense as well as in general surface ac-
tions. On 10 April 1940, five British destroyers of the 2nd Destroyer
Flotilla under Captain B. A. W. Warburton-Lee attacked 10 German
destroyers that were taking part in the invasion and were stationed
at the Norwegian port of Narvik. The ensuing battle resulted in the
British sinking two of the German vessels and damaging an addi-
tional three destroyers. The high degree of loss for the Germans was
due primarily to the fact that they were caught unawares. Warbur-
ton-Lee’s force, however, sustained damage due to five of the Ger-
man destroyers being undetected. These ships lay in wait in fjords
and attacked Warburton-Lee’s force from both sides as it was retir-
ing from its initial engagement. One British destroyer was destroyed
while another, Warburton-Lee’s flagship, Hardy, was beached due to
serious damage.
This first battle led to a second on 13 April as the British were de-
termined to destroy German naval units in the Narvik area. The
British battleship Warspite, escorted by nine destroyers, attacked the
remaining German forces at the port and sunk eight more German
destroyers. Only one destroyer, Erich Giese, survived the assault, but
this vessel was critically damaged. With wounded and dying men lit-
tering its decks, the captain ordered the ship abandoned. A maga-
zine explosion later destroyed the vessel.3
In events after the invasion of Norway, destroyers figured promi-
nently. British destroyers in 1941 launched a torpedo attack on the
German battleship Bismarck, but without any success. German de-

stroyers after Norway, where a large potion of their strength was
lost, were used as escorts for capital ships. The most celebrated case
is the 1942 Channel Dash in which the battle cruisers Scharnhorst
and Gniesenau escaped from the French port of Brest and returned
to Germany via the English Channel. This route ran the gauntlet of
the British Royal Navy and the ships were escorted by destroyers.
Destroyers participated in surface action until the last of Ger-
many’s capital ships were driven from the sea. In 1943, British de-
stroyers launched torpedoes against the German battle cruiser
Scharnhorst that caused a portion of the damage that ultimately sank
the vessel. This was the last surface action of the war in the Atlantic;
fittingly, destroyers had played a large part in the conflict, as they had
in so many other operations during the Battle of the Atlantic.
Destroyers also were called upon during war in the Atlantic the-
ater to carry out several tertiary duties that had arisen in World War
I. Rather than being employed in the ASW role, escort for capital
ships, or torpedo attacks and defense, one of the first uses of de-
stroyers in World War II was in the role of troop carrier through an
evacuation. At the end of May 1940, France was reeling from the
German invasion and on the point of collapse. On the beaches of
Dunkirk, 250,000 men of the British Expeditionary Force were
trapped and in need of transport to avert being captured. The loss of
these men would have proven disastrous to the war fortunes of
Great Britain and might have forced the British to negotiate for
peace. In operation dynamo, the evacuation of the BEF to Britain,
destroyers were used as part of the 693-ship armada that took part
in the operation. Destroyers were especially well-suited to this task
as a result of their speed, which could allow for hasty trips back and
forth between the French coast and Britain. By the end of the oper-
ation, the Royal Navy had lost six destroyers to air attacks by the
Luftwaffe, the German Air Force.
The experience of Keith exhibits the nature of destroyer duties in
this action. In late May, Keith embarked about 700 soldiers for the
passage back to England.4 Upon returning to Dunkirk on 31 May
1940, Keith opened fire with its guns on German troops advancing
on the coast toward the evacuation point for Allied forces at
Dunkirk. On 1 June, waves of German aircraft bombed the evacua-
tion site. Two 1,000-pound bombs scored near-misses on Keith that
stove in some of its hull plates, causing flooding, while another
bomb went down the aft smoke funnel and exploded in the engine
room, killing most of the engine room crew and crippling the ship.
96 DESTROYERS
The vessel subsequently sank. This sacrifice, however, was a small

price to pay for the rescue of the BEF from France. As a result,
Britain was able to remain in the war.
Germany also used its destroyers as troop carriers. In the 1940 in-
vasion of Norway, German destroyers sortied to Norway laden with
troops who were offloaded as part of the amphibious invasion before
the warships assumed their stations for offensive operations. Part of
these constituted another World War I role of destroyers, that of gun-
fire support for amphibious operations. While protecting the landing
zone, Allied destroyers participated as gunfire vessels during opera-
tion overlord, the 1944 Allied invasion of Normandy. The warships
of the Allied invasion fleet were primarily destroyers. Eighty of these
craft participated along with 7 battleships and 23 cruisers.
The Battle of the Atlantic also involved destroyers in rescue oper-
ations. A celebrated case is that of the British destroyer Kelly, which
removed the Duke and Duchess of Windsor from the French port of
Le Harve in the opening days of the war to protect that royal family.
Keith, sunk in operation dynamo, performed the same duty on 15
May 1940 for the Dutch royal family. A rescue operation was also
arguably the last battle in which destroyers were involved in the Eu-
ropean theater of the war. On 5 May 1945, German destroyers
screened the evacuation of some 45,000 refugees from East Prussia
as the Soviet Red Army advanced toward Germany. The majority of
rescues during the Battle of the Atlantic, however, involved aiding
the survivors of sunken ships. This role was an important duty for
the destroyers of all combatant navies. Due to the extreme cold and
stormy conditions of the Atlantic, any surviving crewmen had to be
picked out of the water as quickly as possible. Prolonged exposure to
these conditions ultimately led to death.
A final role played by destroyers in the Battle of the Atlantic is in-
dicative of their extreme importance to the Allied war effort. These
ships formed the basis of one of the first wartime agreements be-
tween the United States and Great Britain. In June 1940, soon after
the evacuation of Dunkirk, Britain was faced with the possibility of
amphibious invasion by Germany and thus desperately needed its
destroyers to act as part of a coastal defense force. In addition to
this drain on resources was that posed by the German U-boat cam-
paign against British shipping. Faced with a dearth of destroyers to
cover both tasks, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill desper-
ately appealed to U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt for aid. On 3
September 1940, the neutral United States gave Britain 50 World
War I–era destroyers in exchange for 99-year leases for British bases
in Newfoundland, Bermuda, and the British Caribbean Islands.
Known as the Destroyers for Bases Deal, this act was an incredible
morale boost to the British people in the wake of the fall of France.
It also was a further step by the United States toward outright par-
ticipation in the conflict.
Destroyers proved equally as important in the Mediterranean in
the same roles as those of the Battle of the Atlantic upon Italy’s en-
try into the war on the side of Germany. Having signed the 1939
Pact of Steel with Germany and emboldened by the German con-
quest of France in 1940, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini declared
war on Great Britain. This action opened the Mediterranean Sea as
a new theater of war and consequently posed a severe strategic
threat to the British. Italy’s geographic position threatened British
supply lanes providing oil and supplies from the eastern portion of
the empire that passed through the Suez Canal into the Mediter-
ranean and to the British home islands. The campaign in the
Mediterranean quickly centered on British attempts to protect its
trade and defend the island base of Malta that lay astride its ship-
ping lanes. The Italians were conversely committed to the destruc-
tion of this valuable commerce.
Destroyers participated in almost all the major operations and en-
gagements in the Mediterranean. These actions revolved largely
around commerce war. In the context of the traditional role of pro-
tecting capital ships from torpedo attacks, the Italian Navy used its
destroyers as screens for task forces of battleships and cruisers bent
on the destruction of British trade.
Examples are numerous, but one of the best examples as well as
one of the largest engagements in the Mediterranean was the Battle
of Cape Matapan. On 28–29 March 1941, an Italian squadron com-
prised of 1 battleship, 8 cruisers, and 17 destroyers that was at-
tempting to attack British convoys around Crete was intercepted by
a British force of 3 battleships, 1 aircraft carrier, 4 cruisers, and 13
destroyers. The British destroyers were present in this battle, as in
others in the Mediterranean, to protect their capital ships against
torpedo attacks and try to launch assaults themselves; they were
also among the few Allied warships that could catch the fast Italian
vessels. The British detached their destroyers in an attempt to run
down the Italian squadron. Although this measure failed, the de-
stroyers did have an opportunity to later prove their worth as Italian
cruisers and destroyers were sent to the aid of one crippled cruiser.
98 DESTROYERS
The result was a night action in which three Italian cruisers were
sunk. Although the destruction was accomplished largely by gunfire
from British battleships, two cruisers were finished off by torpedoes
launched by British destroyers. The Allied craft were also used to at-
tack the Italian destroyers that tried to protect the cruisers. By the
end of the battle, two Italian destroyers were also sunk and the Al-
lies had established primacy in the Mediterranean. This coup was
possible in part due to the use of radar—an innovative development
introduced to naval combat in World War II that the Italian Navy
lacked—to pinpoint Axis vessels at night and air superiority.
Destroyers were also used for commerce warfare as escorts for
merchant convoys and as commerce raiders, in which they launched
torpedo attacks against merchantmen. In November 1941, an Ital-
ian convoy escorted by destroyers and bound for North Africa to re-
supply Axis forces was intercepted by a British squadron of cruisers
and destroyers. The result was the loss of the entire Italian convoy
and the destruction of two of the destroyers, one being sunk by a
British submarine that arrived on the scene. The British, like the
Italians, also employed destroyers as escorts. In August 1942, the
desperate need to resupply the British-held island of Malta led to a
convoy being dispatched in which destroyers accounted for the bulk
of the covering force.
Past surface actions that arose from roles in the commerce war,
destroyers were also used as resupply vessels, primarily to North
Africa. The threat of attack by land-based aircraft was high in the
Mediterranean due to the relatively small size of the sea in relation
to the Atlantic Ocean. Destroyers were, because of their high speed,
used to carry troops and supplies at night. Traveling at their maxi-
mum velocity, these ships could make a complete journey in the
cover of darkness, thus greatly decreasing the chance of an air at-
tack that could destroy not only the vessels but also the valuable car-
gos that they carried.
Gunfire support for amphibious invasions also became an impor-
tant task for destroyers. On 8–14 November 1942, the Allies
mounted an amphibious invasion to wrest control of North Africa
from the Axis. Destroyers not only served as sources for covering fire
while Allied troops landed on the beaches; they also guarded the un-
loading of supplies to the ground forces after the initial assault. The
same roles were attached to the Allied destroyers in the 1943 inva-
sion of Italy.
Finally, as in the Atlantic, destroyers were also used in evacuation
and rescue operations. In April 1941, as Greece collapsed under
German invasion, Allied destroyers evacuated the king of Greece

and his family. They also covered the extraction of 43,000 troops
from the Balkan country. This operation resulted in the loss of 26
ships, 2 being destroyers, to German air attacks. This action is a mi-
crocosm of the enormous effort in May 1941 by British naval units
to evacuate Crete in the wake of the German assault on the island.
During this operation, the Royal Navy counted six destroyers sunk
in addition to other warships. These vessels were destroyed by
ground-based German aircraft and are examples of the fact that sur-
face warships largely without air cover were extremely vulnerable to
air attacks. (This fact became far more obvious through experience
in the Pacific.) In addition to large operations such as that at Crete,
destroyers were also used to retrieve the survivors of sunken vessels,
one case being that of a British destroyer that picked up survivors of
the Italian cruiser Pola following its destruction in the 1941 Battle
of Cape Matapan.
As naval campaigns in the Atlantic and Mediterranean continued
to unfold, in late 1941 a new theater of operations was opened that
made what had been largely a European conflict a truly world war.
Japan, which after September 1940 was an ally of Germany and
Italy, was faced with U.S. efforts to stem imperial expansion in
China through economic embargoes intended to starve the Japanese
war machine of needed supplies. Tensions between Japan and the
United States resulted in the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941
on the U.S. Pacific Fleet stationed at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. This act
brought the previously neutral United States into the war as an Al-
lied power. Japan’s strategy called for the conquest of Far East lands
and the islands of the Pacific to supply resources for Japan’s indus-
trial base, which was dependent on overseas supplies, as the home
islands possessed few raw materials. Japanese naval and military of-
ficials then envisioned a defensive war based on a perimeter of con-
quered Pacific possessions. They reasoned that U.S. attempts to
capture these areas would prove so costly in human terms that the
U.S. government would be willing to discuss peace.
The use of destroyers was crucial and consequently very high in
the naval war in the Pacific. Unlike in the Atlantic, the primary task
of destroyers was not ASW, despite their use in this capacity by both
the United States and Japan. Indeed, the first naval shot of the Pa-
cific War came on 7 December 1941, when the destroyer Ward de-
stroyed a Japanese midget submarine that attempted to penetrate
the defenses of Pearl Harbor as part of the Japanese attack. Rather,
the primary use of destroyers in the Pacific was dictated by the fact
100 DESTROYERS
that aircraft carriers were the capital ships of the theater. This was
the duty of escort for primarily the carriers. Throughout the con-
flict, all navies relied on screens of destroyers to use their AA arma-
ment to intercept attacking planes before they could reach the carri-
ers. In the case of the Japanese, the need for such protection
became increasingly vital due to the loss of naval air strength that
greatly reduced air cover for the surface forces of their navy. At the
23–26 October 1944 Battle of Leyte Gulf, the Japanese hoped to
offset Allied air superiority through a reliance on warships such as
destroyers with heavily increased AA armament. The core of the Jap-
anese force in this operation, the Center Force under the command
of Admiral Takeo Kuritia, comprised 5 battleships, 12 cruisers, and
15 destroyers serving primarily as AA screens. In total, there were 27
destroyers of the total 64 Japanese warships employed in the
engagement. The United States used its destroyers in a similar
fashion.
They were particularly useful in the latter stages of the war when
the U.S. Navy faced attacks by kamikazes, the Japanese suicide
bombers bent on the destruction of U.S. surface ships. In the April–
June 1945 Allied invasion of Okinawa, kamikazes sunk 14 U.S. de-
stroyers while the same vessels and their consorts used AA guns to
defend themselves and the rest of the fleet, particularly aircraft car-
riers, against such attacks. U.S. destroyers were also important in
the latter half of the Pacific War as radar pickets versus air attacks.
In this capacity, destroyers formed a perimeter around aircraft carri-
ers and used radar equipment to detect incoming flights of hostile
planes. This ability enabled U.S. task forces some time, albeit not
very much, to prepare for an assault in which the destroyers as well
as other warships that formed the perimeter endeavored to shoot
down as many aircraft as possible.
Amphibious assaults were also operations in which destroyers saw
great use. The task of escort for landing craft was of great impor-
tance for the U.S. strategy of island-hopping across the Pacific,
where select Japanese-held islands were conquered in the effort to
bring Japan within the range of land-based bombers and to cut off
overseas supply to the home islands. A celebrated example of this
duty occurred in the 1944 Battle of Leyte Gulf at Samar. In the clos-
ing stages of the Leyte Gulf contest, the Center Force of Admiral
Takeo Kurita managed to almost accomplish its goal of destroying
the U.S. amphibious forces landing on the island of Leyte. As the
large U.S. aircraft carriers had been drawn away from the landing
zone through the lure of a decoy force comprised of Japan’s last car-
riers, the only protections for the troops were a collection of small
escort carriers, three destroyers, and four escort destroyers. These
latter ships were diminutive versions of conventional destroyers.
Facing this force was Kurita’s four battleships, including Yamato,
being one of the world’s largest battleships and armed with 18.1-
inch guns, six heavy cruisers, and 10 destroyers. In a desperate
fight, the destroyers and escort destroyers launched torpedo attacks
while producing smoke screens to obscure the escort carriers, whose
planes attacked the Japanese vessels. Two hours and 40 minutes
later, two U.S. destroyers and one escort destroyer were sunk along
with one escort carrier. The punishment they received was tremen-
dous, as in the case of the destroyer Hoel, one of the lost vessels,
which suffered more than 40 hits from a variety of different calibers
of Japanese guns. Their action, however, unnerved Kurita, who be-
lieved that he actually was facing the planes and escort screen of a
larger U.S. force. His consequent order to withdraw saved the U.S.
troops on Leyte and eventually led to the successful reconquest of
the Philippine Islands. This action crippled the Japanese war ma-
chine, as it cut the supply lines from the home islands to the re-
source-rich East Indies.
In addition to protecting landing forces, destroyers were also used
as gunfire support vessels for amphibious invasions. Both the
United States and Japan relied on these ships in this capacity. The
United States regularly employed destroyers as gunfire ships during
landings on islands on Japan’s defensive perimeter. The Japanese
looked to destroyers for this task during the 1942 campaign for
Guadalcanal. An example is provided by action on the night of
24–25 August, when Japanese destroyers bombarded Henderson
Field, a vital U.S. airfield on Guadalcanal, as a prelude for an am-
phibious invasion, which ultimately failed.
In connection with their roles as escorts and gunfire support ves-
sels for amphibious operations, destroyers were also used as troop
transports and resupply vessels. The best instances of this role come
from the experiences of the Imperial Japanese Navy, again in the
campaign for Guadalcanal. Part of the strength of the Imperial Japa-
nese Navy involved in this struggle were destroyers under the com-
mand of Rear Admiral Raizo Tanaka. This commander, known to
historians as the most accomplished Japanese destroyer leader of
World War II, used the forces under his command to resupply Japa-
nese forces on Guadalcanal. On the night of 17–18 August 1942,
his squadron, known as the Tokyo Express to the Allies, conducted
its first run to Guadalcanal.
102 DESTROYERS
Destroyers for the Japanese were well-suited to this task, as they

could make a round-trip between their bases and Guadalcanal un-
der cover of darkness thanks to their high speed. The ability to ac-
complish operations entirely at night was important due to Allied air
superiority in the area. Daytime operations would have resulted in
the destruction of the force and its supplies and troops destined for
Guadalcanal. In October alone, the Tokyo Express transported
20,000 troops to Guadalcanal. During the month of November, as
Japanese fortunes waned in the campaign, Tanaka’s force was relied
upon to get supplies to the troops by any means necessary. In one in-
stance, the Japanese used their destroyers to drop rubberized con-
tainers into the water, which floated in the surf to land and were
picked up by forces awaiting the supplies that the boxes contained.
These ships were also used as troop transports. The final use of the
destroyers of the Tokyo Express in the campaign for Guadalcanal
came in February 1943, when they were used to evacuate the
13,000-man garrison of troops that still remained on the island.
A final duty of destroyers in the Pacific (much more prevalent
than in any other theater) was the traditional role of launching tor-
pedo attacks. Some of the earliest instances of this duty came in the
wake of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Following the crip-
pling of the U.S. Pacific Fleet as well as the destruction of a British
force comprised of a battleship and a battle cruiser, the only Allied
forces facing the Japanese were cruisers and destroyers. In late
1941, the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Aus-
tralia formed a united command (ABDA Command) for the defense
of Southeast Asia. The attempts of this force to disrupt Japanese
movements led to several engagements where destroyers were heav-
ily engaged.
The best example of destroyers as torpedo attack vessels is the 27
February 1942 Battle of the Java Sea. Five cruisers and nine de-
stroyers of ABDA Command had sortied with the intention of inter-
cepting a Japanese invasion force bound for Java that included 4
cruisers and 14 destroyers. In the resulting action, both sides
launched torpedo attacks. Although the U.S. effort was a failure,
that of the Japanese, who had always placed great emphasis on the
torpedo and had meticulously trained in the execution of torpedo at-
tacks, was successful. The devastating power of the Japanese Long
Lance torpedo, as well as its superior range that allowed for the
launch of an attack before Allied warships were able to do the same,
exacted a heavy toll. By the end of the engagement, the Allied force
had lost two cruisers and four destroyers while the Japanese vessels
escaped intact. Gunfire was responsible for a large part of the de-
struction, but Japanese torpedoes sank one destroyer, damaged an-
other, and were possibly responsible for the sinking of an additional
destroyer. This battle decimated ABDA Command and, after one ad-
ditional engagement, left Southeast Asia devoid of any significant
Allied naval presence.
U.S. destroyers also claimed victories through destroyer attacks.
In the 1944 Battle of Leyte Gulf, a U.S. force comprised of battle-
ships, cruisers, and destroyers that was defending Surigao Strait an-
nihilated the Japanese Southern Force that was attempting to steam
through the strait. This night action resulted in the sinking of two
Japanese battleships. One of these was sunk by torpedoes while the
other was destroyed by a combination of heavy gunfire and torpe-
does. Destroyers continued to the end of the war as torpedo attack
vessels. As a testimony to their great service, destroyers engaged in
the last naval battle in the Pacific. On 16 May 1945, the British
26th Destroyer Flotilla intercepted the Japanese heavy cruiser
Haguro. In the ensuing engagement, the Japanese cruiser was crip-
pled by three torpedo hits and was subsequently finished off by an
additional attack.
The loss of Haguro provides one of many examples of destroyers
being used in roles other than combat. Following the sinking of this
ship, a Japanese destroyer picked up the vessel’s survivors. In addi-
tion to rescuing crewmen of sunken or sinking vessels, destroyers
were tasked with picking up downed pilots. Destroyers were also
employed as fire-fighting ships whereby massive hoses fed by sea-
water would drench large vessels that were ablaze. When this mea-
sure failed or when a vessel was unsalvageable, the task of scuttling
a ship to prevent its capture by the enemy fell to destroyers.
The myriad of duties performed by destroyers in all the theaters
of World War II made them a vital element in the naval operations
of every combatant. As a result, the destroyer was the type of war-
ship produced in the greatest numbers during the war. The facts
that they were the fastest and cheapest to build also encouraged de-
stroyer production. Of all of the naval powers, the United States and
Great Britain accounted for most of the destroyer construction of
World War II. Other nations did not have the resources to produce
them in very large numbers.
The United States, with its very powerful industrial base, was re-
sponsible for the greatest number of new destroyers. Like World War
I, these ships represented only a handful of classes to save time on
construction by eliminating the process of drawing up several differ-
104 DESTROYERS
ent designs. As war broke out in Europe, the United States was in the
process of launching the last group of its prewar destroyers. These
were the 95 ships of the Benson/Gleaves class and were also the final
ships to adhere to the stipulations of the London Treaty, despite the
fact that the agreement had expired. Launched between November
1939 and February 1943, these vessels were similar to the preceding
Sims class but with slightly greater armament. Construction increased
dramatically as these ships were still in the process of building.
By June 1940 in the wake of the fall of France, U.S. politicians
were aware of the possibility that the United States, although neu-
tral, might eventually be the only power left to stand in the face of
German and Japanese aggression. The result was a naval expansion
program that called for a two-ocean navy to combat both threats if
the need presented itself. Among the ships authorized were 115 de-
stroyers that proved to be only part of total wartime production. Be-
tween 1940 and 1945, the United States built 470 conventional de-
stroyers capable of fleet operations.5
The first of these vessels comprised the Fletcher class, the largest
group ever produced in the world. Launched beginning in 1942,
178 ships of the class were commissioned by September 1944. The
design is commonly considered one of the best in the history of the
destroyer. The hull of Fletcher measured 376 feet, 5 inches by 39
feet, 7 inches by 13 feet, 9 inches and displaced 2,325 tons. Unlike
most destroyers, the engine and machinery spaces of the hull were
protected by .75-inch side armor and .5-inch deck protection. U.S.
naval constructors decided to include this feature in light of British
wartime experience, where even the explosions produced by ord-
nance that narrowly missed generated splinters that could seriously
damage a destroyer’s thin hull plating. The gun armament consisted
of five 5-inch guns in single mounts that were completely enclosed
by gun houses. Both the bow and the stern contained two each of
these weapons while the fifth was sited aft just before the rear por-
tion of the ship’s superstructure, as by this time most destroyers car-
ried auxiliary control positions in this area. In addition, Fletcher car-
ried four 1.1-inch weapons and four 20mm guns for AA defense. Its
torpedo weaponry consisted of 10 21-inch tubes. Finally, as with all
destroyers of the age, the ship was equipped with sonar and depth
charges. Powering this impressive ship were turbines that could pro-
duce a maximum speed of 38 knots.
Supplementing the ships of this type were those of the Allen
Sumner class that comprised 59 commissioned warships by the end
of 1944. These possessed slightly larger, unarmored hulls and
greater armament and were also the product of wartime experience.

By mid-1943, the need for AA defense was recognized by U.S. naval
officials. As a result, the Allen Sumner class included plenty of open
deck space to add additional AA guns as necessary.
The last conventional destroyer design of the war yielded 105
Gearing-class vessels. These were designed specifically for extended
operations in the most far-flung regions of the Pacific. The hull of
Gearing measured 390 feet, 6 inches by 40 feet, 10 inches by 14
feet, 4 inches, displaced 2,616 tons, and was powered by turbines
that produced a maximum speed of 36.8 knots. This vessel was
armed with six 5-inch guns in dual mounts enclosed by gun houses.
Two were sited in the bow while the last was located on the stern.
They also carried 10 21-inch torpedo tubes, an assortment of AA
guns, and depth charges. The Gearing-class destroyers represent the
pinnacle of conventional destroyer design in the United States.
All of these ships, as well as prewar destroyers, were continually
upgraded over the course of World War II. Although some of these
craft were fitted upon their construction with radar equipment,
many of them had to be refitted with the device. Radar is a British
invention that made its wartime debut in World War II. The U.S.
Navy introduced the technology to its larger vessels in 1937, but
sets small enough to fit on destroyers were not available until 1941.
Radar consisted at this time of large dishes that were mounted on
top of the bridge structure of warships. These transmitted ultra-
high-frequency radio waves over great distances that bounced off
objects such as warships. These waves then traveled back to the
radar set of the tracking vessel, where machinery would reveal the
position of the enemy and the distance to the target. This invention
represented a great improvement over past director control systems
for firing guns, as it was far more accurate. Radar also provided U.S.
warships with night-fighting capability and made possible the use of
destroyers as advanced warning pickets to screen aircraft carriers
against air and surface attack.
Whereas only those destroyers produced before 1941 needed
radar upgrades, almost all U.S. destroyers underwent refits of AA ar-
mament. The AA guns of the United States were deemed poor based
on wartime experience. As a result, beginning in 1942 the standard
.5-inch machine gun and the 1.1-inch type mounted on prewar de-
stroyers and many of the wartime classes were steadily replaced by
one of two new weapons. The first of these was the Oerlikon gun.
This 20mm weapon was a Swiss invention and proved far better
than the old type. Later, the weapon of choice became the Dutch
106 DESTROYERS
40mm Bofors gun. This type first went to sea in the U.S. Navy in
July 1942 and was proven to be among the best AA guns. Increas-
ingly large numbers were placed on destroyers to both replace ineffi-
cient armament and to provide the most AA defense possible. Often-
times, the importance of the AA capability outweighed that of more
traditional functions. Many U.S. destroyers had one of their aft gun
mounts removed to accommodate more AA weapons.
These vessels, thanks in part to the continual refits, were the
most capable destroyers produced during World War II by the
United States. Ultimately, however, they did not fill the military de-
mand for destroyers. Their numbers were large, but the myriad roles
demanded of destroyers were too great to fill. The United States
consequently turned to the construction of a type of destroyer that
had been pioneered by the British to bridge the gap. This type was
the escort destroyer.
The escort destroyer was a smaller vessel, making it faster to
build, and was devoted to the performance of fewer missions than
larger ships. U.S. escort destroyers were built largely for a single
mission: ASW. The need for these was dire given the Battle of the
Atlantic, upon which hinged the survival of Great Britain. In 1941,
the British contracted with the U.S. government for vessels that
could protect convoys against submarines given the fact that they
could not domestically produce an adequate number of craft. Escort
destroyers subsequently became important both for Great Britain
and, increasingly, for the United States.
The United States built vessels comprising four escort destroyer
classes over the course of the war. These vessels, influenced by the
original British design, were all generally similar. The last classes,
whose units were launched primarily in 1943, were the DET and
FMR classes designed primarily for ASW, but also for AA defense.
The hull of one of these vessels measured 306 feet by 36 feet, 7
inches by 10 feet, 5 inches and displaced 1,253 tons. Its armament
consisted of three 3-inch guns in single open mounts and three 21-
inch torpedo tubes. This light armament was due to the fact that the
vessel carried a large ASW battery in keeping with its intended pri-
mary role. The vessel mounted one Hedgehog, eight depth charge
throwers, and two depth charge racks. The small number of guns
and torpedo tubes also resulted from the very large number of AA
guns, being two 40mm Bofors and between 8 and 10, 20mm Oer-
likons. These ships, unlike the preceding classes, were equipped
with diesel-fueled engines rather than turbines. This propulsion
plant was necessary because turbines took longer to build and the
need for speedy production of ships was paramount. The diesel en-
gines could generate a maximum speed of only 20.2 knots, but this
was acceptable given that the role of the vessel was primarily that of
protecting slow-moving convoys.
By the end of the war, the United States had commissioned 499
escorts, which eclipsed the number of conventional destroyers in ser-
vice at the end of the conflict. Counted in this number, however, is a
type of vessel that was designed solely for escorting merchantmen
rather than being intended for both ASW and AA defense. Known as
the frigate, this vessel was, like the escort destroyer, a product of
British naval yards. Produced in only one type, a U.S. frigate meas-
ured 301 feet, 6 inches by 36 feet, 6 inches by 13 feet, 2 inches and
displaced 1,509 tons. Its armament consisted of three 3-inch guns in
single mounts, and four 40mm and nine 20mm AA guns. Most sig-
nificantly, the vessel carried one Hedgehog, eight depth charge
throwers, and two depth charge racks. Its engines were capable of a
maximum speed of 20 knots. As with the larger escort destroyers,
high speed was not considered necessary given their mission.
Great Britain also produced regular destroyers, escorts, and
frigates, but in lesser numbers given that its industrial capability was
not equal to that of the United States and its resources were
stretched more thinly. Even so, the British commissioned 285 con-
ventionally designed destroyers over the course of the war. Following
the launch of 11 Tribal-class ships for the Australian and Canadian
navies and 8 J-, K-, and N-class vessels, the British constructed the
16-ship L and M class. Launched between 1939 and 1942, these
vessels were the first British wartime design and were essentially an
enlargement of the preceding type with one additional 4.7-inch gun
and lesser torpedo armament. The next five classes were like the L
and M class in that they were generally of the same design, but with
slight modifications in weaponry. The 24 units of the last of these,
the Ch, Co, and Cr classes, were launched between 1944 and late
1945 and are an example of this trend. The hull of one of these ves-
sels measured 362 feet, 9 inches by 35 feet, 8 inches by 14 feet, 5
inches, displaced between 1,710 tons and 1,730 tons, and was pow-
ered by turbines that generated 36.75 knots. The armament con-
sisted of four 4.7-inch guns in single mounts protected by gun
shields, four 21-inch torpedo tubes, and two 40mm Bofors AA
weapons.
In addition to these similar classes, the British also launched
three more groups of vessels that were larger than those of the past.
These were intended for extended operations in the Pacific. Indica-
108 DESTROYERS
tive of the larger craft are the 16 Battle-class destroyers. The hull of
a unit in this group measured 379 feet by 40 feet, 3 inches by 15
feet, 2 inches and displaced between 2,315 and 2,325 tons. The ar-
mament consisted of four 4.5-inch guns, eight 21-inch torpedo
tubes, and eight 40mm Bofors AA guns. The maximum speed of the
type was 35.75 knots.
All were continually upgraded in keeping with wartime experi-
ence. The two principal improvements were refits to include radar
sets and additional AA armament. Like most other navies, many de-
stroyers finished the war lacking one or more of their primary guns
in favor of more Oerlikon and Bofors AA weapons.
As in the case of the United States, the British also pursued the
construction of escort destroyers for ASW and AA defense roles.
These duties were deemed extremely important by British naval offi-
cials in the event of a war with Germany and had been foreseen by
October 1938. Great Britain was the pioneer of the escort destroyer
type through the production between 1939 and 1940 of the 23
Hunt-class escort destroyers. A Hunt-class ship measured 280 feet
by 29 feet by 12 feet, 6 inches and displaced 1,000 tons. The vessel
was armed with four 4-inch guns in single mounts and four 2-
pounder pom-pom weapons. Most lacked any torpedo battery. This
was the result of the fact that the ship was designed specifically for
the protection of convoys against submarines. The Hunt-class units
carried an impressive ASW armament that totaled between 50 and
110 depth charges. The turbine engines of one of these ships pro-
duced 28 knots. By the end of the war, the British launched three
more batches of escort destroyers that were improved Hunt-class
ships. In total, the Royal Navy operated 86 vessels of the Hunt-class
design.
Supplementing these vessels were the frigates of the Royal Navy.
Great Britain pioneered the design of frigates with the River class,
first launched in 1942. A River-class vessel measured 301 feet, 4
inches by 36 feet, 8 inches by 11 feet, 10 inches and displaced be-
tween 1,310 tons and 1,460 tons. Its armament consisted of only
two 4-inch guns, but it possessed a large ASW battery. This con-
sisted of a Hedgehog and 126 depth charges mounted primarily in
racks. The large amount of antisubmarine ordnance is evidence of
the fact that the frigate of the Royal Navy, like that of the United
States, was intended solely for use against submarines while escort-
ing merchantmen. Great Britain built several classes following that
of the original River type. By the end of the war, the Royal Navy op-
erated 349 escort destroyers and frigates.
The remainder of Britain’s wartime destroyers were procured

rather than built. The majority of these were the 50 aging U.S.
World War I–era destroyers garnered from the 1940 Destroyers for
Bases Deal. The rest were, like the World War I practice, units built
in British shipyards for other countries that were purchased after
the outbreak of war. These were six Brazilian ships and two Turkish
vessels. The vital need for destroyers made it necessary to secure
them by any means necessary.
Other Allied powers produced far less than the United States and
Great Britain. In June 1940, the destroyer program of France ended
with its war effort upon the collapse of the country following Ger-
many’s invasion. Only four destroyers were under production at the
time of France’s defeat. All but one of these were subsequently
scrapped. The destroyer production of the Soviet Union, which be-
came an Allied power after Germany’s June 1941 invasion, was
small. Between the opening of the war in Europe in 1939 and June
1941, the Soviets were still in the process of building six Gnevnyi-
class destroyers and three Storozhevoi-class vessels.
These warships were part of a Soviet commitment to the con-
struction of naval units in the event that a defense was needed
against Hitler’s Germany. After the German invasion, however, the
large amount of material necessary to maintain the Red Army in the
face of enemy forces sapped resources from the navy. The Soviets
consequently planned for only one class of destroyer. The Ognevoi-
class destroyers were built to a prewar design. Only 10 ships were
launched by the end of the war, although contracts were tendered
for 16 vessels. Of these, only two were commissioned at the close of
the conflict. These ships, however, are important because they
shaped the immediate postwar designs of Soviet destroyers. Ognevoi
measured 383 feet, 10 inches by 36 feet, 1 inch by 13 feet, 9 inches,
displaced 2,240 tons, and could steam at a maximum speed of 37
knots. It was armed with four 5.1-inch guns in two dual mounts that
were enclosed by gun houses. One each was located in the bow and
stern. The vessel also carried two 3-inch guns, three 37mm AA
weapons, a .5-inch machine gun for the same duty, six 21-inch tor-
pedo tubes, and 96 mines. All told, the armament of Ognevoi was
heavy and in keeping with past Soviet practice.
As a result of the low numbers of domestically produced destroy-
ers, the Soviet Union depended on procuring the majority of its
wartime craft from other powers. In May 1944, the British trans-
ferred eight of the World War I–era vessels garnered in the Destroy-
ers for Bases Deal to the Soviets. These ships were of little use not
110 DESTROYERS
only because of their age but also from the added wear of several
years of World War II service. In August 1944, the Soviets further
expanded their destroyer fleet when the Red Army marched into Ro-
mania, which had been a German ally. They subsequently seized
four ships. Two of these had been launched in 1917 and 1918 and
were, like the vessels provided by the British, of little use. The other
two were of slightly greater value, as their design resembled that of
the British Shakespeare-class flotilla leaders.
Smaller naval powers with the Allies offered what they could, but
their destroyer programs during the war were on the whole minimal
or nonexistent. Canada ultimately deployed a large number of de-
stroyers and escort destroyers for use in the Battle of the Atlantic,
but as Canada was a member of the British Commonwealth a large
number of these ships were built in British shipyards. Some of the
other vessels, notably 4 destroyers of the Tribal-class design and 18
frigates similar to the British River class, were domestically built.
New Zealand and Australia, also members of the British Common-
wealth, contributed a number of domestically built ships. The
Netherlands managed to launch three new destroyers in late 1939
and early 1940 before being invaded and conquered by Germany in
late May 1940.
Despite the collapse of France’s destroyer program, the low out-
put of Soviet shipyards, and the miniscule forces of lesser Allied
navies, the forces of the United States and Great Britain dwarfed
those of the Axis powers. The largest Axis program was that of Japan,
which built conventional destroyers, escort destroyers, and frigates.
Destroyers were the only type of warship built in any substantial
quantity during the war. Japan launched 33 ships between 1941 and
1945 that were of conventional destroyer designs. The first units
produced after the outbreak of war in Europe were the final six
Kagero-class vessels. These were followed by Japan’s first wartime
construction, the 20 Yugumo-class destroyers that were generally
the same as the preceding Japanese destroyers. Indeed, all Japanese
destroyer classes save one were largely based on the design specifi-
cations of Fubuki. In 1942, Shimakaze was launched as an experi-
mental one-ship class looking forward to the construction of larger
destroyers. The experience gleaned from Shimakaze led to the
launch of 12 ships of the Akitsuki class that were designed primarily
as fast AA defense escorts for aircraft carriers. These were among
the last fleet destroyers built for the Imperial Japanese Navy. The
hull of Akitsuki measured 440 feet, 3 inches by 38 feet, 1 inch by 13
feet, 7 inches, displaced 2,701 tons, and possessed turbines that
generated a maximum speed of 33 knots. Its armament consisted of

eight 3.9-inch guns in dual mounts that were fully enclosed by gun
houses. Two each were sited in the bow and stern. These guns, like
previous Japanese destroyers, were dual-purpose weapons capable
of firing on surface targets and aircraft. The vessel also carried four
24-inch torpedo tubes, four 25mm AA weapons, and 72 depth
charges.
Most Japanese destroyers were refitted with additional antiair-
craft guns to the extent that one of the gun houses and its armament
were removed to allow the necessary space. In some cases, so many
AA weapons were carried that the stability of the ship was under-
mined. Japanese destroyers were also retrofitted with radar sets, but
these were inferior to the equipment of the Allies.
In addition to its conventional destroyers, the Japanese mirrored
the Allies with the construction of both escort destroyers and
frigates. Two classes totaling 32 escort destroyers were constructed
during the war. These were more heavily armed than their U.S. and
British equivalents but still designed primarily for convoy escort
duty. Both types were similarly armed. A unit of the Tachibana class
measured 328 feet, 1 inch by 30 feet, 8 inches by 11 feet, 1 inch
and displaced 1,289 tons. It mounted three 5-inch guns in single
mounts, four 24-inch torpedo tubes, and 60 depth charges. The ves-
sel’s turbines were capable of 27.8 knots.
All of Japan’s escort destroyers were launched between 1944 and
1945 and represent a reaction to the desperate need for commerce
protection in the face of a U.S. submarine campaign that had pro-
duced staggering losses in merchant shipping by this point in the
war. The dearth of escorts was the result of the fact that the Japa-
nese had not planned for a protracted war in which large numbers
of escorts were necessary to protect the empire’s commerce. The
Japanese escort destroyers were an adequate design, but their small
numbers were insufficient to protect against U.S. submarines. Had
these been produced earlier and in greater numbers, the outcome of
the U.S. submarine campaign, in which Japanese trade was deci-
mated and their war effort crippled, may have been different. The
majority of Japan’s 264 frigates were, like the escort destroyers,
launched late in the war and consequently did little to reverse the
damage already done by U.S. submarines.
Germany’s wartime production paled in comparison to that of
Japan and consisted only of conventional destroyers. Most German
vessels built during the war were variations of the 1936 type. With
19 units in three classes, they were launched between December
112 DESTROYERS
1939 and January 1944. The vulnerability of German shipyards to

