Introduction

Mu'tazila is a school of Islamic theology based on reason and rational thought that flourished
in the cities of Basra and Baghdad, both in present-day Iraq, during the 8th–10th centuries.
The adherents of the Mu`tazili school—known in the English language as "Mu`tazilites"—
are best known for their denying the status of the Qur'an as uncreated and co-eternal with
God, asserting that if the Quran is God's word, logically God "must have preceded his own
speech".

The philosophical speculation of the Mu'tazilites centered around the concepts of divine
justice and divine unity. The school worked to resolve the theological "problem of evil", i.e.
how to reconcile the justice of an all-powerful God with the reality of evil in the world. It
believed that since God is Just and Wise, He cannot command what is contrary to reason or
act with disregard for the welfare of His creatures.

Mu`tazilites believed that good and evil were not determined by revealed scripture or
interpretation of scripture, but rational categories that could be "established through unaided
reason; because knowledge was derived from reason, reason was the "final arbiter" in
distinguishing right from wrong. The Mu`tazili school of Kalam posited that the injunctions
of God are accessible to rational thought and inquiry, and that it is reason, not "sacred
precedent", that is an effective means of determining what is just, and obligatory in religion.

The movement emerged in the Umayyad Era, and reached its height in the Abbasid period.
After the 10th century, the movement declined. It is viewed as heretical by some scholars in
modern mainstream Islamic theology for its tendency to deny the Qur'an being eternal. In
contemporary jihadism, supposed allegations of being a mu`tazili have been used between
rivalling group as a means of denouncing their credibility.

Historical background

The Mu'tazila originated in Basra at the beginning of the second century ah (eighth century
ad). In the following century it became, for a period of some thirty years, the official doctrine
of the caliphate in Baghdad. This patronage ceased in ah 238/ad 848 when al-Mutawakkil
reversed the edict of al-Ma'mun, which had required officials to publicly profess that the
Qur'an was the created word of God. By this time, however, Mu'tazilites were well
established in many other centres of Islamic learning, especially in Persia, and had split into
two rival factions, the Basran School and the Baghdad School. Although their links with
these two cities became increasingly tenuous, both schools flourished until the middle of the
fifth century ah (eleventh century ad), and the Basran School only finally disappeared with the
Mongol invasions at the beginning of the seventh century ah (thirteenth century ad). After the
demise of the Mu'tazila as a distinct movement, Mu'tazilite doctrine - by now regarded as
heretical by Sunnis - continued to be influential amongst the Shi'ites in Persia and the Zaydis
in the Yemen.

Al-Ash'ari (died 935) was a pupil of Abu 'Ali al-Jubba'i (died 915), the head of the Basran
School. A few years before his master's death, al-Ash'ari announced dramatically that he
repented of having been a Mu'tazilite and pledged himself to oppose the Mu'tazila. In taking
this step he capitalized on popular discontent with the excessive rationalism of the
Mu'tazilites, which had been steadily gaining ground since their loss of official patronage half
a century earlier. After his conversion, al-Ash'ari continued to use the dialectic method in
theology but insisted that reason must be subservient to revelation. It is not possible to
discuss al-Ash'ari's successors in detail here, but it should be noted that from the second half
of the sixth century ah (twelfth century ad) onwards, the movement adopted the language and
concepts of the Islamic philosophers whose views they sought to refute. The most significant
thinkers among these later Ash'arites were al-Ghazali and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi.

Divine justice

Facing the problem of existence of evil in the world, the Mu'tazilis pointed at the free will of
human beings, so that evil was defined as something that stems from the errors in human acts.
God does nothing ultimately evil, and He demands not from any human to perform any evil
act. If man's evil acts had been from the will of God, then punishment would have been
meaningless, as man performed God's will no matter what he did. Mu'tazilis did not deny the
existence of suffering that goes beyond human abuse and misuse of their free will granted to
them by God. In order to explain this type of "apparent" evil, Mu'tazilis relied on the Islamic
doctrine of taklif — "God does not order/give the soul of any of his creation, that which is
beyond its capacity." [Qur'an 2:286] This entailed the existence of an "act of god" to serve a
greater good, or the existence of evil acts to prevent a far greater evil. In conclusion, it
comprised life is an ultimate "fair test" of coherent and rational choices, having a supremely
just accountability in one's current state, as well as the hereafter.

