McComas (2002)

THE NATURE OF SCIENCE IN SCIENCE EDUCATION
Science & Technology Education Library

VOLUME 5
SERIES EDITOR
Ken Tobin, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA
EDITORIAL BOARD
Beverly Bell, University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand

Reinders Duit, University of Kiel, Germany
Kathlene Fisher, San Diego State University, California, USA
Barry Fraser, Curtin University of Technology, Perth, Australia
Chao-Ti Hsiung, National Taipei Teachers College, Taipei, Taiwan
Doris Jorde, University of Oslo, Norway
Michael Khan, Centre forEducation Policy Development, Braamfontein, South Africa
Vince Lunetta, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania, USA
Pinchas Tamir, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
SCOPE
The book series Science & Technology Education Library provides a publication forum
for scholarship in science and technology education. It aims to publish innovative books
which are at the forefront of the field. Monographs as well as collections of papers will be
published.
The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume.
The Nature of Science in
Science Education
Rationales and Strategies
edited by
WILLIAM F. McCOMAS
University of Southern California,
Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS

NEW YORK / BOSTON / DORDRECHT / LONDON / MOSCOW
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgments ix
Foreword and Introduction xi

Michael Matthews
SECTION I: RATIONALES FOR THE NATURE OF SCIENCE

IN SCIENCE INSTRUCTION
1. The Role And Character of The Nature of Science 3

in Science Education
William F. McComas, Michael P. Clough & Hiya Almazroa
2. The Nature of Science in International Science 41

Education Standards Documents
William F. McComas & Joanne K. Olson
3. The Principal Elements of the Nature of Science: 53

Dispelling the Myths
William F. McComas
SECTION II: COMMUNICATING THE NATURE OF SCIENCE

PLANS, APPROACHES AND STRATEGIES
4. The Card Exchange: 73

Introducing the Philosophy of Science
William W. Cobern & Cathleen C. Loving
5. Avoiding De-Natured Science: Activities that Promote 83

Understandings of the Nature of Science
Norman Lederman & Fouad A bd-El-Khalick
V
vi TABLE OF CONTENTS
6. Confronting Students’ Conceptions of the Nature of Science 127

with Cooperative Controversy
Penny L. Hammerich
7. Nature of Science Activities Using the Scientific Theory Profile: 137

From the Hawking-Gould Dichotomy to a Philosophy Checklist
Cathleen C. Loving
8. Learning By Designing: A Case of 151

Heuristic Theory Development in Science Teaching
Fred Jansen & Peter Voogt
9. Using Historical Case Studies in Biology to Explore the 163

Nature of Science: A Professional Development Program
for High School Teachers
Karen R. Dawkins & Allan A. Glatthorn
10. A History of Science Approach to the Nature of Science: 177

Learning Science by Rediscovering It
Nahum Kipnis
11. Integrating the Nature of Science with Student Teaching: 197

Rationales and Strategies
Michael P. Clough
PART III: COMMUNICATING THE NATURE OF SClENCE

COURSES AND COURSE ELEMENTS
12. A Thematic Introduction to the Nature of Science: The Rationale 211

and Content of a Course for Science Educators
William F. McComas
13. The Nature of Science: 223

Achieving Science Literacy by Doing Science
John O. Matson & Sharon Parsons
14. Elementary Science Methods: Developing and Measuring 231

Student Views about the Nature of Science
Yvonne Meichtry
TABLE OF CONTENTS vii
15. Nature of Science: Implications for Education: An Undergraduate 243

Course for Prospective Teachers
Karen Sullenger & Steve Turner
16. The Use of Real and Imaginary Cases in Communicating the 255
Nature of Science: A Course Outline
David Boersema
17. Teaching the Nature of Science as an Element of Science, 267

Technology and Society
Barbara Spector, Paschal Strong & Thomas LaPorta
18. Of Starting Points and Destinations: Teacher Education and 277

the Nature of Science
Michael L. Bentley & Steve C. Fleury
19. A Programme for Developing Understanding of the 293

Nature of Science in Teacher Education
Mick Nott & Jerry Wellington
20. The Nature of Science as a Foundation for Teaching Science: 315

Evolution as a Case Study
Craig E. Nelson, Martin K. Nickels & Jean Beard
SECTION IV: ASSESSING NATURE OF SCIENCE UNDERSTANDING
21. Assessing Understanding of the Nature of Science: A 331

Historical Perspective
Norman Lederman, Philip Wade & Randy L. Bell
Notes on Contributors 351
Index 361
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The editor wishes to acknowledge
The seminal contributions of Michael Martin and James Robinson who began the
conversation about the relevance of the nature of science to science education;
Richard Duschl, Derek Hodson, Michael Matthews and Norman Laderman who,
through their continuing scholarship, stimulate and inform the study of the nature
of science in science education;
René Stofflett, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and J. Steve Oliver, of the

University of Georgia, the external reviewers, whose suggestions greatly improved
the manuscript;
Michael Clough for insightful conversation and countless useful suggestions;
George Cossman of the University of Iowa, who awakened the editor’s interest in this
important field;
Beverly Franco who helped prepare the manuscript for publication and struggled
with me through the countless revisions;
Joanne Olson, who helped greatly with the index and in polishing the manuscript;
Ken Tobin, for his support of this project as the Science & Technology Education
Library series editor;
The publications board of the Association for the Education of Teachers in Science
who have supported the development of the book from the outset;
Joy Carp and Irene van den Reydt of Kluwer Academic Publishers who have
responded with patience to my countless questions; and
The many authors who have developed the plans and strategies contained in this
book and then entrusted me with their innumerable excellent ideas. To you, most
sincerely, I offer my profound thanks.
ix
MICHAEL R. MATTHEWS
FOREWORD AND INTRODUCTION
It is a pleasure to contribute the foreword to this book. The editor has done science
education a service by overseeing and coordinating the publication of perhaps the
first anthology whose contributions address applied, pedagogical and curricular
aspects of teaching school students and trainee teachers about the nature of science.
Although there has been a long tradition of theoretical writing on the subject, of
establishing the cultural, educational and scientific benefits of teaching about the
nature of science – just how this is to be put into practice has been less attended to.
The theoretical tradition includes Ernst Mach’s arguments in the late nineteenth
century (Mach 1886/1943), John Dewey’s work at the turn of the century (Dewey
1910), F. W. Westaway’s publications in the nineteen-twenties (Westaway 1919,
1929), Joseph Schwab’s writings in the nineteen-forties and nineteen-fifties (Schwab
1945, 1958), the books of Leo Klopfer and James Robinson in the nineteen-sixties
(Klopfer 1969; Robinson 1968), the publications of Jim Rutherford and Michael
Martin in the nineteen-seventies (Rutherford 1972; Martin 1972), and more recently
the work of Derek Hodson, Rick Duschl, Norman Lederman, Joan Solomon, and a
number of others, including myself, many of whom are associated with the
International History, Philosophy and Science Teaching Group and whose work has
appeared in the journal Science & Education (Hodson 1986, 1988; Duschl 1985,
1990; Lederman 1986, 1992; Solomon 1989, 1991; Matthews 1992, 1994, 1998).
This theoretical tradition has not been without some advice for teachers about
how to address matters concerning the nature of science, but this advice has generally
been in the margins. Which may be one reason why the theoretical tradition itself
has been marginalised within the science education community: teachers reasonably
enough require not only the destination, but some roadmap showing how to get there.
Pleasingly, contributors to this anthology directly address these neglected and
practical classroom matters.
Questions about the nature of science have long been of concern to science
teachers and curriculum developers. It has been hoped that science education would
enhance society and have a beneficial impact on the quality of culture and public life
in virtue of students appreciating something of the nature of science, internalising
something of the scientific spirit, and developing a scientific frame of mind that
might carry over into other spheres of life. John Dewey expressed well this
Enlightenment hope for science education when he said:
xii FOREWORD AND INTRODUCTION
Our predilection for premature acceptance and assertion, our aversion to suspended judgment, are signs that
we tend naturally to cut short the process oftesting. We are satisfied with superficial and immediate short-
visioned applications. . . . Science represents the safeguard ofthe race against these natural propensities and
the evils which flow from them. . . . It is artificial (an acquired art), not spontaneous; learned, not native. To
this fact is due the unique, the invaluable place of science in education. (Dewey 1916, p. 189)
Some, with a more narrow focus, maintain that if we want students to learn and
become competent in science, then they must be taught something about the nature
of science. For instance, Frederick Reif in a recent publication, has said:
All too often introductory physics courses ‘cover’ numerous topics, but theknowledge actually acquired by
students is often nominal rather than functional. If students are to acquire basic physics knowledge. . . It is
necessary to understand better the requisite thought processes and to teach these more explicitly. . . . if one
wants to improve significantly students’ learning of physics. . . . It is also necessary to modify students’ naive
notions about the nature of science. (Reif 1995, p. 281)
Curriculum documents in the US (especially Project 2061 and the National

Science Standards), Canada (especially Science for Every Student), and Europe
(particularly those from UK, Denmark, and Spain) are giving increased prominence
to students understanding the nature of science. William McComas and Joanne
Olson, in their contribution to this anthology, discuss some of these international
curricula (but not the European material, discussions of which can be found in
Solomon (1991) and Nielsen and Thomson (1991)).
There has been an imposing amount of research conducted over many decades
concerning the curricular, pedagogical and educational aspects of the nature of
science. Much of this research tradition is reviewed in Lederman (1992). Students’
understanding of the nature of science have been studied (Mackay 1971; Rubba,
Homer & Smith 1981; Griffith & Barman 1995; Griffith & Barry 1993; Solomon,
Scott & Duveen 1996). Teachers’ epistemologies and beliefs about the nature of
science have been documented (Kimball 1967; Carey & Strauss 1968; Rowell &
Cawthron 1982; Koulaidis & Ogborn 1989,1995; Gallagher 1991; Lederman 1986;
Lakin & Wellington 1994). The impact, or otherwise, of teachers’ epistemology on
their classroom practice has been debated (Lederman & Zeidler 1987; Duschl &
Wright 1989; Brickhouse 1989; Mellado 1997; Tobin & McRobbie 1997). The
influence of students’ epistemologies on their learning of science has been
investigated (Hammer 1995). The history of the linkage between curricular
definitions of scientific literacy and knowledge of the nature of science has been
documented (Meichtry 1993). The classroom processes whereby teachers’ beliefs
about the nature of science interact with curriculum and influence students’
epistemologies have been researched (Tobin, Tippins & Hook 1994; Mellado 1997).
The justification, effectiveness, and practicality of nature of science courses in
teacher education programmes have been canvassed (Scheffler 1970; Loving 1991;
Clemison 1990; Eichinger, Abell & Dagher 1997). And the epistemological
assumptions, or commitments, underlying various ‘nature of science’ tests have been
identified and criticized by Lederman, Wade and Bell in this volume and by others
M. MATTHEWS xiii
(Lucas, 1975; Doran, Guerin & Cavalieri, 1974; Rubba & Anderson, 1978).
Nature of science questions are becoming, at the end of the century, perhaps more
pressing than they were during the period from Mach to Martin. During those one
hundred years there was a degree of cultural and philosophical unanimity about the
nature and purpose of science. Of course there was some dispute about the topic –
inductivists versus falsificationists, positivists versus realists, Kuhnians versus
Popperians, empiricists versus rationalists, Bernalian state-interventionists versus
Polanyian free-enterprisers, etc. – but these disputes were basically domestic ones.
There was general agreement that science was a good thing, that it was a cognitive
enterprise abiding by intellectual standards, that it valued objectivity, that it sought
to find truths about the world, and that it gave us the best possible understanding of
nature and reality. Robert Merton’s characterization of science as: open minded,
universalist, disinterested and communal (Merton 1942) summed up professional and
lay opinion on the matter. Anyone who has been reading anything of the ‘Science
Wars’ that have been raging in professional journals and the popular press, will
know that times have changed concerning this hitherto cultural agreement about
science. (If you have missed the war and want to catch up, see Gross and Levitt
1994; Gross, Levitt and Lewis 1996.)
A well known Canadian science educator, Glen Aikenhead, has recently stated,
‘the social studies of science’ reveal science as:
. . . mechanistic, materialist, reductionist, empirical, rational, decontextualized, mathematically idealized,
communal, ideological, masculine, elitist, competitive, exploitive, impersonal, andviolent. (Aikenhead 1997,
p. 220)
The contrast with Dewey, Merton, and the orthodox tradition, is palpable. Times
certainly have changed. And science teachers, and science educators (the teachers
of the teachers), are caught up in the war. Teachers, as usually happens when
cultural and social wars erupt, suffer collateral damage.
The science teacher has to master not only his or her subject matter, and the
techniques of making it interesting and intelligible to students, but also has to get
some grip on orthodox, or we might say modernist, understandings of the nature of
science, and now the legitimacy, or otherwise, of postmodernist challenges to the
orthodox understanding. This is a hard call, but it cannot be avoided. The business
of science teaching cannot be conducted as usual; or if it is so conducted, then it must
be done with recognition of, and with answers to, the challenges posed by
postmodernist critics. To do otherwise is professionally irresponsible.
That these epistemological debates concerning the nature of science are not
educationally idle has been dramatically shown in decisions by a string of major USA
cities to adopt the Portland Baseline Essays in their science programmes (Martel
1991). The science component of these essays lists a number of commitments that
are flatly at odds with a Western-scientific view of the world (see critical discussion
in Good and Demastes 1995, and Montellano 1996). And the claim is made that the
xiv FOREWORD AND INTRODUCTION
Western view is just one of a number of equally valid scientific views, and thus the
purportedly African science contained in the Portland Baseline Essays should be
included in the curriculum. For black children, and others in these cities, the value
of their education hinges on the correctness or otherwise of teachers’ and
administrators’ decisions regarding the historical and epistemological claims made
in the Baseline Essays. Of the Essays, one critic has said:
People who are genuinely concerned with improving science education in the schools and with increasing the
number of minority scientists should vigorously oppose the inclusion of material into the curriculum that makes
unsupported claims, introduces religion under the guise of science, and claims that the paranormal exists. The
critical need to increase the supply of minority scientists requires that they be taught science at its best rather
than a parody. (Montellano 1996, p. 569)
The ability to distinguish good science from parodies and pseudoscience depends
on a grasp of the nature of science. More generally, the widespread debates
occurring over multi cultural science also, in part, hinge upon answers to the
question: What is the nature of science? That is, there is an epistemological question
at issue in the debate, which unfortunately often gets confused with ethical and
political questions (Matthews 1994, chap. 9; Siegel 1997). The Creation Science
debates and trials in the USA in large part hinged upon answers to the question:
What is the nature of science? This was explicitly the case in the 1981 Little Rock
trial over the constitutionality of Arkansas’s Act 590 requiring equal time for the
teaching of creation science and evolutionary science (see contributions to Ruse
1988).
Similarly, nature of science questions are at the heart of many feminist critiques
of contemporary science and of feminist proposals for the reform of science curricula.
Feminism has long ceased to be merely a political movement; it also encompasses a
variety of epistemological positions, some of which are in open conflict with
mainstream or orthodox understanding of science (see, for instance, contributions to
Nelson and Nelson (1996)). Sandra Harding’s ‘standpoint’ feminist epistemology
is an example of one such position that has had some influence in science education
circles (Harding 1986, 1991). But it also needs to be recognized that there are many
critics offeminist epistemology who maintain that feminists have got both the history
and the philosophy of science wrong, and further that they draw wrong conclusions
from the parts that they get right (Koertge 1981,1996; Pinnick 1994). For instance,
Noretta Koertge, a feminist and one of the first philosophers of science to write on
science education (Koertge 1969) has said, in one piece critical of feminist
philosophy of science, that:
If it really could be shown that patriarchal thinking not only played a crucial role in the Scientific Revolution
but is also necessary for carrying out scientific inquiry as we now know it, that would constitute the strongest
argument for patriarchy that I can think of. (Koertge 1981, p. 354)
M. MATTHEWS xv
Epistemological questions are also prompted by much environmentalist, ‘deep

ecology’, and ‘new science’ writing to which students are increasingly exposed. It
is a rare science teacher who has not in the recent past been asked: ‘Do you believe
in the Gaia hypothesis?’or, ‘Does the Big Bang prove God’s existence?’ or, ‘Do
whales have rights?
Further there has been increased stress on metacognitive awareness and
epistemological development as important outcomes of science instruction (White &
Gunstone 1989). In the words of Rosalind Driver and her co-workers at Leeds
University, ‘Science learning, viewed from a constructivist perspective, involves
epistemological as well as conceptual development’ (Driver et al. 1994, p. 219). Any
specification of ‘epistemological development’ brings to the fore questions about the
methodology and nature of science. Just as one cannot specify ‘moral development’
without some normative account of morality, so too one cannot identigy
‘epistemological development’ without some normative account of epistemology.
Perhaps more than anything else, what has pushed nature of science
considerations to the forefront of contemporary science education, is the prominence
that constructivism has gained in the science (and mathematics and literature)
education community. Peter Fensham, a well-placed observer has said: ‘The most
conspicuous psychological influence on curriculum thinking in science since 1980
has been the constructivist view of learning’ (Fensham 1992, p. 80 1). Russell Yeany,
another keen observer, has said: ‘A unification of thinking, research, curriculum
development, and teacher education appears to now be occurring under the theme of
constructivism’ (Yeany 199 1, p. 1). And Ken Tobin, a past president of the National
Association for Research in Science Teaching, has remarked that: ‘constructivism
has become increasingly popular . . . in the past ten years . . . it represents a
paradigm change in science education’ (Tobin 1993, p. ix).
I have argued in a number of places (Matthews 1993, 1994, chap. 7, 1997) that
constructivism is at its core, as it was with Piaget, an epistemological doctrine and
it is standardly coupled with commitments to certain views (postpositivist,
postmodernist, anti-realist, instrumentalist) about the nature of science. The issues
here are complex, (see Volume Six, Numbers One and Two of the journal Science
& Education ), but for the present purpose it suffices to say that science teachers and
science educators who engage with, or adopt, constructivist philosophy, must address
the central issue of the nature of science. As Peter Slezak has written:
There could scarcely be a more fundamental contribution to science education than the one offered by
constructivist sociological theories, since they purport to overturn ‘the very idea’ of science as a distinctive
intellectual enterprise with its special values. (Slezak 1994, p. 291)
The foregoing discussion continues the theoretical analysis of the place of nature
of science considerations in science teaching. What needs to be done, and what is
done in this anthology, is move on to the practical matter of how to teach about the
xvi FOREWORD AND INTRODUCTION
nature of science, how to engage students in the debate or conversation about the
nature of science. Karen Sullenger and Steve Turner, in their contribution, have
nicely articulated the matter in saying:
. . . we wanted to find a way to encourage preservice teachers to clarify and articulate their own, tacit notions
of science and teaching science by challenging them with alternative conceptions of science held within the
history of science, science education, and science communities . . . We wanted to involve them as participants
in these debates Further, we wanted prospective teachers of science to construct more complex understandings
of science, particularlythe understanding of science they would us as a basis for making pedagogical decisions.
It is in everyone’s interest that students, and trainee teachers, develop ‘a more

