China's New Old Thinking

China's New "Old Thinking": The Concept of Limited Deterrence
Author(s): Alastair Iain Johnston

Source: International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter, 1995-1996), pp. 5-42
Published by: The MIT Press
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China's Nexv
"Old Thinking"
Alastair
IainJohnston
The Concept of Limited Deterrence

One overlookedaspect
of thegrowthof China'spowerin recentyearsis a disturbing
setofideas in
the Chinesemilitaryabout nuclearweapons.' Some of theseideas are old,
othersare new.Whathas not changedin thepost-ColdWarera is a deeply
rootedhardrealpolitik
worldviewthatnuclearweaponsbuy bothsoftpower
(international
statusand influence)and hard power (militarily
operational
power).Whatis new are morecomprehensive
and consistent
doctrinalargumentsin favorof developinga limitedflexibleresponsecapabilityFromthe
late 1980son,Chinesestrategists
have developeda conceptof "limiteddeterrence"(youxianweishe)to describethekindofdeterrent
Chinaoughtto have.
Whilethetheconceptis stillevolving,limiteddeterrence,
to Chinese
according
counterforce
strategists,
requiressufficient
and countervalue
tactical,theater,
or nuclear
and strategic
nuclearforcesto detertheescalationof conventional
is AssistantProfessor
at HarvardUniversity,
wherehe is also a
AlastairIain Johnston
of Government
FacultyAssociatewith the Olin Instituteof StrategicStudiesand theFairbankCenterfor East Asian
Research.
The authorwishes to thankPatrickGarrityand the participantsin the CenterforNational Security
Studies Workshop on Regional Nuclear Forces and the Future of Nuclear Weapons, and Karl
Paul Godwin, LisbethGronlund,Harlan Jencks,Stan Norris,Michael Pillsbury,David
Eikenberry,
Shambaugh, David Wright,and especiallyTom Christensenforcomments,criticism,and input.A
numberof U.S. and Chinese officialswho must remainnameless also deserve much thanks.None
of these people is responsibleforthe analysis.
1. JohnLewis's group at Stanfordhas produced excellenthistoriesof theChinese nuclearweapons
program.See JohnWilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds theBomb(Stanford,Calif.: Stanford
UniversityPress, 1988); John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs:
Security,
Vol. 17, No. 2 (Fall 1992),pp. 5-36; and John
Technologies,Strategies,Goals," International
in theNuclearAge
Lewis and Xue Litai,China'sStrategicSeapower:ThePoliticsofForceModernization
(Stanford,Calif.: StanfordUniversityPress, 1994). Chong-pinLin has writtenan importantstudy
of nuclear thinkingup to the mid-1980s;Lin, China's Nuclear WeaponsStrategy:Traditionwithin
Evolution(Lexington,Mass.: LexingtonBooks, 1988). But thereare only a handful of articleson
doctrinal issues in the late 1980s. See Harlan Jencks,"PRC Nuclear and Space Programs,"in
on PLA Affairs
1987 (Kaohsiung: Sun Yat-senCenterforPolicyStudies,
RichardYang, ed., Yearbook
1988); ArthurS. Ding, "PLA in the Year 2000: Nuclear Force and Space Program,"in RichardYang,
ed., Yearbookon PLA Affairs1988-89 (Kaohsiung: Sun Yat-sen Center for Policy Studies, 1989);
J.Mohan Malik, "Chinese Debate on MilitaryStrategy:Trendsand Portents,"JournalofNortheast
Asian Studies,Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer 1990),pp. 3-32; and Xue Litai,"Evolution of China's Nuclear
Strategy,"in JohnC. Hopkins and WeixingHu, eds., StrategicViewsfromtheSecondTier:TheNuclear
WeaponsPoliciesofFrance,Britain,and China (New Brunswick,N.J.:Transaction,1995).
Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter1995/96),pp. 5-42
International
Security,
? 1995 by the Presidentand Fellows of Harvard College and the MassachusettsInstituteof Technology.

International
Security20:3 | 6
shouldbe sufficient
to controlescalation
war.Ifdeterrence
fails,thiscapability
and to compeltheenemyto backdown.
to implement
this
Chinadoes notpresently
havetheoperationalcapabilities
however.Rather,
appearsto establish
visionoflimiteddeterrence,
thedoctrine
ofcapabilities
fromwhichBeijingmustchoosewithintheeconomic,
a wish-list
thenuclearprogramfaces.To the
technological,
and armscontrolconstraints
Chinamaywellpursuethe
extentthattheseconstraints
areliftedor modified,
developmentof forcesto suitthisdoctrine.Whetheror not China's leaders
decideto "storm"thenuclearprogramand to doubleor tripleChina'squanofits
aboutthecredibility
titative
capabilities
depends,in part,on perceptions
deterrent
in thefaceof U.S. ballisticmissiledefense(BMD) systems.Even if
thereis no surgein the size of Chineseforces,we shouldexpectChina to
ballistic
continuethedevelopment
of moreaccuratemobileinter-continental
a larger
missiles(ICBMs),a limitedsub-strategic
nuclearmissilecapability,
thatwill
technologies
submarine-launched
ballisticmissile(SLBM) capability,
ofwarheadsin thefaceofspace and ground-based
improvethepenetrability
and intelligence
(C31)necBMD, and thecommand,control,
communications,
levelsofnuclearconfrontation.
nuclearforcesat different
essaryfordirecting
Recentcommentary
on Chinesenuclearforceshas missedmanyof these
and has underestimated
doctrinalarguments
thedegreeof innovationgoing
in the last eightor so years.2
on withinthe militarystrategycommunity
Westernscholarshipon Chinesenuclearthinkinghas been hamperedby a
dearthof authoritative
materials.Butin recentyearsa relativefloodof new,
heretofore
untappedprimarymaterialspublishedin militaryjournalsand
books by strategists
associatedwiththe Academyof MilitarySciences,the
the GeneralStaffDepartment(GSD), and the
NationalDefenseUniversity,
among
StrategicMissileForces(SMF-also knownas the Second Artillery),
Thisarticle
othermilitary
libraries.
units,has madeitswayintoU.S. university
on Chinesenuclearthinking
by lookingat
beginsto fillthegap in scholarship
thearguments
aboutnucleardoctrinethathave appearedin thesesources.
The articlebeginswitha brieflook at thepast and presentroleof nuclear
weapons in Chinesesecuritypolicy,and thenmoves to a discussionof the
centralelementsoflimiteddeterrence
as definedby Chinesestrategists.
While
conclusions
in Chinaarenecessarily
aboutnuclearthinking
tentative
giventhe
intensesecrecythatsurrounds
theprimary
materials
used
thenuclearprogram,
2. See, forinstance,Hua Di's commentsin the New YorkTimes,October26, 1994,p. A10; and Xue,
"Evolution of China's Nuclear Strategy"

China'sNew"Old Thinking"
|7
insightsintothearguments
ofnuclear
in thisarticleprovidesomeintriguing
The articlethenfocuseson the gap betweenthe operationalrestrategists.3
oflimiteddeterrence
and current
Chinesenuclearcapabilities,
and
quirements
someofthevariablesthatmightaffect
closureofthisgap.
The Role ofNuclearWeapons

and strategists
havedisplayeda consistently
realpolitik
China'sdecision-makers
worldviewsince1949.Even as China has becomemoreengagedin internain the1980sand 1990s,thepreferred
tionaleconomicand security
institutions
ofterritorial
endshavepredominantly
remainedthepreservation
and
integrity
the defenseof politicalpower by the communist
foreignpolicyautonomy,
with
commensurate
leadershipin Beijing,and thegrowthofChina'sinfluence
theworldis,
its self-ascribed
statusas a majorpower.Fromthisperspective,
and materialinterests
arebest
in themain,a threatening
place wheresecurity
A richstateand a strong
or unilateralsecurity.4
preservedthroughself-help
linked,and formthebasic road to
army(fuguo qiangbing)are inextricably
security.5
Giventhisworldview,
China'sleadersand strategists
alikehave been conconcerned
aboutChina'srelativemilitary
power.Mao Zedongwas no
sistently
Ludditeand he believedthatChinahad to reachthemostadvanced
strategic
worldlevels in air,sea, land,and nuclearcapabilitiesin orderforChina to
on nuclearstrategy
Recentwritings
have
"standup" in international
politics.6
the
also made the generalpointthatthe greaterone's military
capabilities,
3. All translationsof titlesand quotations in these materialsare the author's, unless indicated
otherwise.
4. See, forinstance,Li Shisheng,"Guanyu guoji xin zhixu ji ge wenti de tan tao" (A preliminary
discussion of several problems relatingto the new internationalorder), Shijiejingji yu zhengzhi
(Worldeconomicsand politics) [hereafter,
Shijiejingji],No. 10 (1992); Gu Yan, "Duli zizhu shi Mao
Zedong waijiao sixiang de linghun" (Independence and autonomy is the spiritof Mao Zedong's
foreignpolicy thinking),Shijiejingji,No. 2 (1994); Zhao Huaipu and Lu Yang, "Quanli zhengzhi
yu xianghuyicun" (Power politicsand interdependence),Shijiejingji,No. 7 (1993). For a discussion
of the social-Darwinianflavorof Chinese analyses of internationaleconomics,see Huang Yasheng,
"China in the New InternationalPolitical Economy: Perspectives and Problems" (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Center forInternationalAffairs[CFIA], unpublished ms., 1995).
5. Chen Chongbei, Shou Xiaosong, and Liang Xiaoqiu, Weishezhanlue(Deterrencestrategy)(Beijing: Academy of MilitarySciences, 1989) pp. 200-205.
ji qi fazhan(The formationand development
6. Song Shilun,Mao Zedongjunshisixiangde xingcheng
of Mao Zedong's militarythought)(Beijing:Academy of MilitarySciences Press, 1984), pp. 214GrandStrategy,
DomesticMobilizationand Sino215; and Thomas J.Christensen,UsefulAdversaries:
chap. 6.
1947-1958 (Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,forthcoming),
AmericanConflict,

Security20:3 | 8
International
greatertheawesomenessofthestate,and themorelikelyone is to determine

outcomesto one's advantage.7
conflict
have agreed
Chineseleadersand strategists
Giventhiscausal relationship,
interboth
China's
thatnuclearweaponscan play a criticalrolein improving
power.8Nuclearweaponshave beenseenas a
nationalstatusand itsmilitary
ticketintothe majorpower club. Mao remarkedin early1958,"As forthe
atomicbomb,thisbig thing,withoutitpeople say you don'tcountformuch.
stated
oneChinesestrategist
Fine,thenwe shouldbuildsome."9Morerecently,
nuclearpower,people would look
plainly:"If [China]did nothave strategic
majorpowerstatuswould be hardto estabdownupon us and our country's
lishand preserve.'10
have agreedthatnuclearweapons,in addiChineseleadersand strategists
utilityIn the 1960sand 1970s,
tionto buyingstatus,have a generalmilitary
forinstance,
acquisitiondecisionsweredrivenin partby a desireto be able to
Thisfaithin themilitargets.11
hitspecificcountervalue
and softcounterforce
taryvalue of nuclearweapons has not waveredmuchsince.In 1983,Deng
7. Liang Minglun and Zhao Youzi, "Shilun wo jun weilai hetong zhanyi zuozhan de zongti
gouxiang" (Preliminarydiscussion of the comprehensivenotion of our military'sfuturecoordicampaigns),in National Defense UniversityResearchDepartment,ed., Gaojishu
nated war-fighting
ju bu zhanzhengyu zhanyizhanfa(High techlimitedwar and campaign methods) (Beijing:National
Defense University[NDUI Press, 1994) p. 88; Liu Zhenwu and Meng Shaoying, Xiandaijundui
zhihui(The command of modern militaryforces)(Beijing:NDU Press, 1993), pp. 408-409.
8. As Mao's commentsin a speech to the Politburoin April 1956 implied,nuclear weapons could
improveboth China's influenceand status,as well as its abilityto deterthe U.S. threat:"If we are
not to be bullied in thisworld,we cannotdo withoutthe bomb." Mao Zedong, "On the Ten Major
Relationships"(speech April 25, 1956),in SelectedWorksofMao Zedong(Beijing:People's Publishing
House, 1977), Vol. 5, p. 288. As a result,the ballisticmissile and nuclear weapons programhas
been a top priorityof the state science,technology,and militarybureaucracies,and accordingto
theCIA, consumed about two-thirdsofmilitaryR&D fundsthroughthelate 1970s.See U.S. Central
IntelligenceAgency,ChineseDefenseSpending,1965-79 (Washington,D.C.: National ForeignAssessmentCenter,July1980), p. 5; and Lewis and Xue, China BuildstheBomb.
9. Huang Cisheng and Wang Lincong, "Shilun Mao Zedong de he zhanlue sixiang" (Preliminary
discussion of Mao Zedong's thinkingon nuclear strategy),in Quan jun Mao Zedongjunshisixiang
xueshutaolunwenjing xuan (Selected essays fromthe all-Armyacademic meetingon Mao Zedong's
militarythought)(Beijing:Academy of MilitarySciences Press, 1992), Vol. 1, p. 602.
10. Su Qianming,"Shilun changgui liliangyu zhanlue he weishe liliang xiang jiehe" (Preliminary
discussion of the linkages between conventionalpower and strategicnuclear deterrencepower),
in ibid., Vol. 2, p. 566. In the words of a 1993 study on militarycommand,China's nuclear forces
are an "importantpillarof our country'sgreatpower status."Liu and Meng, Xiandaijundui zhihui,
p. 391. The mere possession of nuclear weapons is not sufficientto bestow major power status,
however. Some argued that China had to maintaina level at least comparable to that of other
"middle level nuclearpowers" (e.g., Franceand Britain),or else it could lose its importantposition
in the strategictriangle.See Yang Xuhua and Cai Renzhao, Junshiweishexue gailun (Introduction
to militarydeterrence)(Taiyuan: Shuhai Press, 1989) p. 303.
11. Lewis and Hua, "China's BallisticMissile Programs."