Humans are required to have belief, iman, secure faith and conviction in and about God, and
do good works, amal saleh, to have iman reflected in their moral choices, deeds, and
relationship with God, fellow humans, and all of the creation in this world. If everyone is
healthy and wealthy, then there will be no meaning for the obligations imposed on humans to,
for example, be generous, help the needy, and have compassion for the deprived and
trivialized. The inequalities in human fortunes and the calamities that befell them are, thus, an
integral part of the test of life. Everyone is being tested. The powerful, the rich, and the
healthy are required to use all their powers and privileges to help those who suffer and to
alleviate their suffering. In the Qiyamah (Judgment Day), they will be questioned about their
response to Divine blessings and bounties they enjoyed in their lives. The less fortunate are
required to patiently persevere and are promised a compensation for their suffering that, as
the Qur'an puts it in 39:10, and as translated by Muhammad Asad, is "beyond all reckoning".

The test of life is specifically for adults in full possession of their mental faculties. Children
may suffer, and are observed to suffer, given the nature of life but they are believed to be
completely free from sin and liability. Divine justice is affirmed through the theory of
compensation. All sufferers will be compensated. This includes non-believers and, more
importantly, children, who are destined to go to Paradise.

The doctrine of 'Adl in the words of 'Abd al-Jabbar. It is the knowledge that God is removed
from all that is morally wrong (qabih) and that all His acts are morally good (hasana). This is
explained by the fact that you know that all human acts of injustice (zulm), transgression
(jawr), and the like cannot be of His creation (min khalqihi). Whoever attributes that to Him
has ascribed to Him injustice and insolence (safah) and thus strays from the doctrine of
justice. And you know that God does not impose faith upon the unbeliever without giving
him the power (al-qudra) for it, nor does He impose upon a human what he is unable to do,
but He only gives to the unbeliever to choose unbelief on his own part, not on the part of
God. And you know that God does not will, desire or want disobedience. Rather, He loathes
and despises it and only wills obedience, which He wants and chooses and loves. And you
know that He does not punish the children of polytheists (al-mushrikin) in Hellfire because of
their fathers' sin, for He has said: "Each soul earns but its own due" (Qur'an 6:164); and He
does not punish anyone for someone else's sin because that would be morally wrong (qabih),
and God is far removed from such. And you know that He does not transgress His rule
(hukm) and that He only causes sickness and illness in order to turn them to advantage.
Whoever says otherwise has allowed that God is iniquitous and has imputed insolence to
Him. And you know that, for their sakes, He does the best for all of His creatures, upon
whom He imposes moral and religious obligations (yukallifuhum), and that He has indicated
to them what He has imposed upon them and clarified the path of truth so that we could
pursue it, and He has clarified the path of falsehood (tariq l-batil) so that we could avoid it.
So, whoever perishes does so only after all this has been made clear. And you know that
every benefit we have is from God; as He has said: "And you have no good thing that is not
from Allah" (Qur'an 16:53); it either comes to us from Him or from elsewhere. Thus, when
you know all of this you become knowledgeable about God's justice.

Divine justice

In addition to championing the unity of God, the Mu'tazilites stressed his justice. They held
that good and evil are objective and that the moral values of actions are intrinsic to them and
can be discerned by human reason. Hence God's justice obliges him to act in accordance with
the moral law. For instance, he is thus bound to stand by his promise to reward the righteous
with paradise and his threat to punish the wicked with hellfire. More importantly, the reward
and punishment which he metes out must be merited by creatures endowed with free will.
Thus although the Qur'an says that God guides and leads astray those whom he wills (Surah
14: 4), it cannot mean that he predestines them. This and similar texts refer rather to what will
happen after the judgement, when the righteous will be guided to paradise and the wicked
will be caused to stray far from it. With regard to our acts in this world, God creates in us the
power to perform an act but we are free to choose whether or not to perform it.

Many of the Mu'tazilites held that the principle of justice made it requisite for God always to
do for people what was to their greatest advantage. Al-Jubba'i went as far as to claim that
God is bound to prolong the life of an unbeliever if he knows that the latter will eventually
repent. In view of this, al-Ash'ari is alleged to have asked him about the likely fate of three
brothers: a believer, an unbeliever and one who died as a child. Al-Jubba'i answered that the
first would be rewarded, the second punished and the third neither rewarded nor punished. To
the objection that God should have allowed the third to live so that he might have gained
paradise, al-Jubba'i replied that God knew that had the child lived he would have become an
unbeliever. Al-Ash'ari then silenced him by asking why in that case God did not make the
second brother die as a child in order to save him from hellfire!