Allied strategic bombing attacks and shortages of material in the lat-
ter years of the war prevented the launch of three additional classes.
Construction began on 8 of the 13 projected ships, but none ever
left their shipyards. One of these classes was a design for a behe-
moth that incorporated armor on a hull that was 554 feet, 5 inches
long and displaced 6,300 tons. It would have been armed with six
5.1-inch guns in three dual mounts enclosed by gun houses as well
as 10 21-inch torpedo tubes. The last German destroyer launched
was the one-ship 1942 type that resembled its 1936 predecessor,
but with heavier AA armament in keeping with the trend in all of the
navies of the combatants. This vessel never entered service, being
bombed soon after its launch.
Despite the deterioration of Germany’s destroyer program, the
fleet was enlarged further through vessels seized from countries oc-
cupied during the war. One modern Dutch destroyer and a Greek
vessel were taken. A French destroyer was also procured, but it was
under construction at the time and never completed.
Like Germany, Italy produced few destroyers during the war. The
last six units of the Soldati class were launched between 1941 and
1942, but these were the only ships completed by Italy during the
war. Construction began on a new class comprising nine vessels, but
these were never completed. In 1943, Mussolini’s government col-
lapsed after the Allied invasion of Italy. German forces seized these
Italian vessels while they were still in their shipyards and scrapped
them. The lion’s share of Italy’s wartime destroyers were conse-
quently vessels seized from foreign powers. Three Yugoslavian ves-
sels were procured in this fashion as well as 11 French destroyers.
These latter ships were scuttled by the French at the port of Toulon
in 1942 and salvaged by the Italians.
The conditions that existed aboard all of these destroyers were the
same regardless of nationality. Living conditions were still harsh de-
spite the fact that there had been improvements in the habitability of
destroyers since the first ones were launched in the late nineteenth
century. Nothing could be done for the fact that destroyers, despite
their increase in size, were small relative to even cruisers and larger
ships. Most of the room, as in the first destroyers, remained dedi-
cated to the ship’s propulsion plant, machinery, weaponry, and com-
mand centers. On some destroyers of the Royal Navy, there was not
enough room to hang all of the hammocks for the men to sleep be-
low decks. As a result, many had to sleep on the main deck exposed
to the elements, when weather permitted. The continuous upgrading
of the weaponry of destroyers only served to decrease the space in

many of them, which exacerbated the already poor conditions. In ad-
dition, the cramped living areas were oftentimes awash with sea-
water that poured down from the upper decks. Amid these dank con-
ditions was sometimes the smell of human waste from the failure of
toilets and occasionally vomit from seasick crewmen.
An additional hardship was simply the product of extended opera-
tions. These vessels did not have the same storage capacity as larger
ships. In escort duty in the frigid waters of the Atlantic Ocean,
crews had to rely on the majority of their sustenance from canned
food and hard biscuits. Most destroyers left port with fresh meat,
bread, and vegetables, but these were soon exhausted. Among the
commodities in short supply was water. Once the original stock ran
low, many destroyer crews had to rely on water collected from the
ship’s evaporators contained in the engine room. Oftentimes, the
small amounts gleaned from these machines was barely enough for
cooking and drinking, which meant that personal hygiene suffered.
Adding to the absence of creature comforts such as food and basic
cleanliness was the temperature of the vessel, which could either be
boiling hot in the Pacific or frigid cold in the North Atlantic. All
told, the life of a destroyer man still ranked as one of the hardest in
all of the world’s navies.
The discomfort created by these conditions paled in comparison
to the dangers faced by the officers and men of destroyers in com-
bat. These crews, like those on other ships, were now highly trained
and specialized in specific tasks to operate their vessels efficiently in
combat, thereby increasing the chance of survival. The multitude of
roles in which destroyers were used, however, meant that the lives of
the men who crewed them were constantly threatened. Direct hits
from gunfire in a surface attack could rip through the relatively light
hulls of destroyers, causing massive damage and loss of life. Torpe-
does and bombs launched during enemy air attacks invariably pro-
duced the same mayhem. Due to the thin hull plating, crewmen
were even subject to death by shrapnel produced by explosions from
near-misses. On several occasions, shrapnel ripped through hull
plates, bulkheads, and the superstructures of destroyers to cut down
the men inside. These steel projectiles could mangle a sailor instan-
taneously. Many of those who lived through shrapnel penetrating
the hull lost arms or legs.
The light hulls of destroyers and their small size also meant that,
in the event of the vessel being sunk, crewmen below decks had lit-
tle time to escape. Destroyers on some occasions sank in only a few
114 DESTROYERS
minutes. With the loss of power, crewmen below decks were

plunged into darkness and groped for a way out. Even if they did get
into the water, the chance of survival was still not great. Ordnance
exploding underwater created concussions that could kill. An exam-
ple is the case of the destroyer Hammann, which after the 1942 Bat-
tle of Midway was assigned to guard the crippled aircraft carrier
Yorktown. A Japanese submarine was able to close within range,
mortally wound the carrier, and hit the destroyer. The hull of Ham-
mann consequently broke in two, and as the ship sank its depth
charges reached their exploding depth and detonated, killing many
of the crew in the water. Finally, if crewmen did survive the sinking
of their vessel, they were still exposed to nature. Some men died of
exposure, a common threat in the frigid waters of the Atlantic, while
those in the Pacific faced death from shark attacks.
The forces of nature could also threaten a destroyer in the ab-
sence of combat. On 17 December 1944, the U.S. 3rd Fleet was lo-
cated some 500 miles east of the island of Luzon in the Philippine
Islands when it encountered a typhoon. Confronted by 70-foot
waves and up to 110-knot winds, the destroyers were placed in grave
danger. Many of them registered rolls of 70 degrees, and in some
cases the tips of their funnels touched the water. This latter situa-
tion caused the loss of three of the destroyers of the fleet. These ves-
sels did not right themselves and sank when water flooded down the
funnels and other open vent shafts. There were few survivors of
these episodes. Only 6 men survived from one destroyer; out of a
crew of 18 officers and 245 men aboard another, only 7 officers and
55 men were saved.6
Despite all these hardships, the officers and crews of the destroy-
ers of all nations accomplished their tasks with the same bravery
and daring that had been exhibited in World War I. The myriad of
tasks in which destroyers were employed and the consequent danger
that the crews faced is evident in the numbers of wartime losses.
Japan, whose navy was almost annihilated in the conflict, lost the
most vessels, with 137 destroyers sunk. Ten escort destroyers also
foundered. Close behind was Great Britain, which lost 101 destroy-
ers and 32 escort destroyers. Italy lost 69 destroyers, the United
States 68, being 56 destroyers and 12 escort destroyers. The Ger-
man navy suffered the destruction of 33 destroyers of varying type
and the Soviet Union lost 26 vessels. France, although it surren-
dered early in the conflict, lost 14 destroyers.7
The designation destroyer refers to those ships capable of a multi-
tude of tasks in fleet operations, while the escort destroyer category
includes not only ships of this type but also frigates. These high
numbers suggest the extreme degree of their use and the vital nature
of their tasks. The need for these vessels, proven in war, meant that
destroyers would continue to be important in the world that
emerged after World War II.
ENDNOTES
1. James L. George, History of Warships: From Ancient Times to the

2. Roger Chesneau, ed., Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships,
1922–1946 (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1980). The figures used in
the text are an amalgamation of different sections of this book separated by
country.
3. Ian Hawkins, ed., Destroyer: An Anthology of First-Hand Accounts of
the War at Sea, 1939–1945 (London: Conway Maritime Press, 2003), p.
56.
4. Ibid., p. 78.
5. George, History of Warships, p. 144.
6. Norman Friedman, U.S. Destroyers: An Illustrated Design History (An-
napolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982), p. 188.
7. George, History of Warships, p. 144.
CHAPTER 4
The Cold War and After,

1946–2004
Despite the large numbers of destroyers lost during World War

II, it represented only a fraction of those vessels that were in service
at the close of the conflict. The majority of these were U.S. and
British, as their construction programs had dwarfed those of the
Axis and the production of France and the Soviet Union was greatly
limited. The large numbers had been necessary given the extreme
importance of the ships for Allied victory. The value of destroyers
had changed during the course of the conflict. The two primary
roles had been to launch torpedo attacks against enemy vessels and
to defend against those launched by the enemy. Of these, torpedo
attack had been supplanted by two functions of even greater values:
antisubmarine warfare and antiaircraft defense. The protection of
capital ships and merchantmen had hinged on destroyers perform-
ing these functions given the increasing effectiveness and destruc-
tive potential of submarines and aircraft. In accordance with this
change, the original mission of defending the battle fleet remained.
The difference was only in the methods employed.
Construction of destroyers did not end with World War II, as the
victorious powers recognized that the new mission of destroyers jus-
tified the continued production of the ship type in the years immedi-
ately after the close of the conflict. The majority of the vessels pro-
duced between 1946 and 1951, however, were units comprising
wartime programs. Most of these were U.S. and British destroyers.
Between August 1945 and May 1951, the United States completed
117
118 DESTROYERS
the last 38 destroyers of the Gearing class. By 1951, it also con-

verted 18 units of the Fletcher class to oceangoing destroyer escorts
(designation: DDE) given the perceived need for more ASW ships in
the postwar world, in which tensions were rising with the Soviet
Union. This process entailed the inclusion of the most advanced
sonar equipment and the replacement of three 5-inch guns by two
Hedgehog systems and Weapon Alpha. The development of Weapon
Alpha started in 1946 with the aim of creating a rocket-boosted
depth charge that could reach greater distances from a destroyer in
keeping with the expanded range of the newest sonar systems.
Weapon Alpha entered service in 1951 and consisted of a rocket
armed with a 12.75-inch warhead that weighed 250 pounds. It was
fired from an MK 108 launcher that could fire 12 rounds per
minute. The maximum range of the system was 800 yards. This
ASW weapon remained in service until 1969 when it was replaced
by a newer model. Eleven units of the Gearing class received a simi-
lar conversion.
Most of the remaining postwar destroyer production directly after
the war was in Great Britain, which launched 16 vessels between
August 1945 and April 1951, with half the total being the units of
the Daring class. Daring represented the culmination of British
wartime design, although the original plan was altered in keeping
with the desire, like the United States with the Fletcher-class con-
versions, to incorporate the newest technology possible. The hull of
Daring measured 390 feet by 43 feet by 13 feet, 7 inches and dis-
placed 2,830 tons. The vessel was armed with six 4.5-inch quick-fir-
ing guns, six 40mm Bofors weapons for antiaircraft defense, and 10
21-inch torpedo tubes. In addition, the ship mounted one Squid
ASW launcher. Like the Hedgehog, this new device was designed to
fire ahead of the attacking ship. The chief difference was the size of
the weapon. Squid held six bombs that each weighed 300 pounds.
These were fired in a sequence such that the first bomb would sink
to the deepest depth setting while each subsequent bomb was set to
detonate 50 feet shallower than the preceding one. Little else was
changed from the original plan. The oil-fired engines of Daring pro-
duced a maximum speed of 34.75 knots. A crew complement of 278
officers and men operated the vessel. The other ships launched in
this period were three destroyers of the Weapon class and five other
units of varying types. The other ships of wartime construction
launched directly after the war were the product of the Soviet
Union. Launched in 1947, these were the remaining four units of
the Ognevoi class.
THE COLD WAR AND AFTER 119
In addition to these ships of older design were units built to post-

war designs. The United States and the Soviet Union, being two
powers that increasingly clashed on the world stage by the late
1940s and early 1950s, were responsible for the majority of this
construction. This trend in production continued until the last
decade of the twentieth century with the implosion of the former
Soviet state.
Immediately postwar, the Soviet Union, although being in dire
economic straits as the European portion of the country lay in ruins
from the Nazi invasion, embarked on a production program of rela-
tively cheap destroyers in keeping with Premier Joseph Stalin’s desire
for a large navy. As a result, the Soviet Union led the world in the
early 1950s in terms of the numbers of new destroyers produced.
Starting in 1950 and ending in 1951, the country launched 72 units
of the Skoriy class. Skoriy measured 397 feet, 6 inches by 39 feet, 4
inches by 14 feet, 9 inches and displaced 2,240 tons. Its armament
consisted of four 5.1-inch pieces in two dual-gunned gun houses.
One each was located fore and aft. It also mounted an array of AA
weaponry, being two 85mm pieces, seven 37mm guns, and six 25mm
weapons. The vessel carried an ASW suite that consisted of two
depth charge mortars and two depth charge racks housed in the
stern. Finally, Skoriy mounted 10 21-inch torpedo tubes and was ca-
pable of shipping 50 mines. Its engines produced a maximum speed
of 33.5 knots. A crew of 218 officers and seamen operated the vessel.
The design of these ships originated from that of the Ognevoi
class and incorporated some features of German design. Being in-
tended to meet the primary strategic requirement of coast defense
for the Soviet Navy, they were not considered particularly successful,
given the fact that their AA armament could not elevate enough to
be truly useful against attacking aircraft. Indeed, the lack of this ca-
pability made the guns useful only for short-range surface warfare.
Augmenting the size of the Soviet destroyer fleet were smaller war-
ships also designed for coastal defense. By the end of 1951, the So-
viet Union completed six Kola-class vessels. The hull of Kola meas-
ured 314 feet, 11 inches by 35 feet, 5 inches by 10 feet, 6 inches
and displaced 1,900 tons. It mounted four 3.9-inch guns, four 1.5-
inch weapons, three 21-inch torpedo tubes, four racks for depth
charges, and two MBU-900 launchers. This latter weapon fired anti-
submarine rockets and was the first Soviet postwar ASW device.
Despite the limitations of the Soviet Skoriy class, the number of
units in the group dwarfed the production of the United States. It
began construction on five new destroyers between 1949 and 1951
120 DESTROYERS
that were all launched by mid-1952. Like the Soviet vessels, these
U.S. designs originated from experience gleaned in World War II.
The first of these was Norfolk, originally designated as a cruiser.
Some scholars continue to place this rating on the ship. In actuality,
Norfolk was intended as a destroyer leader (designation: DL), mak-
ing it the first of this type in the U.S. Navy. Essentially, the defining
aspect of this type was its large size. The hull of Norfolk measured
540 feet by 53 feet, 6 inches by 19 feet and displaced 5,560 tons. Its
armament reflected the desire of U.S. naval officials for more ships
capable of ASW defense. The ship mounted eight 3-inch pieces
housed in four dual-gunned gun houses. Two each were located fore
and aft. Norfolk also carried eight 21-inch torpedo tubes as its prin-
cipal ASW weaponry, being capable of firing early homing torpe-
does. Finally, the ship mounted four Weapon Alpha systems. Its en-
gines produced a maximum speed of 33 knots. A crew of 546 men
manned the ship. The chief problem with Norfolk was the enormous
cost, some $61 million for construction and weaponry.1
The other four units laid down by the United States before 1952
comprised the Mitscher class of destroyer leaders that were designed
primarily for ASW operations. Mitscher measured 490 feet by 47
feet, 6 inches by 14 feet, 8 inches and displaced 3,642 tons. It
mounted two 5-inch guns in single-piece gun houses, one each be-
ing located fore and aft. The vessel also carried four 3-inch guns,
eight 20mm AA weapons, four 21-inch torpedo tubes, two Weapon
Alpha ASW systems, and one depth charge rack. The vessel’s en-
gines produced a maximum speed of 36.5 knots. The Mitscher-class
destroyers were only moderately cheaper than Norfolk. These ships
represent the beginning of the trend toward the construction of
fewer destroyers owing to their increasing cost.
The vessels of the United States and the Soviet Union represented
an exception to the rule in the immediate postwar years as the victo-
rious powers reduced the size of their navies to trim maintenance
costs in a peacetime world that did not require warships in such
large numbers. The United States alone had built 349 destroyers
and 420 escort destroyers between the December 1941 attack on
Pearl Harbor and October 1945.2 That country slowed its produc-
tion program while keeping the majority of its destroyers in service to
counter the rising threat of the Soviet Union by the late 1940s. The
British, due to the great financial drain of the war and the govern-
ment’s plan to divert what resources existed to the domestic front,
viewed the reduction of the Royal Navy as a lamentable necessity. A
massive program of cuts in the fleet was instituted in 1948 that led
to the scrapping of primarily old cruisers. Destroyers did not receive

as many cuts, partially because they were less expensive to maintain.
Even so, Britain’s production of new destroyers was greatly slowed
given the postwar environment. France was also in poor economic
condition, and new construction in the first years after the war was
consequently greatly slowed. Indeed, the French possessed few ves-
sels at all after the war, in which a large portion of their fleet was ei-
ther destroyed by the British to prevent units falling into the hands
of the Germans or scuttled by the French themselves to prevent the
same. What few ships remained were those that had escaped to Al-
lied ports. By 1946, the French operated only 11 destroyers. Nine of
these were former German ships transferred to the French.
New destroyer construction was impossible for the defeated Axis
powers in the immediate postwar years. Their economies were in ru-
ins from the physical devastation caused to their lands during the
war. Another impediment of equal importance to the development
of new destroyers consisted of the peace treaties with each power
that restricted the possibility of future construction even if their
economies did improve. The German Kriegsmarine ceased to exist
as an offensive force. Although the navy still had 15 destroyers at
the close of the war, being the bulk of the Kriegsmarine by this time
owing to combat losses, the British, French, and Soviets seized 13 of
them after the war. The last units of the old navy formed part of a
new naval organization created in the place of the Kriegsmarine.
The new naval arm was primarily responsible for coastal defense
and clearing minefields laid in European waters during the war.
The Imperial Japanese Navy suffered a similar fate during the
general disarmament of the country. As with the German force, the
majority of the surface fleet at the end of the conflict was destroyers
and escort destroyers, being 25 in number. The United States,
Britain, the Soviet Union, and China seized 22 of these vessels. The
remaining units formed part of the new Japanese naval force. In
May 1948 in place of the old navy, the Maritime Safety Agency was
created and charged only with duties such as search and rescue.
The only former Axis country that was allowed to retain a navy with
any real surface force was Italy. It was allowed to retain four destroy-
ers and seven escort destroyers. Nevertheless, the Italian Navy was
severely restricted. Under the peace agreement with Italy, the total
tonnage of Italian warships was not to exceed 67,000 tons while
new construction was completely prohibited before 1 January 1950,
with the exception of replacing units that were accidentally lost.
The naval restrictions placed on the former Axis countries were
122 DESTROYERS
eased in the years following the conclusion of the peace treaties that
ended World War II due to the dawn of a new conflict: the Cold War.
The rise of this new struggle demonstrated the continued need for
destroyers in the post–World War II world. Indeed, the new con-
struction programs of the United States and the Soviet Union had
been predicated on this fact. The worldwide conflict of the Cold War
resulted from diplomatic tensions immediately after World War II
that arose between the United States, its European allies, and their
former Soviet ally over Soviet dealings in Eastern and Central Eu-
rope. The United States and Western European countries were
alarmed at the rise of Communist governments in Eastern Europe
that were allied with Moscow and that threatened the global balance
of power as well as the freedoms of those under Communist systems.
In 1947, amid a Communist revolution in Greece that threatened
to envelop the country, U.S. President Harry S. Truman took the
first steps to check the spread of Soviet influence through the Tru-
man Doctrine. It stated that the United States would support any
free nation threatened by “outside pressures” or “armed minorities.”
This policy statement was clearly directed at the Soviet Union. Sub-
sequent steps like the 1947 Marshall Plan, a massive aid program to
rebuild the shattered economies of Europe in order that they might
not be unstable in the face of Communist insurgency, hardened atti-
tudes of the two sides toward one another. In 1949, as a response to
the Berlin airlift crisis of the previous year and the rise of Commu-
nist China, the United States and Western European nations
founded the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a military
alliance against the Soviet Union. It was initially composed of the
United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Canada, the Nether-
lands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, and Iceland.
The Soviets in turn directed their military strength against this
challenge. They also employed the military power of Eastern Eu-
rope. Since the end of World War II, the Soviet Union had estab-
lished control over the military forces of most of the nations of East-
ern Europe. The Soviets ultimately made this arrangement official
in 1955 with the creation of their own alliance, known as the War-
saw Pact. By the end of the 1940s, the world had polarized into two
camps led by two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet
Union, that rivaled one another around the world. This conflict, the
Cold War, was one of massive military buildups. One component
was a new naval arms race.
As most of the maritime powers of the world were either impover-
ished or devastated by World War II, the majority of the destroyer
construction in this competition was U.S. and Soviet. This trend

was established early during the period between 1952 and 1954 as
naval powers around the world commenced destroyer production in
the context of the new struggle. Dominating in terms of numbers
produced was the Soviet Union, which was in the process of con-
structing its mammoth number of Skoriy-class vessels. In 1954, an
enlarged and improved version of Skoriy, Tallinn, was completed
while Soviet shipyards were also completing the first units of an ad-
ditional class of destroyers, the 27-ship Kotlin class. The hull of
Kotlin measured 415 feet, 1 inch by 42 feet, 8 inches by 15 feet, 1
inch and displaced 2,850 tons. The ship was armed with four 5.1-
inch guns in twin-gunned, dual-purpose gun houses. One each was
located fore and aft. The vessel also carried an assortment of AA
weaponry, six depth charge throwers, two racks for depth charges,
and 10 21-inch torpedo tubes. Propulsion was afforded by steam-
powered engines that produced a maximum speed of 38 knots. It
was crewed by 336 officers and men. These ships were much like
the Skoriy-class destroyers, but upon completion of the last units in
1957 they were impressive additions to the Soviet fleet in terms of
sheer numbers. Complementing these large destroyers were coastal
defense units the size of escorts that were much like the previous
Kola class. In 1952, the first of 64 ships of the Riga class was com-
pleted. The chief difference between the two classes was size, as
Riga-class ships displaced almost 400 tons less than a Kola-class
vessel.
The initial response of the United States to the rise in Soviet pro-
duction of destroyers, as well as the threat of Soviet submarines,
had been a program of conversions of World War II–era destroyers
to include the latest ASW and AAW weaponry. The country had also
commenced construction on Norfolk and the Mitscher-class ships,
all being completed by mid-1954. This policy of conversions and
new production was continued, and in 1952 the United States ex-
panded its program to include the 13 ships of the Dealey-class de-
stroyer escorts (designation: DE), being the first of this type
launched since the end of World War II. The first was laid down in
1952 and completed in 1954, with construction on the entire group
being finished in 1958. The relatively small Dealey measured 315
feet by 36 feet, 8 inches by 11 feet, 10 inches and displaced 1,314
tons. Its armament, like the other U.S. vessels of this era, was dedi-
cated to ASW and consisted of four 3-inch guns and a Weapon Al-
pha system. The vessel’s engine produced a maximum speed of 27
knots. Crew complement was 173 officers and men.
124 DESTROYERS
Augmenting all of these ships was a further conversion program

arising from another development in the Cold War. In 1949, the So-
viet Union detonated its first atomic bomb. This presented a huge
threat to the United States through the possibility of airplanes
armed with such weapons attacking the U.S. mainland. As a result,
in 1952 the U.S. government approved the reconstruction of 12
Gearing-class destroyers as radar pickets. Designated DDR, these
vessels proceeded an earlier failed attempt to provide ships with im-
proved detection capabilities that could patrol off the coast of the
United States and warn of incoming Soviet bombers fast enough to
allow U.S. air forces to intercept them before they delivered their
payloads. The radar picket ships traded some armament for vastly
improved radar facilities and slightly augmented command and con-
trol equipment.
In an attempt to provide some measure of AA protection at sea
against bombers detected by these radar pickets, the United States
also laid down the Forrest Sherman class comprising 18 ships. Com-
pleted in November 1955, the hull of Forrest Sherman measured
418 feet, 6 inches by 44 feet, 11 inches by 15 feet and displaced
2,734 tons. The ship was armed with three 5-inch guns, four 3-inch
weapons, two Hedgehog ASW launchers, four 21-inch conventional
torpedo tubes, and six 12.75-inch torpedo tubes that fired ASW tor-
pedoes. The top speed was 33 knots, and it was crewed by 324 offi-
cers and ratings. The last of these warships was completed in August
1959, by which time they were of limited use in their original con-
figuration due to technological innovation.
The program of Great Britain, like that of the United States,
rested on new construction and conversions of World War II craft.
Due to the urgent need for vessels to counter what naval officials
perceived as a rising Soviet submarine threat and the need for econ-
omy, the latter effort dominated the British destroyer program. The
vessels that resulted were designated frigates. The term had origi-
nally been used in the Age of Fighting Sail to denote a powerful ship
that was the ancestor of the cruiser. The same term was revived in
1943 by Canada to refer to vessels of lesser armament than a de-
stroyer that were devoted to one specific task: escort. This term ulti-
mately superseded that of destroyer escort and became commonly
used in many world navies. The first of these ships for Britain were
Rocket and Relentless of the World War II R class. In 1952, these
ships were returned to service as ASW warships with a completely
new superstructure made of aluminum rather than steel to save
weight. This savings was partially consumed by more modern radar
and sonar equipment. The weaponry of each vessel consisted of two

4-inch quick-firing guns, two 40mm AA guns, two 21-inch torpedo
tubes capable of firing homing torpedoes, and two Squid ASW sys-
tems. By 1957, another 21 World War II destroyers were converted
to the same specifications. An additional 10 wartime craft were con-
verted between 1952 and 1956 with slightly reduced detection ca-
pability. The path of conversion was also initiated in 1953 for eight
ships of the World War II Ca class. Like the other vessels, they were
removed from service for a refit that included the addition of new
fire control equipment and the inclusion of two Squid weapons sys-
tems. New construction was notably lacking, although the design
process was under way for a return to destroyer production. In
1953, plans were drawn up to construct a new class of destroyers.
The proposals called for a vessel over 450 feet long with a displace-
ment of some 3,000 tons that was armed primarily with three 5-inch
guns. This plan, however, was shelved in 1955, as the British Admi-
ralty believed it to be an outmoded design.
The other NATO maritime powers also responded to Soviet con-
struction through a return to destroyer production. Their numbers,
however, were far lower than those of the principal combatants of
the Cold War. Indeed, many of the first destroyers in the navies of
the NATO powers were either vessels seized from former Axis pow-
ers or World War II ships provided by either the United States or
Great Britain. France provides an example of this practice. The first
additions to France’s destroyer fleet after the war came in 1948
through the acquisition of the four ships of the Italian Oriani and
Soldati classes. The French also received eight U.S. Cannon-class
destroyer escorts from the United States as part of the U.S.-funded
Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) established after the
war. This legislation was certainly helpful for the French, as their
economy suffered after the war owing partially to the fact that a
great deal of fighting in the west during World War II had been on
French soil and had devastated the country. France used those fi-
nancial resources at its disposal to embark on a new naval policy fo-
cused on building a fleet of small escorts for NATO and a larger
force based on aircraft carriers for national defense. This latter goal
necessitated cruisers as part of the defense of the carriers, but also
destroyers of varying types.
The destroyers of the Italian Navy between 1949 and 1955 were
garnered in the same way as those in France. Although all naval re-
strictions placed on Italy as a result of the World War II peace treaty
were rescinded upon the country’s entry into NATO on 4 April
126 DESTROYERS
1949, the economy of the country had been damaged in the war to
the extent that the Italians could not feasibly produce new destroy-
ers. Exacerbating the problem was Italy’s chronic lack of industrial
raw materials needed for new construction. The Italians also had al-
most no vessels to convert to more modern units. Even so, the Ital-
ian Navy was tasked through NATO with the defense of Otranto
Channel in the Mediterranean Sea and the protection of the
Tyrrhenian Sea and the Adriatic Sea. This created an immediate
need that began to be filled by U.S. aid provided through MDAP by
the transfer in 1951 from the United States to Italy of two World
War II destroyers, one each from the Benson Gleaves class. In the
same year, three World War II Cannon-class destroyer escorts were
also provided to the Italians. Although they had not been modern-
ized, these ships were useful in the sense that the Italian Navy was
somewhat strengthened and the ships served as training facilities for
a new generation of Italian naval officers and men.
The Netherlands also benefited from the large wartime destroyer
fleet of the United States. The invasion of Dutch possessions in the
Pacific by the Japanese in World War II had led to the end of the im-
perial history of the Netherlands, as the former colonies were never
recovered. As a result, the Dutch in 1949 devoted its navy to the de-
fense of Europe in the context of the Cold War when they joined the
NATO alliance. Specifically, the Dutch Navy became partially re-
sponsible for the protection of convoys in the area of the English
Channel and North Sea. The navy became committed to ASW de-
fense, which meant that destroyers formed a large part of their navy
due to their effectiveness in this role. Between 1950 and 1951, the
Netherlands acquired six U.S. Cannon-class destroyer escorts.
Funds from MDAP also provided for frigates built in the United
States. The six ships of the Roofdier class were completed in 1954
and relied largely on World War II technology. Roofdier measured
185 feet by 33 feet by 10 feet and displaced 808 tons. Its weaponry
consisted of one 3-inch gun, an assortment of AA pieces, and one
Hedgehog launcher.
Unlike many of the other powers, however, the postwar Dutch
Navy turned to domestic production from an early stage after the
war. The first new destroyers were the four ships of the Holland
class that were specifically built for ASW defense. Laid down and
completed between 1950 and 1955, a unit of this type had a hull
that measured 371 feet by 37 feet by 17 feet and that displaced
2,215 tons. The destroyer was armed with four 4.7-inch weapons
mounted in two dual-gunned gun houses, one each being located
fore and aft. It also mounted one 40mm AA gun, two 375mm ASW
mortar systems, and two depth charge racks. The engines produced
a maximum speed of 32 knots. These vessels were only the first of a
new program envisioned by the Netherlands that would make it an
integral part of NATO defense at sea.
Potentially augmenting the destroyer force of NATO from an
early period after World War II were the navies of nonaligned pow-
ers, being countries not allied with either the West or the Soviet
Union, that were friendly to Western nations. Among these were
Australia and New Zealand due to their past imperial connection to
Great Britain. By 1951, Australia received the last of two Battle-
class destroyers built in British shipyards. These were of an im-
proved design over those launched for the British Royal Navy in
World War II. Between 1948 and 1949, New Zealand profited from
its relationship with Britain by acquiring six World War II Loch-class
destroyer escorts, which were subsequently designated frigates.
Both countries entertained more additions to their destroyer forces.
All of these nations faced primarily the Soviet Navy rather than a
combined force of the entire Communist bloc. From the beginning
of the Cold War, the Soviet Union had few European allies with sig-
nificant naval power to aid in countering NATO forces. Few nations
in the Warsaw Pact had possessed warships in the years before
World War II. This development was the product either of their
economies, which did not allow for a large naval armaments pro-
gram, or the fact that many of the powers that became members of
the Warsaw Pact were landlocked. Those powers that did have any
naval force in the early 1950s garnered one from the Soviet Union.
In 1949, Bulgaria received one Russian Novik-class destroyer, while
Romania operated two obsolete destroyers that had been built in the
late 1920s in Italian shipyards. The Soviets also did not have any
significant naval allies outside the Warsaw Pact.
Potentially the most powerful of the Soviet Union’s allies in the
opening years of the Cold War was the People’s Republic of China.
In 1949, the Communists of China had established a Communist
regime under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung. In February of the
following year, a 30-year mutual assistance pact was signed with
China that effectively aligned it with the Soviet Union. This agree-
ment was extremely important for China’s efforts to establish a
naval force, as the country was still largely based on an agrarian
rather than an industrial economy. The shipyards that had existed
were in ruins due to the World War II occupations by the Japanese
and the civil war between the Communists and Nationalists that
128 DESTROYERS
had ensued at the conclusion of the war. As a result, the Chinese re-
lied at first on Soviet help to rebuild its facilities, expand their
knowledge of naval architecture, and create a navy for the new
regime. This force was from its inception dedicated to coastal de-
fense. The first units of this new navy were destroyers, being four
Soviet World War II destroyers transferred between 1954 and 1955
to Chinese service. This paltry force could do little to help the Sovi-
ets versus the West.
Regardless of the number or design of destroyers in world navies
in the period between 1946 and 1955, all units shared the common-
ality that they relied on guns and torpedoes as their primary arma-
ments, with limited advancements in ASW and detection equip-
ment. In the minds of naval officials in many countries by 1955,
such as the British who cancelled their 1953 gun-armed destroyer
design, this fact made them obsolete in the face of the advent of the
missile, a new technological development that transformed naval
warfare. The United States was among those nations at the fore-
front of this innovation, whose roots extended back to World War II.
During that conflict, Nazi Germany pioneered missile technology
with the development of the V-1 and V-2 rockets. U.S. naval officials
sought to extend this technology to missiles aboard ships to combat
a very serious strategic threat that had arisen in 1949 when the So-
viet Union became an atomic power upon the detonation of its first
test weapon. This development, in combination with the advent of
jet power for airplanes, allowed the Soviets to attack the U.S. main-
land using fast aircraft armed with weapons of mass destruction.
The speed of these planes largely obviated the use of antiaircraft
guns on ships that might be deployed as a defensive screen in the
waters off the United States. Their rate of fire was slow, as was their
aiming, which was controlled by human beings. Missiles, in con-
trast, could match and exceed the speed of the new jet bombers
through the use of rocket technology. U.S. naval officials also be-
lieved in the need for vessels armed with missiles to protect the air-
craft carriers of the fleet against assaults by enemy jets.
By the early 1950s, hurried R&D with the aid of German scien-
tists for a missile system that could fulfill these needs bore fruit with
antiaircraft missiles that became known as the “3 Ts” and were des-
ignated as surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). These were the Terrier,
Talos, and Tartar missiles. They were the product of the U.S. pro-
gram Bumblebee, which was begun in 1944 and was committed to
the invention of SAM ordnance that possessed long range. While
this long-range missile, the Talos SAM, was in the development
stage, engineers built the Supersonic Test Vehicle to evaluate the

performance of guidance systems for the weapon. Due to the suc-
cess of this device and the fact that Talos was still years from being
perfected as a viable missile, the United States decided to use the
Supersonic Test Vehicle to build a SAM that possessed shorter
range. Flight tests of such a weapon took place in 1951 and led to
the production of the SAM-N-7, the Terrier.
The Terrier subsequently entered service in late 1955 as the first
of the three U.S. SAM systems. The firing equipment consisted of
two twin-armed Mark 10 launchers. Each launcher consisted of two
rails, on which the missiles rested, that were positioned on either
side of a swivel post that could be trained at the target. Once the
missiles were fired, the rails were raised to a vertical position for re-
loading, where more missiles would be mounted via machinery be-
low the main deck of a ship that raised the ordnance out of a vessel’s
magazine and onto the rails. Terrier missiles themselves were ex-
tremely large, being 27 feet long. The early missiles weighed 1,290
pounds, more than a 16-inch shell. They contained a 218-pound
warhead and a solid-fuel rocket for launching and propulsion to the
target; they could achieve a speed of Mach 1.8, about 1,337 miles
per hour. The maximum range of the first Terrier missiles was 12
miles. Later versions had increased range and the ability to carry a
1-kiloton nuclear warhead. The Terrier originally used beam-riding
for its guidance; machinery in the nose of the missile received tar-
geting information from radars that were placed in the aft portion of
a ship in place of the original superstructure. The fire control sta-
tions on a warship emitted a radar beam that bounced off the target
and supplied the necessary data to the missile. Subsequent Terrier
models incorporated technology that gave it the ability to use radar
as well as beam-riding to home in on a target.
The first type of vessel chosen to ship this technological innova-
tion in weaponry was the cruiser. The great weight and large size of
the missile system necessitated the use of larger hulls. In addition,
the protection of aircraft carriers against air attack was a role as-
signed to cruisers in World War II. The first of these cruisers, and
the first surface vessels armed with missiles, were Boston and Can-
berra, which were two World War II–era vessels of the Baltimore
class. In 1954, both ships were removed from service to reconstruct
them. On 1 November 1955, Boston returned to service as CAG-1, a
guided missile cruiser. Other conversions of cruisers followed.
Nevertheless, while the first cruisers were being converted, the
United States did try to incorporate the Terrier missile system into
130 DESTROYERS
the design of destroyers, thus ushering the vessel type into the mis-
sile age. A chief reason was the need for economy, as destroyers were
both cheaper to build and maintain than cruisers and more could
consequently be deployed for missile protection. This desire for ex-
perimentation led to the world’s first guided missile destroyer (desig-
nation: DDG). On 1 December 1956, the Gearing-class destroyer
Gyatt was recommissioned after a conversion that transformed the
ship into a test bed to examine the feasibility of mounting large mis-
sile systems in relatively small ships. The hull dimensions and
propulsion machinery of Gyatt remained unchanged, but the
weaponry was substantially altered. The twin-gunned 5-inch gun
house was removed as well as all of the AA weaponry in the stern. In
place of the 5-inch weapons and gun house was a twin-armed Terrier
missile launcher. Located just forward of the battery was loading ma-
chinery and a magazine that held 14 missiles in addition to the 2 car-
ried on the arms of the launcher. Not only was the vessel the first de-
stroyer to mount missiles; it was also the prototype in the U.S. Navy
for the inclusion of hull stabilization equipment. The rolling and
pitching motion of small hulls like those of destroyers presented a
particular problem to a missile system, which needed a fair degree of
stability to operate effectively. It also led to more fuel consumption
for destroyers in rough seas as captains sought to maintain position
in their vessels, meaning that a ship could not remain on station for
as long as larger ships due to the need to refuel. As a result, Gyatt re-
ceived the Denny-Brown Stabilization System. This technology was
developed by the British and was first employed in the Hunt-class de-
stroyer escorts launched between 1939 and 1940. It consisted of two
45-foot fins located below the waterline on either side of the hull.
This innovation became commonplace in the destroyers of world
navies. Finally, Gyatt received a slightly improved radar system to
provide guidance for Terriers once they were in flight.
Gyatt proved that it was feasible to mount the Terrier on a vessel
of destroyer size, but ultimately the test ship was unsuccessful. The
lack of extensive improvement in the radar system was the result of
weight restrictions arising from the small hull of the Gearing-class
destroyer. The large radar suite mounted on the first guided missile
cruisers for the Terrier system would have threatened the stability of
Gyatt by making it too top-heavy. Without this array, the guidance
system of Gyatt was not advanced enough to provide proper control
for the Terrier missile.
Nevertheless, the United States used the experience gleaned from
Gyatt to produce the world’s first purpose-built guided missile de-
stroyers and usher in a period of large-scale guided missile destroyer

production in the U.S. Navy. Between mid-1957 and late 1961, the
United States laid down and completed 10 Coontz-class guided mis-
sile escorts. These vessels were originally designated as frigates but
became guided missile destroyers through a 1975 directive. The hull
of Coontz measured 512 feet, 6 inches by 52 feet, 4 inches by 17
feet, 9 inches and displaced 4,167 tons. Designed for ASW and mis-
sile defense, it was armed with one Terrier SAM system mounted in
the stern with a magazine capable of holding 40 missiles. It also car-
ried six 12.75-inch torpedo tubes that fired ASW homing torpedoes,
with one 5-inch gun mounted in the bow. Finally, Coontz was among
the first vessels in the U.S. Navy to ship the ASROC (antisubmarine
rocket) system. This system was first deployed by the United States
in 1960. It is designed as an ASW weapon. Still in use in the U.S.
Navy and those of several U.S. allies, it originally fired rockets
equipped with homing torpedoes from an eight-missile box launcher
that could destroy submerged targets at a range between 900 and
10,000 yards. The system was later improved through the introduc-
tion of a vertical launch system for the missile that increased its
range to 15,000 yards. The vessel’s steam turbine engines produced
a maximum speed of 32 knots. A crew of 360 officers and men oper-
ated the warship. Coontz and its sister ships, thanks to their rela-
tively large hulls, were able to mount a far better radar suite than
Gyatt and thus obviated the drawback posed by the smaller vessel.
In addition to the Coontz class that shipped the Terrier missile,
the United States completed the first of 23 units of the Charles F.
Adams class that shipped a new weapon system. Completed in Sep-
tember 1960, Charles F. Adams measured 437 feet by 47 feet by 15
feet and displaced 3,250 tons and was designated a guided missile
destroyer. It was armed with two 5-inch guns, one ASROC ASW sys-
tem, six 12.75-inch ASW torpedo tubes, and one Tartar SAM twin-
armed launcher mounted in the stern.
Research for the Tartar SAM began in early 1951, and although a
prototype was produced in 1958, the weapon was not fully opera-
tional until 1962 due to testing problems. Tartar was a short-range
weapon that contained a 130-pound warhead, measured 15 feet, 6
inches long, with a wingspan 24 inches across, and weighed 1,280
pounds. Its solid-fuel rocket was capable of Mach 1.8 and could
propel the missile to a maximum range of about 8.5 miles. It was
specifically designed to destroy any incoming aircraft that pene-
trated the outer screen of protection of a task force that was af-
forded by the Terrier and Talos missiles. This latter weapon first
132 DESTROYERS
entered service in 1959 and possessed the longest range of the three
missile types, being a maximum of 57 miles. It measured 21 feet
long with a wingspan of 110 inches and weighed 3,400 pounds. A
portion of this was the warhead, which weighed 300 pounds. Its
ramjet engine could produce a maximum speed of Mach 2.5.
The United States was not alone in its quest to produce warships
that incorporated missiles. Technological innovation in the Soviet
Union challenged the missile program of the United States and was
the product of a shift in the priorities of the Soviet Navy. Following
World War II, Stalin had concentrated on the construction of a navy
that could defend the coasts of the Soviet Union and a few large ves-
sels that could project power further overseas. All were armed solely
with guns. Upon his death in 1953, his successor, Nikita Khrush-
chev, turned toward the incorporation of missiles in the belief that
the gun was obsolete in the face of the missile. Indeed, he believed
that the sole priority of the Soviet Union should be the production
of nuclear-missile technology. New warship designs were subse-
quently drawn up under the direction of commander-in-chief of the
navy, Sergei Gorshkov, who rose to this position in 1956, that relied
on the Soviet missile program for armament.
The Soviet program, like that of the United States, had begun in
earnest in the months following the end of World War II with the
acquisition of German rocket technology. Soviet experiments with
the German equipment eventually produced missiles in the mid-
1950s that alarmed the Western powers as increasingly the Soviet
Navy posed a greater strategic threat through their employment. In
September 1955, the Soviet Union became the first nation to fire a
submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), a weapon that could
carry a nuclear warhead and deliver it to a target hundreds of miles
away. The Soviets also produced the first conventionally powered
ballistic missile submarine in 1958.
At the same time, the Soviets were in the process of developing
surface ship missile systems. In the late 1950s, old warships were
refitted to test the first-generation Soviet SAM missile batteries,
while experiments were also under way for the world’s first surface-
to-surface missile (SSM) for use against enemy vessels. This latter
type was the result of the need for an offensive capability against
NATO aircraft carriers owing to the fact that the Soviet Union had
no sea-based airpower. Soviet officials viewed Western aircraft carri-
ers as a threat to the Soviet Union itself, as they could launch air-
craft armed with nuclear weapons against Soviet military sites and
cities. The Soviet Union consequently designed the world’s first
SSM, the SS-N-1, in the late 1950s; it could carry either a conven-
tional or a nuclear warhead. The missile measured 25 feet long with
a wingspan of 15 feet and weighed more than 7,000 pounds. Its
maximum range was 150 miles.
This innovation led to the world’s first missile destroyers armed
with missiles that possessed offensive capability. These were the
Kildin class comprising four ships. All were laid down in 1957 and
1958 and were essentially modified Kotlin-class warships. The first
of these, Neulovimyy, was completed in 1960 and measured 415
feet, 1 inch by 42 feet, 8 inches by 15 feet, 1 inch with a displace-
ment of 2,850 tons. Its innovative SS-N-1 armament was comprised
of a single missile launcher mounted in the stern. The magazine of
this system, consisting of a hanger situated on the main deck aft,
could hold four reloads. In addition to this new weapon, Neulovimyy
also exhibited Soviet advances in ASW weaponry through the inclu-
sion of two RBU-2500 ASW launchers. This weapon was much the
same as the ASROC system of the United States. Developed in
1957 and first in service in the Kildin-class destroyers, it consisted
of a swivel-mount launcher that held 16 barrels. Each of these con-
tained a rocket with a 46-pound warhead that could be fired to a
maximum distance of 2,730 yards against enemy submarines.3 In
addition to this weapon and the SS-N-1 launcher, Neulovimyy also
carried 16 2.2-inch guns and four 21-inch torpedo tubes. As with
the Kotlin class, the vessel’s top speed was 38 knots. Another eight
warships of the Krupny class were also laid down in 1958, with the
first being completed some three years later. The hull of one of
these warships was 452 feet, 2 inches by 48 feet, 11 inches by 10
feet, 6 inches and displaced 4,500 tons. It was armed with two SS-
N-1 missile launchers, one each being located fore and aft, and car-
ried 20 reloads. The ship’s weaponry also included two RBU-2500
ASW launchers, 16 2.2-inch guns, and six 21-inch torpedo tubes.
The ship’s maximum speed was 36 knots, and it was crewed by 350
officers and men.
Neither Kildin- nor Krupny-class destroyers proved to be very
successful designs due to the new SS-N-1 system, which had nu-
merous drawbacks that detracted from its use. Unknown to the
West, the missile was designed to release its warhead at close range
to the target in order for it to submerge in the water before hitting
the hull of an enemy ship. The intention was to cause damage below
the waterline that would sink the target vessel. This release system
was not very reliable, and consequently the probability of a hit was
decreased. In addition, the Soviets lacked the electronic capability
134 DESTROYERS
to guide the missile to targets over the horizon, which further lim-
ited the weapon’s usefulness. In addition to these problems was the
fact that manual labor, rather than loading machinery, was required
to remove these missiles from storage and place them in the launch-
ers. Not only was this process time-consuming; it was also extremely
difficult to perform in even moderately rough seas. As the warships
of the Soviet Navy operated partly in the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans,
these conditions were largely the rule rather than the exception.
Nevertheless, the United States and its NATO allies viewed the ar-
rival of Soviet ships armed with SSM systems with alarm, as few of
these problems were known. The Soviet Union possessed a potential
offensive capability that the navies of the West lacked.
From the late 1950s forward, all of the navies of the world turned
to the production of missile destroyers in light of the fact that the
new weaponry had largely made warships armed primarily with guns
obsolete. The United States and the Soviet Union continued to pro-
duce the majority of these warships. The destroyer program of the
United States up to 1967 continued to rest on new construction and
conversions/refits of older destroyers to counter the large number of
Soviet destroyers, guard against incoming aircraft, and protect
against the Soviet Union’s ballistic missile submarine fleet.
Many of the newly constructed destroyers pressed the limits of
the standard design parameters considered to be those of destroyers.
The first of these was the Leahy class comprising nine warships that
were designed primarily for AA duty. Laid down in 1959 and com-
pleted in mid-1962, the hull of the Leahy measured 533 feet by 53
feet, 4 inches by 19 feet and displaced 5,146 tons. It was armed
with two Terrier SAM launchers, one each being located fore and
aft. Each of these twin-armed launchers had a magazine that held
40 missiles. The ships also mounted one ASROC ASW system, four
3-inch guns, and six 12.75-inch torpedo tubes that fired ASW torpe-
does. The ship’s engines produced a maximum speed of 32 knots.
Crew complement was 377 officers and men. Another nine ships of
the Belknap class, completed between 1964 and 1967, were de-
signed for ASW defense. As a result, they shipped only one Terrier
system, albeit a modified one that could launch SAM and ASROC
weapons, one 5-inch gun, two 3-inch weapons, and an array of hom-
ing torpedoes.
Also among these larger destroyers were two that signaled a new
innovation in destroyer design. This was the introduction of nu-
clear-powered turbine engines in place of those powered by steam
created by oil-fed boilers. The first use of nuclear power occurred in
the late 1940s when the United States built land-based reactors.
The success of these plants spurred an R&D program in the U.S.
Navy for nuclear-powered propulsion in submarines and ships that
was overseen by Rear Admiral Hyman Rickover. In 1954, this effort
led to success when the U.S. submarine Nautilus was commissioned
for service as the world’s first nuclear-powered vessel.
The propulsion system of this submarine and all other warships
that utilize nuclear power is complex. The entire plant is contained
in a section of a ship known as the reactor compartment. Each nu-
clear reactor plant contains more than 100 tons of lead shielding to
protect the crew from radiation. The reactor generates heat through
the process of fission of nuclear material in water. This heat energy is
transferred to a generator that produces steam that is then directed
to a ship’s turbine engines for propulsion. Steam is also used to
power other turbines that supply electricity for shipboard operations.
There are several advantages to nuclear power. The first of these
is the fact that power for the engines is available immediately upon
orders being received in the engine room from the bridge. In the
past, steam power had to build up gradually for a destroyer to reach
its maximum speed, which took a great deal of time. In addition to
this advantage is the fact that warships equipped with nuclear-pow-
ered engines are no longer hampered by the need to steam to a port
and refuel. The only limiting factor to the endurance of a nuclear-
powered warship is the amount of supplies that can be shipped
onboard.
In 1961, the guided missile cruiser Long Beach became the first
surface warship that went to sea with a nuclear reactor for propul-
sion. The ship was intended to operate with Enterprise, the world’s
first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, completed in the same year.
This innovation was extended to slightly smaller vessels than Long
Beach out of the need for more escorts to operate with Enterprise.
The first of these was Bainbridge. Designated as a frigate, Bain-
bridge was laid down in 1959 and completed in 1962. Its hull meas-
ured 565 feet by 56 feet by 19 feet, 5 inches and displaced 7,250
tons. It was armed with two Terrier SAM systems, one each being
located fore and aft, one ASROC ASW launcher, six 12.75-inch
ASW torpedo tubes, and four 3-inch guns. The two turbines of the
vessel were each powered by one nuclear reactor. These reactors
were of the D2G model. The letters and numbers of the designation
indicated the ship type for which the reactor was designed, the ver-
sion of the reactor, and the designer of the plant, respectively. In the
case of these reactors, the model designation indicated a second-
136 DESTROYERS
generation reactor designed for use in ships the size of a destroyer

