Arn30043 Atp - 7 100.2 000 Web 2 PDF

ATP 7-100.
NORTH KOREAN TACTICS
July 2020
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Headquarters, Department of the Army

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(https://armypubs.army.mil/) and the Central Army Registry site
(https://atiam.train.army.mil/catalog/dashboard).
ATP 7-100.2
Army Techniques Publication Headquarters
No. 7-100.2 Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 24 July 2020
North Korean Tactics
Contents
Page
PREFACE................................................................................................................... vii
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... ix
PART ONE NORTH KOREAN FORCES

Chapter 1 NORTH KOREAN FUNDAMENTALS ...................................................................... 1-1
Operational Environments ......................................................................................... 1-1
Major Combat Operations in Conflict ........................................................................ 1-4
Introduction to North Korea ....................................................................................... 1-5
North Korean Motivations .......................................................................................... 1-8
North Korean Capabilities and Intent ........................................................................ 1-9
North Korean Military Principles .............................................................................. 1-11
Framework for Military Operations .......................................................................... 1-17
North Korean Evolution and Adaptation .................................................................. 1-20
Multi-domain Extended Battlefield ........................................................................... 1-21
Actions to Counter U.S. Forces ............................................................................... 1-24
Offensive, Defensive, and Counterstability Actions ................................................ 1-29
Chapter 2 FUNCTIONAL TACTICS........................................................................................... 2-1
Tactical Terms, Symbols, and Control Measures ..................................................... 2-1
Action and Enabling Functions .................................................................................. 2-5
Functional Method ..................................................................................................... 2-6
Action Forces and Elements ..................................................................................... 2-7
Enabling Forces and Elements ................................................................................. 2-8
Functional Tactics in Operations ............................................................................. 2-10
Execution of Mission Tasks ..................................................................................... 2-11
Chapter 3 NORTH KOREAN FORCE STRUCTURE AND FORMATIONS .............................. 3-1
Functional Organization of North Korean Forces ...................................................... 3-1
Service Component Organizations ............................................................................ 3-1
Command and Support Relationships ....................................................................... 3-3
Command Post Command and Control .................................................................... 3-4
Tactical-level Organization of Regular Forces .......................................................... 3-7
Tactical-level Organization of Irregular Forces........................................................ 3-20
PART TWO NORTH KOREAN ACTIONS

Chapter 4 BATTLE DRILLS ...................................................................................................... 4-1
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i
Contents
Purpose of Battle Drills ............................................................................................. 4-1

Actions on Contact .................................................................................................... 4-2
Fixing ......................................................................................................................... 4-6
Break Contact ........................................................................................................... 4-9
Situational Breach ................................................................................................... 4-13
Fire and Maneuver .................................................................................................. 4-16
Complementary Combined Arms Actions ............................................................... 4-19
Chapter 5 RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY .................................................................... 5-1
Reconnaissance and Security Operations ................................................................ 5-1
Reconnaissance and Security Methods.................................................................... 5-4
Reconnaissance and Security Plans, Preparation, and Execution ........................... 5-6
Reconnaissance Fundamentals ................................................................................ 5-8
Reconnaissance Missions ........................................................................................ 5-9
Reconnaissance Formations .................................................................................. 5-14
Security Fundamentals ........................................................................................... 5-21
Security Missions .................................................................................................... 5-22
Defensive Security Formations ............................................................................... 5-36
Chapter 6 OFFENSIVE ACTIONS ............................................................................................ 6-1
Purpose of the Offense ............................................................................................. 6-1
Planning the Offense................................................................................................. 6-2
Preparing for the Offense ........................................................................................ 6-11
Executing the Offense ............................................................................................. 6-11
Types of Offensive Action—Divisions and Regiments............................................ 6-14
Tactical Offensive Actions—Detachments, Battalions, and Subordinate Units ...... 6-22
Offensive Operations in Complex Operational Environments ................................ 6-35
Chapter 7 DEFENSIVE ACTIONS ............................................................................................ 7-1
Purpose of the Defense ............................................................................................ 7-1
Planning the Defense ................................................................................................ 7-2
Preparing the Defense .............................................................................................. 7-3
Executing the Defense .............................................................................................. 7-4
Types of Defensive Action—Divisions and Regiments ............................................. 7-4
Tactical Defensive Actions—Detachments, Battalions, and Subordinate Units ..... 7-18
Defensive Operations in Complex Operational Environments ............................... 7-22
Chapter 8 COUNTERSTABILITY ACTIONS ............................................................................ 8-1
Purpose of Counterstability Actions .......................................................................... 8-1
Planning Counterstability Actions ............................................................................. 8-1
Threats and Criminal Activity .................................................................................... 8-4
Preparing Counterstability Actions ............................................................................ 8-6
Executing Counterstability Actions............................................................................ 8-7
North Korean Actions Within the South Korean Population...................................... 8-7
Counterstability in Support of North Korean Military Operations ............................ 8-11
Chapter 9 ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE WARFARE ............................................................ 9-1
Tactical-level Electronic Intelligence Warfare ........................................................... 9-1
Electronic Intelligence Warfare Tactical Tasks ......................................................... 9-1
Systems Warfare....................................................................................................... 9-2
Windows of Opportunity ............................................................................................ 9-2
Competition and the Human Dimension ................................................................... 9-3
Components of Electronic Intelligence Warfare........................................................ 9-3
Appendix A FIRES SUPPORT OPERATIONS ............................................................................ A-1
Appendix B AVIATION OPERATIONS ........................................................................................ B-1
Appendix C ANTITANK OPERATIONS ....................................................................................... C-1
ii ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Contents
Appendix D AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS ................................................................................ D-1

Appendix E ELECTRONIC WARFARE OPERATIONS ...............................................................E-1
Appendix F ENGINEER OPERATIONS ....................................................................................... F-1
Appendix G CBRN AND OBSCURANT OPERATIONS ............................................................. G-1
Appendix H LOGISTICS OPERATIONS ..................................................................................... H-1
Appendix I SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES OPERATIONS .................................................... I-1
SOURCE NOTES ................................................................................ Source Notes-1
GLOSSARY ................................................................................................ Glossary-1
REFERENCES ........................................................................................ References-1
INDEX ................................................................................................................ Index-1
Figures
Figure 1-1. One strategic environment with numerous operational environments ........................ 1-3
Figure 1-2. Building blocks of KPA tactical doctrine..................................................................... 1-12
Figure 1-3. Actions to counter enemy shaping operations ........................................................... 1-24
Figure 1-4. Actions to counter enemy deterrence ........................................................................ 1-25
Figure 1-5. Actions to counter enemy seizing the initiative .......................................................... 1-26
Figure 1-6. Actions to counter enemy dominance........................................................................ 1-27
Figure 1-7. Actions to counter enemy stabilizing actions ............................................................. 1-28
Figure 1-8. Actions to counter enemy enabling civil authority...................................................... 1-28
Figure 2-1. Typical KPAGF control measures (conceptual) ........................................................... 2-3
Figure 2-2. KPA unit/organization symbol presentation options .................................................... 2-5
Figure 2-3. Method for mission sequence analysis ........................................................................ 2-6
Figure 3-1. KPA armed forces service components....................................................................... 3-1
Figure 3-2. KPAGF corps general locations ................................................................................... 3-9
Figure 3-3. Different types of KPAGF divisions ............................................................................ 3-10
Figure 3-4. KPAGF infantry division structure (example) ............................................................. 3-11
Figure 3-5. Division integrated fires system possible task organization components.................. 3-12
Figure 3-6. Division integrated support system possible task organization components ............ 3-13
Figure 3-7. KPA special operations forces headquarters (example) ........................................... 3-13
Figure 3-8. KPAGF tank brigade (example) ................................................................................. 3-14
Figure 3-9. KPAGF infantry regiment (example) .......................................................................... 3-15
Figure 3-10. KPAGF infantry battalion organization (example) ................................................... 3-16
Figure 3-11. KPAGF infantry company organization (example) .................................................. 3-17
Figure 3-12. KPAGF battalion-size detachment (example) ......................................................... 3-18
Figure 3-13. KPAGF company-size detachment (example) ........................................................ 3-19
Figure 3-14. KPAGF small unit symbols ...................................................................................... 3-19
Figure 3-15. KPAGF small unit symbols with task-organized amplifiers...................................... 3-20
Figure 3-16. Guerrilla battalion organization (example) ............................................................... 3-22
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 iii

Contents
Figure 3-17. Relevant population relationships to irregular forces .............................................. 3-23

Figure 3-18. Armed and unarmed noncombatants (examples) ................................................... 3-24
Figure 4-1. Actions on contact (example) ...................................................................................... 4-4
Figure 4-2. Fixing (example) .......................................................................................................... 4-7
Figure 4-3. Break contact (example) ........................................................................................... 4-10
Figure 4-4. Situational breach (example)..................................................................................... 4-13
Figure 4-5. Fire and maneuver (example) ................................................................................... 4-16
Figure 4-6. Disruption actions (example; part 1 of 2) .................................................................. 4-20
Figure 4-7. Disruption actions (example; part 2 of 2) .................................................................. 4-21
Figure 4-8. All-arms air defense actions (example) ..................................................................... 4-25
Figure 4-9. Air assault defense actions (example) ...................................................................... 4-30
Figure 4-10. Complexity in complex terrain (example) ................................................................ 4-33
Figure 4-11. Defense in a complex battle position (example) ..................................................... 4-36
Figure 4-12. Surface signature of a subterranean complex battle position (example) ................ 4-38
Figure 4-13. Subterranean complex battle position configuration (example) .............................. 4-39
Figure 4-14. Subterranean complex battle position (side-view functional example) ................... 4-40
Figure 5-1. Area reconnaissance and tactical tasks (example) ................................................... 5-11
Figure 5-2. Zone reconnaissance and tactical tasks (example) .................................................. 5-12
Figure 5-3. Route reconnaissance and tactical tasks (example) ................................................. 5-13
Figure 5-4. Task-organized long-range reconnaissance platoon (example) ............................... 5-16
Figure 5-5. Task-organized reconnaissance patrol (example) .................................................... 5-17
Figure 5-6. Task-organized independent reconnaissance patrol (example) ............................... 5-18
Figure 5-7. Reconnaissance company detachment, infantry division (example) ........................ 5-19
Figure 5-8. Reconnaissance battalion detachment, RGB (example) .......................................... 5-20
Figure 5-9. Task-organized reconnaissance brigade, RGB (example) ....................................... 5-21
Figure 5-10. Company defensive screen (example) .................................................................... 5-27
Figure 5-11. Flank guard and battalion detachment (example) ................................................... 5-30
Figure 5-12. Counterreconnaissance detachment (example) ..................................................... 5-38
Figure 5-13. Regiment task-organized for a cover mission (example) ........................................ 5-39
Figure 6-1. Encirclement maneuver (example).............................................................................. 6-4
Figure 6-2. Penetration maneuver (example) ................................................................................ 6-5
Figure 6-3. Thrust maneuver (example) ........................................................................................ 6-6
Figure 6-4. Holding maneuver (example) ...................................................................................... 6-7
Figure 6-5. Turning maneuver (example) ...................................................................................... 6-8
Figure 6-6. Infiltration maneuver (example) ................................................................................... 6-9
Figure 6-7. Besetment maneuver (example) ............................................................................... 6-10
Figure 6-8. KPAGF primary small-unit (company and below) movement formations ................. 6-13
Figure 6-9. Integrated attack (KPAGF mechanized division-level encirclement example) ......... 6-16
Figure 6-10. Dispersed attack (example)..................................................................................... 6-19
Figure 6-11. Assault (example) .................................................................................................... 6-24
Figure 6-12. Ambush (example) .................................................................................................. 6-26
iv ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Contents
Figure 6-13. Raid (example)......................................................................................................... 6-28

Figure 6-14. Reconnaissance attack (example; part 1 of 5) ........................................................ 6-30
Figure 6-19. Known North Korean infiltration tunnel locations ..................................................... 6-37
Figure 7-1. KPAGF brigade mobile defense, initial layout (example; part 1 of 5) .......................... 7-6
Figure 7-2. KPAGF brigade mobile defense (example; part 2 of 5) ............................................... 7-7
Figure 7-5. KPAGF brigade mobile defense (example; part 5 of 5) ............................................. 7-10
Figure 7-6. Division area defense (example) ............................................................................... 7-12
Figure 7-7. KPAGF field army defensive zone (conceptual) ........................................................ 7-14
Figure 7-8. Antitank defensive position (example) ....................................................................... 7-16
Figure 7-9. Simple and complex battle position symbols (example) ............................................ 7-18
Figure 7-10. Platoon orientation in a battle position (example).................................................... 7-20
Figure 7-11. Complex battle position in an urban defense (example) ......................................... 7-22
Figure 8-1. Counterstability actions to create conditions and effects............................................. 8-2
Figure 8-2. Counterstability plan-act-exploit cycle ......................................................................... 8-3
Figure 8-3. Criminal gang organizational structure (example) ....................................................... 8-4
Figure 8-4. Criminal large-scale network organizational structure (example) ................................ 8-5
Figure 8-5. Criminal transnational organization structure and functions (example) ....................... 8-6
Figure 8-6. Attempted assassination of the South Korean President .......................................... 8-11
Figure F-1. KPA combat engineer company (example) ................................................................. F-1
Figure F-2. KPA general engineer battalion (example) .................................................................. F-2
Figure H-1. Regimental Rear Service Department (example) ...................................................... H-1
Figure H-2. Division Rear Service Department (example) ............................................................ H-2
Figure H-3. Corps Rear Service Department (example) ............................................................... H-2
Tables
Introductory Table. Unit conversions .................................................................................................xi
Table 1-1. Variables of an operational environment ...................................................................... 1-2
Table 2-1. KPAGF standard attack frontage and depth ................................................................. 2-2
Table 3-1. KPA command and support relationships ..................................................................... 3-3
Table 3-2. Command post types by command level ...................................................................... 3-4
Table 3-3. KPAGF corps and locations .......................................................................................... 3-8
Table 5-1. Reconnaissance mission descriptions ........................................................................ 5-10
Table 5-2. Security mission functions by mission type................................................................. 5-21
Table 5-3. Typical type of security unit in support of main body force ......................................... 5-23
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 v

Contents
Table 6-1. Known North Korean infiltration tunnels ..................................................................... 6-36

Table 7-1. Security elements in a security zone .......................................................................... 7-13
Table 7-2. KPAGF counterattack types and criteria .................................................................... 7-17
Table 9-1. Electronic intelligence warfare objectives ..................................................................... 9-4
Table A-1. Typical KPAGF indirect fire weapons, corps level and below ...................................... A-2
Table A-2. KPA indirect fire weapons, corps level and below ....................................................... A-3
Table B-1. KPAAF air divisions ...................................................................................................... B-1
Table C-1. KPAGF tank and antitank weapons systems ............................................................... C-2
Table D-1. KPA air defense weapons systems by unit type .......................................................... D-2
Table D-2. KPA surface-to-air missile and MANPADS weapons systems .................................... D-3
Table D-3. KPA antiaircraft artillery weapons systems .................................................................. D-4
Table E-1. KPA radar systems ...................................................................................................... E-3
Table G-1. KPA CBRN- and obscurant-capable tanks and armored fighting vehicles .................G-2
Table G-2. KPA CBRN- and obscurant-capable guns, howitzers, and mortars ............................G-2
Table G-3. KPA CBRN- and obscurant-capable mortars, rocket launchers, and missiles ............G-3
Table G-4. U.S. Army radiation exposure guide ............................................................................ G-4
Table G-5. KPAGF smoke classifications ...................................................................................... G-5
Table I-1. KPA special operations forces units ............................................................................... I-2
vi ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Preface
Army Training Publication (ATP) 7-100.2 describes North Korean tactics for use in Army training,
professional education, and leader development. This document is part of the ATP 7-100 series that addresses
a nation-state’s military doctrine with a focus on army ground forces and tactical operations in offense,
defense, and related mission sets. Other foundational topics include task organization, capabilities, and
limitations related to military mission and support functions. ATP 7-100.2 serves as a foundation for
understanding how North Korean ground forces think and act in tactical operations. This publication presents
multiple examples of functional tactics in dynamic operational environment conditions. The tactics in this
ATP are descriptive, and provide an orientation to tactics gathered from North Korean doctrine, translated
literature, and observations from recent historical events.
The principal audience for ATP 7-100.2 is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders and staffs of
Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable
joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces.
Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this publication.
Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United
States, international, and in some cases host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure
that their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See Field Manual
(FM) 6-27.)
To compare and contrast information in this ATP with other Army doctrine, the reader must first understand
the fundamentals of land operations in FM 3-0 and the Army’s supporting ADPs and ATPs that describe
military operations and the application of combat power. Joint and multinational application will require
comparison to and contrast with relevant joint and multinational doctrine.
ATP 7-100.2 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both
the glossary and the text. For definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the
proponent publication follows the definition. This publication is not the proponent for any Army terms.
ATP 7-100.2 contains acronyms that are theater-specific and are not found in either FM 1-02.1 or the DOD
Dictionary. It also contains Korean People’s Army and other theater-specific concepts, translated into English
where appropriate, that are underlined when introduced in the text. If the concept name is similar to a U.S.
term but has a different meaning, an explanation of the North Korean concept is provided.
ATP 7-100.2 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States,
and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.
The proponent of ATP 7-100.2 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is
the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Center. The lead agency
tasked with developing this ATP is the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command G-2, Analysis
and Control Element, Operational Environment & Threat Analysis Directorate. Send comments and
recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to
Commander, United States Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCD (ATP
7-100.2), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by email to
[email protected]; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 vii

Acknowledgements
The copyright owners listed here have granted permission to reproduce material from their works. Other
courtesy credits listed.
Select concepts in chapters 1, 6, and 7 by permission from James M. Minnich, The North Korean
People's Army: Origins and Current Tactics (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005).
Map reprinted courtesy of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “Korea, North,” The World Factbook,
30 January 2019. Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/kn.html.
viii ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Introduction
ATP 7-100.2 addresses the tactics, organization, and activities of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea’s ground forces. Part one of this document focuses on the
strategic and operational levels, and includes North Korea’s military structure,
organizational philosophy, and an introduction to functional tactics. Part two focuses
on the tactical level, and describes Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (KPAGF)
offensive and defensive tactics in detail. Several appendixes provide additional
information on specific military functions and their use in tactical actions.
PART ONE—NORTH KOREAN FORCES

Chapter 1 describes the strategic environment, operational environments, and approaches to conflict. It
reviews North Korea’s history and political structure, then delves into the country’s military forces. Topics
covered include military principles; operational framework; concept of evolution and adaptation; planned
actions to counter U.S. forces; and motivations, capabilities, and intent.
Chapter 2 explains Korean People’s Army (KPA) actions within the framework of functional tactics. It
discusses the functional method and the terms, symbols, and control measures used to portray and govern
North Korean military activities. A description of action and enabling functions is given, along with common
function types performed by action and enabling units. The chapter concludes with a discussion of mission
task execution.
Chapter 3 addresses North Korean force structure and command and control of formations. It reviews KPA
service component organizations, command and support relationships, and command and control of military
forces. A concise description of force structure at the tactical echelon addresses regular and irregular forces,
with the former primarily at the tactical echelons of division, brigade, regiment, battalion, and company.
PART TWO—NORTH KOREAN ACTIONS

Chapter 4 describes the standardized execution of several fundamental tactical tasks based on conditions
and situational cues during mission performance. North Korean tactical drills common to reconnaissance and
security, offensive, defensive, and counterstability actions can include―but are not limited to―actions on
contact, situational breach, fixing, fire and maneuver, and breaking contact.
Chapter 5 describes how the KPA uses reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition as
essential elements to successfully meet its reconnaissance and security requirements, and addresses the
intelligence process. The section on security provides information on how North Korea protects its military
units from being surprised by the enemy. Examples of reconnaissance and security organizational structures
and the types of missions conducted by both types of units are found throughout the chapter.
Chapter 6 describes the KPAGF’s primary types of offensive actions at the tactical level. The ground forces
have six purposes for conducting offensive action and use seven different forms of maneuver in their attacks.
These maneuver forms can be used in conducting any type of offensive attacks—integrated, dispersed, and
limited-objective attacks at the regimental and divisional level, or assaults, ambushes, raids, and
reconnaissance attacks at battalion level and below.
Chapter 7 describes the KPAGF’s primary types of defensive actions at the tactical level. The ground forces
have two primary forms of defensive actions: mobile defense and area defense. North Korean forces only go
on the defense when necessary, and desire to return to the offense as soon as possible.
Chapter 8 describes North Korea’s counterstability actions, designed to counteract an enemy’s attempts to
create a stable environment for the civilian population to live in and flourish. These activities degrade and
disrupt an enemy’s civil security, law enforcement, public services, infrastructure, and effective governance,
and destroy enemy resolve to resist the eventual outcome of the unification of Korea under the Kim regime.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 ix

Introduction
Chapter 9 describes North Korea’s system to achieve informational and situational understanding
advantages over an enemy. The country utilizes 11 different components, all of which are used in conjunction
with combat operations. North Korea conducts electronic intelligence warfare to obtain information on its
enemies, to deceive them, and to achieve effects against them. While much of this warfare is conducted above
the tactical level on the battlefield, it affects ground forces at all levels.
APPENDIXES
Appendix A describes how North Korean forces provide integrated fires in support of ground maneuver
forces in tactical missions.
Appendix B describes how the KPA conducts aerial operations to include homeland defense, close air
support of its ground forces, and support to special operations forces units.
Appendix C describes how the KPAGF employ antitank weapons in tactical missions in support of ground
maneuver forces.
Appendix D describes how the KPAGF use all-arms air defense to protect its ground maneuver forces.
Appendix E describes North Korea’s ability to conduct electronic warfare at the tactical level in support of
tactical missions.
Appendix F describes the KPAGF’s use of engineers in offensive and defensive tactical missions.
Appendix G describes KPAGF capabilities to use smoke and other obscurants, and chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear weapons in tactical missions.
Appendix H describes how North Korea supplies and sustains its ground maneuver forces in tactical
missions.
Appendix I describes the KPA’s normal methods of using special operations forces to support ground
maneuver force operations.
UNITS OF MEASURE
Units of measure in ATP 7-100.2 are metric. The only exceptions to this are large weights, which are in U.S.
tons (also known as short tons) and are denoted as “tons,” and volumes, which are shown in gallons. The
introductory table provides conversion data from one measurement system to another for units used in this
publication.
x ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Introduction
Introductory Table. Unit conversions
Type Metric English
Area 1 square kilometer 0.38610 square miles
Area 1 square meter 10.7639 square feet
Distance 1 meter (m) 3.28084 feet
Distance 1 centimeter (cm) 0.39370 inches
Distance 1 kilometer (km) 0.62137 miles
Speed 1 kilometer per hour (kph) 0.62137 miles per hour
Speed 1 meter per second (mps) 3.28084 feet per second
Weapon bore size 1 millimeter (mm) 0.03937 inches
Weapon bore size 1 millimeter (mm) 0.03937 caliber
Weight 1 kilogram (kg) 2.2046 pounds
Weight 0.90718 metric tons 1 (U.S./short) ton
Volume 3.78541 liters 1 gallon
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 xi

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PART ONE
North Korean Forces

Part One addresses three primary areas: North Korean fundamentals; functional
tactics; and Korean People’s Army (KPA) force structure. Chapter 1 discusses
operational environments (OEs) and North Korean fundamentals. Chapter 2 describes
functional analysis and tactics used in KPA offensive, defensive, and counterstability
actions. Chapter 3 presents the Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (KPAGF)
structure and task-organization methods at tactical echelons for regular and irregular
forces. Examples include task-organized units, organization military symbology,
command and support relationships, integrated capabilities, and limitations of combat
power.
Chapter 1
North Korean Fundamentals
This chapter describes the strategic environment, OEs, and approaches to conflict. It
reviews North Korea’s history and political structure, then delves into the country’s
military forces. Topics covered include military principles; operational framework;
concept of evolution and adaptation; planned actions to counter U.S. forces; and
motivations, capabilities, and intent.
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS
1-1. The Department of Defense defines an operational environment (OE) as a composite of the conditions,
circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the
commander (Joint Publication, (JP) 3-0). This definition applies to an OE for a specific operation and at any
level of command. Analysis of an OE, either real-world or composite, focuses on eight interrelated
operational variables, shown in table 1-1 on page 1-2.
1-2. Comprehending these eight operational variables and their interrelationships assists in understanding
an OE and its impacts on a particular operation. Military operations will be significantly affected by
conditions beyond just military force capabilities. The largest country with the strongest military forces and
the most modernized systems will not always win in a conflict, because a threat can be a master at employing
basic-technology solutions and exploiting environmental conditions to achieve success. This can include
redefining the elements of victory to be simply continued existence as a force in being. A threat can be regular
forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, criminal organizations, or some hybrid thereof. As a learning
organization, it seeks to continually improve its situational awareness and understanding of both its OE and
its opponent. The threat confronts a foe with adaptive and innovative actions and operates with a range of
motivations, weapons, equipment, and task-organized capabilities optimized to its particular environment.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 1-1

Chapter 1
Note. The chapters of this ATP address topics from the North Korean point of view. So, friendly
refers to North Korea and allied or affiliated forces. Likewise, enemy, adversary, and foe refer to
its opposition, which may be a challenger from within the country itself, or a regional or
extraregional opponent (normally the U.S. or a U.S.-led coalition). Parties are neutral regarding
North Korea. A threat has the capability and intent to harm the U.S., and an opponent may be
against either the U.S. or North Korea, with context determining the correct interpretation.
Table 1-1. Variables of an operational environment
Variable Description
Describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance—

formally constituted authorities as well as informal or covert political powers—within
Political
the operational environment, as well as associated regional and global political
conditions.
Explores the military and/or paramilitary capabilities of all relevant actors (enemy,
Military
friendly, and neutral) in a selected operational environment.
Encompasses individual and group behaviors related to producing, distributing, and

Economic
consuming resources across an operational environment.
Describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic composition within an operational

Social environment, including the beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors of society
members.
Describes the nature, scope, and effects of individuals, organizations, and systems
Information
that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.
Portrays the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a
Infrastructure
community or society.
Physical Explains the geography and man-made structures, as well as the climate and weather
environment of an operational environment.
Describes the timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions within an

Time operational environment, as well as how the timing and duration are perceived by
various actors within the operational environment.
1-3. In preparing an Army training event, scenario, or associated road to war information, leaders consider
an entire OE and its impact on the threat’s organization of forces, equipment, operations, tactics, and probable
techniques in mission execution. In predeployment training against a specific real-world threat, an OE created
for training and readiness evaluation represents the anticipated OE for the actual operation as closely as
possible. For other training, professional education, and leader development venues for sustained Army
learning and readiness, an OE represents a composite of the types of conditions that can exist in various
actual OEs.
THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

1-4. The strategic environment is the set of general conditions, circumstances, and influences throughout
the world that can affect military operations. It is the global environment in which the U.S. Government
employs all the elements of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. There is one
strategic environment and numerous OEs—each of which can refer to a region, a country, a town, or any
other defined area.
1-5. Conditions existing in various OEs, combined with how different actors operate within them, comprise
the strategic environment in which both the Army and its opponents operate. An understanding of these
complexities in OEs across the world is a necessary element of both U.S. and threat preparation and mission
1-2 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

readiness. A threat may have a strategic perspective or be focused on a regional outcome to its actions. Figure
1-1 shows examples of potential OEs.
Figure 1-1. One strategic environment with numerous operational environments
1-6. Several key judgments show how threat actors will respond to current and trending conditions in the
strategic environment to attain the necessary influence and combat power to achieve their goals and
objectives. Understanding these judgments enables Army decision-making for how and when to act against
an opponent. Paragraphs 1-7 through 1-14 outline these key judgments about the strategic environment.
1-7. Future threats will likely prioritize evolution of the organization over adaptation. While adaptation is
a short-term reaction to a battlefield stimulus that enables momentary survival, evolution is how the threat
cultivates an environment for the long term by manipulating conditions in order to ensure the survival and
growth of the organization over time. Evolution facilitates long-term growth and development, while
adaptation focuses on short-term survival.
1-8. An expanding spectrum of contentious issues will likely fuel future conflict among state and non-state
actors. Traditional points of conflict—such as personal interest, religion, honor, and fear—will persist, and
the number and intensity of those friction points will bring state and non-state actors—including peer and
near-peer competitors of the U.S.—closer to overt conflict. Increasing social media presence could provide
a new venue for aggravating flash points between countries or groups. Threats will take advantage of these
friction points to gain an organizational advantage.
1-9. Regional actors will likely challenge the relative position of the U.S. in the global order to gain an
economic, cultural, or other type of advantage. Potential or known competitors include Russia, China, Iran,
North Korea, and non-state actors such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (commonly known as ISIS).
Each competitor will have a different motivation for challenging the U.S.; part of successfully meeting this
challenge will be to understand the other side’s motivations. The combined power of regional players could
exceed that of the U.S. and effectively create a situation where U.S. national power is severely constrained.
1-10. Nation-states will likely continue to fight proxy wars. Criminal and militant groups, special operations
forces (SOF), and other military or paramilitary units can present plausible deniability by a nation-state.
Proxy forces can be used to conduct operations and achieve outcomes that would otherwise be unacceptable
to world powers and international organizations.
1-11. Exponential growth in science and technology will likely provide threats with increased lethality and
stand-off weapon system capabilities. Opponents will seek technologies to achieve overmatch in specific
niche weapons systems directed at perceived or known areas of U.S. vulnerability. Commercial off-the-shelf
technology is a norm for threat acquisitions, and will help them achieve overmatch capabilities.
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Chapter 1
1-12. Threats often operate in urban environments characterized by increased human interactions, but also
interact globally due to increased connectivity through various communications devices. Four major trends
that influence OEs are population growth, urbanization, population growth along major bodies of water, and
human connectedness and interrelations. The convergence of these trends results in turbulence that threats
can manipulate to their short-, mid-, and long-term advantage.
1-13. Physical environmental conditions will remain catalysts for conflict. Climate stress, natural disasters,
extreme weather events, and their second- and third-order effects will have significant impact on affected
regions. Those with the most poverty may have natural resources or locations of strategic importance to
nation-states.
1-14. The global commons—the earth’s unowned natural resources such as oceans, the atmosphere, and
space—will be increasingly contested. Organizations around the world are prioritizing research and
development efforts that would enable control of these currently minimally governed spaces. The domains
of air, maritime, space, and cyberspace will continue to be targeted by threat actors on a regional and
potentially global scale.
THREAT ACTIONS WITHIN AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1-15. Peer and near-peer threats employ direct and indirect actions to create physical and psychological
effects that can suddenly or progressively diminish the U.S. military element of power. Such threats have
significant capabilities to act in all domains of land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace to attack the U.S.
and its interests. Primary and enabling actions using military, political, and informational means are integral
to manipulating all elements of combat power to influence a foe’s situational awareness, understanding, and
mission decision-making in a particular OE. In addition to physical forms of attack, a relevant population
supportive of threat objectives, deception, distorted reporting in social media and political channels, and other
forms of injecting believable misinformation in an OE can be integrated to convince a foe to act in a manner
that favors a threat objective.
1-16. These threats integrate capabilities in order to mitigate the use of U.S. military power. Five broad
physical and psychological ways are as follows: systems warfare, preclusion, sanctuary, isolation, and
information operations. Some of these methods are often more appropriate at the operational and strategic
levels of confrontation; however, actions and impacts can also be conducted or supportive at the tactical
echelon. Actions and outcomes at all three levels focus ultimately at defeating a foe’s resolve to achieve its
stated objective. At the tactical level of operations in conflict, these threats use tactics linked to functions
necessary for combat action. In this ATP, these are referred to as functional tactics. Functional tactics and
non-prescriptive techniques are used to conduct effective mission tasks and drills, achieve desired immediate
or near-term effects, and support higher-echelon aims of weakening or defeating a foe’s resolve to continue
a conflict.
MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS IN CONFLICT

1-17. Major combat operations aim to defeat the enemy’s forces and eliminate its military capability. These
conflicts are dominated by large-scale conventional operations but often include unconventional warfare. At
the conclusion of major combat operations, the character of the campaign may evolve to irregular warfare or
peace operations. Not all combat operations are protracted. Joint operations may capitalize on superior
military capability to quickly overwhelm a weaker enemy. Successful major combat operations defeat or
destroy the enemy’s armed forces or seize terrain. Commanders assess them in terms of numbers of military
units destroyed or rendered combat ineffective, the level of enemy resolve, and the terrain objectives seized
or secured.
1-4 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

1-18. Current complex local, regional, and global changes lead to both opportunities and risks for nation-
states around the world. This risk component of change manifests in certain trends that drive instability and
global competition. Some important trends that will affect ground-force operations in such an era include—
 Globalization.
 Technology.
 Demographic changes.
 Urbanization.
 Resource demand.
 Climate change and natural disasters.
 Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and effects.
 Failed or failing states.
Note. This ATP can be used to inform and shape the composite features, capabilities, activities,
and tactics of an opposing force for Army individual, collective, and leader education and
development training in live, virtual, constructive, and gaming simulations. Army Regulation
(AR) 350-2 defines an opposing force as a plausible, flexible, and free-thinking mixture of regular
forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements representing a composite of varying capabilities
of actual worldwide forces and capabilities (doctrine, tactics, organization, and equipment). The
opposing force is used in lieu of a specific threat force for training and developing Army forces,
and is tailored to replicate highly capable regular and irregular threats that, when combined, can
replicate hybrid threats.
The purpose of an opposing force is to portray a threat and challenging conditions in learning
environments for Army sustained readiness. The ATP 7-100 series provides information on
specific real-world regular and irregular force threats for training and educating Army forces. This
information can be used to tailor an opposing force in order to assess and evaluate individual and
unit readiness to achieve mission-essential tasks and selected mission tasks.
INTRODUCTION TO NORTH KOREA

1-19. The Korean Peninsula is a location of strategic interest for the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific Command due
to its proximity to China, South Korea’s historical relationship with the U.S. over the past 7 decades, and the
booming South Korean economy that makes it an important U.S. trading partner. The Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, commonly known as North Korea or the DPRK, remains one of the United States’ most
critical security challenges for many reasons. These include the country’s provocative and destabilizing
behavior, such as unprovoked attacks on the Republic of Korea (South Korea; ROK); its pursuit of nuclear
weapons and long-range ballistic missiles; and its willingness to proliferate weapons in contravention of
international treaties. For over 50 years, North Korea has sporadically conducted operations directed against
its foes, especially South Korea. These actions include numerous armed incursions into South Korea; capture
of a U.S. ship in international waters and detention of its crew for months; attacks on South Korean naval
and fishing vessels; hijacking of one South Korean passenger airplane and blowing up of another; electronic
warfare (EW) against South Korean signals, including global positioning satellites; cyberspace attacks
against multiple countries; and successful or attempted assassinations of South Korean officials, including
the country’s president.
HISTORY AND POLITICS

1-20. North Korea is run by an oligarchy led by Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un. The Kim family has ruled
the country since the end of World War II, and most military and civilian leadership consists of second- and
third-generation leaders who are family or close friends of the country’s late founder, Kim Il Sung; his late
son, Kim Jong Il; or his grandson, Kim Jong Un. North Korean history has been full of conflict. Outsiders
from China, Mongolia, and—most recently—Japan have repeatedly invaded the peninsula throughout its
history. Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910 brought great hardship to the Korean people, and independence
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Chapter 1
was not returned until the conclusion of World War II in 1945. The U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed to
divide Korea along the 38th parallel to prevent the possibility of friendly fire between the two sides. The
intent was not to divide the country, but for security and control prior to free elections, in which North Korea
chose not to participate.
1-21. In June 1950, North Korea invaded its southern neighbor in an attempt to unify the peninsula under
Kim Il Sung. With the intervention of the United Nations (UN) after the Soviet Union boycotted a UN
Security Council meeting, an international coalition led by the U.S. pushed the North Korean military back
across the pre-1950 boundary between the two countries in September 1950. U.S. General Douglas
MacArthur then drove the UN forces all the way to the Yalu River where China, feeling threatened by anti-
communist forces, interceded on behalf of North Korea with organized Chinese forces. The Chinese-led
counterattacks pushed the U.S. military and its allies back and recaptured Seoul, the capital of South Korea.
The UN forces then counterattacked, pushing the Chinese/North Korean forces to approximately the 38th
parallel, the original dividing line between the two Koreas. Over the following 2 years a stalemate ensued,
with only minor changes of territory between the warring sides. In late July 1953, the military commanders
of North Korea’s KPA, the Chinese People’s Volunteers, and the United Nations Command signed an
armistice that ended the fighting and created a 2,000-m wide demilitarized zone (DMZ) on either side of the
then-current unit disposition, also known as the military demarcation line. Over 60 years after the armistice,
no formal peace treaty has been signed, and the military demarcation line and the 4,000-m wide DMZ still
exist from the peninsula’s east coast to its west coast. Furthermore, North Korea has never renounced its
ultimate goal, which is to unify all of Korea under its control. With a population of approximately 25 million
people, 1.2 million—almost 5 percent of the population—serve on active military duty in the country, and
another 7.7 million serve in the reserve forces. Besides military operations, the North Korean Government
often uses its uniformed personnel for public service projects or harvesting crops.
1-22. The presence of U.S./UN military forces in South Korea and the size and capabilities of the South
Korean military likely deter North Korea from crossing the border to reunite the two countries by force. The
South Korean military is composed of approximately 600,000 active and 3.1 million reserve personnel, with
a mandatory service requirement for almost all South Korean males. Since the armistice was signed, North
Korea has broken it many times with incursions into the DMZ and South Korea by land, sea, air, and even
underground by tunnel. Today, the country faces off against the Combined Forces Command, Korea—
composed of South Korea and the U.S.—with a conventional regular force backed by nuclear weapons. The
United Nations Command is also still present throughout South Korea, primarily in the Joint Security Area
at Panmunjom, where periodic talks take place between the two sides.
1-23. The KPA uses tactics based on former Soviet or current Russian doctrine, Chinese developments,
lessons learned, and observation of recent military actions. North Korea also emphasizes SOF units that
primarily use unconventional warfare tactics. The country has initiated provocative actions against South
Korea, Japan, and the U.S. in defiance of the armistice’s terms. Publicly, the North Korean Government
claims that its country lives in fear of an invasion from the south or an attempt by extraregional forces to
instigate a regime change and the removal of Kim Jong Un. In June 2018, North Korean and U.S. leaders
met in Singapore and agreed to an eventual denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. No timeline was set to
achieve this goal. A second, unsuccessful summit took place in February 2019.
1-24. While North Korea maintains large amounts of military equipment, much of it is outdated making it
quantitatively superior to most armies but qualitatively inferior. Due to the high cost of modern military
equipment and the lack of funds for and access to the same from years of economic sanctions and poor
economic policies, the country retains obsolete hardware, as evidenced by the presence of the T-34/85—a
World War II-era tank—in some of its lower-priority armor units. The age and variety of equipment from the
former Soviet Union, Russia, and China, and its own internally produced equipment generate major logistical
issues for the KPA to effectively keep the assortment of weapons systems fully functional. The various types
of ammunition required by weapon systems that date from the 1940s also puts additional strain on the
military’s logistics.
1-6 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Note. An explanation on naming and acronym conventions follows. The proper name for North
Korea’s military is the Korean People’s Army, or KPA. This organizational structure is
comparable to the U.S. Department of Defense; it does not refer exclusively to ground forces, as
does the U.S. Army. The KPA consists of multiple components that include—but are not limited
to—a ground force, a navy, and an air force. For the sake of clarity, this document adopts the U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency convention of referring to the entire military as the KPA, the ground
force as the Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (KPAGF), the navy as the Korean People’s
Army Navy (KPAN), and the air force as the Korean People’s Army Air Force (KPAAF).
SONGBUN (NORTH KOREAN CASTE SYSTEM)

1-25. Songbun is a three-tier class system divided into 51 categories that was created by the Kim regime to
isolate and control perceived internal political threats. It is very difficult to move up even from one category
to the next-higher category, but it is very easy to move downward. Even an elite person living in Pyongyang
can commit an infraction and be exiled to the country with a much lower songbun. Every person above the
age of 17 in North Korea has a file maintained by the government that contains the individual’s songbun.
The key factors considered include—
 Ancestral socioeconomic background at the time of liberation (1945).
 Ancestral activities during the Korean War (1950–1953).
 Relatives living outside of North Korea (South Korea, China, or Japan).
1-26. The three classes of songbun are core, wavering, and hostile:
 Core. This is about 28% of the population, including professional revolutionaries, friends of the
Kim family, descendants of “war heroes” who died working or fighting for North Korea, peasants,
or those from peasant families.
 Wavering. This is the largest group, with about 45% of the people. These are people who
previously lived in South Korea, China, or Japan; those with relatives that fled to South Korea;
small-scale merchants and their families; and intellectuals.
 Hostile. This group composes 27% of the population and includes the descendants of landlords,
capitalists, religious people, political prisoners, those that assisted South Korean forces during the
Korean War, those deemed anti-Party, or those associated with external countries. The lowest of
the low are those that are permanently banished to labor camps and worked to death. Even if a
couple in the camp is allowed to marry and has children, the children will live their entire lives in
the gulag unless they escape.
1-27. One’s songbun affects whatever a person does in North Korea:
 Occupation. The government chooses a person’s job, which cannot change unless also approved
by the government. If an individual has a low songbun, the government will likely assign the
person manual labor. People with high songbun might receive a cushy Party cadre position. Job
promotion is not based on merit, meaning that those that are most capable may not be working to
their full potential.
 Education. In North Korea, there is no merit system for education. If one’s parents have good
songbun, a student can continue to go to school and even university. Those that attend universities
because of their songbun make connections that will eventually help them when they are working
as adults.
 Family. Parents impress upon their children to obey the laws because a misstep can damage the
entire family. When a North Korean citizen is “convicted” of a crime and sent to a prison or “re-
education camp,” three generations of the family are swept up, as the North Koreans believe that
there must be “bad blood” running through the family. North Koreans usually marry someone of
the same songbun, as the marriage automatically moves the higher songbun spouse to the partner’s
category.
 Internal Exile. The North Korean Government systematically moves political undesirables to
isolated locations, especially the mountainous areas in the northeastern part of the country. There
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Chapter 1
they are forced to perform hard labor in mines with few safety devices. Pyongyang and the
surrounding area is now almost entirely composed of the core class that supports the Kim regime.
 Food. People with higher songbun get more food from the government stores than those with
lesser songbun. This was especially true during the famine in the early 1990s, when up to 30% of
the population died in the hardest-hit areas. About 60% of all North Korean refugees who now
live in South Korea come from North Hamyong Province in the northeastern part of North Korea,
an area hit particularly hard by the famine and where food insufficiency remains to this day.
 Medical Care. Until the 1990s, medical care was free to everyone. With the sanctions, there is
not enough medicine or equipment to take care of the people. Special treatment centers are still
available in Pyongyang, but only for those who are the core supporters of the system. Doctors in
rural areas use whatever they can obtain through the system, find on the black market, or obtain
from the fields, such as herbs. Families are expected to provide food and often the drugs needed
for any operation outside of the best-equipped hospitals for the elites.
 Housing. There is no private ownership of houses or property in North Korea. Those with higher
songbun, however, receive better housing than those with lesser songbun. In rural areas, much of
the housing is “accordion” style, where a series of six or more houses are built right next to each
other so fewer walls are needed (townhouses). Since the 1990s, people have been known to bribe
officials to get better housing or a second unit for their family. Since the 1990s, there have also
been reported cases of people “selling” their houses to others that could afford to buy them in
order to use the money for food.
NORTH KOREAN MOTIVATIONS

1-28. North Korea embraces three primary goals, with additional second-tier objectives that support its
principal aims. The first goal is for Kim Jong Un and his family to maintain their position of authority in the
regime through the ideological control of the country’s population. The Kim family and its supporters will
likely pursue any strategy necessary to remain firmly in power. The second goal is for North Korea to remain
an independent state free of outside interference, especially from the Western powers. The country’s
possession of a nuclear arsenal and its pursuit of missile technology are attempts to ensure that external
powers do not interfere with its internal affairs for fear of a nuclear reprisal. The third goal, often espoused
as the primary goal—from Kim Il Sung through Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un—is the unification of all of
Korea under the North Korean Government. While this ambition is probably not obtainable as long as
U.S./UN forces remain on the peninsula, a unified Korea under the Kim family’s control remains the
government’s ultimate objective.
1-29. North Korea’s large military is used as a tool to threaten its neighbors. The country uses limited military
provocations to obtain diplomatic concessions at the negotiating table with South Korea, Japan, the U.S., and
other countries. It also uses threats of possible war to obtain humanitarian aid. The North Korean Government
knows that the Western powers and South Korea do not want another active war on the peninsula, so its
threats often lead to success at the negotiating table. Its nuclear arsenal and fear by other countries that it may
initiate a conventional or nuclear attack often serve as the impetus for North Korea’s foes to acquiesce to the
Kim regime’s demands.
1-30. While North Korea’s leaders may seem outlandish at times to the outside world, the Kim family is
treated reverently and is seen as almost godlike in this officially non-religious country. Kim Il Sung
developed a personality cult around himself during his long period in power. His son, Kim Jong Il, continued
to cultivate the myth of the Kim family during his time as the country’s supreme leader. The North Korean
people treat the current ruler, Kim Jong Un, with almost the same awe as the previous two rulers. One reason
for this is that many North Koreans are too afraid of the consequences for doing otherwise. Another reason
that the current leader is treated so reverently is that life for the average North Korean has improved under
Kim Jong Un, as compared to the famine of 1994—1998 during his father’s regime—which many North
Koreans still remember. These years of famine—in which an estimated two million North Koreans died—is
known as the “Arduous March.” Despite these bleak years where people starved to death, Kim Jong Il is still
held in high regard by the current citizens that can remember that period, because he kept the country free
from external—especially Western—interference. The Kim family’s cult status is a major component of the
glue that holds the country together.
1-8 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

NORTH KOREAN CAPABILITIES AND INTENT

1-31. North Korea is adaptive, flexible, and agile—as much as a primarily non-motorized, mechanized, or
tank army can be—and changes its composition and focus to optimize organizational capabilities and use
them against known or perceived enemy vulnerabilities. North Korea will take prudent risks; however, the
KPA may also make significant practical sacrifices in individuals and materiel in order to achieve a major
psychological impact on an enemy. An example of such deliberate sacrifice would be a number of KPA near-
simultaneous small-unit or direct action cell assaults on targets that result in the deaths of most or all attackers,
but receive sensational media coverage to a global audience that indicates an absolute commitment to an
objective.
1-32. North Korea maintains a range of capabilities and will apply them at selected times and locations in
order to achieve desired effects. The KPA uses functional offensive and defensive tactics or acts of crime
and terrorism to counter an enemy. These actions can also be employed to manipulate a population and
dissuade support to an enemy’s military forces or other enemy institutions. When necessary, North Korea
will use acts of physical and psychological violence to gain influence and develop willing or coerced
cooperation from a local population. Concurrently, the country will use indirect means to progressively
degrade an enemy’s combat power and infrastructure resources, and otherwise psychologically influence the
political, social, economic, military, and information variables of an OE.
1-33. North Korea will attempt to exploit its familiarity with the physical environment and its ability to blend
in to a local or regional populace and infrastructure in order to exploit U.S. limited language and cultural
skills/experiences to accomplish its missions. The time variable normally favors the goals and objectives of
North Korea, as the country is more flexible time-wise than typical enemy expectations or mandates. KPA
activities occur over extended periods of time, but may change in pace, tempo, speed, and duration. Timing
of KPA actions may appear random, while the actual mode of operations and activities are deliberate
decisions as part of a long-term campaign or strategy.
1-34. Significant capabilities of North Korea include its ability to manipulate or ignore the restrictions and
sanctions that apply to regulated military forces, law enforcement agencies, and internal security forces
belonging to a sovereign state, alliance, coalition, or similar formal partnership of forces. International
protocols and conventions, national statutes and law, and moral codes that guide or regulate behavioral norms
and social interactions can limit an enemy’s use of weapon systems and other capabilities that overmatch
those of North Korea. The country complies with these codes of conduct when advantageous for its electronic
intelligence warfare (EIW) campaign and overt or clandestine actions. When its regular forces incorporate
clandestine use of combat power, the KPA can claim to plausibly deny responsibility for actions considered
illegal or immoral by its foe. North Korea can easily ignore typical standards of conduct, however, when
such standards no longer provide operational value to achieving a goal or objective.
1-35. Although violent actions by an individual, organization, or combination of forces often receive
immediate notoriety, North Korea complements physical violence with methodical, long-term psychological
warfare. The overarching agenda of the KPA can include but is not limited to the following issues:
 Spotlight popular grievances for resolution, including abuse, accidents, or war crimes by foreign
soldiers fighting for North Korea’s enemy.
 Establish influence, popular recognition, and support of susceptible South Koreans.
 Expand active or passive support of those that support North Korean goals or objectives.
 Deter opposition to its goals and objectives from the South Korean populace.
 Marginalize the governance or extraregional influence of the U.S.
 Develop general acceptance and legitimacy of KPA programs and actions.
 Achieve KPA objectives without alienating critical segments of the South Korean populace and
other regional actors.
 Attract an international or global audience and external organizational sources of influence that
support KPA aims.
1-36. North Korea seeks to gain the approval and support by some regional actors, such as China, in order
to obtain active or passive assistance. The methods must eventually communicate a compelling narrative of
legitimacy that is accepted by the population. North Korea can also attempt, however, to confer authority on
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Chapter 1
itself without regard to the population. A credential of legitimacy may require a gradual process of convincing
the relevant population that conceding to North Korea is an acceptable means to achieve desired social,
economic, or political effects. The country may declare its actions are justifiable under existing conditions
and attempt to degrade the legitimacy of a foe. Of note, North Korea already possesses legitimacy from its
populace and recognition by most foreign governments.
1-37. Sometimes external recognition and support are not as important to North Korea as establishing a
geographic or cyberspace enclave from which to plan, prepare, and conduct its activities and influence. For
example, North Korea has established cyberspace teams in foreign countries. The country conducts direct
and indirect actions that are adaptive and persistent from both types of sanctuaries. North Korea is a complex
array of regular and irregular organizations, units, or individuals with sometimes disparate single-agenda
aims. Many of the North Korean senior leaders create small fiefdoms, with the only common denominator
being support—overt or tacit—from Kim Jong Un. A particular geographic, political, cyberspace, or
ideological issue may lead to alliances or affiliations that are dynamic and changeable in purpose and actions.
1-38. In particular conditions and circumstances, North Korean irregular actions can include support from
regular military forces or SOF from other states. The specter of weapons of mass destruction and an
announced willingness to use any of these weapons are additional considerations in senior KPA leader risk
assessment and decision-making in operations.
1-39. South Korean internal security forces and law enforcement organizations that might be infiltrated by
the KPA can also be used to support KPA actions. The collaboration with organizations, units, or individuals
may be based on coercion, contractual agreement, or temporary or long-term common goals and objectives.
North Korea may prefer to use indirect approaches such as subterfuge, deception, and nonlethal action to
achieve its objectives. However, it may commit to violent action, when necessary, in order to compel its
enemy to submit to its intentions. Some irregular organizations, such as criminal gangs in both North and
South Korea, exist for their own commercial profit and power and are not interested in the quality of life or
civil security of a population that they influence or coerce. In the event of a war on the Korean Peninsula, the
KPA may attempt to co-opt or affiliate with varied types of organizations in South Korea for mutual
temporary benefit. Such alliances, however, may not be successful.
1-40. North Korea possesses a variety of military capabilities. Past actions may indicate possible future
actions. While many of these provocations raised tension, the incidents did not lead to a resumption of the
Korean War. These potential actions include the following, with examples in parenthesis:
 Conventional ground attack across the DMZ (June 1950).
 SOF direct mission (Blue House attack, January 1968).
 Seizing ships in international waters (United States Ship [USS] PUEBLO, January 1968).
 Hijacking airliners (December 1969).
 Blowing up airliners (November 1987).
 Ordering assassinations by hit squads (Burma, October 1983, and Malaysia, February 2017).
 Conducting SOF spy missions (September 1996).
 Launching unprovoked conventional artillery attacks (Yeonpyeong Island, November 2010).
 Torpedoing unsuspecting ships (Republic of Korea Ship [ROKS] CHEONAN, March 2010).
 Ambushing South Korean patrols by planting landmines on the southern side of the DMZ (August
2015).
 Assassinating Kim Jong Nam—Kim Jong Un’s half-brother—using VX nerve agent in a
Malaysian airport (February 2017).
 Launching missiles (multiple dates).
1-41. North Korea is constantly adapting and evolving its capabilities. These include improvements in
organization, equipment, tactics, and techniques. North Korea’s actions are a continuum in pursuit of
accomplishing desired outcomes. Any pause or apparent pause in operations can be part of a coherent combat
campaign. A long-term perspective guides near-term and mid-term actions to plan and marshal capabilities
for future actions. While one form of action may appear stalled, another form of action is likely underway
against a foe’s vulnerability. This agility and flexibility are critical to how effectively North Korea adapts its
1-10 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

near-term patterns of operations to keep the initiative while maintaining a long-term expectation of achieving
its goals and objectives.
SHAPE THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1-42. A shaping operation establishes conditions for the decisive operation through effects on the enemy,
other actors, and the terrain. It is likely that North Korea will use EIW techniques including propaganda to
shape the environment, whether it is in an offensive, defensive, or counterstability operation. The intent of
shaping operations is to create the conditions for success of the decisive operation.
TIME AND TEMPO

1-43. During the initial phases of a war, North Korea may attempt to employ a high operational tempo to
take advantage of its conventional army strength against coalition forces stationed on the Korean Peninsula.
Time is not on North Korea’s side when it comes to war on the Korean Peninsula. To successfully win the
war, the KPA must quickly defeat the coalition forces already in South Korea before any country can deploy
additional forces from other places around the world. North Korea cannot fight a long war due to a lack of
petroleum products, ammunition, and spare parts. At most, North Korea has fuel for only 2 months before it
must get resupplied from external sources or used captured stores. If North Korea cannot end the conflict
quickly, it will likely take steps to slow the tempo and prolong the conflict.
1-44. North Korea realizes the significance of coalitions and have observed successes and failures of U.S.-
led coalitions. If timely victory does not occur, U.S. public support may begin to wane and ultimately
influence political decisions. Therefore, the country will seek protraction of conflict to keep U.S. forces
engaged in order to weaken resolve and drain military and economic resources. The KPA may avoid decisive
combat with superior forces and focus on alternative methods. These activities may not be linked to maneuver
or ground objectives, but may instead be intended to inflict mass casualties or destroy critical or essential
systems, thus reducing U.S. resolve or ability to continue the fight.
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

1-45. North Korea possesses nuclear and chemical weapons, and it is highly likely that the country has also
done research on biological weapons. North Korea sought nuclear weapons because its leaders thought the
threat of a nuclear attack would prevent other countries from contemplating a regime change. Estimates for
North Korean nuclear weapons range from 20–60 bombs, with the capability to produce 6 new devices each
year. The Kim family saw that Muammar Gadhafi gave up his nuclear weapons in 2003 but, without them,
external powers intervened in Libya when the domestic revolts began in 2011. The Kim family does not want
something similar to happen in North Korea.
1-46. North Korea has a longstanding chemical weapons program with the capability to produce nerve,
blister, blood, and choking agents, and likely possesses a large chemical weapons stockpile. It is estimated
that the country possesses 2,500–5,000 tons of chemical weapons of approximately 20 different types,
making it the third-largest possessor of chemical agents in the world. This includes the highly toxic sarin and
VX chemical agents. It is highly likely that the KPA would use chemical artillery shells. North Korea is not
a signature to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which is an arms-control treaty that outlaws the
production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and their precursors.
1-47. North Korea possibly has weaponized anthrax or smallpox that could be mounted on missiles for use
against South Korean, U.S., or Japanese targets in the region. One of the most recent defectors, who was a
KPAGF soldier, had been vaccinated against anthrax.
NORTH KOREAN MILITARY PRINCIPLES

1-48. North Korea arrived at its current military principles through a disciplined process that incorporated
thorough research of its previous military ideology, its steadfast attitude to complete its national objective,
and its military-first policy, or Songun. These three foundational elements produced the KPA military
strategy that led to its principles of war and its associated tactical doctrine. This systematic process is shown
in figure 1-2 on page 1-12.
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Chapter 1
Figure 1-2. Building blocks of KPA tactical doctrine
NORTH KOREAN MILITARY IDEOLOGY

1-49. The Military Training Bureau serves as the KPA’s military think tank and has studied conflict from
World War II to the present. With that knowledge, the KPA has developed a military ideology based on its
experiences from 1950–53 fighting the U.S.; Soviet/Russian military theory; and Chinese light-infantry
tactics, modified by more-recent U.S. experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other locations around the world.
Due to the United States’ ability to overwhelm almost any opponent with technology and firepower, the KPA
emphasizes asymmetric warfare in conjunction with large numbers of SOF units. Even with this emphasis,
the KPA plans the use of large amounts of artillery, including multiple rocket launches in lieu of air support,
heavy reliance on antitank guns, and antiarmor support by a variety of first- and second-generation wire-
guided antitank missiles. The KPA plans to overcome the technological mismatch by getting in close to a
more advanced force, where weapons standoff ranges are no longer a factor. The KPA will attempt to
concentrate and coordinate the firing of large numbers of older weapons systems in order to make up for a
shortage of the latest technologically advanced equipment. The lessons learned from the country’s experience
and observation of wars over the past 80 years is the basic foundation of the KPA’s military ideology.
NORTH KOREAN NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

1-50. The second building block is the primary national objectives discussed in the motivations section
above: the reunification of Korea under North Korean control, prevention of external interference in the
country’s internal affairs, and the Kim family remaining in power. For North Korea, the U.S./UN presence
in South Korea is a potential threat to the first, an obvious reminder of the failure of the second, and
completely prevents the third.
NORTH KOREAN MILITARY POLICY

1-51. Juche, translated as “self-reliance,” began as North Korea’s economic self-reliance policy. Kim Il Sung
announced his juche policy in 1972 and this national ethos places an emphasis on self-reliance, independence,
resourcefulness, a display of one’s strength, and self-defense, with the responsibility to internally solve
problems without outside assistance. Songun, begun by Kim Jong Il in the mid-1990s, was a continuation of
his father’s juche policy with an added emphasis on military capability at the expense of civilians and the
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economy. Despite the bravado of juche, North Korea relies on imports to make up for shortages in raw
materials, finished products, and technology that are not available in the country. During the Cold War, North
Korea relied heavily on the support of the Soviet Union and China, especially its economy and military.
1-52. Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, North Korea has found
itself isolated and with few options for support due to UN sanctions and the international political climate.
The country’s only ally and major benefactor is China, with bilateral trade involving over half of North
Korean exports and almost 75 percent of its imports. North Korea maintains a bilateral mutual aid and
cooperation treaty with China, which calls for each country to come to the aid of the other if it is attacked.
North Korea also serves as a buffer state between China and the economically capitalistic and democratic
South Korea. The historical ties between North Korea and China continue to bind the two countries together,
and the latter’s fear of a unified and economically powerful Korean Peninsula under a democratic-style
government most likely motivates Chinese actions to preclude such an event.
NORTH KOREAN MILITARY STRATEGY

1-53. From the three primary national objectives and the country’s careful examination of the U.S.
performance in battle since 1953, the KPA created a three-part strategy if war were to occur on the Korean
Peninsula: surprise attack; a quick, decisive war; and mixed tactics.
Surprise Attack
1-54. The KPA will attempt to conduct all attacks with some form of surprise at the strategic, operational,
or tactical level, with reconnaissance playing a key role.
Quick, Decisive War

1-55. North Korea lacks the resources to fight a protracted war, so any war the KPA fights must be quick
and decisive to present the world with a fait accompli. The country also realizes that the U.S. democratic
system takes time to react, as politicians attempt to build a coalition to deal with international problems. If
the war is over before the U.S. can react, the U.S. may decide to let the status quo remain. This is similar to
the Crimean situation where the international community condemned Russia for annexing part of the Ukraine,
but did nothing to change the outcome.
Mixed Tactics
1-56. Offensively, the KPA plans a two-front war through both regular and irregular means. The country
will use SOF units and clandestine operatives prepositioned in South Korea to create a “second front” in the
enemy’s rear areas while the enemy must deal with the conventional battle on the primary front. The SOF
units will attack enemy key command and control (C2) facilities and important logistical centers, and attempt
to create fratricide between enemy rear-echelon units.
1-57. Since 1992, some North Korean leaders have boasted that their military forces could reach Pusan, a
city on the southern coast of South Korea, in just 3 days. While totally unrealistic, some North Korean leaders
actually believe that, in the right military and political conditions, their goal of reaching Pusan could occur
in less than a month. However, some South Korean reports indicate that several KPA generals now believe
that the capture of the entire peninsula is an impossibility and that, after the capture of Seoul, North Korea
would need to sue for a negotiated peace based upon its position of greater strength. It is not known where
Kim Jong Un stands on this policy revision, but some of the KPA’s military plans reflect this change in
attitude. If war were to resume on the Korean Peninsula, South Korea would face a formidable foe both on
the front line and in its rear areas. Support for both regular and unconventional warfare would include EIW
elements, such as offensive cyberspace operations and EW. See chapter 9 for more details on EIW.
Note. JP 3-13 describes information operations as the integrated employment, during military
operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence,
disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while
protecting our own. North Korea refers to its unique version of information operations as
electronic intelligence warfare (EIW).
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Chapter 1
NORTH KOREAN PRINCIPLES OF WAR

1-58. Based on its military strategy, the KPA created several principles of war that guide its operational and
tactical doctrine, ranging from a two-front war to rear area protection.
Two-front War
1-59. KPA doctrine calls for a two-front war, but not in the traditional sense of the term such as in World
War I or World War II with one force fighting in two different directions. The first front would consist of a
massive conventional assault across the DMZ, using substantial firepower and chemical attacks on selected
forward-position targets to isolate Seoul before moving farther south. Additionally, ballistic missile strikes—
including missiles with chemical warheads—could hit South Korean and U.S. air bases, ports, and C2,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets throughout South Korea
and in Japan. There is also a possibility that North Korea may attempt to use offensive biological weapons
in its attacks or launch intercontinental ballistic missiles aimed at U.S. targets in Hawaii, Alaska, or even the
California coastal cities.
1-60. The second front would be an attack by KPA SOF units throughout the South Korean rear area with
assistance from prepositioned North Korean clandestine operatives. The SOF could reach South Korea by
various means, including helicopter, hovercraft, light plane, parachute, small boat, submarine, or infiltration
tunnel. These personnel could potentially, but not likely, attack U.S. bases in Japan. In addition, North Korea
would focus on asymmetric warfare attacks on perceived areas of U.S. weakness as seen in recent U.S.
overseas operations.
Surprise
1-61. The KPA will attempt to attack its enemy in an unexpected place, time, or means. The characteristics
of a surprise attack could include the use of inclement weather, nighttime operations, or rugged terrain; a
detailed deception plan; skilled infiltration units to include SOF units; parachute or air assault operations;
massing of fires; quick concentration of forces at the decisive point and time; or the unexpected employment
of large-scale mechanized or armor forces.
1-62. Reconnaissance is very important to the KPA. The military will strive to conduct reconnaissance
continuously at all levels, including in the enemy’s rear areas, in order to achieve surprise when attacking
and to prevent surprise when on defense. Each forward-deployed KPAGF infantry corps fields a
reconnaissance battalion, each infantry division contains an organic reconnaissance company, and each
infantry regiment possesses its own reconnaissance platoon. There are also three independent reconnaissance
brigades that could be deployed anywhere on the battlefield for additional intelligence-gathering operations.
Mass and Dispersion

1-63. The KPA will concentrate its combat power at the decisive point and time and will weight its main
effort with additional assets. The country believes that it will only need a 2:1 ratio in favor of its ground
forces at the decisive point to achieve offensive success. The offensive main effort will operate on a narrower
front than the attacks to its flanks, with the supporting attacks dispersing over a wider front to deceive the
enemy on where the main attack will occur. The KPA will use the terrain to maximize its success and
deception operations when dispersing to avoid excessive concentration that could make units a lucrative
target.
1-64. The KPA will also use indirect fire as part of its massing operations. Like the old Soviet Union/Russian
doctrine that dates back to World War II, KPA doctrine expounds the use of large quantities of artillery fire
on a single target. The KPA will use massed fires—including chemical weapons—from artillery, missiles, or
multiple rocket launchers to both psychologically frighten the enemy as well as destroy its position. The
KPAGF field over 10,000 artillery pieces of all types and the KPAAF is focused on support of the ground
forces. With this large amount of indirect fire support available on the battlefield, the KPA can ensure that
almost all targets receive the emphasis they deserve. When not otherwise employed, KPAAF aircraft will fly
in support of ground troops.
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Maneuverability
1-65. The KPA wants to fight and win a quick, decisive war. To achieve this objective, the KPAGF
emphasize maneuverability as a basic element of combat power during training. In combat, units will seek to
use the terrain to their maneuver advantage. The KPAGF will employ ground vehicles to quickly reposition
artillery, armor, and infantry on the battlefield using existing high-speed networks or aircraft. SOF or other
forces will conduct raids to seize key transportation nodes. However, the KPAGF will also conduct night
moves and use minor roads and the rugged terrain to surprise the enemy.
Initiative
1-66. The KPA stresses to its leaders using deception and information denial or—as the Koreans call it—
cunning and personified tactics in all planning for its troops. The emphasis to KPA leaders is to use initiative
and aggressiveness with no hesitation in all situations. While the KPA conducts comprehensive planning and
keeps these plans close hold, the leadership expects subordinates to make quick estimates and conduct bold
operations that will result in a quick, but decisive, war. However, if a KPA commander deviates from the
original plan and it results in failure, the commander will suffer the consequences—which could result in
relief from duties or even execution for disobeying orders.
Operational Security (Secure Secrets)

1-67. The KPA places emphasis on operational security (called secure secrets) and teaches its members to
keep their secrets and plans secure at all times. North Korea not only keeps a close hold on all plans, but also
distributes false information to confuse the enemy as it attempts to protect and secure its secret information.
Activities to safeguard the KPA’s secrets may include reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, deception,
counterintelligence, and cover and concealment measures—such as conducting operations in inclement
weather or darkness—at all levels of command (tactical, operational, and strategic).
Annihilation
1-68. KPA offensive doctrine calls for the annihilation (“destroy” in U.S. terminology) of the enemy at any
cost by continuing the pursuit, staying close to the enemy to reduce the likelihood of the latter’s superior
artillery and close air support coming to the rescue, and continual contact to prevent the enemy from
withdrawing or regrouping for a future attack. The taking of terrain is secondary to the enemy’s destruction.
In the KPA’s seven designated offensive movements—penetration, thrust, holding, turning, infiltration,
besetment, and encirclement—the focus is on the destruction of the enemy or the movement of ground forces
in order to set up another maneuver that will aid in the enemy’s annihilation. (See chapter 6 for more details.)
Combined Operations
1-69. KPA doctrine emphasizes that all actions, conventional or otherwise, must be coordinated at all levels
and between the different types of units. Much of this coordination will be done through liaison or courier,
which reduces the likelihood that an enemy can learn KPA intent by an increase in radio chatter or the
interception of electronic signals. The KPA has many specialized units, including river crossing brigades and
regiments, sniper brigades in all three services, and large numbers of SOF units. Any major attack will
coordinate the use of all the different arms to attack the decisive point at the proper time.
Mobility
1-70. KPA doctrine also stresses the use of armored vehicles in all its operations. Ground forces will use the
speed of vehicles to exploit all openings and, when on defense, the KPAGF will employ their mobile forces
to counterattack any enemy penetration. Military vehicles will use both major and minor roads to move
quickly, and light infantry units possess the ability to travel on foot through the rugged mountainous terrain
to sneak up on enemy positions from an unexpected direction. The KPAGF will attempt to use their tanks
and other vehicles in areas where the enemy does not operate mechanized or armored units, because the
KPAGF fear a direct tank-on-tank battle due to their inferior weapon systems.
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Chapter 1
Rear Area Protection

1-71. The KPA understands the vulnerability of rear areas, as its leaders see the enemy’s rear area as an
operational center of gravity for U.S. forces. Much of North Korea’s SOF effort will be directed at its enemy’s
rear area. Conversely, the KPAGF will also defend their own rear area against ground attacks to ensure
continued rear area operations without disruption from enemy SOF. The country will deploy its vast number
of paramilitary units to defend against rear area attacks in order to free its regular units for more conventional
offensive operations.
NORTH KOREAN TACTICAL DOCTRINE

1-72. The KPA’s offensive and defensive tactical doctrine flows from its principles of war. The KPA
professes both a defensive and offensive strategy in case of war. The defensive strategy is to prevent an
invasion across the DMZ or an amphibious landing on either of North Korea’s coasts. If such an attack would
occur, the country would mobilize not only its 7.7 million reserve personnel, but likely declare a total war in
which every North Korean citizen would be obligated to defend the country. While much of the reserves may
not be useful in combat, the personnel may serve other purposes. To deter any foe from attacking, the country
has threatened the use of nuclear weapons against South Korea, Japan, or any reachable U.S. military facility
in Asia. The country will likely use chemical or biological weapons. The military decision-making process
to invade North Korea by a U.S.-led coalition could be delayed as allies debate the ramifications of North
Korean use of such weapons.
1-73. The KPA prefers the offense to the defense and will remain on the former unless forced to temporarily
go on the latter. It knows the only way to reunify the peninsula under North Korean control is to compel
South Korea to join the country by military force. The last time that North Korea fought a major war was
between 1950 and 1953 against South Korean and UN forces led by the U.S. during the Korean War. The
KPA has studied the wars that the U.S. and other major powers have participated in since that time and
reached a number of conclusions regarding the conduct of war: the most powerful military power does not
win every time; technological advantages can be mitigated; and Western militaries almost always try to
achieve their military goals quickly. One of the most recent examples of the KPA adapting because of
observations on modern battlefields is the conversion of seven infantry or mechanized infantry divisions into
light infantry divisions, presumably tailored to replicate tactics the KPA deemed successful, based on
observations of insurgents fighting conventional coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. These divisions
will likely fight in complex environments, such as cities, where vehicles are not essential for movement due
to reduced battlefield distances. (See chapter 7 for more information on operations in complex environments.)
From these observations and research, the KPA has decided on a number of techniques for its success in
battle that include the following:
Sustainment (Adequate Logistics)

1-74. KPA doctrine calls for each commander to ensure that there are sufficient supplies to complete the
unit’s mission. Due to lack of supplies, most commanders will likely plan to the use of captured supplies,
military or civilian, to successfully complete their assigned mission. KPAGF weapons systems, mortars, and
artillery are often of a slightly larger caliber than those of the enemy, allowing the military to use captured
ammunition stores while denying the same option to its opponent.
Camouflage, Concealment, Cover, and Deception

1-75. Protection and security measures to keep secrets secure for the KPA involve the use of camouflage,
concealment, cover, and deception (C3D) by all units. Since North Korea will likely not obtain even local air
superiority, KPA doctrine calls for denying the enemy any intelligence it may receive from aerial platforms
through the use of both active and passive C3D techniques. The KPAAF uses both underground runways and
harden sites to hide aircraft from aerial attack. The KPAN not only hides its ships in underground berthing
facilities that are connected to the sea by fortified tunnels, it will also attempt to hide its vessels among
civilian fishing boats found in small villages. All three KPA service components will use decoys to protect
KPA assets for long enough to complete the mission and to give the enemy an inaccurate assessment of KPA
attrition, possibly causing the enemy to incorrectly conclude that KPA assets have been destroyed. The KPA
gleaned this from U.S. aerial strikes on Serbia, where the U.S. Air Force fired at decoy sites nearly as often
1-16 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

as at actual positions. North Korean military forces believe that each operation should include a deception
plan that may include a demonstration, feint, raid, or an attempt to create fratricide among enemy units.
Echelon Forces
1-76. The KPA takes from Soviet/Russian doctrine in its use of echelons during both offensive and defensive
operations. In a division offensive operation, the KPAGF will likely place two-thirds (67 percent) of their
forces in the first echelon and two-ninths (22 percent) in the second echelon, with only one-ninth (11 percent)
in operational reserve or as a third echelon. At the corps level (KPA Army Group), KPAGF doctrine describes
a first echelon of four infantry divisions; a second echelon of two infantry divisions and a tank regiment; a
third echelon of two mechanized infantry regiments; and a reserve of divisions not likely to be involved in
the offensive operation. See Chapter 6 for examples of echelons in offensive operations.
1-77. The ground forces will also use echelons when forced to go on the defense, as the KPA believes
echeloning its forces provides for defensive depth with rapid counterattack possibilities. Approximately one-
ninth (11 percent) of a division’s defensive force will be positioned as a forward security force, five-ninths
(56 percent) will be in the first echelon, two-ninths (22 percent) in the second echelon, and the final one-
ninth (11 percent) held in reserve for unforeseen events. The corps will be similarly arrayed in echelons. See
chapter 7 for examples of echelons in defensive operations.
KPAAF and KPAN Employment

1-78. KPA doctrine states that joint operations should be used for most missions. Any major attack by the
country will likely use KPAAF and KPAN assets to deploy KPAGF units into the enemy’s rear areas. The
KPAAF will infiltrate SOF units into South Korea with small airplanes, such as the recently repainted
Antonov An-2 fleet or helicopters. The KPAAF can also use its airplanes, helicopters, or paragliders to drop
airborne units in an air assault operation or to conduct SOF missions. The KPAN will use its small boats,
stealth vessels, surface effect ships (a cross between catamaran and hovercraft), and submarines to
clandestinely transport SOF forces behind enemy lines on both coasts of South Korea.
Terrain Appreciation
1-79. Lastly, KPA tactical doctrine calls for its forces to use the physical environment to best advantage,
with a focus on the mountains, poor weather, or night operations to minimize the advantages of a
technologically superior foe. Just like during the Korean War, the KPAGF will likely use the mountain ranges
and ridges as an avenue of advance in bad weather or at night while their enemy focuses on the more easily
accessible valley floor with its highways.
FRAMEWORK FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS

1-80. In pursuit of its national security strategy, North Korea conducts four types of operations that can be
described as follows:
1-81. Strategic Operations. A strategic-level course of action (COA) that uses all instruments of power in
peace and war to achieve the goals of the country’s national security strategy by attacking its enemy’s
strategic centers of gravity.
1-82. Regional Operations. A strategic-level COA―including conventional, force-on-force military
operations―against the country’s regional foes and internal threats.
1-83. Transitional Operations. A strategic-level COA that bridges the gap between regional and adaptive
operations, and contains elements of both. The country continues to pursue its regional goals while initiating
actions to counter intervention from outside of its area of operations (AO).
1-84. Adaptive Operations. A strategic-level COA to preserve the country’s power and apply it in adaptive
ways against enemies that may overmatch North Korea’s military capabilities.
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Chapter 1
Note. These terms are not actual North Korean tactics or actions as outlined by the country’s
doctrine, but how the U.S. military categorizes possible or potential North Korean actions within
the framework of U.S. adversarial doctrine concepts.
1-85. Regional, transitional, and adaptive operations are typical of operational design for OEs in which North
Korean tactical-level commanders operate. A tactical-level commander receives a mission statement and
intent in plans and orders from higher headquarters. The commander’s analysis and decisions focus on how
to plan, prepare, and execute tactical actions in the current operational context. Conventional patterns of
operation may be initial ways to conduct the mission, while situational understanding and risk-taking may
cause a commander to shift from regional to transitional or adaptive operations. A North Korean commander
sustains a keen understanding of a foe within an OE and decides when and how to employ offensive,
defensive, and counterstability missions and tasks. Operations, missions, and tasks are ordered and conducted
in a flexible and agile manner, and can shift from offense to defense, defense to offense, or transition back
and forth depending on emergent OE conditions.
STRATEGIC OPERATIONS
1-86. Since 1953, North Korea has used its special diplomatic relationships with the Soviet Union and China
to delay the implementation of a final peace treaty to end the Korean War. The breakup of the Soviet Union
in 1991 meant that North Korea would no longer receive the financial subsidies necessary to reduce the cost
of fuel and other products to its people. China, to a lesser extent, has also reduced its unequivocal support to
the country.
1-87. Without the protection of the Soviet Union and China, North Korea began a three-prong approach to
deter its foes by creating a nuclear bomb, improving its missile capabilities, and placing even more emphasis
on EIW through attacks on other countries’ computer network systems. By creating a viable nuclear bomb
small enough to fit on an intermediate- or long-range ballistic missile, North Korea believed that the potential
for a nuclear war would prevent a potential attack on the country or a regime change aimed at the overthrow
of the Kim family. It is likely that the country’s nuclear program began in the late 1960s, with its nuclear
weapons program starting in the late 1970s and being operational by the mid-1980s. North Korea continued
to improve its EIW capabilities over the past two decades for strategic reasons, and the attack on Sony
provided the world with ample evidence of the country’s computer warfare capabilities.
1-88. North Korea’s national military strategy is designed to support its national objectives by defending the
Kim family’s rule and enabling the regime to conduct coercive diplomacy through the potential threat of
nuclear weapons and computer warfare. This strategy relies heavily on strategic deterrence through the
nuclear weapons program and supporting delivery systems, and a large, heavily armed, forward-deployed
military that presents a constant threat to South Korea, especially the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area. These
two aspects of its military strategy are meant to be mutually supporting; the threat posed by one is employed
as a deterrent against an attack on the other.
REGIONAL OPERATIONS
1-89. North Korea can conduct this type of operation against regional opponents with some probability of
success, using primarily offensive actions. The country may possess an overmatch in some elements of
combat power against regional opponents, and focuses this power on discrete or discontinuous offensive
actions. These offensive operations are characterized by using all available means to saturate an OE with
actions designed to disaggregate the opponent’s capability, capacity, and resolve to resist. Actions are
conducted throughout an entire OE; may involve the political, military, economic, social, information, or
infrastructure variables; and are not limited to attacks on military and security forces or conventional
weapons.
1-90. North Korea prefers to achieve its objectives through regional operations, but maintains the flexibility
to adapt its actions quickly in order to sustain or regain the initiative. The country assumes the possibility of
regional or extraregional intervention and has contingencies for transitional and adaptive operations. During
regional operations, North Korea acts to achieve its desired objectives and initially operates at a threshold
1-18 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

that does not cause intervention by other regional actors or extraregional forces. Strategic operations,
including EIW and diplomatic or political actions, are used to dissuade outside intervention. In addition, the
country plans and positions capabilities to conduct antiaccess and area denial operations against the U.S., the
UN, or other external powers.
TRANSITIONAL OPERATIONS
1-91. Transitional operations serve as a pivot point between regional and adaptive operations. They feature
a mixture of offensive and defensive actions that set conditions for the country to control the tempo and pace
of enemy introduction into an AO. Transitional operations can also expand the available time for offensive
operations to succeed. When shifting to this type of operation, the country may still have the ability to exert
its combat power against an overmatched regional enemy in a specific location, and may have already
defeated its original foe.
1-92. As North Korea begins transitional operations, an immediate aim is to preserve its combat power while
setting conditions on the peninsula that allow it to transition back to more offensive-oriented operations.
North Korea identifies and acts against extraregional actor vulnerabilities in conventional or clandestine ways
to slow deployment of combat power or otherwise disaggregate operations. The country may elect to conduct
conventional operations against an extraregional force that could not fully deploy or has been successfully
separated into isolated elements, either in a deployment flow or in an AO.
1-93. North Korea may conduct transitional operations when a coalition threatens the country’s ability to
continue conventional regional operations on the Korean Peninsula. For example, successful North Korean
actions in regional operations may prompt the U.S. to send additional troops to the peninsula. In such a case,
North Korea will initiate actions to defeat the additional intervention.
1-94. Two probable outcomes to transitional operations are as follows:
 The U.S. withdraws from the region based on political decisions subsequent to its military defeat
or for other unilateral or international reasons. In this instance, North Korean operations may begin
to transition back to regional operations if appropriate to country objectives.
 The U.S. continues to deploy combat power into the region. In this situation, North Korean
transitional operations may begin to shift toward adaptive operations and the expectation of future
conflict on the peninsula.
ADAPTIVE OPERATIONS
1-95. Any coalition that faces North Korea on the Korean Peninsula will likely field a technological
advantage—but a considerably smaller quantity of equipment—to meet the KPA on the conventional
battlefield. North Korea will adapt its operations to mitigate its limitations and lesser capabilities, especially
in technology. North Korean operational planners identify conditions, circumstances, terrain, and times that
provide opportunities to optimize the country’s own capabilities and degrade those of the enemy. The country
task-organizes and tailors its forces for specific missions against enemy vulnerabilities. Many North Korean
operations have an overarching intent to disrupt, defeat, or destroy the enemy’s C2 framework and logistics.
1-96. The types of actions and methods that characterize adaptive operations can also promote success in
regional or transitional operations. North Korea has conducted adaptive operations since the 1953 armistice,
including assassination attempts on the South Korean president, the deployment of SOF personnel to start an
insurgency in South Korea similar to that of Vietnam, and infiltration of SOF for direct actions in South
Korea. Should war break out on the Korean Peninsula, it is likely that North Korea would attempt to conduct
adaptive operations if its country was invaded by outside forces.
1-97. The North Korean policy is that if any country decides to invade it and the KPA is defeated, every
North Korean citizen should do his or her duty to resist the invader. KPAGF soldiers learn that if their unit
is no longer functional, the remaining soldiers should turn to guerrilla warfare and continue to fight the enemy
through stay-behind ambushes, harassment, or destruction of enemy supplies. KPAGF soldiers will most
likely fall back to the thousands of subterranean facilities located throughout the country, complete with pre-
positioned supplies, as part of the country’s defensive plans. Civilians are also taught that they should do
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Chapter 1
everything they can to resist the enemy and continue the fight to the best of their ability with any available
resources.
NORTH KOREAN EVOLUTION AND ADAPTATION

1-98. North Korean evolution is a continuous process of development that enables the country to expand
from a simple capability to a higher, more complex, and sustainable entity. It operates on a premise of creating
permanent presence and influence in an OE. Actions promote continual resilience to conditions that would
potentially degrade or destroy its organizational existence. The intent of evolution is continual improvement
towards achieving objectives and permanence in North Korean power and expanding influence in the region
and effects in a strategic OE.
1-99. Adaptation involves changing to accommodate particular near-term conditions in order to facilitate
some capability based on lessons learned in an OE. Adaptation is different, however, from evolution.
Adaptation is a process of change that is often designed to optimize or counter a specific purpose or condition,
and provides results that are often temporary in nature based on variables of a particular OE. While North
Korea can employ adaptive means and methods during various phases of its existence, adaptation results in
temporary changes based on an immediate situation. North Korea will adapt and change based on its success
or lack of success against the coalition forces it engages on the battlefield.
1-100. Analysis by North Korea on evolution centers on understanding how North Korea is to survive and
thrive. Manipulating regional conditions can create leverage and time advantages to keep an adversary or
enemy off-balance in its intended actions, and cause focus on reactive methods to North Korean initiatives
rather than proactive methods to diminish North Korea’s influence. Given observations of U.S. military
performance in Afghanistan, Iran, and Syria, North Korea has modified aspects of its military force structure.
1-101. North Korea can decide to apply an action for purposes of adaptation in a near-term response against
an adversary or enemy. Multiple actions can distract an adversary or enemy from concentrating on issues that
would hamper North Korea from thriving and evolving in capabilities. Sustaining a constant series and group
of organizational activities may force an adversary or enemy into a reactive cycle that centers most of its
capabilities on immediate responses often at the tactical level of operations.
1-102. Multiple drivers of evolution exist with four critical aspects:
 Safe haven.
 Recruitment and retention or forced support of its population.
 C2.
 Logistics.
Of these four conditional drivers for evolution to occur, safe haven takes primacy. A sanctuary, whether
physical, virtual, or both physical and virtual, compounds the value of relative shelter and safety. Safe haven
from external influences provides favorable time and location for plans, preparation, support, and conduct of
actions. With over 3,000 underground facilities located throughout North Korea and most within 113 km of
the DMZ, North Korea considers its mountainous terrain and vast subterranean network a safe haven from
enemy observation and destruction.
1-103. North Korea will attempt to launch an EIW campaign with integrated direct and indirect tactical
actions that amplify public awareness of adversary or enemy inability to adequately counter threat actions.
This manipulation of public opinion and general dissatisfaction of tactical interactions within a relevant
population can include—
 Continually increasing military and civilian casualties.
 Ineffective governance and law and order.
 Ineffective protection and health and welfare life support.
 Unrepaired damage to infrastructure.
 General conflict weariness over extended periods of time.
1-104. Evolution is a concept with a strategic orientation, fostered and reinforced with actions at the
operational and tactical levels of combat. North Korea aims to protect, nurture, and harness the conditions of
an OE to avoid organizational demise, while enabling the ability to evolve as a supple nation-state with
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resilient long-term organizational purpose and capabilities. Evolution and adaptation recognize the North
Korean commitment to a long-term program that promotes operational and strategic initiatives and
objectives.
MULTI-DOMAIN EXTENDED BATTLEFIELD