complex understanding of science’. William McComas’s contribution on ‘Dispelling
the Myths of Science’ is a nice beginning to this task. We all know science is a
complex matter: that metaphysics is an indispensable part of science, that theories
are under-determined by empirical evidence, that science makes enormous use of
metaphorical reasoning, that observation is colored by theoretical preconceptions,
that political and personal factors enter into scientific decision making, and so on.
Science effects culture, and is in turn effected by it. Any half-decent study of
Newton’s mechanics illustrates all of these matters.
But recognition of this complexity simply does not mean that ‘anything goes’, or
‘all ideas and world views are equal’, or ‘science is just a social construction’. The
recognition that science is a complex human construction by no means implies the
relativism and instrumentalism frequently associated with constructivist philosophy.
The choice is not, as it is often put, simplistic understanding of science, or
constructivist understanding of science. If, in the course of studying science,
children are routinely made aware of its intellectual complexity, then they might be
more immune to snake-oil merchants, and others, who gain adherents by promising
to initiate followers into complex and ‘mind-blowing’ ideas. If children have
thought carefully enough about simple old Newtonian ‘action-at-a-distance’, then
their interest in complexity and metaphysics is being productively encouraged.
One important consideration in teaching about the nature of science is that
pointed out by Karen Dawkins and Allan Glatthorn in their contribution, namely:
Since it takes historians and philasophers of science decades of study to derive generalizations about the nature
of science from the historical evidence, it is unrealistic to expect teachers or students to develop profound
understandings from a necessarily limited exposure to the world of science.
It is unrealistic to expect students, or trainee teachers, to become competent

historians, sociologists or philosophers of science. We should have limited aims: a
more complex understanding of science, not a total, or even a very complex,
understanding. There are numerous low-level questions that students can be engaged
by: What is a scientific explanation? What is a controlled experiment? What is a
crucial experiment? How do models function in science? How much confirmation
M. MATTHEWS xvii
does a hypothesis require before it is established? Are there ways of evaluating the
worth of competing research programmes? Did Newton’s religious belief affect his
science? Was Darwin’s ‘damaged book’ analogy a competent reply to critics who
pointed to all the evidence that contradicted his evolutionary theory? Was Planck
culpable for remaining in Nazi Germany and continuing his scientific research
during the war? There is no need to overwhelm students with ‘cutting-edge’
questions. They have to crawl before they can walk, and walk before they can run.
This is no more than commonsensical pedagogical practice: simple pendulums are
dealt with before compound pendulums, addition and subtraction before
multiplication and division, Euclidean geometry before non-Euclidean geometry,
proportional reasoning is mastered before algebra, differentiation before integration,
and so on. It may be that students do not get beyond the simple questions, but
teachers should feel sanguine about that. Rather, students genuinely struggle to
grasp the simple questions rather than just repeat popular nostrums, or their teacher’s
prejudice about the complex questions. Voicing opinions about postmodernism,
when the basics of modernism have not been understood, is akin to the rattling of an
empty vessel.
To this end, the contributions in Part II of the anthology, are ideal. Following
Mach last century, and James Conant and Leo Klopfer in the nineteen-fifties, I
personally believe that historical case studies are ideal vehicles for achieving this
limited, but expandable, goal. A good number of such case studies are included in
this anthology.
These considerations lead onto another question which, unfortunately, is often not
asked. This question is, “What is the purpose in teaching about the nature of science,
or including nature of science considerations in the teacher-education curriculum?”
The question seems so straight-forward as to not be worth asking. But there is an
unfortunate tendency in current writing that suggests that this question needs to be
attended to.
The tendency is one which says: ‘The reason we want teachers to know more
about the constructivist / positivist / realist / feminist / Marxist / multiculturalist /
universalist nature of science is so that their students will better know or embrace
constructivist / positivist / realist / feminist / Marxist / multiculturalist / universalist
views about the nature of science’. That is, there is a tendency that says that the
educational purpose of promoting any particular view about the nature of science
among teachers is so they can, in turn, promote it among their students. This view
needs to be questioned. At one level it is profoundly anti-educational.
Naturally we like people to believe what we believe. Be it in politics, morals,
religion, economics, environmental matters, or whatever else. Teachers have their
share of this tendency. The problem for teachers arises when this natural tendency
nullifies their role as educators.
John Locke expressed this Socratic point in his 1689 Essay Concerning Human
Understanding, where he said:
xviii FOREWORD AND INTRODUCTION
The floating of other men’s opinions in our brains makes us not one jot more knowing, though they happen to
be true. What in them was science is in us but opiniatertry, whilst we give up our assent only to reverend
names, and do not, as they did, employ our own reason to understand those truths which gave them reputation.
(Locke 1690/1924, p. 40)
And then proceeded, memorably, to say:
Such borrowed wealth, like fairy money, though it be gold in the hand from which he received it, will be but
leaves and dust when it comes to use. (ibid)
If Locke’s argument holds against truths it certainly holds against contested or

false opinions. Bringing epistemology and philosophy into focus in science
education, and putting the nature of science into curriculum documents, will be to
no great avail if it merely becomes the occasion for students repeating the opinions
of their teachers. If HPS in science teaching becomes a catechism – like dimat in the
former Soviet Union – then it defeats its potentially major educative purpose.
Bertrand Russell, an out-spoken and fierce partisan of numerous philosophical
and social causes, recognized the antieducational effect of indoctrination. In his
essay On Education, written during the First Great War, he pointed out that:
If the children themselves were considered, education would not aim at making them belong to this party or
that, but at enabling them to choose intelligently between the parties; it would aim at makingthem able to think,
not at making them think what their teachers think ... we should educate them so as to give them the knowledge
and the mental habits required for forming independent opinions... (Egner & Denonn, 1961, p. 401)
Israel Scheffler (1973) and Harvey Siegel (1988) have elaborated this basic
Platonic insight in terms of reason-giving being the raison d’ être of education.
Education, as distinct from indoctrination, conditioning, brain-washing etc., is
marked by students having a concern for reasons and for the justification of beliefs.
And these in turn depend upon free and informed inquiry. As Plato so long ago
insisted, education is not just the having of correct beliefs, it is the having of
adequate reasons for these beliefs. Without informed and adequate reasons, beliefs
are just Locke’s ‘fairy money’.
Science programmes in any scheme of liberal education will include discussion
of the nature of science – its history, methodology, philosophy, social and cultural
impacts, and its relation to other forms of knowledge. And all but the most
impoverished technical programmes will also include aspects of the nature of science
– scientific method, hypothesis generation and testing, and so on. The art of the
teacher is to judge the sophistication of his or her students, and present aspects of the
nature of science that are intelligible to them without being overwhelming.
This anthology goes a long way towards making available to teachers intelligible,
but not overwhelming, nature of science material that can be utilised in classrooms.
University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia

MICHAEL R. MATTHEWS xix
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SECTION I
RATIONALES FOR INCLUDING NATURE OF SCIENCE

IN SCIENCE INSTRUCTION
WILLIAM F. McCOMAS, MICHAEL P. CLOUGH AND HIYA ALMAZROA
1. THE ROLE AND CHARACTER OF THE NATURE OF

SCIENCE IN SCIENCE EDUCATION
Science has a pervasive but often subtle, impact on virtually every aspect of modern
life—both from the technology that flows from it and the profound philosophical
implications arising from its ideas. However, despite this enormous effect, few
individuals even have an elementary understanding how the scientific enterprise
operates. This lack of understanding is potentially harmful, particularly in societies
where citizens have a voice in science funding decisions, evaluating policy matters
and weighing scientific evidence provided in legal proceedings. At the foundation
of many illogical decisions and unreasonable positions are misunderstandings of the
character of science.
For almost twenty-five years the National Science Board has surveyed the
American public as part of its Science and Engineering Indicators study to determine
the state of interest in and awareness of fundamental issues in the sciences and
technology. The results of this study included the conclusion that the “level of
interest in science and technology in the U.S. has remained relatively stable over the
past 16 years with approximately 40 percent of Americans expressing a high level
of interest in science . . .” (National Science Board, 1996). This finding may be
encouraging, but further probing indicates that although Americans may be
interested in science they have no clear idea how science operates.
One element of the survey examined individuals’ views about how science is
conducted. The study designers formulated a series of questions aimed at classifying
respondents’ positions on a four level hierarchy of nature of science understanding.
Those at the highest level (Level I) understand that science is concerned with the
development and testing of theory. Those responding who lack this degree of
sophistication, but still have an awareness that experiments require a control group
would be classified as Level II. Individuals at Level III do not have the
comprehension of those in the higher two groups but still see scientific findings
based on a foundation of careful and rigorous comparison with precise
measurements. Those lacking any understanding of the nature of science were
classified as Level IV.
These findings are sobering. Two percent of the two thousand adult respondents
were at Level I, 21 percent were at Level II, 13 percent were at Level III and 64
percent were at Level IV. This finding is sobering. Even as measured by the basic
nature of science elements contained in this study, more than 60 percent of the
American public effectively had no knowledge of how science works. Somewhat
3
W. F . McComas (ed.) The Nature of Science in Science Education, 3-39.
© 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
4 W. McCOMAS, M.CLOUGH AND H. ALMAZROA
encouraging was the finding that individuals having higher levels of education and
more science and mathematics education were likely to be in Levels I and II.
The explanation for the general public’s poor understanding of how science
functions is astoundingly simple. The crux of the matter is that at all levels science
teaching and textbooks emphasize the factual recall of science content to the near
total exclusion of the knowledge-generation process. Science teachers rarely have
opportunities to learn how science functions in their own studies and, not
surprisingly, fail to emphasize that aspect of science to their students. Lakin and
Wellington, (1994) reported that teachers in their study, having never reflected on
issues relating to the nature of science, tended to undervalue such ideas in their
teaching. Furthermore, educators who would like to incorporate something of the
pageant of science in their science lesson must consult the same textbooks that
frequently misrepresent or even omit discussion of the way in which science
knowledge is produced. This book, The Nature of Science in Science Education:
Rationales and Strategies, was designed to addresses these problematic issues by
illustrating both why and how to communicate the excitement of the scientific
endeavor to others.
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF SCIENCE?
The phrase “history and philosophy of science” (HPS) has been used to describe the
interplay of disciplines that inform science education about the character of science
itself. However, a more encompassing phrase to describe the scientific enterprise for
science education is the “nature of science” (NOS). The nature of science is a fertile
hybrid arena which blends aspects of various social studies of science including the
history, sociology, and philosophy of science combined with research from the
cognitive sciences such as psychology into a rich description of what science is, how
it works, how scientists operate as a social group and how society itself both directs
and reacts to scientific endeavors. The intersection of the various social studies of
science is where the richest view of science is revealed for those who have but a
single opportunity to take in the scenery.
The nature of science is not particularly concerned with the natural world in the
way that science itself is, at least not directly. The scientific community consists of
individuals who devote their careers to better understanding the natural world. This
community of experts determines which ideas best account for natural phenomena.
Those who study the nature of science come from many diverse fields and investigate
science and scientists by asking questions such as “What, if anything, demarcates
science from other human endeavors?”, “Are science ideas discovered or invented?”,
and “How is consensus reached in the scientific community?” In brief, the nature of
science epitomizes Einstein’s, (1933) advice that if you want to know how scientists
THE ROLE AND CHARACTER OF THENATURE OF SCIENCE 5
work, “don’t listen to their words, fix your attention on their deeds” (p. 270).
Through multiple lenses, the nature of science describes how science functions.
For science educators the phrase “nature of science,” is used to describe the
intersection of issues addressed by the philosophy, history, sociology, and psychology
of science as they apply to and potentially impact science teaching and learning. As
such, the nature of science is a fundamental domain for guiding science educators in
accurately portraying science to students.
This book has been developed to help science educators cultivate the multiple
kinds of knowledge necessary for effective teaching. Shulman, (1986) suggests that
teachers’ knowledge can be divided into three broad categories—pedagogical,
curricular, and subject matter—and defines subject matter knowledge as a
discipline’s facts, principals and structure. He writes (p. 9):
Teachers must not only be capable of defining for students the accepted truths ina domain. They must also
beable to explain why a particular proposition is deemed warranted, why it is worth knowing and how it relates
to other propositions, both within the discipline and without, both in theory and in practice.
Hollon, Roth and Anderson, (1991) add that “. . . science teachers must develop
knowledge that enables them to make two types of decisions—curricular decisions
and instructional decisions” (p. 149). The challenge therefore, is for science teachers
to translate an understanding of the knowledge generation process into meaningful
classroom experiences and appropriate classroom discourse. Early in the book we
define what constitutes the nature of science appropriate for guiding science
instruction and in the second section a variety of experts have provided a range of
strategies that effectively communicate this important knowledge both to teachers
and students.
CONSENSUS VIEWS REGARDING THE NATURE OF SCIENCE
Before embarking on the development of any course or unit of study designed to

assist teachers or students in the acquisition of a nature of science understanding, one
must have some notion of what knowledge is worth possessing for incorporation into
curricula and classroom discourse. In spite of significant progress toward
characterizing science, much disagreement remains. Almost thirty years ago,
Herron, (1969) claimed that no sound and precise description exists concerning the
nature and structure of science, and more recent voices echo that sentiment. As an
example, Lauden states that “. . . we have no well-confirmed general picture of how
science works, no theory of science worthy of general assent” (in Ginev, p. 64).
Welch, (1984) and Duschl, (1994) also cites the lack of consensus regarding the
appropriate image of scientific inquiry and the growth of scientific knowledge while
Ledeman (1992) notes that the nature of science is neither universal nor stable. At
the level of the fine details, there will always be an active debate regarding the
ultimate nature of science. However, one of the central responsibilities of science
teachers is to provide an accurate description of the function, processes and limits of
science rather than to engage students in the somewhat arcane arguments that occur
among philosophers of science. At the level of description, there is significant
consensus regarding the nature of science. During the past three decades, a number
of scholars including Robinson, 1968; Martin, 1972; Ennis, 1979; Giddings, 1982;
Lederman, 1983; Duschl, 1988, and Matthews, 1994 have provided both explicit and
implicit suggestions for the characteristics of science to be included in science
instruction.
For example, the nature of science recommendations contained in eight
international science education standards documents show significant overlap (Table
1). Without question, the positions in the following table in no way convey the range
of complex issues surrounding the statements. Such complexities are fundamental
to specialists in the social studies of science, but these recommendations are for K-12
science students—not future philosophers of science. Knowing who the
recommendations are for and the degree of sophistication appropriate for that target
group is an important consideration when crafting nature of science standards.
Moreover, the image of science emerging from the social studies of science is
sufficiently robust that science educators can move forward with confidence and
provide a more realistic picture of the strengths and limitations of this thing called
science. (Smith et al., In press). Where consensus does not exist, science teachers
should present a plurality of views. As Matthews, (1997) argues, the purpose of
nature of science education is not to indoctrinate, but to address reasons for accepting
a particular position. Chapter 2 provides a full elucidation of the variety of nature of
science elements and the degree of consensus, but here in Table I the most prevalent
issues are illustrated.
TABLE I
A consensus view of the nature of science objectives extracted from eight
international science standards documents.
Scientific knowledge while durable, has a tentative character.

Scientific knowledge relies heavily, but not entirely, on observation,
experimental evidence, rational arguments, and skepticism.
There is no one way to do science (therefore, there is no universal step-by-
step scientific method)
Science is an attempt to explain natural phenomena
Laws and theories serve different roles in science, therefore students should
THE ROLE AND CHARACTER OF THE NATURE OF SCIENCE 7
note that theories do not become laws even with additional evidence.
People from all cultures contribute to science
New knowledge must be reported clearly and openly
Scientists require accurate record keeping, peer review and replicability
Observations are theory-laden
Scientists are creative
The history of science reveals both an evolutionary and revolutionary
character
Science is part of social and cultural traditions
Science and technology impact each other
Scientific ideas are affected by their social & historical milieu
THE NATURE OF SCIENCE IN SCIENCE EDUCATION:

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Advocacy for students’ understanding of science and its nature can be traced back to
the early years of this century. Although at that time the phrase “understanding the
nature of science” was not clearly stated, some elements and characteristics of
science were noted as goals worth pursuing in science teaching. For example,
Lederman, (1992) reported that the Central Association of Science and Math
Teachers in 1907 strongly emphasized the scientific method and processes of science
in science teaching. Hodson, (1991) cites Dewey’s 1916 argument that
understanding scientific method is more important than the acquisition of scientific
knowledge. Jaffe, (1938) in his high school textbook New World of Chemistry listed
nature of science objectives such as a willingness to swing judgment while
experiments are in progress, willingness to abandon a theory in light of new
evidence, and knowledge that scientific laws may not be the ultimate truth.
In 1946, James Bryan Conant delivered his famous Terry Lectures at Yale
advocating a historical approach to science instruction. He suggested that all
students must understand the tactics and strategies of science. It was not until the
second half of this century that the construct we now call the nature of science was
stated explicitly as a major aim of science teaching by the National Society for the
Study of Education, (1 960):
There are two major aims of science-teaching; one is knowledge, and the other is enterprise. From science
courses, pupils should acquire a useful command of science concepts and principles. Science is more than a
collection of isolated and assorted facts . . . A student should learn something about the character of scientific
knowledge, how it has been developed, and how it is used. (Hurd, 1960, p. 34).
One of the primary justifications for the inclusion of the nature of science in
science education comes from Schwab, (1964) who was both a philosopher and
science educator. He correctly observed that science is taught as an “unmitigated
rhetoric of conclusions in which the current and temporal constructions of scientific
knowledge are conveyed as empirical, literal, and irrevocable truths” (p. 24).
With the advent of the 1960s science curriculum projects, an effort was made by
some developers to shift science instruction away from the primary focus concerning,
“what do scientists know,” to an examination of tlie question “how do scientists
know”—reflecting Schwab’s, (1960) emphasis on “what do scientists do?’ Klopfer’s
(1964-66) History of Science Cases and Harvard Project Physics (Rutherford,
Holton and Walton, 1970) and Schwab’s, (1963) seminal contributions to the
Biological Science Curriculum Studies programs were important attempts to
illustrate both the process and products of science in formal curricula.
At the turn of tlie decade, several important books were published advocating and
defining elements of the nature of science necessary for inclusion in school science
curricula. Robinson, (1968) in The Nature of Science and Science Teaching
provided science educators ready access to the philosophy of science for the first
time. In his book, Robinson provided an overview of tlie nature of physical reality,
aspects of physical description including probability, certainty and causality, and
view of tlie nature of science in various science disciplines. He concluded with
considerations for the interplay between science instruction and the nature of science.
In Concepts of Science Education: A Philosophical Analysis, Martin, (1972)
reiterated many of the arguments put forward by Robinson in supporting NOS in
science instruction. In addition, lie reviewed many of the important concepts from
the philosophy of science including the value of inquiry learning, the nature of
explanation, and the character of observation both in science and in science learning.
In the section on goals of science education lie specifically stated that student should
acquire a range of scientific propensities.
Despite these early and now-neglected plans and rationales, science teachers and
science curricula seem rigidly bound to a tradition of communicating the facts or end
products of science while generally neglecting how this knowledge was constructed.
After almost fifty years of interest concerning the nature of science in science
curricula, little change has occurred. For example, in 1982, Kilborn suggested that
science instruction does not present the essential background for understanding the
meaning of science. Ten years later, Gallagher, (1991) observed that science lessons
revealed an emphasis on the body and terminology of knowledge in science rather
than the nature of science. Fleury and Bentley, (1991) refer to the way that science
knowledge comes to exist as the “infrastructure of scientific knowledge” and argue
that if knowledge of the infrastructure is faulty then any understanding constructed
on it will be fallible.
Most sobering is the assertion of Bentley and Garrison, (1991) that for most
science students, a description of the NOS is relegated to a few paragraphs at the
beginning of the textbook quickly glossed over in favor of the facts and concepts that
cram the remainder of the book and generally fill the course. And the ideas put forth
in textbooks and school science concerning the nature of science are almost
universally incorrect, simplistic, or incomplete. Duschl, (1994) recently argued that
students are learning facts, hypothesis, and theories of science—the “what” of
science-but they are not learning where this knowledge originated—the “how” of
science.
Recently this disheartening situation is facing more aggressive attack.
Discussions concerning a role for nature of science in school science have increased
rapidly and few now argue with the proposition that school science experiences
should include significant attention to how science works including how knowledge
is created and established. In the past decade alone a number of international
conferences (University of Florida, 1989; Kingston, Ontario, 1992, University of
Minnesota, 1995, and, a North American Regional conference was held in Calgary,
Alberta, Canada in June of 1997) have addressed a more extensive role for the social
studies of science in science education. Furthermore, the main objective of a number
of additional meetings (Pavia in 1983, Munich in 1986 and Paris in 1988) has been
to investigate why and how history and philosophy of science may be integrated in
school science (Nielsen, 1990). Much of this renewed interest in the NOS and its
place in science teaching has come from the leadership of Michael Matthews. His
1994 book Science Teaching; The Role of History and Philosophy of Science
provides a well-reasoned argument for the inclusion of the nature of science in
science instruction.
Incorporating the nature of science in school science has been widely embraced
by organizations such as the Association for Science Education, (1981) in Britain
and organizations in the United States such as the National Science Teachers
Association, (1995), the American Association for the Advancement of Science,
(1989, 1993) and the National Research Council, (1996). Many contemporary
science educators agree that encouraging students’ understanding of the nature of
science, its presuppositions, values, aims, and limitations should be a central goal of
science teaching. As an example, Moms Shamos, (1995) argues in The Myth of
Scientific Literacy that while knowledge of science content may not be necessary for
obtaining science literacy, understanding the nature of science is prerequisite to such
literacy.
THE NATURE OF SCIENCE IN SCIENCE EDUCATION: A RATIONALE
The Current State of Students’ and Teachers’ Knowledge of the Nature of Science
A number of studies exist that document students’ misconceptions concerning the