that was manufactured by General Electric. Each reactor compart-
ment was cylindrical, measured 37 feet high and 31 feet wide, and
weighed 1,400 tons. This propulsion system generated a maximum
speed of 30 knots. Crew complement was 459 officers and ratings. A
larger nuclear-powered frigate, Truxton, was completed in 1967 and
was essentially a Belknap-class vessel equipped with the new
propulsion system.
The possibility of a failure of the engines in these two vessels as
well as the other nuclear-powered warships was a constant threat.
Drawbacks to this new innovation were and still are many and have
had far-reaching consequences that encompass both the military
and civilian sectors. Expenses to maintain the reactors of the nu-
clear-powered frigates were high, but they were vitally necessary. A
reactor failure could lead to a nuclear meltdown that would destroy
the ship and poison the entire crew with deadly radiation. In such a
horrific situation, the nuclear cores would also contaminate the en-
vironment for miles around the doomed vessel. In addition, the
spent fuel cores of nuclear-powered ships such as Bainbridge re-
main deadly for decades after removal from the reactors. Proper
storage of such material was and still is costly and threatens the en-
vironment with radiation if the safety measures of the storage facili-
ties fail.
Nevertheless, these ships were viewed at the time as valuable ad-
ditions to the U.S. Navy. Even so, the U.S. Navy was handicapped in
one respect by these vessels. A chief drawback of both the nuclear-
powered and conventionally powered large frigates was their cost,
which allowed for the production of only relatively small numbers.
The estimated construction cost of Truxton was $146 million,
whereas a comparably equipped conventional vessel cost an esti-
mated $122 million. As a result, most of the destroyers produced by
the United States from the early 1960s to 1967 were smaller out of
the need for greater numbers.
While construction continued on the Charles F. Adams-class de-
stroyers, designs were produced for still smaller vessels suited pri-
marily for ASW duties. In 1963, both units of the Bronstein class,
designated destroyer escorts, were completed. The hull of Bronstein
measured 372 feet by 41 feet by 23 feet and displaced 1,882 tons. It
was armed with three 3-inch guns, two 21-inch conventional tor-
pedo tubes, six 12.75-inch homing torpedo tubes, one ASROC ASW
launcher, and a new ASW system. This was the Drone Anti-Subma-
rine Helicopter (DASH). It was designed in the late 1950s to ad-
dress the limited range of ASROC in relation to the increasing de-

tection ranges of radar and sonar devices. The system entered ser-
vice in November 1962 and consisted of a small, automated helicop-
ter armed with a homing torpedo for use against enemy submarines.
It was enclosed in a heated hanger and launched from a flight deck
aft. During takeoff, it was controlled from a station to the side of the
hanger. Once airborne, control was passed from this location to the
Combat Information Center (CIC) of the ship. Personnel in this fa-
cility guided the DASH to its target. Speed was not a consideration
in the Bronstein class, as the propulsion system could produce only
26 knots. This fact led to the production of the larger Garcia and
Brooke classes that numbered a total of 17 units. These ships
mounted a slightly greater weapons array and were capable of a
maximum speed of 30 knots.
Augmenting the new U.S. construction program was a massive
upgrade program for elderly destroyers and destroyer escorts. In the
late 1950s, U.S. naval officials realized that a large number of the
destroyers built in World War II were becoming too old for service
and would have to be decommissioned and sent to the scrap yards.
This posed an enormous problem for the United States as hundreds
of destroyers approached the end of their operational lives. The loss
of so many vessels in the face of massive Soviet production of sur-
face warships and the threat of Soviet ballistic missile submarines
was deemed unacceptable by both the U.S. Navy and government.
Between 1959 and 1964, consequently, the United States pursued
the Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization (FRAM) program that
refitted 131 destroyers of varying World War II types. The program
rested on two types of overhaul, the first being designated FRAM I,
which entailed completely refurbishing the hull and machinery of a
warship to extend its life by about eight years. The process also
called for fitting as many modern systems—weaponry, sensory
equipment, and communication equipment—on the ship that
weight restrictions would allow. The cost of this endeavor averaged
some $7.8 million per unit.4 The FRAM I conversion was solely for
the Gearing-class destroyers. A unit under this program underwent a
hull refit that included hull dampening to mask the loudest noises
from the old vessels that could easily be detected by Soviet warships.
In most units, one of the 5-inch guns and its gun house were re-
moved as well as all smaller weaponry. In its place was substituted
one ASROC ASW system, six 12.75-inch homing torpedo tubes, and
a DASH ASW system. Radar and sonar were greatly improved. The
other version of the refit program, FRAM II, was designed to
138 DESTROYERS
lengthen the operational life of a destroyer by five years. It entailed

the same hull refurbishment, but with lesser weapons upgrades, and
cost about $4.7 million per unit.5 This program was employed pri-
marily for the old Sumner-class destroyers. A unit under this pro-
gram had the hull modernized in much the same way as FRAM I
units, but it also was fitted with an entirely new bridge structure. A
FRAM II conversion retained all of its 5-inch guns and mounted
two Hedgehog ASW mortars, two 21-inch conventional torpedo
tubes, six 12.75-inch homing torpedo tubes, and a DASH ASW sys-
tem. Both these destroyers and those of the FRAM I type lacked any
missile battery, which meant that they were strictly intended for the
ASW role.
While the destroyer program of the United States progressed, the
Soviet Union continued to build missile-armed warships. Many of
these were units of the Krupny class of SSM armed destroyers
whose first units had entered service earlier. The heart of the So-
viet’s program of new construction in the 1960s, however, was not
SSM warships but rather vessels devoted to both AA and ASW roles.
This effort began in 1960 with the conversion of a Kotlin-class de-
stroyer, Bravyy, to carry the Soviet Union’s first SAM system. This
was the SA-N-1, known as Goa to the West. The SA-N-1 measured
21 feet, 7 inches with a wingspan of almost 5 feet. This 880-pound
missile was capable of delivering a 132-pound warhead to a target
up to 17 miles distant.
Following testing aboard Bravyy, the Soviet Union produced the
18-ship Kashin-class guided missile destroyers, being the first such
group dedicated to AA defense in the Soviet Navy. The first unit en-
tered service in 1963 with construction until 1972. The hull of a
Kashin-class vessel measured 472 feet, 5 inches by 51 feet, 10
inches by 15 feet, 5 inches and displaced 3,750 tons. It was armed
with two RBU-6000 and two RBU-1000 ASW systems, which were
improvements on past models, five 21-inch torpedo tubes, and four
3-inch guns. The primary weaponry consisted of two SA-N-1 missile
launchers, one each being located fore and aft. In addition to the
Soviet advance of the SA-N-1 was innovation in propulsion, as the
Kashin class was among the first equipped with gasoline-powered
turbine engines. The need for boilers to produce steam is obviated
in this system, as gasoline is fed directly into the engine. This
propulsion plant produced a maximum speed of 37 knots. A crew of
280 officers and men operated each ship.
In addition to these larger destroyers were smaller frigates that,
like the FRAM conversions of the United States, were designed pri-
marily for the ASW role as coastal defense ships. Between 1961 and
1969, the Soviets completed 45 Petya-class frigates. Each unit
measured 268 feet, 4 inches by 30 feet, 2 inches by 9 feet, 6 inches
and displaced 950 tons. The armament consisted of four 3-inch
guns, two RBU-2500 ASW launchers, five 16-inch torpedo tubes,
two depth charge racks, and 22 mines. A Petya-class frigate could
achieve a maximum speed of 32 knots. By 1966, 18 similar vessels
of the Mirka class were completed to augment the numbers of So-
viet frigates.
The remainder of the world’s destroyer production in the years be-
tween 1955 and 1967 was largely the result of NATO powers seek-
ing to augment the ability of the West to counter the Soviet Navy.
The naval power with the greatest output was Great Britain. In this
period, destroyers and smaller frigates came to represent the major-
ity of the British surface fleet. This was in part due to financial re-
strictions, as the state of the British economy after World War II had
necessitated a massive cut in the number of ships in service as well
as a curtailment of new construction. Destroyers and frigates were
among the cheapest to build given financial restrictions. These types
of ships were also favored due to the prevailing belief in Britain, as in
many other nations, that navies were largely obsolete in the age of jet
bombers equipped with atomic bombs. Such a belief that empha-
sized airpower, however, meant that aircraft carriers still had some
validity in the Royal Navy. As a result, Britain needed destroyers and
frigates to serve in their AAW role to protect the carriers.
Most of the escorts Britain produced in this era were frigates
rather than destroyers. The only class of destroyer produced by
Great Britain in this period was the County class comprising eight
vessels that were dedicated to the AA escort role in defense of air-
craft carriers. The first six of these were completed between 1962
and 1966, while the other two were ordered in 1967 and completed
three years later. The hull of the lead ship, Devonshire, measured
521 feet, 6 inches by 54 feet by 20 feet, 6 inches and displaced
6,200 tons. Its primary weaponry consisted of Britain’s first domesti-
cally built SAM systems. The first of these was one Seaslug SAM
launcher. Development for the missile had begun in 1949 and sev-
eral plans had been floated for cruisers to carry the weapon, but the
missile was not ready for service until 1962. By that time, Great
Britain had abandoned plans for a cruiser to carry the Seaslug in
preference for mounting the SAM system in cheaper destroyers.
Seaslug was similar to the U.S. Terrier missile in terms of perform-
ance. It measured 16 feet, 1 inch, had a wingspan of almost 57
140 DESTROYERS
inches, and weighed 1,980 pounds. The original missile, the Mark I,
could deliver the 200-pound warhead to a distance of 15 nautical
miles at a maximum speed of Mach 1.8; the improved Mark II that
entered service in 1965 could travel a distance of 35 nautical miles.
The guidance of Seaslug was also much like that of Terrier—beam-
riding technology. Later versions of the missile had a limited anti-
ship capability. Devonshire carried as many as 32 reloads for this sys-
tem that were located in a magazine located in the forward portion.
Missiles were removed from this area and transported via a tunnel
to the launcher in the stern. While en route, preflight checks were
performed and fins were fitted to the ordnance. In addition to
Seaslug, the Devonshire also mounted two Seacat SAM launchers.
This missile also entered service in 1962 and was designed specifi-
cally to counter close range aircraft or missiles. A further design
specification was that it had to be small and lightweight in order for
frigates to mount it. As a result of these requirements, the Seacat
missile measured 1.48 meters long with a wingspan of 65 centi-
meters and weighed 68 kilograms. Its maximum speed was Mach .9
and it could carry its payload to a range of 3 nautical miles. This
missile proved successful and was adopted by several other coun-
tries. In addition to these missile systems, Devonshire was also
armed with two 4.5-inch guns in a dual-gunned turret located in the
bow, two 20mm pieces, and a helicopter for use in an ASW role. The
ship’s engines produced a maximum speed of 30 knots through a
new propulsion system. The Combined Steam and Gas Turbine
(COSAG) system employed both steam-powered turbines and new
gas-powered turbines. A crew of 440 officers and ratings operated
the vessel.
The County-class destroyers were the exception rather than the
rule in terms of Britain’s production of escorts between 1955 and
1967, as they were dwarfed by the number of smaller, cheaper
frigates produced. During this period, Great Britain completed
seven classes of frigates that totaled 58 vessels. This output made
frigates the bulk of the surface fleet of the Royal Navy and signaled
a decisive shift away from large-scale destroyer production for the
sake of economy. It ultimately signaled the end of large-scale de-
stroyer production in Great Britain, the country that had created the
first destroyer.
The first of these ships were the six units of the Whitby class.
Completed between 1956 and 1959, they were designed to act as
ASW escorts. Whitby measured 370 feet by 41 feet by 17 feet, dis-
placed 2,150 tons, and had a maximum speed of 29 knots. It was
armed with two 4.5-inch guns in a single, dual-purpose turret

mounted in the forward section. The frigate also shipped 12 21-inch
torpedo tubes, two 40mm STAAG (Stabilized Tachymetric Anti-Air-
craft Gun) pieces, and two Limbo systems. This latter device was an
ASW mortar composed of three tubes that each held a bomb. Crew
complement was 152 officers and ratings.
These ships did not prove very successful, as they were expensive
and took a lengthy amount of time to construct. These two attrib-
utes ran counter to the reasons why the British favored frigates.
Subsequent frigate designs proved more successful and were all
suited for either the AAW or ASW role with the exception of the
Tribal-class frigates that were designed as general-purpose warships.
All but one of these ships relied on guns and torpedoes for offensive
and defensive capabilities. The exception was a frigate of the Salis-
bury class that was launched in 1959 and equipped with a Seacat
launcher.
The culmination of frigate design for Britain in this era were the
Leander-class units, which many naval officials and scholars con-
sider to be among the best of their type. The 16 warships of this
class were completed between 1963 and 1967 and were designed
for multiple roles rather than a specific one in an attempt to realize
the greatest capability for the least amount of cost. Leander meas-
ured 372 feet by 41 feet by 18 feet, displaced 2,350 tons, and was
capable of a maximum speed of 28.5 knots. It was armed with two
4.5-inch dual-purpose guns that were housed in a single turret lo-
cated forward. The frigate also shipped two 40mm AA guns, one
Limbo system, and one Seacat SAM launcher. Crew complement
was 250 officers and ratings. These vessels proved so successful that
an improved class began construction two years after the launching
of the first unit of the original group.
Next to the United States and Great Britain, the NATO power
with the greatest production of destroyers and frigates was France.
Most of these vessels were not armed with missiles. Unlike many
NATO countries, the French did not rely greatly on the United
States for missile technology. Traditionally, the design of warships as
well as weapons in the French Navy had been entirely domestic.
French R&D in missile technology had not started until the mid-
1950s and was therefore still in its infancy when France began to
build its new postwar navy. This fact is evident in the design of the
Surcouf-class destroyers, being the first built by France since World
War II. The 12 ships of this group, which conformed to a design
similar to those before World War II, were completed between 1955
142 DESTROYERS
and 1957 and were intended for the AAW role to protect aircraft
carriers, which was the same driving consideration in other navies at
the time. The hull of Surcouf measured 422 feet by 42 feet by 18
feet and displaced 2,750 tons. It was armed with six 5-inch guns, six
2.2-inch pieces, four 20mm guns, and 12 21-inch torpedo tubes.
The ship’s maximum speed was 34 knots and it was crewed by 347
officers and men.
Four of these ships exhibited an exception rather than the rule for
France in terms of missiles when they were rearmed in the early
1960s with the U.S. Tartar SAM system. These vessels mounted two
twin-armed launchers in place of their aft 5-inch guns. The next
class of destroyers, the Duperre class, comprised of five ships and
completed between 1957 and 1958, was a virtual repeat of the previ-
ous class and did not ship U.S. missiles. Augmenting these destroy-
ers were 27 frigates of three different classes. Like the majority of
their larger counterparts, these ships were armed with guns and tor-
pedoes. Their primary roles were either AAW or ASW duty or a com-
bination. An example is the last type of frigate produced between
1955 and 1967, being the Commandant Riviere class comprising
nine units. Commandant Riviere measured 338 feet by 38 feet by 14
feet, displaced 1,750 tons, and had a maximum speed of 25 knots.
The ship was designed primarily for use with NATO forces as a con-
voy escort. Its armament consisted of three 3.9-inch guns housed in
three single-piece turrets. Two of these were located aft while the
other was mounted in the forward section of the hull. The ship also
carried two 30mm AA guns, one 12-inch ASW mortar, and six tor-
pedo tubes. A crew of 180 officers and men operated the vessel.
Of these ships, the most effective were those designed for the
ASW role as their armament remained effective for use against sub-
marines. The capability of the AAW destroyers, however, was limited
owing to the fact that they did not have missiles to counter jet air-
craft and Soviet antiship missiles. The four modified Surcouf-class
destroyers were exceptions, but the French insistence on the use of
domestically built missiles meant that the majority were armed with
World War II–era weaponry that was ill-suited to the postwar era.
This problem was resolved in the early 1960s as a result of worsen-
ing diplomatic relations between France and the United States. In
1958, General Charles de Gaulle became the leader of France and
subsequently criticized the command structure of the NATO al-
liance. In his view, France deserved greater influence in the actions
of the alliance. U.S. intransigence over demands to address this is-
sue led the French to quicken the pace of their missile R&D for the
sake of lessening French dependence on the United States in terms

of defense.
While France focused resources on the construction of a new
SLBM, research also went forward on surface weapons. The first of
the latter type to go to sea was the Malafon ASW system. The test
bed for this system was La Galissonniere, a destroyer that had been
laid down in 1958 at first as a gun-armed warship and was very sim-
ilar to the design of the Duperre class. During its construction, the
design was altered to include the Malafon. La Galissonniere was
completed in 1962 and measured 436 feet by 42 feet, 18 inches
with a displacement of 2,750 tons. It was armed with two 3.9-inch
guns in single turrets located in the bow, six 21-inch torpedo tubes,
one 12-inch ASW mortar, and one Malafon ASW system mounted in
the stern. It was composed of a launcher that fired a single missile,
which was supplied by a boxlike magazine located on the forward
main deck. The ship also carried one ASW helicopter housed in a
novel folding hanger that was fitted on top of the Malafon magazine.
This hanger could be unfolded for use as a landing pad for the air-
craft. The top speed of this vessel was 34 knots.
Months after La Galissonniere was completed, construction be-
gan on the first purpose-built French guided missile destroyers.
These were the two units of the Suffren class that were designed to
provide both AAW and ASW support for aircraft carriers. Laid down
in 1962 and completed in 1967, Suffren measured 517 feet by 51
feet by 20 feet, displaced 5,335 tons, and had a maximum speed of
34 knots. Its primary armament was missiles. The ship mounted one
Malafon ASW launcher amidships and a twin-armed launcher on
the stern that shipped the new Mascura SAM. This system was sup-
plied by a magazine located below decks that held up to 48 missiles.
These missile systems were supported by an intricate and powerful
radar set, a portion of which was located in a large dome fitted to
the top of the forward superstructure. The ship was also armed with
two 3.9-inch guns, two 30mm pieces, and four torpedo tubes.
Outside the United States, the destroyers and frigates of France
and Great Britain constituted the majority of NATO’s contribution
to the Cold War. Several other European powers, however, con-
tributed to the naval force of the alliance. One of these was the for-
mer Axis power of Italy. Italy had become a member of NATO in
1949 and was thus free of peace treaty restrictions. Plans for new
warships went forward in the following years under a naval plan that
rested largely on destroyers and smaller craft. Even so, actual con-
struction was slow due to financial limitations and a lack of raw
144 DESTROYERS
materials that continue to plague the Italian Navy. These problems

served to buttress the Italian aim to construct destroyers and
frigates to get the most capability at a cheap price and with the ex-
penditure of a relatively low amount of raw material. Among the first
ships of the postwar Italian Navy were the two Impetuoso-class de-
stroyers. Construction began on both units in 1952, and they were
completed in 1958 as vessels capable of performing both AAW and
ASW roles. The hull of Impetuoso measured 418 feet, 9 inches by
43 feet, 2 inches by 14 feet, 9 inches and displaced 2,775 tons. It
was armed with four 5-inch guns, 16 40mm AA pieces, one ASW
mortar, and six 12.6-inch torpedo tubes. The top speed of the vessel
was 34 knots. The proceeding two units of the Impavido class were
largely similar to those of the Impetuoso type. The key difference
was an example of U.S. aid to other NATO powers, being the inclu-
sion of a Tartar SAM system aft in place of the aft 5-inch gun house.
The numbers of these two classes was eclipsed, as in many other
navies, by the construction of smaller, cheaper frigates that were
armed with guns and torpedoes. Italy completed two classes of this
type that totaled eight ships. As in the past, the Italians showcased
their flair for innovation in warship design through the Bergamini-
class frigates. These vessels were only 308 feet, 4 inches long but
shipped a landing pad aft for the operation of an ASW helicopter.
This made the vessels among the smallest in the world to employ
aircraft and was a considerable feat despite the fact that the design
was deemed unsuccessful. The chief problem was the lack of stabil-
ity possessed by the small ships that rendered very difficult the safe
operation of the helicopter.
By the late 1950s, Italy was not the only former Axis power con-
tributing naval forces to the NATO alliance. On 23 May 1949, the
German Federal Republic formally came into being upon adoption
of a constitution that was accepted by the former Allied powers of
World War II. The need for West German participation in the Cold
War increased greatly in the years after the founding of the republic.
Not only was the front line of the Cold War the border between
West and East Germany; NATO needed all the resources it could
muster for defense against the Soviet Union. In May 1955, Ger-
many became a member of NATO in recognition of these facts. As a
result, the naval restrictions placed on West Germany after World
War II were lifted and a new German Navy, the Bundesmarine, be-
came a contributing member of the NATO force. This arrangement,
however, existed in theory more than practice at first owing to the
fact that the German shipbuilding industry was still in a state of re-
construction following World War II, as most of it had been de-

stroyed in the war.
While the Germans worked to repair their facilities, they received
the first units of their new surface navy from the United States and
Great Britain. All of these were destroyers and frigates of the World
War II era and were acquired between 1958 and 1960, being six
U.S. Fletcher-class destroyers, three British Hunt-class frigates, and
four British Black Swan–class frigates. The first domestic produc-
tion of German warships after World War II was the Koln class com-
prising six frigates. The first of these was laid down in 1957 and
completed in 1961; construction on the entire class was finished
three years after the first unit entered operation. The hull of Koln
measured 360 feet, 4 inches by 36 feet, 1 inch by 15 feet, 1 inch
and displaced 2,090 tons. It was armed entirely with guns and tor-
pedoes, as the Germans lacked a domestically made missile and did
not garner weapons from the United States. The armament con-
sisted of two 4-inch guns in two single-mount gun houses. One each
was located fore and aft. The vessel also carried six 40mm AA guns,
four 21-inch torpedo tubes, and two ASW mortars. In keeping with
past German destroyers, the vessel was powered by diesel engines.
These could produce a maximum speed of 32 knots. A crew of 240
officers and men operated the warship. The Koln class was followed
by the larger Hamburg-class of three destroyers. The first of these
units was completed in 1964 while the last entered service four
years later. These ships displaced 3,340 tons and carried an addi-
tional 4-inch gun in a single-mount gun house located in the bow.
Taken together, these two classes signaled the return of one of the
premier destroyer powers in the world as an ally of its former ene-
mies in the context of a new world struggle.
Between 1955 and 1967, other NATO powers also contributed to
the destroyer fleet of the alliance. The total number was not in-
significant, although most of them were not armed with missiles, as
these nations lacked their own missile programs. As destroyers and
frigates were cheaper to build in relation to other surface units,
many NATO nations with economies less powerful than the large
powers based their surface fleets on these warships. Canada pro-
duced 20 destroyers in four classes between 1955 and 1967 that
were devoted to the AAW and ASW roles. All were gun- and torpedo-
armed, but one class exhibited innovation in design. This was the
Annapolis class of two destroyers that were completed in 1964 and
incorporated a helicopter flight deck in the stern.
The production of the Netherlands was only slightly less than
146 DESTROYERS
that of Canada, as its naval construction program continued in the

context of aiding NATO in the Cold War. Between 1956 and 1958,
the Netherlands completed the Friesland class of eight destroyers.
These vessels were armed with both guns and torpedoes, as the
Netherlands lacked a domestic missile program. The next surface
vessels launched for the navy, however, were armed with missiles
garnered from another member of the NATO alliance. Six frigates of
the Van Speijk class were completed between 1967 and 1968 and
carried the British Seacat missile.
The other NATO members that operated destroyers relied at least
in part on craft sold to them by one of the larger powers of the al-
liance or built to one of their designs. Norway provides an example,
as the country bought three old River-class frigates from the Cana-
dians while also completing by 1967 the Oslo class of five frigates.
Portugal bought or constructed 14 frigates of U.S., British, and
French design. As in the Canadian and Dutch forces, these ships
were armed with guns and torpedoes.
In addition to the forces of nations that were members of NATO,
the West also benefited from neutral nations in the Cold War that
were pro-Western. Two of these powers were Australia and New
Zealand because they had been closely linked to Great Britain
through their imperial past as areas of British settlement within the
empire. Both powers relied on destroyers and frigates of either
British or U.S. design. Australia completed three British Daring-
class frigates between 1957 and 1959, with another unit being ac-
quired from the British five years later. Four Yarra-class frigates also
joined the fleet between 1961 and 1964 that were essentially de-
signed as the British Rothsay class. In addition to these ships, the
Australians bought three Charles F. Adams–class guided missile de-
stroyers from the United States, which gave the country a limited
missile capability for its surface fleet. New Zealand acquired two
Rothsay-class frigates from Britain while also garnering one British
Leander-class frigate.
The combined forces of these two pro-Western nations, however,
paled in comparison to that of another nation that was a former
World War II Axis power. Japan’s navy was restricted to search-and-
rescue duties and coastal defense through the Maritime Safety
Agency, the organization created in 1948 that had replaced the Im-
perial Japanese Navy after the war. This state of affairs, however,
lasted slightly less than six years due to the Cold War. Western naval
officials increasingly believed that Japan needed a stronger naval de-
fense in the face of this new struggle and also desired a friendly
naval power in the Far East. As a result, in 1954 naval restrictions

were lifted on the Japanese, which allowed them to create the Mar-
itime Self-Defense Force. From its inception, the new naval force
was dedicated to ASW operations. Destroyers and frigates conse-
quently became the primary surface combatants of the new navy, as
this was a specific role assigned to them. At first, the Japanese relied
on U.S. ships and technology due to the state of their shipyards that
had been destroyed in the war. The first units of the new Japanese
force were two units each of the Benson/Gleaves class and Fletcher
class acquired in 1954 and 1959, respectively, that were improved
during their service in the Maritime Self-Defense Force.
In 1956, the first Japanese postwar destroyers built in domestic
shipyards entered service. These were the two destroyers of the
Harukaze class that relied on the United States for their weaponry
and sensory equipment. These were followed between 1958 and
1960 by the Ayanami class of seven destroyers that also relied heav-
ily on U.S. technology. Nine additional destroyers in five different
classes joined the navy by 1967 that also incorporated U.S. equip-
ment. All also shared the commonality of armament, which con-
sisted of guns, torpedoes, and assorted ASW systems. The exception
was Amatsukaze, the first guided missile destroyer of the new Japa-
nese Navy. Amatsukaze measured 429 feet, 9 inches by 43 feet, 11
inches by 13 feet, 9 inches, displaced 3,050 tons, and was capable
of a maximum speed of 33 knots. It was armed with four 3-inch
guns, one Terrier SAM system mounted in the stern, one ASROC
ASW launcher, two Hedgehogs, and six 12.75-inch torpedo tubes. A
crew of 290 officers and men operated the warship. Augmenting the
capability afforded by this ship and the others were eight frigates. By
1967, Japan was once again a naval power with a force composed al-
most entirely of destroyers and frigates.
Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union had few allies or
friendly powers to turn to for an augmentation of its destroyer and
frigate force. Few nations in the Warsaw Pact were naval powers.
Economic limitations were in part responsible for the lack of con-
struction, and only a handful of powers within the Warsaw Pact had
access to the sea. The nations that did have warships relied largely
on the Soviet Union for supply. Between 1956 and 1959, the Ger-
man Democratic Republic, or East Germany, acquired four Riga-
class frigates from the Soviet Union. Bulgaria by 1956 operated one
Ognevoi-class destroyer. Only Romania operated destroyers that
were not of Soviet construction, but these were two vessels built in
1917 and 1918 that were completely obsolete. Romania also pos-
148 DESTROYERS
sessed two Italian destroyers that were of a design produced in the

late 1920s and therefore equally useless for the Cold War. By 1968,
all were scrapped.
The one large power friendly to the Soviet Union in the first years
of the Cold War was China, but it was not able to contribute much
in the way of naval force. The Communist People’s Republic of
China had come into being on 1 October 1949 and had subse-
quently aligned itself in 1950 with the Soviet Union through a mu-
tual assistance pact, but the country could not produce naval units.
Not only was China not very industrialized; World War II and the
subsequent civil war between the Communists and Nationalists had
wrought destruction on existing shipyards. As a result, China relied
at first on outside help for the rebuilding of its facilities and the cre-
ation of a navy whose primary purpose was coastal defense. The So-
viet Union provided this aid because it courted China as a Cold War
ally. This assistance took the form of destroyers and frigates to per-
form the mission of coastal defense. By 1959, China possessed four
former Soviet destroyers and four Riga-class frigates whose primary
armament consisted of guns and torpedoes. Such aid, however,
ended in the early 1960s with the Sino-Soviet split over ideological
differences concerning the nature and growth of communism in the
world. The end of the relationship between China and the Soviet
Union forced the Chinese to hurry a return to domestic naval pro-
duction. In 1967, the first two frigates of the five-vessel Jiangnan-
class entered service as the first warships designed and built in
China in the post–World War II era. These ships were essentially
Riga-class frigates and were very poorly armed. A great deal of work
was necessary for China to approach the design and technological
standards of other naval powers.
In addition to the destroyers and frigates of the different Cold
War alliances and those powers associated with them, other purely
neutral nations possessed craft that swelled the numbers in world
service. Among these were powers whose R&D projects yielded in-
novation in the field of naval technology. Chief among them was
Sweden, as it became the first naval power other than the Soviet
Union to construct a guided missile destroyer with antiship missile
capability. In 1951, Sweden laid down two destroyers of the Halland
class based on a design that incorporated an antiship missile being
developed as part of a domestic R&D program. Upon the ships’ com-
pletion in 1955 and 1956, however, the missile was not ready for
service. Even so, this missile, the Saab Rb08A SSM, proved a suc-
cess in 1967 and was subsequently fitted to the ships. This missile
measured 5.72 meters long and weighed 1,215 kilograms. It resem-

bled a fixed-wing aircraft in shape and relied on guidance through
radar enclosed in the nose cone. This system was mounted aft amid-
ships on Halland’s hull, which measured 397 feet, 2 inches by 41
feet, 4 inches by 18 feet and displaced 2,630 tons. The vessel also
mounted four 4.7-inch guns in two twin-piece gun houses. One
each was located in the bow and stern. Additional weaponry in-
cluded AA guns and assorted ASW armament. In addition to these
ships, Sweden also produced four Ostergotland-class destroyers.
They did not have antiship missile capability but were equipped in
1963 with the British Seacat SAM system.
Sweden, however, represents the exception rather than the rule
for neutral nations in terms of destroyers and frigates. Most powers
bought or operated vessels built by larger naval powers. Few pos-
sessed ships with any missile armament. One of the most significant
contributors to the world’s naval force by this manner was India
through the acquisition by 1960 of 11 British frigates. All but three
of these were of modern design. Other countries pursued the same
course, which led to the survival of World War II destroyers into the
1980s in some instances. An example is Argentina, which bought 10
U.S. World War II destroyers.
The world’s destroyers and frigates had ample opportunities to
prove their continued worth in combat duty during the period be-
tween the end of World War II and the late 1960s. These operations
did not involve engagements between Soviet and NATO warships,
but many of them did take place in wars within the context of the
Cold War. The first of these was the Korean War (1950–1953), al-
though naval units saw very little combat. This conflict was the first
hot conflict of the Cold War and had its roots in 1945 when the Ko-
rean Peninsula was occupied by Soviet troops north of the 38th Par-
allel and U.S. troops south at the close of World War II. Diplomats
intended the dividing line between the two armies to be temporary
pending reunification of Korea, but it became permanent due to the
Cold War. A Communist government rose to power in the north that
became militarily strong through the aid of the Soviet Union. On 25
June 1950, this new nation, the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (DPRK), invaded southern areas with the objective of unify-
ing the peninsula under Communist rule. Both the United States
and the United Nations resolved to resist the invasion with armed
force.
The result was a struggle that took part largely on land, but the
war effort of the United States and the United Nations Command
150 DESTROYERS
(UNC) depended on sea power. Destroyers and frigates were among

those naval units that blockaded North Korea, provided gunfire sup-
port for troop landings, and aided in the shipment of vital overseas
supplies to South Korea on which the UNC war effort depended.
Destroyers and frigates were particularly useful in the role of supply
as the ships performed the duty of convoy escort, which was a role
assigned to them during the two world wars. In addition to these du-
ties, destroyers and frigates exhibited the duty of protection for air-
craft carriers that had been attached to their type in World War II
and had been a justification for their continued existence after that
war. Actual combat with enemy naval units was very limited, as the
DPRK was not a naval power. The only clash occurred on 2 July
1950, when a UN naval force composed of the U.S. cruiser Juneau,
the British cruiser Jamaica, and the British frigate Black Swan en-
countered six North Korean gunboats escorting 10 supply ships. In
the engagement, the guns of Black Swan helped to sink all but two
of the enemy vessels.
Destroyers and frigates also proved their worth in the Vietnam
War (1964–1975). The United States became involved in the strug-
gle following the breakdown of elections to unite Vietnam, which
had been divided after World War II, owing to the fact that Wash-
ington believed that Communists in the north would win the elec-
tion. The United States subsequently provided large-scale economic
assistance to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), or South Vietnam, to
ward off any future seizure of South Vietnam by northern Commu-
nist forces already established in the north as the Democratic Re-
public of Vietnam (DRV—North Vietnam). Tensions steadily esca-
lated and culminated in open military involvement in Vietnam
against increasing Communist insurgency.
The catalyst involved destroyers through the Tonkin Gulf inci-
dents. On 2 August 1964, three DRV torpedo boats attacked the
U.S. destroyer Maddox as it collected intelligence data on North
Vietnam while positioned in international waters. Maddox staved off
the torpedo boats with gunfire, but the situation led to the destroyer
being reinforced by an additional destroyer, C. Turner Joy, to guard
against future attacks. On 4 August, the United States believed that
another such attack had occurred during the night. Although cur-
rent information supports the theory that the crews of these destroy-
ers mistook images on their radar to be enemy torpedo boats, the sit-
uation led the United States Congress to pass the Tonkin Gulf
Resolution. While Congress believed that the resolution was de-
signed primarily to give President Lyndon Johnson the right to repel
future attacks on U.S. forces with force, it also included a stipula-

tion that the president could do whatever he deemed necessary to
assist the RVN. Johnson subsequently used this resolution to justify
sending U.S. military forces en masse to South Vietnam.
Over the course of the war, destroyers and frigates performed the
same duties as in the Korean War, but the level of their involvement
proved far greater and more dangerous. The U.S. Navy employed
destroyers extensively for close-in naval bombardment that placed
them at great risk to enemy shore batteries. The destroyer Ozbourn
is an example of this peril when it was damaged by an enemy mortar
while conducting shore bombardment 2 miles off the coast. De-
stroyers were particularly useful in the AAW role as escorts for air-
craft carriers against attack by DRV aircraft while they provided air
support for U.S. ground troops.
Destroyers and frigates also served in noncombat situations asso-
ciated with the Cold War. The most important of these was the 1962
Cuban Missile Crisis, the event that brought the world to the brink
of nuclear war. It was precipitated by a large influx of supplies to
Communist Cuba from the Soviet Union that included fighters and
SAM missiles. Moscow assured Washington that the nature of this
aid was solely defensive, but intelligence received from Cuban
refuges revealed that offensive missiles formed part of the aid sent
to the island. The United States was faced with the fact that Cuba
would soon have hundreds of offensive missiles only 90 miles off its
shores. President John F. Kennedy, after weighing the alternatives to
ending the shipments and getting the Soviet Union to withdraw its
missiles, settled on a naval blockade of the island to halt the flow of
weapons to Cuba. Kennedy informed Soviet premier Nikita
Khrushchev that any Soviet vessel approaching the blockade that
did not stop would be disabled and that any submarines approach-
ing the island would be intercepted. In October, a force of 180 war-
ships was deployed around Cuba that included the guided missile
destroyer Gyatt. Destroyers and frigates were a principal part of this
force, as they were used in their escort role to support the eight air-
craft carriers of the blockading squadron. The U.S. Navy also in-
tended them for use in their ASW role to detect approaching Soviet
submarines. On 27 October 1962, the world waited to see if nuclear
war might result from the approach of Soviet supply ships toward
the blockade. These ships ultimately turned back in the face of U.S.
naval forces, thus averting the crisis and leading to the Soviet with-
drawal of missiles from Cuba. In addition to this famous event, de-
stroyers on both sides of the Cold War struggle were used in non-
152 DESTROYERS
combat roles to gather intelligence around the world on the move-

ment of opposing forces.
Destroyers were also involved in important events outside the con-
text of the Cold War, as they were the principal surface combatants
of many smaller powers. One of the most important examples of de-
stroyer involvement in world events separate from the Cold War took
place in the aftermath of the July 1967 Arab-Israeli War that pitted
Israel against Egypt and Syria. The conflict saw Israeli and Egyptian
naval units go against one another and led to the sinking of two
Egyptian torpedo boats by the Israeli destroyer Eilat, a former British
World War II–era vessel and the flagship of the Israeli Navy. On 21
October 1967, in the wake of the war, Eilat was patrolling off Port
Said, Egypt, when it was attacked by Egyptian missile boats armed
with the Soviet SS-N-2 missile, which was an improvement on the
first Soviet SSM model. Two of these missiles hit Eilat in its engine
room and communications facilities, which rendered the vessel dead
in the water and incapable of defending itself. Some 90 minutes
later, a third SS-N-2 sank the warship, making it the first in history to
be sunk by antiship missiles. This event highlighted the destructive
potential of missiles when used against warships and led to contin-
ued SSM development in the Soviet Union; other nations were
spurred to produce SSM technology of their own.
The aggregate effect of the many usages of destroyers at sea be-
tween 1945 and 1967 was a confirmation of their continued impor-
tance in naval operations and proof of the value of new technology
such as improved radar, sonar, and, in the case of Eilat, offensive
missiles. Between 1967 and 1982, the United States forged ahead
with its destroyer and frigate programs in light of these experiences.
The largest destroyers produced were additional nuclear-powered
warships that, like their predecessors, pressed the limit of the defini-
tion of a destroyer or frigate. The first of these were the two units of
the California class completed between 1974 and 1975 as frigates.
The hull of California measured 596 feet by 61 feet by 20 feet, 6
inches and displaced 10,150 tons. Two D2G nuclear reactors pow-
ered the vessel’s turbines, which produced a maximum speed of 30
knots.
These ships represented a step forward in missile technology. In
place of the older SAM batteries of the 3Ts, these vessels mounted
two twin-armed Standard SAM launchers with magazines that could
each hold 40 missiles. One each was located fore and aft. The Stan-
dard missile represented a great improvement over the 3Ts and is
still in use in the U.S. Navy. Research and development for this
weapon began in 1963 with the object of replacing the Terrier and
Tartar systems. First entering service in 1967 and designated RIM-
66, this missile measures 15 feet, 6 inches, weighs 1,370 pounds,
and possesses a maximum range of 104 miles thanks to its solid-fuel
Aerojet rocket that can produce a speed of Mach 3.5. The guidance
system is greatly enhanced and allows for better accuracy through
faster course corrections while in flight. As a result, it can be used
against aircraft and helicopters and for defense versus cruise mis-
siles. This latter capability was particularly important at the time
given the inability of the 3T missile systems to effectively combat
Soviet antiship missiles. Finally, the Standard missile can also be
used against surface targets, although its destructive power in this
capacity is limited.
This step forward was due in part to increased funding by Con-
gress in the wake of the Eilat incident to research SSM technology
and thereby address the paucity of offensive power against enemy
vessels that plagued the first U.S. missile-armed warships. In addi-
tion to this system and its enhanced fire control and radar array, the
California class also shipped an ASROC launcher and four Mark 32
torpedo launchers for ASW warfare along with a sonar system.
These vessels were also armed with two 5-inch guns in single
mounts for the purpose of close-range defense. Unlike guns of the
past, these were fully automated, computer-controlled weapons.
Each gun possessed a magazine that held 475–500 rounds and
could fire 16–20 rounds per minute to a maximum range of almost
15 miles. This gun remains in use in the U.S. Navy.
Four similar warships of the Virginia class were completed be-
tween 1976 and 1980, the chief difference being the absence of an
ASROC launcher in favor of a Standard missile system that could
fire both SAM and ASROC missiles. None of the units of this latter
class operated as frigates due to a change in U.S. Navy policy. In the
1970s, the United States moved increasingly toward the operation
of smaller ships that were deemed equally effective as the larger
ones through the scrapping of several cruisers. In 1975, as a meas-
ure to offset the reduction of cruisers, the United States chose to re-
designate many of the frigates of the fleet as cruisers. The large size
of the nuclear-powered frigates was one reason behind their inclu-
sion. The move also affected the designation of the Leahy, Bain-
bridge, Belknap, Truxton, and California classes.
Although these vessels received a new label due primarily to their
size, the first of a new class of warship entered service that was only
slightly smaller, but more lightly armed. This was the destroyer
154 DESTROYERS
Spruance, which was the first of a class that comprised 31 vessels.

