The Economist The World in 2021

Table of Contents
From the editor
Ten trends to watch in the coming year
Leaders
After the crisis, opportunity
Needle and spread
Plotting the economic course
Mountebank medicine
Sorry state
Shock and awe
After the tech-celeration
The year of déjà vu
United States
The president’s priorities
Long division
Lingering pains
Police on the line
The children of covid-19
Winning the next ten years
Block, stock and barrel
All change, please
An idea whose time has come
The Americas
Bolsonaro battles on
Taking it to the Mexican people
Optimism in the time of covid-19

Between the virus and the vote
Asia
Between two giants
Best of enemies
Unlucky for some
Staying power
An Afghan mess
Pre-existing condition
The dawn of the Asian century
China
Still a contender
The road to health?
Party of the century
Brave old world
The battle goes on
Middle East
Biden’s problem now
The end of a black golden age
China’s moment
Big brother returns
Shifting sands
Africa
Best of friends
Locked down, locked up
Pulling the plug
Put to the test

Don’t let covid-19 kill democracy
International
Turning a corner on climate
On the road again
A clash, a crunch and a crisis
Streets ahead
Concrete jumble
Bad dreams
Murder by numbers
The plague of poverty
Ahem…about last year
It’s time to pull together
Europe
Weathering the storm
After Angela
Riding to the rescue
Macron’s balancing act
Follow the money in Italy
More pain in Spain
Hungary’s Viktator
Rebel Swedes
Balkan shrinkage
A battle for Russia
Team Europe, playing for the world
Britain
Disruption, deficit and dole

Deconstruction
State of the union
In need of resuscitation
Echoes of 1721
Decline and fall
Global lessons from the pandemic
Aftershocks
We must heed the pandemic’s warning
City of fight
Remote working is different—and better
It’s time for a new deal for workers
Nature cannot be fooled
Shock to the system
A black swan? No
A chance to change things
World in numbers: Countries
Top ten growers
Europe
Asia
North America
Latin America
Middle East and Africa
World in numbers: Industries
The world in figures: Industries
Business
The new geography of business

Beyond the Valley
From “techlash” to “techslog”
Bilateral damage
Bonding from home
Power struggle
More than just a game
Bargaining chips
Books bounce back
Itchy feet
The power of green technology
Finance
Protectors v preservers
After the fall
New money
No shortage of strife
Unequal impact
Balance-sheet of power
Intelligent design
The coming covid-19 credit crunch
Science and technology
A shot in the arm
Getting better
Learning to live with the virus
A vaccine for everyone
Seeking glory in the heavens
A conscious choice
New on the menu
Space for opportunity
Culture
Building a new type of museum
Explaining China
A literary outbreak
Hollywood quake
Afrobeats go global
The show must go on
Obituary
Covid-19’s first casualty

[Tue, 24 Nov 2020]
• From the editor
• Leaders
• United States
• The Americas
• Asia
• China
• Middle East
• Africa
• International
• Europe
• Britain
• Aftershocks
• World in numbers: Countries
• World in numbers: Industries
• Business
• Finance
• Science and technology
• Culture
• Obituary
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From the editor

• Ten trends to watch in the coming year
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Ten trends to watch in the coming year
It’s not all doom and gloom
DO YOU FEEL lucky? The number 21 is connected with luck, risk, taking chances and
rolling the dice. It’s the number of spots on a standard die, and the number of shillings
in a guinea, the currency of wagers and horse-racing. It’s the minimum age at which you
can enter a casino in America, and the name of a family of card games, including
blackjack, that are popular with gamblers.
All of which seems strangely appropriate for a year of unusual uncertainty. The great
prize on offer is the chance of bringing the coronavirus pandemic under control. But in
the meantime risks abound, to health, economic vitality and social stability. As 2021
approaches, here are ten trends to watch in the year ahead.
1 Fights over vaccines. As the first vaccines become available in quantity, the focus will
shift from the heroic effort of developing them to the equally daunting task of
distributing them. Vaccine diplomacy will accompany fights within and between
countries over who should get them and when. A wild card: how many people will
refuse a vaccine when offered?
2 A mixed economic recovery. As economies bounce back from the pandemic the
recovery will be patchy, as local outbreaks and clampdowns come and go—and
governments pivot from keeping companies on life-support to helping workers who
have lost their jobs. The gap between strong and weak firms will widen.
3 Patching up the new world disorder. How much will Joe Biden, newly installed in
the White House, be able to patch up a crumbling rules-based international order? The
Paris climate treaty and the Iran nuclear deal are obvious places to start. But the
crumbling predates Donald Trump, and will outlast his presidency.
4 More US-China tensions. Don’t expect Mr Biden to call off the trade war with China.
Instead, he will want to mend relationships with allies to wage it more effectively. Many
countries from Africa to South-East Asia are doing their best to avoiding picking sides as
the tension rises.
5 Companies on the front line. Another front for the US-China conflict is companies,
and not just the obvious examples of Huawei and TikTok, as business becomes even
more of a geopolitical battlefield. As well as pressure from above, bosses also face
pressure from below, as employees and customers demand that they take stands on
climate change and social justice, where politicians have done too little.
6 After the tech-celeration. In 2020 the pandemic accelerated the adoption of many
technological behaviours, from video-conferencing and online shopping to remote
working and distance learning. In 2021 the extent to which these changes will stick, or
snap back, will become clearer.
7 A less footloose world. Tourism will shrink and change shape, with more emphasis
on domestic travel. Airlines, hotel chains and aircraft manufacturers will struggle, as
will universities that rely heavily on foreign students. Cultural exchange will suffer, too.
8 An opportunity on climate change. One silver lining amid the crisis is the chance to
take action on climate change, as governments invest in green recovery plans to create
jobs and cut emissions. How ambitious will countries’ reduction pledges be at the un
climate conference, delayed from 2020?
9 The year of déjà vu. That is just one example of how the coming year may feel, in
many respects, like a second take on 2020, as events including the Olympics, the Dubai
Expo and many other political, sporting and commercial gatherings do their best to
open a year later than planned. Not all will succeed.
10 A wake-up call for other risks. Academics and analysts, many of whom have
warned of the danger of a pandemic for years, will try to exploit a narrow window of
opportunity to get policymakers to take other neglected risks, such as antibiotic
resistance and nuclear terrorism, more seriously. Wish them luck.
The coming year promises to be particularly unpredictable, given the interactions

between the pandemic, an uneven economic recovery and fractious geopolitics. This
annual will, we hope, help you improve your odds as you navigate the risks and
opportunities ahead.
And it’s not all doom and gloom. Our special section, “Aftershocks”, considers some of
the lessons, and chances for positive change, that have emerged from the crisis. So let
the dice fly high—and, whatever cards 2021 may end up dealing you, may the odds be
ever in your favour.
Tom Standage Editor,

The World in 2021
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Leaders
• After the crisis, opportunity
• Needle and spread
• Plotting the economic course
• Mountebank medicine
• Sorry state
• Shock and awe
• After the tech-celeration
• The year of déjà vu

Leaders
Joe Biden is an improbable architect of a bold new era. But he could be just the
right person
After the crisis, opportunity

Zanny Minton Beddoes considers the forces that will shape the post-Trump, post-
covid world
SOME YEARS loom large in history. Usually it is the end of a war or the onset of a
revolution that punctuates the shift from one chapter to another. 2020 will be an
exception. The defeat of Donald Trump marked the end of one of the most divisive and
damaging presidencies in American history. A once-in-a-century pandemic has created
the opportunity for an economic and social reset as dramatic as that of the Progressive
era. The big question for 2021 is whether politicians are bold enough to grasp it.
Covid-19 has not just pummelled the global economy. It has changed the trajectory of
the three big forces that are shaping the modern world. Globalisation has been
truncated. The digital revolution has been radically accelerated. And the geopolitical
rivalry between America and China has intensified. At the same time, the pandemic has
worsened one of today’s great scourges: inequality. And by showing the toll of being
unprepared for a low-probability, high-impact disaster, it has focused more minds on
the coming century’s inevitable and even higher-impact disaster, that of climate change.
All this means there is no going back to the pre-covid world.
That will not be obvious at the start of the year. Amidst the misery of a resurgent second
wave, attention in many countries will still be focused on controlling the virus. As the
New Year begins a vaccine will be on the horizon, though not yet widely available. Only
as 2021 progresses, and vaccines are rolled out, will it become clear how much has
permanently changed.
And that will turn out to be a lot, particularly in the West. The post-covid world will be
far more digital. From remote working to online retail, the pandemic has compressed
years’ worth of transformation into months, bringing with it a dramatic shake-up in
how people live, what they buy and where they work. Winners from this bout of
creative destruction include the tech giants (whose profits and share prices have surged)
and large companies more broadly (which have the biggest troves of data and the
deepest pockets to invest in digital transformation). Big cities will have to reinvent
themselves. Expect a flood of closures, especially among small businesses and in the
retail, travel and hospitality industries.
Although globalisation will still be about goods and capital crossing borders, people will
travel less. The Asian countries that controlled the virus most effectively were also
those that shut their borders most strictly. Their experience will shape others’ policies.
Border restrictions and quarantines will stay in place long after covid-19 caseloads fall.
And even after tourism restarts, migration will remain much harder. That will dent the
prospects of poor countries that rely on flows of remittances from their migrant
workers abroad, reinforcing the damage done by the pandemic itself. Some 150m
people are likely to fall into extreme poverty by the end of 2021.
Global commerce will be conducted against an inauspicious geopolitical backdrop. Mr

Trump’s mercurial mercantilism will be gone, but America’s suspicion of China will not
end with the departure of “Tariff Man”, as the president was proud to be known. Tariffs,
now levied on two-thirds of imports from China, will remain, as will restrictions on its
technology companies. The splintering of the digital world and its supply chain into two
parts, one Chinese-dominated and the other American-led, will continue. Sino-American
rivalry will not be the only fissiparous influence on globalisation. Chastened by their
reliance on imported medical supplies and other critical goods (often from China),
governments from Europe to India will redefine the scope of “strategic industries” that
must be protected. State aid to support this new industrial policy has become and will
remain ubiquitous.
All this will leave the world economy divided and diminished. The gap between strength
in China (and other post-covid Asian economies) and weakness elsewhere will remain
glaring. China’s was the only big economy to grow in 2020; in 2021 its growth rate will
exceed 7%, substantially faster than the pace of recovery in Europe and America. And
unlike Western economies, its recovery will not be underpinned by gaping budget
deficits or extraordinary monetary stimulus. China’s economic success and quick
vanquishing of covid-19 will be the backdrop for a year of triumphal celebration in
Beijing, as the Communist Party marks its centenary.
The contrast with the West will be stark. America will start the year with wobbly
growth, not least because of the failure to pass a sufficient stimulus package in the last
days of the Trump administration. Europe’s economies will be sluggish far longer, with
generous furlough schemes tying people to jobs that no longer exist and zombie firms
propped up by the state. On both sides of the Atlantic, the inequity of the impact of
covid-19 will become ever clearer: the most vulnerable hit hardest by the virus; job
losses concentrated among the less skilled; educational disruption harming poorer kids’
prospects the most. Public anger will grow, particularly in America, which will enter
2021 still a deeply divided country.
With the West battered and China crowing, plenty of pundits (including in this
publication) will declare the pandemic to be the death knell for a Western-led world
order. That will prove premature. For all its “vaccine diplomacy”, China inspires fear
and suspicion more than admiration. And for all his determination to bring China
centre-stage, its president, Xi Jinping, shows little appetite for genuine global leadership.
Although Mr Trump’s contempt for allies and forays into transactional diplomacy have
shaken trust in the American-led global order, they have not destroyed it.
That means America, once again, will have disproportionate ability to shape the post-
pandemic world—and the man most able to set the tone is a 78-year old, whose political
career began closer to the presidency of Calvin Coolidge than today. Joe Biden, a
consensus-building moderate whose own political positions have always tacked close to
his party’s centre of gravity, is an improbable architect of a bold new era.
But he could be just the right person. Mr Biden’s policy platform is ambitious enough.
Behind the slogan of “build back better” is a bold, but not radical, attempt to marry
short-term stimulus with hefty investment in green infrastructure, research and
technology to dramatically accelerate America’s energy transformation. From
expanding health-care access to improving social insurance, the social contract
proposed by Bidenomics is a 21st-century version of the Progressive era: bold reform
without dangerous leftism.
In foreign policy Mr Biden will repair relations and reaffirm America’s values and global
role. A veteran of diplomacy and instinctive multilateralist and institution-builder, Mr
Biden will send strong signals quickly: America will re-enter the Paris climate
agreement, stay in the World Health Organisation and join COVAX, the global coalition
to distribute a covid-19 vaccine. He will head quickly to Europe to reaffirm America’s
commitment to NATO and the transatlantic alliance—though his first stop will be Berlin
or Paris, rather than Boris Johnson’s Brexit Britain. Mr Biden will reassert the
importance of human rights and democracy to American foreign policy. Expect tougher
criticism of China for its treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang and its oppression in Hong
Kong; there will be no more palling with dictators.
On the most important issues, however, Mr Biden’s presidency will offer more a change
of approach than of direction. America will remain concerned about the threat posed by
a rising China: the Trump administration deserves credit for focusing attention on it.
But rather than attack with unilateral tariffs, Mr Biden’s team will focus on building a
multilateral coalition to counter China. Expect talk of a transatlantic grand bargain,
where America assuages European concerns about its tech giants, particularly the
personal data they gather and the tax they don’t pay, in return for a joint approach
towards Chinese tech companies. Expect talk of a new global alliance, binding Asian
democracies into the Western coalition to counter China—the basis, conceivably, of a
new kind of American-led world order.
The opportunity is there. The question is whether Mr Biden will grasp it. The risk is that,
both at home and abroad, a Biden presidency proves to be long on soothing words and
short on effective action; that, whether or not he is constrained by a Republican Senate,
Mr Biden himself is too focused on repairing yesterday’s world rather than building
tomorrow’s, and too keen to protect existing jobs and prop up ossified multilateral
institutions to push for the kind of change that is needed. The biggest danger is not the
leftist lurch that many Republicans fear—it is of inaction, timidity and stasis. For
America and the world, that would be a terrible shame.
Zanny Minton Beddoes: editor-in-chief, The Economist

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Covid-19 will not suddenly disappear, but it will start to fade into the background
Needle and spread

Vaccines are coming, but their deployment faces many obstacles, says Edward
Carr
FOR A WORLD that desperately needs to be vaccinated against SARS-CoV-2,

the virus that causes covid-19, 2021 will be a frustration sandwich—two thick
slices of good news, wrapped around a layer of conflict, delay and
disappointment. Policymakers should try to make that filling palatable. Many
thousands of lives will depend on their efforts.
The first slice of good news is that the next six months will see lots more new vaccines
to complement the successful candidate from Pfizer-BioNTech. That is a testament to
the power of scientific collaboration. Vaccines used to take 10-20 years to create, but
today there are more than 320 projects, including dozens in advanced clinical trials.
What’s more, this work is yielding valuable advances in vaccine research, as teams
attack the virus from different angles. Some vaccines take the old-fashioned route of
using an attenuated virus. Others, like the Pfizer vaccine, are breaking new ground by,
for example, priming the immune system using viral genes (see Science section). Such
vaccines are easier to manufacture at scale.
The second slice of good news is that, all being well, by the end of 2021 enough vaccines
should be available in sufficient quantities to mean that the spread of covid-19 can be
slowed substantially. Vaccines may also protect infected people by making their
symptoms less severe. Covid-19 will not suddenly disappear, but it will start to fade into
the background.
In between those layers of good news, however, will be plenty of bad. The wave of
winter cases in the northern hemisphere has been severe. And certifying, making,
distributing and administering billions of doses of competing vaccines is sure to present
problems.
Time saves lives, so regulators are rightly in a hurry to approve vaccines. But Russia and
China have given the green light to medicines that are yet to pass through large phase-
III trials. Their products fail to work or cause complications. Vaccines that receive
emergency authorisation in the West will need watching too, because they may work
differently in different groups, or provide only transient benefits. Expect lots of sniping
about regulators cutting corners and lots of theories—many conspiratorial—about why
vaccines should be avoided.
Production of several vaccines has started. Pfizer says it will have 50m doses ready by
the end of 2020. Even so, scaling up vaccine production will be a mammoth task. The
Serum Institute, the world’s largest manufacturer, has warned that there will not be
enough doses to inoculate the entire world until 2024 or beyond. Shortages of medical
glass, and of the “cold chains” that are needed to keep some vaccines, including Pfizer’s,
at -70ºC or even colder, could cause delays. So could a shortage of people trained to
administer vaccines. Given that the pandemic cost the world about 8% of GDP in 2020, a
reluctance to invest in such things for fear of wasting money would be wantonly short-
sighted.
This may hurt

There could be fights among countries. China and Russia are already using vaccine
supply as the inoculated arm of their soft power (see China section). America and
Britain may try to lock in supplies for their own citizens. Many lives are at stake.
Modelling by Northeastern University in Boston suggests that if 50 rich countries
receive the first 2bn doses of a vaccine that is 80% effective, it will prevent 33% of
deaths from covid-19, whereas if the vaccine is distributed according to countries’
population, the share of those saved almost doubles. Such insights are the inspiration
behind COVAX, an initiative to ensure equal access.
There may be fights within countries, too. If limited supplies are to save as many as
possible, health workers must be vaccinated first, followed by the most vulnerable. In
health care, as in other areas, they often find themselves at the back of the queue.
Paradoxically, once the supply is adequate, the problem will switch to rejection by anti-
vaxxers and by sceptics worried about rushed certification. Polls have found that a
quarter of adults globally would refuse a vaccine. The hope is that, if the vaccines are
more than 90% effective, as Pfizer’s seems to be, governments will be able to persuade
most people to turn up for a jab.
All this amounts to a daunting agenda for governments. They must communicate clearly
about the scientific rationale for approvals and the criteria for distribution. They must
invest in supply chains and training, knowing that some spending will be wasted. And
they will need to explain to their citizens how the whole world gains if countries work
together to distribute vaccines fairly.
Edward Carr: deputy editor, The Economist

Too rapid a return to fiscal austerity is a risk as governments fret about deficits
Plotting the economic course

Watch these indicators to see where global growth is heading in 2021, says Henry
Curr
NEVER IN RECENT memory has so much uncertainty hung over global growth.
That is not just because the prospects for the world economy in 2021 depend
on how much the virus spreads and the roll-out of a vaccine. It is also because
it is unknown just how much lasting damage the pandemic has done as it has
slowed economic activity, shut down some firms and left workers jobless. Its
full impact has been obscured by massive emergency government
intervention to bail out companies and support workers. Only when that
support is withdrawn will the veil be lifted. Just as epidemiologists have had
to learn about the virus as it advances, economists must judge its economic
toll on the fly.
America’s labour market is a good place to start. It lies at the heart of all global
economic forecasts. In June half the monetary-policymakers at the Federal Reserve
thought the unemployment rate would fall slowly from its peak in the spring to finish
2020 at a level above 9.3%. By October it was already down to 6.9%. A sign of a v-
shaped recovery, say optimists. Yet in the same month there was more permanent
joblessness than in October 2008, the month after the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
Watch this measure, rather than the plummeting headline rate of unemployment, for
signs of whether the jobs market has truly turned a corner.
A rapid recovery in labour markets might presage higher inflation. Some commentators
warn of surging prices as the enormous monetary and fiscal stimulus injected in 2020
works its way through a global economy that remains disrupted by the crisis. Yet few
investors buy this thesis. Financial markets are priced for central banks to undershoot
their inflation targets for years. Japan seems to be at risk of a return to deflation, and the
euro zone is stuck with sluggish price rises. Were inflationary pressure to emerge, it
would probably do so first in America, and would require a swift adjustment to asset
prices premised on the world staying disinflationary and interest rates staying low.
Keep an eye not on inflation data, which at present are distorted by temporary changes
in the economy, nor on bond yields, which are pegged down by central banks, but on
inflation expectations.
Monetary policy is the most predictable part of the economic landscape. There is no
question of rich-world interest rates rising soon. Rather, more economies will
experiment with taking rates negative. The European Central Bank will review its
monetary-policy framework but, with northern hawks breathing down its neck, seems
unlikely to follow the Fed’s promise to let inflation overshoot its target.
The real action will be in fiscal policy. Governments must judge whether the economic
recovery needs more help. If America’s Republicans retain control of the Senate after
two run-off elections in January, President Joe Biden may find himself unable to pass
more stimulus even if the economy turns sour. Across the rich world too rapid a turn to
fiscal austerity is a risk, as governments fret about deficits, particularly if a rapid
rebound in activity is mistaken for a full recovery. With monetary policy more or less
fixed, the effect of tax and spending decisions will be amplified. Watching finance
ministries will be more important than studying central banks.
Unconventional measures
Emerging markets have not faced the widespread financial crisis that seemed imminent
at the start of the pandemic, despite concentrated and severe economic stress in the
poorest countries. The pandemic has not put as much pressure on their exchange rates
and foreign-exchange reserves as the past three instances of emerging-market stress,
according to the IMF. As a result they, like rich countries, have experimented with
unconventional fiscal and monetary policies, such as mass cash handouts and central-
bank bond-buying. But it is unclear how long emerging economies can emulate the rich-
world economic-policy playbook, even amid favourable global financial conditions. The
currencies of Brazil, South Africa and India may show signs of trouble.
Finally, consider the issue that defined the outlook for 2020 before the pandemic: the
trade war between America and China. Though the “phase one” trade deal between
them remains in place, so do most of the tariffs imposed in recent years. Given the
mutual suspicion that exists between the two countries, the truce is fragile. And as
global manufacturing has rebounded rapidly, so too has China’s economy. The future of
the trade war is unclear. But one economic variable is a reliable source of alarm in
Washington and has grown in 2020. Watch out for China’s trade surplus.
Henry Curr: economics editor, The Economist

The pandemic will eventually weaken populists
Mountebank medicine
The pandemic showed that populists are no good at governing, argues Robert
Guest
POPULISTS IN POWER have handled the coronavirus ineptly. President

Donald Trump downplayed it, promoted quack cures and disparaged face
masks. Thanks partly to his incompetence, Americans were more likely to die
of covid-19 than people in almost any other rich country. Curbing a pandemic
requires sober communication, patient organisation and respect for science.
Mr Trump offered none of these, which was perhaps why voters rejected him
in November.
Other nationalist-populists have performed dismally, too. Narendra Modi, India’s prime
minister, was so eager to seem tough and decisive that he failed to consider the
consequences of imposing one of the world’s tightest lockdowns on a country with so
many poor people. Millions of rural migrants in cities lost their jobs and thronged back
to the countryside, turning packed bus stations into covid-19 hotspots and spreading
the virus across India. Brazil’s president, Jair Bolsonaro, dismissed covid-19 as “the
sniffles” while touting bogus cures. And President John Magufuli of Tanzania declared
his country to be covid-free, thanks to divine intervention—even as bodies were being
secretly stacked in cemeteries at night.
In all these cases, an ignore-the-experts approach at the top led to widespread death
and needlessly severe economic damage. But populists are good at finding excuses and
changing the subject. Mr Modi blames Muslims for spreading the virus, and maintains a
stellar approval rating. Mr Bolsonaro has handed out truckloads of public money to
cushion the shock to Brazilian livelihoods. This has helped him remain more popular
than Mexico’s left-populist president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (known as AMLO),
who has also done a shoddy job of stopping the virus but has been reluctant to give
people money. Mr Magufuli won re-election in October by muzzling the media and
locking up opponents.
Populist leaders claim to know the will of “the people” and vow to defend them against a
shadowy, wicked “elite”. But the people have a range of views, and the “elite” includes
doctors, scientists and epidemiologists. The populist tendency to dismiss expertise is
harmful at the best of times; during a pandemic it is disastrous. From Mr Trump’s
decision to pull America out of the World Health Organisation—the main global body
for fighting pandemics—to Belarusian despot Alexander Lukashenko’s suggestion that
people treat the virus by drinking vodka and driving a tractor, populists have favoured
soundbites over science, with lethal results.
Unfortunately, the pandemic itself makes some voters more susceptible to populism.
People are scared; populists are adept at exploiting fear. People are confused; populists
offer narratives that are easy to grasp, such as the suggestions that China or
globalisation are to blame. There is sometimes an element of truth in these stories:
China’s initial cover-up of covid-19 was indeed grossly irresponsible. But that is in the
past. Governments everywhere have to fight the virus now, and probably throughout
2021. They can do so effectively only if they are guided by evidence.
Happily, there are reasons to predict that the pandemic will eventually weaken
populists. Voters notice when their leaders fail to deliver. A survey by More in Common,
an NGO, found people were far more likely to blame their governments for mishandling
the pandemic in America, Britain and Poland, all run by populist or somewhat populist
governments, than in Germany or the Netherlands, which are not.
Electoral calendars mean that not many voters in 2021 will have a chance to sack or
restrain populist governments. Russia’s legislative elections will not be free or fair.
Indians will elect a new upper house, but Mr Modi will maintain his grip. Mexicans will
elect lawmakers, but AMLO will stay in charge.
Vote the rascals out

Yet the pandemic has shown that the populist toolkit—fearmongering, scapegoating,
appeals to emotion—is useless against a virus that fears nothing and does not respond
to divisive rhetoric. By hitting the global economy, covid-19 has also made it harder for
demagogues to keep bribing voters with their own money, especially in developing
countries that cannot borrow cheaply.
Defeating the virus will require virtues that populists disdain: reason, openness and
international co-operation. The task for liberals in 2021 will be to make this case more
eloquently, and drive the populists back.
Robert Guest: foreign editor, The Economist

A great power has let its foreign service slip, to a dangerous degree
Sorry state
America needs to invest more in diplomacy, argues Daniel Franklin
WHO WILL run the world in 2021? International institutions such as the United Nations
have been weakened by great-power rivalry. Russia will be a spoiler, not a leader. In
Europe, Boris Johnson will have his hands full with the aftermath of Brexit, Germany’s
Angela Merkel will leave the stage and France’s Emmanuel Macron has limited means to
pursue his grand ideas. China is the rising superpower, and an increasingly assertive
one, but not yet keen, let alone able, to take on the burdens of world leadership. The
question is whether America, under President Joe Biden, will be prepared to step back
into the role.
For some years now America, weary of its “endless wars”, has been in retreat. Barack
Obama believed it was time to focus on “nation-building at home”. Donald Trump took
to withdrawal with gusto, pulling the country out of a long list of international
arrangements, including the Paris climate agreement, the Iran nuclear deal and—in the
middle of a pandemic—the World Health Organisation. As America has stepped back,
emboldened authoritarian leaders have stepped forward, posing a challenge to
democracies everywhere.
Look ahead, however, and further withdrawal is scarcely an attractive option. Global
threats will multiply, from pandemics to climate change to space weaponry. And in an
increasingly multipolar world, America cannot count on simply getting its way. It will
need to rely on the patient pursuit of its interests through persuasion, building
coalitions and working with allies. In short, it will have to rely on diplomacy.
This is by no means a dismal prospect. America retains great advantages even in the
more competitive geopolitical era ahead. It is still by far the mightiest military power
and the world’s biggest economy. In contrast to rivals such as China and Russia, it has
steady allies who can help amplify its influence. And at its best it is a champion of
human rights and freedoms that can inspire people everywhere.
Americans are right to want to limit the flexing of their military muscle. The strength of
America’s armed forces will always be a vital part of its ability to exert influence. Yet
since the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 the superpower’s foreign policy has
relied too much on force. It is time to put diplomacy first.
But just as the demand for sustained, sophisticated American diplomacy is rising, the
capacity of the country’s foreign service to supply it is dwindling. The State Department
is demoralised and suffering from a hollowing-out of talent. That will be hard to remedy
soon.
The troubles of the country’s oldest federal agency did not begin with the Trump
administration but they deepened dramatically under it. Mr Trump openly referred to
“the Deep State Department”, repeatedly (if unsuccessfully) proposed slashing its
budget and publicly attacked experienced diplomats, such as those involved with policy
towards Ukraine, whose only crime was to do their job. Career diplomats were virtually
shut out of senior policymaking roles, and the share of political appointees to
ambassadorial roles—their main qualification often being the size of their political
donations—reached new heights. American diplomacy is in crisis.
What can be done? Three times in the past century—after the first world war, after the
second world war and during the cold war—Congress passed legislation to shape a
foreign service fit for the future. Yet in recent decades Congress has focused on the
shape of America’s armed services and on the organisation of the country’s homeland
security, not on diplomacy. Whether lawmakers are capable of agreeing on a new
framework for the State Department is open to doubt. With or without a new act,
however, America must rethink its diplomacy for a more contested global landscape.
America, rediscover your Excellency

Plenty of people are starting to do just that, including a group, led by former
ambassadors at Harvard’s Kennedy School, who have prepared a road map. Some of
their suggestions involve changes to the way the State Department bureaucracy works.
It is notoriously inflexible and risk-averse. It badly needs to modernise its career
structure, including opening up to entry at all levels, not least to help it improve its
dismal record on diversity: among America’s ambassadors abroad, only three are
African-American and four Hispanic. But the big idea is simple and urgent. A great
power has let its foreign service slip, to a dangerous degree. For the sake of its own
future, and for the good of the world, in 2021 America needs to start reinvesting in
diplomacy.
Daniel Franklin, diplomatic editor, The Economist

The recession is shaking up the world of business—and the rules of capitalism
Shock and awe

Prepare to see the extent of the creative destruction left by the pandemic, says
Patrick Foulis
RECESSIONS ARE capitalism’s sorting mechanism. Weak businesses shrink or

fail and stronger ones expand. But in 2020 the process of creative destruction
did not take place in the typical manner. Because the downturn was the result
of a health crisis rather than, say, a financial crash or inflation scare, there
were some idiosyncratic corporate winners and losers: think of the boom in
video streaming, or cruise-liner firms being wrecked. Meanwhile vast state
handouts propped up companies around the world, masking the scale of the
corporate carnage. In 2021 the toll will become clearer as stimulus tapers
down and more firms fail. Healthy businesses will ramp up investment, giving
them an enduring advantage. These top dogs will, however, face a new climate
in which three tenets of modern business—the primacy of shareholders,
globalisation and limited government—are in flux.
Downturns tend to be infrequent and swift: since the second world war America has
been in recession only 14% of the time. But they have a profound impact on the
structure of business. During the previous three slumps the share prices of American
firms in the top quartile of each of ten sectors rose by 6% on average, while those in the
bottom quartile fell by 44%.
This time there have been some obvious winners. Silicon Valley’s prospects have soared
as users have switched to digital services (see next leader). China Inc has had another
great leap forward. Its domestic economy has outperformed most other countries’ and a
wave of initial public offerings, including the fizzy flotation of Nongfu Spring, a bottled
water colossus, has highlighted the strength and depth of Chinese firms. Their share of
world stockmarket value (including Hong Kong) is now 17%, up from 15% before the
pandemic and 13% a decade ago.
Winners and losers

Some success stories have been more unexpected. The Poonawalla family in India, who
until recently were as well known for their stud farms as for their vaccine business,
have seen their fortune rise by 62% to $14bn, according to Bloomberg. The container-
shipping industry has spent years merging into a more efficient structure: the effort has
paid off, with Maersk, the largest firm, predicting solid profits in 2020 despite a slump
in trade. SoftBank, a Japanese conglomerate known for its wild tech bets and huge debts,
has turned a crisis into an opportunity by announcing $80bn of asset sales. Gold-mining
companies, long viewed as dead money, are back in fashion because some investors
think huge government stimulus will lead to a bout of inflation in which bullion is one of
the few assets to hold its worth.
What about the losers? Judged by the bottom line, business is in worse shape than in the
subprime crisis: in the first half of 2020 more than 40% of America’s top 3,000 listed
firms made losses, compared with just over a third in 2009. But default rates in America
remained low, with only about 5% of junk bonds in default and about 4% of business
credit cards in arrears.
In 2021 this unreal world won’t last. Governments will reduce new aid and pivot away
from keeping individual firms alive and towards making sure workers have help if they
lose their jobs. The gap between companies will also widen because stronger ones will
maintain investment as others cut back. By mid-2020, capital spending at the ten
highest-spending listed American firms was still 3% higher than a year earlier, but had
dropped by 82% at the smallest 1,000 firms.
The corporate winners from the slump of 2020-21 will tend to be big firms that benefit
from technological disruption and have exposure to better-performing economies,
notably in Asia and America. Yet they face a tricky post-pandemic environment as the
rules of the game between business and society are recast.
Firms will be under pressure to pay less attention to shareholders and more to workers.
The pace of global buybacks almost halved in mid-2020 and won’t bounce back fully
even as profits recover. The stagnation of globalisation means that more multinationals
will have to operate as federations of national businesses and will be unable to reap the
full efficiency gains from being run as a single globally integrated organisation. And as
the size of government expands everywhere, the levels of regulation and taxes will
inevitably rise. For the top 3,000 global firms the median effective tax rate paid has
dropped from 33% two decades ago to just 22% now; the only way is up. At the end of
this recession the world of business will have been shaken up—and so will the rules of
capitalism.
Patrick Foulis: business affairs editor, The Economist

The big question for 2021 is: how much will things snap back?
After the tech-celeration

New technological behaviours adopted during the pandemic will outlast it, says
Tom Standage
WELCOME TO THE future—not 2021, as you might have been expecting, but
2025, or even 2030, depending on whom you ask. The adoption of new
technological behaviours in response to the pandemic, from video-
conferencing to online shopping, means usage has already reached levels that
were not expected for many more years.
“Recent data show that we have vaulted five years forward in consumer and business
digital adoption in a matter of around eight weeks,” declared McKinsey, a consultancy,
in May 2020. And for online shopping in America, progress was even more rapid: “ten
years’ growth in three months”. Netcomm, an Italian retail consortium, says shopping in
that country, a laggard in e-commerce, has witnessed a “ten-year evolutionary leap”
towards digital. In banking, experts canvassed by The Economist reckon that the share
of cashless transactions worldwide has jumped to levels they had expected to see in two
to five years’ time. In medicine, a British doctor told the New York Times that the
National Health Service had undergone a decade of change within a week, as doctors
switched to remote consultations.
Call it tech-celeration. In all these cases, and in many others, the pandemic has
accelerated existing trends of technological adoption. Shopping was steadily moving
online; payments were slowly going digital; online learning was slowly becoming more
prevalent; more people were working from home, at least some of the time. Now people
in many countries have been abruptly propelled into a future where all of these
behaviours are far more widespread.
This sudden shift has been painful. Many bricks-and-mortar retailers, already in
difficulty, have been forced into bankruptcy, including household names such as J.C.
Penney and Nieman Marcus. With bank branches closed, elderly people unfamiliar with
online banking have been targeted by scammers. The switch to online learning
highlighted inequality in broadband access and computer ownership among students.
But the transition has also sparked rapid transformation in fields, notably health and
education, that are historically resistant to change. The enforced experiment of mass
lockdowns has also destigmatised online learning and remote working, by
demonstrating that with the right equipment and support, they really can work at scale.
That is good news.
The big question for 2021 is: how much will things snap back? Clearly the world is not
going to return to its pre-pandemic state. Many department stores have closed. Italian
grannies have discovered the joys of online shopping. Home-workers are in no rush to
return to commuting five days a week. But nor will all the lockdown behaviours of 2020
persist. Students and teachers are keen to return to in-person tuition. Workers miss the
camaraderie of the office. So some new behaviours will stick, but not all, and the result
will be somewhere in the middle. Exactly where will have enormous implications: for
transport patterns, property prices and the layout of cities, among other things.
McKinsey reports that, by 2022, 15% of executives who took part in an international
poll expect to allow a tenth of their employees to work remotely for two or more days a
week, and 7% were willing to stretch this to three days a week. But those global
averages conceal wide variations. In Britain and Germany, 20% of respondents were
happy for at least one in ten workers to work remotely two or more days a week; in
China, the figure was just 4%. And among technology executives the proportion stood at
34%, up from 22% before the pandemic. Companies in technology and financial services
can function more easily without workers on site. But even in industries where fully
remote working is possible, the most likely outcome is a hybrid future that mixes
remote and in-person working.
The future is now

Some firms—like those that provide services in the cloud, or devices that support
remote working—will get stronger. Others, like bricks-and-mortar retailers, will suffer.
Many will fail altogether. But once again there is a silver lining, as these changes open
up new arenas for innovation. Already companies big and small are devising fresh tools
to improve the experience of remote working, collaboration and learning; to support
new kinds of contactless and appointment-based retailing; and to provide new sorts of
online social experiences, from virtual conferences to virtual tourism. There is no going
back to the past that existed before the pandemic. Instead, covid-19 has propelled the
world into a very different future.
Tom Standage: editor, The World in 2021

It is almost as confusing as the rules of cricket. Almost
The year of déjà vu

Everything is better the second time around, right?—asks Leo Mirani
HERE IS A question for future pub quizzes: in which year were the 2020
Olympics held in Tokyo? An easy one—the answer is 2021. What about Expo
2020 in Dubai? An answer of 2021 would score a point, but so would 2022; it
runs from October to March. How about Miss America 2020? That is a trick
question. The event took place in December 2019, before coronavirus turned
the world upside down. It is Miss America 2021 that has been cancelled.
Many other annual events will try to pick up where they left off in 2019. But organisers
of less regular events are hoping to go ahead with the ones postponed from 2020, and
hope the punters will put up with outdated merchandise. Some, such as Euro 2020, a
quadrennial football tournament, have retained the same name. UEFA, the European
football confederation, says this is “to keep the original vision of the tournament” and to
“serve as a reminder of how the whole football family came together”. But it admits that
“a lot of branded material had already been produced.” The same considerations no
doubt apply to Expo 2020 and the 2020 Olympics.
A sense of déjà vu is already setting in, and 2021 has not even started yet. In July 2019
Tokyo held a celebration to mark the one-year countdown to its big Olympic moment.
There were fireworks, celebrities and an unveiling of the medals to be awarded at the
games the following year. But the only thing that happened 366 days later was a 15-
minute event in an empty stadium to mark, well, another year to the 2020 Olympics.
Call it a twice-in-a-lifetime experience.
In cricket, the 2020 Twenty20 World Cup has been moved to 2021, causing anguish to
fans of linguistic reduplication everywhere (Twenty20 is a shortened form of the game
involving 20 overs for each team). Worse still, the original 2020 Twenty20, which was
to have been played in Australia, will be held in India instead—whereas the 2021 series,
to have been played in India, will occur in Australia in 2022. It is almost as confusing as
the rules of cricket. Almost.
Live music has been affected, too. Among the many stars who have had to postpone
tours by a year are Pearl Jam, Green Day and Alanis Morissette, on her “Jagged Little Pill”
25th-anniversary tour. As if switching between 2020 and 2021 were not taxing enough,
it is strange to be reminded that some people still live in 1995. Meanwhile, on the Isle of
Wight, a quirky English holiday spot and festival venue, the “Experience 1970 Festival”
was postponed, too—proving that time travel never quite works out as intended.
It is not just fun stuff that has been put off to a later date. The 2nd Global Policy Forum
on Memory of the World, which was originally scheduled for May 2020, has been
postponed—no one can say until when. An interdisciplinary conference on “Confronting
Evil”, planned for June 2020, is “under review”.
Then there is politics, which never stops. Londoners who had hoped to ignore the 2020
mayoral elections will now have to extend their apathy for a further year. Hong Kongers
preparing to vote in the city’s legislative-council elections will have had a particularly
rough 12 months in which to make up their minds. And Somalis, having gone 51 years
without elections based on the universal franchise, will have to wait yet another year.
No doubt 2020 will be chiefly remembered for the onset of the covid-19 pandemic. Yet
here, too, the year gets short shrift. Like the absent father whose only contribution is
one night of transmission and a surname, 2019 escaped the consequences, but left
behind its legacy: covid-19 is so named because it was brought to the World Health
Organisation’s attention on the last day of that year.
Let’s try that again

Even the very name of the virus evokes déjà vu. Back in 2002-03 the world confronted
severe acute respiratory syndrome, or SARS. It was confined to fewer than 9,000 cases
by 2004, and has happily not been heard of again. The virus that causes covid-19 is
SARS-CoV-2—one of those unpopular sequels that nobody asked for.
Yet that also offers some reason for cheer. Humanity has already beaten a deadly
coronavirus once. It can surely do so again, albeit on a bigger budget and with more
drama, as is the way with sequels. Of all the things that will be repeated in 2021—
including, quite possibly, the cancellation or postponement of events that were already
delayed from 2020—containing a coronavirus is the one thing everybody would agree
is even better the second time around.
Leo Mirani: senior Britain correspondent, The Economist

United States
• The president’s priorities
• Long division
• Lingering pains
• Police on the line
• The children of covid-19
• Winning the next ten years
• Block, stock and barrel
• All change, please
• An idea whose time has come

United States
The president’s priorities

James Astill: Washington bureau chief and Lexington columnist, The Economist, WASHINGTON, DC
From tackling the pandemic to reviving the economy, Joe Biden has a lot of work
to do
2021 in brief
The trial of four Minnesota police officers charged in the death of George Floyd opens in
Minneapolis in March. Derek Chauvin is charged with second-degree murder, third-
degree murder and second-degree manslaughter. Three others are charged with aiding
and abetting
THE YEAR ahead in America will be a big improvement on its awful predecessor. The
country was wracked by such a series of scandals and disasters in 2020 that, by the time
voters limped to the polls, Donald Trump’s impeachment trial ten months earlier barely
warranted a mention. A quarter of a million Americans were dead of covid-19. Over
10m jobs had been lost. The racial grievances highlighted by the Black Lives Matter
protests—some of the biggest in American history—had been inflamed by the
president’s race-baiting on the trail. Mr Trump’s refusal to accept the election result
then put even the country’s democracy in doubt.
Many of those problems will carry over into 2021. The economy will be shaky as long as
the virus remains rampant. The mistrust of the electoral process that Mr Trump has
encouraged among his supporters will be long-lasting. Yet the simple fact of his ejection
from the White House—after he became the fourth president in a century to fail to win a
second term—has transformed America’s prospects of managing its troubles. Mr Trump
saw covid-19 as a communications problem to be spun into irrelevance. He saw
America’s racial divisions as a political opportunity. In Joe Biden, America will have a
competent president who respects expertise and is committed to bringing people
together.
Mr Biden will signal this in an opening flurry of executive actions. He will cancel
America’s withdrawal from the World Health Organisation, rejoin the Paris climate
agreement and reinstate the Obama administration’s protections for illegal immigrants
brought to America as children. He will scrap Mr Trump’s ban on travellers from some
majority-Muslim countries. Mr Biden will end his predecessor’s policy of separating
illegal child migrants from their parents and launch a mission to find the missing
parents of 545 migrant children in custody. He will issue a national mask mandate.
His administration will also take rapid steps to rebuild America’s Trump-bruised
institutions. It will restore credible scientists to the Environmental Protection Agency
and reintroduce firewalls to protect the independence of the Department of Justice. Mr
Biden’s secretary of state will need to restore confidence and order to America’s much-
abused diplomatic corps as much as to its alliances.
These measures will have added significance because of the Democrats’ failure to
capture the Senate in November. They are unlikely to correct that by winning the two
Senate run-off elections due to be held in Georgia in early January. That means Mr Biden
will be unable to pass almost any of the economic, health-care, climate and tax policies
he promised on the trail. One of his first priorities had been to pass an expansive $2trn
economic stimulus package, including investments in green and other infrastructure.
Getting a much skinnier stimulus package past Mitch McConnell, the veteran Republican
Senate leader, will be a struggle.
Mr McConnell will try to deny the Biden administration any wins and re-establish his
party’s reputation for fiscal conservatism (a dogma that only seems to concern its
lawmakers in opposition), with a view to making gains in the mid-term elections in
2022. Blocked on Capitol Hill, Mr Biden will have to take more ambitious executive
actions to make progress at home, as did the Obama administrations in which he
previously served. Expect him to institute further curbs on pollution from coal- and gas-
fired power stations—though whether such measures will survive the scrutiny of an
increasingly activist conservative majority on the Supreme Court bench is unclear.
In foreign affairs, the new administration will represent a dramatic change in tone from
its predecessor—and more continuity than many expect. Mr Biden will soothe
America’s traditional allies and restore American leadership to the multinational efforts
to contain climate change, Russian aggression and Iran’s nuclear programme (see
Middle East section). But he will maintain the Trump administration’s adversarial
posture towards China, and some of its tariffs. He will slow, but not reverse, America’s
disengagement from Afghanistan. And in America’s accelerating shift in focus from west
to east—which Mr Biden will not interrupt—those same old allies may detect more than
a hint of Mr Trump’s transactional style.
Despite the constraints on his power, 2021 could turn out well for Mr Biden. This will
rest above all on his administration’s ability to make a covid-19 vaccine quickly and
widely available. If that goes smoothly, the economy will rapidly make up its lost ground
and Mr Biden’s popularity will surge. If it does not, the hope stirred by the end of Mr
Trump’s misrule will soon dissipate—to the former president’s advantage.
The degree to which Mr Trump retreats from public life is another great question for
the year ahead. Members of the Republican establishment fear that, by looming over
their defeated party on Twitter and television, Mr Trump will be a barrier to reforming
it. Their fears will probably be realised.

Long division
Jon Fasman: Washington correspondent, The Economist, WASHINGTON, DC
America’s culture wars will intensify
The fight goes on
Joe Biden will be unable to deliver the unity he promised
2021 in brief
America marks 20 years since the attacks of September 11th 2001. Hijackers flew
aeroplanes into the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington,
DC. A fourth plane crashed in Pennsylvania. Nearly 3,000 people were killed
BERNIE SANDERS and Elizabeth Warren had more passionate fans. Kamala Harris and
Pete Buttigieg were more poised speakers. But Joe Biden had something other
Democratic candidates lacked: faith that he could bring Democrats and Republicans
together. Many considered this naive and unrealistic. But it appealed to enough voters
to propel him past his more strident challengers in the primary, and then to defeat the
most divisive president in modern history.
It is not hard to see why. The past four years—and to a lesser extent, the eight before
that, under Barack Obama—have been a period of intense cultural and political
polarisation in America. Increasingly, Democrats and Republicans do not just hold
different views on, say, gay marriage and tax rates. They inhabit different universes and
increasingly distrust each other.
Two months before the 2020 election, a poll showed that over 40% of Americans of
both parties believed violence would be justified if the other side’s candidate won the
election. Most presidents, including Mr Obama, saw such deep antipathy as damaging,
both to national unity and to their political prospects. At least rhetorically, virtually all
presidents have tried to broaden their appeal once in office.
Mr Trump never did. He exploited and inflamed division, like the reality-television star
he was before entering office, rather than trying to heal it. Small wonder that over 75m
Americans rallied to Mr Biden’s plea for unity. Ordinarily such appeals would be routine
for an American politician. But these were not ordinary times. With Mr Trump
appealing to his base, and the woke left appealing to theirs, the vast American middle
found its tribune in Mr Biden, an ageing career politician who ably met his moment.
Even so, he will be unable to deliver the unity he promised. That is not his fault: nobody
could. Partisanship and division sell. Rush Limbaugh and “The Daily Show” are not
going away just because Mr Trump lost and Mr Biden prefers unity. Social media lets
Americans have their political views constantly confirmed rather than challenged.
Gone are the days of conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans regularly crossing
the aisle. Today political parties are almost wholly aligned along cultural and ideological
fault-lines. Most senators and representatives hold safe seats where they have more to
fear from a more radical primary challenger within their own party than an opposition
candidate.
Even if Mr Biden had won the landslide that the left hoped for, America would have
remained deeply divided; he might just have had an easier time getting legislation
through Congress. Soon after taking office on January 20th, he will urge all Americans to
wear masks; adherence to that suggestion will almost certainly be greater in
Democratic- than Republican-leaning areas. Several cases in the Supreme Court’s
pipeline may severely restrict abortion rights without directly outlawing it. The battles
over those cases will be no less intense just because Mr Biden sits in the White House.
No politician can force Americans to end their country’s culture wars. They must decide
to do that themselves.

Lingering pains
Callum Williams: senior economics writer, The Economist
An economy on the mend—but at a cost
2021 in brief
Construction work begins on a new high-speed rail line between Dallas and Houston.
Trains travelling at speeds of up to 200mph (320kph) could reduce the journey time to
90 minutes
IN 2020 AMERICA faced an almighty economic shock. In January unemployment was at

a five-decade low of 3.5%. Wages for the lowest paid were rising fastest. But within
weeks the country experienced unemployment rates last seen at the end of the
Depression of the 1930s, concentrated among the poorest. In the second quarter, GDP
fell by 10% year on year. Yet since then the economy has rebounded more quickly than
expected—and may outperform pundits’ forecasts in 2021.
In June the Federal Reserve’s forecasters reckoned that unemployment would reach 9%
by the end of 2020. America’s jobless rate actually fell below that level in August. That
may be in part because consumer spending has remained more robust than many
economists had expected. Exports have also performed reasonably well.
Much of this was due to a series of huge stimulus programmes agreed upon early in the
pandemic. So far Congress has passed some $3trn-worth of fiscal support, more than in
any other country both in absolute terms and relative to the size of the economy. People
have received cheques of up to $1,200, for instance, while Congress bumped up
unemployment-insurance payments by $600 a week. Many people’s incomes are higher
today than they were before the pandemic hit.
Unemployment will keep going down. The evidence from the aftermath of past
recessions suggests that joblessness falls quickly when a large share of the unemployed
believe that their job loss is only temporary. Being let go by a restaurant that is not
allowed to serve customers because of a lockdown is different from being let go when
the place has gone bust. Early in the pandemic, three-quarters of those who had lost
their jobs believed their predicament was temporary.
Economists worry that Congress’s failure to agree on extra stimulus in the summer will
doom the economy in 2021. That is too pessimistic. Many people saved a large part of
their stimulus cheques: they can now spend them, giving the economy a boost. A fresh
stimulus package in 2021 cannot be ruled out. Republicans and Democrats strongly
differ on precisely what the economy needs, but a majority would like to inject more
money.
Though America may recover faster than many other rich countries, the effects of the
pandemic will linger. Few economists expect the unemployment rate to return to 3.5%
soon (analysts at Goldman Sachs predict it will not come down to 4% until 2025). A
large and growing group of those who lost their jobs—if still a minority—believe that
they were let go permanently. They will find it harder to find new work. The risk for
these people, as they spend more time out of employment, is that they will lose the
motivation to try something new and their skills will ossify or perish. For now,
policymakers must focus on steering the American economy back on course. But at
some point they will need to turn their attention to the pandemic’s lost generation.

Police on the line

Jon Fasman: Washington correspondent, The Economist, NEW YORK
Change is necessary, but difficult
ON AUGUST 9TH 2014 Michael Brown, a young unarmed black man, was shot and killed
by Darren Wilson, a white police officer, in Ferguson, Missouri. The circumstances of
Brown’s death remain disputed. Some claim he had his hands raised in surrender; Mr
Wilson said that Brown punched him, charged at him, tried to grab his gun and reached
towards his waistband, as if to pull out a gun of his own. Weeks of protests in Ferguson
followed. And although a Justice Department investigation cleared Mr Wilson, police
officers were all required to adopt body-worn cameras (bodycams).
On May 25th 2020 Derek Chauvin, a police officer in Minneapolis, knelt on the neck of
George Floyd—an unarmed, handcuffed black man—for nearly nine minutes,
asphyxiating him. The footage of Floyd’s death sparked weeks of protests, and shifted
national opinion on police reform. Protestors urged politicians to “defund the police”
and, though those calls have died down, some Democratic governors and legislators
have enacted policies to increase police oversight and transparency. The coming year
will determine how widespread change will be.
Only a few of America’s 18,000 law-enforcement agencies are federal; most are
governed by states, cities and counties. But the federal government can do two things to
advance police reform. First, it can change federal law. A bill that passed the
Democratic-led House in June, for instance, made using chokeholds a civil-rights
violation, and withheld federal grant funds from jurisdictions that do not ban them. It
also eroded personal-liability protections for police officers, and conditioned federal
funding on departments banning racial profiling. Joe Biden’s progressive criminal-
justice platform contains many of these measures, but his ability to enact them will
depend partly on whether Democrats control the Senate, which will not be determined
until after two run-off elections in Georgia on January 5th.
Second, the Justice Department can investigate police forces accused of persistent
misconduct that contravenes citizens’ constitutional rights. If it finds such a pattern, it
usually enters into a “consent decree” with that force—an agreement that lays out a
detailed plan for reform, overseen by a federal judge. Barack Obama’s administration
used consent decrees to encourage police reform in at least 20 jurisdictions. Donald
Trump curtailed the practice. Joe Biden has pledged to revive it.
Some governors and state legislators have already sprung into action. Probably more
than half of America’s law-enforcement agencies equip some officers with bodycams,
and at least six states have passed statewide laws; New York joined their ranks in June.
New York also banned chokeholds like the one that killed Floyd, created an independent
office to investigate misconduct allegations, required officers to report gun firings
within six hours and repealed a law that kept police disciplinary records secret. The
state required courts to collect and publish demographic data on low-level offences, so
the public can determine, say, whether police departments stop a disproportionate
number of non-white drivers. Colorado has also expanded reporting requirements. New
Jersey has ordered departments to identify officers punished for misconduct. Other
examples abound, particularly in Democratic-controlled states and cities.
To many activists, this is only the beginning. For all the ink spilled over inchoate
demands to “abolish” or “defund” the police, many proposals are more concrete.
Campaign Zero, a push for reform that grew out of the tragic events in Ferguson,
advocates eight policy changes which it claims could reduce police violence by nearly
three-quarters. The list includes banning chokeholds and shooting at moving vehicles,
requiring de-escalation and warnings before opening fire, and mandating that police
stop fellow officers they see using excessive force and report every time they threaten
or use force.
These are common-sense reforms, but bitterly opposed by many police departments.
The chances of such changes being implemented are far greater in places under
Democratic rather than Republican control.
The children of covid-19

Idrees Kahloon: United States policy correspondent, The Economist, WASHINGTON, DC
The gap between rich and poor will widen
The repercussions will linger for years
MOST SPECIES of social scientists—be they economists, sociologists or psychologists—

agree that adversity in childhood spells difficulty in adulthood. Though children are
mercifully much less likely to die of covid-19, the impacts of increased poverty, family
job loss and disrupted schooling will not be so easily avoided.
In-person learning is superior to virtual instruction, which, more than mere nostalgia,
explains its persistence. This is even more the case for poor children without good
internet connections or personal laptops, whose families cannot pay for supplemental
tutoring, and for whom schools provide free meals and stability. Analysts at McKinsey, a
consultancy, calculate that if schools resume in-person instruction in January 2021 (and
that now looks unlikely in many cases), the average student would suffer seven months
of lost learning. Black students would lose even more: ten months. Poor students would
forego more than an entire year.
Home life is also increasingly disrupted. Surveys from the Census Bureau conducted in
September—after enhanced unemployment benefits had lapsed—showed that 30% of
households with children, headed by parents without high-school degrees, reported not
having had enough to eat in the preceding week. Of less educated families (a proxy for
the less well paid), 21% reported missing last month’s rent and a similar share thought
it very likely that they would be evicted in the coming two months. Partly because job
losses have been more pronounced, indicators of parental mental distress, such as
depression and anxiety, have also increased disproportionately. Food, housing and
parental instability are harbingers of worse behaviour in schools, poorer testing
outcomes and, eventually, lower rates of high-school graduation and college completion.
The sooner parents are able to return to work and children to in-person schooling, the
less unequal the fallout. The sorts of insulating policies that the federal government
might pass to cushion the blow—such as a national tutoring corps for those unable to
afford such help, or wider access to laptops—are unlikely to become reality because of
the usual partisan antipathy. State and city governments will be sidelined with their
own budgetary crises. Instead, America’s decentralised education system will have to
tackle these problems piecemeal, district by district. As with much else afflicting the
children of covid-19, the lack of a policy response will lead to even greater inequality.
The repercussions will linger for years.

