Whether FBNI is solidarily liable with Rima and Alegre for moral damages, attorney’s fees and costs

of suit

FBNI contends that it is not solidarily liable with Rima and Alegre for the payment of damages and attorney’s fees
because it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly Rima and Alegre.
FBNI maintains that its broadcasters, including Rima and Alegre, undergo a "very regimented process" before they
are allowed to go on air. "Those who apply for broadcaster are subjected to interviews, examinations and an
apprenticeship program."

FBNI further argues that Alegre’s age and lack of training are irrelevant to his competence as a broadcaster. FBNI
points out that the "minor deficiencies in the KBP accreditation of Rima and Alegre do not in any way prove that FBNI
did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and supervising them." Rima’s accreditation
lapsed due to his non-payment of the KBP annual fees while Alegre’s accreditation card was delayed allegedly for
reasons attributable to the KBP Manila Office. FBNI claims that membership in the KBP is merely voluntary and not
required by any law or government regulation.

FBNI’s arguments do not persuade us.

The basis of the present action is a tort. Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they
commit.52 Joint tort feasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance,
cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. 53 Thus,
AMEC correctly anchored its cause of action against FBNI on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. 1a\^/phi1.net

As operator of DZRC-AM and employer of Rima and Alegre, FBNI is solidarily liable to pay for damages arising from
the libelous broadcasts. As stated by the Court of Appeals, "recovery for defamatory statements published by radio or
television may be had from the owner of the station, a licensee, the operator of the station, or a person who
procures, or participates in, the making of the defamatory statements." 54 An employer and employee are solidarily
liable for a defamatory statement by the employee within the course and scope of his or her employment, at least
when the employer authorizes or ratifies the defamation.55 In this case, Rima and Alegre were clearly performing their
official duties as hosts of FBNI’s radio program Exposé when they aired the broadcasts. FBNI neither alleged nor
proved that Rima and Alegre went beyond the scope of their work at that time. There was likewise no showing that
FBNI did not authorize and ratify the defamatory broadcasts.

Moreover, there is insufficient evidence on record that FBNI exercised due diligence in
the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly Rima and Alegre. FBNI merely showed that it exercised
diligence in the selection of its broadcasters without introducing any evidence to prove that it observed the same
diligence in the supervision of Rima and Alegre. FBNI did not show how it exercised diligence in supervising its
broadcasters. FBNI’s alleged constant reminder to its broadcasters to "observe truth, fairness and objectivity and to
refrain from using libelous and indecent language" is not enough to prove due diligence in the supervision of its
broadcasters. Adequate training of the broadcasters on the industry’s code of conduct, sufficient information on libel
laws, and continuous evaluation of the broadcasters’ performance are but a few of the many ways of showing
diligence in the supervision of broadcasters.

FBNI claims that it "has taken all the precaution in the selection of Rima and Alegre as broadcasters, bearing in
mind their qualifications." However, no clear and convincing evidence shows that Rima and Alegre underwent FBNI’s
"regimented process" of application. Furthermore, FBNI admits that Rima and Alegre had deficiencies in their KBP
accreditation,56 which is one of FBNI’s requirements before it hires a broadcaster. Significantly, membership in the
KBP, while voluntary, indicates the broadcaster’s strong commitment to observe the broadcast industry’s rules and
regulations. Clearly, these circumstances show FBNI’s lack of diligence in selecting and supervising Rima and
Alegre. Hence, FBNI is solidarily liable to pay damages together with Rima and Alegre.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of 4 January 1999 and Resolution of 26
January 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40151 with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral
damages is reduced from ₱300,000 to ₱150,000 and the award of attorney’s fees is deleted. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

 Penned by Associate Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, with Associate Justices Corona Ibay-Somera and Mariano M.
2

Umali concurring.
3
 Penned by Judge Antonio A. Arcangel.