1-105. Like most countries that fight a war, North Korea will likely act in several deliberate ways to
establish conditions for success. These ways are conceptually enduring methods that bring about desired
ends. While a wide array of methods is available, the one method currently perceived to be unavailable to the
country is to defeat the U.S. in a conventional battle. Instead, any aggregated violence will be designed not
to defeat the U.S. on a battlefield, but to cause enough damage—real or perceived—in the physical and
informational spheres that the U.S. cannot sustain its resolve.
1-106. Such a strategy requires two major lines of effort: attacks that cause damage, and actions that extend
the time required for U.S. mission accomplishment. Likely North Korean actions will progress along these
two lines of effort using all means available in the environment. The country will likely employ five broad
conflict approaches toward limiting the effectiveness of U.S. military power: systems warfare, preclusion,
sanctuary, isolation, and EIW.
SYSTEMS WARFARE
1-107. Systems warfare identifies and deconstructs vulnerable and vital enemy systems and networks. A
system is a set of connected or related elements that, when combined, perform a unique function. The
essential ingredients of a system include the individual components, the synergy among the components and
other systems, and a functional boundary separating the system from other systems. A system of systems is
a set of different systems so connected or interrelated as to produce results unachievable by the discrete
individual systems. In systems warfare, the intent is to identify critical system components and attack them
in a way that will degrade or destroy the effective use or practical importance of the overall system.
1-108. North Korea views an OE, the battlefield, its own instruments of power, and an opponent’s
instruments of power as a collection of complex, dynamic, and integrated systems composed of subsystems
and components. The country will likely seek to disaggregate enemy combat power by destroying or
neutralizing vulnerable single points of failure in a warfighting function. Due to the inferiority of much of its
equipment compared to its foes, the KPAGF regular forces will attempt to avoid infantry and armor units and
instead attack enemy combat support and rear service units. The KPA believes that, without logistical
support, U.S. frontline units will collapse due to lack of supplies. This belief that U.S. Soldiers will quit
fighting when surrounded by the enemy or without a large logistical advantage dates back to the Korean War
and a Chinese/KPA assessment of U.S. combat units during that period. The large number of KPA SOF will
also concentrate its attacks in rear areas against combat support, rear service, or other high-value targets.
These can include missile and radar sites; C2 cells; chemical or nuclear facilities; airfields; petroleum, oils,
and lubricants facilities; dams or power plants; bridges; isolated communications relay sites; and logistical
bases. The KPA believes its best chance for success on the battlefield is to break the U.S. logistical system
and thus render the infantry and armor units combat ineffective due to lack of ammunition, fuel, and other
supplies that U.S. Soldiers rely heavily upon in battle.
PRECLUSION
1-109. Preclusion combines antiaccess and area denial methods to degrade U.S. ability to mass and sustain
joint combat power. Antiaccess is defined as action, activity, or capability, usually long-range, designed to
prevent an advancing enemy force from entering an operational area (JP 3-0). Area denial is action, activity,
or capability, usually short-range, designed to limit an enemy force’s freedom of action within an operational
area (JP 3-0). Preclusion refers to the combination of antiaccess and area denial methods, and seeks to
influence an extraregional foe’s ability to introduce forces into the AO and sustain combat power. It is an
efficient way to prevent accumulation of enemy combat power in a region, and promote defeat or deny
success to a militarily superior enemy. North Korea will attempt to use preclusion to selectively deny, delay,
and disrupt entry of additional forces into the region (antiaccess), and compel extraregional forces to keep
their staging and operating bases beyond continuous operational reach (area denial).
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1-110. Strategic preclusion seeks to completely deter extraregional involvement or severely limit its scope
and intensity. North Korea will attempt to achieve strategic preclusion in order to reduce the influence of the
U.S., hostile regional powers, or other Western countries that may interfere with its actions on the peninsula.
The country will employ all its instruments of power to preclude direct involvement by any extraregional
power. Since U.S. military forces are already located on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea’s actions would
most likely focus on the prevention of additional forces deploying to South Korea. The country uses its close
relationship with China in diplomatic and economic circles to prevent additional isolation of North Korea.
Until 2017, China showed a reluctance to force the country to the negotiating table or to condone the most
severe economic sanctions wanted by the UN. North Korea originally used the large KPA, with reserves
numbering over seven million, as a strategic deterrent. When the collapse of external support from Russia
and China reduced the KPA’s strength due to weapons becoming obsolete over time, the country chose to
focus on nuclear weapons and missile system as an attempt to regain strategic preclusion. Kim Jong Un
reinforced this COA in March 2013 by instituting the policy of byungjin, which gave priorities to the nuclear
and munitions sectors within North Korea while still providing resources to the electrical, coal, metal, and
railway transport sectors of the country’s economy.
1-111. Operational exclusion is to selectively deny an extraregional force access to or use of forward
operating bases or sites within the region. North Korea could attempt operational exclusion by launching
nuclear or chemical missiles at existing military bases in Japan, Guam, Alaska, or Hawaii.
1-112. Access limitation is an attempt to affect an extraregional foe’s ability to introduce forces into the
theater. Access-control operations do not necessarily have to deny the enemy access entirely. A more realistic
goal would be to limit or interrupt access into the theater in such a way that the KPA could deal with the
forces after their arrival. The KPA might conduct access limitation through minefields laid in sea lanes,
submarine attacks on troop or supply ships, airplanes or air defense weapons shooting down aircraft, or SOF
operations.
SANCTUARY
1-113. Sanctuary provides protection to key assets using both physical and non-physical means. North
Korea will use any means necessary to protect key elements of its combat power from destruction by enemy
forces, with particular attention paid to its air and missile capabilities. This protection for the KPA may come
from use of any or all of the following:
 Engineer effort and fortifications.
 Complex terrain.
 Proximity to noncombatants.
 Risk of unacceptable collateral damage.
 Countermeasure systems.
 Dispersion.
 EIW.
1-114. Sanctuary generally cannot protect the entire KPA for an extended time period. Knowing this, the
organization will seek to protect selected elements of its forces for long enough to gain the freedom of action
necessary to pursue its strategic goals. The country will employ a wide variety of counterprecision techniques
that include C3D; Global Positioning System jamming; EW; terminal defenses; close-contact tactical fights;
aircraft; and extended-range munitions. It will also create sanctuary by exploiting civilian populations and
cultural sites to hide weapons systems, support defensive postures and capabilities, and shape dispositions
for offensive actions.
1-115. North Korea employs hardened and buried facilities and uses decoys of key facilities or capabilities,
such as short-range ballistic missiles and surface-to-air missiles. North Korea will likely employ an integrated
fires system that includes cannon, howitzer, multiple rocket, and short-range and medium-range missile
systems capable of tactical to extreme-range fires and counterfires. North Korea employs a large number of
older air defense weapons in its integrated air defense systems that may include a limited number of
countertactical ballistic missiles. The KPA’s reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, intelligence,
surveillance, and target acquisition capabilities are essential to the country’s use of its integrated systems.
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1-116. The estimated number of underground facilities in North Korea range from 3,000 to 14,000, most
within 113 km of the DMZ. The KPA will launch its offensive against South Korea from the relative safety
of its subterranean facilities and use tunnels under the DMZ to place SOF in the enemy rear areas. If forced
to retreat back over the DMZ, the KPA will fall into these previously prepared combat battle positions; it will
require significant personnel, ammunition, and time to eliminate the military personnel located in these
underground facilities. See Chapter 6 for additional information on KPA subterranean operations.
ISOLATION
1-117. Isolation techniques are used to attempt to contain a foe’s combat power so that it cannot impact
KPA mission accomplishment. North Korea will seek ways and means to isolate U.S. military power and
influence indirectly rather than with direct confrontation. The country will seek to degrade and isolate U.S.
capabilities in ways that include—
 Disrupting effective communications with higher command and coordinating headquarters.
 Disrupting sustainment and general logistics to and within regional operations.
 Altering situational understanding of an OE through deception.
 Persuading South Koreans to repudiate outside support.
 Convincing enemies they are decisively engaged.
 Limiting or preventing mobility due to complex terrain, man-made or reinforced natural obstacles,
or effects of weapons of mass destruction.
 Defeating political resolve to continue government commitment to actions in the theater, region,
or operational area.
1-118. It is likely that North Korea believes that defeat of U.S. forces is not just a battle between the armed
forces of enemies. For North Korea, victory is to not be defeated and to force the U.S. military to conclude
its actions before its assigned goals are achieved. The intent of isolation is to limit U.S. freedom to act
effectively against physical attacks, prevent mutual support of U.S. forces, diminish psychological attacks on
KPA resolve, and minimize attack effects on KPA C2, systems, networks, and general support infrastructure.
ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE WARFARE

1-119. EIW uses all aspects of the information environment to create effects favorable to North Korea’s
objectives. Kim Jong Il stated that there were three pillars to creating a powerful state: ideology, arms, and
information technology. Kim Jong Un has continued this emphasis on EIW. North Korea will attempt to
identify critical or essential decisions by enemy forces that would most affect its own goals and objectives.
With an understanding of these actions and the situational awareness and understanding that impact on these
decisions, the country will attempt to execute a comprehensive EIW campaign to induce preferred decisions
and actions by the enemy. An EIW campaign is waged through multiple means that can include―
 EW.
 Deception.
 Physical destruction.
 Protection and security measures.
 Perception management.
 Information attack.
 Computer warfare.
 Reconnaissance.
 Cryptanalysis.
 Intelligence Collection.
 Disinformation operations.
1-120. These EIW means are combined systematically and continuously to target decision-making
processes. Multiple forms of information attack present a believable compilation of information and
corroborating evidence, as a deception, that guides decisions that seem to be reasoned and correct to an
enemy, but actually support KPA goals. KPA perception management manipulates information and other
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forms of sensory presentation so that apparently true data obtained are mutually supporting misinformation
that is undetected by the target of the EIW.
ACTIONS TO COUNTER U.S. FORCES

1-121. North Korea can operate across all domains and oppose U.S. interests in all phases of a joint
operation. Using varied forms of hybrid and multi-domain capabilities, the North Koreans will carefully plan
and execute actions prior to overt hostilities with U.S. forces as a series or group of integrated operations.
Some actions will purposely be overt while others will be intentionally covert, to be activated at a critical
point in time as determined by the commander. The balance of the five domains will shift with the tempo and
nature of ongoing operations. While all five domains will be employed, there are important trends that might
predominate actions and be most critical to North Korean success at particular points in time and events
during a conflict.
ACTIONS TO INFLUENCE SHAPING OPERATIONS

1-122. North Korea prefers to win without fighting and on terms favorable to its interests. If its actions are
successful but counter to critical U.S. interests, the U.S. may consider introducing additional armed force to
the region. North Korean goals prior to this increase are centered on preventing this decision and, if that fails,
constraining the introduction of additional military forces in such a way as to prevent the success of a U.S.
joint and combined operation. During enemy shaping operations, North Korea will primarily use EIW, with
less emphasis on systems warfare and preclusion and even less emphasis on sanctuary and isolation, as shown
in figure 1-3. The balance of the country’s methodologies will be focused on four key areas.
Figure 1-3. Actions to counter enemy shaping operations
Provide an Alternate Understanding of an Operation Environment

1-123. North Korean EIW activities will manipulate the acquisition, transmission and presentation of
information in a way that suits its preferred decision outcomes. Manipulating cognitive understanding of
conditions shapes a foe’s decisions to actually support North Korean objectives.
Enable Targeted Instability

1-124. North Korea will attempt to foster instability in the South Korean population in such a way that
regional security does not match U.S. operational requirements.
Disaggregate Partnerships
1-125. The country will act upon partnerships to reduce the ability of the U.S. to operate in its preferred
combined, joint, and interagency manner.
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Prevent the Facilitation of Access

1-126. North Korea will focus pre-conflict preclusion activities on nonlethal means. It will attempt to
undermine relationships, raise political stakes, manipulate public opinion, and attack resolve in order to
constrain or deny basing rights, overflight corridors, logistic support, and concerted allied actions.
ACTIONS TO DETER AUGMENTATION OF ENEMY FORCES

1-127. North Korea desires to accomplish its aims to deter introduction of additional enemy forces into the
region, with focus on four key areas. During the enemy deter phase, North Korea will focus its operations on
the reflexive control and preclusion domains, place a lesser emphasis on the systems warfare and sanctuary
domains, and perform limited operations in the isolation domain, as shown in figure 1-4. Its goals are centered
on manipulating deterrence efforts with effects that halt or significantly slow introduction of additional
combat power.
Figure 1-4. Actions to counter enemy deterrence
Alter Perception of Risk

1-128. North Korea may use EIW activities to manipulate an opponent’s view of the risks involved in key
actions. These efforts will focus on the heightened risk of escalation inherent in any action conducted by the
U.S. and the potential loss of life for all sides.
Expose U.S. and Allied Forces

1-129. North Korea could expose enemy forces to attack, such as ships from South Korea, submarines, and
even possible attacks on aircraft flying into the AO. These actions are designed to degrade the deterrence
value of adding additional enemy forces to the Korean Peninsula in an attempt to destroy credibility among
current and potential U.S. partner nations.
Mask Intent
1-130. North Korea could manipulate the information environment to incorrectly portray its intent.
Successful deception would cause the U.S. to build deterrence capacity aimed at a false or less than critical
North Korean capability.
Slow and Disrupt Deployment

1-131. North Korea could focus on continuing preclusion activities to limit the accumulation of applicable
U.S. combat power to a level and presence that does not threaten the accomplishment of its goals.
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Chapter 1
ACTIONS TO MAINTAIN THE INITIATIVE

1-132. North Korea understands the role of initiative in victory. Time is a weapon the country believes
favors its own goals and interests initially, and then fades the longer the conflict will last. During the enemy’s
seize initiative phase, North Korea will attempt to use the preclusion and systems warfare domains to stifle
its enemy’s ability to seize the initiative. To a lesser extent, North Korea will use the EIW and isolation
domains, with even less reliance on the sanctuary domain, as shown in figure 1-5. The balance of its
methodologies at this point in operations will be focused on two key areas: tempo and preclusion.
Figure 1-5. Actions to counter enemy seizing the initiative
Control Tempo
1-133. During the initial phases of an extraregional force’s entry into the region or the addition of forces
from a country already involved, North Korea may employ a high operational tempo to take advantage of the
weaknesses inherent in enemy power projection. Lightly equipped forces are usually the first to enter the
region. This may take the form of attack against enemy early-entry forces and be linked to diplomatic,
economic, and informational efforts to terminate the conflict quickly, before the main enemy force can be
brought to bear. If the North Koreans cannot end the conflict quickly, they will likely take steps to slow the
tempo and prolong the conflict. The country realizes the significance of coalitions and has observed successes
and failures of U.S.-led coalitions. If timely victory does not occur, U.S. public support begins to wane and
ultimately influences political decisions. Therefore, the North Koreans will seek protraction of conflict to
keep U.S. forces engaged in order to weaken resolve and drain military and economic resources. The
preferred tactics during this period avoid decisive combat with superior forces. These activities may not be
linked to maneuver or ground objectives, but may instead be intended to inflict mass casualties or destroy
critical or essential systems, which reduces U.S. resolve or ability to continue the fight.
Conduct In-theater Preclusion

1-134. North Korea will threaten and attack forward bases and supplies via operational fires and affiliated
irregular forces. This raises the risk to U.S. forces, hinders operational phasing, and diminishes host-nation
support for protection of U.S. lines of communications. The North Koreans may now, or in the near future,
have access to multiple weapons platforms to assist in conducting preclusion. Medium- and long-range,
precision-strike munitions can provide the ability to target deploying forces, strategic mobility assets, forward
operating bases and sites, staging areas, and lines of communications. Proliferation of long-range air defense
systems can present significant challenges as North Korea attempts to exclude or limit U.S. access to areas
where U.S. forces are directed to deploy. Other North Korean platforms may include unmanned aircraft that
employ capabilities such as Global Positioning System jammers, sensors, EW capabilities, or other
weaponized capabilities. In addition, readily available commercial imagery and omnipresent media sources
provide early warning of U.S. actions and will become increasingly difficult to elude.
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ACTIONS TO GAIN AND SUSTAIN DOMINANCE

1-135. North Korean actions will seek to render U.S. combat power ineffective by systematic and continual
attacks on sustainment activities and C2 networks. North Korea will attempt to isolate and contain enemy
maneuver and fires formations, and force U.S. forces to commit combat power to battles and engagements
that diminish capabilities and prevent U.S. success. North Korea will likely focus on the domains of systems
warfare, isolation, and sanctuary during the enemy’s dominate phase. EIW is relegated to a subordinate role,
while preclusion has an even lesser role, as shown in figure 1-6.
Figure 1-6. Actions to counter enemy dominance
Employ Targeted Overmatch

1-136. The destruction of high-visibility or unique systems employed by U.S. forces offers exponential
value in terms of North Korean goals. These actions are not always linked to military objectives; they also
maximize effects in the information and psychological arenas. High-visibility systems that could be identified
for destruction might include stealth aircraft, attack helicopters, counterbattery artillery radars, aerial
surveillance platforms, or rocket launcher systems. Losses among these premier systems could undermine
U.S. morale, degrade operational capability, and inhibit employment of these weapons systems. If North
Korea is able to obtain them, precision munitions can degrade or eliminate high-technology weaponry.
Camouflage, deception, decoy, or mock-up systems can degrade the effects of sensor systems. The North
Koreans can employ low-cost Global Positioning System jammers to disrupt precision munitions targeting,
sensor-to-shooter links, and navigation. Lethal weapon systems such as missiles, air defense systems, sensor
and EW weapons, unmanned aircraft systems, and artillery will all be used to degrade U.S. capabilities. An
alternate way to operate on the margins of U.S. technology is to maneuver during periods of reduced
exposure, based on detailed study of U.S. capabilities and patterns.
Protect Key Capabilities

1-137. North Korean forces could selectively forego massed formations, patterned echelons, and linear
operations that would present easy targets. Military forces may hide and disperse in areas of sanctuary that
limit the ability to apply the full range of U.S. technological capabilities. The country will retain the ability
to rapidly mass forces and fires from dispersed locations for decisive combat at the time and place of its own
determination. North Korea will use the physical environment and natural conditions to neutralize or offset
the technological advantages of modern reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence operations. The
country will employ its large array of reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence, and target acquisition
systems. Deceptive misinformation to large numbers of sensors can overwhelm a foe’s ability to receive,
process, and analyze raw intelligence data and provide timely and accurate intelligence analysis.
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Chapter 1
Disaggregate Enemy Formations

1-138. North Korea will target key vulnerabilities, fix maneuver forces, disconnect networks, and
manipulate decision-making to limit or prevent U.S. forces from benefitting from the synergy of mobile,
integrated, and protected firepower. North Korea will attempt to influence enemy maneuver forces to choose
incorrect deployment times and attack avenues. North Korean regular and irregular forces’ countermobility
efforts will limit flexibility and disrupt enemy maneuver responses and counterattacks.
ACTIONS TO COUNTER CONSOLIDATION OF ENEMY GAINS

1-139. North Korea will act to prevent consolidation of enemy gains and to alter conditions into a situation
in which the country resumes control of an OE. Its goals are centered on manipulating consolidation efforts
to a point where the country returns to or gains a level of influence over the region commensurate with its
objectives and interests. If North Korea is losing the war and the enemy goes into a stabilization phase, the
remaining North Korea assets will focus on the domains of EIW and systems warfare, with a lesser role for
the sanctuary and isolation domains. Any efforts in the preclusion domain are minor, as shown in figure 1-7.
If North Korea loses the war and the enemy’s enable civil authority phase begins, any remaining pro-Kim
regime elements would primarily operate in the EIW domain, deemphasizing the domains of systems warfare
and sanctuary. The preclusion and isolation domains will have even less emphasis, as shown in figure 1-8.
The balance of its methodologies at this point in the operation will be focused on four key areas.
Figure 1-7. Actions to counter enemy stabilizing actions
Figure 1-8. Actions to counter enemy enabling civil authority
Counter Stability
1-140. North Korean use of reflexive-control activities will manipulate the foe’s view of the value of
continued actions in the region. These efforts will focus both on altering the value of continued operations
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by the U.S. and changing the perceived value by other actors in their continuing support as ally or partner to
the U.S. This effort will include actions to undermine the authority and effectiveness of governance elements
acting in concert with U.S. forces.
Redirect Support
1-141. North Korea will attempt to influence the South Korean populace and possibly other regional actors
to shift their support to its interests and to act against the stated aims of the U.S. The country will exploit any
lack of cultural understanding observed in U.S. forces. It will conduct EIW campaigns dedicated to portray
the U.S. culture as an institution bent on political and economic global domination in the name of “Western”
democracy. Information campaigns will present U.S. military forces as brutal and unconstrained by the
accepted rules of warfare, and exploit instances of U.S. missteps due to cultural differences. The fabrication
and exaggeration of U.S. cultural shortcomings are designed to alienate the South Korean populace from
supporting the U.S. and aid in recruiting people and other countries to support North Korea and its goals and
objectives.
Change the Nature of the Conflict

1-142. North Korea will seek to shift the nature of the conflict, or at least its perceived nature, to
characteristics that do not match the themes proffered by U.S. information operations. North Korean forces
will also act to prevent enemy consolidation areas from becoming secure enough to permit substantive
stability operations.
Employ Cultural Standoff

1-143. North Korea will optimize cultural standoff and social aspects of an OE to provide protection and
freedom to maneuver for friendly forces. Cultural standoff techniques employed by North Korean actors
include integrating religious, medical, and other sensitive facilities into sanctuaries; employing human terrain
and cognitive manipulation for deception objectives; and exploiting the South Korean population using EIW.
OFFENSIVE, DEFENSIVE, AND COUNTERSTABILITY ACTIONS

1-144. Offensive and defensive actions occur within three general types of KPA operations. Those types of
actions at the tactical echelons are―
 Offensive actions.
 Defensive actions.
 Counterstability actions.
1-145. The types of actions in KPA operations are both tactical methods and guides to the design of COAs
and mission orders. KPA counterstability actions, although offensive and defensive in nature, are often
recurring actions to create or amplify conditions that support an OE conducive to achieving North Korean
objectives. These types of actions often seek to create or sustain conditions to destabilize a society, its
governance of law and order, and other social support to a relevant population of the society.
OFFENSIVE ACTIONS
1-146. The KPAGF conduct three basic types of tactical offensive actions at the echelons of regiment and
higher―
 Integrated attack.
 Dispersed attack.
 Limited-objective attack.
1-147. The tactical missions of integrated and dispersed attacks are based on the objective and how the
KPAGF assess their combat power in relation to their enemy. An integrated attack applies overmatch
capabilities in selected windows of opportunity for synchronized and massed combat power to destroy an
enemy’s resolve to continue a conflict. When the KPAGF do not have overmatch capability, typical offensive
actions include dispersed attacks conducted over extended periods of time and expansive areas. Attacks can
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Chapter 1
include domains of land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace. Interdependent and coordinated actions by
dispersed forces attack throughout their assigned areas of responsibility. Specific actions aim to destroy key
components of an enemy’s combat system, degrade enemy resolve, and gradually defeat enemy ability to
continue a conflict through continuous EIW actions.
1-148. The KPAGF will conduct limited-objective attacks when, while combating a stronger enemy force,
they recognize an opportunity to seize the initiative from enemy operations. Two types of tactical limited-
objective attacks are spoiling attack and counterattack. The purpose of a spoiling attack is to pre-empt or
seriously disrupt an enemy while it is in the process of planning, forming, assembling, or preparing to attack.
A counterattack prevents the enemy from achieving its offensive mission outcome, and allows the KPAGF
to regain tactical initiative in their operations. Typical forces with the flexibility to react to situational
opportunities with a limited-objective attack are reserve or designated counterattack forces.
1-149. KPAGF attacks can have designated purposes with expected outcomes. An attack to destroy
eliminates a target entity as a useful fighting force or an objective, and often focuses on a single component
of an enemy’s combat system. An attack to seize is to gain control of key terrain or man-made
facilities/infrastructure. An attack to expel forces an enemy to vacate an area. Attacks to expel often have a
significant EIW component that facilitates degradation of enemy resolve and fosters enemy defeat. A strike
is an offensive action that rapidly destroys a key enemy organization through a synergistic combination of
massed precision fires and maneuver. A strike mission is conducted typically at a C2 operational level above
division, based on the combat power required for effective mission success. The tactical outcomes for strikes
are not limited to destruction, seizure, or expulsion.
1-150. At the tactical echelon of battalion and below, the KPAGF conduct four basic types of offensive
action―
 Ambush.
 Assault.
 Raid.
 Reconnaissance attack.
1-151. The tactical actions of ambush, assault, and raid can be conducted with a combat power allocation
as minimal as one individual, whereas the combat power normally required to conduct a reconnaissance
attack is at least that of a task-organized company. See chapter 6 for discussion and examples of offensive
actions at divisional, regimental, and subordinate-unit levels.
DEFENSIVE ACTIONS
1-152. The KPAGF consider defensive operations as a temporary interval between attacks in order to gain
time or conserve troop strength. The KPAGF will only go on the defense when forced to do so and only as a
temporary measure until they can return to the offense again. The KPAGF go on the defense to repulse a
superior attacking force, to inflict grave casualties upon an attacking force, to defend key terrain, and to
transition to a decisive attack. Defense is conceptually a planned defense or a situational defense. Planned
actions typically involve sufficient time, knowledge, and situational understanding of an OE to prepare and
rehearse forces for specific tasks. Nonetheless, circumstances change often and suddenly at times that
preclude actions as originally planned. In instances such as being surprised or finding KPAGF combat power
at a significant disadvantage, conditions can require a temporary situational defensive posture until the
KPAGF can regain the initiative.
1-153. At the tactical echelons of regiment and above, defensive tactics are identified with one of two
descriptions:
 Mobile defense.
 Area defense.
1-154. A KPAGF tactical mobile defense applies fires and maneuver to destroy key elements of the enemy’s
combat system to deny enemy forces their objective while preserving its own combat power. A mobile
defense uses the depth and breadth of an AO and available time to create favorable conditions for KPAGF
actions to disrupt, defeat, or destroy an enemy. The objective is typically focused on defeat or destruction of
key C2 nodes and logistics support. For the KPAGF, this form of defense trades space for time. The main
1-30 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

combat power is concentrated in the second echelon, while the first echelon fights a series of delaying actions
to disrupt the enemy until the decisive fight against the second echelon.
1-155. A tactical area defense denies key areas of terrain or access to designated areas in order to set the
conditions that cause an enemy’s offensive operations to culminate before achieving its objectives. Deception
activities are a key component of EIW, especially during counterattacks. An area defense retains selected
terrain, when directed, to support other defensive or offensive actions to protect critical capabilities, preserve
combat power, or create favorable conditions for KPAGF actions to disrupt, defeat, or destroy an enemy.
1-156. At the battalion, detachment, and subordinate echelons, the KPAGF perform maneuver and area
defensive actions using combinations of―
 Simple battle position (SBP) defenses.
 Complex battle position (CBP) defenses.
1-157. A SBP is a coordinated defensive position(s) oriented on an enemy avenue of approach. A CBP is a
coordinated defensive location with multiple SBPs. The purpose of a CBP can include—
 Protect and conceal a safe haven or sanctuary of key KPA capabilities.
 Delay enemy forces in an AO for a specified period of time.
 Defend and prevent seizure of a location or area by an enemy.
 Contain or block enemy forces.
1-158. Defensive tasks often set conditions for the KPAGF to resume offensive actions. Whether the
defensive mission task is terrain oriented or enemy-force oriented, conditional fires and maneuver of forces
are typically part of how the KPAGF intend to use combat power in support of mission purpose and intent.
See chapter 7 for discussion and examples of defensive actions at divisional, regimental, and subordinate-
unit levels.
COUNTERSTABILITY ACTIONS
1-159. Counterstability actions are a normal aspect of North Korean operations, and often occur concurrent
with other ongoing defensive or offensive actions. These types of actions leverage the variables of an OE,
combat, and a relevant population to create conditions that enhance the KPA’s physical, informational, and
cognitive goals and objectives in support of the mission. Offensive and defensive tasks in counterstability
actions can be simultaneous and continuous at various levels of intensity. North Korea sustains or modifies
the frequency and level of physical and cognitive violence and coercion in order to destabilize an OE. Actions
are at times sudden and massive in effects, but are more often a series of gradually escalating incidents that
cause long-term debilitating effects to an enemy and relevant population. Whether sudden and massive or
gradual and insidious, counterstability actions degrade the capabilities of a foe and seek to manipulate OE
conditions to the advantage of the KPA.
1-160. North Korea will plan and coordinate counterstability actions to incite dissatisfaction by the South
Korean population. The country’s actions can overtly or covertly challenge legitimacy of the South Korean
Government by disrupting governmental services such as military and internal security forces, law
enforcement and judicial agencies, financial institutions, internal development programs, diplomatic
initiatives, or degrading civil services and a safe and secure environment. North Korea will attempt to
interrupt indigenous or external support to South Korea to extend instability in the area. In some instances, it
may attempt to provide civil services and support to an area while concurrently disrupting those types of
services and support from the South Korean Government in order to acquire support from the local
population, political affiliates, and the North Korean diaspora.
1-161. An effective strategic communications program, integral to EIW objectives, can directly and
indirectly criticize and damage the aims of South Korea, opposition groups, and partner actions through local,
regional, and global media outreach. North Korea has proven it is not constrained or limited by the rule of
law or international conventions and protocols. Crime and terrorism are two areas of counterstability actions
that confront a safe and secure OE, the rule of law, social and economic well-being, and just and stable
governance. These actions are instrumental to disruption and subversion of enemy military forces and society.
See chapter 8 for discussion and offensive and defensive examples of counterstability tactical action.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 1-31

Chapter 1
1-162. The recent Russian takeover of Crimea only reinforced likely KPA previous planning to insert some
KPA SOF into South Korea or to activate clandestine operatives already living in South Korea before any
actual hostilities begin. Their task would be to help gain any North Korean advantage that would slow down
the mobilization of South Korean reserves. The SOF could do this in a number of ways:
 Social media: spreading the word that war is not imminent and that military reserve mobilization
is unnecessary as well as expensive.
 Antiwar protests: leading/infiltrating rallies intended to convince the South Korean Government
not to act against its North Korean brothers.
 False-flag provocations: blaming any SOF actions in South Korea on others, especially those
South Koreans who favor war preparedness.
 Political attacks: causing chaos and possibly advocating regime change during the crisis, thus
diverting political attention away from North Korean actions.
 Terrorist attacks: if other means prove ineffective or as an approaching conventional attack date
draws near, launching terrorist attacks to spread panic among the South Korean civilian
population.
 Attack key nodes: just prior to the North Korean attack, attacking important C2 and
communications centers to prevent the flow of true information throughout South Korea.
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Chapter 2
Functional Tactics
This chapter explains Korean People’s Army (KPA) actions within the framework of
functional tactics. It discusses the functional method and the terms, symbols, and
control measures used to portray and govern KPA activities. A description of action
and enabling functions is given, along with common function types performed by
action and enabling units. The chapter concludes with a discussion of mission task
execution.
TACTICAL TERMS, SYMBOLS, AND CONTROL MEASURES

2-1. The Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (KPAGF) typically use a minimum number of control
measures to orient or regulate functional actions in a military operation. A control measure is a means of
regulating forces or warfighting functions (ADP 6-0). The KPAGF visualize an operational environment
(OE) to facilitate rapid transition, when necessary, between offensive and defensive actions and between
linear and nonlinear dispositions. The KPA adapts to the nature of conflict conditions and provides clear
expectations of a mission—as well as limitations or constraints to mission expectations—in written, verbal,
or graphical instructions.
Note. A force is normally regimental or larger in size. An element is normally battalion or smaller
in size. A unit is a generic term for either a force or an element. An organization is the group of
units that are tasked to complete a specific mission.
2-2. A commander identifies the conditions of an OE from the perspective of that level of command and a
mission assignment. Within a unit’s area of operations (AO), defined by the next-higher commander, a
commander designates specific AOs for subordinates, along with zones and other control measures to
facilitate mission intent, responsibilities, freedom of action, and mission success. Typical tactical control
measures include the AO and multiple zones:
 Offensive zones.
 Defensive zones.
 Security zone.
 Defense zones.
 Zone of reconnaissance responsibility (ZORR).
 Attack zone.
 Kill zone.
 Kill box.
AREA OF OPERATIONS
2-3. The KPA defines an area of operations (AO) as the geographical area and associated airspace within
which a commander has the authority to plan and conduct combat operations. An AO is bounded by a limit
of responsibility beyond which the organization may not operate or conduct fires without coordination
through the next-higher headquarters. AO boundaries may be linear or nonlinear and may or may not be
contiguous. Linear AOs can contain subordinate nonlinear AOs, and nonlinear AOs can contain linear AOs.
Contiguous or noncontiguous boundaries are dependent on the mission and situational conditions of an OE
and typically include more than military considerations, such as political declarations on sovereign territory,
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Chapter 2
formal objections by multiple actors on disputed resources, or rogue actors operating in global commons and
jeopardizing regional stability.
2-4. A combat order normally defines an AO and zones within the AO by specifying boundary lines in
terms of distinct local terrain features through which a line passes. An order specifies whether each of those
terrain features is included or excluded from the unit’s AO or zones within the AO. A higher headquarters
commander may retain control of airspace over an AO assigned to a subordinate headquarters. This decision
would be stated in standard airspace management measures.
ZONES
2-5. On the offense or the defense, the KPAGF main body will be divided into a defense zone with either
three echelons or two echelons and a reserve. In the offense, the first echelon will consist of approximately
two-thirds of the maneuver units. The second echelon will consist of approximately two-ninths of the
organization’s remaining combat power. The final one-ninth of the organization’s maneuver units will serve
as a reserve or a third echelon unit. The location of the echelons depends on the size of the unit—battalion,
regiment, division, or field army. In the offense, the KPA uses fewer control measures than when on the
defense.
2-6. An AO depicts zones for a specified mission with the intent to preserve as much flexibility as possible
for subordinate units to conduct their operations within the higher headquarters commander’s intent. The
security zone, defense zones, and several other control measures are described in the following paragraphs.
Other control measures in chapter 5 expand a discussion of control measures and tasks in reconnaissance,
counterreconnaissance, and security missions.
Offensive Zones
2-7. The KPAGF use minimal control measures when conducting offensive actions, including zones. The
KPA commander gives each subordinate commander left and right boundaries, and the order delineates the
avenues of advance. Table 2-1 provides the standard attack frontage and depth for various KPAGF units. See
chapter 5 for detailed information about reconnaissance and advance guard units.
Table 2-1. KPAGF standard attack frontage and depth
Unit Frontage, km Depth, km
Army 40–60 80–100
Corps 20–40 40–50
Division 10–16 10–15
Regiment 3–6 5–7
Battalion 1.5–2 2–3

km kilometers
Defensive Zones
2-8. KPAGF AOs typically consist of four primary zones when on the defensive: the security zone and the
first, second, and third defense zones. There is also a buffer zone located between each of the three defense
zones in a field army area defense. Zones may be linear or nonlinear in nature. The size of these zones
depends on the size of the KPA units involved, engagement ranges of weapon systems, the terrain, and the
nature of the enemy’s operation. The KPAGF do not designate a support zone, so there is no support line as
found in U.S. Army doctrine. The battle line (the KPA does not use this term) separates the first defense zone
from the security zone. The KPAGF will place their logistical units in the rear of the first defense zone and
throughout the second and third defense zones. Figure 2-1 illustrates several types of KPA control measures.
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Functional Tactics
Figure 2-1. Typical KPAGF control measures (conceptual)
Security Zone
2-9. The security zone is the AO of a disruption force. This zone is a geographical area and airspace in
which the security force fixes or disrupts an enemy, and sets conditions for successful combat actions
throughout an AO. The KPAGF divide the security zone into the combat security area and the general security
area. The combat security area is 1–2 km in front of the first defense zone and is subdivided into two areas.
The first area extends 200–400 m from the forward battalions and is occupied by security outposts, security
patrols, and ambush teams. The second area extends up to 2 km in front of each forward regiment and is
occupied by a company (+) unit arrayed in 3–4 combat observation posts. These posts provide early warning,
prevent surprise attacks, and call for and adjust artillery fire. The general security area extends 10–15 km in
front of the first echelon defense zone of a division or corps. For corps operations the general security area
is manned by a regiment (+) and for division operations this area is occupied by a battalion (+). The mission
of general security outposts is to provide early attack warning and to conduct disruption, delay, and
interdiction missions. Units in this security zone begin the attack on specified components of the enemy’s
combat system to begin the disaggregation and defeat of that system. Successful actions in the security zone
will create a window of opportunity that is exploitable for forces in the defense zones. Specific actions in the
security zone can include:
 Defeat enemy reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance forces.
 Maintain reconnaissance or surveillance of critical enemy systems.
 Deny enemy ability to acquire and engage KPA systems with long-range fires.
 Disrupt enemy air defenses.
 Disrupt enemy engineer capabilities.
 Disaggregate enemy movements and maneuver.
 Interrupt effective enemy logistics support to action force.
 Deceive the enemy on disposition and actions of KPA units, main effort, or main defenses.
2-10. The security zone is bounded by the battle line and the limit of responsibility of the overall AO. In
linear offensive combat, the higher headquarters may move the battle line and limit of responsibility forward
as the force continues to move and maneuver in successful offensive actions. A higher headquarters
commander can adjust the security zone boundary as forces adopt a temporary defensive posture while
consolidating gains after a successful offensive action or in preparation for subsequent offensive actions.
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Chapter 2
Similarly, a higher headquarters commander can adjust the security zone boundary based on emergent
conditions in defensive actions.
2-11. Security zones between or among KPAGF units may be contiguous or noncontiguous. They can also
be layered, with a security zone of a subordinate command being integral to the security zone of the next-
higher command. Battalions and subordinate units may be directed to conduct disruption actions within the
security zone of a higher headquarters.
Defense Zones
2-12. The defense zone is the portion of an AO where the KPAGF expect to conduct decisive actions. A
KPAGF field army operates three defense zones separated by buffer zones with prepared positions in all
zones. The KPAGF simply call these the first, second, and third defense zones. The defense zone is separated
from the security zone by the battle line. Lateral boundaries are part of the limit of responsibility. Forces in
the three defense zones exploit opportunities created by actions in the security zone. Using all elements of
combat power, the KPAGF engage the enemy in close combat to achieve tactical success in this zone.
2-13. In a defense zone, the KPAGF unit is typically tasked to accomplish one or more of the following―
 Deceive enemy attention from a main offensive effort or supporting defensive effort.
 Prevent movement or maneuver of an enemy force that might otherwise impact KPA actions in an
AO.
 Inflict significant casualties on enemy forces.
 Defeat enemy command and control (C2) or logistics.
 Destroy enemy forces.
 Defend key terrain.
2-14. A division does not always form a divisional defense zone, as the defense zone may be the aggregate
of the defense zones of subordinate headquarters. In nonlinear situations, there may be multiple,
noncontiguous regimental or divisional defense zones. The regimental defense zone provides each of the
subordinate unit commanders the terrain to frame decisive tactical actions. Battalion and subordinate
headquarters may have AOs that consist primarily of a defense zone with support units contained within it.
Support Zone
2-15. Unlike many threat armies, the KPAGF do not designate a support zone. Combat support/rear service
units will be located in the AO of their parent headquarters, with much of this support located in the second
and third defense zones. Security forces will operate in the rear of the first defense zone and the other two
defense zones in a combat role to defeat enemy forces that might otherwise impact effective logistics and
administrative support to KPAGF units in an AO. Camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception measures,
as in other zones, improve defense against enemy reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target
acquisition (RISTA) and precision attack. Logistics support and services integrate actions to ensure effective
KPAGF combat power in conduct of missions and supporting tasks.
2-16. A division’s logistical units can be dispersed within the various defense zones of its subordinate units,
or the division may place its logistical units in a defense zone that is separate from subordinate AOs. If the
defense zone moves during the course of a battle, KPA logistical units will reposition based on command
direction to ensure timely and continuous support to the command.
Zone of Reconnaissance Responsibility

2-17. A ZORR is the combination of a unit AO and the area outside of the AO that can be observed by the
unit’s technical sensors. The ZORR extends into other AOs when boundaries are contiguous in an operation.
Attack Zone
2-18. An attack zone is given to a subordinate unit with an offensive mission, to delineate clearly where
forces will be conducting offensive maneuver. Attack zones are often used to control offensive action by a
subordinate unit inside a larger defensive battle or operation.
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Functional Tactics
Kill Zone
2-19. A kill zone is a designated area where the KPAGF plan to destroy a key enemy target. A kill zone may
be within the security zone or any of the defense zones of an AO. A kill zone is typically a two-dimensional
control measure of depth and width on the ground, defined by a boundary of grid coordinates, terrain features,
or another common reference system.
Kill Box
2-20. A kill box can be defined as a three-dimensional target area in depth, width, and height to facilitate the
integration of coordinated joint weapons fire. This KPA joint coordination and control measure facilitates
effective and timely use of air and indirect fires in support of the ground maneuver commander’s mission.
The kill box may include no-fire areas, restricted operations areas, and airspace coordination areas. A kill
box used as a joint forces coordination and control measure enables Korean People’s Army Air Force air
assets to engage surface targets without further coordination or terminal attack control.
UNIT SYMBOLS
2-21. Unit symbols for all KPA units use the diamond-shaped frame. All KPA task-organized units use the
“task force” amplifier placed over the “echelon” (unit size) modifier above the diamond-shape frame. Figure
2-2 shows ways in which KPA units can be portrayed. When multiple forces and elements are interspersed
in an AO, special frames and colors can be described and used for visual clarity.
Figure 2-2. KPA unit/organization symbol presentation options
ACTION AND ENABLING FUNCTIONS

2-22. A number of functions occur each time a KPAGF unit executes a mission. While functions required to
accomplish any given mission vary depending on the specific OE and mission set, functions can be divided
into two broad categories:
 Action functions.
 Enabling functions.
2-23. The action function is the primary set of KPAGF activities that actually accomplishes a given mission
outcome. One specific part of a KPAGF unit or organization that is conducting a particular action is normally
responsible for performing this primary function or task to accomplish the objective of an assigned action.
The unit with the primary function will be called an action force or action element, depending on its size and
level of command.
2-24. The higher echelon commander will typically identify the action unit with a more specific designation
that states the organization’s specific function. For example, if the objective of the action is to conduct an
assault to destroy an enemy unit or seize terrain, the action unit designated to complete that action is called
the assault unit. In regimental or larger unit offensive operations, an organization that has the primary
offensive mission to attack and defeat or destroy an enemy, or seize and secure terrain, is the action force.
Other attacking forces supporting this defeat or destruction are enabling the action function. In defensive
action examples, a battalion or subordinate unit that performs the main defensive mission in a defense zone
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 2-5

Chapter 2
is the action element. Other units of the defensive mission throughout an AO enable the main defense
function.
2-25. An enabling function is a set of activities that supports the mission task to be accomplished by the
action unit. In relation to units conducting the action function, all other parts of the organization conducting
a mission to support the action unit provide enabling functional support based on their assigned mission
task(s). Enabling support can change as tactical opportunities arise during a mission. Each of these units is
an enabling force or enabling element; however, each unit with an enabling function is normally identified
by the specific function it performs.
2-26. Enabling units create the conditions that allow the action unit the freedom and flexibility to
successfully operate. In order to create a window of opportunity for the action unit to succeed, the enabling
unit(s) may be required to operate at significant risk and may sustain substantial casualties. In some instances,
an enabling unit may not even make contact with the enemy in order to accomplish its function; for example,
a force conducting a demonstration.
FUNCTIONAL METHOD
2-27. The functional method follows a three-step sequence for mission performance: identify the action
function and enabling functions needed to achieve a mission task; allocate resources to execute the required
functions; and synchronize the functions for conduct of the mission. Stating a task and purpose for each of
the functions assists in identifying the capabilities required to enact or support both within the mission. An
initial analysis, after receipt of a mission, includes a sequential and standardized process to—
 Understand and acknowledge an assigned mission purpose and intent with emphasis on
completing the mission by the designated time.
 Restate a mission for analysis and development of an initial concept of mission conduct.
 Develop mission courses of action backward from the end state of the objective.
 Analyze mission courses of action from the current situation to completion of the mission purpose
and intent.
 Determine a concept of operation for mission success.
 Plan the mission and consider branches and sequels.
 Prepare for the mission.
 Execute the mission.
 Conduct post-mission analysis to improve or sustain tactical performance.
2-28. The three-step method provides the framework for confirmation of actions or final adjustments prior
to conduct of the mission task. KPA leaders executing the functions of a mission task remain alert for tactical
conditions that indicate a change may be required to original orders or directives in order to achieve the
mission purpose. At the conclusion of a mission, initial post-action analysis and subsequent deliberate
analysis identify methods, processes, and actions to improve or sustain for effective mission execution. Figure
2-3 provides a simple diagram of the KPA mission sequence analysis.
Figure 2-3. Method for mission sequence analysis
2-29. The KPA uses two perspectives of analysis for mission planning, preparation, execution, and
subsequent actions. Forward analysis makes an initial assessment of factors, assumptions, and successful
mission end-state conditions that the KPA uses to visualize and evaluate critical actions and requirements.
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Functional Tactics
Considerations include understanding tactical conditions from mission assignment to mission completion,
and possible or probable actions and options that follow a mission assignment. A complementary perspective
is a reverse sequence of analysis that starts at a point of achieving the mission objective and works backward
through critical actions to the starting point of mission planning.
2-30. Once mission functions are determined, action and enabling forces or elements are identified and task-
organized in order to accomplish the assigned mission, with consideration given to mission contingencies.
Probable or possible subsequent mission tasks can be visualized and analyzed for conditions, purpose,
mission intent, and relative KPA combat power required for potential future operations. Mission analysis
identifies or indicates critical aspects that include but are not limited to―
 Relative KPA combat power at successful conclusion of the mission task.
 Combat effectiveness of enemy forces before, during, and at conclusion of the KPA mission.
 Prudent risk level a KPA commander is willing to accept in how combat power is positioned,
tailored, and maneuvered in conduct of a mission.
 Coordination of electronic intelligence warfare (EIW) support.
 Combat power provided to a reserve.
 Assets allocated to or coordinated for RISTA for continuous redundant capabilities to achieve and
maintain situational awareness.
 Assets allocated to the action unit(s) and enabling units(s) throughout mission execution.
 Logistics support to the mission.
 Time requirements or allowances to conduct and complete a mission.
 Considerations for mission branches and sequels.
2-31. The analysis is a continuous process to validate information and intelligence, and engage KPA leaders
in critical thinking and effective decision making for mission planning and execution. Mission planning
considers all variables of an OE in the mission. KPAGF doctrine supposedly empowers military leaders with
the C2 responsibility to maintain combat readiness and efficiency of their subordinate forces, plan and
prepare for operations, and provide decisive leadership and direction during mission execution.
2-32. KPA writings appear to direct units to focus on the purpose of their tactical mission and act toward
achieving its mission purpose and intent, even when the details of an original plan have changed or become
irrelevant through enemy action or unforeseen events. KPA writing seems to emphasize flexible and agile
actions and reactions in tactical situations as the result of training, practical experiences, and unit conditioning
of leaders and subordinates. In actuality, KPA commanders may not deviate from their assigned missions for
fear of the repercussions should failure occur. Despite the possible stifling of initiative by KPA leaders,
especially at the lower levels of command, some basic functions become almost instinctive, as in a combat
drill, and require minimal deliberate decision making and orders to conduct effective actions. Units are
trained to tactical situations through learning standard functional responses; these can consist of immediate
drills or groups of tactical tasks that use techniques appropriate to a particular OE and mission task.
ACTION FORCES AND ELEMENTS

2-33. An action unit (force for regimental and above; element for battalion and below) is the part of the
organization(s) conducting a particular offensive or defensive action that is responsible for performing the
primary task that accomplishes the overall mission objective. In most tactical situations, the higher unit
commander will give the action unit a specific designation that identifies the function(s) or task(s) it is
directed to perform in order to achieve the objective of the higher command’s mission. Functional action
titles can include but are not limited to assault, main defense, and mission.
ASSAULT FORCE OR ELEMENT

2-34. An assault task can be the primary action to destroy an enemy unit through firepower or an integrated
employment of fires and maneuver, or seize or secure specified geographical terrain, facilities, or other
infrastructure. In this situation, an assault unit can be an action unit.
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Chapter 2
2-35. An assault unit can be designated with a more descriptive title. For example, if the objective of the
action at company level is to conduct a raid, the element designated to complete the raid’s purpose is typically
called the raiding element. As another example, the action force at regimental or higher echelon headquarters
that completes the primary offensive mission of an attack by exploiting a window of opportunity, created by
an enabling force, is called an exploitation force. For the KPAGF in a conventional attack, the exploitation
force is normally a second tactical echelon mobile combat arms unit that passes through a first tactical echelon
unit that has opened a gap in the enemy’s front line. The second tactical echelon unit will then “exploit” the
situation by attacking the combat support and rear service units in the enemy’s division and corps rear areas.
MAIN DEFENSE FORCE OR ELEMENT

2-36. A KPAGF main defense unit has the primary defensive task of destroying the enemy in a defense zone.
This main defense force completes the destruction of the enemy after the progressive disruption, reduction,
or defeat of enemy combat power by an enabling force in a security zone as the enemy attempts to attack
through that zone. For the KPAGF, the main defense unit operates in the first of its three sequential defense
zones.
MISSION FORCE OR ELEMENT

2-37. In non-strike offensive actions where the mission can be accomplished without the creation of a
specific conditional opportunity, the unit that accomplishes the mission can be called a mission unit. A KPA
commander, however, may give a mission unit a designation that identifies its specific function. KPA
examples could include a surveillance reconnaissance element or a film reconnaissance element.
ENABLING FORCES AND ELEMENTS

2-38. In relation to the action force or action element, all other parts of a KPA unit/organization conducting
an offensive or defensive action provide enabling functions in support of the primary action. At regimental
or higher headquarters echelon, the unit headquarters and subordinate units performing these enabling
functions are referred to as an enabling force. At battalion and subordinate units, these functional
units/organizations are referred to as enabling elements.
2-39. In most tactical situations, the higher KPAGF unit commander will give the enabling unit a specific
designation that identifies the function or task it is directed to perform in order to support achieving the
objective of the mission. For example, a force at regimental and higher headquarters echelon that enables
accomplishment of a mission task by fixing enemy forces so that the enemy cannot interfere with the primary
action force is titled a fixing force. An element at battalion or lower echelon headquarters that clears or
breaches obstacles to permit an action element to accomplish its primary mission task is titled a clearing or
breaching element. Types of functional titles for enabling forces or elements can include but are not limited
to—
 Security.
 Fixing.
 Deception.
 Disruption.
 Assault.
 Support.
 Reserve.
SECURITY FORCE OR ELEMENT

2-40. The security function is a principle enabler for all KPAGF tactical actions. Security is a continuous
requirement and is performed by units with capabilities that act to protect KPA units from observation,
destruction, or becoming fixed. Security functions can be to provide early warning and reaction time to the
KPA, isolate enemy elements from an ongoing KPA mission, or actively delay, defeat, or destroy enemy
forces to enable a KPAGF action unit to be successful.
2-8 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Functional Tactics
2-41. A security unit provides security for a larger organization to which it is assigned, protects it from
observation, and provides early warning of enemy actions. The security unit conducts activities to prevent or
mitigate the effects of hostile actions against the overall tactical-level command or its key components. The
KPA commander may choose to charge this security unit with providing protection for the entire AO,
including the rest of the functional units; logistics and administrative units; and other key installations,
facilities, and resources. The security force may include various types of units—such as infantry, special
operations forces, counterreconnaissance, and signals reconnaissance assets—to focus on enemy special
operations and long-range reconnaissance forces operating throughout the AO. It can also include internal
security forces units allocated to tactical-level command, with the mission of protecting the overall command
from attack by irregular or paramilitary forces. The security force may also be charged with mitigating the
effects of weapons of mass destruction.
FIXING FORCE OR ELEMENT

2-42. The fixing function is a principle enabler for most tactical actions. Performing a fixing function
requires capabilities that provide the means to prevent enemy units from interfering with KPA mission
accomplishment. A fixing unit can fix the enemy by preventing a part of its force from moving from a specific
location for a specific period of time so it cannot interfere with the primary KPAGF action. For example, in
a mission to ambush a convoy moving through an urban area, a fixing function could be to delay arrival of
an enemy quick reaction force. If the mission is to destroy an enemy force in a battle position, a fixing
function could be to prevent a reserve from reinforcing the enemy force in the battle position.
2-43. Success in fixing an enemy is accomplished when a designated part of an enemy unit cannot participate
in timely actions that otherwise could lead to disruption or failure of a KPA mission. This function can be
accomplished in various ways including but not limited to―
 Suppressing a unit with fires.
 Deceiving with coordinated elements of EIW.
 Delaying enemy forces or elements from entering an area with voluntary or coerced civilian
demonstrations.
 Ambushing enemy units.
 Denying enemy movement with countermobility effects.
 Disrupting enemy logistics sustainment.
2-44. The KPA identifies which enemy forces need to be fixed and the method(s) by which they will be
fixed. It will then assign this responsibility to a force that has the capability to fix the required enemy forces
with the correct method. A fixing force may consist of a number of units separated from each other in time
and space, particularly if the enemy forces required to be fixed are similarly separated in disposition and
location. A fixing force could consist entirely of affiliated irregular forces conducting discrete attacks on
logistics, C2, or other systems to fix an enemy.
DECEPTION FORCE OR ELEMENT

2-45. A KPA deception unit conducts deception actions that lead the enemy to act in ways prejudicial to
enemy interests or favoring the success of a KPAGF action unit. When the EIW plan requires combat forces
to conduct deception actions, such as a feint or demonstration, these forces will be designated as deception
forces. Operational security measures protect the actual purpose of these forces, and allocated resources
support the practical conduct of tasks to deceive an enemy leader of mission intent.
DISRUPTION FORCE OR ELEMENT

2-46. A disruption unit typically operates in the KPA security zone to disrupt enemy preparations or actions;
destroy or deceive enemy reconnaissance; or begin reducing the effectiveness of key components of the
enemy’s combat system. The KPAGF security zone is normally 16–20 km in width and 10–15 km in depth
for a KPAGF field army, and is in front of the first defense zone found in the main defense area. In the
offense, the disruption unit could be a disruption force that already existed in a preceding defensive situation.
For example, the disruption force for a division is typically a regiment with additional assets task-organized
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 2-9

Chapter 2
for the disruption function. Battalions or subordinate headquarters typically serve as disruption forces for
regiments and can require task-organizing as a detachment.
ASSAULT FORCE OR ELEMENT

2-47. An assault unit, as an enabler, supports the success of an action unit. One or more enablers could be
directed to assault to destroy an enemy force or seize a piece of terrain that supports the conditions for an
action unit to achieve the overall objective. At regimental level, the commander may employ one or more
assault forces.
2-48. The purpose of an assault force may be to create or help create the opportunity for an action
force―such as an exploitation force―to accomplish the primary mission. In this instance, an assault unit
would have an enabling function. For example, a unit that breaches an obstacle and enables an assault unit to
attack through the breach is a breaching unit. In such an offensive action, the breaching actions require an
assault to enable the breaching to occur. Since the term “breaching” is more descriptive of the supporting
function than the term “assault,” the former is used instead of the latter. The breaching units serve as an
enabler for an action force to continue the attack and accomplish the KPAGF’s primary mission objective.
In this mission, the role of the supporting assault force is to create the tactical conditions for an exploitation
unit—the action unit—to accomplish the mission objective.
SUPPORT FORCE OR ELEMENT

2-49. A support unit provides support to action units. Support units can be designated by their specific
functions and may include─
 Support by fires. (See Appendix A for more information on fires support operations.)
 Types of other combat support.
 Types of rear service.
 C2 functions for parts of a unit or organization.
PROTECTED FORCE OR ELEMENT

2-50. In tactical missions, there may be a particular organization(s) that the KPA commander wants to be
protected from enemy observation or fire to ensure that it will be available after the current operation is over.
This is designated as a protected unit. A protected unit is a capability preserved by a commander for a
specified purpose. This type of unit is typically located in the rear of the main defense area.
RESERVE
2-51. In initial orders, some KPA subordinate units are held in an uncommitted status. At the KPA
commander’s discretion, some forces or elements may be retained under direct control, in reserve, as a means
to influence unforeseen events or take advantage of emergent tactical opportunities. These capabilities are
designated as a reserve. If and when such reserves are subsequently assigned a mission to perform a specific
function, they receive the appropriate functional unit designation. For example, a reserve force might be
ordered to become a counterattack unit. As another example, a unit with a mission task of demonstration or
feint can be designated a deception unit.
FUNCTIONAL TACTICS IN OPERATIONS

2-52. Functional tactics are the integrated employment of units by task and purpose to achieve a desired
mission outcome. As the KPA conducts cyclic functional analysis, it continues to assess and evaluate what
functions must occur in order to achieve the mission purpose and outcomes that support a commander’s
intent.
2-53. The functional tactics for a given operation are based on decision making by KPA leaders with prudent
risk taking, combat power and force protection assessment, confidence in effective RISTA capabilities,
acknowledgement of mission assignment from a higher echelon commander, and a clear understanding of
mission success that supports the higher echelon commander’s intent.
2-10 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Functional Tactics
2-54. The offensive and defensive mission tasks introduced in chapter 1 are the foundation of how the KPA
operates. In addition to offense and defense actions, the complement in many operations is counterstability
actions. EIW is integral to all KPA actions.
OFFENSE
2-55. The offense is the decisive form of conflict. Success over an enemy eventually necessitates, in almost
all situations, offensive actions. The primary purpose of the offense for the KPA is to defeat, destroy, or
neutralize a stated enemy in order to accomplish success within a mission purpose and intent. Tactical
conditions and tasks may require the KPA to be on the defense for periods of time before transitioning to the
offense. Offensive and defensive actions in a mission can be conducted in a simultaneous, parallel, or
sequential manner.
DEFENSE
2-56. The defense is a form of conflict that creates conditions for the KPAGF to obtain, sustain, or regain
the initiative in operations. Tactical conditions and tasks may require the KPAGF to defend in order to
support offensive actions by other KPAGF units operating in an AO, fix or isolate an enemy in preparation
of offensive actions, or create vulnerabilities in enemy combat power. Tactical conditions and tasks may
require the KPAGF to defend with the expectation of significant casualties or loss of particular system
capabilities. Defensive and offensive actions are often conducted simultaneously in a mission. The defense,
as a temporary or long-term tactic, can be directed to support success of a higher headquarters’ intent, even
if actions at a subordinate echelon do not appear successful. Defensive actions retain and display an
aggressive posture in achieving the intent of a defense.
COUNTERSTABILITY
2-57. KPA counterstability actions typically integrate with other offensive and defensive actions to create
multiple situational conditions that its enemy is forced to confront. Multiple concurrent dilemmas can stress
the ability of a foe to adequately address all of its tactical stability requirements while also conducting
offensive or defensive operations. Counterstability actions contest and disrupt a foe’s campaign to ensure a
safe and secure OE, fair and just governance in an area or region, or a relevant population supportive of a
foe’s presence. Counterstability actions are conducted with a keen sense of physical and cognitive impacts
on enemy military forces and a relevant civilian population that can affect overall KPA success. Tactical
actions can create vulnerabilities in a foe’s stability actions that can be further attacked, overtly or covertly,
with a KPA intent to degrade the success of OE conditions that the foe is attempting to promote. EIW is
particularly important in support to and conduct of all KPA counterstability actions.
EXECUTION OF MISSION TASKS

2-58. The KPA acknowledges several expectations in executing offensive and defensive mission tasks and
associated counterstability tasks that can differ significantly from norms and values of an enemy. KPA leader
decisions and actions do not necessarily comply with international law of war conventions, South Korean
laws and regulations, or multinational and coalition agreements during conflict. The KPA can act in ways
that might normally limit or constrain operations by the forces it is facing on the battlefield. Several
significant considerations in KPA conduct can include the following—
 Apply EIW in an integrated local, regional, and global strategic communications campaign.
 Shield KPA systems by embedding within a civilian population and infrastructure.
 Employ C2 capabilities that preclude electronic/sensor acquisition.
 Direct decentralized C2 methods to enhance distributed execution of mission intent.
 Sustain complex battle positions adaptive to OE conditions.
 Demonstrate strategic patience in tempo, pace, and duration of operations.
2-59. KPA rules of engagement while operating in relevant populations of an OE are adjusted to best serve
North Korea’s mission. The KPA will actively seek to identify restrictions and constraints in enemy rules of
engagement that provide opportunities to take advantage of in overt and covert actions. The KPA understands
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 2-11

Chapter 2
fundamental aspects of how to affect South Korea’s and its allies’ will and resolve in order to achieve KPA
results. Considerations are as follows:
 Mission focus is typically to fix or isolate enemy combat power, in order to attack and
defeat/destroy enemy sustainment and C2.
 Combat action by KPA forces is not casualty averse, as the KPA is willing to accept significant
casualties in order to achieve mission task success.
 Noncombatants in North and South Korea may be coerced to support KPA operations.
 Noncombatants in North and South Korea may be manipulated as passive or unknowing
participants in support of KPA operations.
 Recurring physical violence and cognitive trauma from acts of terrorism can degrade or defeat
enemy military forces and their supporting entities.
2-12 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Chapter 3
North Korean Force Structure and Formations
This chapter addresses North Korean force structure and command and control (C2) of
formations. It reviews Korean People’s Army (KPA) service component organizations,
command and support relationships, and C2 of military forces. A concise description
of force structure at the tactical echelon addresses regular and irregular forces, with the
former primarily at the tactical echelons of division, brigade, regiment, battalion, and
company.
FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION OF NORTH KOREAN FORCES

3-1. As discussed in chapter 1, the KPA forces are organized functionally and named accordingly. At
regimental and higher headquarters, units performing these functions are referred to as forces. At battalion
and subordinate headquarters, units are called elements. When applicable to both forces and elements, the
term used is unit.
SERVICE COMPONENT ORGANIZATIONS

3-2. All North Korean military forces, except the internal security forces, belong to the KPA. There are no
separate military services per se. KPA armed forces are typically structured into six service components and
various types of paramilitary reserve personnel, as indicated in figure 3-1.
Figure 3-1. KPA armed forces service components
Note. The order of battle illustrations throughout this document are representative examples of
KPA units. Due to the tiered nature of the KPA, where frontline and higher-priority units receive
the most modern equipment and reserve units operate less-capable equipment, the same type of
KPA unit may not operate the same type of equipment. For example, units along the demilitarized
zone (DMZ) may field T-62 or even newer domestically produced tanks, while reserve units may
operate T-54 or even vintage T-34/85 tanks. Any change to a subordinate organization would
change the composition of the represented unit.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 3-1

Chapter 3
ARMY
3-3. The army is the largest of the six services, and relies on mobilization of reserve and militia forces to
conduct sustained military operations. To avoid the confusion between the overall military forces and the
ground forces, the army units will be called the Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (KPAGF), while the
entire military will be called the KPA. The KPAGF are composed of approximately 1.02 million active duty
and 600,000 reserve personnel.
NAVY
3-4. The navy includes naval forces for both oceanic and littoral missions. The Korean People’s Army
Navy (KPAN) is composed of 60,000 active duty personnel with no reserve.
AIR FORCE
3-5. There are approximately 120,000 active duty personnel supporting 1,600 aircraft. There are no reserve
units within the Korean People’s Army Air Force (KPAAF).
STRATEGIC FORCE
3-6. The Strategic Force, formerly the Strategic Rocket Forces Command, is now on the same level as the
army, navy, and air force. This command fields 7–8 brigades of surface-to-surface missiles of different types
with various ranges.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

3-7. There is no single command responsible for KPA special operations forces (SOF). Command of SOF
units is divided between the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), the Light Infantry Training Guidance
Bureau, and the Strategic Operations Forces. The latter is also responsible for the SOF that will call in deep
fires for the artillery. There are also SOF units that receive their training guidance from the RGB, but are
assigned on a habitual basis to train with the four KPAGF forward-deployed corps. While many military
forces field SOF and commando units in their military, the KPAGF do not use commando units; however,
several of the light units belonging to the SOF forces would contain characteristics normally found in such
units. The North Korean armed forces field approximately 200,000 SOF personnel divided among the
KPAGF, KPAN, and KPAAF, with most belonging to the KPAGF.
PARAMILITARY FORCES
3-8. The Worker-Peasant Red Guard and People’s Guard—also known as the Red Guard Army—is a
militia of approximately 5.72 million personnel organized by military district with units down to the village
level. While some of the units are armed, many do not possess weapons and would be used as a labor force
or as replacement soldiers. These personnel receive approximately 160 hours of annual training. The Red
Youth Guard is just under one million secondary-school students who regularly receive basic military
instruction and marksmanship training. There are also approximately 620,000 members of reserve military
training units—also known as the Instruction Guidance Units—who normally serve as instructors.
INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

3-9. These 189,000 personnel serve as a national police force and border guards that are subordinate to the
Ministry of People’s Security in peacetime, but could be used for military purposes in time of war. Internal
security forces personnel possess light arms to use in their work. There is also a Guard Command, sometimes
called General Guard Bureau, responsible for the protection of Kim Jong Un, his family, and other senior
officials. Composed of approximately 100,000 personnel, the Guard Command contains three combat
brigades, several bodyguard divisions, and a single construction battalion. It is equipped like military units,
with antiaircraft artillery (AAA), multiple-launch rocket systems, armored vehicles, tanks, limousines, and
trucks.
3-2 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

3-10. In wartime conditions and when subordinate to a military force commander, internal security forces
can be assigned tactical combat or combat support mission tasks within organizational capabilities. Mission
tasks can include limited offensive and defensive actions, but are typically more oriented to security and
civilian population control. Other related tasks can include tactical support to prisoner-of-war processing and
control missions, or support to traffic control and regulation. Intelligence collection can also be assigned to
internal security forces, as the units operate within the North Korean population and would work within the
South Korean populace if war were to occur on the peninsula.
COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

3-11. Each of the KPA units, even when it involves a grouping of multiple units, organizations, or cells, has
an identified leader or commander. These command and support relationships may change during the course
of an operation in order to best accomplish the assigned tasks. The general category for C2 includes
constituent and dedicated relationships, and supporting and affiliated responsibilities. KPA units organize
using four command and support relationships as summarized in table 3-1.
Table 3-1. KPA command and support relationships
Relationship Commanded by Logistics from Positioned by Priorities from
Constituent Gaining Gaining Gaining Gaining
Dedicated Gaining Parent Gaining Gaining
Supporting Parent Parent Supported Supported
Affiliated Self Self or “parent” Self Mutual agreement
CONSTITUENT
3-12. Constituent units are those forces assigned directly to a unit and forming an integral part of it. They
may be organic to the KPA administrative force structure forming the basis of a given unit, assigned at the
time the unit was created, or attached to it after its formation.
DEDICATED
3-13. Dedicated is a command relationship identical to constituent, with the exception that a dedicated unit
still receives logistics support from a parent headquarters of similar type. An example of a dedicated unit
would be a specialized unit, such as an attack helicopter company, allocated to a maneuver brigade. The
maneuver brigade does not possess the technical expertise or repair facilities for the aviation systems. The
dedicated relationship, however, permits the company to execute missions exclusively for the brigade while
receiving its logistics support from its parent aviation organization.
SUPPORTING
3-14. Supporting units continue to be commanded by and receive their logistics from their parent
headquarters, but are positioned and given mission priorities by their supported headquarters. The KPA calls
this administrative control. This relationship permits supported units the freedom to establish priorities and
position supporting units while allowing higher headquarters to rapidly shift support in dynamic situations.
An example of a supporting unit would be a multiple rocket launcher battalion supporting a brigade for a
particular phase of an operation, but ready to rapidly transition to a different support relationship when the
brigade becomes the division reserve in a later phase. The supporting unit does not necessarily have to be
within the supported unit’s area of operations (AO).
AFFILIATED
3-15. Affiliated status is mutually agreed-upon cooperation with an organization in support of another unit
operating in a common AO. Affiliation infers the coordination to influence actions towards outcomes that
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 3-3

Chapter 3
benefit both actors and is usually temporary in time and limited in scope. No command relationship exists
between an affiliated organization and the unit in whose AO it operates. Affiliated organizations are typically
nonmilitary or paramilitary groups such as criminal organizations, guerrilla units, or insurgent cells. In some
cases, affiliated forces may receive combat support or rear service from a division or brigade as part of the
agreement under which they cooperate.
Note. In organization charts, the affiliated status is reflected by a dashed line―rather than
solid―connecting the affiliated unit to the organization with which it is affiliated. This dashed
line is not to be confused with dashed unit symbols, which indicate additional units that may or
may not be present. Although there is typically no formal indication of this relationship in KPA
plans and orders, the acronym for affiliated (AFL) can be used as a free text description next to a
unit symbol.
COMMAND POST COMMAND AND CONTROL

3-16. The KPA exercises tactical control over its wartime forces from an integrated system of command
posts (CPs). The design of this system enhances the capability of uninterrupted C2 of forces.
3-17. The CPs are typically formed in three parts: a control group, a support group, and a communications
group. The control group includes members of the command group or section and staff. The support group
consists of the transport, logistics, and security/guard elements. Whenever possible, the communications
group is remoted from the control and support groups in order to minimize C2 physical and electromagnetic
signatures.
3-18. KPA military planners create a CP structure that emphasizes survivability through dispersal, stringent
security measures, redundancy, and mobility. A CP system is organized to sustain damage with minimum
disruption to the actual C2 process. In the event of disruption, subsystems reestablish C2 as soon as possible.
Tactical CPs are typically designed to be mobile, with a physical and electronic signature smaller than
comparable enemy CPs. The number, size, and types of CPs depend on the level of command and operational
environment conditions.
COMMAND POST TYPES

3-19. KPA ground maneuver forces use several basic and special types of CPs. Not all levels of command
use all CP types at all times, as shown in table 3-2. Redundancy provided by multiple CPs enhances resilient
C2 operations. The KPA will allow a CP to move only after approval by its next higher commander. For
brevity, acronyms are used for the various types of CPs.
Table 3-2. Command post types by command level
Command Post Type Division Regiment Battalion Company
Main Yes Yes Yes No
Forward Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rear area Yes Yes No No
Reserve Optional Optional Optional No
Command observation post Yes Yes No No
Deception Optional Optional Optional Optional
Airborne Optional Optional No No
Auxiliary Optional Optional No No
3-4 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Main Command Post

3-20. The KPA main CP is normally located within the second echelon area, in a key sanctuary area, or in a
fortified position that provides easy access, communications with higher and lower units, and defensibility.
The main CP contains the majority of the staff, with the chief of staff directing its operation. The primary
purpose is to simultaneously coordinate the activities of subordinate units not yet engaged in combat and plan
for subsequent missions. Particular emphasis in the main CP is planning details of transitioning between
current and future operations. The main CP is the central point to control mission execution. It is less mobile
and much larger than the forward CP, and may use hardened sites when practical for a particular mission.
3-21. The chief of staff directs the staff in implementing the commander’s decisions as plans and orders;
coordinates the movement and deployment of all subordinate units not yet in combat; and monitors their
progress and combat readiness in conjunction with the sustainment CP. In addition to the chief of staff, there
is a political section, specialty staff sections, tactics section, unified communications section, counteraviation
section, and the naval and air services. Additional staff personnel present at the main CP may include the
liaison teams from subordinate, supporting, allied, and affiliated units, unless their presence is required at
another CP.
3-22. The KPA main CP is often located in an accessible valley that encompasses 4–6 square kilometers and
within 3–5 km of a landing strip. The main CP will contain communications equipment, including that
necessary for retransmission operations.
Forward Command Post

3-23. A commander often establishes a forward CP with a small group of selected staff members. The
forward CP is deployed at a point from which the commander can more effectively and personally observe
and influence the tactical operation. Location of the forward CP provides the commander with current or near
real-time information, intelligence, and effective communications that facilitate situational awareness and
understanding and enhance command decisions.
3-24. The personnel at the forward CP are not permanent designations. Assignment of forward CP members
to accompany the commander is dependent on the mission, situation, and availability of functional experts,
communications, and transportation means. Officers who may typically accompany the commander may
include the operations officer and the chief of reconnaissance. Other primary or secondary staff officers may
also deploy with the forward CP, depending on the tactical situation. This may include a fires coordinator
linked to the integrated fires system (IFS), signals and codes chief, branch of service chiefs, forward air
controllers, the political commissar, operations section members, communications section, and sister-service
liaisons. The secondary staff contains enough personnel to man the forward CP without degrading the ability
to operate the main CP or IFS CP. When a forward CP forms, the commander is typically located where C2
of ongoing operations can best be performed. The chief of staff in the main CP has the authority to issue
directives in the commander’s absence.
Rear Area Command Post

3-25. The deputy commander for rear service establishes and controls resources and support of the force
from a rear area CP. This CP operates from a position within the unit’s rear area to permit the effective
supervision and execution of sustainment procedures for all classes of supply, as well as transportation and
movement of resources. The location should allow for ease of transportation of supplies into the area and the
evacuation of wounded personnel. The rear area CP contains staff officers for subsistence; clothing and
equipment; petroleum, oils, and lubricants; construction and barrier material; ammunition; major end item
provision, repair, and maintenance; medical material and health service support; nonmilitary program
support; and other miscellaneous support to the command’s mission. The post coordinates with higher-
echelon support headquarters and subordinate units to ensure sustained capabilities for combat, combat
support, and rear service units. Multiple rear area CPs may be formed based on tactical requirements.
Reserve Command Post

3-26. The reserve CP, sometimes called an auxiliary CP by the KPA, is established by the KPA deputy
commander for military affairs and consists of a few signal and staff personnel along with a fires section. It
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 3-5

Chapter 3
is located in the best position to facilitate the movement of the antitank (AT) reserve, antilanding designated
units, or the maneuver reserve. Normally, the reserve CP is to the rear or possibly the flank of the main CP.
3-27. If the KPA commander’s CP becomes nonoperational, the reserve CP could serve as an alternate CP.
The KPA commander establishes which CP will act as an alternate if the main (or forward) CP is destroyed
or disabled. For situations that require reconstitution or major reorganization, a sustainment CP might be
temporarily designated as the alternate command CP.
Command Observation Post

3-28. The deputy commander for artillery for each echelon of command down to the infantry regiment will
establish a command observation post (OP) that is considered an IFS CP. From this post, the artillery
commander and staff will observe the enemy situation, study the terrain and potential targets, perform fire
direction duties, and coordinate indirect fire on the enemy.
3-29. The IFS CP possesses limited means to synchronize communications, airspace control, and automated
fire control systems required to integrate reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition
(RISTA) means and execute long-range fires. Sections of the IFS headquarters and IFS CP typically locate
in dispersed sites. The IFS CP is typically separated from the main CP. Each secondary staff subsection and
some functional staff subsections have an element dedicated to the IFS CP. The IFS CP includes liaison
teams from fire support, army aviation, and long-range reconnaissance or SOF elements.
3-30. At times, a KPA maneuver unit may establish command OPs. Such posts are usually composed only
of reconnaissance and operations personnel. The command OP is established in a location for ease of
observation of the entire front or important terrain.
Deception Command Post

3-31. While not specifically stated, it is expected as part of the overall electronic intelligence warfare (EIW)
operations that the KPA will employ deception CPs. Capabilities must present realistic and robust
multisensor signatures to deceive the enemy and support the commander in creating tactical opportunities to
exploit for mission success.
Airborne Command Post

3-32. It is highly unlikely that a KPA commander will establish an airborne CP due to the likelihood of the
enemy’s control of the airspace. If this were to happen, however, it would be to maintain control in rapidly
evolving tactical situations, when subordinate operations are dispersed over a wide geographic area, or when
the other CPs are moving between locations. This capability for C2 situational awareness and understanding
is at divisional and higher level commands. Helicopters are a typical mode for this mobility and effective
communications.
Auxiliary Command Post

3-33. Only in the most remote circumstances will the KPA commander create an auxiliary CP to provide C2
over subordinate units, such as when operations are isolated or may be on remote axes. The commander may
also use an auxiliary CP in the event of disrupted C2 or when adequate control cannot be maintained from
the main CP.
COMMANDERS’ DUTIES
3-34. The KPAGF place a stressful amount of responsibility on their unit commanders. The KPAGF expect
their commanders to—
 Conduct detailed planning and preparation for all operations.
 Exploit the terrain, weather, and time to the KPA’s advantage.
 Achieve surprise during the initial phase of each attack and at decisive times during the course of
battle.
 Concentrate overwhelming forces at the decisive time and place.
3-6 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

 Conduct timely, fast, and daring maneuvers.

 Maintain control over subordinate elements’ actions to ensure bold, determined, and exact
execution of plans.
COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES
3-35. While the KPA does have improved radio communications equipment, it is likely that it will routinely
avoid using the radio for operational security reasons and because it has less communications equipment than
most other militaries of its size and capabilities. In static situations, the KPA will likely use wire and fiber-
optic communications, if available, to reduce radio traffic that is more susceptible for compromise. The
KPAGF will likely use unsophisticated communications means such as signal flags, bugles, and whistles to
communicate on the battlefield. However, some KPA units will have access to emerging technological
capabilities and will use them for communications. In case of a communications break with higher
headquarters, KPA units will continue operations within previously planned missions or prescribed
alternatives.
TACTICAL-LEVEL ORGANIZATION OF REGULAR FORCES

3-36. KPAGF tactical units fight battles and engagements, with the largest organizations conducting tactical
operations being divisions and regiments. The KPAGF field a limited number of brigades, primarily in their
armor or mechanized forces. In peacetime, KPAGF divisions are subordinate to a corps headquarters. There
are some units that remain under direct control of a North Korean governmental bureau during peacetime
and some KPA units may report directly to their service headquarters.
3-37. Major tactical-level commands of the KPAN, KPAAF, Strategic Force, and SOF units often remain
under the direct control of their respective parent component headquarters while supporting the KPAGF. The
KPA retains centralized command or control of certain elite elements of the ground forces, including airborne
and SOF units. This command arrangement permits flexibility in the employment of these specialized
capabilities in response to mission requirements.
Note. The KPA may task-organize its forces for a particular mission down to the squad level, but
does not identify this type of unit with a different term. Generic unit terms (squad, platoon,
company, battalion, regiment, and division) or task-organized unit terms will be used throughout
ATP 7-100.2. When there is no known KPA descriptive term, a U.S. term with similar meaning is
used to provide a better understanding of the KPA unit’s capabilities.
CORPS
3-38. The corps is a typical C2 headquarters above the division echelon for the KPAGF. Each corps
headquarters is capable of controlling combined arms, joint, or interagency operations necessary to execute
its mission. In peacetime, the four corps along the DMZ have permanently assigned divisions. Any division
assigned to a forward corps is augmented with an additional artillery battalion and a military police battalion.
The active duty KPAGF field two mechanized corps, 10 infantry corps, one capital defense (Pyongyang)
corps, an air defense command, and a SOF corps assigned to the Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau.
The KPAGF maintain four infantry corps (I, II, IV, and V) along the DMZ in their first strategic echelon.
The second strategic echelon contains their tank brigades and mechanized corps. The remainder of the
KPAGF are scattered throughout the northern half of the country and along the borders with China and
Russia. Table 3-3 on page 3-8 and figure 3-2 on page 3-9 show the peacetime locations of these various units.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 3-7

Chapter 3
Table 3-3. KPAGF corps and locations
Major Army Unit Headquarters Location Province
I District Command Wonsan Kangwon
I Corps Hoeyang Kangwon
II Corps Hanpori South Hwanghae
III Corps Kaechon South Pyongan
IV Corps Haeju North Hwanghae
V Corps Huppyong-ni Kangwon
VII Corps Tongsin South Hamgyong
VIII Corps Tongrim North Pyongan
IX Corps Information not available North Hamgyong
X Corps Information not available Ryanggang
XII Corps Information not available North Hamgyong
108 Mechanized Corps Hamhung South Hamgyong
425 Mechanized Corps Chongju North Pyonggan
Pyongyang Defense Command Soannae-san Pyongyang
Air Defense Command Pyongyang Pyongyang
Reconnaissance General Bureau Information not available Information not available
3-8 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Figure 3-2. KPAGF corps general locations
3-40. A corps consists of those division-, brigade-, regiment-, battalion-size, and other units allocated to the
command to accomplish mission tasks. The units assigned to a corps will depend on its mission(s). If a
particular corps has contingency plans for participating in more than one tactical mission, it could receive a
different set of forces under each operational plan. Typical units assigned to a corps include—
 Infantry divisions.
 Mechanized divisions.
 Motorized divisions.
 Infantry divisions (partial reserve).
 Infantry divisions (reserve).
 Light infantry divisions.
 Tank divisions (105th).
 Tank brigades.
 Artillery brigades.
 Light infantry brigades.
 Sniper brigades (KPAGF, KPAN, KPAAF).
 Missile regiments.
 Engineer regiments (bridge).
 Signal regiments.
 AT battalions.
 Reconnaissance battalions.
 Long-range reconnaissance battalions.
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Chapter 3
 Engineer battalions (general and construction).