Winning the next ten years

Adam Roberts: Midwest correspondent, The Economist, CHICAGO
Could gerrymandering become a tiny bit harder to do?
2021 in brief
Horse-drawn carriage licences in Chicago cannot be renewed this year after the city
council voted to ban the vehicles from the city’s streets. The new rule marks a long-
sought victory for animal-rights activists
FOCUS ONLY on elections and you risk missing how, once in a decade, decisions are
made that greatly influence who gets to hold power in America. In the year after the
2020 census it is up to states—either through their legislatures or through special
commissions—to redraw voting districts to adjust for population change. Where
politicians or their appointees oversee this, they get a chance to gerrymander. By
drawing lines craftily, such as by concentrating their own likely voters and dividing
those of their opponents, they can lock in a partisan advantage that endures for ten
years.
Last time around, Republican strategists did so skilfully. Democrats, clobbered by the
Tea Party wave, did badly in elections for state legislatures and governors in 2010.
Republicans won those easily in Midwestern swing states, such as Ohio, Michigan,
Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, then got to decide on redistricting the following year. The
result: such states have become some of the most grossly gerrymandered. In Wisconsin,
for example, even if Democrats won 54% of the votes cast in legislative elections,
Republicans could still expect to enjoy a nine-seat majority in the state assembly.
This is not just unfair. It also encourages extremism. In gerrymandered seats the
incumbent knows that the risk of losing in the general election is slight. The greater
threat is from in-party primary challengers who typically appeal to the political
extremes (mostly it is ardent party activists who turn out for primaries). Less
gerrymandering this time, therefore, could help encourage moderates in both parties.
There had been hopes that in 2021 matters would swing back a bit. Democrats had
expected to win over more state houses in 2020, for example, but their efforts badly
flopped. In some places where Republicans still control the legislature, such as
Wisconsin, Democrats now occupy the governor’s mansion, and can (usually) veto
legislators’ redistricting plans if they are egregious. A clash there is likely as legislators
and the governor squabble before the courts intervene. That will look ugly but could
result in less lopsided districts.
Just as importantly, several states have cleaned up the process of drawing boundaries
by pushing politicians aside. In 2018 voters in Michigan, for example, overwhelmingly
backed a plan for an independent commission, for both congressional and state district
maps. Arizona, California and Colorado have all introduced independent commissions.
Iowa already has non-partisan staff drawing its maps. In Pennsylvania courts have
redrawn maps that were deemed too partisan, which with luck will ensure that future
efforts are more restrained. Two years ago Missouri opted to reform its system, but
voters undid that change in November. Even so, at least in the Midwest, there will be
less chance for skulduggery.
Where will gerrymandering still happen? Keep an eye on two trends, suggests Michael
Li, an expert in the subject at the Brennan Centre for Justice, a New York think-tank that
focuses on law and policy. First, watch states where one party won the “trifecta”: control
of the assembly, the state senate and the governor’s mansion. Republicans already have
several and added two more, in New Hampshire and Montana, in November. And,
second, see where sizeable population shifts are recorded, meaning that big changes to
voting districts are due.
Democratic-run Illinois remains badly gerrymandered. More serious worries arise in

fast-growing southern states, where Republicans often dominate all wings of
government. Race is usually an underlying issue—maps are redrawn to weaken the
influence of African-American and other non-white voters (who are more reliably
Democratic). Conditions are ripe for bad behaviour in Florida, Georgia and Texas—and
in North Carolina, where the governor cannot veto redistricting plans.
It is unlikely that a divided Congress would agree on federal plans to improve

redistricting for all, but it could push for national standards both for congressional
districts and for state legislative ones. Three representatives from California proposed
such a bill in 2019. Congress has acted before. In 1842 it ordered that a district could
have only one representative, for example. Nearly two centuries on, it might be time for
it to act again.

Block, stock and barrel

Alexandra Suich Bass: senior correspondent, politics, technology and society, The Economist, DALLAS
Gun control will make headlines
More guns were sold in 2020 than in any previous year
ACCORDING TO THE Chinese zodiac, 2020 was the year of the rat. In America
it was the year of the gun. More guns were sold in 2020 than in any previous
year. Amid widespread anxiety about the coronavirus and social unrest, 5m
more guns were sold than otherwise would have been, according to Phillip
Levine and Robin McKnight, professors at Wellesley College. In the first nine
months of the year 29m federal background-checks were submitted for
firearms, 84% more than in the same period five years earlier. (Not all
background checks correspond to a sale.) First-time gun-buyers waited in
queues more reminiscent of rock concerts than retail. On one Saturday in July,
the wait to enter the gun show being held at a Dallas convention centre was
more than two hours.
America already has the highest per-person rate of gun ownership in the world. It has
more guns than people and more mass shootings than any other rich country. But if
2020 was the year of the gun, 2021 will be the year that gun control gets more attention.
There are four places to watch.
First is the White House. As president, Donald Trump played to his pro-gun supporters
and unwound existing restrictions where he could. Joe Biden, by contrast, will set his
sights on gun control. As a senator in the 1990s, Mr Biden helped enact the current
federal background-check system, and the assault-weapons ban, which expired in 2004.
As president, he has promised to pursue another such ban, although it would be
politically contentious. He is more likely to expand universal background-checks by
closing loopholes for gun sales and transfers.
Second, pay attention to the Supreme Court. The newest justice, Amy Coney Barrett,
could second-guess many long-standing gun-control laws, predicts Adam Winkler,
author of “Gun Fight” and a professor at UCLA Law School. For example, she may call
into question state laws that ban felons from owning firearms and that remove guns
from people who are mentally ill. This is bad news for supporters of gun control.
Historically the Supreme Court has been loth to take up new Second Amendment
cases—in the spring of 2020 alone it turned down ten—but this will change with Ms
Barrett on the bench.
Third, watch the states. Blue states, like California, will push for more restrictive laws,
while red states will try to expand people’s ability to carry guns without a permit.
Americans’ views on guns have shifted after so many mass shootings, and this is evident
in the unprecedented attention politicians at the state and federal level are giving gun
control, says Joseph Sakran, a surgeon and activist.
Fourth, keep an eye on on the National Rifle Association (NRA). A powerful force in
American politics, the non-profit group has attacked gun-control efforts in the past but
will be under attack itself in 2021. New York’s attorney-general has sued the
organisation and is trying to shut it down, and the Internal Revenue Service is
reportedly investigating the NRA’s president for possible tax fraud. This will
reverberate in the fight over gun-control policy. No longer does a weaker NRA seem like
a long shot.

All change, please

Jon Fasman: Washington correspondent, The Economist, NEW YORK
Cash-strapped cities will need to be nimble in managing distressed public-

transport systems
The new normal
THESE DAYS, says Nicole Gelinas, a New York-based writer at a think-tank, working on
a book about the history of public transport in her city, “when I ride the subway, I’m
tempted to tweet, ‘The subway is great—you should come join me’.” But if everyone is
taking the subway, she adds, “we shouldn’t be on the subway.”
Welcome to the paradox of public transport during a pandemic. Buses and subways
have never been cleaner; masked, socially distanced riders never more quiet and
considerate; and people never more frightened of riding. Ridership bottomed out with
declines of more than 80% in New York, Chicago, the San Francisco Bay Area and
Washington, DC. To make riding safer, cities innovated with deep cleaning, different
routes and changed boarding methods for buses. Some of these innovations will survive
and mature into 2021, and change how public transport sustains and shapes American
cities—provided that transit agencies can find their way out of the financial pit into
which the pandemic shoved them.
Ordinarily, agencies in financial trouble could turn to their regional or state
governments for help. But local governments face their own revenue problems, for
much the same reason: sharply reduced economic activity leading to a decline in
revenue, and increased costs incurred by the need for more frequent and intense
cleaning, and the provision of protective equipment for their employees. The federal
government provided $25bn to public-transport systems in the CARES Act, enacted in
March. That sounds like a lot, but parcelled out among America’s hundreds of separate
agencies, it was quickly spent. Pat Foye, the chairman of New York’s Metropolitan
Transportation Authority, which runs the city’s buses, subways and commuter rail lines,
warns that his agency faces “a hundred-year fiscal tsunami”.
Without federal help, agencies may need to reduce service dramatically, resulting in less
frequent and more crowded trains and buses—which, in turn, could mean more people
choosing to commute by car, worsening gridlock. Service cuts take a long time to
reverse, particularly when cities and states are digging themselves out of their own
financial holes. Any expansions that looked likely in 2021 will almost certainly be
pushed back.
Around 75% of New Yorkers commute by mass transit; a system slowdown will make
the entire region less productive. The share of the workforce using public transport is
lower in Boston and San Francisco, but shunting those users onto the streets will leave
those cities more gridlocked. In Detroit around 7% of workers commute by bus; cuts
may lead them to drop out of the workforce.
But covid-19 has also pushed systems to innovate and grow more nimble—and those
habits may also endure into 2021. Many cities have rethought the bus-boarding process,
for example. Rather than having everyone file in at the front, increasing the amount of
time that buses wait at stops and making the system less efficient, some have
experimented with all-door boarding.
Public-transport enthusiasts have long cheered dedicated bus lanes—and cities have
learned that making them does not require lengthy approval processes and loads of
capital: just a few cans of paint and a willingness to experiment. Some of these “pop-up
bus lanes” may become permanent as cities take a more nimble, cost-effective approach
to public transport in 2021.

An idea whose time has come

Guaranteed-income programmes can tackle inequality and build economic resilience,
says Michael Tubbs, mayor of Stockton, California
Poverty and economic insecurity are choices of policy, not individuals
IN MARCH 2020 Tomas Vargas junior lost his job at a commercial airport because of
covid-19 and became one of 40m Americans who applied for pandemic unemployment
assistance. The money didn’t arrive for weeks, but Tomas was able to fall back on the
guaranteed income of $500 a month that he’d been receiving since February 2019, as
part of an experimental programme I’ve been piloting in Stockton, California. He spent
this unconditional cash on rent, food and bills. Building on this income floor, he gave
back to his community, providing free car-repair services to essential workers and
donating supplies to the local fire station.
Though Tomas’s experience is specific to a once-in-a-generation pandemic, a sudden job

loss for any other reason could also have forced him, and a majority of Americans, into
eviction, food-bank lines, and crippling debt. Covid-19 has simply laid bare what has
always been true: people are working, but the economy isn’t. Economic insecurity in
America is widespread, and structural racism has maintained racial wealth and income
disparities that make it impossible for people to thrive. Tomas’s story is one example of
how an income floor can build economic resilience.
All of our neighbours are worthy of an economic floor, particularly because emergencies
and economic disruption have become the norm. It might be a pandemic today, but it
could be a hurricane or fire tomorrow. In the wealthiest country in the world, it is
uncivilised for people to be contributing to the economy and their communities and still
fall below the poverty line. There is nothing inherently dignified in working two or three
jobs, yet still being unable to afford the basics; or to be deemed an “essential worker”,
but not be entitled to hazard pay, union protection, health insurance or personal
protective equipment.
In the 1930s, the last American economic crisis of this scale was met by drastic social
reform that brought about significant protection for workers, including the right to
unionise and unemployment insurance. But in 2020 we need more. Unemployment
insurance is necessary but insufficient, and even full-time employment does not mean
economic security anymore. We need a social safety-net that goes beyond conditional
benefits tied to employment, that works for everyone and begins to address the call for
racial and economic justice.
In 2021 we will change course and build an economy that recognises the universal
dignity of all people through a guaranteed income. Rooted in Martin Luther King’s
economic dream, a guaranteed income—in the form of a monthly cash payment given
directly to individuals—embodies government at its best, trusting our constituents and
giving them the agency to make the right decisions for themselves and their families.
The Stockton guaranteed-income programme, which started in February 2019, gives

125 residents $500 a month for 24 months. I trusted that recipients would spend the
cash as they needed for themselves and their families, and that’s exactly what the data
have shown—40% of all spending has been on food, 25% on sales and merchandise, 11%
on utilities and less than 2% on tobacco and alcohol. And less than 2% of recipients are
unemployed and not looking for work, thus helping to dismantle the malicious and
racist tropes that those struggling with economic insecurity will squander money or
stop working.
Building on the success of my pilot, in June 2020 I launched Mayors for a Guaranteed
Income, a coalition of more than 25 mayors advocating a federal guaranteed income.
Mayors have been on the political front lines of not only covid-19, but also the civil
unrest that followed the killings of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor and others. Although
these protests began in response to police brutality, they are also about the violence of
poverty and economic insecurity and continue a conversation we’ve been having for
400 years: does the inalienable right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness truly
apply to everyone?
Poverty and economic insecurity are choices of policy, not of individuals. Covid-19 and
the global Black Lives Matter protests point to the simple and undeniable truth that we
must chart a new path forward—a path that sees and acknowledges the dignity of all of
humanity. The coming year beckons for a New Deal that puts poverty and scarcity in a
museum and unleashes the degree of well-being and sense of belonging needed to
create the beloved community in which we all deserve to live.

The Americas
• Bolsonaro battles on
• Taking it to the Mexican people
• Optimism in the time of covid-19
• Between the virus and the vote

The Americas
Bolsonaro battles on
Sarah Maslin: Brazil correspondent, The Economist, SÃO PAULO
Covid-19, fires and scandals will not bring down Brazil’s president
2021 in brief
Costa Rica aims to generate 100% of its electricity from renewable sources by 2021. It
has also extended a moratorium on oil extraction and exploitation from 2021 until the
end of 2050
IN 2021 BRAZIL’S president, Jair Bolsonaro, will have to navigate a perilous path to save
the economy without sacrificing his popularity. The coronavirus pandemic cemented his
reputation as an international pariah. As Brazil’s death toll climbed to the second-
highest in the world, Mr Bolsonaro told a reporter, “So what?” At home, though, many
seem to be getting used to their provocative president. Amid scandals in his family and
fires in the rainforest, his approval rating rose.
That is partly because of big spending on poor people, who received 600 reais ($107) a
month at the start of the pandemic and 300 reais from September until the end of 2020.
This was an about-turn for the liberal economy minister, Paulo Guedes, who had
promised to assist Brazil’s recovery from a previous recession (2014-16) by slashing
spending and red tape. Reforms were delayed to focus on covid-19. In 2021 markets
will be less forgiving. Any new spending that does not come with cuts or reforms will
push Brazil closer to fiscal insolvency. In 2020 public debt jumped from 76% of GDP to
around 95%. A move by Congress to get rid of a federal spending cap imposed in 2016,
though unlikely, would cause a crisis of confidence. Mr Guedes could quit.
Yet removing the safety net that was put in place during the pandemic will lead to an
increase in poverty and a decrease in Mr Bolsonaro’s popularity. With the municipal
elections of 2020 out of the way, opposition parties will be turning their attention to the
presidential contest in 2022. To avoid being cast as a miser, Mr Bolsonaro will therefore
need to balance economic reforms with efforts to shore up his support.
A revamp of the byzantine tax code would reduce the cost of doing business, attract
foreign investment and boost employment. Its success depends on chumminess with
the centrão, a bloc of centre-right parties in Congress that started voting with
bolsonarista legislators in 2020 (in exchange for the sort of patronage he had previously
denounced). Mr Bolsonaro may also seek victories on his ideological agenda: expanding
gun access, for example, and weakening environmental enforcement. That would satisfy
his conservative base and the “beef, Bible and bullet” lobbies in congress.
The Amazon will suffer further in 2021. Fires will rip through the rainforest and the
Pantanal wetlands for the third year in a row. That is the new normal, the result of
climate change and rising deforestation. The high price of gold spurred a boom in illegal
mining. Mr Bolsonaro’s government will push Congress to legalise it on indigenous
reserves, but as politicians debate the controversial bill, miners and loggers will invade
more land. The few remaining isolated tribes will be further squeezed.
Pressure from international investors may force big beef and soya producers to crack
down on deforestation in their supply chains. But Mr Bolsonaro will not adopt a greener
tune. Joe Biden, less of a friend than Donald Trump, will criticise Brazil’s environmental
vandalism, though he will probably stop short of sanctions.
Brazil’s Congress will again take the lead on passing ambitious policies. In 2020 these
included long-awaited improvements to the regulatory framework for public sanitation,
which now allows private-sector investment, and a reform of the main financing
mechanism for public education, which will help poorer schools.
Unless Mr Bolsonaro’s approval rating collapses, the centrão will shield him from
dozens of impeachment motions. The presence of two new supreme-court justices,
picked by Mr Bolsonaro, will increase his chances of slowing probes investigating him
and his sons. Flávio, a senator from Rio de Janeiro, is suspected of money-laundering
and connections with organised-crime groups called milícias. Carlos and Eduardo, who
are also politicians, are under scrutiny for allegedly running an online misinformation
network. Mr Bolsonaro faces an investigation in the supreme court for obstruction of
justice. It was begun after the justice minister, Sérgio Moro, resigned and accused the
president of firing the director of the federal police in order to shield his family.
Despite all the drama, polls suggest that if the presidential election were tomorrow, Mr
Bolsonaro would win again. But the path is full of pitfalls, and Brazil is full of surprises.
A lot could change by 2022.

Taking it to the Mexican people

Sarah Birke: incoming Mexico and Central America bureau chief, The Economist
Andrés Manuel López Obrador proposes a referendum on his presidency so far
Mexico’s mingler
AMLO may not pay at the polls for his blunders
MEXICO’S POPULIST president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, has proposed a

constitutionally dubious referendum to validate his presidency halfway through its six-
year term. He says it could take place alongside mid-term elections in June, when
Mexicans will be voting for the 500 seats of the lower house of the national congress
and, in almost half the 32 states, for their congresses and governors.
Whether the recall referendum goes ahead or not, the elections could spell trouble for
Morena, the party AMLO founded. Mask-free and hug-happy, months into the pandemic,
AMLO and his government have badly mishandled it. Mexico entered 2021 trailing only
the United States, Brazil and India for the number of deaths from covid-19. (The
government admits the official figure may be a gross underestimate.) As children
elsewhere returned to school in September, Mexicans started television education.
Mexicans are getting poorer, too. The economy is in its worst slump for 80 years. It
probably shrank by at least 10% in 2020; more than 1.1m people lost their jobs
between March and June. AMLO, a fiscal conservative, has continued to tout austerity,
ignoring advice that he should ride out the covid-19 crisis with spending. Decisions
taken before the pandemic hit, such as cancelling a new airport, worth $13bn and
already half-built, have led to less investment and more capital flight.
Security is also worsening. In the first six months of 2020 Mexico registered a record
17,349 murders, a 1.7% increase on the same period in 2019—in other locked-down
countries, crime fell. In June 2020 Mexicans were rattled by a drug gang’s assassination
attempt against Mexico City’s police chief. It was unusually shocking both for being so
brazen and for taking place in a posh area of the capital.
However, AMLO may not pay at the polls for his blunders. His approval rating dropped
from 80% at the start of 2020 to around 60% by mid-year, and support for Morena has
fallen, too. In May only 19% of people said they would definitely vote for the party in
2021, less than half the proportion in December 2018.
Yet AMLO’s appeal, like that of other populists globally, rests more on personality and
patrimony than prowess. Many Mexicans see him as one of them: he stops to eat tacos at
roadside stalls and mingles with workers. Others see him as their saviour. Many credit
him with projects such as the expansion of pensions and training programmes for youth.
AMLO’s clean reputation helps. Even his detractors admit that he is not personally
corrupt, a rare quality among the country’s leaders. That has been conveniently
highlighted by a huge continuing corruption scandal in which a former head of the state
oil company has made serious accusations against high-level Mexican officials, including
three former presidents.
The opposition parties could club together to wound Morena. So AMLO may emerge
with less of a mandate and a diminished ability to proceed with his grandiose plan to
purge corruption, erase wealth inequality and promote national self-sufficiency—
dubbed ”a fourth transformation” of Mexico.
One outcome in 2021 is clear: as in many countries around the world, not least Mexico’s
neighbour to the north, elections have little power to heal divisions amplified by a
polarising head of state.

Optimism in the time of covid-19

The pandemic is speeding up social change, says Claudia López, mayor of Bogotá
THE BEGINNING of 2020 looked like the beginning of a great dream for me. After years
of struggling, Bogotá gave me the opportunity to be the first woman, the first LGBT
person and the first to come from a humble background, outside the elite class, to
become mayor of Colombia’s capital. I took office and proposed a new social and
environmental contract for Bogotá, in which tackling inequality, the climate crisis and
the gendered dimension of poverty would become real priorities.
In the following months Bogotá became the stage for public protests. Young people and
the middle class took to the streets to express their discontent with the lack of
opportunities and the risk of losing modest achievements in social mobility. On January
1st we thought our greatest challenge would be governing in the midst of such
discontent while staying true to the platform on which we were elected. But covid-19
came to impose a new order.
Governance became about managing the pandemic. Other gaps became even more
visible. The digital gap, for example, where 40% of students in public schools did not
have a computer or an internet connection. Or the gender gap, where thousands of
women who had managed to free themselves from unpaid care work were forced to
stay at home and care for others. In addition to the health consequences of the disease,
the worst part of the pandemic has been the social and economic setback, perhaps of a
decade, for young people and women, two groups that I proudly represent. It seemed
that the pandemic had come to make achieving the new social and environmental
contract we proposed in the campaign even more difficult.
We had to take new actions every day. Health had to be managed, deaths prevented,
income protected and hunger avoided at all costs. We had to modify government
programmes. For example, we went from giving cash transfers to 20,000 households at
the beginning of the year to giving a basic income and food aid to 712,000 households in
a matter of seven months. We managed to provide internet connections and tablet
computers to 124,000 students. We convinced university and higher-education
institutions to reduce costs, shorten programmes and make them more flexible so that
more people could have a better chance to go back to school, or to enroll for the first
time. In short, the pandemic posed new challenges but it was also an opportunity to
innovate and make transformative change happen.
The pandemic forced us to put into practice immediately the social and environmental
contract we had outlined. It brought new ways of living, working, consuming and
commuting—driving us towards a more sustainable city. As well as doubling ICU
capacity, we also doubled the share of trips by bicycle in the city. We added 85km of
bike lanes to the existing 550km. We pedestrianised streets and improved public space
so that restaurants, stores and artists could go back to work. We now have the lowest
levels of air pollution in years. An estimated 93% of Bogotá’s people use facemasks and
most still stay at home as much as possible, even out of lockdown.
Many of these improvements are here to stay. But just as the pandemic accelerated
some things, it temporarily suspended others, such as the manifestation of social
discontent. That pressure came back with the force of water that has been dammed.
Young people, women and the dissatisfied returned to the streets with problems
aggravated by the pandemic.
Eventually citizens will not only take to the streets but to the polls (Colombia’s next
elections are in 2022). And at the polls we will have to defeat another pandemic: that of
populism, which will prey on people’s frustration. An authoritarian populism of the left,
which is capable of turning what we have built of democracy into ashes; and an
authoritarian populism of the right, which is capable of abolishing the higher courts and
banning public protests. We need to consolidate democratic change without falling into
the hands of passing messiahs who undermine the very institutions that are capable of
sustaining the changes we have fought for.
I have more pride and optimism than ever. I have seen the best sides of my city and its
people. In 2021 and beyond, we will emerge as better human beings and citizens, and
we will achieve something that has been elusive for our country, which we have always
strived for: a democracy that delivers a more equal and peaceful society.

Between the virus and the vote

Michael Reid: Bello columnist; senior editor, Latin America and Spain, The Economist
A battle to revive economies and defend democracy
FOR LATIN AMERICA’S leaders 2021 will be about steering economic recovery while
fending off a debt crisis and trying to persuade their citizens that democracy can still
deliver results. What are the prospects around the region?
With populations ravaged by covid-19 despite long lockdowns, many countries may
have some degree of “herd immunity”. But the socio-economic consequences of the
pandemic will linger: after economies contracted by 8% or so in 2020, Latin America
will have some 40m “new poor”, taking those living in poverty to at least one in three of
the population. Frustrations will show up in street protests—watch Argentina and
Colombia in particular—and the threat of populist victories in elections. Armies may be
called upon to play a more prominent role in enforcing order and propping up
governments, though many will be reluctant. Even so, democracy, predominant in the
region since the 1980s, could succumb in some places. Look out for El Salvador’s
authoritarian president, Nayib Bukele, in that regard.
In 2021 most countries will struggle to claw back much more than half of the output lost.
Recovery will be led by Brazil and some other South American countries. The damage
will be greater in Mexico, where investors distrust the president, Andrés Manuel López
Obrador. With public debt likely to start the year at over 80% of GDP, Latin America will
be pushing for more aid from the IMF. Without it, the region will face recovery-crushing
fiscal austerity or a debt crisis, or both.
Presidential elections in Ecuador (February), Peru (April) and Chile (November) could
see populists winning, though conservatives have a chance, too. In Ecuador, Rafael
Correa, a leftist populist who ruled from 2007 to 2017, is barred from running by his
conviction in absentia for corruption. He hopes to return via a proxy candidate, Andrés
Arauz, a young economist. Mr Arauz faces a tough fight against Guillermo Lasso, a
conservative banker, and Yaku Pérez, an indigenous leader. Peru’s election is wide open
and may result in the triumph of a political outsider. In Chile, a bulwark of capitalist
stability until it was shaken by protests in 2019, the election will take place in parallel
with deliberations on a new constitution, which is likely to give a bigger role to the state
in health care, education and pensions. The left will mount a strong challenge for the
presidency but may lose to Joaquín Lavín, a mildly populist conservative. Mid-term
legislative elections in Argentina (October) and Mexico (June) will provide an
important pointer to the strength of the presidencies of Alberto Fernández, a moderate
Peronist, and Mr López Obrador.
Will change come at last to Latin America’s leftist dictatorships? In Cuba the Castro
dynasty will formally come to an end after more than 60 years. At a Congress of the
ruling Communist Party in April, Raúl Castro (aged 89) will step down as its first
secretary, having handed over the country’s presidency in 2019 to Miguel Díaz-Canel, a
younger party bureaucrat. (Raúl inherited both jobs from his elder brother, Fidel.)
Cubans will be watching to see whether Mr Díaz-Canel becomes head of the party too, or
whether he will share leadership, and whether the Stalinist or reformist wing of the
party comes out on top in the new politburo. The Castros aren’t quite finished: Raúl’s
son, Alejandro, runs the intelligence services.
Nicaragua’s dictator, Daniel Ortega, will use an election in November to inaugurate his
dynasty, seeking to turn his eccentric wife, Rosario Murillo, into his successor as
president. Electoral fraud is guaranteed, and so is a new wave of protests.
Venezuela’s political conflict will enter a new phase in 2021. The mandate of Juan
Guaidó, the opposition speaker of the National Assembly who is recognised as “interim
president” by almost 60 countries, ends in January. Nicolás Maduro, the country’s
dictator, has divided the opposition. But he has run out of money, thanks partly to
American sanctions. Having so far failed to oust Mr Maduro, the United States may
negotiate with him to try to achieve a return to democracy. The United States is due to
host the ninth summit of the Americas, involving all countries in the hemisphere, at
some point in 2021. Venezuela will be at the top of the agenda.
Asia
• Between two giants
• Best of enemies
• Unlucky for some
• Staying power
• An Afghan mess
• Pre-existing condition
• The dawn of the Asian century

Asia
Between two giants

Dominic Ziegler: Banyan columnist, The Economist, HONG KONG
South-East Asia finds itself at the centre of the struggle between China and
America
2021 in brief
South Korea’s defence ministry plans to start building its first aircraft-carrier in 2021,
and to acquire fighter jets to operate on it. It is expected to buy American-made F-35B
jets, costing about $122m each
NO PART OF the world risks suffering more from the economic, strategic and military
rivalry now playing out between the United States and China than the 11 nations of
South-East Asia. And that rivalry will intensify in 2021.
On the one hand, many in the region are wary of President Xi Jinping’s mission to
reclaim for China the centrality it enjoyed in East Asia before the imperial depredations
by the West and Japan in the 19th and 20th centuries. It is not just that China is
aggressively challenging the maritime and territorial claims of Brunei, Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea, through which the
majority of China’s seaborne trade passes. It is also that Mr Xi’s call for “Asian people to
run the affairs of Asia” sounds like code for China running Asia. As a Chinese foreign
minister once told a gathering of the ten-country Association of South-East Asian
Nations (ASEAN): “China is a big country and [you] are small countries, and that is just a
fact.”
On the other hand, while ASEAN members welcome America as the dominant military
power in the region to counter China’s growing heft, they know that conflict would be
disastrous for them. South-East Asian diplomats did not loudly cheer the anti-China
rhetoric of President Donald Trump’s administration, which is unlikely to soften much
under Joe Biden. And no wonder. Many of the region’s governments are hostile to
democracy, and few see America’s political model as one to emulate.
Above all, China is too close and already too mighty to turn against. It is by far South-
East Asia’s biggest trading partner and its second-biggest investor, behind Japan.
ASEAN’s prosperity is as bound to China as its supply chains are. And as Sebastian
Strangio, a perceptive observer of the region, points out in a new book, “In the Dragon’s
Shadow”, South-East Asia has a powerful stake in China’s growth and stability:
historically, turmoil in China has spread instability southward.
So, how not to get caught between the two giants? The region’s strategists remind
themselves that, when it comes to great-power rivalry, things have been worse. At the
height of the cold war, bloody conflict in Indo-China, along with communist insurgencies
elsewhere, threatened to reduce South-East Asian autonomy to zero. Those concerns,
and the need for a mechanism to manage their mutual mistrust, were catalysts for
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore to form ASEAN more than
50 years ago. And today? At least, the strategists say, with black humour, China and the
United States have not carved up the region between them.
As for 2021, the region’s experience in managing great-power rivalry will come to the
fore. South-East Asia has lived under China’s armpit for millennia, and ASEAN’s member
countries have dealt with the American presence since the second world war. The
approach will be to “hedge, balance and bandwagon” between the two, says Bilahari
Kausikan, formerly Singapore’s top diplomat. Students of international relations are
usually taught that only one of these three approaches is possible at any time. Yet
pragmatic South-East Asians, Mr Kausikan argues, have a knack for doing all three. One
example in 2021: just as the Philippines under President Rodrigo Duterte will keep
wooing Mr Xi over Chinese investment, expect a rapid improvement in once-strained
military ties with America. South-East Asia in 2021 will also do more to invite other
powers, notably Japan, South Korea, Australia and India, to share in both regional
prosperity and security.
Hedging, balancing and bandwagoning rests, admittedly, on one big assumption: that
neither America nor China really intends to decouple their two economies entirely. That
calculation is probably right, and even if hard-nosed competition and negotiation
between the two powers reconfigures global supply chains, South-East Asians still
intend to profit from that.
Even so, it is a gamble, and other risks loom. Not the least of them is maintaining ASEAN
solidarity—China has already tried to drive a wedge into the organisation by turning
Cambodia and Laos, for now, into client states. Mr Xi’s increasing claims to speak for all
ethnic Chinese overseas, including 30m South-East Asians of Chinese ancestry, raise the
risk of nativist demagogues using anti-China feelings to whip up ethnic hatred.
Perhaps the most nail-biting risk of all is of some unintended clash between China and
America over the South China Sea. In the event of military conflict, the hedge, the
balance and the bandwagon will not get anyone very far at all.

Best of enemies
Charlie McCann: South-East Asia correspondent, The Economist, SINGAPORE
Vietnam has to balance more than most
Vietnam’s relationship with China has always been tricky
2021 in brief
Five new sports take their place alongside the other categories at the postponed 2020
Summer Olympics in Tokyo. Athletes will be competing for the first time for medals in
karate, skateboarding, surfing, sports climbing and baseball/softball
IN JANUARY 2021 the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) will convene its five-yearly
meeting, the 13th national congress. The party faithful will rubber-stamp the victor of
internal party jockeying to be the new secretary-general. He will then lay out priorities
for the coming years.
China will loom large over discussions. Vietnam’s relationship with its northern
neighbour has always been tricky. In the coming year it will become even more so.
China lays claim to a vast swathe of the South China Sea and will encroach upon waters
that Vietnam claims as its own—sometimes forcefully, as it did in 2020 when Chinese
boats rammed and sank Vietnamese fishing vessels. Such provocations could well bring
Vietnamese people out onto the streets, evoking memories of mass protests in 2014 and
2018, when anti-Chinese sentiment produced a spasm of rioting.
Public outrage over Chinese provocations will ensure that the government, on the
surface, maintains a frosty attitude towards China. But Vietnam will not want to make
an enemy of the superpower, says Carlyle Thayer of the University of New South Wales.
There are few remaining communist countries to keep Vietnam company, and ties
between the CPV and its Chinese counterpart run deep. More importantly, the
economies of the two countries are ever more tightly entwined. China is Vietnam’s
largest trading partner, its biggest source of imports and the destination of most of its
exports. What is more, says Tuong Vu of the University of Oregon, the CPV fears a
confrontation with China.
The new leadership will therefore keep on hedging. This will mean deepening trade
links with China in order to promote economic development, while also attempting to
counter Chinese advances in the South China Sea by cultivating ties with America.
The two favourites for the top spot are Tran Quoc Vuong, head of the party secretariat
and a loyalist of the current secretary-general, and Nguyen Xuan Phuc, the prime
minister. Though both are dyed-in-the-wool communists, for whom party control will
remain the priority, whoever wins will also need to be a dyed-in-the-wool pragmatist.
He will have to talk tough on China to keep domestic anti-Chinese sentiment under
control, while resisting the entreaties of a faction within the party that wants to pivot
more rapidly towards America. Showing China that this trans-Pacific relationship is
growing stronger by, for instance, allowing more port visits by American warships
would strengthen his hand. But in the end, Vietnamese leaders know that China will
always be there and, in the long term, America might not.

Unlucky for some

Eleanor Whitehead: Australia and New Zealand correspondent, The Economist, SYDNEY
The fallout from Australia’s first slump in 28 years
AUSTRALIA WILL be down on its famous luck in 2021. Its unbeaten run of recent
economic growth—a record 28 years without a recession—made its people, on average,
the second-wealthiest in the world. But the pandemic has brought that stretch to an
unexpected end. As the country claws its way out of recession, Australians face a
punishing year.
The government expects an unemployment rate of 8% as the new year dawns. By March,
a wage-subsidy scheme, which has helped preserve 3.5m jobs, is due to dry up. Australia
has closed its international borders in an effort to keep out the coronavirus, locking out
the immigrants who normally help power its economy.
This sets the stage for a debate about the prosperity that has come so easily to Australia
for so long. China has recently been the source of most of it. It gobbles up more of what
Australia produces than any other country: almost 40% of its exported goods, in all.
China is also the biggest supplier of tourists—1.4m of them in 2019—and foreign fee-
paying students, accounting for 13% of all enrolments at Australia’s largest universities.
Difficult adjustments await in 2021. The two countries are fighting over everything from
the Beijing government’s response to covid-19 to Australia’s participation in naval
exercises in the Indian Ocean. The list of Aussie exports boycotted by China grows
longer by the month. Having banned beef from several big abattoirs and whacked tariffs
on barley, it has ordered factories to stop buying Australian cotton, and threatened a
catalogue of other goods, from timber to wine to lobster.
Those who play down the risks of Oz’s exposure have always claimed that China cannot
readily replace the vast supplies of Australian resources that fire its industrial
revolution. Yet lately Chinese importers have been turning away Australian coal as well.
Australia depends far more on China than the other way around. If the bigger country
wants to play the bully, it has plenty of room to make the smaller one squirm
economically, while hardly feeling a pinch at home. At stake is not only Australia’s
prosperity but the very assumption that has informed its place in the modern world:
that it can rely on China to drive its economy while retaining America as its most
important military and diplomatic ally.
At the same time, Australians are increasingly concerned about outsiders (and one in
particular) meddling in their democracy. Politicians are seeking new powers to prevent
such “foreign” interference, and want to air grievances about China’s military
expansionism and infringements of human rights. That leaves them facing
uncomfortable choices.
In the year ahead Australians will have to work with other like-minded countries to
stand up to their biggest trading partner. The harder line will spur vigorous debate
about how much that will cost their lucky country—and where it should seek its fortune
in the future.

Staying power
Noah Sneider: Tokyo bureau chief, The Economist, TOKYO
Japan’s new leader faces electoral and other tests
Just add Suga
BETWEEN 1990 and 2012, Japan had 15 prime ministers. When Abe Shinzo took the job
in 2012, few believed he would last much longer than the average of less than two
years—indeed, his first stint in office in 2006 ended after just one. Yet when Mr Abe
resigned because of ill health in September 2020, his term had lasted a record 2,822
days.
Suga Yoshihide, Mr Abe’s loyal lieutenant, replaced him, promising continuity and
stability. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) elected Mr Suga in an emergency
vote to serve out the remainder of Mr Abe’s term. A full contest for the next three-year
term as party leader, scheduled for September 2021, will indicate whether the LDP is
back to its revolving-door ways. The public will have a chance to register its verdict on
the party’s post-Abe direction in a nationwide Diet election in October (or earlier in the
year, if Mr Suga dissolves the parliament ahead of schedule, as many expect he will).
Although Mr Suga at first seemed to be a caretaker candidate, he will try to stick around.
(Career politicians tend not to cede the top job willingly, even those like Mr Suga who
prefer to operate in the shadows.) Voters appear ready to give him a chance: though less
than 10% of Japanese named him as their preferred successor in polls taken before Mr
Abe’s resignation, support for his new administration began at nearly 70%.
Mr Suga will need to demonstrate quick results in difficult conditions. Covid-19 will
remain a drag on Japan’s economy, which had already fallen into recession before the
pandemic hit. In the second quarter of 2020, GDP contracted by 28.1% compared with
the previous year, the steepest drop on record. It will struggle to make up the lost
ground. Amid sluggish demand the old menace, deflation, will haunt it again in 2021.
The Olympic games could provide a boost—if the Japanese government and the
International Olympic Committee can work out how to hold them safely.
Foreign-policy challenges will be no less daunting. Mr Abe made diplomacy a priority,

using more than 80 overseas trips to forge close relationships with other leaders. Mr
Suga will have to build his own credibility on the world stage, at a time when
opportunities for personal contacts are limited. His first test will be to strike a new deal
with America on host-nation support, the logistics agreement that undergirds the two
countries’ security alliance and stationing of 50,000 American troops (the current deal
runs out in March 2021).
Yet the pandemic’s disruption could also help some of Mr Suga’s most prized reforms.
He has promised to create a new digital agency to push the modernisation of Japan’s
archaic government services. In 2021 the hanko, a personal seal used on official
documents, will become a harmless relic, rather than an essential tool of doing business.
So too, with any luck, will the fax machine.
If he can stabilise the economy and contain the virus, Mr Suga may be able to sew up the
LDP election by securing the support of the party’s faction bosses before the vote even
takes place, much as he did after Mr Abe’s resignation. But if Mr Suga looks wobbly as a
leader, an all-out war for the l LDP’s presidency will break out.
Plenty of ambitious politicians are itching for a turn after Mr Abe’s long tenure. Ishiba
Shigeru, a former defence minister whom Mr Suga defeated in 2020, may resume his
crusade; he will have a better shot in a regular election that includes the party’s rank-
and-file. Kono Taro, a Georgetown-educated former defence and foreign minister
currently overseeing administrative reform, could emerge as the next-generation
candidate (at 57, he is young for the seniority-minded LDP). Noda Seiko, one of a mere
handful of women in senior LDP jobs, wants to become Japan’s first female prime
minister. Whoever triumphs will find winning the election easy compared with staying
in office.
An Afghan mess
Daniel Knowles: international correspondent, The Economist
Will the Taliban get back into government?
Talking to the enemy
A bleak sort of peace may be possible
THE AMERICAN withdrawal from Afghanistan will not have a Saigon-style moment,
with helicopters ferrying people out of its embassy as the Taliban encroach on Kabul.
Yet 2020 was the year in which the war, at least as far as America is concerned, began to
reach its end. In February President Donald Trump’s administration signed a deal with
the Taliban to withdraw American troops. In exchange, the militants promised to start
talking to the internationally recognised Afghan government, which in turn was forced
to release some 5,000 Taliban prisoners. By the end of the year the number of American
soldiers in the country had dropped to fewer than 5,000. That is just about enough to
ensure the security of international organisations’ headquarters in Kabul, but not much
more.
Does this mean that peace is about to come to a country that has known war since the
Soviet invasion in the late 1970s? Sadly, that is less clear. Nobody really has a clue what
2021 will look like, says Ashley Jackson, a researcher at the Overseas Development
Institute, a think-tank in London. The American withdrawal leaves behind a mess. But
one thing seems likely: two decades after being pushed out of Kabul by a coalition of
NATO and the rebels of the Northern Alliance, the Taliban have a good chance of
returning to power. The question is what sort of a government they will join.
Talks were meant to start in March; eventually they kicked off in September in Qatar but
they have moved slowly, and been dominated by arguments over protocols. The
government wants the Taliban to agree to a ceasefire before moving on, but that seems
unlikely. Afghanistan’s government has rarely looked more feeble. Its army, never
exactly effective, is much weaker now that it is deprived of American air support. The
Taliban have forsaken spectacular attacks on American targets, but stepped up targeted
assassinations of Afghan government officials. They have entrenched their control of
some major roads, on which they collect tolls. As the siege of Kabul deepens, the
government’s negotiating power slips away.
The Taliban have contradictory goals. What they clearly want is to be the dominant
force in a new government—an Islamic emirate, not constrained by the constitution
written after the invasion of 2001. But they also seem to want the international aid on
which Afghanistan survives. So a bleak sort of peace might be possible. The trouble for
Ashraf Ghani, the president since 2014, is that this would mean in essence dissolving his
administration in order to form a government with his former enemies. Having come to
power promising to fix the failed Afghan state, he would find that a bitter pill to swallow.
Whether or not he is willing to do so may prove the most important question of the
coming year.

Pre-existing condition
Tom Easton: South Asia business and finance editor, The Economist
India’s economy was ill before the coronavirus crisis—and will still be unwell
when it has passed
AS INDIA’S PRIME MINISTER, Narendra Modi, likes to say, now should be India’s
moment. The West’s disputes with China mean that trillion-dollar supply chains are up
for grabs. India has the abundant land mass needed for manufacturing, the long
coastlines needed for shipping, the millions of under-employed young people needed
for labour and a vast pool of software engineers, all of which should make it a worthy
alternative to the vexing communist state to its north, or at the very least a complement.
But even before the spread of covid-19 crushed India’s economy, conditions were
deteriorating as companies found its virtues more evident in theory than reality. GDP
growth has been declining since 2016, and investment since 2018. Annual vehicle sales
reported in March 2020 (ie, almost entirely pre-lockdown) were lower than they had
been a year earlier. As the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy, an independent
research firm, put it, industrial production went “from down to downer”.
Inevitably, there will be a rebound. Economists have begun suggesting the possibility of
a slight contraction in GDP during the first half of 2021, tempered by a sharp increase in
the latter half of the year, assuming a catch-up for lost sales. Privately, many speculate
about a multi-year decline.
Years of bad financial management mean the government’s accounts were stretched
pre-covid, but disguised by fanciful expectations for tax receipts and windfalls from the
divestment of government-controlled entities. Even previously plausible expectations
are unfeasible now. Tax collections have tanked; nothing has been divested. Deficits,
already huge, will swell even without further demands, which could arise from large-
scale vaccinations and recapitalisation of the banking system.
The repeated delay of a necessary clean-up of government-controlled banks meant the

financial system entered the crisis in bad shape. Things have got worse as emergency
rules have allowed companies to defer repayments and banks to pretend they were
being made whole. At the same time, inflation, fed in part by the cash-starved
government’s levies on petrol, has been rising, adding to borrowing costs. The challenge
for 2021 will be to manage a national bail-out with money that (unlike richer countries)
India cannot print cheaply.
Mr Modi has been on a global tour to attract needed foreign investment. The reaction
has been public enthusiasm but private reluctance. There have been exceptions. Some
overseas funds have taken minority stakes in banks and existing assets with strong
franchises, such as Delhi’s airport. Money has been flooding into Reliance Industries,
India’s biggest company, and (in far smaller amounts) into Adani Group, another
conglomerate. Each has the great talent of being able to navigate the country’s mercurial
regulators and courts. The billions of dollars poured into these investments by
Facebook, Google, and a host of private-equity giants, sovereign-wealth funds and
multinational companies were hailed by the local press as expressions of confidence in
India Inc. But they may be just the opposite. After years of trying to make it on their own,
with decidedly mixed results, many foreign firms have concluded that the only way to
get ahead in India is to team up with a well-connected local conglomerate.
For India to rebound, broad investment must recover and for that, foreign businesses
must be persuaded that the deck is not stacked against them. There will be some
exceptions: Apple, for example, is scaling up smartphone production in India, both to
diversify away from China and to avoid import tariffs that push up its prices. Much of
the investment Mr Modi is hoping for, however, will head to Bangladesh, Vietnam and
other developing countries with more tolerable business environments.
Given these difficulties, a genuine economic crisis in India would hardly be a surprise.
Credit-rating agencies debated downgrading India’s sovereign debt to junk in 2020, but
decided to wait and see if its prior high rates of growth will return. Though a
downgrade would not mean much in itself—India has little foreign debt—it would
shake already fragile confidence. Multiple financial institutions have failed over the past
two years.
All is not lost. In August a returnee to the largely closed building in Mumbai that houses
The Economist’s local office was delighted to be greeted outside by the familiar
bookseller, phone repairman and chaiwallah (tea-seller), who were eager to resume
business, plague and monsoon notwithstanding. They are part of a vast informal
economy—responsible for perhaps 80% of India’s employment and half its GDP—in
which resilient entrepreneurism thrives, beyond the government’s asphyxiating grip. It
will keep India going in 2021.

The dawn of the Asian century

The West’s incompetent response to the pandemic will hasten the power-shift to East
Asia, argues Kishore Mahbubani of the Asia Research Institute, National University of
Singapore
East Asian countries’ far lower death rates offer a lesson to all
HISTORY HAS turned a corner. The era of Western domination is ending. The
resurgence of Asia in world affairs and the global economy, which was happening
before the emergence of covid-19, will be cemented in a new world order after the crisis.
The deference to Western societies, which was the norm in the 19th and 20th centuries,
will be replaced by a growing respect and admiration for East Asian ones. The phrase
has been bandied around for a while, but the pandemic could mark the real start of an
Asian century.
The crisis highlights the contrast between the competent responses of East Asian
governments (notably China, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) and the incompetent
responses of Western governments (such as America, Britain, France and Spain). The
far lower death rates suffered by East Asian countries offer a lesson to all. They reflect
not just medical capabilities, but also the quality of governance and the cultural
confidence of their societies.
What has shocked many in Asia is the reluctance of some Western governments to allow
science and basic epidemiological modelling to determine sensible policy responses.
After its initial cover-up of the outbreak in Wuhan (which was clearly disastrous), China
firmly deployed good science and robust public-policy measures to break the back of
the problem. It responsibly released the genetic data as soon as Chinese scientists
sequenced the virus’s genome in January.
A half-century ago, had a similar global pandemic broken out, the West would have
handled it well and the developing countries of East Asia would have suffered. Today
the quality of governance in the region sets the global standard. The result is that the
post-covid-19 world will be one in which other countries look to East Asia as a role
model, not only for how to handle a pandemic but how to govern in general.
Clearly there are sharp differences between the communist system of China and the
societies of Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. Yet one feature they have in
common is a belief in strong government institutions run by the best and the brightest.
This emphasis on meritocracy also has deep roots in Confucian culture. The entry bar to
the Chinese Communist Party is set very high: only the top graduating students are
admitted. Equally importantly, the rising levels of competent governance are both
fuelled by, and contribute to, rising levels of cultural confidence. All this is gradually
eroding the deference to the West that used to be the norm in Asia.
Taken together, the competence and confidence of East Asia will reshape the world
order. It has already begun. Twenty years ago, no Chinese national ran any UN
organisation. Today they oversee four. If the International Monetary Fund and World
Bank remain bastions of Western power, insisting that only Europeans and Americans
can run the shop, they will gradually lose their credibility unless they allow Asians (as
well as Africans and Latin Americans) to manage them.
To maintain its role and its respect, America will have to demonstrate remarkable
diplomatic dexterity. Yet its foreign service has never been more demoralised, at a time
when its Chinese counterpart has never been more confident. All is not lost for America.
In South-East Asia, for example, there remain huge reservoirs of goodwill after many
years of American engagement, which its diplomats can tap.
As China’s weight in global affairs grows, it will have to take on greater responsibilities.
America has increasingly walked away from the family of UN institutions. China has not,
and may use its new confidence to take on a larger role. For example, before the
pandemic the World Health Organisation had been weakened by an effort led by the
West, starting in the 1970s, to reduce member states’ funding obligations, so that the
majority (80%) of its budget now comes from voluntary contributions. China could
demonstrate global leadership by calling for the restoration of mandatory funding to its
earlier level of around 60%.
That would be just a start. The world after the crisis may see a hobbled West and a
bolder China. We can expect that China will use its power. Paradoxically, a China-led
order could turn out to be a more “democratic” one. China does not want to export its
model. It can live with a diverse, multi-polar world. The coming Asian century need not
be uncomfortable for the West or the rest of the world.

China
• Still a contender
• The road to health?
• Party of the century
• Brave old world
• The battle goes on

China
Still a contender
David Rennie: Beijing bureau chief, The Economist, BEIJING
The Biden administration will try to box clever on China
Universal Studios Beijing opens to the public in May. The theme park is expected to
receive more than 10m visitors annually. Its special features include the Kung-Fu
Panda Land of Awesomeness
FOR FOUR years, Chinese officials have grumbled that President Donald Trump is an
unpredictable bully, sometimes guided by his own selfish interests but at other
moments by advisers who hate the Communist Party. A leaked diplomatic note quoted
China’s Communist Party chief, Xi Jinping, complaining to European visitors that
relations with America resemble a “no-rules boxing match”. The team around President-
elect Joe Biden wants the contest to become at once more orderly, less overtly
ideological and more challenging for China. As if planning the comeback of a
heavyweight champion, incoming Democrats want to see a fitter, smarter America pick
fights with China more carefully, then train hard to win each one.
A wary China will try to ease tensions but has no illusions about a full reset of relations.
There will be no return to the days before 2016, when American presidents of both
parties argued that engagement might lead China to open its economy—and perhaps its
society—to the world. Instead, Mr Biden will level a different criticism at Mr Trump:
that in swinging too wildly at the assertive China of the Xi era, he failed to land decisive
blows.
Disappointment awaits business bosses who hope to see Mr Biden rush to cancel,
wholesale, the tariffs that Mr Trump imposed on two-thirds of imports from China. Nor
will Mr Biden instantly unwind all the export controls and investment curbs that the
Trump administration slapped on Chinese technology firms. Mr Biden must deal with
Chinese leaders sure that America is bent on keeping China down, making a great-
power contest inevitable. To maintain leverage he has an interest in dismantling Mr
Trump’s trade barriers only cautiously.
Mr Biden will at times sound positively Trumpian when he talks about the need for
reciprocity in dealings with China, and about bringing manufacturing jobs back to
America, with industrial policies and “Buy America” rules to support domestic firms if
necessary. Though he often supported free-trade agreements during four decades in the
Senate, he leads a Democratic Party more sceptical than ever of globalisation. As vice-
president, Mr Biden was a cheerleader for free-trade alliances designed to counter
China’s mercantilist ways, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership. As president, Mr Biden
will not rush into any such pacts.
China will find some changes reassuring. The Biden White House will be staffed by
mainstream economists who believe that trade tariffs are mostly self-defeating, and
who see grave risks in using the dollar-denominated financial system as a tool to hold
China down—a gambit that appealed to some senior Trump aides. The door of the
Biden Oval Office will be more open to tech bosses from Silicon Valley. They will plead
with the government to be much more selective about declaring that certain high-tech
products and supply chains are a threat to national security, and must not involve China.
Still, some things about a tech-savvy Biden administration will make life harder for
China. The president will call for America to retain primacy over China in foundational
technologies of the future, from artificial intelligence to quantum computing, with the
help of massive investments in basic science. He will be less alarmed by apps such as
TikTok, a Chinese-created digital platform on which teenagers film their dance moves.
He will be more likely than Mr Trump to welcome Chinese students to American
universities, saying that he trusts the fbi to spot the small number sent to steal secrets.
A more open America is a mixed blessing for Chinese officials trying to get talented
researchers to come home.
In private, Chinese officials openly admit that they liked Mr Trump’s lack of interest in
human rights or liberal democratic values. They know that will change. Notably, Biden
advisers have said that their boss sees a worrying divide opening between techno-
democracies, which use digital tools to expand freedoms, and a techno-authoritarian
bloc led by China. Even if Mr Biden were minded to be cautious, Congress will demand
sanctions over China’s crushing of civil liberties in Hong Kong, and over the forced “re-
education” of Muslim Uyghurs in the far-western region of Xinjiang.
Mr Biden will tread carefully regarding the democratic island of Taiwan. He will
preserve a decades-old balancing act in which America uses its armed forces to deter
China from trying to invade the island, while reassuring Chinese leaders that America
will not encourage a formal declaration of independence by Taiwan.
In a big change, Mr Biden will seek China’s help with global problems that Mr Trump
mocked, such as climate change, or preferred to tackle alone, such as developing covid-
19 treatments. Mr Biden may ask China to join him in reviving the nuclear pact that
Barack Obama signed with Iran and leading world powers, before Mr Trump disowned
it. Olive-branches to China will be denounced by Republicans, particularly those with
eyes on 2024.
Finally, America will be back in the business of coalition-building, or at least picking

fewer fights with its allies. Mr Biden wants friends in his corner as he squares off against
China. Rules or no, a tough contest looms.

The road to health?