I9
Xiaopingdescribedthebasicdeterrent
effect
ofnuclearweaponsthisway:"You
have some [nuclearmissiles],and we also have some.If you wantto destroy
willreceivesomeretaliation."
us, thenyou yourself
Even afterDeng's "strategic
decision"of 1985thatChinano longerhad to
prepareto fightan early,large-scaleand nuclearwar,12and even afterthe
roleofnuclearweaponshas
collapseoftheSovietUnionin 1991,themilitary
not changedappreciablyin commentary
As a recent
by Chinesestrategists.
missileforces"enoranalysisof militarycommandnoted,China's strategic
our army'sreal powerand nucleardeterrence
mouslystrengthen
capability,
out our country's
and are playingan increasingly
rolein carrying
important
activedefensestrategy."13
The military
security
value of nuclearweapons,moreover,
promisesto inAn interagency
crease,accordingto manyChinesestrategists.
meetingin February1987 organizedby the GeneralStaffDepartment's(GSD) chemical
defensedepartment"4
concludedthatsince otherstateswere continuing
to
developnuclearand chemicalweapons,thennuclearwar in thefuturecould
notbe completely
ruledout.China'smilitary
had tobe preparedtofight
under
5
1985
the
decision.
nuclearand chemicalwarfareconditions,
despite
strategic
A 1988studyoflimitednuclearwarconcludedthat"nuclearweaponsnotonly
butrather
willdevelopcontinuously;
cannotbe pushedoffthestageofwarfare,
16
the questionis how to develop the role theywill play in futurewars."
12. The strategicdecision in 1985 codifieda more relaxed estimateof the probabilityof a massive
Soviet thrustinto China fromthe northand northwest,based on the expanding Sino-American
strategicrelationshipand improvedSino-Sovietrelations.
13. Liu and Meng, Xiandaijundui zhihui,p. 391. A study of combined operationsnoted that"only
by possessing a great power to destroythe enemy can we decide the fateof a war, increase the
deterrent."Liang and Zhao,
awesomeness ofour armyand state,and produce a long-termeffective
"Shilun wo jun weilai hetong zhanyi," p. 88. See also Zhang Baotang, "Dui xin shiqi zhanlue
daodan budui zhanlue jianshe ji ge wenti de chu tan" (Initial explorationof several questions
relatingto the strategyfor building the StrategicMissile Forces in the new period), in NDU
Research Department,MilitaryConstructionResearch Institute,ed., Junduixiandaihuajianshede
sikao(Thoughtson the building of a modernized military)(Beijing:NDU Press, 1988), p. 412.
14. The GSD chemical defense departmenthandles nuclear,chemical, and biological weapons
defense issues, including the nuclear explosion detectionnetwork,civil defense activities,and
nuclear and chemical de-contaminationforces.See General StaffDepartmentChemical Defense
Department,ed., Fang hua bingshi (The historyof the chemical defense troops) (Beijing:Peoples
LiberationArmyPress, 1990). Otherinstitutionsrepresentedat the meetingincluded the Ministry
of ForeignAffairs(MFA), Ministryof Nuclear Industry,Ministryof Health, the Operations and
IntelligenceDepartmentsof the GSD, the Academy of MilitarySciences (AMS), and the National
Defense University
15. Ibid., p. 182.
16. Hu Yanlin, "Weilai zhanzheng hen keneng shi yi chang you xian he zhanzheng" (The future
war could very well be a limitednuclear war), in NDU CurriculumResearch Office,ed., Junshi
sixiangluncong(Essays series on militarythought)(Beijing:NDU Press, 1988), p. 373.

International
Security20:3 | 10
Anotheranalystarguedthatin thepost-ColdWarperiod,improvedpolitical
relationsbetweentheUnitedStatesand Russia,drasticcutsin theirarsenals,
and increasedattention
towardsconventional
have
high-tech
regionalconflicts
But
all reducedthedeterrent
value of nuclearweaponsforthesuperpowers.
formedium-size
since
nuclearstates,theroleofnuclearweaponswillincrease,
of thesestateson the
thereare inherent
contradictions
betweentheinterests
one handand U.S. hegemony
and itsvisionofa newworldorderon theother.
Moreover,
non-nuclear
but "nuclearoriented"stateswillcontinuetheirefforts
to developnuclearweapons,and improvetheirstatusand bargaining
power
in regionalpolitics.Thus,byimplication,
Chinawillcontinued
to neednuclear
weapons.'7
RecentInnovationsin ChineseNuclearThinking
Giventhedearthof open Chinesematerialson China'snucleardoctrineand
forceposture,18therehas been some debateamongWesternscholarsas to
preciselyhow Chinesestrategists
have thoughtabout the utilityof nuclear
weapons.Therehavebeen threegeneralviewsin theWest.The firsthas used
"minimum
deterrence"
to characterize
Chinesenucleardoctrine:
theChinese,
it is argued,believe thata small numberof warheadssufficient
to inflict
on
unacceptabledamage a handfulof enemycitiesconstitutes
a credibledeterrent.
China'sforcestructure-by
the1980srelying
on aroundfifty
primarily
inaccurate
inter-continental
and intermediate-range
single-warhead,
relatively
ballisticmissiles(ICBMsand IRBMs)-could do nothingelse.19A secondview
17. Suo Kaiming,"The Role of Nuclear Weapons on the Future,"paper presentedto International
School on Disarmamentand Research on Conflicts[ISODARCO] Beijing Arms ControlSeminar,
October 1992, pp. 4-7. Accordingto anothermilitaryauthor,"followingthe continuousdevelopment and improvementin science and technology,[China] will certainlyhave the capabilitiesto
approach and catchup to the advanced countriesin termsof the qualityof nuclear weapons." Su,
"Shilun changgui liliang,"pp. 565, 568. For a similarexhortation,see Yang and Cai, Junshiweishe,
p. 306.
18. Lewis and Hua contend thatup until the early 1980s,therewere very few discussions about
strategyto guide technicaldecisions made by warhead or missile designers.See Lewis and Hua,
"China's BallisticMissile Programs,"pp. 5-6. This is confirmedby the small numberof articleson
nuclear strategyfrom1974-87 in JunshiXueshu(MilitaryStudies), an authoritativemilitaryjournal
that is limited to officersat the regimentlevel and above. See Zhao Qinde and Wu Xianshun
eds., Junshixueshu suoyin 1974-1987 (Index to MilitaryStudies) (Beijing: Academy of Military
Sciences, 1988).
19. See Lewis and Hua, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs," p. 21. A senior strategistin the
Academy of Social Sciences, Wu Zhan, acknowledged that many Westernanalysts thoughtthat
the term "minimum deterrence"best described Chinese forces.See Wu Zhan, "Shilun zhanlue
jingong wuqi" (Preliminarydiscussion of strategicoffensiveweapons), in Meiguo yanjiu cankao

I 11
contendsthatChinesestrategists
have nevergenuinelyacceptedminimum
or
deterrence,
but insteadlean towardsome formof limitedwar-fighting
A
view
ofChina's
flexibleresponse.20 third
has focusedon the"Chineseness"
deterrent:
China has been deeply influencedby a strategictraditionthat
stressesminimalism,
flexibility,
and patience.Thus it has conambiguity,
ambiguous
structed
a unique,relatively
smallproto-triad,
hasbeendeliberately
abouttargeting
and launchdoctrine,
and has balancedcautionand bravadoto
keep adversariesuncertainabout theirabilityto achievenuclearor conventionalvictory.21
and strateofChineseofficials
Fuelingthisdebatewas thepublicpropensity
as a description
of whatChinesenuclear
giststo rejecttheterm"deterrence"
stillinsist
forcesweresupposedto do. Even today,some Chinesestrategists
butadheresto a doctrineof "defense"
thatChinadoes notpracticedeterrence
or "self-protection"
And behindthepublicdiscourse,when
(fangyu)
(zi wei).22
ziliao (Referencematerials on American studies), No. 7 (1985). A senior officialin the Ninth
Academy, the institutein charge of nuclear weapon design, used the termto describe Chinese
forces in commentsat the 1994 ISODARCO Beijing Arms Control Seminar. For other characterizationsthat essentially describe minimum deterrence,see Robert Sutter,"Chinese Nuclear
Weapons and Arms Control Policies: Implicationsand Options forthe United States," Congressional ResearchService,ReportforCongress,March 25, 1994, pp. 14-15; and AlastairI. Johnston,
Asian
"Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization:ImplicationsforArms Control,"JournalofNortheast
Studies,Vol. 2, No. 2 (June1983) pp. 13-28.
20. See Jencks,"PRC Nuclear Programs";Malik, "Chinese Debate"; and Paul Godwin, "Changing
Concepts of Doctrine,Strategyand Operations in the Chinese People's LiberationArmy,19781987," China Quarterly,
No. 112 (December 1987), pp. 584-587.
21. Lin, China'sNuclearStrategy.
22. AveryGoldstein reportsthatin his conversationswith Chinese analystsin 1991 theyinsisted
that deterrencewas hegemonisticin charactersince it involved the threatof forceto compel an
adversary to act in a way that was contraryto its interests.See Avery Goldstein,"Robust and
AffordableSecurity:Some Lessons fromtheSecond-RankingPowers During theCold War,"Journal
ofStrategicStudies,Vol. 15, No. 4 (December 1992),p. 516. See also Chen Peiyao, "Ze yang kandai
he weishe zhanlue" (How should we approach nuclear deterrencestrategy?),in Shijiejingji,No. 5
(1987) pp. 39-44; Sun Xiangming,"Zhanlue lilun ji ge wenti zhi wo jian" (My views on several
questions in strategictheory),Zhongguojunshikexue(Chinese militarysciences), No. 3 (1990), in
Renmindaxue,Fuyin baokanziliao-junshi (People's Universityreproduced periodical materialsmilitaryaffairs)[hereafter
Fuyinbaokanziliao-junshi],No. 6 (1990),pp. 65-66; and Hu Guangzheng
and Xiao Xiandu, Yingxiangdao ershiyishijide zhengming
(Contentionthatwill have influenceinto
the 21st century)(Beijing:Peoples LiberationArmyPress, 1989), pp. 139-140. However, fromthe
late 1980s on, particularlyin internalcirculationmaterials,Chinese strategistsincreasinglyused
"deterrence"to characterizethe mission of Chinese forces.See Chen Weimin,"Weishe lilun yu
guofangjianshe" (Deterrencetheoryand national defenseconstruction),Shijiejingji,No. 3 (1989),
p. 47. A recentbook on the U.S.-Sovietarms race and arms controlnoted plainly:"Capitaliststates
use deterrence,socialiststates use deterrence;large states use it, medium and small statesuse it.
We must not only not oppose, but must also take advantage of nucleardeterrencethatis favorable
forpeace and development."Wang Yang, ed., Mei Su junbeijingsaiyu kongzhiyanjiu(Researchin
the U.S.-Soviet arms race and arms control)(Beijing:Academy of MilitarySciences Press, 1993),
p. 172.

20:3 | 12
International
Security
aboutwhatthe
"deterrence"
was used, therewas a fairdegreeof ambiguity
Chinesenucleardoctrine.
termmeantwhenused to characterize
In the last few years,however,in a rangeof newlyavailable materials
publishedin "internal
circulation"
military
journalsand books,one can now
discerntheoutlinesofa roughconsensusaboutnucleardoctrine,
a consensus
thatis closerto the second group of Westernanalyses.Around1987,the
MissileForcesbeganto redresstheneglectofresearchon doctrine
Strategic
by
startingup a nuclearcampaigntheory(zhanyililun)researchprogramthat
focusedon detailedoperationalissues.23Aroundthesame time,theChinese
Navy's MilitaryStudiesResearchInstituteconductedstudieson the use of
withtheSMF's ICBMs.24Out
SLBMs forretaliation
singlyor in coordination
of theseand otherresearchprogramshas comean emergingagreement
that
China shouldrelyon whatis now termed"limitednucleardeterrence"
(you
xianhe weishe).Chinesestrategists
now explicitly
"limiteddeterdistinguish
rence"from"minimum
deterrence"
and fromwhattheysometimes
call "maxioftheUnitedStates
mumdeterrence"
doctrines
(e.g.,counterforce
war-fighting
and theSovietUnion).In limiteddeterrence,
nuclearweaponsplay a critical
role in the deterrence
of bothconventional
and nuclearwars as well as in
if deterrence
escalationcontrol(intrawardeterrence)
fails.In otherwords,
ofminimum
nuclearweaponshavea widerutility
thanproponents
deterrence
would suggest.The deterrent
and war-fighting
value of nuclearweapons,in
theeyesof thesestrategists,
has notdeclinedoverthepast decades,but has,
infact,increased.
Thesearguments
arebasedon twomajorsetsofassumptions,
namely,thattheadventof nuclearweaponsdoes notfundamentally
change
thenatureofwarfare,
and thatdeterrence
restson theoperationalusabilityof
nuclearweapons.Whatfollowsis an analysisoftheseassumptions,
afterwhich
I discusshow theseassumptions
are embodiedin theoperationalconceptsof
limiteddeterrence.
23. These included militarytechnologydevelopmentand its effectson nuclear counterattacks,
the
characterand formof nuclearcounterattacks,
applicationsof nuclearfirepower,the command and
controlof nuclear campaigns, the political and logisticalaspects of nuclear campaigns, training
exercises for nuclear campaigns, the defense and survivabilityof nuclear capabilities,and the
principlesand methodsof the adversary'snuclearattack.See Liu Tieqing,Rong Jiaxin,and Chang
Jinan,"Zhanlue daodan budui zhanyililun tixichuyi" (Our views on thestructureofthe campaign
theoryof the StrategicMissile Forces),in NDU ResearchDepartment,ed., Zhanyijibenlilunxintan
(New explorationsof the basic theoryof campaigns) (Beijing:NDU Press, 1989), pp. 323-324.
24. See Jiang Shenggong, "Dui haijun zhanyi xue lilun tixi de sixiang" (Thinking about the
structureof the theoryof naval campaigns), in ibid., pp. 206-207.

| 13
A NUCLEAR REVOLUTION?
In contrastto U.S. proponentsof theassured-destruction

conceptof deterrence,
who writeon nuclearquestionsexplicitly

mostoftheChinesestrategists
reject
the notionthatnuclearweapons have overturned
Clausewitz'saxiom that
of politics.Theyaccurately
notethearguments
of
warfareis thecontinuation
thenuclearrevolutionists
thatsincenuclearwarwillbe toodifficult
to control,
forall states,therecan be no political
and sincetheoutcomesare so horrific
purposeforwhichnuclearweapons would be worthusing (as opposed to
wielding),but thentheywill go on to criticizethisnormativeargumenton
threegrounds,one descriptive,
one political,and one military.25
Descriptively,according to some Chinese strategists,the causes of nuclear
war and its consequencesare not directly

linked.The causes of nuclearwar
the aggressiveness
of hegemonism,
existobjectively
(interstate
conflict,
etc.)
and are necessarily
politicalsincethedecisionto use nuclearweaponswould
have to be motivatedby some politicalchoiceor goal. The consequencesof
nuclearwar are a resultof suchvariablesas technology,
commandskills,and
26 Thus,whethera statecan objectively
achieveits politicalgoals
geography
through
nuclearwar,andwhethera stateis motivated
by politicalgoalswhen
usingnuclearweapons,aretwodifferent
things.
Thelatterpossibility
stillexists
and thusClausewitz'saxiomcannotbe overturned.27
Politically,the anti-Clausewitzianview of nuclear weapons leads to "blind
opposition"to nuclearweapons,accordingto one analyst.This ignoresthe
25. See Xia Zhengnan, "He zhanzheng bu zai shi zhengzhi de jixu le ma?" (Is nuclear war not the
continuationof politics?),Zhongguojunshikexue(Chinese militaryscience),No. 2 (1989), reprinted
in Fuyinbaokanziliao-junshi, No. 10 (1989), p. 30. For a minorityvoice in defenseof the nuclear
revolutionview, see Zhao Qinxuan, "Shilun he zhanzheng bu zai shi zhengzhi de jixu" (Preliminarydiscussion on nuclear war not being a continuationof politics),Waiguojunshixueshu(Foreign
militarystudies), No. 2 (1989), reprintedin Fuyinbaokanziliao-junshi, No. 5 (1989), pp. 17-19.
26. Wang Pufeng and Guo Shanyi, "He zhanzheng be keneng gaibian 'zhanzheng shi zhengzhi
de jixu' de yuanli" (Nuclear war cannot change the basic principlethat 'war is a continuationof
politics'), Zhongguojunshi kexue(Chinese militaryscience), No. 3 (1990), in Fuyin baokanziliaojunshi,No. 6 (1990),pp. 43-46; Zhao Fusheng and Zhang Chengliang,"He zhanzheng yu zhengzhi
guanxi de sikao" (Thoughts on the relationshipbetween nuclear war and politics),in Quan jun
Mao Zedongjunshi sixiang,Vol. 1, pp. 592-594; Liu Kaitong, "Suowei he shidai luoji yu dang jin
shijie xianshi" (So-called 'logic of the nuclear age' and presentworld reality),in Shijiejingji,No.
12 (1990), p. 34.
27. Fang Diansheng, "He wuqi de faminghe shiyong gaibian bu liao zhanzheng de zhengzhi
benzhi" (The inventionand use of nuclear weapons cannot change the politicalnatureof war), in
NDU CurriculumResearch Office,ed., Junshisixiangluncong(Essay series on militarythought),
(Beijing:NDU Press, 1988), pp. 47-48.