 Nuclear-chemical defense battalions.
 Signal battalions (wire, radio, or telephone).
 Electronic warfare/military intelligence companies.
COMBAT DIVISION FORCE STRUCTURE

3-41. In the KPAGF, the largest tactical formation is the division. Divisions are able to—
 Conduct operations as part of a corps or higher organization without being task organized.
 Sustain independent operations for a designated period of time.
 Integrate interagency forces up to brigade- or group-size formations.
 Execute all actions as directed by a higher headquarters.
3-42. The KPAGF field one armored division, four mechanized divisions, 27 infantry divisions, and 40
additional infantry divisions assigned to the reserves. Figure 3-3 shows the various types of divisions that the
KPAGF field, and figure 3-4 on page 3-11 illustrates the structure of a KPAGF infantry division. Mechanized
infantry divisions are very similar except the squads ride in armored personnel carriers (APCs) or infantry
fighting vehicles (IFVs), depending on the priority of the unit for equipment.
Figure 3-3. Different types of KPAGF divisions
3-43. A KPA infantry division would field approximately 12,800 personnel, including about 1,600 officers.
Major equipment for the division includes the following:
 T-55/62 tanks: 31
 B-10 (82-mm) or B-11 (107-mm) recoilless rifles: 54
 AT-3 (Sagger) AT launchers: 27
 76.2-mm AT guns: 48
 RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launchers: 630
 152-mm howitzers: 24
 107-mm multiple rocket launchers: 27
 120-mm mortars: 54
 SA-7b man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS): 42
 S-60 (57-mm) AAA machine guns: 6
 37-mm AAA machine guns: 12
 ZPU-4 (14.5-mm) AAA machine guns: 87
 Heavy machine guns: 370
 AK rifles: 9,085
3-10 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Figure 3-4. KPAGF infantry division structure (example)
3-44. Division structure will be dependent upon the unit’s mission and location. Units along the DMZ will
receive an additional artillery battalion and a military police battalion. Artillery could be self-propelled or
towed, based on priority, location, and availability of equipment. KPA tank divisions will have less infantry,
but the infantry will likely be mounted on APCs or IFVs. Mechanized divisions will be similar to standard
infantry divisions, but with more vehicles with the infantry in APCs or IFVs. When dismounted from their
APCs or IFVs, KPA infantry will likely operate in the same manner as a standard KPA infantry unit.
3-45. Besides the normal types of units found in most army divisions, KPAGF divisions contain a security
company that focuses on internal unit security to ensure all soldiers are politically reliable. All units down to
company level have at least a political officer that is separate from the unit commander. The size of this
political security unit increases with parent unit size.
3-46. Selection to serve as a political officer is stringent and based on prior military service, party loyalty,
and belonging to a politically reliable family. Political officers receive their training at various institutions in
North Korea, including the Kim Il Sung Political College and the Kumsong Political College. The training
focuses on politics, economics, party history, juche philosophy, and party loyalty. Upon graduation, the
students receive a commission as a lieutenant and serve as a political officer in a KPA unit. Political officers
receive advanced training as they move up in rank.
3-47. Political officers may have as much power as the KPA unit commander. They are to ensure that the
soldiers in the unit remain supportive of the Kim family and the current regime. Political officers will conduct
investigations of anyone accused of disloyalty—including saying negative things about the country or its
leaders—and can have the individual arrested and charged with crimes. During combat operations, political
officers must approve all the unit commander’s plans and any subsequent changes. At the lowest level,
company political officers will ensure that the unit’s soldiers carry out their duties diligently, and will execute
any soldiers that attempt to flee the battlefield or retreat without orders. Cowardice is not tolerated in the
KPA, and the political officer is the enforcer.
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Chapter 3
3-48. Divisions in the four forward corps (I, II, IV, and V) receive additional augmentation beyond the
standard units in the form of a second artillery battalion and a military police battalion. These forward corps
also may receive additional reconnaissance assets that may be attached to subordinate divisions.
Integrated Fires System

3-49. The KPA uses an IFS based on the Soviet/Russian model of a regimental artillery group or division
artillery group, and consists of a standing C2 structure and task-organized constituent and dedicated fire
support units. While not specifically stated or named, most division-level and higher KPAGF organizations
possess at least one IFS C2 structure—staff, CP, communications and intelligence architecture, and
integrated/automated fire control system—at their headquarters, while brigade-level units and below do not.
The unit commander will coordinate all available indirect fire resources through one leader, while
consolidating the assets in a regimental or division artillery group for maximum effect. Figure 3-5 shows an
example of a possible division IFS.
Figure 3-5. Division integrated fires system possible task organization components
3-50. The IFS exercises C2 of all constituent and dedicated fire support assets retained by its level of
command. This can include army aviation, artillery, and missile units. It also exercises C2 over all RISTA
assets allocated to it. EIW is a norm in all mission conduct, and such units are included in the IFS structure.
See chapter 5 for more detail on IFS missions.
Note. The order of battle illustrations in this ATP are provided to give the reader the appropriate
context for the tactical discussion in part II. For more detailed information on possible orders of
battle and tables of organization and equipment, see the force structures available on the
Operational Environment Data Integration Network (ODIN).
Integrated Support System

3-51. The integrated support system is the aggregate of rear service units, possibly some combat support
units organic to a division, and additional assets allocated from higher headquarters to form a task-organized
organization, as shown in figure 3-6. An integrated support system contains units that the division does not
suballocate to lower levels of command. The division may allocate part of its integrated support system units
as an integrated support group to support its IFS or one of its major divisional units. An integrated support
system or group can also include units performing combat support tasks such as chemical warfare, engineer,
or law enforcement.
3-12 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Figure 3-6. Division integrated support system possible task organization components
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

3-52. Difficult though it is to estimate exact numbers of North Korean SOF units and their personnel strength
levels, most recent reports assign a figure of between 180,000 and 200,000 soldiers, sailors, and airmen as
part of North Korea’s SOF units. See Appendix I for additional information on the SOF. Figure 3-7 illustrates
the organizational structure of the KPA SOF units.
Figure 3-7. KPA special operations forces headquarters (example)
3-53. There are two primary organizations responsible for training and executing missions assigned to the
KPA SOF—the RGB and the Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau. The former is the new name for what
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Chapter 3
was once called “Second Bureau (Reconnaissance),” while the latter is also known as the “Training Unit
Guidance Bureau.” The KPA SOF includes ground, air force, and maritime SOF units. In wartime or in
transition to war, the KPA will maintain some SOF units under the C2 of their respective service headquarters
or political bureau. Some SOF units that are under bureau or service-command control in peacetime,
however, can also be provided to operational- or tactical-level commands during the task-organization
process to perform designated missions or mission support.
3-54. SOF are not permanently subordinate to tactical-level units at divisional or subordinate headquarters.
Relationships for C2 of SOF operating in a regular-force tactical commander’s AO vary. Command and
support relationships for SOF may be constituent, dedicated, supporting, or affiliated. Relationships between
SOF and paramilitary or nonmilitary personnel or groups are typically affiliation.
MANEUVER BRIGADES
3-55. The basic combined arms unit of the KPAGF is a regiment. The KPAGF, however, do field 15 separate
armored brigades, 14 infantry brigades, and 21 artillery brigades. Normally when brigades are constituent to
divisions, they are called divisional brigades. Brigades that are structured as separate brigades possess the
ability to conduct independent missions without additional allocation of forces from higher-level tactical
headquarters. Figure 3-8 illustrates the structure of a typical KPAGF tank brigade.
Figure 3-8. KPAGF tank brigade (example)
3-56. A KPA tank brigade would field approximately 2,500 personnel, including around 230 officers. Major
equipment for the tank brigade includes the following:
 T-55/62 tanks: 93
 IFVs/APCs: 58
 BRDM patrol cars: 3
 M-1985/Type 62/63/PT-76 light tanks: 40
 152-mm self-propelled howitzers: 18
 122-mm self-propelled howitzers: 18
 RPG-7 RPG launchers: 43
 SA-7b MANPADS: 12
 M-1983/BTR-152 AAA vehicles: 6
3-14 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

 37-mm AAA machine guns: 12

 Type 80/ZSU-57 (57-mm) AAA guns: 6
 Radar systems (FIRECAN or others): 3
 2 1/2–ton trucks: 162
 Tank retrievers: 6
 Light machine guns: 70
3-57. Maneuver brigades are designed to be able to—
 Serve as the basic organization for forming a task-organized brigade.
 Fight as part of a division.
 Fight as a separate unit in a corps, as an organization from the AFS, or in subordination to a field
army.
 Sustain independent combat operations over a period of several days.
 Integrate interagency forces of up to battalion size.
 Execute all actions as assigned.
REGIMENTS
3-58. The basic combined arms unit of the KPAGF is an infantry regiment. Figure 3-9 illustrates the structure
of a KPAGF infantry regiment.
Figure 3-9. KPAGF infantry regiment (example)
3-59. KPA infantry regiments would field approximately 2,500 personnel, including around 185 officers.
Major equipment for an infantry regiment includes the following:
 76.2-mm AT guns: 6
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 3-15

Chapter 3

 107-mm multiple rocket launchers: 9
 ZPU-4 (14.5-mm) AAA machine guns: 27
 AK rifles: 1,718
3-60. Besides infantry, the KPA infantry regiment contains artillery, mortar, AT gun, engineering, signal, air
defense, reconnaissance, chemical, and logistics units. Maneuver regiments are designed to be able to—
 Fight as part of a division.
 Sustain independent combat operations for a short period of time.
 Execute all actions as assigned.
BATTALIONS
3-61. The basic unit of action in the KPAGF force structure is the battalion. An example of an infantry
battalion is shown in figure 3-10.
Figure 3-10. KPAGF infantry battalion organization (example)
3-62. KPA infantry battalions would field approximately 555 personnel, including around 30 officers. Major
equipment for an infantry battalion includes the following:
 40-mm underbarrel grenade launchers (40-mm): 40
 AGS-17 (30-mm) automatic grenade launchers: 6
3-16 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

 AK rifles: 412
 SVD sniper rifles: 27
3-63. Battalions are designed to be able to—
 Serve as the basis for forming a task-organized battalion-size unit.
 Fight as part of a regiment or division.
 Execute basic combat missions as part of a larger tactical force.
 Execute tactical actions as assigned.
COMPANIES
3-64. In KPAGF force structure, the largest unit without a staff is the company. An example of an infantry
company can be seen in figure 3-11.
Figure 3-11. KPAGF infantry company organization (example)
3-65. KPA infantry companies would field approximately 120 personnel, including around six officers. One
of these officers is the political officer. Major equipment for an infantry battalion includes the following:
 Underbarrel grenade launchers (40-mm): 18
 AK rifles: 75
3-66. In KPAGF fire-support units, this level of command is called a company, unlike U.S. doctrine where
it is a battery. Companies are designed to be able to—
 Serve as the basis for forming a task-organized company-size unit.
 Fight as part of a battalion, regiment, or division.
 Execute tactical tasks. Of note, a company will not normally be asked to perform two or more
tactical tasks simultaneously.
DETACHMENTS
3-67. A detachment is a tactical element organized on either a temporary or permanent basis for special
duties (ADP 3-90); for the KPAAF this normally means the unit is augmented with additional forces to
conduct a specified mission. Detachments are typically the smallest combined arms formations and are by
definition task-organized. A detachment that is subordinate to a battalion headquarters is titled battalion
detachment, and one at company level is termed a company detachment. Detachments can accept dedicated
and supporting SOF, aviation (combat helicopter, transport helicopter), and possibly unmanned aircraft
system units. While the KPAGF do not differentiate between a standard battalion or company and one that
is task organized, the term detachment will be used throughout this publication to designate a unit that
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 3-17

Chapter 3
contains assets different from its normal force structure. Figure 3-12, below, and figure 3-13 provide
examples of a possible KPAGF battalion or company detachment. The capabilities allocated to a detachment
can include—
 Artillery or mortar units.
 Air defense units.
 Engineer units with obstacle, survivability, or mobility assets.
 Heavy-weapons units including heavy machine guns, automatic grenade launchers, and AT guided
missiles.
 Units with specialty equipment such as flame weapons, specialized reconnaissance assets, or
helicopters.
 Interagency forces up to company size for battalions or up to platoon size for companies.
 Chemical defense, AT, medical, logistics, signal, and electronic warfare units.
Figure 3-12. KPAGF battalion-size detachment (example)
3-68. A basic type of KPAGF detachment—whether formed from a battalion or a company—is an

independent mission detachment. These detachments are formed to execute missions that are separated in
space or time from those being conducted by the remainder of the forming unit. Independent mission
detachments can be used for a variety of missions, such as―
 Seize key terrain.
 Linkup with airborne or heliborne forces.
 Conduct tactical movement on secondary axes.
 Pursue or envelop an enemy force.
 Conduct a raid or ambush.
3-69. Other types of specialized detachments and their uses are discussed in chapter 5. These specialized
detachments could include—
 Counterreconnaissance detachment.
 Security detachment.
 Reconnaissance detachment.
 Movement support detachment.
 Urban detachment.
 Mobility obstacle detachment.
3-18 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Figure 3-13. KPAGF company-size detachment (example)
PLATOONS AND SQUADS

3-70. In the KPAGF organizational structure, the smallest unit typically expected to conduct independent
fire and maneuver is the platoon. Figure 3-14 provides examples of unit symbols at the platoon level and
below.
Figure 3-14. KPAGF small unit symbols
3-71. KPA infantry platoons are normally composed of 39 personnel, including a single officer. A typical
KPA infantry platoon contains the following weapons:
 Underbarrel grenade launchers (40-mm): 6
 AK rifles: 25
3-72. Platoons are designed to be able to—

 Serve as the basis for forming a functional element or patrol.
 Fight as part of a company, battalion, or detachment.
 Execute tactical tasks.
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Chapter 3
3-73. KPA infantry squads are normally composed of 12 personnel, led by a sergeant. The duty positions
and their standard weapons are shown below:
 One squad leader: AK rifle
 One deputy squad leader: AK rifle with G-25 (40-mm) underbarrel grenade launcher
 Three machine gunners: light machine gun (RPD)
 Three assistant machine gunners: AK rifle
 Two AT gunners: RPG-7 and AK rifle
 One grenadier: AK rifle with G-25 (40-mm) underbarrel grenade launcher
 One sniper: SVD rifle
3-74. Platoons and squads within a platoon can be task-organized by function for specific missions. Figure
3-15 displays examples of unit symbols for various types of KPAGF task-organized platoons and squads.
This task-organized status can be temporary for a specified mission task, or semi-permanent for conduct of
mission tasks during an extended period of time. A patrol is typically a platoon- or squad-size unit task-
organized to accomplish a specific reconnaissance or security mission. A platoon or smaller element will not
be ordered to perform two or more simultaneous functional tasks.
Figure 3-15. KPAGF small unit symbols with task-organized amplifiers
TACTICAL-LEVEL ORGANIZATION OF IRREGULAR FORCES

3-75. Irregular forces addressed as threats to South Korea and its coalition partners in ATP 7-100.2 are
categorized in several primary groupings of insurgent organization/cells, guerrilla units, or criminal
organizations. Terrorist groups can be distinct from other irregular forces in some situations, but are often
linked to one or more of these paramilitary or criminal activities. Irregular forces can be individuals or groups,
typically armed, that are not members of the regular armed forces, law enforcement agencies, or other forms
of governmental organizations such as internal security forces. Nonetheless, the distinction of being armed
or unarmed can include a wide range of people and groups capable of being categorized as potential irregular
forces. After the threat of the massive KPA fires capabilities, strategic irregular forces may be the biggest
threat the KPA can create on the Korean Peninsula.
3-76. Various organizations can be termed irregulars, correctly or incorrectly, by participants in a conflict.
Any of these forces can be affiliated or associated with North Korean regular forces. The issue of who is a
combatant or noncombatant, and who operates within lawful protection of international conventions and law
of war protocols, is often a legal determination in a specific political and military setting and may be difficult
to determine in North Korea, where all the people are directed to defend their country from outside invaders.
3-77. Militias, as a force, can acquire an identity at times of an irregular force based on actions, how the
organization self-proclaims itself in EIW announcements, or how general social media portrays a naming
convention for a group. In contrast to an irregular force connotation, militia as a category of regular forces is
the mobilization of civilian, commercial, or paramilitary capabilities into the regular force structure of North
Korean armed forces. For example, during mobilization, North Korean commercial trucking companies could
be organized as militia transportation units subordinate to military authority in order to provide transportation
of military cargo and personnel in support of military operations. Another example could be the mobilization
of civilians, with or without previous military training, into an infantry militia unit, and incorporated into the
C2 of a regular force.
3-20 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

3-78. Irregular forces can be augmented with support from regular forces, SOF, or other North Korean
governmental agencies. Support can include training, RISTA, communications, fires support or other direct
action assistance to plans, preparation, and conduct of mission tasks by irregular forces.
INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONS
3-79. There are no known insurgent organizations operating inside of North Korea. It is very likely that there
are North Korean clandestine operatives operating in South Korea that could be classified as insurgents
against the South Korean Government prior to hostilities commencing, during combat operations, or during
the post-hostilities phases. In the event that there is a war on the Korean Peninsula, it is likely that North
Korea would activate these clandestine operatives to conduct their missions against high-value targets. It is
likely that most of the clandestine cells are quite small, but South Korea did discover one such cell of five
North Korean supporters in 2011.
3-80. It is likely that some KPA SOF personnel will be inserted into South Korea or that North Korea will
activate clandestine operatives already living in South Korea before hostilities begin. Their task would be to
help gain any North Korean advantage that would slow down the mobilization or movement of South Korean
reserves. The SOF or clandestine operatives would likely perform counterstability actions to achieve this
goal. See paragraphs 1-159–1-162 and chapter 8 for more information on counterstability actions.
GUERRILLA UNITS
3-81. While North Korea has no operational guerrilla units in South Korea, clandestine operatives currently
operating in South Korea or SOF members operating in South Korea during a war could be considered
guerrilla units under certain circumstances. A guerrilla unit organizes a paramilitary force structure, within
its available resources, similar to that of a regular force military unit. Guerrilla units, however, have no
standardized organizational structure. A guerrilla is a combat participant, and typically conducts actions in
enemy-occupied or hostile territory. During a war, guerrillas in South Korea would most likely be clandestine
operatives or North Korean sympathizers supported by KPA SOF personnel. If invaded by enemies, guerillas
in North Korea would likely consist of members of the Worker-Peasant Red Guard, People’s Guard, and Red
Youth Guard, along with a cadre of KPA SOF and/or KPA regulars from destroyed conventional units.
3-82. The force structure for guerrilla units is at brigade level and subordinate headquarters. Guerrilla forces
can be as large as several independent or affiliated brigades or as small as independent guerrilla teams.
Organization and capabilities depend on factors including physical environment, sociological demographics
and relationships, economics, and support available from an indigenous or relevant populace, organizations
internal to a geographic area, and states or groups external to a region in conflict. See figure 3-16 on page
3-22 for an example of a possible battalion-size guerrilla unit organization.
CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS
3-83. There are no known major criminal organizations operating in North Korea, but there is criminal
activity, including smaller gangs. North Korea is the second-most corrupt country in the world, mostly due
to government officials taking bribes. It has become a way of life for those living in the country to give local
officials small bribes to look the other way, whether it is to conduct entrepreneurial activities that are
officially banned by the government or to cross the border into China. Bigger bribes are needed to obtain
bigger favors from regional or national government officials. Due to the government’s activities, there are
several North Korean officials on the US Treasury Department’s Transnational Criminal Organizations
Designation list.
3-84. Violent criminal activity is relatively low in North Korea and is seldom seen in either urban or rural
areas. Since the famine in the early 1990s, criminal activity has centered on smuggling, and a larger black
market emerged as the people struggled to prevent starvation. The black market occurred more often in rural
areas and in regions away from Pyongyang, as the governmental supply system continued to feed the elites
living in the capital city.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 3-21

Chapter 3
Figure 3-16. Guerrilla battalion organization (example)
3-85. A criminal organization is a group of individuals with an identified C2 structure engaged in illegal
activities for purposes of obtaining power, influence, and monetary or commercial gains. Criminal
organizations have no standardized structure. The organization protects its activities through patterns of
corruption, coercion, or violence. Criminal networks vary in size, scope, structure, communications means,
and commodity ventures. These networks can range within a local community, national/regional areas, or
international/transnational activities. Due to the illegal activities that are sanctioned by Kim Jong Un, the
North Korean Government could be considered a criminal network. The Kim regime is involved in drug
trade, counterfeiting, human trafficking, and cybercrime.
3-86. Many armed forces recognize the utility of using criminal organizations at every level of society and
every operational environment. Criminals may cooperate with either regular or irregular forces. Criminal
organizations will almost always, however, pursue their activities independent of other actors’ goals.
3-87. Criminal organizations, embedded in relevant populations, can create conditions for the active or
passive support of criminal activities and other irregular force actions. North Korean civilians, as
noncombatants, can be coerced to directly support irregular as well as regular forces. Other civilians may be
aware of irregular-force activities and decide to remain passive and not report information to a governing
authority. Other civilians may be sympathetic and know of irregular-force activities, but remain uninvolved
in any overt activity. Other noncombatants may unknowingly support irregular-force initiatives. Some
members of a relevant population may elect to willingly participate in or actively support criminal or other
irregular-force actions. In these type of cases, status as a combatant or criminal may complicate how an
irregular force sustains support within South Korea if North Korea launched a ground attack or in North
Korea if the country was invaded. See figure 3-17 for possible forms of support within a relevant population
to irregular forces.
3-88. A criminal organization establishes its hierarchy of C2 within North or South Korea. Mutual interests
of criminals, insurgents, or guerrillas can include preventing extraregional or local government forces from
interfering in their respective agendas. By agreement when interests coincide, criminal organizations may
become affiliated with insurgents or guerrillas controlling and operating in the same geographic or functional
areas. Such affiliations can provide security and protection against enemy forces or support to criminal
organization activities. The amount of mutual protection depends on the size and sophistication of each
criminal organization and its level of influence on a state’s government, the local military forces, and the
relevant civilian population.
3-22 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Figure 3-17. Relevant population relationships to irregular forces
TERRORIST GROUPS
3-89. Terrorism is a tactic. Acts of terrorism demonstrate an intention to cause significant psychological or
physical effects on a relevant population through the use or threat of violence. Terrorism strategies are
typically long-term commitments to degrade the resilience of an opponent in order to obtain concessions
from the same. International conventions and law of war protocols on armed conflict are often not a constraint
on terrorists. Whether acts of terrorism are deliberate, apparently random, or purposely haphazard, the
physical, symbolic, or psychological effects can diminish the confidence of a relevant population in its key
leaders and governing institutions. Social and political pressure, internal or external to a relevant population
and governing authority, is frequently exploited by terrorists with near real-time media coverage in the global
information environment. The local, regional, international, or transnational attention on acts of terrorism by
state or nonstate actors can often isolate a government from its relevant population and foster support of
organizations, units, or individuals who feel compelled to use terror to achieve their objectives. The themes
and messages promoted by terrorists can accent anxiety, demoralize the resolve of a relevant population and
its leaders, and eventually defeat an opponent.
3-90. There are no known terrorist groups active in North Korea working against the Kim regime. In
November 2017, the U.S. President placed North Korea back on the list of state sponsors of terrorism for its
nuclear and missile programs and assistance to the government in Syria. Previously, North Korea had been
removed from the list in 2008. North Korea has conducted many acts that placed it on the list originally, such
as:
 1969. Two North Korean MiG-17s shot down a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft that never violated
North Korean airspace and killed 31 U.S. crewmembers.
 1974. A Japanese-born North Korean killed Yuk Young-soo during an assassination attempt on
her spouse, South Korean president Park Chung-hee.
 1976. North Korean soldiers ambushed a United Nations team trimming a tree, killing two U.S.
officers.
 1983. North Korean agents attempted to kill South Korean president Chun Doo-hwan with
explosives during a visit to Rangoon, Burma.
 1987. Two North Korean spies planted a bomb on Korean Airlines Flight 858 that exploded,
killing all 115 people on the plane.
 2000. North Korean agents crossed into China and kidnapped Reverend Kim Dong Shik, who was
running several underground shelters for North Korea refugees. North Korea tortured and starved
him to death.
 2010. According to South Korean and U.S. reports, North Korea sank the ROKS CHEONAN, a
South Korean Navy ship, killing 46 sailors during a training exercise.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 3-23

Chapter 3
NONCOMBATANTS
3-91. Noncombatants are persons not actively participating in combat or actively supporting any of the forces
involved in combat. Noncombatants can be either armed or unarmed. Figure 3-18 shows examples of various
categories of noncombatants, and the complexity of identifying friend from foe in a relevant population.
While military personnel are a small minority in most countries, the opposite is true in North Korea. In
addition to large reserve and paramilitary forces, the civilian populace is subject to mandatory war work, thus
making only the very old or the very young actual noncombatants.
Figure 3-18. Armed and unarmed noncombatants (examples)
Armed Noncombatants
3-92. There are few armed noncombatants in North Korea, as no civilians may lawfully acquire, possess, or
transfer a firearm or ammunition. Over seven million North Koreans belong to a military reserve unit or a
paramilitary organization. These would be mobilized during a war and would be considered a paramilitary
organization with access to weapons and ammunition. Firearms in North Korea are exclusively reserved for
use by the military or police. There is an estimated 130,000 guns, licit and illicit, held by civilians in North
Korea, making the gun possession rate less than 0.6 per 100 people in the country. There are no private
security contractors, business owners and employees, or private citizens and groups with guns. Since gun
ownership by civilians is a crime in North Korea, possessing a gun would make the individual a criminal
who, if caught, would most likely be sent to a prison camp as a minimum sentence.
Unarmed Noncombatants
3-93. Very few unarmed noncombatants exist in North Korea. Besides the persons belonging to the
paramilitary organizations, all other North Koreans are still subject to mandatory war work, thus making
them combatants—whether armed or unarmed. There is no free media in North Korea, as the government
controls all information outlets including newspapers, radio stations, and television stations. There are few
nongovernmental organizations working in the country, as the government previously expelled most of them.
Due to the trade restrictions against North Korea, there are few transnational corporations with offices in
North Korea, most of which would be from China.
3-24 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

PART TWO
North Korean Actions

Part Two adresses tactical tasks and drills in Korean People’s Army Ground Forces
(KPAGF) reconnaissance and security, offensive, defensive, and counterstability
actions. Electronic intelligence warfare (EIW) is integral to all Korean People’s Army
(KPA) operations. Each chapter presents specified tasks, subtasks, and tactical action
models to convey the types of sequencial, parallel, or simultaneous actions required
to successfully accomplish a mission task.
Chapter 4
Battle Drills
This chapter describes the standardized execution of several fundamental KPAGF

tactical tasks based on conditions and situational cues during mission performance.
After a discussion of the purpose of battle drills, actions covered include actions on
contact, fixing enemy forces, breaking contact, conducting situational breaches, and
fire and maneuver. During the conduct of each of these drills, complementary
combined arms actions occur, such as disruption actions, all-arms air defense (AAAD),
and air assault defense actions. The chapter concludes with complex terrain operations.
PURPOSE OF BATTLE DRILLS

4-1. A battle drill is a collective task initiated by a situational cue that requires minimal leader orders to
execute. It consists of previously rehearsed integrated actions that become reflex-like responses to conditions
that may suddenly appear during a mission, resulting in a desired outcome. Battle drills are unit tactical tasks
at detachment level or lower, and are carried out by functionally-organized elements performing various
subtasks. The composition of such elements will vary depending on the type of force and the operational
environment (OE); however, the subtasks performed will be the same for any tactical unit. Most battle drills
focus on enabling functions that facilitate the primary action of a larger tactical mission task.
Note. While the literature on the KPA does not have a specific term for “battle drills,” its ground
forces will rehearse tactical drills common to reconnaissance and security, offensive, defensive,
and counterstability actions.
4-2. Battle drills are conducted in offensive, defensive, and counterstability operations. Their purpose is to
achieve advantage in controlling the tempo of combat. Drills allow KPAGF units to perform basic combat
functions without hesitation or need for further coordination. They are a baseline of tactical competence.
Once able to execute all battle drills, KPAGF units can be instructed to act with concise and rapidly directed
combat orders.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 4-1

Chapter 4
Note. Any battalion or company receiving additional assets from a higher command becomes a
battalion-size detachment or company-size detachment. Therefore, references to a detachment
throughout this chapter may also apply to a battalion or company, unless specifically stated
otherwise.
TASKS
4-3. A drill is a synchronized group of actions that achieve a specific task with minimal guidance or orders
as a reaction to a particular set of conditions. Drills and subtasks are applicable for the individual soldier or
a weapon system or platform crew, and can also apply to specialized equipment or capabilities.
4-4. A task is an action or activity to be performed with the expectation of a clearly defined tactical outcome.
The KPAGF describe tasks and state critical subtasks that must be performed to accomplish the task to a
standard.
CONDITIONS
4-5. Conditions in training represent the probable situational environment requiring execution of a
particular drill. The KPAGF train in graduated levels of condition difficulty in order to prepare individuals
and units for particular missions based on a unit’s required state of readiness.
4-6. In KPAGF training, a practical description of conditions could include the following:
 Operating independently or as part of a larger unit.
 Receiving an operation order or fragmentary order with a mission task, purpose, intent, and
applicable overlays or graphics.
 Receiving an adequate task organization that provides the combat power capabilities to
accomplish the task.
 Understanding KPAGF forces and enemy forces, noncombatants, government agencies,
nongovernment organizations, and local and international media may be operating in an OE.
 Acting in a manner that is not constrained by standardized rules of engagement and does not
always comply with international conventions or agreements on the conduct of warfare.
 Acknowledging some tasks may be performed in a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
(CBRN) environment.
 Implementing command and control (C2) with communications to higher, adjacent, subordinate,
and supporting elements.
STANDARDS
4-7. The KPAGF conduct tactical actions in accordance with the operations order and a commander’s
intent. Units conduct drills, with associated tasks and subtasks that are typically universal throughout the
KPAGF when confronted with particular, but similar, circumstances. Execution of drills by the KPAGF,
however, can include actions conducted purposely in close proximity to a civilian population as a human
shield advantage. In addition, North Korea may not be as casualty averse as its enemy or associated governing
authority, and KPA tactical decisions will reflect this.
4-8. Measures of performance determine a satisfactory level of conduct of drill tasks and subtasks. A
standard provides criteria for determining the minimum acceptable proficiency of task performance in the
designated tactic. Acceptable proficiency to standards includes an evaluation of leader, soldier, and unit
performance.
ACTIONS ON CONTACT
4-9. Actions on contact is a force-oriented battle drill to fix, bypass, or destroy an enemy, and is designed
to ensure KPAGF units retain the initiative and fight under circumstances that they determine. When a
KPAGF element makes contact with an enemy, the element executes an actions on contact drill; this helps
4-2 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Battle Drills
provide the KPAGF commander with the flexibility to either continue with the planned course of action
(COA) or rapidly adopt a new one more suited to situational conditions. This battle drill is designed to ensure
the KPAGF element retains the initiative in circumstances supporting mission success.
4-10. The KPAGF recognize seven typical forms of contact:
 Direct fire.
 Indirect fire.
 Obstacle.
 Air.
 CBRN.
 Electronic warfare (EW).
 Sensor.
4-11. The actions on contact battle drill is primarily intended for an element making sensor or direct fire
contact with an enemy unit. When making undesired contact—indirect fire; air; CBRN; EW; or ground
contact by a noncombat unit—the break contact battle drill is employed instead. Actions on contact can also
include a drill to situationally breach an obstacle. Figure 4-1 on page 4-4 provides an example of actions on
contact.
4-12. The actions on contact drill has six subtasks:
 Plan.
 Prepare.
 Execute.
 Fix.
 Isolate.
 Continue mission.
PLAN
4-13. The plan subtask includes the following:
 Identify enemy unit capabilities and limitations that may be encountered.
 Identify mission objective(s).
 Analyze action and enabling functions that must be performed to achieve mission success.
Consider tasks to deceive, disrupt, suppress, neutralize, fix, contain, breach, defeat, or destroy.
 Determine the functional tactics to be applied by action and enabling elements.
 Identify situational awareness and understanding requirements for collection and analysis.
 Anticipate forms of contact and identify means of retaining freedom of maneuver under those
conditions.
 Task-organize units for the mission by function.
 Determine how and when functional elements perform or enable action on contact or transition to
other tasks or subtasks.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 4-3

Chapter 4
Figure 4-1. Actions on contact (example)
PREPARE
4-14. The prepare subtask includes the following:
 Provide situational understanding of the enemy and OE from current reconnaissance, surveillance,
and intelligence reports.
 Execute EIW in support of actions on contact.
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Battle Drills
 Report regular, periodic, and unexpected information updates in a timely manner to satisfy the
commander’s critical information requirements and mission intent.
 Coordinate the integration of available reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target
acquisition (RISTA) assets for continuous and overlapping coverage of designated areas, zones,
routes, or special objectives in the area of operations (AO) and zone of reconnaissance
responsibility (ZORR).
 Conduct counterreconnaissance actions preventing enemy situational understanding of KPA
intentions or offensive actions.
 Tailor unit capabilities, considering anticipated complex terrain, survivability measures, and
camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D).
 Conduct mission and task rehearsals of action and enabling units.
 Confirm redundant C2 communications requirements and capabilities.
EXECUTE
4-15. The execute subtask includes the following:
 Conduct undetected and sequenced movement by reconnaissance elements through or into an area
occupied by enemy units in order to locate and report them.
 Conduct undetected and sequenced movement by security elements through or into an area
occupied by enemy units in order to deceive, disrupt, fix, delay, suppress, neutralize, defeat, or
destroy enemy security or response units.
FIX
4-16. The fix subtask includes the following:
 Report contact and critical details of enemy location, disposition, composition, and assessment of
enemy combat power in contact.
 Report the commander’s assessment of the tactical situation and whether making contact with the
enemy constitutes a change in the KPAGF primary COA.
 Designate security elements making contact as fixing elements.
 Prevent the enemy from moving any part of its unit from a specific location for a specific period
of time in order to keep it from influencing KPAGF COAs.
 Reinforce the fixing elements with the minimum support necessary to sustain the fixing task.
 Provide early warning of additional approaching enemy units and prevent them from gaining
further information on the KPAGF units not in contact.
ISOLATE
4-17. The isolate subtask includes the following:
 Deny the enemy freedom of movement and maneuver along ground or air avenues of approach
that could be used to reinforce the enemy or interfere with friendly maneuver. Ambush, block,
canalize, contain, delay, destroy, disrupt, fix, suppress, neutralize, interdict, or isolate as required.
 Prevent the enemy from gaining further information on the KPAGF unit’s intentions.
 Position a reserve element for rapid movement or maneuver, on order of the higher KPA
commander, to support the mission.
 Conduct direct and indirect fires and EIW to suppress or neutralize designated targets.
 Employ continuous reconnaissance and surveillance with security elements in the AO to sustain
situational understanding and provide early warning of enemy activities that can influence the
mission.
 Employ continuous counterreconnaissance with security elements to destroy enemy
reconnaissance units and to prevent the enemy from obtaining situational understanding of
KPAGF intentions.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 4-5

Chapter 4
 Influence (deceive, degrade, disrupt, deny, or exploit) enemy tactical decision making through
EIW capabilities.
 Conduct undetected and sequenced movement by support elements through or into an area
occupied by enemy units and occupy a direct or indirect fire position(s) in order to isolate
designated enemy units.
CONTINUE MISSION
4-18. The continue mission subtask includes the following:
 Maneuver to bypass or destroy designated enemy in contact.
 Continue rapid forward momentum of elements to assigned objective(s).
 Inform follow-on units of any situational countermobility obstacles on mission route or axis of
advance.
 Coordinate for logistics linkup points for combat support and rear service units in support of rapid
offensive momentum and objectives.
 Recommend if current tactical conditions require an adjustment to mission actions.
 Report accomplishment of subsequent mission task(s).
FIXING
4-19. A fixing drill is to prevent the enemy from moving any part of its force from a specific location for a
period of time. Actions can appear similar to tasks that isolate, block, or contain an enemy; however, a fixing
drill differs in that it focuses on a specific location and time period. EIW components such as perception
management activities, deception techniques, and EW can be used to manipulate situational understanding
of an OE. The KPAGF apply a fixing drill to deny an enemy unit the ability to physically move from a
location or to psychologically convince it to remain stationary. Tactical intelligence on the enemy situation,
understanding the natural conditions of the AO, and anticipated tactical actions shape how a KPAGF leader
uses available resources to fix the enemy. Figure 4-2 provides an example of a KPAGF fixing drill.
4-20. Fixing is often a subtask found in other battle drills. The ability to fix the enemy at crucial points in
time or location is a fundamental way to maintain freedom to maneuver and retain the initiative. An enemy
becomes fixed in one of three basic ways:
 The enemy cannot physically move.
 The enemy does not want to move.
 The enemy does not think it can move.
4-21. An enemy that cannot physically move is constrained. An enemy does not want to move when it feels
that doing so invites greater risk to casualties and damage or loss of materiel. Fires or EIW actions can also
achieve the effects of physically fixing the enemy when feasible.
4-22. EIW actions support fixing the enemy by convincing it that it cannot or does not want to move.
Examples of EIW used to fix the enemy include—
 Propaganda claiming the enemy will be destroyed if it moves in the open.
 Sniper team employment and use of substantial countermobility obstacles to reinforce KPAGF
ability to cause casualties or damage enemy combat power.
 Deception communications that simulate the enemy higher commander ordering the enemy unit
to remain in place.
 Information attack on enemy sensors to register that the KPAGF fixing element has significantly
more combat power than it actually possesses.
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Battle Drills
Figure 4-2. Fixing (example)
4-23. The fixing drill has five subtasks:

 Plan.
 Prepare.
 Execute—prevent movement.
 Execute—fix.
PLAN
 Identify reconnaissance and surveillance objectives for collection and analysis in support of AO
situational awareness and situational understanding requirements.
 Identify enemy units to be fixed in support of the mission.
 Collect current information on enemy unit capabilities, limitations, locations, and other OE
information.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 4-7

Chapter 4
 Determine the functional tactics to be applied by action, enabling, and support elements.
 Identify task-organization requirements for units by function.
 Determine how functional elements perform or enable security tasks, fix the designated enemy
units, perform other offensive actions, or transition to other tasks or subtasks.
 Identify time constraints or restrictions on accomplishing the mission and supporting
requirements.
PREPARE
 Task-organize units providing capabilities to fix the enemy.
 Coordinate the integration of available RISTA assets for continuous and overlapping coverage of
designated areas, zones, routes, or special objectives in the AO and ZORR.
 Conduct counterreconnaissance actions that prevent enemy situational understanding of KPA
 Tailor unit capabilities, considering anticipated complex terrain, survivability measures, and C3D.
 Conduct mission and task rehearsals of action and enabling units and action subtasks to fix an
enemy unit.
 Coordinate required direct and indirect fires.
 Coordinate and prepare to emplace selected countermobility obstacles in conjunction with C3D
actions.
 Execute EIW in support of offensive actions.
EXECUTE—PREVENT MOVEMENT
4-26. The execute—prevent movement subtask includes the following:
 Confirm current conditions at the enemy location and direction, speed, and tempo of movement
or maneuver of enemy units to be fixed.
 Coordinate with friendly units in adjacent AOs to ensure overlapping coverage of ZORRs and
provide early warning of enemy activities or OE conditions that could impact the drill.
 Conduct counterreconnaissance tasks to destroy or defeat enemy security units that could
influence the drill.
 Detect enemy units along ground or air avenues of approach in the vicinity of unit(s) to be fixed
who could influence success, and coordinate to disrupt, delay, or deny access of those units to the
fixed enemy.
 Maintain contact with the enemy to be fixed through observation or technical sensor
reconnaissance and surveillance means to sustain current situational information.
 Emplace selected stationary countermobility obstacles in conjunction with C3D actions.
 Position a reserve element for rapid movement or maneuver, on order of the KPAGF commander,
to support the mission.
 Conduct undetected movement by action and enabling elements to occupy simple battle positions
or support locations for the drill and associated security tasks.
 Execute actions convincing the enemy that it cannot move from the present location.
 Execute EIW convincing the enemy to not move from its present location.
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Battle Drills
EXECUTE—FIX
4-27. The execute—fix subtask includes the following:
 Provide security for action and enabling elements executing the drill.
 Engage enemy units with direct and indirect fires in the fix location or kill zone.
 Suppress or neutralize enemy units in the fix location or kill zone.
 Execute selected mobile countermobility obstacles in conjunction with direct and indirect fires
and obscuration.
 Conduct EIW perception management activities to convince the enemy that it cannot move or not
to move from the present location.
 Employ, when appropriate, EW activities to block or disrupt enemy C2 and communications in
support of fixing the enemy unit.
 Employ, when appropriate, a relevant population in the target area to physically block, contain, or
disrupt an enemy unit.
 Deny enemy units freedom of movement and maneuver in a designated location or kill zone for a
specified period of time.
 Achieve the fixing purpose, which can include an intent to contain, isolate, suppress, neutralize,
interdict, defeat, or destroy selected enemy units.
CONTINUE MISSION
commander’s situational awareness and situational understanding requirements.
 Execute tasks with stay-behind elements, when required, including but not limited to surveille,
disrupt, delay, suppress, neutralize, defend, defeat, or destroy.
 Report reorganization and combat effectiveness of KPAGF units.
 Recommend if current tactical conditions require an adjustment to the time or tempo of current or
subsequent mission tasks.
BREAK CONTACT
4-29. Break contact is designed to remove the enemy’s ability to maintain contact with and decisively engage
a KPAGF unit, a primary objective of which is to prevent the enemy from placing destructive or suppressive
fires. This is accomplished by implementing protective measures to include fixing the enemy; employing
fires, C3D, and countermobility; and regaining freedom to maneuver. A security element initially fixes the
enemy and, if appropriate, isolates it. Related actions protect the KPAGF unit while it maneuvers to a position
out of contact. These may be as simple as placing obscuring smoke between the enemy and the KPAGF unit
or, depending on the time available, as complex as a deception plan employing decoys. Countermobility
actions can include emplacement of dynamic obstacles or destruction of manmade structures to restrict an
enemy’s ability to maneuver and maintain contact.
4-30. The KPAGF will routinely break contact in order to—
 Maneuver into predesignated defensive positions.
 Maneuver to a positon of advantage against an enemy.
 Draw the enemy force into an ambush.
 Retain the ability to conduct its chosen COA.
 Move away and continue an assigned mission.
4-31. Breaking contact ensures KPAGF units retain the initiative and fight under circumstances of their
choosing. It also provides the commander with the flexibility to either continue with the planned COA or to
rapidly adopt a new COA more suited to changed conditions. Figure 4-3 on page 4-10 provides an example
of a break contact drill.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 4-9

Chapter 4
Figure 4-3. Break contact (example)
4-32. The break contact drill has six subtasks:

 Plan.
 Prepare.
 Execute—protect.
 Execute—fix.
 Execute—isolate.
4-10 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Battle Drills
PLAN
 Determine an order of movement for each subordinate element or unit, its departure time(s), and
direction of movement.
 Identify mission objective(s) for subordinate and attached units, to include how long each unit will
occupy a position and any specific methods to break contact.
 Consider tasks to deceive, disrupt, suppress, neutralize, fix, contain, breach, defeat, or destroy.
 Anticipate forms of contact and identify means of retaining freedom of maneuver under those
conditions.
 Determine how and when functional elements perform or enable action on contact or transition to
other tasks or subtasks.
PREPARE
 Execute EIW in support of break contact.
 Tailor unit capabilities, considering anticipated complex terrain, survivability measures, and C3D.
EXECUTE—PROTECT
4-35. The execute—protect subtask includes the following:
 Determine the forms of contact—direct fire, sensor collection, obstacles, CBRN, air, indirect fire,
or EW.
 Take immediate steps to protect the unit from these forms of contact.
 Select alternate routes, assembly areas, and positions.
 Select routes and positions that make use of covering and concealing terrain.
 Employ mobility and countermobility actions.
 Employ manmade concealment and obscuration.
 Employ deception.
 Retain freedom of maneuver
 Reduce units in contact to only security element(s).
 Select one or more routes permitting continued maneuver out of contact while continuing the
mission.
 Fix and isolate enemy maneuver units.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 4-11

Chapter 4
EXECUTE—FIX
 Report the commander’s assessment of the tactical situation and whether making contact
constitutes a change in the enemy’s anticipated primary COA.
of time in order to keep it from influencing KPA COAs.
 Reinforce the fixing elements with the minimum support necessary to sustain the fixing task.
further information on the KPA units not in contact.
EXECUTE—ISOLATE
4-37. The execute—isolate subtask includes the following:
that could be used to reinforce the enemy or interfere with friendly maneuver.
 Ambush, block, canalize, contain, delay, destroy, disrupt, fix, suppress, neutralize, or interdict as
required.
 Prevent the enemy from gaining further information on KPAGF intentions.
mission.
reconnaissance elements and to prevent the enemy from obtaining situational understanding of
KPAGF intentions.
 Influence (deceive, degrade, disrupt, deny, or exploit) enemy tactical decision-making through
EIW capabilities.
occupied by enemy elements and occupy a direct or indirect fire position(s) in order to isolate
designated elements of the enemy force.
 Assess and report.
 KPAGF commander reports to the chain of command the form of contact made, critical details of
its composition, and an assessment of the situation.
CONTINUE MISSION
 Maneuver to avoid, bypass, or destroy designated enemy in contact.
 Inform follow-on elements of any situational countermobility obstacles on route or axis of
advance.
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Battle Drills

SITUATIONAL BREACH
4-39. A situational breach is the rapid reduction of and passage through an obstacle encountered in the
execution of another tactical task. A breach drill is a combined arms tactical task executed by functionally
organized elements performing various subtasks. Figure 4-4 provides an example of a situational breach.
Figure 4-4. Situational breach (example)
4-40. The purpose of a situational breach is to achieve tactical advantage, maintain the momentum or tempo
of offensive operations, and sustain organizational combat power in order to achieve the mission task. The
decision to conduct a situational breach is based on the KPAGF leader’s knowledge of the enemy, the
surrounding OE, and the expected tactical advantage to accomplishing the mission. The unit conducting a
situational breach may or may not have expected an obstacle but, in either case, conducts the breach with
readily available resources and does not wait for specialized equipment and other support. The unit typically
attempts to breach an obstacle from tactical movement with minimal delay, assault through the passage lane,
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 4-13

Chapter 4
and press the attack without first halting on the far side of the obstacle to consolidate. KPAGF elements
following the breach and assault elements proof and improve the initial passage lane as needed.
4-41. The situational breach drill has six subtasks:
 Plan.
 Prepare.
 Execute—secure.
 Execute—penetrate.
PLAN
 Identify reconnaissance and surveillance objectives for collection and analysis in support of AO
situational awareness and situational understanding requirements.
 Collect current information on enemy unit capabilities, limitations, and an OE.
 Identify task-organization requirements for units by function.
 Determine how and when functional elements perform or enable security tasks, offensive actions,
or transition to other tasks or subtasks.
 Identify time constraints or restrictions on accomplishing the mission and supporting
requirements.
PREPARE
 Task-organize units by function, which typically includes security, support, breach, assault, and
reserve.
 Tailor element capabilities, considering anticipated complex terrain, survivability measures, and
C3D.
 Coordinate for required direct and indirect fires.
 Conduct mission and task rehearsals of action and enabling units and action element subtasks.
 Execute EIW in support of offensive actions.
EXECUTE—ISOLATE
 Infiltrate security elements to conduct reconnaissance of obstacles.
 Conduct counterreconnaissance to destroy or defeat enemy security units.
 Report when a practical bypass exists to obstacles.
 Provide early warning of enemy actions that can influence the situational breach.
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Battle Drills
 Detect other enemy units and prevent them from contacting the enemy near the breach site.
that could be used to reinforce the enemy at the breach site or interfere with the tasks of the breach
or assault elements.
 Ambush, block, canalize, contain, delay, destroy, disrupt, fix, suppress, neutralize, interdict, or
isolate as required.
 Prevent the enemy from gaining further information.
 Execute EIW in support of the situational breach.
 Obscure the breach site and surrounding terrain from enemy visual and technical observation.
 Initiate breach element actions at the breach point.
EXECUTE—SECURE
4-45. The execute—secure subtask includes the following:
 Target enemy units in vicinity of the breach site.
 Neutralize enemy defending the breach site.
 Continue direct and indirect fires to suppress designated targets.
 Coordinate continued obscuration of breach site and surrounding terrain to prevent enemy visual
and technical observation.
 Report progress as each obstacle is reduced.
 Lift or shift fires as the breach element progresses through the obstacles.
 Report the initial passage lane marked and secure.
 Call forward the assault element to continue attack momentum.
EXECUTE—PENETRATE
4-46. The execute—penetrate subtask includes the following:
 Guide the assault element quickly through the marked passage lane.
 Support the rapid advance of the assault element and follow-on elements through the passage lane.
 Report when trail element of the action element has exited the far side of passage lane.
 Inform follow-on elements of any enemy explosive obstacles marked and bypassed along passage
lines.
 Seize or secure far side of breaching objective beyond passage lane exit.
 Report status of casualties and location of friendly element casualty collection point in vicinity of
the passage lane.
CONTINUE MISSION
 Inform follow-on elements of any situational countermobility obstacles emplaced during the
breach to protect the passage lane and route or axis of advance.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 4-15

Chapter 4
FIRE AND MANEUVER

4-48. Fire and maneuver is a tactical drill designed to ensure the KPAGF retain the initiative to move and
fight. Fire and maneuver is how the KPAGF make contact with, or react to contact by, an enemy. The action
element is the movement or maneuver element, and the support element is the fixing element. Figure 4-5
provides an example of fire and maneuver.
Figure 4-5. Fire and maneuver (example)
4-49. A deliberate decision is the preferred way of conducting fire and maneuver in order to provide the
commander with the flexibility to continue with a planned COA or rapidly adopt a new one suited to changed
conditions. A fixing element suppresses the enemy while an action element moves or maneuvers against the
enemy being fixed. When necessary, the action element occupies an advantageous position and transitions to
the fixing element. The former fixing element becomes the action element and maneuvers to a successive
position of advantage against the enemy. Fire and maneuver is usually used to destroy the enemy being fixed
and maneuvered against, but can also be used to fix and bypass an enemy unit. Fire and maneuver purposes
can be to destroy the enemy; defeat or repel an enemy attack; or another intention, such as seizing an enemy
unit or location.
4-50. The collective actions of fire and maneuver involve setting conditions to fix or isolate an enemy unit.
This typically requires a KPAGF element to engage, suppress, or neutralize the enemy with fires so another
KPAGF element can maneuver against the fixed or isolated enemy. Effective control measures, C2, and
communications shift KPAGF fires to allow the maneuver element to assault and seize or secure the enemy
position. Fire and maneuver actions can also cause the enemy to withdraw from a location.
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Battle Drills
4-51. The KPAGF leader determines combat power to employ for the fire element and the maneuver element.
A security element typically makes first contact with the enemy, observes it, and reports on enemy activity.
This element may be designated as a fixing element that employs initial fires on the enemy. Once fires fix
the enemy, the maneuver element typically uses an indirect approach to a position of advantage against the
enemy.
4-52. Fire and maneuver KPAGF elements can also exchange functional roles if a sequence of fire and
maneuver action is required to close with the enemy in order to achieve a mission task, such as assault or
raid. On order, the fire element can become a maneuver element once an initial maneuver element establishes
a position to provide fires. When successive maneuver is required, the fire and maneuver functions continue
to alternate between the two KPAGF elements.
4-53. The fire and maneuver drill has seven subtasks:
 Plan.
 Prepare.
 Execute—make contact.
 Execute—fix.
 Execute—maneuver.
PLAN
 Identify mission objective(s).
Consider tasks to deceive, disrupt, suppress, neutralize, fix, contain, breach, bypass, defeat, or
destroy.
 Conduct counterreconnaissance actions preventing enemy situational understanding of KPAGF
 Determine how and when functional elements perform or enable fire and maneuver or transition
to other tasks or subtasks.
PREPARE
 Execute EIW in support of fire and maneuver.
 Tailor unit capabilities considering anticipated complex terrain, survivability measures, and C3D.
 Confirm redundant C2 and communications requirements and capabilities.
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Chapter 4
EXECUTE—MAKE CONTACT
4-56. The execute—make contact subtask includes the following:
 Conduct undetected and sequenced movement by reconnaissance elements through or into an area
occupied by enemy units in order to locate and report them.
 Conduct undetected and sequenced movement by security elements through or into an area
occupied by enemy units in order to deceive, disrupt, fix, delay, suppress, neutralize, defeat, or
destroy enemy security or response units.
 Initiate fires with fixing element to fix enemy unit.
EXECUTE—FIX
 Report the commander’s assessment of the tactical situation, and whether making contact with the
enemy constitutes a change in the KPAGF primary COA.
of time in order to keep it from influencing KPAGF COAs.
 Reinforce fixing elements with the minimum support necessary to sustain the fixing task.
further information on the KPAGF units not in contact.
EXECUTE—ISOLATE
that could be used to reinforce the enemy or interfere with friendly maneuver.
 Ambush, block, canalize, contain, delay, destroy, disrupt, fix, suppress, neutralize, or interdict as
required.
mission.
reconnaissance units and to prevent the enemy from obtaining situational understanding of
KPAGF intentions.
EIW capabilities.
EXECUTE—MANEUVER
4-59. The execute—maneuver subtask includes the following:
 Maneuver to defeat, destroy, or bypass designated enemy in contact.
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Battle Drills
 Inform follow-on elements of any situational countermobility obstacles emplaced during

maneuver.
CONTINUE MISSION
COMPLEMENTARY COMBINED ARMS ACTIONS

4-61. Several combined arms actions complement execution of varied tasks and drills to enhance the
comprehensive tactical effects when conducted in an integrated and synchronized manner. Combined arms
action is the norm in KPAGF operations and occurs throughout the security and battle zones of an AO.
Several combined arms actions occurring regularly in tactical operations include but are not limited to—
 Disruption actions.
 AAAD.
 Air assault defense actions.
 Complex terrain operations.
DISRUPTION ACTIONS
4-62. The purpose of disruption actions by the KPAGF is to significantly degrade an enemy capability or
prevent an enemy from effectively conducting its mission. Disruption actions focus offensive actions against
designated components or subsystems to disaggregate the enemy combat system and create vulnerabilities
for exploitation. Disruption actions may be directed to—
 Force the enemy to alter its preparations and tactical actions.
 Gain and maintain reconnaissance contact with the enemy.
 Support KPAGF reconnaissance and security tasks.
 Support KPAGF counterreconnaissance effort.
 Deceive the enemy on the disposition and locations of KPAGF units.
4-63. A disruption tactical task is an offensive action intended to upset an enemy’s formation or tempo,
interrupt its operational timetable, cause it to commit forces prematurely, or cause its operations to occur in
a piecemeal manner. A primary task of a disruption unit is to initiate an attack against a designated enemy
combat system. Disruption tasks can occur anywhere in an AO; however, the KPAGF commander typically
plans and executes specific actions in a security zone to create tactical advantages for mission success.
Actions can be centralized or purposely decentralized in order to mass KPAGF combat power at a designated
time and location, or cause an enemy to address multiple independent threats throughout an operational area.
Reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance defeat enemy reconnaissance and security operations.
Countermobility obstacles channel the enemy into disadvantageous terrain and kill zones, and long-range
direct and indirect fires degrade enemy formations or positions. EIW components are KPAGF combat
multipliers employed to limit effective enemy C2 and communications in defensive and offensive operations.
Destruction of a designated combat system equates to the system being combat ineffective until the capability
is reconstituted. Any KPAGF level of command and any type of units that are conducting a disruption task
have the same basic subtasks. Figures 4-6 and 4-7 on pages 4-20 and 4-21, respectively, provide an example
of a disruption action.
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Chapter 4
Figure 4-6. Disruption actions (example; part 1 of 2)
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Battle Drills
Figure 4-7. Disruption actions (example; part 2 of 2)
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Chapter 4
4-64. KPAGF elements may be assigned offensive, defensive, or security mission tasks to disrupt an enemy
force. A disruption element executes a combination of tactical tasks or drills to set the conditions for KPAGF
success. These execution tasks include but are not limited to—
 Cover.
 Delay.
 Disrupt.
 Fix.
 Ambush.
 Contain.
 Canalize.
 Isolate.
 Neutralize.
 Interdict.
4-65. The disruption task has six subtasks as follows:

 Plan.
 Prepare.
 Execute—find.
 Execute—contain.
 Execute—destroy.
Plan
 Identify reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance objectives.
 Identify deception objectives.
 Collect current information on enemy unit capabilities, limitations, and OE information to be
obtained or confirmed.
 Analyze action, enabling, and support functions that must be performed to achieve mission
success. Consider tasks to deceive, suppress, delay, fix, contain, breach, neutralize, defeat, or
destroy.
 Identify situational awareness and understanding requirements for collection and analysis by
ground maneuver, aviation, and other technical capabilities.
 Task-organize elements by function.
Prepare
 Evaluate ongoing reconnaissance, surveillance, and counterreconnaissance actions to provide
situational understanding and shape OE conditions required for destruction of enemy
reconnaissance units and capabilities.
 Coordinate the combined arms integration of available RISTA assets for continuous and
overlapping coverage of designated areas, counterreconnaissance zones, routes, predicted enemy
locations, kill zones, and special objectives in a security or battle zone.
 Coordinate for situational awareness and understanding among friendly elements in an AO and
associated ZORR, such as long-range reconnaissance; special operations forces; mounted, aerial,
and dismounted elements operating in the AO or ZORR; and signals reconnaissance intelligence.
 Assess current counterreconnaissance actions to prevent enemy RISTA from obtaining situational
understanding of KPA intentions.
 Conduct mission and task rehearsals of action, enabling, and support elements.
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Battle Drills
 Confirm secure communications requirements and capabilities.

 Execute EIW in support of the mission.
Execute—Find
4-68. The execute—find subtask includes the following:
 Coordinate reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance ground maneuver, aviation, and other
technical collection, disruption, or EW assets of KPAGF RISTA to locate, monitor, and set the
conditions for actions against designated enemy units and capabilities.
 Conduct undetected and sequenced movement and maneuver by reconnaissance elements through
an AO in order to locate enemy reconnaissance, surveillance, and other security units in
counterreconnaissance zones, reconnaissance zones, routes, predicted enemy locations, kill zones,
and special counterreconnaissance objectives. Report enemy security units, main forces, reserves,
rear service units, and C2 and communications nodes.
 Conduct undetected and sequenced movement and maneuver by counterreconnaissance elements
through and into an area occupied by enemy units in order to locate and act on intelligence as
tasked in mission order.
 Conduct actions with counterreconnaissance elements in order deceive, suppress, delay, fix,
contain, breach, neutralize, defeat, or destroy enemy security or response units.
 Report regular, periodic, and situational collection updates in a timely manner to satisfy the
commander’s critical and recurring reconnaissance, surveillance, and counterreconnaissance
information requirements supporting the mission intent.
 Destroy enemy RISTA.
 Recommend if current tactical conditions require an adjustment to the time or tempo ordered for
tasks to disrupt the enemy operation.
 Conduct security tasks to provide early warning and protect. Other tactical tasks may include but
are not limited to: block, canalize, contain, delay, destroy, fix, interdict, suppress, or neutralize.
Execute—Contain
4-69. The execute—contain subtask includes the following:
 Use surprise, limited visibility, complex terrain, emplaced obstacles, C3D, and fires to restrict and
channel the enemy combat system into the kill zone(s).
 Conduct EIW activities to convince the enemy it cannot move or not to move from the present
location.
 Employ, when appropriate, EIW activities to block or disrupt C2 and communications of the
enemy unit or combat system being disrupted.
 Employ, when appropriate, a relevant population in the target area to physically block, fix, or
contain an enemy unit.
 Deliver lethal and nonlethal suppression effects on the designated combat system to isolate it from
contact with other enemy units.
 Execute selected countermobility obstacles in conjunction with direct and indirect fires and
obscuration.
 Block, fix, or contain enemy units in the kill zone(s), cause enemy units to center their activity to
a given front, and prevent them from withdrawing any part of a unit for use elsewhere.
 Deny enemy units freedom of movement and maneuver in a designated location or kill zone for a
specified period of time when in concert with mission intent.
 Degrade designated enemy units to temporarily prevent them from assisting the isolated enemy
unit.
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Chapter 4
that could be used to reinforce the enemy or interfere with friendly movement and maneuver.
Execute—Destroy
4-70. The execute—destroy subtask includes the following:
 Attack with sudden and massed effects by action, security, and support elements to destroy enemy
units.
 Destroy designated enemy combat systems.
 Destroy designated enemy units.
Continue Mission
 Consolidate and reorganize KPAGF elements to minimize the impact of combat losses and
functional capabilities.
 Reorganize KPAGF elements quickly to adjust to changing conditions.
 Retain a reserve element.
 Conduct timely undetected movement from or into areas under enemy control by stealth,
deception, surprise, or clandestine means.
 Execute tasks with stay-behind elements, when required, including but not limited to: surveille,
fix, delay, suppress, neutralize, defend, defeat, or destroy.
 Conduct continuous reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance in designated zones and areas.
 Report information and intelligence updates to satisfy the commander’s mission intent.
offensive or defensive momentum and objectives.
 Recommend if current tactical conditions require an adjustment to the time or tempo ordered for
tasks to disrupt the enemy operation.
ALL-ARMS AIR DEFENSE

4-72. The all-arms air defense (AAAD) task is the coordinated employment of various arms and weapons
systems to achieve an effect against the enemy air threat, whether originally designed for that purpose or not.
The primary effect is to destroy or disrupt enemy air threats and cause the enemy to change its intended use
of air assets. The KPAGF recognize that air defense is an all-arms effort at all echelons of task organization.
It possesses numerous air defense artillery units that operate not only missile systems, but a large number of
antiaircraft artillery. While much of this equipment is dated, there will be a large quantity of these systems
throughout the battlefield. In addition, all KPAGF units above the company level possess some type of an
organic air defense capability dependent on the type, size, and echelon of the unit. All elements are prepared
to conduct AAAD as a fundamental way to support and protect freedom to maneuver, defensive posture, and
the ability to retain the initiative. The KPAGF adapt ways of employing traditional air defense systems and
other systems not typically associated with air defense. Machine guns on armored personnel carriers and the
automatic cannon on infantry fighting vehicles can engage both ground and aerial targets. The heavy
antiaircraft machine guns on tanks are specifically designed for air defense. Most antitank guided missiles
can be effective against low-flying rotary-wing aircraft. Field artillery and small arms can also be integral
parts of the air defense scheme. Weapons systems that can be part of a functional AAAD include—
 Small arms.
 Automatic weapons.
 Medium and heavy machine guns.
 Automatic cannons.
 Rocket-propelled grenades.
 Antitank guided missiles.
 Artillery.
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Battle Drills
 Air defense missiles.

4-73. The KPA considers every soldier with a man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) to be an air
defense firing element. These weapons are widely proliferated throughout the KPAGF force structure.
Rocket-propelled grenades can be an effective AAAD system. Tactics usually employ a form of volley or
successive fires in a layered air defense approach to airspace, based on effective ranges and height of available
weapon systems and electronic interdiction and warning systems.
4-74. Many maneuver units have modified selected infantry vehicles into fire-support vehicles equipped for
multirole use with cannons, antitank guided missiles, and MANPADS. These vehicles are employed in air
defense or antitank platoons with dismounted MANPADS teams to engage aerial and other targets and
weapons systems that can act in an antitank role.
4-75. AAAD measures support a range of tactical capabilities from self-protection to key components of an
integrated air defense system. The KPA recognizes that air defense is a combined arms effort. Air defense
supports combined arms combat by the comprehensive integration of a large number and variety of weapons
and associated equipment into an effective, redundant air defense system. Figure 4-8 provides an example of
KPA AAAD.
Figure 4-8. All-arms air defense actions (example)
4-76. The KPA will typically operate without the tactical or operational advantage of air superiority or air
parity against an enemy. A norm of enemy air dominance and overconfidence can be manipulated to KPAGF
advantage by skillful use of active and passive air defensive measures. Passive measures such as C3D in
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 4-25

Chapter 4
dispersed or multiple locations and battle positions hinder enemy detection and situational understanding of
the KPA. Active air defense measures at the tactical echelon apply all arms and available resources to achieve
effective combat power against aerial threats―aviation assets, rockets, and missiles―within the task-
organized capabilities allocated to a commander. KPA sensors within RISTA capabilities are an integral
complement to inform decision making for direct and indirect air defense fires against an enemy aerial threat.
EIW systems can provide the capabilities of—
 EW.
 Deception.
 Reconnaissance.
 Cryptanalysis.
 Intelligence collection.
4-77. Active measures include suppressive or neutralization fires, air and terrain countermobility obstacles,
and other direct or indirect capabilities to mass AAAD effects of KPA combat power. Employment of
integrated AAAD assets is simultaneous, sequential, or selective, and is conducted in accordance with higher-
echelon approved mission-specific rules of engagement. These restrictions acknowledge the norm of a KPA
integrated air defense system; however, at the lower tactical-maneuver unit echelon, the norm is decentralized
C2 and the right of self-defense to an imminent or attacking enemy air threat.
4-78. KPA air defense doctrine emphasizes three interrelated concepts. These concepts are:
 Air defense is an integral part of KPA combined arms combat.
 Every KPA unit is responsible for continuous air surveillance in its AO in order to alert and warn
of enemy aerial observation, flight activities, and pending probable air attack.
 Air defense weapons, radars, and associated acquisition and tracking systems are a critical
component of an integrated KPA C2 and communications system to provide integrated air defense
capabilities into an integrated firing system. (See appendix D for more information on air defense
operations.)
4-79. The AAAD task has five subtasks:
 Plan.
 Prepare.
 Execute.
 Report.
Plan
 Identify situational awareness and understanding requirements for air defense collection and
analysis.
 Identify or predict locations of enemy airfields; forward arming and refueling points; drop,
landing, and pickup zones; and helicopter firing positions in the KPAGF AO and ZORR.
 Identify or predict locations of enemy probable or possible air avenues of approach, air infiltration
routes, and air routes into and throughout the KPAGF AO.
 Identify KPA units to be protected in point or area air defense in tactical sector.
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Battle Drills
 State priorities of air defense support to the mission.

 Determine decision points for simultaneous, sequential, or selected engagement by KPA air
defense systems—
 In enemy air avenue or route and before entering the airspace over KPAGF units within an
AO.
 In the airspace above KPA battle positions or designated point or area locations for air
defense.
 Analyze action and enabling functions that must be performed to achieve drill success. Consider
the requirements for air defense of possible follow-on tasks to deceive, disrupt, suppress, fix,
contain, breach, defeat, or destroy.
 Identify affiliated units, such as guerrilla units, criminal organizations, or coerced or willing
relevant populations, that can perform air defense warning or air defense functions.
 Plan for mutually supporting and overlapping air defense coverage to air defense priorities in
support of the mission.
 Task-organize units for the AAAD drill by function.
Prepare
 Evaluate ongoing reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence updates to provide situational
understanding of the enemy and OE.
designated areas, aerial zones and sectors, routes, or special objectives in the AO and ZORR.
 Confirm mutually supporting and overlapping dedicated air defense systems coverage to air
defense priorities.
 Coordinate direct and indirect fire weapons into integrated air defense for all tactical-echelon
maneuver units.
 Coordinate and emplace selected countermobility obstacles in conjunction with C3D actions.
 Confirm how and when functional elements act to enable or achieve the designated effects on an
enemy aerial unit and transition to other tasks or subtasks.
 Confirm communications requirements and capabilities.
 Conduct air defense mission and drill rehearsals.
 Conduct rehearsals of rules of engagement changes and C2 and communications
acknowledgement procedures.
 Execute EIW.
Execute
4-82. The execute subtask includes the following:
 Detect and track enemy air asset approach into the AO.
 Report enemy aircraft by type, number of aircraft, direction of movement or maneuver, and other
situational information in predicted enemy locations or kill zones.
 Confirm any restrictions to KPA AAAD rules of engagement.
 Engage enemy aircraft with appropriate weapon systems and in accordance with the unit air
defense rehearsals for simultaneous, sequential, or selective fires or EIW attack.
 Maintain observation or technical sensor contact with enemy aircraft to confirm AAAD effects.
 Observe for additional or successive enemy aircraft in AO.
 Coordinate with counterreconnaissance units in order to deceive, disrupt, delay, fix, suppress,
neutralize, defeat, or destroy enemy ground, aerial security, or other units responding to the KPA
air defense.
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Chapter 4
Report
4-83. The report subtask includes the following:
 Report AAAD effects on enemy aircraft.
 Report enemy aircraft effects on KPA area or point locations.
 Determine if current tactical conditions require an adjustment to the AAAD concept of operations
support.
 Influence (deceive, degrade, disrupt, deny, or exploit) enemy tactical decision making before and
during execution of the air defense through coordination of EIW capabilities.
commander’s air defense information requirements.
 Execute tasks with stay-behind or security elements, when required, including but not limited to:
surveille, disrupt, delay, suppress, neutralize, defend, defeat, or destroy.
 Report reorganization and combat effectiveness of dedicated air defense elements and other units
providing AAAD capabilities.
Continue Mission
 Continue air defense of assigned area and point objectives.
 Recommend if mission task requires adjustment.
 Coordinate logistics linkup for combat support and rear service units to replenish ammunition and
for other sustainment actions.
AIR ASSAULT DEFENSE ACTIONS

4-85. The purpose of the KPA’s air assault defense actions is to defeat landings of enemy airborne or
heliborne units through destruction of the transport aircraft in flight or destruction of the enemy immediately
after the air assault or airborne landing occurs. The KPA places so much emphasis on preventing enemy
aerial assaults in its rear area that this section in the KPAGF manuals usually comes before the sections on
offensive and defensive actions. This may be a response to the fear of regime change by foreign forces landing
in Pyongyang or the view of recent training emphasis by a regional enemy on “decapitation capabilities” and
the creation of units specializing in such missions. The KPA conducts air assault defense actions as a
combined arms effort. The primary effect is to destroy enemy air assault threats. Disrupting enemy air assault
operations causes the enemy to lose operational momentum and alter tactical operations. All KPA units are
prepared to conduct AAAD; however, an air assault defense action is a mission task typically assigned to an
air assault defense reserve.
4-86. An air assault defense reserve operates within an assigned zone, or may have a zone activated for the
duration of an air assault action. Air assault defense actions typically include action elements to destroy the
enemy air assault units in the assigned zone; disruption elements to delay the tempo or effectiveness of enemy
actions; security elements to fix or isolate designated enemy units; and support elements to assist the overall
success of air assault defense actions.
4-87. Air assault defense actions focus on probable or possible drop zones and landing zones. RISTA actions
of a higher headquarters are critical to interdiction, integrated air defense, and early warning of enemy
airborne and air assault operations. RISTA provides situational awareness and understanding of enemy aerial
and ground maneuver actions in a KPAGF security or battle zone. Predicted enemy locations on enemy
avenues of approach can indicate maneuver direction, types and density of formations, speed of movement,
and probable objectives. Enemy activity in predicted enemy locations indicate axes of advance and inform
KPAGF commander decisions to activate kill zones along axes and at enemy landing and drop zones.
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Battle Drills
4-88. The KPA typically operates without the tactical or operational advantage of air superiority or air parity
against an enemy. A norm of enemy air dominance and overconfidence can be manipulated to a KPA
advantage by skillful use of active and passive air defensive measures. Passive measures such as C3D in
dispersed or multiple locations hinder enemy detection and situational understanding of the KPA forces. Air
defensive and offensive measures at the tactical echelon apply all arms and available resources to achieve
effective combat power against aerial threats―enemy rotary-, fixed-wing, and unmanned aircraft―within
the task-organized capabilities allocated to a KPA commander. Active measures include direct and indirect
suppressive or neutralization fires, air and terrain countermobility obstacles for air drop and air assault sites,
and other support capabilities to mass the effects of KPA combat power. KPA rules of engagement
acknowledge the norm of decentralized C2 and the right of self-defense against an imminent or attacking
enemy threat. The primary method to prevent landings by enemy airborne or heliborne troops is to destroy
transport aircraft in flight before they can deliver combat power to the ground. When aerial destruction of an
enemy airdrop or air assault operation is not feasible, air assault defense actions destroy landing and landed
enemy units on the ground as soon as possible.
4-89. An air assault defense action is a combined arms action typically assigned to an air assault defense
reserve as a mission task. Any KPA unit with the capability to affect enemy aircraft or landing of enemy
units conducts air assault defense actions. Air assault defense units are assigned an attack zone to control
actions against enemy airborne or air assault forces. The attack zone may only be activated for the duration
of an air assault defense action or may be permanently assigned to an air assault defense reserve. Kill zones
are used to control ground, aerial, and air defense engagements. Anticipated enemy landing or drop zones
focus intelligence collection priorities, tactical plans, and preparations for immediate on-order execution.
4-90. Air landing reserves are typically detachments; however, such a reserve for an anticipated major enemy
landing operation may be a brigade or even a division. Figure 4-9 on page 4-30 shows an example of an air
assault defense action within the KPAGF’s rear area.
4-91. The air assault defense actions task has six subtasks:
 Plan.
 Prepare.
 Execute—air assault defense actions.
 Report.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 4-29

Chapter 4
Figure 4-9. Air assault defense actions (example)
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Battle Drills
Plan
 Identify situational awareness and understanding requirements for air assault defense collection
and analysis.
 Identify or predict locations of enemy airfields; forward arming and refueling points; drop,
landing, and pickup zones; and helicopter firing positions.
 Identify or predict locations of enemy probable or possible air and ground avenues of approach,
air infiltration routes, and air routes into and throughout the KPA AO.
 Identify KPA units to be protected by point or area air defense systems.
 State priorities of air assault defense support to the mission.
 Determine decision points for simultaneous, sequential, or selected engagement by KPA air
assault defense systems.
 Analyze action and enabling functions that must be performed to achieve task success. Consider
the requirements for air assault defense actions to deceive, disrupt, suppress, fix, contain, breach,
defeat, or destroy designated enemy units.
 Identify regular and affiliated elements, such as guerrilla units, criminal organizations, and coerced
or willing relevant populations that can perform air assault defense warning or other air assault
defense functions.
 Plan for mutually supporting and overlapping air assault defense coverage to air assault defense
priorities in support of air assault defense actions.
 Task-organize units for air assault defense actions by function.
Prepare
 Evaluate ongoing reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence updates to provide situational
understanding of the enemy and OE.
 Coordinate for the situational awareness and understanding of designated landing and drop zones,
aerial axes and routes, and objectives in the security or battle zones and the ZORR.
 Confirm support relationships and priorities of effort of higher headquarters fires and air assault
defense to the mission.
 Coordinate direct and indirect fires and air assault defense measures for air assault defense actions
by the tactical-echelon maneuver unit.
 Coordinate and emplace selected countermobility obstacles in conjunction with C3D actions.
 Coordinate tactical plans with regular and affiliated elements.
 Confirm how and when functional elements act to enable or achieve the designated effects on an
enemy aerial element and transition to other tasks or subtasks.
 Confirm communications requirements and capabilities.
 Conduct air assault defense action rehearsals of combined arms capabilities and C2 and
communications procedures.
 Position a reserve for rapid maneuver on order of the KPAGF commander to support air assault
defense actions.
 Execute EIW.
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Chapter 4
Execute—Make Contact
 Detect and track enemy aerial approach in coordination with tactical updates from higher
headquarters.
 Report enemy aircraft by type, number of aircraft, direction of movement or maneuver, and other
situational information in predicted enemy locations and kill zones.
 Coordinate with higher headquarters to deceive, disrupt, delay, fix, suppress, neutralize, defeat, or
destroy enemy ground or aerial maneuver prior to enemy entry.
 Report any enemy airborne or heliborne unit landings by echelon, type, location, and capability.
Execute—Air Assault Defense Actions

4-95. The execute—air assault defense actions subtask includes the following:
 Engage enemy aircraft prior to air drop or air assault of enemy units.
 Maintain observation or technical sensor contact with enemy aircraft to confirm air assault defense
action effects.
 Report and update details of enemy location, disposition, composition, and assessment of enemy
combat power in contact.
 Fix enemy units at a specific location for a specific period of time.
 Isolate enemy units.
 Report additional and successive enemy aircraft.
 Destroy enemy air drop or air assault units.
Report
4-96. The report subtask includes the following:
 Report air assault defense action effects on enemy aircraft.
 Report enemy aircraft effects on KPA units.
 Report destruction of enemy air drop or air assault operations.
 Determine if current tactical conditions require an adjustment to the KPA concept of operations
support.
 Report reorganization and combat effectiveness of dedicated air assault defense elements and
other capabilities.
Continue Mission
 Execute tasks with air assault defense units, when required, including but not limited to
reconnoiter, surveille, disrupt, delay, suppress, neutralize, defend, defeat, and destroy.
 Coordinate logistics linkup for combat support and rear service units to replenish ammunition.
 Continue air assault defense actions.
COMPLEX TERRAIN OPERATIONS

4-98. The KPA realizes creating complex physical and cognitive conditions in combat can be a critical
advantage to tactical success. Luring or canalizing an enemy along and into axes, restrictive corridors, or
routes in order to fix or isolate it improve opportunities for enemy destruction or defeat. Survivability and
force protection are additional KPAGF considerations when defensive or offensive actions are conducted in
tactical actions. The application of massed combat power typically concentrates effects in designated kill
zones. Complexity is particularly stressful in confined spaces and when an attack can occur from any spatial
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Battle Drills
dimension of frontal, flank, rear, overhead, or subsurface. Figure 4-10 provides an example of the above-
ground and below-ground nature of complex terrain within both an urban and a rural environment.
Figure 4-10. Complexity in complex terrain (example)
4-99. Terrain conditions can be manipulated to create additional complexity of natural topography and
obstacles in a mission area. Infrastructure and obstacles of manmade construction can also be used to
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Chapter 4
compound complexity, as can the presence of a local relevant population. Terrain and complex conditions
are generally categorized in one of three categories:
 Surface.
 Subsurface (subterranean).
 Supersurface.
4-100. Complex terrain exists in both rural and urban environments. The KPA optimizes naturally occurring
terrain relief, vegetation, or waterways as obstacles, and commits significant resources to creating grouped
battle positions, defensive arrays, and facilities to retain terrain; protect critical assets; restrict enemy
movement and maneuver; and prevent an enemy from achieving its mission. The KPA integrates each level
of complex terrain into its combat system to cause an enemy to operate in multiple vectors simultaneously,
disperse its employment of combat power, and reduce relative advantages of superior technology and systems
the enemy might otherwise normally be able to employ.
4-101. The KPA can use a relevant population to provide C3D for its operations, enhance its mobility in
proximity to enemy positions or maneuver, and shield itself from enemy precision fires and area indirect
fires. The relevant population of a particular area is often a consideration of how a KPA will attack or defend.
The KPA knows enemy rules of engagement, understands enemy social culture, and manipulates enemy
moral norms that typically set limitations on applying massed combat power that may cause disproportional
collateral damage to infrastructure or noncombatants.
4-102. KPA special operations forces, reconnaissance and security teams, or clandestine operatives may
infiltrate and move among civilian groups in assigned RISTA efforts, conduct covert actions such as
sabotage, or engage in direct actions such as assassinations or kidnapping, either on order of a KPA
commander or based on pre-specified tactical conditions. The civilian population can act as a key intelligence
source for the KPA. Local hires serving among enemy soldiers, civilians with access to enemy-controlled
areas, and refugees moving through enemy-controlled sectors can all be manipulated by the KPA to provide
information on enemy dispositions, readiness, movements, and intent.
4-103. The aim of tactical actions in these types of restrictive terrain environments is to defeat or destroy
the enemy. Defeat of an enemy can be a combination of excessive casualties; an inability to extract forces in
contact because they are fixed or isolated; disruption of C2 and logistics; loss of tactical initiative; or KPA
EIW effects indicate continuation of tactical operations is not worth the additional loss in combat power; and
convincing the enemy commander that his or her force has culminated and is defeated.
4-104. Tactical operations in complex terrain may occur sequentially or—more likely—as simultaneous
and multiple parallel actions. Whether conditions include an underground irrigation tunnel system; hilly or
mountainous terrain; a megacity core of high-rise buildings, dense surface infrastructure, and a developed
subsurface transportation network; or an underground facility protecting indirect fires systems or components
of weapons of mass destruction, the actions to attack or defend such terrain by units at the team, squad,
platoon, company detachment, and battalion detachment echelon will employ functional tactics and tactical
drills in conducting mission tasks.
4-105. The following tactical examples in complex terrain—urban and subterranean environments—are
descriptive and not prescriptive. In either situation, tactical considerations determine how the KPA masses
combat power in location and time for effective tactical execution.
4-106. At the tactical level of combat, action norms are small-unit collective drills executed immediately
as integrated actions in reaction to an immediate tactical condition. Functional tactics typically employ drills
in some combination of actions on contact, fixing (which can include isolation), situational breach, or similar
actions to penetrate an obstacle, break contact, or fire and maneuver.
Urban or Rural Area Actions

4-107. The KPA plans and actions for both urban and rural combat include continuous EIW. The integrated
parts of EIW degrade enemy situational awareness and understanding, and cause physical and psychological
limitations of enemy actions in combat. See chapter 9 for additional information on EIW.
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Battle Drills
4-108. Perception management and media manipulation in EIW can be KPA advantages with significant
planning and effective deception and misinformation actions. The influence of EIW on the enemy and a
relevant population manipulates societal or cultural norms that can shape or misguide behaviors. Densely
populated urban areas present EIW opportunities less likely in rural environments due to easier multiple
media reporting and access to social media and the Internet.
4-109. Urban environment actions incorporate offensive, defensive, and counterstability mission tasks.
Urban considerations include complex manmade physical terrain and natural terrain, such as waterways and
severe topography slopes in elevation or depression that can transit an urban area. Other urban aspects are
demographics of the population, manmade support systems existing within the urban area in building
complexes and surface thoroughfares, and trafficability in subsurface or deep subterranean systems.
4-110. Operations conducted in urban or rural areas often require precise application of fires to avoid
unnecessary civilian casualties. The KPA uses this typical restriction by enemy forces to support its force
protection. KPA units will have fewer restrictions on weaponry use and less likelihood of concern for causing
civilian casualties. Collateral infrastructure damage and civilian casualties can be a KPA-expected or -
intended outcome when employing fires on an enemy.
4-111. Many weapons have enhanced effectiveness in a complex terrain environment due to the often
confined spaces of combat. Other weapon types can pose significant disadvantages, such weapon backblast
zones or lack of system maneuverability in particular topography. Weapons systems in complex terrain
combat can include but are not limited to⸺
 Small arms and automatic weapons with enhanced optics.
 Sniper rifles for precision point engagements.
 Grenades (hand-thrown, rifle-mounted, automatic launchers).
 Antitank rockets and antitank guided missiles.
 Flame and incendiary weapons.
 Obscurants, chemical agents, toxic industrial materials, toxic industrial chemicals.
 Military mines, demolition charges, and improvised explosive devices.
 Breaching demolitions or explosive line charge systems.
 Mortars for high-angle indirect fires.
 Mounted weapons with wide-angle depression and elevation.
 Main battle tank gun systems and artillery pieces in direct fires.
Executing Urban Combat

4-112. The KPAGF typically shape defenses of an environment with consideration given to elevation
advantages when emplacing weapon systems; how to best employ and intersect surface direct and indirect
fires into kill zones; and how to enhance maneuverability of forces among multiple fighting and battle
positions through use of subterranean passageways. Upper floors, roofs, or other terrain at varied elevations
provide excellent observation points and battle positions above the maximum elevation of many enemy
weapons in restrictive corridors. An enemy armored vehicle is more vulnerable at less-armored top, flank, or
rear areas rather than its heavily armored frontal glacis or turret armor. Direct or grazing fires from upper
floor and surface infrastructure, or ground-level fighting positions, can also disrupt and affect enemy
momentum. Basement apertures and surface fighting positions provide fires below the minimum depression
angle of many weapons, and can provide direct fire into vulnerable flank or rear locations of an enemy force.
Sewers, communications conduit tunnels, and subways provide covered and concealed access throughout the
subsurface tactical area and allow rapid KPA movement or maneuver among successive or alternate
positions.
4-113. The KPAGF typically conduct deliberately dispersed actions to limit enemy ability to physically
mass combat power against a main concentration of the KPA. The KPAGF often maneuver to remain very
close to enemy units to avoid the effects of enemy precision fires. They will maintain a large reserve when
practical, often dispersed throughout an AO, in order to minimize the signature of readily available forces
and to sustain flexibility of options for the KPA commander. Maintaining significant enemy units in
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Chapter 4
continuous or dispersed operations increases enemy susceptibility to stress-induced fatigue, reduces

flexibility of enemy maneuver options, and degrades overall enemy tactical performance.
4-114. Area combat typically involves disruption and actions to fix or isolate. Once an enemy is fixed or
isolated, fires and maneuver are massed to defeat or destroy it. Figure 4-11 provides an example of a complex
battle position (CBP) within a both an urban and a rural OE.
Figure 4-11. Defense in a complex battle position (example)
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Battle Drills
Disrupt
4-115. Disrupting enemy forces approaching or in complex terrain occurs initially in a security zone, as it
is integral to security tasks. Initial tasks include but are not limited to—
EIW capabilities.
 Designate units as security elements making contact or supporting fixing elements.
4-116. Repositioning KPA units in a timely manner enables tactical initiative and contact with the enemy
and maintains KPA freedom of action to prevent exploitable gaps or seams with nearby KPA units. An aim
is to defeat the attacking enemy units piecemeal as they arrive in the security zone, and continue to degrade
the enemy as it attempts to approach and enter the main battle zone.
Fix or Isolate
4-117. To fix or isolate the enemy is a critical task requiring persistent, continuous RISTA and integrated
fire and maneuver. Actions may occur in a security zone or a main battle zone. Fixing an enemy prevents it
from moving any part of its unit from a specific location for a specific period of time. The KPAGF integrate
fires and obstacles in kill zones to slow and stop enemy units, and continue fires to defeat or destroy a fixed
enemy.
4-118. The KPAGF may decide to physically, electronically, and psychologically isolate an enemy from
sources of support, deny the enemy freedom of movement, and prevent the isolated enemy from having
contact with other enemy unit that could otherwise influence KPA tactical action.
4-119. Fixing or isolating the enemy includes but is not limited to—
 Fix the enemy from moving any part of its unit from a specific location for a specific period of
time to prevent it from influencing KPA COAs.
 Reinforce fixing elements with the minimum support necessary to sustain the fixing task.
 Isolate and deny the enemy freedom of movement and maneuver with fires and EIW.
 Position reserve elements for rapid movement or maneuver to support the mission.
 Ambush, block, canalize, contain, delay, destroy, disrupt, fix, suppress, neutralize, or interdict, as
required.
Defeat or Destroy
4-120. Actions to defeat or destroy an enemy maintain situational awareness and understanding of enemy
movements, maneuver, and dispositions. Concurrently, KPA actions deny the enemy accurate knowledge of
KPA movements, maneuver, dispositions, and the ability to predict how the KPA will tactically act. Actions
will typically include but are not limited to—
 Employ continuous counterreconnaissance and RISTA.
 Conduct defensive actions to defeat or destroy designated enemy units.
 Fire and maneuver to defeat or destroy designated enemy.
 Continue tactical mission.
Subterranean Area Actions

4-121. KPA plans and actions for subterranean combat, similar to rural or urban complex environments,
include continuous EIW. The integrated elements in EIW degrade enemy situational awareness and
understanding of subterranean conditions, which may exacerbate the physical and psychological limitations
of enemy actions.
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Chapter 4
4-122. Subterranean actions use common tactics and drills in varied types of subterranean complexes.
Subterranean environments used for military purposes can include—
 Natural terrain with cave or basic tunneling systems.
 Manmade subterranean complexes such as interconnected building basements and foundation
networks, transportation systems, or other urban subsurface infrastructure networks.
 Underground facilities, typically constructed for specified military functions.
4-123. From a military perspective, all of these subterranean environments can be militarized as a
subterranean CBP. This battle position provides a level of protection for its functional purpose such as, but
not limited to—
 C2.
 Storage of critical assets.
 Production of materiel.
 Specified tactical, operational, or strategic capabilities.
4-124. Similar to a defensive strongpoint and with a purpose to retain terrain or block or canalize enemy
forces, the complexity of a subterranean CBP can be combined with surface CBPs as a defensive array.
Complex surface and subsurface arrays incorporate C3D for survivability and employ other engineer and
obstacle efforts to protect key activities within the complex from detection and attack and, when located,
deny seizure and occupation by an enemy. Figure 4-12 shows the masked surface signature of a subterranean
CBP.
Figure 4-12. Surface signature of a subterranean complex battle position (example)
4-125. The KPA integrates subterranean CBPs into its defenses throughout its sovereign territory, and may
use them as a significant factor in a system of tactical area or positional defenses. KPA forces operate
subterranean CBPs in both urban and rural environments, and often use a relevant population to shield the
location from enemy precision fires or area indirect fires. Natural irregularities in topography, such as
restrictive serpentine canyon walls or severe narrow valley slopes, can also preclude accurate enemy
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Battle Drills
precision fires. Decoy subterranean CBP signatures deceive or slow enemy identification of vulnerabilities
and concentration of combat power for an attack. Figure 4-13 displays the complexity of subterranean
facilities, which challenge the ability of an enemy to seize or secure.
Figure 4-13. Subterranean complex battle position configuration (example)
4-126. A subterranean CBP typically has several entrance portals and exits with barrier and blast protection.
Berms and other terrain can prevent direct fires on or into the entrance portals. A tunnel system interconnects
galleries, alcoves, mission spaces, silos, shafts, and protective measures throughout the surface and
subsurface footprint of the complex. The connecting tunnels of a system incorporate severe direction changes
in passageways to slow or stop enemy movement within a complex and shape multiple kill zones within the
tunnel and interior system.
4-127. The defense of a subterranean CBP typically integrates surface and subsurface security zones and
battle zones. The CBP commander designates subordinate functional elements in defenses and options for
offensive actions. Subterranean CBPs commonly employ a defense with mission tasks of disruption, main
defense, reserve, and support elements. Figure 4-14 on page 4-40 shows a side view of a possible
subterranean CBP, illustrates how it can be viewed functionally, and indicates the complexity of a system
that may have limited indirect approaches for seizure or securing.
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Chapter 4
Figure 4-14. Subterranean complex battle position (side-view functional example)
4-128. The disruption element on the terrain surface of a subterranean CBP detects enemy units and
provides early warning to the defending CBPs. A disruption element may occupy combat security outposts,
surface ambush sites, or battle positions. Additional tasks can include air assault defense ambushes when
surface observation posts and exit portals allow for rapid assembly on the surface to attack and repel enemy
units being inserted by rotary- or fixed-wing aircraft. On successful conduct of an ambush, disruption
elements may be ordered to reoccupy subterranean positions or to remain in surface fighting positions to
continue disruption actions, coordinate indirect fires, or provide RISTA to the subterranean CBP commander.
Disruption elements may re-emerge from hide positions to further disrupt enemy formations, canalize
attacking forces, and otherwise degrade enemy combat power.
4-129. Disruption elements position and reposition to—
 Provide early warning of an enemy approach.
 Prevent enemy observation of defensive preparations.
 Defeat infiltrating enemy reconnaissance units.
 Prevent enemy direct fires or observed indirect fires from reaching the main defensive area of the
subterranean CBP.
 Disrupt enemy momentum.
Main Defense Unit

4-130. The main defense unit defends the complex position with integrated obstacles and fires focused on
multiple kill zones throughout the surface and subsurface areas of the complex and array. Designated units
fix or isolate the enemy in kill zones inside and outside of the subterranean CBP so KPAGF units can attack
by fire or support by fire to defeat or destroy the enemy. KPAGF defensive units support each other in
repositioning within the CBP in order to continue the defense.
4-131. The KPAGF may maneuver bypassed subterranean CBP units to create a directional dilemma for an
enemy assault force. Passageways of various height and width can typically have impediments such as mesh
or nets, depression traps, and other obstacles to preclude effective enemy use of remote-controlled wheeled,
tracked, or aerial systems to conduct reconnaissance and other actions within the CBP tunnel complex. As
an enemy attempts to conduct a methodical breach in tunnels with only limited knowledge of complex
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Battle Drills
structural configuration, some subterranean CBP units fix or isolate enemy initial assault units, while other
units attack enemy support units in rearward locations in or near the CBP. Surface direct and indirect fires
are incorporated into the concurrent subsurface and surface combat.
Reserve Unit
4-132. A reserve unit as a support capability, provides the KPA subterranean CBP commander with tactical
flexibility. Location of reserves in the CBP ensures rapid response to portals or barriers of the complex in
jeopardy of being penetrated by an enemy. Tasks typical for contingencies and use of a reserve include—
 Block a penetration.
 Fix an enemy unit.
 Isolate an enemy unit.
 Defend a mission space.
 Counterattack.
Support Unit
4-133. A support unit can be located inside or outside of the subterranean CBP for support of KPA units
within, or at a combination of surface and subsurface locations in or at some distance from the CBP. C2 to
interior and exterior units for fires and maneuver options, power generation, potable water, and proper
ventilation within a subterranean CBP are critical considerations in maintaining a subterranean environment
and conducting defensive and, as necessary, offensive actions.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 4-41

Chapter 5
Reconnaissance and Security
This chapter covers Korean People’s Army (KPA) reconnaissance and security—
essential components to any mission. It discusses how the KPA uses reconnaissance,
intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) as essential elements to
successfully meet its reconnaissance and security requirements. It also addresses the
KPA intelligence process. The section on security provides information on how the
KPA protects its units from being surprised by the enemy. Examples of reconnaissance
and security organizational structures and the types of missions conducted by both
types of units are found throughout the chapter.
RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY OPERATIONS

5-1. Reconnaissance and security operations are integrated functions to obtain information and create
practical knowledge in order to enhance tactical decision making and actions and protect designated units,
activities, and KPA combat power. Reconnaissance and security measures continuously sustain situational
awareness and understanding of an operational environment (OE), including friendly forces, enemies,
adversaries, and civilian populations. Security operations provide early and accurate warning of adversarial
actions, intent, or other OE conditions that could impact mission accomplishment, and provide KPA leaders
with time and maneuver space to preempt or react to conditions. The KPA considers reconnaissance and
security as primarily offensive actions.
5-2. Reconnaissance and security missions are typically interwoven in combined arms mission tasks. While
the KPA considers reconnaissance to be a military activity, it requires a variety of information not only about
the enemy’s military, but its politics and economics, as well as an OE’s geography and weather.
Reconnaissance is a specified or implied task for all KPA activities. In addition to the inherent continuum of
reconnaissance and security actions, KPA leaders designate specified missions with appropriate capabilities
and ensure that reconnaissance and security efforts complement the coordinated intelligence mission effect
with higher- and lower-echelon headquarters and units.
5-3. Reconnaissance and security tasks combine the functional capabilities of organizations to provide the
best possible collection and tactical effects to achieve assigned purpose and intent. Capabilities are typically
a combination of ground and aerial resources and sensors. An extensive suite of technical sensor systems at
various KPA echelons supports specified reconnaissance, surveillance, information collection, intelligence
production, target acquisition, and fires tasks. Resource capabilities can overlap in coverage to provide
redundancy or mitigate possible shortcomings of a particular system. Functional areas often integrated for
reconnaissance and security operations include but are not limited to—
 Cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum.
 Artillery rangefinding and signals target acquisition.
 Aircraft collection systems.
 Space system collection downlinks and interface into tactical systems.
 Air defense integrated early warning and target acquisition.
 Engineer mobility and countermobility.
 Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN).
 Human observation and collection.
5-4. Mission tasks occur for the KPA within an area of operations (AO) and can include a zone of
reconnaissance responsibility (ZORR). See chapter 2 for more discussion on control measures. Special
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Chapter 5
reconnaissance missions can occur in areas contiguous or noncontiguous to other KPA operations. The basic
mission of KPA reconnaissance is to not only to gather necessary information about the enemy’s military,
but also local geography, waterways, ports, and weather, to better understand trends that influence civilian
population, politics, and the economy.
RECONNAISSANCE, INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND TARGET ACQUISITION SYSTEM

5-5. The KPA retains a simple concept and effective description of enabling leader decision making and
application of combat power. Situational awareness and understanding are products of a functional system
of RISTA. The KPA continues to refine an integrated system to collect information, create and update timely
intelligence, and identify capabilities to monitor, target, and strike an enemy at an advantageous time and
location. An attack with fires in tactical operations can often require near real-time or immediate execution
to achieve effective results. The RISTA system also provides subsequent data and analysis to estimate or
confirm battle damage assessment on targets.
5-6. RISTA unites the individual functional systems to create a system of systems. The reconnaissance,
intelligence, and surveillance of an area or point of interest are an integrated group of functions and activities
that prioritize and optimize available sensors to locate, study, and exploit a potential or assigned target. These
capabilities combine to indicate when and how to most effectively attack an acquired target. The decision to
attack is often a time-sensitive action, but can also be a decision conducted only when specific conditions are
confirmed.
5-7. The KPA recognizes that defeating the ability of enemy maneuver, RISTA, or fires systems can be
problematic without pinpointing or monitoring the location of the enemy’s units. Notwithstanding the tactical
challenges, RISTA combines KPA capabilities and actions to apply relevant intelligence in compressed
decision cycles to achieve selective situational understanding of an enemy, adversary, or an OE to complete
the desired intent to achieve a specific mission. The KPA also considers a more inclusive use of multiple
RISTA capabilities. In addition to providing a high degree of reliability to committing fires on high-payoff
targets, RISTA and its complement to electronic intelligence warfare (EIW) effects can cause predictable
impacts on the cognitive agility of an enemy. Deceiving or decreasing the skills, moral resolve, and ability
of an enemy to act effectively is a fundamental aspect of the KPA seizing the initiative, creating tactical
opportunities, and applying combat power in an integrated and synchronized manner.
RECONNAISSANCE FIRES SYSTEM

5-8. The reconnaissance fires system is a fires-executing entity of the RISTA system and integrated fires
system (IFS) in tactical-echelon operations. The intelligence and situational understanding resulting from
RISTA processes enable KPA decision makers to conduct precise point or area targeting with near real-time
fire missions on high-value and high-payoff targets. Selective capabilities can provide semiautonomous or
autonomous fire mission execution or can be controlled in a standardized approval process by authorized
KPA leaders. Semiautonomous or autonomous fire missions are pre-approved fire missions that a maneuver
commander can execute upon the identification of a target or a specific target without going through the
standard fire-request chain. Precision fires are a norm for attacking targets in dynamic tactical situations;
however, massed artillery fires often have effects beyond destruction of a particular target. Massed fires can
cause a profound paralysis or psychological trauma on individuals experiencing or witnessing such an attack.
Selected targets are typically engaged with fires of short duration that are task-organized for maximum
destruction or other effects. In either point target or area fire missions, the coordinated firing units quickly
disperse from firing locations to alternate sites within a firing position area to avoid effective enemy
counterfires. The exception is when the Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (KPAGF) fire their artillery
from hardened artillery sites—reinforced firing positions built into mountains, which lessens their
susceptibility to counterartillery fire. See chapters 4 and 7 for more information on subterranean operations,
including hardened artillery sites.
5-9. High-payoff targets are detected, monitored, and selected in conjunction with RISTA for attack
throughout an AO, and can include but are not limited to:
 Condensed groupings of tactical maneuver formations.
 Command and control (C2) and communications nodes.
5-2 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

 Artillery or rocket unit concentrations.