Dominic Ziegler: Banyan columnist, The Economist, HONG KONG
Vaccine diplomacy will give China a makeover
If you have not heard of China’s “health Silk Road”, you will soon
FOR MUCH of 2020 sceptics of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) called it
overhyped and overextended. President Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy is
a mix of economic engagement, diplomacy and canny branding. He intended it
to seize the historical moment, as American leadership stumbled, to shape a
world order more to China’s liking. The estimated cost of improving global
infrastructure, a skein of metaphorical Silk Roads encircling the world by land
and (even more) by sea, rose to $6trn.
The claims made for and against the BRI were exaggerated. China said it was showing
countries the way towards a new and transformational kind of development. Critics in
America said China was exporting its dystopian authoritarianism and deliberately
entrapping poor countries through debt. Yet the shine was coming off the BRI even
before the coronavirus pandemic caused global growth to slow sharply.
The flagship project was the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), with
investments and loans said to be worth $60bn. It has produced a few badly needed
power stations, but has broadly fallen short. Projects are mothballed and debts are
being renegotiated. CPEC paid little heed to Pakistan’s precarious fiscal and balance-of-
payments position, or to its thorny politics. Almost none of the promised industrial co-
operation will happen. Far from transforming the relationship, CPEC has laid bare its
limitations.
Elsewhere, from Malaysia to Sri Lanka to the Maldives, the sheer scale of China’s
economic activities, and its coddling of corrupt leaders, have bred local resentment.
That, says Andrew Small of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, a
Washington think-tank, has undermined China’s economic and strategic goals. The
pandemic has only made things worse. Around the world, though usually out of sight,
China is having to roll over debts and ease the terms of many loans. In 2021 the
Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank will report more bad loans and even
face talk of its credit being downgraded. With lending cut back sharply, Chinese
infrastructure projects in poorer countries will be less prominent.
Yet reports of the BRI’s death from covid-19 are exaggerated, says Eyck Freymann,
author of a new book on the project. In the first half of 2021 it will get a big boost. If you
have not heard of China’s “health Silk Road”, you will soon. Think vaccine diplomacy.
China has already approved three vaccines for emergency use. With clinical trials under
way in Brazil and Pakistan, they may beat Western ones to market. They will also, says
Mr Freymann, be cheaper. An American vaccine, made by Moderna, could cost over $70
per treatment, more than developing countries can afford at scale. China is already
pushing one of its vaccines to BRI partners such as Mexico and the Philippines, along
with help to pay for it. There are regulatory and logistical challenges, and the vaccines
themselves may not prove to be effective. But Mr Xi hopes to help China escape its
reputation as a predatory lender, and as the source of the coronavirus itself, as he takes
credit for helping grateful countries along the Belt and Road.

Party of the century

James Miles: China editor, The Economist
The Communist Party will celebrate its centenary. Some of those years it would
prefer to forget
Happy birthday?
IN 2021 THE Chinese Communist Party will not let anyone forget whose
special birthday it is. On July 1st it will officially mark a century since its
hugger-mugger founding in what was then Shanghai’s French Concession and
is now a trendy shopping district. But the whole year will be dominated by
reminders.
There will be operas, films and nearly 100 tie-in television dramas. Few official
speeches will fail to mention the anniversary. During 2020 the Communist Party dealt
crushing blows to two things that might have spoiled the centenary celebration: covid-
19 and unrest in Hong Kong. By the start of 2021 it will also have declared an end to
extreme poverty and the creation of a “moderately prosperous society in all respects”.
The party will be in a triumphant mood.
It was Mao Zedong who decided that July 1st 1921 was the day of the party’s founding.
The actual date, July 23rd, had been forgotten by the time he seized on its significance
while the party was holed up in caves in north-western China in the late 1930s, a decade
before it took control of the country. In the build-up to the anniversary, one of the
world’s largest political parties has been instructing its 90m members to brush up on
their knowledge of the party’s past—not necessarily that particular detail (though it
acknowledges the mix-up about dates), but the broad sweep of events relating to its rise
and more than seven decades in power.
Officials call it the “four histories”—of the party, of Communist rule in China, of “reform
and opening”, and of the development of socialism. By ensuring that all party members
have the same understanding of these histories, the party hopes to keep them in
ideological line with Xi Jinping, the country’s leader.
Mr Xi worries about what he calls “historical nihilism”: a tendency that was once
evident among China’s liberals (though few dare raise their heads these days) to dwell
on negative aspects of the party’s history, especially during Mao’s brutal rule. Study of
the four histories is intended to ensure that no such nihilism mars the party’s birthday.
Instead, the idea is that only one lesson can be drawn from the party’s past century, and
that is an uplifting one.
There is an app to help, called “Study the Great Nation”. Since 2019 the party has been
using it to ensure ideological conformity, requiring all officials to log on frequently,
study its articles on Xi Jinping Thought and answer questions about them (slackers
beware: usage time is monitored). The four histories have become part of its output. In
Shanghai students and bureaucrats have been taking part in reading “marathons”:
competitions to digest as many works as possible on party history over days, weeks or
months.
Amnesia also helps. Mr Xi is in no mood to revive the atmosphere of 1981 in the build-
up to the party’s 60th birthday—the first big celebration of the party’s founding since
the death of Mao in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping’s launch of reform and opening two years
after. Far from avoiding the horrors of Mao’s rule, the party confronted some of them
head-on.
On July 1st that year the party’s mouthpiece, the People’s Daily, published a lengthy
speech by the party chief, Hu Yaobang, marking the anniversary. It also published the
text of a resolution by the party on “certain questions” relating to its own history. Both
were laced with criticisms of Mao and particularly of the “serious mistake” he had made
by launching the decade-long Cultural Revolution.
Any discussion of the horrors of that period is now all but banned. Soon after he came to
power Mr Xi said that the achievements of the reform era could not be used as a way of
negating what had come before. In 2021 it is unlikely that, during all the hoopla
surrounding the anniversary, the party will recall Mr Hu’s warning in his speech 40
years ago that the reason the Cultural Revolution continued for so long was Mao’s
arrogation of absolute power (“the destruction of collective leadership”, as Mr Hu put it).
Many observers expect Mr Xi to maintain his no-less-absolute grip beyond 2022, when,
by usual convention, he would be expected to step down. He will not want to encourage
historical comparisons.

Brave old world

Simon Cox emerging markets editor, The Economist, HONG KONG
For China’s economy, 2021 will seem strangely familiar
Things are picking up
2021 in brief
Several major new buildings open in Shanghai: a new Astronomy Museum, with the
world’s largest planetarium; the modernist Shanghai Library East, hosting 6,000
reading seats and 4.8m books; and Pudong Football Stadium, the first in China to be
designed to FIFA standards, with a capacity of 34,000
CHINA’S ECONOMY will be about as big in 2021 as everyone in 2019 expected

it would be. Let that claim sink in for a moment. It amounts to saying that
China’s economic output will be as voluminous as it would have been had the
coronavirus pandemic never happened. That is not even an especially bold
prediction. It is only a little above the consensus. It is no less impressive for
that.
Everyone expects China’s growth in 2021 to be unusually fast. A rate of 8% would
surprise no one. Some reputable economists think it could top 9%. This brief return to
the growth rates of an earlier era is not in itself all that remarkable. Most economies
bouncing back from the covid-19 pandemic in 2021 are likely to expand at
uncharacteristic speed, having shrunk at an unprecedented pace the year before. What
sets China apart is that it will also manage to have grown, albeit modestly, in 2020.
The prompt recovery means that China’s GDP for 2021 will be within touching distance
of pre-pandemic predictions. Back in December 2019, for example, The Economist
Intelligence Unit forecast that China’s GDP would be about $15.8trn in 2021. Now it is
predicting it will be a little more than that (thanks in part to a weaker dollar).
No other big economy will recover as thoroughly, including those that have handled
covid-19 relatively well. Japan, for example, will fall short, as will Germany. Indeed,
China’s economy may well overtake the combined GDP of the European Union in 2021
or thereabouts.
China’s recovery has not, of course, been well balanced or evenly spread. It was helped
by exports, which have captured a record share of the global market. Hot items include
masks and sanitisers to satisfy the global demand for personal protection, and
televisions and consumer electronics to meet the global demand for personal
distraction.
Investment, especially in infrastructure and property, also contributed, supported by

strong credit growth. In August 2020 China State Railway said it would link every city
with at least half a million people to the country’s high-speed network, almost doubling
it in size by 2035. Household spending, by contrast, has lagged. Private consumption
will make a smaller contribution to China’s growth in 2020 and 2021 than investment
will. The last time that happened was 2015.
An unbalanced recovery is better than no recovery at all. But China’s growth pattern
will nonetheless create some headaches for the country’s policymakers in 2021. It has
set back their gradual efforts to wean the country off its dependence on investment
spending. And it has reversed some of the progress of its “deleveraging” campaign,
which briefly succeeded in stabilising China’s debt, relative to the size of its economy.
When the deleveraging campaign was introduced in earnest in 2016, a Communist

Party insider, identified only as an “authoritative person”, explained its logic in an
interview with the People’s Daily, a party newspaper. The insider complained that
China’s stability relied on the “old method” of investment stimulus, and pointed out that
“a tree cannot grow to the sky” to justify the government’s efforts to prune China’s debts
before too many decayed limbs came crashing down. Do not be surprised if the same
authoritative person makes another appearance in 2021. China’s policymakers need to
become reacquainted with how to rebalance and deleverage the economy without
killing growth.
For most economies, the pandemic has ushered in a tentative new world, marked by
fragile recoveries, uncharted policies and up-in-the-air business models. But in China,
things are different. The virus has instead returned the economy to a familiar policy
juncture. Just as its GDP figure for 2021 would not surprise anyone who had slept
through the past year, so the policymaking dilemmas it is facing would not surprise
anyone who had slept through the past five.

The battle goes on

Countries must unite to face down China’s growing autocracy, says Nathan Law, pro-
democracy activist from Hong Kong
Hong Kongers will not let their spirits be crushed
THE PANDEMIC of 2020 ensured that a lot of other important news was buried. That
made it the perfect time for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to act. On June 30th it
implemented a new national security law (NSL) in Hong Kong, which in effect ended the
“one country, two systems” political settlement that protected British colonial-era
freedoms when the territory reverted to Chinese rule in 1997.
The new law has changed the fabric and mood of one of the world’s great cities, and
poses a deadly threat to this centre of international finance. It also showed that the CCP
will stop at nothing to enforce its coercive control over every corner of its territory. Its
actions in Xinjiang and Tibet have reinforced the point. In 2021 we can expect this
heavy-handed approach to continue.
China views civil liberties and human rights as an existential threat. It knows they can
lead to political challenges, as shown by its opposition to months of protests in support
of such freedoms on the streets of Hong Kong. The CCP is also driven by the economic
problems China is facing at home, and the fear of instability they could bring. China’s
economic performance has long been regarded as a source of legitimacy and stability.
But the pandemic has dealt this a blow, with a looming debt crisis, uneven recovery,
growing income gaps and rising unemployment rate. China’s growth model and wealth-
distribution system may fail to generate sufficient economic power to keep the country
going on the current path. Internal dissent is increasing.
Amid this insecurity, the government in Beijing resorts to nationalist narratives and
further repression to force adherence to the party line and to divert public attention.
The “wolf-warrior” diplomacy adopted under President Xi Jinping’s leadership is an
example of this shift, trying to drum up nationalistic pride to replace decreasing
confidence in the party. Vocal critics have been quashed on the mainland, as they have
now been in Hong Kong. Ren Zhiqiang, a successful businessman, was recently
sentenced to 18 years in prison after criticising Mr Xi. The repression on the periphery,
especially the internment of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Uyghurs in camps in the
north-western region of Xinjiang, is the most notorious of all.
Yet repression only creates more resistance, which makes regional instability persist.
Coercion will continue, but it comes at a cost to ordinary Chinese citizens. Like Hong
Kongers, many mainland Chinese are keeping up their resistance, even if they are not
able to do so openly on the streets.
Meanwhile, in Hong Kong, the clampdown has clearly had an effect, as people have
cleared the streets for fear of the NSL. My former colleague, Joshua Wong, was arrested
in September for participating in “unauthorised assembly”. The CCP is influencing Hong
Kong’s once independent legal system and allowing unchecked police violence, paving
the way for a broader crackdown. There is no sign the aggression will abate.
Despite the CCP’s attempts to disguise itself as a peacemaker and make friends in
Europe as a counterweight to the United States, there is little hope that China will stop
exporting threats to global human rights. Now, though, it seems some Westerners are
starting to understand this. The EU has issued a statement expressing grave concern
over the NSL. Germany responded to it by suspending its extradition treaty with Hong
Kong. It is a sign that a more multilateral alliance for holding China accountable could be
consolidating. All such pressure will help.
Most importantly, however, the CCP has not bargained for the fact that Hong Kongers
will not let their spirits be crushed. Though street demonstrations are now unlikely,
protest is still alive, but in a more subtle and tenacious form. People are instead trying
to help the movement quietly, economically, by using businesses that display a yellow
ribbon signifying support for the protest movement, and by strengthening advocacy
overseas, where people such as myself are now free from the party’s reach. Hong
Kongers expect democracies around the world to give them more support in their
attempts to safeguard their values-based system.
For years Hong Kongers have been protesting against the threat from mainland China.
We will never give up the struggle for our freedoms. If, as expected, in the coming year
China continues to grip Hong Kong in its iron fist, we will have to come up with new
ways to resist. But resist we will. May all democrats join us in the fight.

Middle East
• Biden’s problem now
• The end of a black golden age
• China’s moment
• Big brother returns
• Shifting sands

Middle East
Biden’s problem now

Roger McShane: Middle East editor, The Economist
Will the new president jump back into the nuclear deal with Iran?
2021 in brief
The Syrian civil war enters its tenth year. Conflict between rebel forces and the
government of Bashar al-Assad began on March 15th 2011. The UN estimates that more
than 400,000 people have been killed in the fighting. Nearly 13m Syrians have become
refugees or displaced people as a result
IT MAY HAVE looked as though John Kerry had the most difficult task in the
negotiations that led to the nuclear deal with Iran in 2015. As he tried to nail down the
terms of the agreement, America’s secretary of state at the time grew so frustrated with
his Iranian counterpart that he threatened to walk away from the talks. Their shouting
matches became the stuff of legend.
Yet a reasonable case can be made that Joe Biden had a harder job. After the details had
been thrashed out, the then vice-president had to sell the deal to Congress. Democrats
were sceptical of the accord, under which Iran curbed its nuclear programme and
agreed to rigorous inspections in return for the lifting of international sanctions.
Republicans were dead against it. In the end, neither the House nor the Senate
supported it—but they did not block it either. Mr Biden had succeeded.
One of the most pressing foreign-policy questions now facing the incoming president
will be whether to re-enter the accord, called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA), which Donald Trump ditched in 2018. Mr Trump has heaped sanctions on Iran,
cutting it off from the world economy. Iran, in turn, has abrogated parts of the deal,
spinning centrifuges it said it would not and blowing through limits on enriched
uranium. This can be used to make nuclear energy—or, if highly enriched, a bomb. But
Iran and the other world powers involved in the JCPOA (Britain, China, France, Germany
and Russia) still hold out some hope of reviving it.
Mr Biden does, too. During the campaign he vowed to re-enter the agreement if Iran
moves back into compliance. This would be “a critical downpayment to re-establish US
credibility, signalling to the world that America’s word and international commitments
once again mean something,” said the candidate. But Mr Biden also promised to
strengthen and extend the JCPOA’s restrictions, some of which run out in the next four
years. The entire thing is due to expire in 2030. Its critics were never happy about these
sunset clauses—or the way the deal ignored Iran’s ballistic-missile programme and the
country’s destabilising activity in Iraq, Syria and Yemen.
Mr Biden says the world’s renewed faith in America will allow him to pursue diplomatic
solutions to these problems. But just getting back into the JCPOA will be hard enough.
For a start, America and Iran would have to agree on who moves first—Mr Biden, in
lifting sanctions, or the mullahs, in walking back their nuclear work? Moreover, Iran
might insist that America lift all the sanctions imposed on it by Mr Trump, including
those relating to terrorism. That is unlikely to happen, not least because Iran continues
to sponsor attacks on American troops. Mr Biden, for his part, may come to appreciate
the leverage that Mr Trump’s sanctions give him when trying to strengthen the deal.
There are other complications, too. Some in the Trump administration hoped that their
“maximum pressure” campaign would lead to regime change. But it merely undermined
Iranian politicians willing to reach out to the West, while empowering hardliners, who
now control parliament. President Hassan Rouhani, whose administration negotiated
the JCPOA, will be term-limited out of office in 2021. A hardliner will surely win the
contest to replace him. That will make life harder for Mr Biden. Ultimately he will have
to win over Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who reluctantly approved
the original deal and refused to negotiate with Mr Trump. The parlous state of Iran’s
economy may leave him little choice but to work with Mr Biden.
So what is most likely to happen? Mr Biden will move first, lifting Mr Trump’s travel ban
on Iran, relaxing some of America’s more symbolic sanctions and helping Iran get the
aid it needs to fight covid-19. Both sides will agree to calm things down in the region—
with Iran keeping a tighter leash on its proxies, and America refraining from attacking
those groups. That will set the stage for new nuclear talks. Iran will agree to roll back its
nuclear programme and Mr Biden will give the mullahs more sanctions relief
(prompting another fight with Congress). But he will hold on to much of the economic
leverage he has in order to negotiate a beefed-up deal.
Alas, such an accord will prove elusive in 2021. After four years of growing tension,
more time will be needed to build trust. But a modest reset in relations between
America and Iran will be no bad thing.

The end of a black golden age

Gregg Carlstrom: Middle East correspondent, The Economist, BEIRUT
A moment of reckoning will arrive for oil-dependent Arab states
Demand for oil will stay depressed
FOR DECADES Arab oil producers have been caught in a quandary. When prices fall,
they pledge to wean their economies off the black stuff. But low prices mean they
cannot afford costly reforms. Then output falls, demand climbs and prices begin their
inevitable rebound. Treasuries are once again flush, and the pressure to reform
disappears.
Privately, some officials now wonder if this cycle is over, making the needed reforms
unavoidable. The drop in demand caused by covid-19 sent Brent crude as low as $21 a
barrel in 2020. Prices will recover a bit in 2021, perhaps crossing the $50 mark. They
will not go much higher, though. Most oil states in the Middle East will still be unable to
balance their budgets.
Saudi Arabia, the region’s biggest producer, will push on with its search for non-oil
revenue. Last year it tripled value-added tax to 15%. Saudis who hoped the rise was
temporary will be frustrated to learn it was not. Still, the deficit will widen. Contractors
will struggle with late payments for public-sector work. Yet the kingdom will plough
ahead with its biggest megaprojects, such as Neom, a $500bn high-tech city in the north-
western desert, and a planned Red Sea resort larger than some European countries. It
will also force more migrants out of the labour market, freeing up jobs, albeit low-
paying ones, for its citizens.
Meanwhile, a drive through Dubai at night will be eerie: towering apartment blocks and
opulent villas will sit dark and empty. The United Arab Emirates will lose about 1m
migrants, one-tenth of its population. Some will return home, having lost their jobs.
Others, having had their salaries cut, will send their families back and move into smaller
flats to cut costs. New construction will cause a further drop in property prices, which
fell by 10% in 2020. Dubai will at least get a delayed boost from the launch of the World
Expo in October 2021.
Kuwait will tap bond markets to plug a deficit that could run to 15% of GDP, saddling
future generations with more debt to pay for an outsized public sector. Bahrain and
Oman, already rated junk, will have a harder time borrowing. Outside the Gulf the
picture looks bleaker still. Iraq will cut spending to cover its bloated payroll. Algeria’s
foreign reserves, an impressive $200bn in 2014, will slide below $40bn.
There will be no relief in sight. Demand for oil will stay depressed. On the supply side,
OPEC+ members that adhered to strict production caps in 2020 will pump more in a bid
for market share. Joe Biden’s new Iran policy will send more crude trickling into the
market. Kings and ministers will finally realise that they need to restructure their
economies. They will also wonder if it is too late.

China’s moment
As America retreats, the other superpower moves in
Iran and China, brothers-in-arms
ONCE IT GOT the coronavirus under control at home, China went on a diplomatic
offensive. Its aid was gratefully received in the Middle East. Egypt, the Gulf states, Iran
and Iraq all received shipments. “China has sent medical supplies and their best
experts…whereas America has not provided us with a single vial,” said Jafaar Allawi,
Iraq’s health minister at the time.
As America withdraws, China’s influence is growing. Just look at Iraq. Today China is its
biggest trading partner and, according to a former electricity minister, “our primary
option as a strategic partner in the long run.” The feeling is shared across much of the
region.
Access to energy is China’s primary motivation, but its relationship with the Middle East
goes beyond that. In return for oil China is building factories, ports and railways. It has
helped Saudi Arabia with its nuclear programme. Huawei, a Chinese telecoms giant,
does a large share of its 5G-networks business in the Middle East.
America views China as an economic and strategic competitor. So it has told Middle
Eastern countries not to get too close. But many Arab leaders see China as a more
reliable partner than America, which has been known to ask uncomfortable questions
about human rights and, anyway, seems fed up with the region.
To be sure, a lot of Arab states still rely on America for arms and protection. China
shows little interest in playing regional policeman. But its engagement is increasingly
strategic. Take its draft co-operation agreement with Iran, under which the two would
share intelligence and carry out joint research and weapons development. They already
train together.
It is a tricky balancing act for China, which has sold drones to Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates, Iran’s enemies. It is friendly with Israel, where Chinese state
enterprises have leased ports. China has also built ports on the Indian Ocean, ostensibly
for refuelling and resupply, that could be put to military use.
According to surveys of people in the region, China is a more popular global power than
America or Russia. Its influence in the Middle East will only grow in 2021.

Big brother returns

Gregg Carlstrom: Middle East correspondent, The Economist, BEIRUT
Dubai may need help from Abu Dhabi again
A YEAR AGO the only real dividing line between the emirates of Dubai and Abu Dhabi
was the speed limit: drivers heading south could escape Dubai’s traffic and open it up to
140kph on Abu Dhabi’s wide, empty highways. But since the pandemic began, they
instead come to a stop: the once-invisible line has become a hard border. Anyone
crossing into Abu Dhabi, the capital of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), must now queue
for a covid-19 test.
The checkpoints are one sign of a sometimes awkward relationship. Dubai is the flashy
one of the pair, with its man-made islands and hedonistic hotels. Abu Dhabi is the seat of
political power and the country’s oil, but happily keeps a lower profile. True to form,
Dubai reopened its economy (and its airport) faster than its neighbour wanted—hence
the border.
In 2009, when the financial crisis battered Dubai’s debt-laden economy, Abu Dhabi
stepped in with a $10bn bail-out. Facing a protracted slump from covid-19, Dubai may
need help again. It will not be an overt bail-out this time. Instead, Abu Dhabi—acting
through Mubadala, its powerful sovereign-wealth fund—will snap up parts of Dubai’s
distressed economy. The two emirates will also merge redundant institutions, perhaps
combining their stockmarkets, for example.
Exactly how much help Dubai will need is an open question. It is notorious for
publishing economic indicators months or years late. Debt levels have long been a
mystery. In the prospectus for bonds issued in September 2020 it listed public debt at
124bn dirhams ($34bn), a modest 28% of GDP. That figure does not include a bunch of
government-related entities, however. Add them to the mix and Dubai’s debts are closer
to 77% of GDP, estimates Moody’s, a rating agency.
There will be renewed talk of merging Emirates and Etihad, the official airlines of Dubai
and Abu Dhabi. They operate from airports just 131km apart (a second Dubai airport,
now under construction, is closer still). A merger makes sense in an era of soft demand.
Etihad lost $870m in 2019; its numbers for 2020 look even worse. But combining the
two will be a hard sell, if only for reasons of prestige.
That will not be the only source of awkwardness. Abu Dhabi is investing heavily in
theme parks, a financial sector and a film industry—all of them in direct competition
with Dubai’s. Meanwhile the UAE’s increasingly assertive foreign policy, run from Abu
Dhabi, will rankle Dubai: tensions with Turkey and Iran are bad for business. Those
border checkpoints will come down in 2021. But the relationship between the two
emirates will be fraught for other reasons.

Shifting sands
New conflicts are shaping an already volatile region
2021 in brief
Two very tall towers open in the Middle East. The Dubai Creek Tower will be at least
820 metres high. Soon after, the Jeddah Tower in Saudi Arabia is due to take over as the
world’s tallest building, and the first to exceed 1km in height
ISRAEL WAITED 31 years for Egypt to become the first Arab state to make peace with it.
Another 15 years passed before Jordan became the second. And more than a quarter of
a century after that, in 2020, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) became the third. But
things are moving faster now. Bahrain and Sudan quickly followed the UAE —and were
applauded by other Arab rulers, for whom the Palestinian cause has grown stale. More
countries will recognise Israel in the year to come, perhaps even conservative Saudi
Arabia.
The cooling of Arab-Israeli hostility is but one way the Middle East is changing, and
perhaps not even the most important. Fresh conflicts are arising as old powers move
out, new powers move in and local players assert more influence. These changes will
accelerate in 2021 and last well beyond it.
Iran remains the primary axis around which countries in the region orient themselves.
Concern over its threatening rhetoric, foreign adventurism and nuclear activity helped
bring Israel and the Arab states together. The conflict between them and Iran has
largely defined the past decade, fuelling wars in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, and adding to
chaos elsewhere. Joe Biden wants to lower the temperature, but America is less engaged
than it was. And a different struggle, one that also involves proxies and foreign powers,
may shape the region’s future.
It begins with the UAE. “Little Sparta”, as it is sometimes called, has long been
overshadowed by its bigger neighbour and ally, Saudi Arabia. The UAE, though, is
arguably more influential. It often wields its power softly, by touting “the Dubai model”
(of good governance and economic dynamism) and throwing its petrodollars around
foreign capitals. In Iran it sees a problem, but also a business partner (Iranian firms
have offices in Dubai), so it has aimed to reduce tensions with the mullahs. But the UAE
has a sharp side, too.
The issue that animates its de facto ruler, Muhammad bin Zayed, is his opposition to
political Islam, which he views as a threat. Since the Arab spring briefly brought an
Islamist government to power in Egypt, as America looked on, Prince Muhammad has
taken a more active role in the region. He has used the UAE’s hefty resources to beat
back Islamist groups. This included funding a popular uprising against Egypt’s Islamist
government and supporting the subsequent military takeover.
That pits Prince Muhammad against Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s strongman
president, who champions the Islamists. Their rivalry is predictably bitter. Istanbul has
become a hive of Arab dissidents. The UAE accuses Turkey of teaming up with Qatar to
push political Islam across the region, with the Turks providing the muscle and the
Qataris the cash. Since 2017 the little emirate has been under blockade by a UAE -led
coalition, in part over its support of Islamist groups. Turkey has come to Qatar’s aid. In
2019 it completed construction of a military base there that can host 5,000 Turkish
troops.
Mr Erdogan has also sent troops (as well as arms and mercenaries) to support the UN-
backed government in Libya, which just happens to work with Islamist militias. It was
thus able to repel an offensive by Khalifa Haftar, a rebellious warlord and staunch anti-
Islamist, who is backed by the UAE, Egypt and Russia. The dispute is spilling into the
eastern Mediterranean, where Turkey has claimed the right to drill in waters off Greek
islands based on a deal it signed with Libya. The Greeks, unsurprisingly, disagree. They
held a military exercise in August in which the Emiratis took part.
Most Arab states still do not consider Turkey to be as big a threat as Iran. But countries
such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt are increasingly concerned about Mr
Erdogan’s adventures in their neighbourhood. He has occupied parts of northern Syria

and hit deep inside Iraq, operations aimed at Kurdish forces whom Turkey considers
terrorists. In the West, too, leaders view Mr Erdogan as a malignant force that needs to
be contained, even though his country remains a member of NATO.
With Turkey drifting away from the West, and towards Iran and Russia, some see those
three countries forming a “rejectionist” bloc in the the Middle East. They share interests
and, perhaps more importantly, enemies. But they disagree on some things, too, notably
whom to back in Libya and Syria. So the grouping is fragile.
The Turkey- UAE rivalry, though, will endure, adding poison to the region. Officials in
the Middle East might at least learn a lesson from all those deals with Israel: bitter
enemies are not destined to remain that way forever.

Africa
• Best of friends
• Locked down, locked up
• Pulling the plug
• Put to the test
• Don’t let covid-19 kill democracy

Africa
Best of friends
John McDermott: chief Africa correspondent, The Economist, JOHANNESBURG
African countries will reject calls to loosen the continent’s strong ties with China
2021 in brief
The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, commonly known as CHOGM, will
be held in June in the Rwandan capital, Kigali, the first such meeting in Africa for more
than a decade
EVERY THREE years African and Chinese politicians gather at a diplomatic jamboree
known as the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC). The summits, which attract
more African heads of state than annual UN gatherings, are waypoints in China’s long
journey on the continent. Over the past three decades it has become the pre-eminent
partner for many African countries. Its importance will be apparent again in 2021 at the
next FOCAC meeting, the eighth, which is due to take place in Dakar, the capital of
Senegal.
Yet the context for this summit is different from that of the previous seven. During the
Trump presidency China’s role in Africa came in for increasing American criticism. In
2020 the secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, accused China of offering African countries
little but “empty promises and tired platitudes”. Though the Biden administration is less
likely to use provocative rhetoric, scepticism of Chinese intentions on the continent will
nevertheless endure. So the coming year could prove a tricky one for African
policymakers, who are already grappling with the fallout from the pandemic.
Their aim will be to avoid getting caught up in a zero-sum game. Ken Ofori-Atta, Ghana’s
finance minister, argues that ever since decolonisation, Africa has been a “chessboard”
for great-power contests and that “hasn’t helped us in any way”. Uhuru Kenyatta,
Kenya’s president, has warned that Africa is not a prize to be fought over: “We don’t
want to be forced to choose.” Cyril Ramaphosa, South Africa’s president, has said that
Africa should not suffer because of America’s “jealousy” of what China can offer the
continent.
Therein lies the rub. For all its carping, and its vast spending in areas such as public
health, America simply does not offer what China does. If you are a leader of an African
country with an urgent need for new roads, bridges or ports, then Chinese finance and
firms are the obvious option. “China still addresses Africa’s hunger for structural
transformation in a way that the West does not,” says Deborah Brautigam of the China
Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins University.
The same is true of telecommunications. Huawei, whose projects in Africa are often
subsidised or underwritten by the Chinese state, has not lost any orders on the
continent since America began encouraging countries to boycott its technology. “It is
not a reasonable ask when [America] is not offering a serious alternative,” argues Judd
Devermont of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a think-tank in
Washington, DC.
The FOCAC in Dakar is unlikely to see the scale of financial pledges made by China at
earlier forums. In both 2015 and, with some fudging, 2018, President Xi Jinping
announced packages of cheap loans, grants and investments worth $60bn over the
subsequent three years. Few analysts think that tally will be matched; China is too wary
of funding white elephants. But that does not mean it will be any less involved on the
continent.
For a start, China is crucial to African hopes of moving beyond the covid-19 pandemic. It
is the single largest bilateral creditor in Africa and thus often holds the key to unlocking
debt renegotiations. Mr Xi has pledged that African countries will receive priority access
to any Chinese vaccine that is developed.
And even before covid-19, China’s engagement with African countries went way beyond
infrastructure. There are perhaps 10,000 Chinese firms, mostly small businesses,
operating in Africa. More African students study in China than are enrolled in America
and Britain combined. Senior Chinese figures have fostered extensive networks with
their African counterparts, especially in military circles.
China’s image in Africa was tarnished last year by the ill-treatment of African migrants
in Guangzhou, a port city. That brought condemnation on social media and by African
politicians. But, broadly speaking, African views of China are nuanced and resilient.
Polling of 18 countries by Afrobarometer, a pan-African research group, released in
September 2020, found that an average of 59% of respondents had a favourable view of
China—marginally higher than of America (58%). No wonder African politicians are
careful not to take sides.
Nor will they see much benefit in speaking out against China over issues such as
Xinjiang, Hong Kong or Taiwan. China places great value on the 54 African countries’
votes at the UN and other international organisations. (In 1971 African votes ensured
that the People’s Republic of China was admitted to the UN and that Taiwan was
expelled.) It will reward those who vote with it and punish those who do not. Officials in
Kenya are known to have studied China’s punitive response to Australian criticism of its
human-rights records—and fear what would happen if their country did anything
similar.
Even if African politicians wanted to speak out against China, few believe Western
governments would support them if they did. “The West is unwilling to underwrite the
cost of antagonising China,” says W. Gyude Moore, a former cabinet minister in Liberia,
now at the Centre for Global Development, a think-tank. “The continent is best served
by charting its own course.”

Locked down, locked up

Olivia Acland: Congo correspondent, The Economist, GOMA
Covid-19 will help unscrupulous incumbents in elections
Free and fair?
The pandemic means fewer eyes will be on them
IN UGANDA, WHERE a general election is scheduled to take place in February 2021,

authorities have banned rallies because of covid-19. Members of the opposition who
have flouted the ban have been arrested. But somehow Dicksons Kateshumbwa, a
candidate for the ruling National Resistance Movement party, simply cannot avoid
holding gatherings with hundreds of supporters. “It is because of my popularity,” he
says, “I cannot control the number of people.” Unsurprisingly, he gets away with it.
At least 18 African countries are expected to go to the polls in 2021 while the pandemic
smoulders across the continent. For presidents like Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, who
prefer a pretence of democracy to the real thing, covid-19 restrictions will offer more
ways to cheat. Not only will they have an excuse to break up opposition rallies, but
fewer eyes will be on them, as international election observers stay away.
In many cases, campaigning will move from the streets to the airwaves or social media,
making it more important than ever for countries to have a free press. But places with
crooked leaders tend to muzzle their journalists. In the Republic of Congo, President
Denis Sassou Nguesso is likely to win another term despite having been in power for 35
years. In the absence of rallies, Mr Nguesso will not have trouble broadcasting his
campaign: several television channels and radio stations are owned by his cronies.
The opposition, however, will struggle. In recent years, journalists have been threatened
for inviting Mr Nguesso’s rivals to express their views or criticising him. And if
opposition activists seem to be gaining traction on social media, the government can
simply turn off the internet, as it did during the last election.
Campaigning on social media will be tricky in Uganda, too, as new rules oblige all
bloggers to register with a government regulator. In Benin, which is due to hold a
presidential election in early 2021, residents may be too scared to post their views on
Twitter or Facebook. In December 2019 a journalist was jailed for 18 months for
tweeting quotes from a local prosecutor. He was accused of spreading false information.
President Patrice Talon faces little opposition anyway—three of his key rivals are in
exile after being threatened with prison sentences.
Other African leaders have used covid-19 as a reason to postpone elections altogether.
In June 2020 Idriss Déby Itno, Chad’s president, delayed an election, which was
originally scheduled for 2015, for the fifth time. Previous excuses include having
insufficient funds, and the threat of attacks by Boko Haram, a jihadist group. (In
Ethiopia, where covid-19 cases tripled in two weeks, the decision to postpone a general
election for at least nine months is slightly more reasonable.)
Organising fair elections during a pandemic is tricky. It will be made trickier still by
scheming incumbents who will do anything to win. Sadly, many of them will triumph in
2021.

Pulling the plug

Jonathan Rosenthal: Africa editor, The Economist
Cuts in aid to Africa will have a positive impact in the long term
Remittances will become even more important than aid
PERHAPS THE only thing thicker than the syrup drizzled over the petit fours
served at African Union (AU) summits is the irony in the speeches given by
those eating them. Between meals largely paid for by Western donors, African
leaders take to the podium to denounce Western countries for having too
much influence. Yet for all the hypocrisy, they have a point: handouts can
cause economic problems and undermine sovereignty.
Dambisa Moyo argued in her book “Dead Aid” in 2009 that aid increases poverty by
fuelling corruption and making exports more expensive. “Aid is not benign, it’s
malignant,” she wrote. When Ghana’s president, Nana Akufo-Addo, later said “it is
obvious that the aid bus will not take Africa where it has to be,” he spoke for many on
the continent. Even so, aid has kept increasing, from $129bn in 2010 to $169bn in 2019.
Africa has long been the biggest recipient.
In 2021 this trend will reverse. Rich countries are cutting direct aid by about a third as a
result of their own problems. The immediate impacts will be bad. Bill Gates, a
philanthropist, says covid-19 and cuts in aid are undermining 25 years of progress in
improving health. The World Bank thinks the number of very poor people globally could
jump by up to 100m.
Yet over the longer run there will be positive changes. Remittances will become even
more important than aid. Having fallen by 23% to $37bn in 2020, they are expected to
improve slightly in 2021. Much of the money sent home by migrants goes into education
and housing. Little is stolen by corrupt officials. Many African countries are putting
scarce aid money into social safety-nets rather than wasteful grandiose projects. And
less aid means many countries will have to raise more in taxes. To do so they will have
to promise better governance, more accountability and more democracy—and perhaps
fewer petit fours at AU shindigs.

Put to the test

Tom Gardner: Addis Ababa correspondent, The Economist, ADDIS ABABA
Abiy Ahmed will present Ethiopia with an unhappy choice
THE OMENS seemed so promising. “The coming time in Ethiopia will be [one] of love
and forgiveness,” said Abiy Ahmed in his inaugural address as Ethiopia’s prime minister
in 2018. After years of anti-government protests, the young reformer promised a new
dawn for Africa’s second-most-populous country. He freed political prisoners,
unmuzzled the media and welcomed opposition parties back from exile. He made peace
with Eritrea, for which he won the Nobel peace prize in 2019. And he styled himself as a
transitional leader, tasked with ridding Ethiopia of dictatorship and shepherding it
towards its first free elections.
In 2021 Ethiopians will find out if Abiy has set the country on the road to liberty—or
plunged it into anarchy. In November the prime minister ordered his forces to hit back
in response to what he claimed was an “attack” on a base housing federal troops in the
northern region of Tigray, the most powerful of Ethiopia’s ten ethnically constituted
states.
As The World in 2021 went to press it was unclear whether the armed confrontation
that followed between Abiy’s forces and those loyal to Tigray’s rulers, the Tigrayan
People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), would be contained. Diplomats might yet persuade
the two sides to talk. But Ethiopia could just as easily find itself in a full-scale civil war,
which could wipe out the progress made over the past two decades in areas such as
rural health care (see next story) and raise the spectre of the disintegration of a country
of 118m people.
The conflict with the TPLF, which called the shots in the capital for almost three decades
before being ousted by Abiy, is far from the only crisis. Parts of the prime minister’s
own region of Oromia, the country’s largest, are besieged by armed separatists.
Elsewhere he is struggling to quell popular—and sometimes violent—protests against
his rule. Those that followed the murder in June of an Oromo musician resulted in at
least 166 deaths. Many victims were members of ethnic minorities, slaughtered by
mobs. Underlying all this are worsening tensions between the federal government and
the states, each of which has the right to secede.
Elections, delayed because of covid-19 and now promised for June, may no longer be
possible. Not that all Ethiopians would mind: many now yearn for a strongman who can
keep order, and Abiy casts himself as the one person who can hold the country together.
The question is whether enough Ethiopians still agree with him.

Don’t let covid-19 kill democracy
Suspending elections amid the pandemic could erode African democracy unless the
right steps are taken, argue Alan Doss, special adviser, Kofi Annan Foundation, and Mo
Ibrahim, founder, Mo Ibrahim Foundation
The virus is no excuse to ignore sound electoral practice
THE PANDEMIC in Africa is not just a crisis of public health or of the economy. It could
well become a political emergency that threatens the democratic progress that
countries across the continent have achieved in recent years.
Africa is poorly placed to deal with the pandemic. Only a few countries have social
safety-nets and the fiscal space to cushion the impact of the severe economic recession
that both the IMF and World Bank have predicted. Millions of people have already lost
their jobs or other sources of income. This will cause widespread social distress and
possibly political upheaval, especially among young people who, more than ever, lack
work and opportunities. This convergence of economic, social and political crises is a
recipe for unrest and instability.
Democratic elections might well be the spark that lights the fuse. More than 20 African
countries were expected to hold national elections in 2020. Many of them were still in
the midst of conflicts, just emerging from them, or on the verge. Only five of those—in
Togo, Guinea, Mali, Burundi and Malawi—proceeded as scheduled, some peacefully,
some with questionable outcomes. Fortunately, none seems to have provoked a covid-
19 surge.
Governments everywhere face a huge challenge: how do they impose strict social
restrictions to prevent contagion, while at the same time letting citizens participate
meaningfully in the electoral process? Looking ahead, fewer elections are scheduled in
Africa for 2021. Nevertheless, the same concerns apply.
This raises complex questions over fundamental human rights, the integrity of
democracy and the legitimacy of governments. The answers will involve difficult trade-
offs. But the citizens and leaders of Africa must be vigilant to ensure that the pandemic
does not become an excuse to avoid or postpone elections for political advantage, to
restrict civil society or to institute authoritarian and anti-democratic measures in the
name of public health.
What can be done to secure the democratic gains and individual freedoms that Africans
have won in recent times, often at great cost? There are several steps that governments
and the public can take, based on recommendations from an international group of
electoral experts convened by the Kofi Annan Foundation.
The foundational principle is the rule of law. Emergency measures relating to elections
should be grounded in constitutional provisions and electoral laws. Where the national
legal framework does not anticipate the current situation, legal changes should be made
in line with internationally accepted standards. The postponement of elections should
not be open-ended. Rather, there should be clarity and agreement on the health
conditions in which elections could take place safely.
Next, leaders should consult widely to build trust and consensus across the political
landscape. If they do not, emergency measures they introduce may be perceived as self-
serving, subverting the public trust needed to address the health crisis.
Third, transparency: governments and electoral authorities should provide clear and
frequent communication with the public. Citizens need to understand what measures
are being considered, by whom and on what grounds. The media and civil-society
groups have crucial roles to play in preserving democracy by monitoring policies,
fostering debate and shining light on critical issues. Governments must protect freedom
of expression. Cover-ups in politics, as in health care, only make matters worse.
Finally, any steps taken by governments—such as protective measures at polling

stations, or changes in how voters are registered, ballots are cast or votes are counted—
should be reasonable and proportionate to the health risk. The virus is no excuse to
ignore sound electoral practice.
Even with free and fair elections, Africa’s democracy is threatened by weakened
economies. Countries will need substantial assistance to get through the crisis.
Governments and their international partners must avoid the failed policies of the past
when, even though debt was forgiven or rescheduled, budgets for education and health
care were slashed. Imposing strict austerity amid mass unemployment would threaten
stability and democratic progress.
Hard times can make people vulnerable to the siren song of populists and extremists
trading on communal enmities. By taking these steps Africa can prevent a health crisis
from killing its young democracies.

International
• Turning a corner on climate
• On the road again
• A clash, a crunch and a crisis
• Streets ahead
• Concrete jumble
• Bad dreams
• Murder by numbers
• The plague of poverty
• Ahem…about last year
• It’s time to pull together

International
Turning a corner on climate

Catherine Brahic: environment editor, The Economist
A vital year for bolder promises to save the planet
2021 in brief
The boldest conservation proposal ever will be put to countries when they gather in
Kunming in south-west China in May for a UN summit to reverse biodiversity loss: a
commitment to protect 30% of land and ocean by 2030. Some 64 countries have already
signed up to the “30X30” pledge but not Indonesia, Australia or America among others
EVERY YEAR since 1995, tens of thousands of climate-policy wonks, politicians,

journalists and campaigners from all corners of the world have gathered in one place at
the end of the year. For two weeks they cram themselves into an enclosed conference
centre. There is much talking and little sleep. At times, hundreds gather in a single
auditorium; at others, they huddle in small clusters. Fresh air is a luxury. There are
social drinks and meals. And at the end of it all, everyone flies back to where they came
from. In other words, the UN’s annual climate summits are ideal superspreader events
for a pandemic virus.
It comes as no surprise, then, that the 2020 event (dubbed “COP26”) was delayed until
November 2021. From a public-health perspective, the decision was obvious. It may
also have been a stroke of luck for the British government, which was due to host the
event in Glasgow. Early in 2020 it became fairly clear that the prime minister, Boris
Johnson, and his team had their hands full with Brexit and were looking somewhat
lacklustre on the climate front. The extension gave them an additional 12 months to do
their homework.
It seems to have paid off. The key task ahead of COP26 is to plead with and nudge the
nearly 200 governments that are party to the 2015 Paris agreement to dig deep and
improve on their promises to slash national emissions. So far, however, the sum of these
“nationally determined contributions” to the agreement (or NDCs) is not sufficient to
prevent catastrophic warming. Models suggest the world is likely to see around 3ºc of
warming above pre-industrial temperatures by 2100, far more than the agreement’s
aim of limiting the rise to 1.5-2ºC.
To make up for the shortfall, signatories were due to submit more ambitious NDCs by
the end of 2020. So far only 15 have done so—mainly small developing countries that
account for just 4.6% of global emissions, yet suffer greatly from their climatic impacts.
From a global climate-policy perspective, 2021 begins on December 12th 2020, the fifth
anniversary of the Paris agreement. Rather than heralding the opening of COP26 in
Glasgow, the anniversary will instead be marked by a summit co-hosted by Mr Johnson
and António Guterres, the UN's secretary-general. Many fresh climate commitments will
be made then. Spurred on by recent European Union and Chinese statements about
eliminating all or most emissions by mid-century, more countries will come forward
with similar net-zero targets.
The EU says it will reduce all its greenhouse-gas emissions to net-zero by 2050, in line
with what the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, a scientific consortium, says
is necessary as a global average to hit the 1.5ºC Paris target. In September 2020 China's
president, Xi Jinping, announced that his country would reduce its “carbon emissions”
(ie, not including other greenhouse gases) to net-zero by 2060. Both the EU and China
are expected to register these mid-century goals with the UN as part of their updated
NDCs. Details of how they plan to achieve these lofty ambitions, and reach their targets
for 2030 of peaking emissions (China) and cutting them to 55% below 1990 levels (EU),
should come with China’s 14th five-year plan and the EU’s Green Deal.
Equally important will be how countries set out their plans to adapt to the inevitable
impacts of a warmer climate at the virtual Climate Adaptation Summit in late January,
and how nations flesh out their economic recovery plans from covid-19. The pandemic
is expected to cause a reduction of nearly 8% in global CO2emissions in 2020, compared
with what they would have been without the associated global recession. Whether or
not emissions rebound, as they did after the global financial crisis in 2007-09, will
depend on how countries decide to stimulate their flagging economies. Some, like
Nigeria, have already announced plans to phase out fossil-fuel subsidies as part of their
recovery. Others, like Canada and France, have tied climate-related conditions to bail-
out funds. And the European Commission plans to spend 30% of its recovery package
on climate action.
Such moves will aid a global transition to a greener economy and ultimately keep global
temperatures cooler than they might otherwise have been. But they are not enough. The
recovery plans of China and India, notably, still include stimulus for future coal-power
development which is entirely inconsistent with Paris targets.
The biggest climate actor to watch in 2021 will be America, newly returned to the fold
under President-elect Joe Biden. On November 4th, the morning after Americans went
to the polls, their country officially came out of the Paris agreement, according to plans
set in motion by President Donald Trump six months after he took office in 2017. Mr
Biden will reverse this decision soon after entering the White House.
He supports a net-zero-by-2050 target, which, taken together with the European and
Chinese pledges, would give 45% of global emissions an expiry date of sorts. Mid-
century is a long way off, though, and if Mr Trump’s presidency has demonstrated
anything, it is that the best-laid plans can easily be overturned by the next
administration. When it comes to the climate, it will be important for Mr Biden to
succeed where Barack Obama failed. And the foundations for that must be laid in 2021.

On the road again

Holidays in 2021 will be fewer, longer and closer to home
Beached
Going abroad, although possible, will remain a hassle
2021 in brief
Artemis 1, the first (and uncrewed) flight of NASA’s Orion capsule and Space Launch
System heavy-lift rocket, is due to launch in November. If all goes well, a crewed mission,
Artemis 2, will perform a lunar fly-by in 2023
THIS MUCH is certain: travel in 2021 will be easier than in 2020. More flights will take
off and land. A greater number of countries will welcome visitors. There will be fewer
restrictions. But those gains will come, as statisticians like to say, from a very low base.
After a year in which flights came to a near-complete standstill, many countries closed
their borders and those that still allowed visitors imposed onerous restrictions, even
the slightest loosening will be a welcome improvement.
The signs are encouraging. By September 2020, 115 of the 217 destinations tracked by
the UN World Tourism Organisation had loosened their travel restrictions. Global hotel-
occupancy rates more than doubled from a low of 22% in April to 47% in August. And
travellers are keen to get going. According to Skyscanner, a price-comparison website,
there is plenty of pent-up demand. Searches on the website spike every time Britain
adds a country to its quarantine-exempt list. In China, where covid-19 cases are few,
domestic air-travel approached pre-pandemic levels by August.
Three big changes will define travel in 2021. The first is frequency and length. Short
breaks across borders will remain difficult. As they open, most countries will impose
two-week quarantines on incoming and returning travellers, turning a three-day
holiday into a 31-day ordeal. As a result, trips will be fewer and longer. Thailand, which
depended on tourism for more than 20% of its GDP in 2019, is keen to admit tourists.
But the condition is that they stay for at least 90 days. More countries will follow suit.
A second change is distance. Domestic tourism will boom in 2021. Big destination
countries are trying to make up for the shortfall in international visitors by encouraging
citizens to holiday at home. In America, airlines are betting on Hawaii. Singapore is
giving its citizens S$100 ($75) to spend on local attractions. Even Airbnb’s home page
encourages its customers to “go near”. Holidaymakers will not be difficult to persuade.
Going abroad, although possible, will remain a hassle: countless forms, the need for
covid-19 tests and the risk of being stranded will all discourage foreign travel.
The third change will be in the nature of the holiday. As trips get fewer and longer, those
who can work from home will find an attractive alternative in working from
somewhere-a-lot-nicer-than-home, and with fewer restrictions on movements. Call it
lockdown arbitrage. Many of these changes will persist long after a vaccine has been
widely deployed. Travellers will get used to longer trips, more flexibility and combining
work with leisure. International tourism will eventually recover to its 2019 levels. But,
starting in 2021, it will look rather different.

A clash, a crunch and a crisis

Daniel Franklin: diplomatic editor, The Economist
The return of nuclear brinkmanship
IN 2021 THE world will have an important new international treaty. The Treaty on the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) commits parties not to develop or host such
weapons. Launched in 2017 and so far signed by 84 countries, it will become law 90
days after 50 of those signatory states have ratified it. On October 24th 2020 Honduras
became the 50th ratifier, triggering the countdown to the treaty’s entry into force on
January 22nd.
But far from marking a new era of optimism for controlling nukes, this will be a sign of
mounting alarm that restraints are being dangerously weakened. The world’s nuclear
powers have no intention of signing the new treaty. A year of nuclear nervousness is in
prospect, including a clash, a crunch and, all too possibly, a crisis.
The clash will come at the five-yearly review conference, or RevCon, of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). That was meant to happen in New York in 2020, marking
the treaty’s 50th anniversary, but it was pushed to 2021 because of covid-19. A new
date of January 2021 was pencilled in. That may slip again, but the delay will not
diminish the sour mood surrounding the event.
The essence of the NPT is that the nuclear have-nots refrain from developing nukes in
exchange for the nuclear powers working towards eliminating theirs. The previous
RevCon, in 2015, was a flop, ending without a consensus statement. Since then, divisions
have only deepened, as nuclear deals have either collapsed (the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces treaty between America and Russia) or have come close to doing so (the
nuclear deal with Iran, which still holds despite America's withdrawal). The new TPNW
is a response from some of the nuclear have-nots to the sense that the nuclear powers
are intent on building up their arsenals rather than drawing them down: in short, that
the NPT is failing.
The looming crunch concerns the New START treaty between America and Russia. The
treaty, which limits each country’s strategic nuclear arsenals and enables intrusive
inspections, will expire on February 5th 2021 unless both agree to extend it for up to
five years. If it lapses, the two superpowers, which together have about 90% of the
world’s nukes, will be without a nuclear treaty for the first time in nearly half a century.
And if that means a new nuclear arms race, America’s chief negotiator, Marshall
Billingslea, said in May: “We know how to win these races, and we know how to spend
the adversary into oblivion.”
The Trump administration wanted to use the deadline to press China (which has a
relatively small nuclear arsenal but is suspected of planning to expand it rapidly) into a
tripartite nuclear arms-control deal. The Chinese show no interest in submitting to
restrictions. Americans at talks on New START in June pointedly photographed Chinese
flags in front of the empty chairs of the Chinese delegates who declined the invitation to
attend. Although, before the American election, Mr Billingslea said a deal with Russia
was “very, very close”, time is running short to keep New START alive.
And the nuclear crisis of 2021? The worrying thing is that the list of potential causes is
long. It includes accidents; cyber-attacks on nuclear facilities; reckless sabre-rattling;
new tests by North Korea; an escalation of border hostilities between India and China;
an escalation of tensions over Kashmir between India and Pakistan; further moves by
Iran towards developing a weapon; threats by other countries to join the nuclear club;
and efforts by rogue groups to obtain a “dirty bomb”. In 2020 the world was too
complacent about the risks of a pandemic. In 2021 it should not make the same mistake
over nukes.

Streets ahead
Marie Segger: data journalist The Economist, BERLIN AND LONDON
How will the pandemic change urban-transport patterns?
With more cars, but less road space, bicycles and e-scooters will become more
attractive options
OBSERVERS OF many industries claim that the pandemic has accelerated change in
their sectors. But is it true for transport? Over the past decade, city planners have
promoted public transport to ease congestion and reduce pollution. Since the start of
the pandemic, however, people have been opting for more solitary options such as cars
and bicycles. But street space is in short supply in dense cities such as New York and
Paris. As a result, big cities should expect big changes in how people get around in 2021.
Until a vaccine is made widely available or better treatments are found, the pandemic
will shape patterns of travel. To see how travel might evolve, we analysed mobility data
from Apple, Google and TomTom in ten big cities. Use of public transport in August,
when covid-19 cases had fallen from their initial peaks, remained 40% below its pre-
pandemic norm. That suggests that in 2021, while the virus remains a threat, people
will still prefer independent travel, despite efforts to make public transport safer by
promoting the wearing of masks.
In Berlin passengers on public transport who fail to wear masks are warned of a €50
($60) fine with the slogan “Protect others. Yourself. And your wallet.” Our data suggest
that many people will avoid such fines by driving instead. Traffic congestion in Berlin
was 8% above pre-pandemic levels between August and October. The pandemic has
driven up vehicle registrations in New York City. In every city we analysed, car use grew
more quickly than public transport and walking, after lockdowns eased in mid-2020.
Congestion has followed this trajectory in most places, though a drop in tourist numbers
has freed space on the roads.
In recent years urbanites in developed countries have been shifting away from driving
and car use, in favour of public transport, ride-hailing, car clubs and other alternatives.
Tightening regulation, in the form of congestion charges and emissions rules, also made
car ownership less attractive. Julia Poliscanova from Transport & Environment, a think-
tank, says the future of city centres is, if not car-free, then at least electric. In 2021 the
EU is due to review its rules on emission standards that will help reduce the numbers of
dirty vehicles on the road. The recent uptick in car usage may prompt cities to
accelerate their plans to ban non-electric vehicles from their streets.
Several cities, including Athens, Budapest, London, Milan, New York and Paris, have
pedestrianised streets to aid social distancing and introduced new bike lanes. Many
plan to make these changes permanent. As the combination of more cars and closed-off
roads compounds congestion, that will help two other competitors in the race for space
on the streets: bicycles and e-scooters.
During the lockdowns in mid-2020 bicycles experienced a surge in popularity. New

bikes were in short supply, and city residents who had previously considered bike-
sharing schemes to be transport for tourists changed their minds. With few visitors
around, London’s bike-sharing scheme saw a threefold increase in new users between
March and July. The city’s cycling tsar, Will Norman, says London has added 40 miles of
temporary bike lanes. Nationally, the government has pledged £2bn ($3.2bn) towards
new cycling and walking infrastructure. During the summer, cycle traffic recovered to
pre-pandemic levels on many commuter routes into central London, even as offices
remain largely empty. In 2021 many more commuters will opt for pedal power.
The latest contender for street supremacy is the e-scooter, which can be rented by the
minute using a smartphone app. Startups have launched scooter services in cities
around the world, and the pandemic has strengthened the case for their adoption. In
Berlin, which has thousands of e-scooters, usage rose when lockdown eased in May
2020.
One argument against e-scooters is that they are used for short trips and may
discourage walking and cycling, but do not replace car journeys. But an analysis by inrix,
a research outfit, in 2018 found that one-fifth of car journeys in large American and
British cities were of less than a mile. Half of urban car trips in America, and two-thirds
in Britain, were shorter than three miles. Some critics say e-scooters are dangerous. But
data from Lime, a rental firm, indicates that one-third of all accidents occur within the
first five journeys, which suggests that training and practice can help. Pilot schemes to
approve e-scooters have been launched in Britain and are likely to go ahead in New
York.
Another way to ease congestion, of course, is to work from home. Even before the
pandemic struck, Tokyo had devised a programme to encourage firms to let employees
work remotely, or commute outside peak hours, in order to reduce crowding during the
2020 Olympics. If the games go ahead in 2021, the city will be well prepared.