International
Security20:3 | 14
of
objectivefactthatnuclearweaponsexistand that"thecompletedestruction
nuclearweaponsis alreadyimpossible."28
thecritiquegoes,theopponentsofClausewitz'sdictumexaggerate
Militarily,
of
the uncontrollability
of nuclearwar and thus underminethe credibility
deterrence
threats.If a stateis incapableof usingnuclearweapons shortof
The improvokingmutualsuicide,thendeterrence
threatsare notcredible.29
plicationis, then,thatcredibledeterrence
at leastassumesthatnuclearwar is
controllable
and thus,logically,thatthereare achievablepoliticalgoals in
nuclearwar.Some strategists
pointto theGulfWaras a good exampleof the
politicalutilityof nuclearweapons: one Chineseanalysisassertsthatthe
UnitedStatesdeployed800-900nuclearweaponsagainstIraq,and thatusabileffectthatconventional
ity provideda deterrent
weapons could not have
replaced.30
Thepredominant
viewappearstobe thatthenuclearrevolution
does notby
itselfeliminatethe possibilitythatstates(includingChina) can use nuclear
rebutthe
weaponsin wartimeforachievablepoliticalends.Chinesestrategists
normativeargumentthatnuclearweapons are unusablewitha descriptive
to theparadoxesofnucleardeterrence
thatexhibitslittlesensitivity
argument
or to itstechnicaland politicalfragility
WHAT DETERS?
Thereis stillsome ambiguity

amongChinesestrategists
aboutwhatdetersa
nuclearattackin thefirstplace.31In discussionsoftheU.S.-Soviet"balanceof
one oftenfindsthe argumentthatthe crediblethreatof inflicting
terror,"
thesourceof deterrence.
unacceptabledamageon theenemyis, in principle,
Oftena discussionofdeterrence
on thethree
beginsby citingHenryKissinger
thecapability
to inflict
mainelementsofdeterrence:
unacceptable
damage,the
28. Zhang Jianzhi,"Dui caijun jiben lilun wenti de tantao" (Preliminaryinvestigationof questions
concerningthe basic theoryof disarmament),in Guoji caijundouzhengyu Zhongguo(China and the
internationaldisarmamentstruggle)(Beijing:CurrentAffairsPress, 1987), p. 52.
29. Wang and Guo, "He zhanzheng be keneng gaibian," p. 43.
30. Liu Mingshou and Yang Chengjun,Gao jishu zhanzhengzhongde daodanzhan (Missile warfare
in high-techwars) (Beijing:NDU Press, 1993), p. 177.
31. The Chinese termfor deterrence-wei she-is ambiguous. It literallymeans to use awesomeness, or latentpower, to terrorize.Oftenthe concept is described by a fourcharacteridiom-yin
er bu fa-meaning to "draw the bow but not shoot." This leaves two somewhat contradictory
impressions.One is of massive, undifferentiated,
virtuallyautomaticretaliation-an image closer
to assured destructionvisions of deterrence.The otheris a threatof accuratelytargeted,precise,
almost surgicalviolence-an image closer to war-fighting
notionsof deterrence.

| 15
will to do so, and the clear communication

of both capabilitiesand will.32
However,whenit comesto moredetaileddiscussionsofhow to communicate
a credibledeterrent
thearguments
threat,
have movedin two different
directions.
One viewis essentially
similarto whatRobertPowellcallsthe"spectrum
of
risk."DrawingfromThomasSchelling'sconceptof "threats
thatleave somethingto chance,"Powellarguesthatone way to makecrediblean otherwise
incredible
threatto commitmutualsuicidethrough
nuclearretaliation
is fora
to takediscretely
stateto threaten
rationalmovesthatincreasetheprobability
thatsubsequentmovesmaylead to mutualdestruction.
In otherwords,ifstate
A relieson a spectrumof risk,it mustact in ways whichcouldbegin an
unravellingprocess.Whetherthisunravellingoccursdepends on stateB's
reactionto thisinitialmove.The fearthat"explosiveescalation"mightoccur
throughincrementally
riskystepswould make the implicitdeterrent
threat
morecredible.33
Chinesestrategists
are not as explicitas Schellingand Powell about the
ofrisk.However,in thepastthismayhavebeenChina'simplicit
manipulation
Chinesestrategists
approachto deterrence.
mayhave believedthatrhetorical
bravadoand apparently
risk-acceptant
behaviorin thefaceof superiorU.S.
to begina confrontational
and Sovietcapabilitiescommunicated
a willingness
sequencethatmightspinout of controlshouldtheotherside persistin challengingChina.In someof themorerecentwritings
on nuclearstrategy,
there
are also hintsofthissortofdeterrence
calculus.Usuallythisentailsa recognitionthatnuclearwar is hardto control,
and thatonce thenuclearthreshold
has been crossed,a full-scalenuclearwar could easilybreakout.34A more
ofnuclearresponses,
due
explicitversionofthiscontendsthattheautomation
to theneed fora rapid responseat the earliestwarningof a nuclearattack,
The implication,
increasesthe chanceof miscalculation.35
then,is thatdeterwhichcould plaurencemayreston theinitiation
ofrisk-acceptant
behavior,
siblylead confrontation
past thenuclearthreshold.
32. Liu, Rong, and Chang, "Zhanlue daodan budui," p. 326.
33. RobertPowell, "The TheoreticalFoundationsof StrategicNuclear Deterrence,"PoliticalScience
Vol. 100, No. 1 (Spring 1985), pp. 75-96.
Quarterly,
34. Fang, "He wuqi de faminghe shiyong,"pp. 45-46; Sang Zhonglin and Xiao Kaishi, "Wo jun
zhanyi lilun de yanjiu ying zeng qiang 'he guannian"' (We must strengthenthe 'nuclear concept'
in our army's campaign theory),in NDU ResearchDepartment,Zhanyijiben lilunxintan,p. 802.
35. Chen, "Ze yang kandai he weishe," p. 43.

20:3 | 16
International
Security
The second and morecommonview about what deterscomes closerto

of
Powell's notionof "thespectrumof violence."In thiscase thepossibility
explosiveescalationis assumedto be low becausenuclearwar is assumedto
be controllable.
Instead,side B is deterredwhenit comesto believethatside
A canbearas muchormorepainordestruction
thanB.36Deterrence
is achieved
toinflict
future
painon B (made
bybothpunishment
and denial;thatis,threats
and receivedbyA) also implythat
crediblebythedestruction
alreadyinflicted
A will escalateto thepointwhereB is deniedvictory.
Again,Chinesestrategists
are not thisexplicitabout spectrum-of-violence
restson a credibleabilityto
thinking.
Buta numberemphasizethatdeterrence
that
fightan actual nuclearwar (shizhannengli)."Withoutthe prerequisite
nuclearweaponscould possiblybe used in a realwar,thennuclearweapons
value. If we do not have the
cannotbe politicaltools and have deterrent
a nuclearattackon the
determination
and real capabilityto dare implement
thenournuclearpowerlosesitsdeterrent
enemythrough
powerful
retaliation,
theoutbreakofnuclearwar."37
Anotherstudyofmilitary
value in constraining
theappliedwarfare
notessimplythatthegreater
ofa state,
capabilities
strategy
Ifdeterrence
thegreater
thedeterrent
effect.
breaksdown,thenonemustresort
totheoperational
useofnuclearweaponstodeterfurther
andto"strive
escalation,
Thismeans
to fightand win a nuclearwar" (li zhengda yinghezhanzheng).38
fromintimidating
the enemy
havingthe abilityand will to do everything
theenemyand
injuring
through
deployments,
exercises,
and tests,to selectively
damaging
incrementally
increasing
psychological
pressureon it,to irreparably
when
itsabilitytofight,
or
War
deterrence
fails
escalate, prolongnuclearwar.39
a state'swar-fighting
capabilityis weak or doubtedby theenemy;intrawar
36. Powell, "TheoreticalFoundations,"p. 81.

37. Zhao and Zhang, "He zhanzheng," p. 592. See also Hu and Xiao, Yingxiangdao ershiyishiji,
p. 143; Wang Wenrong,Ma Bao'an, and Liu Hongji, "Mudi, fangshi,liliang:wo guo xin shiqi junshi
zhanlue de san ge jiben wenti" (Goals, methods, and strength:three basic questions in our
country'smilitarystrategyin the new period), Guofangdaxuexuebao(NDU Journal),No. 1 (1989)
in Fuyinbaokanziliao-junshi, No. 4 (1989), pp. 47-48.
38. Peng Guangqian and Wang Guangxu, Junshizhanluejianlun (A briefdiscussion of military
strategy)(Beijing:Peoples LiberationArmyPress, 1989), pp. 160; see also pp. 84-85.
39. Guan Jixian,Gao jishu jubu zhanzhengzhanyi(Campaigns in high tech limitedwars) (Beijing:
NDU Press, 1993),p. 43. See also Liu and Meng, Xiandaijunduizhihui,p. 410, and Lin Zhaochong,
"Xiandai weishe zhanlue man tan" (Informaldiscussion of moderndeterrencestrategy),in Academy of MilitarySciences StrategyDepartment,eds., Hua shuo zhanlue (Talking about strategy)
(Beijing:Academy of MilitarySciences Press, 1987), pp. 59-60.

117
deterrence
failswhena statedoes nothave thecapacityto continueto inflict
40 In essence,compellent
damageon theenemy
actionshave deterrent
effects.
The secondview predominates
in Chinesewritingson nucleardeterrence,
butithas in commonwiththefirst
viewthatdeterrence
shouldnotbe mutual.
In otherwords,fordeterrent
threatsto be credible,Chinacannotbe deterred
In an interesting
or perceivedtobe deterred
by theadversary's
threats.
appropriationofhistorical
languageto "Sinify"
theconcept,someChinesestrategists
claimthatthegoal of deterrence
is, in Sun Zi's words,"to defeattheenemy
withoutfighting."41
Theuse ofthisphraseimpliesthatdeterrence
is one-sided,
and thatit can have activepoliticalpayoffs(compellent
ratherthan
effects)
Thisis a verydifferent
merelypassiveones (deterrent
effects).
imagethanthe
one thatU.S. theorists
ofassureddestruction
haveused to describedeterrence,
thatof two people in a roomfulof gasoline,each holdingmatches.It would
view deterrence
as theproductofa
seem,then,thatmanyChinesestrategists
veryrealabilityto inflict
damageon theenemyin a competitive
nuclearduel.
Theyare, apparently,
uncomfortable
withthe assureddestruction
notionof
deterrence.
LIMITED
DETERRENCE,
LIMITED
WAR-FIGHTING
Chinesewritings
of
reveala bewildering
and typologies
arrayofclassifications
deterrence.42
to
Only a handfulof these,however,have been used explicitly
describeChina's deterrent:
defensive,self-defensive,
minimum,
eclectic,and
limited.The consensusappears now to be, however,that"minimumdeterrence"does notdescribewhatChineseforcesare supposedto do. Ratherthe
termis "limiteddeterrence."
preferred
40. One discussion of conventionallimited war that parallels the nuclear discourse notes that
counterattacksor actions designed to "teach a lesson" all have intrawardeterrenceeffects;they
convince the enemy of China's willingness and ability to inflictfurtherdamage. See Wang
Houqing, Wang Chaotian,and Huang Dafu, Jubu zhanzhengzhongde zhanyi(Campaigns in limited
wars) (Beijing:NDU Press, 1990), pp. 97-98.
41. Chen, "Ze yang kandai he weishe," pp. 40-42; Xu Guangyu,He zhanluezongheng(The ins and
outs of nuclear strategy)(Beijing:NDU Press, 1987), p. 358; Liu Huaqiu, "Sun Zi Bing Fa yu dang
dai he weishe" (Sun Zi's Artof Warand contemporarynuclear deterrence),paper presentedto the
Second InternationalSymposiumon Sun Zi's Artof War,Beijing,October 1990.
42. I have come across at least 20 types: offensive,defensive,passive, active, punitive,positive,
offenimmediate,general,strong,medium, weak, minimum,maximum,assured, self-defensive,
sively defensive,superior,balanced, eclectic,and limited.See, forinstance,Liu, "Sun Zi Bing Fa";
Lin, "Xiandai weishe"; Zhang, "Dui caijun jiben lilun"; Yang and Cai, Junshiweishe;and Peng and
Wang,Junshizhanlue.

International
Security20:3 j 18
minimumdeterrence
For Chinesestrategists,
requiresonly the abilityto
carryout a simple,undifferentiated
countervalue
second strike.The adversary'speopleand socialwealthare heldhostage,and thefearofunacceptable
damagedetersany firststrike.AnymeasuresthatmightreducethedestrucA veryfewwarheads,anywhere
from
tivenessofnuclearwararedestabilizing.
minimum
thusa statethataccepts
a handfulto severaltens,are sufficient;
A number
deterrence
readilyacceptsqualitativeand quantitative
inferiority.43
of Chinesestrategists
now explicitly
as a viable
rejectminimumdeterrence
deterrence
is thatminimum
optionforChina.The mainargument
capabilities
are in practicetoo vulnerableto a disarmingfirststrike,
and thushave little
deterrence
value. Moreover,a minimumcountervalue
assuredsecond-strike
or forachieving
is uselessforcontrolling
capability
anyescalatory
competition
"A numberof peoplehave theview thatone onlyneeds
intrawardeterrence.
This view is a
a fewnuclearweaponsto scarepeople and thatis sufficient.
productof a lackofunderstanding
of therealmeaningof nucleardeterrence
it is
betweennucleardeterrence
and therelationship
and actualwarfighting;
it."44
biasedand harmful
and we oughtto takethelead and correct
At theotherend ofthespectrum
is whatChinesestrategists
call maximum
deterrence.
This essentiallydescribeswhat Chineseanalystsbelieveare the
characteristics
ofU.S. and Sovietnucleardoctrine.
Thisdoctrine
maintains
that
sinceitis difficult
to determine
whattheadversary
mayconsiderunacceptable
countervalue
damage,in orderto deterone has to have superiorwar-fighting
The goal is to developa first-strike
and war-winning
capabilities.
advantage
suchthatin a crisisone can eliminate
whilereducingone's
enemycapabilities
forbothpolitiown losses.45
Chinesestrategists
orientation
rejectthisdoctrinal
the
cal and technological
reasons:thisis
strategy
pursuedby hegemonistic
to No First Use (NFU);
powers and contravenesChina's commitment
43. Peng and Wang, Junshizhanlue,p. 160; Lin, "Xiandai weishe," p. 50. This conceptualization
essentiallyparallels what some have called the assured destructionschool. Charles Glaser,"Why
Do StrategistsDisagree about the Requirementsof StrategicNuclear Deterrence?"in Lynn Eden
and Steven E. Miller,eds., NuclearArguments:
Understanding
theStrategicNuclearArmsand Arms
ControlDebates(Ithaca,N.Y.: CornellUniversityPress,1989). See also RobertJervis,TheMeaningof
theNuclearRevolution:Statecraft
and theProspectof Armageddon(Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University
Press, 1989), p. 75.
44. Liu and Meng, Xiandaijunduizhihui,p. 409. See also Zhang, "Dui caijun jiben lilun,"pp. 56-57.
45. Peng and Wang,Junshizhanlue,p. 161; Zhang, "Dui caijun jiben lilun,"pp. 56-57. This descriptionparallels theargumentsof thedamage-limitationschool in theUnitedStates.See Glaser,"Why
Do StrategistsDisagree," p. 113.