 Systems with precision-guided munitions.
 Logistics sites with critical bulk commodities, such as ammunition and fuel.
 Air defense weapon or target acquisition nodes.
 Systems specialized for space downlink of navigational or other C2 data.
 Sensor systems with specialized optical, electro-optical, radar, thermal-imaging, acoustic, or other
collection and targeting devices.
5-10. The integration and timely coordination of fires in support of tactical missions uses a suite of redundant
C2 and communications, complemented by the presence of KPA fires force commanders at critical locations
to make timely decisions with and for the maneuver force commander. This fires support is typically a tactical
artillery commander in a command observation post (OP) co-located with or near a supported maneuver
commander. Technical system capabilities assist both commanders in mutual situational awareness and
understanding, and often include both manned and unmanned sensors to augment real-time human
observation and integrated digital communications at forward observation locations.
5-11. An IFS and its reconnaissance fires system links enhance semiautomated or automated C2 and
communications systems to provide effective fires support. High-payoff targets in operational-echelon
operations and at far distances from a tactical AO are typically engaged by an operational- or strategic-
echelon headquarters and its reconnaissance strike system. The IFS for these fires uses appropriate long-
range reconnaissance and strike systems as a norm under the C2 and communications of an operational- or
strategic-echelon headquarters, but can also direct a tactical-echelon IFS to support fires as part of a
reconnaissance strike system fire mission.
5-12. Both of these fires systems form a network-centric system that integrates operators, reconnaissance
assets, C2, communications, selective semiautomated or automated decision-making capabilities, and a full
range of fires systems that include cannon and gun artillery, mortars, multiple launch rocket artillery, surface-
to-surface ballistic or cruise missiles; attack aviation; and may include naval or coastal seaborne fires.
INTEGRATED FIRES SYSTEM

5-13. The IFS is the combination of standing C2 and communications structures and the task organization
of constituent and dedicated fire support units, as well as other capabilities—such as an integrated air defense
system—to enable effective fires in support of military operations. Selective centralized and decentralized
options exist for semiautonomous or autonomous fires based on RISTA engagement criteria. When near real-
time or immediate fires is not required, a standardized approval process by authorized KPA leaders can also
be employed.
5-14. A KPAGF division and higher headquarters operate an IFS with functional staff, command posts,
communications and intelligence architecture, and automated fire control system. Task-organized divisions
can have rotary-wing attack assets in a supporting role and can also request fixed-wing sorties for direct air
support through the IFS to higher-echelon headquarters. At regimental level, attack helicopters supporting a
mission would typically remain under control of the KPAGF division commander.
5-15. Support of fixed- or rotary-wing assets for a battalion mission would come from a higher-echelon
headquarters. A battalion does not have constituent rotary-wing assets and normally does not have a dedicated
forward air controller. If aviation support is provided for a mission to a battalion, the brigade or division
would provide a forward air controller to the battalion for air support coordination in conjunction with the
IFS.
5-16. An IFS exercises C2 of all constituent and dedicated fire support assets retained by its level of
command. This includes army aviation, artillery, and missile units. It also exercises C2 over RISTA assets
allocated to it. Components of EIW apply to all plans and actions of an IFS. Based on mission requirements,
a division or higher-headquarters commander can place maneuver forces under the C2 of the IFS commander.
5-17. Conditions could exist that require fire support relationships among service, joint, or combined forces.
An example of possible task organization would be to direct an IFS to command a division-echelon disruption
force, an exploitation force, or any other functional force whose actions must be closely coordinated with
fires delivered by the IFS.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 5-3

Chapter 5
RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY METHODS

5-18. KPA leaders determine the appropriate combination of dismounted, mounted, aerial, and other
technical sensor systems to employ in order to accomplish a mission. Reconnaissance and security methods
apply the KPA fundamentals and principles for efficient and effective configuration and employment of
resources over the duration of a reconnaissance or security mission. The configuration of capabilities and
timing of employment consider at least three key aspects of collecting information: cueing, mixing, and
redundancy.
5-19. Cueing is integrating one or more types of reconnaissance or surveillance systems so that one system
prompts another to collect additional or more-detailed information on an objective or target. A particular
reconnaissance or surveillance action, once prompted for execution by a pre-identified condition, also needs
to be timed in conjunction with the KPA leader priorities of effort and systems availability.
5-20. Mixing is combining two or more different capabilities to collect against the same intelligence
requirement. Employing two or more systems increases the probability of effective collection and the ability
to determine deceptive measures by a foe.
5-21. Redundancy is using two or more similar assets to collect against the same intelligence requirement.
Redundancy improves the probability of collecting required information and indicators and provides depth
in the event that one unit becomes compromised.
DISMOUNTED RECONNAISSANCE
5-22. KPAGF dismounted reconnaissance can provide detailed information collection about the enemy,
terrain, civil considerations, and infrastructure, using human observation and technical systems. While
dismounted action is typically the most time-consuming method by ground and air units, the terrain on the
Korean Peninsula—with mountain ranges that typically run north-south—makes it an excellent method for
reconnaissance with a lesser chance of detection by enemy units. There are four primary dismounted
reconnaissance formations used by KPAGF reconnaissance squads, with the standard squad being 10
soldiers, based on the terrain: semi-open, open, defile, or hilltop.
Semi-open
5-23. In semi-open terrain and at night, the KPAGF reconnaissance squad moves in a column formation with
the squad leader in front, leading the group. The interval between each soldier is 10 to 20 paces in the daytime
and 3 to 5 paces at night, depending on terrain and visibility.
Open
5-24. In open terrain or when an area reconnaissance is needed, the squad breaks into three teams. The squad
leader takes one team, the assistant squad leader leads a second team, and one of the more experienced
soldiers takes charge of the third team. The distance between the squad members remains the same. The
squad leader designates a route for each of the three groups to take and then a linkup point for the three
groups. The three groups communicate with each other through hand and arm signals, clapping hands,
whistling, lighting matches, or using blinking flashlights. After meeting at the linkup point, the patrol reforms
and continues its reconnaissance mission.
Defile
5-25. If the reconnaissance patrol knows it will pass a chokepoint, the squad will use a defile formation. The
squad leader will send a three-soldier team ahead while the others wait in a hidden location and provide
security. If the lead team receives enemy fire, the squad leader will decide what to do based on the amount
of enemy fire. If the enemy weapon fire is light, the remainder of the patrol may move forward to fire and
maneuver on the enemy. If the fire is too heavy, the lead team will attempt to break contact and return to the
rest of the reconnaissance patrol. The squad leader will then decide what to do based upon the volume of fire
and the patrol’s mission.
5-4 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Hilltop
5-26. When a squad wants to reconnoiter a hilltop or a ridgeline, the squad leader will assign two soldiers to
cover a side of the hill or ridge. The rest of the squad will move to another side of the hill in column, usually
90 degrees from the security team, and walk single-file to the military crest of the hill. At the military crest,
the squad will spread out to both flanks of the squad leader and, together, the soldiers will top the hill. If
occupied, the reconnaissance squad will take the hill from the enemy and then have the two soldiers from the
security team join it. If there is contact on the hilltop, the squad leader will decide whether to attack or
withdraw based on the mission, with the security team providing covering fire.
MOUNTED RECONNAISSANCE
5-27. KPAGF mounted reconnaissance can typically employ systems with greater collection range and
stand-off capabilities, and can enhance collection abilities based on the speed or range of mounted systems.
Mounted and dismounted methods are usually configured as a mixed method. The KPA normally uses
dismounted patrols, but in certain circumstances may use a combination of motorcycles, trucks, or armored
vehicles to conduct reconnaissance.
AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE
5-28. KPA aerial reconnaissance enhances mounted and dismounted ground capabilities to collect, with
increased speed, range, and altitude of its systems. Tactical reconnaissance incorporates fixed-wing and
rotary-wing aerial platforms along with an expanding role for unmanned aircraft (UAs), from low-level
micro-platforms to high-altitude or space platforms with downlinks to other reconnaissance, surveillance,
and weapons systems. The KPA may employ multiple rotary- and fixed-wing UAs. See appendix B for
additional information on UAs.
ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM TECHNICAL SENSORS RECONNAISSANCE

5-29. The KPA possesses older sensor systems that complement its abilities to monitor, intercept, track, and
collect information for reconnaissance and surveillance purposes. Electromagnetic radiation is classified by
wavelength into radio wave, microwave, terahertz (or submillimeter) radiation, infrared, the visible region
(perceived as light), ultraviolet, X-ray, and gamma ray. Dismounted, mounted, aerial, cyberspace, and
electromagnetic sensors provide flexibility for the mixture and redundancy of technical assets and methods
in order to focus special or unique capabilities on a comprehensive reconnaissance task. While North Korea
lacks some capabilities, such as space assets, the KPA would likely be assisted by partners and allies with
such capabilities. The KPA could also augment space-based intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance
through commercially purchased imagery.
RECONNAISSANCE BY FIRE
5-30. Reconnaissance by fire is a method in which direct or indirect fires are placed on a suspected enemy
position to cause the enemy to disclose its presence by movement or return fire. This type of engagement can
be direct, indirect, or a combination of direct and indirect fires. When available, indirect fires support a KPA
reconnaissance unit that remains undetected as it observes possible enemy reactions. Reconnaissance by fire
does not ensure that an enemy will disclose itself, and is typically used only when other reconnaissance means
are not available or timeliness of intelligence collection requires this action.
RECONNAISSANCE AMBUSH
5-31. A KPAGF reconnaissance ambush is a method accomplished by surprise attack from cover for the
purpose of seizing prisoners, documents, and samples of weapons or equipment. Typical targets for ambush
are solitary enemy soldiers or small groups moving on foot or in vehicles. The more favorable conditions for
finding such isolated targets are when the enemy is preparing for an attack or when it is regrouping or
relieving units. Information collection is the most common purpose of an ambush conducted by
reconnaissance patrols. Patrols also may execute an ambush, however, to delay reserves or to inflict damage
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 5-5

Chapter 5
on a target of opportunity. Reconnaissance ambushes can occur in all kinds of battle, on any terrain, at any
time of day or year, and under various weather conditions.
RECONNAISSANCE ATTACK
5-32. The reconnaissance attack is the most ambitious—and least preferred—method to gain information.
When other means of gaining information have failed, a reconnaissance unit can undertake an attack. The
attack may be force-, terrain-, or facility-oriented, but the overall objective is force-oriented. The KPA
commanders understand that their enemy will take necessary measures to prevent them from gaining critical
intelligence, so their reconnaissance assets will need to fight to gain that information. See chapter 6 for how
to execute a reconnaissance attack.
RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY PLANS, PREPARATION, AND

EXECUTION
5-33. For the KPA, reconnaissance is a critical component of combat support. In modern combat, especially
on the Korean Peninsula, the battlefield will not always develop in a contiguous manner. Units cannot rely
on the security of their flanks or rear—in fact there may not be “flanks” or a “rear.” Friendly and enemy units
can become intermingled, with the combat situation developing and changing quickly. Reconnaissance units
must warn KPA commanders of developing threats and identify enemy strengths and vulnerabilities. The
KPA organizes reconnaissance to acquire continuous, timely, and accurate information on the OA. This
includes information about—
 The enemy’s CBRN and precision weapons, unit disposition, and intentions.
 Terrain and weather.
5-34. This information is vital to the KPA decision-making and planning process. Reconnaissance can
decisively influence the outcome of a battle. Since the enemy typically defends vital information with security
actions and camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D) measures, KPA reconnaissance plans will
always contain a provision for defeating the enemy’s efforts to protect itself.
RECONNAISSANCE PLANNING
5-35. The purpose of reconnaissance planning is to thoroughly coordinate the actions of all reconnaissance
organizations and levels of command. Ultimately, the planning must ensure that missions, targets, times,
forms of action, ZORRs, and the exchange of information are fully coordinated.
5-36. Each tactical-level unit down to the battalion level has one or more ZORRs. This zone is a combination
of the unit’s AO and the area outside of the AO that can be observed by the unit’s technical sensors. The
ZORR may extend into adjacent unit AOs. This results in overlapping coverage, which can prevent surprise
and the KPAGF’s enemy exploiting the seams between AOs. Within its ZORR, the unit must be able to
monitor enemy activity sufficiently to ensure that unexpected enemy moves do not disrupt its own plans.
Reconnaissance in this zone should provide early warning of potential enemy movement into the AO from
any direction.
5-37. The chief of reconnaissance develops a reconnaissance plan for the commander within the framework
of the higher headquarters’ mission and the higher commander’s decisions. The chief of reconnaissance
combines this information with—
 The higher headquarters’ instructions regarding reconnaissance missions.
 Information currently available on the enemy.
 The status of reconnaissance assets.
5-38. Depending on the situation, the reconnaissance plan may include—

 The AOs of KPA units.
 The commander’s concept and mission.
 All available information regarding known and suspected enemy groups and intentions.
5-6 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

 A list of tasks—including obtaining new information, confirming previously available

information, battle damage assessment, and calling for fire on targets of opportunity.
 A list of priority targets for reconnaissance.
 The deployment of reconnaissance assets in terms of these tasks and targets.
 The time and sequence for executing the tasks.
 Restrictions on reconnaissance actions during specific times or in certain areas.
 The method and time for reporting.
5-39. The content of reconnaissance missions depends on the KPA commander’s information requirements.
These, in turn, depend on the nature of the KPA unit’s combat mission. In offense, reconnaissance must
establish the enemy’s effective combat strength, affiliation, combat effectiveness, and whether or not it has
CBRN or precision weapons. Reconnaissance must discover firing positions for weapons, strong points, gaps,
and the nature of engineer preparation of defensive positions. It is also important to locate and track enemy
reserves and possible axes for counterattacks. Reconnaissance must also identify terrain that may present
trafficability problems for advancing KPAGF units.
5-40. In the defense, reconnaissance must cover enemy preparation for an attack and determine the possible
time of the attack. The reconnaissance effort must establish the makeup of the enemy grouping and identify
the axis of its main attack and the nature of its maneuver. It is especially important to determine the locations
of firing positions of artillery and other weapons, as well as locations of C2 and communications facilities,
the combat effectiveness of enemy troops, and their affiliation. The plan should include reconnaissance tasks
for the entire course of defensive actions as well as tasks that support an eventual transition of the KPAGF
back to the offense.
INFORMATION FLOW AND COMMUNICATIONS

5-41. The KPAGF commander’s instructions, the unit’s reconnaissance plan, and the unit’s combat orders
to reconnaissance units identify information requirements and specify how and when to report this
information. To minimize radio traffic from overloading a certain frequency, the flow of information both up
and down the chain of command will normally take place on a designated reconnaissance channel. KPA
commanders determine how frequently they wish to receive various types of situational data.
5-42. KPA reconnaissance units typical report to the commander of their parent reconnaissance unit, the
chief of reconnaissance, or the chief of staff of the maneuver unit that dispatched the reconnaissance unit. In
exceptional cases, however, a reconnaissance leader may skip an echelon and report to a higher level if
directed in the unit’s specific instructions. There are two types of reconnaissance reports. Periodic reports are
submitted regularly at a set time, and aperiodic reports are submitted when there are significant changes in
the situation. The reconnaissance subsection under the chief of reconnaissance’s direction conducts the
following activities—
 Evaluates and summarizes incoming information for its unit commander.
 Disseminates this information to other command and staff elements in the unit, including higher
headquarters, and adjacent units.
 Studies all available information from all sources before reaching conclusions.
 Studies even false information, as it contradicts information from other sources or does not
correspond to the developing situation; this false information can reveal the enemy’s deception
plans.
5-43. KPA commanders and staffs receive reports from reconnaissance units or chiefs of reconnaissance.
Depending on the situation, these reports may be in the form of briefings, radio communications, or written
reports. The term reconnaissance report applies to a specific document prepared by a KPA headquarters for
reporting information about the enemy to a higher headquarters. It may be a periodic reconnaissance report
forwarded every few hours as specified in instructions. It may also be an aperiodic report prepared at the
initiative of the subordinate commander or upon special request from the higher KPA commander. In any
case, the report includes, at a minimum, the following components—
 The general nature of enemy activities throughout the reporting unit’s entire ZORR.
 The disposition and grouping of enemy units in each area or axis within the ZORR.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 5-7

Chapter 5
 Significant changes that have occurred since the previous report.

 The reporting unit’s conclusions about possible enemy actions based on its analysis of indications
within its ZORR.
 The source of the data and the time received.
5-44. The reconnaissance summary is a report, prepared by a KPA unit at regimental level or above, that
contains information about the enemy covering a given period of time. The reporting unit sends this summary
to the higher headquarters at times established in its instructions. It is normally provided no more than once
per day as a narrative of the highlights of the past 24 hours. The reconnaissance summary is also sent to
adjacent and subordinate headquarters for information purposes. The reconnaissance summary normally
contains the following components—
 The general nature of enemy activities in the KPAGF unit’s ZORR.
 Data about the enemy’s CBRN and precision weapons and their employment.
 The positions of enemy units at the time of the preparation of the summary.
 Information about the enemy’s air and naval forces, air defense, command posts, radar equipment,
logistics installations, obstacles, and field fortifications.
 The KPA reporting unit’s general assessment of the disposition, activities, and condition of enemy
units and the nature of forthcoming enemy activities.
 Information gaps to be addressed during further reconnaissance activities.
5-45. The summary may also include significant results from prisoner interrogation or from the exploitation
of captured enemy documents or equipment.
RECONNAISSANCE FUNDAMENTALS
5-46. Reconnaissance fundamentals focus plans and actions to effectively employ reconnaissance and
associated security tasks. These fundamentals complement the general principles stated in chapter 1.
RECONNAISSANCE OBJECTIVE
5-47. The reconnaissance objective focuses a reconnaissance task as a clearly stated requirement for
specified information. The object of the requirement is often a terrain feature, geographic area, enemy unit,
adversary capability or limitation, or information on a different variable of an OE. The requirement may also
include a professional assessment based on human observation and data collection. The available resources
and priorities of effort will determine what specific objectives are assigned to units to inform the commander
or confirm or deny information on the enemy in order to conduct intelligence preparation of current and
projected operations. In achieving the reconnaissance objective, the KPA leader understands the risk expected
in developing the tactical situation while retaining freedom of movement and maneuver. This assessment of
risk and decision making in reconnaissance operations includes higher-headquarters guidance on
engagement, disengagement, displacement, tactical task handover, or bypass criteria for a particular mission.
CONTINUITY
5-48. Reconnaissance provides constant coverage of selected variables in an OE. Continuous reconnaissance
improves the corroboration or confirmation of accurate and reliable information and intelligence, and
provides multiple indicators to suspect and then counter adversary or enemy deception efforts. The KPAGF
unit maintains contact with its reconnaissance target with overlapping, successive, or alternating resources.
5-49. KPA leaders determine how and when to commit capabilities to ensure constant reconnaissance. If
coverage gaps emerge during preparation or execution of a mission, the KPA leader informs higher
headquarters, acknowledges the gap and risk, and coordinates for capabilities to remedy the potential
collection vulnerability. Reconnaissance plans and actions are a continuum focused by the KPA commander
on critical information requirements and priority tactical issues.
5-8 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

AGGRESSIVENESS
5-50. Aggressiveness is a vigorous behavior to identify and collect required information in order to produce
specified intelligence. KPAGF reconnaissance activities willingly fight for information when other forms of
collection are inadequate to achieving a reconnaissance objective. KPAGF reconnaissance units may be
required or directed to transition from reconnaissance to direct action tasks against a reconnaissance target.
TIMELINESS
5-51. Timely information reporting is critical to situational awareness and understanding in rapidly changing
OEs. The ability to acquire, report, target, and deliver capabilities in near real-time with RISTA, a C2
element, and an IFS provides the KPA commander with the greatest opportunity to successfully complete the
unit mission. Timely reporting enables a KPA commander and subordinate leaders to exploit temporary
tactical opportunities and enemy vulnerabilities.
5-52. Timeliness also considers the speed, pace, and tempo required to efficiently and effectively collect and
report information, decide on action, and act. Tempo, pace, and speed relate to the time period allowed to
conduct a reconnaissance mission, the intent of covert and overt reconnaissance activities, and the level of
detail anticipated from a focused collection effort.
ACCURACY
5-53. The KPA uses all available reconnaissance means to verify the accuracy and reliability of reported
information. A KPA commander bases decisions on accurate and reliable reconnaissance information and
professional experience in deciding and taking action. The accuracy and reliability of reconnaissance
information are critical to the targeting and destruction of high-value targets, such as enemy CBRN
capabilities, precision weapons, attack aviation, logistics centers, C2, and communications. The KPA
achieves accuracy and reliability through the creation of overlapping coverage and the use of improved
technologies.
RELIABILITY
5-54. Reconnaissance must reliably clarify the enemy situation in spite of enemy C3D and
counterreconnaissance activities. Actions tailor reconnaissance efforts to the tactical situation. KPA
commanders select and allocate reconnaissance units in accordance with their capabilities in terms of
missions and targets. Subsequent actions are to compare, validate, and integrate reconnaissance reports from
multiple sources. The study and integration of reconnaissance information collected by multiple sources can
assist in identifying and assessing false targets and other false indicators of enemy actions or intentions.
MULTIDIRECTIONAL
5-55. Reconnaissance must occur in all directions. KPA units cannot become so focused on one direction
that a unit is surprised from another direction. The KPA is limited in the number of sensors available and will
likely use them on its reconnaissance objectives. It will use units, however, to perform reconnaissance,
surveillance, and/or security tasks to protect the main body from surprise while still accomplishing primary
reconnaissance missions.
RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS
5-56. KPA reconnaissance missions are usually grouped into three broad categories: area, zone, and route.
A fourth category is special reconnaissance, which is typically conducted by special operations forces (SOF)
or other designated units operating in the depth of an enemy AO or at selected sites. Table 5-1 on page 5-10
provides concise descriptions of reconnaissance missions.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 5-9

Chapter 5
Table 5-1. Reconnaissance mission descriptions
Mission Description
Area Obtain detailed information within a specified area identified by a boundary that
includes terrain, enemy units, and relevant population considerations that can
reconnaissance impact on mission success.
Zone Obtain detailed information within a zone identified by a boundary that includes all
routes, obstacles, terrain, enemy units, and relevant population considerations
reconnaissance that can impact on mission success.
Route Obtain detailed information on a specified route, trafficability, lateral routes, terrain,
enemy units, and relevant population on or along the route that an enemy could
reconnaissance use to impact movement or maneuver.
5-57. KPA doctrine further categorizes the different reconnaissance missions by branch or function. These
categories include—
 Infantry.
 Armor.
 Field artillery.
 Signal corps.
 Engineers
 Chemical.
 Wireless technology.
 Rear area.
 Geographic.
AREA RECONNAISSANCE
5-58. KPAGF area reconnaissance is a mission to obtain detailed information about the terrain, adversary or
enemy activity, civilian activities, infrastructure, or other OE features within a designated geographic area.
The area may be identified as a single geographic point or a specified area defined by a boundary. One
difference between an area reconnaissance and a zone reconnaissance is that an area reconnaissance focuses
typically on a geographic area smaller than a zone.
5-59. Figure 5-1 provides an example of a reconnaissance platoon reinforced with engineer reconnaissance
squads conducting an area reconnaissance oriented on possible river crossing sites. The reconnaissance may
include the following requirements—
 Trafficability of primary and alternate access, approach, and exit routes to crossing sites.
 Sustainability of routes based on soil and slopes.
 Concealed locations for crossing support units.
 Lateral and overhead restrictions to staging, support, and readiness areas.
 Riverbank slope and reinforcement material.
 Water flow characteristics, velocity, and probable near- and far-bank saturation areas in heavy
rains.
 River bottom characteristics.
 Seasonal wind direction for smoke obscuration use considerations.
 Bypass routes if two planned crossing areas become untenable.
5-10 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Figure 5-1. Area reconnaissance and tactical tasks (example)
ZONE RECONNAISSANCE
5-60. KPAGF zone reconnaissance is a mission to obtain detailed information on all routes, obstacles,
terrain, and enemy units in a zone defined by boundaries. Operations validate the intelligence preparation of
the battlefield process by confirming or denying items of interest such as natural and manmade obstacles,
trafficability of routes, viability and utility of key terrain, and areas with possible or known CBRN
contamination or other limitations that can affect a mission. Zone reconnaissance is a deliberate and intensive
operation that takes more time to conduct than other forms of reconnaissance in order to refine detail and
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 5-11

Chapter 5
understanding of an OE, adversary or enemy composition, disposition, and readiness, or civil considerations
of a relevant population. Figure 5-2 provides an example of a zone reconnaissance with its associated tactical
tasks.
Figure 5-2. Zone reconnaissance and tactical tasks (example)
ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE
5-61. KPAGF route reconnaissance is a mission to obtain detailed information of a specified route and all
terrain from which the enemy could influence movement or maneuver on or adjacent to a designated route.
The route may be a manmade transportation feature, cross-country mobility corridor, or several routes in an
axis of advance. A route reconnaissance can be a discrete mission task or a specified task within a zone or
area reconnaissance. Route reconnaissance is not a route classification mission, which requires technical
measurements and analysis typically performed by mission-tailored engineer reconnaissance teams. Basic
route classification information can be collected, however, by other than engineer teams. Figure 5-3 provides
an example of a platoon echelon route reconnaissance mission.
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Figure 5-3. Route reconnaissance and tactical tasks (example)
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 5-13

Chapter 5
SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE
5-62. KPA special reconnaissance includes reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special
operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic
or operational significance. This type of reconnaissance usually employs military capabilities not resident in
regular units. SOF typically provide this type of reconnaissance operations support and liaison to a senior
KPA commander of regular or combined forces. Special reconnaissance can occur prior to, during, or after
regular forces entering an AO. These actions provide an additional capability for commanders to supplement
other conventional reconnaissance and surveillance actions. Irregular units affiliated to KPA regular or SOF
can employ a wide range of reconnaissance skills from simple human observation and collection to use of
sophisticated sensor systems. Surveillance by irregular units can occur over extended periods of time and
complement SOF or regular units at selected points in time as regular and irregular units operate within an
AO or ZORR.
RECONNAISSANCE METHODS
5-63. The KPA employs a variety of different methods when conducting reconnaissance. Many of these
types of reconnaissance are very specific, but a unit may conduct more than one at the same time. These
reconnaissance methods include—
 Surveillance: either direct observation or through surveillance equipment (binoculars, night-vision
scopes, or similar equipment).
 Listening: hear the enemy or use wiretapping equipment.
 Raid: make contact with enemy static position to acquire weapons, supplies, or technical
equipment.
 Ambush: make contact with moving enemy to acquire weapons, supplies, or technical equipment.
 Searching: find targets during a specific mission, such as engineers searching for information for
a bridge crossing.
 Filming: use photography or video to report on a target.
 Combat: at brigade or divisional level, attack the enemy to acquire data on how the enemy reacts.
 Acoustic: measure the sounds of artillery to determine locations of firing batteries.
 Direct inspection: unit(s) conduct a detailed investigation of a particular enemy unit.
 Electromagnetic detection: used often by antiaircraft units to determine target’s location with
electromagnetic equipment.
 Radio direction-finding: method used to determine the location and operational procedures of
enemy electronic equipment.
 Artillery fires: fire artillery so the enemy reveals its positions.
 Interrogation (questioning): question enemy prisoners in order to obtain timely information on
their unit.
 Examination of enemy papers, weapons, and technical equipment: examine captured enemy
equipment and documents for intelligence value.
RECONNAISSANCE FORMATIONS
5-64. KPA reconnaissance exists as a function at every echelon of KPA formations, beginning with an
individual observer and extending to all KPA activities, task organizations, and unit echelons. Some KPA
reconnaissance formations are designated reconnaissance units. Functional maneuver units, such as infantry
or tank units, can be augmented with additional capabilities for specified reconnaissance mission tasks. In
either case, reconnaissance formations are typically combat or combat support capabilities task-organized to
conduct reconnaissance operations.
5-65. KPA reconnaissance mission analysis and guidance on reconnaissance methods identify the
capabilities to be provided to a designated unit headquarters. Formations may receive a mission to operate
independently, or be directed to conduct synchronized reconnaissance actions as a task-organized unit with
specialized capabilities not organic to the unit. KPAGF reconnaissance requirements may necessitate
5-14 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

augmentation for additional combat power such as infantry, armor, aviation, artillery, engineer, chemical, or
other combat support and rear service expertise. Sustained logistics support is a factor in designating task
organization and asset allocation for a mission.
OBSERVER TEAM AND OBSERVATION POST

5-66. KPA reconnaissance observation is an expectation of every member of a unit or activity. At a small
unit activity such as squad or platoon, a recurring task is reconnaissance in conjunction with security
measures. Although one individual can act as an observer, the typical configuration is to use at least two
individuals as a team in order to observe and report, with specified responsibilities, as well as sustain team
security.
5-67. An OP is a position within which a team of varied size and capability conducts surveillance of activities
in a given zone or location. An OP receives communications assets and sensors based on mission
requirements to ensure the ability to locate, track, and report on its reconnaissance targets and assigned areas
of interest. An OP can be stationary or may periodically shift location to accomplish its purpose and intent.
5-68. The size, number, and location of OPs depend on the mission, duration of tasks, and available
capabilities in the KPA force. While all units practice security, KPAGF battalions and regiments normally
establish one to two OPs. KPAGF divisions will establish two to three OPs and the soldiers assigned to them
will receive observation equipment and a compass. The number of corps OPs will depend on the mission,
but these soldiers will also carry a sketch of the target plus an observation journal, map, communications
equipment, and a watch. The location of the OPs will only be known to the soldiers manning it, the
commander, and those intelligence officers with a need to know.
RECONNAISSANCE TEAM
5-69. A KPAGF reconnaissance team is an element, typically at squad or platoon level, tasked from units
such as SOF, an operational or strategic reconnaissance battalion, reconnaissance brigade, sniper brigade
(army, air force, or navy), or a deep artillery reconnaissance battalion. Missions are typically conducted as
independent actions at significant distances deep in adversary-occupied or enemy-held terrain. For SOF units,
a team and detachment have a versatile ability to quickly task organize. Missions are often conducted with a
very small number of task-organized individuals, but can also temporarily combine functional capabilities to
conduct a mission as a large-scale grouping of combat power and subsequently dispersing back into smaller
teams or detachments.
5-70. Other units can organize reconnaissance teams from within their task organization for tactical tasks in
their AO. Typical tasks for a team can be to identify and collect information on targets such as precision
munitions and weapon sites, CBRN capabilities, C2 and communications facilities, reserves, airfields, or
other assigned priorities. A reconnaissance team may infiltrate dismounted or mounted, or be inserted by
aerial or naval assets. Recovery of a team can use similar methods. Reconnaissance tasks for this type of
team do not typically include direct combat action to collect reconnaissance. Figure 5-4 on page 5-16 provides
an example of the composition of a long-range reconnaissance platoon.
5-71. The smallest KPAGF reconnaissance element is normally a 10-soldier patrol consisting of a squad
leader with small arms. The patrol may receive additional equipment, such as a rocket-propelled grenade
launcher or medium machine gun, if the patrol is part of the division reconnaissance company or the corps
reconnaissance battalion. Approximately half the patrol may be dressed as civilians or in the enemy’s
uniforms to travel unimpeded or get closer to its assigned targets. If available and operating in a sector where
the enemy speaks English, some of the reconnaissance members will understand that language. Those in
KPAGF uniforms might wait in a hidden location for the others to return. Patrol squads operating semi-
independently could come together to conduct an attack on a high-value target. The reconnaissance element
provides its own security while on the move, at halts, or during actions on an objective.
5-72. A KPAGF reconnaissance patrol may consist of one or more of the following specialized teams. In
smaller reconnaissance elements, some members may be assigned to one or more of the teams and serve
more than one function. These teams are clearing and scouting, raiding, destruction, capture, security, and
interdiction.
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Chapter 5
Figure 5-4. Task-organized long-range reconnaissance platoon (example)
5-73. The mission of the clearing and scouting team (clearing element) is to lead the patrol to traverse
obstacles, participate in the raid, and cover the other teams’ actions.
5-74. The raiding team (action element) is responsible for actions on the objective and to provide support to
the capture and destruction teams.
5-75. The capture team (action element) is responsible for capturing enemy prisoners for future interrogation,
collecting enemy documents, and taking control of equipment designated in the reconnaissance element’s
orders.
5-76. Members of the destruction team (action element) are skilled in the use of explosives and are
responsible for blowing up the objective if that is part of the element’s mission.
5-77. During the raid, the security team (security element) provides overwatch to those teams involved in
the raid on the objective. Members of this team are especially skilled marksmen.
5-78. The interdiction team’s (fixing element) primary mission during the actual raid is to prevent
reinforcements from arriving at the target site. This could be by executing an ambush or by setting up mines
or booby-traps on the most likely avenues that reinforcements would take. During the exfiltration of the
reconnaissance element, the interdiction team (deception element) attempts to deceive any enemy following
from the actual route or to block the enemy’s pursuit through the use of obstacles, booby-traps, or ambushes.
RECONNAISSANCE PATROL
5-79. A KPAGF reconnaissance patrol is generally a platoon-size tactical reconnaissance element with the
mission of acquiring information about the enemy and the terrain. The general intention of a patrol is to avoid
direct fire action with an enemy; however, it is capable of self-defense and engagement with limited combat
power. While a reconnaissance patrol varies in size depending on the commander’s requirements, units
available, and tactical situation, mission focus determines the functional capabilities and task organization of
a patrol. Typical mission options and equipment are as follows:
5-80. KPA signals reconnaissance assets include radio intercept, direction-finding, and radar intercept
systems. Technical equipment exploits signals from cellular, digital, satellite, fiber-optic, and computer
network systems.
5-81. KPAGF engineer capabilities are usually configured as engineer specialists at squad or platoon level.
Engineer reconnaissance focuses primarily on aspects of terrain in support of the mission and generally
analyzes for mobility or countermobility tasks.
5-16 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

5-82. KPA chemical defense assets can establish chemical and radiological OPs to complement mobile
CBRN reconnaissance to confirm or deny CBRN contamination. Chemical defense reconnaissance identifies
and marks areas of CBRN contamination, determines the extent and nature of any contamination, locates
potential bypass routes around contaminated areas, and conducts doctrinal CBRN monitoring to report and
warn of terrain and downwind CBRN hazards. See appendix G for more information on CBRN operations.
5-83. KPAGF artillery reconnaissance capabilities can be included in a patrol or detachment with artillery-
specific capabilities such as battlefield surveillance radars, target acquisition radars, counterfire radars, or
sound-ranging and flash-ranging systems. Direct or indirect fires can be used for reconnaissance by fire with
risk considerations for unmasking of KPA locations.
5-84. The KPAGF distinguishes between various types of patrols under the general descriptive term of
reconnaissance patrol. Patrols are tasked with specialized functional capabilities when required, such as
signals sensors, engineer mobility or countermobility assessments, or reconnaissance of CBRN presence.
Figure 5-5 provides an example of the composition of a KPAGF reconnaissance platoon. Other types of
reconnaissance patrols include:
 Commander’s reconnaissance patrol.
 Officer reconnaissance patrol.
 Combat reconnaissance patrol.
 Independent reconnaissance patrol.
Figure 5-5. Task-organized reconnaissance patrol (example)
Commander’s Reconnaissance Patrol

5-85. KPAGF tactical commanders typically conduct a personal reconnaissance as part of a mission planning
and execution process. A KPAGF commander goes to a site in the vicinity of planned actions to conduct a
visual study of the adversary, enemy, terrain, and other OE conditions. Subordinate KPAGF commanders
and leaders, and special staff members or subject matter experts, accompany the commander in support of
the reconnaissance task and purpose. During the reconnaissance, the KPAGF commander issues guidance to
continue plans and actions as anticipated, or adjusts orders and coordination to enhance mission
accomplishment.
Officer Reconnaissance Patrol

5-86. A KPAGF commander or staff activity can order an officer reconnaissance patrol to update information
on tactical conditions and OE variables with on-site observation and sensor collection. A KPAGF officer
reconnaissance patrol is typically small in size and can comprise one to three officers and two to five other
members for operating communications equipment, providing specialized expertise, or ensuring local
security to the patrol. This type of reconnaissance is limited in task scope and time duration.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 5-17

Chapter 5
Combat Reconnaissance Patrol

5-87. A KPAGF combat reconnaissance patrol is a platoon-size element that is typically task-organized from
within a maneuver unit with an expectation that direct action combat may occur in order to achieve its
reconnaissance objective. Nevertheless, the patrol typically avoids direct fire action with an enemy if
possible. It normally operates within an area that can be supported by the indirect fires of the parent
headquarters. When required to support a particular mission task, specialized capabilities such as engineer or
CBRN can be allocated to the patrol. KPAGF units employ one or more patrols based on the tactical situation.
Mission tasks may be to reconnoiter, conduct security, or conduct security functions for the unit the patrol
supports. The KPAGF security function anticipates direct action combat and indirect fire support when an
enemy is in the area of the patrol mission. Figure 5-6 provides an example of a combat reconnaissance patrol
task-organized from within a maneuver unit.
Independent Reconnaissance Patrol

5-88. A KPAGF independent reconnaissance patrol is typically a reconnaissance or combat arms platoon,
often augmented with engineers, CBRN specialists, or other task-organized expertise. A KPAGF tactical-
level command at battalion or higher headquarters echelon can task and organize an independent
reconnaissance patrol to conduct reconnaissance of an enemy, designated terrain, or other specified collection
of OE conditions. These patrols can operate on multiple axes or focus on a primary axis, zone, area, or route.
Figures 5-5 and 5-6 on pages 5-16 and below, respectively, provide examples of KPAGF independent
reconnaissance patrols.
5-89. An independent reconnaissance patrol operates typically at greater distances than a reconnaissance
patrol operates from its parent headquarters, and can remain on mission in an assigned area for longer time
periods. Although reconnaissance is the priority mission, these patrols recognize that they may have to fight
to obtain the information to be collected. An independent reconnaissance patrol can also support air assault
defense actions in its mission area against enemy airborne or heliborne insertions. Detailed continuous
communications by the headquarters controlling the patrol occurs with higher headquarters for coordinating
or informing other units operating in the patrol zone of an AO.
RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON
5-90. The KPAGF infantry and mechanized infantry regiments are organized with a reconnaissance platoon.
The infantry regiment’s reconnaissance platoon operates primarily on foot, but is authorized trucks for long-
distance transportation. The KPA sometimes tasks an infantry maneuver battalion to divide its subordinates
units and for these units to perform duties as reconnaissance platoons. Additional capabilities may be task-
organized to the reconnaissance platoon based on mission requirements. Figure 5-6 provides an example of
a platoon tasked-organized into an independent reconnaissance patrol.
Figure 5-6. Task-organized independent reconnaissance patrol (example)
5-18 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY
5-91. The KPAGF infantry or mechanized infantry division is organized with a reconnaissance company
with significant capabilities. All division-size maneuver units have at least a reconnaissance platoon in their
unit structure. Lead divisions in an attack may receive additional reconnaissance assets from higher
headquarters. Figure 5-7 provides an example of an infantry division reconnaissance company with additional
units added for a specific mission.
Figure 5-7. Reconnaissance company detachment, infantry division (example)
RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION
5-92. The KPA Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) fields eight reconnaissance battalions to conduct
strategic, operational, or tactical missions in support of the overall KPA mission. The RGB may field another
battalion that is tailored to conduct clandestine operations in other countries. This type of specially designed
reconnaissance unit may, while highly unlikely, attempt to attack US military targets in Guam, South Korea,
or Japan. Each of the four forward-deployed KPAGF corps (I, II, IV, and V) arrayed along the demilitarized
zone (DMZ) receives an additional reconnaissance battalion from this group of eight battalions, in addition
to its organic reconnaissance assets and any assets from the reconnaissance brigades. Each of these 500-man
battalions will likely serve as the lead unit if an army corps crosses the DMZ into South Korea. These units’
missions will be to gather tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence, attack strategic targets, and
assassinate military and political leaders. Other missions could include sniper shootings to create panic
among the civilian populace, attacks against C2 and communications centers, and assessing the reactions of
the civilian population.
RECONNAISSANCE DETACHMENT
5-93. The reconnaissance detachment is the largest element that KPAGF maneuver units typically employ
at the tactical level to supplement other reconnaissance units. A combat arms company or battalion is the
basis for a detachment task organization. The primary mission is reconnaissance; however, a reconnaissance
detachment is task-organized with the capabilities to fight for information in order to accomplish its mission.
A division or regiment that forms a reconnaissance detachment normally employs it in a security zone of an
AO; however, missions can be assigned throughout a security or defense zone. Figure 5-8 on page 5-20
provides an example of an RGB reconnaissance battalion.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 5-19

Chapter 5
Figure 5-8. Reconnaissance battalion detachment, RGB (example)
RECONNAISSANCE BRIGADE
5-94. The KPAGF reconnaissance brigade is a separate SOF brigade at the operational- or strategic-echelon
headquarters, and has capabilities that can be selectively task-organized to support tactical operations.
KPAGF reconnaissance brigade forces operating in or beyond a tactical force’s AO can include long-range
reconnaissance, long-range sensor reconnaissance, intelligence and electronic warfare, mounted and
dismounted reconnaissance. When directed, these brigades can augment capabilities with selective
mechanized, armor, antitank, artillery, air defense, sniper, or engineer support. Aviation, air assault, and
unmanned aircraft system units of a reconnaissance brigade can also be in support of tactical operations.
5-95. The KPAGF fields three brigades comprised of a total of 17 reconnaissance battalions, all distributed
among the KPAGF’s forward-deployed corps and mechanized divisions. Often a long-term relationship
exists between the reconnaissance battalion and the unit it supports, with a view toward engendering an
improved quality of performance. It is likely that the operational SOF units will rely on ground infiltration
along predesignated routes, since strategic SOF units will receive a higher priority for air support. Some of
this infiltration could be through preconstructed tunnels under the DMZ, with just the final few yards needing
to be dug to reach an egress point. An estimated 16–30 tunnels may exist under the DMZ; four tunnels have
already been discovered and blocked by South Korea. SOF personnel used in this manner may wear enemy
coalition uniforms or civilian attire to avoid confrontation with enemy units. It is believed that most of the
reconnaissance brigades’ soldiers can speak English, and some subordinate units are comprised exclusively
of females. The reconnaissance battalions will attempt to determine the enemy coalition’s disposition and
intentions, and serve as indirect fire observers. Reconnaissance battalion missions may also include attacking
high-value targets such as airfields, naval bases, port facilities, petroleum, oils, and lubricants storage
facilities, or missile sites. Figure 5-9 provides an example of the structure of a possible RGB reconnaissance
brigade.
5-20 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Figure 5-9. Task-organized reconnaissance brigade, RGB (example)
SECURITY FUNDAMENTALS
5-96. KPA security operations protect a supported unit with a designated level of early warning and combat
power. KPA security and reconnaissance complement each other in developing and sustaining situational
awareness and understanding of an OE and conditions that impact on mission success. The intent of KPAGF
security operations is to give the KPAGF commander the freedom to select the best course of action to
complete the mission without enemy interference.
5-97. KPA security operations focus on several tactical missions, the primary ones being screen, guard, and
cover. Other KPA security tasks include area security and local security. Counterreconnaissance is a mission
task inclusive to security actions. See table 5-2 for a comparison of the three types of security missions.
Table 5-2. Security mission functions by mission type
Mission Type
Mission Function Screen Guard Cover
Provide early warning to the

Yes Yes Yes
supported unit
Prevent observation of the

Yes Yes Yes
supported unit
Prevent direct fire on the

No Yes Yes
supported unit
Prevent indirect fire on the

No No Yes
supported unit
Become decisively engaged Only to complete the Only to complete the

No
by the enemy unit mission mission
Relative distance from the Within the enemy’s Outside the enemy’s Outside the enemy’s
supported unit direct fire range direct fire range indirect fire range
5-98. KPAGF security units are assigned an AO in support of a unit to be protected with adequate early
warning of an approaching enemy and to prevent enemy ground units from observing or engaging the
protected unit with direct fires. Protecting the KPAGF unit from enemy indirect fires is problematic due to
the various types of long-range weapon systems that are available to an enemy.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 5-21

Chapter 5
5-99. Primary security fundamentals include an objective, timely warning, and maintenance of enemy
contact.
SECURITY OBJECTIVE
5-100. The KPAGF security objective is protection of the supported unit. All actions focus on accurate and
timely warning of OE conditions that can hinder the mission of the supported unit and security actions that
protect the same from an enemy. A KPAGF security unit understands and acts in conjunction with the
supported unit’s scheme of maneuver and mission. These factors cause the security unit to typically operate
between the protected unit and suspected or known enemy units. A security unit conducts stationary or mobile
actions depending on the mission of the unit to be protected. The level of combat power task-organized in a
security unit is based on the level of required security and the degree of risk the tasking headquarters
commander is willing to accept in assigning the mission.
TIMELY WARNING
5-101. Timely warning provides an effective alert of known, probable, or possible conditions that can
adversely impact on a mission. Timeliness of reporting information and intelligence on a foe or other OE
conditions enables informed decisions and actions to protect the supported unit. The KPAGF security unit
detects, observes, and monitors OE conditions that can influence the protected unit’s mission, and acts within
its mission guidance to protect the supported unit.
MAINTAIN ENEMY CONTACT

5-102. Real-time and accurate information requires KPAGF reconnaissance and security units to gain and
maintain contact with the enemy. Developing the tactical situation involves continuous activities that provide
options in reaction time, available maneuver space, and shaping or placing an enemy at a disadvantageous
position in relation to the protected unit. The duration required for a security mission task depends on the
KPA protected unit’s situation and mission guidance. The KPAGF security unit receives mission guidance
that includes engagement, disengagement, or displacement criteria. Engagement and disengagement criteria
identify when or how the security unit can attack enemy units and conditions that restrict engagement to
preserve C3D measures of the protected unit. Displacement criteria state conditions, typically based on time
and the tactical situation, that allow or deny movement or maneuver to subsequent locations or fighting
positions.
SECURITY MISSIONS
5-103. KPAGF doctrine is unclear in differentiating between different types of security missions, but the
KPAGF provide different levels of protection to varying units. The types of unit will typically relate to the
positioning and distance of the security unit to the unit it protects. KPAGF security unit task-organized
combat power indicates the expected level and type of contact with an enemy unit.
5-104. KPAGF units perform three basic types of security actions. Screen actions provide early warning to
the main body of a supported unit without becoming decisively engaged by an enemy. Guard actions protect
the supported unit main body with early warning and prevent enemy observation and direct fire on the same.
A guard unit can accept decisive engagement if required to accomplish its security mission. Cover actions
protect the supported unit main body from enemy observation and effective direct and indirect fires, and are
typically tactical missions conducted at a significant distance from the protected unit. A cover unit accepts
decisive engagement when required to accomplish its security mission.
5-105. Additional security missions that occur in an operation can include area and local security and their
subsets. Area security actions protect friendly installations, routes, units, and facilities within an AO. Mission
tasks identify specific requirements within a designated objective area or specified points in the area. Local
security is a responsibility of all units and activities as a unit protection measure. Situational awareness and
early warning to a protected unit provide time for proactive or reactive actions in support of a protected unit
operation. Mission tasks identify specific requirements within a local security mission. Subsets of area and
local security are route security and convoy security. See table 5-3 or the size of security unit used to protect
each main body unit size.
5-22 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Table 5-3. Typical type of security unit in support of main body force
Flank or Rear
Echelon Screen Advance Guard Cover
Guard
Battalion Platoon (+) Platoon Squad (+) n/a
Regiment Company (+) Battalion Platoon n/a
Division Regiment Regiment Battalion Battalion (+)
Corps Division Division Regiment Division

Note. Aviation fixed-wing and rotary-wing mission support is typically provided via coordination through an integrated
fires system. Rotary-wing attack or light aircraft can be in mission support for specified missions; however, aviation assets
could be in mission support only down to the maneuver regiment.
n/a not applicable
COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE
5-106. Counterreconnaissance is a tactical mission task that encompasses reconnaissance and security
measures taken by a KPAGF commander to counter enemy reconnaissance and surveillance efforts.
Counterreconnaissance is the sum of all actions taken at each echelon of KPA headquarters to protect KPA
units, mission plans and intentions, unit dispositions, and ongoing actions. The purpose of a
counterreconnaissance mission is to destroy, defeat, or repel all enemy reconnaissance units throughout an
assigned AO and ZORR.
5-107. The counterreconnaissance drill has four main subtasks:
 Plan.
 Prepare.
 Execute—find.
 Execute—report.
 Execute—destroy.
Plan
 Identify counterreconnaissance objective(s).
 Collect current information on enemy unit capabilities and limitations and OE information to be
obtained or confirmed in an AO.
 Analyze action, enabling and support functions that must be performed to achieve mission success.
Consider tasks to deceive, disrupt, suppress, delay, fix, contain, breach, neutralize, defeat, or
destroy.
 Identify situational awareness and understanding requirements for collection and analysis by
ground maneuver, aviation, or other technical capabilities.
 Task-organize units for counterreconnaissance by function.
 Determine how and when functional units act, enable, or support the counterreconnaissance or
transition to other tasks or subtasks.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 5-23

Chapter 5
Prepare
 Evaluate ongoing reconnaissance, surveillance, and counterreconnaissance actions to provide
situational understanding or shape OE conditions required for destruction of enemy
reconnaissance units and capabilities.
 Coordinate the combined arms integration of available RISTA assets for continuous and
overlapping coverage of designated areas, counterreconnaissance zones, routes, probable enemy
locations, kill zones, or special objectives in a security zone or defense zones of an assigned AO.
 Coordinate for situational awareness and understanding among friendly units in an AO and its
ZORR, such as long-range reconnaissance units; SOF; mounted, aerial, and dismounted units
operating in the same AO or ZORR; and signals reconnaissance intelligence units.
 Assess current counterreconnaissance actions to prevent enemy RISTA from obtaining situational
understanding of KPA intentions.
 Conduct mission and task rehearsals of action, enabling, and support units.
 Confirm secure communications requirements and capabilities.
 Execute EIW in support of the mission.
Execute—Find
5-110. The execute—find subtask includes the following:
 Coordinate counterreconnaissance ground maneuver, aviation, and other technical collection,
disruption, or electronic warfare assets of enemy RISTA to locate, monitor, and set the conditions
for actions against designated enemy units or capabilities.
 Conduct undetected and sequenced movement and maneuver by counterreconnaissance units
through or into an AO to locate and report enemy reconnaissance, surveillance, and other security
units in counterreconnaissance zones, reconnaissance zones, routes, predicted enemy locations,
kill zones, or special counterreconnaissance objectives. When identified during
counterreconnaissance, report enemy main forces, reserves, rear service units, and C2 and
communications units.
 Conduct undetected and sequenced movement and maneuver by counterreconnaissance units
through or into an area occupied by enemy units in an AO to locate and report information as
tasked on OE conditions such as key terrain, natural and man-emplaced obstacles and chokepoints,
landing or drop zones, route trafficability and restrictions, bridges, fords, designated urban areas,
facilities, or other aspects of the civilian population and AO.
 Conduct undetected and sequenced movement and maneuver by support units through or into an
area occupied by enemy units in the AO to provide direct and indirect fires in order to support the
counterreconnaissance mission.
 Conduct undetected and sequenced movement and maneuver by support units through or into an
area occupied by enemy units in the AO to coordinate combat support and rear service units’
support to the counterreconnaissance mission.
 Conduct undetected movement and maneuver by action unit(s) through or into an area occupied
by enemy units in the AO to occupy a position(s), reconnoiter along routes and sites or in
designated zones and areas, to accomplish assigned and implied counterreconnaissance tasks.
 Coordinate with counterreconnaissance units in the AO in order deceive, disrupt, suppress, delay,
fix, contain, breach, neutralize, defeat, or destroy enemy security or response units as part of
assigned counterreconnaissance tasks.
 Determine if current tactical conditions require an adjustment to the counterreconnaissance
mission.
5-24 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Execute—Report
5-111. The execute—report subtask includes the following:
 Inform counterreconnaissance units with current information and intelligence to support the
destruction of enemy RISTA.
 Report regular, periodic, and situational collection updates in a timely manner to satisfy the
counterreconnaissance unit commander’s critical or recurring reconnaissance, surveillance, and
counterreconnaissance information requirements.
 Report regular, periodic, and situational collection updates in a timely manner to the next higher-
echelon headquarters staff.
 Recommend if current tactical conditions require an adjustment to the time and or tempo allowed
for the counterreconnaissance mission.
Execute—Make Contact
 Employ continuous reconnaissance and surveillance to sustain situational awareness and
understanding of an OE and provide early warning of enemy activities that can influence the
counterreconnaissance mission.
 Gain and maintain undetected contact with enemy RISTA units.
 Engage designated enemy to disrupt enemy tempo of actions in order to accomplish the KPA
commander’s counterreconnaissance mission intent.
 Engage the enemy to fix specified enemy units in order to accomplish the KPA commander’s
counterreconnaissance mission intent.
 Influence (deceive, degrade, disrupt, deny, or exploit) enemy tactical decision making before and
during execution of counterreconnaissance tasks through coordination for and conduct of EIW
capabilities.
 Maintain contact with the enemy through observation or technical sensor reconnaissance and
surveillance means in order to sustain current situational awareness and understanding of an OE
and enemy.
Execute—Destroy
5-113. The execute—destroy subtask includes the following:
 Destroy enemy RISTA in designated objective area, zone, or specified area.
 Defeat designated enemy counterreconnaissance, when situational conditions require engagement
of these units, in order to accomplish the KPAGF counterreconnaissance mission to destroy enemy
RISTA.
Continue Mission
 Conduct timely movement and maneuver of KPAGF counterreconnaissance units by stealth,
deception, or clandestine means to enhance freedom of maneuver of follow-on KPAGF units.
 Execute tasks with stay-behind KPAGF counterreconnaissance units, as directed, that can include
but are not limited to: surveille, disrupt, delay, suppress, neutralize, defeat, or destroy.
 Report information and intelligence updates to satisfy the KPAGF commander’s
counterreconnaissance mission intent.
 Conduct continuous stay-behind unit counterreconnaissance in designated zones or areas, as
directed, in support of the KPA commander’s counterreconnaissance mission intent.
SCREEN
5-115. A KPAGF security screen provides early warning to the main body of its associated force in a tactical
operation. Screen mission tasks combine offensive and defensive actions to disrupt and possibly delay enemy
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 5-25

Chapter 5
units and counterreconnaissance to defeat or destroy enemy reconnaissance attempting to collect information
and intelligence on the main body force. The screen orients on enemy avenues of approach into the KPA
unit’s assigned area as an economy-of-force action that supports security to a main body force, facility, or
area. KPA units that conduct a screen will likely engage in more combat than those U.S./allied forces that
conduct screens for their units.
5-116. OPs and mounted, dismounted, or aerial patrols in a zone ensure observation and surveillance of an
assigned area in order to gain and maintain enemy contact without becoming decisively engaged. Indirect
fires for the screening force are typically provided from the main body force as a complement to the former’s
direct fires. The intent is to prevent the screening force from being decisively engaged by an enemy as it
displaces and reduces its direct fire capabilities.
5-117. A screen is typically assigned to the flanks or rear of a KPAGF main body force, though it can also
be forward; however, a screen does not occur forward of a moving main body force. In the case of a
maneuvering force, forward security to the main body force occurs as a zone reconnaissance mission,
reconnaissance in force, or guard mission. KPAGF screen missions can be assigned when tactical operations
have extended flanks, coverage gaps occur between major subordinate maneuver units of a force, or when
required to provide early warning in areas not considered critical enough to require security tasks of greater
combat power.
5-118. The depth of a KPAGF screen zone is typically terrain dependent in order to prevent direct
observation of the main body by enemy units. Depth provides the main body with more time to react to
approaching enemy maneuver units and allows for reconnaissance and security handover. A KPAGF
screening force employs depth by positioning OPs and other sensor collection assets between a designated
forward-oriented limit of advance and the rear boundary of the security force. The number of OPs or patrols
required by the screening force considers zone depth, width, duration of mission, and orientation of the screen
to the main force. Available time and allowable distance from the main body are significant additional factors
in planning and conducting a screen, reconnaissance handover, or battle handover of a screening force to
another force.
5-119. A KPAGF screen displaces to subsequent positions based on event or time criteria stated in a mission
order. A rearward passage of lines continues defensive actions and maintains enemy contact while conducting
the passage and handover. These passage actions may or may not be conducted under enemy pressure. The
force accepting handover typically accepts control of the AO forward of a handover line after two-thirds of
the screening force’s combat units clear designated passage points. Execution of a screen requires forces
proportional to the level of protection directed by the main body force commander. Execution considerations
for a screen include—
 Conducting surveillance of all avenues of approach that can affect the main body’s mission.
 Detecting and reporting all enemy forces approaching the screen zone.
 Conducting counterreconnaissance to disrupt, defeat, or destroy all enemy reconnaissance units.
 Delaying enemy maneuver of ground forces in the screen zone.
 Disrupting enemy movement or maneuver of aerial forces in the screen zone.
 Identifying probable enemy main effort.
 Providing the protected force with early warning of enemy activities, locations, and movement or
maneuver.
5-120. A KPAGF screen is designated as either a stationary screen or a moving screen. A screening force
is typically assigned a zone with a wide frontage, with subordinate forces normally deployed abreast. A
screening force conducts a moving flank or rear screen similar to a stationary screen, but employs movement
and maneuver dependent on the tactical situation of the main body force. Figure 5-10 provides an example
of a defensive screen with delay actions conducted by an infantry company detachment.
5-26 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Figure 5-10. Company defensive screen (example)
Stationary Screen
5-121. A KPAGF stationary screen mission requires terrain-oriented and time-duration guidance. Air and
ground force integration enable security-area coverage and acceptable risk as determined by the force
commander. A phase line located along identifiable terrain identifies the forward limit of advance of the
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 5-27

Chapter 5
screen. Phase lines also identify lateral and rear limits of advance. The screening force is responsible for the
area between the screened force and the screen rear boundary. The rear limit of advance can be a
reconnaissance handover or battle handover line. Other phase lines control forward, lateral, or rearward
movement and maneuver of the screening force in its mission. The screening force uses checkpoints, contact
points, named areas of interest, and other control measures as required to identify specific areas of interest
and to coordinate RISTA and movement or maneuver. Engagement, disengagement, and displacement
criteria prompt actions of the screening force.
5-122. The screen orients to a forward limit of advance and is considered a restrictive control measure that
requires coordination when forces move beyond it into a ZORR. Key considerations include the maximum
range of supporting indirect fires, possible fields of fire, requirements to observe specific named areas of
interest or target areas of interest, and control measures for area target acquisition, fire support, and airspace
or air defense support. Considerations for occupying a screen zone include time available and the KPAGF
situation, and methods used are typically infiltration or tactical road march. When conditions allow, a zone
reconnaissance is the norm for collecting information and intelligence as a screening force occupies terrain
and identifies any enemy forces already in the screen zone.
5-123. The screening unit will receive equipment, units, and assistance to conduct its missions. These
include, but are not limited to the following—
 Multiple sensors from the main body force or higher headquarters to collect and monitor an OE.
 Aerial reconnaissance acting as a supporting or independent screen for early warning of
approaching enemy or enemy presence in selected areas of the security zone.
 Fire planning, including the integration of direct and indirect fire, attack aviation, and other direct
air support.
 Designation of kill zones along likely enemy avenues of approach.
 Engineer assets to provide mobility, countermobility, and survivability capabilities for specific
tasks, such as road and trail improvement, obstacle emplacement, or OP survivability construction.
 Coordination of KPAGF obstacles with fires to assist in the disruption or delay of enemy units.
 Mine-dispensing systems that can rapidly and precisely emplace a minefield with predetermined
self-destruct times.
 Logistics support tailored to meet screening unit(s) requirements.
Moving Screen
5-124. Maneuver and movement of a KPAGF moving screen orients on the main body force and specified
mission tasks assigned for early warning on the enemy. Coverage for a KPAGF moving flank screen begins
at the front of the main body lead combat unit and ends at the rear of the protected force. Front and rear
security forces are responsible for their own early warning protection. A line of departure integral to the main
body force separates the screen mission from the main body force and becomes the initial rear boundary of
the moving screen.
5-125. As the main body force maneuvers, its screening force occupies a series of successive screens with
four basic movement method options:
 Alternate bounds by individual OPs.
 Alternate bounds by subordinate security units.
 Successive bounds.
 Continuous march.
5-126. The screening force adjusts to time and distance factors as required by the KPAGF main body force
commander and as determined by the terrain. Coordination is continuous with other KPAGF security forces
that may be protecting the main body force beyond the screening force, such as a guard force or covering
force.
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GUARD
5-127. Guard is a KPAGF security mission task to protect the main body by fighting the enemy in order to
create reaction time and maneuver space for the main force. The KPAGF guard force also observes and
reports information on its AO and ZORR, and prevents enemy ground observation of and direct fire on the
main body force. A force conducting a guard mission cannot operate independently, as it relies on additional
fires and other functional support from the main body force. A guard force expects contact with an enemy
and provides protection to the main body force that a screen force cannot provide. Figure 5-11 on page 5-30
provides an example of an offensive flank guard with delay actions conducted by a mechanized infantry
battalion detachment as part of a task-organized brigade attack.
5-128. A KPAGF guard force conducts multiple mission tasks, both stationary and moving, to include
reconnaissance. Counterreconnaissance by a guard force is to destroy enemy reconnaissance within the
security zone. A KPAGF guard force is prepared to accept decisive engagement with an enemy and can
attack, defend, or delay to enable reaction time and maneuver space to the protected main body force. Three
types of guard missions are—
 Advance guard.
 Flank guard.
 Rear guard.
5-129. A KPAGF guard force operates within the range of designated indirect fire weapons of the main
body force and accomplishes all the tasks of a screen, but operates over a narrower zone frontage to permit
the concentration of combat power. The KPAGF guard force differs from a screen in that the guard force
contains sufficient combat power to defeat, cause to withdraw, or fix lead enemy forces before they can
engage the protected main body force. Battalion detachment or larger-echelon groups are the norm for guard
missions, based on the combat power required to counter an anticipated enemy. Aerial assets typically support
a guard force by screening between gaps and in front of force arrays or battle positions that the guard force
establishes in its security zone. Aviation tasks can include:
 Reconnoiter the area between the guard force and the main body force.
 Maintain contact between any security units to their front and the main body force.
 Provide early warning and a degree of security to the guard force.
5-130. Timely development of the tactical situation by a KPAGF guard force along the axis of advance of
the main body force enables situational awareness and understanding of an OE. Maintaining tactical initiative
in contact with the enemy allows the main body force the option to continue its primary mission, conduct an
appropriate defensive task such as defend, or respond with an offensive task such as a counterattack.
5-131. A KPAGF guard force executes its mission with several tactical expectations. The intent of guard
force actions include but are not limited to:
 Develop the tactical situation with early warning in order to provide the main body force
commander with the optimum situational awareness and understanding for mission decisions.
 Prevent enemy observation of the KPAGF main body force.
 Prevent enemy direct fires on the protected KPAGF main body force.
 Maintain surveillance of avenues of approach into and in the security zone.
 Detect and report all enemy forces approaching the security zone.
 Conduct counterreconnaissance to destroy all enemy reconnaissance units.
 Defeat the enemy advance guard.
 Deny the enemy the ability to place effective direct fires on the protected force.
 Delay the enemy approach and cause the enemy main body to deploy.
 Defend the security zone.
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Chapter 5
Figure 5-11. Flank guard and battalion detachment (example)
5-30 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

5-132. KPAGF guard forces deny enemy ground maneuver forces the ability to penetrate through the
security zone. KPAGF indirect fire considerations for a guard force are similar to a screen and include, but
are not limited to, the following—
 A guard force typically receives more indirect fire support.
 Engineers support the guard force with mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks.
 Other combat support and rear service units are task-organized in depth throughout the security
zone.
 Immediate logistics support forces move with the flank guard force.
 Additional logistics support move with the main body force axis or as directed by the KPAGF
guard force commander.
5-133. In a noncontiguous AO, advance, rear, or flank guard forces can be based on cardinal direction or
general orientation to an enemy. Mission tasks of defend, delay, and disrupt are typical for a rear guard, and
may include a task to fix the enemy until other forces, such as a quick reaction force, arrive to help.
Advance Guard
5-134. A KPAGF advance guard for a moving force is offensive in actions to locate and defeat enemy
forces along the axis of advance of the main body force it protects. An intention of a KPAGF advance guard
is to enable uninterrupted movement of the protected main body force. Terrain appreciation of an AO and
expected tempo of maneuver of the main force are key considerations of how far the guard force operates
from the same.
5-135. Task organization internal to the advance guard provides capabilities in forward units to immediately
engage and defeat or fix any enemy that might impede the momentum of the main body force. Based on
timely combat reconnaissance patrol intelligence, these forward units mass task-organized direct and indirect
fires and engineer mobility or countermobility support to set conditions for the remainder of the advance
guard to maneuver and defeat or destroy the enemy. The KPAGF main body force should not have to deploy
from its march or attack formations; however, if the advance guard cannot defeat the enemy force, it fixes
the enemy to enable the main body force to bypass or deploy additional forces against the enemy.
5-136. A KPAGF advance guard for a stationary force is primarily defensive in nature and deploys forward
of a main body force orientation. An advance guard provides similar protection in a security zone to a main
body force and main defenses in a defense zone. Once the KPAGF guard force obtains and maintains contact,
it defends, delays, or disrupts in support of the main body force. Typical mission tasks include:
 Deceive the enemy as to the location of the actual main defenses of the defense zone.
 Force the enemy to deploy its main body forces.
 Target critical enemy assets such as C2 and communications, artillery groupings, and mobile
logistic sites such as refuel on the move points or ammunition transfer points.
5-137. Offensive actions such as ambushes, raids, or limited counterattacks can support advance guard
security in an AO.
5-138. Depending on the terrain, the KPAGF advance guard—which consists of an infantry regiment with
possible attachments—operates well out in front of the division main body. The first element is a scout squad
called the front area scout element. An infantry platoon trails the scouting element within a reasonable
distance (300–600 m). Following approximately 3–6 km after is the remainder of the lead infantry battalion.
The rest of the regiment, composing the advance guard, follows 2–3 km later. An infantry platoon guards
each flank of the lead regiment’s main body.
Flank Guard
5-139. A KPAGF flank guard force protects a flank of the KPAGF main body force. The flank guard force
responsibility typically begins at the trail element of an advance guard or at the lead combat element of the
main body force, and ends at the rear of the protected main body force or at the lead element of the rear guard
force.
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Chapter 5
5-140. A KPAGF flank guard force for a stationary force performs a zone or area reconnaissance when
establishing its initial security positions. Upon reaching the initial battle positions or OPs, the flank guard
force establishes a defensive array oriented on kill zones in probable or possible enemy avenues of approach.
Once the flank guard force makes contact with an enemy force, it defends or delays to protect the main body
force in compliance with the main body commander’s criteria for guard force engagement, disengagement,
and displacement.
5-141. The flank guard—often a regiment for a division—normally covers 2–4 km of terrain to the flank of
the KPAGF main body, depending on the terrain. In keeping with the norm to make contact with the enemy
with the smallest element possible, the flank point element is an infantry platoon. Approximately 1 km closer
to the main body is the remainder of that platoon’s battalion. The rest of the regiment is in column even
nearer the main body, with a front area scout element and a rear area point element.
5-142. A KPAGF moving flank guard force mission task presents additional considerations and
requirements. A KPAGF moving flank guard force has many of the same considerations as a moving flank
screen; however, a moving flank guard can occupy a series of battle positions to protect a main body force
axis of advance. The main body force commander assigns a security objective to orient the flank guard force
in its security zone. Tasks for the moving flank guard include but are not limited to:
 Maintain continuous surveillance of enemy avenues of approach along the KPAGF main body
force axis of advance.
 Establish a series of battle positions to guard the KPAGF main body force.
 Reconnoiter the zone between the KPAGF main body force and flank guard force battle positions
and limit of advance.
 Maintain contact with the lead to rear units of the main body force and other security units
protecting the KPAGF main body force.
 Conduct counterreconnaissance to destroy all enemy reconnaissance forces in the guard security
zone.
 Protect the KPAGF main body force.
5-143. A KPAGF moving flank guard force conducts its maneuver in successive bounds, alternate bounds,
or continuous marches. Occupation of battle positions is situationally dependent on the enemy threat to the
main body force. In a sequential maneuver of a flank guard, the flank guard force crosses the line of departure
separately and sequential to the main body force movement. A sequential method is typical when a main
body force has already penetrated a line of contact or the main body force being protected is not in contact
with an enemy. In a simultaneous method, a flank guard force crosses the line of departure within the main
body force and then deploys from that same main body force axis into its flank security zone. A simultaneous
action is appropriate when the main body force conducts its own penetration of enemy defenses along a line
of contact. The flank guard force follows the lead combat elements of the protected main body force through
the departure point(s) and deploys into its guard force array in the security zone. The lead element of a moving
flank guard force conducts a zone or area reconnaissance with three key mission tasks:
 Maintain contact with the KPAGF main body.
 Reconnoiter the zone between the KPAGF main body force and moving flank guard force route
or routes of advance.
 Reconnoiter the moving flank guard force routes in the flank security zone.
5-144. The KPAGF moving flank guard force maneuvers along the routes of advance to occupy battle
positions and OPs parallel to the main body force axis of advance. Commanders establish phase lines that
run parallel and perpendicular to the direction of the movement of the main body force. If the enemy attacks
into the protected flank, the KPAGF guard force uses phase lines parallel to the main body force to control a
delay or defense. Phase lines perpendicular to the main body force are used to control forward movement in
the same direction as the main body force’s axis of advance. The guard force regulates movement along its
routes of advance by the pace of the protected main body force. The three primary methods of movement are
successive bounds, alternate bounds, and continuous movement.
5-145. If the protected force stops, the KPAGF guarding force occupies blocking positions oriented to likely
enemy axes of advance toward the KPAGF main body force. As the speed, pace, or tempo of the main body
forces change, the guard force adjusts its movement and maneuver to provide protection accordingly. If the
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guard force anticipates being overextended in its ability to protect, the guard force commander informs the
KPAGF main body force commander and recommends one of the following courses of action:
 Reinforce the flank guard.
 Reduce the AO.
 Screen a designated area of the flank security zone and guard the remaining area.
Rear Guard
5-146. A KPAGF rear guard protects the rear of the main body force. Rear guards are appropriate when
conducting offensive tasks, when the protected main body force breaks contact with friendly flanking forces,
or during a retrograde operation. The KPAGF rear guard deploys and defends to protect moving and
stationary main body forces. The tasks described for a stationary flank guard apply to a rear guard mission.
The KPAGF rear guard for a moving force displaces to successive battle positions along phase lines in depth
as the main body force moves and maneuvers.
5-147. The KPAGF commander establishes a rear guard during a main body force withdrawal, retirement,
or delaying action in one of two typical ways:
 The KPAGF guard force relieves main body force units in place and occupies battle positions as
the main body force moves or maneuvers in a direction away from an enemy.
 The KPAGF guard force establishes battle positions in depth to the rear of a main body force, and
conducts multiple passages of the KPAGF main body force moving or maneuvering through the
guard force defensive array.
5-148. When an infantry regiment assumes a rear guard mission, it places a rear point force (normally an
infantry battalion) that is to delay the enemy’s movement as the enemy attempts to pursue and catch the
KPAGF main body. The rear guard infantry regiment also provides its own flank security to prevent
envelopment of the main body by the enemy as well as a scout element, point company, and advance guard
in the direction of movement to prevent the rear guard infantry regiment from being surprised by an enemy
that manages to position itself between the rear guard and the main body. The distances between the rear,
flank, and advance security elements will be terrain dependent. If a KPAGF rear guard cannot defeat an
approaching enemy, it fixes the enemy force until the main body force can support additional security actions.
COVER
5-149. Cover is a KPAGF security mission task to protect the KPAGF main body by fighting the enemy to
create reaction time and maneuver space for the KPAGF main body force. The typical mission intent is to
defeat or destroy enemy forces within the covering force’s capabilities. A covering force is tactically self-
contained and task-organized for extended operations, and capable of operating independently from the
KPAGF main body force it protects. It typically operates at a significant distance from the KPAGF main
body force in order to—
 Develop the tactical situation with early warning in order to provide the main body force
commander with the optimum situational awareness and understanding for mission decisions.
 Prevent enemy observation of the KPAGF main body force.
 Prevent enemy direct and indirect fires on the protected KPAGF main body force.
5-150. The covering force collects and reports information on its AO and ZORR in support of the protected
main body commander’s priorities, and may include system capabilities to disrupt or prevent selective enemy
long-range indirect fires from affecting the main body force it protects.
5-151. A covering force conducts counterreconnaissance to destroy enemy reconnaissance within its
security zone. As it develops the tactical situation at an extended distance from the protected main body force,
mission tasks can vary between reconnoiter, screen, guard, disrupt, attack, defend, or delay in order to protect
the main body force. A covering force anticipates decisive engagement with an enemy, if required, to achieve
protection of the main body force, and does not allow enemy forces to bypass its force array. A KPAGF
covering force expects to confront enemy combat power normally greater than that expected of a guard or
screen mission force.
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Chapter 5
5-152. Integration of aerial assets is critical to task organization for a cover mission. Aviation assets assist
in security tasks between a covering force and its main body force, maintain contact with the protected main
body force when extended distances involve the security zone and defense zone, or screen to the front of the
covering force.
5-153. A KPAGF covering force may be offensive or defensive in nature. All covering force actions employ
an offensive orientation as opportunities evolve or are created in a tactical situation. The covering force
executes its mission and intent as enemy-oriented reconnaissance throughout its assigned AO, and typically
conducts security tasks in the context of guard or screen tasks.
Offensive Cover
5-154. An offensive KPAGF covering force retains or seizes the initiative to provide the main body force
commander with time and the ability to maneuver. An offensive covering force can operate to the front or
flanks of the main body force. Offensive covering forces conduct the following key tasks:
 Reconnoiter along the main body force axis of advance.
 Identify enemy dispositions, capabilities, and probable axes of approach.
 Maintain continuous surveillance of enemy avenues of approach.
 Destroy enemy reconnaissance and security forces in the AO.
 Deny the enemy information about the size, strength, composition, and objective of the main body
force.
 Disrupt, fix, block, and defeat enemy forces in the cover security zone.
 Exploit tactical opportunities in support of KPAGF main body force fires and maneuver.
 Protect the KPAGF main body force from effective observation, surveillance, and direct and
indirect fires.
5-155. The two forms of offensive cover are advance cover and flank cover. A KPAGF advance covering
force is to locate and penetrate the enemy force’s security zone and forward defenses. When the enemy is a
moving or maneuvering force, a KPAGF advance cover destroys enemy reconnaissance and defeats advance
guard units and first-echelon units of the enemy main body force. A KPAGF flank cover is conducted similar
to a flank guard mission.
5-156. Differences between a KPAGF covering force and a guard force are the larger tactical scope of the
cover mission, the significant task organization of forces for tactical operations, and the greater distance from
the KPAGF main body force as a semi-independent or independent security mission. A KPAGF covering
force typically clears the area between its route of advance and the main body; however, the main body force
commander can assign missions to other security forces with zone responsibilities to protect the KPAGF
main body force.
Defensive Cover
5-157. A KPAGF defensive cover forces the enemy to reveal its main effort, disrupts enemy offensive
actions, and creates conditions for successful KPAGF main body force tactical actions. A KPAGF defensive
covering force operates to the front, flanks, or rear of a main body force deploying into an AO or already
deployed to defend. Planning and execution considerations are applicable to all three types of defensive
cover. Mission tasks for defensive cover include—
 Maintain continuous surveillance of enemy avenues of approach.
 Destroy enemy reconnaissance and security forces in the security zone of the AO.
 Deceive enemy situational understanding of main body force dispositions and capabilities of the
main body force defensive array.
 Determine the size, strength, composition, and direction of the enemy’s main effort.
 Maintain contact with enemy forces and cause commitment of enemy second-echelon forces.
 Exploit tactical opportunities in support of main body fires and maneuver.
 Protect the main body force from effective observation, surveillance, and direct and indirect fires.
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5-158. A KPAGF rear covering force protects a main body force that is moving away from the enemy. A
rear covering force can be directed to conduct a relief in place of a main body force as integral to a deception
plan, with covering forces deployed abreast and in depth. Another tactical option is a covering force
deploying behind the main body force, supporting battle handover and passage of lines with the main body
force in contact with the enemy, and conducting a defense or delay. A covering force typically displaces to
subsequent phase lines in depth in accordance with the defensive mission. The KPAGF covering force
maintains contact with the enemy until relieved of that task by the main body force commander.
AREA SECURITY
5-159. KPAGF area security is a security task conducted to protect friendly units, installations, routes, and
actions within a specified area. Area security is essential to all operations. The security intention is to preserve
the main body KPAGF force commander’s freedom of maneuver in tactical missions, ability to move reserves
and position fire support assets, and provide effective logistics and other sustainment actions. Area security
degrades the enemy’s ability to affect friendly actions in a specific area by denying the enemy’s use of an
area for its own purposes. The KPAGF commander may task subordinate units to conduct the following
actions in support of area security operations:
 Area, route, or zone reconnaissance.
 Screen or guard security actions.
 Offensive and defensive tasks.
 Route or convoy security.
 Protection of high-value assets.
5-160. KPAGF security actions at and within designated area security perimeters or areas, complemented
with other reconnaissance and security tasks, are based on risk assessment of enemy-force capabilities and
intentions and KPAGF units available to employ in missions assigned by the main body force commander.
Area security can be assigned to a unit when tactical conditions dictate and can contain contiguous or
noncontiguous perimeters and boundaries in an AO. The KPAGF commander positions reaction or reserve
units in the AO for rapid response to probable enemy actions. Other missions or tasks in support of area
security may include but are not limited to—
 Conducting route or convoy security of designated lines of communications.
 Monitoring and controlling movement with checkpoint or combat outpost operations in the AO or
on critical lines of communications.
 Employing patrols to provide reconnaissance, intelligence, or security between secured
perimeters.
 Maintaining an observable presence to the relevant population of an AO.
ROUTE SECURITY
5-161. KPAGF route security missions prevent enemy units from affecting freedom of maneuver along a
protected route. A KPAGF route security unit operates on and to the flanks of a designated route. Route
security operations are typically defensive in nature and are terrain-oriented to the protected route. A route
security unit enables force traffic flow along a route, with actions that include—
 Conducting mounted, dismounted, and aerial reconnaissance and security tasks for designated
routes and key locations along routes.
 Occupying key terrain along or near designated routes to prevent enemy observation and direct
fire that could disrupt route operations.
 Conducting engineer reconnaissance and maintenance to ensure satisfactory trafficability for force
operations.
 Cordoning sections of the route with periodic searches for suspected enemy materiel, actions, and
intentions.
 Conducting offensive actions to ambush, disrupt, defeat, or destroy enemy units intent on affecting
route security and freedom of KPAGF force movement.
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Chapter 5
5-162. Convoy security is a subset of area security and route security. KPAGF convoy security missions
are offensive in nature and orient on the protected force. This type of security mission can be conducted in
conjunction with route security operations. A KPAGF convoy security force operates to the front, flanks, and
rear of a convoy moving along a designated route, and is typically integrated into the body of the convoy. A
security force conducts tasks that include but are not limited to—
 Reconnoiter a route the convoy is to travel.
 Provide early warning of enemy presence along a designated route.
 Clear a designated route of obstacles.
 Prevent an enemy force from influencing convoy actions along a designated route.
5-163. KPAGF local security includes all actions to prevent or interdict enemy efforts. Local security is
continuous in all missions, and essential to maintaining mission task initiative. Active patrolling and
continuous reconnaissance are measures that support local security. Passive measures include C3D; noise
and light discipline; standardized movement control; and concise standardized communications.
DEFENSIVE SECURITY FORMATIONS

5-164. KPAGF defensive security formations include—
 Combat reconnaissance patrols.
 Combat security outposts and OP teams.
 Counterreconnaissance detachments.
 Defensive screen forces.
 Defensive guard forces.
 Defensive cover forces.
 Forward detachments.
COMBAT RECONNAISSANCE PATROL

5-165. In the defense, the KPAGF will send out combat reconnaissance patrols to perform security and
reconnaissance functions for the unit it supports. The KPAGF security function anticipates direct offensive
action combat when an enemy is in the security zone of the patrol mission. As in offensive reconnaissance
missions, a CRP is a typically platoon-size element that is task-organized from within a maneuver unit with
an expectation that direct action combat will occur. The KPAGF CRP can be directed to avoid direct fire
action with an enemy, or can be directed to initiate combat actions with an enemy for situational
understanding of the enemy or to deceive an enemy. Normally within the indirect fire support range of the
supported force, a KPAGF CRP can also have indirect fires task-organized within its maneuver and support
units.
5-166. When required to support a particular mission task, specialized capabilities such as engineer or
CBRN reconnaissance capabilities are allocated to the patrol. Forces employ one or more CRPs based on the
tactical situation.
COMBAT SECURITY OUTPOST AND OBSERVATION POST TEAM

5-167. A KPAGF combat security outpost typically conducts defensive actions in a security zone in
conjunction with the main body force defense zones. A grouping of such outposts, typically reinforced
maneuver platoons, provides early warning along enemy probable main and secondary axes of advance in an
AO. Combat actions can include—
 Identify approach and entry of the enemy into an assigned zone.
 Disrupt the momentum of enemy movement or maneuver.
 Defeat enemy reconnaissance.
 Support counterreconnaissance tasks to destroy enemy reconnaissance.
 Deceive the enemy regarding the actual location of the main body main defensive array.
5-36 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

 Act as a stay-behind capability to maintain situational understanding of follow-on enemy forces.