Concrete jumble
Joel Budd: social affairs editor, The Economist
Cities will struggle, but will avoid a mass exodus
No jams, at least
2021 in brief
“Davos Dialogues” take place online in January in place of the usual meeting of the
World Economic Forum in the Swiss resort. A small in-person meeting will be held in
Lucerne in May
IN BIG CITIES, disaster seems always to lurk around the corner. E.B. White, an American
essayist, worried in 1948 that New York could be destroyed by “a single flight of planes
no bigger than a wedge of geese” dropping bombs on it. Great cities have been razed or
have descended into anarchy in a great many films and books, from “War of the Worlds”
to “High-Rise” and “Godzilla”. That a new virus should strike cities so hard does not
seem too surprising.
Covid-19 did not just break out in large metropolises, killing their inhabitants before
doctors knew how to treat the disease. It also induced a protective response that has
been exceptionally hard on cities. When public transport, theatres, nightclubs and
offices are forced to close, or when people are afraid to visit them, the impact on villages
and small towns is minimal. Cities, by contrast, almost stop functioning.
In the initial panic, many urbanites fled. Mobile-phone records suggest that 17% of
Parisians departed in the week before France was locked down in March. Over the
following months, city-dwellers in many countries recalibrated their attitudes to
property. A poll by Ipsos mori in June 2020 found that Britons of every generation
prized a private garden above all other features of a home, including secure locks and a
good internet connection. Suburbia had not looked so alluring for years.
So big cities will enter 2021 in an awful state. Offices will still be quiet; theatres will be
closed; public-transport agencies will be begging governments for bail-outs. The army
of urban service workers—the coffee-pourers, nail-painters, sandwich-makers and yoga
instructors—will still be struggling to pay the rent. But by the end of the year things will
be looking up again.
Cities will recover not because a covid-19 vaccine or better treatments appear, although
those would help greatly, but because of their innate capacity for change. Adapting to
shocks is what great cities do. As previous industries withered, they turned cotton
warehouses into offices, railway lines into parks and slaughterhouses into boutiques. If
shops and offices are abandoned, urbanites will find new uses for them. This flexibility
seemed to hurt cities during the pandemic, as white-collar workers switched to working
from home and stopped buying bus tickets and sandwiches. But not adapting would
have been calamitous.
Cities’ power to assemble talented people remains strong. The Black Lives Matter
protests and a rash of illegal urban raves have shown that young city-dwellers still want
to congregate. Middle-aged office workers may feel differently. Yet predictions that
knowledge industries will abandon city centres for a network of small satellite offices
misunderstand the purpose of offices. They are not for making phone calls or tapping at
computers, but for sharing ideas. A hub is essential; a suburban satellite office may not
be much of an improvement on a converted bedroom.
Some urbanites will move to suburbs and small towns. They have long done so: it is
almost a feature of great global cities that they have a negative balance of domestic
migration, and rely on babies and immigrants to keep up their numbers. But anybody
who believes that the outflow will turn into a flood has perhaps not tried to get planning
permission for a house or a block of flats in the suburbs recently. Cities will hit the
ground hard, then bounce.

Bad dreams
Hamish Birrell: public policy correspondent, The Economist
A golden age for universities comes to an end
Some universities will disappear altogether
THE PAST year was a difficult one for new students. Many were barred from campus.
Others could not enter the country in which they hoped to study. Those who made it
were greeted by freshers’ fairs on Zoom and strict socialising rules.
All this means that 2021 will be a difficult time to run a university. Over the past few
decades, universities have thrived, supported by rising prosperity, growing demand and
politicians who saw them as engines of economic growth. Covid-19 threatens much of
this.
The most obvious risk concerns international students. Their numbers have surged in
recent years. By the time the pandemic struck, there were more than 5m around the
world, mostly travelling from the emerging world to study in the rich world’s best
universities, and paying handsomely to do so.
Now universities are working out how to get by with fewer of them. The problem will be
most acute in countries with strict travel restrictions. In July 2019, 144,000
international students arrived in Australia. In July 2020, just 40 made it.
Support from politicians will be limited. This is partly a question of priorities.

Universities must compete with businesses and the public sector for financial support.
But it also reflects the fact that they have lost some of their lustre in recent years.
The expansion of higher education has coincided with poor productivity growth in
much of the rich world, undermining faith in universities’ ability to boost growth.
Political disputes are increasingly divided along educational lines: between the have-
degrees and the have-nots.
In America, Australia and England, right-wing governments gave much less support
than universities wanted to help them through the first wave of the pandemic. In
America, the financial context for universities will deteriorate, as states respond to
falling tax revenues by cutting spending.
Universities will have to cut back as a result. Grandiose building projects will be put on
hold. Staff with short-term contracts will lose their jobs. In America, official figures
suggest that the college workforce has shrunk by 7% since the start of the pandemic. Job
losses appear to be even bigger in Australia.
Some universities will disappear altogether. In some cases the process will be smoothly
managed, and the troubled institution will engineer a merger with a stronger neighbour.
But there will also be bankruptcies, most often in America. Edmit, a college-planning
outfit, estimates that a third of American private colleges are on course to run out of
money within six years.
Institutions wishing to avoid this fate must find new ways to make money. Many are
working out how to teach from a distance. Others are looking to offer short, practical
courses to the temporarily jobless.
By the end of 2021 things may start to improve. Universities provide somewhere for
youngsters to wait out a recession, and thus tend to see enrolment grow after economic
downturns. There may even be pent-up demand among international students who
have put off studying for a year. But it will be a long wait for many universities, and not
all will make it through the crisis.

Murder by numbers
Shashank Joshi: defence editor, The Economist
A cyber-attack could deliberately kill someone in 2021
2021 in brief
March 5th is the 75th anniversary of Winston Churchill’s speech in Fulton, Missouri, in
1946, in which he likened the Soviet Union’s growing influence after the end of the
second world war to an “iron curtain” descending across Europe. The speech heralded
the start of the cold war
LURID SCENARIOS of cyber-killings go back decades. In 1999 the New York Times raised
the prospect of an “electronic Pearl Harbour”. In 2011 Leon Panetta, then America’s
secretary of defence, suggested that “the next Pearl Harbour…could very well be a
cyber-attack,” perhaps one “as destructive as the terrorist attack of 9/11”. No such
deadly, large-scale cyber-attack is known to have occurred. But in September 2020, an
attack shut down the computers of a hospital in Düsseldorf, and a woman who needed
urgent surgery died after being transferred to another city. This, the first known death
as a result of a cyber-attack, appears to have been accidental: the attackers meant to
extort money by targeting computers at Düsseldorf University, not its associated
hospital. But it shows that deliberately causing death in this way is certainly possible. It
has not happened yet, but as more aspects of human life involve being plugged into
networks, that could change in 2021.
To harm or kill someone who is not already dependent on life-support machinery,

malicious code must harness the kinetic or chemical energy of something it controls.
The obvious candidates are industrial-control systems, such as those that supervise
power-plants and factories. In 2007 America’s Department of Energy publicly showed
that 21 lines of code could rapidly open and close a diesel generator’s circuit breakers,
causing the machine to smoke, shake and shatter. “It was akin to the stress placed on a
car’s transmission when a driver shifts into reverse while the car is speeding forward,”
noted Ben Buchanan of Georgetown University in his book, “The Hacker and the State”.
Shortly afterwards America and Israel launched Stuxnet, a computer worm that pulled a
similar trick on Iranian gas centrifuges, which spin uranium, causing more than a
thousand to break. In 2016 Russian malware, inspired partly by Stuxnet, disrupted
Ukraine’s electricity grid and cut power to a fifth of Kiev in the middle of a bitter winter.
It targeted the protective relays which monitor current and voltage, shutting down
electrical systems in abnormal conditions. Persuading machinery or circuitry to commit
suicide is not the only way to harm people. In April 2020 an Israeli water and sewage
plant was struck by a suspected Iranian cyber-attack apparently intended to fool pumps
into adding excess chlorine to residential water supplies. Ukraine reported a similar
intrusion at a chlorine plant in 2018.
Nobody died as a result of those attacks. But they might have done. The thwarted
sewage-plant attack could have caused “very big damage to the civilian population”,
noted Yigal Unna, head of Israel’s National Cyber Directorate. In Ukraine in 2016, the
attackers appear to have pulled their punches, notes Mr Buchanan, targeting only a
single electrical substation in Kiev. Such restraint may not last. In recent years, America
and Russia have been probing one another’s power grids and leaving behind malware,
like arms caches stashed behind enemy lines. In a serious crisis, leaders might choose to
use these instead of a riskier military option, potentially cutting off power to vital
services.
Such services could also be more directly targeted by code-borne assaults. In 2017
North Korean hackers deployed WannaCry, a piece of “ransomware” that encrypted
data and demanded a ransom to unlock it. It inadvertently struck Britain’s National
Health Service, affecting dozens of hospitals and nearly 600 doctors’ surgeries. Unlike in
Düsseldorf, the impact was limited—there was a drop in admissions but no increase in
mortality. But malware specifically designed to disrupt health systems could certainly
put lives at risk.
There may be simpler means of cyber-homicide. Vehicles—unlike centrifuges or

transformers—tend to have highly breakable humans sitting inside them while moving
at high speeds, increasingly with a connection to the internet. Such links tend to have
weak security standards. Hackers have repeatedly demonstrated the ability to seize
control of cars in motion; one such demonstration caused Fiat Chrysler to recall 1.4m
vehicles in 2015. ABI, a market-intelligence firm, reckons that 91% of new light vehicles
and trucks sold in America in 2020 have internet connectivity. At highway speeds, it
would not take a Stuxnet to do some damage. As attackers become more sophisticated
and the number of potential targets grows, it is now a question of when, rather than if, a
cyber-attack will prove deliberately fatal.

The plague of poverty

Sarah Maslin: Brazil correspondent, The Economist, SÃO PAULO
The continuing fallout from covid-19 will swell the ranks of the global poor
IN 2021 POVERTY will rise to levels unseen in a decade and governments will struggle
to respond. The World Bank predicts that the pandemic will increase the ranks of the
extremely poor, on less than $1.90 a day, by up to 150m. From 1990 until 2019 their
numbers fell from 36% of the world’s population to 8%. Now they are increasing for the
first time since 1998. The UN says 240m-490m people in 70 countries will be pushed
into “multidimensional poverty”, a measure that includes lacking basic shelter or having
children go hungry.
Most of the newly destitute will be in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. City-dwellers
will fare worse than the rural poor, because they cannot grow their own food and tend
to work in informal sectors that have been slow to recover (for example, as maids or
street vendors). Many saw their safeguards disappear in 2020. Remittances from family
members abroad stopped. Many sold assets such as jewellery. Millions will return to
their villages. Many children will leave school to go to work.
The UN World Food Programme predicts that acute hunger will double by the end of
2020: an additional 130m people will not have enough to eat. The long-term effects will
be dire, especially for young children whose physical growth and mental development
will be stunted. The pandemic's disruption of health care means more mothers will die
in childbirth, and more people will die from chronic illnesses such as diabetes, and
preventable diseases such as malaria, in 2021.
All this suffering will exacerbate political instability and social unrest. Fragile states
teetering on the edge of armed conflict will see skirmishes break out. Some may
descend into civil war. Rising inequality and widespread frustration could lead to
protests. And with virtually every country dealing with crises at home, efforts to help
the most vulnerable nations will be limited. In the shadow of the pandemic, the plague
of poverty will spread even further.

Ahem…about last year

Tom Standage: editor, The World in 2021
How did our forecasts for 2020 pan out?
For us and for other future-gazers, 2020 was a chastening experience
WELL, WE DIDN’T see that coming. Like almost everyone else, we were blindsided by
the outbreak of covid-19, the first cases of which were identified in December 2019. As
well as causing death and hardship around the world, and the delay or cancellation of
events large and small, one of the pandemic’s less important side-effects was to
invalidate most predictions for 2020, including our own.
We expected a global slowdown, but not the biggest economic contraction since the
Depression. We anticipated continuing Sino-American tensions over Chinese exports,
but not of the viral variety. We looked forward to action to reduce greenhouse-gas
emissions, but not an 8% annual reduction, the largest since the second world war, as
the pandemic throttled transport and industrial activity.
That said, we got a few things right about events that took place before covid-19 went
global. Donald Trump was, as expected, impeached but not convicted by the Senate. Tsai
Ing-wen won re-election as president of Taiwan. And Sir Keir Starmer, whom we tipped
as “a dark horse to watch” in the aftermath of Britain’s general election, became leader
of the country's opposition Labour Party after its defeat.
Some predictions relating to the online world also stood up well, as people and activities
retreated into the digital sphere. “Fortnite”, a popular video-game which we pointed to
as the nearest thing to the virtual worlds depicted in science fiction, played host to a
concert in April by Travis Scott, an American hip-hop artist, that some observers called
the live-music event of this unusual year. We also pointed out that “American politicians
are just starting to notice” the popularity of TikTok, a Chinese video app, among
American teenagers. TikTok ended up embroiled in a row between the superpowers, in
line with our prediction that more Chinese tech firms, beyond Huawei, would find
themselves caught up in such fights.
Mostly, however, we got things wrong. In a further blow to our forecasters’ pride, GPT-
2—a program developed by OpenAI, an artificial-intelligence startup—got a number of
things right. Our “interview” with it was not meant to be taken seriously. But its
predictions that “we are going to have a lot of turbulence in the world economy”, of
“major changes in China” and that Donald Trump “will be defeated in the general
election” turned out to be spot on.
Futurists love to talk about how machines will take everyone’s jobs. Despite decades of
such predictions, it has yet to happen. Perhaps the jobs they should be worried about
are their own. For us, and for other future-gazers, 2020 was a chastening experience. So
should you expect to see more humility among prognosticators in 2021? Don’t bet on it.

It’s time to pull together

Global co-operation is vital to address the challenges ahead, says António Guterres,
secretary-general of the United Nations
We also need a vaccine for our overheating planet
COVID-19 IS A test of international cooperation—and it is a test the world is failing.

With some notable exceptions, countries have focused on themselves and defined their
own strategies, sometimes in contradiction to what their neighbours were doing. We
have seen the results. As countries go in their own directions, the virus has gone in
every direction. Populism and nationalism, where they prevailed, did not contain the
virus and often made things manifestly worse.
Rich countries mobilised resources at unprecedented levels, but much-needed

resources are not reaching developing countries, which could face crippling debt and a
liquidity crisis. Now, as a new year looms, the challenges are clear: the pandemic
response will consume 2021 and the climate crisis will drive the decade. A sensible,
sustainable recovery must start now.
Many are pinning their hopes on a vaccine, but there is no panacea in a pandemic. The
priority is ensuring that any vaccine is a global public good—a people's vaccine
available and affordable for everyone, everywhere.
We also need a vaccine for our overheating planet. The five-year period since the
signing of the Paris agreement on climate change has been the hottest on record.
Greenhouse-gas concentrations in 2021 will reach heights unseen in millions of years.
Ahead of the next United Nations climate conference in November 2021, I have urged
world leaders to submit more ambitious national plans and long-term strategies aligned
with the Paris agreement and the goal of limiting the average temperature rise to 1.5ºC.
All countries, especially g20 members, should commit themselves to carbon neutrality
by 2050. All companies, banks and cities should establish their own plans and
benchmarks for a transition to net-zero emissions of greenhouse gases.
Technology and economics are on our side. A green economy fuels employment.
Renewable energy generates three times more jobs than investments in fossil fuels.
Bail-outs of industry, aviation and shipping should be conditional on aligning with the
goals of the Paris agreement. It is time to end fossil-fuel subsidies, put a price on carbon
and commit to no new coal.
Pandemic recovery is our chance to re-engineer economies and re-imagine our future.
Recovery must also advance gender equality; no other single step could do more to
fortify societies for the future. As vast sums are deployed to re-energise economies, how
these funds are spent is a critical matter for people and planet alike. Covid-19 response
and recovery also depend on silencing the guns and standing up for human rights. The
fury of the virus shows the folly of war. A surge of hatred and misinformation has
heightened the dangers. That is why I have called for a global ceasefire.
We must also avoid a new cold war, where the two largest economies split the world in
a Great Fracture—each side with its own trade and financial rules, internet and
artificial-intelligence capacities. Such divides risk turning into geostrategic and military
splits.
International co-operation will be crucial. The arrangements agreed on 75 years ago

prevented a much-feared third world war. But the world now needs a new generation of
global governance with the un at its centre. At a time of lawlessness in cyberspace,
erosion of arms-control agreements, rising inequalities, a pushback on human rights
and a global trading regime tilted against the poor, we are not keeping pace.
We do not need new bureaucracies. But we do need a networked multilateralism that

links global and regional institutions. We also need an inclusive multilateralism that
engages businesses, cities, universities and movements for gender equality, climate
action and racial justice.
My plan for a new social contract focuses on the national level, with investments in
social cohesion, a new generation of social protection and policies to promote resilience
in the face of economic and environmental shocks. Education and digital technology
must be two great enablers and equalisers in making this possible.
My proposed new global deal seeks to ensure that power, wealth and opportunities are
shared more broadly. Fair globalisation, free and fair trade, and prioritising the well-
being of future generations are all building blocks of this new model of global
governance.
We face two critical tests—covid-19 and climate change—compounded by a third:

fragility and fragmentation. Realising that solidarity is self-interest will help us end this
crisis and emerge stronger together.

Europe
• Weathering the storm
• After Angela
• Riding to the rescue
• Macron’s balancing act
• Follow the money in Italy
• More pain in Spain
• Hungary’s Viktator
• Rebel Swedes
• Balkan shrinkage
• A battle for Russia
• Team Europe, playing for the world

Europe
Weathering the storm

Duncan Robinson: Brussels bureau chief and Charlemagne columnist, The Economist BRUSSELS
A difficult year looms for the European Union
2021 in brief
It is 100 years since the Anglo-Irish treaty was signed, concluding the Irish War of
Independence and establishing an Irish Free State the following year
INTERNAL FRICTIONS, external worries and some long-anticipated farewells will be the
order of the day for the European Union in 2021. A colossal amount of effort went into
agreeing to issue €750bn ($888bn) in collective debt for the first time to allay a
financial crisis, as covid-19 racked the continent. In 2021 EU politicians will learn that
agreeing to borrow the money was the easy bit—agreeing how to spend it will be much
harder.
Sceptical countries, such as the Netherlands, will keep a close eye on what governments
are doing with the money; Spanish and Italian politicians will not appreciate other EU
countries butting into their financial affairs. They will have to get used to it, though.
Such debates are normally the purview of purely national politics. In 2021 they will
start to take place on a European level.
Mark Rutte, the Dutch prime minister, will have little incentive to go easy on his
southern neighbours. The Netherlands will go to the polls in the spring—the first of two
important European elections in 2021—and Mr Rutte will pick a fight with southern
governments so as not to lose voters to his Eurosceptic right. Yet the liberal-
conservative Dutch prime minister will have to walk a tightrope: Europhilic parties lurk
to his left. Mr Rutte has found a cunning way to balance these two camps. Expect him to
join liberal rivals in staunch criticism of Poland and Hungary for backsliding on
democratic norms. For the Dutch, a press-nobbling Hungarian is just as bad as a
profligate Italian.
Doubts over the rule of law will dog the union in 2021. This will get worse as countries
such as Bulgaria, Cyprus and Malta—where allegations of corruption, passport-hawking
and press suppression are rife—join Poland and Hungary on the EU’s naughty step. The
single market rests upon the assumption that each country has incorruptible politicians,
a free press and a fair legal system, which is not something that can be guaranteed.
Patience will be in short supply.
So will action. Viktor Orban, Hungary’s prime minister, has run rings round his liberal
opponents for more than a decade, protected in part by his membership of the
European People’s Party, the influential centre-right group of European politicians.
Invertebrate politicians from the centre-right have done little to restrain him. Mr
Orban’s run of victories will not be brought to a halt, even as his fellow leaders grumble.
Depressingly, many leaders ignore the topic because they believe the EU has bigger
problems. When it comes to foreign policy, they are right. A ring of instability surrounds
the bloc, from north Africa to Russia. Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan will
menace the union’s frontiers, while the EU flails in its response. Coming up with a
coherent foreign policy towards the EU’s neighbours will be a nightmare. Interests
diverge too sharply over countries such as Russia and Turkey, which manage to be
useful friends for some member states and existential threats to others.
The EU will be more united on matters farther afield. It is easier, but still not easy, to
devise a common policy towards China than it is on Russia. The arrival of Donald Trump
in the White House was a timely reminder that American and European interests do not
always align. European powers (egged on in particular by Emmanuel Macron, the
French president) have learnt, belatedly, that sometimes the union must go it alone.
European sovereignty—the ability not to be bossed around by a hegemon—will be the
watchword. President Joe Biden will do little to stop this inexorable shift. Ursula von der
Leyen, the newish president of the European Commission, has said she will run a
“geopolitical commission”. It is in the EU’s relations with other great powers that this
idea will be forged. The EU will remain wary of over-reliance on America. It is
determined not to be sucked into any great-power struggle between China and America.
Although the EU has long held its own as an economic power, using trade as a stick,
serious attention will turn to its (lack of) military capability in 2021. After all, Britain,
the main—but by no means the only—obstacle to such an approach, is gone.
In 2021 Brexit begins in earnest. After four years of argument, its effects will start to be
felt. Business people have long been aware that their lives will change, but British
citizens will receive a ruder awakening. Attention will be grabbed by seemingly trivial
consequences. Rows over such issues as pet passports—and the potential spectacle of
French border guards impounding British dogs—rather than more substantial
economic issues will play an improbably large role in the debate. Brexiteers have long
made the mistake of assuming that the EU is puny. Remainers, meanwhile, assume that
it is kind. Both are in for a shock.
Other departures will leave more of a hole. Angela Merkel will exit the European stage
when she leaves office after the German election in the autumn. Mrs Merkel has been
the Copernican constant of the EU system: politics moved around her. Although
Germany did not always get what it wanted, it was nearly always able to stop what it
opposed. Her departure will leave a vacuum. Who will fill it? For Europe, that will be the
most consequential outcome of 2021.

After Angela
Tom Nuttall: Berlin bureau chief, The Economist, BERLIN
Who will become Germany’s next chancellor?
Auf Wiedersehen
The prospect of life after Merkel will prove unsettling to many Germans
20201 in brief
A new law comes into force in Germany banning the sale from July of disposable plastic
products such as straws, cutlery and cotton buds that are polluting the world’s oceans
GERMANY’S LEADERS have a habit of longevity. Konrad Adenauer ran West Germany
for 14 years, Helmut Kohl for 16. Angela Merkel, who took office in November 2005 and
will stand down after the federal election in the autumn of 2021, could outlast them all
(overtaking Kohl if coalition talks run until mid-December). Over four terms as
chancellor, three of them running a “grand” coalition of centre-left and-right, Mrs
Merkel embodied the virtues of competent centrism and emerged as Europe’s crisis-
manager-in-chief. But those same qualities have had a tranquillising effect on German
politics. The prospect of life after Merkel will prove unsettling to many Germans.
That sense will only be heightened by the unpredictability of the election. Mrs Merkel’s
conservative Christian Democratic Union (along with its Bavarian sister party, the
Christian Social Union) is still likely to lead the next government, as it has for all but
seven of the 30 years since reunification. But the CDU/CSU’s “Merkel bonus”, boosted by
steady handling of the covid-19 crisis, will fade in 2021 as German voters adjust to the
party’s new leadership.
Mrs Merkel’s hopes of engineering her own succession collapsed when Annegret
Kramp-Karrenbauer, her protégée, flamed out in early 2020. Each of the three men now
vying to replace her as party leader will expect victory to translate into a CDU/CSU
nomination for the chancellorship (the two parties propose a joint candidate). Armin
Laschet, the premier of North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany’s largest state, offers
centrism in the Merkel mould. Friedrich Merz, a pro-business Atlanticist, promises a
flintier conservatism. Norbert Röttgen, the third contender, is a long shot. The dark
horse is the CSU’s charismatic leader (and Bavaria’s premier), Markus Söder, whose
high approval ratings might endear him to the CDU should its own new leader fail to
inspire voters.
After the election a fragmented parliament will complicate the formation of a coalition.
Eight unhappy years as understudy to Mrs Merkel mean the Social Democrats (SPD)
may relish a spell in opposition, despite the ambition of Olaf Scholz, Germany’s finance
minister and the SPD’s candidate for chancellor. But the Greens, already in governing
coalitions in more than half of Germany’s 16 states, are gearing up for national office.
Their co-leaders—Annalena Baerbock and Robert Habeck, who must decide which of
them will lead the election campaign—have shifted the party to the centre. A CDU/CSU-
Green (“black-green”) coalition, the likeliest outcome, might combine Green
compromises on defence and foreign policy with conservative assent to a big
programme of climate-friendly public investment. Less probable coalitions include a
Green- or SPD-led “progressive” government with the ex-communist Die Linke.
Mrs Merkel’s successor will be tempted to imitate her measured approach. But new
tests await. Perhaps the chancellor’s greatest fault was failing to prepare Germany for
long-term challenges, from insecurity in Europe’s neighbourhood and beyond to the
disruptions facing its crucial car industry. The crises she managed battered Europe but
rarely interrupted stability at home. Her successor may not be so lucky.

Riding to the rescue

Rachana Shanbhogue: finance editor, The Economist
The European Commission will turn on the spending taps—and become mightier
as a result
The view in Brussels
EUROPE’S ECONOMY is hobbling into 2021. The pandemic hit it hard and southern
economies have suffered the most. Output in Italy and Spain shrank by a tenth or more
in 2020. As furlough schemes are pared back, unemployment could well reach 20% in
Spain. By comparison Germany, with its downturn of 5% in 2020, will seem to have
escaped relatively unscathed.
This north-south divergence would once have spelt disaffection with the European
Union and caused strains on the currency union, especially as southern countries,
burdened by high levels of public debt, have much less capacity to stimulate their
economies than northern ones. But 2021 will bring a break with the past. For the first
time the EU itself will act to redress the balance, through its €750bn ($888bn) recovery
fund, which will be financed by debt issued by the European Commission and jointly
backed by its member states. It will begin doling out the dosh through loans and grants.
The cash should have a powerful effect. Countries that are in greatest need, such as Italy
and Spain, will receive the most. Beneficiaries will be encouraged to invest in clean
technologies and digital infrastructure, which should lift Europe’s otherwise lacklustre
growth potential. It will also help that monetary policy will stay stimulative. The
European Central Bank has pledged to keep interest rates low for as long as needed to
raise inflation towards its target of close to, but below, 2%. After completing a strategy
review, which concludes in mid-2021, it may even promise to tolerate a period of
above-target price rises, in the hope of encouraging an economic revival.
The recovery fund will mean a more muscular European Commission. For decades it
was charged with policing countries’ spending plans and enforcing the EU’s fiscal rules,
but had little power to punish misbehaviour. Now, with hundreds of billions of euros at
its disposal, it could have more bite. Its officials will review countries’ spending plans
before making payouts (though only national governments can veto handouts).
The commission will be a big influence in financial markets, too. Before the pandemic it
issued only a tiny amount of debt each year. By 2024 it will be one of Europe’s top
issuers. Investors, hungry for super-safe assets, will flock to its highly rated bonds. A
chunk of the recovery fund will be financed through green bonds, meaning that the
commission could account for as much as a quarter of eco-friendly issuance over the
next three years. That will contribute to the growing popularity of this newish asset
class.
Governments will also start discussing how all this debt should be paid off. The talks
will take years; but with some countries preferring that the EU levy its own taxes rather
than that their own contributions rise, an even mightier role for the commission could
be on the cards. And if the recovery fund opens the door to more debt issuance in the
future, as supporters hope, then the commission’s role as the EU’s quasi-fiscal authority
could be here to stay.
There will be niggles, of course. Some members—mainly the Dutch—will deem some
projects in some countries a waste of money. A truly speedy recovery would have
required the cash to be doled out much faster. Perhaps a fifth of the fund will make it
out of Brussels in 2021, and delays in national capitals mean that even less will actually
be spent in the course of the year. As economies stay fragile, countries will, undoubtedly,
need to spend more themselves. But for all that, without the recovery fund, Europe’s
economy—and the European project itself—would have been much, much feebler.

Macron’s balancing act

Sophie Pedder: Paris bureau chief, The Economist, PARIS
French politicians limber up for the presidential elections of 2022
Looking for a middle way
2021 in brief
The Spanish province of Galicia, covid-19 permitting, hopes to celebrate the jubilee of
Santiago (St James the Apostle) in 2021. The year-long festivity can only take place
when July 25th falls on a Sunday. More pilgrims following the way to Santiago de
Compostela, would bring joy both to religious authorities and the tourist industry
WHO MIGHT credibly challenge Emmanuel Macron for the presidency? By the end of
2021 the French will get a good sense of which rival opponents could do so at elections
the following spring. This will make for a politically divisive year, as hopefuls of all
stripes test their chances. Stand by for tribal feuds, culture wars, opportunistic
incursions—and a lot of Macron-bashing.
In 2017 Mr Macron crushed the mainstream parties of the left (the Socialists) and the
right (the Republicans) at national level. But each retains strong local roots. So both will
do well at elections scheduled in all of France’s 13 regions in March—covid-19
permitting. By contrast, Mr Macron’s party, La République En Marche! (LREM), is
unlikely to win a single one, exposing its structural fragility.
One race to watch is that in Hauts-de-France, in the north. The sitting regional president,
Xavier Bertrand, an ex-Republican, will use his re-election bid as a platform to run for
the French presidency in 2022. The space he seeks to occupy is narrow. The centrist Mr
Macron has lured ex-Republicans to his government to shore up centre-right support.
But the president will be closely watching Mr Bertrand, who has cultivated a
fashionably anti-Parisian image from his northern base.
The left’s presidential prospects depend on whether the squabbling Socialists and
Greens can agree on a single candidate. Apart, they will struggle. The Socialist Party is a
shadow of its former self. The Greens are more upbeat, having won several city town
halls in 2020. But their support is skewed towards metropolitan voters. And they will
find it hard to overcome internal quarrels, notably between Yannick Jadot, a national
leader, and Éric Piolle, the eco-radical mayor of Grenoble. Keep a close eye on Anne
Hidalgo, the bicycle-riding Socialist mayor of Paris, who was re-elected with Green
backing. If she decides to run, and can secure national Green support and break out of
her big-city image, Ms Hidalgo could become a serious presidential challenger.
Mr Macron’s potential rivals are desperate to avoid a repeat of the previous presidential
run-off, between him and the far-right Marine Le Pen. But she retains a core nationalist
base, which will be hard to dent. She will play on old fears (migrants) as well as new
ones (covid-19 conspiracies) to stir indignation and distrust of elites. She will promote
her protégés and squash any move to push her niece and rival, Marion Maréchal, back
into politics.
Denounced from all sides, Mr Macron will play a shifting game of political équilibrisme—
balancing left and right, Paris and the regions—to try to destabilise his opponents,
wherever they emerge. He will counter his market-liberal image with spending from a
€100bn ($120bn) stimulus plan, a third of it earmarked for green measures. He will
continue his crackdown on Islamist radicals, while drawing up measures to improve
early education (as well as secular teaching) in the country’s heavily Muslim banlieues.
Unloved in the polls, Mr Macron is often at his best when others write him off.
A turbulent year will be made all the more so when state support is wound down, firms
go under and jobs are lost. In ever-volatile France, social revolt cannot be ruled out. But
while Mr Macron grapples with discontent at home, he will increasingly assert himself
abroad, stepping into the gap that will be left by Angela Merkel’s departure as German
chancellor in the autumn. Plenty of friction looms as the French president seeks to
model Europe into a muscular player in the face of global big-power rivalries and
regional troublemakers, from Turkey and Russia to Libya. Not everybody will
appreciate Mr Macron’s diplomatic activism. But in a post-Brexit, post-Merkel Europe,
leadership will be his for the taking.
Follow the money in Italy

John Hooper: Italy and Vatican correspondent, The Economist, ROME
Lots of liquidity, but any chance of structural reform?
Same old cycle?
The allocation depends on the size of the economic hit from covid-19
THE COMING year will be when Italy hits the jackpot. By summer the first
tranche is due of the cash the European Commission is raising to help EU
member states recover from the effects of covid-19. Italy will get a
disproportionately large share: according to the government, €209bn
($250bn) in grants and loans, out of a total of €750bn.
Such a massive injection of liquidity would be unprecedented: not even the Marshall
Plan, which transformed Italy’s fortunes after the second world war, delivered as much
(taking into account the size of the economy and after factoring in inflation). Whether
the EU’s recovery funds will have the same impact will depend on several factors.
The first is whether the government’s estimate proves correct. The eventual allocation
will depend partly on the size of the hit each country’s economy took from covid-19
restrictions. Halfway through 2020, Italy’s GDP was 17.3% below its level of a year
earlier. That was worse than the EU average. But Italy still fared better than either Spain
or France.
The second question is whether the authorities can devise the kinds of projects the
European Commission can approve: the greener and more digital the better. And a third
is whether the money that is allocated will all reach its intended destination. One of the
aims will be to channel funding to the mezzogiorno, as the country’s south is known, in
an effort to close the wealth gap with the richer north. Past efforts to achieve that have
failed, in part because too much of the cash has ended up in the hands of Italy’s
organised criminals, who are ominously well embedded in the legal economy.
But perhaps the most important question of all, when it comes to Italy’s future
productivity, competitiveness and overall prosperity, is whether those in charge are
ready to accompany the aid with the kind of painful structural reforms that the country
has successfully fended off for more than two decades. That, in turn, will depend on
politics.
The coalition of the prime minister, Giuseppe Conte, which includes the centre-left
Democratic Party (PD) and the anti-establishment Five Star Movement (M5S), looks
relatively durable, despite a fragile majority in the Senate, parliament’s upper house.
But the M5S in particular has a weakness for nationalisation and the PD has historical
and emotional ties to a labour movement that has successfully blocked attempts in the
past to make Italy a more modern and efficient country. Do not hold your breath.

More pain in Spain

Michael Reid: Bello columnist; senior editor, Latin America and Spain, The Economist, MADRID
A weak government looks to Europe for help
HOW FAR behind the rest of Europe will Spain’s economic recovery lag? And will the
resentment of the many losers from the covid-19 crisis translate into destabilising
support for extremist forces? These are the big questions facing the country in 2021.
A long and severe lockdown, the wiping-out of the tourist season, disruption caused by
renewed outbreaks of covid-19 and less fiscal firepower than some of its neighbours all
conspired to plunge the country into a deep recession. The economy shrank by around
12% in 2020 with the loss of 1m jobs. Recovery has begun but it is complicated by a
strong resurgence of the virus and renewed restrictions on leisure activities.
The recovery is also lopsided. Spain is unusually dependent on tourism (12.3% of GDP
in 2019 ) and other face-to-face businesses. Nobody wants to go back to a generalised
lockdown, but some regional governments will struggle to organise effective tracking,
tracing and isolation of those infected with the virus.
In some ways life will become easier for the minority left-wing coalition government of
Pedro Sánchez, the Socialist prime minister. A decision by Ciudadanos, a centre-right
party, to rally round seems likely to help him pass a budget. He will hope to avoid
having to reduce emergency aid to workers and businesses too soon. If things go well,
the economy could grow by 7% or so in 2021. The government places high hopes in the
€140bn ($165bn) it expects over time to get from the European recovery fund. Most of
this will go on projects such as renewable energy, digitisation or reforms of training
schemes that will yield benefits only in the medium term.
So far Spaniards have been admirably stoical. But as they endure the second economic
shock in a decade their patience may wear thin. The previous crisis gave birth to
Podemos, a far-left party that is now the junior partner in the government. The current
one may boost Vox, a hard-right party which became the third-biggest force in
parliament in elections in 2019. Despite falling support for independence in Catalonia,
the separatist parties there will hope to benefit from the apathy of their opponents in a
regional election due on February 14th.
Mr Sánchez will muddle through. If the economy recovers strongly and the pandemic
recedes he could call a snap election before the inevitable fiscal adjustment of 2022. His
Socialists would hope to make gains at the expense mainly of Podemos. However, the
likelihood is that Spain faces more years of weak government.

Hungary’s Viktator
Vendeline von Bredow: European business and finance correspondent, The Economist, BERLIN
Viktor Orban will hold on to the extraordinary powers he seized to fight the
coronavirus
Hungary (and Orban) first
2021 in brief
Portugal holds presidential elections in January. The incumbent, Marcelo Rebelo de
Sousa, a former leader of the centre-right opposition, is the strong favourite to win.
Portugal’s president is more than just a figurehead, having the power to dissolve
parliament
THE START of 2021 will be difficult for Hungary. After a relatively mild first
wave of the covid-19 pandemic in spring 2020, the country’s second wave,
which started in the late summer, brought a much higher rate of infections as
well as more fatalities. The economy will be in the doldrums as the new year
dawns. And yet the prime minister, Viktor Orban, will be more firmly in the
saddle than at any time since he returned to power in 2010.
Frightened by the spectre of a pandemic in a country with a decrepit health-care system,
Mr Orban took near-dictatorial powers through a law enacted at the end of March 2020.
The law allowed him to rule by decree—bypassing parliament—until the coronavirus
crisis is over.
Human-rights groups, European Union lawmakers and the international press were
outraged. The European Commission threatened budgetary sanctions. The government
had the gall to demand that American news outlets apologise for “baseless” critical
reports about Mr Orban’s emergency powers—though in June it asked parliament to
revoke them.
In reality, Mr Orban merely pretended to give them up. Even as parliament repealed the
emergency-power law, it passed another one that gave the prime minister the same
sway, this time with even fewer restrictions.
The new powers are buried in a 250-page document, says Kim Lane Scheppele, an
expert on constitutional law at Princeton University. Mr Orban created a new “state of
medical emergency” that can be declared by the government without parliament’s
consent—and, once such a state has been declared, parliament has no ability to suspend
it. The government immediately used this new power to keep military commanders in
charge of hospitals. It also extended the remit of an emergency body, created to contain
the virus, whose members are not part of the cabinet.
The state of medical emergency is in theory limited to six months. In practice the
government can extend the emergency as often as it pleases—and it is likely to do so
twice in 2021. It has done the same with the “state of migration emergency”, a law
passed in 2015 that was then extended every six months.
Mr Orban is in for the long haul, predicts Ms Lane Scheppele. Only an uprising, it seems,
could remove him from power—but Hungarians are frightened of what might replace
the Orban autocracy. He will face parliamentary elections in the first half of 2022, after
what is likely to be a year of economic and health-related hardship. Yet for many the
result is hardly in doubt. The Viktator will almost certainly keep his two-thirds super-
majority in parliament.

Rebel Swedes
Matt Steinglass: Europe correspondent, The Economist
The split over covid-19 will continue
THE NORDIC countries share similar political models and cultural norms. So when
covid-19 arrived in March 2020, many expected Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden
to adopt similar policies. Instead Sweden took a loose approach, keeping restaurants
and primary schools open and relying on citizens to observe social-distancing
recommendations themselves. The others enforced strict lockdowns and relaxed them
only as the epidemic receded.
That turned the Nordics into a natural experiment, testing which approach best
preserves public health while minimising economic and social damage. Depending on
the answer, you would expect that in 2021 either the Swedes would shift to their
neighbours’ approach or vice versa. Which might it be?
At first the answer seemed clear. In spring 2020 Sweden’s infection rates rose far above
its neighbours’. By mid-June its daily case rate, adjusted for population size, was ten or
more times as high as those in Denmark, Finland and Norway. By the end of July Sweden
had registered 5,729 deaths officially ascribed to covid-19. Denmark, with about half
Sweden’s population, had recorded just 615. Sweden was seen as a covid-19 super-
spreader. In June, when the others reopened their borders to European travellers, they
kept them largely closed to Swedes.
Yet over the summer Sweden’s infection rate fell along with those in the rest of Europe.
When the pandemic’s second wave arrived in late August, it was Denmark that had the
worst outbreak in the Nordic region. About half of Sweden’s covid-19 deaths had been
in care homes, a result mainly of negligence and bad luck rather than policy. Swedes
were moving around more than citizens of other Nordic states, but otherwise their
social-distancing practices were not too different. Had they been right all along?
Probably not. For the economy, eschewing a lockdown merely postponed the damage.
Sweden’s GDP and employment rate stayed buoyant in March but dropped when
infections rose, even as the other Nordics rebounded. Containing the virus allowed the
others to reopen their schools quickly, too. Tests in August showed that even in hard-hit
Stockholm, less than a quarter of residents had antibodies to covid-19, far from the
rates needed for herd immunity.
In 2021 Sweden’s neighbours will not imitate its policies. The Nordics trust each other
less than before. “It was worrying that we had to take different pathways,” says Mika
Salminen of Finland’s Institute for Health and Welfare, which advises the government
on covid-19 policies. If infection rates diverge again, there will be new travel
restrictions. Another legacy is a hit to Sweden’s strict, hygienic image. “It’s very strange
that Sweden is the big risk-taker among the Nordics—they’ve always been the safe
player,” says Asne Seierstadt, a Norwegian journalist.
Yet the Swedes seem happy with their rebel status. In 2021 they will stick with their
lenient measures, including shorter quarantines (of just seven days). The strategy
retains overwhelming approval at home, and Anders Tegnell, the country’s infection-
control chief, has become a national icon. The Nordic split shows that in public health,
communication and trust are as important as results.

Balkan shrinkage
Tim Judah: Balkans correspondent, The Economist
Emigration and low birth rates are taking their toll
MOST EUROPEAN countries will carry out a census in 2021, and for many of them the
results will be easy to predict. It is a different matter in the Balkans.
Ever since the fall of communism and the end of the bloody Yugoslav wars that followed,
people in the Balkan region have been having fewer children and many people have
been emigrating. This exodus has been aided by labour-hungry parts of Europe like
Germany making it easier for citizens of non-EU countries to get work permits. The fact
that no one knows how many have gone and how many remain is causing problems for
the Balkan countries’ planners.
North Macedonia has not had a census since 2002. Since then its statistical office has
dutifully been making projections based on the country that it used to be. The
statisticians estimate that there are 2.08m people in North Macedonia—but the real
figure could be as low as 1.5m. In some countries, such as Bulgaria, the figures are more
up to date, but whether the numbers are reliable or not, the trends are the same. The
combination of emigration and low birth rates means that these societies are ageing and,
with no inward migration, their populations are shrinking.
In 1989 there were 8.9m Bulgarians; now there are only 6.9m. Three decades ago Serbia
(not including Kosovo) had 7.8m people; today it might have 6.9m. There used to be
23.2m people in Romania, but in 2020 they were estimated to number 19.4m. Moldova,
which will not hold a census until 2023, may have lost a third of its population,
currently about 2.7m, since the end of communist rule.
As for births, Bosnian women have a fertility rate of 1.26, Albanian women of 1.37—
some of the lowest in the world, and far below the replacement level of 2.1. Other
countries, such as Bulgaria, where the rate is 1.56, are closer to the EU average of 1.55,
though without immigration that is not enough to stop the population shrinking.
Economic worries as a result of the coronavirus pandemic mean that women are likely
to have even less babies now than ever before.
The censuses in 2021 should provide governments with the reliable data they need to
plan for everything from kindergartens to pensions, as the better-educated emigrate
and more of the poorly educated and the elderly are left behind. But whatever the
precise numbers, the outlook is not bright. Projections by statisticians at both the UN
and the EU suggest that by 2050 Bulgaria will have lost 39% of its population since
1989, while Bosnia will have lost 37%, Romania 31%, Serbia and Croatia 24% and
Albania 25%.
Such large changes will bring big social and economic consequences. To take one early
example, unemployment used to be a problem across the region. Labour shortages are
now a bigger worry.

A battle for Russia

Arkady Ostrovsky: Russia editor, The Economist
Vladimir Putin v Alexei Navalny
Novichok? My hands are clean
2021 in brief
Italy marks the 700th anniversary of the death of Dante Alighieri, a medieval poet and
philosopher who wrote “The Divine Comedy”, and is known as the father of the Italian
language. Born in Florence in 1265, Dante died in exile in Ravenna in 1321
THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY of the collapse of the Soviet Union will be a poignant
backdrop for Russian politics in 2021. In August 1991 Communist Party hardliners led a
coup against Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet reformer. They brought tanks onto the
streets in an effort to reverse the current of history that had moved against them, and in
doing so accelerated the disintegration of the empire. Muscovites came out to defend
their national parliament under the tricolour flag of Russia. Four months later the Soviet
Union was dissolved.
Although most former Soviet republics have moved on, Russia itself has reverted to its
imperial past. Vladimir Putin, who began his presidency in 2000 with the restoration of
the Soviet anthem, has gradually reinstated many of the old Soviet practices, including
censorship, repression, confrontation with the West and aggression towards neighbours.
His willingness to throw away the post-cold-war rulebook and ability to use force have
given him a tactical advantage over the West.
But 30 years after the Soviet collapse, another fast and powerful historical current is
moving against the remnants of the Soviet order. This current will intensify in 2021,
exposing the costs and failures of Mr Putin’s policy. Having bet his legitimacy on the
idea of imperial resurgence, he has alienated most of the former Soviet republics, which
now see Russia as a threat rather than a magnet. His annexation of Crimea and the war
in Donbas have cost Russia its relationship with Ukraine. And the six-week war between
Armenia and Azerbaijan, which ended in a Russian-brokered peace deal on November
10th, showed the growing role of Turkey in the region.
Perhaps nowhere is the Soviet legacy being challenged as visibly as on the streets of
Belarus, one of the most authoritarian and seemingly docile parts of the former Soviet
empire, now being swept by a national uprising. For the past 26 years it has been ruled
by Alexander Lukashenko, a populist former collective-farm boss, who used the Soviet
legacy as a foundation of his regime. He got rid of the red-and-white flag first introduced
in 1918 during a short-lived period of Belarusian independence and then re-adopted in
1991, swapping it for a modified version of the flag of Soviet Belarus. With the help of
Russian subsidies he kept factories in state hands, repressed his people and rigged
elections in the name of stability.
In August 2020, hundreds of thousands of Belarusians took to the streets to protest

against his stealing yet another election. He greeted them with violence, turning a
protest into a national uprising. Demonstrators wrapped themselves in the national red-
and-white flag and sang Belarusian songs, which Mr Lukashenko tried to drown out
with Soviet music.
The national awakening was rightly perceived as a threat to Mr Putin’s regime, too—not
only because it exposed the brittleness of dictatorship, but because it challenged its
shared ideological foundation. It also struck a chord with protesters in Khabarovsk, in
the Russian far east, who took to the streets at almost the same time, after the
government in Moscow arrested their popular governor. And whereas the Kremlin
backed Mr Lukashenko, its opponents in Russia cheered Belarusian protesters and
displayed their flag on the streets and on the internet.
Like Mr Lukashenko, Mr Putin has built his ideology almost entirely around Soviet dates
and symbols. He has turned the military parade marking the Soviet victory in the second
world war into his main official pageant. In 2020 it preceded a pseudo-referendum on
constitutional changes that reset Mr Putin’s presidential term limit to zero, enabling him
in theory to stay in power until 2036. Yet his approval ratings and his legitimacy are
steadily declining, along with Russians’ disposable incomes. A stagnating economy will
not reverse this trend.
The poisoning of Alexei Navalny, Russia’s main opposition leader, with Novichok, a
military-grade nerve agent, seems like a sign of desperation. Mr Navalny’s survival and
his assertion that Mr Putin was behind the attack have further undermined the
president’s standing.
Although Mr Putin controls the courts, the security services and electoral committees,
Russia’s parliamentary elections in 2021 are likely to turn into a battlefield. Mr
Navalny’s tactic of consolidating protest votes against the United Russia party, the
vehicle through which Mr Putin exercises his power, could shatter the Kremlin’s
appearance of omnipotence. Even more important, Mr Navalny’s vision of Russia as a
modern nation state could prove to be more appealing than Mr Putin’s Soviet-style
imperial nationalism. A serious fight for the parliament that 30 years ago declared
Russia’s independence from the Soviet Union could make this an unexpectedly
significant anniversary year.

Team Europe, playing for the world

From defeating the virus to combating climate change, solving global problems requires
teamwork, argues Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission
The European Union has a unique asset—our convening power
SOME COUNTRIES see the quest for a vaccine as a race among global powers,
reminiscent of the space race of the 1960s. This is an illusion. The only race is against
the virus and against time. We, as human beings, are fighting this together. Our best
strategy is co-operation, and this has been the European Union’s approach from the
very outset of the coronavirus crisis.
It usually takes up to ten years to develop, test and distribute a new vaccine. But the
world cannot afford ten years of this pandemic—a decade of mourning, confinement
and disruption. Every month we gain will save thousands of lives and millions of jobs.
Dozens of research teams are now racing to develop vaccines. We need as many as
possible to reach the finish line.
This is all about geopolitical co-operation, not competition. It will not matter whether
the first vaccine is Chinese, American or European. What truly matters is that the world
gets a safe vaccine with the shortest delay, and that the most vulnerable are immunised
first, wherever they are. Doctors, nurses, elderly people and essential workers should
take precedence, whatever their nationality. This is the most efficient way to stem the
pandemic and save lives. Vaccine nationalism—a “my country first” approach to
immunisation—can only slow down the global fight against the virus.
Since the early days of the crisis the European Commission has worked to give health
professionals a better chance to succeed, in our collective interest. When the initial
outbreak morphed into a global pandemic, we swiftly joined forces with the World
Health Organisation and other global-health actors, such as Gavi and CEPI, as well as
businesses and civil-society groups. Together we launched an initiative to speed up the
fight against the disease: the Access to Covid-19 Tools Accelerator.
Its vaccines pillar, called COVAX, brought together 170 countries with NGOs, business
leaders and philanthropists, to create the largest portfolio of vaccine candidates in the
world. The aim is to make sure that as many vaccines as possible reach the trial phase
and, eventually, the market. Instead of competing against other countries, Europe is
joining forces with them, so that we all increase our chances of success.
We do not do this out of altruism. We simply realise that our European interest
coincides with a shared global interest. While engaging in talks with six pharmaceutical
groups to purchase potential vaccines for European citizens, we are also working to
reserve and finance doses for low-income countries through COVAX. For instance, when
we signed advance-purchase agreements with Sanofi and GSK, we agreed they would
reserve a significant portion of their vaccine supply for COVAX.
This is how I see the European Union’s mission in today’s world. We have a unique
asset—our convening power. As a union of 27 sovereign countries, we have an
unparalleled diplomatic network. We are a trusted interlocutor for international
organisations and NGOs. We can reach out to countries that will not even talk to each
other, and rally them around a common cause. We are team-builders by vocation, and in
the quest for a vaccine we have put our convening power at the service of all nations.
I want Europe to be a global leader—and true leaders are not those who leave everyone
else behind. Leadership is about building large and strong coalitions towards a common
goal. Take climate action. We have become a trailblazer in the transition towards a
cleaner and more circular economy, and the European Green Deal will accelerate this
transition. We have set the highest goals for ourselves: the European Union will cut its
carbon emissions by at least 55% compared with 1990 levels by 2030, and we will be
climate-neutral by 2050.
Yet the European Union accounts for less than 10% of global emissions. We cannot stop
global warming alone. The good news is we are not alone. There is a global movement
for climate action, one that can count on powerful nations but also on countless cities,
local authorities and individuals. Europe wants to contribute to the movement and
make it grow. We will form ambitious coalitions in the fight against climate change,
deforestation and chemical pollution. On emissions trading, we are ready to work with
all partners who also believe that carbon must have a price.
Our offer to the world is clear. Let us join forces for our common good. There is no time
to lose. In 2021 will humanity finally play as a team? I do not know—but I do know
where Europe will stand.

Britain
• Disruption, deficit and dole
• Deconstruction
• State of the union
• In need of resuscitation
• Echoes of 1721
• Decline and fall
• Global lessons from the pandemic

Britain
Disruption, deficit and dole

Duncan Weldon: Britain economics correspondent, The Economist
The lasting impact of covid-19 will dominate the economic outlook
2021 in brief
A retired Boeing 747 jumbo jet starts a new life at Cotswold Airport in Kemble, England,
after the pandemic brought its 26-year flying career to an early end. It can be hired as a
cinema and conference venue, with its inflight entertainment system available for
business presentations. Meanwhile another retired 747, at Dunsfold aerodrome, takes
on a new role as a film set
FOR THE British economy, 2021 will be a strange year. The annual rate of GDP growth
will be the fastest in decades. Yet the country will be gripped by a sense of crisis, amid
high unemployment and a huge deficit.
The year will open with a trade shock as Boris Johnson’s government at last fulfils its
pledge to “get Brexit done”: Britain’s transition period in the European single market
and customs union comes to an end on December 31st 2020. The difference between
the once-feared no-deal outcome and the kind of thin trade arrangements that the
government has sought to negotiate is relatively minor in the longer run. And in the
short term both will lead to disruption. Carmakers and the aerospace industry, whose
just-in-time processes were built on the assumption of easy cross-border movement in
Europe, will for a while struggle to adapt. Retailers will face shortages of some goods as
customs-clearance procedures take time to smooth out.
But whereas Brexit dominated British political and economic discourse from 2016 until
2020, it will be the recovery from the recession caused by covid-19 that takes centre
stage in 2021. Britain experienced its deepest recession in at least a century in the first
half of 2020. Although the initial bounceback was relatively rapid, the recovery slowed
towards the end of the year. The government’s furlough scheme, which ran from April
to October, helped keep unemployment down through the early stages of the pandemic.
But as job losses mount and hiring remains low, unemployment will head to its highest
level since the early 1990s.
With labour-intensive industries such as (physical) retail and hospitality both suffering
from social-distancing regulations and the rise of working from home, joblessness will
remain stubbornly high throughout 2021. The “kick-start” scheme introduced in the
autumn of 2020 to help young people into work will be followed by more job-creation
schemes in 2021 as the Treasury fights to bring unemployment down.
A persistently high government deficit will lead to much angst, but little action to sort it
out. As long as borrowing costs remain low the chancellor of the exchequer, Rishi Sunak,
will be content to talk about the need for tough action later in the parliament. No
serious discretionary fiscal tightening will take place before 2022 at the earliest. Instead
both the spring and autumn budgets in 2021 will be preceded by the usual briefing on
the need for tax hikes on pensions, the self-employed and high-earners, before the
chancellor rules them out for the near term. But one focus for the government will be
infrastructure spending, with the chancellor and prime minister both keen to get their
“levelling-up” agenda, to help Britain’s disadvantaged regions, back on track.
Another big issue for policymakers in the second half of the year will be a rising tide of
defaults on government-backed “bounce-back” loans. This scheme, under which the
Treasury offered a 100% guarantee on loans of up to £50,000 ($65,000), was
introduced in May 2020 to support small and medium-sized firms. With a government
guarantee, banks felt less need for detailed due diligence, and stepped up their lending.
Some £38bn was loaned out in the scheme’s first five months, to 1.6m businesses. The
first interest and capital payments will be due in May 2021—and bankers fear that as
much as 40% of the loans will go bad quickly. The government will either have to
pursue hundreds of thousands of small businesses through the insolvency courts, or
write off billions of pounds by converting the loans into grants.
Despite pandemic- and Brexit-related supply disruptions, inflation will stay low. The
weak jobs market will hold back wage growth, and demand will remain soggy. The Bank
of England will leave interest rates at 0.1%—and is more likely to expand its
programme of quantitative easing than move to negative interest rates in the face of any
new economic shock.
By the end of 2021 the economy will have made up the ground lost in the first half of
2020. But it will have emerged from the hole with higher unemployment, a much larger
stock of government debt and scars that may take years to heal.