These units entered service between 1975 and 1983 as warships ca-
pable of both the AAW and ASW roles. The hull of Spruance meas-
ures 563 feet, 4 inches by 55 feet, by 20 feet, 6 inches and displaces
5,826 tons. It is armed with two 5-inch guns in single mounts, one
each being located fore and aft. In addition, the ship carries one AS-
ROC ASW system, six 12.75-inch torpedo tubes that fire ASW hom-
ing torpedoes, and one helicopter that operates off a flight deck lo-
cated aft amidships. Finally, the vessel is armed with one Sea
Sparrow system. This consisted of an eight-cell box launcher
mounted in the bow. The Sea Sparrow is a relatively small missile
that can be launched as either a SAM or an SSM to a range of 8
nautical miles. Gas turbines produce a maximum speed of 30 knots.
In addition to these vessels, the United States constructed for
Iran five Kidd-class destroyers that are virtually identical to the
Spruance class. The chief difference between the two types is the
inclusion of armor on the Kidd-class vessels, a rare feature for mod-
ern warships. This armor is a lightweight, extremely strong plastic
material known as Kevlar. Although this armor, mounted on the hull
over weapons and machinery spaces as well as on sensory arrays,
cannot completely negate the destructive effects of larger missiles, it
can localize the effects of a blast and thus decrease the damage
caused by a hit. These ships also have better air-conditioning and
air-filtration systems to allow them to better operate in the Middle
East. The 1979 Islamic Revolution that toppled the U.S.-supported
shah of Iran in favor of a fundamentalist government led the United
States to cancel the transfer of the vessels. Congress subsequently
purchased them, and they entered service in the U.S. Navy.
In addition to these larger vessels, the United States constructed
two classes of smaller combatants. U.S. naval officials intended
both to be low-cost, mass-production designs. Between 1969 and
1974, the 46 units of the Knox class entered service as ASW vessels
with the designation destroyer escort. The hull of Knox measured
438 feet by 47 feet by 25 feet, displaced 3,020 tons, and was pow-
ered by a turbine that produced a maximum speed of 27 knots. Its
armament consisted of one 5-inch gun, one Sea Sparrow SAM sys-
tem, one ASROC ASW launcher, DASH, and four 12.75-inch tor-
pedo tubes. Although naval officials criticized the Knox class as poor
seafaring boats, these ships served as the foundation for the design
of the next group of frigates.
This next group was the Oliver Hazard Perry class comprising 54
units. The first entered service in 1971; the last unit was not com-
pleted until 1989. The hull of the Oliver Hazard Perry measured 445
feet by 45 feet by 22 feet and displaced 2,650 tons. Warships of the
class produced after 1979 had an elongated bow 10 feet longer. The
original armament of Oliver Hazard Perry is one 3-inch gun
mounted aft amidships, one Standard SAM system with a magazine
that holds 40 reloads, six 12.75-inch torpedo tubes, and two heli-
copters. The missile launcher is capable of firing not only SAM
weapons but also the Harpoon antiship missile.
Harpoon became the first true SSM in the U.S. Navy. The naval
version of this missile was first deployed in the early 1980s. It is still
a primary weapon of the U.S. Navy and was first deployed on the
Virginia-class cruisers (once designated frigates) in 1982 when they
were retrofitted with them. The Harpoon weighs 1,385 pounds and
is 15 feet long. It carries a 488-pound warhead at a speed approach-
ing the speed of sound and has a maximum range of almost 70 miles.
The missile resembles the French Exocet, an SSM produced earlier
by the French Navy. Like the Exocet, its guidance system allows it to
home in on a target while skimming the surface of the ocean before
striking the hull of an enemy vessel and exploding within the ship.
The Harpoon greatly enhanced the offensive capability of U.S. war-
ships through the deployment of SSM systems that were far better
than the limited surface capability afforded by the Standard system,
which had been originally intended for SAM defense.
During the first half of the 1980s, warships of several classes
were retrofitted with the Harpoon missile as well as other innova-
tions. In the case of Harpoons, this process normally entailed the in-
clusion of a box launcher that held four missiles. All former nuclear-
powered frigates were slated for this upgrade as well as units of the
Farragut, Spruance, and Charles F. Adams classes. The latter group
fired Harpoons from the Tartar missile launcher rather than using
the new box launcher.
Between 1967 and 1982, the Soviet Union countered the con-
struction program of the United States with large destroyers, missile
frigates, and conversions of older vessels. In 1981, two vessels en-
tered service that, like the nuclear-powered frigates later designated
as destroyers by the United States, blurred the distinction between
destroyers and cruisers. One of these was Sovremenny, designed for
anti-ship warfare that was armed with a variety of ordnance that in-
cluded SSM and SAM systems. The other type was Udaloy, equipped
for the ASW role. For purposes of comparison to the large U.S.
frigates that were reclassed as cruisers, Sovremenny measured 511
feet, 10 inches by 56 feet, 9 inches by 21 feet, 4 inches and dis-
156 DESTROYERS
placed 6,200 tons. It was armed with two SS-N-22 SSM launchers,
two SA-N-7 SAM launchers, four 130mm weapons and four 30mm
guns for AA defense, four 20.8-inch torpedo tubes, two RBU-1000
ASW launchers, and one helicopter. The vessel’s maximum speed
was 35 knots.
Ultimately, 20 units of the Sovremenny class and 13 vessels of the
Udaloy class were commissioned for the Soviet Navy. The designa-
tion of these ships is a matter of debate among naval scholars. Many
class them as cruisers rather than destroyers, and for purposes of
this work they will be considered as cruisers. Aside from these large
warships, in 1970, as construction continued on the final units of
the Kashin class, the Soviet Union completed the first of its Krivak-
class guided missile frigates. These were the largest of the frigates
produced in this age. The hull of one of these vessels measures 405
feet, 3 inches by 46 feet, 3 inches by 15 feet, 1 inch and displaces
3,300 tons. Designed for ASW duty, the armament consists in part
of one SS-N-14 ASW box launcher mounted in the bow that holds
four missiles. Entering service in 1969, this missile measures 25
feet long and has a range of 30 nautical miles. It can also be used
against surface ships. In addition, the ship also possesses two RBU-
6000 ASW rocket launchers and eight 21-inch torpedo tubes. A Kri-
vak-class warship also carries two SA-N-4 SAM launchers with 20
reloads each and four 3-inch guns mounted in dual-piece gun
houses located in the stern. A subsequent version of the type, Krivak
II, mounts two 4-inch guns in single-mount gun houses in place of
the original gun armament. The top speed is 32 knots. Crew com-
plement consists of 200 officers and men. The Soviet Union com-
pleted 33 Krivak-class warships between 1970 and 1982 while also
producing 43 Grisha-class frigates designed for coastal defense. Al-
though a unit of this class is rather small and lightly built, measur-
ing only 234 feet, 11 inches and displacing 950 tons, it is armed
with one SA-N-4 SAM launcher. This missile, like the SA-N-1, can
be used against surface targets.
In addition to new construction, the Soviets augmented the over-
all effectiveness of their destroyer fleet by converting a large number
of existing destroyers to fire missiles of varying types. Between 1967
and 1972, seven Kotlin-class vessels received a SA-N-1 SAM
launcher in place of the aft 5.1-inch gun mount. By 1977, eight
Kanin-class vessels had also received a SA-N-1 SAM launcher; in
this instance it replaced the SS-N-1 SSM system. The Soviets also
pursued conversions to SSM systems due to the continuing value at-
tached to them by the Soviets in terms of the strategic mission of

guarding against enemy aircraft carriers. In addition, the 1967 sink-
ing of the Israeli ship Eliat provided reinforcement for using the
SSM. Between 1973 and 1975, Soviet shipyards refitted six Kashin-
class destroyers to include four SS-N-2C SSM launchers. Each
launcher holds one missile, which is mounted aft amidship on the
side of the vessel facing toward the stern. Three Kildin-class vessels
also incorporated the SS-N-2C in the same manner as the Kashin-
class units. By 1982, as a result of these refits as well as new con-
struction, the Soviet Navy was capable of overseas operations to an
extent that the country had not previously enjoyed.
As in the first years of the Cold War, the members of NATO,
other than the United States and the pro-Western neutral powers,
accounted for the majority of the rest of the world’s destroyer and
frigate production. One of the largest producers of destroyers be-
tween 1967 and 1982 was France, but this construction took place
in an environment where France was no longer a member of NATO.
Relations between France and the United States declined steadily
over the issue of an increased French role in the leadership of the
alliance. In 1969, the failure to resolve this standoff satisfactorily
led to the French leader Charles de Gaulle’s decision to withdraw
France from NATO. Fortunately for the French, this action did not
cripple France’s ability to deploy naval missiles thanks to the fact
that domestic R&D had been greatly increased in the opening stages
of the diplomatic impasse with the United States.
In 1970, the French completed their second Suffren-class de-
stroyer, and in 1973 they produced the ASW destroyer Aconit that
mounted a missile armament of one Malafon ASW launcher. Far
more important than this ship was the completion between 1974
and 1977 of the three Tourville-class destroyers whose design was
descended from Aconit. These vessels were the first destroyers de-
signed to ship France’s new SSM missile. The Exocet was one of the
first successful, purpose-built antiship missiles designed outside of
the Soviet Union. It was introduced in 1968 and has proven so ef-
fective that it is still in use in more than 20 countries. Stored in a
box launcher, this weapon is guided when first fired by onboard
radar systems, but as it nears the target vessel it switches to internal
radar control. This guidance system controls the missile in a decent
to an altitude of 10–12 feet above the water to hamper detection by
enemy radar devices and make it more difficult to shoot down. It
can travel at a maximum velocity just below the speed of sound and
158 DESTROYERS
delivers a 160-kilogram warhead. The missile is designed to pene-

trate the hull of an enemy warship before exploding to cause the
maximum amount of damage.
Tourville, which measures 501 feet by 50 feet by 19 feet and dis-
places 4,580 tons, mounts six Exocet missiles in single-cell box
launchers. It also mounts one Crotale SAM system, which was an
improvement of the Mascura, shipped one Malafon ASW system
that has been removed, carries two 3.9-inch guns mounted in sin-
gle-piece gun houses in the bow, two torpedo tubes, and two ASW
helicopters that operate off a flight deck on the stern. The vessel,
crewed by 303 officers and men, is capable of 31 knots. The vessels
of the Tourville class reflect the French intention, as in other navies
in recent years, to produce destroyers capable of multiple roles out
of the need for economy due to the high cost of modern warships.
These vessels can perform AAW, ASW, and antiship operations. The
other destroyers built in this period were intended specifically for
the ASW role. Between 1979 and 1986, the French produced five
Georges Leygues–class destroyers. These vessels mount two fewer
Exocet missiles and have greater facilities for ASW helicopters. Dur-
ing this same period, most of the pre-existing destroyers and frigates
of the French Navy were retrofitted with Exocet missiles.
Like many navies, the number of frigates constructed by France
exceeded that of destroyers. French naval officials intended these
ships to serve as coastal units and to show the flag overseas. Be-
tween 1976 and 1982, 13 D’Estienne d’Orves-class frigates entered
service. These ships are rather small, being 262 feet by 34 feet by 10
feet with a displacement of 950 tons, but they are well armed for
their size. D’Estienne d’Orves mounts two Exocet missiles, one 3.9-
inch gun in a single-piece gun house mounted forward, one ASW
mortar, and four torpedo tubes. Its maximum speed is only 23 knots,
but this is adequate for the designed purpose of the craft.
The construction program of Great Britain mirrored that of
France in the sense that the number of destroyers produced was less
than that of frigates. Between 1967 and 1982, the British commis-
sioned 12 missile destroyers. In 1973, the British completed Bristol
as an escort for new aircraft carriers. This vessel, staffed by 300 offi-
cers and men, mounted new British missile ordnance with the Sea
Dart SAM system, capable of a range of 35 miles, and the Ikara
ASW system. The latter weapon was a joint effort by the British and
Australians. It is an ASW torpedo affixed to a rocket. The cost of
this vessel, however, led to the cancellation of further units in favor
of the design of the Sheffield-class destroyers. This 10-ship group,
completed between 1975 and 1982, were intended, like Bristol, as

escorts. The hull of Sheffield measured 410 feet by 46 feet by 19
feet and displaced 3,850 tons. It was armed with one 4.5-inch gun
mounted in a Mark 8 gun house located in the bow. This system re-
sembled the U.S. model in that it was fully automated. It also car-
ried one Sea Dart SAM system, with the launcher sited in the bow,
six 12.75-inch torpedo tubes for ASW operations, and one helicop-
ter for the same duty that operated on a flight deck located on the
stern. The maximum speed of this vessel was 30 knots. These ves-
sels have proven relatively successful, but the British did feel the
need to address the size of the hull, the primary weakness of the de-
sign. The dimensions of the ship necessitated cramped living condi-
tions for the crew as well as decreased endurance for the ship while
at sea.
The British rectified this problem with the four Manchester-class
destroyers. The first of these entered service in 1982; the other
units followed three years later. The hull of Manchester was 53 feet
longer than Sheffield and 3 inches wider, which allowed for better
accommodation and performance at sea. It also made possible the
storage of more reloads for the vessel’s armament, which was the
same as that of the preceding class. The difference was that while
Sheffield held only 22 reloads, Manchester purportedly carries 40
missiles in its magazine.
The number of these destroyers paled in comparison to that of
the cheaper frigates that Britain built in the same period. Between
1968 and 1982, 23 frigates comprising four classes entered service.
The first of these were 10 improved Leander-class frigates com-
pleted from 1969 to 1973 that sported a hull with a wider beam,
which improved endurance for extended operations at sea. Follow-
ing the last of these was the frigate Mermaid, which represented a
departure from normal British construction in the sense that it
lacked missiles. President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana ordered this
ship as his presidential vessel, but a coup that toppled him led the
British to commission it into the Royal Navy. The last two groups
showcased the lack of a true, domestically built and designed SSM
in the Royal Navy. The first was the eight-ship Amazon class pro-
duced between 1974 and 1978 as general purpose escorts. The hull
of Amazon measured 384 feet by 41 feet, 9 inches by 19 feet and
displaced 2,860 tons. Its armament consisted of one 4.5-inch gun in
a Mark 8 gun house located in the bow, one Seacat SAM launcher,
six 12.75-inch ASW torpedo tubes, and one helicopter. The vessel’s
maximum speed was 30 knots. Six ships of this class, the exceptions
160 DESTROYERS
being Amazon and Antelope, were also equipped with four French
Exocet SSMs in two dual-tubed launchers located on the super-
structure immediately forward of the bridge.
The chief problem with these vessels was the fact that their hulls
were very lightly built, which was a weakness revealed in combat.
The last new frigates in service, the four Broadsword-class vessels,
completed between 1979 and 1982, are essentially larger frigates
that carry a greater AA capability through their two Sea Wolf SAM
systems. The Sea Wolf missile, although smaller than the Seacat, is
superior due to its speed. The Seacat traveled at a maximum velocity
of Mach .6 while the Sea Wolf attains a speed of Mach 2.5. Like the
Amazon class, these warships also carry four Exocet missiles. By
1982, the frigates of the Amazon and Broadsword classes were only a
portion of the British vessels that carried the French weapon. Eight
Leander-class frigates also received the Exocet through an upgrade
program.
Aside from Britain and France, the majority of the destroyers and
frigates constructed in Europe between 1967 and 1982 were units
of the NATO nations of Italy, West Germany, and the Netherlands.
Italy, in keeping with its naval construction program that rested pri-
marily on destroyers and smaller craft, produced two Audace-class
destroyers in 1972 that shipped an armament similar to the previous
Impavido class. The chief difference was the inclusion of helicopters
for ASW operations. The Italians also completed nine frigates. Four
of these represent the Lupo class and are the first Italian frigates to
carry an SSM system. The hull of Lupo measures 370 feet, 2 inches
by 39 feet, 4 inches by 12 feet and displaces 2,208 tons. It is armed
with one 5-inch gun in a gun house mounted in the bow, one U.S.
Sea Sparrow SAM system, four 40mm AA guns, six 12.6-inch tor-
pedo tubes, one ASW helicopter, and eight Ottomat SSM weapons.
These are contained in single-cell launchers. One each is located on
the sides aft amidships of the helicopter hanger. The other two are
situated on either side of the forward superstructure. The current
version of this weapon is a sea-skimmer like the Exocet. In 1982,
the first three of eight Maestrale-class frigates entered service that
also mount Ottomat SSM weaponry and are essentially enlarged
versions of the preceding class.
The Netherlands nearly equaled the destroyer and frigate produc-
tion of Italy, launching eight missile frigates. The Kortenaer class
represents the majority of this construction. The first 6 of this 14-
ship group entered service between 1978 and 1981 and are general-
purpose destroyers. Kortenaer measures 427 feet by 47 feet by 14
feet, displaces 3,000 tons, and mounts an array of weaponry that in-
cludes one U.S. Sea Sparrow SAM launcher, eight Harpoon SSM
weapons, and two helicopters. This armament reflects the Dutch
decision to rely on U.S. weapons technology.
West Germany augmented its fleet with five vessels that also re-
lied on U.S. technology. Indeed, three of these are modified U.S.
Charles F. Adams–class destroyers. Known as the Lutjens class,
these ships mount a modified Tartar SAM launcher that fires the
Standard SAM and the Harpoon SSM. The United States com-
pleted these vessels for shipment to Germany between 1969 and
1970, making them the largest surface units of the West German
Navy at that point. The Germans did not produce additional war-
ships until 1982 with the completion of the first two units of the
seven-ship Bremen-class frigates, which were actually a variation of
the Dutch Kortenaer class. The hull of Bremen measures 420 feet by
47 feet, 10 inches by 19 feet, 9 inches and displaces 3,700 tons.
The warship’s armament consists of one 3-inch gun located in the
bow, eight Harpoon SSMs, one Sea Sparrow SAM system, four
ASW torpedo tubes, and two ASW helicopters contained in a hanger
that forms the vessel’s aft superstructure. The maximum speed of
the ship is 30 knots.
Japan, a pro-Western nonaligned power, nearly equaled the out-
put of all three of these European NATO powers through the con-
struction of 18 destroyers and frigates that resoundingly signaled
the return of Japan as a world naval power. These vessels continued
to reflect Japan’s strategic emphasis on ASW vessels and its reliance
on U.S. weapons technology. Between 1967 and 1974, Japan com-
pleted 12 ASW destroyers. Among these were the last three units of
the Yamagumo class and seven vessels of the Takatsuki and
Minegumo classes that were largely similar. The other two were the
innovative vessels of the Haruna class that revived Japan’s reputa-
tion as an innovative power in destroyer design. Completed between
1973 and 1974, these destroyers were the first in the world to carry
three full-sized helicopters for ASW operations. The hull of Haruna
measures 501 feet, 11 inches by 57 feet, 5 inches by 16 feet, 8
inches, displaces 4,950 tons, and is capable of a maximum speed of
32 knots. Its armament consists of two 5-inch guns in single mounts
located in the bow, one ASROC ASW system, six 12.75-inch torpedo
tubes, and three helicopters that operate on a flight deck situated on
the stern.
In 1980 and 1981, the Japanese constructed two additional units
of the Shirane class that are enlarged versions of the Haruna design.
162 DESTROYERS
The addition of a Sea Sparrow SAM system to these ships increases

the overall combat capability of the Japanese Navy. The Sea Sparrow
was subsequently added to the Haruna class and was also incorpo-
rated on the Tachikaze-class vessels that left Japanese shipyards be-
tween 1976 and 1982. The final vessel produced, being the first of
the seven-ship Hatsuyuki class, further increased the combat poten-
tial of the Japanese Navy through the inclusion of eight Harpoon
SSMs. This ship is also testimony to the continuing reliance of
Japan on U.S. weapons technology. In addition to the Harpoon, the
units of the Tachikaze class and two of the Takatsuki class received
Harpoons through refits in the early 1980s.
The remainder of destroyer and frigate production between 1968
and 1982 was largely the result of the other members of NATO and
the pro-Western neutral powers. Within NATO, Canada completed
four Iroquois-class destroyers in 1972 and 1973 that shipped two
helicopters in keeping with the intention of producing ASW war-
ships. New NATO powers also contributed to the alliance’s naval
strength. The largest contribution was that of Spain once it joined
NATO in 1982; it brought 24 destroyers and frigates into the al-
liance. Thirteen of these were modern frigates completed between
1974 and 1982, with one class mounting the Standard SAM system
while the more modern eight-ship Descubierta class carries the Sea
Sparrow SAM.
Turkey also contributed vessels. After its entry into NATO in
1952, between 1971 and 1980 Ankara purchased nine aging U.S.
Gearing-class destroyers that had undergone FRAM conversions. In
addition to these, Turkey completed in 1972 and 1975 its first do-
mestically built warships of any size since before World War I (these
warships had been destroyers built in the last decade of the nine-
teenth century). These Berk-class frigates are small, being only 312
feet, 4 inches long, and have limited capability in the modern age, as
the armament is outdated. Nevertheless, their construction gave
Turkish shipyards valuable experience for use in the future. Outside
the alliance, NATO felt confident that it could continue to rely on
the naval forces of Australia and New Zealand in the event of a gen-
eral conflict stemming from the Cold War. Between 1968 and 1982,
Australia built two Swan-class frigates and acquired two U.S. Oliver
Hazard Perry–class frigates. New Zealand bought two frigates of the
British Leander type during the same period.
The world’s destroyer and frigate fleet swelled additionally
through the efforts of nonaligned nations other than Japan. The
largest number were those of India, as the country based its navy on
surface warships of destroyer and frigate size. Between 1972 and

1980, India procured three Soviet Kashin-class destroyers and six
British Leander-class frigates. China continued its struggle to con-
struct ships for a navy committed to coastal defense after the loss of
Soviet financial and technical assistance. The country’s efforts pro-
duced 12 Jinan/Luta–class destroyers that are essentially of the So-
viet Kotlin type. China also completed 16 frigates that also reflected
the country’s reliance on Soviet design and weapons. The most im-
pressive of these are the nine warships of the Jianghu class that are
the first Chinese warships to carry SSM weaponry. The class even-
tually comprised 30 units. The hull of Jianghu measures 337 feet, 9
inches by 39 feet, 4 inches by 13 feet, 2 inches, displaces 1,800
tons, and carries four Soviet SS-N-2 SSM in two dual-cell launchers
as its primary armament.
In addition, smaller neutral powers contributed through the pur-
chase of warships from NATO and the Soviet Union. Examples are
many, but among them is Argentina, with the purchase of two
Sheffield-class destroyers, and Indonesia with the procurement of a
Claud Jones–class frigate. World War II–era destroyers comprised a
large part of the fleets of smaller nations. Among those that oper-
ated either British or U.S. destroyers in the period between 1968
and 1982 were Peru, Taiwan, South Korea, and Brazil.
All of the destroyers and frigates produced up to 1982, regardless
of whether they belonged to the principal participants in the Cold
War or to neutral powers, were used extensively as the surface com-
batants of the world’s navies. A portion of the combat duty between
1968 and 1982 remained in the context of the Cold War as the Viet-
nam conflict remained in the balance. Destroyers and frigates of the
U.S. Navy continued to act as escorts for supply convoys to Viet-
nam, shore bombardment vessels, and most importantly as AAW es-
corts. The new missile technology became extremely important in
terms of this latter role. In 1972, the Belknap-class warships Sterrett
and Biddle (designated as cruisers in 1975) shot down DRV aircraft.
Both ships shot down two MiG fighters, but Sterrett used its missile
system to also shoot down an SSM, making it the first warship in
history to use a SAM missile to destroy an antiship missile.6
The end of the Vietnam War in 1975 did not lead to a prolonged
period devoid of destroyer and frigate warfare. Indeed, the 1982
Falkland Islands War between Great Britain and Argentina led to a
much higher degree of use for these vessels. The cause of the con-
flict was the Falkland Islands, a territorial possession of Great Britain
located east of the southernmost portion of South America off the
164 DESTROYERS
coast of Argentina. The ownership of these islands had been a source

of contention since the eighteenth century. By 1982, the military
junta that governed Argentina called for the acquisition of the Mal-
vinas Islands, as the Argentines called the Falklands, in an effort to
divert popular attention from poor conditions at home that included
massive civil rights violations to an issue of Argentine nationalism. At
this time, there were 1,800 British citizens living on the islands that
wished to remain British nationals. The British government of Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher did not believe that war would occur
over this issue. This view proved incorrect on 2 April 1982, when Ar-
gentina landed troops on the Falklands. The Thatcher government
subsequently resolved to fight for the Falkland Islands and dis-
patched a task force four days later that included the aircraft carriers
Hermes and Invincible. To protect these carriers against air attack
and as a reflection of the fact that by this time smaller craft became
the majority of the Royal Navy, the task force included 23 destroyers
and frigates.7 The British also relied on these vessels as escorts for
the supply vessels that accompanied the warships.
Destroyers and frigates proved pivotal to the British war effort in
the Falklands. Although the Argentine Navy remained in port follow-
ing the 2 May 1982 sinking of the cruiser General Belgrano by a
British submarine, the British had to fend off repeated attacks on
the task force by the fine aircraft and pilots of the Argentine Air
Force. These planes, which used French Exocet SSM weapons and
bombs, exacted a heavy toll on the task force. The majority of British
losses were destroyers and frigates, as they were the largest number
of craft in combat and were actively engaged in the defense of the
principal targets of aircraft carriers and supply vessels against Ar-
gentine air attack. On 4 May 1982, the destroyer Sheffield suc-
cumbed to Argentine air forces. An Exocet SSM, fired from a
French-built Super Entendard fighter, caught the vessel virtually
unawares, penetrated above the waterline amidships, and deto-
nated. Among the systems damaged by the hit were the water mains
used for fire-fighting, which meant that the crew had no means to
fight the fires that progressively consumed the ship. Sheffield was
abandoned and remained afloat for six days before capsizing while
in tow. The attack killed 22 officers and ratings.
The Sheffield-class Coventry was also destroyed by air attack on
25 May 1982, although the method of destruction was different. Ar-
gentine aircraft bombed the vessel, hitting it three times with 1,000-
pound weapons. Coventry was set ablaze and sank from its damage
on the same day with the loss of 19 officers and ratings. In addition
to these vessels, the British also suffered the destruction of the

Amazon-class frigates Ardent and Antelope. In May, a rocket mor-
tally damaged the former while bombs destroyed the latter. During
the course of the conflict, Argentine aircraft damaged an additional
eight British destroyers and frigates.
Nevertheless, the surface vessels of the British fleet claimed 100
Argentine planes and contributed to the British victory. On 13 June
1982, the Argentine Army on the Falklands surrendered to British
troops, which brought to an end the extended conflict at sea that
employed the new missile technology. Both the losses of British ves-
sels and Argentine aircraft exhibited the value of the new weaponry.
Naval officials also used the war to evaluate the performance of de-
stroyers and frigates in the missile age and refine their design. An ex-
ample is the material used to construct ships. To save weight, some
naval powers in the 1970s had employed aluminum rather than steel
for the construction of superstructures. The substance proved sus-
ceptible to being weakened by high-intensity heat, as in the case of
Sheffield, and naval officials subsequently discarded it as a viable
material for widespread use in warships. The dangers to the ship and
crew in combat certainly did not justify the use of aluminum.
British naval officials first realized the drawbacks of aluminum
construction in the years before the Falklands War when a fire in
1977 nearly destroyed the frigate Amazon. Unfortunately for the
British, this fire was the second; in 1973 an engine room blaze
nearly destroyed the destroyer Bristol. These events are examples of
the fact that noncombat duty could prove just as dangerous being in
harm’s way. This fire was only one of several peacetime incidents at
sea that were always possible given the extensive use of destroyers
and frigates in daily fleet operations, as they formed the majority of
the vessels in service for the world’s navies. On 31 August 1974, the
Soviets Kashin-class destroyer Otvazhnyy suffered an internal fire
while on maneuvers in the Black Sea. The blaze detonated the war-
ship’s aft SA-N-1 SAM magazine. The force of the blast was so great
that a large section of the vessel’s deck and superstructure in the aft
amidships area of the hull was blown into a position vertical to the
hull. After taking this catastrophic damage, the vessel sank stern
first with the loss of 200 of its crew of about 280 officers and men.
In one case, part of the crew of a frigate faced peril from a pur-
poseful act. On 8 November 1975, the Soviet Krivak-class warship
Storozhevoi lay in Riga Harbor in the Baltic with a portion of its crew
ashore in celebration of the fifty-eighth anniversary of the Bolshevik
takeover that ushered the Soviets to power in Russia. Some of the of-
166 DESTROYERS
ficers and crew used this opportunity to stage a mutiny with the ob-
ject of trying to reach international waters and ultimately defect from
the Soviet Union. This attempt failed, however, as Soviet jets caught
and repeatedly strafed the vessel to compel the mutineers to abort
their action. Soviet officials subsequently removed the entire crew,
whether they had been involved in the mutiny or loyal to the govern-
ment, and replaced them with a fresh complement. They also trans-
ferred Storozhevoy to another theater of operations.
Whether involved in combat operations or peacetime duties, de-
stroyers and frigates were regarded around the world as indispens-
able vessels. Upgrades of existing units and construction continued
in the context of the Cold War between 1983 and 1991, the latter
date being the end of the Cold War period due to the collapse of the
Soviet Union. The United States produced 26 frigates of the Oliver
Hazard Perry class, but naval officials turned back to designs for
larger craft capable of handling multiple, simultaneous threats. This
move was not new by the 1980s, as many recognized in the late
1950s in the wake of the introduction of the Terrier SAM that the
chief weakness of the 3-T systems was the inability to engage more
than one target at a time.
This led to the Typhon program for new long- and medium-range
missiles to ultimately replace the Talos and Terrier systems that
would benefit from a new type of sensory array for targeting. Several
proposals concerning the proper vessel to carry it led to a design for
a frigate, but the extreme cost of the system and ship led to the
1963 decision to cancel the effort. Nevertheless, the concept did
not die with the program in terms of an improved missile control
system. This innovation, the Aegis Combat System, is designed to
control and coordinate the defense of the ship that carries it, as well
as to command the defense of entire task forces through the use of
complex computers. First tested in 1973, the Aegis system relies on
the powerful AN/SPY-1 radar that can simultaneously conduct
searches and track more than 100 targets. This data is fed to the
command center of a ship (the Combat Information Center), where
a computer evaluates which targets pose the greatest threat to the
ship or task force and uses the vessel’s weapons accordingly to ad-
dress the situation. At first, U.S. naval officials believed that the best
warship to carry the new system was a cruiser. As a result, in 1983
the first Ticonderoga-class cruiser, equipped with the Aegis system,
entered service.
In subsequent years, however, the innovation extended to de-
stroyer design with the Arleigh Burke class. The lead ship, commis-
sioned in July 1991, is one of the most advanced warships in the

world. The hull of Arleigh Burke, which is partially armored with
Kevlar, measures 504 feet, 6 inches by 66 feet, 8 inches by 32 feet,
7 inches, displaces 8,315 tons, and is powered by gas turbines that
can produce a maximum speed of 32 knots. Its principal armament
consists of a 29-cell vertical launch system (VLS) housed in the bow
just forward of the bridge superstructure and a 61-cell VLS posi-
tioned aft. The VLS can fire Standard SAM weaponry and Toma-
hawk cruise missiles.
The Tomahawk was deployed in 1986 and is the most powerful of-
fensive missile in the arsenal of the U.S. Navy. This weapon weighs
2,900 pounds, 3,500 pounds if it is equipped with a booster rocket
for greater distance. It measures 18 feet, 3 inches long, but its length
increases to 20 feet, 6 inches when a booster is included. The Toma-
hawk cruise missile can carry a 1,000-pound conventional warhead
or a nuclear payload over a distance of 1,000 miles. The guidance
system is extremely complex and allows for control that is largely in-
dependent of the ship that fires it. This guidance includes a targeting
computer equipped with the Terrain Contour Mapping (TERCOM)
system. This system uses the missile’s radar to examine the topogra-
phy ahead of it to match it to a three-dimensional map stored in the
missile’s computer memory. The computer can correct the course of
the weapon based on variations between the two maps. The Toma-
hawk missile is also equipped with a Global Positioning System
(GPS) to improve reliability of the targeting data. Finally, Tomahawks
also use a system known as Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation
(DSMAC) in the final stages of flight. As the missile nears its target,
DSMAC uses a camera to take a picture of the target, which the
computer verifies. This equipment provides for great accuracy, and
the missile is extremely difficult to detect as it flies at a low altitude.
In addition to the missiles of the VLS system, the Arleigh Burke
also ships eight Harpoon SSMs in two four-celled box launchers lo-
cated aft, one 5-inch gun in an automated gun house located in the
bow, six 12.75-inch torpedo tubes, one helicopter, and a Vulcan
Phalanx gun. This latter armament was ready for service in 1977
and is still in use in the U.S. Navy. This weapon is a 20mm Gatling
gun that is fed by a magazine that holds 1,000 rounds. It was de-
signed as a last measure of defense to destroy incoming missiles at
close range, but it can also be used against aircraft. The gun can fire
at a rate of 100 rounds per second. Its computer-controlled tracking
system is built into the gun mount and can direct effective fire over
a range between 500 and 1,500 yards. The Aegis system coordinates
168 DESTROYERS
the use of all of these weapons and relies on large, flat sensory pan-
els mounted on the sides of the superstructure. All told, the Arleigh
Burke design of multi-role destroyer is among the most advanced
and powerful in the world.
The production program of the Soviet Union did not approach
that of the United States. This was due to both the struggling Soviet
economy by the 1980s and the coming to power in March 1985 of
Mikhail Gorbachev. The new Soviet leader greatly curtailed the con-
struction of new warships and began to lessen the extent of sea-
borne operations for existing units to ease some of the burden on
the Soviet economy. As a result, Soviet production was a far cry from
that of the first decades of the Cold War. The Soviet Union con-
structed nine more Krivak-class frigates to counter the production
of the United States and its NATO allies. The majority of construc-
tion, however, centered on smaller craft designated as frigates, suit-
able largely for coastal defense rather than blue-water operations.
Between 1986 and 1990, the Soviets commissioned 11 Parchim-
class frigates with hulls that measure 246 feet, 8 inches by 32 feet,
2 inches by 14 feet, 5 inches and displace 769 tons. They are armed
with SAM weapons and one 3-inch gun. Additional units of the
Grisha class, a previous design intended for the same task, also left
Soviet shipyards. All entered service in the Soviet Navy with an un-
certain future. Owing to continually worsening economic problems
and Gorbachev’s policy toward the navy, many units of the Soviet
fleet were already riding inactive at anchor and in a state of decay.
By 1991, the problem was particularly pronounced as the Soviet
Union neared collapse.
Not only did the number of new destroyers in the United States
dwarf the production of the Soviet Union; so did that of the other
members of the NATO alliance. Chief among these was Great
Britain. Following the Falklands War, London announced plans to
reverse the policy of reductions in the navy for the sake of economy
that had been the hallmark of past years. This decision, although
not long-lasting, resulted in the construction of two types of frigate.
Between 1984 and 1990, British dockyards completed 10
Broadsword-class frigates in two variants of the original design. They
also turned out the first three units of the Duke class. Norfolk, the
lead ship, entered service in 1990 and measures 436 feet, 2 inches
by 52 feet, 9 inches by 18 feet with a displacement of 3,500 tons. It
is armed with eight Harpoon SSM in two four-celled launchers lo-
cated in the bow, a Sea Wolf SAM system in the bow, one 4.5-inch
gun, two 30mm AA guns, four torpedo tubes, and one helicopter
that operates off a flight deck located on the stern. The maximum
speed of the vessel is 28 knots, and the crew consists of 181 officers
and ratings. Although Norfolk entered service, the number of total
units was not determined. In 1991, London reversed its post-Falk-
lands stance on new construction through the Option for Changes
Program. This policy called for a reduction of the Royal Navy in
keeping with the end of the Cold War.
Other NATO powers contributed to the destroyer and frigate fleet
of the alliance, although the output steadily decreased in most na-
tions, as in Great Britain, with the diminution of the Soviet threat.
As in all other navies in Europe, frigates constituted all of the con-
struction, as they are cheaper to build than destroyers. Germany
constructed an additional five Bremen-class frigates by 1991, while
Italy produced five units of the Maestrale design. Canada, out of the
need for economy, relied largely in this era on refits of existing units,
but it did commission the first of its Halifax-class frigates designed
for the AAW role. In 1986, the Netherlands commissioned two Ja-
cob Van Heemskerck–class vessels armed principally with eight Har-
poon missiles. Two Karel Doorman–class frigates followed five years
later. Turkey buttressed the naval force of the alliance with four
Meko-class frigates between 1987 and 1989 that relied in part on
technical assistance garnered from Germany. Spain produced the
same number of ships that were launched in Spanish yards, but they
are Oliver Hazard Perry–class vessels.
As throughout the Cold War, NATO also looked to the forces of
nonaligned, pro-Western powers for aid in the event of war with the
Soviet Union. The largest producer of destroyers and frigates among
these powers was Japan, which added destroyers and frigates to its
fleet. While units of the Hatsuyuki class neared completion, the Jap-
anese also commissioned in 1986 and 1988 two Hatakaze-class de-
stroyers armed with both Harpoon SSMs and Standard SAM
weaponry. Closely following these vessels between 1988 and 1991
were eight Asagiri-class destroyers that are similarly armed. Aug-
menting the power of these new vessels were eight frigates. This
output greatly exceeded that of France, a former NATO member
that, despite its withdrawal from the alliance, was certainly still
counted as a nation friendly to the organization. Between 1988 and
1991, France commissioned two more Georges Leygues–class vessels
and two Cassard-class destroyers, the latter being armed with Exocet
SSM and Standard SAM weapons. French shipyards also continued
the D’Estienne d’Orves–class frigate program and launched another
five such vessels.
170 DESTROYERS
Finally, Australia and New Zealand continued their affiliation

with the West, although the latter did not build or acquire more ves-
sels in the period from 1983 to the end of the Cold War. The former,
like Spain, relied on the United States for frigates rather than pro-
ducing vessels of domestic design. Between 1983 and 1992, Aus-
tralia bought two Oliver Hazard Perry–class vessels from the United
States and constructed an additional two of the same type in a do-
mestic shipyard.
Increasingly by the end of the Cold War, the naval forces of non-
aligned powers in the Cold War assumed great importance as their
swelling numbers suggested the birth of new naval powers. Chief
among these is India, as that country committed itself to the con-
struction of a powerful navy with vessels that relied heavily on foreign
warship design and weaponry. Between 1982 and 1988, four Rajput-
class destroyers entered service that are a variant of the Soviet
Union’s Kashin type. They are each armed with two Soviet SA-N-1
SAM launchers and four Soviet SS-N-2C SSM weapons. These ves-
sels joined a further unit that entered operation previously. As with
these vessels, the three Godvari-class units are the product of foreign
technology. Entering service between 1983 and 1988, their design is
based on the British Leander class; weaponry consists of one Soviet
SA-N-4 SAM launcher and four Soviet SS-N-2C SSM weapons.
Despite initial difficulties, China, like India, was in the process by
1991 of constructing a strong navy. Frigates composed part of this
endeavor. By the close of the Cold War, the Chinese commissioned
seven frigates built in Chinese shipyards. Some are improvements of
the Jianghu-class design. This type of vessel established China as a
world naval power through foreign demand for it. Egypt procured
two such warships in 1984, and in the early 1990s Bangladesh and
Thailand acquired one and four units, respectively.8
All nations that possessed destroyers and frigates continued to
use them in fleet operations between 1983 and 1991 as the Cold
War continued to unfold. There were few instances in which de-
stroyers and frigates exhibited their roles in combat. The two con-
flicts of this period that did involve these warships unfolded in the
Middle East in a context outside the Cold War. The first was the
Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) that pitted the two powers over control
of the Shatt al-Arab waterway. This river is formed by the conflu-
ence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers that lies in part on the bor-
der between Iran and Iraq and empties into the Arabian (Persian)
Gulf. The 1975 Algerian Treaty had established joint control of the
waterway between the two powers, but Iraqi dictator Saddam Hus-
sein decided to take advantage of turmoil in Iran caused by the 1979

overthrow of the shah by Shiite forces under Ayatollah Khomeini.
In 1980, Hussein launched a large-scale offensive into western
Iran. Hussein’s hope for a quick victory over a disorganized enemy
proved illusory as Iranian forces not only blunted the initial Iraqi as-
sault but also launched offensives of their own. Between 1982 and
1987, the war unfolded as a stalemate. Both powers resorted to at-
tacking shipping in the Arabian Gulf as a means to deny supply to
the other. The governments of Iran and Iraq also pursued this
course to damage the oil export industry of their enemy. This action
drew in countries that depended in part on oil from the Arabian
Gulf. Among these was the United States, which in 1987 stationed
warships in the gulf to guard tankers against attack. Destroyers and
frigates assumed the majority of the work in this operation as one of
their primary missions was escort. On 17 May 1987, an attack on
the Oliver Hazard Perry–class frigate Stark exhibited the significant
risk for warships in a combat zone. The mission of Stark entailed
showing the flag, a common practice to project a naval power’s in-
fluence around the world, and to monitor ship and plane move-
ments in the international waters of the gulf. Around 9:00 p.m. two
Iraqi fighter jets took off from their airbase and one of them turned
toward Stark. A little after 10:00 p.m., this plane approached the
U.S. vessel, the captain of which being unconcerned to this point,
as many Iraqi as well as Iranian jets had flown in the gulf in the past
with no threat of attack on a U.S. warship.
At this point, however, the proximity of the plane led Captain
Glenn Brindel to order a warning be sent to the plane to turn away
from Stark’s position. The refusal of the pilot to do so prompted a
second warning that also went unheeded. Minutes afterward, a
lookout aboard Stark reported that a missile was approaching the
vessel. This French Exocet SSM hit the unprepared ship above the
waterline on the port side. Although it failed to detonate, the fuel
from the ordnance created a large fire. Seconds later, a second Exo-
cet hit and exploded in the same general area as the first. The dam-
age was severe enough that the ship might have sunk if not for the
16-hour battle by the crew to save their vessel. Their efforts allowed
Stark to survive the attack, but at the cost of 37 lives. The incident,
although later considered inadvertent by the United States, led to an
order at the time that authorized U.S. Navy warships to shoot down
all aircraft that did not respond to a verbal warning to withdraw.
The plight of Stark was not the only instance where the destroy-
ers and frigates of the United States were placed in harm’s way dur-
172 DESTROYERS
ing the Iran-Iraq War. A second incident involving the Oliver Hazard
Perry–class frigate Samuel B. Roberts led to a U.S. response that in-
volved frigates. On 14 April 1988, this ship was en route to port for
re-supply after patrolling the gulf when a lookout spotted mines in
proximity to the ship. Upon closer inspection, the captain of Samuel
B. Roberts concluded that his warship lay in the midst of a mine-
field. After 21 minutes of successfully navigating the minefield, the
ship struck a mine, which detonated and produced a hole 15 feet by
20 feet in a portion of the hull beneath the waterline and close to
the keel. The force of the blast created a crack in the hull that held
the potential of breaking the ship in half. To prevent the crack from
growing larger, the crew lashed steel cables across the crack. This
procedure as well as the other damage control efforts saved the ves-
sel. The incident led three days later to an attack on Iranian oil plat-
forms and warships. Named operation praying mantis, it involved
frigates that shelled oil platforms and engaged enemy vessels.
By the close of the war in June 1988, the frigates of the United
States had succeeded in protecting shipping lines for oil tankers to
an extent that obviated any threat to the world economy through
skyrocketing oil prices. The war, however, had left Iraq with the
largest military in the Middle East with the exception of Israel. This
served as a catalyst for the next conflict in the region in which de-
stroyers and frigates participated. In August 1990, Iraqi forces,
many of them being veterans of the Iran-Iraq War, invaded Kuwait
in keeping with Saddam Hussein’s goal of acquiring the oil reserves
of the small nation. The threat posed to the stability of the region, as
well as to the global economy through the disruption of oil exports
from Kuwait, led to an international coalition dedicated to wresting
control of Kuwait from Iraq. During the night of 16–17 January
1991, operation desert storm began with an air offensive con-
ducted largely by the United States. Naval forces of several nations
formed a key part of this effort as aircraft carriers conducted numer-
ous strikes against Iraqi targets. Destroyers and frigates protected
these valuable vessels from the possibility of attack. They also joined
in the air offensive against Iraq through the use of their missiles.
During the operation, the Spruance-class destroyer Fife launched
58 Tomahawk missiles against Iraqi targets.9 The destruction caused
by the Fife, other destroyers, and larger vessels of the fleet seriously
damaged Iraqi command and communication facilities. On 28 Feb-
ruary, President George H. W. Bush declared a ceasefire after a
ground war that had lasted only 100 hours. The Iraqi war effort had
completely collapsed. The Gulf War became an example of the con-
tinued importance of naval units such as destroyers in joint opera-

tions with ground forces in modern warfare.
As in the past, the perceived value of destroyers and frigates in
warfare partially drove their continued construction after 1991, al-
though by the end of that year the Cold War ended with the collapse
of the Soviet Union. From 1992 to the present, the United States
has continued production of the Arleigh Burke–class Aegis destroy-
ers and now operates an additional 48 vessels. Of these, 21 have im-
proved helicopter facilities. These modern vessels are replacing all
the destroyers of the Cold War era, as the United States no longer
faces a large naval opponent such as the Soviet Union. By 2004, all
of the Spruance-class destroyers not equipped with a VLS system,
received during refits beginning in the early 1990s, had been de-
commissioned, as well as some of the modernized vessels, leaving
only 10 of the original 31 units in service. The surviving units will
eventually be removed from service as well. All of the Kidd-class de-
stroyers are also laid up pending disposal while the units of the
Charles F. Adams, Farragut, and Forrest Sherman classes have been
scrapped. The number of frigates in the U.S. Navy is also being
greatly decreased. Of the 54 units of the Oliver Hazard Perry–type
frigate, 33 remain operational. The United States has sold many of
the frigates of this class to other powers that include Turkey, Egypt,
Bahrain, and Poland. As a result of cutbacks, the U.S. Navy cur-
rently maintains 38 destroyers and 33 frigates.
This force strength is on par with that of Russia since the collapse
of the Soviet Union. Financial difficulties have rendered the former
Soviet Navy a shadow of its former self, as there is not a great deal
of money to provide for new construction. Production has not
ended, and in 1993 the Russians commissioned one frigate of an
improved Krivak design. This vessel, however, represents the only
new unit in service (as of 2004) and certainly cannot make up for
the losses of the fleet through financial cutbacks. Of the enormous
number of destroyers and frigates produced by the Soviet Union,
only 1 of the 18-ship Kashin class remains, and that unit is not fully
operational. In addition, 15 of the 42 Krivak-class frigates are in ser-
vice and 22 of the 43-unit Grisha-class frigates are operational. The
frigate fleet also includes the 11 vessels of the Parchim class. How-
ever, the frigates are largely coastal defense vessels ill-suited to blue-
water operations. In 2004, Russia operated 61 frigates of oceango-
ing capability and 33 smaller frigates.
In Western Europe, the principal naval powers of the post–Cold
War age remain France, Great Britain, and Italy. Construction in
174 DESTROYERS
France since 1991 has centered on frigates. Between 1992 and