China'sNew "OldThinking"
I 19
moreover,
Chinadoes nothave theeconomicor technological
wherewithal
to
buildthiskindofdeterrent.46
Betweenthesetwoextremes
standslimiteddeterrence,
thepreferred
descriptivetermused by Chinesestrategists.
The termappearedas earlyas 1987.At
did notdiffer
thattimeitsdefinition
muchin character
fromminimumdeterrence.One strategist
contended,for example,thatlimiteddeterrence
was
suitableforeconomically
and technologically
weak states.The abilityto inflict
unacceptabledamage witha few hundredwarheadsaimed at enemycities
was sufficient.47
Another
notedthatthegoaloflimited(also
"andothertargets"
calledeclectic)deterrence
was to developa mutuallyassureddestruction
second-strike
capabilityand thusmaintainstrategic
stability48
Overtime,however,
Chinesestrategists
between
havedrawnthedistinctions
minimum
muchmoresharplyand havegiventhelatter
and limiteddeterrence
limitedcounterforce-war-fighting
a distinctly
flavor.A numberof Chinese
nowarguethata limiteddeterrent
strategists
meanshavingenoughcapabilities
to deterconventional,
theater,
and strategic
nuclearwar,and to controland
suppressescalationduringa nuclearwar.Thatis, a limiteddeterrent
should
be able to respondto anylevelor typeofattackfromtacticalto strategic,
and
the initialresponseshould be calibratedto the scope of the initialattack.49
Limiteddeterrence
thinkingappears to entertain
war-winning
possibilities.
doesnotmeanachievingcompletepolitical-military
War-winning
victoryover
an adversaryat any levelof violenceand dictating
politicaltermsat theend
of war,but it does mean inflicting
and countervalue
enough counterforce
damageon theenemysuchthatitbacksdown and is thusdeniedvictory.
Thewar-fighting
oflimiteddeterrence
is obviousfromthelistof
orientation
considerappropriate.
The consensusseemsto
targetsthatChinesestrategists
be thatChina'slimiteddeterrent
oughttobe abletohita rangeofcountervalue
and hard and softcounterforce
targets.The authorsof one recentstudyon
modernmilitarycommandargued,forexample,thatChina's SMF had the
wartimeoperationaltasks:
following
46. Chen, "Weishehlun," pp. 49-50.
47. Lin, "Xiandai weishe," p. 50.
48. Zhang, "Dui caijunjiben hlun,"pp. 56-57. Therewas some confusionin Zhang's analysisabout
deterrence.In places he implied thatChina's "eclectic"(zhezhong)deterrentbelongs in the assured
second-strikecategory of strategies(p. 53). Elsewhere, however, he implied that war-fighting
strategies-a differentcategory-were examples of "active defense," a term used to describe
China's overall militaryorientation(p. 59).
49. Peng and Wang,Junshizhanlue,p. 162; Xu, He zhanluezongheng,p. 368.

International
Security20:3 | 20
* to strikeenemystrategic
missilebases and weaponsstockpiles,
majornaval
and strategic
reserveforces,and
and air bases,heavytroopconcentrations,
thusdestroytheenemy'sstrategic
attackcapabilities;
* to strikeat the enemy'sthreater
throughstrategicpoliticaland military
commandcentersand communication
hubs,thereby
weakeningitsadministrative
and commandcapabilities;
* to striketheenemy'sstrategic
warningand defensesystems;
* to striketheenemy'srail hubs,bridges,and otherimportant
targetsin its
transportation
networks;
* to strikebasicindustrial
and military
industrial
targets;
* to strikeselectively
at severalpoliticaland economiccentersso as to create
socialchaos;and
* to launchwarningstrikesin orderto undermine
theenemy'swillto launch
nuclearstrikes,
and thereby
containnuclearescalation.50
Theseare verydifferent
and muchmoredemandingtargetsthanthosefor
To hittheseand to retaintheabilityto engagein prominimumdeterrence.
tractedescalationsuppression,
wouldrequirefarmorethan
a limiteddeterrent
a handfulof inaccuratesecond-strike
warheads.Indeed,Chinesestrategists
moreaccurate,survivable,
arguethatit requiresa greaternumberof smaller,
and penetrable
ICBMs; SLBMs as countervalue
retaliatory
forces;tacticaland
theaternuclearweaponsto hitbattlefield
and theatermilitary
targetsand to
suppressescalation;
ballisticmissiledefensetoimprovethesurvivability
ofthe
limiteddeterrent;
space-basedearlywarningand commandand controlsystems;and anti-satellite
weapons(ASATs)to hitenemymilitary
satellites.51
50. See Liu and Meng, Xiandaijundui zhihui,pp. 392, 401, 405. For similar targetlists,see also
Yang and Cai, Junshiweishe,pp. 304-305; Liu, Rong,and Chang, "Zhanlue daodan budui," pp. 322,
328; Academy of MilitarySciences,Junshizhanlue(Militarystrategy)(Beijing:Academy of Military
Sciences Press, 1987), p. 235; Guan, Gao jishu jubu zhanzheng,p. 112. This list suggests thatXue is
inaccuratein arguing thatChina's strategistsare only interestedin "area targetingtheory."Xue,
"Evolution of China's Nuclear Strategy,"p. 180.
51. See Liu and Yang, Gao jishu zhanzheng,pp. 170-171; Liu, Rong, and Chang, "Zhanlue daodan
budui," p. 330; Liu Jixian,Wang Tangying,and Huang Shuofeng,Guofangfazhanzhanluegailun
(Introductionto national defense developmentstrategy)(Beijing:NDU Press, 1989), p. 161; Song
Zhi, "Ben shijie mo ge zhuyao guojia de junshi zhanlue he women de duice" (The militarystrategy
of each major state at the end of this centuryand our countermeasures),in Academy of Military
Sciences Operations Analysis Research Department,ed., Guoji xingshiyu guoji zhanlue(The international situationand internationalstrategy)(Beijing:Academy of MilitarySciences Press, 1987),
p. 73. There has probablybeen some debate as to the relativepriorityamong these systemsfor
limiteddeterrence.Song Zhi argued thatmost ofChina's new missilesshould be placed on SLBMs.
Others argue that a limited deterrentshould rely on mobile land-base systems,making use of
smaller warheads and improved reaction times. See Liu, Rong, and Chang, "Zhanlue daodan

| 21
Limiteddeterrence
also suggestsa launchstrategy
thatputsa premiumon
destroying
as manyenemymilitary
capabilitiesas possiblebeforetheseare
used (or at least as manyas is necessaryto denythe enemyvictory).This
createstensionwithChina'sofficial
no-first-use
(NFU) pledge,made in 1964
afteritsfirstnucleartest.Givenquantitatively
inferior
a political
capabilities,
goal of denyingthe adversaryvictory,
and a targetset thatincludesthe
it
nuclearweapons,commandand controland otherpointtargets,
adversary's
to strikefirstin a crisis.Whilesome strategists
would make sense militarily
note thatthe NFU pledge carriespoliticalimage benefits-itmeans,forinin
use of nuclearweaponswould be justified
stance,thatChina'sretaliatory
world opinion-manyalso appear to believe it is a considerablemilitary
withthe SMF CommandCollege have arguedthat,in
handicap.Strategists
NFU gives China's capabilitiesa "passive
comparisonto the superpowers,
nature,"among otherquantitativeand qualitativeweaknesses.52
The NFU
pledgeleads to an emphasison detecting
and surviving
an initialcounterforce
strike hencethe importance
of earlywarning,dispersal,and concealment,
on thesize of China'sforces.53
and theutterlack of transparency
Veryoften
one findsstrategists
in favoroffirst
strikesin conventional
arguingabstractly
and nuclearwar,even whileclaimingthatChina is committed
to a second
strikeposture(houfazhiren).54
Thata numberofChinesestrategists
chafeat thepossibleoperational
restrictionsimposedbyNFU is obviousfromseveraldiscussionsoftheideal timing
ofChina's"nuclearcounterattack"
(hefanji).Theseanalystsstressthatthefirst
responseto an attackmustbe immediateand extremely
rapid.Whilethisis a
reactionto an aggressiveactiontakenby theenemy,it is notat all clearthat
China'sforcesshouldwaituntilthisinitialactionis complete.In otherwords,
thereare intriguing
hintsof interest
in launch-on-warning
or launch-underearlyattack.
Thisis theimportofcomments
on theoperational
oftheSMF
responsibilities
in an authoritative
of
workon strategy
compiledby theStrategy
Department
the Academyof MilitaryScienceswithinputfrom,amongotherunits,the
budui," p. 330; Liu and Yang, Gao jishu zhanzheng,p. 173; Zhang Jinxiand Wang Xiancun, "Mao
Zedong junshi sixiang yu wo guo de he zhanlue hlun" (Mao Zedong militarythoughtand our
country'stheoryof nuclear strategy),JunshiZhishi(Militaryknowledge), No. 5 (1988), reprinted
in Fuyinbaokanziliao-junshi, No. 8 (1988), p. 18.
52. Liu, Rong, and Chang, "Zhanlue daodan budui," pp. 328-329.
53. Sang and Xiao, "Wo jun zhanyi lilun," pp. 806-807.
54. Guan, Gao jishu jubu zhanzheng,pp. 110-111.

International
Security
20:3 | 22
oftheGSD and theSMF: "On thebasisofthegeneral

OperationsDepartment
of thefuturewillbe implepolicyof secondstrike,
thenuclearcounterattack
mentedthrougha nuclearcounterstrike
campaignaftertheenemy'snuclear
muststriveto be immediate
surpriseattack.The firstnuclearcounterattack
retaliation,
thatis, [we must]reactquickly,and rapidlyimplement
a nuclear
the enemy'smissilesare coming,but before
counterattack
afterdetermining
Elsewheretheauthorsnote,"secondstrikedoes notby
theyhaveexploded."55
a beating.We mustnotwait untilafter
any meansimplypassivelysuffering
before
theenemy'snuclearweaponsexplode,leavingconfusioneverywhere,
One sourcecalculatedthatwithan
out a nuclearcounterattack."56
carrying
of an enemy's
earlywarningsystemthatcould give real-timeintelligence
launch,China could have as muchas twentyminutesin whichto launchits
own missilesbeforeenemymissileshit.57
Otherstrategists
appear to favora moreobviouslypreemptive
operational
doctrine.Recently,
forinstance,
one analystarguedthatideallya state's"first
strategic
surpriseattack"(shouci zhanluetuji) shouldtakeplace some time
afterthefirsttwo to threedays of a crisis,and thata nuclearsurpriseattack
withina generalnuclearcounterattack
shouldtakeplace in six or so hours.
This counterattack
should take place in threewaves. The firstwould use
ICBMs,SLBMs,and theatermissilesand be aimedat enemystrategic
missile
forcesand othertargetsdeep in the enemy'srearareas. The second wave
shoulduse lightbombersand nuclearstrikeaircraft
to hittheenemy'sshallow
The finalwave shoulduse
rearforcesalong withtargetsin thewar theater.
long-range
nuclearbombersto attacktheenemy'sdeep reartargetsagain.In
a nuclearwar,thefirsttaskof a strategic
surpriseattackis to "eradicatethe
55. Academy ofMilitarySciences,Junshi
zhanlue,pp. 115-116.Goldsteinand Lin argue thatChina's
launch doctrinemightbe "launch at any uncertaintime"-days, weeks, even months,afteran
initial attack. This would induce sufficientuncertaintyin the aggressorabout the efficacyof its
strikeas to have a deterrenteffect.See Goldstein, "Robust and AffordableSecurity";and Lin,
China'sNuclearStrategy.
Similarly,Xue contendsthatthe Chinese are uninterestedin developing a
launch-on-warningcapability.See Xue, "Evolutionof China's Nuclear Strategy,"p. 180. However,
the evidence here suggests thatmany strategistsin the late 1980s and 1990s rejectedthese argumentson the grounds thatthe basis of deterrenceis a real and communicatedabilityto fightand
to inflictcostlycounterforcedamage quicklyin a nuclear conflict.
56. Academy of MilitarySciences,Junshizhanlue,p. 235. One analyst,referring
to war in general,
argued that China must flexiblyapply the second-strikeprinciple,with specific emphasis on
"exploitingthe firstopportunityto defeatthe enemy" (xianji zhi ren).See Chen Huiban, "Guanyu
xin shiqi zhanlue fangzhenhe zhidao yuanze wenti" (Concerningquestionsrelatingto the guiding
principlesand strategicpolicies of the new period), in Guofangdaxue xuebao (NDU Journal),in
Fuyinbaokanziliao-junshi, No. 3 (1989), p. 28. Chinese strategistshave noted thatFrance's refusal
to adopt NFU strengthensits deterrentby keeping enemies guessing as to its response to a
conventionalattack.See Lin, "Xiandai weishe zhanlue," pp. 56-57.
57. Liu and Meng, Xiandaijundui zhihui,p. 400.

123
enemy'snuclearsurpriseattackweaponsand thusobtainnuclearsuperiority
and strategicinitiative.To this end the most important
strategicobjective
becomessurprise-attacking
theopponent'sstrategic
missilebases,takingout
its nuclearweapons aircraft
and theirbases, and nuclearsubmarinesand
relatednaval bases."58Stillothersarguedisingenuously
thata firststrikeon
an enemywhoseattackis imminent
is stilla retaliatory,
second-strike
act.One
in realityit is a
strategist
noted,forinstance,"As fortheSMF's warfighting,
undernuclearconditions
or undernuclearthreat."59
counterstrike
Components
ofa LimitedDeterrence
Capability
In additiontoarticulating
thegeneraloutlinesofa limitedflexible
counterforce
over
the
few
Chinese
have
war-fighting
doctrine,
last
years
strategists explored
in moredetailsomeofthekeyrequirements
forthiskindofdeterrent,
namely
space technologies
and weapons,ballisticmissiledefense,theaterand tactical
weapons,and civildefense.
SPACE
Some Chinesestrategists
contendthatspace will becomea fourthleg in any
nuclearcapabilities.
need space-basedearlywarningcaChinawill therefore
the
time
of
its limiteddeterrent:
ASATs(both
to
reaction
pabilities speed up
whichare beto hitenemymilitary
space-basedand air-launched)
satellites,
in directingnuclearand conventionalcamcomingincreasingly
important
paigns;and space-basedballisticmissiledefensesystemsin orderto increase
the survivability
of Chinesenuclearforces.60
These strategists
have already
58. Guan, Gaojishujubu zhanzheng,
pp. 112-113;emphasis added. The evidence indicatesthatsome
militarystrategistswould preferto avoid theNFU constraint.This suggeststhereis less consensus
behind the value of NFU thanXue contends.Xue, "Evolutionof China's Nuclear Strategy,"p. 180.
59. Wang Xiancun, "Mao Zedong renminzhanzheng sixiang zai zhanlue daodan budui zuozhan
zhong de yunyong" (The application of Mao's thinkingon peoples' war in the operationsof the
StrategicMissile Forces), in Quan jun Mao Zedongjunshisixiang,Vol. 1, p. 595, emphasis added.
This argumentis consistentwith Chinese definitionsof active defense in conventionalconflicts.
As one study of active defensenoted,China's operationsagainst Vietnamin 1979 were militarily
offensive,but politicallydefensive."[A] strategiccounterattackcarriesthe implicationsof a strategic offensive.From a political perspective,it makes more sense and is more advantageous not
to call it 'attack'but to call it a 'counterattack'."See Zhang Jingand Yao Yanjin,Jijifangyuzhanlue
qianshuo(An introductionto the active defense strategy)(Beijing: LiberationArmy Publishing
House, 1985), p. 137. A recentanalysis of limitedwar argued that the best time fora "counterattack"was when the enemywas preparingto launch an attackbut beforeits planes and missiles
had leftthe ground. Guan, Gao jishujubu zhanzheng,pp. 141, 23-24.
60. One recentanalysis obliquely remarked,"These kinds of weapons are not just in the hands of
the superpowers;lots of middle-rankedstates have researchand developmentprogramsof considerable scale." Zhang Yinnan and Zhao Xu, "Gao jishu zhanzheng de tedian" (Special characteristicsof high tech war), in NDU ResearchDepartment,ed., Gao jishuju bu zhanzheng,p. 27.