Deconstruction
Adrian Wooldridge: political editor and Bagehot columnist, The Economist
Boris Johnson wants to reform the state
The civil service relies too much on the old model of generalists
2021 in brief
“The Archers”, an everyday story of country folk, and the world’s longest-running
drama, celebrates 70 years on air. It began broadcasting on BBC radio on January 1st
1951 after a successful five-episode pilot the previous summer
THE INTERIOR designers have been hard at work at Number 70 Whitehall, in the heart
of the British government. Rooms have been fitted out with “co-working” desks and flat
screens displaying “real-time performance data”. The Cabinet Office civil servants who
used to occupy the building have been kicked out and replaced by Boris Johnson’s
closest aides, including Dominic Cummings, his right-hand man, who calls it a “NASA-
style mission-control centre”.
The sound of sawing and hammering will be heard across government in the year ahead.
Departments will be redesigned. Civil servants will be told to sharpen up. “Culture
change” will be enforced from on high.
And rightly so. The government’s poor handling of the coronavirus pandemic has
demonstrated that the idea that Britain possesses a “Rolls-Royce civil service” is a myth.
The pandemic came hot on the heels of a four-year struggle over Brexit that showed
that, as well as being out of date, the governing class and its institutions are out of touch
with ordinary people.
The reforms will try to reconcile two aims: modernising government while reconnecting
it with the broader life of the nation. The civil service relies too much on the old model
of generalists: people who are recruited straight out of university and then moved from
one department to another. The government will try to recruit more specialists
(particularly people trained in maths and science) and encourage them to work in
“high-performance teams”. The civil service is still rooted, both institutionally and
culturally, in the prosperous south-east. The government will try to move departments
out of London.
It has two important things on its side: a widespread sense that the British state needs
fixing and a growing consensus on what needs to be done to fix it. But it will
nevertheless struggle with several problems of its own making. Mr Johnson is a big-
picture man who can succeed only if he’s surrounded by competent people who can
take care of detail and implementation. But (largely thanks to Brexit) he has stuffed his
cabinet with mediocrities who, rather than making up for their boss’s defects, simply
add defects of their own.
Mr Johnson’s chief lieutenants when it comes to government reform—Michael Gove,

chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and the ubiquitous Mr Cummings—are certainly
not mediocrities. But they nevertheless thrive on conflict and chaos; Mr Cummings has
promised that a “hard rain” is going to fall on the civil service. They are also both natural
centralisers who talk about ceding power to the provinces while hoarding it themselves.
Government reform requires the “strong and slow boring of hard boards”, to borrow a
phrase from Max Weber. The government knows broadly what needs to be done to fix
the state. Whether its politicians are capable of carrying out this “slow boring” will be
one of the most interesting questions of 2021.

State of the union

Matthew Holehouse: British politics correspondent, The Economist
The cracks in the United Kingdom will widen
Message to London
2021 in brief
A new right-leaning, free-to-air television news channel, GB News, starts broadcasting.
Andrew Neil, a leading political journalist, has left the BBC to help set it up, saying it
aims to serve “the vast number of British people who feel underserved and unheard by
their media”
THE UNION of the United Kingdom—England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland—is
unwell. It will survive 2021, and the years immediately after. Its condition is chronic,
rather than acute. But relations between London and the other national capitals will
worsen. For 20 years the tension between unionism and separatism has been contained
by the devolution settlement, under which parliaments in Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast
make laws. That system will come under assault from all sides.
The deepest reflection over whether the union can hold together will come in Northern
Ireland. The centenary of its founding and the partition of Ireland will be
commemorated in 2021. It will be a muted affair. The British government has proposed
a programme to promote culture, sport and business. Michelle O’Neill, the deputy first
minister from Sinn Fein, a nationalist party that wants Ireland reunified, says there is
“nothing to celebrate”. For the unionist side, celebrations may also be in short supply.
On January 1st the United Kingdom’s Brexit divorce of October 2019 will come into
effect. Despite Boris Johnson’s promise to maintain unfettered trade, Northern Ireland
will continue to follow EU food and product regulations, and customs checks will be
carried out as goods cross the Irish Sea. (British and EU teams spent 2020 haggling over
whose officials will do the checking, what border posts will be needed and how taxes
would be levied.) Over time, as Britain diverges from the rest of Europe, the rules
governing the province’s economy will look less like London’s and more like Dublin’s.
Unionists fear that economic separation from the rest of Britain will, in time, lead to
political separation, too.
The risk to the union will be less acute, but much noisier, in Scotland. In May 2021,
elections to the Scottish Parliament will take place. The coronavirus pandemic enhanced
the Scottish government’s image as a state-in-waiting. Brexit has fuelled the idea that
Scotland and England are on divergent paths.
Barring a major slip in the polls, the Scottish National Party will increase its number of
seats in the parliament, which Nicola Sturgeon, the Scottish first minister, will say is a
mandate to hold a new referendum on independence from the United Kingdom. Boris
Johnson will refuse to permit it. He will point to his own mandate, having promised to
oppose such a vote in the general election of 2019; and besides, he has little to gain and
everything to lose from a vote that would break up the country. Ms Sturgeon will ignore
calls from her supporters to hold a referendum without approval from London, saying it
must be legally watertight to secure independence. A long and ugly stalemate will ensue.
The ground will shift in the Welsh Parliament elections in May, too. The Labour Party,
which was responsible for devolution, has been hegemonic in Wales for decades. It will
lose seats to the Conservatives, who want a closer relationship with London, and Plaid
Cymru, which favours independence. Radical ideas will also show their face: support for
independence will remain far lower than in Scotland, but it may inch up. So, too, may
support for the idea circulating among the fringe right of scrapping the devolved
parliament altogether.
Members of Mr Johnson’s circle think the strategy of the past 20 years—staving off
separatism with ever-growing powers for the devolved administrations—has failed. He
will seek to reassert the role of Whitehall in governing them. Whereas EU funds for
roads and bridges were handed to the devolved administrations to spend, Mr Johnson’s
government will take command of the cash, and advertise it noisily.
He will seek to dispel the idea that he is a guest when visiting Scotland. Brexit will also
mean that London will set the rules, once made in Brussels, that apply in Scotland and
Wales on pesticides, competition and much else. That will provoke accusations of a
power-grab by an over-mighty centre. The prime minister’s team are veterans from the
referendum of 2016 to take Britain out of the EU. The coming year will test whether Mr
Johnson is as good at containing insurgencies against unpopular unions as he is at
leading them.
In need of resuscitation
Hamish Birrell: public policy correspondent, The Economist
Standards will slip in the National Health Service
A national treasure
BRITISH PEOPLE have always been fond of the National Health Service (NHS)—but
rarely have they gone to such lengths to demonstrate it. During the first wave of the
pandemic, banners supporting the NHS were draped across streets and windows.
Charities associated with the health service were showered with cash. Every Thursday
evening people stood on their doorsteps to applaud health workers.
The NHS was one of the few parts of the British state to emerge from the first wave of
the pandemic with its reputation intact, having managed to avoid a Lombardy-style
inundation. In 2021 it will face a different sort of challenge: providing routine health
care while staying ready to meet additional spikes in covid-19 hospitalisations. It will be
unable to maintain the balancing act without letting standards slip.
Even before the pandemic, the NHS was in a bad way. Although protected from the
worst of austerity, for most of the past decade it received funding increases below the
level economists think necessary to maintain existing standards. Just before the crisis,
only 85% of emergency-department visitors were seen within four hours, against a
target of 95%.
The reality of the NHS is very different from popular perception. It is good at keeping
costs down; England spends less than the rich-world average on health care. But it also
produces middling to poor health outcomes on many measures, including deaths within
a month of a heart attack, or within five years of being diagnosed with various cancers.
This historical stinginess will cause problems in 2021. The government has given the
NHS an injection of cash to do things like paying for the use of beds in private hospitals.
But as an analysis by the Nuffield Trust, a health think-tank, notes, England has less
capacity than most other rich countries. Many hospitals are decrepit, lacking single-
occupancy rooms and the sort of open common areas helpful when keeping patients
apart.
As one of the world’s biggest bureaucracies, the NHS is normally cumbersome. Yet it
displayed a rare agility when covid-19 struck, transforming overnight to a single-
minded focus on the pandemic. Now the task is to try to capture efficiencies revealed by
this transformation. For years, ministers tried to get doctors to embrace digital
technology. The need to minimise the risk of infection means that 44% of family-doctor
consultations now happen by phone or online. Matt Hancock, the health secretary, has
said there will be no going back.
Yet these changes can only make so much difference. The need for personal protective
equipment and clean rooms reduces the number of patients who can be seen in a day.
Lots of treatment was paused during the worst of the pandemic. Even in the summer,
during a lull in covid-19 cases, the number of elective in-patient treatments was still
below half the pre-pandemic level, and the number of diagnostic tests were at three-
quarters of the normal level.
The result will be long queues for treatment. By August 111,026 people had been on
waiting lists for longer than a year, compared with 1,643 in January 2020. Some 2m had
been waiting longer than 18 weeks. At first, there was little outcry, with people seeing
queues as a cost of covid-19. But patience has its limits. Politicians will funnel extra cash
to the NHS, but will also seek greater control over what it does, to be quicker to respond
to disquiet. Above all, their aim will be to avoid the charge of betraying Britain’s beloved
health service.

Echoes of 1721
Emma Duncan: Britain editor, The Economist
Omens from the aftermath of an earlier disaster
Picking up the pieces after a disaster can make your career
IT WAS THE year of clearing up, after the bursting of the South Sea Bubble in 1720.
Thousands had been ruined by speculation in the shares of a company granted a
monopoly in trading slaves to the South Seas. A committee of inquiry—of the sort that
will look into Britain’s mismanagement of covid-19—reported on the disaster in 1721
and found that big cheeses in government, who had taken free shares from the South
Sea Company and helped inflate its share price, were culpable. Many were sacked. The
chancellor of the exchequer was imprisoned.
Sir Robert Walpole, who had kept his nose clean, sorted out the mess. He stripped the
company’s beneficiaries of most of their wealth and handed over the money to the
victims, though he protected the king and his mistresses. He thus assuaged public fury,
stayed on the right side of the monarch and made his reputation, becoming the first
British prime minister. (The title was not used at the time, but was instead an insult
used to describe a courtier who had accrued too much influence at court.) Walpole held
the position for two decades—still a record. The lesson? Picking up the pieces after a
disaster can make your career (as Rishi Sunak, Britain’s ambitious chancellor, is surely
aware).
That is not the only tale from three centuries ago that may prove relevant in 2021. Back
then the wife of Britain’s ambassador to Turkey, Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, noticed
that there was very little smallpox in the country. In each village, she wrote, an old
woman “comes with a nut-shell full of the matter of the best sort of small-pox, and asks
what vein you please to have opened. She immediately rips open that you offer her, with
a large needle…and puts into the vein as much matter as can lie upon the head of her
needle.”
Lady Mary returned to Britain and in 1721 had her daughter inoculated in front of a
group of people, including the king’s doctor. An outcry ensued, but some of her friends
followed suit, as did the king. It was not until 75 years later that Edward Jenner
developed a vaccine from cowpox, and the practice took off. But 1721 was an important
year in the defeat of a deadly disease. Britons will be hoping 2021 is, too.

Decline and fall

The once-mighty British passport will lose even more of its power
BETWEEN 2013 and 2015 the British passport—in its burgundy-covered EU-member
incarnation—was the most powerful in the world, according to an index compiled
annually by Henley & Partners, a firm that helps rich customers acquire a new
nationality. This was because it allowed its lucky holders visa-free access to more places
than any other country’s passport. In 2016 it dropped from first to third position, and
has since slid further. In 2020—the year it reverted to its traditional blue cover—it fell
to seventh. In 2021 this gentle decline in its power will become a plunge.
The biggest reason is Brexit (which was also one of the reasons for the change in colour).
Britain has enjoyed many of the privileges of an EU member state during its post-Brexit
transition period, which ends on December 31st 2020. Britons will not require visas to
visit the 27 remaining member states after that, but they will lose the right to live, work
or study there, and will face limits on how long they can stay without paperwork. They
will have to fill in a form and pay a small fee once the EU puts in place its American-style
pre-authorisation system, which is due to launch in 2022. They will also find it harder to
take pets into the EU.
A big factor influencing visa regimes is the wealth of a country’s tourists. British
travellers are a high-spending bunch, and will still be sought after around the world.
The main reason the British passport slipped down the rankings over the past few years
is not that some countries shut their doors to Britons, but that they opened their doors
to others. Holders of Singaporean, South Korean and Japanese passports are
increasingly welcome in more countries than Brits or other Europeans.
Yet geopolitics and trade affect visa policies too. Political tensions with China, Iran and
Russia trickle down to ordinary travellers. Moreover, countries like Germany, Japan and
South Korea are economic powerhouses that make lots of things. Other countries value
economic relationships with them, and visa-free travel can be a spur to greater trade.
But Britain, which has a strong services sector, “is no longer a major player in terms of
finished goods and that has an effect on the perception of the UK,” says Paddy Blewer of
Henley & Partners. As a result, “other sovereign states are less willing to give it visa-free
travel.” Nor is Britain particularly generous when it comes to granting visa-free access
to its own shores to citizens of non-Western states. That creates resentment.
The pandemic will not help. Even as borders closed across the world, EU states
continued to treat Britain as a member. But after the transition period Britain will be
treated like any other country, and access to the rest of Europe will be conditional on
keeping infection rates low. Outside Europe, few countries make special exceptions for
British citizens. Britain’s new, weaker position in the world will make reciprocal visa
policies a part of new negotiations. Some Brits may feel pride at the return of the blue
passport, but it will not be nearly as widely welcomed as the old burgundy one.

Global lessons from the pandemic

The countries that have responded best to the pandemic offer lessons to others for 2021,
argues Sir Keir Starmer, leader of the Labour Party
Covid-19 has shone a harsh light on failures of leadership
NO NATION, AND no government, would have found this pandemic easy to deal with.
And none has performed perfectly. However, as we reflect on 2020 it is undeniable that
some countries have handled the virus better than others and that there are lessons all
governments must learn. Crucially, we must learn to co-operate better. This is not a race
in which a single country will emerge the winner, nor a virus we can fight alone.
This has been an extraordinary year for us all. In Britain, I was elected as leader of the
opposition during the height of the pandemic. We have all had to adapt, and observe
developments as this virus spread. We have also had to look and learn from the traits
that have enabled some countries to respond more effectively than others.
The first is leadership. Across the world, public trust, confidence and willingness to
change behaviour all stem from good leadership. In a time of crisis people look to their
leaders for reassurance and direction. New Zealand’s Jacinda Ardern has led with
honesty, clarity and compassion while communicating in new and innovative ways. In
doing so, she has built a sense of unity and common purpose—her “team of 5m”—which
will define those countries that adapt best to the post-pandemic world.
Equally, covid-19 has shone a harsh light on failures of leadership: those dodging blame,
dividing communities or undermining public-health advice. In America, three-quarters
of the public say the country is now more divided than before the pandemic. In Britain,
Boris Johnson’s failure to sack his chief adviser for breaking lockdown rules saw public
confidence in his government’s response plummet. It is now the lowest among 14
advanced economies.
Research from previous crises shows that people are willing to make sacrifices for their
community, but leadership is key. It must be authentic and accountable, as exemplified
by the Danish prime minister’s press conference for children, or the way South Korea
named those responsible for each element of its plans.
Speed is crucial, too. This pandemic thrives on inaction. The most obvious and
devastating impact of that inaction is the cost to life. Recent research found that
delaying lockdown by a single week across eight countries would have cost more than
half a million lives. It is now accepted that many countries were too slow in moving to
suppress the virus. The British government was not only slow into lockdown, but slow
to protect the elderly in care homes and slow to deliver a functioning testing system. By
contrast, countries with low death tolls were characterised by fast lockdowns, quick
roll-out of testing and swift adoption of technologies to trace outbreaks.
The final dividing line has been preparedness. Nothing has killed more humans
throughout history than infectious disease. And covid-19 was not even the first
pandemic in this century. The warning signs were there—SARS, MERS, H1N1.
Preparation is not just having a plan on a shelf, though. Singapore reportedly copied
Britain’s pandemic plan but, according to one health official, “actually implemented it”.
Preparedness also means ensuring public services have the resilience to handle a crisis.
The policy levers available to governments are inevitably defined by the state of those
services—Germany, for instance, faced the pandemic with twice as many nurses per
person as Britain. Covid-19 has exposed parts of our societies left fragile by
underinvestment and government mismanagement.
One lesson for all countries, regardless of how they performed individually, is the need
for better global co-operation. In Britain we are rightly proud of the leading work being
done here on vaccine development. But it should not matter where a vaccine is found.
The World Health Organisation is right to urge a focus on global distribution. Without it,
one country might become safe, but the virus will not be beaten and the global economy
will not recover.
It beggars belief that in the biggest health crisis in living memory, the G20 leaders held
just one emergency meeting, in March, while the G7 replaced a summit with a one-hour
video call. World leaders have the capability, as we all do, to meet remotely. Considering
the impact of co-ordination during the financial crisis in 2008, not to do so now feels
like a failure of leadership. In 2021 countries must get around the table—showing
leadership, speed and preparedness—and take co-ordinated action on health and the
economy. We can defeat this pandemic and build a better future, but we can only do it
together.

Aftershocks
• We must heed the pandemic’s warning
• City of fight
• Remote working is different—and better
• It’s time for a new deal for workers
• Nature cannot be fooled
• Shock to the system
• A black swan? No
• A chance to change things

Aftershocks
We must heed the pandemic’s warning

Toby Ord: senior research fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford University
The outbreak shows humanity’s vulnerability—and the need to prepare for other
risks in future
THE CORONAVIRUS pandemic is a warning for humanity. It is a reminder that,

despite all our technological progress, humanity remains vulnerable to
catastrophes that shake the world.
Many have taken to calling 2020 an unprecedented time—but the truth is precisely the
opposite. We have long been vulnerable to devastating pandemics. The Black Death of
1346-53 killed around one-tenth of the world’s population, including about a third of
the people in Europe. The introduction of European diseases into the Americas may
have killed as many as 90% of the people living there—again a tenth of the world’s
population. And just a hundred years ago, the 1918 flu (the first truly global pandemic)
killed about one in 30 people across the world. What would have been truly
unprecedented is if our vulnerability had ended. This catastrophe is simply part of a
very long-running trend.
Yet there is one sense in which our time is without precedent. With the development of
nuclear weapons in the 20th century, humanity’s escalating power finally reached the
point where we could cause catastrophes on the largest possible scale: the destruction
of our own species, and with it, everything we could have achieved or become. Like all
species, we have always been vulnerable to a small background of natural extinction
risks, but these have now been outstripped by risks of our own creation. The existential
risk of nuclear war was soon joined by that of extreme climate change, and this century
will bring even greater risks from advanced biotechnology and artificial intelligence.
Will we wake up to these risks in time, taking the steps needed to control them, or will
we continue to focus on other things until the risks catch up with us? This will be the
defining question of our age—and perhaps of the entire human story.
One of the greatest challenges in managing existential risks is that we have to survive
our entire future without ever falling victim to them. If an existential catastrophe struck,
it would be too late to learn any lessons. We thus have to eke out every possible lesson
we can from the warnings we do receive: the near misses, such as the Cuban missile
crisis of 1962, and the catastrophes that were severe, but survivable, such as the
pandemics of 1346, 1918 and 2020.
We certainly will learn lessons from covid-19, improving our defences against similar
pandemics. And 2021 will be our best chance to do so, when we have recovered just
enough to be able to raise our eyes to the future, but while the shock of the past still
stings. However, without a great effort, I fear we will learn only the narrow lessons—
those that might help prevent a re-run of 2020—while failing to address the
increasingly important threat of engineered pandemics, or the array of other existential
risks we face. This is a rare opportunity to change course, because it won’t be long
before the societal antibodies from this once-in-a-century pandemic begin to fade. We
should make the most of it.
Toby Ord is the author of “The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity”
(Bloomsbury, 2020)

City of fight
Anne Hidalgo: mayor of Paris
Paris illuminates the way ahead for cities: trust citizens and build more bike lanes
Action at the city level is the best scale when dealing with a crisis like this one
THE COVID-19 crisis has shaken up our lives and there is still more to come.
For a city like Paris—a city open to the world, a city of culture and one whose
way of life revolves around meeting, dialogue and exchange—it is an
unprecedented change. This crisis has caused us to question how we live in
the city, how we travel, how we consume. It has made us think afresh about
our relationship with others and with the spaces we share.
The main responsibility of a mayor is to understand these disruptions. What do they
mean for the everyday life of the city’s population and how the city operates? Compared
with all other public policymakers, mayors are better placed to understand the reality of
their citizens’ lives. That’s why action at the city level is probably the best scale for
concrete measures against the consequences of a crisis like this. Preparing for the post-
covid world starts with handling today’s emergencies.
This crisis has reminded us that life is fragile. That realisation should lead us to do
everything we can to preserve it. That means protecting our environment to keep
everyone in good health; fighting pollution to ensure the air in our cities is clean;
reaching out to the most vulnerable among us, because the epidemic has shown us how
our destinies are intertwined; and letting citizens create and develop solutions for a
future that allows everyone to live better. We need each other and the key is what we
have in common.
What I have witnessed during these weeks will mark me for the rest of my life. I saw the
energy, creativity and solidarity of thousands of citizens, who are the city’s lifeblood. We
must not allow this energy to be lost. We must not let our creativity fade, nor let this
solidarity disappear.
We must draw inspiration from the strength of all Parisians and as a city commit
ourselves with the same determination. We must trust our citizens, provide them with
the means to express themselves democratically, to create with us the city of tomorrow
and set about building it with their own hands. Every time we put our faith in them, they
come up with solid, local solutions.
We put our trust in restaurant owners to extend their terrace areas and they made the
city more attractive and kept their neighbourhoods vibrant. We trusted Parisians by
opening new cycle lanes, and with their bikes they are bringing this transformation to
life. We must trust everyone around the world who loves Paris in order to bring the City
of Light back to its true splendour. I am sure they will be up for the challenge.
The world in 2021 may not be quite the same as it was before, but it will be open to the
future. In that world, culture will play a central role. The environment will be the
driving force for the changes ahead. And solidarity between people and regions will be
the foundation of this new ecological pact for the preservation of humanity.

Remote working is different—and

better
Erica Brescia: chief operating officer, GitHub
At some software companies, most people already worked remotely. What

lessons can they offer other firms?
Companies that build distributed teams can hire the best talent from anywhere in
the world
IT IS VERY possible that more than $1trn in value has been created by globally
distributed teams of programmers who write the open-source software that
powers much of the modern world. Their code serves as the foundation of the
internet and powers everything from smartphones to medical devices. The
open-source model has proved that distributed teams who communicate,
collaborate and contribute can build incredibly valuable products from
anywhere in the world. GitHub maintains the online repository for most of the
world’s open-source software, and we operate much like the 50m developers
our platform serves—distributed, asynchronously and online. More than 70%
of our 2,000 or so employees work remotely. This way of working has been
our “normal” for more than a decade.
Covid-19 has made it everyone’s normal. The mandatory shift to remote work was
disruptive, but many companies are starting to embrace the long-term value of the
concept. Some employees are more productive at home; they appreciate the flexibility,
lack of commute or ability to work in solitude without interruption. And companies that
build distributed teams can hire the best talent from anywhere in the world. In a future
that embraces distributed work, the search for talent is unconstrained by office
locations or direct flight paths. An uptick in distributed work across all industries in
2021 will connect the talent of developing countries such as Indonesia, Nigeria and
Pakistan with the employment opportunities and economic growth offered by
companies all around the world.
But what does this shift to distributed work mean for the workplace? Our decade of
experience with a distributed workforce tells us that offices are not going away, but the
way we use them will change. With more flexibility, employees will come in fewer days
a week. We will see a rise in hot-desking and a reduction in office footprints; companies
just won’t need as much commercial space. Offices will be designed for collaboration:
team deep-dives, customer and community events, celebrations, planning and design
work. People will go to the office because they want or need to engage with others, not
because company policy requires it.
This will change both how work gets done and how companies foster culture. When
workers are more distributed, the work itself becomes distributed—so it must be
documented, visible and doable in an asynchronous manner, by individuals working
independently of one another across time zones and work environments. Collaboration
and camaraderie will be built virtually, using technology that is not new, but has
renewed purpose—video-conferencing, virtual meetups and instant messaging. Virtual
happy hours and a “cameras on” policy for conference calls may seem like pandemic-
induced workarounds to boost morale and encourage engagement, but they are in fact
crucial components of post-covid corporate culture. Tools to support remote working
abound, but successfully building a distributed team demands deliberate changes in the
way people work. That requires a shift in the way companies train, empower and
support people to work in new ways.
Managers tasked with creating a culture of collaboration within a distributed team will
find that the profile of a leader changes. A recent study found that the skills and traits of
successful leaders in an in-person, office-based environment differ from those needed
to lead distributed, remote teams. Instead of valuing confidence and charisma, remote
teams value leaders who are organised, productive and facilitate connections between
colleagues. In a post-covid world, companies will have to place greater emphasis on
retaining and promoting leaders who have these skills.
In just a matter of weeks, the spread of covid-19 brought about a shift to distributed
work that happened more quickly than anyone thought possible. But the open-source
community has been working this way for more than two decades. In 2021 companies
will stop seeing remote work as an inconvenience and embrace it as a chance to create
an interconnected, asynchronous, global workforce that is more flexible and dynamic
than ever before. In every crisis there is opportunity—and this is a huge opportunity to
embrace a better way of working for the future.

It’s time for a new deal for workers

Azeem Azhar: founder, Exponential View
The pandemic has highlighted the need for new thinking on workers’ rights
Employment law should be updated to reflect new, technology-enabled styles of

working
In the middle of the last decade, forecasters predicted a grim future for workers. They
promised that automation in the office and robots on the factory floor might
permanently destroy millions of jobs. In 2016 one respected analyst predicted that one
in six American jobs would be lost by 2025. Yet just before the coronavirus rampaged
through the global economy, the oecd, a club of mostly rich nations, was reporting
record levels of employment among its member countries.
Instead it was the pandemic, not robots or smart software, that caused tens of millions
of job losses, and for rather conventional reasons: recession, a decline in consumer
spending and companies going out of business. Firms that had invested in advanced
technologies, far from laying people off, went on a hiring spree. Amazon, renowned for
its cutting-edge acumen, recruited an additional 175,000 people as lockdowns began in
March 2020. Netflix, a technology-driven media company, continued to hire throughout
the pandemic. Academic evidence on whether artificial intelligence and industrial
robots hurt employment remains inconclusive. Predictions of the number of jobs at risk
have declined, and in some cases gone negative. A recent European Commission paper
suggested that “robot adoption tends to be positively associated with aggregate
employment”, and a study by Leslie Willocks, an economist at the London School of
Economics, reached a similar conclusion.
Even if robots have yet to take all the jobs, technology is fundamentally reshaping the
nature of work in other ways, as firms rethink their businesses after the pandemic.
There will be new skills to learn, new responsibilities to master and new models of
remote and hybrid working. Employees will be forced to adapt. Such constant change
will be unsettling. Not everyone relishes working in an environment where what they
do, who they work with and the skills they need change regularly. Firms that do not
adopt these new, technology-enabled ways of working risk going the way of Blockbuster,
Kodak or BlackBerry.
Companies may be tempted to use the rupture provided by the pandemic to adopt new
labour practices. They may, for example, place greater reliance on gig-work platforms,
paying workers for specific tasks or projects, rather than employing them. For firms, the
benefit is clear: a contractor comes and does the job without being a lingering payroll
liability. Though some workers appreciate and benefit from the flexibility that gig
working offers, it does not afford the economic security or personal-development
opportunities of a full-time job.
Ensuring that technology-driven change benefits workers as well as companies will

require new thinking from employers. The good news is that there are signs of progress.
Many large firms are investing in re-skilling their workforces for the future. In 2020
PWC, a consultancy, announced that it would invest $3bn to re-train its 275,000
employees. IBM, a computer giant, has promised $1bn for re-training its workforce.
Amazon has committed $700m. More firms will follow suit.
Smaller entrepreneurial outfits are dealing with workers’ emerging needs. Lambda
School, based in Silicon Valley, trains software developers, and defers its fees until
graduates have found jobs paying more than $50,000 a year. Portify helps freelance
workers, whose earnings may not be backed by a giant industrial conglomerate, build
up their credit ratings. Firms like Hustle and Zego provide gig workers with affordable
insurance while they are on the job; Collective Benefits helps gig workers with holiday
pay and sick leave.
Policymakers need to act, too. As gig-working has already shown, employment law
should be updated to reflect the shifting rights and responsibilities associated with new,
technology-enabled styles of working. Although the threat of a robot-job apocalypse
seems to have been postponed, workers can still find themselves on the wrong end of
technological change. Devising a new and fairer settlement requires further innovation.
Nature cannot be fooled

Ursula Bassler: president, the CERN council, CNRS France
The crisis is a reminder of the value of evidence, scientific expertise and

international collaboration
The crisis has shown the value of taking an open and multilateral approach
AS COUNTRIES around the world emerged from covid-19 lockdowns in late

summer 2020, a trend became apparent: those that were slow to heed the
message of science had paid the price. Delays had resulted in a dramatic rise
in infection and fatality rates, requiring more severe and longer-lasting
lockdowns and often plunging the economy into deeper recession. What can
we learn from this?
Health officials’ calls for early lockdown measures were based on the scientific evidence
available at the time. Accepting such evidence requires humility, as it cannot be wished
away, and ignoring it may hit you harder in the long run. As Richard Feynman, a
physicist, once put it: “Reality must take precedence over public relations, for Nature
cannot be fooled.” We would do well to keep this in mind when tackling many of the
world’s other pressing challenges.
Ultimately, the purpose of science is to establish evidence that can be used to solve
problems. This can take time, and often involves scientific debate. Science is a dynamic
process: observations are gathered, protocols established, experiments carried out,
verifications made, errors tracked down. Consequently, it can be confusing and
frustrating for those seeking immediate certainty. But as more evidence is gathered and
analysed, results become increasingly precise (though often more complex), and the
basis for decision-making steadily becomes clearer.
Communicating how science works to the wider public can be hard, but it is vital. The
media—both the traditional kind, and social-media platforms—bear great
responsibility in this respect. Traditional media should rely on evidence-based
reporting and explanations, rather than chasing clicks by giving credence to far-fetched
positions or nonsensical claims. And social-media platforms have a duty to monitor and
flag misleading information.
The covid-19 pandemic triggered an unprecedented scientific mobilisation to

understand the virus and to find responses, treatments and vaccines. The effort among
scientists is international and collaborative as the urgency of dealing with the pandemic
has fostered worldwide co-operation. It must also be multidisciplinary: beyond the
efforts in the biomedical sphere, disciplines from mathematics to social sciences are
needed in the long fight against the coronavirus to give adequate support to policy-
makers. CERN has played its part by contributing computing resources and making
expertise available. A group of physicists at CERN has also designed a low-cost
ventilator that can help patients recovering from covid-19, in particular those in
developing countries.
As well as challenging scientists directly, the crisis highlights the difficulty of keeping
track of huge numbers of results and publications, guaranteeing quality, making
progress efficiently and coherently, and ensuring co-ordination and co-operation among
competing groups. It also highlights the question: how can scientific results be equitably
shared with industry and society as a whole? The question predates the pandemic and
applies to a wide range of scientific fields. The crisis has shown the value of taking an
open and multilateral approach to answering it.
In recent years policymakers have placed much emphasis on research that is problem-
oriented rather than curiosity-driven. But when it comes to understanding covid-19,
crucial contributions have come from seemingly unrelated fields: producing images of
the virus using electron microscopes would not have been possible, for example,
without quantum mechanics. Science in all its aspects is a single and essential
endeavour, and covid-19 has shown the importance of putting its results at the heart of
decision-making. When scientific evidence is respected and multilateral collaboration
fostered, solutions come faster—for the benefit of all.
Shock to the system

Lynn Jurich: co-founder and CEO, Sunrun
Large-scale electrification would create lots of jobs
IN 2021, AS we look for solutions to the immediate crisis caused by the

pandemic, and to the longer-term challenge of climate change, new technology
offers a shining opportunity. Embracing the new generation of electrification
technologies, powered by renewable energy, will help us decarbonise the
economy while creating millions of new, local and non-exportable jobs. In
America, where renewable energy has abundant space to grow, we will ditch
the idea that a sustainable future means sacrificing, or weakening, America’s
global position. With the right technology, we can still have our big cars,
homes and air-conditioning. A zero-carbon future is realistic, and it starts in
the home.
The energy sector, including electricity and heating, transport and manufacturing,
accounts for two-thirds of global carbon emissions. Electrification powered by
renewable sources is the solution. In 2021 more communities will institute building-
code requirements like those in the Californian cities of San Jose, Santa Rosa and Los
Gatos, which ensure new homes have solar panels, are fully electrified and do not rely
on natural gas. These residential solar-power systems include a car-charger and a
battery to store solar energy and share it with the grid. Induction stoves for cooking,
radiant heating systems in place of radiators and never having to visit a petrol station
not only reduce the cost of living, they deliver a more delightful day. The battery makes
each home more resilient in the event of a hurricane or blackout.
Utilities will also embrace this future. In 2020 Pacific Gas & Electric became the largest
American utility to express support for electrification, on the basis that gas
infrastructure “might later prove under-utilised”. Covering all suitable rooftops with
solar panels could provide almost half of America’s electricity needs, and 75% of
California’s. Pair batteries with those installations, and they can be networked into
virtual power plants. Buildings generate their own energy with rooftop solar, store what
they do not use and sell that energy to the grid, thereby reducing the need for polluting
power plants to cope with peak demand. Just 75,000 properties in Los Angeles can
generate 300 megawatts of energy—equivalent to a natural-gas power plant. And
customers pay less than they would for conventional utility power.
Dozens of virtual power plants are already active today, but many more will come
online in 2021. In 2020 a minority of rooftop solar systems in America included a
battery. In 2021 battery deployments will more than double, to a total of 3.5 gigawatts
of capacity. That is enough to retire almost 10% of California’s natural-gas power
plants—10% in one year, and that’s just in 2021.
Better still, all this will create record numbers of new jobs, nearly 30m over the next
decade in America alone. “Solar installer” was the fastest-growing job category before
the pandemic hit. This transformation is inevitable—and the faster we do it, the less it
will cost.

A black swan? No
Michele Wucker: analyst and author, “The Gray Rhino”
This was a “grey rhino”—a predictable crisis
We must replace black-swan fatalism with grey-rhino pragmatism
ONE OF THE biggest lessons from the covid-19 pandemic has been the folly of
ignoring warnings about highly likely, high-impact risks that are a matter of
when, not if. For years, many governments brushed off countless credible
warnings that the world was poorly prepared for a pandemic. When the novel
coronavirus emerged in China, too many nations were too slow to respond.
The pandemic should encourage policymakers to pay more attention to other known
but poorly managed risks. These include rising inequality, climate change and financial
imbalances such as dangerous corporate-debt levels and asset bubbles. Picture each of
these obvious dangers as a two-tonne grey rhinoceros with its horn pointed our way
and its massive weight bearing down on us: they are very visible and their impact can
be foreseen. The interactions among these rhinos heighten the danger. You could
appropriately call them a crash—the zoological term for a group—of grey rhinos.
Politicians, pundits and investors often invoke the metaphor of the “black swan” to
describe highly improbable, even unimaginable events. In particular, the global financial
crisis of 2007-09 is often described as a black-swan event, despite warnings about
derivatives and a subprime housing-market bubble. By definition, black swans cannot
be predicted, so nothing can be done to prepare for them. This kind of thinking makes
things worse by encouraging fatalism, rejecting accountability and giving the nod to
short-termism and wilful ignorance, which in turn generate volatility and tail risk. To
face the looming risks of 2021, we must replace black-swan fatalism with grey-rhino
constructive pragmatism.
As covid-19 spread, analysts quickly downgraded their early pandemic predictions of a

fast V-shaped recovery to a slower U-shaped recovery, and then to an even more
gradual “swoosh”. We now have a k-shaped recovery that has given the well-to-do a big
boost, creating financial-asset bubbles while essential workers and vulnerable sectors
struggle. In 2021 the global economy will suffer from a ripple effect of bankruptcies, job
losses and defaults, which stockmarkets cannot ignore for ever. At the same time,
increasingly violent storms, droughts, wildfires and freak weather will threaten insurers,
property, coastal cities and, by extension, financial stability.
Facing the daunting challenges ahead will require long-term thinking, a greater
emphasis on the real economy rather than stockmarket performance and, above all, a
commitment to hold ourselves and our leaders accountable. But it also presents new
opportunities. Removing fossil-fuel subsidies and promoting investment in clean
technologies will create jobs and reduce energy and health-care costs. Tackling
inequality will lift the bottom leg of the k-shaped recovery and spread the benefits of
the economic rebound.
We can see black swans only in the rear-view mirror. In 2021 we should focus on the
grey rhinos in front of us: obvious, foreseeable and giving us a choice to respond.
Michele Wucker is the author of “You Are What You Risk: The New Art and Science of
Navigating an Uncertain World” (Pegasus Books, April 2021) and “The Gray Rhino: How
to Act and Recognize the Obvious Dangers We Ignore” (St Martin’s Press, 2016)

A chance to change things

Slavea Chankova: health-care correspondent, The Economist
The crisis has up-ended people’s lives. What does it take to make a new habit stick?
If you do something once a day for two weeks, it turns into a habit
BARELY 8% OF new-year’s resolutions survive until the end of January. Some

people set goals that are too ambitious; others simply set too many goals. Yet
perhaps the biggest reason why people fail so miserably is that changing a
particular behaviour is difficult if the routines that are tightly woven around it
remain the same. Resisting the lure of a calorie-laden caramel latte in the
morning is easier if you switch to a route that doesn’t take you past the coffee
shop.
In a survey of nearly 70,000 people in Britain, carried out in August 2020, about a
quarter of people said their lives had changed completely or a lot since covid-19 came
along, and a third said (with characteristic British understatement) they had made
“quite a few changes”. Many of these changes will stick, because the pandemic has up-
ended people’s routines so dramatically. It does not matter whether you walk past the
coffee shop or not if it has closed down—or if you rarely leave the house.
Many changes were for the worse. But not all.
During the lockdowns unhealthy snacking increased, but so did cooking at home and
eating family meals together—practices generally linked with healthier eating patterns.
People could not see friends and family, but they got to know the people next door
(about 20% of Britons said talking more to their neighbours was a change that would
outlast the pandemic). With gyms and organised sports closed for months, some people
cut down on regular exercise. Others, however, took up new sports. In England the
proportion of people cycling at least once a week reached 16% in June 2020, twice the
level of the early weeks of lockdown. Nextbike, which runs shared-bike schemes in
several European countries, reported a 35% increase in rides in April and May,
compared with a year earlier.
The greater popularity of cooking, neighbourly chats and cycling will persist. If you do
something new once a day for two weeks, it starts to feel automatic—the defining
feature of a habit, says Benjamin Gardner of King’s College London. Doing something for
longer helps solidify the habit. One study of people who took up healthy eating or
regular exercise found that the degree to which it felt automatic increased, but then
plateaued, on average, after 66 days. That is roughly how long Europeans spent in
lockdown.
Other things will help, too. Many people with office-based jobs will work from home in
future, at least some of the time. That will help them stick with home-cooked meals and
being chummier with their neighbours. Those returning to offices may feel nervous
about travelling on crowded public transport, making cycling more attractive. Big cities
are trying not to waste the crisis. They are pumping up cycling’s prospects by
subsidising bike purchases and laying down more cycling lanes.
The pandemic has changed many things. But for some people at least, the changes are
like new-year’s resolutions they wish they had made long ago.

World in numbers: Countries

• Top ten growers
• Europe
• Asia
• North America
• Latin America
• Middle East and Africa

The world in numbers Countries
Post-pandemic rebounds will produce a sharp rise in global and some regional growth
rates, but none of the larger countries will expand by enough to enter the top ten.
Instead, the list is dominated by small states, half of them island economies that are
counting on the return of holidaymakers.
Macau’s chart-topping growth rate (35%) will bring only some relief from the
catastrophic collapse in tourism and gambling that lopped two-thirds off the territory’s
economy as covid-19 struck. Lockdowns devastated tourism in the British Virgin Islands,
Sint Maarten, Antigua & Barbuda, St Lucia and the Maldives, too, from which 2021’s
striking growth rates will represent only a partial rebound.
The others in the top ten have their own stories. Libya’s high growth rate reflects a
modest recovery from catastrophe, in this case civil war, which will include a significant
increase in oil output. Albania’s economy suffered its own covid-19 blow as well as
contagion from the deep recession in Italy, a vital trade partner, but will regain all the
ground lost in 2020. Guyana stands alone on this list as a country barely affected by the
virus and is instead riding a wave of offshore oil development. The largest country in
the top ten, Peru, will benefit from rising copper output and higher prices.
2021 forecasts unless otherwise indicated.

Inflation: year-on-year annual average.
Dollar GDPs calculated using 2021 forecasts for dollar exchange rates (GDP at PPP, or
purchasing-power parity, shown in brackets).
All figures simplified by rounding.
[email protected]
Source:

Europe
Austria
GDP growth: 4.7%
GDP per head: $53,123 (PPP: $60,280)
Inflation: 1.7%
Budget Balance (% GDP): -3.1
Population: 8.7m
The government entered the covid-19 crisis with ample fiscal ammunition and will
spread largesse far and wide to mitigate the impact of the virus. The government, a
coalition of the centre-right Austrian People’s Party and the Greens, is Europe’s first to
unite a centre-right party and an environmentalist party. With only an 11-seat majority,
it will be forced to seek support from others, including from the far-right Freedom Party,
to retain power. The economy will rally, but not by enough to offset the contraction of
2020, with weak tourism and cautious consumers holding it back.
Belgium
GDP growth: 5.4%
GDP per head: $46,150 (PPP: $53,220)
Inflation: 1.0%
Population: 11.6m
The parties making up the minority caretaker government, the centre-right New
Flemish Alliance and the Socialist Party, should overcome deep antipathy and assemble
a permanent coalition, if only to keep the rising far-right Vlaams Belang out of power. If
they are unable to reach agreement, fresh elections are a distinct possibility. Any
coalition will be wobbly and, once the covid-19 emergency subsides, will struggle to
agree on the direction of policy. The economy will suffer local lockdowns until mass
vaccination is available, and recovery from the deep recession will be sluggish.
TO WATCH: Degrees of separation. The governing coalition may offer more devolution
to the regions, especially in labour-market, transport and health policy, to subdue long-
simmerinng separatist tendencies.
Bulgaria
GDP growth: 3.7%
GDP per head: $10,840 (PPP: $25,230)
Inflation: 2.5%
Population: 6.9m
Parliamentary elections are planned for spring 2021, but volatile politics could produce
an earlier contest. In late 2020 the ruling centre-right Citizens for European
Development of Bulgaria party gave in to mass anti-corruption protests and called for a
new constitution, to be approved by an assembly chosen in a snap election. If the
proposal fails to win parliamentary approval, a regular general election will be held in
March or April, in which the ruling party hopes to come out on top.
TO WATCH: Eyes open. Bulgaria was subjected to post-accession monitoring after it

joined the EU in 2007. The reviews had been expected to end, but weak progress on
corruption and legal reforms will keep the scrutiny in place.
Croatia
GDP growth: 4.7%
GDP per head: $14,950 (PPP: $28,210)
Inflation: 1.1%
Population: 4.1m
Andrej Plenkovic stayed on as prime minister after elections in July 2020, leading a
coalition headed by his centre-right Croatian Democratic Union. In his second term, Mr
Plenkovic will rein in his party’s right wing and pursue closer ties within the EU,
including Schengen membership and adoption of the euro. The country coped well in
the initial stages of the covid-19 pandemic but will take a big economic hit as crucial
tourism traffic slows, regaining less than half the ground lost in 2020.
TO WATCH: Brussels bonanza. Croatia’s share of the EU’s $850bn covid-19 financial-
support package will be the biggest of any member state relative to its GDP, at 22.4%.
Czech Republic
GDP growth: 4.4%
GDP per head: $24,800 (PPP: $42,830)
Inflation: 1.9%
Population: 10.7m
The prime minister, Andrej Babis, leads an uneasy coalition of the centrist ANO
movement and the centre-left Czech Social Democratic Party, reliant on a pact with the
far-left Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, but will approach elections in
October hopeful of a second term. He will focus on post-pandemic recovery at home and
pursue a pro-EU foreign policy, while pressing Brussels for more funding.
Manufacturing and consumer demand will rally, edging back to 2019 levels.
Denmark
GDP growth: 4.1%
GDP per head: $61,280 (PPP: $60,780)

Inflation: 0.5%
Population: 5.8m
An early and strict lockdown, coupled with generous fiscal intervention, limited the
impact of covid-19 on health and the economy, and a rebound in 2021 will restore the
economy to its 2019 position. The prime minister, Mette Frederiksen, will benefit from
an atmosphere of national unity spurred by the crisis, and divisions between her Social
Democrat-led minority government and its “Red Bloc” centre-left allies will be buried
for now.
TO WATCH: Pillow talks. The European Federation of Sexology will hold its 15th
biennial congress in the city of Aalborg in June.
Estonia
GDP growth: 4.3%
GDP per head: $24,590 (PPP: $39,130)
Inflation: 2.7%
Population: 1.3m
The government of prime minister Juri Ratas, a coalition of the Centre Party, the
Eurosceptic Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE) and the conservative Isamaa,
has set aside its internal divisions to confront covid-19, but disagreements over issues
such as immigration will resurface as the health crisis subsides. Infections have been
relatively few, but the economy is reeling from a recession in key export markets.
Persistent unemployment and falling wages will hurt growth.
Finland
GDP growth: 2.4%
GDP per head: $50,780 (PPP: $51,330)
Inflation: 1.2%
Population: 5.5m
Sanna Marin, who became the world’s youngest prime minister when her predecessor
was forced out by labour strikes, has benefited from the suspension of political
hostilities during the covid-19 emergency. But feuding within the governing coalition in
areas such as climate policy will re-emerge. The Finns, a far-right opposition party, will
make hay as unhappiness over immigration and austerity rises.
France
GDP growth: 7.1%
GDP per head: $43,000 (PPP: $49,670)
Inflation: 1.5%

Population: 65.4m
Emmanuel Macron, the president, will revamp his wide-ranging policy platform to focus
on recovery from the economic slump brought on by covid-19. France’s stimulus plan is
unusual in relying on supply-side reforms, including tax cuts, rather than demand-
boosting measures. Mr Macron is betting these will be enough to restore his public
image ahead of elections in April 2022. Social unrest will return as unemployment rises.
The economy won’t regain all of its lost ground.
Germany
GDP growth: 4.6%
GDP per head: $48,160 (PPP: $56,870)
Inflation: 1.0%
Population: 82.9m
The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) of the fourth-term chancellor, Angela Merkel,
will start 2021 under a new party leader; Armin Laschet, a centrist state premier, is the
leading contender. As the CDU’s candidate for chancellor, he would also be favourite to
win the general election in late 2021. The field will remain polarised by immigration
and climate policy, but the CDU is emerging strengthened from the pandemic and
should lead the next coalition government. Germany responded to covid-19 with a rare
bout of fiscal generosity and its recession will be shallower than the EU average.
TO WATCH: Going underground. Work is scheduled to start on the Fehmarnbelt tunnel

between Germany and Denmark. At 18km it will be the world’s longest combined road-
and-rail immersed tube tunnel.
Greece
GDP growth: 3.5%
GDP per head: $19,680 (PPP: $31,230)
Inflation: 0.2%
Population: 10.4m
Freed temporarily from the straitjacket of EU budget demands, the centre-right

government of Kyriakos Mitsotakis will focus on recovering the loss of nearly a quarter-
century of growth to the pandemic. With a huge fiscal gap and a public debt around
double the economy’s size, the fight-back will be slow. Financial support equal to nearly
18% of GDP from the EU rescue fund will help, but as living standards fall, the
government will need all the goodwill it has earned from its sound handling of the crisis.
Hungary
GDP growth: 4.8%
GDP per head: $16,600 (PPP: $34,260)
Inflation: 2.7%
Population: 9.6m
A weak currency and high debt levels have denied Viktor Orban’s government the
ammunition to fight the economic effects of the pandemic, though an early lockdown
limited the damage. A $6.5bn grant from the EU rescue fund will support the recovery,
offsetting a contraction in other EU aid. Mr Orban, in his third consecutive term and
backed by a strong majority, will centralise power, defying EU pressure.
Ireland
GDP growth: 4.3%
GDP per head: $84,630 (PPP: $90,870)
Inflation: 0.5%
Population: 5.0m
Micheal Martin, the prime minister leading the first coalition between rival parties
Fianna Fail and Fine Gael, along with the Greens, took office at the pandemic’s height
but at least has some warning of the second great challenge: the definitive departure in
2021 from the EU of a key trade partner, Britain—perhaps without a trade deal to
soften the blow. Border arrangements between Ireland and Northern Ireland will be
resolved only at the last minute, so some disruption to trade is inevitable. Covid-19
recovery permitting, the coalition will press for greater spending on health, housing and
welfare, and (on behalf of the Greens) decarbonising the economy.
Italy
GDP growth: 5.8%
GDP per head: $33,630 (PPP: $42,610)
Inflation: 0.8%
Population: 60.4m
National interest has helped unite a fractious coalition government, but the prime
minister, Giuseppe Conte, lacks the backing to advance basic reforms to the economy,
such as cutting red tape and reducing corruption. Asset purchases by the European
Central Bank will underwrite Italy’s shaky sovereign debt, as long as the country
returns to strict fiscal discipline as the pandemic subsides. The economy will endure
one of Europe’s most severe virus-induced recessions and recovery will be slow. The
budget gap will narrow from a 2020 blow-out and public debt will decline modestly as a
percentage of GDP.
TO WATCH: Sense of proportion. The governing coalition will push for an all-
proportional electoral system that would make it harder for the resurgent right-wing
Lega and far-right Fratelli d’Italia to win power.
Latvia
GDP growth: 4.9%
GDP per head: $17,680 (PPP: $22,850)
Inflation: 0.9%
Population: 1.9m
The centre-right government took office just in time to confront the start of the covid-19
outbreak, and duly declared a state of emergency. As the economy rallies, fault lines in
the coalition will re-emerge. New Unity, the party of the prime minister, Krisjanis Karins,
is the smallest in the coalition, while three allied parties are new to government. Two
more, the populist Who Owns the State? party and the Eurosceptic National Alliance,
will push policy away from the country’s long-standing centre-right consensus. Reliance
on exports has made the economy especially vulnerable during the crisis, but rising
European demand will support growth in 2021.
Lithuania
GDP growth: 3.8%
GDP per head: $22,230 (PPP: $40,360)
Inflation: 1.6%
Population: 2.7m
A shifting coalition was replaced by an equally fragile governing alliance in elections in

October 2020, led by the opposition Homeland Union-Lithuanian Christian Democrats.
The country’s longer-term goals—addressing a low birth rate, mass emigration and
strengthening ties with the EU and NATO—will remain, but repairing the damage from
covid-19 will be the priority. The economic recovery will be substantial, but will not
wipe out the losses of 2020.
Netherlands
GDP growth: 4.1%
GDP per head: $55,980 (PPP: $59,140)
Inflation: 1.1%
Population: 17.4m
The ruling coalition, formed after almost seven months of post-election negotiations in
2017, lacks a majority in either house and has limped through its term. Even so, thanks
to a mostly positive public response to its handling of the pandemic, it should emerge on
top from elections in March, with the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy—led
by the prime minister, Mark Rutte—as the largest party. Its programme of tax cuts will
take second place to reviving the economy.
TO WATCH: Rescue resentment. Critics will attack the coalition’s support for the EU
rescue pact, which will require a net payment equal to 3.8% of GDP.
Norway
GDP growth: 3.0%
GDP per head: $70,130 (PPP: $66,670)
Inflation: 1.4%
Budget Balance (% GDP): 1.3
Population: 5.4m
An effective pandemic response has strengthened the position of the centre-right

coalition heading into elections in September. Acting as a minority government since
the withdrawal of the far-right Progress Party in early 2020, the coalition relies on
opposition support to pass legislation, slowing progress on its policy agenda. Low oil
prices mean less export income, but the well-heeled sovereign oil fund gives the
government some fiscal room to soften the impact of the pandemic, which it has done
with wide-ranging support measures.
TO WATCH: Medical trip. The Norwegian Association for Psychedelic Science, which
researches mind-bending drugs and their clinical potential, aims to hold its first
conference in 2021.
Poland
GDP growth: 4.2%
GDP per head: $16,100 (PPP: $35,000)
Inflation: 2.4%
Population: 37.8m
The government, led by the socially conservative and economically interventionist Law
and Justice party, will press ahead with institutional reforms that include placing the
judiciary under greater political control and restraining independent media. The EU will
grumble, but Poland’s allies in the bloc will head off punitive action. Budgetary support
and a rally in private consumption will help restore most of the economic ground lost to
the pandemic, itself modest by European standards.
Portugal
GDP growth: 5.0%
GDP per head: $23,410 (PPP: $35,430)

Inflation: 0.4%
Population: 10.2m
The second-term minority government of the prime minister, António Costa of the
Socialist Party, will find it harder than in its first term to secure parliamentary support
for its legislative agenda, though pandemic-induced solidarity will help for a while. After
a budget surplus in 2019, virus-related spending caused the deficit to balloon and
outlays will be constrained in the coming years. The economic blow from the domestic
lockdown and international-travel bans was substantial, and recovery will be slow.
Romania
GDP growth: 4.2%
GDP per head: $13,050 (PPP: $32,650)
Inflation: 2.8%
Population: 19.1m
After a hiatus when the main parties put on a united front in the face of the pandemic,
political instability is returning. The main opposition Social Democratic Party is in
disarray, and the minority government, led by the National Liberal Party (PNL), will
serve out the rest of the parliamentary term, which runs until early 2021. The
parliamentary election, due to be held by March, will lead to a centre-right coalition
centred on the PNL. The rally from the pandemic recession will be limited.
Russia
GDP growth: 3.0%
GDP per head: $10,540 (PPP: $28,470)
Inflation: 3.9%
Population: -2.0
Covid-19 slammed the economy, and low oil prices, soft global demand, cautious fiscal
policy and Western sanctions will slow the recovery in 2021. Constitutional changes
have strengthened the office of the presidency and allowed Vladimir Putin to occupy it,
in theory, until 2036. The government will deploy a mix of tools to quell opposition,
from arrests and poisonings to online trolls. As ever, Mr Putin’s regime will project
Russian influence in its neighbourhood and beyond.
Slovakia
GDP growth: 6.4%
GDP per head: $20,470 (PPP: $34,090)
Inflation: 1.9%
Population: 5.5m
The country suffered one of Europe’s lightest health impacts from covid-19 but one of
its heaviest economic downturns, and 2021 will be dedicated mainly to clawing back
the lost ground. The right-leaning government of the prime minister, Igor Matovic, and
his Ordinary People and Independent Personalities party and its partners took office
during the lockdown and deployed a range of fiscal measures. The coalition, though
united around an anti-corruption agenda, will struggle to agree on spending priorities,
and outspoken party leaders could clash. The economy will rally, but not by enough to
restore 2020’s losses.
Slovenia
GDP growth: 5.0%
GDP per head: $24,740 (PPP: $40,150)

Inflation: 1.5%
Population: 2.1m
The prime minister, Janez Jansa of the centre-right Slovenian Democratic Party, leads
the latest in a succession of fragile coalitions. The administration, like its three
immediate predecessors, may not finish its term. Mr Jansa’s sympathies with climate
sceptics and anti-immigration nationalists will spark more popular protests. Covid-19
infections and fatalities were relatively light, but an economy dependent on tourists and
supply-chain links with hard-hit Italy has suffered disproportionately and recovery will
take time.
Spain
GDP growth: 6.8%
GDP per head: $29,600 (PPP: $40,450)
Inflation: 0.9%
Population: 46.8m
One of Europe’s most severe outbreaks of covid-19 brought an initial flush of unity to
Spain’s turbulent party politics. But ideological enmity quickly resurfaced, and there
was no guarantee in late 2020 that the coalition of the centre-left Spanish Socialist
Workers’ Party and the far-left Podemos would make it beyond the vote on a 2021
budget, let alone complete a term that nominally ends in 2023. The health crisis was
matched by an economic one, from which recovery will be slow and accompanied by
sharp declines in living standards.
Sweden
GDP growth: 2.9%
GDP per head: $55,690 (PPP: $56,880)
Inflation: 1.2%
Population: 10.2m
A relatively hands-off response to the covid-19 outbreak ultimately did not cushion the
economy and contributed to a high death rate, especially in old-age homes, undermining
early support for the centre-left coalition government of the prime minister, Stefan
Lofven. A cross-party commission has struggled to agree on a migration policy that will
head off a challenge from the far-right Sweden Democrats without offending liberal
sensibilities, and this will remain a live political issue as temporary legislation expires in
2021. A coalition agreement that would have shifted economic policy rightwards will
remain on hold as the government strives to restore the economy.
TO WATCH: Last dance. Avicii, a superstar DJ and songwriter who took his own
life in 2018 at the age of 28, will get his own museum in Stockholm.
Switzerland
GDP growth: 3.5%
GDP per head: $84,770 (PPP: $70,270)
Inflation: 0.3%
Population: 8.7m
The right-wing Swiss People’s Party (SVP), which holds the largest share of
parliamentary seats and two places in the seven-member Federal Council (the cabinet),
faces a rising challenge from the Greens, the fastest-growing party. An SVP-sponsored
referendum on limiting EU immigration was rejected in September 2020, further
damaging the SVP’s flagging brand. A strict covid-19 lockdown, which provoked rare
street protests, suppressed contagion and deaths but at a high economic cost, which in
2021 will be only partially repaired.
TO WATCH: Outsiders. Switzerland and Britain will implement a trade deal replicating
existing arrangements when Britain’s post-Brexit transition runs out at the end of 2020.
Turkey
GDP growth: 3.6%
GDP per head: $7,690 (PPP: $29,900)
Inflation: 10.8%
Population: 85.0m
The president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, responded to the slump caused by covid-19 by
pressing the central bank to relax monetary policy and by pushing more credit into the
economy through state-run banks, undermining the country’s already fragile financial
stability. The foreign creditors on which the country relies are becoming increasingly
cautious, while scarce foreign reserves will make it hard to defend the lira, deepening
the risk of a currency crisis. The country is heading for a hard landing in 2021 and is
becoming ever more isolated.
TO WATCH: Sultan lotion. The hunt for oil and gas to reduce the country’s dependence
on imports will expand, ensuring friction with Greece and other regional players over
energy-exploration rights in the eastern Mediterranean.
Ukraine
GDP growth: 5.7%
GDP per head: $3,750 (PPP: $13,630)
Inflation: 6.7%
Population: 41.7m
The ambitious reform programme proposed by the president, Volodymyr Zelensky, was
knocked sideways by the pandemic, and the lockdown erased much of the economic
growth achieved since the shock of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Cracks in Mr
Zelensky’s Servant of the People party, papered over during the pandemic, will reappear
as the emergency subsides. International creditors will be patient for now, but a return
to reforms will be required if Ukraine is to keep up with its bills, while simmering
conflict in the east will weigh on growth prospects.
United Kingdom
GDP growth: 6.9%

GDP per head: $40,290 (PPP: $47,130)
Inflation: 0.5%
Population: 68.2m
The country will start 2021 fully outside the EU, perhaps with no new trade agreement
with its largest partner. The impact of this will be significant in some sectors, but the
blow from covid-19 will be far greater. A late and poorly designed response brought a
terrible toll in lives and economic damage, though decisive fiscal interventions
mitigated the blow for many. The Conservative Party government of the prime minister,
Boris Johnson, had earlier pledged an investment programme to lift productivity, but
that could be curtailed by demands for fiscal consolidation within his own party.
TO WATCH: Scoxit. Elections for the Scottish Parliament and the expected renewal of
the Scottish National Party’s majority will fuel demands for a new referendum on
Scottish independence.
In Person
Nicola Sturgeon, the daughter of a dental nurse, has been a toothache for British
governments since becoming Scotland’s first minister in 2014, with her relentless
campaign for Scottish independence. She will be seeking a majority for her Scottish
National Party in elections for the Scottish Parliament in May, and has a fair chance of
winning one. She will be helped by the failure of other British parties to appeal to
Scottish voters, and the frustration of EU-supporting Scots with Brexit. Her bid to
achieve a second independence referendum—after a first, in 2014, went narrowly
against the nationalists—faces economic headwinds. But, as with Brexit, emotion will
outweigh economics in a referendum, if Westminster can eventually be arm-twisted
into granting one.