2001, France commissioned six Floreal-class frigates and five
Lafayette-class vessels equipped with Exocet and SAM systems. The
design of the latter generated interest abroad and has led to orders
from Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, and Singapore. These new vessels joined
the French Navy, which retained several of its Cold War–era de-
stroyers and frigates. In 2004, France operated 12 destroyers: 7
Georges Leygues–class vessels, 2 Cassard class, 1 of the Suffren type,
and 2 Tourville-class units. Additionally, nine of the D’Estienne
d’Orves–class frigates remain in service. Great Britain continued its
Duke-class frigate program and constructed 13 more of the type.
The nation currently operates these new vessels as well as 11 de-
stroyers and 4 Broadsword-class frigates. Italy commissioned only
four frigates of the Artigliere class in the mid-1990s that now oper-
ate in an Italian Navy that counts four destroyers and eight other
frigates as part of its strength.
Aside from these powers are other European nations whose fleets
are smaller. Germany, which emerged from the Cold War as a united
country through the reunification of West Germany and East Ger-
many, has continued construction of destroyers and frigates as the
core of its navy. Between 1994 and 1996, four Brandenburg-class
frigates entered service. In 2003, the first of a new three-ship class
of destroyer began its sea trials. This ship, Sachsen, measures 469
feet by 56 feet by 22 feet, 5 inches, displaces 5,960 tons, and is ca-
pable of a maximum speed of 29 knots. The armament includes a
32-cell VLS system and eight Harpoon missiles. When ready for ser-
vice, this vessel will join seven Bremen-class frigates and, technically
speaking, one of the old Lutjens-class destroyers. This latter vessel is
only partially operational due to severe mechanical problems as a re-
sult of its age. The class that includes Sachsen is slated to replace
this ship. Both the Netherlands and Spain have also augmented
their fleets with new destroyers and frigates. Among the most im-
pressive of these is the Spanish Alvaro de Bazan class, whose first
unit is currently in service. This vessel is equipped with the Aegis
system and a 48-cell VLS.
Several powers other than those of the West have also continued
their destroyer and frigate programs in the wake of the Cold War.
Chief among these is Japan. Between 1996 and 2002, the Japanese
commissioned nine Murasame-class destroyers. These vessels, while
a capable design, are slightly less advanced than the four Kongo-
class destroyers that entered service between 1993 and 1998. These
ships are improved Arleigh Burke–class destroyers that, like the U.S.
Navy design, are equipped with the Aegis system. Currently, Japan
operates one of the largest naval forces in the world in terms of de-
stroyers and frigates. In 2004, the Japanese Navy included 45 de-
stroyers. The fleet also maintains nine frigates with two of these be-
ing built after 1991. As the Japanese Navy is dedicated to homeland
defense, these ships counter the program of China, Japan’s neigh-
bor, that continues to forge ahead in destroyer and frigate produc-
tion as part of its plan to extend its influence in Asia through the use
of a fleet comprised of oceangoing craft. Between 1992 and 2004
the Chinese constructed 4 destroyers and 11 frigates. Currently, the
Chinese operate 4 destroyers and 31 frigates. In addition to these
Far East powers is India. The Indian Navy currently operates eight
destroyers and four frigates. Three of the destroyers and one of the
frigates represent construction since the end of the Cold War.
Added to these three powers are the host of nations around the
world that base their fleets on a smaller number of destroyers and
frigates that are either old units procured from other nations or new
vessels purchased from foreign shipyards. Examples of the former
practice include Chile, which currently operates three former
British County-class destroyers, and Turkey, which bought eight old
U.S. Oliver Hazard Perry–class frigates. Instances of the latter oc-
currence abound, as in the case of Thailand, which bought six
frigates from China between 1991 and 1995.
The crews of today’s modern destroyers and frigates operate in an
environment where most aspects of life have changed since the dawn
of the missile age. These define present-day life aboard destroyers
and frigates. Education for officers and regular ratings has become
much more complex as a result of the use of computers, missile sys-
tems, and nuclear power. Officers continue to receive education in
naval schools, where many graduate with specialty degrees in specific
systems aboard ship. These include the United States Naval Acad-
emy in Annapolis, Maryland, and the Admiral Nakhimov Naval
Preparatory School in Russia. Regular ratings receive more general
education both on land and through experience at sea. These sailors
are currently recruited as volunteers in the case of Western nations,
whereas those in the Soviet Navy, and later that of Russia after the
fall of communism, are conscripts and volunteers.
In some cases, the need for efficiency has led to the abolishment
of time-honored traditions that existed since the Age of Fighting
Sail. One of these is the use of alcohol aboard destroyers, frigates,
and warships in general. In 1970, the Royal Navy dispensed with
the practice of providing rum rations to its sailors. The Soviet Navy
176 DESTROYERS
also abolished alcohol aboard ship, but with less success. Often-
times, Soviet sailors procured alcohol on the black market or dis-
tilled beverages from industrial alcohol used to clean machinery
aboard ship. This resulted from generally poor conditions aboard
Soviet, and later Russian, ships that led the crews to seek comfort
through alcohol.
The greater need for well-educated and effective crews has also
led to a drive in many navies to provide not only for officers and rat-
ings but also for their families to attract people to service at sea. The
Royal Navy has instituted programs in keeping with the British wel-
fare state in which financial allowances are given to assist sailors in
the purchase of housing for their families. The British also provide
money for the children of sailors to attend boarding schools. The
United States has also followed this course in an effort to attract
people to naval service. In 1981, the pay of U.S. sailors was in-
creased to a level that closely mirrored pay in the civilian sector to
allow families to better provide for themselves.
Another change in the life of sailors is living conditions aboard
ship. The crew compartments are generally more spacious, and
bunks have replaced the hammocks of the past that had been
shipped in the destroyers and frigates of most navies since the Age
of Fighting Sail. Vessels now contain all basic amenities, such as air-
conditioning, in addition to a variety of extracurricular equipment
that includes Internet access and e-mail, satellite TV, and gymnasi-
ums. Food has also improved markedly in many navies. Life aboard
many of the world’s destroyers and frigates, particularly those of the
United States, is a much better experience today than in the past.
These living conditions have been affected in Western navies
through the integration of the sexes. Although women served in
Western navies during World War II, their participation was land-
based rather than in combat. This situation has changed with the in-
clusion of women among the crews of warships. An example is the
U.S. Navy. In 1976, the petitioning of women’s advocacy groups and
political representatives led to the acceptance of women in the
United States Naval Academy in an effort to make military service
open to all. By 1999, women comprised 13 percent of the U.S.
Navy; of 117 combatant ships in service, 57 had integrated crews.10
Despite this myriad of changes, some conditions aboard destroy-
ers and frigates remain the same and probably will never be altered.
Life aboard these ships is still one that includes rigid discipline,
constant drilling and training, and periods of personal hardship pro-
duced by extended deployments during which officers and sailors
are separated from families. These aspects have always been pres-
ent, and they still define life at sea. They are the price that the peo-
ple who crew the destroyers and frigates of the world pay to fulfill
the strategic requirements that are charged to the world’s warships
by all maritime powers.
These men and women who operate destroyers and frigates do so
in an environment, despite the end of the Cold War, where duties
abound. In today’s world a significant duty for destroyers is the pro-
jection of power abroad. This duty reveals danger through the rising
threat of global terrorism. On 12 October 2000, the Arleigh
Burke–class destroyer Cole entered the port of Aden, Yemen, in the
Middle East for refueling and suffered the detonation of explosives
by suicide bombers aboard a small boat that was among those hired
to guide the warship to its moorings. The blast blew a hole in the
side of Cole that measured some 20 feet by 40 feet. Although the
crew saved the vessel, the attack crippled it and killed 17 sailors and
wounded 31 others. The attack was a serious blow to U.S. prestige in
the Middle East and highlights the fact that destroyers and frigates
operate in an environment of constant danger despite the fact that
the Cold War has ended and the world is not in a state of general
armed conflict. This situation is more apparent than ever since the
terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 that resulted in the destruc-
tion of the World Trade towers in New York City. In the unfolding
war on terrorism, destroyers and frigates continue to project power
overseas. As the war is primarily a land-based endeavor, direct action
is limited. Even so, destroyers and frigates have participated actively
in the war through the 2003 operation iraqi freedom designed to
topple Saddam Hussein from power. In the opening stages of this ef-
fort, the U.S. Navy counted 15 destroyers and 6 frigates in its strike
force. Those destroyers equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles
were used to attack targets in advance of the ground offensive. On
20 March 2003, two Arleigh Burke–class destroyers joined two
Ticonderoga class cruisers to launch 40 Tomahawk missiles at the
Iraqi capital of Baghdad. On the same day, a further 50 Tomahawks
were launched against other Iraqi targets by an additional Arleigh
Burke–class vessel and American and British attack submarines.
Nevertheless, the future of destroyers is somewhat in doubt given
their large construction costs versus smaller frigates, which, with
the exception of the very few nations such as the United States and
Japan, constitute the majority of warship construction. At present,
Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and Spain are all in the process
of constructing new destroyers. In the case of Germany, these are
178 DESTROYERS
two additional vessels of the Sachsen type. Japan will launch an im-
proved Kongo-class destroyer in 2007 while the Netherlands is
building three AAW destroyers. Spain is building an additional Al-
varo de Bazan–class destroyer and has contracted for two more. The
numbers pale in comparison to frigates.
Some of these programs are multinational to cut design costs.
Among these is a frigate design, known to many as the Horizon
class, produced from collaboration originally between France, Great
Britain, and Italy, although Britain dropped out of the project. The
hull of one of these vessels will measure 130 feet and mount en-
gines that can produce a maximum speed of 27 knots. The arma-
ment of these multi-role frigates will be Exocet missiles, a SAM sys-
tem, a gun, torpedoes, and a helicopter. France has contracted for
17 such ships, with 2008 being projected as the year of delivery for
the first units. Italy issued orders for two of these ships, to be deliv-
ered in 2007 and 2009. Aside from joint projects, work also pro-
gresses on individual, highly advanced frigate designs in a myriad of
nations around the world.
Despite the trend toward frigates, the story of the destroyer will
continue for some years owing to the DD(X) program of the United
States, which calls for vessels with hulls designed to mask detection
by enemy sensors, a quiet electrical-drive propulsion system, and
various weapons to make the warship a multirole craft. Although
still in the design stage, the U.S. government projects as many as 60
orders of DD(X) vessels over the coming years. It will also endure
through existing units, as all naval nations appreciate their value in
a world increasingly fraught with the uncertainties of the post–Cold
War age, particularly the war on global terror. Destroyers, as well as
the smaller frigates, will remain at the forefront of global naval oper-
ations until unseated by still smaller, cheaper, more effective craft.
ENDNOTES
1. Norman Friedman, U.S. Destroyers: An Illustrated Design History (An-

napolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982), p. 258.
2. William G. Schofield, Destroyers: 60 Years (New York: Rand McNally,
1962), p. 105.
3. Norman Polmar, Guide to the Soviet Navy (Annapolis, MD: Naval In-
stitute Press, 1986), p. 410.
4. Friedman, U.S. Destroyers, pp. 285–287.
5. Ibid.
6. Robert Gardiner, Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1947–
1982—Part I: The Western Powers (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
1983), p. 215.
7. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (New
York: W. W. Norton, 1983), pp. 346–348.
8. Bernard Prézelin, Combat Fleets of the World 1993: Their Ships, Air-
craft, and Armament (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993), p. xv.
9. Ibid., p. 833.
10. Ronald Spector, At War at Sea: Sailors and Naval Combat in the
Twentieth Century (New York: Viking, 2001), p. 394.
Destroyers and Frigates
of the World
DESTROYERS, 1850s–1918
France Durandal Class (1899–1900)

France Branlebas (1907–1908)
France Chasseur Class (1909–1910)
Germany D10 (1898)
Germany S.90 (1898–1901)
Germany S.31 Class (1913–1915)
Germany H.145 Class (1917–1918)
Great Britain Vesuvius (1874)
Great Britain Lightning (1877)
Great Britain Swift (1885)
Great Britain Rattlesnake (1887)
Great Britain Havock and Hornet (1894)
Great Britain Desperate type (1897)
Great Britain Viper (1900)
Great Britain River Class (1904–1905)
Great Britain Cricket Class (1906–1909)
Italy Fulmine (1898)
Italy Indomito Class (1912–1913)
Japan Shirakumo Class (1902)
Japan Sakura Class (1912)
Russia Pruitki (1895)
Russia Bespokoiny Class (1913–1914)
United States Farragut (1899)
United States Bainbridge Class (1902)
United States Paulding Class (1909–1910)
181
182 DESTROYERS
United States Cassin Class (1912–1913)

United States Clemson Class (1918–1920)
DESTROYERS AND FRIGATES, 1919–1945
France Chacal Class (1923–1924)

France Guépard Class (1928–1930)
France Le Fantasque Class (1933–1934)
France Mogador Class (1936–1937)
Germany 1934 Class (1935)
Germany 1936 Class (1937–1938)
Great Britain E and F Classes (1934)
Great Britain Tribal Class (1937–1946)
Great Britain Hunt Class (1939–1940)
Great Britain River Class (1942–1944)
Great Britain Ch, Co, and Cr Classes (1945–1946)
Italy Navigatori Class (1928–1930)
Italy Pegaso Class (1936–1937)
Japan Mutsuki Class (1925–1927)
Japan Fubuki Class (1927–1930)
Japan Hatsuharu Class (1932–1934)
Japan Kagero Class (1938–1940)
Japan Akitsuki Class (1941–1944)
Soviet Union Gnevnyi Class (1936–1941)
Soviet Union Storozhevoi Class (1938–1940)
United States Farragut Class (1934–1935)
United States Sims Class (1938–1939)
United States Benson/Gleaves Class (1939–1943)
United States Fletcher Class (1942–1944)
United States Gearing Class (1944–1946)
DESTROYERS AND FRIGATES, 1946–2004
France Suffren Class (1967–1970)

France Tourville Class (1974–1977)
France D’Estienne d’Orves Class (1981–1986)
France Lafayette Class (2001)
Germany Bremen Class (1982–1990)
Great Britain County Class (1962–1970)
DESTROYERS AND FRIGATES OF THE WORLD 183
Great Britain Leander Class (1963–1973)

Great Britain Amazon Class (1974–1978)
Great Britain Sheffield Class (1975–1982)
Great Britain Duke Class (1990–2002)
Italy Animoso (De La Penne) Class (1993)
Italy Artigliere Class (1994–1996)
Japan Amatsukaze (1965)
Japan Haruna Class (1973–1974)
Japan Asagiri Class (1988–1991)
People’s Republic of China Jianghu I Class (1975–1984)
Soviet Union Kildin Class (1958)
Soviet Union Krupny Class (1961)
Soviet Union Kashin Class (1963–1972)
Soviet Union Krivak Class (1970–1991)
Sweden Halland Class (1955–1956)
United States Gyatt (1956)
United States Coontz Class (1959–1961)
United States Spruance and Kidd Classes (1975–1983)
United States Oliver Hazard Perry Class (1977–1988)
United States Arleigh Burke Class (1991–)
AUTHOR NOTE
The destroyers and frigates listed above and discussed below are
arranged alphabetically by country within three eras. In each coun-
try subset, the destroyers and frigates are listed chronologically ac-
cording to the dates of their completion. The data concerning each
vessel and class are contained in the categories described below.
When referring to a class of ship, the data concerning the attributes
of the type are that of the lead ship of the class.
The information and statistics included for each entry are:
Units: In the case of a class of ships, all vessels are named.

Type and Significance: A brief statement concerning the type and
importance of the ship or class of vessel.
Dates of Construction: Includes the dates when construction be-
gan and the dates when a ship or class was either launched or
completed.
184 DESTROYERS
Hull Dimensions: The measurement of a hull’s length, beam, and

draft (when known) in feet and inches.
Displacement: In most cases, the tonnage of the vessel is the stan-
dard displacement, meaning the weight of the ship when fully
equipped but without fuel.
Armor: Side armor, deck armor, barbette armor, and turret protec-
tion are listed in measurements of inches.
Armament: The types and size of all weaponry and how the pieces
were mounted.
Machinery: The propulsion plant.
Speed: Maximum speed of the ship or class.
Complement: The number of officers and sailors who crewed the
vessel.
Summary: Comments on the performance and careers of the ship
or class.
DESTROYERS, 1850s–1918
186 FRANCE: DURANDAL CLASS
FRANCE: DURANDAL CLASS

Courtesy of Art-Tech/Aerospace/M.A.R.S./TRH/Navy Historical
Units: Durandal, Hallebarde, Faucon- gines whose power output was 4,800
neau, Espingole horsepower that was driven by two
Type and significance: These vessels coal-fired boilers.
were France’s first true destroyers Speed: 26 knots
rather than torpedo boats. Complement: 52
Dates of construction: Two units Summary: These vessels resembled
launched in 1899 while another two Havock of Great Britain. Its hull in-
followed in 1900. corporated a turtleback bow in-
Hull dimensions: 188'8" 20'8" tended to streamline the vessel to al-
10'5" low it to better cut through the
Displacement: 296 tons water. Espingole was sunk in 1903
Armor: None while Durandal, Hallebarde, and
Armament: One 2.5" gun, six 1.8" Fauconneau were retired from ser-
weapons, and two 15" torpedo tubes. vice in 1919, 1920, and 1921, re-
Machinery: Two triple-expansion en- spectively.
FRANCE: BRANLEBAS CLASS 187
FRANCE: BRANLEBAS CLASS

Units: Branlebas, Slaive, Poignard, Machinery: Two triple-expansion en-

Sabretache, Oriflamme, Étendard, gines powered by two coal-fired boil-
Fanion, Sape, Gabion, Fanfare ers that produced 6,700 horsepower.
Type and significance: Unlike many de- Speed: 27 knots
stroyers of this era, these ships incor- Complement: 60
porated armor into their design. Summary: The incorporation of armor
Dates of construction: Four units into the design showcased the
were launched in 1907 while con- French penchant for innovation in
struction on another five ended in warship design. All of these warships
1908. The final unit was produced were operational in World War I.
the next year. Branlebas was sunk in 1915 while
Hull dimensions: 190' 21'7" 7'9" Étendard was destroyed in 1917. The
Displacement: 339 tons other units of the class were gradu-
Armor: .75" steel belt extended over ally retired over the interwar years as
the propulsion equipment. they became obsolete. The last ves-
Armament: One 2.6" gun, six 1.8" guns, sel, Slaive, went to the breakers in
and two 17.7" torpedo tubes. 1932.
188 FRANCE: CHASSEUR CLASS
FRANCE: CHASSEUR CLASS

Courtesy of Walker Archive
Units: Chasseur, Fantassin, Janissaire, Speed: 28 knots

Cavalier Complement: 79
Type and significance: The first tur- Summary: Not only were these ships the
bine-powered and oil-fueled destroy- first French destroyers fitted with
ers of the French Navy. turbines and oil-fired boilers; they
Dates of construction: Chasseur and were also the first warships overall in
Fantassin were launched in 1909; the the French Navy to incorporate oil-
other two units followed the next year. fired boilers into their design. Al-
Hull dimensions: 210'8" 21'4" though the machinery of the vessels
16'2" (These dimensions for the suffered frequent breakdowns, all
Chasseur only. Other units differed served extensively in World War I pri-
slightly in length and beam.) marily in the Mediterranean theater
Displacement: 450 tons of operations. Fantassin was wrecked
Armor: None in 1916 through a collision with the
Armament: Six 2.5" guns and three French destroyer Mameluk. The
17.7" torpedo tubes other units survived the conflict,
Machinery: Turbines powered by four with Chassuer and Janissaire being
oil-fired boilers with the exception of removed from service in 1919 and
the Chasseur, which had coal-fired 1920, respectively. Cavalier followed
boilers. The maximum power output in 1927 after being used as a target
was 7,200 shaft horsepower. ship.
GERMANY: D10 189
GERMANY: D10
Courtesy of Naval Historical Foundation
Type and significance: Germany’s first Speed: 27 knots

destroyer. Complement: 47
Dates of construction: Launched in Summary: This vessel was not an in-
1898. digenous design, being built by Brit-
Hull dimensions: 217' 19'6" 7'9" ain’s Thornycroft shipbuilding com-
Displacement: 365 tons pany. As a result, it resembled British
Armor: None vessels built by the same organiza-
Armament: Five 2" guns and three tion. By the opening of World War I,
17.7" torpedo tubes D10 was aged to the point that the
Machinery: Two triple-expansion en- majority of its wartime career was in
gines driven by coal-fired boilers that coastal defense duties. It was
produced a maximum power output scrapped in 1922.
of 5,600 horsepower.
190 GERMANY: S.90 CLASS
GERMANY: S.90 CLASS

Units: S.90–S.101 rather than the turtleback bow of de-

Type and significance: These were Ger- stroyers in other navies. Developed
many’s first domestically designed in Germany at the same time as the
and constructed destroyers. They are United States, the raised forecastle
among the first that incorporated a made ships of this class much more
raised forecastle into their design. seaworthy than those equipped with
Dates of construction: Launched be- turtleback bows. Some speed was
tween 1898 and 1901. sacrificed, making these ships slower
Hull dimensions: 206'10" 22'11" than destroyers in some other na-
9'4" tions. This reduction, however, was
Displacement: 388 tons offset by the increase in their capa-
Armor: None bilities that was afforded by the new
Armament: Three 1.9" guns and three hull design. The other naval powers
17.7" torpedo tubes. of the world eventually adopted the
Machinery: Two triple-expansion en- feature of the raised forecastle.
gines powered by coal-fired boilers All of these craft save one were
that generated 3,900 horsepower. scrapped by the early 1920s. The ex-
Speed: 26.5 knots ception was the S.90, which sank on
Complement: 55 17 October 1914, after running
Summary: The hull of S.90-class units aground during the siege of Tsing-
incorporated a raised forecastle tao, China, in World War I.
GERMANY: S.31 CLASS 191
GERMANY: S.31 CLASS

Courtesy of Wüerttembergische Landesbibliothek
Units: S.31–S.36 ing up to World War I in that they

Type and significance: The last Ger- generally mounted fewer, slightly
man destroyers launched before smaller guns than their British coun-
World War I and the first to incorpo- terparts, a reflection of the contin-
rate solely oil-fired boilers into their ued German belief in the primary
design. role of destroyers being torpedo at-
Dates of construction: All units were tack. The use of mines represents the
launched between 1913 and 1915. German belief before World War I
Hull dimensions: 261'2" 27'4" that destroyers could assume the role
9'2" of minelayer in addition to their pri-
Displacement: 802 tons mary mission. Although their oil-
Armor: None fired boilers made them the first Ger-
Armament: Three 3.45" guns, six 19.7" man destroyers equipped with that
torpedo tubes, and 24 mines. innovation, they also had the un-
Machinery: Turbines powered by three usual feature of a second auxiliary
oil-fired boilers that produced rudder placed beneath the bow in
23,516 shaft horsepower. case the other was rendered inopera-
Speed: 33.5 knots ble in combat.
Complement: 83 All served extensively in World
Summary: These vessels are indicative War I. S.31 and S.34 were sunk in
of German design in the years lead- 1915 and 1918, respectively, by
192 GERMANY: S.31 CLASS
mines. A British submarine torpe- the British naval base of Scapa Flow
doed and sunk S.33 in 1918, while while the Imperial German Navy lay
S.35 was sunk by heavy gunfire from there pending the conclusion of the
British battleships in the 1916 Battle Paris Peace Conference that ended
of Jutland. The crews of S.32 and World War I. These latter two units
S.36 scuttled their vessels in 1919 at were raised in 1925 and scrapped.
GERMANY: H.145 CLASS 193
GERMANY: H.145 CLASS

Units: H.145–H.147 shift in German design from vessels

Type and significance: The last de- whose armament emphasized the tor-
stroyers built for the Imperial Ger- pedo to larger, more heavy-gunned
man Navy in World War I. warships. Even so, the primary mis-
Dates of construction: H.145 was sion of these ships, as those in the
launched in 1917, while the other past for Germany, was torpedo attack.
two units were launched in early None of these craft had time to jus-
1918. tify their existence in World War I, as
Hull dimensions: 277'3" 27'7" they were launched at the close of the
11'2" conflict. H.145 was scuttled in 1919
Displacement: 990 tons at the British naval base of Scapa
Armor: None Flow while the Imperial German
Armament: Four 4.1" guns, six 19.7" Navy lay there pending the conclu-
torpedo tubes, and 24 mines. sion of the peace conference in Paris
Machinery: Turbines powered by three that ended World War I. France re-
oil-fired boilers that generated ceived both H.146 and H.147 at the
23,849 shaft horsepower. end of the war as reparations from
Speed: 34 knots Germany. H.147 was scrapped in
Complement: 105 1933, while H.146 followed two years
Summary: These destroyers represent a later after service in the French Navy.
194 GREAT BRITAIN: VESUVIUS
GREAT BRITAIN: VESUVIUS

Type and significance: The first British Summary: This ship represents an early
warship designed specifically for tor- design step forward toward the de-
pedo attack. stroyer. It proved an unsuccessful de-
Dates of construction: Construction sign as the relatively deep draft for
on Vesuvius began in 1873 and was the size of the hull produced an inor-
completed in 1874. dinately high amount of drag in a
Hull dimensions: 90' 22' 8'6" seaway, which greatly affected the
Displacement: 245 tons speed of the vessel. As a result, most
Armor: None battleships, the principal prey of a
Armament: One 16" torpedo tube ship like Vesuvius, were faster than
mounted in the bow. the torpedo craft and could outrun it.
Machinery: A compound engine driven The design problem of Vesuvius led
by coal-fired boilers capable of pro- quickly to the vessel being removed
ducing 350 horsepower. from active service in favor of use as
Speed: 9.7 knots an experimental craft. The vessel
Complement: 15 went to the scrap yard in 1924.
GREAT BRITAIN: LIGHTNING 195
GREAT BRITAIN: LIGHTNING

Type and significance: Britain’s first offer the smallest silhouette and thus
torpedo boat. make it harder for the enemy’s gun-
Dates of construction: Construction ners to hit it. The small size essen-
commenced in 1876 and was com- tially dictated its use in coastal
pleted the following year. defense operations rather than blue-
Hull dimensions: 87' 10'8" 5'2 water duties. Even so, all naval pow-
Displacement: 32.5 tons ers recognized the value of torpedo
Armor: None boats as these cheap craft could de-
Armament: The original armament con- stroy expensive battleships with their
sisted of two torpedo cages that torpedoes. The potential threat
could be lowered into the water on posed by Lightning ultimately led to
either side of the craft. These proved ships designed to hunt them down
impractical and were replaced by a and prevent their torpedo attacks.
torpedo tube in the bow. These vessels would be destroyers.
Machinery: A compound engine driven The hull of Lightning, like all tor-
by coal-fired boilers that produced a pedo boats and many destroyers, was
maximum of 460 horsepower. not very strong as a heavy hull would
Speed: 19 knots impede the vessel’s speed. Conse-
Complement: 15 quently, in 1896 Lightning went to
Summary: This very tiny craft was in- the breakers with a highly degraded
tended to fire torpedoes after steer- hull.
ing the ship directly at the target to
196 GREAT BRITAIN: SWIFT
GREAT BRITAIN: SWIFT

Type and significance: British warship Speed: 24 knots

designed as a torpedo boat catcher Complement: 25
that proved to be an antecedent to- Summary: This vessel was classed as a
ward the production of the first true torpedo boat but was larger and more
destroyer. heavily armed than preceding war-
Dates of construction: Laid down in ships. The reason for this was that
1884 and launched in 1885. the designers intended the vessel to
Hull dimensions: 153'8" 17'6" protect the capital ships of the battle
9'6" fleet against torpedo boat attack. As
Displacement: 137 tons such, Swift was an early prototype of
Armor: None the destroyer.
Armament: Four 3-pounder guns and Swift enjoyed a long career that in-
three 14" torpedo tubes. cluded service in World War I when
Machinery: Engines that produced a the British fitted hydrophones and
maximum output of 1,330 horse- depth charges to the vessel for ASW.
power Swift was scrapped in 1921.
GREAT BRITAIN: RATTLESNAKE CLASS 197
GREAT BRITAIN: RATTLESNAKE CLASS

Units: Rattlesnake, Grasshopper, Sand- Summary: These vessels were enlarged

fly, Spider versions of Swift and resulted from
Type and significance: These vessels the continuing quest by the British
were improved torpedo boat catchers for a torpedo boat catcher to counter
and another design step toward the the threat of small torpedo boats ver-
destroyer. sus battleships. Labeled by the
Dates of construction: Rattlesnake British as torpedo gunboats (TGBs),
was laid down in 1885 and com- the warships of the Rattlesnake class
pleted in 1887; the other units were were not the ultimate solution to the
launched in 1888. threat posed by the torpedo boat.
Hull dimensions: 200'(pp) 23' They were capable of more opera-
10'4" tions at sea rather than just coastal
Displacement: 550 tons (Rattlesnake) defense owing to the incorporation
while the other units displaced 526 of the triple-expansion engine in
tons. their design, which consumed less
Armor: A .75" protective deck over the coal, but their top speed was a glar-
machinery and engines. ing problem, as it was not high
Armament: One 5" gun, six 3-pound enough to permit the ships to over-
pieces, and four 14" torpedo tubes. take the fast torpedo boats that they
Machinery: Two triple-expansion en- were intended to destroy. They also
gines driven by coal-fired boilers that were not very seaworthy and limited
rendered 2,700 horsepower. in range due to their relatively small
Speed: 19.25 knots size. All four vessels were sold to
Complement: 66 scrap yards between 1903 and 1910.
198 GREAT BRITAIN: HAVOCK AND HORNET
GREAT BRITAIN: HAVOCK AND HORNET

Units: Havock, Hornet Speed: 27 knots

Type and significance: Generally re- Complement: 42
garded as the world’s first destroyers. Summary: These ships were the first to
Dates of construction: Construction truly pose a viable solution to the tor-
on both Havock and Hornet com- pedo boat, as their top speed allowed
menced in 1892 and ended in 1894. them to run down their opponents.
Hull dimensions: 185' 18'6" 7'3" Their high speed was partially the re-
Displacement: 275 tons sult of the turtleback bow. These
Armor: None ships suffered from poor seaworthi-
Armament: One 12-pound quick-firing ness that resulted from their lightly
gun, three 6-pound quick-firing weap- built hulls and machinery break-
ons, and three 18" torpedo tubes. downs caused by the strain put on
Machinery: Triple expansion engines the engines to attain their top speed.
that, in the case of Havock, were Hornet was broken up for scrap in
powered by coal-fired, locomotive 1909; Havock followed in 1912.
style boilers. New water-tube boilers
drove the engines of the Hornet.
GREAT BRITAIN: DESPERATE-TYPE 199
GREAT BRITAIN: DESPERATE-TYPE

Units: Desperate, Fame, Foam, Mallard Summary: These ships were the product
Type and significance: These vessels of the British desire by the turn of
are among the first of the British 30- the twentieth century for destroyers
knotters that dominated construc- of the greatest speed possible. The
tion in the country in the last decade 30-knotters, of which these ships
of the nineteenth century. were a part, were completed between
Dates of construction: All units were 1896 and 1902 and possessed larger
laid down in 1895 and completed in hulls to house the more powerful
1897. machinery needed to attain the extra
Hull dimensions: 210' 19'6" 7' knots sought by the British Admi-
Displacement: 310 tons ralty. Meeting the Admiralty require-
Armor: None ment came at the cost of reliability
Armament: One 12-pounder quick-fir- and sea-keeping. Due to the great
ing gun, five 6-pounder quick-firing emphasis on speed, these vessels
weapons, and two 18" torpedo tubes. were lightly built and their engines
Machinery: Triple expansion engines strained to generate their maximum
powered by coal-fired boilers that output. Oftentimes the engines
produced a maximum power output broke down or their vibration led to
of 5,700 horsepower. stress on the hull that could warp it
Speed: 30 knots or crack the plating, thus causing
Complement: 63 leaks that endangered the ships.
200 GREAT BRITAIN: DESPERATE-TYPE
Their small hulls, like so many de- scrapping of Foam in 1914, but the
stroyers at the time, were also too other units served in World War I.
small to carry the fuel and supplies Desperate and Mallard went to the
necessary for extended operations. breakers in 1920; Fame followed a
The problems with the machinery year later.
and structural weakness led to the
GREAT BRITAIN: VIPER 201
GREAT BRITAIN: VIPER

Type and significance: A destroyer, Speed: 33.75 knots

Viper was the first warship in the Complement: 70
world equipped with turbine engines. Summary: The 1897 debut of the tur-
Dates of construction: Viper was laid bine-powered vessel Turbina de-
down in 1898 and completed in 1900. signed by Charles Parson led the
Hull dimensions: 210'3.5" (pp) 21' British Admiralty to commission pri-
Displacement: 344 tons vate shipyards to produce turbine-
Armor: None powered destroyers. Viper was the
Armament: One 12-pounder quick-fir- first to enter service, but the vessel
ing gun, five 6-pounder quick-firing did not yield much experience with
weapons, and two 18" torpedo tubes. turbines in warships due to its being
Machinery: Turbines supplied by coal- wrecked in the English Channel in
fired boilers. 1901.
202 GREAT BRITAIN: RIVER CLASS
GREAT BRITAIN: RIVER CLASS

Units: Erne, Ettrick, Exe, Kennet, Jed, between 7,000 and 7,500 horse-
Derwent, Eden, Foyle, Itchen, Ribble, power.
Teviot, Usk, Welland, Cherwell, Dee, Speed: 26 knots
Waveney, Arun, Blackwater, Chelmer, Complement: 70
Colne, Gala, Garry, Swale, Ure, Wear, Summary: Several different private firms
Ness, Nith, Liffey, Moy, Ouse, Boyne, built these vessels to Britush Admi-
Doon, Kale, Rother ralty specifications. These ships are
Type and significance: Destroyers that considered by most scholars as the
are generally regarded as the world’s world’s first oceangoing destroyers, as
first oceangoing destroyers. the German S.90 class and the U.S.
Dates of construction: Completed be- Bainbridge class that preceded the
tween 1904 and 1905. British ships and were similar in de-
Hull dimensions: 233'6" 23'6" sign proved to be less seaworthy and
9'9" (Erne) of lesser endurance. Despite their re-
Displacement: 550 tons (Erne) duced speed in comparison to the
Armor: None British 30-knotters, the reduction
Armament: One 12-pound quick-firing was acceptable given the advantages
gun, five 6-pound quick-firing guns, that it presented. These ships, with
and two 18" torpedo tubes. their raised forecastles, had better
Machinery: Triple expansion engines or sea-keeping abilities than past British
turbines powered by coal-fired boil- destroyers. In addition, the surrender
ers that produced a maximum output of some power decreased mechanical
GREAT BRITAIN: RIVER CLASS 203
breakdowns through lessened wear Gala and Blackwater were lost in

on the engines. Finally, the raised collision in 1908 and 1909, respec-
forecastle and internal arrangement tively, while Cherwell and Dee were
of the hulls of the River-class units scrapped months after completion in
allowed for shipping more coal and 1904. The other units served in
thus improving their cruising radius. World War I. Eden, Derwent, Kale,
The advantages of the River class led Itchen, and Foyle were destroyed in
all other naval powers to incorporate the conflict. The surviving units were
features of their design into their broken up between 1919 and 1920.
own vessels.
204 GREAT BRITAIN: CRICKET CLASS
GREAT BRITAIN: CRICKET CLASS

Units: Cricket, Dragonfly, Firefly, Sand- Speed: 26 knots

fly, Spider, Gadfly, Glowworm, Gnat, Complement: 35
Grasshopper, Greenfly, Mayfly, Moth, Summary: The British intended these
TB13–TB36 destroyers for only coastal duties ow-
Type and significance: The units of the ing to the nature of their relatively
Cricket class were the first in the small hulls. Nevertheless, they proved
world to use oil-fired boilers rather unseaworthy in general and are im-
than coal-fired ones. portant only for their use of oil fuel.
Dates of construction: Launched over All units were involved in World War
a period between 1906 and 1909. I with Grasshopper, TB13, and TB24
Hull dimensions: 180' 17'6" 6' being sunk in collisions. Mines de-
Displacement: 225 tons stroyed Greenfly and Moth. The sur-
Armor: None viving units were sold for scrap be-
Armament: Two 12-pounder quick-firing tween 1919 and 1922.
guns and three 18" torpedo tubes.
Machinery: Turbines powered by oil-
fueled boilers that generated 3,750
horsepower.
ITALY: FULMINE 205
ITALY: FULMINE
Type and significance: Fulmine was Machinery: Triple expansion engines

Italy’s first domestically produced de- powered by four coal-fired boilers
stroyer. that produced a maximum power
Dates of construction: Laid down in output of 4,729 horsepower.
1897 and completed the following Speed: 24 knots
year. Complement: 50
Hull dimensions: 203'11.5" 21' Summary: Although being a step for-
7'6.5" ward for Italy in terms of domestic
Displacement: 293 tons warship production, Italian naval of-
Armor: None ficials considered Fulmine an unsuc-
Armament: The original armament con- cessful design. As a result, the ves-
sisted of five 2.2" guns and three 14" sel’s only value was to act as an
torpedo tubes. In 1901, this was al- experimental craft to yield informa-
tered to one 3" gun, three 2.2" tion for future construction. The ves-
pieces, and two 14" torpedo tubes. sel went to the scrap yard in 1921.
206 ITALY: INDOMITO CLASS
ITALY: INDOMITO CLASS

Courtesy of Walker Archive
Units: Indomito, Intrepido, Irrequieto, fired boilers that produced a maxi-

Impavido, Impetuoso, Insidioso mum of 17,620 horsepower.
Type and significance: These vessels Speed: 30 knots
were the first Italian destroyers to Complement: 80
mount turbines driven by oil-fueled Summary: These vessels were both the
boilers. first Italian destroyers to mount tur-
Dates of construction: Indomito, In- bines and the first large destroyers
trepido, and Irrequieto were built for the Italian Navy. All served
launched in 1912 while the other in World War I, in which Intrepido
three units followed the next year. and Impetuoso were sunk. The Ital-
Hull dimensions: 239'6" 24' 7'11" ians scrapped three of the units in
Displacement: 672 tons 1937; the last, Insidioso, served in
Armor: None World War II. The Germans seized
Armament: One 4.7" gun, four 3" the vessel in late 1943 for use in
pieces, and two 17.7" torpedo tubes. their navy, but in August 1944 a U.S.
Machinery: Turbines driven by four oil- torpedo plane sank the ship.
JAPAN: SHIRAKUMO CLASS 207
JAPAN: SHIRAKUMO CLASS