International
Security20:3 | 24
begunto thinkin moredetailaboutwhata space capability

shouldlooklike.
One plan envisionsthecreationofa space warfareheadquarters,
witha space
scienceand technology
warfare
politicaldepartment,
and logistics
department,
department.
This commandcenterwould controla systemof space stations
and bases; a war-fighting
of satellitesand weaponssyscapabilityconsisting
temsforfighting,
command,reconnaisance,
and earlywarning;training
academies; and a fleetof aircraftand space-capablevessels fortransportation,
logistics,and war-fighting.
The space leg would be designedto breakthe
China'sspace-basedcapasuperpowers'
monopolyon spaceweapons,protect
bilities,supportgroundand naval operations,and maintaina capacityto
intercept
a portionof enemyICBMs and reducethe destructiveness
of any
nuclearattack.Thissystemwould be assistedby ground-based
BMD. While
Chinawould notbe able to matchtheUnitedStatesin thesesortsofcapabilities,it oughtnotto lag too farbehindqualitatively,
accordingto theauthorof
thisplan. Chinamuststriveforweaponsofa comparableleveloftechnology
as thosein thehandsofthesuperpowers.61
in thisconceptualization.
Obviouslythereis a strongelementofimagination
Chinese
are
concerned
about the need to
Nonetheless,
strategists seriously
incorporate
spacesatellites
and weaponsintoChina'snuclearand conventional
operationaldoctrines.
Indeed,space is now consideredone ofChina's"strategic frontiers,"
along withland boundaries,territorial
waters,and airspace.62
This presentsproblemsforChina'spresentarmscontrolpositioncallingfor
theweaponization
ofspace,established
in the
banningASATsand preventing
DefenseInitiative
wakeoftheU.S. Strategic
(SDI). Theremaybe somepressure
frommilitary
to rethink
this.One Chineseexperton satellitesand
strategists
space weapons recently
impliedthatChina's positionhad becomeoutdated
ofsateliites
in directing
becauseoftheincreasing
warfare.
importance
Military
satellitesare now legitimatetargetsin war,and thus ASATsare legitimate
weapons.63
The Chinesespace arms controlposition,however,does not excludethe

developmentof ground-basedBMD,64 and strategistsare increasingly
61. Bao Zhongxing,"Jianshetian jun gouxiang" (The notion of building a space army),in NDU
Research Department,Military ConstructionResearch Institute,ed., Junduixiandaihuajianshe,
pp. 431-442; Zhang, "Dui xin shiqi zhanlue daodan budui," p. 417; and Hu and Xiao, Yingxiang
dao ershiyishiji,pp. 144-145.
62. Hu and Xiao, Yingxiangdao ershiyishiji,p. 144.
63. Conversationwith author,April 1994. See also Bao, "Jianshetian jun," p. 426.
64. The Chinese list of destabilizingBMD systemsthatshould be banned include space, land, or
sea-based weapons designed to attack "spacecraft"(not re-entryvehicles or missiles),and space-

China'sNew"OldThinking"
125
uninterested
in defending
China'sofficial
oppositionto space-basedBMD as
of
well,sinceit is clearthatBMD, in theirview,wouldenhancethecredibility
a limiteddeterrent.
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
Due toRonaldReagan'sSDI program,

and itsreincarnation
intheTheaterHigh
AltitudeArea Defense(THAAD) program,
ballisticmissiledefensehas been
closelystudiedby Chineseanalysts.China was initiallystrongly
opposed to
SDI. The arguments
tendedto be similarto thoseofopponentsin theUnited
U.S. defensivecapabilitylinkedto a
Statesand theSovietUnion:an effective
offensive
doctrineand capabilitieswould dramatically
increase
war-fighting
theU.S. abilityto launcha disarming
firststrike,
and thusincreasetheSoviet
incentivesto strikebeforethe SDI systemwas complete.Indeed,the early
arguments
againstSDI seemedto indicatethatsomeChineseanalystsessentiallyendorsedtheprinciplesbehindtheAnti-Ballistic
Missile(ABM) Treaty
of theassureddestruction
school.65
Leftless explicitwere
and thearguments
the arguments
thatChina could not hope to competein a U.S.-SovietBMD
raceand thatevenmoderately
effective
superpowerBMD would degradethe
ofChina'ssmalldeterrent
force.
credibility
In themid-1980s,
Chinesestrategists
therefore,
begana moredetailedanalysis ofChina'soptions.Thosewholeanedtowardsassured-destruction
thinking
thesurvivability
focusedon ways of increasing
and penetrability
of Chinese
warheadsby usingroad,rail,or boat-mobile
missiles;spinningor hardening
missilestoneutralize
beamweapons;ordevelopingsystems
capableofbaffling
Those who leaned towards
enemyBMD detectionand trackingsensors.66
counterforce-war-fighting
optionsstressedthe developmentof an offensive
and defensivesystemsto use against
capabilityto destroyenemycapabilities,
a portionof enemystrategicforces.They were more sanguineabout the
could be developed;forevery
thatadequatedefensetechnologies
possibility
spear(mao)therewas a shield(dun).ThiskindofresponsetoBMD wouldentail
based systems designed to attack "objects" in the atmosphere,on land or at sea (presumably
including RVs and missiles). Absent fromthis list are ground-basedsystemsdesigned to attack
"objects."See UN Conferenceon DisarmamentWorkingPaper,CD/579, March 19, 1985,p. 1.
65. See, forinstance,Zhuang Qubing, "Meiguo xinqiu da zhan jihua pouxi" (Analysis of the U.S.
starwars plan), Guojiwentiyanjiu,(Internationalstudies),No. 4 (October1984); He Qizhi, "Jiaqiang
zhizhi waikong junbei jingai de falu cuoshi" (Strengthenthe legal measures thatpreventan arms
race in space), Guoji wentiyanjiu (Internationalstudies), No. 4 (October 1984); and Wu, "Shilun
zhanlue jingong wuqi."
66. Wu, "Shilun zhanlue jingong wuqi."

International
Security20:3 | 26
developingbothspace and ground-based

terminal
BMD, ASATs,defensesuppressiontechnologies,
and moreaccurateoffensive
technologies.67
Judging
fromtheconsensusaroundthelimiteddeterrence
concept,itwould
seemthecounterforce-war-fighting
are winningout.Sincenuclear
arguments
missilesare important
war-fighting
tools,theyare also likelyto be keytargets
ofenemyattack.BecauseChinais hobbledto someextentby itsNFU pledge,
thisproblemis especiallypressing.Thus BMD is criticalforpreserving
the
"Ifa statehas multi-level,
war-fighting
optionsprovidedbylimiteddeterrence.
multi-method
nuclearattackpower,and at thesametimecanbasicallyprotect
itselffromdirectstrike,
thenithas a wide rangeofstrategic
choices."68
Proponentsof limiteddeterrence
let
make verylittlementionof the ABM Treaty,
alone demonstrate
The argumentthatan
any concernforits principles.69
distribution
of offensive
asymmetrical
and defensivecapabilitiescan fundadestabilizedeterrence
is notchallenged;it is simplyignored.
mentally
THEATER
AND TACTICAL
NUCLEAR
WEAPONS
(TNW)
in the1980sand 1990shavebeenrelatively
Chinesestrategists
clearabouttheir
preference
forTNW systems.70
As one strategist
at theNDU succinctly
putit,
67. On Chinese responses to the SDI program,see JohnGarver,"China's Response to theStrategic
Defense Initiative,"Asian Survey,Vol. 26, No. 11 (November 1986), pp. 1220-1239;and Bonnie S.
Glaser and BanningN. Garrett,"Chinese Perspectiveson theStrategicDefense Initiative,"Problems
Vol. 35, No. 2 (March/April1986), pp. 28-44.
ofCommunism,
68. Hu "Weilai zhanzheng," p. 375. See also Liu and Yang, Gao jishu zhanzheng,pp. 179-180; Liu
and Meng, Xiandai jundui zhihui,pp. 400, 415-416; Liu, Rong, and Chang, "Zhanlue daodan
budui," pp. 329-330.
69. One of the faultlines in Chinese discussions of BMD may run between arms controllersand
nuclear strategistsin the military.The anti-BMD positions,most of which draw on the principles
behind the ABM Treaty,have been espoused mainlyby those with specificarms controlexpertise.
Recent articulationsof this position, for instance,have come fromarms controllersin China's
nuclear weapons lab and missile developmentsystems.See Du Xiangwan and Li Bin, "Analysis
and Discussion of Arms Controlin Space," paper presentedto ISODARCO BeijingArms Control
Seminar,May 1992; Li Bin, "The Effectsof BallisticMissile Defenses on Chinese AttitudesTowards
Arms Control,"SSRC-MacArthur
No. 7 (May 1995), pp. 16-18; and Liu Erxun,"On the
Newsletter,
Subjectof theAmendmentof the ABM Treaty,"unpublished paper,April 1995.However,the arms
controllersmay not have much influenceon operationaldoctrineissues.
70. For earlier discussions of the advantages of TNW includingnuclear artilleryand mines, see
Xu Baoshan, "We Must Prepare to Fight a Nuclear War in the FirstStage of Any Future War,"
Bao, September16, 1979, translatedin JointPublicationsResearchService (JPRS),No. 88
Jiefangjun
(June4, 1980); Wu Yigong,Zhang Shufa,and Zhong Weilun,He Wuqi(Nuclear weapons) (Beijing:
Soldier Press, 1983); Zhou Shizong, "Kangji Sulian shou ci tu ji de ji ge wenti" (Several questions
on resistingthefirstSoviet surpriseattack),Junshixueshu(MilitaryStudies),No. 6 (1982), in Junshi
xueshu lun xuan (Selected essays fromMilitaryStudies) (Beijing: Academy of MilitarySciences
Press, 1984), Vol. 2; and Li Baihong and Gao Guofeng, "Mogu zhuangyan yun xia de xin kangzheng" (The new resistanceunder the mushroomcloud), Jiefangjun
bao (LiberationArmyDaily),
January27, 1984. Li and Gao argued that the use of TNW involved "relativelysmall risks" and
could advantageouslyspeed the course of war. For a secondaryanalysis of China and TNW, see
Malik, "Chinese Debate," pp. 18-19.

127
Theirsmallsize and
havingTNW "greatly
enriches"a state'snuclearstockpile.
limitedyieldsmean thattheiruse does not carryas greata riskas strategic
nuclearretaliation.
They help createa "nuclearladder" and thus enhance
deterrence.71
Withoutthisladder,a statecould not crediblyreactto,say,the
seizureofa smallportionofitsterritory.
in the1970s
Franceservesas an example.Accordingto one Chineseanalyst,
couldnot
Frenchstrategists
realizedthatFrance'sstrategic
nuclearcapabilities
deterall threatsto its nationalinterests
obligations.As a
and international
morethought
oftacticalnuclearweapons,
result,
was giventothedevelopment
nuclear
and in the 1980s,some Frenchstrategists
called TNW "pre-strategic
deterrence
weapons" and "front-line
capabilities."TNW would be used to
protectforwardFrenchinterests(e.g., Germany'sborderwith the Warsaw
The
Pact),whileits strategic
forceswould detera directattackon France.72
forChinamightbe thatTNW couldbe usefulfordeteranalogousargument
frontiers"
alongitsborders
renceat theouterboundariesofChina's"strategic
fordevelopingTNWarebeingpitchedinthe
waters.Arguments
and territorial
contextof developinga capabilityto fight"high-tech
limitedwars" around
China'speriphery.
in thelate1970sand early1980s,Chinesematerials
on TNW tended
Initially
to arguethatthesecapabilitieswereessentialto stopa SovietarmoredblitzChinesemilitary
and westernborders.In particular,
kriegacrossthenorthern
plannerswereworriedthatthePeople's LiberationArmy(PLA) Air Force's
strikeaircraft
were inadequateforbattlefield
deliveryof nuclearweapons
againstSoviettanks.73
Nonetheless,
by theirown admission,researchon the
use ofTNW was relatively
underdeveloped
amongChinesestrateoperational
was stillcomgists.As one mid-1980s
studyargued,the"nuclearconception"
on nuclearwarheadtests
weak in thePLA. Therewererestrictions
paratively
of
usefulfordevelopingTNW,and a dearthof researchon theactualeffects
Both
underTNW conditions.
TNW explosions.74
The PLA also lackedtraining
71. Hu, "Weilai zhanzheng," p. 376.

72. Wang Huaizhi, "Faguo de junshi zhanlue ji qi qishi" (Frenchmilitarystrategyand its inspiration)in Academy ofMilitarySciences,OperationsAnalysisResearchDepartment,ed., Guojixingshi
yu guoji zhanlue,pp. 128-129.
73. Lewis and Hua, "China's BallisticMissile Programs,"p. 6.
74. It is not clear whetherthe authorreferredto the Chinese government'sannouncementin early
in testingminiatur1986 thatit would eschew atmospherictests,or simplyto technicaldifficulties
ized warheads. The moratoriumon atmospherictestingpresumably prevented the PLA from
conductingabove-groundtestsforthe effectsof TNW on militaryequipment.