For al-Ash'ari, divine justice is a matter of faith. We know the difference between good and
evil solely because of God's revelation, and not by the exercise of our own reason. God
makes the rules and whatever he decrees is just, yet God himself is under no obligation: if he
wished, he could punish the righteous and admit the wicked to paradise. Moreover, to
suppose as the Mu'tazilites did that human beings had free will would be to restrict the
sovereign freedom of the creator. On the contrary, God creates in his creature both the power
and the choice; then he creates in us the actions which correspond to these. Nevertheless, we
are conscious of a difference between some actions, such as the rushing of the blood through
our veins, which are involuntary, and others, such as standing up or sitting down, which are
in accordance with our own will. Al-Ash'ari argues that by approving of these latter actions,
which God created in us, we 'acquire' them and are thus held responsible for them.

The Doctrine of Divine Justice

In the preceding lecture I have mentioned the five fundamental Mu'tazilite principles, and
explained the first issue, i.e. their doctrine of tawhid. Here we shall take up their doctrine of
Divine Justice.

Of course, it is evident that none of the Islamic sects denied justice as one of the Divine
Attributes. No one has ever claimed that God is not just. The difference between the
Mu'tazilah and their opponents is about the interpretation of Justice. The Asha'irah interpret it
in such a way that it is equivalent, in the view of the Mu'tazilah, to a denial of the Attribute of
Justice. Otherwise, the Asha'irah are not at all willing to be considered the opponents of
justice.

The Mu'tazilah believe that some acts are essentially 'just' and some intrinsically 'unjust.' For
instance, rewarding the obedient and punishing the sinners is justice; and that God is Just, i.e.
He rewards the obedient and punishes the sinners, and it is impossible for Him to act
otherwise. Rewarding the sinners and punishing the obedient is essentially and intrinsically
unjust, and it is impossible for God to do such a thing.

Similarly, compelling His creatures to commit sin, or creating them without any power of
free will, then creating the sinful acts at their hands, and then punishing them on account of
those sins - this is injustice, an ugly thing for God to do; it is unjustifiable and unGodly. But
the Asha'irah believe that no act is intrinsically or essentially just or unjust.

Justice is essentially whatever God does. If, supposedly, God were to punish the obedient and
reward the sinners, it would be as just. Similarly, if God creates His creatures without any
will, power or freedom of action, then if He causes them to commit sins and then punishes
them for that - it is not essential injustice. If we suppose that God acts in this manner, it is
justice.

For the same reason that the Mu'tazilah emphasize justice, they deny al-tawhid al-'af'ali.
They say that al-tawhid al-'af'ali implies that God, not the human beings, is the maker of
human deeds. Since it is known that man attains reward and punishment in the Hereafter, if
God is the creator of human actions and yet punishes them for their evil deeds - which not
they, but God Himself has brought about - that would be injustice (zulm) and contrary to
Divine Justice. Accordingly, the Mu'tazilah consider al-tawhid al-'af'ali to be contrary to the
doctrine of justice.

Also, thereby, the Mu'tazilah believe in human freedom and free will and are its staunch
defenders, contrary to the Asha'irah who deny human freedom and free will.

Under the doctrine of justice - in the sense that some deeds are inherently just and some
inherently unjust, and that human reason dictates that justice is good and must be practised,
whereas injustice is evil and must be abstained from - they advance another general doctrine,
which is more comprehensive, that is the principle that "beauty" (husn) and "ugliness"
(qubh), (good and evil), are inherent properties of acts. For instance, truthfulness,
trustworthiness, chastity and God-fearing are intrinsically good qualities, and falsehood,
treachery, indecency, neglectfulness, etc. are intrinsically evil. Therefore, deeds in essence,
before God may judge them, possess inherent goodness or evil (husn or qubh).

Hereupon, they arrive at another doctrine about reason: human reason can independently
judge (or perceive) the good or evil in things. It means that the good or evil of some deeds
can be judged by human reason independently of the commands of the Shari'ah. The
Asha'irah are against this view too.

The belief in the inherent good or evil of acts and the capacity of reason to judge them,
upheld by the Mu'tazilah and rejected by the Asha'irah, brought many other problems in its
wake, some of which are related to theology, some to human predicament; such as, whether
the Divine Acts, or rather, the creation of things is with a purpose or not. The Mu'tazilah
claimed that absence of a purpose in the creation is "qabih" (an ugly thing) and so rationally
impossible. How about a duty which is beyond one's power to fulfil? Is it possible that God
may saddle someone with a duty which is over and above his capacity? The Mu'tazilah
consideied this, too, as "qabih", and so impossible.

Is it within the power of a believer (mu'min) to turn apostate? Does the infidel (kafir) have
any power over his own infidelity (kufr)? The answer of the Mu'tazilah is in the affirmative;
for if the believer and the infidel had no power over their belief and infidelity, it would be
wrong (qabih) to award and punish them. The Asha'irah rejected all these Mu'tazilite
doctrines and held opposite views.

Conclusion