nature of science (Clough, 1995; Lederman, 1992; Meyling, 1997; Rowell &
Cawthron, 1982; Rubba, Horner & Smith, 1981). Ryan and Aikenhead, (1992)
collected the responses of more than two-thousand upper secondary students,

concluded that they confused science with technology, and were only superficially
aware of the private and public side of science and the effect that values have on
scientific knowledge. Moreover, they reported that:
46% held the view that science could rest on the assumption of an interfering
deity;
Only 17% were certain of the inventive character of scientific knowledge;
19% believed that models are actual copies of reality;
Only 9% chose the contemporary view that scientists “use any method that
might get favorable results”; and
64% of students expressed a simplistic hierarchical relationship in which
hypotheses become theories and theories become laws, depending on the
amount of “proof behind the idea.”
While acknowledging that a number of out-of-school factors misrepresent the

nature of science, overwhelming evidence exists that school science is at least equally
culpable. Almost 50 years ago Anderson, (1 950) concluded that teachers were more
concerned with imparting scientific facts than helping students understand the
processes of science-an indication that something was awry regarding teachers’
notions of the nature of science. Miller, (1 963), after conducting one of the earliest
and frequently-cited studies of teachers’ views of the image of science, concluded that
many science teachers and their students failed to demonstrated understanding of
how science works. Several years later, Schmidt, (1967) replicated Miller’s study
and made essentially the same conclusions. Elkana, (1970) claimed that teachers’
understanding of the philosophy of science trailed developments in the philosophy
of science by some twenty to thirty years. In 1978, Cawthron and Rowell concluded
that science teachers take a naive-realist position of science, maintain that scientists
have particular characteristics, and employ scientific method to account for the
achievements of science. Four years later they argued (Rowell and Cawthron, 1982)
that many science teachers subscribe to an inductivist-empiricist outlook of science.
Brush, (1989) noted that science teachers are not generally aware of the social and
cultural construction of scientific thought. DeBoer, (1991) in his review of the
history of science education states that the positivist view of the philosophy of science
from the last century still informs much classroom practice and pervades most
available curriculum materials. Melado, (1997) reports that while the preservice
science teachers in his small study showed more multi-faceted NOS views that a
positivist empirical label implies, they were insecure and contradictory in their
statements and admitted they had never before reflected on the epistemology of
science. Tragically, too often science teachers simply do not include nature of
science issues in the design of science learning plans (Bell, et al. 1997; King 1991;
Lakin and Wellington, 1994), likely because they lack knowledge of them.
The Value of Nature of Science for Teaching and Learning
The significant misconceptions that both students and teachers hold regarding the
nature of science, by themselves, represent an important justification for including
the social studies of science in science courses and presetvice science teacher
education programs. Driver et al., (1996) have suggested five additional arguments
supporting the inclusion of the nature of science as a goal of science instruction. The
arguments include the utilitarian view that “an understanding of the nature of science
is necessary if people are to make sense of the science and manage the technological
objects and processes they encounter. . .” (p. 16). This is related to the democratic
view that people must understand the NOS “to make sense of socio-scientific issues
and participate in the decision-making process” (p. 18) and the cultural argument
that such understanding is necessary “in order to appreciate science as a major
element of contemporary culture” (p. 19). The fourth rationale is moral, to
understand the “. . . norms of the scientific community, embodying moral
commitments which are of general value,” (p. 19). Driver’s final justification for
including the nature of science in science instruction is that it “supports successful
learning of science content” (p. 20).
Matthews, (1997) argues that questions regarding the nature of science are
inherent in many education issues such as multicultural science, the evolution/
creation public education controversy, feminist critiques of modem science and their
suggestions for science program reform, the place of religion in science education,
environmentalism and new-age science, and the notion that learning science will
result in an understanding of its nature while at the same time causing students to
become more scientific in solving life’s problems.
Moreover, students in a recent study by Meyling, (1 997) showed significant
interest in the nature of science. Two-thirds of the physics students who experienced
instruction regarding epistemological issues showed interest in more epistemology.
In contrast, only one-third of students not experiencing such instruction showed
interest. Students in this study approved of NOS discussions and most indicated
their epistemological conceptions had changed.
NOS to Enhance the Learning of Science Content
Evidence suggests that knowledge of the nature of science assists students in learning
science content. For example, Songer and Linn, (1991) illustrated the importance
of students having dynamic rather than static views of science in developing a
conceptual understanding of topics such as thermodynamics. In a sample of 153
eighth-grade physical science students with instruction emphasizing hands-on
experiments, the authors were able to characterize students’ views of science as either
static, mixed, or dynamic. The static view of science is the idea that science is a
group of facts that are best memorized. The dynamic view of science posits that
scientific knowledge is tentative, and the best way to understand this knowledge is
by understanding what scientific ideas mean and how they are related. Although the
authors did not address the mixed view, they did find that students with dynamic
views of science acquired a more integrated understanding of thermodynamics than
those with static views.
NOS Knowledge to Enhance Understanding of Science
Understanding how science operates is imperative for evaluating the strengths and
limitations of science, as well as the value of different types of scientific knowledge.
For instance, science teachers may understand the atomic model, Boyle’s law, and
evolutionary theory, but may not understand what law, theory, and model mean in
the discipline of science. Hence, ridiculous statements like, "evolution is only a
theory" or "when such-and-such a theory is proven it will become a law" may result.
One of the major theses of Michael Martin’s, (1972) book Concepts of Science
Education: A Philosophical Analysis is that philosophy of science study is beneficial
to the science educator. Studies in philosophy of science will clarify teachers’
thought about the nature of science and help them understand the roles and methods
which guide study in the discipline. As Manuel, (1981) writes:
This more philosophical background advocated for teachers would, it is believed, enable them to handle their
science teaching in a more informed and versatile manner and to be in a more effective position to help their
pupils build up the coherent picture of science-appropriate to age and ability -- which is so often lacking (p.
771)
Furthermore, those who comprehend the durable, yet revisionary, nature of

scientific knowledge will not be confused by changing science concepts or the
disappearance of particular science ideas learned earlier. Individuals who
understand how science works will likely be less cynical about the scientific
enterprise (Connelly et al., 1977, p. 7-8). Because science is often wrongly perceived
primarily as a body of literal truths, entire fields of knowledge are sometimes
questioned when single facts are revised. Perceiving science as a process of
improving our understanding of the natural world turns the notion of tentativeness
into a strength rather than a weakness.
Surely, lack of knowledge about the history and philosophy of science would
hinder teachers’ incorporation of philosophical aspects of science in their teaching.
In a 199 1 study, King showed that the science teachers he investigated attributed the
difficulties of incorporating ideas such as discovery and relevance in their science
instructions to their ignorance about history and philosophy of science.
NOS to Enhance Interest in Science
A sensitivity to the development of scientific knowledge may also make science itself
and science education more interesting. Tobias, (1990) maintains that a number of
potential university science students—those she calls the second tier—lament that
science classes ignore the historical, philosophical, and sociological foundations of
science. Incorporating the nature of science while teaching science content
humanizes the sciences and conveys a great adventure rather than memorizing trivial
outcomes of the process. The purpose is not to teach students philosophy of science
as a pure discipline but to help them be aware of the processes in the development
of scientific knowledge (Matthews, 1989). Here we see justification for Driver’s,
(1996) “cultural argument” for learning about the nature of science.
NOS Knowledge to Enhance Decision Making
The "democratic argument" for the nature of science instruction (Driver et al., 1996,
p. 18) may be illustrated in a number of ways, but certainly having accurate views
about how science functions is vital for informed decision making. For example, the
funding of scientific and technological research is an increasingly important topic
with respect to governmental budget decisions. Ample evidence exists (Ryan and
Aikenhead, 1992) to suggest that science is often confused as technology leading the
public to support science because they wrongly see it as providing society with
gadgets, vaccines, and other practical outcomes that improve everyday living.
However, basic research is not directly concerned with practical societal outcomes,
but rather an understanding of the natural world for its own sake. The public’s
failure to see the importance of basic research in technological innovations may have
significant societal consequences when funding decisions are made (Elmer-Dewitt,
1994).
The public education controversy involving evolution and creationism nicely
illustrates the importance of an informed citizenry regarding the nature of science.
John Moore, (1983) writes:
It becomes evermore important to understand what is science and what is not. Somehow we have failed to let
our students in on that secret. We find as a consequence, that we have a large and effective group of creationists
who seek to scuttle the basic concept of the science of biology . . . It is hard to think of a more terrible
indictment of the way we have taught science. . .
Far too many secondary science teachers avoid teaching biological evolution.
However, Scharmann and Harris, (1992) found that promoting an applied
understanding of the nature of science reduced teachers’ anxiety toward teaching this
fundamental idea. Johnson and Peeples, (1987) found that as students’
understanding of the nature of science increases, they are more likely to accept
evolutionary theory. Dagher and Boujaoude, (1997) investigated how students with
different religious backgrounds accommodated their beliefs with biological evolution
and recommended that teachers devote significant attention to values, beliefs and the
nature of science. Clough, (1994) made several practical suggestions regarding NOS
instruction for reducing students’ conflicts with the theory of evolution. If students
and teachers simply understood the distinction between science and religion, that
alone would ease the occasional tension caused by discussions of evolution.
NOS Knowledge to Enhance Instructional Delivery
Matthews, (1994) has argued for the inclusion of NOS courses in science teacher
education programs. The examples he provided demonstrates that a firm grounding
in the nature of science is likely to enhance teachers’ ability to implement conceptual
change models of instruction. Studying the process of historical conceptual
development in science may shed some light on individual cognitive development
(Wandersee, 1986). For example, many students’ ideas parallel that of early
scientific ideas, suggesting that "alternative conceptions" may sometimes be a better
description than "misconceptions." The persistence of students' naive ideas in
science suggests that teachers could use the historical development of scientific
concepts to help illuminate the conceptual journey students must make away from
their own naive misconceptions. In other words, teachers' interest in NOS could
assist in understanding the psychology of students' learning (Matthews, 1994).
The history of science confirms that scientific knowledge is not exclusively
determined empirically. The construction of scientific knowledge (Latour, 1987;
Latour & Woolger, 1986; Knorr-Cetina, 1981; Kuhn, 1970; Mendelsohn, 1977;
Mulkay & Gilbert, 1982; Shapin, 1982) has much in common with conceptual
change. This makes the nature of science useful as a disequilibrating agent in
changing science teachers' views of learning and teaching. For example, some of the
resistance to conceptual change theory among classroom teachers arises from the
mistaken notion that knowledge of the natural world is completely
objective—existing independently of the searching individual. This view of science
gives the impression that learning is a fairly straightfoward process of replacing
what is known with that which the scientific community has discovered is right.
However, the history of science may also reveal a fierce battle to construct meaning
concerning the natural world. This construction, sometimes requiring enormous
effort and time, is not a straightforward process. When science is seen in this light,
children's misconceptions and difficulties in learning contemporary science ideas are
understandable. To assist in this process of inquiry-based or constructivist teaching,
Duschl, (1987) states that teachers themselves need to have an adequate
understanding of the nature of science.
THE EFFECT OF TEACHERS’ KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATURE OF

SCIENCE ON STUDENT UNDERSTANDING
A Simplistic Assumption
Teachers represent the most important variable in the classroom learning equation.
Even welldesigned NOS instructional packages that are at odds with the
philosophical orientations of teachers may not be effective. Duschl, (1987) writes
that in spite of attempts to “teacher proof” schooling through the enforcement of
strict curriculum guidelines and teaching models, teachers will continue to make the
most critical decisions in the education of students. Regarding NOS instruction,
Hodson, (1 988) argues that “the most important factors determining [attitudes toward
science] are teaching style (Evans & Baker, 1977; Rubba, Horner & Smith, 1981)
and the teacher’s own image of science” (Jungwirth, 1971). What this suggests for
nature of science instruction is sobering given science teachers’ dismal
understanding of the nature of science (Hodson, 1988).
Hence, bolstering teachers’ understanding of NOS is clearly a prerequisite for
effective science teaching with many adherents (Table II).
TABLE II
Researchers’ assumptions about the relationship between
teachers’ views on science and their teaching behavior
Author Relevant Statement
Abimbola Knowledge of the philosophy of science will enable science

teachers to know what science they are teaching and this knowledge
will affect all their instructional practices (1983, p. 189).
Carey and If the teacher’s understanding and philosophy of science is not

stauss congruent with the current interpretations of the nature of science,
. . . then the instructional outcomes will not be representative of
science (1970, p. 368).
Gill The type of science imparted to students depends upon the teachers
own views of the nature of science (1977, p.4).
Hurd It is undoubtedly true [that] a teacher’s conception of what science

is influences not only what he teaches, but how he teaches (1969,
p. 16).
Nunan . . . I wish to suggest that a teacher's "image of science" which

contains [the teacher's notion of the nature of science and its links to
society] is a vital factor in directing personal stances towards content
and methodological concerns. . . . it is irresponsible of science
teachers to suggest that historical, philosophical, or sociological
examinations of science have no relevance to them as in the final
analysis their teaching preferences convey values based upon studies
in these areas. (1977)
Ogunniyi If science teachers hold inadequate views of science then the

instructional outcomes will inevitably be a corruption of what they are
supposed to teach (1983, p.193).
Robinson It is assumed that a teacher's conception of nature of science is an

important force in shaping his classroom behavior (1969, p. 99).
Scheffler . . . whatever [the science teacher] does is likely to be qualified by his

[philosophical] reflections on the field of science (1973, p. 36).
A Complex ReaIity
Only in the last decade has the assumed relationship between teachers’ knowledge
of NOS and their classroom behaviors been put to the test. In 1982, Dibbs was
among the first to investigate the relationship between teachers’ practices and
students' views regarding the nature of science. Dibbs determined that a
questionnaire he developed could be used to delineate four broad philosophical
categories among science teachers verificationist (V-type), inductivist (I-type),
hypothetico-deductivist (H-type), and no discernable philosophy of science (0-type).
Interviews, occurring some months after completion of the questionnaire, were held
with selected "extreme" V-type, I-type and H-type teachers to (a) determine whether
teachers' views expressed in a more searching interview agreed with their responses
to the questionnaire, and (b) probe for possible links between the teachers’ stated
views on the philosophy of science and their reported teaching styles. Dibbs
determined that H-type teachers have a problem solving approach to teaching
science, V-type teachers had a factual or informative approach to teaching science,
and I-type teachers have an observational approach to the teaching of science. Dibbs,
writes:
Teachers of the first three extreme types not only have more clearly formulated views about the philosophy of
science, but are influenced by their views when planning their lessons. The ways in which they describe their
teaching styles and report using practical work in their lessons shows a strong positive relationship between
these and their beliefs concerning the philosophy of science (p. 225).
Information from the "extreme" teachers’ teaching style and particularly the
manner in which they introduced and used practical work in their lessons was then
used in planning teaching practices for the groups of pupils involved in the teaching
experiment. Five normal science classes in a natural setting were subjected to biased
teaching styles in some of their science lessons for approximately two school terms.
According to Dibbs:
Pupils’ views about the philosophy of science are influenced by the way in which they are taught science even
if their teacher does not attempt to do so explicitly. The teaching style used implies that the teacher holds a
certain philosophy, and this implicit philosophy can have effects upon the pupils. Pupils taught in different
ways exhibit a different pattern of responses on the specially designed measure of science undentanding.
Pupils given H type teaching achieve significantly higher scores on the scale measuring agreement with the
hpthetico-deductivist philosophy. Pupils who have received I type or V type teaching obtain their highest
scores on the inductivist and verificationist scales respectively (p. 226).
Particularly noteworthy is the effect H, V, and I-type teaching appears to have on

student vocabulary used to describe scientists and their activities. With the
cooperation of an English teacher who taught many of the students in the
experiment, students were asked to write a science fiction story. No guidance was
provided about the plot of the story, but students were asked to make the scientists
in the story behave as authentic scientists would if faced with the situation described
in their story. Over half of the students in the experiment wrote stories. Simply
counting the number of times certain words or phrases appeared in the stories
revealed some interesting differences between students who had received the three
different teaching styles. For example (pp. 202-3):
Pupils who had been exposed to the H style ofteaching used words such as ‘idea’, ‘think’, ‘thought’, ‘problem’,
‘question’, ‘test’, ‘testing’, ‘check’, and ‘clues’ more often than did those who had been in the I or V groups.
Pupils from the I group seemed to favor words such as ‘record’, ‘recording’, ‘noted’, ‘sample’, ‘specimen’,
‘notice’, ‘look’, ‘observations’, ‘information’, ‘discovery’, ‘theory’, ‘pattern’, and ‘conclusion’ . . . All
mentioned experiments frequently but pupils from the V groups more often said that they ‘prove’ something.
In another study, Smith and Anderson, (1984) observed an elementary science

teacher teaching an activity-based unit on plant growth and photosynthesis. They
reported that the teacher was surprised to learn that her students could not predict
whether or not seeds beginning to grown in the dark would survive. This was
unfortunate because the students spent two weeks measuring and observing two
planted grass seeds both in the light and dark. The teacher hoped that her students
would derive photosynthesis, a theoretical construct, from empirical observations of
plants grown in the light and dark. The teacher’s expectation for her students
betrays her personal views of science in that she believes scientific theories are
implied from data through inductive logic.
A study by Lantz and Kass, (1987) is particularly instructive regarding the