International
Security20:3 | 28
theUnitedStatesand Russiawerefarahead of Chinain thinking

aboutand
planningforlimitednuclearwar.75
Since the declineof the Sovietthreatin the mid-1980sand the Chinese
military'sincreasinginterestin limitedwars (occasionedoriginallyby the
FalklandsWar,and mostdramatically
by theGulfWar),researchon limited
now believethemostlikely
war and TNW has pickedup. Chinesestrategists
futuresourceof threatto be a limitedconflict
over resourcesand territory
76 One Chinesestudyoflimitedwar quantified
the
aroundChina'speriphery
borderand 66 percentofits
threat:
70 percentofChina's21,656kilometer-long
over3,000,000
ofterritorial
squarekilometers
watersfacesomelevelofexternal
Conflict
overterritory
threat.77
mayor maynotinvolvea clashwitha nuclear
power,butthenuclearstrategists
arguethatChinaneedsto havetheabilityto
fighta limitednuclearwarusingTNW.78
Evenifthewar werea conventional
sincenuclear
one,itshouldstillbe considered
a warundernuclearconditions,
weapons would help deterboth conventional
and, if the opponentwas a
nuclearstate,nuclearescalation.79
Among the capabilitiesneeded to fight
limitedborderwarsaretheater
and tacticalmissiles,includingbothcruiseand
In thisenvironment,
less
ballisticmissiles.80
groundforceswill be relatively
importantthan naval, air,and strategicmissileforces.Indeed,one author
projectsthatbytheyear2030,only60 percentofthePLAwillbe groundforces,
whiletheotherbrancheswill all increaseto makeup theremaining
40 percent.8'
In a limitedwar,accordingto Chinesestrategists,
thepremiumwill be on
in orderto defeatenemyforces
speed and overwhelming
military
superiority
on the
It will requirean abilityto concentrate
firepower
earlyand decisively.
enemy'sown local air,naval,and missileforces.This is a missionforstrike
75. The authors contended thatmost Chinese researchon campaign theoryneglectedthe nuclear
viewpoint.Sang and Xiao, "Wo jun zhanyi lilun,"pp. 811-812.One of theauthors,Sang Zhonglin,
with the GSD chemicaldefensedepartment,is identifiedin Chinese sources as a strongproponent
of nuclear war-fighting
doctrines.See Hu and Xiao, Yingxiangdao ershiyishiji,p. 143.
76. On local high-techwar in Chinese militarydoctrine,see Wang, Wang, and Huang, Ju bu
zhanzheng,pp. 82-83; Guan, Gao jishu zhanzheng,pp. 23-24; Paul Godwin, "Chinese MilitaryStrategy Revised: Local and Limited War," Annals,Vol. 519 (January1992), pp. 191-201; and David
Shambaugh, "The Insecurityof Security:The PLA's Evolving Doctrine and Threat Perceptions
Towards 2000," JournalofNortheast
Asian Studies,Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 3-25.
77. Wang,Wang, and Huang, Jubu zhanzheng,p. 82.
78. Hu, "Weilai zhanzheng," p. 372.
79. Song and Xiao, "Wo jun zhanyi lilun," pp. 804-805.
80. Su, "Shilun changgui liliang,"p. 117; Guan, Gao jishu zhanzheng,pp. 12-13.
81. Guan, Gaojishuzhanzheng,
pp. 12-13. The presentproportionis about 75 percentgroundforces.
Calculated fromthe InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies,MilitaryBalance,1993-1994 (London: Brasseys,1994).

129
butalso one forconventional

aircraft,
and,ifnecessary,
nuclearmissiles.In the
earlystagesof a limitedwar,then,it is bestto choose"all typesof effective
methodsof attack"to destroythe enemy'ssuperiority
in high technology
weaponsand airpowerbeforethesecomeintoplay82Thismeans,forinstance,
usingeverything
fromcomputervirusesto disruptenemycommand,to missiles,aircraft,
and elitespecialforces.83
submarines,
For thosetargetsthatmay be some distanceaway fromthe theater(e.g.,
aircraft
air bases,naval bases,commandheadquarters,
carriers,
and strategic
and theatermissilebases), missileattackswould be especiallyusefulin the
earlystagesofthewar.84Strategists
arenotexplicitaboutwhether
thesemight
be nuclearor conventionally
armedmissiles,butgiventhenatureofsome of
the targets,and giventhatthe adversarymay well be a nuclearstate,the
dominantargumentappears to be thatthe PLA should develop a limited
nucleardeterrent
based on theuse ofnuclearweaponsin thesetheater
roles.85
CIVIL DEFENSE
Proponents
of nuclearwar-fighting
doctrinesin theUnitedStatesand Soviet
Unionbelievedthatan important
was the
componentof damage limitation
of a good portionof the civilianpopulation.86
protection
The literature
on
limiteddeterrence
in China,however,has not paid specialattention
to civil
defense,perhapsbecause civil defensewas a prominent
featureof Chinese
doctrinewell beforethisliterature
military
emergedin thelate 1980s.In the
of
wake Sino-Sovietborderclashesin 1969,Mao launcheda massivecivil
defenseconstruction
programknownas the campaignto "dig tunnelsdeep
the1970s,almostall workunitsin
and storegraineverywhere."
Throughout
sheltersthatprovidedvarying
majorcitiesacrossChina builtunderground
thecenter
and
radiation.
Underneath
degreesof protection
againstblast,fire,
ofBeijing,forinstance,
thereis a vastunderground
city,
originally
designedfor
82. Militarystrategistsargue thatChina should plan to fightagainst a quantitativelyand qualitativelysuperioradversaryin local conflicts.This suggeststhattheUnited States,Japan,and Russia
set the standards for the adversaryagainst which the PLA should prepare. See Guan, Gao jishu
zhanzheng,p. 11; and Liang and Zhao, "Shilun wo jun weilai hetongzhanyi zuozhan," p. 87.
83. Liang and Zhao, "Shilun wo jun weilai hetongzhanyi zuozhan," p. 80.
84. Ibid., p. 87; Guan, Gao jishu zhanzheng.pp. 110-111,119.
85. Liu, Wang,and Huang, Guofangfazhanzhanlue,p. 154; Guan, Gao jishuzhanzheng;Wang,Wang,
and Huang, Ju bu zhanzheng;Su, "Shilun changgui liliang"; Zhang and Zhao, "Gao jishu zhanzheng"; Liu, Rong, and Chang, "Zhanlue daodan budui."
86. RobertScheer,WithEnoughShovels:Reagan,Bushand NuclearWar(New York:Random House,
1982); Steven Kull,Mindsat War:NuclearRealityand theInnerConflicts
ofDefensePolicymakers
(New
York:Basic, 1988).

International
Security20:3 | 30
atomic,biological,and chemical(ABC) defense,and sincethe1980sused as

hospitals,stores,and hotels.87
Butwidespreadtestingofcivildefenseplansapparently
tooksometime.In
1974 theCentralMilitaryCommission's(CMC) Construction
Corps and the
GSD organizedthe firstall-Chinaconference
on civil defenseengineering
technology,
and designatedtheShenyangMilitaryRegion(MR),whichfaced
themostlikelyrouteof a SovietinvasionthroughManchuria,as a testpoint
forcivildefenseactivities.Changchuncitycivildefenseauthorities
began a
researchprogramusingcomputers
to analyzetheeffects
ofnuclearstrikeson
citiesand thuswhattheappopriateresponsesmightbe. Not until1984,however,did the China Civil DefenseCommissionhold its firstall-ChinaCivil
Defensemeeting.
Itscircularorderedlocal authorities
to stepup ABC defense
education.In 1987and 1988respectively,
thecitiesof Taiyuanand Xianheld
civil defenseexercisesunder simulatedABC conditions.In 1987 the Civil
DefenseCommissionset a goal of formaleducationin ABC defensefor20
millionstudentsby theyear2000.88
ThePLA'sdevelopment
ofa literature
on theprotection
ofurbanpopulations
accompaniedtheseexercises.The premiseofthesestudiesis thatas centersof
economic,industrial,
and logisticalpower,citiesare criticalforensuringthat
Chinaretainsufficient
to maintainitswar-fighting
"nationalstrength"
capabil89
theGSD chemicaldefensedepartment
ity Thus,tominimizeurbancasualties,
has examinedproposalsforbuildingsatellitecitiesto deconcentrate
civilian
thatall new building
populationsand economiccenters;proposalsrequiring
meetscivildefensespecifications;
and plans forunderground
transportation
networks,
production
facilities,
supplydepots,etc.TheGSD has recommended
Thisrequires
that40-60percentoftheurbanpopulationshouldbe dispersable.
plansfortheorganization,
timing,
method,and portionofpopulationstargeted
fordispersal,as well as evacuationroutes,transportation
meansand logistics,
the
and suppliesto supportthedispersedpopulation.90
Interestingly,
however,
who writespecifically
on limiteddeterrence
do notdiscuss
military
strategists
in any detailthe tasksof civil defense:the focusis almostentirelyon the
and commandtechnologies
thatwill maximizethe
developmentof military
87. Rosita Dellios, ModernChineseDefenseStrategy:
PresentDevelopments,
FutureDirections(London:
Macmillan, 1989), p. 35.
88. General StaffDepartment,Fanghuabing,pp. 230-232.
89. Xiao Guangbo, He zhanzhengyu renfang (Nuclear war and civil defense) (Beijing: Peoples
LiberationArmyPress, 1989), p. 37; Cui Zhangqi, Xiandaifangkong(Modern air defense)(Beijing:
NDU Press, 1989), p. 379.
90. Xiao, He zhanzheng,pp. 253-301; Cui, Xiandaifangkong,pp. 382-401.

131
survivability
and effectiveness
ofChinesemissiles,so itis notclearhowcentral
a rolecivildefensewillplayin limiteddeterrence
conceptsas thesearerefined.
TheDoctrine-Capabilities
Gap
Despiteall thisinterest
amongChinesestrategists
in a limitednuclearwarfighting
capability,
thereis a largegap betweenthesedoctrinal
arguments
and
Does thissuggestthatlimiteddeterrence
doctrine
China'spresentcapabilities.
is orwillbe irrelevant
forguidingthemodernization
ofChinesenuclearforces?
In mid-1995,
justoverhalfofChina'sballisticmissilesareliquidfueledwith
reactiontimesoftwohoursor more.Forthemostpart,theland-basedmissiles
are inaccurateenoughto raisedoubtsabouttheabilityto hithardened,point
counterforce
targets.
The circularerrorprobability
(CEP) oftheDF3 and DF4,
themainstayoftheland-basedmissileforces,
forexample,is worsethan1,000
meters.91
Witharound300 strategic
warheadsand bombsand onlya handful
of theseon full-range
ICBMs,Chinesedecision-makers
could nothope to hit
nearlytherangeof counterforce
and countervalue
targetsthatlimiteddeterrencetheorists
have outlined.92
To thispointtherehas been no obviouspush
fora rapidincreasein thenumberofweaponsdeployed.Indeed,thenumbers
seemto have leveledoffin thelate1980sas thesecondgeneration
ofmissiles,
DF21,cameon line(see Figure1).
itis notlikelythatChina'scentralcommandsystemin Beijing
Operationally,
has theabilityto acquiresufficient
real-time
intelligence
aboutan adversary's
and
of
military
preparations thepossiblechangingstatus potentialtargetsto
launcha rapid attack.Nor does the nationalcommandappear to have the
thesize or effectiveness
of a nuclearattackon China,
capabilityto determine
thatis crucialforgaugingwhatkindof responseis possible.The
intelligence
PLA did notbeginto build a nucleareventdetection
and observation
system
until1974.From1974-80it constructed
a numberof fixedobservation
posts
In the early 1980s the GSD completedplans for the
around the country.
ofreporting
centers
construction
and a network
linkingall themilitary
regions
91. RobertS. Norris,Andrew S. Burrows,and RichardW. Fieldhouse, British,Frenchand Chinese
NuclearWeapons(Boulder,Colo.: Westview,1994).
92. The numberof nuclear weapons is one of China's most closely guarded secrets.The estimates
fromoutsidersvary dramaticallyfromaround 200-300 strategicwarheads (Sutter,"Chinese Nuclear Weapons"; IISS, MilitaryBalance)to 500-650 (Malik, "Chinese Debate on MilitaryStrategy").
One reason why the Chinese oppose participationin five-powerstrategicarms controlmay be to
avoid transparency.
Chinese strategistsargue thattransparencyis notin theinterestsofweak states,
who need to keep superior adversaries guessing about their capabilities. Author's interview,
September1994.

International
Security20:3 32
Figure 1. Growth of Chinese Nuclear Forces, 1964-93.

450
400/
O bombs
* DF2
A DF3
O DF4
DF5
A DF21
T JL1
* TNW
4 Totalwarheads
350
300
|0
250
200
150
I00.
50.
0
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
Year
SOURCE: Robert S. Norris,Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons
Databook, Vol. 5, British,French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder, Colo.: Westview,
1994), Table 7.1, p. 359.
and servicebrancheswiththenationalcommand.The networkwas to determinethetime,place,type,and yieldofenemynuclearexplosionsand toassess

radiationand damagelevels.A testpointforthisnetworkwas set up in the
LanzhouMR in 1984,but not completeduntil1986.As of 1988an all-China
systemhad yetto be set up, thoughit is possiblethatsincethenit has been
completed.93
in theoperational
The PLA is, ofcourse,acutelyawareoftheshortcomings
thePLA beganexercisesto
capabilitiesofitsnuclearforces.In themid-1980s,
traintheSMF to launchundersimulatednuclearwar conditions.94
Strategists
areveryexplicitabouttheneeds(andhenceweaknesses)oftheSMF command,
93. GeneralStaffDepartment,Fanghuabing,pp. 226-228. This studywas published in 1990. I have
not come across any more recentsources on the nuclear detectionsystem.
94. Ibid., pp. 216-217.