 Assist in movement and maneuver transition of the main body force between defensive and
offensive missions.
5-168. A combat security outpost may receive additional support from its headquarters or higher units in
order to complete its designated mission(s). These additional assets include, but are not limited to, the
following—
 Engineer countermobility support and survivability construction in support of direct or indirect
fire weapons that will concentrate into designated kill zones.
 Once kill zones are identified, the engineer units may help the outpost unit(s) create primary and
alternate fighting positions and develop a comprehensive defensive all-round perimeter.
 Engineers may place obstacles of wire entanglements, tripwire, mines and demolitions, and other
techniques to channel or contain the enemy.
 Time permitting, engineers will assist in the construction of interconnecting trench lines and
overhead protection as part of cover, concealment, camouflage, and other deception and protection
measures.
 Time permitting, engineers may assist the outpost(s) with the construction of subsequent and
supplemental fighting positions.
 Time permitting, underground shelters within the outpost provide storage for munitions and
materiel, as well as living quarters for the soldiers that are separate from their fighting positions.
 Attached weapon system positions may create or reinforce defilade protection.
 Field artillery observation teams provide visual and sensor awareness on activities in assigned
areas of interest and kill zones, and support adjustment of direct and indirect fires on the enemy.
5-169. The defensive actions of combat security outposts in the security zone and security positions forward
of the main defense zone enable a battle handover of the enemy to the main defensive array that continues to
deceive the enemy as to the exact location of the main body force defense. The KPAGF main body higher
headquarters can also direct selected outposts to remain in battle positions in the security zone or to preclude
initial combat action until lead enemy forces have passed and follow-on forces are susceptible to outpost
attack, disruption, defeat, or destruction of high-value targets.
5-170. The combat security outpost array can also support transition to KPAGF main body offensive actions
from the defense. Sustained situational awareness of the enemy and terrain for intended tactical movement
and maneuver provides the main body force with real-time human observation or sensor indications to
support commander decision making and timing of actions.
COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE DETACHMENT
5-171. Counterreconnaissance can be a specified mission task and is conducted as a task-organized,
combined arms action. The KPAGF often forms a counterreconnaissance detachment, typically based on a
company or battalion combat arms headquarters, to accomplish this mission task. The detachment comprises
constituent and dedicated units; however, a command and support relationship may be required to apply
specialized capabilities for limited periods of time in execution of a mission. For example, a detachment
might receive augmentation support for precision-capable fires in order to locate and destroy a critical target
acquisition system and fires to an enemy fires support system. In another situation, a detachment might
receive aviation support to conduct reconnaissance, confirm high-payoff target locations, and coordinate
indirect fires and aerial attack missions. Figure 5-12 on page 5-38 provides an example of the structure of a
mechanized (tracked or wheeled) infantry company augmented with multiple capabilities as a
counterreconnaissance detachment.
5-172. A counterreconnaissance mission is integrated into all KPAGF actions. Control measures include
counterreconnaissance zones, predicted enemy locations, and kill zones. Other norms can include check
points, contact points, and phase lines.
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Chapter 5
Figure 5-12. Counterreconnaissance detachment (example)
DEFENSIVE SCREEN FORCE

5-173. A KPAGF screen unit provides early warning to the KPAGF main body of the force that the
screening unit is subordinate to in a tactical operation. In addition to fundamental aspects of ensuring a degree
of local security in all unit echelons and preventing surprise by an enemy, defensive and offensive screening
actions support counterreconnaissance to defeat or destroy enemy reconnaissance from collecting
information and intelligence on the main body force. A KPAGF screening force maintains contact with the
enemy without becoming decisively engaged, and conducts a battle handover of the enemy to the KPAGF
main body force that the screening force supports. See paragraphs 5-115–5-126 for addition information on
a screen force.
DEFENSIVE GUARD FORCE

5-174. A KPAGF guard force employs a task-organized formation, typically structured around on a
maneuver battalion when part of a unit organized to protect a main body force in a prepared defense with a
security zone to the main body force’s front, either flank, or rear. Conditions and risk assessment can indicate
that a task-organized company detachment can provide the required guard protection.
5-175. KPAGF defensive guard actions provide early warning of enemy activity in the assigned security
zone, and include counterreconnaissance to destroy any enemy reconnaissance units that evade other security
actions in the security zone. Protection prevents enemy situational understanding of KPAGF main body force
actions and critical locations. A KPAGF defensive guard force is prepared to decisively engage enemy forces.
If the guard force cannot defeat an approaching enemy, it fixes the enemy force in order to provide the
KPAGF main body commander with time to decide on future defensive or offensive actions.
DEFENSIVE COVER FORCE

5-176. A defensive cover force is typically a regimental or larger force that protects a higher headquarters
main body force such as a division, corps, or combined arms army in a prepared defensive position. Tactical
conditions could exist for a maneuver battalion to be assigned a cover mission for a division with an additional
mission task and supporting task organization. A KPAGF defensive covering force can be offensive or
defensive in conduct and reflects the mission of the main body force it protects. It accomplishes all the tasks
5-38 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

of KPAGF defensive screening and guard forces, but has significant additional capabilities in force capability
and use.
5-177. Figure 5-13 provides an example of the structure of a KPAGF infantry regiment task-organized for
a defensive cover mission with additional support from a higher headquarters IFS, as well as affiliated and
associated support in the tactical AO by possible unconventional forces.
Figure 5-13. Regiment task-organized for a cover mission (example)
FORWARD DETACHMENT
5-178. A forward detachment is typically a task-organized battalion- or regimental-size unit capable of
semi-independent or independent mission execution. The KPAGF higher headquarters assigning the mission
and task organization synchronizes its other reconnaissance and security forces in the AO to inform the
detachment mission on directional orientation and maneuver in relation to the enemy and an assigned
objective.
5-179. In offensive operations, the forward detachment maneuvers to its objective on an axis other than the
KPAGF main body force axis of advance. Maintaining situational understanding from higher headquarters
reconnaissance forces to its front, the detachment avoids contact with enemy forces until it nears its objective.
When directed, forces within a forward detachment can conduct raids and other offensive actions that support
the rapid maneuver to and seizure or occupation of the objective. An example is linkup of a forward
detachment and air assault forces on key terrain deep in an AO and behind enemy forces, which enables
continued momentum of the higher headquarters main body force in its attack.
5-180. A variant of a forward detachment is an enveloping detachment. Given appropriate terrain and an
enemy situation that allows a rapid envelopment, the objective is to attack a flank or rear of an enemy array
that is in contact with another KPAGF main body force. Whether attacking an enemy flank or rear, or seizing
an objective in the depth of the defense zone or security zone, the enveloping detachment is often under the
C2 of a headquarters senior to the main body force attacking the enemy frontage.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 5-39

Chapter 5
5-181. In defensive operations, a forward detachment can be assigned defend, delay, or disrupt tasks in the
security zone, usually along secondary enemy axes of advance. Tactical actions slow or halt enemy advances
in a security zone and deceive the enemy regarding the location of the actual main defenses of a defense
zone. Forces within the detachment can be directed to conduct ambushes or limited counterattacks in support
of the security zone defenses.
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Chapter 6
Offensive Actions
The Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (KPAGF) visualize offensive actions as the
decisive form of operations and an ultimate means of imposing their will on the enemy.
The KPAGF have six purposes for conducting offensive action and use seven different
forms of maneuver in their attacks. They use specific combat formations at the
company and platoon level, with tight control by junior leaders. At the regimental and
division level, they conduct integrated, dispersed, and limited-objective attacks. At
battalion and below, KPAGF units conduct assaults, ambushes, raids, and
reconnaissance attacks.
PURPOSE OF THE OFFENSE

6-1. The Korean People’s Army (KPA) will likely attack and execute defenses by utilizing each and every
gap between enemy forces—no matter how small. The KPA will likely endeavor to fix its enemies’ maneuver
forces and then flank and turn them with light infantry on the high ground. The goal will be to isolate enemy
ground forces—particularly heavy forces—and, while they may not be destroyed, they will be cut off from
sustainment support. Surrounded, low on ammunition, and out of fuel is a very psychologically destructive
position to be in, and is the reason why entire U.S. units were lost during the Korean War. The primary
distinction between different types of offensive actions is the purpose, which depends on three things: the
situation, the resources available, and the overarching mission. Purpose is defined by the KPAGF commander
in a mission statement, and the unit political officer must approve all of the unit commander’s orders. The
KPAGF recognize six general purposes of tactical offensive actions:
 Gain freedom of movement.
 Restrict freedom of movement.
 Gain control of key terrain, personnel, or equipment.
 Gain information (conduct reconnaissance).
 Dislocate.
 Disrupt.
6-2. KPAGF task organization of a unit for the offense is determined by function, with primary mission
areas of disruption, attack, support, and reserve actions. Analysis of a primary action and enabling functions
indicate how to most effectively apply available capabilities. Special mission requirements may emerge
during this analysis, requiring specialized capabilities and task organization.
ATTACK TO GAIN FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

6-3. A KPAGF attack to gain freedom of movement creates a situation in location and timing to allow
KPAGF units to apply fires and maneuver in support of a mission. Attack examples can include seizing an
important mobility corridor to prevent a counterattack into the flank of another moving unit, destroying an
enemy air defense unit so a Korean People’s Army Air Force aviation unit can use an air avenue of approach,
breaching a complex obstacle to allow an exploitation force to pass through lanes, or executing security tasks
to fix a designated enemy in order to create an assailable enemy flank.
ATTACK TO RESTRICT FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

6-4. A KPAGF attack to restrict freedom of movement degrades enemy ability to maneuver. Attacks can
include denying key terrain, ambushing moving units, dominating airspace, or fixing an enemy formation.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 6-1

Chapter 6
Tactical tasks often associated with restricting freedom of movement are ambush, block, canalize, contain,
fix, and isolate.
ATTACK TO GAIN CONTROL OF KEY TERRAIN, PERSONNEL, OR EQUIPMENT

6-5. A KPAGF attack to gain control of key terrain, personnel, or equipment prevents use of a designated
capability by an enemy. Tactical tasks associated with this type of attack include raid, clear, destroy, occupy,
retain, secure, and seize. Other means to gain control can be psychological warfare, information attack,
computer warfare, electronic warfare, or other elements of electronic intelligence warfare (EIW).
ATTACK TO GAIN INFORMATION (CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE)

6-6. A KPAGF attack to gain information collects data to create or update situational awareness and
understanding in an operational environment (OE). In this case, the purpose is not to locate to destroy, fix,
or occupy, but rather to gain information about the enemy. Quite often, the KPAGF will have to penetrate or
circumvent the enemy’s security units and conduct an attack in order to determine the enemy’s location,
disposition, capabilities, and intentions.
ATTACK TO DISLOCATE
6-7. A KPAGF attack to dislocate employs units to obtain significant positional advantage, rendering the
enemy’s dispositions less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant. It aims to make the enemy expose units to a more
dangerous situation by forcing it to react to the dislocating action. Dislocation requires enemy commanders
to make a choice: accept neutralization of part of their unit or risk its destruction while repositioning. Turning
movements and envelopments produce dislocation. Artillery or other direct or indirect fires may cause an
enemy to either move to a more tenable location or risk severe attrition. Typical tactical tasks associated with
dislocation are ambush, interdict, and neutralize.
ATTACK TO DISRUPT
6-8. A KPAGF attack to disrupt interferes with the synchronization of enemy actions, plans, or tempo.
Attacks to disrupt often have a strong EIW component to disrupt, limit, deny, or degrade the enemy’s use of
the electromagnetic spectrum, especially its command and control (C2) and communications systems. The
KPA does not limit its attacks to military targets or enemy combatants; an attack to disrupt may be carried
out against noncombatant civilians and infrastructure.
PLANNING THE OFFENSE

6-9. Key elements of planning offensive missions are—
 Determine the offensive objective.
 Ensure there is adequate logistical support to accomplish the objective.
 Determine available time to plan and prepare actions.
 Organize units by functional mission task requirements.
 Conduct EIW activities, including psychological warfare, available and authorized at the
command planning level.
 Initiate offensive actions.
PLANNED OFFENSE
6-10. A planned offense is an offensive mission or action conducted when there is sufficient time and
situational understanding to prepare and rehearse units for specific tasks. Key considerations in offensive
planning includes but are not limited to—
 Implement a plan for reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA).
 Determine the when, where, and how of enemy plans, actions, and intentions.
 Identify enemy vulnerabilities and how to exploit those weaknesses.
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Offensive Actions
 Locate critical nodes of the enemy’s combat systems and when to most effectively interdict them.
 Enact functions that reinforce opportunities for offensive actions in the area of operations (AO).
 Determine the offensive method that will deny the enemy its tactical objectives.
 Task-organize units by function to attack and support with enabling functions.
 Create or take advantage of a tactical window of opportunity.
 Plan for offensive actions given success of defensive actions.
SITUATIONAL OFFENSE
6-11. A situational offense is an offensive action or mission conducted when temporary circumstances
emerge and require rapid and timely offensive actions and drills to take advantage of a tactical opportunity
against an enemy. A window of opportunity could be exploited in conditions such as—
 A key enemy unit, system, or capability is identified and vulnerable.
 An enemy repositioning of units in progress indicates a vulnerability in its formation array.
 An enemy concentration of units creates a lucrative target group.
FORMS OF KPAGF OFFENSIVE MANEUVER

6-12. KPAGF maneuver units use seven different types of offensive maneuvers when they attack an enemy.
A unit, such as a division, may employ more than one type of maneuver, with its subordinate units using
different forms. These types of maneuver are called—
 Encirclement.
 Penetration.
 Thrust.
 Holding.
 Turning.
 Infiltration.
 Besetment.
Encirclement Maneuver (P’owi)

6-13. The encirclement maneuver, p’owi (pronounced “po we”) in Korean, is conducted by the KPAGF at
both the operational and tactical levels. While KPAGF corps- and army-level headquarters may use up to
two divisions to conduct an operational encirclement, any encirclement done at the division and lower level
will normally use the entire unit. The intent of the encirclement maneuver is to intercept the majority of the
retreating enemy unit(s), encircled it, and destroyed it. During the Korean War, North Korean units
consistently attempted a double envelopment of South Korean and U.S. units. The KPAGF commander will
often choose a location for the intended encirclement somewhere between the location of the enemy’s front-
line positions and its reserve unit. The KPAGF anticipate that successful penetration or thrust maneuvers in
the area will cause units in adjacent AOs to withdraw or move to alternate positions. The KPA believes
enemy units are most vulnerable during a retrograde operation, making them susceptible to encirclement and
annihilation. Figure 6-1 on page 6-4 is an example of an encirclement. The KPAGF further break down their
encirclement maneuvers based on the situation:
 Partitioned destruction: encirclement of large units.
 Compressed destruction: encirclement of smaller units.
 Fire power destruction: destruction of units in narrow areas and while fighting encirclement
operations.
 Raid destruction: destruction of units in built-up areas.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 6-3

Chapter 6
Figure 6-1. Encirclement maneuver (example)
Penetration Maneuver (Tolp’a)

6-14. The penetration maneuver, tolp’a (pronounced “dolpa”) in Korean, is normally a division-level
operation to destroy a defending unit and create a maneuver corridor 2–3 km in width. The penetration is
normally supported by 50 to 80 tubes of mortar, artillery, and rocket fire for each kilometer of the defensive
position under attack. Along the demilitarized zone (DMZ), a penetration during an initial attack by the
KPAGF would likely receive support from 150 to 180 tubes per kilometer. The purpose of the penetration is
for a first tactical echelon unit to create a gap wide enough to allow a second tactical echelon unit to pass
through. Once the first tactical echelon unit penetrates the front-line position, it would set up a situational
defensive position while the second tactical echelon unit passes through in order to conduct a deep attack
against the combat support, rear service, and C2 units in the enemy’s division or corps rear area. See figure
6-2 for an example of a penetration maneuver.
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Offensive Actions
Figure 6-2. Penetration maneuver (example)
Thrust Maneuver (Ch’ŏmip)

6-15. The thrust maneuver, ch’ŏmip (pronounced “chim ip”) in Korean, is conducted by a company,
battalion, or regiment against an enemy strongpoint. The normal assault area will only be 600–800 m in
width, with a maximum of 1,000 m. The attacking unit will receive support from between 110 and 150 tubes
of mortar, artillery, and rockets. Units along the DMZ during an initial attack would likely receive support
from 150 to 180 tubes if designated to conduct a thrust maneuver. Similar to a wedge splitting a log, the small
attacking unit would force an opening through the strongpoint in order to allow an exploitation force to pass
through the gap. For a larger thrust maneuver, the KPAGF may use two action units, one on each side of the
gap, to create a larger hole for the following exploitation force. Once the second tactical echelon force passes
through the gap, it could receive one of four missions:
 Continue the attack by striking the rear or flank of the targeted enemy unit.
 Attack the rear or flank of a unit adjacent to the targeted unit.
 Open a blocked maneuver corridor.
 Assist in the passage of a larger force conducting a turning maneuver or besetment maneuver in
the enemy’s division or corps rear area.
See figure 6-3 on page 6-6 for an example of a thrust maneuver.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 6-5

Chapter 6
Figure 6-3. Thrust maneuver (example)
Holding Maneuver (Kyŏnje)

6-16. The holding maneuver, kyŏnje (pronounced “kyun jae”) in Korean, is a type of dispersed attack to fix
a larger force with a much smaller KPAGF unit. The KPAGF’s intent is to draw enemy reserves away from
the main effort. Holding maneuvers can be conducted by any size unit, from company to division. The
holding unit will often serve as part of a feint or demonstration across a larger front. It may employ small-
unit raids or mass indirect fires to deceive the enemy on its actual size and cause the committal of enemy
reserves to its location. If a second tactical echelon unit is successful in passing through a penetration or
thrust in an adjacent AO, the holding unit may conduct an actual attack to prevent the reserves or the unit
under the holding attack from going to the aid of a unit being encircled or under besetment. See figure 6-4
for an example of a holding maneuver.
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Offensive Actions
Figure 6-4. Holding maneuver (example)
Turning Maneuver (Uhoe)

6-17. The turning maneuver, uhoe (pronounced “wu hoe”) in Korean, is a precursor movement to
establishing an encirclement position or conducting a besetment of an enemy defensive position. KPAGF
corps- and army-level headquarters conduct operational turning maneuvers, while division and lower
headquarters conduct tactical turning movements. This maneuver can be used against the enemy’s reserve or
to coerce an enemy unit to abandon its primary defensive positions and fight in an undesirable direction. The
turning unit may use limited visibility (night or inclement weather) or rough terrain (swamps, rice paddies,
rivers, or mountains) to avoid undesirable contact with the enemy. If there is no natural gap in the enemy’s
defensive position, the turning unit could be part of a second tactical echelon that has passed through a gap
in the front lines created by a penetration or thrust by a first tactical echelon unit. See figure 6-5 on page 6-8
for an example of a turning movement.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 6-7

Chapter 6
Figure 6-5. Turning maneuver (example)
Infiltration Maneuver (Ch’imt’u)

6-18. The infiltration maneuver, ch’imt’u (pronounced “chim tu”) in Korean, is an attempt to pass a KPAGF
unit through the enemy’s lines undetected in order to establish attack positions in the enemy’s division or
corps rear area. The infiltration unit(s) will use limited visibility or rough terrain to pass through the enemy’s
front lines undetected. The mountainous terrain on the Korean Peninsula, with most of the mountains running
north-south, makes light infantry traversing the ridgelines an excellent method of reaching the enemy’s rear
area. A KPAGF division will normally designate several light infantry companies as infiltration units. While
KPAGF units lower than division do not have designated infiltration units, regular KPAGF infantry may be
used in that role. KPAGF infantry regiments will normally employ a single infantry company, and infantry
battalions will employ one platoon to conduct infiltration maneuvers within their AOs. KPAGF units larger
than division may also use infiltration maneuvers. An infantry corps will likely use the majority of its light
infantry brigade and attached sniper brigade (four battalions each) during an offensive operation to attack the
enemy division or corps rear areas. These infiltrating units will normally attack enemy C2 elements or
artillery positions, block enemy reinforcements, or secure chokepoints to facilitate the movement of friendly
follow-on units. See figure 6-6 for an example of an infiltration maneuver.
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Offensive Actions
Figure 6-6. Infiltration maneuver (example)
Besetment Maneuver (P’och’o)

6-19. The besetment maneuver, p’och’o (pronounced “po cho”) in Korean, is conducted by KPAGF units at
the regimental and lower level to destroy units in defensive strongpoints. For success, the KPAGF unit
making the attack desires a 3:1 ratio of friendly to enemy units, so regiments attack battalion strongpoints,
battalions attack company strongpoints; and companies attack platoon strongpoints. The intent is to attack
the defending unit on multiple flanks to make it impossible for the enemy unit to escape. There are four types
of KPAGF besetments, but any flank not under direct fire will be covered with indirect fire. The four types
of besetments are—
 Front and one flank.
 Front and two flanks.
 Front and rear.
 Front, rear, and two flanks.
See figure 6-7 on page 6-10 for an example of a besetment maneuver.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 6-9

Chapter 6
Figure 6-7. Besetment maneuver (example)
FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION OF FORCES—DIVISIONS, BRIGADES, AND REGIMENTS

6-20. A KPAGF divisional, brigade, or regimental commander specifies the initial required functions of a
force within the command and task-organizes resources to achieve integrated functions in a mission. Given
the resources available at this level, multiple functional mission tasks can be assigned to a division or lower-
level unit. The KPAGF commander can adjust task organization of forces during an operation to address
emergent tactical conditions.
FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION OF ELEMENTS—DETACHMENTS, BATTALIONS, AND

SUBORDINATE UNITS
6-21. Detachments, battalions, and companies are assigned mission tasks based on a function to achieve, but
differ in how task organization occurs compared to a tactical regiment, brigade, or division. The KPAGF
task-organizes battalions and companies as detachments to accomplish a single tactical task; a detachment is
assigned multiple functional mission tasks only when necessary.
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Offensive Actions
Note. A KPAGF commander gives a detachment a functional designation based on the role it has
in the overall mission or the specific function it will perform. For example, a detachment assigned
to conduct a raid may be called a raiding detachment.
PREPARING FOR THE OFFENSE

6-22. In the preparation phase, the KPAGF organize an AO, zone of reconnaissance responsibility, and
functional units to optimize successful offensive actions and create or seize opportunities for actions.
Offensive preparations apply a systems warfare approach to degrade the enemy’s system of systems, deny
integrated performance of the enemy combat system, and create vulnerabilities that KPAGF units can exploit.
MAINTAIN CONTACT
6-23. KPAGF offensive actions maintain contact with enemy units for relevant situational awareness and
understanding of an OE and probable or known enemy actions. Reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance
actions include rapid reorganization or reconstitution of assets to ensure no gaps in situational awareness and
understanding of the enemy, AO, or zone of reconnaissance responsibility. Effective RISTA guide prudent
use of KPAGF combat power to achieve the KPA offensive mission.
CONDUCT MOBILITY PREPARATIONS

6-24. The KPAGF position logistics support in anticipation of offensive mission task and enemy actions.
Preparations consider mobile logistics support, caches, and other sustainment requirements as lines of
communications extend with the directions of offensive actions. KPA doctrine places the burden on each
level of command to ensure the proper logistics are in place to complete its mission.
PREPARE FOR CONTINGENCIES

6-25. The KPAGF prepare for a primary concept of mission execution, as well as considering branches and
sequels to primary plans. Plans include the possibility of other contingencies and are developed with flexible
abilities in terms of priorities of effort and support. The KPA commander normally designates units as
reserves or rapid response units to handle unforeseen contingencies.
REHEARSE KEY MISSION TASKS

6-26. The KPAGF commander establishes the priorities for critical action rehearsals, effort, and support.
The unit rehearses those actions as realistically as possible in the time allocated for preparation. Typical
actions rehearsed in preparation for an KPAGF offensive mission include but are not limited to—
 RISTA updates.
 Counterreconnaissance.
 EIW, including psychological warfare.
 Integrated fires support.
 Battle handover from security and disruption units to main- and supporting-effort attack units.
 Main- and supporting-effort attacks.
 Mission, counterattack, and exploitation options.
EXECUTING THE OFFENSE

6-27. Successful execution of a KPAGF offensive mission is often followed by continued offensive action
to exploit tactical opportunities. In some situations, the offense may temporarily transition to the defense in
order to consolidate gains, defeat enemy counterattacks, or avoid culmination. The intent is to continue the
KPAGF’s offensive actions. The KPA commander does not only want to secure the objectives, but also to
annihilate or destroy the enemy units at the same time.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 6-11

Chapter 6
NATURE OF THE OFFENSE

6-28. When planning an offensive attack at the division or lower-unit level, the KPAGF base their tactics
and techniques on the current posture of the enemy. Based on enemy activity, strength, and the KPAGF’s
unit strength, the KPAGF commander will choose the form(s) of maneuver to use when making the attack.
The KPAGF’s posture can be one of the following—
 An attack against a defending enemy. The enemy is in a defensive position and not on the move.
 An attack against an attacking enemy. The KPAGF meet the enemy when it is on the move to
conduct an offensive.
 An attack against a retreating enemy. The enemy is in retreat and the KPAGF want to flank the
units conducting the retrograde movement in order to rout them.
6-29. At all levels of command, the KPAGF emphasize the isolation of the objective by infiltrating units
behind and to the flanks of the enemy to prevent reinforcement.
MAINTAIN CONTACT
6-30. The KPAGF ensure their units maintain contact with key elements of enemy units throughout the
mission. Actions include rapid reconstitution of reconnaissance capabilities for a continuum of timely and
accurate information and intelligence. The KPAGF also wants to maintain close contact with the enemy to
help mitigate the latter’s superior aerial weapons systems and indirect fire capabilities. Due to the enemy’s
aversion to friendly fire casualties, it may choose to not fire at KPAGF units in close proximity to its own
forces for fear of killing its own soldiers.
EXECUTE MISSION TASKS AND DRILLS

6-31. The KPAGF conduct mission tasks and drills with aggressive and flexible actions that have been
practiced to standards. As situational conditions evolve during a mission, clear and concise modifications to
methodical and practiced combined arms actions allow the KPAGF to rapidly adapt and react to new tactical
conditions.
COMPANY COMBAT FORMATIONS

6-32. There are three primary movement formations used by a KPAGF infantry company when there is the
possibility of contact with the enemy: wedge, V, and line. The chosen formation is based on the terrain, the
front the company must cover, and the expectation level of enemy contact. Figure 6-8 illustrates these
formations.
Wedge Formation
6-33. The wedge formation consists of three infantry platoons—one forward and two trailing—with 150–
200 m between any two platoons. The company headquarters locates itself in the center of the formation,
with additional assets such as extra machine guns behind but near the company commander. This formation
provides the most all-around security for the company as it moves forward. It allows the company commander
to make contact with a small element, but maintain two maneuver elements to develop the situation.
V Formation
6-34. The V formation is the reverse of the wedge formation, and is used when the KPAGF infantry company
needs to cover a wider axis of advance. Depending upon terrain, the two lead infantry platoons are 300–350
m apart, with the trail platoon 150–200 m to the rear in the center. The company headquarters is in the center
of the formation, with the attached weapons behind it but in front of the trail platoon. If contact with the
enemy is made, the company commander can use the trail platoon and any attached heavy weapons to
maneuver while the lead infantry platoon that made contact fixes the enemy.
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Offensive Actions
Figure 6-8. KPAGF primary small-unit (company and below) movement formations
Line Formation
6-35. The company line formation places all three KPAGF infantry platoons parallel to each other with
approximately 150–200 m between platoons. The infantry platoons may be in any formation dependent upon
the terrain, the likelihood of enemy contact, and the need for rapid movement. Any heavy weapons or reserve
trail 150–200 m behind the infantry platoons. The KPAGF infantry company headquarters is located about
halfway between the infantry platoons and the heavy weapons or company reserve.
PLATOON COMBAT FORMATIONS

6-36. At the infantry platoon level, the KPAGF may use the column or double column for faster movement.
If enemy contact is possible, a KPAGF infantry platoon uses the same three formations as the company:
wedge, V, and line. The primary difference is the distance between subordinate units.
Wedge Formation
6-37. In the wedge formation, one KPAGF infantry squad is forward with the two trailing squads 75–100 m
to the rear of the lead squad, depending upon the terrain. There is about 50 m between the two trailing squads.
The platoon headquarters is in the center between the two trailing squads. This formation allows the platoon
leader to make contact with the smallest element—the squad—while allowing for the remaining two-thirds
of the unit to maneuver if the leading squad makes contact with the enemy.
V Formation
6-38. The V formation is the reverse of the wedge formation and is used if the KPAGF infantry platoon is
required to cover a wider area in its movement. Depending upon the terrain, all squads will maintain
approximately 100 m distant from each other. The headquarters is in the center of the formation, about
halfway between the leading and trailing squads. If contact is made with the enemy, the trailing squad can
maneuver to support the squad in contact, and depending on the situation, the other leading squad could also
maneuver to support the one in contact.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 6-13

Chapter 6
Line Formation
6-39. The KPAGF infantry platoon line formation places all three KPAGF infantry squads parallel to each
other with approximately 50 m between them. The platoon headquarters is usually in a trailing position
behind the center squad. This formation is most often used when enemy contact is imminent. The KPAGF
soldiers do not go “on line” until they are approximately 150 m from the objective.
KPAGF INFANTRY PLATOON ASSAULT TECHNIQUES

6-40. While terrain will dictate the actual distances, a KPAGF infantry platoon will likely complete the
following actions in an attack—
 Platoon moves in a wedge, V, or line formation until reaching around 900 m (actual distance based
on terrain) from the known enemy position.
 KPAGF platoon leader designates three assault lines, with the third line 100 m from the enemy
position found through previous reconnaissance.
 Platoon deploys in a “skirmish” line about 150 m in width.
 On the platoon leader’s signal, pairs of KPAGF soldiers “leapfrog” toward the first assault line
without firing their weapons.
 Attached heavy machine guns set up around the first assault line, aimed at the enemy positions.
 When the platoon reaches the first assault line, the heavy machine guns open fire on the objective.
 Soldiers use fire and movement to assail the enemy position.
 At 30 m, soldiers throw grenades.
6-41. KPAGF soldiers are trained to fire only one-third of their allocated ammunition between the first and
second assault lines, and another one-third between the second and third assault lines. The remainder of the
allocated ammunition is used in the final assault from 100 m away (the third assault line) to arrival at the
objective.
6-42. After the attack is launched there is no turning back, as any change of plans must be approved by the
political officer. Once the platoon attacks, it will continue until the objective is taken or the last man falls.
Any KPAGF soldier in the platoon that fails to continue the assault or tries to retreat will be shot by the
political officer. Of note, the regiment is the lowest level within the KPAGF unit structure where the
commander can order a withdrawal.
SEIZE TACTICAL OPPORTUNITIES

6-43. While KPA doctrine emphasizes decentralized execution of a mission task and use of tactical initiative,
actual execution of the initiative may not occur because of fear of any repercussions due to the failure of the
mission. KPA units at the lower echelons of command may do nothing without orders from above. It remains
to be seen whether subordinate units will take advantage of emergent opportunities and adapt tactical actions
in concert with the purpose of a mission order and its intent. If a KPA commander takes initiative and acts
without orders from above and succeeds, the commander will likely be rewarded. If the commander takes
personal initiative and fails, the punishment will be severe. There appears to be no middle ground for KPA
commanders.
TYPES OF OFFENSIVE ACTION—DIVISIONS AND REGIMENTS

6-44. The types of KPAGF offensive action are tactical methods and also guide adaptive decision making in
how to best achieve a mission. An offensive mission typically includes subordinate units executing specified
offensive and defensive functional actions within an overall offensive mission framework.
6-45. The two primary types of offensive missions at tactical regimental to divisional operations are
integrated attacks and dispersed attacks. The KPAGF also conducts some limited objective attack variants.
A KPAGF tactical commander may use both of the primary forms of offense simultaneously throughout an
AO. A KPAGF offensive action or series of engagements may include subordinate units executing various
combinations of mobile and area defenses, as well as offensive actions, within an overall offensive mission
framework.
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Offensive Actions
ATTACK
6-46. An attack is an offensive operation emphasizing the destruction of enemy units, seizure and securing
terrain, or both. It seeks to achieve tactical decision through primarily military means by defeating the
enemy’s military power. This defeat does not necessarily result from the destruction of systems but through
the disruption, dislocation, and subsequent paralysis that occurs when combat units are rendered irrelevant
by the loss of the capability or will to continue the fight.
6-47. There are two types of attack: integrated attack and dispersed attack. The KPAGF do not have a
separate design for exploitation or pursuit as distinct offensive missions, but they are considered a subsequent
norm to integrated and dispersed attacks. Situational conditions and timely risk assessment indicate when
these actions are prudent to conduct following a successful attack. Both types of attack can use any of the
seven forms of offensive movement.
Integrated Attack
6-48. The primary objective of an integrated attack is destroying the enemy’s will and ability to fight. The
KPA recognizes modern militaries cannot continue without adequate logistics support or effective C2 and
communications, and emphasizes an attack on these targets.
6-49. Integrated attacks are characterized by actions to—
 Target and focus attacks on enemy logistics, C2, and communications.
 Degrade enemy situational understanding with EIW elements, especially psychological warfare.
 Disrupt enemy forces with reinforced complex terrain and disruption forces.
 Fix designated enemy forces.
 Isolate targeted critical components of the enemy combat system.
 Attack targeted critical components of the enemy combat system.
 Defeat enemy forces with fires and maneuver, supported by EIW.
 Destroy enemy will and resolve to continue armed conflict.
6-50. The KPAGF prefers to conduct integrated attacks when most or all of the following conditions exist—
 Possess superior combat power over enemy forces.
 Maintain the ability to disrupt or destroy enemy aviation or missile assets in AO airspace.
 Degrade enemy standoff reconnaissance and attack systems to an acceptable levels of risk
assessment as determined by the KPA commander.
6-51. Integrated attack is an offensive action where the KPAGF seeks a military decision by destroying the
enemy’s will or ability to continue armed conflict through the application of combined arms effects. An
integrated attack is often conducted when the KPAGF enjoys overmatch of its enemy and is able to focus
significant aspects of combat power on an objective. Integrated attack can also be directed against a more
sophisticated and capable opponent when a tactical opportunity emerges or is created during an operation.
Figure 6-9 on page 6-16 is an example of a KPAGF mechanized division conducting an integrated attack.
The numbers shown in the text below match the numbers in figure 6-9.
6-52. Though a KPAGF division can conduct an encirclement at operational level, many of its subordinate
units may be involved in other forms of military movement. While the main assault forces conduct the attack
in the form of an encirclement, fixing forces may conduct thrust, penetration, or holding movements in their
own AO. In figure 6-9 on page 6-16, one of the assault forces also conducts a turning movement before
becoming part of the encirclement force.
6-53. For an attack, KPAGF doctrine only requires a 2:1 advantage at the point of the attack. It designates
the main attack advance on a much narrower attack zone than the secondary attacks, which requires the rest
of the division to disperse more widely throughout the remainder of the divisional front. The KPAGF
commander’s intent is to provide the appearance to enemy units that there is significant military force to their
front, to keep them from assisting other units.
6-54. The KPAGF division’s artillery assets are located in the division artillery group. The division artillery
group may receive additional indirect fire assets from the corps, dependent upon whether the division is
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 6-15

Chapter 6
conducting the main or a supporting attack. The division artillery group initiates the attack (#1) by firing
indirect artillery and rockets not only at the frontline enemy units, but at the enemy brigade command post
(CP) and reserve as well. (For clarity purposes, only three artillery strikes are shown.) The division artillery
group’s task is to provide adequate indirect fire in order to achieve neutralization of the brigade reserve;
disrupt the C2 of the brigade CP; and harass at a minimum or neutralize, if possible, the frontline units.
Figure 6-9. Integrated attack (KPAGF mechanized division-level encirclement example)
6-55. A KPAGF division typically uses its light infantry units on infiltration missions to initiate the attack
during the night, inclement weather, or poor visibility conditions. All six light infantry companies in this
example take part in the integrated attack, but support three different offensive actions. On the western flank,
two light infantry companies (#2) assist the mechanized battalion to clear a mountain pass chokepoint (#3).
The units’ task is to conduct a thrust attack to clear the pass in order to gain freedom of movement and allow
possible exploitation from second-echelon units.
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Offensive Actions
6-56. Two other light infantry companies on the same flank infiltrate (#4) farther to the south to attack the
enemy’s brigade CP (#5) by fire in order to destroy it, if not already destroyed by KPAGF artillery fire. On
the eastern flank, the remainder of the light infantry battalion—two companies—infiltrates (#6) to serve as
the support unit (#7) on the eastern flank of a planned kill zone.
6-57. Even though there are adjacent KPAGF divisions also attacking, the majority of the KPAGF division’s
reconnaissance company (#8) still protects the eastern flank of the main attack with a screen, especially as
the main assault force makes its turning movement to the west and then north again (#16). A single
reconnaissance platoon (#9) screens the division’s western flank to prevent a surprise attack from the adjacent
KPAGF division’s AO.
6-58. Away from the main attack and the light infantry battalion activities, there are three other supporting
attacks occurring almost simultaneously. These include the thrust attack (#3) on the western flank already
mentioned above, two holding maneuvers (#10 and #11) by fixing forces to the east and west of the main
attack, and a penetration movement (#12) to the east of the main attack. The engineer battalion and the first-
echelon tank company (#13) are prepared to follow the main attack along the major road or along possible
secondary avenues of approach to the east. The engineer battalion is prepared to assist with any breach
operations required along the main axis of advance or the secondary axis, located to the east.
6-59. The second-echelon units (#14), consisting of a tank company and two mechanized infantry battalions,
serve as the KPAGF’s divisional exploitation force and are at a far enough distance to follow whichever first-
echelon unit is most successful. The planned exploitation is along the main axis of advance (#15), but could
possibly go through the cleared chokepoint to the west (#3) or, if the penetration attack has been more
successful than the main attack, farther to the east (#12). In the tradition of old Soviet/Russian doctrine, the
KPAGF will reinforce success, and any KPAGF division plan will contain different route options for the
second-echelon units to follow based on the success of the first-echelon units.
6-60. The KPAGF main attack has many moving parts. A single tank company and two mechanized infantry
battalions (the assault force) would then conduct a turning movement (#16) from the east to attack the
enemy’s brigade reserve (#17) from the south. Its task is to get behind the enemy’s brigade reserve in order
to drive it into the planned kill zone (#18). If possible, the timing of this attack would occur shortly after the
brigade reserve initiated movement from its assembly area to reinforce a gap in the front lines to its north.
6-61. The planned KPAGF kill zone (#18) is located between the enemy’s frontline units and its reserve
force (#17). If executed correctly, the KPAGF tank company and two mechanized infantry battalions would
attack by fire from the south (#19); one mechanized infantry battalion with possibly a tank company would
support by fire (#20) from the north. The intent is for the main assault force to annihilate the brigade reserve
at its most vulnerable time, the moment it begins its movement from the reserve assembly area.
6-62. The two KPAGF light infantry companies that infiltrated earlier would support by fire (#7) from the
east to prevent the enemy reserve from escaping in that direction. The kill zone’s fourth flank, to the west, is
blocked by high ground. If necessary, indirect fire from artillery and rockets in the division artillery group
(#21) could cover the western flank area not covered by direct fire from ground units. In addition to the
second-echelon units designated to exploit the success of the first-echelon assaults (#14), the KPAGF division
will keep approximately one battalion in reserve (#22) for other contingencies. The division’s organic air
defense battalion will provide sector coverage for the AO.
6-63. Upon completion of the encirclement of the enemy brigade reserve and any frontline units falling back
into the kill zone and their subsequent annihilation, the KPAGF division would continue its movement to the
south. Based on its experiences during the Korean War, KPAGF commanders expect that a significant
penetration of the enemy’s front lines will cause adjacent enemy units to also conduct retrograde operations
to maintain contact with their flanks and to avoid being cut off.
6-64. If the first-echelon KPAGF units still maintain adequate forces, these would continue to press the attack
southward. If not strong enough to remain a viable force, or based on the situation, the KPAGF division’s
second-echelon forces could then pass through the first echelon to attack the enemy’s combat support, combat
service support, C2, and communications units in the enemy’s divisional or corps rear area.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 6-17

Chapter 6
Functional Organization for an Integrated Attack

6-65. An integrated attack employs various types of functional units. The tactical KPAGF commander
assigns subordinate units functional designations corresponding to their intended roles in the attack.
Enabling Forces
6-66. An integrated attack often employs fixing, assault, and support forces. A disruption force exists, but is
not created specifically for this type of offensive action.
6-67. The fixing force prevents enemy defending, reserve, and quick-response forces from interfering with
the actions of the assault and exploitation forces. The mission task to fix a designated enemy force can be
time-related or when relieved of the task by the KPAGF commander. One or more fixing forces can be
employed during the attack.
6-68. The assault force is charged with destroying a particular enemy force or seizing key terrain. The assault
or assaults can create a tactical opportunity for an exploitation force. The commander may employ one or
more assault forces.
6-69. A support force provides the assaulting unit with one or more of the following, including but not limited
to—
 C2 and communications.
 Rear service units.
 Direct fire support.
 Indirect fire support.
 Mobility support.
 EIW support.
Action Force
6-70. The most common type of action force in an integrated attack is the exploitation (second tactical
echelon) force. This force must be capable of penetrating or avoiding enemy defensive forces and destroying
targeted critical components of the enemy combat system. An exploitation force typically possesses a task-
organized combination of mobility, protection, and firepower to accomplish the assigned exploitation
objective.
Dispersed Attack
6-71. Dispersed attack is an offensive action in which the KPAGF conducts offensive actions when
threatened by a superior enemy or when unable to mass or provide integrated C2 and communications to an
attack. While a unit of any size can conduct a dispersed attack, it will likely be conducted by a company or
larger. The primary objective of dispersed attack is to create tactical opportunities to destroy the enemy’s
will or capability to continue armed conflict. Dispersed attack relies on dispersion of units and EIW effects
to conduct tactical offensive actions when overmatched by an enemy. To achieve this, the KPAGF does not
necessarily have to destroy the entire enemy force, but often only destroy or degrade key components of the
enemy’s combat system.
6-72. The KPAGF dispersed attack concept is to conduct recurring attacks in varied timing and multiple
locations to degrade vulnerable enemy capabilities. A dispersed attack can be used against peer forces when
tactical opportunities emerge and support the gradual defeat of the enemy combat system. Figure 6-10 is an
example of a dispersed attack by KPA special operations forces (SOF) with assistance from North Korean
clandestine supporters already living in South Korea. A subordinate unit could also conduct a dispersed attack
as part of its higher unit’s integrated attack. Number 3 in figure 6-9 on page 6-16 provides an example of a
unit conducting a dispersed attack while the higher KPAGF unit conducts an integrated attack.
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Offensive Actions
Figure 6-10. Dispersed attack (example)
6-73. Dispersed attacks are characterized by the following activities:

 Degrade enemy situational understanding with EIW elements.
 Target and focus attacks on key components of the enemy’s combat system.
 Conduct rapid massing and use of combat power, followed by rapid dispersal.
 Disrupt enemy forces with reinforced complex terrain and disruption forces.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 6-19

Chapter 6

 Conduct recurring attacks on critical components of the enemy combat system.
 Defeat enemy will and resolve with EIW.
 Destroy enemy will and resolve to continue armed conflict.
6-74. To establish tactical conditions favorable for dispersed attack, actions include but are not limited to—
 Destroy enemy ground reconnaissance.
 Deceive enemy imagery and signals sensors.
 Create a vulnerable air defense environment.
 Deceive the enemy regarding situational awareness and understanding.
 Optimize use of complex terrain.
Functional Organization for a Dispersed Attack

6-75. A dispersed attack employs various types of functional units. The KPAGF commander assigns
subordinate units functional designations corresponding to their intended roles in the attack.
Enabling Forces
6-76. A dispersed attack often employs fixing, assault, and support forces. A disruption force may exist, but
is not created specifically for this type of offensive action. Deception forces can also play an important role
in a dispersed attack.
6-77. The fixing force fixes enemy defending forces, reserves, or quick-response forces to prevent them from
interfering with the actions of the assault and exploitation forces. The mission task to fix a designated enemy
force can be time-related or when relieved of the task by the KPAGF commander. One or more fixing forces
can be employed during the attack.
6-78. The assault force is charged with destroying a particular part of the enemy force or seizing key
positions. Such an assault can create favorable conditions for the exploitation force to rapidly move from
dispersed locations and penetrate or infiltrate enemy defenses. The commander may employ one or more
assault forces.
6-79. A support force provides support throughout multiple dispersed sites in an AO. Support includes one
or more of the following but is not limited to—
 EIW support.
Action Force
6-80. The most common type of action force in an integrated attack is the exploitation force. This force must
be capable of destroying the target of the attack. An exploitation force can be a dispersed group of forces
conducting multiple attacks progressively or simultaneously on designated targets or objectives.
LIMITED-OBJECTIVE ATTACK
6-81. A limited-objective attack achieves results critical to tactical operations by denying critical capabilities
to the enemy. The results of a KPAGF limited-objective attack typically support the overall success of
KPAGF operations, preserve KPAGF combat power, and degrade enemy capabilities. The primary objective
of a limited-objective attack is to degrade a particular enemy capability, system, or group of systems, but can
also be to disrupt the enemy tempo of operations.
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Offensive Actions
6-82. Limited-objective attacks are characterized by actions to—

 Focus on disruption or destruction of a designated target or objective.
 Optimize use of systems warfare.
 Deny the enemy a particular capability.
6-83. There are two types of tactical limited-objective attacks: spoiling attack and counterattack. These share
some common characteristics but differ in tactical purpose.
Spoiling Attack (Attack Against an Attacking Enemy)

6-84. The purpose of a KPAGF spoiling attack is to preempt or seriously disrupt an enemy attack while the
enemy is in the process of planning, forming, assembling, or preparing to attack. A spoiling attack can also
affect enemy defensive operations by disrupting the tempo of related enemy activities. The spoiling attack is
designed to disrupt or deny enemy actions favorable to conducting an enemy attack.
6-85. Spoiling attacks are characterized with actions that—
 Confirm intelligence of enemy tactical plans or preparations.
 Identify a critical enemy vulnerability.
 Indicate a timely and rapid action to counter enemy plans or preparations.
 Retain or regain the tactical initiative.
6-86. The KPAGF shape the following conditions for a spoiling attack with—
 Reconnaissance, intelligence, and surveillance of enemy attack preparations.
 Target acquisition of enemy security, reserve, and response forces that could possibly disrupt the
spoiling attack.
 Fixing designated enemy forces.
 Isolating targeted critical components of the enemy combat system.
 Denying, defeating, or destroying the enemy or a particular capability.
Counterattack
6-87. A counterattack is a KPAGF offensive action by a designated force against an enemy attacking force
with the aim of denying the enemy its tactical objective. Typically a mission task initiated by a KPAGF
defending force, it causes an enemy offensive action to culminate and allows the KPAGF to control the tempo
of operations and retain or regain the tactical initiative. The KPA emphasizes to its commanders to
counterattack as quickly as possible to prevent the enemy from solidifying its position and to catch it where
it is the weakest physically and logistically. The KPAGF will often conduct a counterattack when the
commander believes the enemy forces do not possess adequate support or are disorganized. Counterattacks
can be conducted by all sizes of KPAGF units from company to regiment. During the counterattack, the
KPAGF counterattack force could use any of the seven forms of maneuver previously discussed. The KPAGF
counterattack will rarely extend beyond the limit of any supporting weapons.
6-88. The KPAGF conducts counterattacks to—
 Slow the enemy’s advance.
 Annihilate a portion of the attacking force.
 Recapture a lost position.
6-89. Counterattacks are characterized by—

 A shift in command and support relationships to assume an offensive posture for the
counterattacking force.
 Proper identification that the enemy is at or near culmination.
 Planned rapid transition of the remainder of the force to the offense.
 The possibility that a counterattack may open a window of opportunity for other combat actions.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 6-21

Chapter 6
6-90. The KPAGF seek to set the following conditions for a counterattack:
 Locate and track enemy reserve forces and cause them to be committed.
 Destroy enemy reconnaissance forces that could observe counterattack preparations.
 Begin the counterattack at night, to be completed by midnight, so gains can be consolidated before
daybreak.
Functional Organization for a Limited-objective Attack

6-91. Functional organization for a limited-objective attack may appear similar to either an integrated or
dispersed attack. The functions of forces may differ, however, based on the tactical conditions. A spoiling
attack could be ordered during offensive or defensive operations, while a counterattack would typically be
ordered for execution only from a defensive operation. Limited-objective attacks are characterized by actions
to—
 Focus on disruption or destruction of a designated target or objective.
 Optimize use of systems warfare.
 Attack to deny the enemy a particular capability or disrupt enemy tempo.
6-92. Action Forces. The most common type of action force in a limited-objective attack is an assault force
or exploitation force. The primary purpose of the mission task is the description assigned to the action force.
6-93. Enabling Forces. A counterattack often employs fixing, assault, and support forces. If a disruption
force is utilized, the units used are normally ones that were part of a previous KPAGF defensive posture. It
is unlikely that the KPAGF commander will receive additional external forces in order to execute a
counterattack.
6-94. The fixing force in a counterattack is the part of the force engaged in defensive action with the enemy.
This force continues to fight from its current position and seeks to account for the key parts of the enemy
array and ensure they are not able to break contact and reposition. Additionally, the fixing force has the
mission of making contact with and destroying enemy reconnaissance forces and any combat forces that may
have penetrated the KPAGF defense.
6-95. The assault force, an enabler when supporting an exploitation force, can be assigned tasks of forcing a
penetration of enemy forces, continuing the assault, causing commitment of enemy reserves, or similar
actions fixing enemy forces and degrading enemy reaction to an exploitation force.
6-96. A support force provides task-organized combat support, rear service, C2, or communications
functions. Other specialized support is mission dependent.
TACTICAL OFFENSIVE ACTIONS—DETACHMENTS,

BATTALIONS, AND SUBORDINATE UNITS
6-97. KPAGF commanders of detachments, battalions, and subordinate units are tasked to conduct offensive
actions with a mission purpose and intent. KPAGF units at this tactical level typically execute only one
tactical mission at a time. Conducting simultaneous multiple missions by a detachment or subordinate-type
element would be rare. If simultaneous multiple missions are required as part of a larger mission set, more
than one detachment or tactical unit will be tasked and organized for actions within the larger mission.
FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION OF OFFENSIVE ELEMENTS

6-98. At the detachment, battalion, and subordinate unit level, functional organizations are called elements,
rather than the force descriptor used at divisional or regimental level.
6-99. An action element typically is an assault, ambush, or raid element. In a reconnaissance attack, however,
the action element typically changes during the mission. This is due to the multiple actions required to find
and fix selected enemy units and set conditions for a mission leader to order a decisive action, such as an
attack, assault, ambush, or raid.
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Offensive Actions
Note. Any battalion or company receiving additional assets from a higher command becomes a
battalion-size detachment or company-size detachment. References to a detachment throughout
this chapter may also apply to a battalion, company, or subordinate unit unless specifically stated
otherwise.
ASSAULT
6-100. An assault is an attack that destroys an enemy unit through firepower and the physical occupation
or destruction of a position. An assault is a basic form of KPAGF tactical offensive combat.
6-101. Other types of offensive action may include an element conducting an assault to complete a mission;
however, that action will be given a designation corresponding to the specific mission accomplished. For
example, an element conducting an assault as part of the action element of an ambush would still be
designated as an ambush element. Figure 6-11 on page 6-24 provides an example of a simple assault.
Functional Organization for an Assault

6-102. A detachment conducting an ambush typically is organized into three elements: the assault element,
the security element, and the support element. There may be more than one of each of these types of element.
6-103. The assault element is the action element. It maneuvers to and seizes the enemy position, and defeats
or destroys any enemy units at the objective.
6-104. The security element provides early warning of approaching enemy units and prevents them from
reinforcing the assaulted position or unit. The KPAGF commander may accept risk and employ a security
element that can only provide early warning, but is not strong enough to halt or repel enemy response
elements. Security elements can provide reconnaissance, security, and counterreconnaissance.
6-105. The support element provides the assaulting detachment with one or more of the following, including
but not limited to—
 EIW support.
Organizing for an Assault

6-106. The detachment conducting an assault is assigned an AO and objective. A key coordination point
with respect to the AO is whether a higher headquarters is controlling the airspace associated with the assault.
Executing an Assault
6-107. An assault is typically an integrated combined arms approach. KPAGF assaults are characterized
with actions to—
 Conduct tactical security.
 Isolate the objective.
 Fix designated enemy elements.
 Suppress the objective with fires.
 Maneuver to seize the objective.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 6-23

Chapter 6
Figure 6-11. Assault (example)
6-108. Assault Element. The assault element is the action element. Actions center on maneuver, supported
by fires, from an assault position to and beyond the objective. Typical tactical tasks expected of the assault
element are—
 Clear.
 Destroy.
 Occupy.
 Secure.
 Seize.
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Offensive Actions
Speed of execution is critical to an assault. The assault element will use surprise and situational factors of
limited visibility and complex terrain, as well as camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception.
6-109. Security Element. The security element is typically the first element to act in an assault. It moves
to a position(s) to deny the enemy freedom of movement along any ground or air avenues of approach that
can reinforce the objective or interfere with the mission of the assault element. The security element can be
directed to perform other tactical tasks to include—
 Ambush.
 Block.
 Canalize.
 Delay.
 Disrupt.
 Fix.
 Contain (this task usually requires multiple elements.)
 Isolate (this task usually requires multiple elements.)
 Destroy.
6-110. Support Element. The support element can have a wide range of functions in an assault. The
detachment commander typically exercises C2 from within a part of the support element, unless analysis
deems that success requires the commander to lead the assault element personally.
AMBUSH
6-111. An ambush is an attack by fire or other destructive means from concealed positions on a moving or
temporarily halted enemy (FM 3-90-1). In an ambush, enemy action determines the time of attack, whereas
the KPAGF unit sets the location. Figure 6-12 on page 6-26 provides an example of an ambush. Ambush
effects can include but are not limited to—
 Destroy or capture personnel and supplies.
 Harass and demoralize the enemy.
 Delay or block movement of personnel and supplies.
 Canalize enemy movement by making certain routes unavailable for traffic.
6-112. The KPAGF can use an ambush as a psychological warfare enabler. Key factors in an ambush are—
 Surprise.
 Control.
 Simplicity.
 Security.
 Coordinated fires.
 Withdrawal.
Functional Organization for an Ambush

6-113. A detachment conducting an ambush is typically organized into three elements: the ambush element,
the security element, and the support element. There may be more than one of each of these types of element.
The composition of these elements may vary depending on the mission. The type of units could involve
infantry, reconnaissance, armor, antiarmor, air defense, or engineer, but are not limited to those listed.
6-114. Action Element. The ambush element is the action element. The ambush element attacks to defeat
or destroy enemy units in a kill zone. An ambush can be a primary or complementary action to prevent an
enemy from accomplishing its mission.
6-115. Security Element. The security element has the mission to prevent enemy units from responding to
the ambush before completion of the attack. The element provides early warning, prevents the ambush
element from becoming decisively engaged, and supports effective withdrawal of all ambush elements from
the ambush site.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 6-25

Chapter 6
6-116. Support Element. The support element of an ambush has the same basic functions as one for an
assault. Typically, the detachment commander exercises C2 from within a part of the support element.
Figure 6-12. Ambush (example)
Organizing for an Ambush

6-117. The planning and preparation of an ambush is concentrated on massing combat power into a kill
zone. One or more kill zones can be employed depending on the terrain, expected size of the enemy, and
KPAGF combat systems coverage of the kill zone. Firing positions provide concealment, cover, and
6-26 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Offensive Actions
favorable fields of fire into the kill zone. Manmade obstacles reinforce the restrictions of natural obstacles
and the terrain.
Executing an Ambush
6-118. At a C2 signal or terrain-oriented point, the ambush element engages the enemy in the kill zone.
Security elements engage any enemy elements not in the kill zone. After the enemy has been rendered combat
ineffective, designated ambush or support elements exploit the objective area and kill zone, and then
withdraw to a rally point. The KPA places emphasis on intelligence collection and the retrieval of weapons
and other equipment of value by the ambush element. Successful execution of an ambush focuses on the
desired effects in the mission order, which can include harassment, seizing prisoners, or annihilation of
enemy elements.
RAID
6-119. A raid is an attack to temporarily seize a stationary or moving target in order to capture or destroy
personnel or equipment. Raids can also be tasked to secure selective information or deceive an enemy. A raid
concludes with the withdrawal of the raiding detachment to sanctuary. Figure 6-13 on page 6-28 provides an
example of a KPAGF raid.
6-120. Raids are characterized by actions to include but not limited to—
 Destroy or damage key systems or facilities.
 Secure designated enemy materiel.
 Seize prisoners.
 Support EIW objectives.
 Support operations by creating a tactical opportunity for another KPAGF unit.
6-121. The raiding detachment typically consists of three elements: raiding, security, and support. Other
functional elements may be task-organized dependent on the mission. The size of the raiding element depends
upon its mission, the nature and location of the target, and the enemy situation. The composition of these
elements may vary depending on the mission. The type of units could involve infantry, reconnaissance,
armor, antiarmor, air defense, or engineer, but are not limited to those listed.
6-122. Action Element. The raiding element is the action element. It attacks to accomplish its assigned
mission at a particular objective.
6-123. Security Element. The security element uses stealth to occupy positions in order to fix enemy
security or response units that would disrupt the raiding element. Security tasks can include preventing enemy
escape from the objective. The security element also protects the withdrawal as the other elements move to
sanctuary.
6-124. The security element moves to positions to deny the enemy freedom of movement along any ground
or air avenues of approach reinforcing the objective or interfere with the mission of the assault element. The
security element can be directed to perform other tactical tasks to include—
 Ambush.
 Block.
 Canalize.
 Delay.
 Fix.
 Contain (this task usually requires multiple elements).
 Isolate (this task usually requires multiple elements).
 Destroy.
6-125. Support Element. The support element of an ambush has the same basic functions as in an assault.
Typically, the detachment commander exercises C2 from within a part of the support element.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 6-27

Chapter 6
Figure 6-13. Raid (example)
RECONNAISSANCE ATTACK
6-126. A reconnaissance attack is a tactical offensive action to confirm situational understanding of an
enemy’s location, disposition, and actions in order to fix, defeat, or destroy a designated enemy. This
offensive action can be used to gain specified information and intelligence on an enemy’s capabilities and
intentions for KPAGF tactical advantage in a future mission.
6-127. The KPAGF fights for information when necessary to retain or regain the initiative. A
reconnaissance attack integrates a complex set of mission tasks, and can be employed when other means do
not provide accurate situational understanding of an enemy and AO.
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Offensive Actions
6-128. Key factors in employing a reconnaissance attack, as a complement to continuous aggressive

reconnaissance, security, and related offensive actions, include but are not limited to—
 Situational awareness requirements of an evolving enemy presence or actions in an AO.
 Tempo of KPAGF conditional developments to regain situational understanding and tactical
initiative.
Functional Organization for a Reconnaissance Attack

6-129. The detachment commander typically organizes a reconnaissance attack with reconnaissance,
security, action, and support elements. More than one element of each functional type is typical in this
mission due to the several simultaneous requirements and actions occurring in multiple zones within an AO.
Note. Based on the requirement for appropriate C2 of multiple functional elements in several
simultaneous actions during the tactical phases of a reconnaissance attack, a company detachment
is the smallest task-organized element to command a reconnaissance attack. The scope of this type
of mission could require a C2 headquarters and a task-organized battalion or regiment.
6-130. Reconnaissance Elements. The reconnaissance attack employs several reconnaissance elements
to confirm the location and actions of enemy units operating in the detachment’s AO and conditions of an
OE. If the mission purpose is to fix or destroy enemy units when located, reconnaissance elements provide
reconnaissance support to other functional elements, such as security and actions elements.
6-131. Security Elements. Security elements operate in conjunction with reconnaissance elements, but
also conduct reconnaissance tasks during the security mission. Upon locating an enemy unit and on order of
the detachment commander, actions by security elements include but are not limited to—
 Fix or isolate designated enemy units.
 Block enemy reinforcement avenues of approach.
 Ambush enemy on withdrawal routes from a target or objective.
 Protect KPAGF elements during movements, maneuver, and follow-on mission tasks.
6-132. Action Elements. The action elements obtain a mission descriptor that most clearly identifies the
primary action task. Actions can include mission tasks such as assault, ambush, or raid. The detachment
commander monitors initial reconnaissance and security actions confirming the enemy situation, and then
decides on actions to fix, isolate, defeat, or destroy a designated enemy unit.
6-133. Support Elements. Support elements are task-organized with particular capabilities and a priority
of effort and support to designated functional elements in the reconnaissance attack detachment. The
detachment commander locates C2 and communications nodes in the AO to most effectively receive and
report timely reconnaissance and security indicators from the detachment elements. An extended depth and
width of an AO may require a detachment CP well forward in the AO for reliable real-time information and
intelligence.
Organizing for a Reconnaissance Attack

6-134. Multiple attack routes or axes often characterize reconnaissance attacks. There may also be objective
rally points and orientation objectives.
Executing a Reconnaissance Attack

6-135. Multiple elements normally infiltrate or maneuver separately within an AO to find and report the
current enemy situation. The detachment commander then directs when to fix, defeat, or destroy enemy units.
6-136. Initial supporting functions include multiple reconnaissance and security elements operating within
designated zones of action to confirm the enemy situation. Other actions include reporting on the trafficability
of routes and axes for follow-on movements and maneuver of the reconnaissance attack. Figure 6-14 on page
6-30 through figure 6-18 on page 6-34 provide an example of a KPAGF reconnaissance attack.
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Chapter 6
Figure 6-14. Reconnaissance attack (example; part 1 of 5)
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Offensive Actions
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 6-31

Chapter 6
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Offensive Actions
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 6-33

Chapter 6
Support of a Reconnaissance Attack

6-137. A reconnaissance attack requires multiple types of support collectively supporting KPAGF fires and
maneuver in accomplishing the mission task. Support systems can include reconnaissance, security, direct
and indirect fires support, aviation, air defense, engineer, logistics, and EIW.
Fires
6-138. Integrated fires support and integrated air defense provide responsive fires to all elements prior to
and during the reconnaissance attack, and support the withdrawal of reconnaissance, security, action, or other
support elements after completion of the mission. Fire support in a reconnaissance attack aims to—
 Protect reconnaissance and security elements in their zones.
 Protect action and support elements in maneuver or other offensive actions on enemy locations or
terrain-oriented objectives.
 Suppress, neutralize, or destroy designated targets in an AO.
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Offensive Actions
Aviation
6-139. Aviation elements can be task-organized and integrated into fires support, reconnaissance, security,
or maneuver elements. Combat support and rear service aviation can also be task-organized in support. Due
to the air superiority of its enemies, it is likely the KPA will only have the majority of its aviation elements
available during the initial stages of any conflict. Aviation support will likely be rare in later military action.
Engineer
6-140. Engineer support focuses initially on mobility tasks to assist KPAGF movements and maneuver
throughout the AO. Engineer units are also task-organized to conduct countermobility actions in support of
tasks such as fix, block, or isolate designated enemy units during the reconnaissance attack.
Logistics
6-141. A reconnaissance attack typically has dispersed elements throughout an AO and often operates over
extended time periods. The KPA positions task-organized logistics support with functional elements, and can
create a system of logistics caches or mobile resupply points to sustain the elements during the mission.
Electronic Intelligence Warfare

6-142. EIW activities in a reconnaissance attack are primarily executed to—
 Protect KPA units from enemy detection.
 Deceive enemy units into revealing their actions and intentions.
 Assist in fixing or isolating enemy units.
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN COMPLEX OPERATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTS
6-143. The KPA expects to perform offensive operations in two primary types of complex OEs: urban and
subterranean.
URBAN OPERATIONS
6-144. KPAGF offensive doctrine emphasizes speed in the attack. As such, the first operational echelon
forces will likely bypass any major cities they encounter during offensive operations, leaving follow-on
forces to deal with later. The KPAGF will likely isolate the bypassed cities to prevent assistance from the
outside or a breakout from inside the urban area. The KPAGF has numerous small urban-warfare training
facilities scattered throughout North Korea and at least one major army-level urban training facility to
practice urban-warfare skills.
6-145. The major South Korean cities are densely packed urban environments with vast underground
networks for communications, transportation, and utilities. There are over 320 km of track in the Seoul
subway, with 70% of it located underground. There are also subways located in the four next-largest cities
in South Korea: Busan, Incheon, Daegu, and Daejeon. These underground tunnels will serve as air raid
shelters for local civilians.
6-146. If the KPAGF decided to conduct offensive operations in an urban area, the soldiers would face the
same difficulties all military units face when confronted with operations within cities. It takes a large number
of dismounted soldiers to clear each building before moving on to the next unsecured building.
SUBTERRANEAN OPERATIONS
6-147. U.S. and South Korean military units have discovered four infiltration tunnels reaching under South
Korean territory. There may be other tunnels that could complement a KPAGF direct attack on South Korea.
The existence of these tunnels became known in the mid-1970s when a KPAGF engineer defected to South
Korea and disclosed the information during his debriefing. Of the four known tunnels, ranging in length from
1.64 km to 3.5 km, three tunnels are aimed primarily at Seoul, a strategic KPA target.
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Chapter 6
6-148. All four tunnels remained undiscovered until they actually crossed the military demarcation line
(MDL) into South Korea. The length of the tunnel passageways south of the MDL ranges from 435–1,100
m. The estimated number of troops able to pass through the tunnels ranges from 4,000 soldiers per hour for
Tunnel #1 to 8,000 soldiers per hour for the other three tunnels. There are sources that estimate an even
higher troop movement capacity. Some of the tunnels could also move heavy weapons, such as large machine
guns or small-caliber artillery. One of the tunnels even possesses a concrete interior instead of a dirt floor.
Tunnel #3 is unique, as the diggers installed a rail system to remove the debris created during its excavation
and a mechanical system to take the water out of the tunnel on the North Korean side of the MDL.
6-149. Some analysts, as well as the South Korean Defense Ministry, estimate as many as 17 to 21 more
KPA tunnels cross the MDL into South Korea. This estimate is supported by another North Korean defector,
who stated during his debriefing in the early 1970s that Kim Il Sung ordered every forward-deployed KPAGF
division along the DMZ to dig and maintain at least two infiltration tunnels into South Korea. If a general
war were to resume between the two Koreas, it is likely that SOF could use the infiltration tunnels as one of
their methods to gain access to South Korean rear areas. The SOF would establish a “second front” by
creating chaos in the South Korean strategic rear areas through attacking military CPs and key logistical
centers. Table 6-1 compares the specifications of the four infiltration tunnels discovered so far, and figure
6-19 shows their locations.
Table 6-1. Known North Korean infiltration tunnels
Data Point Tunnel #1 Tunnel #2 Tunnel #3 Tunnel #4
8 km NE of 13 km N of 4 km S of 26 km NE of
Location
Korangpo Chorwan Panmunjon Yanggu
Korangpo- Chorwan- Sohwa-Wontong-

Invasion route Munsan-Seoul
Uijongbu-Seoul Ponchon-Seoul Seoul
Troop capacity, per

4,000 8,000 8,000 8,000
hour
Total length, km 3.5 3.5 1.64 2.05
Length south of the

1,000 1,100 435 1,030
MDL, m
Distance from Seoul,

65 101 44 203
km
Depth below
45 50–160 70–73 145
surface, m
Tunnel height, m 1.2 2 1.95 1.6
Tunnel width, m 0.9 2 2.1 2.6
Tunnel lining Concrete None None None
Discovery date 15 NOV 1974 19 MAR 1975 17 OCT 1978 3 MAR 1990
km kilometers m meters MDL military demarcation line N north NE northeast
S south
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Offensive Actions
Figure 6-19. Known North Korean infiltration tunnel locations
6-150. South Korean units and their allies continue to monitor suspected tunnel entrances in North Korea
as well as possible exits south of the DMZ. In the past, the South Korean military built countertunnels to
intercept the KPAGF tunnels and make them inoperable for use during an invasion. Countertunneling is a
costly endeavor, however, and the exorbitant expense may cause South Korea to employ other
countermeasures if another KPAGF underground invasion route is discovered.
6-151. The South Korean media regularly publish articles about North Korean tunneling activities. In
October 2014, a retired South Korean general claimed North Korea has drilled at least 84 invasion tunnels
into South Korea, with some of these tunnels being 64 km long and capable of reaching all the way to Seoul.
In all likelihood, this information is erroneous, as the South Korean Defense Ministry believes no tunnel
could extend beyond 10 km south of the DMZ due to groundwater issues in South Korea and the need to pass
successfully beneath the Imjin River. The South Korean Defense Ministry, however, does believe there are
undiscovered North Korean infiltration tunnels in existence.
6-152. In April 2015, Israel announced one of its leading defense electronics firms, Elbit Systems, recently
developed a system that could locate underground tunnels with almost 100% accuracy. Due to the difference
in the soil composition between the Gaza Strip and the Korean Peninsula, the equipment may not operate at
the same level of success. Some South Koreans spend their free time searching for tunnels, but no new ones
have been located in over a quarter century. Still, the South Korean Government and military continue to
search for additional infiltration tunnels in the DMZ, which is off limits to civilian personnel, while the
amateur detectives search in areas south of the DMZ.
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Chapter 7
Defensive Actions
The Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (KPAGF) only go on the defense when
necessary and desire to return to the offense as soon as possible. This chapter explains
the purpose behind the KPAGF fighting a defensive battle. It also explains how the
KPAGF plan, prepare, and execute their defensive actions. The KPAGF can fight a
mobile defense, but prefer to fight an area defense, so as not to cede any ground to the
enemy. The tactical defensive actions for units are described, with detailed explanation
of how the KPAGF use complex operational environments—urban and subterranean—
within their defensive doctrine.
PURPOSE OF THE DEFENSE

7-1. The purpose of any given KPAGF defensive action depends on the situation, resources, and the larger
mission. During the initial stages of a renewed conflict on the Korean Peninsula, the KPAGF will view
defensive actions as only temporary to achieve certain tactical or operational objectives. The emphasis in the
early stages of any conflict would be to return to the offense as soon as practical. The KPAGF recognize four
general purposes of tactical defensive missions:
 Repulse a superior offensive force.
 Inflict grave casualties on an offensive force.
 Defend key terrain.
 Gain time.
7-2. Task organization of a unit for defense is determined by function within four main mission areas:
disruption, main defense, support, and reserve. Special mission requirements may also exist that necessitate
specialized capabilities.
REPULSE A SUPERIOR OFFENSIVE FORCE

7-3. The KPAGF use a defense to repulse a superior offensive force when their forces are facing an
overwhelming enemy force. The KPAGF understand that their enemies prefer a 3:1 to 6:1 troop ratio at the
decisive point to make an attack. Going on the defense allows the KPAGF to possibly defeat a numerically
superior foe three to six times its own size. Once the enemy has suffered sufficient attrition, the KPAGF may
return to the offense to achieve their desired objective(s).
INFLICT GRAVE CASUALTIES ON AN OFFENSIVE FORCE

7-4. The KPAGF may use a defense to inflict grave casualties on an offensive force when the KPAGF
commander decides the defense is the best method to inflict maximum casualties on the enemy. By
maximizing the terrain and the unit’s firepower, the KPAGF commander will design the defense to inflict
the largest number of casualties possible on the attacking force.
DEFEND KEY TERRAIN

7-5. A defense to defend key terrain prevents the KPAGF’s enemy from seizing or using critical geographic
features or facilities. Actions to defend key terrain do not necessarily require physical control, but the KPAGF
unit does not want the key terrain to become controlled by its enemy.
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Chapter 7
GAIN TIME
7-6. A defense to gain time prevents the KPAGF’s enemy from successfully concluding actions,
movements, and scheme of maneuver before a certain point in time or prior to a given event taking place.
Actions to gain time create opportunities for the KPAGF to transition to the attack or maintain the initiative.
PLANNING THE DEFENSE

7-7. Key elements of planning KPAGF defensive missions are to—
 Identify the defensive objective.
 Determine available time to plan and prepare defenses.
 Organize units by functional mission task requirements.
 Conduct electronic intelligence warfare (EIW) activities.
 Implement defenses.
PLANNED DEFENSE
7-8. A KPAGF planned defense is a defensive mission or action employed when there is sufficient time
and knowledge of the situation to prepare and rehearse units for specific tasks. Key actions in an effective
planned defense include but are not limited to—
 Implement a plan for reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA).
 Determine the when, where, and how of enemy plans, actions, and intentions.
 Identify enemy vulnerabilities and how to exploit those weaknesses.
 Locate critical nodes of the enemy’s combat systems and how/when to most effectively interdict
them.
 Understand and reinforce the defensive characteristics of the area of operations (AO).
 Determine the defensive method that will best deny the enemy its tactical objectives.
 Task-organize units by function to defend.
 Create or take advantage of a tactical window of opportunity.
 Plan for offensive actions given success of defensive actions.
SITUATIONAL DEFENSE
7-9. A situational defense is a defensive mission or action when circumstances require rapid and timely
defensive actions and drills to protect the force and retain the initiative. Key considerations in determining
when a posture of situational defense mitigates risk and is appropriate can include but are not limited to—
 An enemy unexpectedly attacks a key Korean People’s Army (KPA) unit, system, or capability.
 An enemy obtains air superiority and integrated air defense in a particular tactical situation.
 An enemy counterattack requires temporary KPAGF defensive measures.
FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION OF FORCES—DIVISIONS, BRIGADES, AND REGIMENTS

7-10. A KPAGF divisional, brigade, or regimental commander specifies the initial functions of a units within
the command and task organizes resources to achieve those integrated functions of a mission. Given the
resources available to this level of organization, multiple functional mission tasks can be assigned to a
division or regiment. The KPAGF commander can adjust task organization of units during an operation to
address emergent tactical conditions. Each functional unit has an identified KPAGF commander.
FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION OF ELEMENTS—BATTALIONS, COMPANIES, AND

SUBORDINATE UNITS
7-11. Battalions, and companies are assigned mission tasks based on a function to achieve, but differ in how
task organization occurs as compared to a division, brigade, or regiment. The KPAGF task-organizes
battalions and companies as detachments to accomplish a single tactical task. Assignment of a functional task
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Defensive Actions
to a detachment, such as fix or isolate, is integral to a larger mission. A detachment is assigned multiple
functional mission tasks only in exceptional situations.
PREPARING THE DEFENSE

7-12. In the preparation phase, the KPAGF organizes an AO, zone of reconnaissance responsibility (ZORR),
and units to optimize successful defensive actions and create or seize opportunities for offensive actions. The
KPAGF believe in a prepared defense in depth, with heavy emphasis upon terrain, engineering, and artillery.
Defensive dispositions and tactics apply a systems warfare approach to degrade the enemy’s system of
systems, deny integrated performance of the enemy combat system, and create vulnerabilities that KPAGF
defensive units can exploit.
DENY ENEMY INFORMATION

7-13. Defensive preparations focus on deception or destruction of enemy units and sensors in order to limit
enemy situational awareness and understanding of the KPAGF defensive plan. The KPAGF execute missions
to destroy standoff RISTA means, conduct counterreconnaissance in an AO and ZORR, and employ
camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D) methods to improve unit protection.
CONDUCT COUNTERMOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY PREPARATIONS

7-14. Preparation of the defense is a continuum of actions to improve the defense. Engineer activities are a
coordinated combination of survivability, countermobility, and mobility priorities and actions to create
tactical opportunities. The obstacle plan complements the engineer effort and supports the fires and maneuver
plan to produce the desired defensive effects. In conjunction with other mission tasks, engineers support the
EIW plan through activities such as constructing decoy defensive positions and preparing false routes. The
KPAGF create and reinforce complex terrain in all defensive actions to provide cover from direct and indirect
fires, concealment, camouflage, and protection. See appendix F for more information on engineer operations.
ALLOCATE LOGISTICS
7-15. The KPAGF stock sufficient logistics support forward in caches with maneuver units and allocate
appropriate logistics throughout the depth of an AO and in coordination with rearward support areas. Classes
of supply, medical capabilities, and personnel support along and on lines of communications are arranged by
priority to support the main and supporting defensive efforts, and in consideration of logistical requirements
for transition to the offense. See appendix H for more information on logistics operations.
PREPARE FOR CONTINGENCIES

7-16. The KPAGF prepare for defensive and offensive contingencies when conducting a defensive operation.
High-priority contingencies are developed for actions in the security zone and defense zones. Early warning
of critical indicators in the ZORR complement probable decision points.
REHEARSE KEY MISSION TASKS

7-17. The KPAGF establishes priorities of effort and support, and rehearses critical actions of the defense
based on the available time and resources. Typical actions rehearsed in preparation for a defense include but
are not limited to—
 RISTA updates.
 EIW.
 Integrated fires support.
 Battle handover from disruption forces to main defense forces.
 Main defense.
 Counterattack options.
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Chapter 7
 Commitment of reserves.
 Logistics resupply and general sustainment.
EXECUTING THE DEFENSE

7-18. Successful execution depends on units conducting their specified functions that are integral to the
overall defense. A successful defense execution results in the culmination of the enemy’s offensive actions
without achieving its objectives, and ideally creates conditions for the KPAGF transition to offensive actions.
Success criteria for a KPAGF defense typically include but are not limited to—
 KPAGF combat formations remain capable of performing their functional roles in the defense.
 Enemy units do not achieve their mission objectives.
 KPAGF sustain ability to transition designated units to offensive mission tasks.
Note. KPA units may operate with a doctrinal expectation that significant casualties are expected
and acceptable in order to achieve an assigned mission task. This acknowledgement of significant
casualties may prevent effective conduct of follow-on mission tasks until a designated unit is
reorganized or reconstituted.
MAINTAIN CONTACT
7-19. The KPAGF want to maintain contact with the enemy. Reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance
actions include rapid reorganization or reconstitution of assets to ensure no gaps in situational awareness and
understanding of the enemy, AO, and ZORR. Effective RISTA guides prudent use of KPAGF combat power
to achieve the defensive mission.
EXECUTE MISSION TASKS AND DRILLS

7-20. The KPAGF conduct mission tasks and drills with flexible actions practiced to certain standards. As
situational conditions evolve during a mission, clear and concise modifications to methodical and practiced
combined arms actions allow the KPAGF to rapidly and readily adapt and react to new tactical conditions.
The KPAGF leader directs tactical adjustments to a mission task or drill to address a functional requirement
in the new conditions and states the intent of the modified actions.
SEIZE TACTICAL OPPORTUNITIES

7-21. While KPA doctrine discusses decentralized execution of a mission task and use of tactical initiative,
superiors expect success if a subordinate commander uses initiative different than the prescribed plan. If
subordinate unit commanders decide to take advantage of emergent opportunities and modify the unit’s
tactical actions to differ from the prescribed role in the orders, the unit best be successful. Successful
deviations from the plan will be rewarded, but there will be severe punishment of the commander if the
change in plans leads to failure.
TYPES OF DEFENSIVE ACTION—DIVISIONS AND REGIMENTS

7-22. The types of defensive action in KPAGF doctrine are both tactical methods and guides. The two basic
types at divisional or regimental operations are the mobile defense and the area defense. A KPAGF
commander may use both forms of defense simultaneously throughout an AO. A defensive battle or series of
engagements may include subordinate units executing various combinations of mobile and area defenses, as
well as offensive actions, within an overall defensive mission framework.
MOBILE DEFENSE
7-23. While not preferred, a KPAGF tactical mobile defense is designed to achieve tactical decision by
skillfully using fires and mobility to destroy key parts of the enemy’s combat system and deny enemy forces
their objective while preserving the friendly units. A mobile defense may be appropriate when the KPAGF
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Defensive Actions
can focus their available combat power and are not completely overmatched by an enemy. EIW is a key
enabler, in coordination with RISTA, to shape and conduct a mobile defense. This type of defense causes the
enemy to continually lose effectiveness until its actions culminate before achieving an intended objective.
Even within a mobile defense, the KPAGF commander may use area defense on some enemy attack axes to
shape the battle in a security zone, the first defense zone, and even possibly the second and third defense
zones.
Method
7-24. The KPAGF mobile defense inflicts losses on the enemy, trades space for time, and protects friendly
units. This defense allows the KPAGF, with effective RISTA, to select the location and time for engagements.
The bulk of the KPAGF unit’s combat power is normally in the second echelon, while the first echelon fights
a series of delaying actions. Typically employed when an AO has significant geographic depth of its zones,
the KPAGF progressively attack key nodes of the enemy combat system and create vulnerabilities to defeat
or destroy the enemy. The mobile defense conducts recurring indirect and direct fires from a succession of
defensive engagements, and adds additional combat power mass with timely fires and counterattacks. Figures
7-1 through 7-5 on pages 7-6 through 7-10 progressively demonstrate a KPAGF mobile defense.
Defensive Arrays
7-25. The basis of KPAGF mobile defense is to conduct fires and maneuver from battle position to battle
position through a succession of defensive arrays. A defensive array is a group of battle positions in which
one or more subordinate units have orders to defend for a specified time within a higher commander’s order
and intent. Defensive arrays reinforce terrain and shape corridors and axes into kill zones. In the geography
between defensive arrays, units conduct disruption actions and deceive the enemy as to where the successive
defense is located.
Defensive Maneuver
7-26. KPAGF defensive maneuver consists of selective timing of precision fires on enemy units, defensive
array of direct and indirect fires and obstacles, and coordinated movement and maneuver bounds by two
types of forces. The main force divides its combat power into two forces: a contact force and a shielding
force. The contact force is the force occupying the defensive array, and is in current or imminent contact with
the enemy. The shielding force is the force occupying a subsequent defensive array, thus permitting the
contact force to disengage and reposition to a defensive array to the rear of the shielding force. A disruption
force or main defense force can perform defensive maneuver.
7-27. The contact force ideally coerces the enemy to deploy its maneuver units and begin its direct and
indirect fires in preparation for the attack. Then, before the contact force becomes decisively engaged, it
conducts battle handover to the shielding force and maneuvers to its next preplanned defenses. While the
original contact force is moving, the shielding force maintains the enemy under continuous observation and
fires, and defends its own defensive positions. When the original contact force assumes positions in its
subsequent defensive array, it becomes the shielding force for the new contact force—formerly the shielding
force—now in combat with the enemy. KPAGF forces continue to defend and delay the enemy. The
succession of defensive arrays is designed to defeat or destroy the attacking enemy force. Arrays are close
enough to each other to allow the defending units to maintain coordinated, continuous engagement of the
enemy while moving from one array to another. KPAGF forces may be ordered to defend even if actions
result in a decisive engagement.
7-28. A key consideration in locating defensive arrays is that the distance between defensive arrays precludes
the enemy from engaging two arrays simultaneously without displacing its indirect fire weapons. This
requires the enemy, having attacked one array, to reposition the majority of its firing positions and coordinate
a new approach and attack on the subsequent KPAGF array.
7-29. The example of mobile defense in figures 7-1 through 7-5 on pages 7-6 through 7-10 shows actions of
a contact force and shielding force. Fires and maneuver are continuous, and focus on fixing or isolating
designated enemy forces, delaying other enemy forces, and defeating or destroying key systems of enemy
combat power to ultimately defeat the enemy attack.
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Chapter 7
Figure 7-1. KPAGF brigade mobile defense, initial layout (example; part 1 of 5)
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Defensive Actions
Figure 7-2. KPAGF brigade mobile defense (example; part 2 of 5)
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 7-7

Chapter 7
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Chapter 7
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Defensive Actions
Disruption Force
7-30. The disruption force initiates the attack on the enemy’s combat system by targeting and destroying
systems that are critical to enemy effectiveness. A disruption force seeks to coerce the enemy to fight on
disadvantageous terrain and at a tempo of the KPAGF’s selection. The disruption force may be able to cause
culmination of the enemy attack before the enemy enters the first, second, and third defense zones. A
disruption force can also set the conditions for a KPAGF spoiling attack or counterattack. The disruption
force may be directed to occupy prepared battle positions in the defense zones to reinforce the main defense
force. A disruption force may also be directed to remain in the security zone as bypassed units in order to
attack follow-on enemy units.
Main Defense Force

7-31. The main defense force task is to complete the defeat or destruction of the enemy by employing contact
forces and shielding forces. The basic considerations for employing a main defense force in the defense zones
are kill zones, simple battle positions (SBPs), complex battle positions (CBPs), and—in concert with the
defensive order—coordinate timing and repositioning of contact forces and shielding forces. A force within
the main defense force may be directed to remain in a battle position as a bypassed unit in order to defend or
attack follow-on enemy units.
Reserves
7-32. A KPAGF commander can designate a number of reserve units of varying types and capabilities. In
planning, a maneuver reserve is a unit strong enough to defeat an anticipated enemy exploitation force. The
commander positions a reserve in the AO to respond to probable contingencies and probable priorities of
effort for reserve employment.
AREA DEFENSE
7-33. In situations where the KPAGF must deny key terrain or AO capabilities to an enemy, or access to
them, a tactical area defense may be appropriate and is the KPAGF’s preferred type of defense. An area
defense may also be suitable when the KPAGF is overmatched in combat power by an enemy or the enemy
must not advance any farther. This type of defense is designed to achieve tactical decision by defending
designated terrain with a cohesive defense of mutually supporting CBPs, channeling and stopping enemy
units in kill zones, and using massed fires and other parts of combat power to defeat or destroy the enemy.
This defense can also have a specified duration. An area defense retains the initiative and creates windows
of opportunity to use maneuver to defeat or destroy the enemy. EIW elements are key enablers, in
combination with RISTA, to shape and conduct area defense.
Method
7-34. The KPAGF area defense inflicts progressive losses on the enemy, retains designated terrain, and
protects friendly units in conjunction with mission and tactical risk assessment. An area defense centers on
creating kill zones and CBPs on or in the vicinity of key terrain, reinforcing defenses with significant obstacle
effort on designated corridors and axes, and positioning decentralized logistics. Units conducting an area
defense execute offensive and defensive actions in the security zone to degrade the enemy in its attack
capabilities and momentum. Integrated fires attack to defeat or destroy key components and subsystems of
the enemy’s combat system. Area defense creates windows of opportunity in which to conduct spoiling
attacks or counterattacks and destroy key enemy systems. The KPAGF commander places two-thirds of the
defensive units in the first echelon and one-third of the units in the second echelon. The KPAGF commander
will designate one-ninth of the entire unit, taken from the second echelon units, as the reserve. Another one-
ninth of the total combat unit, taken from the first echelon, will serve as the disruption unit in the security
zone. Figure 7-6 on page 7-12 is a simplified pictorial representation of the KPAGF area defense.
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Chapter 7
Figure 7-6. Division area defense (example)
Disruption Force
7-35. The security zone of a KPAGF area defense, approximately 16–20 km in width and 10–15 km in depth
for a division, is designed to be an area of continuous contact with the enemy. The security zone is subdivided
into a combat security area and a general security area. RISTA units and precision integrated fires disrupt
enemy units as situational awareness confirms the enemy’s main groupings and directions and reveals
probable enemy intentions. Selective KPAGF attacks deceive the enemy as to the location and configuration
of defense zone main defenses, delay enemy maneuver, canalize the enemy into obstacles and kill zones, and
create time for additional improvement of defense zone defenses. Within the overall context of an area
defense, the disruption force might employ a mobile defense. In this case, the distance between positions in
the security zone is such that the enemy will find it necessary to displace the majority of its supporting
weapons to continue an attack on subsequent positions. Table 7-1 provides information on the security units
found in the security zone.
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Defensive Actions
Table 7-1. Security elements in a security zone
Location (FWD of
Security Area Security Type Purpose main defensive Unit Size
position)
General security General security Attack warning, Corps: regiment (+)

10–15 km
area outposts delay, ambush Division: battalion (+)
Attack warning, raid

Combat security Combat prevention, Regiment: company (+)
1–2 km
area outposts indirect fire Battalion: platoon (+)
observation
Security outposts,
Combat security Attack warning, raid
Direct security 200–400 m security patrols,
area prevention
ambush patrols
FWD forward km kilometers m meters
Combat Security Area

7-36. The combat security area is normally 1–2 km in depth in front of the first defensive zone, and is further
subdivided into two areas. In the first area, from the main defensive to 200–400 m in front of the forward
units, the forward battalions provide their own local security with security outposts, security patrols, and
ambush patrols. The second area can extend up to 2 km in front of the other area. A platoon or larger unit
sets up three to four combat observation posts; these provide early warning to their regiment, preventing
surprise attacks as well as calling for and adjusting artillery fires.
General Security Area

7-37. The general security area is a KPAGF corps- or division-level operation located in front of the combat
security area and extending 10–15 km in front of the first defense zone. The size of the force located in the
general security area is a regiment (+) for a corps and a battalion (+) for a division. The general security
outposts are tasked to provide early warning to the main defensive force, delay the enemy, and coerce the
enemy to deploy into its battle formations from march formations earlier than desired.
Main Defense Force

7-38. The KPAGF main defense force defeats or destroys the enemy with fires from mutually supporting
CBPs in defensive arrays. The main defense force is located in the defense zones and focuses on kill zones
from simple and CBPs. KPAGF units use key terrain, reinforced with obstacles and other engineer effort, to
mass combat power on kill zones. When movement and maneuver between battle positions is part of the area
defense plan, repositioning routes are reconnoitered. A main defense force can conduct counterattacks in
support of the defense mission and intent.
7-39. The KPAGF uses the old Soviet concept of echelons in constructing its main defensive positions. A
KPAGF field army will place a single division in the first defensive zone, covering 16–20 km of the front.
The field army will then place other divisions or regiments in the second and third defensive zones. Each
zone will be 10–15 km in depth. Between these three defensive zones are buffer zones, 4–6 km in depth, with
prepared positions if time allows their construction. Of note, the KPA has already built these defensive
fighting positions in the areas north of and adjacent to the demilitarized zone (DMZ). See figure 7-7 on page
7-14 for a visual representation, but the actual deployment of the units will be based on the terrain and forces
available to the KPAGF commander.
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Chapter 7
Figure 7-7. KPAGF field army defensive zone (conceptual)
7-40. Each KPAGF infantry division will normally place two regiments in its first echelon and one regiment
in its second echelon. The forward regiments—but not always the division reserve regiment—will also use
the same “two up, one back” echelon concept for their maneuver battalions. Each forward regiment will be
responsible for 8–10 km of frontage, with each forward battalion responsible for about half of the regiment’s
front.
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Defensive Actions
Reserves
7-41. A KPAGF commander can designate a number of reserve units of varying types and capabilities. The
commander positions this reserve in the AO to respond to probable contingencies and probable priority of
effort for reserve employment. The KPAGF do not commit the reserve in a piecemeal fashion. The KPAGF
commander can use reserves to seal an enemy penetration. In some defensive operations, the reserve units
may be for launching a counterattack to return the KPAGF unit to the offense. The reserves may move
through the enjoined units to give new impetus to the battle, or into gaps between units.
Antitank Defense System

7-42. The KPAGF consider enemy tanks the most lethal ground attack vehicle and design their area defense
to stop enemy armor through the use of antitank (AT) defensive positions and AT engagement areas. The
KPAGF plans to fight an AT battle along the predictable routes the enemy’s armor vehicles will likely travel.
The KPAGF breaks down its defensive plan into six phases: antiarmor obstacles, antiarmor fire plan, AT
defensive positions, AT engagement areas, the AT reserve, and the counterattack unit. Phase numbers in the
following descriptions correspond to the numbers in figure 7-6 on page 7-12. (See appendix C for more
information on AT operations.)
Antiarmor Obstacle Plan

7-43. The KPAGF’s defense phase 1 is the antiarmor obstacle plan, with obstacles located in front of the
forward defensive positions and within each AT engagement area or kill zone. The KPAGF will place these
obstacle belts so they tie into the terrain and include a combination of AT and antipersonnel mines. The
KPAGF will cover each concealed obstacle belt with direct fire weapons and observers to call in indirect fire.
The obstacle belts will consist of several layers positioned to take advantage of the KPAGF’s various AT
weapon ranges, normally 400–1,000 m.
Antiarmor Fire Plan

7-44. Phase 2 of the KPAGF AT defense system is the antiarmor fire plan, which contains four subphases
conducted by disruption force. These are based on the location of the enemy as observed by security elements
ahead of the forward defensive line, whose task is to call in indirect fire for the purpose of preventing an
effective enemy attack.
7-45. During phase 2a, the KPAGF plan area fires at potential chokepoints along the suspected enemy’s
avenues of approach, often along main roads. The KPAGF allocate two artillery battalions per each enemy
company to their front. The KPAGF will fire mortars, artillery, or rockets at these chokepoints. The normal
size of a company target is approximately 100 m wide by 900 m deep.
7-46. Phase 2b is a set of KPAGF planned rolling fires approximately 2,000 m in front of the forward battle
positions, with the purpose to disrupt and destroy armor march units as they transition to battle formations.
The normal width for these barrages is 400–700 m, and they may occur every 500–800 m for a maximum of
four times.
7-47. Phase 2c of the KPAGF plan, antiarmor rectangular target fires, occurs immediately after phase 2b.
The primary difference between these two types of indirect fire is that while the width is approximately the
same (400–700 m), the depth of the fire is less (300–500 m), and is performed in three sequential volleys:
first rockets, then artillery, and lastly mortars, as the enemy approaches the obstacle belts. Antiarmor
rectangular fire will cease at the obstacle belt along the forward battle positions.
7-48. Phase 2d, the KPAGF direct-fire fight, begins at the forward defensive obstacle belts. Tanks, AT guns,
recoilless rifles, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) are fired at their maximum ranges while KPAGF
soldiers fight the enemy’s infantry. The KPAGF plan indirect final protective fire when the enemy closes to
within 300 m of their frontline units.
Antitank Defensive Position

7-49. Phase 3 is the AT defensive position, planned by the KPAGF regimental commander and executed by
a KPAGF battalion commander. The AT defensive position will be set up along the most likely armor avenue
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 7-15