Asia
Australia
GDP growth: 1.6%
GDP per head: $56,700 (PPP: $53,160)
Inflation: 1.5%
Population: 25.8m
The economy contracted sharply in 2020 despite an early government response to
covid-19, and the rebound will be modest as global trade stays soft. The prime minister,
Scott Morrison, will lose popularity as pandemic-imposed hardship persists, and this
could be the last full year in office for the three-term Liberal-National coalition as
elections approach in 2022. Fallout from the crisis, internal disagreement over energy
and climate policy, and the government’s thin majority will hamper progress on its
legislative agenda.
TO WATCH: Island chain. The Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations Plus
(PACER Plus), a trade and aid pact linking Australia, New Zealand and nine Pacific island
nations, takes effect in 2021.
Bangladesh
GDP growth: 5.8%
GDP per head: $2,200 (PPP: $5,550)
Inflation: 5.6%
Population: 166.3m
The shock to employment and living standards from the covid-19 pandemic will fuel
opposition to the government under the prime minister, Sheikh Hasina Wajed, now in
its third successive term. Even so, the ruling Awami League’s grip on political and
military power and its entrenched patronage networks will guarantee its survival. The
economy will rally, but it will take another year to recover the 5%-plus trend GDP
growth of the past decade.
TO WATCH: Locked up. Protests will spike if Khaleda Zia, an opposition leader jailed for
corruption but freed on health grounds, is sent back to jail.
China
GDP growth: 7.3%

GDP per head: $11,300 (PPP: $18,710)
Inflation: 3.1%
Population: 1.40bn
The president, Xi Jinping, will use political capital gained from the rapid response to
covid-19 to press his domestic agenda, sidelining critics, tightening his grip on the
security apparatus and promoting allies to influential positions. In the face of mounting
antipathy from Western and regional powers, the government will redouble its
commitment to self-sufficiency in areas including energy and technology, while
exploiting the image of a hostile world to stoke domestic support. The economy will
bounce back from the slowdown in 2020.
Hong Kong
GDP growth: 2.4%
GDP per head: $50,670 (PPP: $62,030)
Inflation: 1.4%
Population: 7.6m
The territory’s draconian new national-security law will keep protesters off the streets,
the “localist” movement out of public debate and the legislature packed with pro-
government officials. The authorities will seek to quell wider discontent by tackling
structural long-term issues such as a housing shortage, but the negative fiscal drag
imposed by covid-19 will delay plans. The economy will rebound, recovering much of
the ground lost to the virus, but the impact of Beijing’s assault on the “one country two
systems” model will prove hard to combat.
India
GDP growth: 6.7%
GDP per head: $2,150 (PPP: $6,850)
Inflation: 4.0%
Population: 1.39bn
In his second five-year term, the prime minister, Narendra Modi, is widely popular and
the opposition is weak, further strengthening his hand. But the virulent covid-19
outbreak that erupted late in 2020 after the relaxation of an initial national lockdown—
and the extensive economic damage caused by the restrictions—highlight the risk of
social unrest. Communal clashes and protests by religious groups will erupt from time
to time. A programme of market liberalisation and infrastructure investment will be
accelerated to help rally an economy that has been battered by the pandemic.
TO WATCH: Pacific gravity. Further flare-ups will occur over infrastructure works on
the northern border with China, allying India more tightly with countries seeking to
restrain Chinese influence in the region.
Indonesia
GDP growth: 4.3%

GDP per head: $4,260 (PPP: $12,840)
Inflation: 3.2%
Population: 269.8m
The president, Joko Widodo (known as Jokowi), enjoys strong public support but has no
party of his own, so must offer compromises on his policy programme to maintain
political elbow-room. He is backed in the legislature by the Democratic Party of Struggle
and Golkar party and has representatives of six parties in his cabinet. As a result,
stability will take precedence over reform, but initiatives in job creation and
infrastructure investment will make progress. Economic growth stalled under covid-19,
which surged late in 2020, but will rebound strongly as exports and domestic demand
recover.
Japan
GDP growth: 1.7%
GDP per head: $39,950 (PPP: $42,060)
Inflation: 0.5%
Population: 126.1m
The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) elected Suga Yoshihide as the party’s
president, and hence prime minister, in late 2020, after the resignation for health
reasons of Abe Shinzo, Japan’s longest-serving prime minister. Mr Suga will maintain his
predecessor’s approach towards revitalising the economy. A patchy pandemic response
has eroded the government’s popularity, but the LDP and its legislative partner,
Komeito, will dominate lower-house elections due in October. (An earlier snap election
is possible.) Measures to combat the pandemic brought a steep recession, and recovery
will be slow.
TO WATCH: Passing the torch. The delayed games of the XXXII Olympiad will take place
in the summer of 2021, though the 2020 branding will remain.
Kazakhstan
GDP growth: 3.5%
GDP per head: $8,930 (PPP: $26,820)
Inflation: 6.3%
Population: 19.0m
The president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, will consolidate his control as his long-serving
predecessor, Nursultan Nazarbayev, watches from behind the throne. A second
pandemic surge (and second lockdown), compounded by a slump in oil prices, brought
a long run of economic growth to an end, though the government responded with aid
measures paid for in part from its well-stocked sovereign-wealth fund. The rebound will
be quick, with the lost ground fully recovered before year-end. The oil price will also
tick up, though not by much.
Malaysia
GDP growth: 5.0%

GDP per head: $10,620 (PPP: $28,330)
Inflation: 1.3%
Population: 32.8m
Politics have not yet settled since the ousting in 2018 of the United Malays National
Organisation (UMNO) after more than 60 years in power. There have been two
governments since and, judging by the weakness of the current Perikatan Nasional
coalition and its leader, the prime minister, Muhyiddin Yassin, 2021 will bring a third,
though elections are not scheduled until 2023. Mr Muhyiddin may prevail in an early
vote, but a return to an UMNO premiership is possible. Political uncertainty will damage
an economy already reeling from covid-19.
New Zealand
GDP growth: 1.4%
GDP per head: $40,760 (PPP: $41,680)
Inflation: 1.6%
Population: 5.0m
Strengthened by a widely lauded response to covid-19, the prime minister, Jacinda

Ardern, led her ruling Labour Party to a resounding election victory in October. The
centre-left party won 49% of the vote and a rare outright parliamentary majority, which
will push policy to the left. The public-health success came at the cost of a deep
recession. Recovery will be slow.
Pakistan
GDP growth: 0.8%
GDP per head: $1,180 (PPP: $4,690)
Inflation: 6.0%
Population: 225.2m
The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf government under the prime minister, Imran Khan, will
retain power through a tacit agreement with the army, which runs security policy and
foreign affairs. Opposition parties will combine to obstruct the legislative programme,
but with their leaders in jail or under investigation they will not threaten the
government’s survival. Public spending and record remittances from expat workers
cushioned the blow from covid-19, but getting back even to the recent modest rate of
growth will take a couple of years.
Philippines
GDP growth: 5.8%
GDP per head: $3,610 (PPP: $9,150)
Inflation: 3.2%

Population: 111.0m
The economy will bounce back strongly from the covid-19 recession, falling short of
recent trends but more than compensating for the ground lost in 2020. A surge in
infections threatened to undermine the authority of the president, Rodrigo Duterte, and
a squeeze in living standards will further inflame public opinion. Constraints on civil
liberties, including a gag on the media, will mute opposition.
TO WATCH: Cover girl. Mr Duterte will spend the year polishing the image of his
daughter, Sara Duterte, mayor of Davao City and potential presidential candidate in
2022.
Singapore
GDP growth: 3.9%
GDP per head: $64,190 (PPP: $101,990)
Inflation: 1.3%
Population: 5.6m
Notwithstanding the biggest stimulus package in its history and the successful
suppression of the virus, the country suffered one of Asia’s biggest recessions in 2020
and recovery for the export-led economy will be slow. Preparations by the prime
minister, Lee Hsien Loong, to transfer power to the fourth generation of leaders from
the ruling People’s Action Party, in charge since 1959, will be put on hold after the PAP’s
disappointing performance in the general election of 2020. Instead he will focus on
improving government performance in areas that concern younger voters, such as
immigration, reducing housing costs and improving social welfare.
South Korea
GDP growth: 2.4%
GDP per head: $32,870 (PPP: $44,530)
Inflation: 1.3%
Population: 51.3m
The president, Moon Jae-in, will redouble his reform push, buoyed by his Minjoo Party’s
success in securing a parliamentary super-majority in the 2020 general election. The
government got a pre-election boost from its effective response to the coronavirus
outbreak, which minimised the impact on health and the economy. Policy will focus on
inequality, boosting small and medium-sized businesses and deepening labour-market
reforms. The economy will return to trend growth.
TO WATCH: Back to the brink. North Korea’s traditional belligerence will return as the
love-in with Donald Trump fades into memory.
Sri Lanka
GDP growth: 2.3%
GDP per head: $3,940 (PPP: $13,580)
Inflation: 5.1%
Population: 21.5m
In elections in 2020, a landslide win for the Sri Lanka People’s Front (SLPP) gave
sweeping authority to the government, headed by the powerful Rajapaksa family
(Mahinda is prime minister and Gotabaya president). They immediately vowed to tweak
the constitution to increase presidential powers. The main opposition party is, like the
SLPP, supportive of the Sinhala-speaking Buddhist majority. A gradual pick-up in
exports will help the economy recover, though only partially, from the covid-19
recession.
Taiwan
GDP growth: 1.5%
GDP per head: $27,500 (PPP: $57,480)
Inflation: 0.2%
Population: 23.6m
The president, Tsai Ing-wen, and her Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) secured a
second term in 2020. The DPP’s victory came with a reduced majority, but the
defections were mainly to sympathetic parties, so its legislative advantage will be only
slightly eroded. Policy will focus on benefits and house-building to tackle inter-
generational inequality, infrastructure investment and promoting next-gen information
technology and renewable energy. A decisive response to covid-19 minimised both
public-health and economic impacts, and activity will rally.
TO WATCH: Word play. The 13th English as a Lingua Franca conference (ELF13),
delayed from 2020 by covid-19, will take place in Tainan in the summer.
Thailand
GDP growth: 3.2%
GDP per head: $8,000 (PPP: $18,940)
Inflation: 1.1%
Population: 70.0m
Protests against the military-backed government of Prayuth Chan-ocha, a former coup
leader, and against the king, are growing, drawing in middle-class urbanites who
previously supported the establishment in the country’s long-running “red shirt” versus
“yellow shirt” power struggle. The government should be able to outlast the protesters,
but a military crackdown cannot be ruled out. As covid-19 subsides, the government
will try to improve business conditions for foreign investors. A partial economic
recovery is all that can be expected.
Uzbekistan
GDP growth: 6.3%
GDP per head: $2,220 (PPP: $8,970)
Inflation: 12.2%
Population: 33.9m
The president, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, will push ahead with tax reform and privatisation.
The government will try to improve relations with neighbours while maintaining key
economic partnerships with China and Russia. The pandemic slashed demand at home
and abroad, but the economy will bounce back strongly in 2021.
TO WATCH: Close combat. The capital, Tashkent, will host the World Judo
Championships after the original choice, Vienna, was ruled out over a government
scandal.
Vietnam
GDP growth: 5.2%
GDP per head: $3,780 (PPP: $11,430)
Inflation: 2.1%
Population: 98.2m
A new team will take over the ruling Communist Party after the 13th National Congress
in early 2021, probably with Nguyen Xuan Phuc, the prime minister, becoming general
secretary. The transition will be smooth, and the government’s programme of economic
liberalisation will resume following the covid-19 interruption, including measures to
attract foreign direct investors and restructure state-owned firms. The economy will
slot back into its high-growth groove as the slowdown caused by the pandemic fades.
In Person
In a political set-up that shuns personality, let alone personality cults, Nguyen Xuan
Phuc, prime minister of Vietnam and one of the favourites to take over as general
secretary of the Communist Party, fits the bill to a tee. A seasoned administrator with a
background in management studies, he has shown a steady hand, not least in his
effective handling of covid-19—aided by a healthy distrust of China’s initial
reassurances. Still, his lack of experience in the propaganda side of national leadership
could be costly. His focus will be to tackle an entrenched system of back-scratching
among politicians and business leaders, sometimes crossing the line into corruption,
which is off-putting to foreign investors. The new team will also need to find an
accommodation with China on territory the two countries dispute in the South China
Sea.

North America
Canada
GDP growth: 4.0%
GDP per head: $45,930 (PPP: $50,650)
Inflation: 1.5%
Population: 38.1m
The Liberal Party government, led by the prime minister, Justin Trudeau, lacks a
majority in its second term and must seek support among the three main opposition
parties to pass legislation. The country rallied round Mr Trudeau as covid-19 struck, but
he will find the going much harder as the pandemic fades. Policy slip-ups could bring
the government to an early end. The economy was hit by the virus and low oil prices in
2020 and although the health crisis will pass, oil will stay cheap. Full recovery will take
years.
Mexico
GDP growth: 3.3%
GDP per head: $8,940 (PPP: $19,160)
Inflation: 3.9%
Population: 130.3m
The president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, and the government led by his Morena
party face a reckoning at mid-term elections in June. They will be helped by popular
anti-corruption measures and a weak opposition but hurt by a late and lacklustre
response to covid-19. On balance, they should retain their majority. The government
will pursue redistributive policies to support the poorest, but a slow recovery following
a deep recession in 2020 means there will be less to go round.
TO WATCH: Northwards. After focusing little on foreign policy, Mr López Obrador will
seek better relations with America, Mexico’s main economic partner and home to
almost all of its 12m emigrants.
United States
GDP growth: 3.6%
GDP per head: $64,790 (PPP: $64,790)
Inflation: 1.7%
Population: 332.9m
Joe Biden’s victory in the presidential election will return America to a semblance of
normalcy, and will shift policy left of centre. But legislating will be difficult, and the
pandemic is taking a severe toll—the country has just over 4% of the world’s population
but has suffered nearly 20% of recorded covid-19 deaths. The availability of a vaccine,
even though “anti-vaxxers” may shun it, will support the economic recovery. Even so,
the bounceback will be underwhelming; America’s $21.5trn economy won’t return to
2019 levels until late in 2021. Racial-justice protests will erupt regularly; police will
need years of retraining before they learn to ask questions first and shoot later.

Latin America
Argentina
GDP growth: 6.0%
GDP per head: $8,530 (PPP: $20,500)
Inflation: 45.3%
Population: 45.6m
The government of the president, Alberto Fernández, may get help from the IMF after a
deal with private creditors in 2020. It will be welcome: covid-19 will leave a big hole in
an economy that was already labouring under price controls and structural weaknesses,
and another devaluation is inevitable if IMF support is not forthcoming. The
government will lose some seats in mid-term elections in October but should retain a
majority. Inflation will drift upwards as some price controls are eased.
Bolivia
GDP growth: 3.8%
GDP per head: $3,350 (PPP: $8,090)
Inflation: 1.5%
Population: 11.8m
Luis Arce of the Movement for Socialism party won a presidential election in late 2020,
which will mean a return to the interventionist policies that marked his time as
economy minister under the former president, Evo Morales. The country must deal with
deep economic and fiscal imbalances amid competing pressures to promote a recovery
from a deep, coronavirus-induced recession.
Brazil
GDP growth: 3.0%
GDP per head: $6,940 (PPP: $15,040)

Inflation: 2.9%
Population: 213.3m
The president, Jair Bolsonaro, will prioritise re-election in 2022 over pushing his pro-
market reforms in a congress where his Liberal Social Party requires support from a
fragmented opposition to get anything done. A contest for the leadership of the lower
house, set for February, will clarify battle lines, with opposition centre-right parties
keen to control the legislative agenda. A relaxed covid-19 response protected the
economy but caused many deaths.
TO WATCH: Centred. Elected as a far-right populist, Mr Bolsonaro will woo centrist

support to avoid impeachment, without straying from his base.
Chile
GDP growth: 4.6%
GDP per head: $13,940 (PPP: $25,010)
Inflation: 2.7%
Population: 19.2m
Voters overwhelmingly approved a plan to rewrite the Pinochet-era constitution in a

referendum in late 2020. The vote was held in response to mass anti-inequality protests
that began in November 2019. Drafters of the new constitution will be elected in April
and their work will be ratified, again by referendum, in 2022, potentially shifting a long-
standing cross-party political consensus to the left. An effective covid-19 response
shielded the economy and will ensure a decent recovery.
TO WATCH: Copper bottom. Copper production will rally, replenishing a sovereign-
wealth fund depleted by a generous fiscal response to the virus.
Colombia
GDP growth: 4.4%
GDP per head: $5,550 (PPP: $15,080)
Inflation: 2.9%
Population: 51.3m
The president, Iván Duque of the rightwing Democratic Centre party, will resume
ambitious pro-growth reforms as the health crisis ebbs, including changes to taxation,
labour laws, pensions and health care, alongside the sale of state assets. But this will
serve to restore only part of the heavy losses from covid-19. The slow recovery will add
to social tensions over inflows of Venezuelan migrants, peace arrangements with the
FARC guerrilla movement and violence in the countryside.
Cuba
GDP growth: 2.3%
GDP per head: $9,880 (PPP: $13,480)

Inflation: 6.0%
Population: 11.3m
A pro-market reform agenda, already proceeding slowly, was suspended as covid-19

struck and will resume haltingly as the emergency subsides. The president, Miguel Díaz-
Canel, will gradually yield day-to-day policymaking to the prime minister, Manuel
Marrero, in a departure from the centralised leadership structure. The epidemic has
battered a fragile economy; the recovery will be feeble.
Ecuador
GDP growth: 5.1%
GDP per head: $5,720 (PPP: $11,000)
Inflation: 0.0%
Population: 17.8m
The president, Lenín Moreno, will approach the general election in February unloved by
the public, obstructed by the opposition majority in congress and assailed by a host of
challenges. Fiscal straits meant there was little support for a population wracked by
coronavirus, and austerity will hamper recovery. Protests will resume as the health
emergency eases and the next government, probably under centrist control, will inherit
a fractious public and a limp economy.
Paraguay
GDP growth: 2.9%
GDP per head: $4,930 (PPP: $13,070)
Inflation: 2.1%
Population: 7.2m
An exemplary early response to covid-19 was marred by a later surge in cases.That

undermined a potential bid by the health minister, Julio Mazzoleni, to become the
presidential candidate of the ruling Colorado Party in primaries due early in 2021,
although the election itself is not until 2023. The president, Mario Abdo Benítez, will
focus on shoring up political alliances amid a public backlash over corruption
allegations in the government. The recession will be one of the region’s mildest.
Peru
GDP growth: 9.2%
GDP per head: $6,340 (PPP: $12,220)
Inflation: 2.3%
Population: 33.5m
A particularly harsh pandemic, economically and medically, will provide ammunition to
nationalist parties ahead of April’s general election, in which the centre-right incumbent,
Martín Vizcarra, cannot stand. The winner will inherit an economy bashed by the
region’s biggest recession but recovering nonetheless, after a decade of strong growth.
Congress will be fragmented and rowdy.
TO WATCH: Freed up. If Mr Vizcarra escapes arrest at the end of his term, he will be the
first of the country’s past five presidents to do so.
Uruguay
GDP growth: 3.5%
GDP per head: $14,710 (PPP: $23,960)
Inflation: 7.5%
Population: 3.5m
Luis Lacalle Pou of the centre-right National Party leads a majority government flush
with public support after effective management of covid-19. Labour unions will resist
efforts to reform social security, and taxes could rise to narrow the post-pandemic fiscal
gap, but productivity and competitiveness reforms should gain ground. Two big
construction projects, a pulp mill and an overhaul of ports and railways, will help the
economy recover.
Venezuela
GDP growth: -1.7%
GDP per head: $2,110 (PPP: $4,480)
Inflation: 640%
Population: 27.8m
The president, Nicolás Maduro, will remain in office for now amid plunging living
standards and growing hostility abroad, but his regime is unsustainable. The longer he
survives the more chaotic his demise will be. If the army withdraws support, he is
finished. The economy, in dollar terms, contracted by two-thirds between 2018 and
2020 and will shrink again in 2021.
In Person
With Latin America’s age of dictators largely over, the route to absolute rule today starts
at the ballot box. The latest caudillo to tread this road is Nayib Bukele, president of El
Salvador, who won election in 2019 to become the region’s youngest national leader (he
turns 40 in 2021). Confronting the established parties, he campaigned against poverty,
crime and corruption, but the democratic mask quickly fell away. In February 2020,
piqued by a hostile legislature, he marched his soldiers up the aisle like a latter-day
Cromwell. When the Supreme Court struck down his harsh covid-19 measures, he
persisted. When gang murders spiked, he crammed jailed gang members together,
hands tied and stripped to their underwear. Many citizens like his hard line, and
legislative elections scheduled for February should strengthen his grip.

Middle East and Africa
Algeria
GDP growth: 1.3%
GDP per head: $3,710 (PPP: $10,870)
Inflation: 2.2%
Population: 44.5m
Public protests will re-emerge as the health emergency subsides, reflecting frustration
with the regime over its perceived failure to address grievances that forced long-time
autocrat Abdelaziz Bouteflika to resign in 2019. The re-drafted constitution, due to be
approved by referendum in late 2020, does little to demote the business, military and
political alliance that wields power. The economy will languish after a deep recession in
2020.
Angola
GDP growth: -0.1%
GDP per head: $2,000 (PPP: $6,410)
Inflation: 19.1%
Population: 33.9m
The president, João Lourenço, will push to dismantle the power networks established
over nearly 40 years by his predecessor, José Eduardo dos Santos, but will move slowly
to avoid a backlash from vested interests. The IMF will provide support to bridge a fiscal
crisis. Low oil prices will compound the economic blow from covid-19, yielding a second
successive year of recession.
Cameroon
GDP growth: 2.5%
GDP per head: $1,500 (PPP: $3,670)

Inflation: 2.7%
Population: 27.2m
A growing armed separatist movement in the Anglophone west will threaten stability,
compounding discontent with the seven-term president, Paul Biya, over his response,
and over attacks in the far north by Boko Haram, a militant Islamist group. The economy
will pick up from its pandemic dip as natural gas starts to flow through a new offshore
terminal at Kribi port. Delayed infrastructure projects will resume.
Egypt
GDP growth: -2.3%
GDP per head: $3,710 (PPP: $12,380)
Inflation: 5.1%
Population: 102.8m
The president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, will focus on reviving the economy from its viral
funk. He has plenty of time: a constitutional reform allows him to rule until 2030,
pending re-election in 2024, and with a legislative majority and little opposition, he
probably will. A tighter post-covid budget will bring protests, but the regime is well
protected by support from the armed forces.
Ethiopia
GDP growth: 3.1%
GDP per head: $900 (PPP: $2,250)
Inflation: 19.3%
Population: 117.9m
The risk of civil war will grow after the prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, sent the army into
the northern region of Tigray to quell opposition. Delayed legislative elections will
probably take place early in 2021, reinforcing the majority held by the ruling Prosperity
Party. Economic liberalisation will take a back seat as the government tries to restore its
high-growth credentials, stunted by two plagues—covid-19 and locusts.
Iran
GDP growth: 2.0 %
GDP per head: $6,150 (PPP: $11,510)
Inflation: 21.3%
Population: 85.0m
The pandemic was an additional blow to an economy already assailed by Western

sanctions, implacable opposition by America and a sharp decline in oil prices—all of
which points to a win for a hardliner in the presidential election in June. The slow
response to covid-19 will stoke public anger and a humanitarian crisis in an already-
weakened health system. After a deep recession in 2020, a strong recovery in China will
boost Iran’s economy.
Iraq
GDP growth: 0.7%
GDP per head: $4,450 (PPP: $ 10,070)
Inflation: 1.9%
Population: 41.2m
Oil markets will take time to recover from reduced global demand caused by the
pandemic, and Iraq’s oil-reliant economy will stagnate after a deep recession. The
transitional prime minister, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, will try to rally the economy and
confront the country’s deep governance challenges, but only if he secures the job
permanently in elections called for June.
Israel
GDP growth: 2.5%
GDP per head: $42,390 (PPP: $40,320)
Inflation: 0.2%
Population: 9.4m
A unity government formed in the face of the emerging pandemic envisaged the prime
minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, of the right-wing Likud party, handing power to Benny
Gantz, of the centre-right Blue and White party, in October, for a further 18 months. But
the coalition is shaky and may not see out its term. Fiscal support measures will be
withdrawn as the year progresses, and unemployment will rise, undermining the
recovery.
TO WATCH: The trial of Mr Netanyahu on corruption charges will begin in earnest in

January. He may be replaced as Likud leader regardless of the verdict.
Jordan
GDP growth: 2.1%
GDP per head: $3,690 (PPP: $8,420)
Inflation: 0.9%
Population: 11.6m
Public discontent will mount over falling living standards, higher unemployment and
post-pandemic austerity. The virus will limit Western financial support and bring
expatriate workers back home from economically straitened neighbouring states,
adding to social strains. There will be protests, but King Abdullah II will remain secure.
Fragile public finances further weakened by the pandemic response will hold back
recovery.
Kenya
GDP growth: 2.0%
GDP per head: $1,790 (PPP: $ 4,460)
Inflation: 6.0%
Population: 55.0m
An effective response to covid-19 will raise support for the president, Uhuru Kenyatta.
Tensions within and between the two main parties will become more intense as the
government enters its final year, and a split in Mr Kenyatta’s Jubilee Party is on the
cards as supporters of his deputy, William Ruto, seek a platform. Emergency
international funding will help revive the economy.
TO WATCH: Building bridges. Mr Kenyatta’s stronger footing will allow him to pursue a
rewrite of the constitution discussed with the opposition, including a dilution of
executive powers.
Lebanon
GDP growth: 1.1%
GDP per head: $9,440 (PPP: $12,620)
Inflation: 98.8%
Population: 6.8m
Nowhere is vulnerability to catastrophe more in evidence than in Lebanon, where even

covid-19 was eclipsed by a fertiliser explosion in August 2020 that obliterated Beirut’s
port and brought down the government. The transitional prime minister, Mustafa Adib,
resigned when he failed to form a government; Saad Hariri has taken over. A complete
economic meltdown cannot be ruled out. An IMF rescue package is possible if a new
government can be formed.
Libya
GDP growth: 20.9%
GDP per head: $4,230 (PPP: $ 10,970)
Inflation: 7.7%
Population: 7.0m
A proxy war is pitting the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) against the UN-
recognised Government of National Accord, fuelled by international backers seeking
regional influence. A UN-sponsored process of political normalisation will remain
suspended until a ceasefire is brokered. The pandemic compounded a devastating
blockade of the country’s oil exports by the LNA, and the economy will only partially
recover.
Morocco
GDP growth: 1.6%
GDP per head: $3,180 (PPP: $7,700)
Inflation: 0.8%
Population: 37.3m
Growth will resume after covid-19 and drought wracked the economy, though
persistent unemployment and regional inequalities will fuel discontent. This, and
divisions within the ruling Justice and Development Party, will hamper the government,
but it will retain its authority under the king, Mohammed VI. Expect a lukewarm
economic rally.
Nigeria
GDP growth: 1.0%
GDP per head: $2,090 (PPP: $5,050)
Inflation: 16.8%
Population: 211.4m
The main task for the president, Muhammadu Buhari, will be dealing with the decline in
the economy brought on by the pandemic and the related slump in oil prices. But he
must also confront an Islamist insurgency in the north-east, separatism in the south and
anti-police protests that erupted in late 2020. The crisis will boost talk of market-
friendly reforms, but the government’s resolve to pursue them will fade as the economy
rallies.
Saudi Arabia
GDP growth: 2.0%
GDP per head: $20,520 (PPP: $46,150)
Inflation: 1.6%
Population: 35.9m
The ailing king, Salman bin Abdel-Aziz al-Saud, will rely on his son, Mohammad bin
Salman al-Saud, the crown prince, to handle the fallout from covid-19 and a drop in oil
prices. In turn, his heir will prepare for his eventual accession to the throne by
suppressing rival members of the royal family. As the pandemic fades, he will rev up his
policy of social liberalisation blended with rigid political control.
South Africa
GDP growth: 1.5%
GDP per head: $5,110 (PPP: $12,390)

Inflation: 4.1%
Population: 60.0m
The president, Cyril Ramaphosa, will have his hands full sustaining a post-pandemic
economic rebound, forestalling a debt crisis via spending cuts, preventing land reform
from becoming a land grab and just keeping the lights on. He will face resistance from
elements in the ruling African National Congress. The findings of a major anti-
corruption report are due in March.
Syria
GDP growth: -1.7%
GDP per head: $1,400 (PPP: $ 3,780)
Inflation: 54.5%
Population: 16.3m
Recession brought on by the pandemic will persist in an economy ravaged by war,

international sanctions and the blast in Beirut, a key regional import route. Protests will
increase as economic hardship bites, but the regime of the president, Bashar al-Assad,
has the resources and the political clout to stay secure. A pro-forma presidential
election will take place in April or May.
Zimbabwe
GDP growth: 0.4%
GDP per head: $1,390 (PPP: $2,480)
Inflation: 223%
Population: 15.1m
Social strife, economic hardship and political instability were the best the country could
hope for before covid-19 struck. In its wake, the government of the president,
Emmerson Mnangagwa, will face increasing popular protest. Mr Mnangagwa will
sideline opponents and rivals and hold on to power—as long as he retains military
support.
In Person
Uganda’s president, Yoweri Museveni, has held power since 1986 and the advantages of
incumbency should see him to a 6th term in elections due early in 2021. But he faces a
young challenger in Robert Kyagulanyi, also known as Afrobeats singer Bobi Wine, who
built his “People Power” movement after becoming an independent MP in 2017, then
launching a political party in July 2020. The self-styled “ghetto president” promises his
mostly young, mostly poor, red-beret-wearing supporters relief from Mr Museveni, who
is using the pandemic to launch a police crackdown and harass and intimidate his
political opponents. The odds are against Mr Kyagulanyi, but he just might uncork a
flood of popular sentiment that carries him to power.

World in numbers: Industries

• The world in figures: Industries

Automotive
Sales of cars in 2020 were expected to shake off the sluggishness of recent years;
instead, the pandemic brought disaster. Carmakers will get some relief from pent-up
demand in 2021, when sales of both new passenger cars and commercial vehicles will
accelerate by around 15% from the prior year. Europe and America will lead the way
but Asia, the usual driver of progress, has no deep slump to come back from and will be
in a lower gear. No region will regain its 2019 levels. Global sales will still be 5% lower
than before the pandemic, at 84m vehicles.
Electric vehicles will be sparkier, with 3.4m sales in 2021—up from just 2.1m in 2019.
China, which previously accounted for more than half of the EV market, will see its
share drop to 45%, despite extending tax breaks. The EU will lead on growth as it
tightens its emissions rules again and disburses yet more subsidies for electrics. Tesla
and others will expand in China, while China’s BYD will head for Norway, where four
out of ten cars run on batteries. Self-driving cars will lag behind, though BMW will reach
“level 3” automation, making cars that can drive themselves, conditions allowing. Firms
bent on going further will struggle.
Carmakers will combine forces to mend their dented finances. Honda will team up with
General Motors in North America. Fiat Chrysler and Groupe PSA, newly merged, will
become Stellantis, overtaking GM to form the world’s fourth-biggest carmaker. Some car
companies will prune plants to cut costs. Honda will close its British factory in Swindon
in July; Nissan will leave Barcelona in December 2021. Indonesia has also lost a Nissan
plant but will gain one from Hyundai, keen to expand in South-East Asia. New ventures
will offer solace elsewhere, too. Ineos, hitherto a petrochemicals company, will begin
making cars at a former Daimler factory in France.
TO WATCH: Electric spin-offs. Irked by the higher share prices of pure-EV brands such
as Tesla, GM may sell a stake in its EV business. Hyundai plans its own EV spin-off, Ioniq.
Although it will be a sub-brand, with no stake sale, Hyundai’s share price should benefit.
Defence and aerospace
The fortunes of commercial planemakers in 2021 will be determined by travellers’

willingness to fly, which will in turn depend on the course of the pandemic. Airlines’
travails have prompted billions of dollars of losses at Airbus and Boeing. The
planemaking duopoly has had to slash production and delay deliveries; more order
cancellations could follow. In 2021 Moody’s, a rating agency, expects the industry to
churn out 30-40% less large commercial aircraft than it did pre-coronavirus.
Planemakers’ best hope is that disease-conscious consumers prove willing to take short,
domestic flights, lifting demand for narrow-body jets. Boeing’s grounded 737 MAX
(possibly renamed the 737-8) would be among them, once regulators clear it to fly again.
However, Boeing will first deliver the 450 already built. Its profits will recover to $5.7bn
in 2021, Moody’s projects, well below the $13bn it made before the MAX fiasco. A
challenge to the MAX and Airbus’s 320 NEO could loom closer as China’s Commercial
Aircraft Corporation (COMAC) belatedly begins delivering its mid-size C919.
Defence will be the safer business. Many countries are set on military modernisation
and replacing outdated equipment. Geopolitical risks are rife, pandemic or no: Sino-
American tensions could even spread into the realm of space-based weapons. America’s
government, the biggest defence spender, is helping domestic weapons-makers. Still,
even defence spending may not escape cuts if pandemic-induced debt-worries multiply.
TO WATCH: War, virtually. Covid-19 promises to spur defence strategists’ use of virtual
reality for war-gaming. “Synthetic environments” offered by the likes of SoftBank-
funded Improbable help planners model responses not just to conventional threats but
to a rampaging killer virus. Surely it could never happen.
Energy
Energy demand collapsed during the pandemic. Crude-oil consumption fell as

consumers and companies were locked down and oil-guzzling sectors such as travel
were hit hard. As the world economy picks itself up, pent-up demand will help the
global appetite for oil recover slightly, by 5%, to an average of 96m barrels a day in
2021. America and China, the two biggest oil addicts, will match this rate. Asia will be
the source of over 60% of new oil demand in coming years.
Oil companies have the tricky task of matching output to the uncertain economic
trajectory. America’s shale producers are the chief losers from low prices. As billions of
dollars of their low-grade debt comes due in 2021, expect more bankruptcies; this will
contribute to a plateauing of US output. The OPEC-Russia deal to cut 5.8m barrels a day
from oil markets in 2021 will prop up prices, though backsliding is inevitable among
Russia’s powerful private-sector oil firms. Still, political strife in Iran, Libya and
Venezuela will help restrain supply. The price of benchmark Brent crude will limp to an
average of $45 a barrel in 2021.
Oil’s tumble has dragged down prices for liquefied natural gas. LNG’s cheapness will
help boost demand by nearly 5%. A further increase will be driven by the continuing
shift from coal-fired to gas-fired power plants. Low prices for fossil fuels will tarnish
hopes that the post-pandemic world will have a green tinge, though solar power and
wind-energy production will again swell at double-digit rates.
TO WATCH: Blocked pipe. Gazprom’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline linking Russia to
Germany via the Baltic could finally start pumping gas in the first quarter. America will
do its best to stop it. Its sanctions have already helped delay the $11bn project. America,
itself a burgeoning producer of natural gas, wants to loosen Russia’s hold on the
European market, but it can only delay the inevitable. Nord Stream 2, once fully
operational, will be able to carry 55bn cubic metres a year to the EU, 11% of its pre-
covid needs.
Entertainment
Entertainment’s jazziest performer will again be over-the-top (OTT) services such as

video streaming. Still, OTT subscriptions growth will slow as incomes suffer, rising by
just 11% in 2021 after a 26% expansion in 2019, according to PwC, a consultancy. The
appetite for video will not keep pace with the blossoming range of viewing options.
ViacomCBS, a media giant, will weigh in with a revamped and renamed “CBS All Access”
streaming service. Netflix will lose some licensed content (notably “The Office”) to rivals
but will stay on top thanks to its vast content library and popular algorithm-based
viewing recommendations.
Box-office revenue will surge by 78% in 2021 yet lag behind 2019 levels by 38%, given
caps on cinema capacity. After a dire 2020, American takings will jump by 80% to
$6.4bn, says PwC, as delayed big-ticket films (“Top Gun: Maverick”, for instance, and
“Dune”, a sci-fi epic) lure back punters. But production hold-ups in 2020 will stall long-
awaited releases such as “The Batman”, from Warner Bros, for another year, until 2022.
To prosper, streaming platforms and production houses alike must conjure up enticing
new works. Filming has recovered in Asia but will hit a bottleneck in 2021 in Hollywood.
Pandemic-related restrictions on shooting will prod a few brave production houses to
tap artificial intelligence: “b”, a Hollywood sci-fi movie due to be made in 2021, will star
Erica, a Japanese humanoid robot.
TO WATCH: Microsoft ups its game. Gaming wars are increasingly playing out on cloud
platforms, not consoles. Microsoft wants to harness its cloud expertise to do battle with
Sony and Nintendo and next-generation-competitors Google, Amazon and Nvidia. Its
Project xCloud, launched for Android smartphones in 22 countries in 2020, lets
subscribers stream console games on mobile devices. Microsoft’s cloud assault could be
propelled in 2021 by the arrival of its long-awaited game, “Halo Infinite”.
Financial services
Finance firms may not have caused the covid-driven economic crisis but will
nonetheless bear the brunt of it in 2021. Debt is already soaring and bankruptcies will
rise. American lenders are well placed to withstand even the severest of scenarios. By
contrast, European banks will brace themselves for consolidations, with lenders in
Greece and Cyprus particularly vulnerable. Indian banks’ non-performing loans will
near 15% of all credits. China’s lenders will also struggle as bad debts near $500bn.
Countries with the weakest financial systems, including Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, will
navigate sovereign-debt crises.
Banks will scramble to increase loan-loss provisions, while central banks and
governments juggle low interest rates and deflation risks. Regulators will keep close
watch, but will also be tested by new payment platforms (think WhatsApp Payments),
as the lines between banks, tech firms and retailers blur. Digital currencies will add a
further challenge: Russia will allow their free circulation from January and China is
launching its own.
Stockmarkets that suffered in 2020 will rebound, as those in Hong Kong and London
weather political upheavals. Trading will widen as mobile apps like Robinhood allow
novice investors to dabble, bolstering stockmarkets in developing countries. Insurance,
too, will widen its appeal as it recovers from 2020’s setbacks, with China leading the
charge. Emerging-market premiums will shoot up by 7% in 2021, predicts Swiss Re, a
reinsurance company.
TO WATCH: CIPS v SWIFT. The tussle between China and America over Hong Kong’s
status may entangle international payments. If America tries to block China’s access to
SWIFT, China will turn to its own Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS).
Should CIPS prove cheaper than SWIFT, more of the global trading system could shift
away from the dollar.
Food and farming
Demand for food is stickier than toffee, which in the midst of a global pandemic bodes
well for farmers (if less so for consumers). The Economist Intelligence Unit’s index of
agricultural prices rose by just under 1% in 2020 and will climb a further 2% or so in
2021. Beverages and grains promise to be particularly resilient.
For producers, though, troubles await. A stronger dollar will suppress poorer countries’
appetite for food imports even as it encourages producers to increase output. Trade
protectionism will provide plenty of grist for worriers. Food supply chains have been
rocked by the pandemic, which has also caused labour shortages. In Britain, the shortfall
will be compounded after the Brexit transition arrangement expires at the end of 2020:
tens of thousands of EU workers normally help British farmers harvest produce.
A topsy-turvy 2021 lies in wait for commodities, including cocoa. A deal between
market heavyweights Ghana and Ivory Coast is supporting producers, but as global
prices dip by 10% in 2021, the cohesion between the two may yet crumble. The coffee
trade, too, looks frothy. Prices of sought-after arabica beans will shrivel by 6% while
those of rival robusta beans will surge by 16%; still, arabica will remain roughly twice
as expensive. Coffee retailers will have to cater to post-covid tastes. Expect a new wave
of coffee machines and home-delivery services.
TO WATCH: Vertical ascent. High-tech “vertical farming” could help overcome covid-
era food woes. Cultivation occurs indoors in stacked trays that can be tended by
(sickness-immune) robots. Supply lines can be shortened because farms tend to be
located closer to consumers. Larger farms will sprout in 2021 in places as far-flung as
Britain’s Bedfordshire and Houston, Texas.
Health care
The rollout of covid-19 vaccines will be the hope and headache of 2021. Finalising trials
and scaling up production will be hard, the costs of delivery vast. Health-care workers
will be first in line for immunisation, particularly in rich countries. Gavi, an international
vaccine alliance, will lead efforts to provide at least 2bn doses for poorer countries.
Overall, vaccine producers will earn up to $100bn and draw fire if they are seen to be
profiteering. The anti-vax movement will seize on any safety failures.
Meanwhile, covid-19 deaths will ripple past 2m by April. Evidence will build of long-
term effects, including brain damage and chronic fatigue. Hospitals will scramble to
catch up with delayed non-covid care but struggle with quarantine rules. Cancer deaths
will also rise after delays in screening. Telemedicine will catch on rapidly everywhere,
as insurers step up to cover the bills. Mergers between hospitals in America will help
cut costs, though some deals will falter amid economic uncertainty.
Global health-care spending, squeezed during lockdowns, will bounce back by just over
6% in dollar terms. Asia will lead the way as China’s latest five-year plan accelerates
reforms intended to spur innovation among insurers, hospitals and clinics. Pressure on
prices in America and China will slow growth of pharmaceutical sales to 5%, despite
those vaccine sales. Even so, the industry will be one of the few able to invest in
expansion.
TO WATCH: Digital dilemma. Delayed by covid-19, the EU’s new Medical Device
Directive comes into full force in May as regulators scurry to catch up with smart-health
apps and wearables. Fitbit and Apple are monitoring closely.
Infrastructure
Governments face a dilemma. Infrastructure is capital-intensive and their debts have

exploded: rich nations’ debt-to-GDP ratio will exceed 120% by the start of 2021 and
poorer countries are building their own gargantuan piles. Yet infrastructure can offer a
rewarding target for stimulus spending: the gap between the investment needed
globally and expected outlays runs into trillions of dollars. Overall, the urge to spend
will win out in 2021. Gross fixed investment, a rough proxy for infrastructure spending,
will strengthen by 8% globally. It dropped by 10% in 2020 as coronavirus distracted
governments and construction workers stayed at home.
Many of the keenest builders will be in the developed world. Nine of the 25 fastest-
growing spenders will hail from Europe, with France and Ireland growing by 20% or
more. Britain, too, will make it into the top 25 as its Conservative government tries to
use infrastructure improvements to boost the Midlands and the north of England. For
scale of investment, though, no one will match China: its fixed-asset investment will
rebound by nearly 7% in dollar terms to $6trn, 30% of the global total. China wants to
channel cash towards improving its digital infrastructure, but more traditional targets
(rail, road and urban infrastructure) will benefit, too. India’s spending, though much
lower, will surge by 18% as Narendra Modi’s government makes infrastructure a pillar
of recovery.
Elsewhere the setback for spending will be longer-lasting. Under Joko Widodo,
Indonesia had hoped to throw money at creating new connections between its myriad
islands. But the president’s goals are under threat from both the virus and Indonesia’s
paltry fiscal income (less than 14% of GDP). Big improvements to Indonesia’s
infrastructure will be elusive in 2021.
Information technology
The pandemic is giving a shot in the arm to swathes of IT. Social distancing will boost
technologies including robotics, the internet of things, virtual workspaces and video
conferencing. Software will be the top performer, with spending up by 7% in 2021,
topping 2019, Gartner forecasts. As remote working spurs the need for backup systems
and cloud-based software, “infrastructure as a service” is set to rocket by 28% to $64bn.
Market leaders such as Amazon, Google and Microsoft will race to add data centres; Asia
and Africa are prime targets.
Purveyors of cutting-edge wearables will seek to capitalise on the post-lockdown

popularity of mobile gaming and “at-home entertainment” (or “Netflixing”). Apple may
add augmented-reality content to Apple TV+, a streaming service, in 2021 before
launching compatible headsets. In India, Reliance Jio plans to release AR glasses
designed for the mass market.
The picture is not all rosy. Though overall IT spending will grow by 4% to $3.7trn, that
will still be 3% less than before covid-19. Fewer workers in offices means hardware
demand will languish 14% below recent highs. Remote working also creates
opportunities for online baddies. Even pre-pandemic, cybercrime losses were projected
to hit $6trn in 2021, twice the level in 2015. The raft of new e-commerce startups are
prime targets for phishing sorties. So are telehealth providers, which have been allowed
by some regulators to weaken their defences as they struggle to cope with surging
demand.
TO WATCH: Big-tech opportunity. India’s tech scene faces new challenges. Slowdowns
in America and Europe will weigh on IT-services companies such as Infosys and TCS.
Amid Sino-Indian tensions, Indian e-commerce and tech startups will have to look
beyond Chinese investors for funds. Sensing an opportunity, America’s tech giants will
pour billions into India in coming years.
Media
After declining by around 7% in 2020, ad revenues will rise by 6% to $573bn, according
to Magna Research. Rescheduled sports events (see Sport) will loosen advertisers’ purse
strings. But the global ad-take will come up $9bn short of pre-coronavirus days. Asia-
Pacific will grow fastest (by 8%), helped by an expected $800m splashed out on the
Tokyo Olympics. North America, least hurt in 2020 owing to political ad-spending in an
election year, will grow slowest (4%). Still, with $222bn in ads, America will all but
recover ground lost in 2020.
Advertising via traditional media will just about return to positive territory.
Newspapers and magazines will shed yet more ad dollars, hastening the transition to
digital-subscription models, even in developing Asia. Revenues for television and radio
will expand by 2% and 1% respectively, according to Zenith Media. Out-of-home and
cinema ads will surge (by 16% and 65% respectively) following steep dips in 2020, but
fail to reach previous highs.
Ad placements on social media and video content will proliferate. More streaming
companies will be tempted to launch ad-backed free versions to snare viewers, as have
Pluto TV (owned by CBS), Peacock (Comcast) and India’s SonyLIV. User-generated
content on platforms such as Instagram Reels or TikTok will find favour. Video ads will
get even shorter, to attract eyeballs on Instagram Stories or Facebook Thumbstoppers.
Metals and mining
Metals prices were flagging with oversupply even before coronavirus, for steel in
particular. Amid the economic wreckage, they have been hit hard again—far harder
than their agricultural cousins. The silver lining? Having dwindled further in 2020,
metals prices will bounce back faster in 2021. A moderate rise in demand will deplete
stocks and push up the EIU’s base-metals index by 5%, though prices will not attain
their former shine.
Big spending on infrastructure in China, especially, ought to support suppliers of
industrial metals such as copper. Indeed, the strength of China’s economic recovery will
be pivotal for many miners. Producers will also pray the Sino-American trade conflict
does not harm carmakers, a source of demand bolstered by growing need for electric-
vehicle batteries. Meanwhile, strikes at copper mines in Latin America and Indonesia
will restrain output. Prices will increase by about 5% in 2021. Protectionism is a
menace to other industrial metals, too. Take aluminium: America’s import tariffs will
divert supplies away from its shores; crimped output will keep prices high there.
Aluminium prices, bashed out of shape in 2019-20, will climb by more than 4% in 2021.
Among precious metals, gold, perhaps unsurprisingly, has shone brightly in these
uncertain times: average prices were 27% higher in 2020. But as economies recover,
consumption will fall by 7% and prices will be flat in 2021.
Retail
Having declined by nearly 5% in 2020, global retail sales will expand by 3% in 2021.
Asia will lead the charge, with sales in Vietnam and China growing by around 4% and
the Philippines by 7%. India, having taken a beating in 2020, will not regain its former
lustre, with sales up 4%—sluggish by its standards. Africa’s retail boom must wait:
covid-19 has blighted incomes there. Globally, sales will be lower than before the
pandemic and retail, ever a cut-throat business, will get bloodier. Rivalry between
emerging-market retailers and foreign interlopers will intensify. Reliance Industries’
online marketplace, JioMart, will bring the fight to Amazon and Walmart-owned Flipkart.
Consumers’ covid-inspired buying habits will become ingrained. Under lockdown, 47%
of Americans over 55 started shopping more online, according to an e-Marketer survey;
many new converts will stick around. Because online shoppers crave slick delivery
services, sellers will be obliged to invest in technology and logistics, favouring deep-
pocketed players and encouraging tie-ups between retail, tech and payments firms. In
America, click-and-collect sales will climb by 10%, having ballooned by 60% in 2020.
In the coming years more people will shop from their sofas, check out goods using
augmented reality and order them via smart speakers. Retailers have a chance to cut the
cost of running physical stores: many will invest in improving their own websites or
listing on online marketplaces such as Amazon or Facebook Shops. Struggling stores
will morph into warehouses, losing out to big-box retailers that collect lots of brands
beneath one roof. Prepare for more bankruptcies.
Sport
The sports industry aspires to make a spectacular comeback in 2021 but will fail to
generate the $580bn in revenues predicted pre-pandemic. Postponed events will fill
schedules. In Tokyo, the Summer Olympics and Paralympics will stick proudly to their
name (“Tokyo 2020”) as they welcome more than 11,000 athletes and admit new sports
such as skateboarding and surfing. Medals will be made with metal recycled from 6.2m
mobile phones. The UEFA Euro 2020 football tournament, also postponed, will avoid
possible travel bans by spanning 12 European cities. Its sister tournament, the 2021
Copa América, will take place in Colombia and Argentina.
China, too, will stage postponed competitions after lifting a ban on international
sporting events imposed in mid-2020. Not postponed—coronavirus permitting—will be
the Rugby League World Cup in Britain, which has long been scheduled for late 2021.
The success of these events will drive the recovery of businesses in related industries,
from hospitality to the $85bn sports-betting market.
Even so, sponsors and advertisers will be wary of renewing contracts as corporate
finances falter, while social distancing limits ticket sales. Crowds will not live up to the
name, though fans unfazed by contagion risks are likely to snap up refunded tickets.
Millions will be content to watch the action online, where the e-sports industry will
mount a $1.2bn challenge. TV sports rights will stay cheap despite new bidders. That
augurs badly for America’s National Football League, whose $1bn deal with Disney
comes to a close after 2021.
Telecoms
Booming online shopping and remote working will fuel record demand for mobile and
internet services. But the pandemic’s economic fallout will stop the number of mobile
and broadband subscribers rising by more than about 3% from pre-covid levels.
American and Chinese operators will focus on expanding and monetising their fledgling
5G coverage. Europe will play catch-up, rushing to launch 5G services after dragging its
feet in 2020 over whether to use Huawei’s technology. Meanwhile, Latin America, Africa
and South Asia will be busy upgrading from 2G and 3G to high-speed 4G LTE. Mobile
revenues will rise more quickly in developing countries than developed ones, climbing
by 2%, according to GSMA, an industry body.
The handset market will fragment further. Huawei will be hurt by America’s ban on
using its technology. The Chinese company’s loss will not necessarily be Apple’s gain.
South Korea’s titan, Samsung, is well placed to thrive if it can win over new users with
affordable 5G phones. Other Chinese players (Xiaomi, Oppo and Vivo) should make
strides and low-cost makers such as Transsion (China, again) and VinSmart (Vietnam)
will claim new ground in Africa and Asia.
Sino-American tensions, Brexit and slowing economic growth will prod the EU to loosen
its competition policies. The overturning in 2020 of a ban on a merger between O2 and
Three will encourage other post-pandemic link-ups. Watch for consolidation in
countries with more than three operators, such as Spain.
TO WATCH: Chipping Huawei. Once America’s sanctions sever supplies of crucial chips
for Huawei’s smartphones, its handset shipments could plummet by 75% in 2021.
Huawei is set to lose its status as the second-largest smartphone vendor, but don’t write
it off. It has other business lines and a huge domestic market to fall back on—plus a big
R&D budget to push for self-reliance in chipmaking.
Travel and tourism

Few industries were walloped harder by the pandemic than travel and tourism. More
tourists will venture forth in 2021, but they will face cancellations and quarantines.
International arrivals in the world’s 60 largest economies will rise by 8%—but languish
15% below 2019 levels. Both leisure and business travel will still be suffering. Morgan
Stanley reckons 31% of business travel will shift to online meetings. Millions of tourism-
related jobs will be at risk.
All things being equal, Asia should recover fastest, as Thailand and New Zealand lift
their travel bans. Macau, where tourism brought in more than half of pre-pandemic GDP,
will welcome back non-Chinese visitors. But travellers from China (the world’s top
tourism spender) will tread cautiously, while America (the biggest earner) will stay
selective about visitors. In Europe, Britain will face new checks once the Brexit
transition deal expires, and Venice will levy a tourist tax to limit visitor numbers. Public
events such as the delayed Tokyo Olympics and Dubai Expo will be socially distanced.
Domestic travel, already 75% of tourism revenue in rich countries, will fill some gaps.
Even so, spending at hotels and restaurants, though up on 2020, will be 9% down on
2019 in dollar terms. Government funding will keep many travel companies going. Yet
airlines, despite receiving $123bn in aid, will make a loss of $15bn in 2021. Cargo
demand will outpace passenger numbers, but that will not prevent some airlines from
vanishing. It will not be plain sailing for cruise lines either, as cancellations accumulate.