influence of teachers’ beliefs on their classroom practice. Three chemistry teachers
who adopted the Same cumculum materials implemented them in ways that reflected
their views of chemistry knowledge rather than the explicit orientation of the
curriculum materials. For example, two teachers who viewed chemistry as a stable
body of concepts, principles, and theories, had difficulty finishing the course because
they attempted to teach everything as fundamental. The third teacher perceived
chemistry as a constantlydeveloping body of knowledge, and limited the
presentation of topics to those deemed essential.
Brickhouse, (1989) also considered the influence of teachers’ beliefs about the
nature of science on their classroom practice. She conducted extensive interviews
and observations of three science teachers and concluded that teachers’ nature of
science conceptions do influence their decisions about what they teach. For example,
the first teacher viewed theories as truths uncovered through rigid experimentation,
and, not surprisingly, the intent of instruction in this classroom was for students to
learn the “truth.” Students’ perforinance in science activities was evaluated solely
by the outcome of the activity, not on the process. This first teacher also perceived
scientific processes as inductive, and therefore, lab instruction included precise
procedures to acquire the “right” answer. Viewing science as an accumulation of
knowledge, students were told, "every experiment from this page on proves the rest
of the chapter, each and every one of them." The second teacher, on the other hand,
thought of theories as tools to solve problems and, therefore, students used theories
to explain observations and to resolve problems. The third teacher, viewed science
as the accumulation of knowledge, a position clearly reflected in classroom
instruction regarding the development of atomic theory. For example, each change
in our historical conception of atomic structure was presented as simply the building
on prior conceptions, and each scientist’s contribution was conveyed to students as
simply increased detail to the former model of the atom. In summary, Brickhouse
concluded that teachers’ science philosophies influence laboratory instruction, the
way in which demonstrations are used, and instructional goals.
Not all research supports the notion that a teacher’s views concerning the nature
of science will influence their classroom practice. Mellado, (1997) performed an in-
depth study of four preservice science teachers and concluded that no correspondence
existed between their NOS views and classroom practice. In 1987, Lederman and
Zeidler reported the results of a study of 18 biology teachers each of whom was
characterized by a rich data set. A systematic pair-wise qualitative comparison
among the 18 data sets classified differences in the classrooms and in instruction
used by the teachers. As a result, 44 classrooin variables emerged that distinguished
the 18 teachers’ behaviors. The processes of deriving the classroom variables was
done without knowledge about the teacher’s conceptions of the nature of science.
Zeidler administered the Nature of Scientific Knowledge Scale (NSKS) to the science
teachers and categorized teachers into two groups, high and low, depending upon
their scores on the NSKS. To examine the assumption that a teacher’s views of the
nature of science influence their classroom behaviors, they tested the capability of
each classroom variable statistically to differentiate between high and low teachers.
They concluded that “teachers’ classroom behavior doesn’t vary as a direct result of
his/her conception” (p. 73 1).
Tobin and McRobbie, (1997) in an in-depth study of one chemistry teacher, his
students, and the instruction that took place found that the implemented curriculum
was at odds with both the teacher’s and students’ views of science. The curriculum
seemed to be most influenced by the teacher’s notions of how students learn, beliefs
about how teachers should yield power in a classroom, and how extensively the
teacher accepted perceived constraints without struggle. Interestingly, the students’
and teacher’s goals for the course matched perfectly, hence significant change in
instruction, including the nature of science, would most likely have been met with
some resistance.
In 1989, Duschl and Wright also addressed this question with their investigation
of high school teachers’ decision-making models for planning and teaching science.
Based on this study, they argued that student development, curriculum guide
objectives, and pressures of accountability significantly affected science teachers’
decision-making in the selection, implementation, and development of instructional
tasks. Significantly missing in this decision-making process was any consideration
to the nature or role of scientific theories or structure of the subject matter. In 1992,
Lederman used this conclusion as evidence against the presumed relationship
between teachers’ conception and their teaching behavior. Lederman reported "the
nature and role of scientific theories are not integral components in the constellation
of influences affecting teachers’ education decisions" (p. 347). However, Duschl and
Wright pointed out that none of the teachers held contemporary views about the
nature of science. They reasoned that "the lack of consideration for an accurate
portrayal of the cognitive activities of science can be explained by teacher’s lack of
knowledge about the nature of science" (p. 493). Hence, if those teachers had been
informed about the most fundamental issues in the nature of science, then these new
views may have influenced teachers’ decision making. They indicated that heavy
emphasis is typically placed on memorizing the vocabulary of science with limited
weight on matters related to the nature of science, and that this is related to the fact
that “teacher’s knowledge of science is limited to the body of knowledge of science”
(p. 125).
In spite of some views to the contrary, we take the position from this overview of
research that science teachers’ knowledge and understanding of the nature of science
do influence the teachers’ classroom behaviors. That is, without explicitly thinking
about such things, teachers consider the nature of what they perceive their discipline
to be and those views are translated in ways they themselves may find surprising.
Moreover, the influence of a subject matter understanding on teachers’ behavior is

not limited to science education. For example, in mathematics, Thompson, (1982)
found that teachers’ conception of the nature and structure of mathematics influence
their behavior. Scholars who have examined teachers’ thinking such as Olson,
(1980), (1981), Elbaz, (1981), Thompson, (1982), and Holton and Anderson, (1987)
have shown that a teacher’s beliefs, values, and personal philosophies impact a
teacher’s instruction and curriculum reforming (Tuan, 1991). In particular, a
summary of research on teachers’ thinking by Shavelson and Stern, (1981)
considered teachers’ conceptions of their subject matter to be one of the factors that
affect teachers’ pedagogical decisions and judgments.
Obviously, teachers must consider myriad factors when planning and
implementing lessons, and that may explain the difficulty in always finding a direct
relationship between teachers’ views regarding the nature of science and their
classroom practices. Clark, (1 988) maintains that research on teachers’
preconceptions and classroom instruction “has documented the many heretofore
unappreciated ways in which the practice of teaching can be as complex and
cognitively demanding as the practice of medicine, law, architecture” (p. 8).
Therefore, the complexity of teaching may mitigate or hide the influence of teachers’
views concerning the nature of science.
Lederman, (1992), following an extensive review of the literature, writes that “the
presumed relationships between teachers’ conceptions of science and those of their
students as well as that between teachers’ conceptions and instructional behaviors
were finally directly tested and demonstrated to be too simplistic . . .” (p.347).
Simply because a teacher has an understanding of the nature of science does not
mean they know how to integrate forcefully such topics within instruction.
Apparently, an understanding of the nature of science is a necessary, but insufficient
condition, for purposeful teaching to facilitate student understanding of the nature
of science. However, as Lederman, (1992) adds, “. . . the most important variables
that influence students’ beliefs about the nature of science are those specific
instructional behaviors, activities, and decisions implemented within die context of
a lesson” (p. 351).
COMMUNICATING THE NATURE OF SCIENCE
The Role of Textbooks and Activities
Science teachers’ dependence on textbooks is well documented (Weiss, 1993) and the
United States has the disconcerting distinction of ranking first in frequency of
textbook reading as a means of instruction (Lapointe, Mead, and Phillips, 1989).
The situation is much the same as described by Stake and Easley, (1978) who found
that more than 90 percent of the science teachers surveyed indicated they used
textbooks or other instructional materials 90 to 95 percent of the time. They write
Behind nearly every teacher-leamer transaction . . . lay an instructional product waiting to play its dual role
as medium and message. They command teacher’s and learner’s attention. In a way, they virtually dictated
the curriculum. The curriculum did not venture beyond the boundaries set by the instructional materials (p.
66).
Thomas Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970) makes clear that
science textbooks convey an image of what science is and how it works. He writes
that “[m]ore than any other single aspect of science, [the textbook] has determined
our image of the nature of science and of the role of discovery and invention in its
advance” (p. 143).
The significant role in instruction played by textbooks necessitates a look at how
they portray the nature of science. Munby, (1976) speculated that the language
appearing in curriculum materials may signifcantly affect students’ understanding
of the nature of science. In the science textbooks he analyzed, two distinct positions-
-instrumentalism and realism-- regarding the nature of scientific knowledge were
implicit in the language used. Consider the following passage taken from Physics:
Matter, Energy, and the Universe by Harnwell and Legge, (1967):
If a glass rod and a piece of fur are chosen as the test materials, it is found initially that they show no tendency
either to attract or repel one another. If they are rubbed smartly together and quickly separated, it is found that
they tend to attract one another. Our description of the process says that the materials have become electrified
or charged, and that the force of attraction arises in consequence . . . On the evidence of such simple
experiments. . . , early experimenters were led to construct a qualitative description of electrification in terms
of the separation of some quality or substance associated with the materials being rubbed together (in Munby,
1976, p.121).
Munby, (1976) states that when students read phrases like “. . . our description of the
process says . . .” and “ . . . experimenters were led to construct . . . ,” they may
easily interpret this to mean that science ideas have an inventive character and, thus,
may not exactly describe reality. The position that scientific ideas are useful tools to
help us understand the natural world fits nicely with an instrumentalist view of
science knowledge.
Consider the passage from Conceptual Physics: a New Introduction to Your
Environment by Hewitt (published in 1971):
Although the innermost electrons in an atom are bound very tightly to the oppositely charged nucleus, the
outermost electrons of many atoms are bound very loosely and can be easily dislodged. The force with which
the outer electrons are held in the atom varies for different substances. The electrons are held more firmly in
rubber than in fur, for example. Hence, when a rubber rod is rubbed by a piece of fur, electrons transfer From
the fur to the rubber rod. The rubber therefore has an excess of electrons and is said to be negatively charged.
The fur, in turn, has a deficiency of electrons and is said to be positively charged. (In Munby, 1976, p. 121)
The description of electrical phenomena in this passage (e.g., electrons are bound,
dislodged, transferred) conveys an entirely different message concerning the
ontological status of electrons. Here the role of humans in producing explanations
for phenomena is missing and students are left to infer that scientists simply found
electrons while doing experiments. Therefore, Munby argued, students may derive
different views about the nature of science depending on the way that science
knowledge is communicated in textbooks. He further suggested that the societal
attitudes toward science can be explained by the way that science has been
communicated in schools. “The fact that science is viewed as a source of true,
reliable, and dependable knowledge might be a consequence of it being taught that
way” (Munby, 1976, p. 123).
In a more recent study, Jacoby and Spargo, (1989) examined a total of sixteen
physical science textbooks from Britain, the United States, and South Africa for their
portrayal of the nature of science. They concluded that “With the exception of one
textbook . . . , all the texts examined revealed a predominance of an inductivist-
empiricist approach (p. 45). Textbook readings will, in ways not anticipated by
most science teachers, convey a definite view about the status of scientific knowledge
and how that knowledge came to be.
Other curricula decisions also impact students’ notions about the nature of
science. As an example, tlie form of laboratory activities conveys much about science
processes and the construction of knowledge. Unfortunately, these experiences are
often cookbook or verification type laboratory activities which again portray science
as a rhetoric of conclusions totally divorced from human influence. Clough and
Clark, (1994) have suggested a different approach to laboratory exercises that more
actively engage students in science content and accurately portray many significant
issues in the nature of science. They advocate placing students in small research
teams that are responsible for developing experiments to investigate a particular
question posed by the instructor. Students must make important decisions
concerning the experimental set-up, collection of relevant data, its interpretation, and
judgements regarding the veracity of their work. Ensuing negotiation of meaning
conveys a very different picture of science than typical cookbook/verification lab
work where students are following recipes to get preordained results. This
suggestion is supported by the work of Burbules, (1991) who suggests that
classrooms should look like a research laboratory where students participate in
science activities as part of a social group. Earlier, Haukoos and Penick, (1983)
compared the influence of two classroom climates on students’ learning of science
process skills and content achievement in college level classes. While maintaining
even gains in biology content, the students in the discovery climate classroom
achieved significantly higher scores in science process skills as measured by the
Welch Science Process Inventory.
The Role of the Teacher
Despite the pervasive and critical role of curricula, evidence is clear and substantial
that teachers are the most influential factor in educational change (Duffee and
Aikenhead, 1992; Eylon and Linn, 1989; Fullan, 1991; Good and Brophy, 1987;
Koballa and Crawley, 1985; Laforgia, 1988; Langer and Applebee, 1987; and
Shymansky and Penick, 1981) and that teachers make exemplary programs (Berliner,
1989; Penick, Yager, and Bonnstetter, 1986). For instance, after observing how
science teachers assimilated new writing activities into their old ways of thinking,
Langer and Applebee (1987, pp. 87, 137) wrote:
For those who wish to reform education through the introduction of new curricula, the results suggest a different
message. We are unlikely to make fundamental changes in instruction simply by changing curricula and
activities without attention to the purposes the activities serve for the teacher as well as for the student. It may
be much more important to give teachers new frameworks for understanding what to count as learning than
it is to give them new activities or curricula. . . . [T]o summarize bluntly, given traditional notions of
instruction, it may be impossible to implement successfully the approaches we have championed.
Teachers translate the written curriculum into a form ready for classroom
application and decide what, how and why to learn. As Eisner, (1985, p. 59) writes,
“In the final analysis, what teachers do in the classroom and what students
experience define the educational process.” In fact, curricula has been claimed to
constitute only 5 percent of the variance in students’ learning (Welch, 1979), while
science teachers’ beliefs, knowledge, and practices represent the bulk of what the
science instructional experience is for students (Smith, 1980).
One of the dominant activities in the classroom is teacher talk, and, therefore,
important implications for student understanding could be derived from an analysis
of teachers’ verbal behavior. Munby’s analysis of language applies equally well to
teachers’ verbal patterns.
Zeidler and Lederman, (1989) extended Munby’s findings by investigating
whether or not teachers’ presentation of subject matter has an impact on students’
formulation of a world view of science. They administered the Nature of Scientific
Knowledge Scale (NSKS) to 18 science teachers and their 409 students at the
beginning and end of a semester and isolated six variables that “reflected Munby’s
distinction between Realist and Instrumentalist language.” The six variables
“represent teachers’ conceptions of the nature of science by way of the language
teachers use to convey the subject matter.” In an earlier paper Zeidler and
Lederman, (1987) concluded from this analysis (pp. 6-7) that:
The results reveal that the variables Testable, Developmental, Arbitrary Constructs, Anthropomorphic
Language, Creativity and Subjective were highly signifcant in distinguishing between instrumental and realist
conceptions of the nature of science with respect to teachers’ language and subsequent changes in students’
orientation. . . . it is concluded that the ordinary language teachers use to communicate science content does
provide the context in which students formulate their own conceptions of the nature of science.
For example, when the teacher used ordinary language in discussing science
constructs, the students tended to have a realist conception of science. A selection
in which the teachers’ use of language is clear comes from Zeidler and Lederman,
(1989); “This portion of the amino acid is called the amino group. It contains a
nitrogen atom and two hydrogens. Always and forever . . . Exactly, always and
forever” (p. 780).
Alternatively, students tended to develop an instrumentalist view of science when
the teacher used precise language in presenting science constructs. For example, .
. . the periodic table is just something created by scientists to organize all the
elements . . . This brings up again another problem that always exists in
classification. Remember I told you that living organisms don’t always fit into the
neat little classifications that we have made up. . .” (Zeidler and Lederman, 1989,
p. 778).
The conclusion is inescapable. The teachers’ use of language influences their
students’ views of the nature of science. Lederman, (1986), Haukoos and Penick,
(1983), Yager, (1966), and Dibbs, (1982) have all concluded that the way teachers
conduct instruction in the classroom influences the way students think of science.
In particular, the way teachers verbally present scientific enterprise has implications
for the way in which students will form their views of science (Munby, 1976 and
Ziedler and Lederman, 1989).
NATURE OF SCIENCE AND SCIENCE EXPERIENCES
Requiring that preservice teachers take more science courses and experience
authentic laboratory research projects are often thought to be the solution to
improving prospective science teachers’ understanding of the nature of science. A
number of studies have investigated whether a relationship exists between knowledge
of science content and an understanding of the nature of science. For instance,
Craven (1966) investigated tlie relationships between the total science grade point
average earned by prospective teachers and their understanding of science measured
by TOUS. The data revealed no significant correlation between the two factors.
Carey and Stauss, (1968) administrated the Wisconsin Inventory Science Process
(WISP) test to prospective and experienced science teachers, (1970). The WISP
scores were correlated variables including the number of high school science units,
college mathematics, biology, physical science and total science units. Further
correlations were performed with college mathematics, biology, physical science and
total science grade point averages. No significant correlations were found, leading
Carey and Stauss to conclude that simply taking science classes or even doing well
in such classes does not communicate much in the way of NOS knowledge. This
conclusion is substantiated by Olsted, (1969) who showed that no relationship exists
between an understanding of the nature of science (as measured by the Test on
Understanding Science) and science content knowledge as measured by the

Advanced General Science Test.
Anderson, Harty, and Samuel, (1986) used the Nature of Science Scale (NOSS)
in comparing two groups (1969 and 1984) of science teachers’ views concerning the
nature of science. The two groups differed in the number of semester hours of
science completed for certification requirements. Even though both groups
demonstrated faulty views of science, the 1984 group with 51 semester hours of
science had a significantly higher NOSS score than the 1969 group with 64 semester
hours of science.
Rymonda, (1986) analyzed prospective secondary school science teachers’
understanding of the nature of scientific knowledge. She identified academic
variables that might contribute to the teachers’ views of science and compared these
to the subjects’ scores on the Nature of Scientific Knowledge Scale (NSKS). With
the exception of “orientation toward science process,” she found no significant
correlation between teachers’ understanding of the nature of science and science
major GPA, overall science GPA, number of science major semester hours, and total
number of science semester hours.
Other researchers have investigated the influence of authentic research
experiences on participants’ views of science. Benhke, (1961) investigated a group
of scientists and a group of secondary science teachers’ regarding the nature of
science, science and society, the scientist and society, and the teaching of science.
More than one half of the teachers and 20% of the scientists incorrectly viewed the
content of science as fixed and unchangeable. He found that teachers differed most
from the scientists on statements which involve an understanding of the scientific
enterprise in some depth. Teachers and scientists disagree most frequently on
statements related to the goals and limitations of science.
Kimball, (1967) used the NOSS nature of science instrument and administered
it to college graduates. He was interested in investigating the differences in nature
of science knowledge between those science majors who entered professional science
careers and those who became science teachers. He wanted to know if the difference
in understanding the nature of science could be attributed to training or experience.
Using NOSS, he concluded that no significant difference in understanding the nature
of science existed between scientists and science teachers.
Visavateeranon, (1992) studied the effect of research experience on teachers’
perceptions of the nature of science. The study involved thirty-one teachers who
worked on research projects with university faculty members in the lab or in the field
for two to four weeks. The researcher compared teachers’ pre- and post-experience
perceptions of science using the Nature of Science - Key Features Test, lesson plans,
interviews, and journals. Only 18-27% of teachers as measured by various
instruments changed their traditional views of science to more contemporary ones.
Interestingly, the researcher recommended linking history of science reading
materials and organized seminars about the nature of science to the research
experience so teachers would better understand the nature of science.
An interesting explanation for tlie misunderstanding of science held by science
teachers and scientists was provided by Pomeroy, (1993) who used a fifty-item survey
to investigate scientists’ and elementary and secondary science teachers’ views about
the nature of science. She found that science teachers and scientists expressed
traditional views of the nature of science. They perceived science as objective,
empirical, and involved with issues of the control of nature. She suggested that the
positivistic ideas expressed by scientists and science teachers are due to the
“scientists and secondary science teacher’s deep initiation into the norms of the
scientific community” (p. 269). They see themselves as role models and as such are
likely to present normative rather than realistic views of science. Another reason,
she suggested, could be that the scientists are working within the “normal science”
paradigm (Kuhn, 1970) and so used accepted theories to answer new questions.
Therefore, their work may resemble positivistic tnodes of scientific method.
Despite naive commonsense solutions for improving science teachers’ views
regarding the nature of science, simply requiring extensive science course work and
research experience will not help. The general conclusion from these studies is that
neither extensive science course work nor research experience is sufficient for
promoting an understanding of significant issues in the social studies of science.
NATURE OF SCIENCE IN SCIENCE TEACHER EDUCATION
A dynamic understanding of science requires significant background in the social