Chapter 7
of approach into the forward infantry regiment’s AO. The KPAGF regimental commander will often select
two parallel forward ridgelines running in the same direction as the enemy’s movement, so the armor vehicles
can be hit by a crossfire from two, if not three, directions.
7-50. The KPAGF battalion creating this defensive position will receive additional resources, such as AT
missiles or recoilless rifles. When the enemy is within range, the KPAGF main defense force—composed of
tanks and AT guns, such as Saggers—will engage the enemy with direct fire with a mission to concentrate
on and destroy the enemy armor vehicles first. As the enemy armor continues to advance, it will meet an
AT/antipersonnel minefield where KPAGF soldiers armed with recoilless rifles or RPGs will engage as the
vehicles become bogged down in their attempted breach. The KPAGF will attempt to contain the enemy
within the kill zone and prevent the armor from flanking the defensive battalion’s position.
7-51. Any armor vehicles that successfully traverse the minefield will be attacked by additional RPG teams
tasked to support by fire with the mission to prevent the armor from escaping off the desired axis of advance.
Any remaining operational AT weapons from the forward-position disruption units can relocate to
supplemental positions to continue engaging any enemy armor that passes through the kill zone and eliminate
it.
7-52. The KPAGF battalion commander will also possess a counterattack unit composed of armor or AT
weapon systems, often hidden from view and shielded from direct fire on the reverse slope of a hill. On order,
the counterattack unit will maneuver and attack the enemy’s flank with the purpose to destroy the remaining
armor threat before the enemy escapes the battalion’s AT defensive position. Even if some enemy armor
vehicles pass through this first-echelon battalion AT defensive position, those vehicles could face other
battalion AT defensive positions, regimental AT engagement areas, or even possibly a divisional engagement
area.
7-53. Any units or personnel in the forward battalions not killed by the enemy are trained not to retreat, but
to remain behind to set up stay-behind ambushes of enemy combat support and combat service support units
as they enter the overrun KPAGF battalion’s AO. Figure 7-8 is a pictorial representation of a possible KPAGF
battalion AT defensive position.
Figure 7-8. Antitank defensive position (example)
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Defensive Actions
Antitank Engagement Area

7-54. Phase 4 of the KPAGF AT defense system is the AT engagement area, which is similar to the battalion
AT defensive position but occurs at the regimental or divisional level. Any enemy units successfully making
it through the forward regiment’s battalion AT defensive positions will likely run into an AT engagement
area set up by other KPAGF units.
7-55. The attack is similar to the AT defensive position described above, but on a much larger scale. The
KPAGF commander will select a location so the enemy units will be canalized and can be attacked on three,
if not four, sides. Two platoons of SU-100 howitzers will likely be allocated for a direct fire role and up to
two RPG-7 platoons for a regimental or divisional AT engagement area. Any additional weapons systems
available, such as tanks and recoilless rifles, can also be used.
Antitank Mobile Reserve

7-56. Phase 5 of the KPAGF AT defense system is the AT mobile reserve, designed to destroy any tanks
appearing unexpectedly within the KPAGF’s defensive system, especially in the vulnerable rear areas. This
AT mobile reserve would confront any enemy tanks managing to survive the AT defensive positions, the
regimental engagement areas, and the divisional engagement area. Each KPAGF division commander
normally keeps two AT companies for this role and locates them between the first- and second-echelon units.
Counterattack
7-57. Phase 6, and the final piece of the AT defense system, is the counterattack conducted by the
counterattack unit. All regimental and higher units in the KPAGF will possess a plan to conduct a
counterattack to eliminate any enemy penetrations into their lines. Only the divisional counterattack force is
shown on the division defense diagram in figure 7-6 on page 7-12, but each battalion, regiment, division, and
corps will designate a counterattack unit.
7-58. Once a penetration becomes a possibility, the appropriate KPAGF commander will attempt to predict
the direction in which the penetration will continue and then selects a counterattack position, normally 1 km
to the rear of the penetrated unit. The type of counterattack—rapid, standard, or delayed—that is chosen by
the KPAGF commander will depend on the depth of the penetration toward the unit’s rear area and the
criticality of the position penetrated, as shown in table 7-2.
Table 7-2. KPAGF counterattack types and criteria
Counterattack Type Regiment Division Corps
First-echelon platoon First-echelon company First-echelon battalion

Rapid
penetration penetration penetration
First-echelon company First-echelon battalion First-echelon regiment

Standard
First-echelon battalion First-echelon regiment First defense zone

Delayed
7-59. The normal KPAGF procedure at divisional level is to conduct a rapid counterattack for a company-
level penetration, a standard counterattack for a battalion-level penetration, and a delayed counterattack for
a regiment-level penetration. The difference between the types of counterattack is how fast the mission can
be executed. For example, if a KPAGF infantry regiment received the mission to counterattack the
penetration of one of its first-echelon battalions, the regimental commander would need to conduct a delayed
counterattack—the type of counterattack with the longest time period before the mission can be accomplish—
as it takes additional time and planning to execute. The division commander, however, might be able respond
quicker with a standard counterattack against the same penetration, while the corps commander could respond
the fastest with a rapid counterattack. The situation at the time and the counterattack unit available could also
dictate what unit receives the counterattack mission. Once the unit for the counterattack is designated, the
depth of the penetration into the KPAGF’s lines will determine what method the counterattack unit employs
against the penetration.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 7-17

Chapter 7
TACTICAL DEFENSIVE ACTIONS—DETACHMENTS,

BATTALIONS, AND SUBORDINATE UNITS
7-60. KPAGF detachments, battalions, and companies typically participate as part of a maneuver or area
defense organized by a higher tactical command. KPAGF detachments and their subordinates are structured
to execute one functional mission at a time. These units conduct tactical defensive actions employing SBPs
and CBPs as part of either an area or mobile defense.
SIMPLE BATTLE POSITION

7-61. A simple battle position (SBP) is a defensive location oriented on a likely enemy avenue of approach.
The development and construction of a SBP is selected on terrain well-suited to an assigned mission task. A
SBP typically identifies the location of a small element, unit, piece of equipment, or system. The location of
a SBP is not necessarily in complex terrain or coordinated with nearby battle positions. Improving a SBP—
such as increasing C3D—is a continuous action, with an understanding of how much time is allowed to
initially establish the SBP, available local resources, unit capabilities, and priorities of effort and support.
COMPLEX BATTLE POSITION

7-62. A complex battle position (CBP) is a defensive location designed to employ a combination of complex
terrain, C3D, and engineer effort to protect the unit(s) in the position from detection and attack, and provide
capabilities to defend and deny seizure and occupation by an enemy. North Korea has had 65 years to plan
and prepare defensive positions, and the majority of these only need to be reinforced prior to hostilities. CBPs
typically have the following characteristics that distinguish them from SBPs:
 Limited avenues of approach.
 Existing avenues of approach are observable by the defender.
 360-degree defensive measures and protection from attack.
 Engineer effort that provides some countermobility obstacles that do not jeopardize C3D measures
or otherwise reveal the CBP location.
 Sufficient logistics caches for intended defensive operations.
 Sanctuary from which to launch local tactical actions.
7-63. The location of a CBP is not necessarily oriented to an avenue of approach, as with a strongpoint.
When sanctuary is the locational purpose, a CBP occupies terrain not likely to experience regular attention
or use by an enemy unit. Figure 7-9 provides examples of SBPs and CBPs.
Figure 7-9. Simple and complex battle position symbols (example)
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Defensive Actions
Note. The symbol for a KPAGF SBP in this ATP is typically a convex arc with spike-like lines
arrayed along the outside of the arc, as in figure 7-9. The apex of the convex arc points toward the
expected or known enemy direction of approach.
FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION OF A BATTLE POSITION

7-64. The KPAGF commander of a detachment, battalion, or company defending in a battle position
designates subordinate units with functional responsibilities, with titles that describe each unit’s function.
Disruption Element
7-65. The disruption element operates in a security zone to—
 Defeat enemy reconnaissance efforts.
 Determine the location, disposition, and composition of approaching enemy units.
 Report on observations and situational understanding.
 Coordinate actions and fires in conjunction with RISTA.
 Coordinate actions and fires with chemical-, biological-, radiological-, or nuclear-capable
weapons systems.
7-66. Combat security outposts are typical of disruption capabilities employed outside of main defensive
arrays and perimeters in an AO. They are generally composed of task-organized platoon- or squad-size
elements. During counterreconnaissance and other security actions, other elements of a unit may be directed
to support outpost mission tasks. See chapter 5 for more information on combat security outposts. Figure
7-10 on page 7-20 is a pictorial representation of a typical platoon with its orientation within a battle position.
Main Defense Element

7-67. The main defense element is to defeat or destroy an attacking unit. Designated elements may be
directed to maneuver, attack, and defeat a penetration of the main defensive positions.
Reserve Element
7-68. The reserve element provides tactical flexibility. All KPAGF leaders consider probable and possible
contingencies and identify a capability to respond to emergent situations. Some types of KPAGF reserves
have an assigned mission task and are a committed element, but can be redirected to other actions based on
command decision for effective defenses and mission success.
Support Element
7-69. The support element of a battle position has the mission of providing one or more of the following
capabilities, including but not limited to—
 Command, control, and communications.
 Direct fires support.
 Indirect fires support.
 Support to nonlethal actions such as EIW.
 Engineer support.
ORGANIZING BATTLE POSITION ACTIONS

7-70. The organization of a defense concentrates available assets to mass combat power in designated kill
zones. A kill zone is typically on a likely enemy avenue of approach. A detachment, battalion, or company
commander specifies the functions and task organization of elements in a security zone or the main defenses
of a defense zone.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 7-19

Chapter 7
Figure 7-10. Platoon orientation in a battle position (example)
Security Zone
7-71. The security zone is the area beyond the SBP or CBP perimeter where the KPAGF defeat enemy
reconnaissance efforts, detect attacking units, disrupt and delay an enemy approach, and destroy key attacking
units prior to engagement in the defense zone. A defense of a battle position may or may not include a security
zone.
7-72. Defenders conduct continuous and aggressive counterreconnaissance activities to prevent the enemy
from effective reconnaissance. The KPAGF observe avenues of approach to provide early warning;
determine location, composition, and disposition of attackers; and direct integrated fires against key enemy
systems or their components.
Defense Zones
7-73. The main defenses of a defense zone are the areas for conclusive actions to defeat or destroy attacking
enemy units. A SBP will have its defense-zone fires integrated with those of adjacent SBPs. In the defense
of a CBP, the defense zone can be limited to the area immediately surrounding the CBP that the defending
units can influence with its direct fires, but can also be a much larger geographic area depending on the
RISTA and integrated fires available. Defenders in a battle position prepare actions to defeat any penetration.
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Defensive Actions
7-74. The KPAGF will place its command, control, communications, rear service units, indirect and direct
support fire assets, reserve, and other supporting assets in the rear of the first defense zone and throughout
the second and third defense zones. For an individual SBP, such as a combat security outpost, its immediate
support is normally located inside the SBP perimeter. The support elements for a unit could be located within
a CBP or can occupy a location noncontiguous to a CBP.
EXECUTING DEFENSE OF A BATTLE POSITION

7-75. The defense includes aggressive counterreconnaissance and other security measures in the security
zone and counterreconnaissance actions in all defense zones, including those with combat support or rear
service units. Disruption elements conduct battle handover to elements in the defense zone, where main
defense elements defeat or destroy attacking enemy units.
7-76. The KPAGF uses restrictive terrain and engineer countermobility efforts to deny the enemy the ability
to approach, seize, and occupy a defensive position. Countermobility actions shape the battlefield by
disrupting the enemy’s approach march, blocking avenues of approach, and turning the enemy into and fixing
it in kill zones. Engineer support can shift to mobility support for reserve or other elements’ maneuver
options, based on priorities of support and available time.
7-77. To keep the enemy from discovering the nature of the KPAGF defenses and to draw fire away from
actual units, defenders will establish dummy firing positions and battle positions. In addition to enhancing
unit protection, the KPAGF will employ deception positions as an economy-of-force measure to portray
strength. A reverse slope defense can mask main defensive positions from enemy observation and direct fire.
This type of defense can also isolate frontal elements of an attacking unit as they cross the topographic crest.
Other considerations can include C3D and cultural standoff to deny the enemy the ability to detect or attack
the defenses. Figure 7-11 on page 7-22 is an example of a CBP within an urban environment.
7-78. Continuous RISTA and integrated fires are fundamental to destroying the enemy in the defense zones.
Integrated air defense systems complement the fundamental concept of all-arms air defense and fires. Direct
and indirect fires mass in kill zones to cover obstacles and fix or isolate the enemy. Defenders employ fires
to—
 Degrade attackers along avenues of approach and in areas of temporary concentration.
 Defeat or destroy attackers in the defense zones.
 Destroy penetration of battle positions.
 Support counterattacking units.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 7-21

Chapter 7
Figure 7-11. Complex battle position in an urban defense (example)
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN COMPLEX OPERATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTS
7-79. Certain operational environments add complexity to KPA defensive operations, both north and south
of the DMZ.
URBAN OPERATIONS
7-80. The KPAGF will likely avoid urban operations in its own country—with the possible exception of
Pyongyang—for several reasons. First, the large number of underground facilities throughout the country,
7-22 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Defensive Actions
and especially along the DMZ, provide the KPAGF the capability to fight from prepared positions without
concentrating in the cities, where their units would become a lucrative target. Second, the KPAGF will likely
avoid concentrating units in a small area except where they are protected by underground facilities
specifically designed to fight the enemy. Lastly, most the core supporters of the Kim regime can be found in
the Pyongyang area. The KPAGF may decide to protect their country’s capital city and regime supporters,
while having less inclination to do the same for the other two classes of North Korean citizens throughout
the rest of the country.
SUBTERRANEAN OPERATIONS
7-81. The KPAGF may rely on subterranean operations when on the defense. The nature of the KPAGF
subterranean operations will be vastly different depending on whether the defense is taking place north or
south of the DMZ. There is a large number of underground facilities throughout North Korea, while defense
fortifications the KPAGF build in South Korea would only be what could be accomplished in the time
available. The KPAGF’s familiarity with underground facilities may give them a slight advantage against
their enemies in any operations conducted underground.
NORTH OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE

7-82. Estimates of the number of underground facilities for military or governmental use within North Korea
range from 11,000 to 14,000. The country has taken much of its military and governmental activity below
ground because of the massive destruction that United Nations airplanes caused to above-ground facilities
during the Korean War, and as a means to avoid enemy overhead collection opportunities. The actual amount
of subterranean activity is only speculation, however, and often underground excavations are only discovered
by the amount of debris generated—whether left on site or transported away.
7-83. North Korean use of underground concrete bunkers dates back to at least January 1951, when the U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency located a bunker designed specifically for use by the contemporary North
Korean leader, Kim Il Sung, a short distance outside of Pyongyang. Underground construction has slowed
down in the last decade due to a materiel shortage, the lack of heavy equipment, and frequent electrical
blackouts throughout the country. Nevertheless, work on underground facilities continues with much of it
formerly done by machinery now being completed using manual labor.
7-84. The North Korean Government recruits its citizens, usually in their late teens, into distinctive military
units constructing or operating specialized underground facilities. The soldiers sign a confidentiality
agreement and the North Korean Government expects the individuals to work in the same facility until they
turn 60 years old. The KPAGF expect the male soldiers to find wives from among their coworkers, but are
forbidden to marry until they have served 10 years in the military. The KPAGF, however, allow females to
marry after they reach the age of 24. The North Korean Government does not usually allow the workers
outside of their facility, even to see their families, and defectors call the service in these underground facilities
more like a prison sentence than an occupation.
7-85. Since the western corridor has been the traditional route used by armies moving north-south in Korea
for centuries, the KPAGF have concentrated much of their subterranean construction in this western region
of the country. The North Korean terrain varies widely, with the most arduous terrain generally in the eastern
part of the country and less difficult terrain in the west. The eastern mountains are rugged and normally best
suited for light infantry operations. The central region, containing part of the Taebak Mountains, is rugged,
but there are some routes suitable for light armored vehicles. The western part of North Korea is least
forbidding in terms of terrain. Both the North Korean capital city of Pyongyang and the South Korean capital
city of Seoul lie on the western side of the peninsula. The region’s geological formations, with substantial
granite and other metamorphic hard rock formations, provide natural protection against damage from the
weapons of war—even the most modern equipment. North Korea has enhanced nature by digging
underground in order to protect itself from aerial attack while hiding its activities from overhead intelligence
collection efforts. All military branches and civilian agencies are involved in keeping their activities shielded
from outside prying eyes. The North Koreans use their underground construction not only for defensive
purposes, but as places to launch offensive operations from as well.
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Chapter 7
7-86. The KPA is the major beneficiary of North Korea’s subterranean activities. North Korean underground
facilities stretch along the DMZ from east to west coasts, creating a fortified defensive belt along the entire
border between North and South Korea. The bunkers and underground facilities take advantage of the
mountainous terrain located along most of the mutual boundary. Due to the direction the mountains run in
the Kaesong region, north of Panmunjom, the KPA opted to build many “Y” type bunkers. A Y bunker is
normally built with the base of the Y along a ridgeline. Two other bunkers split off from the main bunker
and are angled down each side of the ridge’s slope. When viewed from the air, the bunkers appear to be
shaped similar to the letter Y. The KPAGF built many of these bunkers from precast concrete and covered
them with rocks and dirt. The bunkers increase protection for KPA soldiers from the anticipated direction of
attack when the terrain does not.
Hardened Artillery Sites

7-87. The KPAGF deploys 65–70% of its entire military, including artillery, in three defensive belts located
within 80 km of the mutual border between the two Koreas. The KPAGF selected their current artillery
positions so approximately two-thirds of each weapon’s range lies inside South Korean territory. Many of
the artillery units operate from a hardened artillery site (HARTS), a robust position with a complex network
of subterranean chambers connected by tunnels. It contains shelters, usually underground, for ammunition,
fire direction center, barracks, mess hall, latrine facilities, bathhouse, recreation room, classroom, and
outdoor recreation facilities. Typical HARTS may contain shooting positions for three to eight artillery
pieces.
7-88. While North Korea’s first defensive belt contains the majority of the HARTS, the second and third
defensive belts encompass some as well. These second- and third-belt sites may not be manned, depending
on the tactical situation. The KPAGF artillery units have already surveyed the unoccupied HARTS, however,
in order to provide immediate indirect fires once occupied by the firing unit. It is estimated that North Korea
has constructed some 500 HARTS in the central and western corridors, the most likely avenue of advance
for an enemy offensive from the south. The KPAGF built the HARTS in the 1950s at mountain fronts, but
later switched to positions near mountain tops. Figure 4-14 on page 4-40 provides an example of a HARTS.
7-89. Based on the terrain, the HARTS could be entirely manmade or a modification of a natural cave or
cave system. If needed, a HARTS may contain surface trenches for both communications purposes and
internal self-defense, including machine gun pillboxes for use against ground attack. The entrance doors to
the bunkers will often be made of either solid steel or hollow steel with concrete poured between the metal
slabs for additional protection. The passageways in a HARTS are typically 2–3 m in height and width and
lined with 20–40 cm of concrete, often reinforced with steel. HARTS are equipped with an exhaust fan and
a ventilation system to remove the smoke produced when firing for long periods of time. If the artillery is of
the towed variety, the artillery prime movers will likely be nearby in a covered area for protection from
counterartillery or direct aerial fire attack. Tunnels will likely connect the various guns so crew members can
move between the positions without being seen by their enemy or becoming vulnerable to direct or indirect
fire.
7-90. Each artillery piece in a HARTS will feature its own gun platform, crew cover, and ammunition storage
areas. Each firing position, as some guns will have more than one, features a sheltered location consisting, at
a minimum, of a crushed rock pad surrounded by a high berm created from the rock and dirt excavated during
the construction process. Some HARTS will also contain a concrete pad for the artillery pieces or concrete
walls. The HARTS position will be situated in such a way that the artillery tube or multiple rocket launcher
system can be fired from inside its covered position.
7-91. Each gun or multiple rocket launcher system emplacement will likely have immediate access to one to
four units of fire, consisting of 120 rounds per gun. It is estimated that the KPAGF store 30–90 days of
additional ammunition in the local area. In offensive operations, the KPAGF planning factor is four units of
fire on day one and two units of fire for the next 2 days, before moving forward to a new position. In defensive
operations, the KPAGF plan on two units of fire per day. ZPU-2 or ZPU-4 heavy antiaircraft machine gun
companies in protected positions, most likely crewed by local female militia members, will protect most
HARTS from aerial attack.
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Fortified Tank Positions

7-92. The KPAGF not only place their infantry in underground facilities, but also place their armor in
fortified tank positions for protection against indirect fire and aerial targeting. The KPAGF tanks do not
expect to fight from these positions. A fortified tank position is similar to a HARTS, but must be constructed
at the bottom of the hill or ridge.
7-93. There are two primary types of fortified tank positions. In the first type, the tank must enter through
the front entrance. In the other type, there is a rear entrance and the tank drives through the tunnel to its firing
point. Both types are built similarly, except for the entrance/exit procedures. There is an earthen or rock berm
in front of the entrance to provide the tank with a hull defilade firing position.
7-94. There are prepared machine gun positions on the flanks of the tank to prevent enemy infantry from
approaching. Inside the tunnels are steel doors at various points in order to close them off. The tunnels also
contain a ventilation system to remove exhaust fumes and smoke. The tanks can maneuver out of their
positions or flee out of the back entrance if it is available.
Infantry Company Strongpoint

7-95. There are many infantry company strongpoints that are actually CBPs located 200–1000 m north of
the DMZ; these contain concrete tunnels for shelter against indirect and aerial fire and for safe storage of
food and ammunition. A typical strongpoint includes three interconnected tunnels burrowed through the
upper portion of a hill or ridge. Within the tunnels are living quarters, ammunition storage areas, a water
storage unit or well, and perhaps a kitchen. Two of the tunnel entrances face the expected enemy’s avenue
of approach, and the third is on the reverse side of the hill. All three openings are guarded with a machine
gun pillbox.
7-96. The concrete and steel pillboxes take maximum advantage of natural and artificial camouflage in order
to blend in with the environment. Each of the pillboxes has two or three firing ports, and some are equipped
with two machine guns. Some of these strongpoints will have prepared mortar positions on the reverse slope
of the hill or ridge. There are heavy steel doors with rubber gaskets at each tunnel entrance that can be sealed
to protect the occupants from chemical, biological, or radiological contamination. Open communications
trenches interconnect the pillboxes and contain prepared fighting positions for soldiers with small arms.
Naval Underground Facilities

7-97. The Korean People’s Army Navy (KPAN) is responsible for North Korean coastal defense and
operates several subterranean activities to support its mission. Like the KPAGF, the KPAN also uses HARTS
situated on likely landing spots along both coasts, near major ports, and on KPAN naval bases. HARTS have
been spotted on islands off North Korea’s western coast that can cover the Northern Limit Line, the naval
dividing line between North and South Korea. This line is an extension of the military demarcation line on
the peninsula, but is located over the water. Evidence indicates the KPAN, sometime around November 2011,
constructed 20 new artillery positions in Hwanghaedo Province capable of reaching the Northern Limit Line.
It is likely that there are at least 1,000 KPAN artillery pieces designated for defensive operations, mostly
76.2-mm and 130-mm, on the North Korean west coast alone.
7-98. The KPAN also uses underground facilities to store some of its warships for protection from aerial
attack. The KPAN uses its subterranean areas for ammunition and fuel storage, training, operations centers,
and command posts. Some of these protected tunnels will even allow KPAN boats to travel from their
underground berths all the way to the sea without being seen from the air. According to one Central
Intelligence Agency report, at least 10 port cities provide underground berthing facilities for ships. Once the
KPAN ships leave their protective positions, however, they become susceptible to aerial attacks.
Air Force Underground Facilities

7-99. Because the KPA does not believe the Korean People’s Army Air Force (KPAAF) can obtain air
superiority in the skies, ground antiaircraft fire as well as C3D will serve as the best protection for the KPAGF
against enemy aircraft. A KPA manual smuggled out of North Korea in 2010 emphasizes the protection of
facilities located in cave strongholds, such as command posts, fighter jet bases, naval bases, and runways.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 7-25

Chapter 7
This realization over the last half-century caused the KPAAF to build many of its airfields with underground
runways or hangers for protection from aerial attack.
7-100. The KPA takes great solace in the knowledge that 1999 NATO aerial attacks in the former
Yugoslavia actually destroyed only 13 of the Serbs’ 300 tanks, despite early claims that the attacks destroyed
40% of all Serbian armored targets. The KPA believes its underground facilities, paired with its C3D
operations, will only further reduce its units’ vulnerability to aerial attacks. The KPAAF conducts much of
its support operations from underground facilities. This includes airplane manufacturing; vehicle, fuel, and
ammunition storage; aircraft repairs and maintenance; and ground training.
7-101. While many KPAAF runways may be soft-surfaced, at least 20 North Korean airfields feature some
type of underground aircraft shelters, dispersal facilities, or maintenance bays. North Korean airfields often
feature taxiways leading away from the runways to fortified dispersal tunnels located in nearby hills. The
distance to these protective locations may be as far as 1–2 km from the actual runways. The doors to these
tunnels often feature moveable blast walls, concrete barriers, or earth blast barriers.
7-102. Inside the dispersal area, the tunnels may curve within the hill and contain several separate rooms.
Most tunnels are 14 m wide and 10 m high, and they may be as long as 600 m in length. Some tunnels feature
internal blast walls cordoning off the inside rooms from the main tunnel. At Sunchon Air Base, possibly the
most important KPA airfield, the KPAAF stores at least half of all its MiG-29 and Su-25s airplanes in
underground hangers. The MiG-29 is the KPAAF’s most advanced fighter, and the Su-25 is the KPAAF’s
only modern ground attack airplane. The KPAAF operates one “underground” air base and is in the process
of constructing a second. The completed underground air strip is located near the western coastal town of
Onchon-up. The base under construction is on the east coast at Kangja-ri and will serve as a replacement for
the nearby Kangja-ri highway strip—a road that can be used as a runway. These two bases feature runways
and concrete taxiways that extend into the nearby mountains so airplanes can take off without taxiing in the
open or land directly into the protection of the mountains.
7-103. Due to the fear of aerial attack, the KPAAF operates over 50 ground-control intercept and early-
warning radar facilities throughout North Korea. While the system is overlapping, there are blind spots due
to the mountainous terrain. Many of these ground-control intercept and radar facilities operate from
underground locations. In many cases, the actual radar system is mounted on a hydraulic lift system the
KPAAF personnel can raise out of the ground when in use. When the radar is not in use or maintenance is
needed, the radar operators can retract the system to reduce its vulnerability to an enemy attack.
7-104. Some of the KPAAF air defense weapon systems may also be housed in underground facilities. The
air defense weapons are also situated on retractable lifts and only elevated when preparing to fire. The
underground air defense complex will house additional missile launchers, support vehicles, administrative
offices, and crew sleeping quarters. It is likely that 20% of the air defense bases are unoccupied at any one
time, allowing the crews to change locations depending on the tactical situation.
Logistical Facilities
7-105. The KPA maintains a 2- to 3-month level of strategic supply reserves in case of war. These strategic
stocks include food (primarily rice); petroleum, oils, and lubricants for its armored units; and ammunition of
all types. The KPA stockpiles these war materiels in underground facilities constructed for this purpose. At
one time it was estimated that North Korea stores 1.2 million tons of food, 1.46 million tons of fuel, and 1.67
million tons of ammunition in subterranean facilities. Reports indicate North Korea now constructs its fueling
facilities underground in the missile launch sites. The KPA provides security for these below-ground
facilities, as the resources are not available for general public use. It is likely that some of the supplies are
colocated with units using underground facilities such as HARTS, where several days’ worth of ammunition
is already on hand. The movement of supplies from these facilities, if conducted above ground, would likely
to occur at night when there is limited visibility. The KPA may use trucks, civilian tractors, carts pulled by
animals or people, or porters to move the supplies to where they are needed on the battlefield.
7-106. North Korea may operate up to 300 underground munitions factories supported by numerous other
civilian factories, also built underground. If needed, the country could convert some of these civilian-goods
factories to war production. The construction of underground manufacturing plants dates back to the Korean
War, when North Korea felt compelled to do so to avoid United Nations air strikes. After the armistice in
7-26 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Defensive Actions
1953, underground factory construction halted due to the fiscal reality of the increased cost of construction
projects in a subterranean environment. In 1964, however, Kim Il Sung reinstated his underground facility
construction policy by stating that all new major plants must be built underground instead of on the surface.
7-107. Almost all of North Korea’s critical industries are now located underground. About 180 factories
dedicated for military support or capable of being converted are located in the Jagang-do region, a
mountainous province adjacent to China. Often the workers do not even know the plant’s final product, but
only their small role in the process. The factories’ subterranean locations may make it difficult for any
military to destroy North Korea’s military production capability.
SOUTH OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE

7-108. If it is necessary to go on the defense within a major South Korean city containing an underground
infrastructure network, it is likely the KPAGF will use those networks to move from building to building to
avoid exposure above ground. This would then become an urban operation with its associated issues. It is
likely the KPAGF would attempt to use CBPs built in urban South Korean areas as they would in North
Korea. The primary difference would be the amount of time available to create these CBPs; therefore the
level of sophistication would be less than CBPs found north of the DMZ, though the KPAGF would create
the strongest CBPs possible with the time and resources available.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 7-27

Chapter 8
Counterstability Actions
No peace treaty has been signed to end the Korean War; only an armistice is currently
in place. As such, North Korea has conducted counterstability operations in South
Korea since the cease-fire began in 1953. The purpose of North Korean counterstability
actions is to counteract the actions of an enemy to create a stable environment for the
civilian population to live in and flourish. North Korean counterstability actions can
include regular and irregular Korean People’s Army (KPA) activities to degrade and
disrupt an enemy’s civil security, law enforcement, public services, infrastructure, and
effective governance, and destroy enemy resolve to resist the eventual outcome of the
unification of Korea under the Kim regime. The methodology to conduct
counterstability operations will change depending on the environment, from the current
semipeaceful state between North and South Korea to the possibility of renewed
combat operations on the peninsula.
PURPOSE OF COUNTERSTABILITY ACTIONS

8-1. The purpose of KPA counterstability actions is to create conditions enabling the successful design and
execution of operations in a particular operational environment (OE) in order to complete a mission.
Counterstability actions complement other regular or irregular KPA offensive and defensive tasks to counter
the stability operations of South Korea and its coalition partners or allies. Counterstability is an integral aspect
of KPA military operations and often causes an impact beyond the tactical and operational effects of armed
combat. Whether conducted by regular forces, irregular forces, combinations of regular and irregular forces,
or willing or coerced civilians, counterstability actions focus on disrupting major areas of potential stability
in an OE. The KPA plans, prepares, and executes counterstability activities to support tactical and operational
missions and strategic goals in order to―
 Discredit enemy civil law enforcement or internal security forces.
 Deride enemy judicial processes.
 Damage enemy civilian infrastructure.
 Degrade enemy civil governance.
 Dissuade South Koreans from supporting the enemy.
 Disrupt coalition partner or ally support to the enemy.
 Dislocate enemy from regional or global community and diaspora support.
 Defeat enemy military and internal security operations.
 Destroy enemy civilian and military resolve to resist North Korea.
PLANNING COUNTERSTABILITY ACTIONS

8-2. The KPA, with assistance from the Korean Workers’ Party, will exploit conditions of instability to
enhance achieving its goals and objectives during both conflict and non-conflict periods. Counterstability
actions range from covert influence to overt violence. The KPA will create conditions, unstable and
otherwise, to promote a gradual acceptance of its objectives by the South Korean people, regional powers,
and even eventual acceptance and support from transnational institutions.
8-3. If war were to break out on the Korean Peninsula, the KPA would attempt to exceed South Korea’s
capacity to exercise effective governance, maintain civil order and obedience, and ensure economic
development. A principal aim would be to sustain recurring incidents in the South Korean population, create
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 8-1

Chapter 8
disruptive conditions that threaten effective South Korean governance, and defeat South Korea’s practical
resolve. Examples of instability actions that North Korea can institute or co-opt against South Korean targets
include but are not limited to—
 Computer warfare aimed at civilian computer systems.
 Recurrent acts of terrorism within South Korea by North Korean supporters or special operations
forces (SOF) personnel.
 Degrading or making infrastructure obsolete to diminish civilian quality of life.
 Reducing effectiveness or attempting to corrupt law enforcement forces.
 Reducing effectiveness or attempting to corrupt security forces.
 A combination of North Korean sympathizers and SOF operating similarly to guerrillas
conducting paramilitary operations.
 Supporting charismatic individuals and special interest groups that disrupt effective civil
governance; possibly focusing on the reunification of the country and that “brothers” should not
kill each other.
 Manmade disasters by KPA SOF or North Korean sympathizers.
 Increased criminal activities, possibly agitated by KPA SOF or North Korean supporters.
8-4. Figure 8-1 provides examples of actions, targets, and the effects that North Korea hopes to achieve to
destabilize the South Korean Government.
Figure 8-1. Counterstability actions to create conditions and effects
8-5. An integrated KPA counterstability concept would typically require a long-term framework, with tasks
that expand and sustain unstable conditions until North Korea obtains the ability to achieve its plans and
policies. The range of counterstability tasks and missions can include support to military operations, from
small-scale military or paramilitary engagements to participation in major military operations. Related
coercive activities in the civilian sector often include crime and acts of terrorism. North Korea can coordinate
implementation at any point along this range of military, paramilitary, or nonmilitary civil activities in order
to destabilize the operations of its enemies and enhance the electronic intelligence warfare effects of its
agenda. Counterstability tasks to discredit South Korea and its allies can include but would not be limited
to—
 Military engagement missions against South Korea and its allies.
 Peace operations to keep or enforce international peace agreements signed by North Korea.
 Offering civil governance and social well-being activities to make South Korea look bad if they
are refused, such as participating in the Olympics, family reunions, and joint North Korea/South
Korea ventures.
 Highlighting corruption and other problems within South Korea, such as the imprisonment of a
former South Korean president.
8-2 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

 Placing pressure on the international community and South Korea regarding the humanitarian
crisis caused by international sanctions through highlighting the effects on North Korean children.
 Military combat operations against South Korea and its allies.
8-6. North Korea recognizes that decisions and actions by its likely enemies are normally compliant with
international conventions and legal restrictions on conduct of war activities. International forces deployed to
the peninsula will typically act consistent with host-nation laws and regulations when operating as part of a
coalition or alliance, and conduct operations with rules of engagement that are typically more restrictive than
actions demonstrated by the KPA.
8-7. Mission planning of counterstability actions includes combinations of offensive and defensive tasks.
Key elements in planning North Korean counterstability tasks include―
 Determine the goals and objectives.
 Define the time available for plans, actions, and mission completion.
 Define the amount of time allowed to plan and prepare for operations.
 Organize forces by function for particular missions.
 Coordinate electronic intelligence warfare activities in support of each mission.
 Incorporate recurring observations into refined plans and actions.
8-8. Counterstability actions require detailed reconnaissance and surveillance to collect information,
develop situational awareness, and determine situational understanding of OE conditions. This continuous
intelligence preparation and production, often complemented with support of a local network, provides an
appreciation of how to most effectively conduct actions with available resources in order to achieve specified
and implied tasks. Actions will be either offensive or defensive in nature and execution. A conceptual cycle
of planning, preparation, execution, and exploitation results is continuous assessment and evaluation.
Learning from this cycle is integrated into subsequent planning and action. Figure 8-2 shows the steps in the
cycle and the continuous nature of the cycle itself.
Figure 8-2. Counterstability plan-act-exploit cycle
8-9. Offensive counterstability actions use KPA offensive doctrinal guidance and purposes to shape the
planning process. The two types of offensive action are the planned offense and the situational offense. A
planned offense implements an offensive mission task when there is sufficient time and knowledge of the
situation to prepare and rehearse forces for specific tasks. Typically, the enemy is in a defensive position or
in a known location. A situational offense is used when tactical opportunities arise unexpectedly or on short
notice. Planning and preparing for this type of action may have to be abbreviated in order to take advantage
of an opportunity. See chapter 6 for more information on offensive actions.
8-10. Defensive counterstability actions also apply KPA doctrinal guidance and purposes. The two types of
defensive actions are the planned defense and the situational defense. A planned defense is a defensive
mission task conducted when sufficient time and knowledge of an OE and enemy situation allow preparation
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 8-3

Chapter 8
and rehearsal of forces for a deliberate defense. The decision to use a situational defense can occur when
conditions change quickly and the KPA must adopt a defensive posture in a limited amount of time with
immediately available resources. In post-hostility periods and the occupation of their country by external
forces, the most ardent Kim supporters—including those with guerrilla training—may initiate
counterstability operations spontaneously, due to decades of indoctrination of a total resistance strategy by
all North Korean people. See chapter 7 for more information on offensive actions.
THREATS AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

8-11. Criminal activity exists at every level of society as a destabilizing factor in all environments, whether
it is in North or South Korea. In peacetime, much of the crime in North Korea is local or conducted by
government officials. In wartime, it is likely that North Korea would work with criminal elements in South
Korea if it was to their mutual advantage. The presence of criminals as a threat to the South Korean
Government and its allies, whatever their level of capability in independent or affiliated activities, can
complement other South Korean opponents conducting counterstability operations.
8-12. Whether or not criminal activities are coordinated with KPA forces for deliberate counterstability
actions, the social impact of criminal actions typically degrades enemy capability to stabilize conditions in
the South Korean population. Criminals can also conduct criminal actions separate from North Korean forces
in support of their own goals and objectives. If North Korea is defeated and the country occupied,
collaborating criminal organizations will likely continue to operate and possibly coordinate with the KPA,
the Korean Workers’ Party, or their remnants.
8-13. Criminal organizations generally fall into three organizational types: gangs, large-scale criminal
networks, and transnational criminal organizations. Typical examples of these types are shown in figures 8-3,
below, 8-4 on page 8-5, and 8-5 on page 8-6, respectively. Gangs and criminal networks may develop into
larger criminal networks, and can evolve into transnational criminal organizations. The lines of separation
between echelons of capability and criminal influence can be purposely vague. Organizational structure can
be relatively flat or involve multiple levels of control and commodity marketing, sales, and distribution.
Figure 8-3. Criminal gang organizational structure (example)
8-14. Basic differences exist, however, in how these three types of organizations are structured and how they
typically operate. Gangs and small-scale networks tend to have an internally publicized organizational
structure and leadership focused on localized crime, protection of territorial or commodity operations in a
gang-declared area, and coercion of a local population. Their disruptive impact on the populace is significant,
even when they are not affiliated with KPA forces.
8-15. Large-scale criminal networks expand illicit commodity operations, increase organizational profits,
and typically focus on producing or acquiring and trafficking a product and protecting market distribution
and territory. These networks and gangs can have an enduring association, but can also adapt to emergent
opportunities to expand criminal control for profit and power. Criminal networks controlling local or regional
markets may have ties to and frequently do business with criminal organizations in other regions or countries.
8-4 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

This enterprise expansion can lead to a larger networks of customers, intermediary outlets, access to advanced
technologies, and other capabilities and resources for successful large-scale criminal ventures.
Figure 8-4. Criminal large-scale network organizational structure (example)
8-16. Criminal networks may develop into expansive criminal networks or transnational criminal
organizations, depending on leadership or opportunities. These organizations may have ambitious economic
or political agendas. They often fill the power vacuum in poorly governed or ungoverned geographic regions,
and can challenge governmental control of a region and its population. In individual cases, this type of
criminal organization can evolve into a de facto insurgency, with goals and objectives geared toward
increasing wealth, power, or influence. Criminals can cooperate in transnational ventures, often taking
advantage of the increasing ease and effectiveness of global communications. Globalization and the increased
legitimate and illegitimate movement of people across contested borders and among nation-states add
significant capabilities to criminal activities and the disruption of enemy governance or use of military forces.
8-17. The nature of shared goals or interests determines the tenure, type of tactical relationship, and degree
of affiliation. Any affiliation depends on the needs of the criminal organization at a particular time. Criminals
and criminal organizations may oppose other criminal actors whose activities degrade the success of a
criminal enterprise. Criminal motivations vary, but are seldom from a political or religious ideology. These
organizations may become affiliated with KPA military or paramilitary forces for mutual benefit if their
interests coincide. Activities can range from misdemeanor acts, such as petty theft, to major felony crimes
such as murder. Any of these can sap the resources and ability of the South Korean Government, military
forces, nongovernmental organizations, or supporting coalition or allied forces to increase OE stability.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 8-5

Chapter 8
Figure 8-5. Criminal transnational organization structure and functions (example)
PREPARING COUNTERSTABILITY ACTIONS

8-18. In the preparation phase—whether in war or peacetime—North Korea will focus on ways to apply all
available resources and the full range of actions to place the enemy in a vulnerable position. North Korea
will prepare the South Korean OE and its own organizations to achieve a mission purpose, and considers
mission requirements for branches and sequels to a designated counterstability task. Aspects of camouflage,
concealment, cover, deception, or complex terrain provide degrees of force protection and operational
security to KPA plans, preparations, and actions. As in typical offensive and defensive actions, key
considerations include but are not limited to―
 Conduct reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition.
 Identify the mission objective.
 Coordinate functional support and logistics.
 Determine plans and actions.
 Rehearse critical actions and finalize mission order.
 Position forces and resources for mission execution.
8-6 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

EXECUTING COUNTERSTABILITY ACTIONS

8-19. Counterstability actions may appear as discrete events when executed; however, North Korea typically
plans and operates with a comprehensive approach to conducting actions in order to achieve unity of effort
toward a primary objective. Cooperation and coordination by North Korea leverages the capabilities of
disparate actors to conduct a broad array of actions. Shared understanding and appreciation may be displayed
as a formal organization, long-term association, or temporary affiliation for mutual benefit.
8-20. North Korean leaders understand actors are not compelled to work together toward one common goal,
but can often be convinced to mutually support and benefit from select activities. One example would be
individuals or groups providing goods to North Korea from overseas locations, contrary to international
sanctions. A desired end state can be crafted to accommodate the best interests and goals of both North Korea
and diverse participating actors.
8-21. North Korea may desire to create legitimacy for its actions, and typically seeks to establish control of
a process, resources, or commodity with the acceptance of a target audience. The manner in which North
Korea and cooperating organizations conduct themselves in long-term operations can either foster legitimacy
or cause indirect or direct resistance to their actions. Internally, North Korea uses the creation of a cult
following of the Kim family to provide legitimacy of the current government to its people. North Korea uses
draconian measures, such as sending people to gulags or executing them after show trials, to stifle any dissent
from its citizens. Consent or resistance to North Korea in the region is typically based on fear of a return to
an active conventional war on the peninsula or the start of nuclear war. North Korea often uses the other
side’s fear of these two types of warfare as blackmail to receive external support.
8-22. North Korean actions may concentrate on convincing the South Korean populace that the actions of its
established governmental organizations are dysfunctional or corrupt, and a mandate proclaimed by North
Korea offers an improvement. In order to increase support of North Korea’s goals and objectives on the
Korean Peninsula, the country would conduct operations to destabilize South Korea’s civil and military
organizational performance, disrupt support to South Korea by coalition partners or allies, and defeat South
Korean military operations. North Korea may attempt to replace South Korea’s destabilized systems with
demonstrated support system capabilities as a method to obtain active or passive acceptance by the South
Korean population.
8-23. In addition to offensive and defensive operations by military forces, acts of crime and terrorism can be
applied to increase the types and number of recurring destabilizing incidents the South Korean Government
must confront. The examples in this chapter demonstrate how crime and terrorism can be integral to North
Korean operations, with a cumulative effect to defeat the resolve of South Korean leaders and the populace
to resist North Korea’s goals and objectives.
NORTH KOREAN ACTIONS WITHIN THE SOUTH KOREAN

POPULATION
8-24. Infiltrating governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations in South Korea is a
possible way for North Korea to disrupt operations and relationships among enemy actors and institutions.
Intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations are the primary sources of subject matter expertise in
many essential services and governance responsibilities. They are also the primary provider of humanitarian,
infrastructure, and essential services in South Korea. Intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations
usually have experienced and detailed knowledge of the civil environment within which they operate. In this
principally civilian context, a diverse array of noncombatants can be a significant resource to be manipulated
by the KPA or the Korean Workers’ Party.
REGULAR-FORCE INSTABILITY ACTIVITIES

8-25. Since the armistice ended the fighting in 1953, North Korea has conducted activities within South
Korea or in South Korean territorial waters in a number of ways. Two examples are the sinking of the South
Korean corvette, ROKS CHEONAN, and the artillery attack against Yeonpyeong Island. The first may
demonstrate the inability of South Korean naval forces to protect themselves from attack, while the second
showed the vulnerability of South Korean civilians residing within range of North Korean artillery units.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 8-7

Chapter 8
8-26. On 26 March 2010, an explosion ripped the CHEONAN as it cruised the Yellow Sea a short distance
south of the disputed Northern Limit Line. Despite the heroic efforts of the South Korean Navy, only 58 of
the 104 sailors on board survived the attack. North Korea denied any role in the sinking, but a joint
investigation with experts from five countries concluded that a torpedo fired from a North Korean submarine
sank the ship. Russia later conducted its own investigation and determined the evidence was insufficient to
determine a culprit.
8-27. On 23 November 2010, North Korean artillery units on Mudo Island and the mainland launched an
attack with 122-mm multiple rocket launchers on Yeonpyeong Island. This occurred after a South Korean
Marine K-9 artillery battery stationed on the island refused to stop its scheduled artillery exercise after a
North Korea directive. The Marine battery conducted counterbattery fire on the firing units. The North
Korean artillery barrage killed two South Korean Marines and two civilians who lived on the island. The
South Korean Government decided to evacuate approximately 200 civilians to its mainland. After tensions
rose throughout the day, calmer heads prevailed and the situation returned to normal.
8-28. These two incidents indicate the vulnerability of not only South Korea’s civilians, but also of its
military units to surprise attacks from North Korean forces. The threat of future North Korean provocations
keeps tensions high in South Korea and could result in instability within its populace.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES INSTABILITY ACTIVITIES

8-29. North Korean SOF and Korean Workers’ Party forces are active and often operate in South Korea.
During the 1960s, North Korean military personnel and agents infiltrated into South Korea in an attempt to
create an insurgency similar to the one occurring in South Vietnam at the same time. The most well-known
SOF action was the 1968 attempt to assassinate the South Korean president in order to jump-start an
insurgency. See page 8-9 for additional details on this incident.
8-30. Since 1953, North Korean has sent in SOF personnel into South Korea many times for reconnaissance,
direct action missions, and attempted conversion of local civilians to communism. How many times this has
happened is unknown, but there have been numerous documented incidents. One example occurred in
September 1996: A North Korean submarine ran aground in South Korea while on a mission to retrieve a
SOF reconnaissance team. Left on its own, the team tried to make its way back to North Korea through the
demilitarized zone (DMZ). After a 50-day manhunt, South Korean forces killed or apprehended the entire
team at the cost of 11 of their own soldiers’ lives.
IRREGULAR FORCES ACTIVITIES

8-31. Irregular forces include—but are not limited to—terrorists, insurgents, guerrillas, criminals, active
supporters, passive supporters, and independent actors. The Korean Peninsula is unique, as North Korea does
not have most of these groups inside its own country, but in the case of a conflict these groups could arise to
become a threat to the country’s government. Within North Korea, there are no known terrorist groups,
insurgents, or guerrillas working against the Kim regime. While there is a high level of corruption in North
Korea, there appears to be no major criminal enterprise working independently of a governmental official.
These criminal groups are not known to be actively or passively operating against the Kim regime. As
evidenced by the songbun system described in chapter 3, however, there are both active supporters of the
Kim regime and citizens that are neutral about the government. Any North Korean who is vocal against the
current government is already a political prisoner in the gulag system.
8-32. In the event of war, these groups may appear on the battlefield. North Korea, most likely through its
SOF and Korean Workers’ Party clandestine agents, may work through its active supporters in South Korea
to destabilize the country. There is criminal activity in South Korea, but it is unlikely that criminal elements
will join North Korea against their own government. Figure 6-10 on page 6-19 demonstrates one possible
role that a North Korean clandestine operative could play in conjunction with KPA SOF in a dispersed attack.
If the war moved into North Korea, it is possible that individual separated North Korean units or civilians
could become guerrilla units operating against the enemy.
8-8 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

TERRORISM AND MISSION TASK EXECUTION

8-33. Terrorism is the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political,
or other ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are
usually political (JP 3-07.2). Terrorism strategies are typically long-term commitments to degrade the
resilience of an enemy in order to obtain concessions. Whether acts of terrorism are deliberate, apparently
random, or purposely haphazard, the physical, symbolic, and psychological effects can diminish a
population’s confidence in its key leaders and governing institutions. The local, regional, international, and
transnational attention on acts of terrorism by state or non-state actors can often isolate an enemy from its
supporting population. The themes and messages promoted by acts of terrorism can accentuate anxiety,
demoralize the resolve of a population and its leaders, and eventually contribute to defeat of an enemy.
North Korean Use of Terrorism

8-34. North Korea uses terrorism as a way to cause significant psychological or physical effects on the South
Korean population through the anxiety or fear caused by a stated intention to use or the actual use of violence.
A North Korean decision to apply terrorism will be motivated by the ideological belief that the Kim family
and the North Korean Government is the legitimate government for all of Korea. Social and political pressure,
internal or external to the South Korean population and its government, will be exploited by North Korea
with near real-time media coverage in the global information environment. International conventions and
law-of-war protocols on armed conflict and the illegality of conducting acts of terrorism are often not a
constraint on KPA forces. The pursuit of goals and actions labeled as terrorism by South Koreans may be
considered fully justifiable by North Korea and even some South Korean sympathizers.
8-35. Another consideration is an independent North Korean actor who may be separate and distinct from
any other North Korean individual or organization. The spectrum of actors on the peninsula can range across
political, public, and commercial institutions, other institutions appearing legitimate but disguising an illicit
agenda, and individuals or organizations who openly declare intent to use terror as a matter of policy and
practice. Any of these may choose to engage in acts that the Western world would define as terrorism.
8-36. Over the last decade or so, whether intentional or not, North Korea has used unmanned aircraft (UAs)
to sow concern amongst South Korean leaders. They fear that North Korea has not only the capability to send
UAs across the DMZ undetected, but also to harm South Korean governmental officials, civilians, or
infrastructure by carrying chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. Between October 2013 and
May 2017, at least five North Korean UAs crossed the DMZ, including four that crashed on South Korean
ground. Though the UAs did not harm anyone physically, each possessed the capacity to carry enough weight
to do so, creating concern to the South Korean Government. Each recovered North Korean UA could have
contained conventional explosives or chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons; these platforms
could be used in assassination operations against South Korean leadership or to damage or disable key
infrastructure. The cameras recovered from the UAs, all manufactured in Japan, contained pictures of key
South Korean infrastructure, including nuclear power stations, military bases, and the Blue House—South
Korea’s official presidential residence (equivalent to the U.S. White House). Historically, North Korea has
conducted many terrorist-style operations in South Korea; the 1968 attempt to assassinate the South Korean
president at the Blue House is one example.
Historical Example: Attack on the Blue House

8-37. In the mid-1960s, North Korea attempted to create an insurgency in South Korea, similar to what was
happening in South Vietnam at the time. South Korean military and police forces killed 130 infiltrators and
captured another 43 between 1964 and 1967. In 1966, the KPA started training Unit 124 for the express
purpose of assassinating South Korean President Park Chung-hee. The mission’s secondary purpose was to
create chaos throughout South Korea and, with assistance from clandestine North Korean supporters, launch
a guerrilla campaign against the South Korean Government in order to create a regime collapse.
8-38. The KPA soldiers selected for this mission were handpicked and trained for 2 years, including the last
2 weeks at a full-scale model of the Blue House near Wonsan. The soldiers received intensive training on
infiltration and exfiltration methods, weapons, land navigation, hand-to-hand combat, and concealment. They
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 8-9

Chapter 8
were trained to cover 13 kph while carrying a 30-kg rucksack. The intense training resulted in numerous
injuries: at the end, only 31 soldiers made the cut for the mission.
8-39. Unit 124 left Wonsan on 16 January 1968 and headed for the North Korean section of the DMZ. Each
team member had dark overalls, tennis shoes, a cap, a submachine gun, a pistol, eight grenades, an antitank
mine, a dagger, and a rucksack with other supplies. On the night of 17–18 January 1968, the soldiers
infiltrated across the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division section of the DMZ, near Yeoncheon, in six different teams.
The KPA chose the U.S. sector because its personnel were known to operate under more restrictive rules of
engagement than the South Koreans and, if the assassination was successful, South Korea might have blamed
the U.S. for the security failure. The lead team had cut the wire on the south barrier fence by 2300 local time
and, by 0200, the six teams had assembled at camp sites near Morae-dong and Seokpo-ri.
8-40. The unit remained at these campsites until crossing the frozen Imjin River wearing white bedsheets at
0500 on 19 January 1968 and subsequently creating a single campsite on Simbong Mountain to hide in during
daylight hours. At 1400 hours, four South Koreans searching for firewood stumbled across the campsite and
were captured. The Unit 124 members debated on whether to kill them, but decided instead to convert them
to their communist ideology. After several hours of indoctrination and threats by the KPA soldiers, the South
Koreans promised not to give the team away. After being released, however, they immediately alerted the
police of what had happened.
8-41. After releasing the South Koreans, Unit 124 immediately broke camp and traveled at 10 kph, crossing
Nogo Mountain and arriving at Bibong Mountain at 0700 on 20 January 1968. South Korean forces had
immediately started a search for the North Korean soldiers on Simbong and Nogo Mountains, but Unit 124
had long departed those areas. The South Korean authorities increased security around Seoul, including at
any potential high-value targets. After spending the rest of the day and most of the night on Bibong Mountain
discussing what to do since they had been detected, the Unit 124 leader devised a new plan. The unit broke
into teams of two to three soldiers and continued to infiltrate to a rally point, the Seungga-sa Temple. Located
on the northern side of the Seoul suburbs, the temple was less than 14 km from the Blue House.
8-42. Despite the police and military searchers, all of the North Korean soldiers made it to the temple safely.
Once there, they removed their overalls—revealing a South Korean Army uniform of the local 26th Infantry
Division. The Unit 124 soldiers openly marched in platoon formation along Segeomjeong Road toward the
Blue House, passing several South Korean police officers and army units. Whenever questioned by
authorities, the North Korean leader would say they were a South Korean platoon on a break from the search
operation.
8-43. At 2200 on 21 January 1968, the unit approached the Segeomjeong-Jahamun checkpoint, less than 100
m from the Blue House. The local police chief approached the disguised KPA soldiers and asked them a
series of questions. About the same time the police chief became suspicious of the KPA soldiers and pulled
out his pistol, a civilian bus arrived at a nearby bus stop. The Unit 124 members assumed the bus was full of
police or military reinforcements, pulled out their weapons, and started shooting at the police chief, other
police officers, and the civilian bus.
8-44. The Unit 124 members then fled the scene. South Korean and U.S. forces immediately initiated a
search. By 23 January 1968, 29 of the 31 soldiers had been killed in firefights. One was captured alive when
his grenade failed to explode in a suicide attempt. The other soldier made it back to North Korea alive and
later became a general. Between the attack at the checkpoint and the search operation, there were 26 South
Koreans killed and 66 wounded. The dead included the aforementioned local police chief, his assistant, and
24 civilians, most of them on the bus by the checkpoint. Four U.S. Soldiers were also killed by the escaping
infiltrators as they attempted to return to North Korea.
8-45. The North Korean Government tried to distance itself from the assassination attempt by blaming it on
a rogue element within the government. The attack took a back seat to other issues when the Korean People’s
Army Navy captured the USS PUEBLO in international waters on 23 January 1968. Unit 124 failed its
mission. Not long after this, North Korea lessened its infiltration attempts into South Korea and dismissed
any hopes of creating an insurgency similar to South Vietnam. Figure 8-6 shows the route that the
assassination team took from the DMZ crossing to the Blue House.
8-10 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Figure 8-6. Attempted assassination of the South Korean President
COUNTERSTABILITY IN SUPPORT OF NORTH KOREAN

MILITARY OPERATIONS
8-46. Successful counterstability actions are typically evaluated as part of a long-term campaign to achieve
North Korea’s goals and objectives. Counterstability in tactical-level actions orients on several major
characteristics of an OE. Offensive and defensive tasks aim at creating, sustaining, and exploiting a lack of—
 Nominal safety in everyday livelihood and commerce.
 Fair and impartial judicial processes.
 Trustworthy and effective law enforcement.
 Effective military and internal security forces.
 Responsible administration, stewardship, and governance by leaders.
8-47. North Korea will likely employ criminal activities and terrorism in its actions to destabilize the South
Korean population, civilian environment, and governance in order to support of its goals and objectives.
Although criminal organizations and terrorist groups are examples of capabilities that can conduct
counterstability actions, the desired effects can also be created by KPA regular forces, irregular forces,
combinations thereof, or willing or coerced civilians.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 8-11

Chapter 9
North Korea conducts electronic intelligence warfare (EIW) as part of all operations.
This chapter covers the 11 different components of EIW and how North Korea uses it
in conjunction with combat operations. North Korea conducts EIW to obtain
information on its enemies, to deceive them, and to achieve effects against them. While
much of North Korean EIW is conducted above the tactical level on the battlefield,
EIW at all levels will affect the tactical units.
TACTICAL-LEVEL ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE WARFARE

9-1. The Korean People’s Army (KPA) defines chonja chinungjon, or electronic intelligence warfare
(EIW), as specifically planned and integrated actions taken to achieve an information advantage at critical
points and times. The primary goals of EIW are to—
 Influence an enemy’s decision making through its collected and available information,
information systems, and information-based processes.
 Retain the ability to employ friendly information and information-based processes and systems.
9-2. Information and its management, dissemination, and control are critical to the successful conduct of
tactical missions. Given today’s advancements in information and information systems technology, this
importance is growing in scope, impact, and sophistication. The KPA recognizes the unique opportunities
EIW gives tactical commanders, and it continuously strives to incorporate EIW activities in all tactical
missions and battles.
9-3. EIW may help degrade or deny effective enemy communications and blur or manipulate the battlefield
picture. In addition, EIW helps the KPA achieve the goal of dominating the tempo of combat. Using a
combination of perception management activities, deception techniques, and electronic warfare (EW), the
KPA can effectively slow or control the pace of battle. For example, the KPA may select to destroy lucrative
enemy targets through the execution of EW. It may also execute a perception management activity that
weakens the enemy’s international and domestic support, causing hesitation or actual failure of the operation.
The KPA executes deception plans to confuse the enemy and conceal its true intentions. More-traditional
EW activities also contribute to the successful application of EIW at the tactical level by challenging the
enemy’s quest for information dominance.
9-4. EIW also supports the critical mission of counterreconnaissance at the tactical level. The KPA
constantly seeks ways to attack, degrade, or manipulate the enemy’s reconnaissance, intelligence,
surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) capabilities. All enemy target acquisition systems and sensors
are potential targets.
ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE WARFARE TACTICAL TASKS

9-5. The effects of EIW can be multidimensional and at times hard to pinpoint. The KPA, however,
highlights the following tasks and associated effects as critical to the application of EIW at the tactical level:
destroy, degrade, disrupt, deny, deceive, exploit, and influence.
DESTROY
9-6. Destruction tasks physically render an enemy’s information systems ineffective. They are most
effective when timed to occur before the enemy executes a command and control (C2) function or when
focused on a resource-intensive target that is hard to reconstitute. Neutralizing or destroying the opponent’s
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 9-1

Chapter 9
information capability can be brought about by physical destruction of critical communications nodes and
links.
DEGRADE
9-7. Degradation attempts to reduce the effectiveness of the enemy’s information infrastructure, systems,
and collection means.
DISRUPT
9-8. Disruption activities focus on interrupting enemy observation and sensor capabilities at critical times
and locations. Disruption impedes the enemy’s ability to observe and collect information and to obtain or
maintain information dominance.
DENY
9-9. Denial activities attempt to limit the enemy’s ability to collect or disseminate information on the KPA
or deny its collection efforts.
DECEIVE
9-10. Deception activities strive to mislead the enemy’s decision makers and manipulate its overall
understanding of KPA activities. Deception manipulates perception and causes disorientation among decision
makers within their decision cycle.
EXPLOIT
9-11. Exploitation activities attempt to use the enemy’s C2, communications, or RISTA capabilities to the
advantage of the KPA. The KPA also uses its various EIW capabilities to exploit any enemy vulnerability.
INFLUENCE
9-12. Influencing information affects an enemy’s beliefs, motives, perspectives, and reasoning capabilities
in order to support North Korean objectives. This may be done through misinformation or by manipulating
information.
SYSTEMS WARFARE
9-13. In the systems warfare approach to combat (see chapter 1), the KPA will focus on attacking C2,
communications, RISTA, logistics units, or other critical components of selected combat systems belonging
to enemy forces. It is often more feasible to attack such targets than to directly engage the enemy’s combat
or combat support forces. Tactical-level EIW can be a primary means of attacking these assets, either on its
own or in conjunction with other components of the KPA’s own combat system.
WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY
9-14. To conduct successful actions against a more-powerful force enjoying a technological overmatch, the
KPA will exploit windows of opportunity. Sometimes these windows occur naturally, as a result of favorable
conditions in the operational environment. Most often, however, the KPA will have to create its own
opportunities for offensive or defensive action. EIW can contribute to this by executing effective deception
techniques, EW, and physical destruction, including—
 Destroying or disrupting enemy C2, communications, and RISTA assets.
 Deceiving enemy imagery and signals sensors.
 Selectively denying situational awareness.
 Slowing the tempo of enemy operations by overloading or confusing enemy leaders with too much
or contradictory information.
9-2 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

 Isolating key units of the enemy force.

 Putting information on the Internet that draws people, including deception operations, “click bait,”
and “honey traps.”
 Using its peasant class as both a direct and indirect influencer of the operational environment
(deception operations, ruses, and decoys).
COMPETITION AND THE HUMAN DIMENSION

9-15. Three components compose the human dimension component during periods of conflict—cognitive,
physical, and social. EIW normally attacks the cognitive and social aspects of the enemy’s soldiers. War has
normally been a clash of wills between at least two sides, but has risen to new heights in the current global
environment. North Korea will use all aspects of EIW to attack its enemy before any shots are actually fired
on the battlefield.
COMPONENTS OF ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE WARFARE

9-16. North Korean EIW should not be confused with the U.S. view of EW or information operations. North
Korean EIW contains a number of components that are part of U.S. information operations, including EW,
but also includes several activities that the U.S. does not normally associate with these terms. Integrated
within North Korean EIW doctrine are the following components:
 EW.
 Deception.
 Reconnaissance.
 Cryptanalysis.
 Intelligence collection.
9-17. These components do not exist in isolation from one another and are not mutually exclusive. The
overlapping of functions, means, and targets requires all components to be integrated into a single, cohesive
EIW plan. Effective execution of EIW, however, does not necessary involve the use of all components
concurrently. In some cases, one component may be enough to successfully execute a tactical EIW action.
Nevertheless, using one component, such as camouflage, does not by itself necessarily constitute an
application of EIW.
9-18. The use of EIW components is determined by the tactical situation and support to the overall
operational objective. The size and sophistication of an enemy force also determines the extent to which the
KPA employs the various components of EIW. The KPA commander may mix and match components to
best suit tactical needs, within the bounds of guidance from higher authority.
9-19. Tools for waging EIW can include, but are not limited to—
 Conventional physical and electronic destruction means.
 Malicious software.
 Denial-of-service attacks.
 The Internet.
 The media.
 International public opinion.
 Communications networks.
 Various types of reconnaissance, espionage, and eavesdropping technologies.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 9-3

Chapter 9
9-20. The KPA can employ EIW tools from both civilian and military sources and from assets of third-party
actors. Information links, such as transmitters, communications devices, and protocols, will be targeted. The
KPA is extremely adaptive and will employ the best option available to degrade, manipulate, influence, use,
or destroy an information link. See table 9-1 for typical examples of EIW objectives and targets.
Table 9-1. Electronic intelligence warfare objectives
Mission Objectives Possible Targets
Exploit, disrupt, deny, and degrade the

Command and control and RISTA
Electronic warfare enemy’s use of the electromagnetic
assets and networks.
spectrum.
Mislead enemy decision makers. Cause

confusion and delays in the decision Key military decision makers. General
Deception making process. Persuade local enemy populace and international media
population or international community to outlets and Internet sites.
support North Korea’s objectives.
Command and control nodes and links,

Destroy the enemy’s information
Physical destruction RISTA assets, telecommunications, and
infrastructure.
power sources.
Protection &
Protect critical information assets. Enemy RISTA assets.
security measures
Enemy RISTA assets. Local populace

Perception Distort reality or manipulate information
and leaders. Media outlets, both
management to support North Korea’s goals.
international and domestic.
Decision makers and other information

Information attack Alter or deny key information. users. Systems reliant on accurate
information.
Disrupt, deny, or degrade the enemy’s Enemy command and control unit,
Computer warfare
computer networks and information flow. RISTA assets, and computer networks.
Obtain key information on the enemy to

Reconnaissance achieve positive results on the Enemy units and leaders.
battlefield.
Decode the enemy’s coded message Enemy written and electronic

Cryptanalysis
traffic. communications.
Intelligence Obtain key information as directed by

Enemy units and leaders.
collection the KPA unit leader.
Deliberately release false information,

Disinformation
causing the enemy to make a wrong Enemy political and military leaders.
operations
decision.
KPA Korean People’s Army RISTA reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
9-21. The KPA employs both lethal and nonlethal means of EW. Nonlethal methods range from signals
reconnaissance and electronic jamming to the deployment of corner reflectors, protective countermeasures,
and deception jammers. The KPA can employ low-cost Global Positioning System jammers to disrupt enemy
precision munitions targeting, sensor-to-shooter links, and navigation. Lethal EW activities include the
physical destruction of high-priority targets supporting the enemy’s decision-making process, such as
reconnaissance sensors, command posts (CPs), and communications systems. They also include activities
9-4 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

such as lethal air defense suppression measures. If available, precision munitions can degrade or eliminate
high-technology C2 and communications assets and associated links.
9-22. EW activities often focus on the enemy’s advanced C2 and communications systems, developed to
provide real-time force synchronization and shared situational awareness. The enemy relies on the
availability of force composition and locations for both sides, digital mapping displays, and automated
targeting data. By targeting vulnerable communications links, the KPA can disrupt the enemy’s ability to
digitally transfer and share such information. The KPA enhances its own survivability through disrupting the
enemy’s ability to mass fires with dispersed forces while increasing enemy crew and staff workloads and
disrupting enemy fratricide-prevention measures.
9-23. EW is a perfect example of the integrated nature of KPA EIW components. It overlaps significantly
with protection and security measures, deception, and physical destruction. Reconnaissance, aviation, air
defense, artillery, and engineer support may all contribute to successful EW for EIW purposes. See Appendix
E for additional information on KPA EW operations.
Signals Reconnaissance
9-24. Signals reconnaissance is action taken to detect, identify, locate, and track high-value targets through
the use of the electromagnetic spectrum. It includes both intercept and direction finding, which may enable
a near-real-time attack on the target. KPA commanders determine the priorities for signals reconnaissance
by determining which high-value targets must be found in order to have the best chance for success. If the
collected intelligence is of higher value than the destruction of the target, the KPA commander determines
the best tactical course of action: destroy the target, jam it, or continue to exploit the collected information.
9-25. Signals reconnaissance targets must be detectable in some manner in the electromagnetic spectrum.
The KPA operates available system(s) that perform this type of detection. Some high-value targets do not
generate an electromagnetic signature and must be detected by other means. Those sought by signals
reconnaissance efforts are specific to the battle, the KPA’s plan and capabilities, and the enemy’s plan and
capabilities. Typical targets of KPA signals reconnaissance efforts include enemy—
 Maneuver unit CPs.
 Forward air controllers.
 Logistics CPs.
 Fire support and tactical aviation networks.
 Target acquisition systems.
 Reconnaissance and sensors networks.
 Battlefield surveillance radars.
9-26. Signals reconnaissance information is fused with information obtained from other sources. For
example, the KPA can use trained reconnaissance units to—
 Put “eyes on” targets and objectives.
 Collect required information.
 Provide early warning.
 Monitor lines of communications and movement corridors in a target area.
9-27. Such reconnaissance could possibly include a signals reconnaissance capability.
Electronic Attack
9-28. KPA electronic attack supports the disaggregation of enemy forces. The primary form of electronic
attack is jamming—interference with enemy signals links in order to prevent their proper use. Jamming
priorities are similar to those for signals reconnaissance. The KPA jams maneuver units in order to disrupt
coordination between and within units, especially when enemy units are achieving varying degrees of
success. The KPA also will attack reporting links between reconnaissance and engineering units and their
supported maneuver units, since these units attempt to exploit any KPA weaknesses detected.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 9-5

Chapter 9
Targets
9-29. The KPA can and will conduct electronic attack on virtually any system connected by signals
transmitted in the electromagnetic spectrum. This includes both communications and noncommunications
signals and data. As with signals reconnaissance, the choice of which links to disrupt varies with the scheme
of maneuver, the impact of the disruption, the enemy’s sophistication, and the availability of KPA electronic
attack assets. A limited but representative list of possible targets includes—
 C2 and communications links between a key unit and its higher command.
 The link between a Global Positioning System satellite and a receiver.
 The link between a firing system and its fire direction center.
 The link between a missile or munition and its targeting system.
 Computer data links of all types.
Distributive Jamming
9-30. Instead of wide-band barrage jamming using large semifixed jammers, the KPA often fields small
distributive jammers. These may be either dispersed throughout the battle area or focused on one or more
select targets, and may be either fixed or mobile. Mobility can be by ground vehicle or aircraft. Jammers can
be controlled though civilian cellular phone networks or by local forces. Along with known military
frequencies, the KPA can target civilian radios or cellular phones of a regional neighbor, nongovernmental
organizations, or other civilians from outside the region. Distributive jamming can cause—
 Loss of Global Positioning Systems, communications, and non-communications data links, such
as Blue Force and personal or unit communications.
 Degradation of situational awareness and common operational picture.
 Disruption of tempo.
 Reduction of intelligence feeds to and from CPs.
 Opportunities for ambush, which is recorded and used for perception management operations.
 Units forced to use alternative, less secure communications.
Expendable Jammers
9-31. The KPA can take advantage of the time prior to an enemy attack to emplace expendable jammers,
which can disrupt enemy communications nets. When used in conjunction with terrain—such as at natural
chokepoints, mountain passes, or valleys—the jammers can achieve significant results despite their short
range and low power. The KPA can also use them to support a deception plan without risking expensive
vehicle-based systems. While limited in number, artillery-delivered expendable jammers may be employed.
These jammers are especially useful in those areas where support is not available from more-powerful
vehicle-mounted jammers.
Proximity Fuse Jammers

9-32. Proximity fuses used on some artillery projectiles rely on return of a radio signal reflected from the
target in order to detonate the round within lethal range. Proximity fuse jammers cause the round to instead
explode at a safe distance. The KPA may deploy such jammers to protect high-value assets within range of
enemy indirect fire weapons.
DECEPTION
9-33. The KPA integrates deception into every tactical action. It does not plan deception measures and
activities in an ad hoc manner; rather, the deception plan is typically a major portion of the KPA’s overall
EIW plan. The extent and complexity of the deception depend on the amount of time available for planning
and preparation. The KPA formulates its plan of action and the overall EIW plan, including the deception
plan, concurrently.
9-34. The KPA attempts to deceive the enemy concerning the exact strength and composition of its forces,
their deployment and orientation, and their intended manner of employment. When successfully conducted,
9-6 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

deception activities ensure the KPA achieves tactical surprise while enhancing force survivability. All
deception measures and activities are continuously coordinated with deception plans and operations at higher
levels. Affiliated forces may assist in executing deception activities.
9-35. The KPA employs all forms of deception, ranging from physical decoys and electronic devices to
tactical activities and behaviors. The key to deception activities is both realism and consistency with the
deception story. Due to the sophistication and variety of sensors available to the enemy, successful deception
requires a multispectral effort. The KPA must provide false or misleading thermal, visual, acoustic, and
electronic signatures.
9-36. When creating the picture of the battlefield that the KPA wants the enemy to perceive, deception
planners have two primary objectives. The first is to cause the enemy to commit forces and act in a manner
favoring the KPA’s plan. The second—and the focus of deception activities when time is limited—is to
minimize friendly-force signatures, which limits detection and destruction by the enemy.
9-37. Integral to the planning of deception activities is the KPA’s identification of the deception target. This
will be an individual, organization, or group with the necessary decision-making authority to take actions (or
neglect to do so) in line with the KPA’s deception objective. On the tactical battlefield, this target is typically
the enemy commander, although the KPA recognizes the importance of focusing actions to affect specific
staff elements.
9-38. Successful deception activities depend on the identification and exploitation of enemy information
systems and networks, as well as other conduits for introducing deceptive information. Knowing how the
conduits receive, process, analyze, and distribute information allows for the provision of specific signatures
meeting the conduits’ requirements. On the tactical battlefield, the enemy reconnaissance system is the
primary information conduit and therefore receives the most attention from KPA deception planners. The
international media and Internet sites may also be a target for deceptive information at the tactical level. The
KPA can feed the enemy false stories and video portraying tactical-level actions with the goal of influencing
operational or even strategic decisions.
Deception Units
9-39. The KPA battle plan or EIW plan may call for the creation of one or more deception units, meaning
that nonexistent or partially existing formations attempt to present the illusion of real or larger units. When
the EIW plan requires units to take some action, such as a feint or demonstration, they are designated as
deception units in close-hold executive summaries of the plan. Wide-distribution copies of the plan make
reference to these units according to the functional designations given them in the deception story.
9-40. The KPA deception unit is typically given its own command structure. The purpose of this is both to
replicate the organization(s) necessary to the deception story and to execute the multidiscipline deception
required to replicate an actual or larger military organization. The headquarters of a KPA unit that has lost
all of its original subordinates to task organization is an excellent candidate for use as a deception unit.
Deception Activities
9-41. Deception units may use a series of feints, demonstrations, ruses, or decoys. All activities must fit the
overall deception story and provide a consistent, believable, and multidiscipline representation. Basic tactical
camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D) techniques are used to support all types of deception.
9-42. The KPA conducts deception activities to confuse the enemy to the extent that it is unable to distinguish
between legitimate and false targets, units, activities, and future intentions. Inserting false or misleading
information at any point in the enemy decision-making process can lead to increased KPA survivability and
the inability to respond appropriately to KPA tactical actions. Manipulation of the electromagnetic spectrum
is often critical to successful deception activities as the KPA responds to the challenge posed by advances in
enemy C2 and communications systems and sensors. Some example deception activities for the KPA may
include—
 Executing feints and demonstrations to provide a false picture of where the main effort will be.
 Creating the false picture of a major offensive effort.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 9-7

Chapter 9
 Maximizing protection and security measures to conceal movement.

 Creating false high-value assets.
Feints
9-43. Feints are offensive in nature and require engagement with the enemy in order to show the appearance
of an attack. The goal is to support the mission and ultimately mislead the enemy. Feints can be used to force
the enemy to—
 Employ its forces improperly. A feint may cause enemy forces to move away from the main attack,
or it may be used to fix enemy follow-on forces.
 Shift its supporting fires from the main effort.
 Reveal its defensive fires locations by causing premature firing.
Demonstrations
9-44. Demonstrations are a show of force on a portion of the battlefield where no decision is sought, for the
purpose of deceiving the enemy. They are similar to feints, but contact with the enemy is not required.
Advantages of demonstrations include—
 Absence of contact with the enemy.
 The possibility of using simulation devices in lieu of real items to deceive the enemy’s
reconnaissance capabilities.
 Use of a smaller force due to lack of contact with the enemy.
Ruses
9-45. Ruses are tricks designed to deceive the enemy in order to obtain a tactical advantage. They are
characterized by deliberately exposing false information to enemy collection means. Information attacks,
perception management actions, and basic C3D measures all support this type of deception.
Decoys
9-46. Decoys are physical imitations of KPA systems or deception positions made detectable to enemy
RISTA assets in order to confuse the enemy. The goal is to deceive enemy resources into reporting or
engaging false targets. It is not necessary to have specially manufactured equipment for this type of visual
deception. Decoys are used to attract an enemy’s attention for a variety of tactical purposes. Their main use
is to draw enemy fire away from high-value assets.
9-47. Decoys are generally expendable. They can be either elaborate or simple, and either prefabricated or
made from field-expedient materials. Their design depends on several factors, such as the target to be
mimicked, a unit’s tactical situation, its available resources, and the time available. Except for selected types,
prefabricated decoys are not widely available. A typical unit can construct effective, realistic decoys to
replicate its key equipment and features through imaginative planning and a working knowledge of its
electromagnetic signature emissions.
9-48. The two most important factors regarding decoy employment are location and realism. Logically
placing decoys can greatly enhance their plausibility. They are usually placed close enough to the real target
to convince an enemy that it has found the correct target. They must be far enough away, however, to prevent
collateral damage to the real target when the decoy draws enemy fire. Proper spacing between target and
decoy depends on target size, expected enemy target acquisition sensors, and type of enemy munitions likely
to be used.
9-49. Decoys must include target features an enemy will recognize. The most effective decoys are those
closely resembling the real target in terms of electromagnetic signatures. Completely replicating the
signatures of some targets, particularly large and complex ones, can be difficult. Therefore, decoy
construction should address the electromagnetic spectral region in which the real target is most vulnerable.
9-50. Smart decoys are designed to present a high-fidelity simulation of a real vehicle or other system. They
may present heat, electromagnetic, electro-optical, audio, or visual signatures. They are distributed,
9-8 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

controlled decoys. Computerized controls turn on decoy signatures to present a much more valid signature
than previous-generation “rubber duck” decoys. Smart decoys can be placed close to prohibited targets, such
as churches, mosques, schools, or hospitals, and civilian populations. If the enemy engages them, the KPA
can exploit resulting civilian damage in follow-on perception management activities. Smart decoys cause—
 Loss of situational awareness.
 A flood of false targets, bogging down the enemy’s targeting process.
 Expenditure of limited munitions on false targets.
 Negation of multispectral RISTA assets, such as night vision goggles, infrared scopes, and other
electro-optical devices.
 Negation of critical targeting planning and allocation of assets.
9-51. The KPA EIW plan may also call for employing deception CPs. These are complex, multisensor-
affecting sites that are integrated into the overall deception plan. They can assist in achieving battlefield
opportunity by forcing the enemy to expend C2 and communications warfare effort against meaningless
positions.
9-52. The KPA attempts to deny the enemy the ability to accurately identify its force dispositions and
intentions by using false deployments. Knowing it cannot totally hide its forces, the KPA tries to blur the
boundaries and composition of forces while providing indications of deception units and false targets.
Specific KPA tactical actions taken to hide the exact composition and deployment of forces may include—
 Establishing deception assembly areas or defensive positions supported by decoy vehicles.
 Establishing security zones to conceal the actual battle line of friendly defensive positions.
 Concealing unit and personnel movement or maneuver.
 Creating the perception of false units and their associated activity.
 Creating false high-value assets.
9-53. By providing the appearance of units in false locations, the KPA attempts to induce the enemy to attack
into areas most advantageous to itself. When the deception is successful, enemy forces may decide to attack
where the KPA can take maximum advantage of terrain. False thermal and acoustic signatures, decoy and
actual vehicles, and corner reflectors, supported by false radio traffic, all contribute to the appearance of a
unit where in fact none exists.
9-54. The reduction of KPA electromagnetic signatures is critical to the success of any deception plan.
Minimizing the thermal, radar, acoustic, and electronic signatures of people, vehicles, and supporting systems
is critical to ensuring deception of the enemy and enhanced survivability. The KPA makes extensive use of
a variety of signature-reduction materials, procedures, and improvised methods to provide protection from
enemy sensors and target acquisition systems operating throughout the electromagnetic spectrum.
Electronic Deception
9-55. Electronic deception is used to manipulate, falsify, and distort signatures received by enemy sensors.
It must be conducted in such a way as to replicate realistic signatures. Electronic deception can take the form
of manipulative, simulative, imitative, or non-communications deception. The KPA may use one or all of
these types of electronic deception.
Manipulative Electronic Deception

9-56. Manipulative electronic deception seeks to counter enemy jamming, signals intelligence, and target
acquisition efforts by altering the electromagnetic profile of friendly forces. North Korean specialists modify
the technical characteristics and profiles of emitters that could provide an accurate picture of KPA intentions
to its enemies. The objective is to have enemy analysts accept the profile or information as valid, and therefore
arrive at an erroneous conclusion concerning KPA activities and intentions.
9-57. Manipulative electronic deception uses communications or other types of signals to convey indicators
to mislead the enemy. It can cause the enemy to fragment its intelligence and EW efforts to the point where
they lose effectiveness. It can also cause the enemy to misdirect its assets and therefore cause fewer problems
for KPA communications.
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Chapter 9
Simulative Electronic Deception

9-58. Simulative electronic deception seeks to mislead the enemy as to the actual composition, deployment,
and capabilities of the friendly force. The KPA may use controlled breaches of security to add credence to
its simulative electronic deception activities. There are a number of techniques the KPA may use. With unit
simulation, the KPA establishes a network of radio and radar emitters to emulate those emitters and activities
found in the specific unit or activity type. The KPA may reference the false unit designator in
communications traffic and may use false unit call signs. In capability or system simulation, the KPA projects
an electronic signature of new or differing equipment to mislead the enemy into believing a new capability
is in use on the battlefield. To add realism and improve the effectiveness of the deception, the KPA may
make references to “new” equipment designators on related communications nets. To provide a false unit
location, the KPA projects an electronic signature of a unit from a false location while suppressing the
signature from the actual location. Radio operators may make references to false map locations near the false
unit location, such as hill numbers, a road junction, or a river. This would be in accordance with a script as
part of the deception plan.
Imitative Electronic Deception

9-59. Imitative electronic deception injects false or misleading information into enemy communications and
radar networks. The communications imitator gains entry as a bona fide member of the enemy
communications system and maintains the role until it passes the desired false information to the enemy.
9-60. In imitative electronic deception, the KPA imitates enemy electromagnetic emissions in order to
mislead its opponent. Examples include entering the enemy’s communications nets by using its call signs
and radio procedures, then giving its commanders instructions to initiate actions. Targets for imitative
electronic deception include any enemy receiver, ranging from cryptographic systems to simple, plain-
language tactical nets. Among other effects, imitative electronic deception can cause an enemy unit to be in
the wrong place at the right time, to place ordnance on the wrong target, or to delay attack plans. Imitative
deception efforts are intended to cause decisions based on false information that appears to have come from
the enemy’s own side.
Noncommunications Deception
9-61. The KPA continues to develop and field dedicated tactical noncommunications means of electronic
deception. It can simulate troop movements by such means as use of civilian vehicles to portray the
movement of military vehicles to radar, and marching refugees to portray movement of marching troops.
Simple, inexpensive radar corner reflectors provide masking by approximating the radar cross sections of
military targets such as bridges, tanks, aircraft, and even navigational reference points. Corner reflectors
bouncing waves back at the source can be quite effective when used in conjunction with other EW systems,
such as ground-based air defense jammers.
PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION
9-62. Another method for disrupting enemy control is physical destruction of the target. The KPA integrates
all types of conventional and precision weapons systems to conduct destructive fires, to include—
 Fixed- and rotary-wing aviation.
 Cannon artillery.
 Multiple rocket launchers.
 Surface-to-surface missiles.
9-63. In some cases, the destruction may be accomplished by ground attack. The KPA can also utilize other
means, such as explosives delivered by special operations forces (SOF) or North Korean sympathizers.
9-64. Physical destruction measures focus on destroying critical components of the enemy force. Enemy C2
and communications nodes and target acquisition sensors are a major part of the KPA fire support plan during
physical destruction actions. KPA priority targets typically include—
 Battalion, brigade, and division CPs.
 Area communications distribution system centers and nodes.
9-10 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

 Artillery fire direction centers.