Units: Shirakumo, Asashio Machinery: Triple expansion engines

Type and significance: These vessels are that generated 6,000 horsepower.
examples of early Japanese destroyers. Speed: 29 knots
Dates of construction: Construction Complement: 59
on both units began in 1901 and Summary: These vessels are indicative
ended in 1902. of Japanese destroyers of the early
Hull dimensions: 216' 20'9" 6' twentieth century in that they are
Displacement: 342 tons British designs rather than domestic
Armor: None ones as Japan continued to develop
Armament: Two 12-pound guns, four 6- its shipbuilding capacity. Both units
pound pieces, and two 18" torpedo served in World War I and were
tubes. scrapped in 1923.
208 JAPAN: SAKURA CLASS
JAPAN: SAKURA CLASS

Units: Sakura, Tachibana Speed: 30 knots

Type and significance: These were the Complement: 95
first destroyers built in Japanese Summary: These ships represented a
shipyards to a domestic design. milestone for the Japanese shipbuild-
Dates of construction: Sakura was ing industry, being the first destroy-
laid down in 1911; Tachibana fol- ers launched in a Japanese yard to a
lowed in the next year. In 1912, both domestic design. Although the ships
units entered service. were of limited value as they were
Hull dimensions: 274' 24' 7'3" primarily designed for coastal de-
Displacement: 605 tons fense, the Japanese garnered valu-
Armor: None able experience through the con-
Armament: One 4.7" gun, four 3.1" struction of the Sakura class. Both
pieces, and four 18" torpedo tubes. vessels went to the scrap yards in
Machinery: Triple expansion engines 1933 after extensive service that in-
powered by five boilers that pro- cluded World War I.
duced 9,500 horsepower.
RUSSIA: PRUITKI 209
RUSSIA: PRUITKI
Type and significance: Pruitki was one of two 11-pound guns, two 15" tor-
of the fastest of the world’s early de- pedo tubes, and 10 mines.
stroyers. Machinery: Triple expansion engines
Dates of construction: Construction powered by eight coal-fired boilers
of Pruitki began in 1894 and con- that produced 3,800 horsepower.
cluded the following year. Speed: 30.2 knots
Hull dimensions: 190' 18'6" 7'6" Complement: 54
Displacement: 220 tons Summary: Pruitki, known by most of
Armor: None the world as Sokol, generated a great
Armament: The original armament con- deal of interest among naval officials
sisted of one 11-pounder, three 3- outside of Russia due to its speed.
pound guns, and two 15" torpedo After serving as a minelayer in World
tubes. Alterations later in the vessel’s War I, the craft went to the breakers
career led to an armament comprised in 1922.
210 RUSSIA: BESPOKOINY CLASS
RUSSIA: BESPOKOINY CLASS

Units: Bespokoiny, Gnevy, Gromki, Speed: 34 knots

Derzki, Pronzitelny, Bystry, Pospeshny, Complement: 125
Pylki, Schastlivy Summary: Russian naval officials appre-
Type and significance: The Russian de- ciated the potential of the airplane in
stroyers were among the early craft naval warfare and the danger it posed
that mounted weaponry for use to surface vessels. The Russians con-
against aircraft. sequently intended the 1.8" guns and
Dates of construction: All units en- the machine guns of the Bespokoiny
tered service between 1913 and 1914. class for use versus enemy aircraft.
Hull dimensions: 321'6" 30'6" All units served in World War I, in
10'6" which the Russians scuttled Pron-
Displacement: 1,100 tons zitelny and Gromki in June 1918; in
Armor: None October 1918 Schastlivy was wrecked.
Armament: Three 4" guns, two 1.8" The Russians sold the surviving units
pieces, four machine guns, 10 18" for scrap in 1924 with the exception
torpedo tubes, and 80 mines. of Bystry, which was destroyed in
Machinery: Turbines powered by five 1941.
oil-fired boilers that generated
25,500 horsepower.
UNITED STATES: FARRAGUT 211
UNITED STATES: FARRAGUT

Type and significance: Farragut was the Machinery: Two triple-expansion en-
first destroyer of the U.S. Navy. gines powered by three coal-fired
Dates of construction: Construction boilers that generated 5,888 horse-
began in 1897, and in 1899 the ves- power.
sel was commissioned into the navy. Speed: 30 knots
Hull dimensions: 214' 20'8" 6' Complement: 66
Displacement: 279 tons Summary: Although officially classed as
Armor: None a torpedo boat, Farragut was in actu-
Armament: Four six-pound guns and ality a destroyer. In 1919, the U.S.
two 18" torpedo tubes. Navy sold the ship for scrap.
212 UNITED STATES: BAINBRIDGE CLASS
UNITED STATES: BAINBRIDGE CLASS

Units: Bainbridge, Barry, Chauncey, that produced a maximum power

Dale, Decatur output of 8,000 horsepower.
Type and significance: The Bainbridge Speed: 29 knots
class was the first multiple-unit class Complement: 73
of destroyer in the U.S. Navy. Summary: These vessels signaled the
Dates of construction: All units were beginning of a construction plan in
laid down in 1899 and completed in the United States that centered on
1902. destroyers as protection against en-
Hull dimensions: 250' 23'7" 6'6" emy torpedo vessels. They were not
Displacement: 420 tons extremely seaworthy vessels despite
Armor: None the incorporation of a raised forecas-
Armament: Two 3" guns in single tle rather than a turtleback bow. All
mounts, five 6-pounders, and two units served in World War I, in which
18" torpedo tubes. Chauncey was lost in 1917 after a col-
Machinery: Triple expansion engines lision with another vessel. The other
powered by four coal-fired boilers units were sold for scrap in 1920.
UNITED STATES: PAULDING CLASS 213
UNITED STATES: PAULDING CLASS

Units: Roe, Terry, Paulding, Drayton, Armor: None

Perkins, Sterrett, McCall, Warring- Armament: Five 3" guns in single
ton, Burrows, Mayrant mounts and six 18" torpedo tubes.
Type and significance: These vessels Machinery: Turbines fed by four oil-
were the first destroyers in the U.S. fired boilers that produced 12,000
Navy to use oil rather than coal for shaft horsepower
fuel. Speed: 29.5 knots
Dates of construction: Roe and Terry Complement: 86
were launched in 1909; the other Summary: All vessels enjoyed lengthy
units followed in the next year. service and were scrapped between
Hull dimensions: 293' 26'3" 8' 1934 and 1935.
Displacement: 742 tons
214 UNITED STATES: CASSIN CLASS
UNITED STATES: CASSIN CLASS

Units: Aylwin, Balch, Parker, Benham, Machinery: Turbines and reciprocating

Cassin, Cummings, Duncan, Downs engines powered by four boilers that
Type and significance: These destroy- generated 16,000 shaft horsepower.
ers were the first of the U.S. 1,000- Speed: 29 knots
tonners. Complement: 98
Dates of construction: All units Summary: These ships represent the
launched between 1912 and 1913. culmination of U.S. destroyer design
Hull dimensions: 305'5" 30'2" in the era before World War I. All
Displacement: 1,010 tons participated in World War I and
Armor: None served well into the interwar period,
Armament: Four 4" guns in single being broken up between 1934 and
mounts and eight 18" torpedo tubes. 1935.
UNITED STATES: CLEMSON CLASS 215
UNITED STATES: CLEMSON CLASS

Units: This class comprised 161 units. Complement: 114

Type and significance: The Clemson- Summary: Almost all of these flush-
class destroyers represent one of two decked ships were still under con-
mass-produced groups of craft to struction at the close of World War I.
meet the needs of World War I. Several went to the scrap yards in the
Dates of construction: Construction early 1930s, but some units served in
took place between 1918 and 1920. World War II, in which various
Hull dimensions: 314'4" 30'10" causes led to the destruction of 15
9'10" units. Among these was Reuben
Displacement: 1,190 tons James, torpedoed and sunk by a Ger-
Armor: None man submarine on 31 October 1941.
Armament: Four 4" guns in single This vessel was the first U.S. warship
mounts, one 3" gun, and 12 21" tor- sunk in World War II. Following
pedo tubes. World War II, the United States
Machinery: Turbines powered by four transferred some units to the British
oil-fired boilers that produced a max- Royal Navy and the Royal Canadian
imum power output of 27,000 shaft Navy. The remaining ships were all
horsepower. scrapped by 1946.
Speed: 35 knots
D E S T R O Y E R S A N D F R I G AT E S ,
1919–1945
218 FRANCE: CHACAL CLASS
FRANCE: CHACAL CLASS

Units: Jaguar, Lynx, Tigre, Chacal, fired boilers that produced 50,000
Léopard, Panthère shaft horsepower.
Type and significance: These vessels Speed: 35 knots
were among the first known as super- Complement: 195
destroyers. Summary: Chacal and its sister ships
Dates of construction: Construction were designated by world naval offi-
on Jaguar came to an end in 1923; cials as superdestroyers due to their
the other units were launched the large size and powerful armament
following year. relative to the type of ship. This class
Hull dimensions: 415'11" 37'2" fared poorly in World War II, which
13'5" claimed most of the units. Jaguar was
Displacement: 2,126 tons sunk on 23 May 1940 by a German
Armor: None torpedo boat attack; Chacal was sunk
Armament: Five 5.1" guns in single the next day by aircraft. Lynx was
mounts protected by gun shields, two scuttled in 1942; the Italians seized
3" pieces, and six 21.7" torpedo tubes. Panthère and scuttled it the following
In 1939, eight 13.2mm AA guns re- year. Léopard was wrecked off the
placed one of the aft 5.1" pieces. coast of Tobruk. Only Tigre survived,
Machinery: Turbines fed by five oil- being scrapped in 1954.
FRANCE: GUÉPARD CLASS 219
FRANCE: GUÉPARD CLASS

Units: Guépard, Valmy, Verdun, Bison, Speed: 35.5 knots

Lion, Vauban Complement: 230
Type and significance: The first French Summary: These superdestroyers were
superdestroyers that displaced over larger, faster, and more heavily armed
2,400 tons. than the preceding Chacal class.
Dates of construction: Guépard, None survived World War II. In
Valmy, Verdun, and Bison were 1940, Bison was bombed and sunk
launched in 1928; Lion was com- off the coast of Norway. On 27 No-
pleted in 1929 with Vauban following vember 1942, the crews of the Gué-
the next year. pard, Valmy, Verdun, Lion, and Vau-
Hull dimensions: 427'2" 38'7" ban scuttled their vessels at the
15'4" French naval base of Toulon. The
Displacement: 2,436 tons Axis, however, raised Guépard, Valmy,
Armor: None Verdun, and Lion. Lion and Valmy
Armament: Five 5.5" guns in single were scuttled by the Italians in 1943
mounts protected by gun shields, and 1945, respectively, while Gué-
four 37mm pieces and four 13.2mm pard was destroyed by bombs in
guns for AA defense, and six 21.7" March 1944. Verdun, despite being
torpedo tubes. raised, was never repaired.
Machinery: Turbines powered by four
oil-fired boilers that generated 64,000
horsepower.
220 FRANCE: LE FANTASQUE CLASS
FRANCE: LE FANTASQUE CLASS

Units: Le Malin, Le Terrible, L’In- tered the AA armament to eight

domptable, L’Audacieux, Le Fan- 40mm guns and 10 20mm weapons.
tasque, Le Triomphant The only exception is Le Triomphant,
Type and significance: Contemporary which shipped only six 40mm guns.
naval officials viewed the super- Machinery: Turbines powered by four
destroyers of the Le Fantasque class oil-fired boilers that generated
as some of the most impressive de- 74,000 shaft horsepower.
stroyers of their era. Additionally, Le Speed: 37 knots
Terrible remains one of the fastest Complement: 210
vessels in modern naval history. Summary: These destroyers were ex-
Dates of construction: Le Malin, Le tremely powerful and fast in terms of
Terrible, and L’Indomptable were their type. Le Terrible achieved a
launched in 1933; the others fol- maximum speed of 45 knots, which
lowed in the next year. remains an enviable record in the
Hull dimensions: 434'4" 40'6" modern age. All units served in World
16'5" War II. L’Indomptable was scuttled
Displacement: 2,569 tons in 1942; L’Audacieux was destroyed
Armor: None by bombing in May 1943. The other
Armament: Five 5.5" guns in single units served well past the end of the
mounts protected by gun shields, four war. Le Triomphant was removed
37mm guns and four 13.2mm pieces from service in 1954; Le Fantasque
for AA defense, nine 21.7" torpedo followed in 1957. Le Terrible and Le
tubes, and 50 mines. Between 1943 Malin went to the breakers in 1962
and 1944, refits on surviving units al- and 1964, respectively.
FRANCE: MOGADOR CLASS 221
FRANCE: MOGADOR CLASS

Units: Volta, Mogador the armament comprised four 37mm

Type and significance: These two ves- guns and four 13.2mm weapons for
sels were the largest superdestroyers AA defense, 10 21.7" torpedo tubes,
ever built. and 40 mines.
Dates of construction: French ship- Machinery: Turbines powered by four
builders completed construction of oil-fired boilers that yielded 92,000
Volta in 1936; Mogador was launched shaft horsepower.
the following year. Speed: 39 knots
Hull dimensions: 451'1" 41'7" 15' Complement: 264
Displacement: 2,884 tons Summary: Both conducted operations
Armor: None in World War II. Neither unit sur-
Armament: Eight 5.5" guns in dual- vived the war, as they were scuttled
piece mounts protected by gun on 27 November 1942 at the French
houses. Two each were mounted in naval base of Toulon. They were
the bow and stern. The remainder of raised the next year and scrapped.
222 GERMANY: 1934 CLASS
GERMANY: 1934 CLASS

Units: Z1 (Leberecht Maas), Z2 (Georg many’s return to destroyer production

Thiele), Z3 (Max Schultz), Z4 (Rich- after World War I, but they were not
ard Beitzen) considered extremely successful ow-
Type and significance: Germany’s first ing to design limitations. The engines
class of destroyer built in the period were a high-pressure type intended to
after World War I. produce a great deal of energy for
Dates of construction: All units were propulsion, but they frequently broke
launched in 1935. down. Indeed, these vessels were
Hull dimensions: 391'5" 37' 13'1" rarely able to maintain their maxi-
Displacement: 1,625 tons mum speed. In addition, the ships
Armor: None were not very seaworthy.
Armament: Five 5" guns in single All units served in World War II.
mounts protected by gun shields, On 22 February 1940, German air-
four 37mm pieces and four 20mm craft sunk both Z1 (Leberecht Maas)
weapons for AA defense, and eight and Z3 (Max Schultz) when the pi-
21" torpedo tubes. lots mistakenly dropped their bombs.
Machinery: Turbines powered by six Z2 (Georg Thiele) was sunk the same
oil-fired boilers that generated year by British destroyers. The British
70,000 shaft horsepower. seized Z4 (Richard Beitzen) as a war
Speed: 38.2 knots reparation at the end of the conflict.
Complement: 315 They subsequently scrapped the ship
Summary: These vessels signaled Ger- in 1947.
GERMANY: 1936 CLASS 223
GERMANY: 1936 CLASS

Units: Z17 (Diether von Roeder), Z18 Speed: 40 knots

(Hans Lüdemann), Z19 (Hermann Complement: 313
Künne), Z20 (Karl Galster), Z21 Summary: Although these vessels re-
(Wilhelm Hiedkamp), Z22 (Anton tained the problematic high-pressure
Schmitt) steam plant of the 1934 class, the in-
Type and significance: These ships corporation of a clipper bow made
were among the last destroyers to en- them more seaworthy. All but one
ter service in Germany before World vessel was destroyed in World War II
War II. during the 1940 German invasion of
Dates of construction: All units were Norway. On 10 April 1940, British
launched between 1937 and 1938. destroyers sunk Z21 (Wilhelm Hied-
Hull dimensions: 404'2" 38'8" kamp) and Z22 (Anton Schmitt);
13'1" three days later Z17 (Diether von
Displacement: 1,811 tons Roeder), Z18 (Hans Lüdemann), and
Armor: None Z19 (Hermann Künne) engaged
Armament: Five 5" guns in single British destroyers, with the former
mounts protected by gun shields, being sunk. The crews of the other
four 37mm pieces and seven 20mm two ships, after exhausting their sup-
weapons for AA defense, and eight ply of ammunition, scuttled their
21" torpedo tubes. vessels. The Soviets seized Z20 (Karl
Machinery: Turbines powered by six Galster) as a war reparation in 1946
oil-fired boilers that generated 70,000 and subsequently scrapped it around
shaft horsepower. 1961.
224 GREAT BRITAIN: E AND F CLASS
GREAT BRITAIN: E AND F CLASS

Units: Echo, Eclipse, Electra, En- favor of one 3" gun and 1–4 20mm
counter, Escapade, Escort, Esk, Ex- weapons for the purpose of AA de-
press, Fame, Fearless, Firedrake, fense. By the end of World War II,
Forester, Foresight, Fortune, Fox- several vessels had undergone a fur-
hound, Fury ther refit that converted them into
Type and significance: The units of this escort destroyers that shipped three
destroyer class are examples of ves- 4.7" guns, six 20mm weapons, four
sels built to the stipulations of the 21" torpedo tubes, 125 depth
1930 London Treaty. charges, and a Hedgehog ASW
Dates of construction: Construction launcher. Still other units were refit-
was completed on all of these vessels ted for mine laying.
in 1934. Machinery: Turbines powered by three
Hull dimensions: 329' 33'3" 12'6" oil-fired boilers that generated
Displacement: 1,350–1,405 tons 36,000 shaft horsepower.
Armor: None Speed: 36 knots
Armament: The original armament con- Complement: 145
sisted of four 4.7" quick-firing guns Summary: This class conformed to the
in single mounts protected by gun tonnage restrictions of the 1930
shields and eight 21" torpedo tubes. London Treaty, the international
A refit removed four torpedo tubes in agreement crafted for the purpose of
GREAT BRITAIN: E AND F CLASS 225
arms limitation. All of these units to Greece and the Dominican Re-
served in World War II, with Eclipse, public, respectively. The former
Electra, Encounter, Escort, Esk, Fear- power broke up Echo in 1956, while
less, Firedrake, and Foresight being the latter nation scrapped Fame in
sunk from various causes. Fury 1968. All the other units remaining
stayed afloat after suffering heavy in British service save Express were
damage from a mine in 1944, only to scrapped between 1946 and 1948.
be declared beyond repair. After the Express followed in 1956.
war, the British sold Echo and Fame
226 GREAT BRITAIN: TRIBAL CLASS
GREAT BRITAIN: TRIBAL CLASS

Units: Afridi, Ashanti, Bedouin, Cos- guns and as many as 12 20mm guns
sack, Eskimo, Gurkha, Maori, were added for AA defense.
Mashona, Matabele, Mohawk, Nu- Machinery: Turbines supplied by three
bian, Punjabi, Sikh, Somali, Tartar, oil-fired boilers that produced
Zulu, Arunta, Bataan, Warramunga, 44,000 shaft horsepower.
Athabaskan (I), Haida, Huron, Iro- Speed: 36.25–36.5 knots
quois, Athabaskan (II), Cayuga, Mic- Complement: 190–250
mac, Nootka Summary: These vessels constitute a
Type and significance: These ships British reaction to the Japanese
were Great Britain’s only super- Fubuki-class destroyer and were in-
destroyers. tended primarily to engage vessels of
Dates of construction: All units were similar design. Although a British de-
launched between 1937 and 1946. sign, the Canadians and Australians
Hull dimensions: 377' 36'6" (37'6" built some of the units. Of those ves-
in the Canadian version) 13' sels that served in World War II, a to-
Displacement: 1,854 tons tal of 13 were sunk from various
Armor: None causes during the war. The British,
Armament: Eight 4.7" guns placed in Canadians, and Australians scrapped
four dual-gunned mounts protected the others between 1948 and 1966,
by gun shields with two each being with the exception of one. Haida, a
located fore and aft, four 2-pound Canadian warship, was preserved for
pom-pom AA guns, four 21" torpedo the nation in 1964 and is now a mu-
tubes, and 30–45 depth charges. seum ship anchored at Hamilton,
During World War II, two 40mm Ontario.
GREAT BRITAIN: HUNT CLASS 227
GREAT BRITAIN: HUNT CLASS

Units: Atherstone, Berkeley, Blencathra, Speed: 28 knots

Brocklesby, Cattistock, Cleveland, Complement: 147
Cotswold, Cottesmore, Eglinton, Ex- Summary: The design of the Hunt class
moor, Fernie, Garth, Hambledon, was intended primarily for ASW war-
Liddesdale, Mendip, Meynell, Pytch- fare to protect convoys against en-
ley, Quantock, Quorn, Southdown, emy submarines, which is why they
Tynedale, Whaddon became known as escort destroyers.
Type and significance: The units of this All of them operated in World War II.
class were the world’s first escort de- Berkeley, Exmoor, Quorn, and Tyn-
stroyers. dale were destroyed in the conflict by
Dates of construction: All of the ves- either bombs or torpedoes. The
sels were launched between 1939 British retained the surviving units
and 1940. after the war and sold Mendip to
Hull dimensions: 280' 29' 12'6" China in 1948, Cottesmore to Egypt
Displacement: 1,000 tons in 1950, and Meynell and Quantock
Armor: None to Ecuador in 1954. China returned
Armament: Four 4" guns in two dual- Mendip in 1949, which the British
gunned mounts protected by gun subsequently scrapped. Egypt oper-
houses, four 2-pounder pom-pom AA ated its vessel into the 1980s;
weapons, and 50–110 depth charges. Ecuador discarded its warships in
Machinery: Turbines powered by three 1978. The 14 units that remained in
oil-fired boilers that generated British service were scrapped be-
19,000 shaft horsepower. tween 1948 and 1968.
228 GREAT BRITAIN: RIVER CLASS
GREAT BRITAIN: RIVER CLASS

Units: This class comprised 139 units. type for accelerated mass production
Type and significance: These vessels to counter the dire threat of German
were the first frigates in the world. submarines to British commerce in
Dates of construction: All units were World War II. Although the British
launched between 1942 and 1944. produced this design, the Canadians
Hull dimensions: 301'4" 36'8" and Australians built a substantial
11'10" amount of the overall number. These
Displacement: 1,310–1,460 tons vessels, known as frigates, were to-
Armor: None tally devoted to convoy escort, which
Armament: Two 4" guns in single is evident given the small number of
mounts, one being located fore and guns and low speed that rendered
aft, 126–150 depth charges, and one them incapable of fleet operations.
Hedgehog ASW launcher. Only six of these craft were de-
Machinery: Triple expansion engines stroyed in World War II. Most of the
powered by three oil-fired boilers others remained in service in the
that produced 6,500 shaft horse- British Royal Navy, Royal Canadian
power. Navy, and Royal Australian Navy;
Speed: 20 knots some were sold to a variety of na-
Complement: 140 tions. The majority of the River class
Summary: The British intended this was scrapped by the mid-1960s.
GREAT BRITAIN: CH, CO, CR CLASSES 229
GREAT BRITAIN: CH, CO, CR CLASSES

Units: Chaplet, Charity, Chequers, 40mm Bofors AA guns, and four 21"
Cheviot, Chevron, Chieftain, Child- torpedo tubes. They also shipped a
ers, Chivalrous, Cockade, Comet, Co- depth charge armament of up to 108
mus, Concord, Consort, Constance, depth charges. During World War II,
Contest, Cossack, Creole, Crescent, all units received additional AA
Crispin, Cromwell, Crown, Croziers, weapons, normally being 20mm guns.
Crusader, Crystal Machinery: Turbines driven by three
Type and significance: This class was oil-fired boilers that produced 40,000
among the last built in Great Britain shaft horsepower.
during World War II. Speed: 36.75 knots
Dates of construction: All units were Complement: 186–211
launched between 1944 and 1945 Summary: These vessels did not enter
and completed between 1945 and service in time to participate in
1946. World War II. The British scrapped
Hull dimensions: 362'9" 35'8" 16 of them between 1960 and 1971
14'3" and sold the others to foreign pow-
Displacement: 1,710–1,730 tons ers. Pakistan acquired four and Nor-
Armor: None way bought another four. The first
Armament: The original armament con- power operated three of its ships into
sisted of four 4.5" guns in single the 1980s; the latter nation scrapped
mounts protected by gun shields, two its vessels between 1966 and 1967.
230 ITALY: NAVIGATORI CLASS
ITALY: NAVIGATORI CLASS

Units: Nicolo Zeno, Luca Tarigo, and four 13.2mm for AA defense and
Ugolini Vivaldi, Alvise da Mosto, An- six 21" torpedo tubes.
tonio da Noli, Nicoloso da Recco, Machinery: Turbines powered by four
Giovanni di Varrazzano, Lanzerotto oil-fired boilers that generated
Malocello, Leone Pancaldo, Eman- 50,000 horsepower.
uele Pessagno, Antonio Pigafetta, An- Speed: 38 knots
toniotto Usodimare Complement: 224
Type and significance: These vessels Summary: Italy constructed these ves-
comprised Italy’s first and only class sels to counter the superdestroyers of
of superdestroyers. France, its primary naval rival. The
Dates of construction: The ships were ships were slightly unstable in a sea-
launched between 1928 and 1930. way, but the relatively calm waters of
Hull dimensions: 352' 33'5" 11'2" the Mediterranean Sea, their princi-
Displacement: 1,900 tons pal theater of operation, obviated any
Armor: None potential problem. All units served in
Armament: Six 4.7" guns placed in World War II. Only Nicoloso da Recco
three dual-piece mounts, one each survived the war and served until
being sited in the bow and the stern 1954, when the Italians scrapped the
while the third was located amidship.
ships. In addition, two 40mm guns
ITALY: PEGASO CLASS 231
ITALY: PEGASO CLASS

Units: Pegaso, Procione, Orsa, Orione oil-fired boilers that generated 16,000
Type and significance: These small ves- horsepower.
sels represent the Italian trend of Speed: 28 knots
building smaller destroyers for the Complement: 168
sake of quick construction. Summary: Although the Italians did not
Dates of construction: Pegaso was specifically design these ships as es-
launched in 1936; the other three cort destroyers, their rather heavy
units followed the next year. ASW armament made them best
Hull dimensions: 293' 31'9" 12'3" suited for the role. As a result, this
Displacement: 840 tons design was a step toward the purpose-
Armor: None built escort destroyer. All units served
Armament: Two 3.9" guns in single in World War II, with Pegaso and Pro-
mounts protected by small gun cione being scuttled in 1943. The
shields, four 18" torpedo tubes, eight Italians removed Orsa and Orione
13.2mm AA weapons, and six depth from service in 1964 and 1965, re-
charge throwers. spectively.
Machinery: Turbines powered by two
232 JAPAN: MUTSUKI CLASS
JAPAN: MUTSUKI CLASS

Units: Mutsuki, Kisaragi, Yayoi, Udzuki, Machinery: Turbines powered by four

Satsuki, Minadsuki, Fumidsuki, Na- oil-fired boilers that yielded 38,500
gatsuki, Kirudsuki, Mikadsuki, Mo- shaft horsepower.
chidsuki, Yudsuki Speed: 37.2 knots
Type and significance: These destroy- Complement: 150
ers were the first in the world to Summary: The Japanese attached great
carry the 24" torpedo, known as the value to the use of destroyers in their
Long Lance. role of torpedo attack. The units of
Dates of construction: All units were the Mutsuki class, with their 24"
launched between 1925 and 1927. Long Lance torpedo tubes, exhibited
Hull dimensions: 320'(pp) 20' this emphasis. All warships of the
9'9" class were sunk in World War II. Mi-
Displacement: 1,315 tons nadsuki was destroyed by a U.S. sub-
Armor: None marine; the others were sunk by Al-
Armament: Four 4.7" dual-purpose lied aircraft.
guns in single, unprotected mounts,
two 7.7mm weapons, six 24" torpedo
tubes, and 18 depth charges.
JAPAN: FUBUKI CLASS 233
JAPAN: FUBUKI CLASS

Units: Fubuki, Shinonome, Isonami, set a design trend for heavily armed
Usugumo, Shirakumo, Shirayuki, destroyers in many other naval pow-
Hatsuyuki, Miyuki, Murakumo, ers. Their design caused a great stir
Uranami, Shikinami, Ayanami, Asa- in naval circles due to their many in-
giri, Sagiri, Yugiri, Amagiri, Oboro, novations. These vessels were the
Akebono, Sazanami, Ushio first destroyers to mount their guns
Type and significance: At the time of in turrets and these were armored to
their launch, the units of the Fubuki prevent damage from splinters. The
class were the best-armed destroyers inclusion of director control for aim-
in the world. ing greatly increased the effective-
Dates of construction: Fubuki was ness of the guns. Later units of the
launched in 1927 and followed by class also incorporated the innova-
the other units between 1927 and tion of dual-purpose weapons, being
1930. guns that could either fire at surface
Hull dimensions: 388'6" 34' 10'6" targets or aircraft. A further improve-
Displacement: 1,750 tons ment in destroyer design that the
Armor: Light armor on turrets Japanese incorporated in the Fubuki
Armament: Six 5" guns housed in three, class was a totally enclosed bridge to
twin-gunned turrets. One of these protect the crew from the elements.
was located in the bow while the This made the Fubuki class the first
other two were placed in the stern. in the world with this feature.
In addition, two 13mm guns for AA The main design weakness was
defense, nine 24" torpedo tubes, and stability at sea, as the weight of the
18 depth charges. turrets, director, and bridge made the
Machinery: Turbines powered by four units of the Fubuki class top-heavy.
oil-fired boilers that produced All but one, Miyuki, which was sunk
50,000 shaft horsepower. in 1934 by a collision with another
Speed: 38 knots vessel, served in World War II. Only
Complement: 197 Ushio survived the conflict. It was
Summary: The Fubuki-class destroyers scrapped in 1948.
234 JAPAN: HATSUHARU CLASS
JAPAN: HATSUHARU CLASS

Units: Nenohi, Hatsuharu, Hatsushimo, Machinery: Turbines powered by three

Wakaba, Yugure, Ariake oil-fired boilers that generated
Type and significance: These destroy- 42,000 shaft horsepower.
ers were the first in Japan designed Speed: 36.5 knots
to conform to the stipulations of the Complement: 200
1930 London Treaty. Summary: Following Japan’s signing of
Dates of construction: Nenohi was the 1930 London Treaty that limited
launched in 1932; the other units the displacement of destroyers to
followed in 1933 and 1934. 1,500 tons and the size of the arma-
Hull dimensions: 359'3" 32'10" ment to 5" guns, the Japanese sought
9'11" to incorporate the greatest amount of
Displacement: 1,490 tons armament into a ship that conformed
Armor: None to the displacement stipulation. All
Armament: Five 5" dual-purpose guns, operated in World War II, during
two 13mm AA weapons, nine 24" which all were lost.
torpedo tubes, and 14 depth charges.
JAPAN: KAGERO CLASS 235
JAPAN: KAGERO CLASS

Units: Kagero, Kuroshio, Oyahio, Hat- During World War II, the Japanese
sukaze, Natsushio, Yukikaze, Haya- altered the armament in favor of a
shio, Maikaze, Isokaze, Shiranui, greater AA capacity. This arrange-
Amatsukaze, Tokitsukaze, Urakaze, ment consisted of four 5" dual-pur-
Hamakaze, Nowaki, Arashi, Hagi- pose guns, 14 25mm AA weapons,
kaze, Tanikaze and 36 depth charges. Subsequent
Type and significance: This design was refits increased this new armament to
the last produced by Japan before the as many as 24 25mm AA guns.
outbreak of World War II. Machinery: Turbines powered by three
Dates of construction: Construction oil-fired boilers that produced
of the class took place between 1938 52,000 shaft horsepower.
and 1940. Speed: 35 knots
Hull dimensions: 388'9" 35'5" Complement: 240
12'4" Summary: All but one was lost in World
Displacement: 2,033 tons War II to a variety of causes that in-
Armor: None cluded Allied air attack and surface
Armament: The armament consisted action. The survivor, Yukikaze, was
originally of six 5" dual-purpose guns, transferred to China in 1947 and
four 25mm AA weapons, eight 24" then Taiwan in 1949. The Taiwanese
torpedo tubes, and 16 depth charges. scrapped the vessel in 1971.
236 JAPAN: AKITSUKI CLASS
JAPAN: AKITSUKI CLASS

Units: Akitsuki, Terutsuki, Suzutsuki, Machinery: Turbines powered by three

Hatsusuki, Niitsuki, Wakatsuki, Shi- oil-fired boilers capable of 52,000
motsuki, Fuyutsuki, Hanatsuki, Yoi- shaft horsepower.
tsuki, Harutsuki, Natsutsuki Speed: 33 knots
Type and significance: These vessels Complement: 300
were among the last fleet destroyers Summary: The Japanese specifically de-
built by the Imperial Japanese Navy. signed these vessels to provide AA
Dates of construction: These units defense for aircraft carriers. Akitsuki,
were launched between 1941 and Terutsuki, Hatsusuki, Niitsuki, Waka-
1944. tsuki, and Shimotsuki were destroyed
Hull dimensions: 440'3" 38'1" in World War II. Suzutsuki, Fuyut-
13'7" suki, Hanatsuki, and Natsutsuki were
Displacement: 2,701 tons scrapped in 1948. In 1947, the other
Armor: None two units, Yoitsuki and Harutsuki,
Armament: Eight dual-purpose 3.9" were transferred to China and the
guns in dual-gunned mounts that Soviet Union, respectively. The Chi-
were fully enclosed by gun houses nese scrapped their vessel in 1963;
with two each sited in the bow and the Soviets expended their unit as a
stern. In addition, four 24" torpedo missile target ship sometime in the
tubes, four 25mm AA weapons, and late 1960s.
72 depth charges.
SOVIET UNION: GNEVNYI CLASS 237
SOVIET UNION: GNEVNYI CLASS

Units: This class comprised 31 units. Machinery: Turbines powered by oil-

Type and significance: These Soviet fired boilers that generated 48,000
vessels were indicative of Stalin’s de- shaft horsepower.
sire to revive Russia’s destroyer pro- Speed: 37 knots
gram in the years after the 1917 rev- Complement: 240
olution. Summary: Although being constructed
Dates of construction: All units were entirely in Russian shipyards, the
launched between 1936 and 1941. Gnevnyi class relied heavily on Ital-
Hull dimensions: 370'7" 22'6" ian naval engineering. All but one
13'5" unit, Reshitelnyi (which ran aground
Displacement: 1,855 tons in 1938), served in World War II.
Armor: None Operations in World War II claimed
Armament: Four 5.1" guns in single 10 of the vessels. The Soviets re-
mounts housed in gun shields with moved most of the others from the
two each being located in the bow navy in the 1950s, while four units
and stern. In addition, two 3" guns, were transferred to China in 1955.
six 21" torpedo tubes, two 45mm and These vessels served the People’s Re-
four .5" guns for AA defense, and 56 public of China until the mid-1980s.
mines.
238 SOVIET UNION: STOROZHEVOI CLASS
SOVIET UNION: STOROZHEVOI CLASS

Units: This class consisted of 19 units. three 37mm AA weapons, four .5"
Type and significance: These ships machine guns, six 21" torpedo tubes,
were the first completely Russian de- and 60 mines.
signed and built destroyers of the Machinery: Turbines powered by four
postrevolution era in Russia. oil-fired boilers that yielded 54,000
Dates of construction: All units were shaft horsepower.
launched between 1938 and 1940. Speed: 36 knots
13'1" Summary: Service in World War II led
Displacement: 2,192 tons to the destruction of nine of these
Armor: None vessels. All of the other units, except
Armament: Four 5.1" guns in single for Soobrazitelnyi, were taken out of
mounts protected by gun shields. service by 1959. In 1966, the one
The bow and stern each carried two surviving unit became a museum
of these. In addition, two 3" guns, ship.
UNITED STATES: FARRAGUT CLASS 239
UNITED STATES: FARRAGUT CLASS

Units: Hull, Farragut, Aylwin, Dewey, Owing to the threat of enemy air-
MacDonough, Worden, Dale, Mon- craft, during World War II the arma-
aghan ment included additional AA weap-
Type and significance: These U.S. de- ons at the cost of one aft 5" gun.
stroyers were the first in the United They also shipped depth charges for
States produced to a post–World War ASW operations.
I design. Machinery: Turbines powered by two
Dates of construction: These ships oil-fired boilers that produced
were launched between 1934 and 42,800 shaft horsepower.
1935. Speed: 36.5 knots
11'7" Summary: These ships proved to be the
Displacement: 1,358 tons template for all U.S. destroyer pro-
Armor: None duction before World War II. All
Armament: The original armament con- units served in World War II. In
sisted of five 5" guns in single mounts 1943, Worden was sunk; Hull and
with the forward two guns being pro- Monaghan followed the next year.
tected by partially enclosed gun The other units went to the scrap
houses. In addition, four .5" machine yard in 1947.
guns and eight 21" torpedo tubes.
240 UNITED STATES: SIMS CLASS
UNITED STATES: SIMS CLASS

Units: Sims, Hughes, Anderson, Ham- weapons, eight 21" torpedo tubes,
mann, Mustin, Russell, O’Brien, and 10 depth charges.
Walke, Morris, Roe, Wainwright, Buck Machinery: Turbines powered by three
Type and significance: This class of oil-fired boilers that produced
U.S. destroyer serves as an example 50,000 shaft horsepower.
of U.S. destroyer design upon the Speed: 35 knots
outbreak of World War II. Complement: 190
Dates of construction: All units were Summary: All of the vessels in the class
constructed between 1938 and 1939. served in World War II. Sims, Ham-
Hull dimensions: 348'4" 36' mann, O’Brien, Walke, and Buck
12'10" were destroyed in the conflict. By
Displacement: 1,764 tons 1948, the others were either scrapped
Armor: None or destroyed as test ships.
Armament: Five 5" guns, four .5" AA
UNITED STATES: BENSON/GLEAVES CLASS 241
UNITED STATES: BENSON/GLEAVES CLASS

Courtesy of U.S. Naval Institute
Units: This class comprised 95 units. tion, six .5" AA guns, 10 21" torpedo
Type and significance: This class was tubes, and depth charge racks. The
both the last design produced before actual armament following the first
World War II and the last to adhere 24 units varied, and many were refit-
to the stipulations of the 1930 Lon- ted with different armaments during
don Treaty, despite the fact that the World War II.
agreement had expired. Machinery: Turbines powered by four
Dates of construction: The first of oil-fired boilers that generated
these units was launched in 1939 50,000 shaft horsepower.
and construction continued on the Speed: 35 knots
class through 1943. Complement: 208
Hull dimensions: 348'4" 36'1" Summary: These vessels served exten-
13'2" sively in World War II. Fourteen of
Displacement: 1,839 tons the class were sunk in the war. Most
Armor: None of the others operated far past World
Armament: As designed, five 5" guns in War II, the last in U.S. service being
single mounts enclosed in gun scrapped in 1972. The United States
houses. Two each of these were lo- transferred several units to other
cated in the bow and stern while the powers following the war. Taiwan op-
fifth was sited aft amidships. In addi- erated one of them until 1976.
242 UNITED STATES: FLETCHER CLASS
UNITED STATES: FLETCHER CLASS

Units: This class comprised 178 ships. located aft amidships. In addition,
Type and significance: This class of de- four 1.1" weapons and four 20mm
stroyer is the largest, in terms of the guns for AA defense, 10 21" torpedo
number of units, ever produced in tubes, and depth charges.
the world. Machinery: Turbines fed by four oil-
Dates of construction: Construction fired boilers that generated 60,000
of the vessels in this class spanned shaft horsepower.
from 1942 to 1944. Speed: 38 knots
13'9" Summary: The Fletcher class was an im-
Displacement: 2,325 tons pressive design that incorporated the
Armor: Side armor .75" thick and .5"- rare feature (for a destroyer) of ar-
thick deck protection protected the mor protection. Most operated in
machinery spaces and engines. World War II. Fifteen of them were
Armament: The original armament con- sunk from various causes. Many of
sisted of five 5" guns in single them also served in the Korean War
mounts that were completely en- for the purpose of gunfire support. In
closed by gun houses. The bow and 1975, the U.S. Navy removed the
the stern contained two each of last Fletcher-class destroyer from ser-
these weapons. The fifth mount was vice. Units of this class ended up in
UNITED STATES: FLETCHER CLASS 243
the service of Argentina, Brazil, and Museum at Baton Rouge, Loui-

Chile, Columbia, Greece, Japan, siana. The Sullivans is preserved as
Mexico, Peru, South Korea, Spain, part of the Buffalo and Erie County
Taiwan, Turkey, and West Germany. Naval and Military Park in Buffalo,
None remain in service, but three New York. Cassin Young was pre-
survive as museums. Kidd is part of served in 1978 as a museum in the
the Louisiana Veterans Memorial Boston Navy Yard.
244 UNITED STATES: GEARING CLASS
UNITED STATES: GEARING CLASS

Units: This class comprised 108 units. Speed: 36.8 knots

Type and significance: The Gearing Complement: 336
class was the last fleet destroyer de- Summary: These destroyers represented
sign of the United States in World the pinnacle of U.S. destroyer design
War II. in World War II and were extremely
Dates of construction: All units were good craft. None were sunk in World
launched between 1944 and 1946. War II, and all served during the
Hull dimensions: 390'6" 40'10" Cold War era. Those in U.S. service
14'4" received FRAM I conversions; others
Displacement: 2,616 tons were transferred to Brazil, Ecuador,
Armor: None Egypt, Greece, Iran, Pakistan, South
Armament: The original armament con- Korea, Spain, Taiwan, and Turkey. In
sisted of six 5" guns in dual mounts 2004, Taiwan had most of the surviv-
enclosed by gun houses. Two were ing Gearing-class destroyers, being
sited in the bow while the third was seven units that received FRAM I
located on the stern. In addition, the conversions. Mexico maintains two
vessel carried 12 40mm guns and 11 vessels in its navy. Other vessels sur-
20mm weapons for AA defense, 10 vive as museums. Orleck is main-
21" torpedo tubes, and depth charge tained as a museum by the Southeast
racks or depth charge throwers. Most Texas War Memorial and Heritage
of those vessels receiving the FRAM Foundation in Orange, Texas. Joseph
I modernization between 1959 and P. Kennedy Jr. is preserved in Battle-
1964 had one of the 5" guns and its ship Cove at Fall River, Massachu-
gun house removed as well as all setts. Eversole (II) was transferred to
smaller weaponry. In its place were Turkey in 1973 and renamed Gayret.
substituted one ASROC ASW sys- It was stricken in 1995 and is now
tem, six 12.75" homing torpedo preserved as a museum at Izmit,
tubes, and a DASH ASW system. Turkey.
Machinery: Turbines powered by four
oil-fired boilers capable of 60,000
shaft horsepower.
D E S T R O Y E R S A N D F R I G AT E S ,
1946–2004
246 FRANCE: SUFFREN CLASS
FRANCE: SUFFREN CLASS