studies of science—taught to teachers in a manner so this knowledge is connected to
what Lederman, (1992) argues and Clough, (1997) describes are those “specific
instructional behaviors, activities, and decisions implemented within the context of
a lesson.” Obviously, science teacher education programs are in the best position to
ensure tliat these practices are taught to science teachers. Without question, the calls
for improving teachers’ views of the nature of science through the inclusion of
history and philosophy of science (HPS) courses in teacher education programs has
a long and consistent history (Abimbola, 1983; Anderson, et al., 1986; Gill, 1977;
Harms & Yager, 1981; Kimball, 1967; King, 1991; Loving, 1991; Manuel, 1981;
Martin, 1972; Matthews, 1989, 1990, 1994; Nunan, 1977; Robinson, 1969 and
Summers, 1982).
However, Summers, (1982) noted that undergraduate science and science teacher
education curricula do not emphasize the philosophical background of science
content. As recently as 1988, Hodson lamented that “the frequent calls for
philosophy of science to become a major component in teacher-training courses have
gone largely unheeded, so that there are now several generations of serving teachers
with little or no understanding of basic issues in the philosophy of science and their
significance in the design of effective learning experiences.” More recently,
Gallagher, (1991) indicated that science teacher education programs do not seem to
value nature of science instruction, and so, not surprisingly, teachers do not know
how to teach about the nature of science. Loving, (1991) surveyed 17 science
educators whose institutions have undergraduate and/or graduate science education
programs and found that only “13% of undergraduate science education majors and
19% of graduate students have a philosophy of science course in their degree plan .
. .” (p. 828). Sadly, these numbers are likely optimistic. Matthews, (1994) reports
that in the United States, only the state of Florida requires prospective science
teachers to complete a course in the history and philosophy of science. The lesson
is clear that preservice science teachers arrive with largely unexamined beliefs about
the nature of science, and, too often, graduate with such beliefs unchallenged in their
teacher education programs (Haggerty, 1992; O’Brien and Korth, 1991). What this
means is that teachers’ ideas about the nature of science are “picked up indirectly”
(Matthews, 1994) rather than deliberately during their formal science teacher
education experience.
The Effectiveness of Nature of Science Instruction
The lack of formal nature of science instruction in science teacher education

programs is particularly disappointing when the evidence indicates that explicit
instruction in the social studies of science does succeed in changing teachers’ views
concerning the nature of science. For example, Carey and Strauss, (1968)
investigated the influence of a science methods course on prospective secondary
science teachers’ views of science. The methods course started with an introduction
to the nature of science through lectures, discussion, and outside readings. The
pretests and posttests indicate significant enhancement in understanding the nature
of science as measured by the Wisconsin Inventory Science Process (WISP). Similar
results were obtained with experience science teachers using WISP (Carey and
Strauss, 1970).
Billeh and Hasan, (1975) conducted a four-week summer program for Jordanian
secondary science teachers. The program consisted of lectures and demonstrations
in teaching science, laboratory investigations emphasizing a guided discovery
approach, twelve fifty-minute lectures on the nature of science, and enrichment
activities designed to further promote understanding of science concepts and
scientists at work. The findings indicated a significant positive difference when the
posttest results were compared with the pretest measures of understanding the nature
of science as measured by the Nature of Science Test (NOST).
Lavach, (1969) studied an inservice program emphasizing the historical
development of selected physical science concepts and noted that participants made
statistically significant gains in their understanding regarding the nature of science
as measured by the total score on TOUS. King, (1991) surveyed and interviewed
thirteen student teachers at Stanford University about their beliefs, knowledge, and
attitudes toward the history and philosophy of science. He found that the three
participants who were formally exposed to the history or philosophy of science had
more reasoned responses to the philosophical questions. Ogunniyi, (1983) and
Akindehin, (1988) report on the effect of an independent NOS course in their
preservice science teacher programs. They found a significant difference in the
understanding of science between students who took such a course and those who did
not.
While the knowledge gains reported in these studies are encouraging, sadly, little
attention or research has been directed to the role science teacher education should
play in ensuring such knowledge is forcefully implemented in science curricula and
teaching strategies. Fortunately, exceptions to the rule do exist. In Australia,
Matthews, (1990) designed a course in the history and philosophy of science (HPS)
to stimulate teachers’ interest in science and help them to identify the HPS issues that
arise in science teaching. In Nigeria, Ogunniyi, (1983) devoted an independent
course in history and philosophy of science in the science teacher preparation
program for his students. Recently, Eiclunger, Abell, and Dagher, (1997) presented
their experience in developing and teaching a NOS course to science education
graduate students at both Purdue and the University of Delaware. At the University
of Iowa, two semester-length courses in the nature of science have been required of
all preservice teachers and science education graduate students for more than two
decades.
Description of a Desired State for Nature of Science
While acknowledging the existence of institutional constraints that thwart efforts to

incorporate tlie nature of science in science teacher education programs, significant
explicit attention to the social studies of science and relevant teaching strategies are
imperative to ensure such instruction is extensively integrated in school science
programs. Without this attention, the overwhelming demands placed on science
teachers will prolong the current sorry state of affairs. For example, Bell et al.,
(1997) recently followed several preservice teachers through their student teaching
experience to determine how extensively they implemented tlie nature of science.
Most of these teachers did not show significant explicit attention to teaching the
nature of science, and one subject in their study made the statement, “I don’t plan to
teach the nature of science . . . I don’t think it is something that I would spend a
great deal of time on.”
While many science teachers likely take this same position, ironically, some view
of the nature of science will always be communicated to students whether or not it
is done purposefully or accurately. Consider a typical day in the life of a science
teacher. Class begins with an opening statement, then an activity or demonstration
occurs followed by some sort of discussion before a textbook assignment is given as
homework. Throughout these daily experiences are explicit and implicit cues
regarding how science works and the status of scientific knowledge.
Clearly, a rationale for the social studies of science in science education should
spiral through all aspects of a science teacher education program. Nature of science
concepts will likely seem esoteric to teachers so practical classroom applications must
be extensive. Examining nature of science instruments is imperative to address the
daunting task teachers face in identifying and tracking 125 students’ views regarding
the nature of science. Scrutinizing readings, audiovisual materials, and activities that
accurately portray the nature of science while teaching science content is also
imperative. The paucity of such materials necessitates that teachers be prepared to
revise curricula so they effectively teach both the nature of science and science
content. Presentations by practicing science teachers who implement nature of
science instruction in their classes may be particularly useful in convincing skeptical
teachers. Critical incidents illustrating the inseparable ties between science content
instruction and the nature of science (Nott and Wellington, 1995) are valuable for
increasing the sensitivity of preservice teachers to this subtle, but very real,
juxtaposition. Alongside these efforts, science teacher educators must model
behaviors, strategies, and language that accurately portray the nature of science.
Literature and organizations devoted to the social studies of science and its
implications for science teaching should be introduced so teachers have resources to
seek out when a need arises. Finally, research and anecdotal reports indicating
positive changes in students’ views and actions regarding the nature of science are
needed to bolster teachers confidence that attention to these issues will reap the
desired effects (Clough, 1995).
THE NATURE OF SCIENCE IN THE CLASSROOM1
Four approaches to incorporating the nature of science in science teacher education

programs are often suggested. Each of the four approaches has its own strengths and
limitations and these are discussed below. One approach, where nature of science
instruction is blended into methods classes, is most often applicable in the preservice
environment. Of course, some programs offer an advanced science methods course
for experienced teachers, so the first approach to incorporating the nature of science
may also work for inservice teachers. The other three strategies may, with
modifications, be used in either the preservice domain or applied in general science
instruction or science teacher education. Regardless whether one particular approach

or a combination of approaches is used, several questions remain. These include the
minimal amount of nature of science content needed by science teachers, who should
teach such courses, and whether they should be required for both undergraduate and
graduate students.
Nature of Science in Methods Courses
In this strategy, the content and pedagogical strategies of the nature of science are
communicated within a science teaching methods course.
Advantages to NOS in Methods Courses
The central advantage here is that nature of science content is discussed in an

environment where tlie curriculum and pedagogical connections can be immediately
discussed. In this fashion, both the nature of science content, a rationale for its
inclusion in science teaching, and the strategies for teaching that content will be
conveyed to prospective science teachers. In addition, because practicum experiences
should be tied to methods course, students have the needed opportunities to put these
strategies into action with students in schools. In addition, students (and perhaps
other education faculty members) may be more receptive to the unfamiliar topics
within the nature of science by encountering them with familiar faculty discussing
familiar and applicable topics. Finally, this approach may facilitate discussions of
the parallels between the development of science itself and the learning of science.
Disadvantages to NOS in Methods Courses
The disadvantages associated with blending the nature of science with methods
include the possibility that other topics may be neglected or that the NOS itself may
get less than adequate treatment given the many other issues needing attention in
methods courses. Depending on the skill and knowledge of the instructor, the
suggested NOS teaching methods may illustrate how to apply some NOS concepts,
but miss other fundamental ideas and their integration with science content.
Nature of Science in Science Content Classes
This approach requires that significant attention to relevant nature of science issues
be intertwined with the teaching of science content. In the pre-college environment
this approach may be most strongly recommended, but in the college domain,
preservice science teachers may have problems deriving teaching strategies from pure
nature of science content.
Advantages to NOS in Science Content Classes
One of the advantages to this approach is that students can see the application of the
nature of science in context, thus legitimizing the nature of science as a useful
domain. Instructors who take such an approach may cause change in the educational
infrastructure itself by encouraging other instructors to include nature of science
elements in their classes. Moreover, students in the class who are interested in the
education have explicit modeling to draw from when designing instruction.
Disadvantages to NOS in Science Content Classes
Central among the disadvantages for this approach is the fact that science faculty
members may not know how to discuss NOS issues. Also, in the college
environment, methods students learning about the nature of science in their science
classres may not receive useful strategies enabling them to share nature of science
content with their own students. The critical challenge that remains is the question
of who will provide science teachers with specific strategies permitting them to
integrate NOS in their classes.
Teachers as Scientists
In this strategy, teachers of the nature of science should have had some authentic
experience actually doing science so that they can talk with some authority about how
science is done.
Advantages to the Teachers as Scientists Approach
The advantage of this plan is that if individuals learn about the nature of science by
doing scientific research, those participating could speak with authority and
enthusiasm about the NOS from first-hand experience. Another advantage is that
those who have had such experiences would be more able to guide students in
pursuing their own research and science fair projects.
Disadvantages to the Teachers as Scientists Approach
The primary disadvantage to this plan is found in the assumption that those who do
science learn enough about the nature of science to communicate it accurately. The
studies reported earlier in this chapter clearly show that research experience confers
no guarantee that NOS knowledge is assimilated accurately simply through working
in a laboratory. In addition, the necessary strategies to translate NOS content into
classroom practice are missing.
Formal Courses or Units of Study in the Nature of Science
This plan would have science teachers learn about the nature of science in a discrete
unit of study or in a course taught by a science educator. In higher education, some
might argue against a specific course focusing on the nature of science for science
teachers on the grounds that most major universities already provide formal history
and philosophy of science courses taught by experts in those fields. Unfortunately,
such courses tend to be abstract examinations of science usually from a highly
theoretical and prescriptive perspective commonly focusing primarily on a specific
science discipline replete with symbolic logic and somewhat arcane (at least for the
needs of science teaching) debates. While such courses are recommended for majors
in those fields, and perhaps as continuing education for science teachers, the highly
focused content is unlikely to be useful to the uninitiated science student or education
major.
Advantages to Formal NOS Courses
A specific nature of science course or unit of study would guarantee that students see
the fruitful connections between history, philosophy, sociology and psychology of
science, not as a prescriptive endeavor within one science discipline, but as an
authentic description of how science is practiced generally. If such a course were
taught by a science educator, experiences in the course would likely be tailored to the
needs of practicing science teachers. In addition, discrete courses could be
implemented without revising other aspects of the education curriculum.
Disadvantages to Formal NOS Courses
Specific courses invariably require additional time that may impact other useful
courses thus prolonging the time needed to complete a degree or certification
program. Also, a discrete NOS course may be disconnected from science content
possibly diluting its relevance. Finally, if the course involves science teachers then
it is vital that such courses connect to problems of teaching NOS.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has explored the dynamic arena of the nature of science by examining
both its history and ways that the nature of science has informed and should guide
science teaching. We have taken the position that a pragmatic consensus exists
regarding some of the most important elements regarding the process of science, but
have demonstrated that constructive debate exists. Research and discussion
continues regarding the relationship between what teachers believe about the nature
of science and what they then communicate to students. We assert that teachers must
have experiences where they explore the social studies of science and contemplate
the methods by which that content may be shared with students. This is the core
purpose for developing this book, a book of rationales and strategies. It is vital that
the science education community provide an accurate view of how science operates
to students and by inference to their teachers. What follows in the accompanying
chapters are tested strategies for doing just that. Whether these plans find a home
in teacher education programs, in school classrooms, or simply in the minds of
interested individuals, we are confident that science education will be a richer
discipline and our students will be more adequately prepared for their lives as
citizens when they are afforded a fuller understanding of the nature of this thing
called science.
1,3 University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California, USA

2
University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, USA
NOTE
1. The section addressing the advantages and disadvantages of various approaches

for the integration of nature of science into the teacher education curriculum is
adapted from the results of an informal synthesis of a large group discussion on the
topic by participants attending the Third International History and Philosophy of
Science in Science Teaching Conference held at the University of Minnesota,
Minneapolis, MN, USA from October 29 to November 1, 1995. The authors
sincerely acknowledge all of those whose ideas have been used here.
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WILLIAM F. McCOMAS AND JOANNE K. OLSON
2. THE NATURE OF SCIENCE IN

INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE EDUCATION
STANDARDS DOCUMENTS
This chapter provides one solution to the problem of what elements best represent
a description of how science operates at a level that is both authentic and appropriate
for science learning contexts. A qualitative analysis of recent science education
standards documents from several countries has demonstrated that there is a high
degree of agreement about the elements of the nature of science that should be
communicated to students. Furthermore, there is evidence that four disciplines (the
philosophy, history, sociology and psychology of science) add to our description of
how science operates leading us to the conclusion that the nature of science (NOS)
as applied by science educators is not a synonym for the philosophy of science alone.
The goal of this project was to produce a definition of the content of the nature
of science (NOS) useful in informing science teaching and learning. With the
proliferation of science education standards documents, this seems an ideal time to
perform a rigorous qualitative analysis of those documents to provide both a matrix
of the nature of science elements, look for points of central agreement, and gauge
disciplines such as history and philosophy that provide the content of the nature of
science.
We reviewed a number of leading science education standards documents for
their recommendations relative to the nature of science. In many instances these
recommendations are contained within a discrete section or chapter of the document,
but where possible, the entire document was reviewed to extract NOS elements
contained elsewhere in the text. We acknowledge that this procedure of analyzing
text following its extraction from supporting narrative somewhat decontextualizes
the statements involved. However, in keeping with a similar method applied
successfully by Cossman (1989), we feel that the sacrifice of some context is
reasonable because it permits cross-document comparisons to be made efficiently.
The documents reviewed include several national science education standards
directed at the K-12 environment, one leading state framework document from the
United States, and one U.S. publication (The Liberal Art of Science) targeting the
undergraduate learner. In four of the documents (Curriculum Corporation
[Australia], 1994; AAAS (Benchmarks], 1993; California Framework, 1990; Council
of Ministers of Education [Canada], (1996) and AAAS [The Liberal Art of Science],
1990) an entire chapter or discrete section is devoted to the nature of science. In
the National Science Education Standards (1996) the NOS elements are contained
41
W. F. McComas (ed.) The Nature of Science in Science Education, 41-52.
42 W. McCOMAS AND J. OLSON
in each chapter following a discussion of content and in the New Zealand (1993)
publication no section is specifically devoted to the nature of science but such
material is embedded in the narrative.
We began this analysis with a thorough reading of the section of each standards
document addressing issues specifically labeled as the nature of science, the history
and philosophy of science, or those that appeared to represent nature of science
elements applying the qualitative methods pioneered by Glaser and Strauss (1967).
In cases where the entire document was available, it was reviewed completely to
provide an overall feeling of how the nature of science is integrated with other
standards.
Explicit individual nature of science statements from all documents were
extracted from the accompanying text and affixed to cards. We both agreed on the
statements to be included in the final data set. Statements were chosen if they
included a specific definition, a description of what science is or how science
functions, what impacts or has impacted science, issues of knowledge generation,
processes involved in the intellectual (rather than mechanical) aspects of science and
other facts that provide information about science and its nature. These cards held
the raw data which were subjected to the next level of analysis.
Individual statements were sorted into piles based on the degree to which the
statements were similar. Initially, thirty such piles were formed and labeled with
categories including “observational bias,” “science as a human activity,” “ethics in
science,” “clear reporting of results,” “the tentative aspect of science knowledge.”
This process continued with all grouped statements, but in keeping with the method
of constant comparison, some categories were combined and some statement cards
were shifted from one group to another.
As an example of our method, consider the statements contained in Table I.
Although each uses different words, they all contain the central idea that scientific
knowledge is tentative. Therefore, a statement (“scientific knowledge is tentative”)
was written to subsume all of these individual statements.
TABLE I
Statements from various standards documents illustrating the tentative
nature of scientific knowledge
USA; BenchmarksforScienceLiteracy(AAAS, 1993)
‘‘. . . both incremental growth and occasional radical shifts are part of
science.” (p. 4)
INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE EDUCATION STANDARDS 43
USA; Science Framework for California Public Schools (California Department of

Education,1990)
“But science never commits itself irrevocably to any fact or theory, no

matter how firmly it appears to be established in the light of what is
known.” (p. 17)
USA; National Science Education Standards (NRC, 1996)
“Because all scientific ideas depend on experimental and observational

confirmation, all scientific knowledge is, in principle, subject to change as
new evidence becomes available.” (p. 201)
Australia; A Statementon Science (CurriculumCorporation, 1994)
“Our scientific understanding of the world is continually changing, sometimes

incrementally, sometimes in gigantic, revolutionary bounds” (p. 3)
USA; The Liberal Art of Science (AAAS, 1990)

“Scientific knowledge is not absolute; rather, it is tentative, approximate,
and subject to revision.” (p. 20)
England/Wales; Science in the National Curriculum (Department of Education, 1995)
“Students should be given opportunities to relate social and historical

contexts to scientific ideas by studying how at least one scientific idea has
changed over time.” (p. 14)
New Zealand; Science in the New Zealand Curriculum (Ministry of Education, 1993)
“. . . understanding in science changes.” (p. 24)
Canada; Common Framework (Council of Ministers of Education, 1996)