 Forward air controllers.
 Weapons system-related target acquisition sensors.
 Jammers and signals intelligence systems.
9-65. The KPA may integrate all forms of destructive fires, especially artillery and aviation, with other EIW
activities. Physical destruction activities are integrated with jamming to maximize their effects. Specific
missions are carefully timed and coordinated with the EIW plan and actions of the supported units.
9-66. The KPA gives special emphasis to destruction of its enemy’s RISTA capabilities prior to an expected
enemy attack on KPA defensive positions. Once the attack begins, the KPA heavily targets the enemy C2
and communications nodes responsible for the planning and conduct of the attack, along with supporting
communications. Of note, destruction of these nodes prior to the attack may allow the enemy time to
reconstitute control. Targeting the nodes once forces are committed to the attack, however, may cause a far
greater disruptive effect.
9-67. The KPA does not possess the smart bombs of other modern militaries and would likely use “strap-
on” guidance systems to increase the accuracy of its missiles. North Korea’s missile inaccuracy is a major
issue for the KPA when conducting attacks against EIW-related targets that require precision and timing.
Due to the mobility and fleeting nature of its enemy’s information operations targets, North Korea will likely
focus its limited missile arsenal against high-priority targets.
9-68. The KPA continues to research and develop directed-energy weapons, to include radio-frequency
weapons and high-power lasers. While North Korea has fielded no dedicated directed-energy weapons
systems whose sole role is to conduct laser attacks, it may employ low-power laser rangefinders and laser
target designators in a sensor-blinding role.
PROTECTION AND SECURITY MEASURES

9-69. Protection and security measures encompass a wide range of activities and incorporate some
components of deception and EW. Successful protection and security measures significantly enhance tactical
survivability and preserve combat power. The KPA will attempt to exploit the large number and superior
technology of enemy sensors. For example, it may employ software at the tactical level to analyze the
enemy’s satellite intelligence collection capabilities and warn friendly forces of the risk of detection. The use
of signature-reducing and signature-altering devices, along with diligent application of operational security
measures, supports deception activities in addition to denying information.
9-70. At the tactical level, protection and security measures focus primarily on—
 C3D.
 Information and operational security.
9-71. These and other protection and security measures may overlap the realms of EW or deception.
Counterreconnaissance
9-72. Winning the counterreconnaissance battle is important to the KPA, since it can limit what information
the enemy is able to collect and use in operational planning and execution. KPA tactical commanders realize
the enemy’s operations hinge on situational awareness. Therefore, counterreconnaissance efforts focus on
destruction and deception of enemy sensors in order to limit the enemy’s ability to understand the KPA battle
plan.
9-73. The KPA recognizes that, when facing a powerful opponent, it will often be impossible to destroy
enemy standoff RISTA means to observe KPA forces. While the KPA may execute missions to do so, it often
uses C3D as the method of choice for degrading the capability of such systems. The KPA also recognizes the
reluctance of enemy commanders to operate without human confirmation of intelligence due to the relative
ease with which imagery and signals sensors may be deceived. A high priority for all defensive preparations
is to deny enemy ability to maintain reconnaissance contact on the ground. KPA tactical commanders
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Chapter 9
consider ground reconnaissance by enemy SOF as a significant threat, and therefore focus considerable effort
to ensure the destruction of SOF reconnaissance units.
Camouflage, Concealment, Cover, and Deception

9-74. The KPA gives particular attention to protective measures aimed at reducing its enemy’s ability to
target and engage KPA systems with precision munitions. Knowing the enemy cannot attack what its RISTA
systems do not find, the KPA employs a variety of C3D techniques throughout the security and defense
zones. These techniques range from the simplest and least-expensive methods of hiding from observation to
the most modern multispectral signature-reducing technologies.
9-75. The KPA dedicates extensive effort to employing C3D to protect its defensive positions and high-value
assets. All units are responsible for providing protective measures for themselves with their own assets, with
possible support from engineering units. The KPA employs a variety of signature-reducing or signature-
altering materials and systems, to include infrared-absorbing and radar-absorbing camouflage nets and paints.
9-76. The KPA declared 2004 as the “Year of Camouflage,” demonstrating how important C3D are to the
survival of its military. A KPA manual smuggled out in 2010 discussed the failure of the U.S. Air Force to
destroy Yugoslavian tanks due to the deception caused by false equipment. Instead of hitting the actual
military weapons, the U.S. destroyed decoy tanks, antiaircraft guns, missile launcher sites, and aircraft made
of logs, plywood, and cloth. Shortly before the November 2010 artillery bombardment of the South Korean
island of Yeonpyeong-do, the KPA deployed painted plywood or inflatable 122-mm and 240-mm rocket
launchers around its real launchers in an attempt to increase the difficulty of the enemy’s counterartillery fire.
Information and Operational Security

9-77. Information and operational security can protect the physical and intellectual assets used to facilitate
KPA C2 and communications. Security must function continuously to be effective. It must conceal not only
the KPA commander’s intentions and current locations, configurations, and actions of tactical units, but also
obscure the tactics and techniques for employment and operation of information systems.
9-78. The KPA clearly understands the importance of information and operational security. Commanders
understand their vulnerability to being attacked through their own information systems and develop means
to protect these systems. In addition, the KPA must be capable of isolating attacks on its information systems
while maintaining the ability to execute. In order to reduce its vulnerability, the KPA emphasizes strong
communications, computer, and transmissions security. The KPA may even resort to using runners to avoid
interception of electronic communications by enemy forces.
PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT
9-79. Perception management involves measures aimed at creating a perception of truth best suited to the
KPA’s objectives. It integrates a number of widely differing activities using a combination of true, false,
misleading, and manipulated information to steer its enemy’s commanders and staffs towards a preconceived
idea. Targeted audiences range from enemy military forces, to the South Korean populace, to regional or
world popular opinion.
9-80. At the tactical level, the KPA seeks to undermine an enemy’s ability to conduct combat operations
through psychological warfare and other perception management activities aimed at deterring, inhibiting, and
demoralizing the enemy and influencing civilian populations. The various perception management activities
include efforts conducted as part of—
 Psychological warfare.
 Direct action.
 Public affairs.
 Media manipulation and censorship.
 Statecraft.
 Public diplomacy.
9-12 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

9-81. The last three components, while not usually conducted at the tactical level, can certainly have a great
impact on how and where the KPA conducts tactical-level perception management activities. These activities
must be consistent with, and contribute to, the KPA’s operational and strategic goals.
Psychological Warfare
9-82. Psychological warfare is a major contributor to perception management during pre-combat, combat,
and post-conflict stages of a war. Targeting enemy military forces, psychological warfare attempts to
influence the attitudes, emotions, motivations, aggressiveness, tenacity, and reasoning of enemy personnel.
Specialists plan psychological warfare activities at all levels of command. In addition to enemy military
forces, North Korea also conducts psychological warfare against its own people to control them.
9-83. North Korean specialists also concentrate on manipulating the local South Korean population and
international media in favor of the KPA, turning opinion against its enemies’ objectives. KPA planners focus
special emphasis on highlighting enemy casualties and lack of success. KPA planners also highlight enemy
mistakes, especially those causing civilian casualties. The South Korean population will be a major target of
these activities due to the criticality of South Korean public support for military activities.
9-84. Example: North Korea Blames U.S. for American Student’s Death. In January 2016, an American
student visited North Korea as part of an organized tour group. As he was departing the country, the student
took down a propaganda poster and attempted to smuggle it out of the country. The North Korean
Government arrested him and sentenced him to 15 years’ hard labor in prison just two months later. Early in
his sentence, the student suffered a severe neurological injury and the North Korean Government released
him in June 2017 on “humanitarian grounds.” The student returned to the U.S., but died a week later.
9-85. North Korea attempted to deflect its culpability in the student’s death in a number of ways, both
domestically and internationally. First, the student confessed publicly on television to breaking North Korea’s
laws, reading from a handwritten script at the prompting of a local Methodist church and a university secret
society. Second, the North Korean Government claimed the student was sent to the country to break its laws
at the behest of the U.S. Government, doing so both before the trial and after the student’s death. Third, North
Korea stated the U.S. Government was trying to exploit the student’s death for internal political purposes.
Fourth, The North Korean Government denied any allegations that the student was tortured while in its
country, and he had fallen into a coma due to a combination of botulism and sleeping pills. The U.S. doctor’s
noninvasive autopsy did not prove the student was tortured. Lastly, North Korea released three other
Americans in May 2018 to demonstrate the country’s willingness to negotiate with the U.S.
9-86. Through a variety of outlets, North Korea attempted to manage the perception of the student’s death
to the people living in North Korea, the U.S., and the international community. North Korea attempted to
control the message as much as it could to create the impression that the student’s death was not due to
anything government officials did or failed to do while the student was in prison.
9-87. The KPA attempts to employ media and other neutral players, such as nongovernmental organizations,
to further influence public and private perceptions. If North Korea perceives the presence of nongovernmental
organizations to be detrimental to its objectives, the Kim government will attempt to hinder their efforts to
provide humanitarian assistance to the populace, thus discrediting them.
Public Affairs
9-88. The KPA may conduct public affairs actions aimed at winning the favor or support of the South Korean
leadership and populace in the event that North Korea decides to invade South Korea. This civil support from
the KPA might take many forms, such as public information and community relations. It could involve
providing money, schools, medical support or hospitals, religious facilities, security, other basic services, or
hope—as seen from the North Korean perspective. The KPA would accompany these support activities with
the message or impression that, if North Korea loses the war or leaves the area, the local population will lose
these benefits and the security provided by the KPA.
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Chapter 9
Media Manipulation
9-89. Perception management targeting the media is aimed at influencing both domestic and international
public opinion. The purpose is to build public and international support for North Korea’s actions and to
dissuade an adversary from pursuing policies perceived to be adverse to its interests. The willingness of the
local South Korean population to either support or to oppose the KPA military effort will be critical to North
Korea’s success. While most aspects of media manipulation are applicable to levels well above the tactical,
the trickle-down effect can have a major effect on the KPA tactical fight.
9-90. North Korea exploits the international media’s willingness to report information without independent
and actual confirmation. For example, South Korean and other international media reports state North Korea
has ended its nuclear testing and has closed down its test facility. This is based on reports given to the media
by the country and inviting the media, who are not knowledgeable about nuclear testing, to visit the nuclear
test facility.
Note. North Korea employs media censorship to control its own population’s access to information
and perception of reality. Successful preparation of the population significantly enhances public
support for the KPA’s military actions. As part of this, North Korea prepares its forces and
population for enemy information operation activities.
Target Audiences
9-91. North Korean perception management activities seek to define events in the minds of decision makers
and populations in terms of North Korea’s choosing. Successful perception management consists of two key
factors: speed and connection. Speed means reaching the target audience before the other side can provide
the correct information, thus altering the perception of events. Connection means having the right media to
provide the story to the target audience in a way that it will find credible and memorable. World opinion is a
primary target of perception management, either to gain support for North Korean causes or to turn world
opinion and support against potential foes. Reinforcement of its message (preferably by different sources) is
also a powerful tool North Korea uses to convince the target audience of the veracity of its position.
INFORMATION ATTACK
9-92. Information attack focuses on the intentional disruption or distortion of information in a manner to
support KPA mission completion. Unlike computer warfare attacks targeting the information systems,
information attacks target the information itself. Attacks on the commercial Internet by civilian hackers have
demonstrated the vulnerability of cyberspace and information systems to innovative and flexible penetration,
disruption, or distortion techniques. North Korean cyberspace attackers learn from and expand upon these
methods. The KPA recognizes the increasing dependence of modern armies on tactical information systems.
It therefore attempts to preserve the advantages of such systems for its own use while exploiting the enemy’s
reliance on them.
9-93. Information attack is a critical component of EIW, offering a powerful tool for North Korea. For
example, an attacker may target an information system for electronic sabotage or to manipulate and exploit
information. This may involve altering data, stealing data, or forcing a system to perform a function for which
it was not intended, such as creating false information in a targeting or airspace control system.
9-94. Data manipulation is potentially one of the most dangerous techniques available to North Korea. It
involves covertly gaining access to an enemy information system and altering key data items without
detection. The possibilities are endless with this technique. Some examples are—
 Navigation. Altering position data for enemy units, soldiers, and systems, making them think they
are in the right place when they are not.
 Blue Force Tracking. Altering position data of enemy units, soldiers, and systems to make other
units, soldiers, and systems believe them to be in one place where they are not or to lose track of
them entirely. Alternatively, data manipulation can make KPA units appear as enemy forces or
vice versa.
9-14 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

 Battlefield Information Systems. Enhancing KPA tactical success by the ability to mitigate or
influence enemy activities controlled via battlefield information systems.
 Survey and Gun or Mortar Alignment. Causing enemy weapons to fire on the wrong target
location.
 Targeting and Sensors. Misdirecting sensors to have false reads, locate false targets, or identify
the enemy’s own units as KPA targets.
 Weapon Guidance. Sending enemy weapons to the wrong location or target.
 Timing. Changing internal clocks, thereby disrupting synchronization.
 Logistics Tracking. Sending logistics packages to the wrong place or delaying their arrival. This
can be done by altering bar codes on equipment or by hacking and altering logistics (delivery or
request) data.
 Aviation Operations. Changing altimeter readings, position location data, or identification, friend
or foe codes.
9-95. North Korea attempts to inject disinformation through trusted networks. The KPA tries to make its
enemies distrust their RISTA and situational awareness assets by injecting incorrect information. Attacks
could take the form of icon shifting (blue to red) or moving the icon’s location. Fire missions and unit control
would require significant human interaction, thus slowing the enemy’s target engagement cycle.
9-96. Likely targets for an information attack are information residing in the critical tactical systems of the
enemy. Such targets include—
 Telecommunications links and switches.
 Fire control.
 Logistics automation.
 RISTA downlinks.
 Situational awareness networks.
 C2 and communications systems.
COMPUTER WARFARE
9-97. North Korea conducts computer warfare for three primary reasons—
 Countering the superior conventional military strength of its enemies.
 As a low-cost/low-risk means of targeting enemy computer vulnerabilities.
 In peacetime, as a method to upset the status quo with little fear of retaliation.
9-98. Computer warfare consists of attacks focusing specifically on computer systems, networks, or nodes.
This includes a wide variety of activities, including—
 Unauthorized access (hacking) of information systems for intelligence-collection purposes.
 Insertion of malicious software (viruses, worms, logic bombs, or Trojan horses).
9-99. Such attacks concentrate on the denial of service, disruption, or manipulation of the integrity of the
information infrastructure. Distributed denial-of-service attacks use a network of slave computers to
overwhelm target computers with packets of data and deny them outgoing access to networks. Such attacks
could disrupt logistics, communications, intelligence, and other functions. North Korea may attempt to
accomplish any of these activities through the use of agents or third-party individuals with direct access to
enemy information systems. The country can also continually access and attack systems at great distances
via communications links such as the Internet.
9-100. North Korea can employ various types of malicious software or “malware” on enemy computers to
slow operations, extract data, or inject data. Poor enemy operational procedures can enable this type of attack,
with significant loss of capability or spillage of data to North Korea. These attacks also cause the enemy to
waste data time and cycles in prevention and remediation. Malware could affect internal clocks (creating
positional errors and communications difficulties) and slow the functional speed of computing. Any Internet-
capable or networkable system is at potential risk.
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Chapter 9
9-101. North Korean computer warfare activities may be conducted prior to or during a military action. For
example, by damaging or destroying networks related to an enemy’s projected force deployments and troop
movements, the KPA can effectively disrupt planning and misdirect movement, producing substantial
confusion and delays. As modern armies increasingly rely on “just-in-time” logistics support, targeting
logistics-related computers and databases can produce delays in the arrival of important materiel such as
ammunition, fuel, and spare parts during critical phases of a conflict.
9-102. North Korea can successfully conduct invasive computer warfare activities from the safety of its
own territory. It has the distributed ability to reach targeted computers anywhere in the world, as long as they
are connected to the Internet. North Korea has the capability to continuously exploit the highly integrated
information systems of an adversary.
9-103. The primary organization responsible for computer warfare in North Korea is Bureau 121, which
fielded at least 1,000 elite hackers in 2010 who focused on other countries’ computer systems. This number
is likely much higher now: as of 2009, North Korea’s Mirim College was graduating approximately 100
cyberspace hackers per year for the KPA.
RECONNAISSANCE
9-104. The KPA considers reconnaissance to be a component of its EIW campaign. At its core,
reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods,
information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the
meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area (JP 2-0). See chapter 5 for
details on the KPA use of reconnaissance.
CRYPTANALYSIS
9-105. Cryptanalysis is the art or process of deciphering coded messages without the key. Most of this work
will be done above the KPA division level or in other offices within the North Korean Government, such as
the Reconnaissance Bureau. The results of cryptanalysis could be used at the tactical level.
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
9-106. Intelligence collection is the systematic process used by the KPA to meet its intelligence
requirements through the tasking of all available resources to gather and provide pertinent information within
a required time limit. For additional information on intelligence collection, see the RISTA section of chapter
5.
DISINFORMATION OPERATIONS
9-107. Disinformation operations is the process whereby the KPA will deliberately release false information
in order to deceive the enemy. The KPA may use black propaganda as part of this campaign, which is false
information and material supposedly from an enemy source, but actually from North Korea. Black
propaganda is often used to misrepresent, embarrass, or disparage the KPA’s enemies. The disinformation
may be directed at an enemy’s military forces, its media, or a third party.
9-16 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Appendix A
Fires Support Operations
This appendix provides a doctrinal overview of Korean People’s Army Ground Forces
(KPAGF) fires support typically supporting a ground maneuver infantry regiment,
brigade, or division formation. It provides a functional overview of fires support, the
organizations providing it, capabilities and limitations, and its employment and
integration in Korean People’s Army (KPA) combined arms operations.
FUNCTIONAL OVERVIEW
A-1. The mission of all KPAGF artillery is to destroy or defeat enemy personnel, equipment, and facilities
and to support friendly maneuver unit (infantry and armor) operations. All KPAGF artillery, including
howitzers, mortars, rockets, and recoilless rifles, are organized by type and assigned to specific units to
perform explicit missions. Artillery is organized at each echelon of command from regiment to corps level
to form artillery groups. Because it is likely the KPA cannot create air superiority or even air parity, it
emphasizes artillery support at all levels of command. The KPA relies on artillery to offset deficiencies in
other aspects of its ground forces.
ORGANIZATION
A-2. The KPA fields two artillery commands and the Strategic Force can provide indirect fire support to its
units. Indirect fire and rocket units within the KPA include—
 1 artillery division.
 21 artillery brigades.
 3–4 FROG/KN-02/300-mm multiple rocket launcher brigades.
 1 SCUD-B/C/D/ER missile brigade.
 1 No Dong brigade.
 1 Musudan brigade.
 1 KN-08 brigade.
 Indirect fire weapons assigned to KPAGF divisions, brigades, regiments, and battalions.
Table A-1 on page A-2 provides an example of what indirect fire weapons typically support KPAGF infantry
units, from battalion to corps level. The weapon variants will differ from unit to unit, with lower-quality
weapons found in reserve units.
INDIRECT FIRE COMMAND AND CONTROL

A-3. The senior artillery officer within a KPAGF command normally serves as the artillery group
commander for the organization. In a regiment, this is normally the regularly assigned artillery battalion
commander supporting the infantry regiment. In a division, this is typically the artillery regimental
commander. This artillery commander commands the artillery group and coordinates with the supported
maneuver command. The artillery group commander will organize a staff from all the artillery units assigned
to support the maneuver unit.
REGIMENTAL ARTILLERY GROUP

A-4. The regimental artillery group is composed of all organic and attached artillery units assigned to a
regiment. The mortar battalion is normally positioned on the rear slope of a hill, approximately 1.5 km from
the KPAGF frontline in the offense or the defense, but actual location will be terrain dependent. The KPAGF
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 A-1

Appendix A
intent is to place at least two-thirds of each gun’s range forward of the KPAGF’s front lines. The forward
regiments along the demilitarized zone have their artillery groups prepositioned or positions prepared to move
into so two-thirds of the guns’ range fire into South Korea. The 122-mm and 152-mm artillery battalions are
normally deployed between a regiment’s first and second tactical echelon maneuver units. Most forward
maneuver regiments will receive between two and four artillery battalions for support.
Table A-1. Typical KPAGF indirect fire weapons, corps level and below
Weapon Battalion Regiment Division Corps
Mortar 82-mm: 9 tubes 120-mm: 18 tubes n/a n/a
Recoilless rifle 82-mm: 3 guns n/a n/a n/a
100-mm: 12 guns
Antitank gun n/a 76.2-mm: 6 guns n/a
122-mm: 18 guns
152-mm: 24 tubes
Howitzer n/a 122-mm: 18 tubes 170-mm: 108 tubes
122-mm: 18 tubes
Multiple rocket 107/140-mm: 122-mm: 240-mm:

n/a
launcher 9 systems 12 systems 108 systems
14.5-mm: 8 guns
Air defense 14.5-mm: 8 guns
n/a 14.5-mm: 20 guns 37-mm: 12 guns
artillery 57-mm: 36 guns
57-mm: 6 guns
mm millimeters n/a not applicable
DIVISION ARTILLERY GROUP

A-5. The division artillery group is typically composed of three to five artillery battalions, some organic and
others attached, of guns, howitzers, mortars, and multiple rocket launchers. The artillery group is located
between the KPAGF division’s first and second tactical echelon maneuver regiments, but the exact location
will be terrain dependent.
CORPS ARTILLERY GROUP

A-6. The corps artillery group is composed of between three and six organic and attached long-range and
missile battalions, and is normally located behind the KPA lead division’s second tactical echelon. When a
corps arrays its divisions three abreast, it will form three artillery groups of four battalions each. If the corps
has deployed its divisions in a two up and one back formation, the corps will form two artillery groups with
six battalions in each.
CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

A-7. Over 70% of all KPAGF indirect fire units are deployed in the southern third of the country and are
focused on South Korea. This includes the KPAGF’s artillery units usually located in fortified underground
emplacements called hardened artillery sites (HARTS). From their current locations, the KPAGF artillery
units can attack deep inside their enemy’s rear areas, including approximately 700 artillery and rocket
systems with the capability to hit South Korea’s capital city, Seoul.
A-8. Coastal artillery, usually operated by the Korean People’s Army Navy, is also placed along both
seaboards to prevent enemy amphibious assaults. Many of these artillery units are also located in HARTS,
but there are recent indications that some artillery units presurvey positions along the coasts for mobile
artillery units to set their guns during any invasion from the sea. The KPA has also placed artillery on islands
a short distance off both coasts to protect against amphibious assaults.
A-2 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Fires Support Operations
A-9. The ranges for KPA artillery and multiple rocket launcher systems vary greatly. The KPA’s longest-
ranged self-propelled artillery cannon is the M-1989, with a range of 35 km with conventional ammunition
and 60 km with extended-range ammunition. The KPA Type 68 towed cannon can fire a maximum range of
27.2 km, but is not equipped to use extended-range ammunition. The North Korean KN-09 close-range
ballistic missile possesses a range of 200 km and rockets for the KPA M-1991 multiple rocket launcher can
travel 60 km. Table A-2 provides data on the longest-range weapon systems for each of four different
categories of weapons in the KPAGF.
Table A-2. KPA indirect fire weapons, corps level and below
Self-propelled Multiple Rocket Close-range

Data Point Towed Cannon
Cannon Launcher Ballistic Missile
Total (all), 2018 5,600 3,440 5,500 INA
Most capable M-1989 Type 68 M-1991 KN-09
Quantity on hand,
500 INA 200 INA
2018
Range/extended
35/60 27.2/INA 60/INA 200/INA
range, km
Normal rate of fire,

1 6 22 (40 seconds) INA
per minute
INA information not available km kilometers
A-10. The major limitation of KPA indirect fire weapons is the age of the equipment. Most of the artillery
dates to 1989 technology or before. Some artillery for KPA reserve and lower-quality units date back to
World War II. The KPA artillery has been neglected in order to improve missile capabilities. Despite the lack
of modern sophisticated indirect fire weapons, any army with approximately 9,000 artillery systems and
5,500 multiple rocket launcher systems is capable of massive destructive effects.
A-11. Other limitations include an over-reliance on high explosive ammunition, a limited number of smart
weapons, inaccuracy—often due to a lack of crew training, and a high rate of ammunition failure. While all
these limitations will further reduce the effects of KPA indirect fire weapons, any enemy ground force must
respect the capabilities of the KPA indirect fire units.
EMPLOYMENT AND INTEGRATION IN COMBINED ARMS

A-12. In the offense, KPA artillery is camouflaged and normally emplaces during the night or other periods
of limited visibility. Artillery batteries not firing from HARTS will occupy their firing positions at the last
possible moment in order to avoid detection by the enemy. Many of these artillery batteries will normally be
located 500–1000 m behind the front line, but actual distances will be terrain dependent.
A-13. KPA artillery will likely fire 10–30 minutes prior to an assault in order to destroy enemy command,
control, and communications nodes and observation posts; neutralize heavy weapons; and open gaps in
enemy lines. If enough ammunition is available, the KPA may conduct indirect fire against other targets in
an attempt to disguise the location of the actual assault. During the assault, the artillery will shift to
appropriate targets to the rear and flank of the enemy position to isolate the defending units from
reinforcement and resupply, prevent a counterattack, or to deny the enemy a safe withdrawal route.
A-14. After the maneuver units successfully take an objective, the artillery will displace forward to continue
support. KPA artillery normally displaces by thirds. Two-thirds of the artillery will continue to provide
support while the other third displaces. When the unit that move first is ready to provide support, another
third will move forward.
A-15. In the defense, the KPA uses indirect fire to disperse and neutralize enemy attacks, inflict casualties,
and harass reserves. The KPA wants to separate enemy infantry from its armored support. Artillery units are
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 A-3

Appendix A
assigned to specific zones, and special attention is given to the areas between KPA strongpoints. The KPA
deploys its artillery in depth to assure any penetration of a defense zone can be brought under indirect fire.
A-16. In the defense, the units assigned to the regimental artillery group are normally located behind the
forward battalions and 5–7 km from the front line. The mortar positions are normally 300–800 m behind the
front line and are habitually emplaced on the reverse slope of a hill, about 10 m from the crest. The division
artillery group units are typically located in the same general area as the second-echelon regiment of the
forward division, approximately 5–10 km from the front line. The corps artillery group units are usually
located with the second-echelon division, 10–15 km behind the front line. While these are estimated
distances, the actual locations will be dependent on the terrain.
A-17. There will likely be large numbers of unexploded ordnance from all the indirect fire weapons the KPA
will use. During the North Korean artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island in August 2015, 60 of the initial 80
rounds hitting the island exploded, indicating a dud rate of 25%. For artillery rounds to function properly and
explode on impact, they must be used in a timely fashion or the stock rotated to the factory to be rechecked.
Due to cost of ammunition and the limited economic abilities of North Korea, it is likely the KPA does not
fire artillery ammunition when it is close to the end of its reliable service life or rotate it out for new
ammunition.
A-4 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Appendix B
Aviation Operations
This appendix provides a doctrinal overview of the Korean People’s Army (KPA)
aviation operations typically supporting a ground maneuver infantry regiment, brigade,
or division formation. It provides a functional overview of aviation operations, the
organizations providing aviation support, the capabilities and limitations of aviation
support, and the employment and integration of aviation in KPA combined arms
operations.
FUNCTIONAL OVERVIEW
B-1. The Korean People’s Army Air Force (KPAAF) is part of the KPA. The primary mission of the
KPAAF is to provide air defense capability to the North Korean homeland and its territorial waters. Other
missions include tactical air support to the Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (KPAGF) and the Korean
People’s Army Navy, special operations forces (SOF) insertion, strategic bombing, reconnaissance,
transportation, and logistical support. All aircraft, fixed- or rotary-wing, belong to the KPAAF. There are
approximately 120,000 personnel, including 29,000 officers, and about 1,600 aircraft in the KPAAF. In
addition, the KPAAF controls all airfields and airports within North Korea, the North Korean national airline,
and all airplane-related clubs.
ORGANIZATION
B-2. The KPAAF is part of the KPA and is responsible for all its aircraft. It is divided into four combat air
divisions, based at 13 major bases. There are also two transportation air divisions. The KPAAF will use any
airports or runways in the country to conduct military operations. There are also a number of emergency
recovery airstrips and airfields throughout the country that it can use. The KPAAF has one operational
underground runway, where planes can land without observation from the air, and another is under
construction. Most of the military airfields possess hangers built into mountains for protection against aerial
attack. Approximately 50% of the KPAAF is deployed within 100 km of the demilitarized zone. See table
B-1 for additional information on these divisions and their mission.
Table B-1. KPAAF air divisions
Unit Type Location Mission Region
1st Air Division Combat Kaechon Air Base Regional protection Northwest
2nd Air Division Combat Toksan Air Base Regional protection East
3rd Air Division Combat Hwangju Air Base Regional protection South
5th Air Division Transportation Taechon Air Base Transport & logistics n/a
6th Air Division Transportation Sondok Air Base Transport & logistics n/a
Training & regional

8th Air Division Combat & training Orang Air Base Northeast
protection
n/a not applicable
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 B-1

Appendix B
B-3. The KPAAF is not only aviation-focused, but is also responsible for North Korea’s air defense. If the
mission involves aviation or airspace, the KPAAF is responsible for the unit or function. KPAAF
organizations include the following—
 National air defense headquarters and command elements.
 Air staff.
 6 air divisions.
 18 fighter regiments.
 3 light bomber regiments.
 1 fighter/ground attack regiment.
 1 ground attack regiment.
 Some independent air battalions.
 Some transportation regiments.
 1 attack helicopter regiment.
 Some helicopter transportation regiments.
 Some training regiments.
 2 sniper brigades.
 Reconnaissance unit.
 Unknown number of unmanned aircraft system (UAS) units.
 19–20 surface-to-air missile brigades.
 Surface-to-air missile maintenance depot.
 Antiaircraft artillery academy.
 Unknown number of antiaircraft artillery regiments.
 3 radar regiments.
 Unknown number of searchlight battalions.
 Communications regiment.
 Air traffic control regiment.
 Unknown number of aircraft production and repair facilities.
B-4. The KPAAF operates out of its headquarters in Pyongyang, the former Mirim Air Base, and several
suspected underground facilities at Majang-san, Chunghwa-gun, and Pyongyang-si.

B-5. The KPAAF inventory contains approximately 1,600 fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, including
some that can operate in a variety of roles on the battlefield. Although some of the equipment is quite old,
the KPAAF has the capability to conduct almost all air force missions. These include strategic bombing with
the H-5 Beagle, direct air support of the KPAGF with attack or multirole aircraft, airspace control,
transportation, and logistical support.
B-6. Compared to most Western air forces, KPAAF pilots do not receive sufficient training time to become
truly proficient in their skills. Some KPAAF pilots have conducted combat operations in other countries, but
most of this was during Vietnam or the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Reports indicate that about 15 KPAAF pilots
may have flown with the Syrian government forces attacking Aleppo in November 1973. Other KPAAF
pilots have helped train pilots for the Ugandan Air Force. Before Kim Jong Un took power in North Korea,
pilots flew only 15–25 hours per year due to the cost, a shortage of aviation fuel, and the lack of spare parts.
Most training flights usually only lasted 30–45 minutes and focused mainly on taking off and landing the
aircraft safely. Units flying the MiG-29, MiG-23, or Su-25 received additional training hours. After Kim
Jong Un took power, pilot flight time double to 50 hours per year. The latest economic sanctions may have
cut back the KPAAF pilots’ flight time, but the effects are not fully known. It is likely that KPAAF pilots are
substandard when compared to other modern air force pilots who receive many more flight hours in both
simulators and the actual cockpit.
B-2 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Aviation Operations
B-7. Another major limitation for the KPAAF is the advanced age of its aircraft. Most of the KPAAF aircraft
use technology from before 1980. While there are a few more-recent aircraft and some of them may have
received upgrades over the years, most of the planes and helicopters are at least a generation behind those of
North Korea’s foes in terms of technology.

B-8. Aviation operation types most likely to be employed by the KPAAF include direct air, airborne, SOF,
UAS, and command and control (C2) support to the KPAGF.
DIRECT AIR SUPPORT

B-9. When not fulfilling its primary mission of defending the homeland from aerial attack, the KPAAF will
assist the KPAGF through direct air support. This mission is to disrupt and destroy enemy forces in proximity
to friendly forces. The KPAAF will provide direct air support through its attack helicopters, fixed-wing attack
regiments, and its multirole fixed-wing aircraft. Due to the possibility of the KPA’s enemy maintaining air
superiority—or at least air parity—over much of the battlefield, the amount of support the KPAAF provides
will likely be limited, forcing the KPAGF to rely on artillery for most of their fire support to KPAGF units.
AIRBORNE OPERATIONS AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES SUPPORT

B-10. North Korea fields at least seven airborne units, ranging from battalion- to brigade-size, and the KPA
regards all of them as SOF. Two such units are airborne sniper brigades that, once inserted into an enemy’s
rear area, would conduct missions including the destruction or neutralization of airbases, as well as C2
elements, computers, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. The airborne sniper brigades
receive priority access to aviation assets in anticipation of a requirement for airborne insertion in support of
combat operations. Due to aircraft shortages, most missions will entail air drops of battalion size or smaller.
B-11. Of the 30,000 total airborne soldiers in the KPA SOF community, it is expected that about half would
be inserted by parachute or air-mobile operations using helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft during the opening
stages of any war. Once on the ground, the airborne SOF would seek out C2 and communications nodes, rear
service units, or high-value targets to attack.
B-12. The KPA will use several techniques in order to deliver its airborne SOF. One is by using an ancient
biplane—the AN-2 Colt—that was first flown in 1947. Due most likely to maintenance issues, the number
of serviceable AN-2s for the KPA has dropped from 300 in July 2012 to 200 in April 2016. While at 160 kph
the AN-2 Colt is relatively slow, it can fly at low altitudes to avoid enemy radar, and its small signature
makes detection by radars more difficult than locating larger aircraft, even when the Colt increases altitude
to facilitate tactical parachute drops. To avoid visual detection, in the last decade the KPAAF has changed
the AN-2 camouflage pattern to light blue on the aircraft’s underside and a green pattern on top. This helps
the Colts to blend with the sky, reducing observation from the ground, and with the terrain to avoid
observation from above. The AN-2 Colt can land and take off using unimproved short runways. The easily
flyable airplane can take off from a dirt runway only 650 min length or from paved surfaces, including roads,
at a shorter distance—396 m.
B-13. Another aircraft capable of air-mobile insertion of SOF personnel is the MD-500, a U.S.-made
helicopter that North Korea obtained by circumventing U.S. export laws. Some South Korean air defenders
may be reluctant to shoot down a North Korean MD-500 because its appearance closely resembles an aircraft
flown by the South Korean Air Force. Photographs also exist showing North Korean MD-500s painted with
South Korean air force markings. The identification, friend or foe, confusion could delay air defense
personnel long enough to allow the KPA helicopter to complete its SOF insertion mission. The KPA has even
experimented with delivering SOF personnel from the air using hang-gliders, motorized paragliders, and 10-
passenger gliders towed behind an AN-2 aircraft.
B-14. Depending on wind and weather conditions, KPA airborne forces can drop year-round throughout the
Korean Peninsula. Air-mobile operations could be conducted as far as 48 km beyond KPA’s front lines, but
most likely 14–19 km. The KPA usually conducts an airborne operation in three phases. In phase one, a
reconnaissance element and a small airborne force parachute in to secure the landing or drop zone. The main
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 B-3

Appendix B
force arrives later and expands the landing or drop zone perimeter. The third phase occurs when the follow-
on echelon lands 4–6 hours later with support units and additional supplies. KPA airborne soldiers normally
carry a 3- to 4-day basic load of ammunition and rations. Resupply is considered unlikely based on the
expectation that the CFC will maintain air superiority most of the time using U.S. and South Korean aircraft.
Should the KPA choose to resupply its forces from the air, such operations would probably be conducted at
night or in hours of limited visibility. The KPA deception plan for aerial resupply would entail dummy drops
and covering 2–3 different routes with fighter escorts to protect the transport aircraft. During most airborne
operations, it is expected that the airborne SOF will begin to run short of supplies within 72–96 hours and
will thereafter resort to foraging.
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SUPPORT TO THE KPAGF

B-15. The KPA operates most UASs in North Korea, but the Reconnaissance General Bureau and the
KPAAF may control a small number of them. The KPA primarily tests and modifies imported UASs, but it
is likely starting to develop its own. North Korea has portable unmanned aircraft (UA) launcher capabilities
comparable to the Soviet/Russian Zil-130 cargo trucks. Due to the country’s mountainous terrain, the KPAAF
UA inventory includes a significant number of runway-independent platforms that can be catapulted or
rocket-launched from the ground or from a vehicle-mounted rail. The potential for North Korea to modify
various types and classes of UAs into intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance or one-way strike exists.
Expect North Korea to use low-altitude and short- to medium-range platforms for intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance, and basic target acquisition operations, as well as possible attack missions in a mass
kamikaze-style formation using light weapons or biological and chemical agents. North Korean UAs can
carry munitions, but the specific types are unknown. Some North Korean UAs flying into South Korea are
painted a spotted light-blue/dark-blue pattern with a dark nose for camouflage purposes.
B-16. The most likely tactical missions for KPA UAs include the following, not all of which are military-
related or directed against enemy forces:
 Aerial reconnaissance in support of maneuver forces.
 Observation of indirect fire for adjustment.
 Target confirmation and “suicide” loitering weapon systems.
 Pre-battle information (live stream or still photo).
 Battle damage assessment.
 Communications relay in restrictive environments due to valleys, hills, or mountains.
 Monitoring and controlling unit formations.
 Monitoring camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception activities to determine level of
success.
 Monitoring civil gatherings, curfew violations, or rationing violations of its own citizens.
 Monitoring weather effects on agriculture, production, and infrastructure.
AVIATION COMMAND AND CONTROL

B-17. The KPA and KPAAF operate a dual C2 system for aviation support. Requests go through the KPA
chain of command and air force personnel on the ground direct the aircraft to the target, with the final
direction provided by forward air control parties observing the target.
B-4 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Appendix C
Antitank Operations
antitank (AT) operations typically supporting a ground maneuver infantry regiment,
brigade, or division formation. This appendix provides a functional overview of AT
operations, the organizations providing AT support, capabilities and limitations, and
the employment and integration of AT operations in combined arms operations.
FUNCTIONAL OVERVIEW
C-1. AT operations are the primary concern for the Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (KPAGF), and
enemy tanks are a primary target for all Korean People’s Army armored forces through an AT defense system
composed of six phases. See chapter 7 for a detailed account of each of these phases. The KPAGF
commanders, as part of the AT defense system, will create a number of AT defensive positions, regimental
AT engagement areas, and divisional AT engagement areas.
ORGANIZATION
C-2. When in the defense, KPAGF maneuver battalions will create an AT defensive position. This position
is so important that the regimental commander will designate its physical location and will also create the
associated plan, which the battalion commander responsible for the area’s defense will execute. The position
will likely be situation on the forward slope of two or three hills in order to create a kill zone where the
enemy’s tanks can be caught in a crossfire. Figure 7-8 on page 7-16 is an example of a battalion AT defensive
position. Typical units used in an AT defensive position are one recoilless rifle platoon (three guns), one
76.2-mm platoon (two guns) and several RPG-7s employed in two- or three-man teams. Other weapons in
an AT defensive position may use include AT or antipersonnel mines, 100-mm AT guns, and tanks.
C-3. Each KPAGF maneuver regiment and division will create at least one AT engagement area on the most
likely axis of attack through the unit’s defensive position. The regimental and divisional commanders will
use these engagement areas if the enemy’s armor forces get through the first echelon of defenses and the AT
defensive positions. The physical construction of the regimental and divisional AT engagement areas are
similar to the AT defensive positions, but the kill zone may be larger and the number of weapons involved
greater. The task organization for an AT engagement area will typically consist of two platoons of SU-100
howitzers and two RPG-7 platoons augmented by additional assets such as AT or antipersonnel mines, 76.2-
mm AT guns, recoilless rifles, and tanks. Figure 7-8 on page 7-16 of the battalion AT defensive position is
similar to the physical layout of an AT engagement area. Table C-1 on page C-2 shows common KPAGF
tanks and AT weapons systems.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 C-1

Appendix C
Table C-1. KPAGF tank and antitank weapons systems
Type (Primary Antitank Primary Weapon Production

Weapons System Quantity
Weapon) Range, m Start Date
T-34/85 Tank (85-mm) 1,500 250 1943
T-54/55/Type 59 Tank (100-mm) 1,500 1,000 1955
T-62 or Chonma Tank (115-mm) 1,500 1,200 1961/1971
Pokpung Tank (115-mm/125-mm) 1,500 600 2002
Songun Tank (125-mm) 1,500 200 2010
PT-76 Light tank (76.2-mm) 1,500 450 1951
Type 63 Light tank (85-mm) 1,500 INA 1963
PT-85 Light tank (85-mm) 1,500 500 1985
Type 62 Light tank (85-mm) 1,500 INA 1962
BRDM-2 (Not all armed

Recon (Sagger) 500–3,000 2,100 1962
the same)
Infantry fighting vehicle

BMP-1 500–3,000 222 1972
(Sagger)
9K11/9M14 (AT-3) ATGM (Sagger) 500–3,000 INA 1963
9K111/9M111 (AT-4) ATGM (Spigot) 70–2,500 INA 1970
9P148/PM113 (AT-5) ATGM (Spandrel) 70–4,000 INA 1970
B-10 Recoilless rifle (82-mm) 400 INA 1954
B-11 Recoilless rifle (107-mm) 1,300 INA 1954
ZIS-2/M-1943 Antitank gun (57-mm) 2,000 INA 1945
ZIS-3/M-1943 Antitank gun (57-mm) 2,000 INA 1945
D-44 Antitank gun (85-mm) 1,150 INA 1944
D-48 Antitank gun (85-mm) 1,200 INA 1948

ATGM antitank guided missile INA information not available m meters mm millimeters

C-4. The KPAGF have the capability to conduct AT operations in both the offense and defense due to their
large numbers of tanks and AT weapons. While many of the weapons systems are dated, the immense number
of weapon systems makes the KPAGF a formidable armor force. The KPAGF fields over 3,500 main battle
tanks, ranging from the 1940s era T-34/85 to the Songun tanks built indigenously in the last decade. The
KPAGF also possess about 950 light tanks, 2,500 armored personnel carriers, 2,100 BRDM scout vehicles,
and over 200 BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles. Some of these vehicles operate AT weapons. The KPAGF
also have a large number of both self-propelled and towed AT guns, many dating back to World War II, that
the soldiers could use against enemy tanks.
C-5. If necessary, the KPAGF will not hesitate to use some of their artillery guns in the direct fire mode in
order to stop tanks or an armor-heavy force. This technique would only be a temporary solution before the
guns returned to their primary role of providing indirect fire support to KPAGF units.
C-2 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Antitank Operations
C-6. The major limitation for KPAGF AT operations is the age of the weapons. Many of the weapons
systems date back several generations, as far as World War II. This creates readiness issues regarding
maintenance of such aged weapons and logistical issues associated with massive ammunition requirements
for all the various weapon sizes.
C-7. Some of the KPAGF towed AT guns do not have a long maximum effective range. By the time the
enemy’s tanks have gotten within range, the enemy has already had sufficient time to locate and target the
KPAGF AT guns with longer-ranged weapons.
C-8. Many of the KPAGF tanks are not as accurate nor the maximum effective range as long as that of the
enemy’s tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. While the enemy’s tanks will not be able to fire to their
maximum ranges due to the mountainous terrain, almost every one of them will have a longer range and
better accuracy than the KPAGF tanks. Many KPAGF tanks cannot fire their main gun while on the move,
which makes them more vulnerable to the enemy’s tanks and AT weapons systems.

C-9. Each KPAGF infantry division is normally assigned an armor battalion, as shown in figure 3-4 on page
3-11. The KPAGF also fields mechanized and armor units that will contain a larger number of tanks. These
tanks can range from North Korea’s own locally produced Chonma, Pokpung, or Songun tanks, to vintage
World War II Soviet T-34/85 tanks operated by the lowest-quality units. The most prevalent tank is the T-
54/55/Type 59 tank provided to the KPAGF by the former Soviet Union or China. The KPAGF also field a
number of light tanks used by reconnaissance units. In total, it is most likely the KPAGF possess at least
3,700 tanks of all types. The commander will decide the mission and combat formations of any assigned
armor units based on the terrain and enemy situation.
C-10. The KPAGF usually place their armor unit assembly areas 9–14 km from any hostile positions and
designate the unit’s line of departure 1–3.5 km from its forward line of troops. A small advanced infantry
party equipped with mine detectors normally reconnoiters in front of the lead tank to detect mines, warning
devices, and obstacles, and to seek out enemy positions. When confronted by enemy units, the tanks’ priority
of targets are tanks, AT weapons systems, and then infantry. In the absence of any AT threats, the tanks will
provide support to infantry assaults by using their machine guns and main guns against hardened targets.
C-11. The intent of almost all KPAGF offensive attacks is to break through the enemy’s initial forward
positions and allow its more mobile armor forces (tanks and mechanized infantry) to seek out and destroy
enemy combat support and combat service support units in the enemy rear areas. The initial reduction or
elimination of the enemy’s AT weapons systems is to allow the faster-moving mobile force to exploit any
gaps in the enemy’s front lines. See chapter 6 for more details on how the KPAGF will likely fight while in
the offense, including AT operations.
C-12. In defensive operations, the KPAGF normally position armor units in depth for flexible response to
evolving tactical situations. Small numbers of tanks may be used in AT defensive positions in the forward
battalions or in divisional or regimental AT engagement areas. The KPAGF normally does not use large
armored units to defend terrain. In a KPAGF field army area defense, the commander will likely place the
armor regiment in the second defense zone, 10–15 km behind the front edge of the first defense zone. The
KPAGF commander would most likely use this armor regiment in a counterattack role or as a major unit in
the resumption of the offense.
C-13. In the defense, the KPAGF will set up a number of AT defensive positions as shown in figure 7-8 on
page 7-16, regimental engagement areas, and divisional engagement areas as shown in figure 7-6 on page
7-12. The KPAGF locate these engagement areas on the most likely armor avenues of approach. When
initiated, the KPAGF will focus their weapons on enemy tanks and AT weapons systems before any infantry
targets. If separated from their unit, KPAGF soldiers will likely continue the attack in small groups (two to
five tanks) or even as a lone tank. Like the infantry, KPAGF armor soldiers learn in training to fight as long
as they can, and may try to hide in order to hit enemy combat support and combat service support units from
a stay-behind ambush position. See chapter 7 for more details on how the KPAGF will likely fight while on
the defense.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 C-3

Appendix D
Air Defense Operations
This appendix provides a doctrinal overview of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) air
defense operations typically supporting a ground maneuver infantry regiment, brigade,
or division formation. This appendix provides a functional overview of air defense
operations, the organizations providing air defense support, capabilities and
limitations, and the employment and integration of air defense operations in combined
arms operations.
FUNCTIONAL OVERVIEW
D-1. The Korean People’s Army Air Force (KPAAF) is responsible for the KPA’s air defense units. All
KPA units, however, are responsible for all-arms air defense. (See chapter 4 for additional details.) The KPA
wants to protect its most important combat positions, installations, and large troop movements from aerial
attack. It expects that its forces will not control the airspace, so the Korean People’s Army Ground Forces
(KPAGF) must rely on surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) to protect ground
forces. The KPAAF augments its air defense weapons with barrage balloons at point targets. The large
number of air defense weapons operated by the KPAAF will create a high density of air defense artillery
against enemy aviation.
ORGANIZATION
D-2. In addition to the KPAGF using its organic weapons for air defense, the KPAAF maintains 19 or 20
SAM brigades organized into three air defense sectors, along with an unknown number of AAA regiments
and three radar regiments. The KPAAF is also responsible for a SAM maintenance depot and an AAA
training academy. The entire KPA can field at least 11,000 antiaircraft guns that range from 14.5 mm to 100
mm. The KPAGF also field a number of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) in this type of unit
and as weapons allocated to other unit types.
D-3. While some KPA defectors have stated that a single SAM brigade may operate more than one type of
SAM, it is more likely each brigade is equipped with a single system type. It is estimated that there are 15
SA-2, 2 SA-3, and 2 SA-5 brigades. The KPAAF maintains approximately 1,700 launchers in operational
units and the same number in storage for combat operations. The most common SAM is the SA-2, as older
models have been fired during training. Table D-1 on page D-2 provides examples of various infantry and
air defense units with the primary mission of providing air defense protection to KPA units.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 D-1

Appendix D
Table D-1. KPA air defense weapons systems by unit type
Typical
Unit Weapons System Type Quantity Number of Comments
Units
SA-16 may be
SA-7b MANPADS 42 n/a
substituted
Infantry ZPU-4 (14.5-mm) AAA 60 10 batteries

division
M-1939 (37-mm) AAA 6 1 battery
S-60 (57-mm) AAA 6 1 battery
1 AAA battery may be

SA-5 launcher
SA-5 regiment SAM 18 3 batteries organic to each SA-5
(1 missile)
regiment
SA-3 launcher Probably does not have

SAM 16 3 batteries
(2 missiles) organic AAA
SA-3 regiment
ZPU-4 (14.5-mm) AAA 18 3 batteries
SA-2 launcher
SAM 18 3 batteries
(1 missile)
SA-2 regiment
ZPU-4 (14.5-mm) AAA 18 3 batteries
SA-16 may be
substituted
M-1993/BTR-152A
AAA 6 1 battery
(14.5-mm)
Armored
brigade
K-37-2 SPAAG Some may be replaced
AAA 6 1 battery
(37-mm) with M-1992 SPAAG
ZSU-57 SPAAG
AAA 6 1 battery
(57-mm)
SA-16 may be
substituted
M-1993/BTR-152A
AAA 6 1 battery
(14.5-mm)
Mechanized
infantry Some may be
brigade K-37-2 SPAAG
AAA 18 3 batteries replaced with M-
(37-mm)
1992 SPAAG
ZSU-57 SPAAG
AAA 6 1 battery
(57-mm)
AAA antiaircraft artillery MANPADS man-portable air defense systems mm millimeter
n/a not applicable SPAAG self-propelled antiaircraft gun SAM surface-to-air missile
D-2 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020


D-4. The primary capability of the KPA’s air defense is the sheer number of air defense weapons systems
fielded by the military—estimated at over 11,000 different weapons or systems. Many of the air defense
units, especially those in static locations, are operated by female soldiers. The KPA uses an integrated air
defense system with overlapping radar and air defense systems throughout North Korea. There are fewer air
defense platforms in the north along the border with China and Russia than in the south along the
demilitarized zone. While the KPAGF commander is the senior commander in most circumstances, it is the
responsibility of the KPAAF to coordinate the integrated air defense system.
D-5. The major limitation for KPAGF air defense operations is the age of the weapons and its technology,
similar to its other equipment. Much of the AAA weapons date back to the 1950s and 1960s. Most KPA radar
systems are older models using vacuum tubes received years ago from China or the former Soviet Union.
The missile systems, while newer, still are several generations behind the systems found in other armies.
Tables D-2 and D-3 below and on page D-4, respectively, provides a list of the major antiaircraft weapons
systems fielded by the KPA.
Table D-2. KPA surface-to-air missile and MANPADS weapons systems
Vertical Slant
NATO Name Production
Weapon Type On Hand Target Target
(Common Name) Date
Range, m Range, m
3,000– 7,000–
S-75 SA-2 Guideline SAM <270 1957
25,000 29,000
SA-3 Goa (Neva/

S-125 SAM 140 batteries INA INA 1950s
Pechora)
SA-5 Gammon
1,000– 2,000–
S-200 (Angara/Vega/ SAM 40 1967
40,000 300,000
Dubna)
9K32/ SA-7/7b Grail

MANPADS INA 50–2,300 50–2,300 1964
9K32M (Arrow)
S-300 or
HQ-9 1,000– 2,000–
SA-10 Grumble SAM INA 1984
variant 30,000 100,000
(9M82)
9K35 SA-13 Gopher SAM INA 25–3,500 50–5,000 1969
SA-16 Gimlet
9K310 MANPADS INA 50–5,000 50–5,000 1981
(Needle)
SA-18 Grouse
9K38 MANPADS INA 50–5,200 50–5,200 1983
(Needle)
HN-5/5A Red Tassel MANPADS INA 50–2,500 800–4,400 circa 1975
FIM-92A Stinger MANPADS INA 50–4,800 50–4,800 1981

MANPADS man-portable air defense systems INA information not available m meter
mm millimeter SAM surface-to-air missile
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 D-3

Appendix D
Table D-3. KPA antiaircraft artillery weapons systems
Vertical Slant
Common On Production
Weapon Type Target Target
Name Hand Date
Range, m Range, m
M-1938/ DShK heavy

12.7-mm INA 0–2,000 50–2,000 1938
1946 machine gun
ZGU-1 n/a Towed, 14.5-mm INA 0–1,400 0–1,400 1949
ZPU-1 n/a Towed, 14.5-mm INA 0–1,400 0–1,400 1949
M-1983 n/a Towed, 14.5-mm INA INA INA 1983
ZU-23-2
n/a Towed, 23-mm INA 50–2,000 50–2,500 1960
(2A13)
ZSU-23-4 Shilka SP, 23-mm INA 0–1,500 0–2,500 1964
M-1992 n/a Towed, 23-mm INA INA INA 1992
M-1990 n/a SP, 30-mm INA INA 50–3,600 1990
M-1992 n/a SP, 30-mm INA 0–3,000 0–3,500 1992
M-1939 n/a Towed, 37-mm INA 50–4,000 50–3,000 1939
Type 65 n/a Towed, 37-mm INA 0–8,500 0–3,500 1965
Type 74 n/a Towed, 37-mm INA 0–8,500 0–3,500 1974
M-1992 n/a SP, 37-mm INA INA 0–3,500 1992
ZSU-57-2 n/a SP, 57-mm 250 100–4,500 100–12,000 1947
AZP S-60 n/a Towed, 57-mm INA 100–6,000 100–6,000 1950
Various n/a Towed, 57-mm INA 100–6,000 100–6,000 INA
M-1985 n/a SP, 57-mm INA INA INA 1985
KS-12 n/a Towed, 85-mm INA 100–10,500 100–15,500 INA
KS-19 n/a Towed, 100-mm INA 100–12,700 100–15,000 1945

AAA antiaircraft artillery INA information not available m meter
mm millimeter n/a not applicable SP self-propelled

D-6. The KPA unit’s chief of staff is responsible for unit air defense and determines what facilities,
command, control, and communications nodes, or units are to receive priority for protection. KPA air defense
weapons are often placed on high ground, but are well camouflaged. Formations can vary between linear,
fan-shaped, triangular, or square. Normally, the KPAAF places its air defense weapons 50–100 m apart, with
air defense units separated by at least 200 m.
D-7. In the offense, the KPA deploys its AAA assets to protect units in concentrated areas and key facilities.
The most prevalent air defense weapon in a KPAGF infantry division is the ZPU-4. The ZPU-4 will provide
coverage to maneuver units on the move and then displace forward. The ZPU-4 battery could also receive a
D-4 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

mission to protect a particular unit or area. The M-1939, S-60, and any corps air defense batteries would
provide area coverage concentrating on the protection of high-value targets. Divisional MANPADS teams
would provide local air defense protection to subordinate units. The AAA has two primary missions in the
offense—
 Ensure the attacking units maintain their freedom to maneuver.
 Protect artillery, tanks, and mechanized units in the second echelon.
D-8. In the defense, KPA AAA protects key facilities, railways, and supply depots. Division AAA assets
normally protect the first tactical echelon, while corps AAA protect the second tactical echelon and further
into the KPA corps rear area. Division air defense assets that include ZPU-4, M-1939, and S-60 antiaircraft
weapons will provide overlapping coverage for the first defense zone. Divisional MANPADS teams will
provide local air defense protection. SA-2, SA-3, and SA-5 regiments with their air defense missiles and
antiaircraft machine guns will operate in overlapping fans to protect designated units behind the frontline
divisions. KPA AAA defensive missions include—
 Detect enemy air activity.
 Interdict enemy bombing of forward and rear areas.
 Use electronic countermeasures against enemy aviation, communications, and radar systems.
 Cover the defense in depth through overlapping engagement envelopes.
 Prevent enemy air patrol penetration.
 Fire upon airborne or air assault units.
 Provide cover for artillery and tank units.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 D-5

Appendix E
Electronic Warfare Operations
This appendix provides an overview of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) electronic
warfare (EW) operations typically supporting a ground maneuver infantry regiment,
brigade, or division formation. This appendix provides a functional overview of EW
operations, the organizations providing support, capabilities and limitations, and the
employment and integration of EW in combined arms operations.
FUNCTIONAL OVERVIEW
E-1. EW is one of the components of electronic intelligence warfare. The mission of EW is to deny the
enemy the use of its electronic emitters while still safeguarding the use of one’s own emitters. The KPA
recognizes the importance of EW in modern warfare and emphasizes its role in combat mission success.
E-2. EW is divided into three categories: electronic support measures, electronic countermeasures, and
electronic counter-countermeasures. Electronic support measures evaluate the enemy’s present and future
EW activities, including interception of radio and radar signals, direction finding, wiretapping, analysis, and
report. Electronic countermeasures prevent or reduce the enemy’s capability to use its own electronic
emitters. Countermeasure methods include active (electronic) and passive (chaff) jamming, as well as
imitative and manipulative electronic deception. Electronic counter-countermeasures are the KPA’s
protective measures to prevent or degrade the effectiveness of the enemy’s electronic countermeasures
against its own electronic emitters.
ORGANIZATION
E-3. Much of EW occurs above the tactical level, but the EW activities conducted at the strategic and
operational level still affect operations at the tactical level. The Electronic Warfare Bureau is responsible for
the administration and training of all EW and signals intelligence (SIGINT) assets within the KPA. The
bureau oversees offensive and defensive EW operations in coordination with the Communications Bureau,
Command Automation Bureau, and the Reconnaissance General Bureau’s Technical/Radio Department.
E-4. Most EW and cyberspace warfare operations take place within the Cyber Warfare Guidance Unit, more
commonly known as Bureau 121. While at the strategic and operational level, the following strategic assets
can have an effect on the tactical battle. There are over 6,000 members in Bureau 121, many of them operating
from other countries, such as Belarus, China, India, Malaysia, and Russia. North Korean computer hackers
have even been able to access secure systems and steal South Korean war plans. There are four subordinate
units below Bureau 121:
 The Andarial Group. 1,600 members (+/-) whose mission is to gather information by conducting
reconnaissance on enemy computer systems and creating an initial assessment of the network’s
vulnerabilities. This group maps the enemy network for potential attack.
 The Bluenoroff Group. 1,700 (+/-) whose mission is to conduct financial cybercrime by
concentrating on long-term assessment and exploiting enemy network vulnerabilities. This group
exploits the systems for financial gain for the regime or to take control of the system.
 Electronic Warfare Jamming Regiment. Located in Pyongyang, there is a single KPA EW
jamming regiment composed of three subordinate EW battalions. These EW battalions are most
likely located in Kaesong, Haeja, and Kumgang.
 The Lazarus Group. Unknown number of members whose mission is to create social chaos by
weaponizing enemy network vulnerabilities and delivering a payload if directed to do so by the
regime. This group preloads the network with codes for later activation that disrupt or destroy the
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 E-1

Appendix E
network. The Lazarus Group unleashed the WannaCry malware in 2016–2017, causing massive
problems around the world—including in the U.S.
E-5. Each of the four Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (KPAGF) forward-deployed corps (I, II, IV,
and V) are assigned a communications regiment and an EW/SIGINT battalion with administrative control by
the KPAGF corps headquarters. Some of the divisions within the forward corps will contain an EW/SIGINT
company, and all of the divisions will contain a communications battalion. A KPAGF division may be
allotted an EW/SIGINT battalion, company, or nothing at all, depending on its mission. All KPAGF division
staffs possess at least several EW/SIGINT-trained officers to help coordinate any such assets the unit is
allotted. Any division deployed along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) is assigned a DMZ police battalion,
which operates ground surveillance equipment, radar, infrared, and thermal imaging devices. While North
and South Korea began a series of activities (DMZ guard post destruction, mine-clearing operations, and
enforcing a no-fly zone around Panmunjom) to reduce the hostility level between the two sides in late 2018,
as of publication there had been no open-source reporting of changes in EW/SIGINT monitoring activities
by either country.

E-6. The primary EW capability at all levels of the KPA is jamming of the enemy’s electronic systems.
Since at least 2000, various KPA units have conducted jamming of South Korean and U.S. communications
and radar systems. These attacks have affected the airports around Seoul for short periods of time.
Unclassified reports do not state the specific types of jammers that the KPA operates; it is known that they
are truck-mounted Russian-made systems with a range of 48–97 km. Additional reports state that the KPA
is attempting to obtain jammers with even longer ranges.
E-7. The Korean People’s Army Air Force (KPAAF) is also responsible for operating over 50 early-warning
radar facilities that provide overlapping coverage of the entire country, with the focus on the DMZ and the
west coast. The lowest density of coverage is along the North Korea-China border. Due to North Korea’s
mountainous terrain, there are gaps in low-altitude coverage below 300 m. Many of these radar sites are built
into mountains on top of hydraulic lifts, so they can be lowered into the mountain for both protection from
attack and to conduct maintenance. The KPAAF also operates Global Positioning System and airborne
warning and control system radar jammers using the P-10 Knife Rest and the P-14 Tall King systems. The
KPAAF or the KPA intelligence services also operate electronic intelligence systems against enemy air
forces.
E-8. The primary deficiency with the KPA EW systems, like most of its equipment, is its age and technology
level. The KPA is still using equipment several generations behind its likely enemies. Table E-1 provides a
list of the most prevalent KPA radar systems and their capabilities and limitations.
E-2 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Electronic Warfare Operations
Table E-1. KPA radar systems
NATO/ Distance
Nomenclature Type Band First Year
Common Name Range, km
Kabina 66 Back Net Air defense/early warning F 250 INA
Early warning &

5N87 Back Trap E&F 410 1991
acquisition
Early warning & ground

5N69 Big Back D 500+ 1975
control intercept
MT-LBU Dog Ear Acquisition F&G 80 pre-1983
Fan Song 60–120 (A/B);

SNR-75 Fire control & tracking E, F, & G 1960s
A/B/C/E/F 75–145 (C/E/F)
SNR-75A Gin Sling Fire control & tracking F&G <145 1970s
SNR-125 Low Blow Fire control & guidance I&D 40 (I); 85 (D) 1961

INA Moon Face INA INA INA
control intercept
PRV-13 Odd Pair Height finding E 400 1992

P-8 Knife Rest A VHF 150–250 1950
control

P-10 Knife Rest B/C VHF 200–250 1953
control
Spoon Rest Early warning & ground

P-12 VHF 275 1956
A/C/D control
P-14 Tall King Early warning VHF 500–600 1959
Early warning &

P-15 Flat Face UHF 250 1955
acquisition
P-15M Squat
P-15M2 Early warning UHF 5–200 late 1960s
Eye
P-35/37 Bar Lock A/B Early warning E&F 250–390 1958
PRV-11 Side Net Height finding E 180 1972
Back Net/Back
5N87 Early warning A 410 1970
Trap
SJ-202 Gin Sing-A Fire control & acquisition INA INA pre-1994
5N62 Square Pair Fire control H 350 1967

36D6 Tin Shield E&F 180–360 INA
control intercept
INA information not available KM kilometers UHF ultra-high frequency VHF very high frequency
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 E-3

Appendix E

E-9. At each level of command, the signal section leader or senior signal commander is responsible for
preparing the KPAGF commander’s plan to implement EW measures based on the commander’s orders and
other staff instructions. This EW plan will include—
 Ground communications reconnaissance, coordinated with the reconnaissance section leader,
including methods of employing radio-intercept and radar-intercept equipment.
 Organization of all assigned and attached radio jammers.
 Measures all subordinate units will take to counteract enemy radio-jamming actions through
techniques, including the following—
 Strict observation of standard KPA communications procedures.
 Allocation of alternate frequencies.
 Destruction of enemy jamming equipment.
 Detection and destruction of air-dropped enemy jamming devices.
E-10. The KPA uses a number of electronic countermeasure techniques to prevent the enemy’s EW from
affecting its missions. These techniques include—
 Total or partial radio silence.
 Using directional antennas and low power outputs to ensure maximum reduction of emissions.
 Conducting electronic deception by transmitting false traffic to confuse the enemy.
 Frequently relocating equipment that emits radio signals.
 Making periodic frequency and call sign changes.
 Training radio operators in electronic jamming countermeasures.
 Verification via landline after a radio transmission.
E-11. The KPA will conduct intelligence gathering for EW operations for the following purposes—
 Radio interception to collect data on enemy organizations, equipment, movement, and intentions.
 Radio directional finding to determine the location of enemy electronic emitters.
 Wiretapping enemy landlines to monitor communications.
E-12. The primary targets for EW before, during, and after all KPA military operations include the following
enemy assets:
 Command and control facilities.
 Communications facilities and relay stations.
 Aircraft early-warning radar systems.
 Coastal radar systems.
E-13. The KPA will conduct communications jamming against the following enemy targets—
 Fire control facilities.
 Ground-to-air communications links.
 Aircraft request nets.
E-14. The KPA will conduct barrage jamming against specific enemy targets including the following—
 Fire control nets.
 Ground-to-air control links.
 Aircraft request channels.
E-15. Whether the North Korean unit performing the EW mission is at the division level, above it, or below,
the effects on the enemy ground forces will be the same.
E-4 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Appendix F
Engineer Operations
engineer operations typically supporting a ground maneuver infantry regiment,
brigade, or division formation. This appendix provides a functional overview of
engineer operations, the organizations providing engineer support, capabilities and
limitations, and the employment and integration of engineer operations in combined
arms operations.
FUNCTIONAL OVERVIEW
F-1. Like all military engineer units, the Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (KPAGF) engineers can
conduct missions related to mobility, countermobility, survivability, and reconnaissance. If necessary,
KPAGF engineer units can fight as infantry. Due to the large number of rivers in South Korea, the KPAGF
engineer operations spend a significant amount of time conducting wet-gap crossing training.
ORGANIZATION
F-2. There are organic engineer units within KPA maneuver regiment, division, and corps levels. In
addition, the KPA fields several types of specialized engineer units, including five to eight engineer river
crossing/amphibious regiments and a single engineer river-crossing brigade.
F-3. Each infantry regiment is assigned a combat engineer company composed of three engineer platoons
and a company headquarters. Its primary equipment includes the following:
 Four flamethrowers.
 Three RPG-7s.
 Three RPD machine guns.
 Three mine detectors.
 Thirteen mine probes.
 Five 2 1/2-ton trucks.
Figure F-1 shows a possible combat engineer company.
Figure F-1. KPA combat engineer company (example)
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 F-1

Appendix F
F-4. The engineer company commander normally attaches squad-size elements to infantry battalions to
reduce obstacles during offensive operations. In the defense, the company prepares obstacles, constructs
positions, and can serve as part of the antitank reserve. Priority of effort is on the creation of antitank obstacles
as opposed to firing positions. The engineer company only repairs roads and bridges in its regiment’s rear
area.
F-5. Each infantry division is likely to contain both a general engineer battalion and a combat engineer
company; the latter is the same as for an infantry regiment. The general engineer battalion consists of a
general construction company, an obstacle construction company, a road construction company, and the
battalion headquarters. The engineer battalion will normally operate the following weapons and equipment:
 Ten RPG-7s.
 Six RPD machine guns.
 Twenty-five 2 1/2-ton trucks.
 Two bulldozers.
 Two cranes.
 One welder.
 Twenty-seven mine detectors.
 One decontamination apparatus.
 Two generators.
 One spotlight.
Figure F-2 shows a possible general engineer battalion.
Figure F-2. KPA general engineer battalion (example)
F-6. The general construction company engages in general construction and repair work, to include
fortifications. The obstacle construction company both emplaces and removes obstacles on the battlefield.
The road construction company is concerned primarily with construction and maintenance of lines of
communications. Division engineer assets can perform all the functions of the regimental engineer company
plus construct metal and wooden bridges, provide illumination over a limited area, and set up and manage a
water supply point, as well as constructing military facilities.
F-7. Each corps will likely field a general engineer battalion, a construction battalion, and an engineer river
crossing regiment. The size, equipment, and capabilities for the first two battalions are similar to those
assigned to other levels of command. Most engineer river crossing units are located in the forward corps or
in the western area of the country, as the western corridor is more conducive for offensive operations.

F-8. KPAGF engineer units can conduct the standard mobility, countermobility, and other engineering
missions found in most armies. Engineer divisions field a number of standard engineer units, but may receive
additional support from a higher command for a specialized mission.
F-2 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Engineer Operations
F-9. The KPA fields various types of river-crossing battalions and regiments to conduct wet-gap crossing
operations. Equipment used for conducting these wet-gap operations include 2 1/2-ton trucks, K-61 tracked
amphibious vehicles, LPP light pontoon bridge sections, TPP heavy pontoon bridge sections, PMP or S-type
floating bridges, GSP ferries, and motorboats (Russian BMK-30 or BMK-90). The K-61 can carry 60
personnel or 5,000 kg of supplies or equipment while operating on water, but only 3,000 kg on land. It can
travel at 35 kph on land and 10 kph in the water.
F-10. KPA engineers transport the LPP light pontoon bridge sections by truck and launch them by gravity.
The LPP load capacity comes in three weights: 12 tons, 24 tons, and 40 tons. Single pontoon sections are
used as the floating supports for the 12-ton bridge, while the larger capacity bridges have 2- and 3-section
pontoons as the floating supports. The length of the bridge depends on its load capacity: 160 m for the 12-
ton, 88 m for the 24-ton, and 64 m for the 40-ton. The length of time to emplace the bridge is 60 minutes for
the two lighter bridges and 65 minutes for the heaviest bridge; night emplacement times increase by 50–100
percent. The LPP sections from a single unit can be used to create six ferries; some can carry 12 tons while
others can carry 24 tons.
F-11. The TPP heavy pontoon bridge is similar to the LPP, but with a larger carrying capacity. The TPP has
various weight capacities affect the length of the bridge. The 16-ton bridge spans 163 m, the 50-ton bridge
can cross 135 m, and the 70-ton bridge can cross a 103-m gap. The length of time to emplace the bridge is
60–70 minutes; up to twice as long at night. There have been reports that the TPP has been used to cross
rivers where the water flow was 4 mps, but the highest normal speed for safe operations is usually 2.4 mps.
The TPP sections can be used to construct ferries that can transport 50 or 70 tons of equipment or vehicles.
F-12. The PMP heavy pontoon bridge is often referred to as a ribbon bridge. The PMP comes in two carrying
capacities: 20 tons can span 281 m and 60 tons can cross 119 m. By reducing the 20-ton bridge capacity by
half, the engineers can create a bridge half as wide but double the distance. The construction time for the 20-
ton bridge is 25 minutes, while only 15 minutes is needed for the larger bridge. The bridges can be erected
safely in water slower than 2.7 mps. The PMP engineer unit can also be used to create ferries with capacities
of 40, 60, and 80 tons.
F-13. The GSP heavy amphibious ferry consists of two closed-deck, tracked amphibious vehicles upon which
have been mounted streamlined, closed-deck steel plate pontoons. For cross-country mobility, the pontoon
is folded (top down) over the amphibious carrier. The two-propeller amphibious carrier is powered by an
engine modified to provide greater horsepower. The water depth must be at least 1.2 m and the river banks
cannot be higher than 51 cm. Heavy vehicles, such as tanks, can drive up onto a GSP ferry, then be transported
across water, then drive off without much preparation on the far side of the wet gap. Assembly time is 20
minutes in daylight and 30–40 minutes at night. GSP ferries cannot be joined together to form a bridge. In
certain circumstances, it may be possible for a KPA tank to fire its main gun while crossing the wet gap on
the GSP.
F-14. The KPA normally plans wet-gap crossings at the corps level and higher, but some divisional
operations are also possible. Planning normally takes 1–2 days, but the plans for the first crossings south of
the demilitarized zone may already be prepared. Lead KPA units will conduct forced river crossings quickly
and use whatever materials are at hand. Some of the KPA tanks and armored personnel carriers are
amphibious or possess snorkeling capabilities.
F-15. When the wet gap is 120–180 m wide, KPA engineers will transport the maneuver unit vehicles using
rafts such as the GSP and soldiers using K-61 amphibious vehicles. Pontoon bridges also may be used to
conduct river crossings for wet gaps of the same distance, but these would be used by the second-echelon
and reserve units. When the wet gap is greater than 180 m wide, the engineers would need to install a float
bridge. When the water is above 59 °Fahrenheit, individual KPA soldiers may also cross wet gaps using
domestically made flotation vests, which hold the soldier and personal equipment above the water surface,
or field-expedient rafts made from a raincoat, poncho, or shelter half.
F-16. The KPA crosses a wet gap in four phases. Phase one begins when engineers set up four crossing lanes
for the first-echelon units. Two of the lanes are designated for tanks and amphibious tracked vehicles; the
other two are rafts and ferries for the infantry. During phase two, the first-echelon units cross at one of the
four designated lanes. The third phase begins when the second tactical echelon units begin to cross. By this
time the engineers have had sufficient time to improve the river-crossing site. There are still four lanes, but
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 F-3

Appendix F
the soldiers no longer cross by ferry, but by a foot bridge. The vehicles are now crossing using a plank system
mounted on the ferries. The fourth phase begins after a couple days’ work by the engineers. There are still
two foot bridges for follow-on echelon soldiers to cross, but there is a single heavy and light float bridge
designated for vehicles to use.
F-17. During the mid-1970s, it was estimated that it would take a Soviet Army of four divisions—one tank
division and two motorized divisions in the first echelon and one motorized division in the second echelon—
between 12 and 24 hours to cross a river 400 m wide. This time was based on the assumption the tanks would
use snorkels, while armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles would swim to cross the river.
The difference in estimates is based on how quickly a pontoon bridge was erected and how many ferries were
available. The time for the river-crossing operation did not take into account whether the crossing was
opposed, or any losses in engineer equipment. A Soviet Army is somewhat similar in size to a KPA front-
line corps in strength, but with less heavy equipment. Thus, it is possible a KPAGF army of four divisions
could cross in a faster time.
F-18. Due to fuel shortages, it is likely the KPA seldom practices major wet-gap crossings during training
exercises, so the KPA is most likely not as well-trained as the Soviet Army was in 1976. The KPA will likely
not be able to protect the bridgehead and its river-crossing equipment from aerial attack. It is thus likely that
a KPA corps will take more than 24 hours to conduct a major wet-gap crossing.
F-19. One of the major limitations for engineer operations is the lack of mechanical equipment. Much of the
work conducted by the KPAGF engineers is performed by manual labor due to a lack of equipment from
years of sanctions against the country, the shortage of replacement parts, and the lack of fuel. Because of this,
training conducted by engineer units focuses on tasks that do not require mechanical equipment or the
associated fuel.

F-20. KPAGF engineers concentrate on mobility and countermobility operations that reinforce the combat
power of the KPA maneuver units. KPA engineer missions include, but are not limited to—
 Conducting combat operations in conjunction with other units.
 Emplacing and clearing demolitions and obstacles.
 Employing ferries and bridges in support of wet-gap crossings.
 Constructing and maintaining roads.
 Conducting engineer reconnaissance.
 Constructing tunnels and field fortifications.
 Constructing and maintaining buildings and facilities.
 Providing technical camouflage guidance.
 Providing engineer supplies.
 Maintaining engineer equipment.
 Supplying water to units.
 Preventing or fighting fires.
 Fighting as infantry, if necessary.
 Providing other engineer public services.
F-21. For additional information about the use of engineers in the offense and defense, see chapters 6 and 7,
respectively.
F-4 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Appendix G
CBRN and Obscurant Operations
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) and obscurant operations
typically supporting a ground maneuver infantry regiment, brigade, or division
formation. This appendix provides a functional overview of CBRN and obscurant
operations, the organizations providing CBRN and obscurant support, capabilities and
limitations, and the employment and integration of CBRN and obscurant operations in
combined arms operations.
FUNCTIONAL OVERVIEW
G-1. North Korea is known to have chemical and nuclear weapons and is highly suspected of conducting
research into biological weapons. It is likely the KPA will not hesitate to use chemical weapons in both
offensive and defensive operations. The KPA is expected to use smoke, flame, and incendiary weapons on
the battlefield.
G-2. The KPA trains in both offensive and defensive CBRN warfare. Korean People’s Army Ground Forces
(KPAGF) reconnaissance units, including some specialized in CBRN warfare, are aware of the CBRN threat
and would provide warning for other KPA units. Normally, KPA soldiers are only be issued protective masks
and clothing if a chemical attack was imminent. Hardened artillery sites and other underground facilities are
typically designed to protect KPA soldiers from a chemical attack.
ORGANIZATION
G-3. The KPAGF contain chemical units at each level of command, from regiment to corps, which are
similar in organization. At the national level, there is a Nuclear-Chemical Defense Bureau with battalions
operating directly under it. Some of these national assets may be assigned to support a corps, division, or
regiment. These units provide the KPAGF with both detection and decontamination capabilities. The corps
chemical battalion has three chemical companies, each with two chemical reconnaissance platoons and two
chemical decontamination platoons. The KPA infantry division chemical company has essentially the same
organization. The KPA infantry regiment chemical platoon has two reconnaissance squads and two
decontamination squads.

G-4. KPA capabilities include chemical, biological, nuclear, and smoke and flame weapons. Tables G-1
through G-3 on pages G-2–G-3 provide the CBRN and obscurant capabilities of various KPA weapons
systems. These tables are not all-inclusive.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 G-1

Appendix G
Table G-1. KPA CBRN- and obscurant-capable tanks and armored fighting vehicles
Weapons System Type Capability Options
M-2002/Pokpung-ho/
Main battle tank Smoke grenade launchers
Storm Tiger
Chonma-ho (Pegasus) Main battle tank Smoke grenade launchers
T-54/55 Medium tank Smoke generator; smoke grenade launchers
T-34 Medium tank Smoke generator; smoke grenade launchers
Smoke generator (engine exhaust); smoke grenade

T-62 Medium tank
launchers
Type 59 Medium tank Smoke generator; smoke grenade launchers
Type 62 Light tank Smoke rounds; smoke generator; smoke grenade launchers
Type 63 Light tank Smoke rounds
PT-76 Light tank Smoke generator (engine exhaust)
BMP-1 IFV Smoke generator; smoke grenade launchers
BTR-40 APC Smoke grenade launchers

APC armored personnel carrier IFV infantry fighting vehicle
Table G-2. KPA CBRN- and obscurant-capable guns, howitzers, and mortars
M-1978/Koksan (170-mm) SP gun Chemical rounds; smoke generator (engine exhaust)
M-1989 (170-mm) SP gun Information not available
M-1943/D-1 (152-mm) Towed gun Chemical
M-1977 (152-mm) SP gun Nuclear
M-1954/M-46 (130-mm) Towed gun/howitzer Chemical; smoke
D-74 (122-mm) Towed gun Chemical; smoke
A-19/M-1937 (122-mm) Towed gun Chemical
M-1938 (152-mm) Towed howitzer Chemical
M-1955/D-20 (152-mm) Towed howitzer Chemical; smoke
M-1937 (152-mm) Towed gun/howitzer Chemical
M-1938 (122-mm) Towed howitzer Smoke
D-30 (122-mm) Towed howitzer Chemical; smoke

mm millimeter SP self-propelled
G-2 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Table G-3. KPA CBRN- and obscurant-capable mortars, rocket launchers, and missiles
2S9 Anona (120-mm) SP mortar Smoke
M-1943 (120-mm) Towed mortar Smoke
M-37 (82-mm) Mortar Smoke
KN-09 (300-mm) MRLS Chemical
M-1985/1991 (240-mm) MRLS Chemical; smoke
M-1991 (240-mm) MRLS Chemical
M-1985 (122-mm) MRLS Chemical; smoke
BM-21/Grad /RM-70 (122-mm) MRLS Chemical; smoke
BMD-20/Storm-1 (200-mm) MRLS Chemical
BM-24/Katyusha (240-mm) MRLS Chemical
FROG-3 SP SSM Nuclear
FROG-5 SP SSM Chemical
FROG-7 SP SSM Chemical; nuclear
Scud-B/CSS-1B/C SP SSM Chemical; biological; nuclear
Nodong 1/2/Scud-D/E SP SSM Chemical; biological; nuclear
KN-08 SP SSM Nuclear
Musudan SP SSM Nuclear
KN-01 Antiship missile Nuclear

mm millimeter MRLS multiple rocket launcher system
SP self-propelled SSM surface-to-surface missile
CHEMICAL WEAPONS
G-5. North Korea may possess the largest stockpile of chemical weapons in the world, with 2,500–5,000
tons. North Korea has produced and stored mustard, hydrogen cyanide, phosgene, and chloropicrin gases, as
well as blood and nerve agents. The KPA possesses artillery, multiple rocket launchers, mortars, aerial
bombs, and missiles capable of distributing chemical weapons.
G-6. KPAGF chemical detection units operate from vehicles equipped with warning flag emplacers,
allowing the chemical reconnaissance teams to mark contaminated areas without leaving their vehicles. These
emplacement systems can be mounted on various vehicles including the BRDM-RKh, BRDM-2-RKh, UAZ-
69-RKh; or the Hungarian-made D-442 FUG.
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
G-7. Reports indicate it is likely that North Korea began biological weapons research in the 1960s. Possible
agents include anthrax, cholera, yellow fever, smallpox, typhus, and typhoid fever. Only 1 kg of anthrax
could kill up to 50,000 people in Seoul. The KPAGF uses Russian detection devices to determine if biological
warfare is being used.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 G-3

Appendix G
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
G-8. It is estimated that North Korea possesses at least 20 nuclear warheads; some reports state the country
could obtain as many as 100 by 2020. If exposed to nuclear fallout, KPA doctrine is to continue the mission
based on the amount of exposure. The KPA uses the roentgen as the standard unit of measurement for
radiation. The absorbed dose of 1 roentgen equals approximately 0.877 centigray in soft tissue. Table G-4
shows the U.S. Army’s guide for radiation exposure.
Table G-4. U.S. Army radiation exposure guide
Radiation Exposure Total Past Cumulative Additional Dose During

Status Category Dose Operation
Negligible risk: ≤50 cGy
RES-0 No exposure Moderate risk: ≤70 cGy
Emergency risk: ≤150 cGy
Negligible risk: ≤10 cGy
RES-1 ≤ 70 cGy Moderate risk: ≤30 cGy
Negligible risk: any
RES-2 > 70 and ≤ 150 cGy Moderate risk: any
Negligible risk: any
RES-3 > 150 cGy Moderate risk: any
Emergency risk: any

cGy centigray RES radiation exposure status
G-9. The dosage allowed by both militaries is about the same, with the major difference being that KPA
soldiers can return to the contaminated area after an evacuation period of 20 days. The KPA considers the
following to be allowable dosages for its soldiers—
 50 roentgens in 1 day = one-time allowable dose and then the soldier will be evacuated from the
affected area.
 10 roentgens per day = repeatable allowable dose. After 100 roentgens in 10 days, no more than
15–20 roentgens on any given day, the soldier will be evacuated from the affected area and not be
allowed back into a contaminated area for 20 days.
 1 roentgen per day = normal exposure, not to exceed 10 roentgens for the day.
SMOKE AND FLAME WEAPONS

G-10. The KPAGF may employ smoke for tactical missions, such as wet-gap crossings or tank operations.
The KPAGF will also use smoke to mislead observations, disrupt direct enemy fire, protect tanks from
antitank weapons, and cover withdrawals. The use of smoke requires a detailed plan and knowledge of terrain
and weather, since physical conditions can heavily influence the smoke’s effectiveness in combat.
G-11. The primary methods used by the KPAGF to produce smoke are canisters and tanks. Some KPA tanks
may be equipped with BDSh-5 smoke canisters operated by the tank’s driver, which can cover between 4,000
and 5,000 square meters. KPAGF tanks may also make smoke by running fuel over the exhaust system; as
the heat burns the fuel, it produces thick smoke. Table G-5 provides addition information on types of smoke
and their usage.
G-4 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Table G-5. KPAGF smoke classifications
Classification Type Usage
Camouflage Conceal a unit from the enemy
Tactical Deceptive Confuse the enemy on the unit’s actual mission

missions
Blocking Obstruct enemy observation & prevent calls for fire
Aerial Prevent aerial observation & target acquisition
Frontal smoke screen Screen the forward area of a unit
Directional Flank smoke screen Screen the side(s) of a unit
Rear smoke screen Screen the rear of a unit
Frontline maneuver Conceal a unit’s movement before or during combat

smoke operations
Operational Along a floating phase Provide concealment in a fixed area (must be planned in
techniques line advance)
Entire frontal smoke

Provide concealment smoke for an entire fixed area
screen
G-12. Some KPAGF units possess flame weapons that are highly effective in urban or subterranean warfare,
especially if on the offensive. The primary KPA flamethrower is the ROKS-3, which weighs 26 kg when
filled to its 4-gallon capacity of fuel. Its firing range is 15–35 m, depending on the thickness of the fuel. The
KPAGF flamethrower operator normally fires the weapon in 5- to 6-second bursts. Ten igniters set fire to the
fuel; after the 10th use, they must be replaced with new igniters.
LIMITATIONS
G-13. The major limitation for the KPA is the accuracy of its missile systems. Most North Korean missile
systems are not as accurate as those of its enemies. The target must be large enough that accuracy is not
necessary for the success of the mission. Nuclear and chemical weapons, however, do not have to be accurate
to be effective. The panic to the civilian population and the aftereffects of a KPA CBRN attack could cause
significant issues for the enemy, who would need to continue to fight while mitigating the attack’s effects.
G-14. Another limitation is the effectiveness of biological weapons and the near impossibility for North
Korea to limit their effects to the enemy. The release of a biological weapon through mosquitoes, spray, or
other means could have as much effect on exposed KPA soldiers as on enemy soldiers.

G-15. If a KPAGF unit is given a CBRN warning during an assault, the soldiers will don their protective
masks and continue the attack. They are told to move in short rushes, using protective mats or their capes to
fall on. The KPAGF will likely increase the intensity of the attack, as the soldiers are taught the enemy would
be even more vulnerable at this time. Once the attack is over, the KPAGF units will continue the mission. If
a unit cannot continue its mission, a reserve unit will take over the mission and continue the attack.
G-16. If on the march and a CBRN warning is given, KPAGF soldiers will don their masks, protective capes,
and uniforms; close all windows in vehicles; and block other gaps. KPA military personnel will cover all
weapons and equipment with tarps or field-expedient coverings to protect them from chemical contamination
or nuclear fallout. Units will move through the affected area as rapid as possible in vehicles or on foot. KPA
personnel are told not to eat, drink, or smoke in the contaminated area. They are also taught not to
unnecessarily sit on, lie on, pick up, or touch anything in any contaminated zone. If digging must be done,
the KPAGF soldiers are taught not to use the contaminated topsoil as part of their fighting positions.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 G-5

Appendix G
G-17. In the defense, KPA personnel are told to take cover in tunnels and other underground fortifications if
there is a CBRN warning or attack. If caught in the open, they are trained to lie prone, facing away from the
nuclear blast, for 3 seconds while covering their heads. If not already on, KPA members will don their masks
and put on any protective clothing issued to them.
G-18. While the KPA does possess some individual protective equipment for its soldiers, there is not enough
for all the active and reserve soldiers. When the specialized equipment is not available, the KPA personnel
will rely on towels, handkerchiefs, cotton, or gauze soaked in water to protect their respiratory tract system;
straw or mats to prevent contamination from the ground; and bags, heavy paper, or leggings to protect the
individual’s shoes and feet. North Korean does domestically produce some of its CBRN equipment.
G-19. If a KPA unit is exposed to a chemical or biological attack, the unit will only go through
decontamination once its current mission is over or when there is a lull in the fighting. The KPAGF will set
up cleansing stations in rear areas to decontaminate personnel and equipment. These stations include
substations for personnel, animals, clothing, vehicles, weapons, and technical equipment.
G-20. Decontamination equipment includes showers, barrels of uncontaminated hot water, soap, scrub
brushes, clean clothes, clean cloth for cleaning weapons, and special equipment, including brushes, for
animals and equipment. North Korea produces some of this equipment, while obtaining other equipment
from overseas.
G-21. Decontamination for the KPA consists primarily of washing the equipment with uncontaminated water,
using brushes and soapy cloths. Before the washing, large equipment and weapons will be swept with brooms
or improvised implements of straw, grass, twigs, or rope. In the absence of decontamination equipment, KPA
personnel will conduct a hasty local decontamination. The affected personnel will shake, dust, or scratch with
grass, twigs, or other improvised methods in order to continue the unit’s mission without delay.
G-6 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Appendix H
Logistics Operations
This appendix provides a doctrinal overview of the Korean People’s Army Ground
Forces (KPAGF) logistics operations typically supporting a ground maneuver infantry
regiment, brigade, or division formation. This appendix provides a functional overview
of logistics operations, the organizations providing logistics support, capabilities and
limitations, and the employment and integration of logistics in combined arms
operations.
FUNCTIONAL OVERVIEW
H-1. The KPAGF function with less logistical support than most other modern armies. The KPAGF
emphasizes combat units over rear service units. They places great pressure on commanders to complete their
missions with limited logistics resources. The emphasis is on commanders using any available resources,
including civilian or enemy, to support the completion of missions as directed by the chain of command. Due
to the shortage of supplies, KPAGF commanders use salvaged items to repair less-damaged equipment and
captured enemy or confiscated civilian supplies to support their units.
ORGANIZATION
H-2. The General Rear Service Bureau provides most of the logistic and administrative support to its
respective units at the regiment, division, and corps levels of command. The Rear Service Department (RSD)
at the regimental level is responsible for food, POL, clothing, finance, transportation, and a medical station.
See figure H-1 for a possible regimental RSD. Division RSD elements include a staff section, supply depot,
vehicle repair station, a supply and service section, a transportation company, and a division hospital. See
figure H-2 on page H-2 for a typical division RSD. The corps RSD includes a headquarters, a general hospital,
a field hospital, two transportation battalions, and a vehicle repair factory. See figure H-3 on page H-2 for an
example of a corps RSD. RSDs at each echelon include unit mess halls, barbers, and military stores similar
to other military’s exchange facilities.
Figure H-1. Regimental Rear Service Department (example)
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 H-1

Appendix H
Figure H-2. Division Rear Service Department (example)
Figure H-3. Corps Rear Service Department (example)
H-3. Battalions and companies may receive support from mobile military stores sent out by the division
RSD. Each RSD maintains warehouses for food, POL, and clothing. The RSD is not responsible for all supply
functions. The Artillery Department issues and maintains all artillery weapons and ammunition. The
chemical, engineer, and signal sections at each staff level probably handle supplies unique to their services.
The Political Department supplies musical instruments and reading material.

H-4. Korean People’s Army (KPA) personnel are taught from their initial entry into the military to operate
under severe logistical restraints. The KPAGF teach their soldiers to improvise and overcome, often without
any technical solution. The soldiers go through a severe physical fitness training regimen, so they are
mentally and physically conditioned to travel faster and cover more ground with a heavy equipment load
while eating far less than the soldiers of other armies. During the Korean War, soldiers fighting for North
Korea survived on three rice balls of food per day—smaller than one’s fist. Even with these scant rations,
KPAGF soldiers may be able to cover up to 40 km in daylight or 29 km at night in only 6 hours, while
marching for 2–3 weeks straight. This inurement to deprivation during training allows the KPA to provide
less support to its fighting soldiers than other armies, and thus reduce the logistical burden on the strained
North Korean economy and supply system.
H-5. The KPA will make use of any equipment found on the battlefield, including that of the enemy. During
the Korean War, the U.S. was the second-largest supplier of weapons, ammunition, and equipment—from
H-2 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

captured materiel—to the Soviet Union for the North Korean military forces. The KPA would likely use a
similar strategy during another war on the peninsula.
H-6. One of the primary weaknesses of the KPA is the limited logistics capability of both the KPA and the
North Korean economy when compared to other militaries. KPA units, in general, possess limited
organizational transportation, forcing most units to travel on foot. Existing north-south main roads and
railways are capable of supporting large-scale combat operations, but rugged terrain restricts lateral
movement. The KPA would be dependent on external assistance for ammunition, fuel, armored vehicles, and
artillery after initial supplies were used up, or would need to resort to using captured enemy equipment. In
addition, North Korean soldiers are only allowed to carry 18 kg in total—including weapons and water—and
are issued rations every three days, thus limiting the amount of supplies available at any given time.