Units: Suffren, Duquesne homing torpedoes. Currently, the

Type and significance: These vessels Duquesne retains the Mascura sys-
were the first French purpose-built tem, the two 3.9" guns, and the four
guided missile destroyers. torpedo tubes and carries four Exo-
Dates of construction: Suffren was cet SSM, six 20mm guns, and two
laid down in 1962 and completed in 12.7mm weapons.
1967; Duquesne was laid down in Machinery: Two turbines powered by
1964 and completed in 1970. four oil-fired boilers that produce a
Hull dimensions: 517' 51' 20' maximum power output of 72,500
Displacement: 5,335 tons shaft horsepower.
Armor: None Speed: 34 knots
Armament: The original armament con- Complement: 355
sisted of one Mascura SAM launcher Summary: The Suffren class provided
located in the stern, one Malafon the French with a template for future
ASW launcher sited amidships, two warship design in their navy. Suffren
3.9" guns, two 30mm weapons, and was decommissioned in 2001; Du-
four torpedo tubes that fire ASW quesne is scheduled to follow in 2007.
FRANCE: TOURVILLE CLASS 247
FRANCE: TOURVILLE CLASS

Units: Tourville, Duguay-Trouin, De two torpedo tubes that fire ASW

Grasse homing torpedoes, and two ASW hel-
Type and significance: These ships icopters that operate off a flight deck
were the first destroyers designed to on the stern. Currently, Tourville and
carry the French Exocet SSM. De Grasse have the same armament
Dates of construction: Tourville, with the exception of the Malafon
Duguay-Trouin, and De Grasse were ASW system, which has been re-
laid down in 1970, 1971, and 1972, moved.
respectively. Tourville and Duguay- Machinery: Two turbines powered by
Trouin were completed in 1974 and four oil-fired boilers capable of
1975, while the other unit followed 58,000 shaft horsepower.
in 1977. Speed: 31 knots
Hull dimensions: 501' 50' 19' Complement: 303
Displacement: 4,580 tons Summary: Duguay-Trouin was removed
Armor: None from service in 1999. The other two
Armament: Six Exocet SSM, a Crotale units remain in service, but Tourville
SAM launcher, one Malafon ASW and De Grasse are scheduled for de-
system, two 3.9" guns mounted in activation in 2008 and 2009, respec-
single-piece gun houses in the bow, tively.
248 FRANCE: D’ESTIENNE D’ORVES CLASS
FRANCE: D’ESTIENNE D’ORVES CLASS

Units: This class comprised 17 vessels. four Exocet SSM, one Matra Simbad
Type and significance: These ships are SAM system, one 3.9" gun, two
indicative of the reliance of many 20mm pieces, one ASW mortar, and
naval powers, like France, on frigates four torpedo tubes.
as they are smaller and cheaper to Machinery: Two diesel engines that
construct than destroyers. generate 12,000 horsepower.
Dates of construction: These units Speed: 23 knots
were laid down between 1972 and Complement: 79
1981, with the final unit being ready Summary: These vessels are designed
for service in 1986. primarily for coastal defense. The
Hull dimensions: 262' 34' 10' French sold three to Argentina, two
Displacement: 950 tons being existing units sold in 1978,
Armor: None while the third was a specially built
Armament: Originally, two Exocet SSM, ship additional to the original num-
one 3.9" gun in a single-piece gun ber. In 2000, the French sold an-
house mounted forward, one ASW other six vessels to Turkey. Nine units
mortar, and four torpedo tubes that remain in service and are scheduled
fire ASW homing torpedoes. The for decommissioning in 2015.
units that remain in service carry
FRANCE: LAFAYETTE CLASS 249
FRANCE: LAFAYETTE CLASS

Units: Lafayette, Surcouf, Courbet, Armament: Eight Exocet SSM, one

Aconit, Guépratte Crotale SAM launcher, one 3.9" gun
Type and significance: These vessels located in the bow, two 20mm weap-
are among the newest frigates of the ons, two 12.7mm guns, and one heli-
French Navy. copter that operates off a flight deck
Dates of construction: These units located on the stern.
were laid down between 1990 and Machinery: Diesel engines capable of
1998 with the last unit, Guépratte, 21,107 horsepower.
being ready for service in 2001. Speed: 25 knots
15'8" Summary: The design of these frigates
Displacement: 3,600 tons (full load) was viewed with interest by foreign
Armor: Machinery spaces and maga- powers. Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, and
zines are protected by steel plate Singapore have placed orders for
10mm thick. units of this type.
250 GERMANY: BREMEN CLASS
GERMANY: BREMEN CLASS

Units: Bremen, Nieddersachsen, Rein- Armor: None

land-Pfalz, Emden, Koln, Karlsruhe, Armament: Eight Harpoon SSM, one
Augsburg, Lübeck Sea Sparrow SAM system, one 3"
Type and significance: These German gun located in the bow, four ASW
frigates were the first warships pro- torpedo tubes, and two ASW helicop-
duced for West Germany since the ters contained in a hanger that forms
1960s. the vessel’s aft superstructure.
Dates of construction: The units were Machinery: Gas turbines and diesel en-
laid down between 1979 and 1987 gines that produce 10,400 brake
with the last, Lübeck, entering ser- horsepower.
vice in 1990. Speed: 30 knots
Hull dimensions: 420' 47'10" Complement: 200
19'9" Summary: All units are currently in ser-
Displacement: 3,700 tons (full load) vice.
GREAT BRITAIN: COUNTY CLASS 251
GREAT BRITAIN: COUNTY CLASS

Units: Devonshire, Hampshire, London, SSM, one Seaslug SAM launcher,

Kent, Fife, Glamorgan, Antrim, Nor- two Seacat SAM launchers, two 4.5"
folk guns in a single turret in the bow, and
Type and significance: These ships one helicopter. The surviving units
were the first purpose-built guided currently carry four Exocet SSM, two
missile destroyers of the British 4.5" guns in the bow turret, and six
Royal Navy 324mm torpedo tubes.
Dates of construction: These units Machinery: Steam and gas turbines
were laid down between 1959 and that produced 30,000 shaft horse-
1966, with the ships being com- power.
pleted between 1962 and 1970. Speed: 30 knots
Hull dimensions: 521'6" 54' 20'6" Complement: 440
Displacement: 6,200 tons Summary: Antrim and Glamorgan oper-
Armor: None ated in the 1982 Falklands War, in
Armament: The original armament con- which both were damaged by bombs
sisted of one Seaslug SAM launcher and, in the case of the latter unit,
located in the stern, two Seacat SAM one Exocet SSM as well. None re-
launchers, four 4.5" guns mounted main in service in the British Royal
in dual-gunned turrets located in the Navy. As of 2004, Chile operates
bow, two 20mm weapons, and one Norfolk, Antrim, and Fife as Capitán
ASW helicopter that operated on a Prat, Almirante Cochrane, and Almi-
flight deck located on the stern. This rante Blanco Encalada, respectively.
was later changed to four Exocet
252 GREAT BRITAIN: LEANDER CLASS
GREAT BRITAIN: LEANDER CLASS

Units: Leander, Ajax, Dido, Penelope, frigates to be among the best of their
Aurora, Euryalus, Galatea, Arethusa, type ever built in the missile age.
Naiad, Phoebe, Cleopatra, Minerva, Dates of construction: The original
Sirius, Juno, Argonaut, Danae (broad- units of this class were completed
beam version: Andromeda, Jupiter, between 1963 and 1967, with the
Charybdis, Hermione, Bacchante, broad-beam ships following between
Scylla, Achilles, Diomede, Apollo, 1969 and 1973.
Ariadne) Hull dimensions: 372' 41' 18'
Type and significance: Many naval (broad-beam version: 372' 43'
officials and scholars consider these 19')
GREAT BRITAIN: LEANDER CLASS 253
Displacement: 2,350 tons (broad-beam None remain in service in the British

version: 2,500 tons) Royal Navy. Most have been either
Armor: None scrapped outright or sunk as targets,
Armament: The original armament con- but some were sold to other nations,
sisted of two 4.5" guns in a dual- and some powers contracted for the
piece mount enclosed by a gun house construction of units. In 2004, of the
that was located in the bow, two original group, India, operates the
40mm guns, two 20mm guns, one former Andromeda as the training
Limbo system, and one helicopter. vessel Krishna. The former Achilles is
During refits, various units received now Ministro Zenteno in the service
one or a combination of the Exocet of Chile. The former Diomede and
SSM, Seacat SAM system, or Sea former Apollo are now the Pakistani
Wolf SAM system. warships Shamsher and Zulfiguar, re-
Machinery: Turbines powered by two spectively. In addition to these, on 27
boilers that generated 40,000 shaft March 2004, one decommissioned
horsepower. British vessel, Scylla, was towed into
Speed: 28.5 knots Whitsand Bay off the coast of Corn-
Complement: 250 wall, England, and scuttled for the
Summary: These ships proved to be suc- purpose of creating Britain’s first ar-
cessful and were frequently rearmed tificial diving reef.
over the course of their careers.
254 GREAT BRITAIN: AMAZON CLASS
GREAT BRITAIN: AMAZON CLASS

Units: Amazon, Antelope, Active, Am- 12.75" ASW torpedo tubes, and one
buscade, Arrow, Alacrity, Ardent, helicopter that operated on a flight
Avenger deck situated on the stern.
Type and significance: These frigates Machinery: Gas turbines that produced
are indicative of a general-purpose 56,000 shaft horsepower.
design for escort duty. Speed: 30 knots
Dates of construction: All units were Complement: 180
laid down between 1969 and 1974, Summary: These ships suffered from
with the last units being completed the fact that their hulls were very
in 1978. lightly built. Two of the units, Ante-
Hull dimensions: 384' 41'9" 19' lope and Amazon, were lost in the
Displacement: 3,100 tons 1982 Falklands War. The first ship
Armor: None sank from damage sustained by air-
Armament: One 4.5" gun mounted in launched rockets, while bomb dam-
the bow, four Exocet SSM, one Sea- age destroyed the other. The British
cat SAM system, two 20mm guns, six have retired all the units of this class.
GREAT BRITAIN: SHEFFIELD CLASS 255
GREAT BRITAIN: SHEFFIELD CLASS

Units: Sheffield, Birmingham, Cardiff, SAM system, two 20mm guns, six
Coventry, Newcastle, Glasgow, Exeter, 12.75" torpedo tubes, and one heli-
Southampton, Nottingham, Liverpool copter operating on a flight deck sit-
Type and significance: Guided missile uated on the stern. The units that re-
destroyers. main in operation carry one Sea Dart
Dates of construction: Sheffield was SAM system, one 4.5" gun, and four
laid down in 1970 and completed in 12.75" torpedo tubes as well as one
1975. The other units were laid helicopter.
down between 1972 and 1978 and Machinery: Gas turbines that gener-
completed between 1976 and 1982. ated 50,000 shaft horsepower.
Hull dimensions: 410 46' 19' Speed: 30 knots
Displacement: 3,850 tons Complement: 280
Armor: None Summary: At the time of their comple-
Armament: The original armament con- tion, these vessels comprised the
sisted of one 4.5" gun in a gun house largest class of guided missile de-
situated in the bow, one Sea Dart stroyers launched by Great Britain.
256 GREAT BRITAIN: SHEFFIELD CLASS
The design was extremely cramped tle, Glasgow, Exeter, Southampton,

for the crew and did not incorporate Nottingham, and Liverpool remain in
sufficient defense systems. As a re- service. Cardiff and Newcastle are
sult, both Sheffield and Coventry slated for removal from service in
were lost in 1982 in the Falklands 2007, while Glasgow is due for de-
War, the former by an Exocet SSM, commissioning in 2009.
the latter by bombs. Cardiff, Newcas-
GREAT BRITAIN: DUKE CLASS 257
GREAT BRITAIN: DUKE CLASS

Units: Norfolk, Argyll, Lancaster, Marl- the bow, a Sea Wolf SAM system in
borough, Iron Duke, Monmouth, the bow, one 4.5" gun, two 30mm
Montrose, Westminster, Northumber- guns, four torpedo tubes, and one
land, Richmond, Somerset, Grafton, helicopter that operates off a flight
Sutherland, Kent, Portland, St. Al- deck located on the stern.
bans Machinery: Gas turbines that can pro-
Type and significance: These frigates duce 31,000 horsepower. Also diesel
are the newest ships of their type in engines that generate 8,100 horse-
the British Royal Navy. power. Finally, the vessel mounts
Dates of construction: Construction electric motors that can yield 4,000
of the first unit, Norfolk, began in horsepower.
1985, with the ship being commis- Speed: 28 knots. Diesel-electric propul-
sioned in 1990. All other units were sion generates 15 knots.
ready for service between 1991 and Complement: 181
2002. Summary: These impressive ships incor-
Hull dimensions: 436'2" 52'9" 18' porate stealth technology into their
Displacement: 3,500 tons design to conceal the vessel from en-
Armor: None emy detection systems. All units are
Armament: Eight Harpoon SSM in two currently in service.
quadruple-cell launchers located in
258 ITALY: ANIMOSO (DE LA PENNE) CLASS
ITALY: ANIMOSO (DE LA PENNE) CLASS

Units: Luigi Durand De La Penne (for- Armament: One 5" gun mounted in the
mer Animoso), Francesco Mimbelli bow, three 3" guns with one being
(former Ardimentoso) mounted astern amidships and one
Type and significance: Currently these each being placed on the sides, eight
ships are the newest guided missile Ottomat SSM, one Standard SAM
destroyers of the Italian Navy. system, six 12.6" torpedo tubes, and
Dates of construction: Luigi Durand two helicopters.
De La Penne (former Animoso) was Machinery: Combined diesel and gas
laid down in 1988 and commissioned machinery capable of 54,000 horse-
in 1993. Francesco Mimbelli (former power.
Ardimentoso) was laid down in 1991 Speed: 31 knots
and was ready for service in 1993 Complement: 377
also. Summary: These destroyers are in active
Hull dimensions: 487'5" 52'10" service and rank as two of the best
28'2" surface combatants of the Italian
Displacement: 4,330 tons Navy.
Armor: Kevlar armor over vital areas.
ITALY: ARTIGLIERE CLASS 259
ITALY: ARTIGLIERE CLASS

Units: Artigliere, Aviere, Bersagliere, bow, eight Ottomat SSM, four 40mm
Granatiere guns, and one helicopter that oper-
Type and significance: These frigates ates on a flight deck situated on the
are the newest vessels of their type in stern.
the Italian Navy. Machinery: Gas turbines and diesel en-
Dates of construction: Construction gines that can produce a maximum
on all four vessels commenced be- power output of 50,000 horsepower.
tween 1982 and 1984, with the last Speed: 35 knots
unit being commissioned for service Complement: 185
in 1996. Summary: The Italians built these ves-
Hull dimensions: 371'4" 37'1" sels for sale to Iraq but transferred
12'1" the vessels to its own navy in lieu of
Displacement: 2,208 tons international arms embargoes that
Armor: None prohibited the sale. All units are cur-
Armament: One 5" gun mounted in the rently in service.
260 JAPAN: AMATSUKAZE
JAPAN: AMATSUKAZE
Type and significance: This vessel was six 12.75" torpedo tubes. In 1978,
the first guided missile destroyer the Terrier system was offloaded in
built in Japan. favor of a Standard SAM system.
Dates of construction: Amatsukaze Machinery: Turbines powered by oil-
was laid down in 1962 and com- fired boilers that produced a maxi-
pleted in 1965. mum output of 60,000 shaft horse-
Hull dimensions: 429'9" 43'11" power.
13'9" Speed: 33 knots
Armor: None Summary: This vessel is one of several
Armament: The original armament con- built by Japan that shows the re-
sisted of four 3" guns, one Terrier liance of the Japanese on U.S. mis-
SAM system, one ASROC ASW sile technology. Amatsukaze was
launcher, two Hedgehog devices, and withdrawn from service in 1995.
JAPAN: HARUNA CLASS 261
JAPAN: HARUNA CLASS

Courtesy of U.S. Navy
Units: Haruna, Hiei ASROC ASW system, six 12.75" tor-

Type and significance: These ships pedo tubes, and three helicopters.
were the first destroyers in the world These ships now carry one Sea Spar-
to carry three full-sized helicopters row SAM system and two 20mm
for ASW operations. Phalanx cannons.
Dates of construction: Haruna was Machinery: Turbines powered by two
laid down in 1970; Hiei followed two oil-fired boilers that are capable of
years later. The former unit was com- 70,000 shaft horsepower.
pleted in 1973, the latter in 1974. Speed: 31 knots
16'8" Summary: These ships and an enlarged
Displacement: 4,950 tons version of their type are the only de-
Armor: None stroyers in the world that carry three
Armament: The original armament con- helicopters. Both units remain in ser-
sisted of two 5" guns in two single vice.
mounts located in the bow, one
262 JAPAN: ASAGIRI CLASS
JAPAN: ASAGIRI CLASS

Units: Asagiri, Yamagiri, Yuugiri, Ama- Armament: One 3" gun mounted in the
giri, Hamagiri, Setogiri, Sawagiri, bow, eight Harpoon SSM, one Sea
Umigiri Sparrow SAM system, one ASROC
Type and significance: These destroy- ASW launcher, two 20mm Phalanx
ers represent some of Japan’s more cannon, six 12.75" torpedo tubes,
recent warship construction. and one helicopter operating on a
Dates of construction: These units flight deck situated on the stern.
were laid down between 1985 and Machinery: Gas turbines capable of
1988, with the last unit being com- 53,000 horsepower.
missioned in 1991. Speed: 30 knots
Hull dimensions: 449'5" 48' 14'7" Complement: 220
Displacement: 3,500 tons Summary: All ships are currently in ser-
Armor: None vice.
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: JIANGHU I CLASS 263
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: JIANGHU I CLASS

Units: This class comprised 30 units. amidships, two 3.9" guns, two RBU-
Type and significance: These frigates 1200 ASW launchers, twelve 37mm
were the first Chinese warships to guns, and depth charges.
carry SSMs. Machinery: Diesel engines that were
Dates of construction: The first of capable of 16,000 horsepower.
these units was launched in 1975 Speed: 25 knots
while the last was completed in Complement: 195
1984. Summary: The design of this vessel at-
Hull dimensions: 337'9" 39'4" tracted foreign interest, and improve-
13'2" ments on the design have led to addi-
Displacement: 1,800 tons tional, improved batches of the type
Armor: None both in China and through contracts
Armament: The original armament con- abroad. In 1984, the Chinese trans-
sisted of two 3.9" guns, four SS-N-2 ferred two of these units to Egypt,
SSM, two RBU-1200 ASW launch- and in 1989 a further unit of the
ers, twelve 37mm guns, and depth class was procured by Bangladesh. In
charges. In 2004, the surviving units 2004, the Chinese maintained 27
carried two HY-2 SSM launchers vessels of the class in service.
264 SOVIET UNION: KILDIN CLASS
SOVIET UNION: KILDIN CLASS

Units: Neulovimyy, Prozorlivyy, Bedovyy, mounted in the stern, two RBU-

Neuderzhimmy 2500 ASW launchers, four 3" guns,
Type and significance: These destroy- sixteen 2.2" pieces, and four 21" tor-
ers were the first in the world armed pedo tubes.
with missiles that had offensive capa- Machinery: Turbines powered by four
bility against other warships. oil-fired boilers that generated
Dates of construction: All were 72,000 shaft horsepower.
launched in 1958 and the first unit Speed: 38 knots
was completed by 1960. Complement: 285
Hull dimensions: 415'1" 42'8" Summary: These vessels were modified
15'1" units of another type, the Kotlin
Displacement: 2,850 tons class, that were fitted to mount the
Armor: None SSM weaponry. All have been
Armament: One SS-N-1 SSM launcher scrapped.
SOVIET UNION: KRUPNY CLASS 265
SOVIET UNION: KRUPNY CLASS

Units: Boiki, Derzkiy, Gnevnyy, Gordyy, Armament: The original armament con-
Gremyashchiy, Upornyy, Zhguchiy, sisted of two SS-N-1 missile launch-
Zorkiy ers, one each being located fore and
Type and significance: These destroy- aft, two RBU-2500 ASW launchers,
ers were the succeeding class to the sixteen 2.2" guns, and six 21" tor-
Kildin class and represent the con- pedo tubes. In 1968, a refit com-
tinued Soviet drive for warships menced that transformed the vessels
equipped with SSM weaponry. into ASW craft armed with one SA-
Dates of construction: The first of N-1 SAM system, three RBU-6000
these units was laid down about ASW launchers, 14 2.2" guns, and
1958 and completed by 1961. The six 21" torpedo tubes.
other units were constructed during Machinery: Turbines powered by four
the same period. oil-fired boilers that were capable of
Hull dimensions: 452'2" 48'11" 80,000 shaft horsepower.
Armor: None Summary: In May 1975, Boiki and
266 SOVIET UNION: KRUPNY CLASS
Zhuguchiy became the first Russian the thirtieth anniversary of the end
warships to visit a U.S. harbor when of World War II. All have been re-
they arrived in Boston to celebrate moved from service and scrapped.
SOVIET UNION: KASHIN CLASS 267
SOVIET UNION: KASHIN CLASS

Units: Obraztsovyy, Odarennyy, Stere- Armament: The original armament

guschchiy, Ognevoy, Provornyy, Kom- comprised two SA-N-1 SAM launch-
somolets Ukrainyy, Krasnyy Kavkaz, ers, two RBU-6000 and two RBU-
Krasnyy Krym, Reshitelnyy, Skoriy, 1000 ASW systems, four 3" guns,
Smetlivvyy, Soobrazitelnyy, Sposobnyy, and five 21" torpedo tubes.
Strogiy, Sderzhannyy, Smelyy, Smysh- Machinery: Gas turbines capable of
lennyy, Stroynyy 96,000 shaft horsepower.
Type and significance: These were the Speed: 38 knots
first AAW destroyers in the Soviet Complement: 300
Navy and the first warships of a sig- Summary: On 31 August 1974, Otvazh-
nificant size in the world that used nyy was sunk in the Black Sea by a
gas-powered turbine engines. fire that detonated the magazine for
Dates of construction: The first unit the SAM launcher. In 1988, the So-
entered service in 1963, while the viets transferred Smelyy to Poland.
last was ready for duty in 1972. Currently, all units but one are re-
Hull dimensions: 472'5" 51'10" tired from service; most have been
15'5" scrapped. Smetlivvyy is the only re-
Displacement: 3,750 tons maining vessel of the class still in
Armor: None service.
268 SOVIET UNION: KRIVAK CLASS
SOVIET UNION: KRIVAK CLASS

Units: This class comprised 42 units. the 3" weapons. In 2004, most of the
Type and significance: This design was surviving units carried eight SS-N-25
a large frigate that was unusual for SSM in two quadruple-cell launch-
the Soviet Union, which constructed ers, two SA-N-4 SAM systems, four
mostly small frigates for coastal de- 3" guns, eight 21" torpedo tubes, and
fense. two RBU-6000 ASW launchers.
Dates of construction: All units were Machinery: Diesel and gas plant capa-
laid down and completed between ble of 48,600 shaft horsepower.
1970 and 1991. Speed: 32 knots
15'1" Summary: On 8 November 1975, a por-
Displacement: 3,300 tons tion of the crew of one of these ves-
Armor: None sels, Storozhevoy, staged a mutiny in
Armament: One SS-N-14 SAM an effort to seize the ship and defect
launcher located on the bow, two SA- from the Soviet Union. Their en-
N-4 SAM launchers, four 3" guns, deavor ultimately failed. Today, 15 of
two RBU-6000 ASW launchers, these units remain in service. Of the
eight 21" torpedo tubes, and 20 others, three were transferred to
mines. Some of these ships, known Ukraine in 1997, and many of the
as Krivak II, have 4" guns in place of others have been scrapped.
SWEDEN: HALLAND CLASS 269
SWEDEN: HALLAND CLASS

Courtesy of Sjöhistoriska Museet, Stockholm
Units: Halland, Smaland Machinery: Turbines powered by two

Type and significance: These destroy- oil-fired boilers that produced 58,000
ers were the first in the world outside shaft horsepower.
the Soviet Union to carry antiship Speed: 35 knots
missiles. Complement: 290
Dates of construction: Both units Summary: These vessels are prime ex-
were laid down in 1951, with Hal- amples of the fact that technological
land being completed in 1955 and innovation was present in countries
Smaland following the next year. other than the major NATO powers
Hull dimensions: 397'2" 41'4" 18' and the Soviet Union. The design
Displacement: 2,630 tons proved successful and attracted in-
Armament: Four 4.7" guns in dual- terest from other nations. The Swedes
gunned gun houses with one each constructed two more units for Co-
being located in the bow and stern, lumbia. In 1985, the Swedes removed
one Saab Rb08A SSM launcher, two Halland from service. Smaland was
14.6" ASW rocket launchers, two retired a year earlier but preserved
2.2" guns, six 40mm weapons, eight for the nation as a museum ship at
21" torpedo tubes, and mines. Gothenburg, Sweden.
270 UNITED STATES: GYATT
UNITED STATES: GYATT

Type and significance: This World War the four 5" guns mounted in the bow,
II–era destroyer was refitted to be- a portion of the AA weaponry, and
come the world’s first guided missile one Terrier SAM launcher mounted
destroyer. in the stern in place of the original 5"
Dates of construction: Gyatt was gun house.
launched in 1945, refitted after Machinery: Turbines powered by four
World War II, and recommissioned oil-fired boilers that produced a max-
in 1956. imum power output of 60,000 shaft
Hull dimensions: 390'6" 40'10" horsepower.
Armor: None Summary: This ship was not only the
Armament: The original armament con- world’s first guided missile destroyer,
sisted of six 5" guns in dual-mount but it was also a prototype for the in-
gun houses. Two of these were lo- clusion of stabilization gear in the
cated in the bow and the last was U.S. Navy. The ship itself did not
sited in the stern. The ship also car- prove a great success in the sense
ried 12 40mm guns, 11 20mm weap- that it could not carry the large radar
ons, and 10 21" torpedo tubes. The set needed to properly control the
armament after the refit consisted of Terrier missile. The hull could not
UNITED STATES: GYATT 271
support the weight of such equip- stroyers. Despite its shortcomings,

ment without endangering the stabil- Gyatt served in the U.S. Navy and
ity. Nevertheless, Gyatt proved the participated in the 1962 blockade of
feasibility of mounting missiles on Cuba during the Cuban Missile Cri-
relatively small craft the size of de- sis. The ship was scrapped in 1969.
272 UNITED STATES: COONTZ CLASS
UNITED STATES: COONTZ CLASS

Units: Dewey, Coontz, Preble, Mahan, ward, one Terrier SAM launcher lo-
King, Farragut, Luce, MacDonough, cated in the stern, one ASROC ASW
Dahlgren, William V. Pratt launcher, and six 12.75" ASW tor-
Type and significance: These destroy- pedo tubes. Following refits, the ar-
ers, originally designated as frigates, mament consisted of eight Harpoon
were the world’s first purpose-built SSM, one Standard SAM launcher,
guided missile destroyers. one 5" gun, one ASROC launcher,
Dates of construction: All units were and six 12.75" torpedo tubes.
laid down in 1957 and 1958 and Machinery: Turbines powered by four
completed between 1959 and 1961. oil-fired boilers capable of 85,000
Hull dimensions: 512'6" 52'4" shaft horsepower.
Armor: None Summary: All have been removed from
Armament: The original armament con- service; most have been scrapped.
sisted of one 5" gun mounted for-
UNITED STATES: SPRUANCE AND KIDD CLASSES 273
UNITED STATES: SPRUANCE AND KIDD CLASSES

Units: Spruance, Paul F. Foster, Kinkaid, seven of the Spruance class were re-
Hewitt, Elliott, Arthur W. Radford, Pe- fitted in major overhauls that began
terson, Caron, David R. Ray, Olden- in 1986. When they emerged, the
dorf, John Young, Comte de Grasse, ships were armed with one 61-cell
O’Brien, Merrill, Briscoe, Stump, VLS launcher in the bow that is capa-
Conolly, Moosbruger, John Hancock, ble of Tomahawk missiles and AS-
Nicholson, John Rodgers, Leftwich, ROC weapons, eight Harpoon SSM,
Cushing, Harry W. Hill, O’Bannon, one Sea Sparrow SAM system, two 5"
Thorn, Deyo, Ingersoll, Fife, Fletcher guns located one each fore and aft,
Kidd class: Kidd, Callaghan, Scott, two 20mm Phalanx cannon, six
Chandler, Hayler 12.75" torpedo tubes, and one heli-
Type and significance: These two copter. The other vessels of the class
groups combined constitute one of as well as those of the Kidd class were
the two largest post–World War II refitted to include eight Harpoon
destroyer groups in the U.S. Navy. SSM.
Dates of construction: All units were Machinery: Gas turbines capable of
laid down between 1972 and 1980 80,000 shaft horsepower.
and completed between 1975 and Speed: 30 knots
1983. Complement: 296
Hull dimensions: 563'4" 55' 20'6" Summary: At present, Spruance, Elliot,
Displacement: 5,826 tons O’Brien, Briscoe, Stump, Cushing,
Armor: Kevlar armor added to the O’Bannon, Thorn, Deyo, and Fletcher
Spruance class while the Kidd class remain in service. The other vessels,
were constructed with armor in- including all those that did not re-
cluded over vital spaces. ceive the VLS upgrade, are decom-
Armament: The original armament con- missioned. The last warships of the
sisted of two 5" guns, one each being class are scheduled for removal from
located fore and aft, one Sea Sparrow service by 2007. All of the vessels of
SAM launcher, one ASROC ASW the Kidd class have been removed
launcher, six 12.75" torpedo tubes, from service and will be sold to Tai-
and one helicopter operating on a wan. They will reenter service in the
flight deck sited in the stern. All but Taiwanese Navy by 2006.
274 UNITED STATES: OLIVER HAZARD PERRY CLASS
UNITED STATES: OLIVER HAZARD PERRY CLASS

Units: This class comprised 54 units. Armor: None

Type and significance: These frigates Armament: The original armament
constitute both the largest class of comprised one 3" gun located aft
this type built by the United States in amidships, one Standard SAM sys-
the post–World War II era and the tem, six 12.75" torpedo tubes, and
only class of frigate remaining in the two helicopters that operate on a
U.S. Navy. flight deck sited on the stern. The
Dates of construction: These units SAM launcher is capable of firing
were laid down between 1975 and both SAM ordnance and the Har-
1987 and completed between 1977 poon SSM. A 20mm Phalanx cannon
and 1988. has been added to the armament. In
Hull dimensions: 445' 45' 22'; 2004, those vessels that remain in
455' 45' 22' (long-hulled ver- the U.S. Navy are armed with four
sion that comprises the majority of Harpoon SSM and Standard SAM
the class) missiles that can both be fired from a
Displacement: 2,650 tons (2,750 tons twin launcher located in the bow,
for long-hulled craft) one 3" gun, one 20mm Phalanx can-
UNITED STATES: OLIVER HAZARD PERRY CLASS 275
non, six 12.75" torpedo tubes, and sunk on 17 May 1987, in the Persian
one helicopter. Gulf by two Exocet SSMs fired from
Machinery: Gas turbines capable of an Iranian warplane. Of the original
41,000 horsepower. 54 units, the U.S. Navy continued to
Speed: 29 knots operate 33 in 2004. Many of the
Complement: 200 units that have been removed from
Summary: The design for these vessels service have either been transferred
called for a cheap, mass-production or sold to other countries that in-
type of craft. One of the units in this clude Taiwan, Turkey, Egypt, Bah-
group was Stark, which was nearly rain, Poland, Australia, and Spain.
276 UNITED STATES: ARLEIGH BURKE CLASS
UNITED STATES: ARLEIGH BURKE CLASS

Units: In 2004, this class remained un- icopter that operates off the flight
der production and currently com- deck sited on the stern.
prises 38 units. Machinery: Gas turbines that can pro-
Type and significance: The Arleigh duce 105,000 horsepower.
Burke class of destroyer is the newest Speed: 32 knots
of the type built by the United States Complement: 346
and among the most advanced de- Summary: In addition to their weaponry,
stroyers in the world. these ships are regarded as very ad-
Dates of construction: Arleigh Burke vanced due to the inclusion of the
was laid down in 1988 and commis- Aegis Combat System. It is designed
sioned in 1991. All other units have to control and coordinate the de-
followed since, the most recent being fense of the ship that carries it, as
Mason, which was laid down in 2000 well as to command the defense of
and launched in 2003. entire task forces through the use of
Hull dimensions: 504'6" 66'8" its complex computers. The system
32'7" can track more than 100 targets si-
Displacement: 8,315 tons multaneously and feed data to the
Armor: Kevlar armor covers vital ship’s command-and-control center,
spaces. where a computer evaluates which
Armament: One 29-cell VLS housed in targets pose the greatest threat to the
the bow and a 61-cell VLS posi- ship or task force and uses the ves-
tioned aft. The VLS can fire Stan- sel’s weapons accordingly.
dard SAM weaponry and Tomahawk Among the units of this class is
cruise missiles. In addition, eight Cole, which was damaged by a ter-
Harpoon SSM, one 5" gun in an au- rorist attack on 12 October 2000, in
tomated gun house located in the the port of Aden, Yemen. The United
bow, six 12.75" torpedo tubes, one States currently plans to construct
20mm Phalanx cannon, and one hel- another 24 of these vessels.
GLOSSARY
AA antiaircraft
abaft “farther aft than”; in or toward the stern
ABDA World War II designation for a force of U.S., British, Dutch, and
Australian warships
adrift a term meaning a vessel is not under control or has come loose
from its moorings
aft near or at the rear portion of a ship’s hull
Allies, Allied Powers Allies being the most commonly used as the col-
lective term for the belligerent states of the United States, Great Britain,
France, and Russia in World War II; Allied Powers also used as a collec-
tive term for those nations arrayed against the Central Powers in World
War I
amidships (midships) center part of a ship that is located between the
bow and stern
antiaircraft battery all the weapons aboard a vessel that are used to de-
fend it against attacking enemy aircraft
AP armor-piercing; a type of shell
astern behind a ship
ASROC antisubmarine rocket
ASDIC Allied Submarine Detection Investigation Committee, the body
that produced an experimental submarine detection set in 1918; that
equipment became known as SONAR
ASW antisubmarine warfare
Axis Powers collective term for the belligerent powers of Germany, Italy,
and Japan in World War II
ballast weight additional to the ship itself carried low in a hull to provide
greater stability while a ship is at sea
battery group of guns or missile launchers; also refers collectively to the
entire armament of a vessel
beach as verb, means to run a ship onto a shore, sometimes a deliberate
act by a captain to prevent a ship from sinking when flooding
beam width of the hull of a ship measured at the widest point
277
278 GLOSSARY
bilges lowest interior portion of a vessel’s hull

bow forward end of a vessel
bridge main center of control for a vessel
broadside generally, refers to the sides of a vessel that are above the wa-
ter; it is also used to define a tactic where all of a warship’s guns on one
side are fired simultaneously
bulkhead vertical partition that separates one compartment from an-
other in the hull of a vessel
bulwark side of a ship that rises above the upper deck
buoyancy ship’s capacity to remain afloat
CA cruiser (oftentimes used to denote a heavy cruiser)
CAG original term for a guided missile cruiser
caliber internal diameter of a gun; also used to refer to the diameter of
shells and bullets
capital ship a warship of the largest or most powerful type
Central Powers the belligerent nations of Germany, Austria-Hungary,
and the Ottoman Empire in World War I
CGN nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser
cockpit compartment within ships of the Age of Fighting Sail where sur-
geons treated sailors wounded in battle
commissioning the official act through which a warship is made an ac-
tive unit of a nation’s navy
conning tower battle station for commanding officers of a battleship,
battle cruiser, or cruiser when in action; normally located forward of the
bridge.
COSAG designation for combined steam and gas propulsion
course direction in which a vessel is steaming or sailing; dependent on
the manner of instrument used in the determination, as the course can
refer to a magnetic, compass, or gyro course
DC depth charge
DCT depth charge thrower
DD designation for a destroyer
DDR designation for a destroyer radar picket
displacement weight of water in tons that is displaced by a ship’s hull
DL designation for a destroyer leader
DLG designation for a guided missile destroyer
draft depth of water at which a vessel floats
DSMAC digital scene matching area correlation; a targeting system used
in cruise missiles
executive officer second in command of a vessel or squadron
flagship the ship carrying the overall commander of a fleet or squadron
fore toward or near the bow
full displacement displacement of a ship when fully equipped and fueled
galley kitchen of a ship
GLOSSARY 279
general quarters an order, i.e., to battle stations on a vessel in prepara-

tion for combat
GPS global positioning system
guerre de course French, “commerce warfare” (or “war on commerce”)
gun deck in the Age of Fighting Sail, the main deck of a frigate that
houses the battery of the vessel
HE high-explosive; a type of shell
head ship’s toilet
heading direction in which a ship’s bow is pointing
horsepower (hp) measurement of power that is equal to about 750 watts
hull the body of a vessel that includes the keel, frames, bulkheads, side
plate or planking, and deck
international waters areas of the world’s oceans that fall outside the wa-
ters within the territorial boundaries of nations
keel wooden or steel plate that runs down the centerline of a hull at the
lowest point of the structure
knot unit of speed at sea that is equal to one nautical mile per hour
laid down the beginning of construction on a ship
list as verb, means the act of a vessel leaning over to one side as a result
of flooding or a shifting of cargo within the hull
Mach the ratio of the speed of an object to the speed of sound; the ac-
tual number value varies based on the temperature of the air through
which the sound passes; for purposes of reference, Mach 1 in an envi-
ronment of 75 degrees Fahrenheit is 769.5 miles per hour
magazine compartment in a warship that stores projectiles and propel-
lant for use in its guns
main battery group of the biggest guns aboard a warship
mess deck deck on a vessel that houses the tables and chairs for eating
and congregating
moor as verb, means the act of fixing a ship to a stationary object by
means of a cable to a dock or an anchor to the bottom of a shallow body
of water
nautical mile unit of measurement at sea that is equal to 6,076 feet
overhaul an extended procedure whereby a warship is taken into a dock-
yard and its machinery, weapons, and equipment are examined and re-
paired if necessary; technological improvements are oftentimes added
during this process; also: the act of one ship overtaking another at sea
portside (port) left-hand side of a ship when one faces toward the bow
pp abbreviation for the length of a ship from the perpendicular bulkhead
in the bow to that of the stern; beyond these bulkheads are the prow and
stern tip, respectively
QF quick-firing; a type of naval gun
retrofit in warships, the process of adding new technology that did not
exist or was not included at the time of initial construction
280 GLOSSARY
rigging originally referred collectively to all the masts, spars, and sailing
accoutrements of a vessel, in latter ages, signal lines and radio wires
round shot ball of iron used as a projectile in the Age of Fighting Sail; its
size was dependent on that of the weapon that fired it; also known as
solid shot
rudder device for steering a vessel that is normally situated in the stern
salvo the firing of several guns at once
SAM surface-to-air missile
scrapping the process of dismantling a ship
scuttling purposely flooding a vessel to sink it
shaft horsepower (shp) the net power available at the propeller shaft af-
ter losing some power to friction generated by the machinery that trans-
fers the power of the engine to the shaft that turns the propeller of a
ship
ship-of-the-line (line-of-battle ship) in the Age of Fighting Sail, term re-
ferred to the most powerful vessels of a battle fleet that formed up in a
line against an opposing like formation of enemy vessels
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
spar in the Age of Fighting Sail a pole comprised of wood that was used
for masts and yards
SSM surface-to-surface missile
standard displacement displacement of a ship when fully equipped but
without fuel
STAAG stabilized tachymetric anti-aircraft gun
starboard right-hand side of a vessel when one faces toward the bow
stern aft end of a ship
superstructure structure that is built on top of the main deck of a ship;
in a warship, this area includes the command and control facilities
TERCOM terrain contour matching; a targeting system used in cruise
missiles
TBD designation for torpedo boat destroyer; this was eventually short-
ened to the modern term “destroyer”
TGB British designation of the nineteenth century that stood for a tor-
pedo gunboat
Triple Entente belligerent powers of Great Britain, France, and Russia
in World War I
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VLS vertical launch system
V/STOL vertical/short takeoff and landing
yard unit of measurement equal to 3 feet; in nautical terms, refers to a
spar attached lengthways across a mast from which a sail is hung
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Baer, George W. One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy,
1890–1990. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994.
Baker, A. D. The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World 1995:
Their Ships, Aircraft, and Armament. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 1995.
Birkler, J. L. The Royal Navy’s New-Generation Type 45 Destroyer: Acquisi-
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INDEX
AA armament. See Anti-aircraft Almirante Lynch, 31

armament Alvaro de Bazan, 174, 178
Aaron Manby, 17 Amatsukaze, 147
AAW weapons. See Anti-air warfare Amazon, 79, 160, 165
weapons Ambuscade, 79
ABDA Command, 102–103 American Revolutionary War, 23–24
Aconit, 157 Anaconda Plan, 20–21
Aden, Yemen, 177 Anglo-Japanese Naval Alliance, 52,
Admiral Hipper, 94 65, 74, 76
Admiral Nakhimov Naval Annapolis, 145
Preparatory School (Russia), Antelope, 160, 165
175 Anti-air warfare (AAW) weapons,
Adriatic Sea, 66, 126 123, 141–145, 151, 154, 158,
Aegis system, 166, 167–168, 174, 163, 178. See also individual
175 weapons
Afghanistan, 29 Anti-aircraft (AA) armament, 87,
Afridi, 48–49 88, 100, 105–106, 117, 138.
Age of Fighting Sail, 1–11, 124 See also individual weapons
Aigle, 75 Antisubmarine rocket (ASROC)
Aircraft carriers, vii, 100 system, 131, 133, 134, 147,
nuclear-powered, 135 153, 154, 161
See also individual ships Antisubmarine warfare (ASW), 64,
Akatsuki, 82 86, 90–95, 106, 117–120,
Akitsuki, 110 123–126, 131, 133–145, 147,
Alabama, 21 151, 153–162
Alcohol, use of, 8, 175–176 Arabe, 66
Alecto, 16 Arabian (Persian) Gulf, 170–172
Algerian Treaty of 1975, 170 Arab-Israeli War (July 1967), 152
Allen Sumner, 104–105 Archimedes, 16
Allied Submarine Detection Ardent, 165
Investigation Committee Argentina
(ASDIC), 92 and destroyers, 1914–1918, 66
287
288 INDEX
Argentina (continued) Austrian Navy, 25

and destroyers, 1919–1939, 90 Austro-Hungarian Navy, 73
and destroyers, 1955–1967, 149 Austro-Prussian War, 43
and destroyers, 1967–1982, Ayanami, 147
163–165
Argentine Air Force, 164 B class, 79, 81
Argentine Navy, 164 Bahrain, 173
Arleigh Burke, 166–168, 173, 174, Bainbridge, 45–46, 47, 135–136,
177 153
Armament. See individual ships; Balkans, 57
individual weapons Baltic Sea, 165
Armistice, 67, 70, 72 Bangladesh, 170
Artigliere, 174 Barbette, 78
Asagiri, 169 Bathing. See Shipboard life
Asashio, 85 Bathrooms. See Shipboard life
ASDIC. See Allied Submarine Battle, 108, 127
Detection Investigation Battle of Cape Matapan, 97–98, 99
Committee Battle of Helgoland Bight, 57
ASROC system. See Antisubmarine Battle of Jutland, 58, 62, 75
rocket system Battle of Leyte Gulf, 100–101, 103
ASW. See Antisubmarine warfare Battle of Lissa, 43, 44
Atlantic Ocean, 11, 14, 91–97, Battle of Midway, 114
106, 110, 113, 114 Battle of Santiago Bay, 56
Atomic power, xi Battle of Sinope, 19
Aube, Theophile, 29 Battle of the Atlantic, 91–97, 106,
Audace, 160 110
Australia, 102, 158 Battle of the Java Sea, 102
and destroyers, 1939–1945, 107, Battle of the Yellow Sea, 56–57
110 Battle of Tsushima, 57, 63
and destroyers, 1946–1955, 127 Battleships, vii, 1, 25. See also
and destroyers, 1955–1967, 146 individual ships
and frigates, 146, 170 Beagle, 49
Austria, 43, 73 BEF. See British Expeditionary
Austria-Hungary Force
and destroyers, 1880–1902, Belgium, 14, 61, 122
44–45 Belknap, 134, 136, 153, 163
and destroyers, 1902–1914, Benson/Gleaves, 104, 126, 147
53–54 Bergamini, 144
and destroyers, 1914–1918, 54, Berk, 162
65, 66–67 Berlin airlift crisis, 122
and destroyers, 1919–1939, 69, Bermuda, 97
73 Bespokoiny, 52
and paddle wheel sloops, 15 Bessemer, Henry, 27
and torpedo boats, 44 Biddle, 163
Austrian Empire Bismarck, 91, 95
and paddle wheel sloops, 15 Black Sea, 19, 61
INDEX 289
Black Swan, 145 CAG-1, 129