Business
• The new geography of business
• Beyond the Valley
• From “techlash” to “techslog”
• Bilateral damage
• Bonding from home
• Power struggle
• More than just a game
• Bargaining chips
• Books bounce back
• Itchy feet
• The power of green technology

Business
The new geography of business

Vijay Vaitheeswaran: US business editor, The Economist, NEW YORK
The pandemic forced firms to experiment furiously in 2020. Now comes the
reckoning
2021 in brief
A new airline planned by David Neeleman, founder of JetBlue Airways, is due to start
service in March, despite the airline industry facing its worst financial crisis ever. The
airline, called Breeze Airways, is expected to focus initially on underserved airports in
the south-eastern United States
IT WAS INNOVATION at warp speed. The best firms in many industries responded to
the outbreak of covid-19 with impressive agility. Employees adapted to new working
methods such as video-conferencing from the kitchen table. Suddenly unprofitable
business lines were swiftly replaced by once-risky approaches like “click and collect”
shopping. Digitisation went into hyper-drive, sending e-commerce, online
entertainment, telemedicine, e-learning and food delivery soaring. This outpouring of
enthusiasm and ingenuity is impressive, but the hard truth is that a lot of it is
unsustainable.
In 2021 chief executives face a year of reckoning, as they deal with innovation fatigue
inside their firms and a complex business environment outside. An analysis for The
World in 2021 by superforecasters at Good Judgment, a forecasting firm, predicts that an
effective covid-19 vaccine will not be widely available during much of 2021. There are
also lots of conflicting views on how quickly the global economy will recover.
Bridgewater, the world’s biggest hedge fund, reckons the pandemic will cost companies
around $20trn globally.
If firms are to survive the difficult year ahead, the executive mindset must shift from
innovation to transformation. In particular, bosses must address three geographic
dilemmas for which there are no easy answers.
First, where should firms make their products? Companies find themselves on the front
line of political fights over tariffs, technology, climate change and racial injustice. In part,
this reflects a failure of leadership from politicians, which has prompted consumers and
employees to demand that bosses step up instead. It also reflects the fact that firms are
now pawns in wider geopolitical battles—just ask Huawei, TikTok, Harley-Davidson,
America’s tech giants or the French wine industry, all of which have been caught up in
trade, tax and technology spats beween America, China and Europe.
In this fast-changing and uncertain regulatory landscape, deglobalisation seems an

obvious response. But Kevin Sneader, global managing partner at McKinsey, a
consultancy, challenges the notion that supply-chain efficiency must be traded off
against resilience, arguing that “over time these ‘resilience costs’ could be innovated
away” by new ways of doing things. That will require bosses and company boards to
make hard decisions about how to modify their global supply chains to make them
shorter, faster, smarter and safer.
The second geographic quandary is: where will customers want to buy things? The rise
in e-commerce during the crisis has clearly boosted online retailers like Amazon but
there may be other, more surprising beneficiaries too. Mauro Guillén of the Wharton
School predicts that companies like Canada’s Shopify, which serves as the online back-
end for smaller businesses, will enable sustainable e-commerce “within 25 miles of your
home, which didn’t exist before”. In America and Britain, which have strong digital
infrastructure but underdeveloped e-commerce when compared with China, the shift
towards online shopping could prove permanent.
But the picture varies greatly by industry and market. Although 60% of Italians shopped
online during the pandemic, only 10% found it satisfying. In many parts of continental
Europe, which have poorer infrastructure for delivery and online engagement, some
consumers will revert to in-person purchasing after the pandemic.
The trickiest question is: where should employees work? Remote working, forced on
firms by the pandemic, has proved popular. Jonas Prising, the boss of Manpower, a
human-resources consultancy, says his clients report high worker satisfaction and
surprisingly strong productivity. “A shift toward remote hiring liberates us to get a
whole new level of talent, and for sure will lead to a greater diversity in hiring,” says
David McCormick, Bridgewater’s chief executive. KPMG, a consultancy, says nearly
three-quarters of chief executives agree.
Even so, remote working can be a double-edged sword. Gary Hamel of the London
Business School says it can magnify management problems such as tyrannical bosses,
excessive bureaucracy and resistance to new ideas. Christian Ulbrich, CEO of JLL, a
property-management giant, thinks employees who have a decent home-office
arrangement, or who have care-giving responsibilities, will not want to come back to
headquarters.
That could be problematic. Many bosses are less effective at communicating

electronically than in person, and prolonged separation is reinforcing departmental
silos and entrenching elite power. Younger employees already miss socialising at work.
Older ones will tire of staring at screens in cramped apartments—especially if Zoom
calls invade their evenings and weekends. Even a senior executive at a tech giant that
makes remote-collaboration software longs for the in-person “ideation” sessions and
water-cooler gossip of yesteryear.
So bosses should prepare themselves, and their companies, for a hybrid future with a
mix of remote working, smaller headquarters and co-working hubs in satellite locations.
They will have to adapt their management styles and pay closer attention to morale and
well-being. In KPMG’s survey of bosses, “talent risk” has shot up from number 12 on its
list of risks to long-term growth before the pandemic struck to number one now. That
means bosses who want their firms to emerge stronger from the crisis must be ready to
compete harder for talent in a world turned upside down.

Beyond the Valley

Ludwig Siegele: US technology editor, The Economist, SAN FRANCISCO
The technology industry’s centre of gravity is on the move
Where did everyone go?
SILICON VALLEY has always been more of a mindset than a place. Its defining feature is
a willingness to make high-risk investments in promising but unproven technologies. As
it has cycled through technologies—from personal computers and the internet to
smartphone apps and cloud computing—its bearings have shifted. Pushed by the
pandemic, it is on the move again, in several respects.
Start with the real world. Silicon Valley’s ground zero used to be Palo Alto, the city
where Stanford University is located, and at one end of Sand Hill Road, the preferred
location of its leading venture-capital (VC) firms. But in recent years its geographic
centre has moved north, to San Francisco, where most unicorns (startups worth more
than $1bn) are based. Now that covid-19 has turned that city into something of a ghost
town, Silicon Valley is spreading out in different directions.
For a time it was easier to find leading VC s in bars in Napa Valley, a wine region to the
north, than in San Francisco (but wildfires have since driven them elsewhere). Tech
workers who can work remotely for the foreseeable future have decamped to Marin
County, also to the north, and Lake Tahoe to the east. Startups, meanwhile, are looking
for their proverbial garages much farther afield. To make their funds last longer, many
have rented Airbnbs in cheaper places.
Things are also shifting in a technological sense. If one sector has benefited most from
the pandemic, it is cloud computing: in many industries it has turbocharged the process
of digital transformation, which often involves moving workloads into shared data
centres. Silicon Valley has big cloud-computing firms of its own, not least Google, but the
market leaders, Amazon and Microsoft, are based in Seattle, farther north on the Pacific
Shelf.
Yet the most important realignment is financial in nature. The tacit understanding
between west- and east-coast business elites over how to share the spoils of tech
investing is under threat. The key element of that deal has long been initial public
offerings. They are designed so that investors in private markets, mostly VC s and
related entities, can cash out while letting investment banks, and institutions active in
public markets, make money from flotations. But some VC s are now pushing for “direct
listings”, in which the initial share price is set by an auction rather than by investment
bankers. That reduces fees and makes it easier for early investors, many of them VC s, to
cash out at a high valuation.
A newer approach is to use a special-purpose acquisition company, though it is not yet

clear whether this trend will benefit Silicon Valley more than Wall Street. SPACs, as they
are known, are shell firms that go public promising to buy one or more private
businesses with the proceeds from the listing. They have a dubious history; many have
underperformed the broader stockmarket. But SPACs will get even more popular in
2021, as well-known VC s such as Reid Hoffman prepare to launch their own.
In 2021 it will become clearer where the new Silicon Valley will settle geographically,
technologically and financially. Whatever happens, it is clear, now more than ever, that
it is less a specific place and more a multi-dimensional, ever-changing space.

From “techlash” to “techslog”

Ludwig Siegele: US technology editor, The Economist, SAN FRANCISCO
Reining in the tech giants, whether through lawsuits or legislation, will take time
2021 in brief
The trial begins in March in Delaware of Elon Musk, the boss of Tesla, who is accused of
breaching his fiduciary duties and personally enriching himself through Tesla’s
purchase in 2016 of SolarCity, a company that was founded by his cousins and failing
financially
“A STRONG AND widespread negative reaction to the growing power and influence of
large technology companies, particularly those based in Silicon Valley.” That is how the
Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines “techlash”. The word, popularised in these
pages in 2013, has since been used in thousands of articles. Yet despite the term’s
popularity, not a lot has actually happened to rein in the power of the tech titans. This
will change in 2021. The techlash will begin in earnest—in the courts and in
parliaments.
Most headlines will be about the antitrust lawsuits in America. The most potentially
consequential was filed by the Department of Justice, in conjunction with some states,
against Alphabet in October 2020. It accuses Google’s parent of having illegally
defended its dominance in online search. Epic Games, meanwhile, the maker of
“Fortnite”, a popular online game, is pursuing a case against the way Apple controls
access to its App Store and the 30% cut it takes on most transactions there. And the
Federal Trade Commission may launch an antitrust suit against Facebook, accusing it of
using its market power to stifle competition.
Yet any of these lawsuits—and other, unexpected ones—could easily drag on for years.
Policymakers across the Western world now mostly agree that lengthy after-the-fact (ex
post) court proceedings are not the best way to deal with tech giants. What is needed,
they say, is a reform of antitrust law and forward-looking (ex ante) regulation. A
committee of America’s House of Representatives published a report in October 2020
that lays out what such a reform might look like. It mainly calls for rules modelled on
the Glass-Steagall Act, repealed in 1999, which separated investment and commercial
banking to avoid conflicts of interest. An equivalent for the tech industry would
separate digital platforms from the goods and services that are offered on top of them.
In other words, Amazon would be banned from selling its own products within its
online marketplace and Apple could no longer offer apps of its own.
The European Union is planning to go even further. Its Digital Services Act, due to be
unveiled by early 2021, will include rules on how big online firms should moderate
content, deal with user complaints, treat rivals that also use their platforms,
interconnect with competing services and share data. Google, for instance, could be
forbidden from giving its own services a leg-up in its search results, and Facebook might
be compelled to open up Messenger and WhatsApp, its messaging services, to allow
interoperability with rival systems such as Telegram and Signal.
But critics of the tech titans should not get their hopes up. These legislative efforts to
rein in the tech giants will also take time. The incoming Biden administration will
probably want to deal with more pressing questions, such as the economy and health
care, before turning to technology regulation. The eu is known to be slow: it took a
decade to produce its landmark General Data Protection Regulation. And the longer the
pandemic drags on, the more dependent people will find themselves on the services the
tech giants provide, and the more entrenched their positions will become.
The word “techlash” evokes quick change. But if history is any guide, tech regulation
will be a slow process, with many fits and starts: more hard slog than rapid whiplash.
The word “techslog” would be more appropriate—though it seems unlikely to make it
into the OED.

Bilateral damage
Stanley Pignal: European business correspondent, The Economist, PARIS
European businesses once hoped to benefit from squabbles between China and
America. No longer
Europe’s approach to China as a trade partner has hardened
TRADE WARS are generally bad news for companies in any of the countries involved.
But might they throw up benefits for those lurking on the sidelines? That was the hope
of some European firms in recent years as Donald Trump stepped up America’s trade
war with China. But this approach has failed to deliver the expected benefits—and in
2021 its drawbacks will become more apparent.
Europe’s hope was that Chinese and American companies, unable to buy from each
other as trade tempers flared, might turn to European firms instead. A UN study in 2019
forecast that Europe would pick up $70bn of fresh exports a year as trade patterns
moved in its favour, largely from Chinese firms needing new suppliers. A geopolitical tiff
in 2020 kicked up a tangible example: when the Trump administration placed sanctions
on Huawei, a Chinese maker of telecoms equipment, American operators (and many
others) keen to upgrade their network gear bought from Nokia of Finland and Ericsson
of Sweden instead.
The thinking was based on the premise that Europe could avoid getting caught in the
crossfire. Increasingly, that is not the case. When it comes to trade restrictions, Europe
has been on the receiving end of both American and Chinese hostility, and more seems
likely in future. Meanwhile, Europe’s approach to China as a trade partner has hardened.
Compared with the all-out trade war he waged against China, Mr Trump started mere
tiffs with Europe. But the areas of tension are long-standing and seem likely to endure.
In October 2019 America imposed tariffs on $7.5bn of EU imports, and in November
2020 the EU hit back with tariffs on $4bn of American goods, in a row over state
subsidies for aircraft manufacturers. Further conflict looms in 2021 if Europe imposes a
tax on large tech companies—which America interprets, with some justification, as
singling out its own firms.
Trade with China has hardly been smoother. In this case it is largely a matter of Europe
cooling to Chinese firms. Human-rights abuses in Xinjiang and the crackdown in Hong
Kong have angered Europeans. But those came on top of concerns that Chinese firms
were morphing from customers of European industrial groups into competitors.
Though still committed to free trade, European policymakers now decry past “naivety”
when it comes to dealing with China. In 2021 the EU will flesh out ways to retaliate
against Chinese firms if state funding is deemed to be helping them undercut European
rivals. Partly in response to covid-19, the EU wants to repatriate supply chains of
“strategic” industries—a term that is used loosely, and can apply to just about any
sector.
Europe has also fallen foul of China by siding with America. Several countries, including
Britain and France, have acceded to American demands that they limit Huawei’s
involvement in their telecoms networks. And China is not afraid to remind European
countries that it can open and close its markets as it pleases: in September, for example,
German pigs were banned from the Chinese market on trumped-up sanitary grounds.
Even if Europe stays on good terms with both its biggest trade partners, their
continuing squabble will affect its firms. What is categorised as a Chinese export may
also be a European company’s product. Ericsson and Nokia manufacture gear in China,
for example, and German carmakers building vehicles in America for the Chinese
market have also been caught in the trade tumult.
More generally, Europe stands to lose from the unravelling of the free-trade system it
has helped build, alongside America, since the second world war. More than half of
European firms’ sales are overseas, compared with less than a third for American
companies, according to Morgan Stanley, a bank. The great rejigging of supply chains
resulting from the partial uncoupling of the Chinese and American economies will also
affect European companies. The few bits of extra business they might pick up on the
side will feel like scant consolation.
Bonding from home

Philip Coggan: Bartleby columnist, The Economist
Firms will need to find new ways to bring their employees together
WHAT QUALITY will business leaders be emphasising in 2021? The answer, surely, is
teamwork. Corporate life in 2020 was disrupted by the pandemic and the need for many
employees to work at home. Most companies got by, but they were living on the social
capital they had accumulated in previous years. In 2021 they will want to refill the tank.
Many managers will have been surprised by how well the working-from-home
experiment went. Research suggested that, before 2020, employees who stayed at home
tended to be isolated from those who remained in the office. They regarded themselves
as second-class citizens. But the pandemic meant that everyone was in the same boat, or
rather the same living room. Managers learned that staff could be productive when not
in the office; employees got used to taking part in video meetings. A study by the
National Bureau of Economic Research found that home workers put in almost an hour
extra a day compared with when they were in the office.
The new arrangements worked because employees were already familiar with their
roles and were used to the rhythm of the organisation. The weekly planning meeting
could take place online; team discussions could be held on Slack or WhatsApp.
Managers knew their staff’s individual strengths and weaknesses and thus whom to nag
and whom to leave alone.
Over time, however, this coherence could deteriorate. Managers and staff will face new
problems and will need to develop methods for tackling them. New staff will join and
existing staff will transfer to new jobs. Accumulated knowledge will be less useful. New
ways of working will have to be developed, which may need closer co-operation than
can be achieved over a video link.
An element of productivity also results from serendipity: the chance discussion with
someone outside your team. Those water-cooler moments are less likely when people
are working from home. Employees may start to relate only to those within their
immediate team or messaging group. The sales team may lose touch with product
design, for example. Eventually this will erode the networks on which a company’s
health may depend.
That is why companies will spend 2021 trying to restore the collective spirit. Even if
employees do not come back to the office full-time, they will probably be asked to
return for at least one or two days a week. When they do, they will be engineered into
meeting with those outside their immediate hierarchy, to stop the company turning into
a battle between “us” and “them”.
All this may also involve some socially distanced version of awaydays, designed to break
down barriers between departments. Zoom drinks events are already common but
some employers have sent wine or beer to employees to encourage participation. Other
events include trivia quizzes, online karaoke and scavenger hunts in which workers
compete to find items within their own homes. Companies will survey employees to test
the state of morale. Human-resources departments will be called upon to do a lot of
extra work, beyond the firefighting role of sorting out problematic relationships.
The big risk in the medium term is the emergence of two cultures, as has happened in
the gig economy, where the workforce is split into a small number of core staff and a
larger number of contracted or casual workers. The pandemic may create another split,
as older, established workers stay at home and younger staff, despite going into the
office, have fewer opportunities to bond with colleagues, build professional networks
and climb the ladder. Team spirit will be harder to create than before—whatever fine
words the chief executive uses.

Power struggle
Simon Wright: industry editor, The Economist
As motor vehicles go electric, the battle for industry supremacy will intensify
Our friends electric
LIKE THE move from horse-drawn carriages to contraptions powered by internal-

combustion engines, the migration from cars powered by fossil fuels to electric vehicles
(EVs) will have a profound effect on personal transport. Covid-19 caused a 20% drop in
global light-vehicle sales in 2020, to about 70m, but they will pick up in 2021. And, led
by China, the proportion of vehicles powered by batteries will grow quickly.
This shift will change the way people travel. Electric power requires a fundamental
rethink of a car’s internal architecture, turning it into a computer on wheels. An array of
new electronic systems brings connectivity and produces data, making possible new
business opportunities, better mobility services and, eventually, cars that are fully self-
driving. During 2021 the companies in the electric-car ecosystem—Tesla, its copycats,
established carmakers and tech giants—will be jockeying for position in the race to an
electrified future.
The surging share price of Tesla, now the world’s most valuable carmaker, provides a
big incentive for incumbents and newcomers to catch up. Tesla may lead in battery
technology and software, but to make those advantages stick it must prove that
“production hell” is behind it. The firm’s boss, Elon Musk, dreams of making 20m cars a
year; in 2019 he made 370,000. Scaling up manufacturing has caused Tesla its biggest
headaches. Will its new “gigafactories” in Texas and near Berlin come online as
smoothly as a new plant in Shanghai, providing proof that Tesla can expand at will?
Tesla may have some catching up to do in large-scale production, but established

carmakers face an equally daunting challenge: learning how to write software. Electric
cars require integrated software, not just to ensure that batteries and motors work
together to provide the best performance, but to connect the car to the outside world.
Incumbent carmakers are struggling to combine disparate electronic systems from
different suppliers to create the seamless experience offered by Tesla, which constantly
improves its cars with smartphone-style “over the air” software updates.
Pivoting from mechanical engineering to developing software and providing the

mobility services that customers will increasingly demand (such as ride-hailing and
ride-sharing) is not the only challenge. Incumbents must also wind down investments in
combustion-engine technology and make the alliances needed to catch up on batteries
and software. Expect more joint ventures and investments in startups, as they try to
share costs, shift away from petrol power and bring in new thinking.
And what of the Tesla wannabes, from China’s Li, Nio, WM Motor and Xpeng to
American firms such as Fisker, Lucid and scandal-hit Nikola? Cash from excitable
investors has poured in and established carmakers are also taking stakes—as are tech
giants, keen to get involved as transport goes digital. But which companies will have
staying power? Can the wannabes persuade investors that they have proprietary
technology that will give them a long-term advantage?
Flashy launches of vehicles are one thing, but as the industry’s travails show, working
out how to make cars at scale, when bits and bytes are as important as brakes and
bodywork, is quite another. Establishing retail and maintenance networks is no joyride,
either. The coming year will make clearer which of Tesla’s competitors, new and old,
can stay in the race.

More than just a game

Daniel Knowles: international correspondent, The Economist
The line between video games and spectator sports will blur
Action-packed
VIDEO-GAME sales soared in 2020 as people sought ways to cope with being confined at
home. But even when they are allowed to go outside again, will they want to? The
launch in November of the PlayStation 5 and the Xbox Series X, the next generation of
video-game consoles, led to sales being rationed to cope with demand. With them come
a host of new games, including the latest titles in blockbusting series such as “Call of
Duty” and “Assassin’s Creed”—more good reasons to stay indoors.
It is not just the usual model of selling games that executives hope will do well in 2021.
The past year also saw a boom in the viewership of e-sports—that is, teams playing
video games professionally for spectators. Even before the pandemic, games such as
“Counter-strike” (a counter-terrorism shooter) and “League of Legends” (a fantasy
strategy game) could fill stadiums with spectators. The virus gave them a bigger boost.
As traditional sports such as football and baseball shut down, e-sports—which can be
played from home—were shown on terrestrial television for the first time in many
countries. Formula One teams and English Premier League football clubs even
experimented with having their players play video games for an audience instead.
Video-game technology has also been used to fill empty stands with fake crowds for
some sports broadcasts.
As the line between video games and traditional sports blurs, companies will strive to
capitalise on the popularity of e-sports in 2021. Guild Esports, a team owned by David
Beckham, an English former footballer, which competes in four different e-sports, is
among those hiring professional players this year. In October the firm raised £20m
($26m) on the London Stock Exchange. Events which had to be scaled back in 2020
because of the pandemic should restart, too. The “Fortnite” World Cup, which debuted
in 2019 but was cancelled in 2020, seems likely to kick off again. In 2019 Epic Games,
the maker of “Fortnite”, provided $30m in prize money for the event. Blizzard, which
runs leagues for “Overwatch” (another cartoonish shooting game) in half a dozen
countries, may even be able to restart events in stadiums.
Will the money pouring into e-sports get a payoff? That is less clear. For all their growth,
e-sports are chiefly a form of marketing for video games. Teenagers are keen, but their
attention spans are short—and new games come out all the time. Traditional sports
have much deeper roots. It is far from clear whether e-sports teams can build brands of
even a fraction of the scale of a minor Premier League football team. But if you do not
play, you cannot win.

Bargaining chips
Hal Hodson: Asia technology correspondent, The Economist
A crucial year for China’s semiconductor firms
THROUGH TRADE wars and pandemics, China remains the world’s workshop. But there
is still one vital product its manufacturers cannot make competitively: the
microprocessor chips that power smartphones and cloud servers, whose number-
crunching underpins the world’s leading companies. In this arena America and its allies,
especially South Korea and Taiwan, remain dominant. China is trying hard to catch up.
America is trying hard to stop it.
This struggle will intensify in 2021. American officials learned a lot about global
microprocessor supply chains during their recent campaign against Huawei, China’s
telecoms-equipment giant. The walls they threw up around the company, to cut it off
from vital chip supplies, went from leaky to robust. They can now deploy that
understanding against China’s nascent chipmaking industry.
Manufacturing chips requires huge multimillion-dollar machines that each carry out
just one step of the complex chipmaking process. A few of those machines are made
exclusively in the United States by American companies, mini monopolies that are ripe
targets for new export-control rules prohibiting sales to Chinese chipmakers. That
would set Chinese efforts back years. Chinese firms working on equivalent machines are
nowhere near ready.
There is a less aggressive alternative. America could, with Joe Biden as president, adopt
a more nuanced approach. Instead of Donald Trump’s unilateral, hard-man tactics,
America could try to build a consensus with its allies about the common threat a
thriving Chinese chipmaking industry would pose.
This would mean striking agreements with friendly governments about which
technologies could be sold to Chinese companies, and which pose a threat. The market
for selling advanced technologies into China is worth hundreds of billions of dollars, too
big to ignore. If America and its allies do not move together, a blockade may create an
opportunity for Japan, Europe or South Korea.
Instead of expecting allies to sign up to its own export controls, America would involve
them earlier on, identifying mutual interests and threats. This would allow for a joint
effort to squeeze and shape China’s technology ecosystem, without the risk of losing all
contact with it, and thereby all control. But if America chooses not to pursue this course,
in 2021 China’s chipmakers will enter a new, and potentially more hostile, phase in
which they must thrive without America, or die. It may take time, but given the
country’s record over the past 40 years, few people would bet against them on that.

Books bounce back

Alexandra Suich Bass: senior correspondent, politics, technology and society, The Economist, DALLAS
Will 2021 be another strong year for books?
The pandemic bolstered the case for books as an alluring, enduring diversion
THE YEAR 2020 is on track to be one of the best for print books in America since 2004.
Sales of e-books and audiobooks had double-digit growth in the 12 months to the end of
September, compared with a year earlier, but sales of print books grew too, by nearly
7%. This may sound like an unlikely plot twist, given that many bookstores stayed
closed during pandemic-driven lockdowns, publishers delayed planned releases of new
titles and Amazon prioritised fulfilling orders for hand-sanitiser over the latest page-
turners.
Yet the pandemic also bolstered the case for books as an alluring, enduring form of
entertainment and education. Print books and audiobooks offer respite for screen-
weary souls, both young and old. The debuts of many political books, including the first
volume of Barack Obama’s memoirs, and the nationwide protests for racial justice,
which drove curious readers to older non-fiction titles on race and civil rights, were
further boons for book-buying. What looked like it was going to be a terrible, horrible,
no good, very bad year for books turned into a fine one.
What next? In 2020 escapist books got a boost: romance and crime will sell well in 2021,
too. So will biographies, children’s books and graphic novels. Another trend to watch is
the strength of the backlist, as readers opt for time-tested books over new releases. The
backlist’s share of sales rose from 64% in 2019 to 68% in 2020, according to Kristen
McLean of npd, a research firm.
In 2020 more people bought books online, and this will hold true in 2021. Amazon
benefited, but so did a newer outfit, Bookshop.org, which routes sales to independent
bookstores. Audiobooks will spread, and an emerging genre, between audiobook and
podcast, will expand further. And the appeal of print will grow in a time of screen
fatigue. E-books account for 27% of the consumer book market and have not dislodged
print books to the extent digital doyens predicted.

Itchy feet
Henry Tricks: Schumpeter columnist, The Economist
Some executives can’t wait to hit the road again
AT FIRST IT was a revelation. Breakfast could be even better in the kitchen than in the
Four Seasons. Children could make you laugh more than in-flight entertainment. You
could put away the high heels and the brogues, the trouser suit and the Hermès tie.
Limos, leg room, power lunches and chocolates on the pillow? All swept aside by the
miracle of Zoom.
No longer. It has taken a gradual return to the office, Zoom fatigue and a jolt of panic
over slumping sales forecasts to make some executives itch to hit the road again. They
may still be itching in early 2021. The cancellation of post-holiday jamborees like CES,
the tech show held annually in Las Vegas in January, and the postponement of Davos, a
winter sojourn for the globalised high and mighty, suggest executive lounges will be
ghostly for some time yet. But some aspects of business travel will return, especially
those where journeys are short and hold out the prospect of a sale at the end of them.
About eight out of ten business trips are domestic, according to the Global Business
Travel Association (GBTA), an industry group. Its latest survey suggests almost two-
thirds of business professionals expect domestic business travel to pick up by the spring
of 2021.
International travel is a different matter, though. Until a covid-19 vaccine is widely

available, and while quarantines are prevalent, it is hard to make forecasts. Even when
restrictions are eased, history suggests the rebound will be slow. GBTA says it took
more than three years for global business travel to return to prior levels after the
terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, and the financial crisis of 2007-09. This time
the headwinds are even stronger. The pandemic overlays fear of travel with economic
hardship, at a time of trade wars and “slowbalisation”. For the first time ever, video-
conferencing has proved to be a workable replacement for travel, and is much cheaper.
According to Morgan Stanley, a bank, corporate travel managers recently said they
expected virtual meetings to replace almost one-third of travel in 2021.
That bodes ill for the $1.5trn business-travel industry. During previous crises, airlines,
hotels and event organisers slashed fares and rates to stoke demand. There is little
point in doing that when health, not cost, remains travellers’ top concern. Some hotels
may shift their focus to leisure tourism, though margins are much lower. The industry
will lobby for more travel corridors, an end to quarantines, covid-19 tests at airports
and liability waivers. But ultimately, its biggest hope lies in a vaccine.
The current assumption is that one will be fairly widely available by the second half of
2021. If so, executives’ desire to get back on the dealmaking trail will revive. For all that
the pandemic has given them a welcome opportunity to catch up on family time (and
sleep), business travel comes with considerable perks, such as pampering, “me time”
and dinners on the company dime. These are powerful incentives for it to rebound.

The power of green technology

The technology industry has a key role to play in fighting climate change, says Sundar
Pichai, chief executive, Google and Alphabet
Our goal is to show that 24/7 carbon-free energy is possible
AFTER DECADES of incremental steps forward, 2021 will be the most significant year
yet for combating climate change. Two recent developments have made this possible.
First, as science tells us that we have a decade to reduce emissions dramatically or face
the worst impacts of climate change, many of those impacts have already arrived at our
door. From the historic and deadly wildfires in Australia and California, to severe
flooding around the world, there is no denying that climate change is already disrupting
our daily lives. At the same time, support for climate action has never been stronger—
from Generation Z’s solutions-oriented mindset, to political support that increasingly
crosses party lines, to Europe’s large-scale ambition to become the first carbon-neutral
continent, society is ever more unified against the threat of climate change.
Second, we are seeing promising technologies and policies that will bring carbon-free
energy within reach. Not long ago, it was hard to imagine a 24/7 carbon-free electricity
supply. At its most basic level, the wind does not always blow and the sun does not
shine at night. But new technologies—including better energy storage and the reduction
of costs associated with wind and solar power by 70% and 89% respectively over the
past ten years—are bringing 24/7 carbon-free energy closer to reality.
Another of those technologies is artificial intelligence (AI). At Google, we are working on

ways to apply AI to optimise electricity consumption within our data centres. In
collaboration with our sister venture, DeepMind, we have developed solutions that have
reduced the amount of energy used to cool our data centres by 30%. This approach
could be used by commercial buildings, including airports and shopping malls, to do the
same. AI can also be used to make wind power more predictable, which will increase the
value, utilisation and adoption of renewable energy.
Meanwhile, sensors on satellites can locate large-scale emitters of carbon dioxide at a

very fine-grained level. This could dramatically improve the effectiveness of the Paris
climate agreement. Technology is also helping cities reduce their carbon emissions.
According to the Global Covenant of Mayors, an international alliance of over 10,000
cities and local governments committed to fighting climate change, less than 20% of
cities outside western Europe have the time, resources and data to meet their climate
commitments. With platforms like our own Environmental Insights Explorer, cities can
use anonymised, aggregated mapping data to estimate the carbon footprint of their
buildings and transport, and realise their solar-energy potential—a critical step, as
cities continue to contribute over 70% of the world’s greenhouse-gas emissions.
Technology is also helping communities adapt to the effects of climate change that are
already apparent. As one example, we are able to use satellite data to map wildfires in
real time and better predict how they might spread. In India, flood forecasting models
use AI to predict when floods will hit and how deep the waters will get, helping save
lives. Machine learning is also being applied to “nowcast” rainfall sooner and with more
accuracy than conventional forecasting methods, helping people make safer, more
informed decisions.
Driven by these promising trends and tools, companies have made bigger sustainability
commitments in shorter time frames. At Google, we have eliminated our carbon legacy
using high-quality offsets, and set a goal to operate on 24/7 carbon-free energy in all
our data centres and campuses worldwide by 2030. Our aim is to demonstrate that a
100% carbon-free electrical grid is not just possible but also economically viable. We
hope that companies of all sizes will join us in this effort.
In addition to concrete and ambitious company commitments, the world also needs
enabling policies and global frameworks to ensure we are working towards the same
goals. We know it’s possible: we have seen this kind of collaboration during the
pandemic, as the private sector worked with governments to deliver personal
protective equipment, medical devices and contact-tracing apps needed to fight the
virus. Stronger public-private partnerships will be just as critical in fighting climate
change.
Throughout history, every generation has confronted big challenges. Climate change
will be our generation’s most profound challenge—and in 2021, the world will take its
biggest steps yet to meet it.

Finance
• Protectors v preservers
• After the fall
• New money
• No shortage of strife
• Unequal impact
• Balance-sheet of power
• Intelligent design
• The coming covid-19 credit crunch

Finance
Protectors v preservers
Callum Williams: senior economics writer, The Economist
Labour markets in the rich world will diverge again in 2021
2021 in brief
The Bank of Korea begins trials of an experimental central-bank digital currency (CBDC).
With China quickly moving towards the launch of its own digital currency, reports say
the Bank of Korea will initially test its blockchain-based CBDC in a virtual environment
LOOK ONLY at the unemployment figures, and you would struggle to believe that in
2020 the world economy has suffered its sharpest downturn since the Depression. In
some countries unemployment did soar: America’s rate rose from 3.5% to a peak of
14.7%. In many others, however, the labour market barely blinked. In October 2020
unemployment rates in Germany and Britain were only a tiny bit higher than they were
before the pandemic hit. These strange contrasts will persist in 2021.
The superior performance of some countries is in part the product of a milder hit from
coronavirus. In Australia, for instance, where the labour market has held up fairly well,
GDP fell by “just” 7% in the second quarter of 2020, compared with more than 10% for
OECD economies as a whole. But in this crisis the relationship between the blow to GDP
and the rise in unemployment is not as strong as it typically is during recessions,
suggesting that two other factors matter more: policy and statistics.
Take policy first. During the pandemic rich countries, broadly speaking, have sought
either to protect people or to preserve jobs. The first group—call them the
“protectors”—includes America, Canada and Ireland where governments have sent vast
quantities of cash to people in the form of stimulus cheques and more generous
unemployment benefits. This has the goal of ensuring that people have income even if
they lose work. The second group, the “preservers”, which includes most of the rest of
Europe and Australia, has instead focused on paying workers’ wages via short-time
working schemes and furlough programmes. By design, therefore, the preservers would
be expected to have experienced a smaller rise in unemployment than the protectors.
But the apparently superior labour-market performance of the preservers is also a

product of the oddities of statistics, observes a report from the Institute for Government,
a British think-tank. “Unemployment” does not mean the same thing in every country. In
Britain and Ireland people who are out of work are generally not counted as
unemployed if they have an attachment to an employer. The European Union generally
counts furloughed workers as employed. But American and Canadian statisticians tend
to classify people as unemployed the moment they stop working, even if temporarily. In
April 2020 Australia’s official unemployment rate was 6%, but it might have been as
high as 12% if it had been calculated using American or Canadian conventions.
In 2021 labour markets across the rich world will keep moving in different ways, but
with the patterns of 2020 reversed. For the protectors, the conversation in 2021 will be
about how quickly unemployment will fall towards its pre-pandemic level (see United
States section). For the preservers, especially in Europe, the conversation will be about
how much unemployment is going to rise. That is because furlough schemes are
ending—the British government wants to wind down its scheme as soon as possible
and Spain’s is likely to end in early 2021.
Both governments will face heavy criticism as unemployment goes up. Some European
governments, keen to avoid a jump in unemployment, have pledged to keep furlough
schemes going for a while yet (though often with employers expected to pay a higher
share of workers’ pay). Short-time working schemes in France and Germany will last
well into 2021 and possibly beyond. In both of those countries, unemployment will
probably increase, though not by much.
It may seem obvious that the Franco-German approach is best. No one likes to see
higher unemployment. But the problem with keeping much of the workforce on
furlough, aside from the enormous running costs of such schemes, is that it prevents
people moving from parts of the economy which, in a post-pandemic world, need fewer
workers (say, high-street shops) towards bits of the economy which need more (say, e-
commerce warehouses or parcel delivery). Ultimately, that is bad for the economy as a
whole. Knowing the right moment to wind down a furlough scheme—and at some point,
they will all need to be wound down—is difficult. During 2021 Europe will have to
wrestle with that question.

After the fall

John O’Sullivan: Buttonwood columnist, The Economist
There will be surprisingly few corporate defaults
Default is in our stars
Cheap money and fiscal support will keep a lot of big firms alive
ONE CONSEQUENCE of the coronavirus pandemic is that the slummier end of the
corporate-bond market has become gentrified. The terminology softened long ago:
bonds that are not of investment grade used to be called “junk” but are now labelled
high-yield or speculative-grade. The neighbours are a lot classier, too. Renault, Kraft
Heinz and Marks & Spencer are among the well-known firms to have lost their
investment-grade status. It is likely that 2020 will set a record for the value of such
“fallen angel” debt.
Companies had sold around $1.5trn of investment-grade bonds by the end of the third
quarter—enough to ensure that 2020 will also be a record year for bond issuance. Firms
also exploited their bank-credit lines to the limit. Overall, business debt in America rose
from 75% to 90% of GDP in the first half of 2020.
After the binge, the hangover. The huge rise in corporate leverage combined with an
uncertain economic outlook increases the chances that debts will not be repaid in full or
on time. Bond defaults have already picked up sharply. By early October the 12-month
trailing rate of default on junk bonds had risen to 6.3% in America and 4.3% in Europe,
according to s&p, a rating agency. More defaults will follow in 2021.
How bad things get depends on a tussle of opposing forces. One is the virus and its
lingering effects. Almost no one expects the economy to have fully recovered by the end
of 2021. In October, in its twice-yearly World Economic Outlook, the IMF forecast that
America’s GDP will return to its 2019 level only in 2022. Already it is clear in Europe
that the rebound in activity from the trough of recession in March and April is losing
momentum, because of a resurgence of infections. A faltering recovery puts more
corporate-bond issuers at risk of default.
Yet there are powerful influences working in the other direction. One is fiscal policy.
The various government-led short-time working schemes, furloughs and support
programmes have helped keep a lot of financially stressed companies alive. A big
concern is that fiscal stimulus will be withdrawn too abruptly, as it was in Europe after
the global financial crisis of 2007-09. But lessons have been learned. The establishment
of a euro-area Recovery Fund is one encouraging sign. Early indications from France,
Germany and Italy suggest that fiscal policy will remain broadly supportive in 2021.
And further stimulus is on the way in America, one way or another.
A second factor is bond-market liquidity. The burst of issuance during 2020 owed a lot
to America’s Federal Reserve, which said in March that it stood ready to buy corporate
bonds, prompting investors to start buying bonds in anticipation. The markets unfroze.
Big firms could raise plenty of cash to tide them over. Rich-world central banks,
including the Fed, are committed to keeping monetary policy extremely loose. And
investors will buy new corporate-bond issues, and roll over old ones, if only for the lack
of good alternatives. Yields on government bonds are vanishingly small in America. In
Europe the safest bonds have negative yields. Corporate bonds are riskier, but have
higher yields to compensate.
Credit is the lifeblood of the economy. As long as firms can borrow, they can survive.
That is why the corporate-bond market sets the tone for riskier assets, such as shares.
There will be more corporate defaults, thanks to a weak recovery and high debt. But
cheap money and fiscal support will keep a lot of big firms alive that would otherwise go
to the wall. Defaults will peak at lower levels than seemed possible in the spring of 2020.
The angels that have already fallen will not be further disgraced. A few may even find
redemption in 2021.

New money
Simon Rabinovitch: Asia economics editor, The Economist, SHANGHAI
China launches the world’s first official e-currency
THERE IS A good chance that the digital yuan will enter circulation in 2021. It is a debut
that will initially make little difference, but could, over time, change the way central
banks conduct monetary policy.
The People’s Bank of China has filed more than 100 patent applications for a digital
currency and has overseen a range of trials, putting the e-yuan into use in a few cities
and on several apps. So far the experiments have gone smoothly, and soon people will
have the option of downloading a government-issued digital wallet. Unlike commercial
ones such as WeChat Pay and Alipay, the official version will be equivalent to an account
at the central bank with the same solidity as hard cash.
For the millions who already use a smartphone instead of a debit card, it will feel like
just another payment app. Yet some talk of digital currency as a revolutionary product
that could spell trouble for banks as people withdraw money from savings accounts and
put it directly into their ultra-safe official e-wallets. What is more, if digital currency
were ever to fully replace cash, central banks would, in theory, gain three new powers:
to lower interest rates below zero with little difficulty; to issue cash directly to those
most in need; and to see more precisely who has money and how it is spent.
In China the central bank is not trying to reinvent monetary policy—at least not yet. Its
motivations derive from more immediate challenges. Given the rise of mobile payments,
it worries that the big tech platforms have too much power. The digital yuan will offer
an alternative. It will also give China a conduit for moving money across its borders
without having to rely on swift, a global payments system that comes under American
influence. But China’s first objective is much more basic still: to check whether the
technology behind the digital yuan works and whether people actually want to use it.
Money has been around for some 3,000 years. This update will take time.

No shortage of strife
Soumaya Keynes: trade and globalisation editor, The Economist, WASHINGTON, DC
Which trade wars will smoulder on in 2021?
GLOBALISATION TOOK a beating in 2020, when covid-19 disrupted international

commerce, causing travel restrictions, border checks and export restraints. Damaged
further by crashing demand, at its trough in May, the volume of globally traded goods
was 18% lower than a year earlier. Though restrictions will ease and trade recover,
2021 will not necessarily be calmer.
With painful memories of the global scramble for personal protective equipment,
policymakers are aware of the gap between the issues they control and those for which
they are held accountable. So 2021 will bring carrots and sticks, including stricter
government procurement rules on who can deliver medical supplies, financial
incentives to reshore production, and the need for firms producing “critical supplies” to
show their plans for a repeat crisis.
Companies caught up in Sino-American tensions should expect further headaches, amid

disagreements over human rights, disputes over Huawei and other tech firms, and
China’s continuing intervention in the economy. The Biden administration will mark a
change in the American approach, but to more co-ordinated confrontation, rather than
less overall. The European Union has already started work to bulk up its defences,
including “redressive measures” in areas where it finds that foreign (read: Chinese)
subsidies are distorting markets.
Other sources of strife will include American and European pledges to apply “border
adjustments” for carbon-intensive imports, as well as subsidies intended to support
covid-stricken businesses, which fuel accusations that the playing field is not level.
Economic nationalists accused of breaking international trade rules will argue that they
are simply putting their own citizens first, as Donald Trump did during the early days of
the pandemic.
The firms that organise many of the world’s supply chains will happily accept handouts,
or restrictions on their competition. But they will also argue that they can reshape
globalisation on their own. Even before the Sino-American trade war, rising labour costs
in China were pushing production elsewhere, while export supply chains shortened.
Those calling for trade peace will say supply chains are too complex to be managed by
blunt policy directives. Intervention could even make supply chains less resilient, by
reducing the ability to produce more in a crisis. Firms could move to a more diversified
form of globalisation, in which manufacturers become less reliant on China to serve
international markets, and build more redundancy into their supply chains—provided
government interventions do not prevent them from doing so.

Unequal impact
Ryan Avent: economics correspondent, The Economist, WASHINGTON, DC
Covid-19 will leave a legacy of increased inequality
2021 in brief
Tax collectors in Europe start knocking on the doors of big tech firms. Digital-services
tax payments are falling due in Britain and France, and a levy is also being introduced in
Spain
WITH ANY luck, covid-19 will prove less of a disruption in 2021 than it did in 2020. But
even if a vaccine allows societies to inch back towards some kind of normality, the long-
run economic costs of the pandemic will mount. As the data flow in, they will reveal a
dramatic rise in inequality which may persist for decades.
Inequality, though far from a solved problem, came to look a bit more manageable in the
years before the pandemic. A slow but steady strengthening of labour markets in the
wake of the global financial crisis eventually yielded healthy wage gains for workers
across the income distribution, and measures of inequality in many economies levelled
off or even declined a little as the 2010s neared their end. At first, covid-19 did not
disrupt this trend much, thanks to generous aid packages provided by governments
around the world. In America, for instance, stimulus measures worth about 13% of GDP
even raised the incomes of some low-wage workers during the pandemic’s first few
months.
By the end of 2020 the picture already looked quite different. Just how different will
begin to become clear in 2021. Economic analysis of pandemics over the past century
suggests that they lead to sharp rises in inequality. Five years after a pandemic begins,
Gini coefficients (a measure of income dispersion) typically remain about 1.25% above
the pre-crisis level: a striking rise for what is typically a slowly evolving variable. Among
people with middling to high levels of education, the share of people in work scarcely
budges as a consequence of a pandemic, but among those with low levels of education it
typically declines by 5%. This time will be no different.
Sustaining generous fiscal-relief measures is difficult at any time, and 2021 will mark a
return to more normal government budgets even as covid-19 continues to squeeze
economies. In America political polarisation in the aftermath of a bitterly fought election,
and concern over historically high levels of public debt, will limit the size of any new
stimulus. Meanwhile, state and local government budgets will be cut dramatically after a
year of depressed tax receipts. In 2020 European governments waived fiscal rules to
give themselves more flexibility to respond to the pandemic. In 2021 pressure to bring
borrowing back within allowable levels will rise.
The phasing-out of income support and cuts to public services will have a
disproportionate impact on poorer households. Reduced aid will be especially painful
given the way in which covid-19 affects economies. For high-wage white-collar workers,
remote work is often a good substitute for going into the office. Blue-collar work, in
manufacturing or services, is much less flexible. And if widespread remote working
becomes a permanent feature of post-covid economies, many low-wage jobs destroyed
by the pandemic will never return.
Those on low incomes who are fortunate enough to find employment face other
inequities. Greater dependence on in-person forms of work puts the low-paid at higher
risk of exposure to covid-19. And as the pandemic keeps children out of schools, many
poorer workers face a terrible choice between going to work or looking after their
children’s education. The digital divide, too, weighs on low-income students without
access to online resources or reliable high-speed internet. But the most important and
distressing source of pressure on poorer families will be the return of persistently high
levels of joblessness. For many low-wage workers, 2021 will be another year of struggle.

Balance-sheet of power
Matthieu Favas: finance correspondent, The Economist
Banks will regain ground against fintech rivals
Point-of-sale lending’s latest instalment
2021 in brief
Jane Fraser becomes the first female boss of a big American bank when she takes over
as chief executive of Citigroup in February. Ms Fraser, who grew up in Scotland, is
currently head of the bank’s global consumer division
A FEATURE OF the covid-19 pandemic has been people’s and firms’ continued reliance
on traditional banks. Branches shut and e-commerce jumped up, boosting tech firms
and the cloud providers that power the pipework of online finance. But at the same time,
governments mandated lenders to distribute support funding to companies and
households, many of which parked vast amounts of money in their deposit accounts.
That hints at one of the most precious and enduring assets that banks have in their fight
against fintech rivals: consumers’ willingness to entrust them with their earnings when
it really counts. In 2021 the best banks will press this advantage to regain decisive
ground.
Some fintechs are still thriving. Firms that equip entrepreneurs and merchants with the
ability to process digital payments with one click, like Stripe or Square, have been
buoyed by the dash away from cash. So have those, like Marqeta or GoCardless, that
help restaurants and gyms collect delivery or subscription fees. “Buy now pay later”
upstarts like Klarna or Afterpay, which arrange short-term loans at the point of sale,
have gained the favour of thrifty shoppers. Electronic brokers, such as Robinhood or TD
Ameritrade, are seeing record volumes of trading as households take to wagering on
stocks from the sofa. Friends settle accounts by dipping into their digital purses rather
than physical wallets.
But the pandemic is throttling others. Venture capitalists still have a lot of money to
spend, yet the uncertain outlook makes them warier of startups that burn cash with no
extinguisher in sight. They also prefer older, proven firms to complete newbies, so
funding is getting more elusive and may remain so next year. At the same time, the
revenues of some popular challenger banks—many of which earn their crust by
pocketing fees on each purchase made by account-holders—have dried up as users no
longer pick up lattes on their way to work. In the name of growth for growth’s sake,
others have let costs escalate. All these pressures are forcing struggling fintechs to cut
marketing budgets, causing customer acquisition to stall. In 2021 their survival may be
called into question.
Established banks, too, have been rocked by covid-19. Many had underinvested in
digital, and were caught off guard as lockdowns started. Low interest rates, along with
rising loan losses as firms go bust and people lose their jobs, mean they will have little
to spend on upgrading their tech. But banks that had the foresight to turn paper and
manual processes into lines of ones and zeros were rewarded by millions of app
downloads, surging sales and glowing satisfaction surveys. As the laggards are forced to
close branches or trim services to cut costs, frustrating their customers in the process,
the leaders will gain market share. They will also broaden their offerings by leaning on
fintechs for some tasks and products.
As they seek to regain control of their finances in chaotic times, many customers will
trust banks more than anyone else to look after their money—at least for a while. It is
an asset the banks should do their best not to squander.

Intelligent design
Rachana Shanbhogue: finance editor, The Economist
How simulations can help shape economic policies
HAVING GONE deep into the red during the covid-19 pandemic, governments will
grapple in 2021 with getting their finances back in order. After the global financial crisis
of 2007-09, those in rich countries tightened their belts too much, choking the economic
recovery. This time they will want to be cleverer about it. Some will be more ambitious,
seeking to redesign their welfare systems: the pandemic will strengthen public support
for stronger social safety-nets. And policymakers in poor countries will want to alleviate
poverty and sustain economic development.
How to balance all these aims? An experiment might tell you if a particular tool works,
and findings from projects on basic income, such as that run in Kenya by Give Directly, a
charity, will influence governments’ thinking. But experiments can be neither broad nor
timely enough to help governments set a plethora of tax and subsidy rates every year.
Conventional economic models do not capture the complexity of human behaviour: that
people change what they do as tax rates rise, or that corrupt officials might pocket some
public funds. So in 2021 governments will be tempted to throw computational power at
their policymaking, using artificial intelligence (AI) to simulate the economy, and the
effects of new policies.
“Agent-based” models simulate the behaviour of different types of participants in the

economy by allowing them to respond to each other over time: if a public servant can
get away with pocketing more money, or a taxpayer with paying less tax, then they will
do so. Some simulate surprisingly realistic behaviour by using machine learning to
“train” the model using vast sets of data. One such approach is Policy Priority Inference,
developed by researchers in Britain and Mexico and sponsored by the UN’s
development programme. Already used in Mexico, it takes governments’ spending plans
across a range of categories and works out, based on its simulation of corruption,
inefficiencies and spillovers, whether a government is likely to hit its development goals,
and where more (or less) money should be spent. More poor countries could see the
appeal of such an approach.
Interest in rich countries could be piqued, too. Researchers at Salesforce, a software

company, and Harvard University have used simulations to show that, much as
computers can learn to play Go and develop strategies that might not occur to humans,
they can also suggest combinations of tax and spending that maximise economic
performance, and which bureaucrats might not have dreamed up. So why not turn to ai
for fresh ideas?
None of this means that economists or bureaucrats will find themselves out of work in
2021. Interpreting the models’ results requires expertise. Politicians will not cede their
power to raise and lower tax rates. But policymakers and researchers keen to
experiment in the aftermath of the pandemic will have an opportunity to expand their
toolkits.

The coming covid-19 credit crunch

This crisis really is different, but its consequences are all too predictable, says Carmen
Reinhart, chief economist at the World Bank
The run-up to this credit crunch does not fit the historical pattern
THE COVID-19 crisis did not start as a financial crisis, but it is morphing into one—and
a global one at that. The headlines of 2020 have been dominated by news of the
pandemic’s spread, record-shattering falls in output, and surges in poverty and the
newly unemployed. Behind these disturbing trends a quieter financial balance-sheet
crisis is gathering momentum across a broad swathe of countries. The financial fallout
from the pandemic does not respect differences by region or income status. Financial
institutions are facing (and will face for some time) a marked rise in non-performing
loans (NPLS).
Historically, banking crises emerge after a lengthy expansion in economic activity.