133
includingclearintelligence
about thenatureof an enemyattack;up-to-date
information
aboutthepositionofenemytargets;
"firepower
plans"(huolijihua)
thetypes,deployment,
whichspecifytargets,
sequencing,
etc.,of
survivability,
and confidence
in theabilitytoissue
themissilestobe used in a counterattack;
No doubtthereare
effective
launchordersat themostadvantageoustime.95
concreteoptionalplans forthe use of nuclearweapons,but recentChinese
writings
suggestthattheseplans do notyetmeetthestandardsrequiredfor
limiteddeterrence.
Theothercomponents
oflimiteddeterrence
also lagbehindtherequirements
BMD norany
set by theconcept.Chinahas notdeployedanyground-based
space-basedsystems,
thoughin 1993it purchased4 batteries
(100missiles)of
S-300 air-defense
missilesand relatedcommandtechnology
fromthe Russians.96It has no ASAT capabilityat presenteither,and no satellitebased
early-warning
(EW) capability
(itrelieson phased-array
radars).As forChina's
civildefenseprogram,it may in factbe morehollowthaneverbefore.The
tunnelsand nuclearsheltersbuiltin the1970sare eitherused forcommercial
purposesor have fallenintodisrepair,
and all alongthereweredoubtsabout
whether
theshelters
wouldprotect
Therehavebeenno
againstnucleareffects.
large-scale
evacuationor shelterexercises,
and witha growing"floating
population"in cities,it is likelythatmanypeople do notknowwheretheclosest
operational
shelter
is and thatno evacuationplansexistformillionsoftransient
urbandwellers.Chinesecivil defenseprogramsmay well be similarto the
natureofSovietcivildefensewhere,as theSovietInterview
Potemkin-village
Projectshowed,most citizenshad no specifictrainingin wheretheywere
supposed to go and what theywere supposed to do in case of a nuclear
attack.97
and nuclearoperations
forconventional
Training
duringa nuclearwaris the
a sustainedeffort.
Thistraining
could
one area wherethePLA has maintained
be usefulforlimitednuclearwarsor forconflicts
in whichTNW wereused.
undersimulatedABC condito one source,thePLA begantraining
According
in
tionsas earlyas 1955,butthiswas disruptedby theanti-Soviet
movement
In 1980,in reactionto thethreatof
affairs
in Chinain thelate1950s.98
military
95. Liu and Meng, Xiandaijundui zhihui,pp. 404-407; Liu, Rong, and Chang, "Zhanlue daodan
budui," p. 327; Zhang, "Dui xin shiqi zhanlue daodan budui," p. 419.
Entersthe21stCentury,
96. KennethAllen,Glenn Krumel,and JonathanD. Pollack,China'sAirforce
MR-580-AF(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1995), p. 157.
97. See StuartKaufman,"Soviet Civil Defense: Hedging AgainstArmageddon,"unpublished ms.,
Universityof Michigan,Ann Arbor,1987.
98. Sang and Xiao, "Wo jun zhanyi lilun," p. 813. The 1955 ABC exercises took place in the
Liaodong peninsula and involved field army-size forces.The objective was to resist a coastal

International
Security20:3 | 34
a Sovietblitzkrieg
theCentralMilitary
alongthenorthern
borders,
Commission
decided thatthe PLA had to be able to fighta combinedconventional
and
nuclearwar,and ABC warfarebegan to receivegreaterattention.
The CMC
apparentlyorderedall unitsto set aside a specifictimeeach year forABC
In thesame year,theShenyangMR organizedfieldarmy-sizeexertraining.
cises underABC conditions.This was followedby ABC exercisesat lower
levels in most MRs, whereunitstrainedunderdifferent
geographicaland
operationalconditions
throughthe1980s(theexercisesinvolved,e.g.,motorized infantry
unitsin 1983,coastaldefenseunitsand naval unitsin 1987and
1988,and unitsalongtheIndianborderin 1988).In someoftheseexercisesthe
PLA simulatedtheuse of its own TNW.The SMF also held strategic
launch
exercisesundersimulatednuclearattackbeginningin themid-1980s.99
There
is a growingresearchliterature
in thePLA on how to concentrate
and disperse
troops,developsurvivablecommandstructures,
restore
communications,
close
nuclearcorridors,
assistattackedareas,etc.,undernuclearconditions.100
It was
notuntilJune1988,however,
thatan entiregrouparmy(jituanjun) underwent
a completetestofitsabilityto avoid or reducedamagefromABC weapons.101
Thereis considerabledebatein theWestoverthe statusof China'sTNW.
Mostwould agreethatdoctrinally,
at least,thePLA has beeninvestigating
the
roleofTNW sincethe1950s.102Morecontroversial,
operational
however,
is the
evidencethattheChinesehaveactuallydevelopedTNW.Chong-pin
Linclaimed
in thelate1980sthattheChinesehad testedverylow yieldwarheads,suitable
forTNW.TherewerereportsthatthePLA had deployedatomicdemolition
munitions
intheearly1980sand had testeda neutron
bombin 1988.103Possibly
as a resultof a directivefromtheMinistry
of Space Industryin 1984to put
morefocuson thedevelopment
oftacticalmissiles,
theChinesehavedeveloped
ballisticmissiles(DF15),whichcouldbe used forTNW delivery.104
short-range
EstimatesofChina'sTNW stockpilevarywildlyacrosssources.In 1984the
U.S. DefenseIntelligence
Agencysaid therethatwerenone.A recentstudyby
landing. This is threeyears earlierthan what Lin reportsas the firstevidence that the PLA was
trainingunder ABC conditions.See Lin, China'sNuclearStrategy,
p. 77.
99. Lin, China'sNuclearStrategy,
pp. 90, 93; General StaffDepartment,Fanghuabing,pp. 215-217.
Thereappears to have been a steady increasein the frequencyof SMF launch exercises.From 1966
to 1974 it averaged 4.5 launches per year;in the mid to late 1970s,6 per year; the mid to late 1980s,
7.7 per year.Sha Li and Min Li, Jianguohou Zhongguoguonei10 ci junshida xingdong(Ten major
militaryactionswithinChina since the establishmentof the state) (Chengdu: Sichuan Science and
TechnologyPress, 1992), p. 257.
100. Sang and Xiao, "Wo jun zhanyi lilun."
101. General StaffDepartment,Fanghuabing,p. 184.
102. Lin, China'sNuclearStrategy,
pp. 78-79.
103. Ibid., pp. 90-91.
104. Lewis and Hua, "China's BallisticMissile Programs,"p. 27.

135
the NaturalResourcesDefenseCouncil claimsthattherewere around 100

weaponsin 1984,and thatby theearly1990sa totalof 150.105However,one
authoritative
Chinesesourcestatesplainlythatas ofthelate1980s,Chinadid
nothaveanytheater
or tacticalnuclearweapons,butdid have limitednuclear
war options:"Atpresent,
althoughwe have notyetequippedourselveswith
theater
and tacticalnuclearweapons,thisis notthesameas sayinginthefuture
we will not arm ourselves.Moreover,
our air force'snuclearbombsand the
Second Artillery's
nuclearmissilescan also be used againstthe rearof the
106
enemy'stheater."
The evidencesuggests,
then,thatthereis,withsomeexceptions,
a considerable gap betweenwhatChinesenuclearstrategists
are sayingChina'snuclear
forcesshouldbe able to do and whattheseforcesarein factcapableofdoing.
Thereare threepossiblereasonsforthisconclusion.
The first
possibility
is that
myanalysisof thedoctrinaldiscussionsis wrong:China'slimiteddeterrence
and theremaybe greater
maybe muchcloserin kindto minimum
deterrence,
betweendoctrineand capabilities
thanI haveassumed.However,
consistency
thisis contradicted
by evidencethat,as the contoursof limiteddeterrence
tookshape,a numberof Chinesestrategists
thinking
explicitly
differentiated
betweenminimum
deterrence
and limiteddeterrence
and ascribedto thelatter
clearwar-fighting,
functions.
victory-denying
A secondpossibility
is thatI havelookedat thewrongsources.In theUnited
betweenthenuclear
States,forexample,therehas alwaysbeen a disjuncture
on theone hand,and thewar plans
discoursein academiaand government
AirCommandon theother.Focusingtoomuchon the
devisedbytheStrategic
former
led to misconceptions
aboutthelatter.
The policyintellectuals
stressed
frommassiveretaliation
to assureddestruction
to flexible
everything
response
to countervailing
to war-winning,
whilethe war plannerstendedto adhere
to war-fighting,
moreconsistently
even preemptive
war-winning,
plans.107In
105. Norris,Burrows,and Fieldhouse, British,
Frenchand ChineseNuclearWeapons,p. 371. A recent
reportby a respectedanalystwith the CongressionalResearchService does not mentionanything
about a TNW stockpile.Sutter,"Chinese Nuclear Weapons."
106. Sang and Xiao, "Wo jun zhanyi lilun," pp. 806, 811. Sang and Xiao were with the GSD
chemical defensedepartment,which is in chargeof ABC activities.The paper was presentedat a
1987 conferenceon campaign theoryorganized by the GSD. The conferenceproceedingswere not
published untilOctober 1989 and were not forpublic circulation.Theirstatementabout China and
TNW, therefore,
may be accurateup to thatdate. This suggests thatthe data on the growthof the
Chinese stockpilepresentedin Norris,Burrows,and Fieldhouse may need revision:theirTable 7.1
lists 1976 as the firstyear in which tactical warheads appeared in the Chinese arsenal. Norris,
Burrows,and Fieldhouse, British,Frenchand ChineseNuclearWeapons,p. 359.
107. Scott Sagan, "SIOP-62: The Nuclear War Plan Briefingto PresidentKennedy,"International
Vol. 12, No. 1 (Summer 1987),pp. 22-51; Greg Herken,CounselsofWar(New York:Knopf,
Security,

International
Security20:3 | 36
thisstudy,however,manyof thesourceshave been written

in
by strategists
unitschargedspecifically
withdevelopingdoctrine.
military
A finalpossibility
is thattheevolvinglimited-deterrence
has indeed
thinking
establishedguidelinesforoperationalplans,technology
and deacquisition,
ploymentin themid-1990sand beyond.On average,it tookelevenyearsfor
of ballisticmissiles(DF2 throughDF5) to movefrom
China'sfirstgeneration
research
and development
(R&D) stagestodeployment.
Thesecond-generation
weapons (JL1/DF21and DF41) have takenabout as long.108Thus any R&D
forlimiteddeterrence
willnot
choicesmade on thebasis of therequirements
if
cometo fruition
untilthelate1990sand thefirst
decade ofthenextcentury:
of Chinese
so, one should expectthe size, mobility,
diversity,
and flexibility
forcesto increaseover thenextdecade or so. One shouldalso expectto see
efforts
todevelopground-based
and possiblysomespace-basedBMD systems,
ASATs,TNW, and improvedearly-warning
capabilities(includingsatellite
Thisdoes notmeanthatChinawillnecessarily
technologies).
engageina crash
does not
programto catchup to U.S. and Russianlevels;limiteddeterrence
requireidenticalcapabilitiesto those of the superpowers,only enoughto
damageenoughenemywar-fighting
capabilitiesat anylevelofviolencesuch
even thoughChina may suffergreater
thatthe adversaryis deniedvictory,
damagein theprocess.Butitdoes suggestthatChinesemilitary
strategists
are
not as confident
at the momentas some were in the past thatChina has a
credibledeterrent:
ifa limitedwar-fighting
is whatdetersand China
capability
does notpossesssucha capability,
thelogicalconclusionis thatthedeterrent
is frailand thatmoreconcerted
efforts
are neededto shoreit up.109Thiswill
be thecaseiftheUnitedStatesdeploysTheater
MissileDefense(TMD)
especially
systemswithan inherent
capabilityof intercepting
strategic
warheads,as the
Clintonadministration
intendsto do.110
fissile
Chinahas sufficient
apparently
materialto expanditswarheadstockpiletwoto threetimesitspresentsize,1ll
1985); Peter Pringle and William Arkin,SIOP: The SecretU.S. Plan forNuclear War (New York:
Norton,1983).
108. Lewis and Hua, "China's BallisticMissile Program,"Table 1.
109. Such concernsabout the presentlack ofa credibledeterrentwere communicatedto Goldstein,
and were also evident in some of my conversationswith analysts connected with the nuclear
weapons program.See Goldstein,"Robust and AffordableSecurity,"p. 502.
110. See LisbethGronlund,George Lewis, Theodore Postol, and David Wright,"Highly Capable
Theater Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty,"Arms ControlToday,Vol. 24, No. 3 (April 1994),
pp. 3-8.
111. The Natural ResourceDefense Council (NRDC) estimatesthatChina may have enough fissile
materialto expand its currentforces2 or 3 times (from300 up to 600-900) warheads. Interview
with NRDC analyst,July1995. The Union of Concerned Scientists'lower-boundestimateis that
China has stockpiledenough highlyenricheduranium (HEU) and separated plutonium(PU) for
about 200 more warheads. LisbethGronlund,David Wright,and Yong Liu, "Chinese Participation

China'sNew "Old Thinking"137
and Chineseofficials
and nuclearspecialistshavesuggestedthrough
a number
ofavenuesthatU.S. TMD would probablyspeedup China'snuclearmodernizationefforts
and reduceChina'sincentive
tosee an earlyComprehensive
Test
Ban Treaty(CTBT)or fissilematerialproduction
ban put in place.
Theseefforts
to increaseChina'srelativenuclearstrength
need notbe unilateral,however.Much of the catchingup will be done forChina.As, or if,
ArmsReductionTalks(START)II levelsare reachedearlyin thenext
Strategic
thesize ofChina'snuclearcapabilities
relativetotheUnitedStatesand
century,
Russiawillincreasedramatically.
TheChinesehavealso madeitclearthatthey
wouldliketo see a STARTIII treaty
thatwouldbringU.S.-Russian
forcesdown
evenlower,to 1,000orevena "fewhundreds"each.Apparently
someChinese
strategists
hope to see roughparityamongthethreestates.Sucha preference
is clearly
moreconsistent
doctrine
witha limiteddeterrent
thanwithan undifferorminimum
thinkentiated
second-strike
deterrent
doctrine.112
Limiteddeterrent
withChina'sadamantoppositionto five-power
ingis also consistent
strategic
nucleararmscontrol
and withitsverylukewarmapproachtoan earlyCTBT.113
in a Fissile Material Production CutoffConvention," unpublished paper, Union of Concerned
Scientists,Cambridge,Mass., June1995,p. 5. David Albrightputs the stockpileof HEU at around
20 tons (? 25 percent)and PU at 3.5 tons (? 50 percent)or enough for700 more warheads (? 50
percent).Interview,July1995.
112. The idea of rough paritywas firstproposed by a Chinese strategistin 1988,around the time
the PLA was paying closer attentionto the war-fighting
featuresof limiteddeterrence,although
theremay be no causal link. See Hua Di, "Nuclear Strategyand Arms Control froma Chinese
Point of View," paper presented to the American Association for the Advancement of Science
annual conference,February1988,p. 13. The "1000 or less" conditionis now standardin comments
by the Chinese in discussions withtheNational Academy of Science,theNatural ResourceDefense
Council, and at the ISODARCO arms controlseminars.Wu Zhan, a strategistwith the Chinese
Academy of Social Science, has used the term"comparability"to describe the desired levels, and
suggested thiswould entailreductionsof 95 percentin U.S. and Russian stockpiles.See Wu Zhan,
"Prospects of Nuclear Disarmament,"paper presentedto the ISODARCO Beijing Arms Control
Seminar,Beijing,October1992,p. 12; Wu Zhan, "Some Thoughtson Nuclear ArmsControl,"paper
presentedto Workshopon Possible InterlinkedSouth Asia and WorldwideNuclear Arms Control
and DisarmamentInitiatives,sponsored by the Federationof AmericanScientists,Shanghai, February 1994, p. 10. As far as I can tell, these figureshave not been articulatedin officialpolicy
statements.
113. In the West,littleis known about the arms controland national securitypolicy process in
China, so it is quite possible that this confluenceof arms controlpositions and nuclear doctrine
preferencereflectsindependent decisions in these two policy spheres,ratherthan a coordinated
policy Nonetheless,the limiteddeterrencedoctrineand China's arms controlpositions generally
reinforceeach other.The only arms controlpositions that would require dramatic revision to
accommodate doctrinalpreferenceswould be China's stance on banning anti-satelliteweapons
(ASATs) and its NFU pledge. The formermay be modifiedor quietly dropped to accommodate
the developmentof Chinese ASAT capabilities,while the lattermay simplynot be credible,hence
costless to maintain. For a fullerdiscussion of China's approach to strategicarms control,see
forthAlastairIain Johnston,"Is There Learningin Chinese Arms ControlPolicy?" ChinaJournal,
coming1996; and BanningN. Garrettand BonnieS. Glaser,"Chinese Perspectiveson Nuclear Arms
Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter1995/96),pp. 43-78.
Control,"International
Security,