“While there can be major shifts in our understanding of the world through
scientific revolutions, most of our understanding is the result of a steady
accumulation of knowledge through a constant critical analysis of scientific
work.” (p. 3)
We ended the first phase of data analysis and categorization having developed
approximately thirty unique statements about the nature of science. At this point, we
grouped the individual statements into larger categories. Statements that were
related to the history of science were associated together while statements related to
the qualities of scientists were likewise grouped. A third category was formed
around the behaviors of scientists and a fourth group included definitions and
qualities of the discipline of science itself. Interestingly, these larger groupings
conform nicely to the disciplines of the philosophy, sociology, history and psychology
of science. A fifth cluster included pedagogical recommendations and strategies
related to the instruction of the nature of science. For purposes of this study, only the
first four groups were analyzed in detail.
This process of grouping is not without its dilemmas. For instance, the
tentativeness issue itself seemed to belong within the philosophy category, but
evidence that scientific ideas are tentative and whether such ideas are transformed
gradually or quickly clearly comes from an analysis of the history of science. In spite
of such issues, each statement seemed logically and exclusively to fit into a single
category.
Our analysis of these eight standards documents has revealed that the nature of
science elements they contain may be included within the following thirty individual
statements. These thirty statements may, in turn, be subsumed into four larger
groups related to the discipline most focused on the study of the issues involved (see
Table II).
TABLE II
A matrix of insights relative to the nature of science extracted from seven
international science standards documents. The number of documents
containing each statement is indicated in parentheses.
or completeness and we believe that it would be illogical to vote, in a sense, on what

should be the content of the nature of science. Therefore, we have rejected the
impulse to create a new statement of the NOS content by listing those elements
appearing on the majority of the documents, for instance. There are some items that
appear in relatively few documents that provide important insights into the way in
which science and scientists operate. In our view, items such as the notion of the
paradigm, the objectivity aspect of science and the idea that science has inherent
limitations, are important to students’ understanding although they do not appear on
a majority of these documents. The fact that they appear at all indicates that a
holistic view of the nature of science as suggested by a review of all of the documents
seems the most logical approach to the question of what ought to be the nature of
science for science education purposes.
Another interesting conclusion is that the standards documents have failed to
include those prescriptive and/or speculative aspects that are of most interest to
philosophers of science but say little to those who would like to provide students an
authentic view of how science operates. As an example, philosopher of science Karl
Popper (1963) has stated that falsification is an epistemologically useful enterprise
that scientists should practice if they want to secure valid knowledge. Few would
argue with his assertion, but there is very little evidence to indicate that scientists as
a group actively work to demonstrate that their ideas are invalid. This issue could
certainly be discussed with students, but it would be unwise to describe that science
works in this fashion. Certainly some students and teachers might find the marginal
debates about the NOS interesting, but the degree to which these tangential issues
help learners appreciate and evaluate the scientific enterprise is minimal.
It is also useful to conclude that four major disciplines seem to provide insights
regarding the nature of science. These disciplines include the philosophy, history,
sociology and psychology of science. We freely admit that our prior expectation was
that philosophy alone is not the sole discipline contributing to a description of how
science operates, but this study has provided an empirical basis for that supposition.
Related to this issue is the degree to which each of these disciplines guide our
understanding. Not surprisingly, philosophy and history of science have the greatest
impact on our knowledge of science, but sociology and psychology add important
elements. It is clear from a review of the science education literature that the term
“nature of science” is not simply a synonym for the philosophy of science, but is a
hybrid domain informed primarily by descriptive scholarship from a variety of
disciplines. Figure 1 represents an approximation of the degree to which each of
these four disciplines adds to knowledge of how science operates.
To turn our attention to the specific generalizations seen following a review of
these documents, we will briefly discuss each of the major clusters. Within the
philosophy of science category, eleven specific statements were extracted which were
found in at least two documents. All of the standards expressly state that scientific
knowledge changes over time and seven stated that this change is usually gradual
(see the section on historical statements). Five documents mention scientific

revolutions as an additional agent of change. Also relating to scientific knowledge
are statements about how knowledge is derived. Five documents referred to
observation and experimental evidence. Another area within the philosophy category
includes statements which describe what science is and how it is done. Such
statements include that science is an attempt to explain phenomena, science is
creative, science has inherent limitations and that science relies on empirical
evidence, logical arguments and skepticism. Together, these statements provide a
broad view of philosophical assumptions underlying the nature of science.
Figure 1. A proposal for the disciplines that add to our understanding of the nature of
science based on a content review of various science education standards documents. The
approximate extent to which each discipline contributes is represented by the relative sizes
of the circles. A description of science -- the nature of science -- is found at the intersection
of these various disciplines.
The sociology category comprises statements related to who scientists are and
how scientists work. All documents include a statement about the ethical decision-
making of scientists, and six state that new knowledge must be clearly and openly
reported by scientists. It is not clear, however, if these statements come from a view
of how scientists work or from an expectation that science should function in this
fashion. Statements in this category also included peer review, replication of
procedures and accurate record keeping.
The third category, psychology, includes statements about the characteristics of
scientists. Six documents mention that scientists generate knowledge in a creative
fashion. Four documents refer to the inherent bias that exists with any observation.
The final group of statements in this category includes the necessity of scientists to
be open to new ideas and intellectually honest.
The final category we examined includes elements from the history of science.
All documents refer to science as a social tradition. Seven documents state that
science has global implications, and five mention the important role that science has
played in the development of technology. Also stated in six documents is the effect
that social and historical contexts have on the development of scientific ideas.
Interestingly, four documents include a statement which refer to the frequent
rejection of new ideas by the rest of the scientific community.
We also observed that those standards documents which include aspects of NOS
vocabulary (i.e., law, theory, etc.) generally fail to define these terms. This may be
an oversight on the part of the authors, but given the varying interpretations held by
members of the general public regarding these terms, we feel strongly that the
standards must not only use the terms, but define them correctly.
It may be more than a coincidence that over half of the documents surveyed
include the nature of science discussion at the outset. From this finding, we may
assume that standards writers believe that student understanding of the nature of
science is, or should be, a vital foundation for all future science learning. The
California Framework (1990), for instance, states that “[t]his chapter [nature of
science] is instrumental to understanding the rest of the framework” (p. 12).
We began this analysis with several assumptions. First, we agree that at the level
of the fine details, no precise and completely agreed upon description exists
concerning the structure of science or the means by which knowledge in science is
produced (Herron, 1969; Laudan, et al, 1986; Lederman, 1992; Duschl, 1994).
Second, we presume that some relationship between the standards documents is
inevitable because developers may have inspected earlier such standards statements.
However, we assume that the various teams consulted the original literature as they
worked to define the nature of science.
As in any ongoing project, the conclusions presented here will be strengthened
or contradicted only by examining additional standards documents and add their
NOS elements to the existing data set. We look forward to including a review of
science education standards in languages other than English and particularly from
non-Western cultures. Not only would such an approach permit us to make firmer
generalizations, but if as we suspect, our conclusions are upheld, we would be able
to present evidence that a single scientific tradition unites humankind.
REFERENCES
AAAS (1993). Benchmarks for Science Literacy, Washington, D.C., American Association for the
Advancement of Science.
Council of Ministers of Education (1996) Common framework of science learning outcomes K-12 (Draft).
Victoria, BC, Ministry of Education, Skills and Training.
California State Department of Education (1990) Science framework for California public schools
Sacramento.
Cossman, G. W. (1989) ‘A comparison of the image of science found in two future oriented guideline
documents for science education’, Proceedings of the First International Histoty and Philosophy of
Science and Science Teaching Conference, University of Florida, Tallahassee, 83-104.
Curriculum Corporation (1994) A statement of science for Australian schools: Ajointproject of the states,
territories and the Commonwealth of Australia initiated by the Australian Education Council, Carlton,
Victoria.
Department of Education (1995) Science in the national curriculum, London.
Duschl, R. A (1994) ‘Research on the history and philosophy ofscience’, in L.G. Dorothy (ed), Handbook
of research on science teaching and learning, New York, MacMillan, 445-455.
Herron, M. D. (1969). ‘Nature of science: Panacea or Pandora’s box’, Journal of Research in Science
Teaching, (6), 105-107.
Glaser, B. G. and Strauss, A L. (1967). The discovery ofgrounded theory: Strategies for qualitative
research, New York, Aldine de Gruyter.
Lauden, et al. (1986). ‘Philosophical models and historical research’, Synthese 69, 141-223.
National Research Council (NRC) (1996) National science education standards, Washington, D.C.,
National Academy Press.
Ministry of Education (1993). Science in the New Zealand Curriculum. Wellington, New Zealand, Learning
Media
Popper, K. R. (1963) Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge, New York, Harper
and Row.
WILLIAM F. McCOMAS
3. THE PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF THE NATURE

OF SCIENCE: DISPELLING THE MYTHS
In the first chapter we explored rationales for the inclusion of the nature of science
in science education and in chapter two we demonstrated the degree of consensus
that exists relative to the elements of the nature of science expressed in international
science education documents. This chapter features a discussion of fifteen major
issues related to the NOS that seem most problematic in the experience of many
science educators. These fifteen issues, described here as “myths of science,” do not
represent all of the important issues that teachers should consider when designing
instruction relative to the nature of science, but may serve as starting points for
evaluating current instructional foci while enhancing future curriculum design.
The “myths of science” discussed here are commonly included in science
textbooks, in classroom discourse and in the minds of adult Americans.
Misconceptions about science are most likely due to the lack of philosophy of science
content in teacher education programs and the failure of such programs to provide
real science research experiences for preservice teachers while another source of the
problem may be the generally shallow treatment of the nature of science in the
textbooks to which teachers might turn for guidance. Some of these myths, such as
the idea that there is a scientific method, are most likely caused by the explicit
inclusion of faulty ideas in textbooks while others, such as lack of knowledge of the
social construction of scientific knowledge, are the result of omissions in texts.
As Steven Jay Gould points out in The Case of the Creeping Fox Terrier Clone
(1988), science textbook writers are among the most egregious purveyors of myth
and inaccuracy. The “fox terrier” refers to the classic comparison used to express the
size of the dawn horse, tiny precursor to the modern horse. This comparison is
unfortunate for two reasons. Not only was this horse ancestor much bigger than a
fox terrier, but the fox terrier breed of dog is virtually unknown to American
students. The major criticism leveled by Gould is that once this comparison took
hold, no one bothered checking its validity or utility. Through time, one author after
another simply repeated the inept comparison and continued a tradition making
many science texts virtual clones of each other on this and countless other points.
In an attempt to provide a more realistic view of science and point out issues on
which science teachers should focus, this chapter presents and discusses fifteen
widely-held, yet incorrect ideas about the nature of science. There is no implication
that all students, or most teachers for that matter, hold all of these views to be true,
nor is the list meant to be the definitive catalog. Cole (1986) and Rothman (1992)
53
54 W. McCOMAS
have suggested additional misconceptions worthy of consideration. However, years

of science teaching and the review of countless texts has substantiated the validity
of the following inventory presented here.
MYTH 1: HYPOTHESES BECOME THEORIES THAT IN TURN

BECOME LAWS
This myth deals with the general belief that with increased evidence there is a
developmental sequence through which scientific ideas pass on their way to final
acceptance (see Figure 1) as mature laws. The implication is that hypotheses and
theories are less secure than laws. A former U.S. president expressed his
misunderstanding of science by saying that he was not troubled by the idea of
evolution because it was, in his words, “just a theory.” The president’s misstatement
is the essence of this myth; an idea is not worthy of consideration until “lawness” has
been bestowed upon it.
Figure 1. The false hierarchical relationship between facts, hypotheses, theories and laws.
Theories and laws are very different kinds of knowledge, but the misconception
portrays them as different forms of the same knowledge construct. Of course there
is a relationship between laws and theories, but it is not the case that one simply
becomes the other -- no matter how much empirical evidence is amassed. Laws are
generalizations, principles or patterns in nature and theories are the explanations of
those generalizations (Rhodes and Schaible, 1989; Homer and Rubba, 1979;
Campbell, 1953). Dunbar (1995) addresses the distinction in a very useful fashion
by calling laws ‘‘cookbook science,” and the explanations “theoretical science.” He
labels the multiple examples of the kind of science practiced by traditional peoples
as “cookbook” because those who apply the rules after observing the patterns in
nature, do not understand why nature operates in the fashion that it does. The rules
work and that is enough.
THE PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF THE NATURE OF SCIENCE 55
Even in more sophisticated settings, cookbook science is occasionally practiced.

For example, Newton described the relationship of mass and distance to gravitational
attraction between objects with such precision that we can use the law of gravity to
plan spaceflights. During the Apollo 8 mission, astronaut Bill Anders responded to
the question of who was flying the spacecraft by saying, “I think Isaac Newton is
doing most of the driving right now” (Chaikin, 1994, p. 127). His response was
understood to mean that the capsule was simply following the basic laws of physics
described by Isaac Newton centuries earlier.
The more thorny, and many would say more interesting, issue with respect to
gravity is the explanation for why the law operates as it does. At this point, there is
no well-accepted theory of gravity. Some physicists suggest that gravity waves are
the correct explanation, but with clear confirmation and consensus lacking, most feel
that the theory of gravity still eludes science. Interestingly, Newton addressed the
distinction between law and theory with respect to gravity. Although he had
discovered the law of gravity, he refrained from speculating about its cause. In
Principia, Newton states “. . . I have not been able to discover the cause of those
properties of gravity from phenomena, and I frame no hypothesis . . .” “. . . it is
enough that gravity does really exist, and act according to the laws which we have
explained . . .” (Newton, 1720/1946, p. 547).
MYTH 2: SCIENTIFIC LAWS AND OTHER SUCH IDEAS ARE ABSOLUTE
This myth involves two elements. First, even if individuals understand that scientific
laws are equal in importance to theories, they rarely appreciate that all knowledge
in science is tentative, occasionally seeing “proof” in science equal to proof in
mathematics. The issue of tentativeness is part of the self correcting aspect of
science but one that those who fault science frequently ignore. Creationists, for
instance, are quick to criticize science by pointing to the discovery of several teeth
found in Nebraska early in this century (Gould, 1991). Initially, these teeth were
considered to have come from a primitive human, but were later found to be those
of an extinct pig. Scientists made both the initial identification and the later
revision, but those who would like to fault science only discuss the error, while rarely
mentioning the inevitable correction.
Another aspect of this myth stems from the realization that there are several basic
kinds of laws — deterministic and probabilistic. Although both types of laws are as
tentative as any scientific knowledge, the laws of the physical sciences are typically
deterministic in that cause and effect are more securely linked while the laws in
biology usually have a probability factor associated. In the life sciences it is typical
to see limitations placed on the application of laws. For example, Mendel’s laws of
inheritance work only with single gene pairs and not even with all such pairs. This
issue has called some to question if there are really laws in biology. My response
56 W. McCOMAS
would be that there are laws in the life sciences, but the rules for their application are
somewhat distinct from those applied in the physical sciences.
MYTH 3: A HYPOTHESIS IS AN EDUCATED GUESS
The definition of the term hypothesis has taken on an almost mantra-like life of its
own in science classes. If a hypothesis is always an educated guess as students
typically assert, the question remains, “an educated guess about what?” The best
answer for this question must be, that without a clear view of the context in which
the term is used, it is impossible to tell.
The term hypothesis has at least three definitions, and for that reason, should be
abandoned and replaced, or at least used with caution. For instance, when Newton
said that he framed no hypothesis as to the cause of gravity he was saying that he had
no speculation about an explanation of why the law of gravity operates as it does.
In this case, Newton used the term hypothesis to represent an immature theory.
As a solution to the hypothesis problem, Sonleitner (1989) suggested that
tentative or trial laws be called generalizing hypotheses with provisional theories
referred to as explanatory hypotheses. Another approach would be to abandon the
word hypothesis in favor of terms such as speculative law or speculative theory.
With evidence, generalizing hypotheses may become laws and speculative theories
become theories, but under no circumstances do theories become laws. Finally, when
students are asked to propose a hypothesis during a laboratory experience, the term
now means a prediction. As for those hypotheses that are really forecasts, perhaps
they should simply be called what they are, predictions.
Figure 2. “Family tree” of hypotheses, illustrating the multiple definitions of the term.
MYTH 4: A GENERAL AND UNIVERSAL SCIENTIFIC METHOD EXISTS
The notion that a common series of steps is followed by all research scientists must
be among the most pervasive myths of science given the appearance of such a list in
the introductory chapters of many precollege science texts. The steps listed for the
scientific method vary somewhat from text to text but usually include: a) defining the
problem, b) gathering background information, c) forming a hypothesis, d) making
observations, e) testing the hypothesis and f) drawing conclusions. Some texts
conclude their list of the steps by listing communication of results as the final
ingredient as illustrated in Figure 3.
7. Report Results
6. Form Conclusions
5. Test the Hypothesis
4. Make Relevant Observations
3. Form a Hypothesis
2. Gather Information
1. Define the Problem
Figure 3. The typical steps associated with the so-called scientific method.
The universal scientific method is one of science educations’ most pervasive

“creeping fox terriers.” The multi-step list seems to have started innocently enough
when Keeslar (1945a b) prepared a list of a number of characteristics associated with
scientific research such as establishing controls, keeping accurate records, making
careful observations and measurements. This list was refined into a questionnaire
and submitted to research scientists for validation. Items that were highly ranked
were put in a logical order and made part of the final list of elements associated with
the investigation of scientific problems. This list was quickly adopted by textbook
writers as the description of how science is done. In time the list was reduced from
ten items to those mentioned above, but in the hands of generations of textbook
writers, a simple list of characteristics associated with scientific research became a
description of how all scientists work.
Another reason for the widespread belief in a general scientific method may be
the way in which results are presented for publication in research journals. The
58 W. McCOMAS
standardized style makes it appear that scientists follow a standard research plan.
Medawar (1991) reacted to the common style exhibited by research papers by calling
the scientific paper a fraud since the final journal report rarely outlines the actual
way in which the problem was investigated.
Those who study scientists at work have shown that no research method is
applied universally (Carey, 1994; Gibbs and Lawson, 1992; Chalmers, 1990 and
Gjertsen, 1989). The notion of a single scientific method is so pervasive that many
students must be disappointed when they discover that scientists do not have a
framed copy of the steps of the scientific method posted above each laboratory
workbench.
Close inspection will reveal that scientists approach and solve problems with
imagination, creativity, prior knowledge and perseverance. These, of course, are the
same methods used by all effective problem-solvers. The lesson to be learned is that
science is no different from other human endeavors when puzzles are investigated.
Fortunately, this is one myth that may eventually be displaced since many newer
texts are abandoning or augmenting the list in favor of discussions of methods of
science.
MYTH 5: EVIDENCE ACCUMULATED CAREFULLY WILL RESULT IN

SURE KNOWLEDGE
All investigators, including scientists, collect and interpret empirical evidence

through the process called induction. This is a technique by which individual pieces
of evidence are collected and examined until a law is discovered or a theory is
invented. Useful as this technique is, even a preponderance of evidence does not
guarantee the production of valid knowledge because of what is called the problem
of induction.
Induction was first formalized by Frances Bacon in the 17th century. In his 1620
book, Novum Organum, Bacon advised that facts should be assimilated without bias
to reach a conclusion. The method of induction he suggested is in part the principal
way by which humans traditionally have produced generalizations that permit
predictions. Baconian induction, and the related process of deduction (or
hypothetico-deductivism) is illustrated in Figure 3. Without the creative leap (shown
later in Figure 4), the process of Baconian induction is most accurately characterized
as naive induction.
The problem with induction is that it is both impossible to make all observations
pertaining to a given situation and illogical to secure all relevant facts for all time,
past, present and future. However, only by making all relevant observations
throughout all time, could one say that a final valid conclusion had been made. On
a personal level, this problem is of little consequence, but in science the problem is
significant. Scientists formulate laws and theories that are supposed to hold true in
all places and for all time but the problem of induction makes such a guarantee
impossible. This problem is particularly acute in biology and to some extent in

geology. The laws of biology for instance, are confined at the moment to the only
planet on which they have been tested. It is unlikely that the rules of the life
sciences, as we know them, would, in fact, operate on other planets where life has
evolved.
Figure 4. A typical view of Baconian knowledge production. Bacon's view (on the left)
of the production of new generalizations and deduction, or hypothetico-deductivism (on the
right) for the testing of such generalizations. The diagram does not imply that the laws
produce new facts, but rather that a valid law would permit the accurate prediction of facts
not yet known.
The proposal of a new law begins through induction as facts are heaped upon
other relevant facts. Deduction is useful in checking the validity of a law. For
example, if we postulate that all swans are white, we can evaluate the law by
predicting that the next swan found will also be white. If it is, the law is supported
(but not proved as we discuss). Locating a black swan will cause the law to be
questioned.
The nature of induction itself is another interesting aspect associated with this
myth. If we set aside the problem of induction momentarily, there is still the issue
of how scientists make the final leap from the mass of evidence to the conclusion.
In an idealized view of induction, the accumulated evidence will simply result in the
production of a new law or theory in a procedural or mechanical fashion. In reality,
there is no such method. The issue is far more complex and interesting than that.
The final creative leap from evidence to scientific knowledge is the focus of another
myth of science. (See Figure 4).
MYTH 6: SCENCE AND ITS METHODS PROVIDE ABSOLUTE PROOF
The general success of the scientific endeavor suggests that its products must be
valid. However, a hallmark of science is that it is subject to revision when new
60 W. McCOMAS
information is presented. Tentativeness resulting in a lack of dogmatism is one of