4
 As AMEC and Ago alleged in their Memorandum in the trial court. Records, p. 243.

5
 Alegre substituted Larry (Plaridel) Brocales who was absent then.

6
 Records, p. 2.

7
 Docketed as Civil Case No. 8236.

8
 Exhibit "A-2," Exhibits Folder, pp. 21-22.

9
 Exhibit "A-3," Exhibits Folder, pp. 23-25.

10
 Records, pp. 28-30.

11
 Ibid., pp. 147-155.

12
 Rollo, pp. 52-68.

13
 Ibid., pp. 67-68.

14
 Ibid., p. 48.

15
 Rima and Alegre did not join the instant petition.

16
 Rollo, p. 45.

17
 In Lopez, etc., et al. v. CA, et al., 145 Phil. 219 (1970), the Court stated the following:

It was held in Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui, that "the repeal of the old Libel Law (Act No. 277) did not abolish the  civil
action for libel." A libel was defined in that Act as a "malicious defamation, expressed either in writing, printing, or by
signs or pictures, or the like, ***, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue,
or reputation, or publish the alleged or natural defects of one who is alive, and thereby expose him to public hatred,
contempt, or ridicule." There was an express provision in such legislation for a tort or quasi-delict action arising from
libel. There is reinforcement to such a view in the new Civil Code providing for the recovery of moral damages for
libel, slander or any other form of defamation. (Emphasis supplied)

 Art. 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no
18

criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise
be sufficient to prove the act complained of.

19
 Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

 Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
20

everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

21
 Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

22
 Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

xxx

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
 xxx

 Should be difamaciόn as stated in Lu Chu Sing and Lu Tian Chiong v. Lu Tiong Gui, 76 Phil. 669 (1946).
23

 Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code.

 Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 354. Requirement of publicity. – Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no
good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other
official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

 Radio Code of the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas, Ink., Exhibit "4."

 TSN, 22 April 1991, pp. 15, 18-19. Rima, however, testified that he and Alegre made the exposés after three or four
27

days from the time the students approached them. (TSN, 26 September 1992, pp. 47-48).

 TSN, 22 April 1991, p. 18.

 50 Am Jur. 2d, Libel and Slander § 313.

 Ibid.
30

 361 Phil. 1 (1999).

 Ibid.
32

 Rollo, pp. 65-67.

 Borjal v. Court of Appeals, supra note 31.

 1989 Revised Edition, Exhibit "4."

 Ibid.
36

 Supra note 20.
37

 Article 21 of the Civil Code provides: "Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
38

contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

 Rollo, p. 28.
39

 People v. Manero, Jr., G.R. Nos. 86883-85, 29 January 1993, 218 SCRA 85.
40

 130 Phil. 366 (1968). See also People v. Manero, Jr., G.R. Nos. 86883-85, 29 January 1993, 218 SCRA 85.
41

 ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. CA, 361 Phil. 499 (1999).

 Article 2219(7) of the Civil Code provides: "Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
43

cases: x x x (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; x x x."

 See Yap, et al. v. Carreon, 121 Phil. 883 (1965), where the appellants included Philippine Harvardian College
44

which was an educational institution.

 See Phee v. La Vanguardia, 45 Phil. 211 (1923). See also Jimenez v. Reyes, 27 Phil. 52 (1914).

 Ibid. Article 2216 of the Civil Code also provides that "No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral,
47

xxx damages may be adjudicated. The assessment of such damages, except liquidated ones, is left to the discretion
of the court, according to the circumstances of each case."

 Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot
48

be recovered, except:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses
to protect his interest;

(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;

(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid, just and
demandable claim;

(6) In actions for legal support;

(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;

(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability laws;

(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;

(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation
should be recovered.

In all cases, the attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.

 Koa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84847, 5 March 1993, 219 SCRA 541 citing Central Azucarera de Bais  v. Court
49

of Appeals, G.R. No. 87597, 3 August 1990, 188 SCRA 328. See also Abrogar v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No.
L-67970, 15 January 1988, 157 SCRA 57.

 G.R. No. 125778, 10 June 2003, 403 SCRA 452.

 Ibid. See PNB v. CA, 326 Phil. 504 (1996). See also ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. CA, 361 Phil. 499 (1999).
51

 Worcester v. Ocampo, 22 Phil. 42 (1912).

 Ibid.
53

 50 Am. Jur. 2d, Libel and Slander § 370.

 Ibid., § 358.
55

 Rollo, p. 31.
56