International
Security20:3 | 38
POLICY IMPLICATIONS: THE CONSTRAINTS ON LIMITED DETERRENCE
ofa limitednuclearwar-fighting
capabilityis notineviChina'sdevelopment
on
table,despitethe pressuresto build one. Thereare obvious constraints
In a
of limiteddeterrence.
meetingthesoftwareand hardwarerequirements
sense,limiteddeterrence
presentsa wish-listof capabilitiesfromwhichthe
must
Chinese,constrained
by moneyand theslipperyslope of armscontrol,
choose.
is hard to estimate,giventhe rapid growthin the
The moneyconstraint
hardto
are exceedingly
ChineseeconomyReal Chinesemilitary
expenditures
but are probablyin the$30 billionrange.The changingportionof
determine
fundsallocatedto theR&D and acquisitionof nuclearweaponsis unknown,
expenditures.114
withone estimateputtingthefigureat 3-5 percentofmilitary
The criticalcostswill not be the developmentof warheads,but of delivery
needed forflexibleresystemsand the commandand controltechnologies
readilyadmitthatwhatmainly
sponse.Nonetheless,
theChinesethemselves
thesize and qualityofChina'sforcesis thecountry's
economicand
constrains
Doctrine(e.g.,theallegedly"defensive"
nature
technological
backwardness.115
of Chineseforces)is rarelymentionedas a specificconstraint.
Thus, even
tomeasure,
costconstraints
aredifficult
thoughforoutsideanalyststhespecific
one can make a generalprojectionthatif marginalcostsdecline,barringa
to developa force
theChinesewill step up theirefforts
changein doctrine,
structure
morecompatiblewithlimiteddeterrence.116
arms
Thesecondconstraint
is armscontrol.
China'sapproachtomultilateral
beencharacterized
controlissuessincetheearly1980shas essentially
by defecChina has rationally
tionand free-riding:
avoided to theextentpossibleany
on itsmilitary
commitments
thatwouldimposespecific
constraints
substantial
whileenjoyingthebenefits
ofthesecurity
publicgoods provided
capabilities,
NuclearForce
by others'armscontrolprocesses(e.g.,theIntermediate-range
China has become
agreement,START). But in the course of free-riding,
114. RichardBitzingerand Chong-pinLin, "Offthe Books: Analyzingand UnderstandingChinese
Defense Spending," paper presented to fifthAnnual Staunton Hill Conferenceon the People's
LiberationArmy,June1994, p. 6. This is roughlyconsistentwith CIA estimatesfor 1965-79. See
CIA, "Chinese Defense Spending," p. 5.
115. Zhang, "Dui xin shiqi zhanlue daodan budui," p. 418.
116. Of course economic constraintsare also political in nature,because ultimatelyChina's top
political and militaryleaders will decide how much to allocate to the nuclear weapons program.
To be effective,
any budgetaryor doctrinaldecisions thatmightconstrainthe nuclearprogramwill
probably have to be made beforeDeng passes away, because it is not clear that the post-Deng
leadership will have the legitimacyin the eyes of the PLA to rule against militaryinterests.

139
entrappedin processesthatit would preferto avoid. For example,despite

China'spublicpledgeto signtheCTBT by theend of 1996,Chinesenuclear
weaponsdesigners
and theChinesemilitary
havemadeitclearthattheywould
prefer
notto see an earlytreaty
becauseintheirviewitwouldfreezequalitative
in nuclearcapabilitiesamong the UnitedStates,Russia, and
asymmetries
in theUN Conference
Yet
on
China.
Chinais involvedin CTBT negotiations
Disarmament
(CD) in Geneva,havingbeenincrementally
drawnintotestban
issuesin theCD becausetheagendais essentially
setby others.In the1980s,
Chinaresistedanydetaileddiscussionsofnucleartestbansin theCD; thiswas
on a CTBT.But
relatively
easy to do sincetherewereno formalnegotiations
in thefallof1993,theCD was giventhemandatetobeginnegotiations
toward
a treaty,
aftertheUnitedStatesand Russia put theissue on theagenda.The
Chinesehad littlechoicebutto participate,
giventheimagecoststhatwould
be incurred
fromopposinga CTBTand undermining
future
an important
pillar
ofthenonproliferation
regime.So, barring
a collapseofthenegotiations,
China
maywell have to signon in 1996.
A CTBTwould restrict
China'sabilityto developa widerrangeofwarhead
designs,thoughnotnew deliverysystems.Thus a testban will certainly
not
ofa limiteddeterrent.
Butthecaseillustrates
a broader
cripplethedevelopment
point:theChinesecan be pulled intoarmscontrolcommitments
that,even
withChina'sfree-riding
decision
thoughcostlyto makeand thusinconsistent
to avoid. A muchmoredramaticconrule,are even morecostlyor difficult
would be a fissilematerialcontrolregime
strainton China'slimiteddeterrent
and
thatlimitedor reducedexistingstockpiles,not just futureproduction,
on ballisticmissiletestingand
multilateral
agreements
thatplacedrestrictions
deploymentand on all formsof BMD and ASAT systems.These could be
in a forumthatwould makeitdifficult
forChinato remainoutside
negotiated
the process.The Conference
on Disarmamentis an obvious place: the five
on theCTBT there,and so
nuclearpowersare conducting
quietnegotiations
formultilateral
theprecedent
nuclearnegotiations
amongthefivehas beenset.
wouldbe a separatenuclearweaponstatesforuminwhich
Anotherpossibility
issues highon China's agenda (such as NFIJand some space armscontrol
issues)could be discussed,along withballisticmissileand BMD restrictions.
The former
agendaissueswould helpto ensurethatChinawouldbe formally
committed
thusincreasing
theimagecostsofavoidingthelatter
to theforum,
issues.
Apartfrommoneyand armscontrol,thereis a thirdpossibleconstraint,

minimum
detera shiftin Chinesedoctrine
towarda morearticulated
namely,

International
Security20:3 | 40
rencethinking.
In thepast,theagendaindiscussionsamongChinesestrategists
by the U.S. and Sovietdiscourseson nucleardoctrine.
has been influenced
ChineseanalystsfollowedverycloselytheU.S. discussionsof countervailing
for
Directive59 in 1979;thearguments
Presidential
strategies
thatsurrounded
the deployment
of theaternuclearweapons in Europein thelate 1970sand
NuclearForce(INF) deployments;
1980sto counterSovietIntermediate-Range
discoursein Caspar Weinberger's
Departand thewar-fighting-war-winning
then,thatfuturediscussionsin
mentofDefensein the1980s.217To theextent,
in thepost-ColdWarfocuson minimum
theUnitedStateson nucleardoctrine
willtakea closerlookat
one shouldexpectthatChinesestrategists
deterrence,
thearguments.
intergovernmental
and nonThe processmightbe assistedby encouraging
to openup multipledialogues
governmental
linkageswithChinesestrategists
the natureof deteron nucleardoctrine,
strategic
stability,
crisisbargaining,
renceand relatedquestions.Otherconstituencies
thatare generally
outsideof
mightalso be engagedthrough
discussionson operationalnuclearstrategy
such dialogues;such constituencies
mightincludearmscontrolspecialistsin
thenuclearweaponsand missilelabs,institutions
suchas theForeignMinistry,
of Contemporary
thinktankssuchas theChinaInstitute
Internainfluential
tionalRelations,and even academiccenterssuch as the ArmsControland
Theobjective
wouldbe tohelp
RegionalSecurity
Programat FudanUniversity
held
so as tobreakthenear-monopoly
pluralizediscussionsofnuclearstrategy
Recentresearchon theoriginsofSoviet"newthinking,"
by PLA strategists.118
forinstance,pointsto thecrucialroleof scientists
and publicpolicyscience
institutions
in Europe and the UnitedStates (e.g., Pugwash,the National
AcademyofSciences,theNaturalResourcesDefenseCouncil)indisseminating
the principlesof theABM Treatyand assureddestruction
ideas of strategic
and fromthere
and civilianforeign
policyspecialists,
stability
amongscientists
The question
intothearmscontroland strategy
debatesinsidetheKremlin.119
is whethertheseeffects
can be reproducedin theChinacase.
117. See, forexample, Hu, Weilaizhanzheng,p. 374, fora discussion of Weinberger'swar-fighting
thinking.
118. Most of theseinstitutionsdo researchon arms controlrelatedsubjects,and fromtimeto time
will discuss nuclear doctrineissues in very general terms.But the compartmentalization
of the
Chinese securitypolicy process and the general deferenceto the PLA on questions of operational
strategyare major barriersto demilitarizingthe discussions.
119. Emanuel Adler, "The Emergenceof Cooperation: National EpistemicCommunitiesand the
InternationalEvolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control,"International
Organization,
Vol. 46,
No. 1 (Winter 1992), pp. 101-145; and Matthew Evangelista, "The Paradox of State Strength:

| 41
Conclusion
In the last fiveto ten years,Chinesemilitarystrategists
have developeda
conceptoflimiteddeterrence
thatis nowused todescribewhatChina'snuclear
forcesoughttobe abletodo. Limiteddeterrence
restson a limitedwar-fighting
capabilityaimedat communicating
China'sabilityto inflict
costlydamageon
the adversaryat everyrungon the escalationladderand thusdenyingthe
Chinesestrategists
adversaryvictoryin a nuclearwar. It is thiscapability,
therefore
argue,thatwilldetersucha warin thefirst
place.Limiteddeterrence
ofa greater
numberoftactical,
requiresthedevelopment
theater,
and strategic
nuclearweapons thatare accurateenough to hit counterforce
targets,are
mobile,can be used in theearlieststagesofa nuclearcrisis,and in a worldof
THAAD are capable of penetrating
ballisticmissiledefensesystems.These
forceswould thus requireeffective
space-basedearlywarning,and some
of BMD capabilities.
configuration
GiventhatChinadoes notnow have such
capabilities,
thestraight-line
prediction
wouldbe thatoverthenextdecadeor
effort
to shifttheforcesaway froma
so, we shouldexpectto see a discernible
minimumstrike-back
assureddestruction
posture,whichChinanow has, toThis may or may not entaila dramaticshort-run
ward limitedwar-fighting.
increasein theabsolutenumbersofwarheadsand deliverysystems:thepace
willdependin parton whethertheUnitedStatesproceedswithTMD deployment.The speed ofchangein China'snuclearcapabilities
will also dependin
of STARTII leads to a steep relative
parton whetherthe implementation
increasein thesize oftheChinesearsenaland reducestherelativenumberof
counterforce
on any such efforts
are exogetargets.The primaryconstraints
It is an open question
nous,namely,
budgetaryand armscontrolconstraints.
whetherendogenousconstraints-ashiftin doctrinetowardminimumdeterrence-mightbe encouraged,
thoughthecase ofSovietnew thinking
suggests
someinteresting
possibilities.
The argumentherehas largelybeen doctrinedriven,wheretheimpactof
doctrinalchangeon forcepostureis mediatedby economicand armscontrol
Thereare, of course,alternative
modelsforthedevelopmentof
constraints.
Threein particular
standout-a technoChinesenuclearforcesin thefuture.
interestmodel,and an idiosyncratic
logicalinertiamodel,an organizational
withthe doctrine-driven
leadershipmodel.Not all of theseare inconsistent
and SecurityPolicyin Russia and the Soviet Union,"
TransnationalRelations,Domestic Structures,
Vol. 49, No. 1 (Winter1995) pp. 1-38.
Organization,
International

International
Security20:3 | 42
effects.
Yetnone of these
argument,
and indeed,some may have interactive
offerscompletely
forpast nuclearpolicies,let alone
convincing
explanations
reliablepredictions
forfuturebehavior.120Testingall fourmodels,however,
requiresfarmoreinformation
aboutChina'snuclearweaponspolicyprocess,
in particular
about therelationship
betweenthosewho thinkaboutdoctrine
and thosewho thinkabout forceposture,and abouttheintegration
of force
posturedecisionswithbudgetary,
armscontrol,and broaderforeignpolicy
decisions.My analysisof the natureand implications
of limiteddeterrence
thinking
requiresadditionaltesting
thecarefulstudyofanyadditional
through
new materialsthatmaysurface,
ofChinesestrategists
in
and theengagement
sustaineddiscussionson nucleardeterrence
and crisisstability.
Butone thingis certain:PLA strategists
have been struggling
to figureout
how to linkconventional
and nuclearweaponswiththeoperationalrequirementsof potentialhigh-tech
local wars over resourcesand territory
around
China's periphery.
in how to integrate
Theyare interested
hightechnology
weaponswith"long-distance
striking
power"so as to deterand,ifnecessary,
denyan adversaryvictoryin any conceivableconventional
and nuclearmilitaryconflict.
PLA strategists
have notbeen contentwithan undifferentiated,
primitive,
countervalue
second-strike
deterrent
statusquo. Indeedtheyappear
to have theirdoubtsaboutthecredibility
ofthiskindofdeterrent,
doubtsthat
have probablybeenstrengthened
by theprospectsofU.S. TMD development.
in an era wheremuchinternational
Regrettably,
effort
is beingput intodelethe utilityof nuclearweapons,Chinesemilitary
gitimizing
have
strategists
been
in
the
apparently
moving
oppositedirection.
120. Briefly,
the technologicalinertiamodel appears to have applied in the past, in part because
therewere few specialists in nuclear strategy.But with the growthof a relativelysophisticated
communityof nuclear strategistsin the 1980s and 1990s,theirideas may begin to guide R&D and
acquisition. Even if doctrineplays a minorrole in the future,thismodel would suggest thatthe
structureof Chinese nuclear forcesmay evolve in limitedwar-fighting
directionsas economic and
technologicalconstraintsdiminish.As foran organizationalinterestmodel, thereis littlereason to
believe thatthe nuclear forceswill not remaina privilegedcomponentof the PLA. Nor is thereas
yet specificevidence of cripplingdebates over which leg of the strategictriad should be getting
what share of resources.Finally,thereis an idiosyncraticexplanationwherebythekey determinant
of Chinese nucleardoctrineand postureis the preeminentleader's preferences.Individual leaders
like Mao and Deng have, however,provided only generalguidelines.Deng, forinstance,has been
a supporterof land-based mobile ICBMs and the SLBM program.His voice was also probably
crucialin the allocationof resourcesto major weapons systems,and on arms controlcommitments
that might constrainnuclear options. It is unlikely,however,than a weak post-Deng collective
leadership will tryto reversethe Maoist and Dengist legacies on nuclear forcequestions.Thus all
four models mightcollectivelyor individuallypush the development of Chinese nuclear forces
along limiteddeterrencelines.


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China's New "Old Thinking": The Concept of Limited Deterrence

Author(s): Alastair Iain Johnston

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The Concept of Limited Deterrence

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The Role ofNuclearWeapons

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greatertheawesomenessofthestate,and themorelikelyone is to determine

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In contrastto U.S. proponentsof theassured-destruction

who writeon nuclearquestionsexplicitly

war and its consequencesare not directly

opposition"to nuclearweapons,accordingto one analyst.This ignoresthe

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Thereis stillsome ambiguity

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will to do so, and the clear communication

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The second and morecommonview about what deterscomes closerto

36. Powell, "TheoreticalFoundations,"p. 81.

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oftheGSD and theSMF: "On thebasisofthegeneral

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begunto thinkin moredetailaboutwhata space capability

The Chinesespace arms controlposition,however,does not excludethe

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Due toRonaldReagan'sSDI program,

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developingbothspace and ground-based

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71. Hu, "Weilai zhanzheng," p. 376.

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theUnitedStatesand Russiawerefarahead of Chinain thinking

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butalso one forconventional

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atomic,biological,and chemical(ABC) defense,and sincethe1980sused as

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Figure 1. Growth of Chinese Nuclear Forces, 1964-93.

and servicebrancheswiththenationalcommand.The networkwas to determinethetime,place,type,and yieldofenemynuclearexplosionsand toassess

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the NaturalResourcesDefenseCouncil claimsthattherewere around 100

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thisstudy,however,manyof thesourceshave been written

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