Growth is often fuelled by a credit boom and rising leverage. Under the motto of “this
time is different”, asset-price bubbles emerge during the biblical “seven fat years”
(whether in property, commodities, equity or bonds). As the economic expansion slows
and turns into recession, loans made during the good times turn sour. Sometimes
balance-sheet problems undermine confidence, and runs on banks and financial
institutions turn the crisis into a fully fledged panic. Households and firms attempt to
deleverage after the crisis, even as banks adopt tighter lending standards. If banks resist
writing down bad loans in favour of “evergreening”, as was the case in Japan’s crisis in
the early 1990s and in Europe after 2007-09, the resulting credit crunch may be longer
and more severe, even surpassing the biblical “seven lean years”.
But this time truly is different. The run-up to the credit crunch in 2021 does not fit the
historical boom-bust pattern in many countries. It is not predicated on having
experienced an economic expansion or an asset-price bubble. The common threads to
the evolving balance-sheet crisis and the credit crunch that will follow are the historic
magnitudes and likely persistence of the slump in economic activity. It is also a
regressive crisis, disproportionally hitting low-income households and smaller firms
that have fewer assets to avert insolvency.
High leverage on the eve of the pandemic will amplify the balance-sheet problems of the
financial sector. Companies in the world’s largest economies, America and China, are
highly indebted and skewed towards high-risk borrowers. The IMF has repeatedly
flagged concerns about the pre-pandemic rise in corporate leverage in many emerging
markets, where much debt is denominated in dollars. Six months into the covid-19 crisis,
S&P had downgraded or cut the outlook on almost 60% of the Latin American
companies it rates. For the rest of the world the share is about 35-40%. Exposure to
commercial property, as malls remain half-empty, is another source of concern in many
parts of the world.
Australia and Canada, among others, have record levels of household debt. In Africa,
where the NPL ratio was estimated at around 11% in 2019, microfinance institutions’
portfolios will come under stress, as much of their lending is to households with volatile
income and no assets. India was already dealing with an NPL ratio of about 9% in the
run-up to the pandemic, and new lending in recent years had already stalled as a result
of efforts to clean up the balance-sheets of state banks.
Since the onset of the pandemic, a range of policies has been introduced by
governments across the world to provide liquidity to the many businesses that have
been shuttered during the lockdowns and to support households hit by a sudden loss of
income and employment. Grace periods in the repayment of existing loans have been
granted. Re-contracting of loans in favour of longer maturities or lower interest rates
has also been common. The hope is that because the health crisis is temporary, the
financial distress of firms and households will be, too. However, even with a prompt
resolution of the pandemic in the form of a globally available vaccine, significant
damage has been inflicted on the global economy and the balance-sheets of financial
institutions.
Given the emergency, these policies have provided a valuable stimulus tool beyond the
conventional scope of fiscal and monetary policy. But by 2021 grace periods will come
to an end and it will become apparent whether the problem facing countless firms and
households is insolvency rather than illiquidity. An extended credit crunch has been a
major headwind to economic recovery in the past. There is little to suggest that it will be
different in the post-pandemic landscape.


• A shot in the arm
• Getting better
• Learning to live with the virus
• A vaccine for everyone
• Seeking glory in the heavens
• A conscious choice
• New on the menu
• Space for opportunity

A shot in the arm

Natasha Loder: health policy editor, The Economist
The largest vaccination programme in history will begin
2021 in brief
A bold conservation proposal will be put to countries gathering in Kunming in south-
west China in May for a UN summit to reverse biodiversity loss: to protect 30% of all
land and ocean by 2030. More than 60 countries have signed up to the “30x30” pledge
but they do not include Indonesia, Australia or America
IN EARLY 2020, with the coronavirus pandemic tearing across the world,
most people thought it unlikely that a vaccine would arrive any time soon.
And as work to develop vaccines began, there were dire warnings of the
difficulties ahead. That is why it is so remarkable that, heading into 2021, it
seems likely that the world is only a few months away from finding one or
more vaccines that work. That this can be said with such certainty reflects the
number and diversity of approaches being taken.
Scientists have developed many different ways of making vaccines. The oldest method is
to take the virus, in this case SARS-CoV-2, and hobble it in some way so it does not cause
disease when it is given. This can be done by weakening it, or even killing it entirely.
Codagenix, a biotech startup, is making a “live-attenuated” vaccine of this kind. The
virus is alive, but its ability to replicate has been restricted. Two Chinese efforts—one
from Sinovac and another from Sinopharm—are using inactivated versions of SARS-
CoV-2.
In recent times genetic engineering has greatly increased the range of possible vaccines.
A popular technique is to take a different, harmless virus and use it as a sort of transport
system to deliver a key portion of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. This “sheep in wolf’s clothing”
approach is being used by one of the leading vaccines, being made by AstraZeneca, a
drugs giant. Based on a chimpanzee adenovirus, it infects cells and delivers instructions
to make the SARS-CoV-2 spike protein, thus priming the immune system to recognise
the real virus.
Most exciting of all are the nucleic-acid vaccines, where a gene that codes for a bit of the
virus is injected directly into the body. That bit of the virus is then manufactured inside
the body from the instructions provided, again priming the immune system. Two
leading vaccine-making firms, Pfizer and Moderna, are pursuing this novel approach. If
it works, it is expected to be easier to manufacture at scale than other kinds of vaccine.
Stanley Plotkin of the University of Pennsylvania, inventor of the rubella vaccine, says
that what he has seen so far of covid-19 vaccines suggests that those which generate
responses to the spike protein will be able to protect people exposed to the virus from
developing covid-19, at least in the short term. What remains less clear, though, is
whether these vaccines will be able to prevent people from carrying the virus and
spreading it to others.
Emergency authorisation of vaccines is likely in late 2020 but supply will be extremely
restricted. In the first quarter of 2021, vaccine-makers will have more data that will
allow regulators to widen the use of these novel vaccines. Demand will still vastly
outstrip supply—a problem that will continue throughout 2021.
The coming year will see difficult political and public debates about how to prioritise
the use of this supply. Although there are fears about vaccine nationalism, one of the
surprising features of 2021 will be how many countries work out how to work together
well to produce and distribute these. The COVAX initiative, to which more than 180
countries have signed up, hopes to avoid the ugly and self-defeating situation in 2020
that saw countries trying to outbid each other for limited supplies of PPE and
ventilators. The scheme allows rich countries to subsidise vaccines for poorer countries,
with the initial aim of vaccinating 3% of the population in all member countries, starting
with front-line health workers. The hope is that coverage can be expanded to 20% by
the end of the year, focusing on those at highest risk.
A few countries that look likely to be oversupplied with vaccines, such as America and
Britain, will try to vaccinate as many people as possible before the winter of 2021. That
will raise ethical questions, as most countries will have to be more strategic. The
pandemic could be brought under control without vaccinating everyone. UNESCO, the
main UN agency organising the global distribution of vaccines, says universal
vaccination will not happen in the “initial years” of the outbreak.
Nada Sanders, a professor of supply-chain management at Northeastern University, says

the availability of a vaccine will not lead immediately to vaccinations, because so much
else needs to be organised. There are concerns about the availability of everything from
medical glass to needles. She says the supply chain needs to be designed and mapped at
a global scale, and worries that this will take longer than expected. Analysts at ubs, a
bank, warn that “fill and finish”, where the vaccine is put into vials and packaged for
distribution, is one of the most significant bottlenecks, followed by shipping. All these
issues will pose problems in 2021.
And there is one final complexity. The first vaccines to arrive will need to be kept cold
during distribution. Currently at least 25% of vaccines arrive in a degraded state due to
problems with the cold chain.
One thing is clear: vaccines will arrive, but they will be distributed unevenly, within
countries and among them, simply because of the scale of the distribution problem. In
the coming year, many people will struggle to understand why loved ones have been
lost to a disease for which there is a vaccine. In 2020 heroic efforts have produced
vaccines in months, rather than years. In 2021 further heroic efforts will be needed to
get them from the laboratory to the clinic.

Getting better
A deeper understanding of covid-19’s impact should improve the outlook for

treatments
With luck, new drugs will be able to prevent infected people from becoming ill
2021 in brief
The United States is due to leave the World Health Organisation in July. President
Trump criticised the WHO for being slow to respond to the pandemic and for being too
China-centric
IN THE WORLD of drug discovery, it is not uncommon for a promising

molecule to take a decade to make the journey from the laboratory to the
pharmacy shelf. For covid-19, however, effective treatments are already in use
at hospitals around the world. There is a good chance that more treatments
will be added to the list in 2021—including some that will dramatically reduce
the number of covid-19 sufferers who need to be hospitalised.
Things are moving fast. Just months after the disease emerged, clinical trials of several
drugs turned up two winners. Dexamethasone, a cheap steroid, was found to improve
survival in the most gravely ill covid-19 patients. Remdesevir, an anti-viral drug
originally developed to treat Ebola, turned out to reduce the duration of covid-19
symptoms.
With luck, at least one of the additions in 2021 will be a drug that prevents infected
people from becoming ill. Such drugs are already used for influenza, rabies and many
other diseases. For covid-19, the drug would be given to people who are at an early
stage of infection. It could also be administered as a prophylaxis, both to those at high
risk of catching the virus (such as health workers) and those likely to become severely
ill (such as residents of care homes with covid-19 outbreaks).
The odds look good. In November 2020 the European Medicines Agency, the EU’s drug
regulator, was in talks with the developers of 26 drugs for covid-19 that are already in
clinical trials, plus 16 drugs that are at a pre-clinical stage.
Scientists will also begin to demystify the lasting, often hidden, effects of the disease on
the heart and other parts of the body. Monitoring for such effects, and providing early
treatment as needed, would soften any delayed blows from a covid-19 infection,
including in people who may be unaware of having caught the virus. Studies looking for
such effects have been running since mid-2020, and results will start to trickle in during
the coming months.
The prognosis for those who suffer from “long covid”, a condition that appears to strike
at random but is more common in middle-aged women, is less optimistic. About 1-2% of
people with symptoms of covid-19 are still unwell three months after becoming infected,
according to a study based on a symptom-tracking app in Britain. Preventing long covid
in people who are already ill will be impossible, partly because their early symptoms
are not specific enough to identify them as being at risk. But many of them will get
better treatment for their lingering illness. Doctors are quickly learning how to diagnose
the physical causes of their symptoms (which organs are malfunctioning, for example).
As a result, many sufferers will get appropriate rehabilitation care earlier.
Greater understanding and better treatments should make covid-19 less terrifying. For
a disease that is here to stay, that would be a good prognosis.

Learning to live with the virus

What to expect in year two of the pandemic
Spreading out to stop the spread
FOR MUCH OF 2020 the public rhetoric around the pandemic was combative.
Politicians and health officials talked about “hammering” the novel
coronavirus and “squashing” towering epidemic curves. But the pesky clump
of RNA that, in a few months, has killed hundreds of thousands of people,
tanked the global economy and wiped out years of progress on poverty has
kept marching on. Though vaccines will emerge, reaching every corner of the
world with them will remain an aspiration. So a more conciliatory tone is in
order. In 2021 humanity will continue to adapt to living with the virus—in
ways that make the coexistence less taxing.
The basics will remain the same. Masks and avid hand-washing will still be necessary.
People will give others a wider berth in public spaces without even thinking about it.
But as the pandemic enters its second year, be prepared for changes in three areas:
testing, quarantine rules and the guidelines for social distancing.
Cheap, rapid tests for covid-19 infection will become ubiquitous. Unlike fancy
laboratory-based PCR technology, which can pick up even minuscule traces of the
virus’s genetic material, cheaper antigen tests look for parts of the virus and pick it up
when it is present in large amounts. Even some of the best antigen tests miss about a
quarter of infections (though these are thought to be at a stage when infected people are
least contagious, if at all). But some antigen tests can be done in 15 minutes with palm-
sized devices, or with kits similar to home pregnancy tests that cost $5. With more than
80 such rapid tests in the pipeline, accuracy will get better, sample collection will be less
horrid (using shallow nose swabs or saliva, for example) and prices will drop to as little
as $1 per test.
By the middle of 2021, rapid covid-19 tests will replace temperature screening at
airports (which is useless anyway). Employers, schools and entertainment venues will
use them routinely to screen for infections. Some people may even add a quick home
test to their morning or bedtime routine. Confirmation of positive results may still
require a more accurate PCR test; a negative result may not be a guarantee that it is safe
to hug granny. But lots of infections will be detected much sooner this way.
A side effect of cheap tests that can be done at home is that many, if not most, of those
infected will stay under the radar of official test-and-trace systems. But in much of
Europe and America trust in these systems is irreparably broken anyway. Even as
things are now, governments can only hope that infected people who are aware of their
status will, for the most part, do the right thing—alert their close contacts and keep
away from others as much as they can. And for people with no symptoms, staring at a
test strip that keeps flashing “positive” day after day may do more for compliance than a
message from a tracing app telling them to stay at home.
When it comes to quarantines, many countries will probably follow France and Sweden
in reducing their length from two weeks to one, in the hopes of boosting compliance.
People will be advised that they could still pose some (albeit lower) risk to others in the
second week—so should avoid seeing elderly relatives during that time, for example.
Officials checking on quarantined people will be more willing to let them out for some
low-risk activities, such as early-morning walks in the park when there are few people
about.
In a similar vein, many governments will give their citizens more autonomy about
socialising. Convoluted and prescriptive rules about who can see whom, and where and
how, will be out. Instead, there will be simple principles for people to follow in
whichever ways they choose. For example, people in more countries will be urged, as in
Japan, to avoid “the three cs”: crowding, close-contact settings and confined spaces.
When getting together with friends and family, they will be advised, as in Canada, to
think “fewer faces, smaller groups, shorter time together and bigger spaces”.
All this should make the second year of the pandemic somewhat more bearable than the
first. Raise a glass to that—in a small group, of course.
A vaccine for everyone

Ensuring global access to a vaccine is the only way to tame the pandemic, says Seth
Berkley, chief executive, Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance
A global exit strategy offers our best chance of success
IF 2020 WILL be remembered for the devastation and suffering caused by the covid-19
pandemic, the hope is that 2021 will be seen as the turning-point in the outbreak. This
is not just wishful thinking. In 2021 we should begin the largest and most rapid global
deployment of vaccines the world has ever seen. If successful, it will mark the beginning
of the end of the crisis.
This can happen only if we are first successful in developing safe and effective covid-19
vaccines, and if those vaccines are made simultaneously and fairly available to people in
all countries, regardless of their wealth. In normal circumstances those are two very big
“ifs”. Normally it takes more than a decade to develop a vaccine, and people in rich
countries get it first.
But these are extraordinary times. The response to this crisis from scientists and
vaccine-manufacturers has been unprecedented, with more than 200 candidate
vaccines in development and dozens already in advanced clinical trials. Equally, the way
global leaders have responded has been unparalleled, with most governments looking
beyond the immediate needs of their citizens in favour of a solution that benefits
everyone. Not since the Paris climate agreement have we seen such global co-operation
and solidarity, and never before in the face of such an immediate and existential threat.
One reason why this kind of global approach is so important, and why governments of
wealthy countries are willing to let people in the poorest parts of the world get
vaccinated before millions of their own citizens, is quite simply that it is necessary. The
sooner people in all corners of the world are protected, the sooner we can end the acute
phase of this pandemic, allow life to return to some semblance of normality and reboot
our economies. Because as long as large reservoirs of the virus are allowed to persist,
the threat of resurgence will remain.
A global exit strategy also offers our best chance of success. There is a good reason why
vaccines normally take so long to develop; it is extremely difficult. Those at the
preclinical stage, before human trials, typically have less than a 10% chance of success.
If they make it to human trials, that rises to less than 20%. In the face of such odds, our
best option is working together and hedging our bets. By pooling investment and
sharing risk, countries are collectively backing the development of a larger number of
vaccines, increasing the chance of success. That has n0t stopped governments pursuing
bilateral deals with manufacturers to secure the doses they need for their citizens, as
several wealthy nations have done. But by joining the collective effort, too, they in
essence have an insurance policy, guaranteeing themselves other vaccine doses even if
their bilateral deals fail—and in the process throwing a lifeline to other countries, which
would otherwise have limited or no access.
All this is what COVAX was created to do. Involving nearly 90% of the world’s
governments, and co-ordinated by my organisation, Gavi, along with the Coalition for
Epidemic Preparedness Innovations and the World Health Organisation, COVAX
maximises our chances of getting safe and effective vaccines, and being ready to
produce them quickly at scale. The initial aim is to provide 2bn doses by the end of 2021,
which should be enough to protect high-risk and vulnerable people, as well as front-line
health-care workers.
We still have a long way to go, first in getting the vaccines through trials, getting them
approved and licensed, and ensuring manufacturing is in place so we can move quickly.
We are also working to ensure that the infrastructure, supply chains and vaccinators are
in place to distribute billions of doses at speed. And all this at a time when health
systems have been disrupted by the pandemic and an infodemic of misinformation is
threatening to undermine public confidence in vaccine safety.
Nevertheless, despite such challenges, the fact that we have come this far bodes well,
not just for how quickly we end this pandemic, but for future preparedness and
resilience for the next one. Because there will be a next one; the emergence of novel
viruses of pandemic potential is an evolutionary certainty. More than just a multilateral
solution to a global crisis, COVAX is also the first step in a collective learning process to
improve our global defences—our disease surveillance, early-warning systems and
response mechanisms—across the entire world, to ensure that the next time this
happens, we are better prepared to act.

Seeking glory in the heavens

Benjamin Sutherland: freelance correspondent
A rich crop of space missions is driven by economic and security interests, not
just science
Collision course for Dimorphos
THRILLING SPACE missions are scheduled for blast- off in 2021. To tweak the
orbit of an asteroid’s moon that is nearly as big as a stadium, America’s NASA
plans to launch a car-sized craft to smash into it the following year. Neither
the asteroid, Didymos, nor its moon, Dimorphos, threatens Earth, but the
collision should yield potentially handy “planetary defence” know-how. NASA
also plans an uncrewed flight around the Moon, and, with help from the space
agencies of Canada and Europe, the launch of the James Webb Space Telescope,
the biggest and priciest ever. India may put three astronauts into orbit. India
and Russia aim to launch lunar landers. And China will begin launching parts
of its next and biggest space station, Tiangong-3.
It is ambitious stuff for all parties concerned. NASA’s asteroid spacecraft must eject an
Italian Space Agency observation pod before hitting its target at a closing speed of
6.6km a second. Unfolding the nearly $10bn space telescope’s mirror and tennis-court-
sized sunshield will require weeks of intricate robotic origami at -230°C. India has never
attempted crewed space flight. Its previous lunar lander crashed. Russia must develop
new systems for difficult ballistic navigation to an unvisited region near the Moon’s
south pole, says Lev Zelenyi of the government’s Space Research Institute in Moscow.
China hopes to complete its space station with a blitz of a dozen launches over two
years.
With spending on space outstripping overall global economic growth, spacefarers are
keen to continue dazzling in 2021 while also trying to keep costs down. Europe’s
ArianeGroup hopes the inaugural launch of its big Ariane 6 rocket will help recover
business lost to American competitors. Russia also knows it is under pressure to
succeed. Its (or, strictly, the Soviet Union’s) last moonshot was in 1976, and its lucrative
monopoly on delivering astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS) was broken
by America’s SpaceX in May 2020.
Expect innovation from established players and newcomers alike. In 2021 Rocket Lab,
an American- and New Zealand-based launcher of small payloads, may even recover a
discarded rocket stage using a helicopter to snag its parachute. Other companies are
also trying to show off a little. Blue Origin, owned by Jeff Bezos, plans the maiden launch
of New Glenn, a rocket with a reusable stage and twice the payload volume of any
existing alternative. Boeing hopes to carry its first astronauts to the ISS (an uncrewed
flight in 2019 failed to dock). United Launch Alliance’s first two flights of the Vulcan
Centaur aim to loft an unflown lunar lander (by Astrobotic) and an unflown spaceplane
(by Sierra Nevada Corp) designed to shuttle cargo and astronauts to low-Earth orbit.
Along with a handful of Western outfits, Russia’s space agency, Roscosmos, hopes to
launch space tourists in 2021.
More is at play than big bucks, however. Many space endeavours in 2021 reflect
geopolitical or military calculations. Behind India’s manned space flight, for instance, is
the “push factor” of rival China, says Raji Rajagopalan, a former assistant head of India’s
National Security Council. And China’s space station offers symbolism and “great value”
for developing skills in orbital manoeuvres, according to Wang Guoyu, a Chinese expert
on space issues. The upshot, believes William Shelton, a former head of the United
States Air Force Space Command, could be better Chinese anti-satellite capabilities. As
France’s defence minister, Florence Parly, put it in a speech that noted Russia’s
threatening activity in orbit, yesteryear’s “new frontier” has become “a new front”.

A conscious choice
Geoffrey Carr: science editor, The Economist
What is the basis of human consciousness? An unusual experiment will put two
rival theories to the test
2021 in brief
The Mayflower Autonomous Ship, a joint venture between Promare, a marine research
organisation, and IBM, a tech firm, is due to embark on its first trans-Atlantic voyage in
April 2021. The research vessel, which has no captain, no crew and no human contact,
will collect data about the state of the ocean
IN AN IDEAL world, science would work by making unambiguous predictions

based on a theory, and then testing those predictions in ways that leave no
wiggle room about which are right and which wrong. In practice, it rarely
happens quite like that, especially in biology. But, the coronavirus always
permitting, a group of neuroscientists plan to apply this method over the
course of the coming year to the most mysterious biological phenomenon of
all: human consciousness. They are organising what is known as an
“adversarial collaboration competition” between two hypotheses about how
consciousness is generated in brains.
The contestants are Giulio Tononi’s integrated information theory (IIT) and Stanislas
Dehaene’s global workspace theory (GWT). The competition was dreamed up at the
Allen Institute for Brain Science, in Seattle, and is being paid for by the Templeton
World Charity Foundation. The practical side of things is being led by Lucia Melloni of
the Max Planck Institute for Empirical Aesthetics, in Frankfurt.
Dr Tononi, of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, thinks consciousness is a direct

consequence of the interconnectedness of neurons within brains. IIT argues that the
more the neurons in a being’s brain interact with one another, and the more complex
the resulting network is, the more the being in question feels itself to be conscious.
Because the parts of a human brain where neuronal connectivity is most complex are
the sensoryprocessing areas (in particular, the visual cortex) at the back of the organ,
these, IIT predicts, are where human consciousness will be seated.
Dr Dehaene, who works at the Collège de France, in Paris, reckons by contrast that the
action, when it comes to consciousness, involves a network of brain areas—particularly
the prefrontal cortex. This part of the brain receives sensory information from
elsewhere in the organ, evaluates and edits it, and then sends the edited version out to
other areas, to be acted on. It is the activity of evaluating, editing and broadcasting
which, according to GWT, generates feelings of consciousness.
One difference between IIT and GWT, accordingly, is that the former is a “bottom up”
explanation, whereas the latter is “top down”. Supporters of IIT think consciousness is
an emergent property of neural complexity that can exist to different degrees, and could,
in principle, be measured as a number (for which they use the Greek letter phi). GWT-
type consciousness, by contrast, is more of an all-or-nothing affair. Distinguishing
between the two would be a big step forward for science. It would also have
implications for how easy it might be to build a computer that was conscious.
The competition’s experiments will be conducted on 500 volunteers at six sites in

America, Britain, China and the Netherlands. Three techniques will be used: functional
magnetic-resonance imaging (fMRI), magnetoencephalography (MEG) and
electrocorticography (ECoG). fMRI measures blood flow, which in turn relates to the
level of activity in the part of the brain being examined (the more blood that is flowing
through an area, the more active it is). MEG records fluctuating magnetic fields
produced by electrical activity in the brain. Neither of these is intrusive. ECoG, however,
records electrical activity directly from the surface of the cerebral cortex. This part of
the project will therefore rely on volunteers who are undergoing brain surgery for
reasons, such as to treat epilepsy, which require the patient to remain conscious
throughout the procedure. Half the data collected will be analysed immediately, by
researchers independent of the protagonists, who have no axe to grind for either side.
The other half will be locked away for future reference, in case confirmatory analyses
need to be done.
In the spirit of adversarial collaboration, the two sides have hammered out a set of tests
that both agree should produce different results, depending on which theory is correct.
These depend on the fact that GWT predicts brain activity only when attention is
actively being paid to something, whereas mere conscious awareness of something is
enough for IIT to predict activity. The tests’ details vary (some involve stationary letters,
objects or faces on a screen while others have shapes moving across the screen). In all of
them, though, the distinction between attention and awareness is clear—and so,
therefore, are the predictions.
Whatever emerges from the experiment will not be anywhere near a definitive
explanation of consciousness. In particular, it will not address the “hard” problem of the
phenomenon: the “feeling of what it is like to be something” that was raised in 1974 by
Thomas Nagel, an American philosopher, in an essay titled “What is it like to be a bat?”
It will, however, by providing what are known as neural correlates of conscious
experience, point to directions in which future investigations might usefully travel.

New on the menu

Emilie Filou: freelance correspondent, and Amy Hawkins: digital journalist, The Economist
Get ready to tuck into insects and lab-grown meat
2021 in brief
From 2021, scientific papers that result from work supported by research-funding
organisations in 16 countries must be published in “open access” journals or platforms.
The “Plan S” initiative aims to improve online access to academic journals
ALTHOUGH TWO billion people around the world regularly eat insects,
consumers in the West have historically shunned them as a food source. But
concerns about the environmental impact of food production are putting
insects on the menu: they are rich in protein and more sustainable to produce
than meats such as beef or pork.
Insect products are now available in many countries. You can buy cricket snacks in
Britain, mealworm burgers in Germany and supermarket-branded cricket powder in
Canada. But it remains a niche culinary interest: research by the International Platform
of Insects for Food and Feed (IPIFF) estimates that 9m people in the European Union
ate insect products in 2019—just 2% of the population. This is not just because of the
yuck factor. Regulation, or the lack of it, also plays a role.
Until 2018 insects were not covered by any EU regulation, for the simple reason that
they were not widely considered as foodstuffs. Individual member states imposed their
own rules, with attitudes ranging from bug-friendly to insect-phobic. That changed with
the introduction of the EU’s Novel Food Directive. But although it covers insects, it
requires individual authorisations for each species—and the first of those is expected
by early 2021.
This will allow makers of insect-based foodstuffs to commercialise their products across
the whole of the EU. That, in turn, will encourage them to scale-up capacity. The IPIFF
forecasts that production will grow from just 5,000 tonnes in 2019 to 260,000 tonnes
by 2030. And if you don’t like the sound of whole roast crickets, don’t worry: producers
are banking on insect powders or ingredients, rather than whole insects, to drive
growth (see chart). And even then, you may well end up eating insects indirectly.
Have your steak and eat it
That is because insects could help reduce reliance on environmentally damaging

proteins in animal feed, such as fishmeal and soyabeans. A fifth of the world’s wild fish
catch is used to make fishmeal, which contributes to overfishing in certain areas, while
soya production is wreaking havoc in the forests of South America.
Across most of the developed world, insects are already allowed in fish feed and pet
food. In 2018 America’s Food and Drug Administration also approved the use of insects
in poultry feed, which the EU is expected to do in late 2020 or early 2021. European
insect producers such as Protix, Ÿnsect and InnovaFeed raised millions of euros after
the EU authorised the use of insects in fish feed in 2017; the opening of the poultry-feed
market will be another step change. Granted, insects currently cost more to produce
than soya, but for feed manufacturers, they offer the prospect of a green, often home-
grown protein, which, given the global pandemic and increased consumer awareness,
will be worth paying for.
Another way to deal with the environmental impact of meat production is to make meat
in a laboratory, rather than on a farm. This involves taking stem cells from an animal
and growing them inside a bioreactor, immersed in a nutrient-rich fluid called a growth
medium. Once the cells start to proliferate, they can be induced to differentiate into
muscle and fat. Scientists then assemble the resulting cells into a product—the simplest
being something loose, like mincemeat. More than 50 startups are working on cultured-
meat products of various kinds, including burgers, chicken nuggets, shrimp dumplings
and steak. In 2021 consumers will be able to try lab-grown meat for themselves.
The main barriers to bringing lab-grown meat to market have been “cost, cost and cost,”
says David Kaplan, a biomedical engineer at Tufts University. Tissue engineering is
prohibitively expensive to do at scale. The humble-looking hamburger unveiled in 2013
by Mosa Meat, a Dutch startup, cost €250,000 ($300,000) to produce. But in January
2020 researchers at Northwestern University managed to reduce the cost of one kind of
growth medium, the most expensive part of the process, by 97%. As a result, says
Hannah Tait of Mosa Meat, the cost of lab-grown burgers will have dropped to a far
more affordable $9 when they go on sale.
Industry observers reckon that Memphis Meats, a startup based in California, may be
the first to launch. In May 2020 it raised $186m, more than the value of all previous
investments in cultured meat combined. The success of plant-based meat substitutes,
such as those made by Beyond Meat and Impossible Foods, has increased investors’
appetites. Europe, Israel and Asia are other global hubs for the industry.
As with insects, there is a yuck factor for some people—but there is also a compelling
environmental argument. Cultured meat uses 99% less land and around 90% less water
than conventionally produced European meat, making it far more sustainable. Should
producers be allowed to call it meat, though? There has been some quibbling about
labelling. But “the global regulatory community has been overwhelmingly receptive,”
says Eric Schulze of Memphis Meats. American and European regulators have already
outlined their guidelines.
So expect to see cultured meat on the menu in 2021, says Dr Kaplan. “We have no
choice,” he says. “If we don’t do it, we are in trouble.”

Space for opportunity

The plunging cost of access to space presents opportunities—but also imposes
environmental responsibilities, says Sarah Al Amiri, minister of state for advanced
technology and chair of the UAE Space Agency
The new space punks are agile, aggressive and fast-moving
AS 2020 is remembered as the year of covid-19, we can only hope 2021 is the first post-
covid year, and one in which we start to apply the lessons we have collectively learned.
There appears to be growing consensus around the idea that the pandemic is not
humankind’s greatest challenge, but that the spectre of climate change looms with far
greater urgency and potential for widespread disaster. Perversely, as our exploration of
space gives us greater insights into our planetary systems, it is also fouling the Earth’s
atmosphere and orbital environment. We are making as much of a mess of the space
surrounding our planet as we are of the planet itself.
As providers continue to develop lower-cost launch vehicles and reduce the turnaround
between launches, access to space has never been easier than it will be in 2021. It is
now the norm for launches to carry multiple payloads as smaller, more agile spacecraft
replace larger, heavier satellites. A new generation of small satellites is creating a
bewildering array of data sources and applications.
The role of governments in space will shift, with a new emphasis on blue-sky research,
funding innovation and developing startups. Governments will also support the sector
by acting as customers for data and analytical services, rather than procuring and
developing systems.
With the increasing dynamism of the private sector, satellite design and engineering can
be done much more quickly, slashing satellite-development times from over three years
to under one. The extreme reliability of long-term, large-scale space systems is no
longer a requirement, further driving down cost barriers to entry and democratising
access to space. The garages that gave birth to Silicon Valley are now space-capable.
Clean-rooms can be small, inexpensive facilities or shared resources.
In the year ahead we will realise we can untether not only from Victorian notions of
education to prepare young people for the workplace, but from the idea of a “workplace”
as we knew it. The space industry provides a striking example. The final stages of the
Emirates Mars mission pre-launch process were accomplished by a team working from
home—and, in fact, the whole mission was put together by a multinational team
working over Zoom and other collaborative online tools. Our mission-control facility is
based around a pair of relatively nondescript rooms with screens and laptops. Gone are
the days of hundreds of workstations arrayed around 100-metre screens of the kind
found at Cape Canaveral.
This is driving an explosion in innovators and operators seeking to explore the

commercial potential of space, eclipsing the small coterie of large companies surviving
on lucrative government contracts. SpaceX, Planet, Capella and others are reproducing
in spacecraft smaller than a kitchen chair what used to take complex systems the size of
an SUV. These new space punks are agile, aggressive and fast-moving. The price of
Earth-observation data is plummeting just as quickly as the applications for new data
streams are exploding.
One key element of the new datasets we are exploring is a growing understanding of
our own planet—of our atmosphere and the changes in our climate that threaten our
health, well-being and our very future. With that greater understanding comes greater
responsibility and the need to invest in technologies that mitigate our collective
environmental impact.
In developing our new solutions, we have given ourselves new problems. One man’s
miraculous small satellite is another man’s space junk. Working in space sciences
renders one stark fact obvious. In all of the observed universe, the only breathable
atmosphere available to humanity sits snugly around this planet. It is a tiny, tiny layer—
75% of our breathable atmosphere lies in a fragile zone that extends an average of
13km from our planetary surface.
New space players will need to address the issue of sustainable access to low-Earth
orbit. We will need to do something about the fast-growing and dense corona of junk we
have placed around our planet. Developing an innovative approach to dealing with
space debris, and safely de-orbiting satellites without incurring additional costs on the
development of space systems, will allow this new business model to flourish. In the
rush to explore this new frontier, we must not neglect our responsibility to an element
of our environment that is just as fragile as our forests, rivers and seas.

Culture
• Building a new type of museum
• Explaining China
• A literary outbreak
• Hollywood quake
• Afrobeats go global
• The show must go on

Culture
Building a new type of museum

Fiammetta Rocco: culture correspondent, The Economist and 1843
The Humboldt Forum in Berlin embodies the museum world’s many

controversies. Could it offer answers?
2021 in brief
The 25th film in the James Bond franchise, “No Time To Die”, starring Daniel Craig as
Bond, is due to be released in April after its debut was twice delayed by that dastardly
international villain, covid-19
THE HUGE building site that stretches across the midriff of Berlin’s Museum
Island has been a meadow, a parade ground, a Dominican monastery, a
Prussian palace under the Hohenzollerns in the 1700s and, after 1945, the
East German parliament known as the Palace of the Republic. In 2021 it will
reopen to the public in yet another incarnation: the Humboldt Forum, a giant
cultural centre that wraps a painstakingly reconstructed historical façade
around a series of climate-controlled ultra-modern exhibition galleries.
Like many big civil construction projects around the world, the Humboldt Forum has
suffered from delays and cost-overruns; the latest estimate is that it will cost €644m
($763m). The pandemic has not helped. Other museums that had to postpone their
openings to 2021 include the Grand Egyptian Museum in Cairo, M+ in Hong Kong and
the Xi Art Museum, an open-air exhibition space in Jiangxi province in south-east China.
Some, such as the Zayed National Museum in Abu Dhabi, will now not open until at least
2022.
When the idea of replacing the nearly derelict East German parliament with a replica of
the elegant Hohenzollern palace was first being seriously discussed in the early 2000s,
it seemed a beguiling prospect. The new building would offer a home to Berlin’s
collections of Asian art and ethnology, as well as the city’s library, the municipal
museum and the Humboldt University. In doing so, it would cement Berlin’s identity as
an outward-looking cultural hub embodying all the ideas of the German Enlightenment,
as represented by the Prussian von Humboldt brothers: Alexander, an explorer and
polymath, who lived until 1859, and Wilhelm, a philosopher, who died in 1835.
It would be a universal museum, like the British Museum (BM) or the Hermitage in St
Petersburg—and more. “It would remake the heart of Berlin,” says Neil MacGregor,
former director of the BM who chaired the advisory committee that set up the Forum.
“Because you already have Greece, Rome, the Mediterranean, Mesopotamia…bringing
Africa, Oceania, the Americas and the Asian art collection together would complete the
representation of the world’s civilisations.”
With political parties from the left and the right all laying claim to the Forum, the
project was subject to intense political debate. But over the years it has also become
embroiled in a series of controversies that are all its own. Many regarded the plan as a
piece of West German political triumphalism. Former East Germans were dismayed at
the tearing down of the Palace of the Republic. It may never have constituted a real
parliament, but many Ossis remembered its discos and bowling alley fondly. Others saw
putting up a replica of an 18th-century building as a way to gloss over the Nazi period,
while still paying homage to the militaristic Prussians. And those hoping that it would
transcend political, nationalist and religious boundaries were shocked to see a Christian
cross—also a symbol of Prussian power—being hoisted onto the roof last May, above a
Christian inscription composed by Friedrich Wilhelm IV, a Prussian king.
The biggest controversy concerns its ethnological collections, particularly those from
Africa. Germany has made great strides in returning art works seized during the Nazi
period, but has paid scant attention to items looted, or acquired by force, during its
African colonial period. Debate over restitution to Africa has become increasingly vocal
in other countries in recent years, especially France and the Netherlands, drawing
attention to Germany’s silence about the genocide it perpetrated in what is now
Namibia, and the looting that accompanied it. “This is really a big problem in Germany,”
says Jürgen Zimmerer, founding president of the International Network of Genocide
Scholars at Hamburg University.
But these controversies might yet be transformed into opportunities. Germany’s
experience as a federal state, which manages by consensus, should inspire the
Humboldt Forum to become a great centre of cultural debate. Provenance, restitution,
curating as a form of cultural power, the future of universal museums—these are all
topics that urgently demand dialogue between former colonial powers and the
countries they once ruled. The Humboldt Forum could lead the way.

Explaining China
Fiammetta Rocco: culture correspondent, The Economist and 1843
Cao Fei, a Chinese multimedia artist, is finally getting a career retrospective in her
own country
Dreamer ballerina
2021 in brief
The long-running reality-TV show “Keeping Up With the Kardashians” comes to an end
after its 20th season. The show, which debuted in 2007, became one of the most popular
of its genre, offering viewers a ringside seat to the trials and tribulations of the
eponymous family
IN 2006 CAO FEI spent six months working in the Osram light-bulb factory in
Foshan, a suburb of her hometown, Guangzhou, as part of the Siemens Art
Programme. “Whose Utopia?”, the video she shot there, is a classic work by an
artist who, perhaps more than any other, has built a career exploring the
Chinese dream and those whose lives are most affected by it. “She is the
archetype of her generation,” says Philip Tinari, director of the UCCA Centre
for Contemporary Art in Beijing, where a show of Ms Cao’s work will be
unveiled in March 2021.
“Whose Utopia?” opens with a hypnotic sequence that recalls Charlie Chaplin’s “Modern
Times”, made a century earlier. Light bulbs move along an assembly line, dancing from
machine tool to machine tool, through a wall of soldering fire, onto a conveyor belt and
into the arms of a line of wistful young factory workers who wear eyeliner and lipstick
even on the factory floor. In a second sequence, the factory workers dress up as their
dreams. One is a ballerina with angel wings; others are tap dancers, electric guitarists or
masters of tai chi. Ms Cao is never overtly critical, but a sense of suspicion about the
underside of capitalism and globalisation pervades all her work. On the soundtrack of
“Whose Utopia?” a thin voice sings: “Part of your life had waned and waned, but to
whom do you beautifully belong?”
The child of a well-known sculptor who taught at the Guangzhou Academy of Fine Arts
in southern China, Ms Cao was born in 1978, the same year Deng Xiaoping launched the
economic reforms that would spark the country’s rise. Growing up in Guangdong
province, she was exposed from an early age to the influences seeping in through
China’s southern border: television and Cantopop from Hong Kong, Japanese anime,
American hip-hop. Her work also incorporates themes of Chinese youth culture, utopia
and dystopia and the effects of technology, which all helped bring her to the attention of
Western curators. From 2003, when she was still only 25, some of the world’s most
important contemporary-art galleries began to show her work: MoMA PS1 in New York,
the Serpentine and Tate Modern in London, and the Venice Biennale three times.
Ms Cao’s UCCA show, “Staging the Era”, will be the first in China to cover her whole
career. Mr Tinari’s ambitions for it are clear: “Our audiences are interested in one
question: why is she as prominent as she is?” And his answer is simple: “I think she’s the
greatest explainer of China to the outside world.”

A literary outbreak
Andrew Miller: culture editor, The Economist
Covid-19 fiction is coming. Inoculate yourself
A SCIENTIST AT a secret laboratory is closing in on a vaccine. Rivals hack into

his computer; a rogue state tries to assassinate him using a gun disguised as a
digital thermometer. He escapes, only to be struck down by the disease.
Secretly besotted with him, the scientist’s assistant finishes the job, saving
him and the world.
Gazing across the street from her balcony, a woman spots a man she has never seen
before. They synchronise their evening appearances and, in the darkest days of the
virus, their socially distanced love blossoms. At last, overcome with passion, they rush
down to the street to embrace—and are arrested for violating the lockdown.
The writing and publishing of novels is a slow business, which means that stories
cooked up during the pandemic, and inspired by it, will mostly be published in 2021.
Some may feature plots not unlike those imagined above. These books will shed light, if
sometimes inadvertently, on the craft of storytelling and the nuanced relationship
between fiction and the news.
The trouble with setting novels during recent events is not only that other writers will
be doing the same; it is that readers have lived through the whole pandemic themselves
and might, to put it mildly, be in the mood for different themes. Even if some readers are
inclined to revisit the horrors of the coronavirus outbreak, original insights will be hard
to come by.
Convulsive as it has been, and for all the life-and-death freneticism of hospitals, for
many people the pandemic has been sedentary and isolated, involving a lot of television
and plenty of baking. That is not the stuff of which page-turning dramas are made. And
for any novelist who manages to surpass these obstacles, yet another authorial risk
looms: if a real-life vaccine intervenes, all the masks and hand-sanitising stations woven
into narratives might seem out of date before the books hit the shelves.
The best efforts will be subtler. Illness in fiction often serves as a metaphor for
something else—moral blindness, say, or the contagion of extreme politics. Similarly,
the most thoughtful contemporary authors will capture the impact of the virus in
indirect ways and settings: a desert substituting for an empty city, or a prison cell for a
lonely living room. They will convey the mood of the plague rather than its ephemeral
details, and its lasting impact on relationships and psyches. Distilling all that requires
time and distance. So although there are bound to be several in 2021, readers may have
to wait a while for the definitive covid-19 novel.

Hollywood quake
Rachel Lloyd: editor, Prospero blog, The Economist
The pandemic is shaking up the movie business
THE SAGA OF “Tenet”, Christopher Nolan’s latest time-twisting thriller,

exemplifies the difficulties that directors and film studios have faced during
the coronavirus pandemic. Initially scheduled to hit cinemas on July 17th
2020, the film was pushed back to July 31st and then August 12th. Warner
Bros then said it would be released later in August, but only in certain
countries. Its premiere in America was scheduled for September—with “select”
cities (ie, those that had loosened lockdown restrictions) getting priority. Film
executives complain that each of those delays cost them money.
Covid-19 has wreaked havoc on the movie business. Film sets were shuttered for
months. Promotional tours were called off. Festivals such as Cannes, where the biggest
titles of the year have their premieres, were cancelled or reconfigured as online events.
Many distributors opted to reschedule their biggest blockbusters to 2021, when they
stand a better chance of making a profit at the box office. That will mean a glut of big-
budget films; even cinephiles are unlikely to see them all.
With audiences cooped up at home, the pandemic has also made ascendant streaming
services more powerful. Netflix added 10.1m new subscribers globally in the second
quarter of 2020 (against a forecast of 8.3m). According to Ofcom, a media regulator,
Britons spent an average of six hours and 25 minutes a day in April watching television
and online video content—an hour and a half more than in 2019. Whereas studios once
put their poor or middling stuff online, they are now peddling their premium content
there, too. In September Disney released its live-action remake of “Mulan”, which cost
$200m, on Disney+, its streaming service, for an extra fee.
Some cinemas have had to compromise on their exclusivity rights as a result.

Universal’s decision to release “Trolls World Tour” online and in limited venues
simultaneously resulted in a new agreement with AMC over theatrical premieres and
digital releases. AMC cinemas used to be able to screen a Universal film for 90 days
before it went online; now that period has been changed permanently to 17 days.
All this has knock-on effects for awards shows. For the Academy Awards, due to take
place in April 2021, a “temporary exception” has been made to the rules so that films
that premiered on streaming services are eligible. Such companies had long
circumvented the previous rules by releasing their best films in their own cinemas—
Netflix earned the most nominations of any distributor at the Oscars in 2020—but this
change puts them in an even stronger position.
In 2021 film studios and on-demand platforms will also have to reckon with the longer-
term effects of lockdowns. With production suspended for several months—the average
Hollywood film takes 106 days to shoot—a dearth of new content looms. Streaming
services, which rely on a jam-packed schedule to appeal to consumers, may struggle to
retain subscribers. And for cinemas, it may mean yet more empty seats.

Afrobeats go global
John McDermott: chief Africa correspondent, The Economist JOHANNESBURG
More African entertainment will cross over into the cultural mainstream
Burna Boy is on fire
African-made content should help update Western views of the continent
Over the past decade Nigerian artists have blazed a trail for the continent’s
musicians. Afrobeats, or Afropop, is an umbrella term for an amalgamation of
sounds that is becoming increasingly popular in Europe and North America. It
reached a new peak in August 2020, when the fifth album by Burna Boy, a
Nigerian singer-songwriter, reached number one in the streaming charts in
dozens of countries.
To date it has been male Nigerian artists such as Burna Boy, Davido and Wizkid who
have led the way in taking contemporary African music into the global mainstream.
They have signed record deals with leading American labels, racked up hit singles and
headlined huge concerts. Their success is inspiring—but it has led some to worry that
overseas audiences will come to think of African popular music as exclusively Nigerian.
Such worries should subside in 2021, however, as a wider variety of African musicians
and sounds gain more global attention. South African rappers Nasty C and Nadia Nakai,
among others, recently signed to Def Jam Africa, a branch of Universal Music Group
established in May 2020. South Africa’s take on house music, which includes the genres
of gqom and amapiano, is growing in popularity. Although these sounds are often
adapted by Nigerian producers before they receive global attention, many listeners
want to check out the original genre.
Other artists who are famous across much of the continent and on the verge of wider
success include Innoss’B (from Congo), Sheebah Karungi (Uganda), Brian Nadra (Kenya)
and Manu WorldStar (who is South African-Congolese). Tiwa Savage, a Nigerian
superstar known as the “Queen of Afrobeats”, is likely to rival the popularity of her male
peers. Styles developed in diaspora communities—most notably Afro Trap—will gain
prominence, too. All these sounds, and more, are finding outlets in dedicated playlists
on platforms such as Spotify and Apple Music.
Western audiences will have more African-made content to watch, as well as listen to, in
2021. Netflix will release several “African Original” shows, including “Far From Home”, a
Nigerian series about a poor teenager catapulted into the world of the country’s elite,
and “Jiva!”, a South African drama. “Blood & Water”, a popular teen series set in Cape
Town, is returning for a second season. Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, a Nigerian novelist,
is having her bestselling novel “Americanah” made into an HBO series by Danai Gurira,
an American actress and playwright of Zimbabwean parentage.
Such programming should help update Western views of the continent. A study of
American television found that, in 700,000 hours of shows broadcast in a single month
(March 2018), there were just 25 significant storylines about Africa. Of those, about half
concerned crime. In 2021 these stereotypes will be increasingly—and belatedly—
challenged.

The show must go on

The skills and talents of the performing arts are too important to lose for good, says
Tamara Rojo, artistic director, English National Ballet
ALTHOUGH THE phrase is familiar, “the show must go on” usually relates to small
disasters: the sore throat of the lead singer, a ballerina spraining her ankle just as the
curtain is about to go up, a sudden technical failure halfway through a production. But
covid-19 is the biggest catastrophe the performing arts have faced in decades, posing a
real threat to their future. So the question now is: should and can the show go on? My
firm answer is: yes, yes, absolutely yes!
We in the cultural and arts sector have for some time been making the financial case for
our existence: how every pound of public money invested in the arts turns into £5
returned to the economy; how we support and sustain other industries, such as
hospitality and tourism. In Britain, the sector provides more than 350,000 jobs. But
there are more profound spiritual, cultural and emotional reasons that are often
forgotten, because they are less measurable.
We have seen throughout this period of isolation and loneliness that the one thing
keeping many people hopeful is indeed the arts. Films, radio, music and plays have all
contributed to people’s emotional and psychological well-being. But as the director Sam
Mendes has said, “It would be deeply ironic if the streaming services should be making
lockdown millions from our finest acting, producing, writing and directing talent, while
the very arts culture that nurtured that talent pool is allowed to die.” Whatever the
medium, gathering together to share stories and to feel empathy for each other is a
necessity deeply embedded in our DNA and intrinsic to all cultures.
I started to share free ballet classes online, from the first day of lockdown. Little did I
know that over the ten weeks that I continued to offer classes from my kitchen, sharing
them with the world, 4m people would come to join me. From professional dancers to
absolute beginners, people found solace, consistency and a reason to get up in the
morning in this daily ceremony of doing ballet class together.
We had a similarly enthusiastic response when we at the English National Ballet (ENB)
started to share our filmed archived performances through our Wednesday Watch
Parties, which ended up reaching 1m viewers all around the world. In normal times, no
amount of performances we could do in one season would ever reach such a big and
diverse audience. People of all backgrounds and traditions connected digitally through
the arts and found a moment of escapism and joy in an evening at the ballet in their own
homes.
So, what next? At ENB, after furloughing 85% of our workforce, we began to return
slowly to the studios, and we started to create. It did not make any financial sense to do
so, but it made emotional and artistic sense. And so we created an online platform, we
commissioned five pieces of new work, we hired film directors and freelance crews, our
musicians started playing again, and we managed to create a full programme of works
that people will be able to have access to, once again, digitally.
As performances with restricted audiences began to be allowed, we announced a series

of them, which sold out in only a few hours. These, too, will never make financial sense.
But, despite the joy of finding solace in a digital community, live performance is a
momentous occasion, a coming together to share the magic of storytelling, and very
much at the core of our raison d’être.
In Britain the government’s rescue package has saved many organisations, including
our own, until 2021. Yet the financial impact of this period will last far beyond 2021. We
need to be able to take risks and invest once again in new shows, in re-hiring our
employees and freelancers, and start taking productions on tour. For that we need
government-backed insurance, in case further covid-19 waves force us to cancel
performances. We also need a sector-specific job-retention scheme to ensure that skill
and talent is not lost for ever.
In continental Europe, where arts organisations receive bigger subsidies, the impact will
not be as deep and long-lasting. In America, with little or no public funding, wonderful
and (in normal times) stable arts organisations and ballet companies are looking at the
real possibility of extinction.
Necessity can spur innovation, and I am the first to admit that ballet is in need of self-
analysis and renovation on many fronts. But this will happen only if companies are able
to survive beyond this period with enough spirit and strength to face and create the
new future.

| Main menu | Previous section |
Obituary
• Covid-19’s first casualty
| Main menu | Previous section |

Covid-19’s first casualty

Ann Wroe: obituaries editor, The Economist
Farewell to the carefree existence of the pre-pandemic world
SOME WEEKS into the new year, K decided that he must see a doctor. The
surgery was only at the end of the road. Once or twice he had thought of
popping in as he went past, but immediately stifled the idea. You didn’t just
pop into places, when you never knew who might have been sitting on that
chair, or turning the pages of that copy of Homes and Gardens. He must think
it out. It was clear, though, that he needed to do something. For, though his life
was perfectly comfortable and successful, he was starting to feel troubled.
Once he had breezed through the world, carefree as a lark. He would spring from bed
most mornings, throw up the blind, fling open the window, deep-breathe the morning
air. Now he got up more circumspectly, so as not to trip on the duvet and sprain
something. He pulled the blind gently, for he couldn’t be sure of finding anyone to fix it if
it jammed. And if he heard the man in the downstairs flat coughing again in his kitchen,
he gave the morning air a miss.
Before, he would often grab breakfast on the run: seize something he fancied from
someone’s ungloved hands and then dart, untangling his earphones as he went, across
the main road, waving for the bus to wait. Or he would graze, if he felt like it, from the
fruit stall by the Tube. To crunch directly into an apple picked up from an open box—or,
for that matter, a hot onion bhaji, or cockles by the sea—without a second thought! But
now, in J. Alfred Prufrock’s words, did he dare to eat a peach? Or anything else
unwrapped?
As he chewed his home-soaked muesli, K soberly debated with himself, as he did almost
daily, whether he needed to go into the office or not. He could not go just because he
suddenly felt like it. He had to commit himself. The word “suddenly” itself was always
suspect; there should be a proper reason. The city was once a place into which he would
plunge every day like a swimmer, taking on everything it might throw at him. Now it
was the place from which, on returning, he immediately and laboriously washed his
hands.
How unconsidered that old existence seemed! How unexamined, how thoughtless! Back
then he was forever nipping out of the office as the mood took him. He would try on
jackets just for fun, or spend an hour in a bookshop sampling Zola one minute, Plath the
next—why not? Now, if he needed to indulge in this primitive form of shopping at all, he
decided what he wanted first and went straight to it, considered, undistracted: a serious
citizen with his thoughts in order.
They were always in order now. Once he and his colleagues in the pub of an evening
would bounce any number of crazy ideas off each other, from suddenly stripping naked
and jumping in the river to launching a new Ponzi scheme. Silly of course. Who knew
what submerged rocks and shopping trolleys lurked in the river? And who knew where
all the mad schemes had gone? They seemed as vacuous as the hearty high-fives and
shoulder-slaps that used to go with them. As for those productive huddles round a
screen, cooking up new schemes—why take the risk? Why even bother to notice the
will-o’-the-wisp of the light-bulb thought?
In his so-recent street-wandering days he could also catch the eyes of young women
who might return his smile, fall into chance conversation and, with luck, end up in bed
with him. #MeToo had already put a crimp on that. Now the whole business seemed
deeply inadvisable. He no longer wanted to risk going to their flat, nor they to his. A kiss,
a tumble, a mere knee-rub in the back row of the Arthouse cinema, were unthinkable.
Even the office had become forlorn. The notching-up of chance liaisons while raiding the
biscuit cupboard now seemed as irresponsible as accumulating air miles with a quick
weekend in Venice, which he had managed once.
Diagnosis of death
He still dreamed, unfortunately—his libido being as carefree as ever—of sweeping up
Doreen from Data in his arms, burying his face in her wild red tresses, and flying
halfway round the world with her. But now he knew, in his waking hours, that he must
not entertain the possibility without a detailed risk assessment. And it suddenly struck
him, with a great tremor, that he might actually be ill.
His online appointment with Dr M was brief. In the event, it took the kindly medic no
time at all to make the diagnosis. K’s spontaneity had died; and that death, Dr M assured
him, was universal.

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Table of Contents

From the editor

Ten trends to watch in the coming year

After the crisis, opportunity

Needle and spread

Plotting the economic course

Shock and awe

After the tech-celeration

The year of déjà vu

The president’s priorities

Police on the line

The children of covid-19

Winning the next ten years

Block, stock and barrel

All change, please

An idea whose time has come

Taking it to the Mexican people

Optimism in the time of covid-19

Between two giants

Unlucky for some

The dawn of the Asian century

The road to health?

Party of the century

Brave old world

The battle goes on

Biden’s problem now

The end of a black golden age

Big brother returns

Locked down, locked up

Pulling the plug

Put to the test

Turning a corner on climate

On the road again

A clash, a crunch and a crisis

The plague of poverty

Ahem…about last year

It’s time to pull together

Weathering the storm

Riding to the rescue

Macron’s balancing act

Follow the money in Italy

More pain in Spain

A battle for Russia

Team Europe, playing for the world

Disruption, deficit and dole

State of the union

Decline and fall

Global lessons from the pandemic

We must heed the pandemic’s warning

Remote working is different—and better

It’s time for a new deal for workers

Nature cannot be fooled

Shock to the system

A chance to change things

World in numbers: Countries

Top ten growers

Middle East and Africa

World in numbers: Industries

The world in figures: Industries

The new geography of business