Blanco Encalada, 31 Caldwell, 64
Blockades, 9–10, 20 California, 152–153
Boilers, 13, 33 Canada, 122, 124
Bolshevik revolution, 69, 72 and destroyers, 1939–1945, 91,
Boston, 129 107, 110
Bourrasque, 75 and destroyers, 1955–1967, 145
Bow torpedo, 32–33. See also and destroyers, 1967–1982, 162
individual weapons and frigates, 162, 169
Boxer Uprising of 1900, 56 Canal boats, iron-hulled, 17
Brandenburg, 174 Canberra, 129
Branlebas, 51 Canister shot, 2
Bravyy, 138 Cannon, 104, 125, 126
Brazil, 163 Cannons, 2–3, 19
Breechloading weapons, 30 iron vs. bronze, 2
Bremen, 161, 169, 174 and projectiles, 2
Brest, 95 See also individual weapons
Brindel, Glenn, 171 Capital ships, 25, 28, 29, 42,
Bristol, 158–159, 165 43–44
British Caribbean Islands, 97 tonnage of, 74
British Expeditionary Force (BEF), Caribbean Islands, 97
61, 95, 96 Carron Company, 3
British Isles, 15, 72 Carronades, 3. See also individual
British Pacific whaling fleet, 8–9 weapons
British Royal Navy, 3, 7–8, 13, Cassard, 169, 174
25–26, 26, 33, 56, 63, 72, 79, Cassin, 46
87, 89, 95, 108, 120, 139, Catamaran, 12
140, 159, 164, 169 Center Force, 100
British 26th Destroyer Flotilla, 103 Central Europe, 122
Broadsword, 160, 174 Central Power, 61, 62, 67, 73. See
Bronstein, 136–137 also Triple Alliance
Brooke, 137 Ch class, 107
Bulgaria Chacal, 75
and destroyers, 1946–1955, 127 Chain shot, 2, 10
and destroyers, 1955–1967, 147 Chamois, 35
Bulldog, 92 Channel Dash, 95
Bulwarks, 3 Charles F. Adams, 131, 136, 146,
Bumblebee program, 128 155, 161, 173
Bundesmarine, 144. See also Chasseur, 51
German Navy Cherbourg, France, 21
Bush, George H. W., 172 Cherub, 9
Bushnell, David, 23–24 Chile, 31, 41
and destroyers, 1914–1918, 63
C class, 81 and destroyers, 1919–1939, 90
C. Turner Joy, 150 and destroyers, 1992–present,
Ca class, 125 175
290 INDEX
China, 56, 82, 90, 99 Conscripts, 5, 175

and destroyers, 1914–1918, 67 Continental System, 10
and destroyers, 1946–1955, 121, Convoy system, 60–61
127–128 Coontz, 131
and destroyers, 1955–1967, 148 Corvette, 1, 17
and destroyers, 1967–1982, 163 iron-hulled, 18, 20
and destroyers, 1992–present, See also individual corvettes;
175 Sloops
and frigates, 148, 163, 170, 175 COSAG Turbine system. See
Churchill, Winston, 96 Combined Steam and Gas
CIC. See Combat Information Turbine system
Center County, 139, 140, 175
Citrus fruit, 7 Coventry, 164–165
Civilian transportation, xi Cowardice in battle, 8
Claud Jones, 163 Cr class, 107
Clemson, 64, 71, 93 Crete, 99
Clipper bows, 87–88 Cricket, 48
Clothing, 7 Crimean War, 19–20
Co class, 107 Crotale SAM, 157
Coal, 13, 27, 38–39 Cruisers, 1, 25, 29, 124, 129–130,
Coal dust, 38–39 163, 166
Coastal defense force, destroyers guided missile, 129, 135
as, 96–97 See also individual ships
Cobra, 36–38 Cuban Missile Crisis, 151–152
Cold War era, 129–150, 151–152, Cutters, 9
152–163, 164, 166–173, 177
beginning of, 122–129 D10, 41
Cole, terrorist attack on, 177 D class, 81
Collisions, and destroyers, D’Abbans, Marquis Jouffroy, 12
1880–1902, 37, 39 Dardenelles Strait, 61–62
Combat, and wounded sailors, Daring, 33, 118, 146
10–11, 113–114 Dartmouth, 56
Combat Information Center (CIC), DASH. See Drone Anti-Submarine
137, 166 Helicopter
Combined Steam and Gas DCT. See Depth charge thrower
(COSAG) Turbine system, DDE. See Escort destroyer
140 DDG. See Guided missile destroyer
Commandant Riviere, 142 DDR. See Radar picket destroyer
Commerce raids, destroyers and, DD(X) program, 178
98 DE. See Destroyer escort
Commerce raids, frigates and, 8 Dealey, 123
Commerce raids, sloops and, 1, Death penalty, 8
8–10, 21 Deck tubes, 32. See also individual
and blockades, 9–10 weapons
Compensatory pay, 39 Decoy, 33
Compound engine, 27 Delaware River, 23
INDEX 291
Democratic People’s Republic of Disease, 6, 7, 38. See also

Korea. See Korea Shipboard life
Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Dispatch carriers, sloops as, 1
See North Vietnam DPRK. See Democratic People’s
Demologos, 12 Republic of Korea
Denmark, 122 Drill at sea, 5, 176
Denny-Brown Stabilization System, Drone Anti-Submarine Helicopter
130 (DASH), 136–137, 138, 154
Depth charge, 60–61, 91–92. See DRV. See Democratic Republic of
also individual weapons Vietnam
Depth charge thrower (DCT), 60. Dryad, 30
See also individual weapons DSMAC. See Digital Scene
Descubierta, 162 Matching Area Correlation
Desperate, 34 Dual-purpose guns, 78
D’Estienne d’Orves, 158, 169, 174 Duke, 168, 174
Destroyer escort (DE), 123 Dunkirk, 96
Destroyers Duperre, 142, 143
1880–1902, 29–45 Durandal, 39–40
1902–1914, 45–54 Dutch Navy, 126
1914–1918, 54–67
1919–1939, 69–90 E class, 81
1939–1945, 91–115 East Germany
1946–1955, 117–129 and destroyers, 1955–1967,
1955–1967, 129–152 144–145
1967–1982, 152–166 and frigates, 144–145, 147
1983–1991, 166–173 East Indies, 82
1992–present, 173–178 East Prussia, 96
cost of, 169, 177 Eastern Europe, 122
development of, vii–viii Eating quarters. See Shipboard
future of, 177–178 life
See also Escort destroyer; École, Jeune, 28. See also Jeune
Frigates; Guided missile École school (Young School)
destroyer; individual destroyers; of thought
30-knotter; Torpedo boat Education methods, 55–56, 89,
catcher; Torpedo boat 175, 176
destroyer; Torpedo gunboat; Egypt, 152, 170
26-knotter; 27-knotter and frigates, 173
Destroyers for Bases Deal, 97, 109 Eilat, 152, 153
DET class, 106 Electrical lighting, 37
Deutschland, 91 Electrical-drive propulsion system,
Devonshire, 139, 140 178
Diet. See Shipboard life Eliat, 157
Digital Scene Matching Area Engines. See individual engines
Correlation (DSMAC), 167 English Channel, 9, 16, 17, 28, 37,
Discipline, shipboard, 7–8, 55, 61, 126
176. See also Shipboard life Enigma device, 93–94
292 INDEX
Enseigne Roux, 66 Foreign policy, and destroyers,

Enterprise, 135 development of, vii
Erich Giese, 94 Foreigners, as sailors, 5
Erickson, John, 15 Forrest Sherman, 124, 173
Escort destroyer (DDE), 106–107, Foundering, 11
108, 111, 118 FRAM program. See Fleet
Escorts, destroyers as, 1, 59, 60, Rehabilitation and
75, 94, 95, 98, 100–101 Modernization program
Escorts, frigates as, 107, 124 France, 14, 19, 33, 95–96, 122
Escorts, sloops as, 1 and commerce raids, 9–10
Essex, 8–9 and destroyers, 1880–1902,
Ethiopia, 90 39–40
Euphrates River, 170 and destroyers, 1902–1914,
Evacuation operations, 89–90, 50–51
95–96, 98–99 and destroyers, 1914–1918, 54,
Exocet missiles, 155, 158, 160, 61, 65, 67
164, 169, 171, 174, 178 and destroyers, 1919–1939,
71–72, 74–75, 76, 81, 82–83,
F class, 81 86, 90
Falkland Islands War, 163–165 and destroyers, 1939–1945, 91,
Far East, 147 93, 104, 109, 110, 112, 114
Far East Islands, 99 and destroyers, 1946–1955, 117,
Farragut, 41, 81–82, 155, 173 121, 125
Farragut, David G., 21 and destroyers, 1955–1967,
Faulknor, 63 141–143
Feudal age, xii and destroyers, 1967–1982,
Fife, 172 157–158
Fire, and wooden hulls, 10–11 and destroyers, 1992–present,
Fire-fighters, destroyers as, 103 174
First China War, 18 fall of, 97, 104
First Gulf War, 172–173 and frigates, 141–143, 158, 174,
First Naval Law, 42 178
Fisher, John, 31, 48, 63 and iron-hulled ships, 18–19
Fleet Rehabilitation and and mines, 24
Modernization (FRAM) and paddle wheel sloops, 15
program, 137–139, 162 recruitment methods in, 55
Fletcher, 104, 118, 145, 147 and steam-powered screw-
Floating mines, 23–24 propelled warships, 16, 17
Floreal, 174 and steel-hulled ships, 27
Flotilla leaders, 63 and torpedo boats, 26, 28–29,
vs. regular destroyers, 62 31, 34, 36, 39–40
FMR class, 106 and torpedoes, 26
Folgore, 83 Francis B. Ogden, 15
Food storage. See Shipboard life Francis Smith, 15
Forban, 34 Franco, Francisco, 89
INDEX 293
Freccia, 76 and destroyers, 1946–1955, 119,

French Army, 74 121
French Navy, 50–51, 91, 141, 155, and destroyers, 1992–present,
174 174, 177, 178
French Revolution, 3, 7, 8, 9–10, and frigates, 169, 174
11 and missile systems, 128–129
Friesland, 146 and missile technology, 128–129
Frigates, 3, 9, 16, 107, 124, 131 and rocket technology, 128, 132
cost of, 169, 177 and spar torpedo boats, 41
trend toward, 178 and torpedo boats, 31
See also individual ships under Ghana, 159
individual countries Gilchrist, Percy, 27
Fubuki, 77–79, 81, 82, 85, 110 Global Positioning System (GPS),
Fulmine, 44, 54 167
Fulton, Robert, 12, 24 Global terrorism, 177, 178
Gloire, 20, 30
G class, 84 Glowworm, 94
Garcia, 137 Gnevnyi, 88, 109
Gas furnace, 27 Gniesenau, 95
Gaulle, Charles de, 142, 157 Goa, 138
Gearing, 105, 118, 124, 130, 162 Godvari, 170
General Belgrano, 164 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 168
General Electric, 136 Gorgon, 14
Geneva Conference of 1927, 80 Gorshkov, Sergei, 132
Georges Leygues, 158, 169, 174 GPS. See Global Positioning
German Air Force, 95 System
German Democratic Republic. See Grapeshot, 2, 10
East Germany Great Britain, 19, 122
German Federal Republic. See and destroyers, 1880–1902,
West Germany 39–40
German High Seas Fleet, 57, 58, 67 and destroyers, 1902–1914,
German Navy, 41, 50, 87, 91, 121, 46–50
144 and destroyers, 1914–1918, 54,
German submarines. See U-boats 57–59, 60–61, 62–63, 67–65
Germany and destroyers, 1919–1939,
and destroyers, 1880–1902, 40, 69–70, 73–74, 75, 79–80,
41–42 80–81, 83, 84–85, 87, 89–90
and destroyers, 1902–1914, 50 and destroyers, 1939–1945,
and destroyers, 1914–1918, 54, 91–98, 99, 102, 103, 105,
57–59, 61, 62, 64–65, 67 106, 107–109, 114
and destroyers, 1919–1939, 69, and destroyers, 1946–1955, 117,
72–73, 83, 84, 87–88, 89, 90 118, 120–121, 124–125, 125,
and destroyers, 1939–1945, 127, 128
91–92, 93–97, 98–99, 104, and destroyers, 1955–1967,
111–112, 114 139–141, 145
294 INDEX
Great Britain (continued) Guns

and destroyers, 1967–1982, dual-purpose, 78
158–160, 163–165 vs. torpedoes, 74–75
and destroyers, 1992–present, Gyatt, 130–131, 131, 151
174
education methods in, 55–56 H.145, 64–65
and frigates, 107, 108, 139–141, H class, 84
145, 158–160, 163–165, H. L. Hunley, 24–25
168–169, 174, 178 Haguro, 103
and iron-hulled ships, 17–18, Halifax, 169
18–19, 20 Halland, 148–149
and mines, 24 Hamburg, 145
and missile systems, 130 Hammann, 114
and paddle wheel sloops, 15 Hanvock, 32
recruitment methods in, 55 Hard-lying money, 39
and steam-powered screw- Hardships. See Shipboard life
propelled warships, 15–16, 17 Hardy, 94
and steel-hulled ships, 27 Harpoon missiles, 155, 161, 162,
and 30-knotters, 34 167, 168–169, 174
and torpedo boats, 26–28, 31 Harukaze, 147
and torpedo boats catcher, Haruna, 161–162
29–31 Hatakaze, 169
and torpedo gunboats, 30–31 Hatsuharu, 82
and torpedoes, 25–26 Hatsuyuki, 162, 169
and 27-knotters, 34 Havock, 33, 39
Greece, 62, 66, 89, 98–99, 122 Hedgehog system, 92, 118, 124,
Greek Army, 89 126, 138, 147
Grisha, 156, 168, 173 Henderson Field, 101
Grivel, Baron Louis-Antoine- Hermes, 164
Richild, 28–29 High Seas Fleet, 72, 73
Guadalcanal, 101–102 Hipper, 91
Guadeloupe, 18 Hitler, Adolf, 83, 84, 87, 89, 91,
Guépard, 75 109
Guerre de course (war on Hoel, 101
commerce), 28–29 Holland, 126–127
Guided missile cruiser, 129, 135. Horizon, 178
See also Cruisers Hornet, 32, 33
Guided missile destroyer (DDG), Housatonic, 25
130–131 Hulls
frigate as, 131 and iron-hulled ships, 17–20
Gun carriage, 3 light, 37–38
Gunboat, iron-hulled, 17–18 and masking of detection by
Gunfire support, destroyers as, 61, sensors, 178
90, 98, 101 of sloops, 4
Gunpowder, xii and steel-hulled ships, 27
INDEX 295
and wooden-hulled ships, 10–11, Italian Navy, 43, 86, 97, 121, 126,
20 144
Humanitarian assistance, 89 Italy, 122
Hunt, 108, 130, 145 and destroyers, 1880–1902,
Husza¥r, 53 43–44
Hydrophones, 60–61. See also and destroyers, 1902–1914, 53
individual weapons and destroyers, 1914–1918, 54,
Hygiene. See Shipboard life 65–66
and destroyers, 1919–1939, 71,
I class, 84 74–75, 75–76, 81, 83, 86,
Iceland, 93, 122 90–91
Ikara system, 158 and destroyers, 1939–1945, 93,
Impavido, 144, 160 97–98, 99, 112, 114
Impetuoso, 144 and destroyers, 1946–1955, 121,
Impressment, 5 125–126
India and destroyers, 1955–1967,
and destroyers, 1967–1982, 143–144, 148
162–163 and destroyers, 1967–1982, 160
and destroyers, 1992–present, and frigates, 143–144, 160, 169,
175 174, 178
and frigates, 162–163, 170, 175 and torpedo boats, 31, 43
Indian Navy, 175
Indomito, 53, 71 J class, 85, 107
Indonesia Jacob Van Heemskerck, 169
and frigates, 163 Jaguar, 75
Inscription Maritime, 55 Jamaica, 150
Insulation Japan, 126, 127
on destroyers, 1880-1902, 38 and destroyers, 1880–1902,
Invincible, 62, 164 42–43
Iran, 154 and destroyers, 1902–1914,
Iran-Iraq War, 170–172 52–53, 56–57
Iraq and destroyers, 1914–1918, 54,
and First Gulf War, 172–173 65, 67
and Iran-Iraq War, 170–172 and destroyers, 1919–1939, 71,
and Kuwait invasion, 172–173 74–75, 76–79, 81–82, 83,
and Second Gulf War, 177 85–86, 90
Iron-hulled ships, 17–20 and destroyers, 1939–1945, 93,
first oceangoing, 17 99–103, 104, 110–111, 114
See also Hulls and destroyers, 1946–1955, 121
Iroquois, 162 and destroyers, 1955–1967,
Islamic Revolution of 1979, 154 146–147
Israel, 172 and destroyers, 1967–1982,
and destroyers, 1955–1967, 152 161–162
Israeli Navy, 152 169
296 INDEX
Japan (continued) Korean Peninsula, 56, 149

and destroyers, 1992–present, Korean War, 149–150
174–175, 178 Kortenaer, 160–161
and frigates, 111, 146–147, Kotlin, 123, 133, 138, 156, 163
161–162, 169, 175 Kriegsmarine, 91, 121. See also
and torpedo boats, 43 German Navy
Japanese Navy, 53, 85, 101, 110, Krivak, 156, 165, 168
121, 146, 162, 175 Kronstadt mutiny, 72
Jason, 16 Krupny, 133, 138
Jellicoe, John, 59 Kuritia, Takeo, 100–101
Jeune École (Young School) school Kuwait, 172–173
of thought, 29, 39, 43
Jianghu, 163, 170 L class, 107
Jiangnan, 148 La Galissonniere, 143
Jinan/Luta, 163 La Masa, 65–66
Johnson, Lyndon B., 150–151 L’Adroit, 75
Juneau, 150 Lafayette, 174
Lampo, 44
K class, 85, 107 Lance, 57
Kagero, 110 Land-based reactors, 135
Kamikaze, 77 Le Fantasque, 82–83
Kamikazes, 100 Le Harve, 96
Kanin, 156 Le Napoleon, 17
Karel Doorman, 169 Le Terrible, 83
Kashin, 138, 156, 157, 163, 165, Leahy, 134, 153
170, 173 Leander, 141, 146, 159, 160, 162,
Kearsarge, 21 163, 170
Keelhauling, 8 Lenin, Vladimir, 72, 88
Keith, 95–96 Lightfoot, 63
Kelly, 96 Lighting
Kennedy, John F., 151 electrical, 37
Kent, 12 on sloops, 6
Kevlar, 154 Lightning, 26–28
Keyes, Roger, 35 Limbo system, 141
Khomeini, Ayatollah, 171 Lincoln, Abraham, 20
Khrushchev, Nikita, 132, 151 Living quarters. See Shipboard life
Kidd, 154, 173 Locomotive boilers, 33
Kildin, 133, 157 London, 17
Kirvak, 173 London Conference of 1930, 80
Knox, 154 London Naval Treaty, 80–81, 82,
Kola, 119, 123 83, 84, 85, 86, 104
Koln, 145 Long Beach, 135
Kongo, 174–175, 178 Long Lance torpedo, 77, 102
Konigin Luise, 57 Louis XIV, 55
Korea, 52, 56, 149–150 Luftwaffe, 95
INDEX 297
Lupo, 160 Mirabello, 66

Luppis, Giovanni, 25 Miranda, 49
Lutjens, 161, 174 Mirka, 139
Lutrow, 62 Military, women in, 176
Missile destroyers, 134
M class, 49, 50, 62, 107 Missile technology, 128–129
Machinery maintenance, on Missiles, 128–178. See also
destroyers, 1880–1902, 39 individual missiles
Maddox, 150 Mississippi River, 20
Maestrale, 83, 169 Mitscher, 118, 123
Mahan, Alfred Thayer, 41 Mogodor, 86
Mainz, 58 Momi, 71
Malafon ASW, 143, 157–158 Monitor, 77
Malta, 97 Motive power, 23
Malvinas Islands, 164 Multiple-unit class, 45
Manchester, 159 Murasame, 174
Manchuria, 56, 82 Mussolini, Benito, 76, 90, 97, 112
Mao Tse-tung, 127 Mutiny, 8
Maritime Safety Agency, 121, 146 Mutsuki, 77
Maritime Self-Defense Force, 147 Mutual Defense Assistance
Marseilles, 89 Program (MDAP), 125, 126
Marshall Plan, 122 Muzzle loading weapons, 2, 19, 30
Martin, Pierre, 27
Mascura SAM, 143 N class, 85, 107
MDAP. See Mutual Defense Napoleon, 10, 24
Assistance Program Napoleonic Wars, 3, 7, 8, 9, 11, 19,
Mechanical unreliability, of steam- 24
powered ships, 12, 13 Narvik, 94
Medicine, shipboard, xi NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty
and surgeons, 11 Organization
and wounded sailors, 10–11 Nature, forces of, 114
See also Shipboard life Naval Laws, 50
Mediterranean Sea, 43, 44, 61, 65, Naval Review, 36
66, 71, 75, 81, 97–99, 126 Navigatori, 76
Meko, 169 Nazi Party, 83
Merchant service, 5 Neglect of duty, 8
Mermaid, 159 Nembo, 44, 53
Meteor, 44–45 Nemesis, 17–18
Mexico, 18 Neptune, 26
Middle East, 49, 154, 170, 177 Netherlands, 14, 65, 102,
Military technology 105–106, 122
and society, impact on, xi–xii and destroyers, 1919–1939, 90
Minegumo, 161 and destroyers, 1939–1945, 110
Minekaze, 71 and destroyers, 1946–1955,
Mines, 23–25 126–127
298 INDEX
Netherlands (continued) Oliver Hazard Perry, 154–155, 162,

and destroyers, 1955–1967, 166, 169, 170, 171–172, 173,
145–146 175
and destroyers, 1967–1982, operation desert storm, 172–173
160–161 operation dynamo, 95, 96
and destroyers, 1992–present, operation iraqi freedom, 177
174, 177 operation overlord, 96
and frigates, 160–161, 169, 174 operation praying mantis, 172
Netley, 9 Option for Changes Program, 169
Neulovimyy, 133 Opytnyi, 88
New Orleans, 20–21 Oriani, 86, 125
New Zealand, 170 Orkney Islands, 72
and destroyers, 1939–1945, 110 Osborne, 56
and destroyers, 1946–1955, 127 Oslo, 146
and destroyers, 1955–1967, 146 Ostergotland, 149
and frigates, 146 Otranto Channel, 126
Newfoundland, 97 Ottoman Empire, 19
Niagra, 20 Ottomat weapons, 160
Nkrumah, Kwame, 159 Otvazhnyy, 165
Norfolk, 120, 123, 168–169 Ozbourn, 151
Normandy, 92, 96
North Africa, 98 Pacific Ocean, 43, 45, 81, 113,
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 114, 126
(NATO), 122, 125, 127, 132, Pacific War, 99–103, 105, 107–108
139, 141–146, 149, 157, 161, Pact of Steel, 97
162–163, 168–169 Paddle wheel, 12–16
founding of, 122 vs. screw propeller, 16
North Korea, 149–150 Paixhans, Henri, 19
North Sea, 43, 61, 91, 94, 126 Parchim, 168, 173
North Vietnam, 150–151, 163 Paris, 17
Norway, 94–95, 96, 122 Paris Peace Conference, 73
and destroyers, 1919–1939, 90 Parsons, Charles, 36
and destroyers, 1955–1967, 146 Patrol duty, 89–90
Novik, 52, 127 Paulding, 46
Nubian, 63 Pearl Harbor, 92, 99, 102, 118
Nuclear meltdown, 136 Pegaso, 86
Nuclear reactor, 152 Perry, Matthew, 42
Nuclear-missile technology, 132 Peru, 163
Nuclear-powered engines, Petya, 139
134–136 Philippines, 46, 101, 114
Phoebe, 8–9
O’Brien, 64 Pig iron production, 29
Oerlikon gun, 105 Pitch and roll, 6–7, 13, 38, 89
Ognevoi, 109, 118, 119, 147 and missile systems, 130
Okinawa, 100 Pola, 99
INDEX 299
Poland, 91, 93 Riga Harbor, 165

and destroyers, 1919–1939, 90 Rigging, of sloops, 4–5
and frigates, 173 RIM-66, 153
Politics, and destroyers, River, 47–48, 49, 108, 110, 146
development of, vii River Sâone, 12
Pommern, 58 Roberts, Samuel B., 172
Port Arthur, 56 Robins, Benjamin, 19
Porter, 84 Rocket, 124
Porter, David, 8–9 Rocket launchers, 118, 119,
Portugal, 122 135–137, 140, 141, 149, 159.
and destroyers, 1914–1918, 62 See also individual launchers
Powerful, 32 Rocket technology, 128, 132
Press gangs, 5 Romania, 110
Prisoners, as sailors, 5 and destroyers, 1946–1955, 127
Projectiles, cannon, 2 and destroyers, 1955–1967,
Pruitki, 40 147–148
Pyroscaphe, 12 Roofdier, 126
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 92–93, 96
Quick-firing guns, 32. See also Rothsay, 146
individual weapons Royal Naval College (Portsmouth),
5
R class, 62–63, 124 Royal Navy. See British Royal Navy
Radar, invention of, 105 Rozhdestvenski, Zinovi Petrovich,
Radar picket destroyer (DDR), 124 57
Raised forecastle, 45 Russia, 10, 19, 29
Rajput, 170 and destroyers, 1880–1902, 40
Rattler, 16 and destroyers, 1902–1914,
Rattlesnake, 30, 34 51–52, 56–57
Reciprocating engine, 36 and destroyers, 1914–1918, 54,
Reciprocating triple-expansion 61, 66, 67
engine, 39 and destroyers, 1919–1939, 72
Recruitment methods, 55, 175 and destroyers, 1992–present,
Redoutable, 27 173
Refueling, on destroyers, 38–39 education methods in, 55, 175
Relentless, 124 and frigates, 173
Republic of Vietnam. See South recruitment methods in, 175
Vietnam and steam-powered screw-
Rescue operations, 95–96, 103 propelled warships, 17
Resupply vessel, destroyer as, and torpedo boats, 28, 29, 31,
101–102 40
Reuben James, 92–93 Russian Navy, 55, 72
Rhadamanthus, 13, 14 Russian Revolution of 1917, 66
Rifled guns, 19. See also individual Russo-Japanese War, 52, 56–57,
weapons 58, 63, 66
Riga, 123, 147, 148 RVN. See Republic of Vietnam
300 INDEX
S.31, 50 Shark attacks, 114

S.90, 42, 47, 50 Shatt al-Arab waterway, 170
S class, 63 Sheffield, 163, 164, 165
Sachsen, 174, 178 Shell guns, 19
Saddam Hussein, 170–171, 172, Shimakaze, 110
177 Shipboard life
Sails, vs. steam propulsion, 12 on destroyers, 1880–1902,
Sakura, 53 38–39
Salisbury, 141 on destroyers, 1902–1918,
SAMs. See Surface-to-air missiles 54–55
Sardinia, 19 on destroyers, 1919–1939, 89
Saudi Arabia, 174 on destroyers, 1939–1945,
Scapa Flow, 72–73 112–113
Scharnhorst, 91, 95 on destroyers, 1975–1982, 159
Scheer, Reinhard, 59 on destroyers, 1992–present,
Scherbius, Arthur, 93 175–177
Schichau, 42, 44 on sloops, 5–8
Schooners, 9 Ships-of-the-line, 16–17
Scotland, 3 Shirakumo, 43
Scott, 63 Shirane, 161
Scott, Winfield, 20 Shiratsuyu, 85
Scouts, sloops as, 1 Shorter, Edward, 15–17
Scrapping, 70, 109 Shot, 19
Screw propeller, 15–17 Siemens, Sir William, 27
Scurvy, 6, 7 Sims, 84, 104
Sea Dart system, 158–159 Singapore, 174
Sea Sparrow, 154, 161, 162 Sino-Japanese War, 56
Sea Wolf, 160, 168–169 Skoriy, 119–120, 123
Seacat launcher, 140, 141, 149, SLBM. See Submarine-launched
159 ballistic missile
Seasickness, 38. See also Shipboard Sleeping on duty, 8
life Sleeping quarters. See Shipboard
Seaslug, 139–140 life
Seaworthiness, 37–38 Sloops, 1–11
2nd Destroyer Flotilla, 94 and armament, 3–4. See also
Second Gulf War, 177 individual weapons
Second London Conference, 83 and blockades, 9–10
Seine River, 17 construction of, 4
Self-propelled torpedo, 21, 23, end of, 21
25–26 hull and rigging of, 4–5
September 11 attack, 177 and paddle wheel, 15
Seven Years’ War, 9 role of, 1, 8–10, 21
Shah of Iran, 154 shipboard life on, 5–8
Shakespeare, 110 steam-powered screw-propelled,
Shark, 58–59 17
INDEX 301
during U.S. Civil War, 20–21 and destroyers, 1992–present,

See also Corvette; individual 174, 178
sloops and frigates, 169, 170, 174
Smelting, 27 Spanish civil war, 89
Smith, 46 Spanish-American War, 56
Smith, Francis Petit, 15–16 Spar torpedo, 24–25
Society, and weapons technology, Spar torpedo boats, 41
impact of, xi–xii Sphinx, 14
Sokol, 40 Spithead, 36
Soldati, 86, 112, 125 Spruance, 154, 155, 172, 173
Solid shot, 2, 10 Squid systems, 118, 125
Somers, 84 SSMs. See Surface-to-surface
Sonar (sound, navigation, and missiles
ranging), 74, 92, 118 STAAG. See Stabilized Tachymetric
South America, 163–164 Anti-Aircraft Gun
South Korea, 149–150 Stabilized Tachymetric Anti-Aircraft
and destroyers, 1967–1982, 163 Gun (STAAG), 141
South Vietnam, 150–151, 163 Stalin, Joseph, 88, 119, 132
Southeast Asia, 82, 102–103 Standard SAM, 152–153, 155,
Soviet Army, 96, 110 161, 162, 167, 169
Soviet Navy, 119, 156, 168, 173, Stanhope, Earl of, 12
175 Stark, 171–172
Soviet Union Stationary mine, 24
collapse of, 166, 173 Steam engine, 12–17
and destroyers, 1919–1939, 72, Steam-powered ship, 12–17
80, 88–89, 90 and armament, 12, 15, 16, 17.
and destroyers, 1939–1945, See also individual weapons
109–110, 114 and boiler explosions, 13
and destroyers, 1946–1955, 117, fuel inefficiency of, 13
118–120, 121, 122–124, 125, iron-hulled, 17–20
127, 128 mechanical unreliability of, 12, 13
and destroyers, 1955–1967, and paddle wheel, 13–16
138–139, 147–148, 151–152 problems with, 13
and destroyers, 1967–1982, and screw propeller, 15–17
155–157, 163 speed of, 12–13
and frigates, 138–139, 147–148, See also individual ships
151–152, 155–157, 163, Steel production, 29
165–166, 168 Steel-hulled ships, 27
and missile systems, 132–134 and torpedo boats, 41
and nuclear-missile technology, See also Hulls
132 Sterrett, 163
Sovremenny, 155–156 Stevens, Robert L., 18
Spahi, 51 Stevens Battery, 18
Spain, 89 Storozhevoi, 88–89, 109, 165
and destroyers, 1919–1939, 90 Stronghold, 79
302 INDEX
Submarine hunters, destroyers as, Tallinn, 123

59–60 Talos missiles, 128–129, 131–132
Submarine rammers, destroyers as, Tanaka, Raizo, 101–102
60 Tanikaze, 65
Submarine-launched ballistic Tartar missiles, 128, 131–132, 142,
missile (SLBM), 132, 143 144, 161
Submarines, 29, 92–94 Ta¥tra, 53–54, 67
nuclear-powered, 135 TBD. See Torpedo boat destroyer
See also Antisubmarine warfare; TERCOM system. See Terrain
U-boats Contour Mapping system
Suez Canal, 97 Terrain Contour Mapping
Suffren, 143, 157, 174 (TERCOM) system, 167
Suicide bombers, 177 Terrier missiles, 128–129,
Sumner, 138 129–130, 131–132, 134, 135,
Super Entendard fighter, 164 147
Superdestroyers, 75 Terrorism, 177, 178
Supersonic Test Vehicle, 129 TGB. See Torpedo gunboat
Surcouf, 141–142 Thailand, 175
Surface action, destroyers and, 94, Thames River, 17
95 Thanet, 79
Surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), Thatcher, Margaret, 164
128–129, 131–132, 134, 135, Theft, 8
138–144, 147, 149, 151–163, 30-knotter, 34–38
165–170, 174, 178 33-knotter, 36
Surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs), Thomas, Sidney, 27
132–134, 138, 148–149, Thornycroft, 32, 33, 34, 41, 43, 44
152–157, 159–164, 167–171 3-T system, 128, 166. See also
Surgeons, shipboard, 11. See also Talos missiles; Tartar missiles;
Medicine, shipboard Terrier missiles
Surigao Strait, 103 Ticonderoga, 166, 177
Swan, 162 Tigris River, 170
Sweden, 15 Tirpitz, Alfred von, 41–42
and destroyers, 1919–1939, 90 Toilet facilities. See Shipboard life
and destroyers, 1955–1967, Tokyo Express, 101–102
148–149 Tomahawk cruise missiles, 167
and frigates, 148–149 Tonkin Gulf, 150–151
Swift, 29, 49, 63 Tonkin Gulf Resolution, 150–151
Switzerland, 105 Torpedo attack, destroyers and, 58,
Swivel guns, 3 90, 95, 102–103, 117
Syria, 152 Torpedo boat catcher, 29–31, 33
Torpedo boat destroyer (TBD),
Tachibana, 111 31–34
Tachikaze, 162 Torpedo boats, 26–34
Taiwan, 174 steel- and wooden-hulled, 41
and destroyers, 1967–1982, 163 See also individual boats; under
Takatsuki, 161, 162 individual countries
INDEX 303
Torpedo defense, destroyers and, UNC. See United Nations

58, 90, 95 Command
Torpedo gunboat (TGB), 30–31 United Nations
Torpedo tubes, 30, 32–33. See also and destroyers, 1955–1967,
individual weapons 149–150
Torpedoes, 24–25, 28, 74–75 and frigates, 149–150
self-propelled, 23, 25–26 United Nations Command (UNC),
Toulon, 112 149–150
Tourville, 157–158, 174 United States
Towed mine, 24 and Civil War ships, 40–41
Treaty of Versailles, 72–73, 83, 87 and destroyers, 1880–1902, 41
Tribal, 48, 85, 107, 110, 141 and destroyers, 1902–1914,
Triple Alliance, 57, 61. See also 45–46
Central Power and destroyers, 1914–1918, 54,
Triple Entente, 57, 61 60, 61, 64, 67
Triple-expansion engine, 30, 34, and destroyers, 1919–1939,
35, 36, 37 70–71, 73–75, 80–81, 81–82,
Troop carrier, destroyer as, 61, 62, 83, 84, 90
95–96, 101–102 and destroyers, 1939–1945, 91,
Truck carriage, 3 92–93, 96–97, 99–107, 114
Truman, Harry S., 122 and destroyers, 1946–1955,
Truman Doctrine, 122 117–118, 119–120, 121–124,
Truxton, 136, 153 125, 126
Tuberculosis, 38 and destroyers, 1955–1967,
Turbina, 36 129–132, 134–138, 145,
Turbine engine, 36–38 149–150, 150–151, 151–152
Turkey, 61, 89 and destroyers, 1967–1982,
and destroyers, 1914–1918, 62 152–155, 163
and destroyers, 1967–1982, 166–168, 171–172, 172–173
162 and destroyers, 1992–present,
and frigates, 162, 169, 173, 175 173, 177, 178
Turrets, 77–78 education methods in, 175
Turtleback bow, 33 and frigates, 107, 135–136, 145,
27-knotter, 34–36 149–150, 152–155, 166,
26-knotter, 33–34 171–172, 172–173
Typhon program, 166 and guided missile destroyers,
Typhoons, 114 130–131
Typhus, 7 and iron-hulled ships, 18
Tyrrhenian Sea, 126 and mines, 24
and missile systems, 128–132
U-562, 93 and missile technology, 128–129
U-boats, 91, 92–94, 96. See also and paddle wheel sloops, 15
Antisubmarine warfare recruitment methods in, 55
Udaloy, 155–156 and steam-powered screw-
Umikaze, 52–53 propelled warships, 17
304 INDEX
United States (continued) iron-hulled, 17–20

and steamships, 12 See also individual ships
and torpedo boats, 41 Warspite, 94
United States Naval Academy, 175 Washington Naval Conference of
women in, 176 1921-1922, 74
U.S. Army, 40 Washington Navy Treaty of 1922,
U.S. Civil War, 20–21, 24–25, 74, 76, 79, 80, 83, 85
40–41, 77 Water-tube boilers, 33
U.S. Congress, 12, 150–151 Watt, James, 12
U.S. Navy, 12, 40–41, 45, 46, 70, Weapon, 118
71, 105, 106, 120, 130, 131, Weapon Alpha system, 118, 120,
135, 136, 137, 151, 152, 154, 123
155, 166, 167, 171, 173, 177 Weapons of mass destruction
women in, 176 (WMDs), xii
U.S. Pacific Fleet, 99 Weapons technology, and society,
U.S. 3rd Fleet, 114 impact on, xi–xii
V-1 rockets, 128 West Germany
V-2 rockets, 128 and destroyers, 1955–1967,
144–145
Valparaiso, Chile, 8–9 and destroyers, 1967–1982, 160,
Van Spijk, 146 161
Vauquelin, 82 and frigates, 144–145, 160, 161
Velox, 37 Whitby, 140–140
Ventilation, 7, 38 Whitehead, Robert, 25
Vernon, 56 Whitehead self-propelled torpedo,
Vertical launch system (VLS), 167, 25–26
173, 174 Wickes, 64, 71
Vesuvius, 26 Wilhelm II, 41, 58
Victoria, Queen, 36 Wilhelmshaven, 47
Vietnam War, 150–151, 163 Windsor, Duke and Duchess of,
Viper, 36–38, 47 96
Virginia, 153, 155 WMDs. See Weapons of mass
VLS. See Vertical launch system destruction
Volunteers, 55, 175 Women, in the navy, 176
Vulcan Phalanx Gun, 167 Wooden-hulled ships
end of, 20
Wages, 39 and fire, 10–11
War of 1812, 8–9 and torpedo boats, 41
War on commerce (guerre de vs. iron-hulled ships, 17
course), 28–29 See also Hulls
Warburton-Lee, B. A. W., 94 World War I, 31, 32, 35, 42, 54,
Ward, 99 57–67, 79
Warrior, 20 post–, 69–73
Warsaw Pact, 122, 127, 147 World War II, 91–115, 104, 125
Warships, vii post–, 117, 122–123
INDEX 305
Wounded sailors, and combat, Yorktown, 114

10–11, 113–114 Yugoslavia, 73
and destroyers, 1939-1945, 112
Yacht, 36 Yugumo, 110
Yamagumo, 161
Yamato, 101 Z Plan, 91
Yarmouth, 61 Zieten, 41
Yarra, 146 Zulu, 63
Yarrow, 32, 33, 40, 43
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Eric W. Osborne, Ph.D., is adjunct professor in history at the Vir-

ginia Military Institute, Lexington, Virginia. His published works in-
clude Britain’s Economic Blockade of Germany, 1914–1919 (2004)
and Cruisers and Battle Cruisers (ABC-CLIO, 2004).
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Air Defense, Shannon A. Brown

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Preface and Acknowledgments vii

Introduction to Encyclopedias of Weapons and Warfare Series,

Destroyers and Frigates of the World 181

Selected Bibliography 281

About the Author 306

The destroyer, a comparatively small vessel of great speed and

on the performance of the destroyer. Other works that focus solely

Chapter 3 examines the era from 1914, the beginning of World

AND WARFARE SERIES

Weapons can have a profound impact on society. Gunpowder

We hope that this series will be of wide interest to specialists, re-

The destroyer is a vessel whose roles have changed markedly

Sloops carried cannons on the main deck. These guns were

Regardless of the type, guns were carried to sea on an extremely

themselves in the heads. In many sloops, this arrangement might be

end of the eighteenth century, convicted people could be sentenced

military purposes by the French—the ship and cargo could be

enclosed in lightly armored boxes to protect them from enemy fire.

decide whether to adopt the screw propeller for warships. In 1838,

the French Le Napoleon that was launched in 1850 as the world’s

1820s, thanks to the work of French Colonel Henri Paixhans, who

The Crimean War made the construction of corvettes like Volage

and gunboats on the river—consisted of 17 ships commanded by

1. Brian Lavery, Nelson’s Navy: The Ships, Men, and Organisation,

7. James L. George, History of Warships: From Ancient Times to the

From Experimental Vessel

The production of the self-propelled torpedo, which ultimately led

In the early 1870s the British pursued the development of ships

was stronger and lighter than iron. The prohibitively expensive

ning consisted of two cages, each containing a torpedo, that could

Grivel realized, however, that France possessed one strength that

The British Admiralty contracted with private shipyards to pro-

chased by the Admiralty from another firm. In addition to the new

turbine, but their brief careers, particularly that of Cobra, called

and traditionalists who based naval power on numbers of capital

of obsolete warships, a fleet smaller than that of Chile. Experimen-

Italian constructors had little experience with small craft. As a re-

ness, endurance, and habitability had produced vessels that could

naval ordnance. Nevertheless, the practice of using gun shields

eclipsed in numbers by Germany in 1905, launched 23 more de-

hulls that measured 323 feet, 3 inches by 28 feet, 1 inch by 9 feet

previous engagement, there were no ships sunk by torpedoes. The

convoys to continue to arrive in British ports and thus keep the

mented by the variety of noncombat duties that fell to them. De-

stroyers, launched between 1916 and 1917, was consequently a vir-

The destroyer program of the United States, which ranked as the

need for destroyers, production lagged. The first destroyer to enter

1. Arthur Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British