i.

Noscitur A Sociis

PEOPLE OF THE PHLIPPINES vs. SIMPLICIO DELANTAR

G.R. No. 169143             February 2, 2007
JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA

FACTS:

An information for violation of Section 5, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 1 was
filed against appellant Simplicio Delantar. That sometime and during the period from 1994 to
August 1996 above-named accused, through coercion and influence, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously promote, facilitate and induce [AAA], 4 a female child below
12 years of age, to indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct for money, profit and
other consideration.

On 25 February 1999, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of violation of Section 5(a), paragraphs 1, 4 and 5 of Article III of R.A. No. 7610.

SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.—Children, whether male or

female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse.

 The Court opines that the prosecution has proven the guilt of the accused
Simplicio Delantar y Redondo beyond reasonable doubt when he delivered his daughter
[AAA] to an Arab national by the name of Mr. Hammond and to Congressman Romeo
Jalosjos of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte at the Ritz Tower in Makati where the
said Congressman for eight (8) times committed acts of lasciviousness on her person when
he kissed her on her lips, private organ and even raped her.

From her testimony, it could easily be gleaned that AAA did not consent to the acts of
lasciviousness and the sexual intercourse.

Appellant claimed that sometime in 1983, AAA was brought to him by a certain
Salvacion Buela, AAA’s real mother, who could not support her.The birth certificate indicates
that AAA was born on "11 May 1985" to "Librada A. Telin" (mother) and "Simplicio R. Delantar"
(father), however nowhere on the face of the birth certificate can the signature of appellant be
found.

According to appellant, Librada A. Telin is his sister and they did not get married to each other
on the date indicated in the birth certificate, or impliedly at least, not ever.
ISSUES: Whether or not the Certificate of live birth presented by respondent may serve
as proof of filiation and justify the imposition of the higher penalty on him

RULING:

NO. While under the Family Code, filiation can be established by, among others, the
record of birth appearing in the civil register,yet the rule is where the birth certificate presented
was not signed by the father against whom filiation is asserted, such may not be accepted as
evidence of the alleged filiation.The court thus hold that the birth certificate of AAA is prima
facie evidence only of the fact of her birth and not of her relation to appellant. After all, it is
undisputed that appellant is not AAA’s biological father.

The court apply, by analogy, the ruling of this Court in People v. Garcia where the court
held that the restrictive concept of guardian, legal or judicial, is required by Sec. 11 of R.A. No.
7659. Said provision, by way of amending Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, ordains that
where the victim of the crime of rape is under eighteen years of age and the offender is, inter
alia, a guardian of the victim, the death penalty shall be imposed.

The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation or the
solemnity of judicial appointment which impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his
office and normally deters him from violating its objectives. Such considerations do not obtain
in appellant’s case or, for that matter, any person similarly circumstanced as a mere custodian
of a ward or another’s property. The fiduciary powers granted to a real guardian warrant the
exacting sanctions should he betray the trust.
 MAPALAD AISPORNA
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-39419 April 12, 1982

TERESITA LEONARDO- DE CASTRO

FACTS:

Rodolfo S. Aisporna was duly licensed by Insurance Commission as agent to Perla

Compania de Seguros, with license to expire on 30 June, 1970, Exh. C; on that date, at
Cabanatuan City, Personal Accident Policy, Exh. D was issued by Perla thru its author
representative, Rodolfo S. Aisporna, for a period of twelve (12) months with beneficiary as Ana
M. Isidro, and for P5,000.00; apparently, insured died by violence during lifetime of policy, and
for reasons not explained in record, present information was filed by Fiscal, with assistance of
private prosecutor, charging wife of Rodolfo with violation of Sec. 189 of Insurance Law for
having, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously acted, "as agent in the solicitation for insurance by
soliciting therefore the application of one Eugenio S. Isidro for and in behalf of Perla Compaña
de Seguros, Mapalad contends that being the wife of true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally
helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy was merely a renewal and was issued because
Isidro had called by telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was
absent and so she left a note on top of her husband’s desk to renew.

The trial court found Mapalad guilty. On appeal the trial court’s decision was affirmed
by the appellate court.

ISSUE:
Whether Mapalad Aisporna is an insurance agent within the scope or intent of the
Insurance Act

RULING:

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the definition of an insurance agent as
found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is intended to define the word "agent"
mentioned in the first and second paragraphs of the aforesaid section. More significantly, in its
second paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the definition of an insurance agent is within the
intent of Section 189. Hence —

Any person who for compensation ... shall be an insurance agent within the
intent of this section, ...

Patently, the definition of an insurance agent under the second paragraph holds true
with respect to the agent mentioned in the other two paragraphs of the said section.
 The second paragraph of Section 189 is a definition and interpretative clause intended
to qualify the term "agent" mentioned in both the first and third paragraphs of the aforesaid
section.

Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph to the agent
mentioned in the first and second paragraphs would give harmony to the aforesaid three
paragraphs of Section 189. 

Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole.

The
particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. In the present
case, the first paragraph of Section 189 prohibits a person from acting as agent,
subagent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without
first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner; while
the second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of the section;
while the third paragraph prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation. The
appellate court’s ruling that the petitioner is prosecuted not under the second paragraph of
Section 189 but under its first paragraph is a reversible error, as the definition of
insurance agent in paragraph 2 applies to the paragraph 1 and 2 of Section 189, which is
“any person who for compensation shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this
section.” Without proof of compensation, directly or indirectly, received from the
insurance policy or contract, Mapalad Aisporna may not be held to have violated Section
189 of the Insurance Act.
 DAI-CHI ELECTRONICS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, 
vs.
HON. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig,
Metro Manila and ADONIS C. LIMJUCO
G.R. No. 112940 November 21, 1994
CAMILO D. QUIASON

FACTS:

On July 29, 1993, petitioner Dai-ichi Electronics Manufacturing Corp. filed a complaint
for damages with the RTC branch 156, against private respondent ADONIS C. LIMJUCO, a
former employee for violation of par. five of their Contract of Employment dated August 27,
1990, which provides:

That for a period of two (2) years after termination of service from EMPLOYER,
EMPLOYEE shall not in any manner be connected, and/or employed, be a consultant and/or be
an informative body directly or indirectly, with any business firm, entity or undertaking engaged
in a business similar to or in competition with that of the EMPLOYER.

Within two years of the private respondent's withdrawal from the petitioner's
employment, the petitioner claimed that the private respondent started working for Angel
Sound Philippines Corporation, a company in the same industry. The petitioner also claimed
that the private respondent currently has the same position as when he was working for the
petitioner:

Petitioner sought to recover liquidated damages in the amount of One Hundred

Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), as provided for in their contract in case of violation.
Since the complaint was for damages arising from employer-employee relationship, the RTC
dismissed the case, it ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
controversy. Citing Article 217(4) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by R.A. No.
6715, respondent court stated that it is the Labor Arbiter which had original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner's claim for damages is one arising from employer-employee
relations?
RULING:

No. Article 217, as amended by Section 9 of R.A. No. 6715, provides as follows:

Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) Except as otherwise

provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of
the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of
stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or
non-agricultural:

(4) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from
the employer-employee relations; (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner does not ask for any relief under the Labor Code of the Philippines. It seeks to
recover damages agreed upon in the contract as redress for private respondent's breach of his
contractual obligation to its "damage and prejudice". Such a claim is under the purview of civil
law, and the regular courts have authority over the dispute. Even more so when we take into
account that the stipulation pertains to the parties' relationships after their employment.

A case in point is Singapore Airlines Limited v. Paño, 122 SCRA 671 (1983), which also
dealt with the employee's breach of an obligation embodied in a written employment
agreement. Singapore Airlines filed a complaint in the trial court for damages against its
employee for "wanton failure and refusal" without just cause to report to duty and for having
"maliciously and with bad faith" violated the terms and conditions of its "Agreement for a
Course of Conversion Training at the Expense of Singapore Airlines Limited." This agreement
provided that the employee shall agree to remain in the service of the employer for a period of
five years from the date of the commencement of the training program. The trial court
dismissed the complaint on the grounds that it did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the controversy.

On appeal, the appellate court held that jurisdiction over the controversy belongs to the
civil courts since that the action was for breach of a contractual obligation, which is intrinsically
a civil dispute. Furthermore, jurisprudence has evolved the rule that claims for damages under
paragraph 4 of Article 217, to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, must have a reasonable causal
connection with any of the claims provided for in that article.

The Court, therefore believes and so holds that the Money claims of workers which now fall
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters are those money claims which
have some reasonable causal connection with the employer-employee relationship (Emphasis
supplied). When the cause of action is based on a quasi-delict or tort, which has no reasonable
 causal connection with any of the claims provided for in Article 217, jurisdiction over the action
is with the regular courts.

i. Ejusdem Generis

PHILIPPINE BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, AND COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 119122             August 8, 2000

JUSTICE FIDEL PURISIMA

FACTS:

June 21, 1989 – PBA received assessment letter from the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue for the payment of deficiency amusement tax with the total amount due and collectible
amounting to P 5,864,260.84

On July 18, 1989, petitioner contested the assessment by filing a protest with
respondent Commissioner who denied the same. On January 8, 1990, petitioner filed a petition for
review2 with the Court of Tax Appeals (respondent CTA) questioning the denial by respondent
Commissioner of its tax protest.