H-7. The KPA company first sergeant submits all supply requests to the battalion staff. Some items may be
issued on a push system, including clothing, ammunition, and fuel. The pull requests go to the appropriate
staff unit at each higher echelon for approval. If approved, the equipment is issued.
H-8. The KPA has stockpiled food, ammunition, fuel, and other supplies in the event of a war. These
warehouses are primarily underground to prevent both observation and destruction by enemies. It is estimated
that the KPA has approximately 2 months of supplies on hand once hostilities begin.
CLASS I (SUBSISTENCE)
H-9. KPA soldiers primarily survive on a diet high in vegetables, including potatoes, cabbage, spinach,
turnips, onions, cucumbers, radishes, and leeks. Fresh vegetables are provided in the summer months, while
preserved or pickled vegetables are served in the winter months. All KPA battalion and higher units must
operate a special service support unit. These units operate gardens, farms, fish farms, or livestock ranches
controlled by the units themselves, whose purpose is to provide much of their own food requirements. Some
of the larger units engage in other businesses to earn foreign currency. Military personnel may receive other
food through service channels, including rice, fish, grain, or flour. The standard daily ration is 2.3 kg of food
per soldier or 23 tons per division. Soldiers conducting long-range patrols may receive dehydrated food.
H-10. Effect on combat: Units in combat will no longer be able to operate agricultural activities at their
peacetime level. KPA supply units will look for other ways to feed the army, such as raiding South Korean
farms and gardens or capturing enemy food supplies, as they move south in an offensive operation.
CLASS II (CLOTHING, INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT, KITS, AND HAND TOOLS)

H-11. Each KPA soldier receives two uniform issues per year: summer clothing in April and winter clothes
in October. The soldier turns in two old uniforms and receives two that are appropriate for the upcoming
season. One of the uniforms will be brand new, which is used during off-duty hours and for indoor training.
The second uniform will have been worn by another soldier the previous season and mended to meet a certain
standard, and is used for outdoor training and work details. The soldier is also authorized to receive two new
sets of underwear and two new pairs of socks during each semiannual issue period. The latter is in short
supply so many KPA soldiers wear socks with holes, socks darned too many times, or go sockless. Some
reports suggest a general shortage of winter clothing. Other equipment and uniform items are replaced when
needed, as determined by the unit’s first sergeant. Soldiers must pay for any lost items, which is often difficult
on their limited pay.
H-12. KPA soldiers are expected to do much of the maintenance on their own uniforms and gear. Unit officers
and sergeants carefully watch to make sure all immediate subordinate personnel are taking care of their gear
properly to extend their use. Prior to the semiannual clothing exchange, KPA soldiers often spend 2–3 days
fixing their equipment, including the sewing and repair of the uniforms being placed back into the supply
channels. The company first sergeant determines what parts of a soldier’s clothing is serviceable and what
items need replacement.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 H-3

Appendix H
H-13. Effect on combat: The average KPA soldier should not expect to receive replacement for combat losses
on clothing, individual equipment, kits, or hand tools. The KPA will use captured materiel, including enemy
uniforms, for use by their soldiers.
CLASS III (PETROLEUM, OILS, AND LUBRICANTS)

H-14. North Korea is almost completely dependent on external sources for POL products. Recent economic
sanctions have made this even more difficult. North Korea has one coal liquefaction plant that, when fully
operational, can produce 143,000 tons of POL substitutes annually. While North Korea’s first oil refinery
was completed in 1974, with the capacity of 2.2 million tons annually, reports indicate it may no longer be
operational. Fuel is issued through the logistical channels and only small amounts are kept in the tactical
units. Anthracite coal is issued through the supply channels for heating and cooking. It is estimated that the
KPA maintains a 2- to 3-month supply of fuel on hand in case of war.
H-15. Effect on combat: Units needing fuel or fuel-related products will look for alternative means, such as
stealing from South Korean civilian sources or using POL products captured from the enemy.
CLASS IV (ENGINEER)
H-16. KPA engineer units are responsible for providing engineer equipment for not only their units, but
barrier material for infantry units as well.
H-17. Effect on combat: Once the 2–3 months’ of engineer supplies run out, engineer units will resort to
field-expedient methods to continue their mission. North Koreans are resourceful due to a lifetime of poverty.
They will use civilian supplies or captured enemy equipment to complete their mission requirements.
CLASS V (AMMUNITION)
H-18. Reports indicate it is likely that the KPA maintains a 3-month supply of ammunition. A KPAGF
division would use an estimated average of 79 tons of ammunition daily. For short durations, this requirement
would vary: 53 tons in light combat, 155 in moderate combat, and 332 in heavy combat. The ammunition is
distributed through the Artillery Department at each KPA echelon of command. Many KPA weapons are
designed to allow the firing of captured enemy ammunition, but the reverse is not true. One example is the
KPAGF 82-mm mortar that could fire captured 81-mm ammunition, but 82-mm ammunition cannot be fired
from the smaller 81-mm mortar.
H-19. Effect on combat: After the North Korean stockpile of ammunition is exhausted, the government will
continue to produce what it can from its domestic factories. Other sources for ammunition could include
support from foreign countries or capture of enemy ammunition depots.
CLASS VI (PERSONAL DEMAND ITEMS)

H-20. The KPA will only possess the most limited resources to provide personal items to its service members.
This will likely be the lowest priority for the KPA logistics system, as the KPA personnel are trained to
survive with few comfort items.
H-21. Effect on combat: The average KPA soldier has been deprived of most comfort items for his or her
entire military career. This dearth of personal items will continue.
CLASS VII (MAJOR END ITEMS)

H-22. It is unlikely that a KPAGF unit would receive replacement vehicles and equipment on a regular basis.
The KPA does not normally remove a unit from the battlefield because it becomes combat-ineffective. If a
unit is no longer able to perform its mission, another unit will receive the assignment to complete it. The
remnants of several combat-ineffective units may be amalgamated to form a single unit. Class VII items will
likely be issued to units not already engaged in combat.
H-4 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

H-23. Effect on combat: During offensive operations, it is likely that the KPA will use civilian vehicles and
any captured major weapons, such as tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, or armored personnel carriers, to serve
as replacements for lost vehicles.
CLASS VIII (MEDICAL)

H-24. Most major medical items are maintained at the corps level. Some may be found at the division-level
medical facilities, but only basic medical items are found at the regimental level and below. The company
level will have the most basic supplies, such as bandages, aspirin, iodine, and other first-aid items. Battalion
aid stations may stock sulfadiazine, camphor, morphine, and splints. The regimental medical station would
also contain penicillin, tetanus antitoxin, and sulfa drugs. Due to the international sanctions against North
Korea, it is likely that many medical supplies are lacking throughout the KPA.
H-25. KPA medical care begins at the company level, with an enlisted sanitation director (medic) who
administers first aid, supervises hygiene, and escorts patients to the battalion aid station. There is a doctor at
the battalion aid station capable of treating minor ailments, with beds available for short-duration stays.
Anyone needing more time would be transported to another medical facility. The doctors in the regimental
medical section can perform emergency surgeries and treat most common disorders. Doctors at the division
can conduct major surgeries if the supplies are available. Corps hospitals are large facilities with 600 beds.
During war, it is expected that additional medical units would be formed.
H-26. Effect on combat: The KPA will attempt to provide medical care for its soldiers, but healthcare
shortages throughout the country means medical treatment will likely be inadequate to maintain soldier
health. Captured medical supplies will probably be of better quality than what the country’s doctors use now.
CLASS IX (REPAIR PARTS)

H-27. The KPA is severely lacking in maintenance capabilities beyond the operator level. There are small-
arms repair stations at the regimental level, supported by the Artillery Department, to do minor repairs and
replacement of parts. Armor regiments have a maintenance company to maintain their vehicles. Due to the
age of much of the KPA equipment and the hesitation to discard any old equipment, there is a great strain on
the maintenance system. International sanctions also exacerbate the issue of lack of replacement parts.
H-28. Effect on combat: The KPA will use whatever means are necessary to keep its vehicles operational,
even if this includes cannibalizing multiple disabled vehicles—removing components from them to facilitate
the repair of other equipment—to make only one vehicle operational. The KPA will also use captured civilian
and military vehicles to provide repair parts if the equipment is compatible.
RAIL TRANSPORTATION
H-29. Much of the freight movement in North Korea was previously by rail, but no longer. There are various
gauges of track, but the nonstandard gauge was undergoing a conversion to standard gauge before the
country’s economic woes began in the 1990s. Freight traffic has dropped due to the closure of many factories
and the international sanctions placed on the country for its nuclear activities. Passenger rail transportation
is also on the decline, as 4-hour trips can now take days. About 22% of the rail is electrified, and if the
electricity is not operational, the trains cannot move. Trains rarely show up on time and they are overcrowded
when they do, so holding a ticket does not guarantee a seat.
H-30. There have been discussions between North and South Korea to connect their railroads through the
demilitarized zone (DMZ) to improve trade between the two countries. So far, only rudimentary surveys have
been done on the North Korean railroad system as part of this project.
H-31. There are two major north-south and two east-west routes. On the east coast, one north-south line runs
from Namyang/Tumen to Wonsan. On the west coast, the second north-south rail line runs from Sinuiju to
Kaesong. The east-west lines are Route R4 from Pyongyang to Kowon and Route R6 from Manpo to
Sunchou.
H-32. Effect on combat: Currently there is no operational railroad connecting North and South Korea. In
2018, a South Korean train did cross the border into North Korea to conduct a survey of the North Korean
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 H-5

Appendix H
railroad network. Currently, any equipment arriving by rail would end its journey in the North Korean part
of the DMZ, as it would be likely that the South Korean railroad connection would be destroyed in the event
of hostilities between the two countries. North and South Korea are currently in discussions about
rehabilitating the North Korean railroad system, including the construction of a connection over the DMZ.
Once completed, the railroad would become more important for the KPA in its logistical operations if the
route was not severed upon the onset of hostilities.
ROAD TRANSPORTATION
H-33. North Korea’s major network follows the main train lines and is inadequate for military transportation
due to a lack of maintenance, a shortage of vehicles, and the dearth of fuel. The KPA solution to this problem,
prevalent during the Korean War, is to make intense use of manpower. The KPA will not hesitate to draft
older men and women of all ages to serve as porters during a time of war. While each porter can only carry
a light load, the North Korean people are often in excellent physical condition. It is not unknown for family
members in Pyongyang to walk 2 hours or more to a garden outside the city to tend it and still work the
required 8-hour shift at their place of employment. During the famine of the 1990s, some entrepreneurs would
walk 25 km in a day (round trip) to sell their goods in order to survive.
H-34. The KPA will most likely transport its supplies during the night to avoid detection and destruction
from aerial attacks. There are three main routes in North Korea. One on the east coast connects the country
to Russia. The one on the west coast connects North Korea to China. A third major route runs down the center
of the country through the capital city of Pyongyang. Lateral east-west routes are few, but have been
somewhat improved over the last 2 decades.
H-35. Effect on combat: It is unlikely that North Korea will use the roads except in periods of limited
visibility or at night, due to the lucrative target the vehicle convoy would make for enemy aerial assets. The
KPA would likely use the roads at night to move supplies and equipment from the north to the south.
AIR TRANSPORTATION
H-36. The Korean People’s Army Air Force possesses cargo rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft. When
operational, the aircraft could provide logistical support to the KPA, including the transportation of special
operations forces (SOF) personnel into South Korea.
H-37. Effect on combat: It is unlikely that North Korea would use its limited air transportation resources for
general resupply purposes. They may be used to resupply SOF deep in the enemy’s rear area, but the Korean
People’s Army Air Force has more pressing needs than resupplying the KPAGF.
WATER TRANSPORTATION
H-38. Most imports into North Korea used to come by rail or road from China or Russia, meaning the harbors
received little attention to improve their infrastructure. There are some port facilities in coastal cities. The
Korean People’s Army Navy can use the ports to conduct military missions. The most likely use of the ports
would be as a staging facility to clandestinely transport KPA SOF into South Korea for waterborne entries.
H-39. Effect on combat: The Korean People’s Army Navy has many boats and a few ships. These could be
used to resupply soldiers along both coasts if they remained operational. Some of the small boats are fast
enough to avoid the enemy, but would only be able to provide limited capacity.
SALVAGE
H-40. Salvage is an important part of the KPA logistical system. Due to the lack of access—somewhat caused
by international sanctions—and lack of funds, the KPA uses almost everything until it is completely worn
out. When a piece of equipment is no longer operational, any serviceable parts are salvaged and used on other
equipment. During combat operations, KPA units will obtain necessary supplies from the civilian populace
by compulsory laws or coercion, if necessary. The transportation of disabled and captured enemy weapons,
equipment, and supplies to the KPAGF rear is the responsibility of all KPA unit commanders. In practice,
the commander delegates this task to the appropriate staff member responsible for that type of equipment. If
H-6 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

the vehicle or piece of equipment cannot be repaired at one level, it is sent to the next level. If it cannot be
repaired at all, it is sent to the General Rear Service Bureau to be scrapped.
H-41. The KPA continues to stress combat units over the noncombat units throughout its forces. While the
KPA can operate on lower logistical requirements than other modern armies, it still must obtain food, fuel,
and ammunition to continue to operate. The KPA will use captured equipment and supplies from not only its
enemy, but from South Korean civilian sources.
H-42. Effect on combat: With the KPA using captured and civilian equipment, enemy identification becomes
even more difficult. This possible confusion could help the KPA surprise its enemy by fighting from a
captured vehicle, or an enemy unit may initiate a friendly fire incident by accidently shooting at a vehicle it
thought was the opponent.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 H-7

Appendix I
Special Operations Forces Operations
special operations forces (SOF) operations typically supporting a ground operation.
This appendix provides a functional overview of SOF operations, the organizations
providing logistics support, capabilities and limitations, and the employment and
integration of SOF in combined arms operations.
FUNCTIONAL OVERVIEW
I-1. The SOF are the best-trained soldiers in the KPA. While some KPA SOF units are similar to the SOF
in other militaries, the SOF designation indicates that these soldiers receive additional training beyond the
basic training given to regular soldiers. The KPA SOF include reconnaissance units, light infantry units,
sniper brigades, and airborne units. The SOF spend their time training while other military units often spend
time planting and harvesting crops, working on logging operations, or involved in other nonmilitary
construction projects.
I-2. The most recent estimates for the KPA SOF are between 180,000 and 200,000 soldiers, sailors, and
airmen. The most recent surge in KPA SOF strength estimates resulted from the conversion of seven infantry
or mechanized infantry divisions into light divisions, presumably tailored to replicate tactics the KPA deemed
successful based on observations of insurgents fighting conventional coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.
I-3. The KPA SOF include ground, air, and maritime SOF units. In wartime or in transition to war, the
KPA will maintain some SOF units under the command and control (C2) of their respective service
headquarters or political bureau. Some SOF units are under bureau or service C2 in peacetime, but can also
be provided to operational- or tactical-level commands during task organization to perform designated
missions or mission support.
ORGANIZATION
I-4. There are two primary organizations responsible for training and executing missions assigned to the
KPA SOF—the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) and the Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau.
Table I-1 on page I-2 reflects the North Korean SOF units and their estimated strengths.
RECONNAISSANCE BATTALIONS
I-5. The RGB fields eight reconnaissance battalions to conduct strategic or operational missions in support
of the overall KPA mission. The RGB may field another battalion tailored to clandestine operations in other
countries. This type of specially designed unit may attempt to attack enemy military targets in other countries
besides South Korea in the region. Each of the four forward-deployed Korean People’s Army Ground Forces
(KPAGF) corps arrayed along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) receives an additional reconnaissance battalion
from this group of eight, in addition to its organic reconnaissance assets and any assets allocated from the
reconnaissance brigades. Each of these 500-man battalions will likely serve as the lead element as a KPAGF
corps crosses the DMZ into South Korea. These units’ missions will be to gather intelligence, attack strategic
targets, and assassinate military and political leaders. Other missions could include sniper shootings to create
panic among the civilian populace, attacks against C2 centers, and assessing the reactions of the civilian
population to the war.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 I-1

Appendix I
Table I-1. KPA special operations forces units
Soldiers
Unit Type Level Command Number of Units
(Estimated)
Reconnaissance Operational or Reconnaissance

8 4,000
battalions strategic General Bureau
Reconnaissance Tactical or Forward Deployed

3 (17 Battalions) 4,500
brigades operational Corps
Light Infantry
Light infantry Tactical or
Training Guidance 12 49,600
brigades operational
Bureau (LITGB)
LITGB (Attached to
Light infantry Tactical or
forward deployed 3 15,600
brigades operational
corps)
Operational or
Sniper brigades LITGB 3 16,800
strategic
7 (includes 3 brigades,
Operational or
Airborne units LITGB 2 sniper brigades, and 30,000
strategic
1 battalion)
Navy sniper Korean People’s

Operational 2 (1 on each coast) 9,000
brigades Army Navy
Amphibious
brigades (naval Strategic LITGB 3 (13 battalions) 5,000
infantry)
Light infantry
Tactical LITGB 7 50,000–60,000
divisions
Strategic Force;
Artillery Bureau,
Deep artillery
Operational or 518 Artillery Division; Information not
reconnaissance 11
strategic Army Corps available
battalions
(mechanized
divisions)
Total 184,500+
RECONNAISSANCE BRIGADES
I-6. The KPA fields three brigades comprised of 17 reconnaissance battalions, all distributed among the
KPA’s forward-deployed corps and mechanized divisions. Often a traditional relationship exists between the
reconnaissance battalion and the unit it supports, with a view toward engendering an improved quality of
performance. The operational SOF units will likely rely on ground infiltration along predesignated routes,
since strategic SOF units will receive a higher priority for air support. Some of the infiltration could be
through preconstructed tunnels under the DMZ, with the final few yards needing to be dug to reach an egress
point. SOF personnel who use this manner of infiltration may wear South Korean military uniforms or civilian
attire to help avoid undesired contact with enemy forces until it is too late. It is believed that most of the
reconnaissance brigades’ soldiers can speak English, and some subordinate units are comprised exclusively
of females. The reconnaissance battalions from the brigades will attempt to determine enemy disposition and
intentions, and serve as indirect fire observers. Battalions from the reconnaissance brigades will be ordered
to attack high-value targets such as airfields; naval bases; port facilities; petroleum, oils, and lubricants
storage facilities; or missile sites.
I-2 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

I-7. A 10-person squad-size unit is the essential building block of all reconnaissance units, but the KPAGF
does not hesitate to use even smaller elements if the mission requires it. An individual soldier may be part of
a cell with a narrow functional focus, such as clearing and scouting, raiding, destruction, capture, security,
or interdiction. See chapter 5 for additional information on reconnaissance missions.
LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADES

I-8. The KPA fields 12 light infantry brigades, which fall under the control of the Light Infantry Training
Guidance Bureau or RGB during peacetime, but would shift to other commands prior to initiating combat
operations. Three of the brigades are attached to the forward-deployed conventional KPA corps during
peacetime, but the remaining eight brigades would most likely be similarly distributed among the four
conventional KPAGF corps for combat operations. KPA soldiers assigned to a light infantry brigade must
have previously served 4–7 years in the military and be considered politically reliable. These requirements
probably stem from the likelihood that these units will operate 30–50 km from the forward edge of the battle
area and away from other KPA units. Missions typically assigned to these light infantry brigades include:
 Infiltrating to seize or destroy missile sites, C2 cells, and chemical or nuclear facilities.
 Infiltrating to disrupt or destroy high-value targets such as airfields or petroleum, oils, and
lubricants facilities.
 Infiltrating around enemy maneuver units to conduct encirclements or flanking attacks in support
of KPAGF ground units.
 Infiltrating, seizing, interdicting, or taking control of major lines of communications to prevent
the arrival of supplies or reinforcements to frontline enemy units.
 Infiltrating to seize key terrain or facilities such as dams, power plants, or enemy supply and
logistics hubs.
 Providing long-range reconnaissance support to KPAGF corps and divisions.
 Serving as a rear guard during withdrawal operations, harassing the enemy or destroying bridges,
tunnels, or other infrastructure that is facilitating the enemy’s advance.
I-9. Light infantry brigades will most likely disperse to operate independently, employing tailored
formations ranging from platoon- to battalion-size during combat operations. These SOF soldiers will likely
wear civilian clothing or enemy uniforms in an attempt to disguise their true identity. Soldiers from these
units will likely cross the DMZ in small groups during hours of limited visibility, then reassemble at a
designated rally point. Some brigade members may infiltrate through the DMZ via the previously mentioned
tunnels or enter South Korea by using small landing craft or miniature submarines along the coasts. Although
KPA light infantry brigades normally operate in platoon-size or larger units, smaller units containing as few
as three to five soldiers can deploy to harass enemy forces and generally create chaos in the enemy’s rear
area.
KPAGF SNIPER BRIGADES

I-10. While the light infantry brigades operate at platoon or higher levels, the three sniper brigades assigned
to the KPAGF will most likely operate in five-man teams to 10-man squads. While the term “sniper” aptly
describes one of their purposes, missions assigned to these units are usually broadened. Leaving larger
objectives to the light infantry brigades, sniper brigade teams will attack smaller C2 posts, isolated
communications relay sites, logistical bases, and other vulnerable high-value targets. If given the opportunity,
the sniper units will assassinate key political or military leaders. There are four additional sniper brigades,
with two each assigned to the Korean People’s Army Air Force and the Korean People’s Army Navy
(KPAN).
AIRBORNE UNITS
I-11. North Korea fields at least seven airborne units, ranging from battalion- to brigade-size units, and the
KPA regards them all as SOF. Two such units are the airborne sniper brigades who, once inserted into an
enemy’s rear area, would conduct missions similar to those assigned to the aforementioned regular sniper
brigades. Additional missions assigned to the airborne sniper units would include destruction or
neutralization of enemy airbases, C2 and communications nodes, and intelligence and surveillance assets, as
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 I-3

Appendix I
well as reconnaissance units. The airborne sniper brigades receive priority access to aviation assets in
anticipation of a requirement for airborne insertion in support of combat operations. Each of the three regular
airborne brigades contains about 3,500 soldiers, with two battalions in each brigade. Due to aircraft shortages,
most missions will entail air drops of battalion size or smaller.
NAVY SNIPER BRIGADES

I-12. The two navy sniper brigades, one stationed on each coast, possess about 3,000 combat troops apiece.
These units have been placed under the operational control of the KPAN in order to enable amphibious
operations. Construction of hovercraft bases for the brigades was previously observed at Sasulpo on the west
coast and Tapchonri on the east coast, but these areas were later repurposed. The new west-coast hovercraft
base will most likely be located at Yongbong-ni, and it is unknown where the east-coast hovercrafts will be
based. The navy sniper brigades’ missions are similar to those of the KPAGF brigades, but the navy snipers
will most likely land on the South Korean coastline. North Korea fields numerous types of landing craft, and
it is estimated the KPA could deliver 5,000 to 7,000 personnel in one lift targeting both coastlines. Navy
sniper brigade team missions would include:
 Supporting a KPA ground offensive by securing river-crossing sites.
 Conducting amphibious raids to destroy critical coastal targets in the enemy’s rear area.
 Harassing enemy rear area logistical operations.
 Attacking or destroying the enemy’s combat service support units.
 Attempting to delay the movement of enemy reinforcements forward to the main combat area.
 Attacking or destroying enemy airbases or naval facilities.
 Occupying or raiding critical coastal islands.
 Attacking enemy C2 and communications nodes.
I-13. Should hostilities erupt on the peninsula, a standing mission for KPAN sniper units is the capture of
the five northernmost South Korean islands along the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea, called the West
Sea by South Korea. Each of the navy sniper brigades may possibly contains a “manned torpedo” battalion
for use against ships, a technique successfully used by Italian naval forces in December 1941 to sink two
British battleships anchored in the harbor at Alexandria, Egypt.
AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADES
I-14. The KPAN fields three amphibious light infantry brigades, totaling 13 battalions. The primary
differences from regular light infantry brigades are that these units routinely operate using naval landing craft
and continuously practice amphibious landings on various types of beaches. One defecting navy sniper in
2011 boasted he traveled more than 32,000 km by sea on floating tubes during his training. These units train
on a variety of landing craft, from the 350-ton Hantae-class utility landing craft, to hovercraft that can travel
at 80 kph, to rubber rafts launched from larger ships for the purpose of infiltrating along the coast. The
amphibious light infantry brigades can also use mini submarines or semisubmersible boats. The navy sniper
brigades and the amphibious brigades use the same landing craft, but if all landing craft supported the
amphibious brigades, the KPAN could conduct two brigade- and several battalion- or company-size landings
along both coasts simultaneously. Once on the ground, these amphibious brigades would attack enemy
combat service support units in the rear areas and seize key terrain to facilitate the onward movement of the
KPAGF, which are advancing from the north.
LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISIONS

I-15. The newest SOF unit in the KPA is the light infantry division. Beginning around 2003, after observing
U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, the KPA began converting seven regular infantry and mechanized
infantry divisions into light infantry divisions. Each new division only contains about 7,000 soldiers, as the
KPA stripped legacy units of most of their former organic support, including artillery, armor, and air defense
units. The KPAGF then changed the focus of training within the newly created divisions to combat operations
in urban and mountainous terrain, to include operating during periods of low visibility. Over time, the
techniques of these units became increasingly unconventional due to the perceived success of irregular
warfare techniques directed against U.S. and other Western forces in the Middle East.
I-4 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

DEEP ARTILLERY RECONNAISSANCE BATTALIONS

I-16. The KPA also fields specially purposed deep artillery battalions, whose mission is to infiltrate deep
into enemy territory, acquire targets, guide fires, and give battle damage assessments to their units. KPA units
operating this type of battalion include the Strategic Force, the KPA Artillery Bureau, the 518th Artillery
Division, all frontline KPAGF corps, and all mechanized divisions.

I-17. The KPA SOF primarily conduct five categories of missions. The first mission is reconnaissance—
strategic, operational, or tactical, depending on unit composition and objective. The second mission type is
direct combat operations conducted in conjunction with conventional operations, with the intent to facilitate
the success of KPAGF main conventional forces. The third mission for the SOF is to establish a second front
focused on defeating the C2 and combat service support units of the enemy. The fourth SOF mission is to
counter the enemy’s SOF by providing security for KPA conventional-force combat support and rear service
units in the KPAGF rear areas. The final SOF mission is to provide internal security for the regime, as the
SOF are some of the most politically reliable units in the KPA. The SOF would be called upon to deal with
any domestic disturbances that might break out within North Korean territory during wartime.
I-18. Based on the Russian experience in Crimea, it is likely that either some KPA SOF would be inserted
into South Korea, or North Korea would activate its clandestine agents already living in South Korea before
hostilities actually began. The task of the SOF, with assistance from clandestine agents, would be to slow
down the mobilization of South Korean military reserves. The SOF could do this in a number of ways:
 Social media. The SOF would attempt to spread the word that war between North and South Korea
was not imminent and the activation of South Korean military reserves was unwarranted.
 Antiwar protests. The SOF, with clandestine supporters, could lead or infiltrate antiwar rallies in
an attempt to convince the South Korean Government not to react to any North Korean actions.
 False-flag provocations. The SOF would attempt to blame any of their actions on others, especially
South Koreans who favor war preparedness.
 Political attacks. Some SOF may attempt to cause chaos and possibly advocate regime change in
South Korea during any political crisis, thus diverting attention away from any North Korean war
preparations.
 Terrorist-style attacks. If other means proved ineffective or as an approaching conventional attack
date drew near, the SOF might launch terrorist-style attacks to spread panic.
 Attack key C2 and communications nodes. Shortly before any KPA conventional surprise attack,
the SOF would attack these important centers to prevent the flow of true information throughout
South Korea.
I-19. There are three primary limitations for KPA SOF units. First, there is a finite number of aircraft and
watercraft to deploy the SOF, meaning most ground units deploying through infiltration or airborne and
waterborne assaults would not likely be larger than a brigade. Secondly, any airborne operation will likely
lose the element of surprise after the initial sortie. Any Korean People’s Army Air Force aircraft making it
back safely to pick up additional SOF personnel will have to face an alerted enemy. Lastly, KPA labeling of
a unit as SOF does not make it so. Many of the SOF units are more likely trained to the same standard as
conventional forces in other militaries. The KPA SOF units are only special in comparison to other units in
the North Korean military.

I-20. The KPA will use its SOF units and clandestine supporters already on the ground in South Korea to
create a “second front” in the enemy’s rear areas, while its enemy must continue to deal with the conventional
battle on the primary front. The SOF units will attack key enemy C2 facilities and important logistical centers,
and attempt to create fratricide between enemy units located primarily in enemy rear areas. The KPA plan is
likely to try to cause the enemy to divert resources to fight the SOF in its rear area, thus leaving its
conventional forces at the front line more vulnerable to a conventional attack, which the KPA could perform
with its limited armored forces.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 I-5

Source Notes
This division lists sources by page number. Where material appears in a paragraph, it
lists both the page number followed by the paragraph number.
3-9 Map of North Korea: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “Korea, North,” The World Factbook, 30
January 2019. Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/kn.html.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 Source Notes-1

Glossary
The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and
joint definitions differ, (Army) or (DOD) precedes the definition. The proponent
publication is listed in parentheses after the definition. Acronyms appearing in ATP 7-
100.2 that are not Army or joint are marked with an asterisk (*).
SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAA antiaircraft artillery
*AAAD all-arms air defense
ADP Army doctrine publication
AFL affiliated
AO area of operations
APC armored personnel carrier
AR Army regulation
AT antitank
ATP Army techniques publication
ATTP Army tactics, techniques, and procedures
C2 command and control
*C3D camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception
*CBP complex battle position
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and [or] nuclear
CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
cm centimeter
COA course of action
CP command post
DA Department of the Army
DMZ demilitarized zone
DOD Department of Defense
*DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
*EIW electronic intelligence warfare
EW electronic warfare
FM field manual
*HARTS hardened artillery site
*IFS integrated fires system
*IFV infantry fighting vehicle
*ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JP joint publication
kg kilogram
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 Glossary-1

Glossary
km kilometer
*KPA Korean People’s Army
*KPAAF Korean People’s Army Air Force
*KPAGF Korean People’s Army Ground Forces
*KPAN Korean People’s Army Navy
kph kilometers per hour
*m meter
MANPADS man-portable air defense system
*MDL military demarcation line
*mps meters per second
*mm millimeter
ODIN Operational Environmant Data Integration Network
OE operational environment
OP observation post
*RGB Reconnaissance General Bureau
*RISTA reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition
ROK Republic of Korea
*ROKS Republic of Korea Ship
RPG rocket-propelled grenade
*RSD Rear Service Department
SAM surface-to-air missile
*SBP simple battle position
SIGINT signals intelligence
SOF special operations forces
UA unmanned aircraft
UAS unmanned aircraft system
UN United Nations
*USS United States Ship
*ZORR zone of reconnaissance responsibility
SECTION II – TERMS
adversary
A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may
be envisaged. (JP 3-0)
air assault operation
An operation in which assault forces, using the mobility of rotary-wing or tiltrotor aircraft and the total
integration of available fires, maneuver under the control of a ground or air maneuver commander to
engage enemy forces or to seize and hold key terrain. (JP 3-18)
ambush
An attack by fire or other destructive means from concealed positions on a moving or temporarily
halted enemy. (FM 3-90-1)
Glossary-2 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Glossary
antiaccess
Action, activity, or capability, usually long-range, designed to prevent an advancing enemy force from
entering an operational area. (JP 3-0)
area defense
A type of defensive operation that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain
for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright. (ADP 3-90)
area denial
Action, activity, or capability, usually short-range, designed to limit an enemy force’s freedom of
action within an operational area. (JP 3-0)
area security
A type of security operation conducted to protect friendly forces, lines of communications, and
activities within a specific area. (ADP 3-90)
assault
To make a short, violent, but well-ordered attack against a local objective, such as a gun emplacement,
a fort, or a machine gun nest. (JP 3-18)
attack
A type of offensive operation that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both.
(ADP 3-90)
battle position
A defensive location oriented on a likely enemy avenue of approach. (ADP 3-90)
block
A tactical mission task that denies the enemy access to an area or prevents the enemy’s advance in a
direction or along an avenue of approach. Block is also an obstacle effect that integrates fire planning
and obstacle efforts to stop an attacker along a specific avenue of approach or prevent the attacking
force from passing through an engagement area. (FM 3-90-1)
breach
A tactical mission task in which the unit employs all available means to break through or establish a
passage through an enemy defense, obstacle, minefield, or fortification. (FM 3-90-1)
bypass
A tactical mission task in which the commander directs the unit to maneuver around an obstacle,
position, or enemy force to maintain the momentum of the operation while deliberately avoiding
combat with an enemy force. (FM 3-90-1)
canalize
(Army) A tactical mission task in which the commander restricts enemy movement to a narrow zone
by exploiting terrain coupled with the use of obstacles, fires, or friendly maneuver. (FM 3-90-1)
clear
A tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate
organized resistance within an assigned area. (FM 3-90-1)
clearing
A mobility task that involves the elimination or neutralization of an obstacle that is usually performed
by follow-on engineers and is not done under fire. (ATP 3-90.4)
combat service support
The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of all
operating forces in theater at all levels of warfare. (JP 4-0)
combat support
Fire support and operational assistance provided to combat elements. (JP 4-0)

Glossary
complex terrain
A geographical area consisting of an urban center larger than a village and/or of two or more types of
restrictive terrain or environmental conditions occupying the same space. (ATP 3-34.80)
concealment
Protection from observation or surveillance. (FM 3-96)
contain
A tactical mission task that requires the commander to stop, hold, or surround enemy forces or to cause
them to center their activity on a given front and prevent them from withdrawing any part of their
forces for use elsewhere. (FM 3-90-1)
control measure
A means of regulating forces or warfighting functions. (ADP 6-0)
counterattack
Attack by part or all of a defending force against an enemy attacking force, for such specific purposes
as regaining ground lost, or cutting off or destroying enemy advance units, and with the general
objective of denying to the enemy the attainment of the enemy’s purpose in attacking. In sustained
defensive operations, it is undertaken to restore the battle position and is directed at limited objectives.
(FM 1-02.1)
counterreconnaissance
A tactical mission task that encompasses all measures taken by a commander to counter enemy
reconnaissance and surveillance efforts. Counterreconnaissance is not a distinct mission, but a
component of all forms of security operations. (FM 3-90-1)
cover
(Army) 1. A type of security operation done independent of the main body to protect them by fighting
to gain time while preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body.
(ADP 3-90) 2. Protection from the effects of fires. (FM 3-96)
defeat
To render a force incapable of achieving its objectives. (ADP 3-0)
delay
When a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the enemy’s momentum and
inflicting maximum damage on enemy forces without becoming decisively engaged. (ADP 3-90)
destroy
A tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is
reconstituted. Alternatively, to destroy a combat system is to damage it so badly that it cannot perform
any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt. (FM 3-90-1)
disrupt
A tactical mission task in which a commander integrates direct and indirect fires, terrain, and obstacles
to upset an enemy’s formation or tempo, interrupt the enemy’s timetable, or cause enemy forces to
commit prematurely or attack in a piecemeal fashion. (FM 3-90-1)
electronic warfare
Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic
spectrum or to attack the enemy. (JP 3-13.1)
enemy
A party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized. (ADP 3-0)
engage
To bring the enemy under fire. (JP 3-09.3)

Glossary
exploitation
(DOD) Taking full advantage of success in military operations, following up initial gains, and making
permanent the temporary effects already created. (JP 2-01.3) (Army) A type of offensive operation that
usually follows a successful attack and is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth. (ADP 3-90)
fire plan
A tactical plan for using the weapons of a unit or formation so that their fire will be coordinated. (FM
3-09)
fix
A tactical mission task where a commander prevents the enemy force from moving any part of that
force from a specific location for a specific period. Fix is also an obstacle effect that focuses fire
planning and obstacle effort to slow an attacker’s movement within a specified area, normally an
engagement area. (FM 3-90-1)
forward operating base
An airfield used to support tactical operations without establishing full support facilities. (JP 3-09.3)
forward operating site
A scalable location outside the United States and its territories intended for rotational use by operating
forces. (JP 4-04)
friendly
A contact positively identified as a friend using identification, friend or foe and other techniques. (JP
3-01)
guard
A type of security operation done to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while preventing
enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body. (ADP 3-90)
guerrilla force
A group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct
military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory. (JP 3-05)
high-payoff target
A target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of
action. (JP 3-60)
high-value target
A target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission. (JP 3-60)
hybrid threat
The diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorists, or criminal
elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects. (ADP 3-0)
integration
(DOD) The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging
as a whole. (JP 1)
intelligence
1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and
interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces
or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. 2. The activities that result in the product. 3. The
organizations engaged in such activities. (JP 2-0)
interdict
A tactical mission task where the commander prevents, disrupts, or delays the enemy’s use of an area
or route. (FM 3-90-1)

Glossary
irregular warfare
A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant
population(s). (JP 1)
isolate
To separate a force from its sources of support in order to reduce its effectiveness and increase its
vulnerability to defeat. (ADP 3-0)
joint
Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military
Departments participate. (JP 1)
local security
The low-level security activities conducted near a unit to prevent surprise by the enemy. (ADP 3-90)
maneuver
(DOD) A movement to place ships, aircraft, or land forces in a position of advantage over the enemy.
(JP 3-0) (Army) Movement in conjunction with fires. (ADP 3-0)
military deception
Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist
organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that
will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. (JP 3-13.4)
mission
The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason
therefore. (JP 3-0)
neutral
In combat and combat support operations, an identity applied to a track whose characteristics,
behavior, origin, or nationality indicate that it is neither supporting nor opposing friendly forces. (JP
3-0)
neutralize
(Army) A tactical mission task that results in rendering enemy personnel or materiel incapable of
interfering with a particular operation. (FM 3-90-1)
operational environment
A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of
capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)
operational level of warfare
The level of warfare at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained
to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. (JP 3-0)
opposing force
A plausible, flexible, and free-thinking mixture of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal
elements representing a composite of varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces and capabilities
(doctrine, tactics, organization, and equipment). (AR 350-2)
patrol
A detachment sent out by a larger unit to conduct a specific mission that operates semi-independently
and return to the main body upon completion of mission. (ATP 3-21.8)
protection
Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary
personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside
the boundaries of a given operational area. (JP 3-0)

Glossary
raid
An operation to temporarily seize an area to secure information, confuse an enemy, capture personnel
or equipment, or to destroy a capability culminating with a planned withdrawal. (JP 3-0)
reconnaissance
A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about
the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological,
hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (JP 2-0)
screen
A type of security operation that primarily provides early warning to the protected force. (ADP 3-90)
security area
That area occupied by a unit’s security elements and includes the areas of influence of those security
elements. (ADP 3-90)
signals intelligence
1. A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications
intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however
transmitted. 2. Intelligence derived from communications, electronic, and foreign instrumentation
signals. (JP 2-0)
spoiling attack
A tactical maneuver employed to seriously impair a hostile attack while the enemy is in the process of
forming or assembling for an attack. (FM 3-90-1)
strategic level of warfare
The level of warfare at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or
multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, then develops and uses
national resources to achieve those objectives. (JP 3-0)
support
1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a
directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command
that assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1)
suppress
A tactical mission task that results in the temporary degradation of the performance of a force or
weapon system below the level needed to accomplish its mission. (FM 3-90-1)
surveillance
The systematic observation of aerospace, cyberspace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or
things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (JP 3-0)
system
A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent
elements; that group of elements forming a unified whole. (JP 3-0)
tactical level of warfare
The level of warfare at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military
objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. (JP 3-0)
tactical mission task
The specific activity performed by a unit while executing a form of tactical operation or form of
maneuver. It may be expressed in terms of either actions by a friendly force or effects on an enemy
force. (FM 3-90-1)
tactics
(Army) The employment, ordered arrangement, and directed actions of forces in relation to each other.
(ADP 3-90)

Glossary
target acquisition
The detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective
employment of capabilities that create the required effects. (JP 3-60)
task
A clearly defined action or activity specifically assigned to an individual or organization that must be
done as it is imposed by an appropriate authority. (JP 1)
task organization
(Army) A temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission. (ADP 5-0)
task-organizing
The act of designing a force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and composition to
meet a unique task or mission. (ADP 3-0)
techniques
Non-prescriptive ways or methods used to perform missions, functions, or tasks. (CJCSM 5120.01A)
terrorism
The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other
ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are
usually political. (JP 3-07.2)
threat
Any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States
forces, United States national interests, or the homeland. (ADP 3-0)
unconventional warfare
Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a
government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla
force in a denied area. (JP 3-05.1)
unmanned aircraft
An aircraft that does not carry a human operator and is capable of flight with or without human remote
control. (JP 3-30)
unmanned aircraft system
That system whose components include the necessary equipment, network, and personnel to control an
unmanned aircraft. (JP 3-30)
weapons of mass destruction
Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons capable of a high order of destruction or
causing mass casualties, and excluding the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such
means is a separable and divisible part from the weapon. (JP 3-40)

References
All URLs accessed on 22 June 2020.
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.
DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. January 2020.
ADP 1-02. Terms and Military Symbols. 14 August 2018.
FM 1-02.1. Operational Terms. 21 November 2019.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.
JOINT PUBLICATIONS
Unless otherwise indicated, CJCS issuances are available online: https://www.jcs.mil/Library/. Joint
doctrinal publications are available online: https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/Joint-Doctine-Pubs/.
CJCSM 5120.01A. Joint Doctrine Development Process. 29 December 2014.
JP 1. Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 25 March 2013.
JP 2-0. Joint Intelligence. 22 October 2013.
JP 2-01.3. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 21 May 2014.
JP 3-0. Joint Operations. 17 January 2017.
JP 3-01. Countering Air and Missile Threats. 21 April 2017. Validated on 2 May 2018.
JP 3-05. Special Operations. 16 July 2014.
JP 3-05.1. Unconventional Warfare. 15 September 2015.
JP 3-07.2. Antiterrorism. 14 March 2014.
JP 3-09.3. Close Air Support. 10 June 2019.
JP 3-13. Information Operations. 27 November 2012.
JP 3-13.1. Electronic Warfare. 8 February 2012.
JP 3-13.4. Military Deception. 14 February 2017.
JP 3-18. Joint Forcible Entry Operations. 11 May 2017. Validated 27 June 2018.
JP 3-30. Joint Air Operations. 25 July 2019.
JP 3-40. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. 27 November 2019.
JP 3-60. Joint Targeting. 28 September 2018.
JP 4-0. Joint Logistics. 4 February 2019.
JP 4-04. Contingency Basing. 4 January 2019.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Unless otherwise indicated, Army doctrinal publications are available online:
https://armypubs.army.mil/.
ADP 3-0. Operations. 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-90. Offense and Defense. 31 July 2019.
ADP 5-0. The Operations Process. 31 July 2019.
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 References-1

References
ADP 6-0. Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. 31 July 2019.
AR 350-2. Operational Environment and Opposing Force Program. 19 May 2015.
ATP 3-21.8. Infantry Platoon and Squad. 12 April 2016.
ATP 3-34.80. Geospatial Engineering. 22 February 2017.
ATP 3-90.4. Combined Arms Mobility. 8 March 2016.
FM 3-0. Operations. 6 October 2017.
FM 3-09. Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations. 30 April 2020.
FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C. The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare. 7 August 2019.
FM 3-90-1. Offense and Defense Volume 1. 22 March 2013.
FM 3-96. Brigade Combat Team. 8 October 2015.
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. “Korea, North.” The World Factbook. 30 January 2019. Available
online: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
Minnich, James M. The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics. Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 2005.
RECOMMENDED READINGS
JP 3-12. Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations. 11 April 2017.
ADP 1-01. Doctrine Primer. 31 July 2019.
ATP 3-06. Urban Operations. 7 December 2017.
ATP 3-21.51. Subterranean Operations. 1 November 2019.
ATTP 3-06.11. Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain. 10 June 2011.
FM 3-12. Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations. 11 February 2017.
WEBSITES
Operational Environment Data Integration Network (ODIN), https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/.
PRESCRIBED FORMS
This section contains no entries.
REFERENCED FORMS
Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate website:
https://armypubs.army.mil/.
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
References-2 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Index
Entries are by paragraph number.
expose U.S. and allied forces, aggressiveness, 5-50

A 1-129
accuracy, 5-53 mask intent, 1-130 air assault defense actions,
slow and disrupt deployment, complementary combined arms
action and enabling functions, actions, 4-85–4-97
2-22–2-26 1-131
continue mission, 4-97
action forces functional actions to gain and sustain execute—air assault defense
organization, for a dispersed dominance, actions to counter actions, 4-95
attack, 6-80 U.S. forces, 1-135–1-138 execute—make contact, 4-94
for an integrated attack, 6-70 disaggregate enemy plan, 4-92
formations, 1-138 prepare, 4-93
action units, assault units, 2-34–
employ targeted overmatch, report, 4-96
2-35
1-136
functional tactics, 2-33–2-37 air defense operations, D-1–D-8
protect key capabilities, 1-137
main defense units, 2-36 capabilities and limitations,
mission units, 2-37 actions to influence enemy D-4–D-5
shaping, actions to counter U.S. employment and integration in
actions on contact, battle drills,
forces, 1-122–1-126 combined arms, D-6–D-8
4-9–4-18
disaggregate partnerships, functional overview, D-1
continue mission, 4-18
1-125 organization, D-2–D-3
execute, 4-15
enable targeted instability,
fix, 4-16 air force, 3-5
1-124
isolate, 4-17 and navy employment, 1-78
prevent access facilitation,
plan, 4-13 underground facilities, 7-99–
1-126
prepare, 4-14 7-104
provide an alternative
actions to counter enemy understanding of an OE, air transportation, H-36–H-37
consolidation, actions to 1-123 airborne, command post, 3-32
counter U.S. forces, 1-139– operations and SOF support,
actions to maintain the initiative,
1-143 B-10–B-14
actions to counter U.S. forces,
change the nature of the units, I-11
1-132–1-134
conflict, 1-142
conduct in-theater preclusion, all-arms air defense,
counter stability, 1-140
1-134 complementary combined arms
employ cultural standoff, 1-143
control tempo, 1-133 actions, 4-72–4-84
redirect support, 1-141
actions within South Korea, continue mission, 4-84
actions to counter U.S. forces, execute, 4-82
counterstability actions, 8-24–
counter enemy consolidation, plan, 4-80
8-45
1-139–1-143 prepare, 4-81
irregular forces activities,
deter enemy augmentation, report, 4-83
8-31–8-32
1-127–1-131 regular-force instability
fundamentals, 1-121–1-143 allocate logistics, 7-15
activities, 8-25–8-28
gain and sustain dominance, alter perception of risk, 1-128
SOF instability activities, 8-29–
1-135–1-138 ambush, executing, 6-118
8-30
influence enemy shaping, terrorism and mission task functional organization, 6-113–
1-122–1-126 6-116
execution, 8-33–8-45
maintain the initiative, 1-132– organizing, 6-117
1-134 adaptive operations, 1-95–1-97
tactical offensive actions—
actions to deter enemy adequate logistics. See elements, 6-111–6-118
augmentation, actions to sustainment
ammunition. See class V
counter U.S. forces, 1-127– advance guard, 5-134–5-138
amphibious brigades, I-14
1-131 aerial reconnaissance, 5-28
alter perception of risk, 1-128 annihilate, 9-6
affiliated units, 3-15
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 Index-1

Index
annihilation, 1-68 to disrupt, 6-8 time and tempo, 1-43–1-44

antiarmor, fire plan, 7-44–7-48 to gain control of key assets, weapons of mass destruction,
obstacle plan, 7-43 6-5 1-45–1-47
to gain freedom of movement, capabilities and limitations, air
antitank, defensive position, 7-49– 6-3
7-53 defense operations, D-4–D-5
to gain information, 6-6 antitank operations, C-4–C-8
engagement area, 7-54–7-55 to restrict freedom of
mobile reserve, 7-56 aviation operations, B-5–B-7
movement, 6-4 biological weapons, G-7
antitank defense system, types of offensive action— CBRN and missile limitations,
antiarmor fire plan, 7-44–7-48 forces, 6-46–6-80 G-13–G-14
antiarmor obstacle plan, 7-43 zones, 2-18 CBRN and obscurant
antitank defensive position, attack functional organization, for operations, G-4–G-14
7-49–7-53 a dispersed attack, 6-75–6-80 chemical weapons, G-5–G-6
antitank engagement area, for an integrated attack, 6-65– electronic warfare operations,
7-54–7-55 6-70 E-6–E-8
antitank mobile reserve, 7-56 engineer operations, F-8–F-19
area defense, 7-42–7-59 auxiliary command post, 3-33
fires support operations, A-7–
counterattack, 7-57–7-59 aviation, 6-139 A-11
antitank operations, C-1–C-13 C2, B-17 logistics operations, H-4–H-6
capabilities and limitations, aviation operations, B-1–B-17 nuclear weapons, G-8–G-9
C-4–C-8 capabilities and limitations, smoke and flame weapons,
employment and integration in B-5–B-7 G-10–G-12
combined arms, C-9–C-13 employment and integration in SOF operations, I-17–I-19
functional overview, C-1 combined arms, B-8–B-17 caste system. See songbun
organization, C-2–C-3 functional overview, B-1
organization, B-2–B-4 CBRN and missile limitations. See
area, of operations, 2-3–2-4 also capabilities and limitations,
reconnaissance, 5-59–5-60 B G-13–G-14
security, 5-159–5-160
battalions, 3-61–3-63 CBRN and obscurant operations,
area defense, antitank defense G-1–G-21
system, 7-42–7-59 battle drills, 4-1–4-133
actions on contact, 4-9–4-18 capabilities and limitations,
combat security area, 7-36 G-4–G-14
disruption forces, 7-35 break contact, 4-29–4-38
complementary combined employment and integration in
general security area, 7-37 combined arms, G-15–G-21
main defense forces, 7-38– arms actions, 4-61–4-133
fire and maneuver, 4-48–4-60 functional overview, G-1–G-2
7-40 organization, G-3
method, 7-34 fixing, 4-19–4-28
reserve, 7-41 purpose, 4-1–4-8 ch’imt’u. See infiltration maneuver
types of defensive action— situational breach, 4-39–4-47 ch’ŏmip. See thrust maneuver
forces, 7-33–7-59 besetment maneuver, 6-19 change the nature of the conflict,
armed noncombatants, 3-92 biological weapons. See also 1-142
army, 3-3 CBRN, G-7 chemical, biological, radiological,
infantry platoon assault break contact, battle drills, 4-29– and/or nuclear. See CBRN
techniques, 6-40–6-42 4-38 weapons. See also CBRN,
sniper brigades, I-10 continue mission, 4-38 G-5–G-6
assault, executing, 6-107–6-110 execute—fix, 4-36 class I, H-9–H-10
functional organization, 6-102– execute—isolate, 4-37
execute—protect, 4-35 class II, H-11–H-13
6-105
organizing, 6-106 plan, 4-33 class III, H-14–H-15
tactical offensive actions— prepare, 4-34 class IV, H-16–H-17
elements, 6-100–6-110 C class V, H-18–H-19
assault units, action units, 2-34– C3D, protection and security class VI, H-20–H-21
2-35 measures, 9-74–9-76 class VII, H-22–H-23
enabling units, 2-47–2-48 tactical doctrine, 1-75 class VIII, H-24–H-26
attack, against an attacking camouflage, concealment, cover,
enemy. See spoiling attack class XI, H-27–H-28
and deception. See C3D
dispersed attack, 6-71–6-74 clothing, individual equipment,
integrated attack, 6-48–6-64 capabilities and intent, kits, and hand tools. See class
on the Blue House, 8-37–8-45 fundamentals, 1-31–1-47 II
to dislocate, 6-7 shape the OE, 1-42
Index-2 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Index
combat division force structure, complementary combined arms corps, 3-38–3-40

integrated fires system, 3-49– actions, air assault defense artillery group, A-6
3-50 actions, 4-85–4-97 counter stability, 1-140
integrated support system, all-arms air defense, 4-72–
3-51 4-84 counterattack, antitank defense
tactical-level organization of battle drills, 4-61–4-133 system, 7-57–7-59
regular forces, 3-41–3-51 complex terrain operations, limited-objective attack, 6-87–
4-98–4-133 6-90
combat reconnaissance patrol,
5-87 disruption actions, 4-62–4-71 counterreconnaissance, continue
defensive security formations, complex battle position, 7-62–7-63 mission, 5-114
5-165–5-166 detachment, 5-171–5-172
complex terrain operations, execute—destroy, 5-113
combat security, area, 7-36 complementary combined arms execute—find, 5-110
outpost and observation post actions, 4-98–4-133 execute—make contact, 5-112
team, 5-167–5-170 executing urban combat, execute—report, 5-111
combined operations, 1-69 4-112–4-120 plan, 5-108
subterranean area actions, prepare, 5-109
command and support 4-121–4-133
relationships, affiliated, 3-15 protection and security
urban or rural area actions, measures, 9-72–9-73
constituent, 3-12 4-107–4-111
dedicated, 3-13 security missions, 5-106–5-114
force structure and formations, components of EIW, computer counterstability, 2-57
3-11–3-15 warfare, 9-97–9-103 in support of military
supporting, 3-14 cryptanalysis, 9-105 operations, 8-46–8-47
deception, 9-33–9-61
command observation post, 3-28– disinformation operations, counterstability actions, 8-1–8-47
3-30 9-107 executing, 8-19–8-23
command post C2, command post EIW, 9-16–9-107 in support of military
types, 3-19–3-33 electronic warfare, 9-21–9-32 operations, 8-46–8-47
commander's duties, 3-34 information attack, 9-92–9-96 offensive, defensive, and
communications procedures, intelligence collection, 9-106 counterstability actions,
3-35 perception management, 1-159–1-162
force structure and formations, 9-79–9-91 planning, 8-2–8-10
3-16–3-35 physical destruction, 9-62– preparing, 8-18
9-68 purpose, 8-1
command post types, airborne threats and criminal activity,
command post, 3-32 protection and security
measures, 9-69–9-78 8-11–8-17
auxiliary command post, 3-33 within South Korea, 8-24–8-45
command observation post, reconnaissance, 9-104
3-28–3-30 computer warfare, 9-97–9-103 cover, defensive cover, 5-157–
command post C2, 3-19–3-33 5-158
conditions, 4-5–4-6 offensive cover, 5-154–5-156
deception command post, 3-31
forward command post, 3-23– conduct, countermobility and security missions, 5-149–5-158
3-24 survivability preparations, 7-14 criminal organizations, 3-83–3-88
main command post, 3-20– in-theater preclusion, 1-134
mobility preparations, 6-24 cryptanalysis, 9-105
3-22
rear area command post, 3-25 reconnaissance. See attack to D
reserve command post, 3-26– gain information
deceive, 9-10
3-27 constituent units, 3-12
deception, command post, 3-31
commander's, duties, 3-34 continue mission, actions on components of EIW, 9-33–9-61
reconnaissance patrol, 5-85 contact, 4-18 electronic, 9-55–9-61
communications procedures, 3-35 air assault defense actions, units, 9-39–9-40
4-97
companies, 3-64–3-66 deception activities, 9-41–9-54
all-arms air defense, 4-84
company combat formations, decoys, 9-46–9-54
break contact, 4-38
executing the offense, 6-32– demonstrations, 9-44
counterreconnaissance, 5-114
6-35 feints, 9-43
disruption actions, 4-71
line formation, 6-35 ruses, 9-45
fire and maneuver, 4-60
V formation, 6-34 fixing, 4-28 deception units, 9-39–9-40
wedge formation, 6-33 situational breach, 4-47 enabling units, 2-45
competition and the human continuity, 5-48–5-49 decoys, 9-46–9-54
dimension, 9-15 control tempo, 1-133 dedicated units, 3-13
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 Index-3

Index
deep artillery reconnaissance defense zones, 2-12–2-14 deceive, 9-10

battalions, I-16 security zones, 2-9–2-11 degrade, 9-7
defeat or destroy. See also support zones, 2-15–2-16 deny, 9-9
annihilate, 4-120 defile, 5-25 destroy, 9-6
disrupt, 9-8
defend key terrain, 7-5 degrade, 9-7 exploit, 9-11
defense, 2-56 demonstrations, 9-44 influence, 9-12
defense zones, defensive zones, deny, 9-9 electromagnetic spectrum
2-12–2-14 enemy information, 7-13 technical sensors
organizing battle position detachments, 3-67–3-69 reconnaissance, 5-29
actions, 7-73–7-74 electronic attack, distributive
direct air support, B-9
defensive, arrays, 7-25 jamming, 9-30
cover, 5-157–5-158 disaggregate, enemy formations,
electronic warfare, 9-28–9-32
cover forces, 5-176–5-177 1-138
expendable jammers, 9-31
guard forces, 5-174–5-175 partnerships, 1-125
proximity fuse jammers, 9-32
maneuver, 7-26–7-29 disinformation operations, 9-107 targets, 9-29
screen forces, 5-173 dismounted reconnaissance, electronic deception, 9-55–9-61
defensive actions, 7-1–7-108 defile, 5-25 imitative, 9-59–9-60
defensive operations in hilltop, 5-26 manipulative, 9-56–9-57
complex OEs, 7-79–7-108 open, 5-24 noncommunications, 9-61
executing the defense, 7-18– reconnaissance and security simulative, 9-58
7-21 methods, 5-22–5-26
electronic warfare, components of
offensive, defensive, and semi-open, 5-23
EIW, 9-21–9-32
counterstability actions, dispersed attack, 6-71–6-74 electronic attack, 9-28–9-32
1-152–1-158 signals reconnaissance, 9-24–
disrupt, EIW tactical tasks, 9-8
planning the defense, 7-7–7-11 9-27
executing urban combat,
preparing the defense, 7-12–
4-115–4-116 electronic warfare operations,
7-17
purpose of the defense, 7-1– disruption, elements, 7-65–7-66 E-1–E-15
7-6 units, 2-46 capabilities and limitations,
tactical defensive actions— disruption actions, complementary E-6–E-8
elements, 7-60–7-78 combined arms actions, 4-62– employment and integration in
types of defensive action— 4-71 combined arms, E-9–E-15
forces, 7-22–7-59 continue mission, 4-71 functional overview, E-1–E-2
execute—contain, 4-69 organization, E-3–E-5
defensive operations in complex
OEs, defensive actions, 7-79– execute—destroy, 4-70 employ, cultural standoff, 1-143
7-108 execute—find, 4-68 targeted overmatch, 1-136
north of the DMZ, 7-82–7-107 plan, 4-66 employment and integration in
south of the DMZ, 7-108 prepare, 4-67 combined arms, air defense
subterranean operations, 7-81 disruption forces, area defense, operations, D-6–D-8
urban operations, 7-80 7-35 air transportation, H-36–H-37
defensive security formations, mobile defense, 7-30 airborne operations and SOF
combat reconnaissance patrol, distributive jamming, 9-30 support, B-10–B-14
5-165–5-166 antitank operations, C-9–C-13
division artillery group, A-5 aviation C2, B-17
combat security outpost and
observation post team, E aviation operations, B-8–B-17
5-167–5-170 CBRN and obscurant
echelon forces, 1-76–1-77 operations, G-15–G-21
counterreconnaissance
detachment, 5-171–5-172 EIW, 9-1–9-107 class I, H-9–H-10
defensive cover forces, 5-176– competition and the human class II, H-11–H-13
5-177 dimension, 9-15 class III, H-14–H-15
defensive guard forces, 5-174– components, 9-16–9-107 class IV, H-16–H-17
5-175 multi-domain extended class V, H-18–H-19
defensive screen forces, 5-173 battlefield, 1-119–1-120 class VI, H-20–H-21
forward detachment, 5-178– support for a reconnaissance class VII, H-22–H-23
5-181 attack, 6-142 class VIII, H-24–H-26
reconnaissance and security, systems warfare, 9-13 class XI, H-27–H-28
5-164–5-181 tactical-level, 9-1–9-4 direct air support, B-9
windows of opportunity, 9-14 electronic warfare operations,
defensive zones, 2-8–2-16 E-9–E-15
EIW tactical tasks, 9-5–9-12
Index-4 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Index
engineer operations, F-20– execute—find, fire and maneuver, battle drills,

F-21 counterreconnaissance, 5-110 4-48–4-60
fires support operations, A-12– disruption actions, 4-68 continue mission, 4-60
A-17 execute—fix, break contact, 4-36 execute—fix, 4-57
logistics operations, H-7–H-42 fire and maneuver, 4-57 execute—isolate, 4-58
rail transportation, H-29–H-32 fixing, 4-27 execute—make contact, 4-56
road transportation, H-33–H-35 execute—maneuver, 4-59
salvage, H-40–H-42 execute—isolate, break contact, plan, 4-54
SOF operations, I-20 4-37 prepare, 4-55
unmanned aircraft support to fire and maneuver, 4-58
situational breach, 4-44 fires, 6-138
the army, B-15–B-16
water transportation, H-38– execute—make contact, air fires support operations, A-1–A-17
H-39 assault defense actions, 4-94 capabilities and limitations,
counterreconnaissance, 5-112 A-7–A-11
enable targeted instability, 1-124 employment and integration in
fire and maneuver, 4-56
enabling forces functional combined arms, A-12–A-17
organization, for a dispersed executing, a reconnaissance functional overview, A-1
attack, 6-76–6-79 attack, 6-135–6-136 organization, A-2–A-6
for an integrated attack, 6-66– an ambush, 6-118
an assault, 6-107–6-110 fix, 4-16
6-69 or isolate, 4-117–4-119
counterstability actions, 8-19–
enabling units, assault units, 8-23 fixing, battle drills, 4-19–4-28
2-47–2-48 defense of a battle position, continue mission, 4-28
deception units, 2-45 7-75–7-78 execute—fix, 4-27
disruption units, 2-46 mission tasks, 2-58–2-59 execute—prevent movement,
fixing units, 2-42–2-44 4-26
functional tactics, 2-38–2-51 executing the defense, defensive
actions, 7-18–7-21 plan, 4-24
protected units, 2-50 prepare, 4-25
reserve, 2-51 execute mission tasks and
drills, 7-20 units, 2-42–2-44
security units, 2-40–2-41
support units, 2-49 maintain contact, 7-19 flank guard, 5-139–5-145
seize tactical opportunities, force structure and formations,
encirclement maneuver, 6-13 7-21 3-1–3-93
engineer operations, F-1–F-21 executing the offense, army command and support
capabilities and limitations, infantry platoon assault relationships, 3-11–3-15
F-8–F-19 techniques, 6-40–6-42 command post C2, 3-16–3-35
employment and integration in company combat formations, functional organization of
combined arms, F-20–F-21 6-32–6-35 forces, 3-1
functional overview, F-1 execute mission tasks and service component
organization, F-2–F-7 drills, 6-31 organizations, 3-2–3-10
engineer. See also class IV, 6-140 maintain contact, 6-30 tactical-level organization of
evolution and adaptation, 1-98– nature of the offense, 6-28– irregular forces, 3-75–3-93
1-104 6-29 tactical-level organization of
offensive actions, 6-27–6-43 regular forces, 3-36–3-74
execute, actions on contact, 4-15 platoon combat formations,
all-arms air defense, 4-82 forms of army offensive
6-36–6-39 maneuver, besetment
execute—, air assault defense seize tactical opportunities, maneuver, 6-19
actions, 4-95 6-43 encirclement maneuver, 6-13
contain, 4-69 executing urban combat, complex holding maneuver, 6-16
maneuver, 4-59 terrain operations, 4-112–4-120 infiltration maneuver, 6-18
penetrate, 4-46 defeat or destroy, 4-120 penetration maneuver, 6-14
prevent movement, 4-26 disrupt, 4-115–4-116 planning the offense, 6-12–
protect, 4-35 fix or isolate, 4-117–4-119 6-19
report, 5-111 thrust maneuver, 6-15
secure, 4-45 expendable jammers, 9-31
turning maneuver, 6-17
execute mission tasks and drills, exploit, 9-11
fortified tank positions, 7-92–7-94
executing the defense, 7-20 expose U.S. and allied forces,
executing the offense, 6-31 1-129 forward, command post, 3-23–
3-24
execute—destroy, F detachment, 5-178–5-181
counterreconnaissance, 5-113
disruption actions, 4-70 feints, 9-43
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 Index-5

Index
framework for military operations, enabling units, 2-38–2-51 infantry company strongpoint,
adaptive operations, 1-95–1-97 executing mission tasks, 2-58– 7-95–7-96
fundamentals, 1-80–1-97 2-59 infiltration maneuver, 6-18
regional operations, 1-89–1-90 functional method, 2-27–2-32
strategic operations, 1-86–1-88 tactical terms, symbols, and inflict grave casualties, 7-4
transitional operations, 1-91– control measures, 2-1–2-21 influence, 9-12
1-94 functional tactics in operations, information, and operational
functional method, 2-27–2-32 2-52–2-57 security, 9-77–9-78
functional organization, for a counterstability, 2-57 attack, 9-92–9-96
limited-objective attack, 6-91– defense, 2-56 flow and communications,
6-96 offense, 2-55 5-41–5-45
for a reconnaissance attack, fundamentals, 1-1–1-162 initiative, 1-66
6-129–6-133 actions to counter U.S. forces, insurgent organizations, 3-79–
for an ambush, 6-113–6-116 1-121–1-143 3-80
for an assault, 6-102–6-105 capabilities and intent, 1-31–
integrated, attack, 6-48–6-64
of offensive elements, 6-98– 1-47
support system, 3-51
6-99 evolution and adaptation,
1-98–1-104 integrated fires system, combat
functional organization for a
framework for military division force structure, 3-49–
dispersed attack, 6-75–6-80
operations, 1-80–1-97 3-50
action forces, 6-80
introduction to North Korea, reconnaissance and security
enabling forces, 6-76–6-79
1-19–1-27 operations, 5-13–5-17
functional organization for an major combat operations in intelligence collection, 9-106
integrated attack, 6-65–6-70 conflict, 1-17–1-18
action forces, 6-70 internal security forces, 3-9–3-10
military principles, 1-48–1-79
enabling forces, 6-66–6-69 motivations, 1-28–1-30 introduction to North Korea,
functional organization of a battle multi-domain extended fundamentals, 1-19–1-27
position, disruption elements, battlefield, 1-105–1-120 history and politics, 1-20–1-24
7-65–7-66 OEs, 1-1–1-16 songbun, 1-25–1-27
main defense elements, 7-67 offensive, defensive, and irregular forces activities, 8-31–
reserve elements, 7-68 counterstability actions, 8-32
support elements, 7-69 1-144–1-162 isolate, 4-17
tactical defensive actions—
elements, 7-64–7-69 G isolation, 1-117–1-118
functional organization of gain time, 7-6 J-K
elements, planning the defense, general security area, 7-37 kill boxes, 2-20
7-11 guard, advance guard, 5-134–
planning the offense, 6-21 kill zones, 2-19
5-138
functional organization of forces, KPAAF. See air force
flank guard, 5-139–5-145
force structure and formations, rear guard, 5-146–5-148 KPAGF. See army
3-1 security missions, 5-127–5-148 KPAN. See navy
planning the defense, 7-10 guerrilla units, 3-81–3-82 kyŏnje. See holding maneuver
planning the offense, 6-20
functional overview, air defense H L
operations, D-1 hardened artillery sites, 7-87–7-91 light infantry, brigades, I-8–I-9
antitank operations, C-1 hilltop, 5-26 divisions, I-15
aviation operations, B-1 limited-objective attack,
CBRN and obscurant historical example. See attack on
the Blue House counterattack, 6-87–6-90
operations, G-1–G-2 functional organization, 6-91–
electronic warfare operations, history and politics, 1-20–1-24
6-96
E-1–E-2 holding maneuver, 6-16 spoiling attack, 6-84–6-86
engineer operations, F-1 types of offensive action—
fires support operations, A-1 I
forces, 6-81–6-96
logistics operations, H-1 imitative electronic deception,
SOF operations, I-1–I-3 line formation, company combat
9-59–9-60
formations, 6-35
functional tactics, 2-1–2-59 independent reconnaissance platoon combat formations,
action and enabling functions, patrol, 5-88–5-89 6-39
2-22–2-26
indirect fire C2, A-3 logistics, 6-141
action units, 2-33–2-37
facilities, 7-105–7-107
Index-6 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Index
logistics operations, H-1–H-42 defensive maneuver, 7-26– strategic environment, 1-4–

capabilities and limitations, 7-29 1-14
H-4–H-6 disruption forces, 7-30 threat actions within an OE,
employment and integration in main defense forces, 7-31 1-15–1-16
combined arms, H-7–H-42 method, 7-24 offense, 2-55
functional overview, H-1 reserve, 7-32
organization, H-2–H-3 types of defensive action— offensive, cover, 5-154–5-156
forces, 7-23–7-32 zones, 2-7
M offensive actions, 6-1–6-152
mobility, 1-70
main, command post, 3-20–3-22 executing the offense, 6-27–
defense elements, 7-67 motivations, 1-28–1-30 6-43
main defense forces, area mounted reconnaissance, 5-27 offensive operations in
defense, 7-38–7-40 moving screen, 5-124–5-126 complex OEs, 6-143–6-152
mobile defense, 7-31 offensive, defensive, and
multidirectional reconnaissance, counterstability actions,
main defense units, action units, 5-55 1-146–1-151
2-36 multi-domain extended battlefield, planning the offense, 6-9–6-21
subterranean area actions, EIW, 1-119–1-120 preparing for the offense,
4-130–4-131 fundamentals, 1-105–1-120 6-22–6-26
maintain contact, executing the isolation, 1-117–1-118 purpose of the offense, 6-1–
defense, 7-19 preclusion, 1-109–1-112 6-8
executing the offense, 6-30 sanctuary, 1-113–1-116 tactical offensive actions—
preparing for the offense, 6-23 systems warfare, 1-107–1-108 elements, 6-97–6-142
maintain enemy contact, 5-102 types of offensive action—
N
forces, 6-44–6-96
major, combat operations, 1-17– national objectives, 1-50
1-18 offensive operations in complex
end items. See class VII nature of the offense, 6-28–6-29 OEs, offensive actions, 6-143–
navy, 3-4 6-152
maneuver brigades, 3-55–3-57
sniper brigades, I-12–I-13 subterranean operations,
maneuverability, 1-65 underground facilities, 7-97– 6-147–6-152
manipulative electronic deception, 7-98 urban operations, 6-144–6-146
9-56–9-57 noncombatants, armed offensive, defensive, and
mask intent, 1-130 noncombatants, 3-92 counterstability actions,
mass and dispersion, 1-63–1-64 tactical-level organization of counterstability actions, 1-159–
irregular forces, 3-91–3-93 1-162
media manipulation, 9-89–9-90 unarmed noncombatants, 3-93 defensive actions, 1-152–
medical. See class VIII noncommunications deception, 1-158
method, area defense, 7-34 9-61 fundamentals, 1-144–1-162
mobile defense, 7-24 offensive actions, 1-146–1-151
north of the DMZ, air force
military, ideology, 1-49 underground facilities, 7-99– officer reconnaissance patrol,
policy, 1-51–1-52 7-104 5-86
military principles, fundamentals, defensive operations in open, 5-24
1-48–1-79 complex OEs, 7-82–7-107 operational security, 1-67
military ideology, 1-49 fortified tank positions, 7-92–
organization, air defense
military policy, 1-51–1-52 7-94
operations, D-2–D-3
military strategy, 1-53–1-57 hardened artillery sites, 7-87–
airborne units, I-11
national objectives, 1-50 7-91
amphibious brigades, I-14
principles of war, 1-58–1-71 infantry company strongpoint,
antitank operations, C-2–C-3
tactical doctrine, 1-72–1-79 7-95–7-96
army sniper brigades, I-10
logistics facilities, 7-105–7-107
military strategy, military aviation operations, B-2–B-4
navy underground facilities,
principles, 1-53–1-57 CBRN and obscurant
7-97–7-98
mixed tactics, 1-56–1-57 operations, G-3
quick, decisive war, 1-55 nuclear weapons. See also corps artillery group, A-6
surprise attack, 1-54 CBRN, G-8–G-9 deep artillery reconnaissance
mission units, 2-37 battalions, I-16
O
division artillery group, A-5
mixed tactics, 1-56–1-57 observer team and observation electronic warfare operations,
mobile defense, defensive arrays, post, 5-66–5-68 E-3–E-5
7-25 OEs, fundamentals, 1-1–1-16 organization (continued)
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 Index-7

Index
engineer operations, F-2–F-7 functional organization of principles of war, annihilation,

fires support operations, A-2– elements, 7-11 1-68
A-6 functional organization of combined operations, 1-69
indirect fire C2, A-3 forces, 7-10 initiative, 1-66
light infantry brigades, I-8–I-9 planned defense, 7-8 maneuverability, 1-65
light infantry divisions, I-15 situational defense, 7-9 mass and dispersion, 1-63–
logistics operations, H-2–H-3 planning the offense, forms of 1-64
navy sniper brigades, I-12–I-13 army offensive maneuver, military principles, 1-58–1-71
reconnaissance battalions, I-5 6-12–6-19 mobility, 1-70
reconnaissance brigades, I-6– functional organization of operational security, 1-67
I-7 elements, 6-21 rear area protection, 1-71
regimental artillery group, A-4 functional organization of surprise, 1-61–1-62
SOF operations, I-4–I-16 forces, 6-20 two-front war, 1-59–1-60
organizing, for a reconnaissance offensive actions, 6-9–6-21 protect key capabilities, 1-137
attack, 6-134 planned offense, 6-10 protected units, 2-50
for an ambush, 6-117 situational offense, 6-11
for an assault, 6-106 protection and security measures,
platoon combat formations, C3D, 9-74–9-76
organizing battle position actions, executing the offense, 6-36– components of EIW, 9-69–9-78
defense zones, 7-73–7-74 6-39 counterreconnaissance, 9-72–
security zones, 7-71–7-72 line formation, 6-39 9-73
tactical defensive actions— V formation, 6-38 information and operational
elements, 7-70–7-74 wedge formation, 6-37 security, 9-77–9-78
P platoons and squads, 3-70–3-74 provide an alternative
p’och’o. See besetment maneuver preclusion, 1-109–1-112 understanding of an OE, 1-123
p’owi. See encirclement maneuver prepare, actions on contact, 4-14 proximity fuse jammers, 9-32
air assault defense actions, psychological warfare, 9-82–9-87
paramilitary forces, 3-8 4-93
penetration maneuver, 6-14 all-arms air defense, 4-81 public affairs, 9-88
perception management, break contact, 4-34 purpose of battle drills, battle
components of EIW, 9-79–9-91 counterreconnaissance, 5-109 drills, 4-1–4-8
media manipulation, 9-89–9-90 disruption actions, 4-67 conditions, 4-5–4-6
psychological warfare, 9-82– fire and maneuver, 4-55 standards, 4-7–4-8
9-87 fixing, 4-25 tasks, 4-3–4-4
public affairs, 9-88 situational breach, 4-43 purpose of counterstability
target audiences, 9-91 prepare for contingencies, actions, 8-1
personal demand items. See class preparing for the offense, 6-25 purpose of the defense, defend
VI preparing the defense, 7-16 key terrain, 7-5
petroleum, oils, and lubricants. preparing counterstability actions, defensive actions, 7-1–7-6
See class III 8-18 gain time, 7-6
preparing for the offense, conduct inflict grave casualties, 7-4
physical destruction, 9-62–9-68 repulse a superior force, 7-3
mobility preparations, 6-24
plan, actions on contact, 4-13 purpose of the offense, attack to
maintain contact, 6-23
air assault defense actions, dislocate, 6-7
offensive actions, 6-22–6-26
4-92 attack to disrupt, 6-8
prepare for contingencies, 6-25
all-arms air defense, 4-80 attack to gain control of key
rehearse key mission tasks,
break contact, 4-33 assets, 6-5
6-26
counterreconnaissance, 5-108 attack to gain freedom of
disruption actions, 4-66 preparing the defense, allocate
logistics, 7-15 movement, 6-3
fire and maneuver, 4-54 attack to gain information, 6-6
fixing, 4-24 conduct countermobility and
survivability preparations, attack to restrict freedom of
situational breach, 4-42 movement, 6-4
7-14
planned, defense, 7-8 offensive actions, 6-1–6-8
defensive actions, 7-12–7-17
offense, 6-10
deny enemy information, 7-13 Q
planning counterstability actions, prepare for contingencies, 7-16
8-2–8-10 quick, decisive war, 1-55
planning the defense, defensive 7-17 R
actions, 7-7–7-11 prevent access facilitation, 1-126 raid, 6-119–6-125
rail transportation, H-29–H-32
Index-8 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Index
rear, area command post, 3-25 functional organization, 6-129– reconnaissance formations,
area protection, 1-71 6-133 5-79–5-89
guard, 5-146–5-148 organizing, 6-134 redirect support, 1-141
reconnaissance, 9-104 reconnaissance and security
methods, 5-32 regimental artillery group, A-4
ambush, 5-31
by fire, 5-30 support for, 6-137–6-142 regiments, 3-58–3-60
company, 5-91 tactical offensive actions— regional operations, 1-89–1-90
detachment, 5-93 elements, 6-126–6-142
regular-force instability activities,
fires system, 5-8–5-12 reconnaissance battalion, 8-25–8-28
intelligence, surveillance, and organization, I-5
target acquisition. See reconnaissance formations,
preparing for the offense, 6-26
RISTA 5-92
preparing the defense, 7-17
methods, 5-63 reconnaissance brigade,
objective, 5-47 reliability, 5-54
organization, I-6–I-7
planning, 5-35–5-40 reconnaissance formations, repair parts. See class IX
platoon, 5-90 5-94–5-95 report, air assault defense actions,
team, 5-69–5-78 4-96
reconnaissance formations,
reconnaissance and security, 5-1– observer team and observation all-arms air defense, 4-83
5-181 post, 5-66–5-68 repulse a superior force, 7-3
defensive security formations, reconnaissance and security,
5-164–5-181 reserve, area defense, 7-41
5-64–5-95 command post, 3-26–3-27
methods, 5-18–5-32 reconnaissance battalion, 5-92
reconnaissance formations, elements, 7-68
reconnaissance brigade, 5-94– enabling units, 2-51
5-64–5-95 5-95
reconnaissance fundamentals, mobile defense, 7-32
reconnaissance company, units, 4-132
5-46–5-55 5-91
reconnaissance missions, reconnaissance detachment, RISTA system, 5-5–5-7
5-56–5-63 5-93 road transportation, H-33–H-35
security fundamentals, 5-96– reconnaissance patrol, 5-79– route, reconnaissance, 5-58
5-102 5-89 security, 5-161–5-163
security missions, 5-103–5-163 reconnaissance platoon, 5-90
ruses, 9-45
reconnaissance and security reconnaissance team, 5-69–
methods, 5-18–5-32 5-78 S
aerial reconnaissance, 5-28 reconnaissance fundamentals, salvage, H-40–H-42
dismounted reconnaissance, accuracy, 5-53
5-22–5-26 sanctuary, 1-113–1-116
aggressiveness, 5-50
electromagnetic spectrum continuity, 5-48–5-49 screen, moving screen, 5-124–
technical sensors multidirectional, 5-55 5-126
reconnaissance, 5-29 objective, 5-47 security missions, 5-115–5-126
mounted reconnaissance, 5-27 reconnaissance and security, stationary screen, 5-121–5-123
reconnaissance ambush, 5-31 5-46–5-55 secure secrets. See operational
reconnaissance attack, 5-32 reliability, 5-54 security
reconnaissance by fire, 5-30 timeliness, 5-51–5-52 security, objective, 5-100
reconnaissance and security reconnaissance missions, area units, 2-40–2-41
operations, 5-1–5-17 reconnaissance, 5-59–5-60
integrated fires system, 5-13– security fundamentals, maintain
reconnaissance and security, enemy contact, 5-102
5-17 5-56–5-63
reconnaissance fires system, reconnaissance and security,
reconnaissance methods, 5-63 5-96–5-102
5-8–5-12 route reconnaissance, 5-58
RISTA system, 5-5–5-7 security objective, 5-100
special reconnaissance, 5-62 timely warning, 5-101
reconnaissance and security zone reconnaissance, 5-61
plans, preparation, and security missions, area security,
reconnaissance patrol, combat 5-159–5-160
execution, 5-33–5-45 reconnaissance patrol, 5-87
information flow and counterreconnaissance,
commander's reconnaissance 5-106–5-114
communications, 5-41–5-45 patrol, 5-85
reconnaissance planning, cover, 5-149–5-158
independent reconnaissance guard, 5-127–5-148
5-35–5-40 patrol, 5-88–5-89 reconnaissance and security,
reconnaissance attack, executing, officer reconnaissance patrol, 5-103–5-163
6-135–6-136 5-86
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 Index-9

Index
security missions (continued) south of the DMZ, 7-108 tactical doctrine, air force and
route security, 5-161–5-163 special, operations forces. See navy employment, 1-78
screen, 5-115–5-126 SOF C3D, 1-75
security zones, defensive zones, reconnaissance, 5-62 echelon forces, 1-76–1-77
2-9–2-11 military principles, 1-72–1-79
spoiling attack, 6-84–6-86 sustainment, 1-74
organizing battle position
actions, 7-71–7-72 standards, 4-7–4-8 terrain appreciation, 1-79
seize tactical opportunities, stationary screen, 5-121–5-123 tactical offensive actions—
executing the defense, 7-21 strategic, environment, 1-4–1-14 elements, 6-97–6-142
executing the offense, 6-43 Force, 3-6 ambush, 6-111–6-118
operations, 1-86–1-88 assault, 6-100–6-110
semi-open, 5-23 functional organization of
service component organizations, subsistence. See class I
offensive elements, 6-98–
air force, 3-5 subterranean area actions, 6-99
army, 3-3 complex terrain operations, raid, 6-119–6-125
force structure and formations, 4-121–4-133 reconnaissance attack, 6-126–
3-2–3-10 main defense units, 4-130– 6-142
internal security forces, 3-9– 4-131
tactical terms, symbols, and
3-10 reserve units, 4-132
control measures, area of
navy, 3-4 support units, 4-133
operations, 2-3–2-4
paramilitary forces, 3-8 subterranean operations, functional tactics, 2-1–2-21
SOF, 3-7 defensive operations in unit symbols, 2-21
Strategic Force, 3-6 complex OEs, 7-81 zones, 2-5–2-20
shape the OE, 1-42 offensive operations in
tactical-level EIW, 9-1–9-4
signals reconnaissance, 9-24– complex OEs, 6-147–6-152
tactical-level organization of
9-27 support, elements, 7-69
irregular forces, criminal
simple battle position, 7-61 zones, 2-15–2-16
organizations, 3-83–3-88
simulative electronic deception, support for a reconnaissance force structure and formations,
9-58 attack, 6-137–6-142 3-75–3-93
aviation, 6-139 guerrilla units, 3-81–3-82
situational, defense, 7-9 EIW, 6-142 insurgent organizations, 3-79–
offense, 6-11 engineer, 6-140 3-80
situational breach, battle drills, fires, 6-138 noncombatants, 3-91–3-93
4-39–4-47 logistics, 6-141 terrorist groups, 3-89–3-90
continue mission, 4-47 support units, enabling units, 2-49 tactical-level organization of
execute—isolate, 4-44 subterranean area actions, regular forces, battalions, 3-61–
execute—penetrate, 4-46 4-133 3-63
execute—secure, 4-45
supporting units, 3-14 combat division force structure,
plan, 4-42
surprise, 1-61–1-62 3-41–3-51
prepare, 4-43
attack, 1-54 companies, 3-64–3-66
slow and disrupt deployment, corps, 3-38–3-40
1-131 sustainment, 1-74 detachments, 3-67–3-69
smoke and flame weapons, G-10– systems warfare, EIW, 9-13 force structure and formations,
G-12 multi-domain extended 3-36–3-74
SOF, instability activities, 8-29– battlefield, 1-107–1-108 maneuver brigades, 3-55–3-57
8-30 platoons and squads, 3-70–
T 3-74
service component
tactical defensive actions— regiments, 3-58–3-60
organizations, 3-7
elements, 7-60–7-78 SOF, 3-52–3-54
tactical-level organization of
complex battle position, 7-62– target audiences, 9-91
regular forces, 3-52–3-54
7-63
SOF operations, I-1–I-20 executing defense of a battle targets, 9-29
capabilities and limitations, position, 7-75–7-78 tasks, 4-3–4-4
I-17–I-19 functional organization of a terrain appreciation, 1-79
employment and integration in battle position, 7-64–7-69
combined arms, I-20 organizing battle position terrorism and mission task
functional overview, I-1–I-3 actions, 7-70–7-74 execution, actions within South
organization, I-4–I-16 simple battle position, 7-61 Korea, 8-33–8-45
attack on the Blue House,
songbun, 1-25–1-27
8-37–8-45
Index-10 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Index
use of terrorism, 8-34–8-36 limited-objective attack, 6-81– W

terrorist groups, 3-89–3-90 6-96 water transportation, H-38–H-39
threat actions within an OE, 1-15– U weapons of mass destruction. See
1-16 uhoe. See turning maneuver also CBRN, 1-45–1-47
threats and criminal activity, 8-11– unarmed noncombatants, 3-93 wedge formation, company
8-17 combat formations, 6-33
unit symbols, 2-21 platoon combat formations,
thrust maneuver, 6-15
unmanned aircraft support to the 6-37
time and tempo, 1-43–1-44 army, B-15–B-16 windows of opportunity, 9-14
timeliness, 5-51–5-52 urban operations, defensive
timely warning, 5-101 operations in complex OEs, X-Y-Z
tolp’a. See penetration maneuver 7-80 zone reconnaissance, 5-61
offensive operations in zones, attack zones, 2-18
transitional operations, 1-91–1-94
complex OEs, 6-144–6-146 defensive zones, 2-8–2-16
turning maneuver, 6-17
urban or rural area actions, kill boxes, 2-20
two-front war, 1-59–1-60 4-107–4-111 kill zones, 2-19
types of defensive action—forces, use of terrorism, 8-34–8-36 of reconnaissance
7-22–7-59 responsibility, 2-17
area defense, 7-33–7-59 V offensive zones, 2-7
mobile defense, 7-23–7-32 V formation, company combat tactical terms, symbols, and
types of offensive action—forces, formations, 6-34 control measures, 2-5–2-20
6-44–6-96 platoon combat formations,
attack, 6-46–6-80 6-38
24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 Index-11

ATP 7-100.2
24 July 2020
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
JAMES C. MCCONVILLE
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
KATHLEEN S. MILLER
Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary of the Army
2020204
DISTRIBUTION:
Distributed in electronic media only (EMO).
PIN:206885-000

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What is the publication about?

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What are some key North Korean military principles discussed?

What are some key North Korean military principles discussed?

ATP 7-100.

NORTH KOREAN TACTICS

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Headquarters, Department of the Army

North Korean Tactics

PART ONE NORTH KOREAN FORCES

PART TWO NORTH KOREAN ACTIONS

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

Purpose of Battle Drills ............................................................................................. 4-1

ii ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Appendix D AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS ................................................................................ D-1

24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 iii

Figure 3-17. Relevant population relationships to irregular forces .............................................. 3-23

iv ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Figure 6-13. Raid (example)......................................................................................................... 6-28

24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 v

Table 6-1. Known North Korean infiltration tunnels ..................................................................... 6-36

vi ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 vii

viii ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

PART ONE—NORTH KOREAN FORCES

PART TWO—NORTH KOREAN ACTIONS

24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 ix

x ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Introductory Table. Unit conversions

Type Metric English

Area 1 square kilometer 0.38610 square miles

Area 1 square meter 10.7639 square feet

Distance 1 meter (m) 3.28084 feet

Distance 1 centimeter (cm) 0.39370 inches

Distance 1 kilometer (km) 0.62137 miles

Speed 1 kilometer per hour (kph) 0.62137 miles per hour

Speed 1 meter per second (mps) 3.28084 feet per second

Weapon bore size 1 millimeter (mm) 0.03937 inches

Weapon bore size 1 millimeter (mm) 0.03937 caliber

Weight 1 kilogram (kg) 2.2046 pounds

Weight 0.90718 metric tons 1 (U.S./short) ton

Volume 3.78541 liters 1 gallon

24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 xi

North Korean Forces

24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 1-1

Table 1-1. Variables of an operational environment

Describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance—

Encompasses individual and group behaviors related to producing, distributing, and

Describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic composition within an operational

Describes the timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions within an

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

1-2 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

Figure 1-1. One strategic environment with numerous operational environments

24 July 2020 ATP 7-100.2 1-3

THREAT ACTIONS WITHIN AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS IN CONFLICT

1-4 ATP 7-100.2 24 July 2020

INTRODUCTION TO NORTH KOREA

HISTORY AND POLITICS