Respondent CTA dismissed petitioner's petition for lack of merit and the Petitioner is
hereby ORDERED to PAY. Petitioner presented a motion for reconsideration 4 of the said decision
but the same was denied by respondent CTA in a resolution. Thereafter and within the
reglementary period for interposing appeals, petitioner appealed the CTA decision to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals rendered its questioned Decision,6 affirming the decision of the CTA
and dismissing petitioner's appeal. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said decision
but to no avail. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the amusement tax on admission tickets to PBA games a national or local tax?
RULING:

The laws on the matter are succinct and clear and need no elaborate disquisition.
Section 13 of the Local Tax Code provides:
"Sec. 13. Amusement tax on admission. -The province shall impose a tax on admission to
be collected from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinematographs,
concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement xxx."

However, the Court ruled that the foregoing provision of law in point indicates that the
province can only impose a tax on admission from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of
theaters, cinematographs, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement. The authority to
tax professional basketball games is not therein included. PD 1959 9the governing law) provides:

"SEC. 44. Section 268 of this Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:

Sec. 268. Amusement taxes. -- There shall be collected from the proprietor, lessee or
operator of cockpits, cabarets, night or day clubs, boxing exhibitions, professional
basketball games, Jai-Alai, race tracks and bowling alleys, a tax equivalent to:

4.Fifteen per centum in the case of professional basketball games as

envisioned in Presidential Decree No. 871. Provided, however, That the tax
herein shall be in lieu of all other percentage taxes of whatever nature and
description;

The amusement tax is paid to the BIR, which payment is a national tax. The said
payment is in lieu of all percentage tax of whatever nature and description.

A historical analysis of pertinent laws does reveal the legislative intent to place
professional basketball games within the ambit of a national tax. The Local Tax Code, which
became effective on June 28, 1973, allowed the province to collect a tax on admission from the
proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinematographs, concert halls, circuses and other
places of amusement. On 1976, the operation of petitioner was placed under the supervision
and regulation of the Games and Amusement Board, with the proviso (Section 8) that “all
professional basketball games conducted by the PBA shall only be subject to amusement tax of
5% of the gross receipts from the sale of admission tickets." Then, PD 1456 came into effect,
increasing the amusement tax to 10%, as envisioned in PD No. 871 xxx." Later in 1984, PD 1959
increased the rate of amusement tax to 15% by making reference also to PD 871. With the
reference to the 3 laws (PD 871 by PD 1456 and PD 1959), there is a recognition under the laws
of this country that the amusement tax on professional basketball games is a national, and not
a local, tax
 THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
DOMINADOR SANTUA

G.R. No. 155703             September 8, 2008

JUSTICE ANTONIO NACHURA

FACTS:

Respondent Dominador Santua filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a petition for
judicial reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-22868.

The respondent claimed that he is the legal owner of specific land. The Capitol Building,
which housed the Office of the Register of Deeds at the time, was entirely destroyed by fire,
and the original copy of TCT was one of its casualties. There is no co- owner's, mortgagee's, or
lessee's duplicate of said certificate of title, and none of the buildings or improvements on said
land belong to respondent. The owner's duplicate copy was lost while in respondent's
possession, and all efforts to find it have been ineffective. Respondent and his family are in
actual possession of the property and have been paying taxes thereon. Attached to the petition
were a tax declaration, survey plan, and technical description

The RTC issued an Order setting the initial hearing of the case. Respondent complied
with the jurisdictional requirements. The Provincial Assessor, Mr. Onisimo Naling, testified that
the tax declaration submitted in evidence is a true and genuine tax declaration issued by their
office. Mrs. Flordeliza Villao, Records Officer III of the Register of Deeds, testified that the
Certification issued by her office is a true and genuine certification. RTC granted the petition
finding the instant petition to be well-taken and there being no opposition.

On January 16, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Notice of Appeal, which
was given due course by the RTC. The CA affirmed the RTC Decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not tax declarations, Technical description and lot plans are sufficient bases
for the reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of title
RULING:

SEC. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources
hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:

(a) The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title;

(b) The co-owner’s, mortgagee’s or lessee’s duplicate of the certificate of title;

(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or
by a legal custodian thereof;

(d) The deed of transfer or other document on file in the registry of deeds, containing
the description of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof, showing that its
original had been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer
certificate of title was issued;

(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property the description of
which is given in said documents, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an
authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and

(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper
basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.

The instant petition for reconstitution is anchored on Section 3(f) of RA No. 26, with
respondent proffering three significant documents - a tax declaration, survey plan and technical
descriptions.

The Court has already settled in a number of cases that, following the principle
of ejusdem generis in statutory construction, "any document" mentioned in Section 3 should be
interpreted to refer to documents similar to those previously enumerated therein.

At most, the tax declaration can only be prima facie evidence of possession or a claim of
ownership, which however is not the issue in a reconstitution proceeding. A reconstitution of
title does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title 16 but
merely determines whether a re-issuance of such title is proper. Moreover, a survey plan or
technical description prepared at the instance of a party cannot be considered in his favor, the
same being self-serving.18 Further, in Lee v. Republic,19 the Court declared the reconstitution
based on a survey plan and technical descriptions void for lack of factual support.