the points that differentiates science from other forms of knowledge. Accumulated
evidence can provide support, validation and substantiation for a law or theory, but
will never prove those laws and theories to be true. This idea has been addressed
well by Horner and Rubba (1978) and Lopushinsky (1993).
The problem of induction argues against proof in science, but there is another
element of this myth worth exploring. In actuality, the only truly conclusive
knowledge produced by science results when a notion is falsified. What this means
is that no matter what scientific idea is considered, once disconfirming evidence
begins to accumulate, at least we know that the notion is untrue. Consider the
example of the white swans discussed earlier. One could search the world and see
only white swans, and arrive at the generalization that “all swans are white.”
However, the discovery of one black swan has the potential to overturn, or at least
result in modifications of, this proposed law of nature. Finding yet another white
swan does not prove anything, its discovery simply provides some comfort that the
original idea has merit. Whether scientists routinely try to falsify their notions as has
been recommended by philosopher of science Karl Popper, and how much contrary
evidence it takes for a scientist’s mind to change are fascinating issues (Lakatos,
1972).
MYTH 7: SCIENCE IS PROCEDURAL MORE THAN CREATIVE
We accept that no single guaranteed method of science can account for the success
of science, but realize that induction, the collection and interpretation of individual
facts providing the raw materials for laws and theories, is at the foundation of most
scientific endeavors. This awareness suggests a paradox. If induction itself is not
a guaranteed method for arriving at conclusions, how do scientists develop useful
laws and theories? Induction makes use of individual facts that are collected,
analyzed and examined. Some observers may perceive a pattern in these data and
propose a law in response, but there is no logical or procedural method by which the
pattern is suggested. With a theory, the issue is much the same. Only the creativity
of the individual scientist permits the discovery of laws and the invention of theories.
If there truly was a single scientific method, two individuals with the same expertise
could review the same facts and likely reach identical conclusions. There is no
guarantee of this because the range, nature, and application of creativity is a personal
attribute. See Figure 5 for an illustration of the role of creativity in the knowledge
generation process.
Unfortunately, many common science teaching orientations and methods serve
to work against the creative element in science. The majority of laboratory exercises,
for instance, are verification activities. The teacher discusses what is going to
happen in the laboratory, the manual provides step-by-step directions and the student
is expected to arrive at a particular answer. Not only is this approach the antithesis
of the way in which science actually operates, but such a portrayal must Seem dry,
clinical and uninteresting to many students. In her 1990 book, They’re Not Dumb,
They’re Different, Tobias argues that many capable and clever students reject science
as a career because they are not given opportunities to see it as an exciting and
creative pursuit. The moral in Tobias’ thesis is that science may be impoverished
when students who feel a need for a creative outlet eliminate it as a potential career
because of the way it is taught.
Figure 5. A more accurate illustration of the knowledge generation process in science. Here
the creative leap (sometimes called abduction) is shown as a necessary element leading from
the evidence to the generalization.
MYTH 8: SCIENCE AND ITS METHODS CAN ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS.
Philosophers of science have found it useful to refer to the work of Karl Popper
(1968) and his principle of falsifiability to provide an operational definition of what
counts as science. Popper suggested that only those ideas that are potentially
falsifiable are scientific ideas.
For instance, the law of gravity states that more massive objects exert a stronger
gravitational attraction than do objects with less mass when distance is held constant.
This is a scientific law because it could be falsified if newlydiscovered objects
operate differently with respect to gravitational attraction. In contrast, the core idea
among creationists is that species were placed on earth fully-formed by some
supernatural force. Obviously, there is no scientific method by which such a belief
could be shown to be false. Since this special creation view is impossible to falsify,
it is not scientific and the term “creation science” is an oxymoron. Creation science
is a religious belief and as such, does not require that it be falsifiable. Hundreds of
years ago thoughtful theologians and scientists carved out their spheres of influence
62 W. McCOMAS
and expertise and have coexisted since with little acrimony. Today, only those who
fail to understand the distinction between science and religion confuse the rules,
roles, and limitations of these two important world views.
It should now be clear that some questions simply must not be asked of scientists.
During one of the recent creation science trials for instance, science Nobel laureates
were asked to sign a statement about the nature of science to provide some guidance
to the court. Seventy-two of these famous scientists responded resoundingly to
support such a statement; after all they were experts in the realm of science
(Klayman, Slocombe, Lehman & Kaufman, 1986). Later, those interested in citing
expert opinion in the abortion debate asked scientists to issue a statement regarding
their feelings on this issue. Wisely, few participated. Science as a discipline cannot
answer the moral and ethical questions engendered by the matter of abortion. Of
course, scientists as individuals have personal opinions about many issues, but as a
group, they must remain silent if those issues are outside the realm of scientific
inquiry. Science simply cannot answer moral, ethical, aesthetic, social and
metaphysical questions, although it can provide some insights which might be
illuminating. For instance, science and resulting technology may be able to clone
mammals, but only society can decide whether such cloning is moral and ethical.
MYTH 9: SCIENTISTS ARE PARTICULARLY OBJECTIVE
Scientists are no different in their level of objectivity than are other professionals.
They are careful in the analysis of evidence and in the procedures applied to arrive
at conclusions. With this admission, it may seem that this myth is valid, but
contributions from both the philosophy of science and psychology reveal that
complete objectivity is impossible for at least three major reasons.
Many philosophers of science support Popper’s (1963) view that science can
advance only through a string of what he called conjectures and refutations. In other
words, Popper recommends that scientists should propose laws and theories as
conjectures and then actively work to disprove or refute those ideas. Popper suggests
that the absence of contrary evidence, demonstrated through an active program of
refutation, will provide the best support available. It may seem like a strange way
of thinking about verification, but the absence of disproof is considered support.
There is one major problem with the idea of conjecture and refutation. Popper seems
to have proposed it as a recommendation for scientists, not as a description of what
scientists do. From a philosophical perspective the idea is sound, but there are no
indications that scientists actively practice programs to search for disconfirming
evidence.
Another aspect of the inability of scientists to be objective is found in theory-
laden observation, a psychological notion (Hodson, 1986). Scientists, like all
observers, hold myriad preconceptions and biases about the way the world operates.
These notions, held in the subconscious, affect the ability of everyone to make
observations. It is impossible to collect and interpret facts without any bias. There
have been countless cases in the history of science in which scientists have failed to
include particular observations in their final reports. This occurs, not because of
fraud or deceit, but because of the prior knowledge possessed by the individual.
Certain facts either were not Seen at all or were deemed unimportant based on the
scientists' prior expectations. In earlier discussions of induction, we postulated that
two individuals reviewing the same data would not be expected to reach the same
conclusions. Not only does individual creativity play a role, but the issue of personal
theory-laden observation further complicates the situation.
This lesson has clear implications for science teaching. Teachers typically
provide learning experiences for students without considering their prior knowledge.
In the laboratory, for instance, students are asked to perform activities, make
observations and then form conclusions. There is an expectation that the conclusions
formed will be both self-evident and uniform. In other words, teachers anticipate
that the data will lead all pupils to the same conclusion. This could only happen if
each student had exactly the same prior conceptions and made and evaluated
observations using identical schemes. The does not happen in science nor does it
occur in the science classroom.
Related to the issue of theory-based observations is the allegiance to the
paradigm. Thomas Kuhn (1970), in his ground-breaking analysis of the history of
science, suggested that scientists work within a research tradition called a paradigm.
This research tradition, shared by those working in a given discipline, provides clues
to the questions worth investigating, dictates what evidence is admissible and
prescribes the tests and techniques that are reasonable. Although the paradigm
provides direction to the research it may also stifle or limit investigation. Anything
that confines the research endeavor necessarily limits objectivity. While there is no
conscious desire on the part of scientists to limit discussion, it is likely that some new
ideas in science are rejected because of the paradigm issue. When research reports
are submitted for publication, they are reviewed by other members of the discipline.
Ideas from outside the paradigm are liable to be eliminated from consideration as
crackpot or poor science and thus will not appear in print.
Examples of scientific ideas that were originally rejected because they fell outside
the accepted paradigm include the sun-centered solar system, warm-bloodedness in
dinosaurs, the germ-theory of disease, and continental drift. When the idea of
moving continents was first proposed early in this century by Alfred Wegener it was
vigorously rejected. Scientists were simply not ready to embrace a notion so contrary
to the traditional teachings of their discipline. Continental drift was finally accepted
in the 1960's with the proposal of a mechanism or theory to explain how continental
plates move (Hallam, 1975 and Mendard, 1986). This fundamental change in the
earth sciences, called a revolution by Kuhn, might have occurred decades earlier had
it not been for the strength of the prevailing paradigm.
64 W. McCOMAS
It would be misleading to conclude a discussion of scientific paradigms on a

negative note. Although the examples provided do show the contrary aspects
associated with paradigm-fixity, Kuhn would likely argue that the blinders created
by allegiance to the paradigm help keep scientists on track. His review of the history
of science demonstrates that paradigms are responsible for far more successes in
science than delays.
MYTH 10: EXPERIMENTS ARE THE PRINCIPAL ROUTE TO

SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
Throughout their school science careers, students are encouraged to associate science
with experimentation. Virtually all hands-on experiences that students have in
science class are called experiments even if they would more accurately be labeled
as technical procedures, explorations or activities. True experiments involve
carefully orchestrated procedures accompanied by control and test groups. Usually
experiments have as a primary goal the establishment of a cause and effect
relationship. Of course, true experimentation is a useful tool in science, but is not
the sole route to knowledge.
Many noteworthy scientists have used non-experimental techniques to advance
knowledge. In fact, in a number of science disciplines, true experimentation is not
possible because of the inability to control variables. Many fundamental discoveries
in astronomy are based on extensive observations rather than experiments.
Copernicus and Kepler changed our view of the solar system using observational
evidence derived from lengthy and detailed observations frequently contributed by
other scientists, but neither performed experiments.
Charles Darwin’s investigatory regime was frequently more similar to qualitative
techniques used in the social sciences than the experimental techniques associated
with the natural sciences. For his most revolutionary discoveries, Darwin recorded
his extensive observations in notebooks annotated by speculations and thoughts about
those observations. Although Darwin supported the inductive method proposed by
Bacon, he was aware that observation without speculation or prior understanding was
both ineffective and impossible. In fact he stated this view clearly by saying, “I could
not help making hypotheses about everything I saw.” (Darwin, 1958). The
techniques advanced by Darwin have been widely used by scientists such as Goodall
and Fossey in their primate studies. Scientific knowledge is gained in a variety of
ways including observation, analysis, speculation, library investigation and
experimentation.
THE PRlNCIPAL ELEMENTS OF THE NATURE OF SCIENCE 65
MYTH 11: SCIENTIFIC CONCLUSIONS ARE REVIEWED FOR ACCURACY
When preparing school laboratory reports, students are frequently told to present
their methods clearly so that others could repeat the investigation. The conclusion
that students will likely to draw from this requirement is that professional scientists
are also constantly reviewing each other’s experiments to check up on each other.
Unfortunately, while such a check and balance system would be useful, the number
of findings from one laboratory checked by others is small. In reality, most scientists
are simply too busy and research funds too limited for this type of review.
It is interesting to note that when scientific experiments are repeated it is usually
because a scientific conclusion attacks the prevailing paradigm. In the recent case
of cold fusion, scientists worldwide dropped what they were doing to try to repeat the
findings provided by Fleishman and Pons. In fairness, these two scientists not only
assailed the conventional wisdom but presented their results in a press conference
rather than in a peer-reviewed journal. Therefore, the community of scientists had
two reasons to be suspicious. One can infer a measure of the disdain exhibited by the
scientific community toward cold fusion and its “discoverers” in the titles of several
new books on the subject. Bad Science: The Short Life and Weird Times of Cold
Fusion (Taubes, 1993) and Cold Fusion: The Scientific Fiasco of the Century
(Huizenga, 1992) both tell the tale of what happens when a new idea is too far
outside scientific norms – at least as far as those norms are presently perceived. The
fact that cold fusion did not exist likely vindicated those who quickly attacked it, but
the more interesting lesson is that is was attacked because the idea was so distant
from the expectation on the part of the scientific community.
The result of the lack of oversight has recently put science itself under suspicion.
The pressures of achieving tenure, accruing honors, and gaining funds do result in
instances of outright scientific fraud, but fortunately such cases are quite rare.
However, even without fraud, the enormous amount of original scientific research
published, and the pressure to produce new information rather than reproduce others’
work dramatically increases the possibility that errors will go unnoticed.
An interesting corollary to this myth is that scientists rarely report valid, but
negative results. While this is understandable given the space limitations in
scientific journals, the failure to report what did not work is a problem. Only when
those working in a particular scientific discipline have access to all information
regarding a phenomenon can the discipline progress most effectively.
MYTH 12: ACCEPTANCE OF NEW SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE IS

STRAIGHTFORWARD
This misconception addresses the belief that when a more accurate interpretation for
the evidence is produced it will immediately be accepted by the scientific community.
66 W. McCOMAS
Nothing could be farther from the truth as we have Seen in at least one previous
myth. A new idea that is not too far from the expectations of scientists working in
a particular field would probably gain entry into scientific journals without much
trouble — particularly if it comes from someone working in that field. However, if
the idea is a significant breakthrough or revolution in Kuhn’s use of the term,
particularly if it is counterintuitive or comes from outside the discipline, its
acceptance is by no means quick and easy.
The lesson to be learned from this myth, is that science is at its heart a human
activity. Humans are the producers of new knowledge and also the arbiters of what
counts as new knowledge. While nothing like a vote takes place when a new idea
is proposed, the peer review system acts as a gatekeeper to new ideas. Those notions
that cannot find a place in the journals will never have a chance to be accepted or
denied. Even those new visions of reality that do make it into the journals still have
to pass what might best be called the “conference test” if they are to be accepted.
Discrepant notions are the talk of professional conferences where they are debated
both in the meeting halls but also during dinner and over drinks. As an example,
consider the current debate about the origin of modem humans. One view suggests
that modern humans arose in various places around the world from ancestral stock
while a competing story places the origin of modem humans squarely in Africa from
which they migrated to displace the more primitive human forms living elsewhere.
The story is told well in a wonderful book, The Neandertal Enigma. In this book,
Shreeve (1995) discusses the evidence, the personalities and the politics that have
directed the conversation about which view should prevail. The final result in the
case of human origins is still unsettled, but in many cases, the acceptance of a new
scientific idea might be as much a matter of the dynamics of the personalities
involved as the strength of the arguments.
MYTH 13: SCIENCE MODELS REPRESENT REALITY
This may be one myth that is shared by both scientists and lay persons alike and is
related to the distinction between the philosophical views of realism and
instrumentalism. Realism is a position that what science produces not only works
and permits the production of accurate predictions but really does represent and/or
describe the actual situation in nature as known by some omniscient entity. Of
course, one of the central limitations of science is that the “true” nature of reality can
never be known because there is no omniscient entity to ask. Science was invented,
at least in part, to answer questions about the natural world and get as close to “the
truth as possible, but no bell rings or light blinks to tell scientists that they have
found the truth. Another philosophical precept is that as long as the scientific ideas
function properly and are consonant with all of the evidence it does not matter
whether they correspond with reality or not. The ideas are useful and descriptive and
that should be the end of it.

With this distinction between realism and instrumentalism in mind we can now
turn to the idea of a scientific model. Although no survey has ever been taken on this
issue, it seems logical that scientists do believe that they are not just producing useful
ideas but that their ideas and descriptions correspond to a reality external to the
scientists themselves. Certainly the average person believes this to be true. It is
doubtful that anyone seriously questions the model suggested by the kinetic
molecular theory of matter which pictures atoms and molecules as tiny discrete balls
that have elastic collisions, thus explaining whole ranges of phenomena. Never
mind that no one has ever seen these tiny balls or witnessed their impacts, but the
model works; it permits both predictions and explanations and therefore must be
true. A realist would say that it is true while an instrumentalist would say it does not
matter as long as there is something to be gained from keeping the idea in mind.
The story may be apocryphal, but it is commonly repeated among science
educators that when students were once asked what color atoms were, their answer
was closely linked to the textbook in use by those students. If the book illustrated
atoms as blue, then blue was the color students would assign to atoms when asked.
It would probably serve us well to think of models as “useful fictions,” but it is
doubtful that more than a few keep this warning in mind. After all, what caused
Galileo trouble was not that he adopted and supported the sun-centered universe, but
that he taught it as the truth in an age when the church felt it had authority over what
was considered the truth.
MYTH 14: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ARE IDENTICAL
A common misconception is the idea that science and technology are the same. In
fact, many believe that television, rockets, computers and even refrigerators are
science, but one of the hallmarks of science is that it is not necessarily practical while
refrigerators certainly are. The pursuit of knowledge for the sake of knowledge alone
is called pure science while its exploitation in the production of a commercial
product is applied science or technology.
Today, most investigators are working on problems that are at least in part
directed from outside their laboratories. Scientists typically blend the quest of pure
science in order to solve a technology challenge. In many ways the distinction
between pure and applied science is not crucial, but it is interesting to explore what
motivates scientists to work on their problems. Few scientists have the luxury to
pursue any goal they choose since most scientific work is funded by organizations
with an agenda. This funding relationship is not necessarily damaging, but the
freedom experienced by the pure scientists of the Victorian age is long gone.
68 W. McCOMAS
MYTH 15: SCIENCE IS A SOLITARY PURSUIT
Most would likely accept the premise that science builds on prior work, but that
essentially great scientific discoveries are made by great scientists. Even the Nobel
prizes recognize the achievements of individual scientists rather than research teams.
Therefore, science must be a solitary and individual pursuit. Sociologists of science
who study scientists at work have shown that only rarely does a scientific idea arise
in the mind of a lone individual which is then validated by that individual alone and
accepted by the scientific community. The process is much more like a negotiation
than the revelation of truth. Scientists work in research teams within a community
of like-minded investigators. Many problems in science are simply too complex for
a sole individual to pursue alone due to constraints of time, intellectual capital and
financing.
CONCLUSIONS
The message from the Science and Engineering Indicators Study (National Science
Board, 1996) discussed in the first chapter, and from an evaluation of the myths of
science presented here is simple. We must rethink the goals for science instruction.
Both students and those who teach science must focus on the nature of science itself
rather than just its facts and principles. School science must give students an
opportunity to experience science and its processes, free of the legends,
misconceptions and idealizations inherent in the myths about the nature of the
scientific enterprise. There must be increased opportunity for both beginning and
experienced teachers to learn about and apply the real rules of the game of science
accompanied by careful review of textbooks to remove the “creeping fox terriers”
that have helped provide an inaccurate view of science and its nature. Only by
clearing away the mist of half-truths and revealing science in its full light, with
knowledge of both its strengths and limitations, will all learners appreciate the true
pageant of science and be able to judge fairly its processes and products.
University of Southern California, Los Angeles, USA
NOTE
This chapter is an expanded and modified version of those originally published in

School Science and Mathematics under the title, Myths of Science: Reexamining
What We Think We Know About the Nature of Science (1996), 96, 10-16, and in
Skeptic , 15 Myths of Science: Lessons of Misconceptions and Misunderstandings
from a Science Educator (1997), 5, 88-95.
THE PRINCPAL ELEMENTS OF THE NATURE OF SCIENCE 69
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Chalmers, A. (1990). Science and its fabrication, Minneapolis, MN, University of Minnesota Press.
Cole, K.C. (1986). ‘Things your teacher never told you about science: Nine shocking revelations!’, The
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Gibbs, A. and Lawson, AE. (1992). ‘The nature of scientific thinking as reflected by the work of biologists
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Gjertsen, D. (1989). Science and philosophy past and present, New York, Penguin Books.
Gould, S.J. (1991). ‘An essay on a pig roast’, in Bully for brontosaurus, New York, W.W Norton, 432-447.
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Hallam, A (1975). ‘Alfred Wegenerandthehypothesis ofcontinental drift’, Scientific American, (2322), 88-
91.
Hodson, D. (1986). ‘The nature of scientific observation’, School Science Review, (68), 17-28.
Homer, J.K. &. Rubba, P.A (1979). ‘The laws are mature theories fable’, The Science Teacher,( 46), 3 1.
Horner, J.K. & Rubba, P.A. (1978). ‘The myth of absolute truth’, The Science Teacher, (45),29-30.
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Schwab, J.J. (1964). Theteadung ofscience as enquiry, in J.J. Schwab & P.F. Brandwein(eds), The teaching
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SECTION II
COMMUNICATING THE NATURE OF SCIENCE:

PLANS, APPROACHES AND STRATEGIES
WILLIAM W. COBERN AND CATHLEEN C. LOVING
4. THE CARD EXCHANGE: INTRODUCING

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
The nature of science is an important though difficult subject to teach meaningfully

and effectively to preservice teachers. To engage the students’ minds in this subject
that many find obscure and esoteric, a good introduction is a necessity. This chapter
presents a learning game called The Card Exchange which has been found effective
in arousing student interest in the philosophy of science. The chapter presents a brief
description of how the game is set up and played and how it relates to the authors’
instruction on the philosophy of science. The chapter includes a list of card
statements. The statements as well as the text of the chapter have been revised and
updated from an earlier publication (Cobern, 1991a).
There are a number of thoughtful articles in the literature stressing the need for
philosophically literate teachers of science at all school levels (e.g., Andersen, Harty
& Samuel, 1986; Hodson, 1985; Martin, 1979) and for many years the textbooks
used in science methods courses have contained at least some material on the
philosophy and nature of science. Nevertheless, science educators have been
concerned that an acceptable level of philosophical sophistication was not being
reached within the ranks of science teachers, and consequently are concerned about
views toward the nature of science promoted in the classroom (e.g., Schmansky &
Kyle, 1986). DuschI (1988, p. 51) summarizes the classroom situation by saying that
“the prevailing view of the nature of science in our classrooms reflects an
authoritarian view; a view in which scientific knowledge is presented as absolute
truth and as a final form.” This view has been called scientism. This is a problem
first because as we learn more about the world views that students bring to the
classroom we begin to understand how the scientistic view extinguishes students
nascent interest in science (Cobern, 1991b; 1996). Secondly, those students who do
accept the scientistic view are likely to become disenchanted with science at a later
date as science fails to achieve the unrealistic expectations accompanying a
scientism orientation. The challenge is how to teach the philosophy of science be
taught to teachers with greater effectiveness?
THE CARD EXCHANGE
Sometime early each year in many schools, lessons are taught addressing the nature
of science. Often instruction in the process of science is nothing more than a method
73
74 W. COBERN AND C. LOVING
listed on the board and provided as the way all scientists work. Or it may be
suggested that students will be following various aspects of this method in numerous
activities throughout the year. Students are told, therefore, they will be doing real
science. We take the view that students’ understanding of a) what science is, b) just
how human the endeavor really is and --perhaps equally important -- c) what science
is not, can be enriched and made more engaging by showing that those who do
science, and those who write about it, hold varying views as to just what is authentic
science (Martin, Kass, and Brouwer, 1990). If we can find ways to determine what
individual students currently think, we at least can acknowledge their varying
views--whether they come from ignorance, first impressions, or an extensive
knowledge base about science. If necessary, teachers can then try to help them
construct meanings more in line with a balanced view of science. Our purpose in
this chapter is to present an activity, a learning game, which acts as a powerful set
induction for subsequent instruction in the philosophy of science. We have found
that this activity engages our students’ minds and precipitates enthusiastic discussion
on the question, “what is science all about?”
We have used the game successfully in a variety of settings. Elementary and
secondary preservice methods classes are one example. Here we found our challenge
to be how much time we can spend on the nature of science versus all the
pedagogical and content issues one must deal with for a variety of science disciplines
and a variety of grades preservice students will teach. We found that if students have
only one science methods class, it is difficult to find the necessary time to do a good
job with nature of science issues. It is always the struggle between our desire to give
them the necessary background and their desire to know “what can I do in my
classroom tomorrow.” The card game does, however, serve as a highly effective
entry into a world many students do not know exists.
Another group with whom we have used the card game are veteran classroom
teachers, either during summer workshops or at state science teacher meetings in
workshop settings. They love the activity, the engagement and, for many, the
discovery that there is a whole area about science for which they have not had much
background or experience. “Light bulbs” often go on in these settings and some
teachers crave more. We both have had, from time to time, this activity result in
teachers later enrolling in our graduate courses which concentrate on the nature of
science and science teaching. There is little indication that most teachers who have
become familiar with this strategy use the cards immediately with their students,
although the high school teachers were more likely to see this as a possibility for
their students in tenth to twelfth grade. Instead, it appeared that they were seeing
this as a self-enriching experience that might enable them to teach from a different
perspective.
When graduate students in science education play the card game, they are
potentially the best prepared to get the most out of this activity. These students tend
to have good backgrounds in science, have taught for a number of years, and have
THE CARD EXCHANGE 75
combined that experience with recent course work and, for some, active research in
current issues of science education reform. Not only do they tend to have the most
intense and detailed conversations, but their resultant paragraphs about science tend
to be what we would consider the most perceptive and balanced. Later in the course,
they go back to some of these statements to design exhibitions for their peers about
how they would teach this principle about science to students. For example, two
graduate students designed five different posters depicting five well-known models
of classification systems throughout the history of science from Aristotle to the
present. Their peers loved it because it was such a vivid way to teach something all
children learn in a developmental way. It so clearly showed these systems to be
human constructions that were later replaced with what the scientific community
decided were more authentic models. What better way to show that “science builds
on what has gone on before and refines its conclusions” or “theory and observation
interact” or “theories help scientists interpret their observations.”
Finally, interesting results occurred when we used the card game with some
university scientists. Scientists are diverse in their views about science -- some
holding rather strong empiricist views, others seeming theoretically driven, and
others appearingbalanced. The cultural component was minimally referred to by our
scientists. The research piece to the card game -- looking more closely at the
relationship between composition (race, culture, gender) of our various card-playing
groups and our results, what they do with the cards, how they respond to the activity
initially and in retrospect, what they propose to do differently when they leave us,
and what they end up doing back in their schools -- is richly layered and ongoing.
The activity we are writing about is called a “card exchange,” a learning game
developed by Bergquist and Phillips (1975) for classes of 20 students or more. We
use the game very much as it was originally developed except that we have changed
the game content to the philosophy of science. The game works well because at the
beginning students are encouraged to move around and talk with each other, things
almost all students like to do! The subject of conversation is the content of the cards.
This works as a set induction because in the course of their conversation students
quite naturally begin considering what they believe about science and how those
beliefs may or may not coincide with what others believe. Later in the game students
form groups based on the content of the cards they hold and then corporately produce
a written summary. Both of these later acts require compromise which forces the
students to give a rough rank order to their beliefs about science. The result is that
when we begin our part of the instructional process, our students are not only keenly
aware that many of them hold quite different views on the nature of science, and
many of them now have doubts about the validity of their own views. They are
engaged.
PLAYING THE GAME
To prepare for this game the teacher must develop a set of science statements related
to what that teacher later wishes to accomplish with his or her philosophy of science
instruction. A single statement is placed on each card. The statements should be
succinct and easily understood. They should represent a broad range of viewpoints
including specific views to be expressed in the course. The set of card statements
may be redundant. In fact, redundancy as well as diversity is necessary so that
students can avoid being trapped with statements that they cannot affirm. We
personally use a set of more than 200 cards containing 40 unique statements
representing six categories (See Appendix A for the actual statements):
1. Theoretical Emphasis: Science is primarily a rationalistic, theory-driven

endeavor (for example, see California Department of Education, 1990, p.
14-18).
2. Empirical Emphasis: Science is primarily and a datagathering,

experimental endeavor in pursuit of physical evidence (for example, see
Braithwaite, 1955).
3. Anti-Science View: Science is overrated. One should not give much

credence to the aims, methods or results of science (for example, see
Appleyard, 1992; Sale, 1995; Skolimowski, 1974).
4. Scientism: Science is the way of knowing; it is the perfect discipline. For

a good introduction to this topic see Poole (1995) and Settle (1990).
5. Cultural View: Science is embedded in a social, historical, and

psychological context which affects all that goes on in science (for example,
see Cobern, 1991b; Fuller, 1991; Harding, 1993; Hodson, 1993).
6. Balanced View: This view point, which reflects our own aversion to
extremism, takes science to be a complicated affair that cannot easily be
reduced to one or even a few simple descriptions (for example, see Loving
1991; 1992).
The statements (see Appendix) used in the activity reflect the diversity found in
current thought. They allow for comparison and contrast with our objective which
simply put is, science viewed as both empirical and theoretical; science as a powerful
though limited way of knowing; science as a human, not mechanical endeavor;
science as a dynamic process. Depending on the instructor’s objectives, other
statements can be used. Our statements were drawn from a number of different
sources. In addition to those listed above, we refer the reader to AAAS (1993),
Aicken (1984), Eastman (1969), Kimball (1967), Matthews (1994), and National
Research Council (1996).
The game begins with the instructor giving to each student a randomly drawn set
of six cards (six to eight cards usually works best). The students evaluate their cards
according to what they can most and least affirm. They then have a period of time
in which to mill about examining each other’s statements and making trades.
Sufficient time should be allowed for each student to examine every other student’s
cards. The goal is to improve one’s hand by trading cards one for one, in other
words the students’ goal is to trade cards they like less for ones they like more.
There is no discarding. We typically allow our classes of 30 to 40 students a
minimum of ten minutes for this phase of the game. At the end of the period we
have everyone sit down while we give the next set of instructions. Instructions for
each phase should not be given in advance.
In the second phase students are again to mill about, but this time seeking
someone with whom they can pair. The pairing rules are that each pair must hold
eight cards on which they have relative agreement. Each member of a pair must
contribute at least three cards. This is important if the pairs are to be truly formed
by compromise. The pair’s remaining four cards are discarded.
Phase three of the game is a repeat of phase two, except now the pairs form
quadruplets. Each foursome is to hold eight cards with each pair contributing at
least three cards. Once the foursome has been established, the students are asked to
rank order their cards. Then if they wish they may discard the two bottomed-ranked
cards. Based on this final set of cards the students cooperate to write a statement of
paragraph length on the nature of science. At the conclusion of the game we ask the
various groups to share their paragraphs and to say why they accepted some
statements while rejecting others. Generally this is enough to precipitate vigorous
discussion. We facilitate the discussion by writing on the board a few phrases that
characterize the views being presented.
We follow up the discussion with a presentation of two case studies from the
history of science. Typically we use Ignaz Semmelweiss’ work with childbed fever
and Newton’s exploration of the phenomena of colors (Mannoia, 1980). In these
case studies we look for examples of the statements on the nature of science that the
students have advocated in their card exchange summaries. The case studies can be
presented orally in a recitation format by the professor or in the form of a printed
handout. The advantage of using a handout is that the groups working individually
at comparing and contrasting their card exchange summaries with the case studies
do a more thorough job. The disadvantage is the amount of time required. The
discussion of the card exchange summaries vis-a-vis the case studies concludes the
set induction. From this point we begin the main body of instruction on the nature
of science.
CONCLUSION
We personally have found the card exchange activity to be an effective method of

drawing our students into the philosophy of science, a subject they heretofore
resisted. It capitalizes on the innate gregariousness of students and the diversity of
opinion among students. A set induction is, however, only the beginning of a lesson.
The effectiveness of what happens afterwards depends on how well one can hold the
attention captured during the set induction. Obviously there is a need for many
creative instructional strategies if the philosophical preparation of preservice science
teachers is to be effective.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Dr. Jennifer Helms of the University of

Colorado, Boulder. Dr. Helms has used variations of the activity in her own teaching
and provided us with valuable insight as we revised the original activity. Her
assistance was especially helpful in tlie development of tlie “Cultural View” category.
1
Western Michigan University, Kalaniazoo, Michigan, USA
2 Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas, USA
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Shymansky, J.A, & Kyle, W.C. Jr. (1986). ‘A summary of research in science education - 1986’, Science
Education, (72), 254-275.
Skolimowski, H. (1974). ‘The scientific world view and the illusions of progress’, Social Research, (41),
52-82.
APPENDIX A
CARD EXCHANGE STATEMENTS
Theoretical Emphasis
1. Science is open-ended, but scientists operate with expectations based on the

predictions of theory.
2. A theory is what scientists strive for: a large body ofcontinually refined observations,
inferences, and testable hypotheses.
3. Theories help scientists interpret their observations: facts do not speak for
themselves.
4. In general, scientists plan investigations by working along the lines suggested by

theories, which in turn are based on previous knowledge. Theories serve to give
direction to observations, i.e., they tell one where to look.
5. A theory is a logical construct of facts and hypotheses that attempts to explain a

range of natural phenomena and that can be tested in the natural world.
6. Good science cannot be done without good theories.
Empirical Emphasis
1. Observation is central to all of science, i.e., seeing is believing.
2. A scientist should not allow preconceived theoretical ideas to influence observation

and experimentation.
3. Unless an idea is testable it is of little or no use; thus, scientists attempt to convert

possible explanations into testable predictions.
4. Careful, repeatable observation and experiment give the facts about the world around
us.
5. Good science always begins with observations.
6. Science is never dogmatic; it is pragmatic-alwayssubject to adjustment in the light

of solid, new observations.
7. A phrase such as "Many scientists believe. ." misrepresents scientific inquiry because
scientists deal in evidence.
Anti-Science View
1. Science is always changing and therefore is not very reliable.
2. Scientists should be held responsible for harm their discoveries have caused, e.g.,
pollution, nuclear weapons.
3. Earning recognition from other scientists is really the main motivation of more
scientists.
4. Most of what scientists do will never be of much practical value.
5. Money spent on projects such as NASA space flights would be better spent on
healthcare for the needy.
6. Science destroys values and morality by disparaging the unique nature of men and
women.
7. Science and religion are fundamentally at odds.

Scientism
1. The scientific method should be followed in all fields of study.
2. Scientists and engineers should make the decisions about things like types of energy
to use because they know the facts best.
3. Science is the most important way of gaining knowledge open to humanity.
4. Science knowledge is of much greater value than any other type of knowledge.
5. Only science can tell us what is really true about the world.
6. Science knowledge is always objective and self-correcting.
7. Credit for our advanced way of life must go to science and scientific progress.
Cultural View
1. Funding influences the direction of science by virtue of the decisions that are made
on which research to support.
2. The scientific enterprise is situated in specific historical, political, cultural, and

social settings; thus, scientific questions, methods, and results vary according to time,
place, and purpose.
3. The predominance of men in the sciences has led to bias in the choice and definition
of the problems scientists have addressed. This male bias is also one factor in the
under representation of women in science.
4. Scientific facts are manufactured through social negotiations. Nature has nothing to
say on its own behalf.
5. Scientists in one research group tend to see things alike, so even groups of scientists
may have trouble being entirely objective.
6. The Early Egyptians, Greeks, Chinese, Hindu and Arabic cultures are responsible for
many scientific and mathematical ideas and technological inventions.
7. Until recently, some racial minorities, because of restrictions on their education and
employment opportunities, were essentially left out of the formal work ofthe science
establishment. The remarkable few who overcame these obstacles were even then
likely to have their work disregarded by the science establishment because of their
race.
Balanced View
1. Science is one of several powerful ways of knowing and understanding the natural
world, however, some matters cannot be examined usefully in a scientific way.
2. Science leads to generalizations based on observations or theories. Science always

aims to be testable, objective and consistent.
3. As with all human endeavors science is subject to many influences both good and
bad.
4. Science builds on what has gone on before and refines its conclusions, but scientific
work does not result in infallible propositions, such as the word “proof” implies to
a nonscientist.
5. Scientific progress has made possible some of the best things in life and some of the
worst.
6. Theory and observation interact. Each contributes to the other: If theory without
observation is empty, then observation without theory is blind.
NORMAN LEDERMAN AND FOUAD ABD-EL-KHALICK
5. AVOIDING DE-NATURED SCIENCE:

ACTIVITIES THAT PROMOTE
UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE NATURE OF SCIENCE
In spite of a renewed interest in establishing the nature of science as a major element

of the science cumculum we fear that the current reform emphasis relative to the
nature of science (NOS) will have as little impact as earlier efforts. It seems that two
critical omissions noted in previous reform efforts are again apparent. There has not
been a concerted effort to communicate clearly what is meant by the NOS and how
a functional understanding of this crucial aspect of science can be communicated to
K-12 students (Lederman & Niess, 1997).
The focus of this chapter is to address this second issue by providing strategies
to communicate important aspects of the nature of science to students in a hands-on
fashion. As far as communicating proper understandings of the NOS to students is
concerned, teachers have been led to believe that their students will come to
understand the NOS simply through the performance of scientific inquiry and/or
investigations. This advice is no more valid than assuming that students will learn
the details of cellular respiration by watching an animal breathe. Too many students
and teachers believe that scientific knowledge is provable in an absolute sense,
objective, and devoid of creativity and human imagination. It is also just as common
for students and teachers to believe that laws are theories that have been proven and
that there exists a single step-wise scientific method which characterizes scientific
investigations (Lederman, 1992).
It is highly unlikely that students and their teachers will come to understand that
science is tentative, empirically-based, partly the product of human imagination and
creativity, and is influenced by social and cultural factors solely through learning
about the content of science or its processes. We believe that a concerted effort on
the part of science educators and teachers to explicitly guide learners in their
attempts to develop proper understandings of the nature of the scientific enterprise
is essential. The notion of explicitness is imperative. It is critical that we target
teaching the NOS if the desired impact on learners’ conceptions is to be achieved.
ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES
This chapter introduces a set of activities designed to model an explicit approach to

teaching crucial aspects of the NOS. These activities have been successfully used
with students and science teachers. Science educators and science teachers can use
83
84 N. LEDERMAN AND F. ABD-EL-KHALICK
the following activities to convey to students and preservice or inservice science

teachers adequate notions of the NOS. The notions advocated in these activities are
designed at a level of generality that renders them virtually non-controversial.
Moreover, the scientific knowledge prerequisite is minimal to remove the constraints
on using the activities.
Science educators can use these activities in either science content or science
methods courses. In case your audience consists of precollege students, the
appropriate grade level(s) for using a certain activity are pointed out, but most
activities can be adapted for audiences of varying levels of sophistication. Where
appropriate, extensions that make an activity more amenable for use with older
students are included. Additionally, by not requiring specialized scientific
knowledge, the activities free the learners from having to struggle with complex
scientific concepts as they try to internalize certain aspects of the NOS. The
following activities are presented with no sequence in mind; each can stand on its
own. The activities can be presented in a nature of science unit or can be infused
throughout a science content course of study.
The activities are grouped in three sections relative to important aspects of the
NOS. These sections include observation versus inference, creativity, and
tentativeness, subjectivity and social and cultural context in science, and black-box
activities. Each section starts with a general discussion of related NOS notions.
Each activity specifies student objectives, materials, setup and/or procedure in
addition to a possible scenario. The overheads that you need for the activities can
be conveniently reproduced from the ones included. The procedure/scenario section
provides an explicit idea about the kind of questions and answers that can be
expected and the notions that need emphasis during a certain activity. These
scenarios are not meant to be prescriptive in any respect. They are drawn from
classroom experiences and genuine student reactions to the activities and are meant
to give you a better idea about one possible discourse among many equally fruitful
classroom interactions. The approach you choose to undertake to a certain activity
is totally up to your professional judgment.
Throughout the discussions and activities, examples and ideas from science are
infused. These are intended to enrich classroom discourse and support the notions
presented with instances from science. Moreover, references to several scientific
articles and/or books are included for your own use. Most of these readings are not
appropriate for precollege students but should be adequate for preservice and
inservice secondary science teachers. They are intended to provide a background
that makes the ideas presented more contextual and embedded in scientific practice.
AVOIDING DE-NATURED SCIENCE 85
SECTION I: OBSERVATION, INFERENCE, CREATIVITY,

AND TENTATIVENESS
Among the inappropriate conceptions of the NOS frequently portrayed in textbooks

is the notion that for every question posed about the natural world, scientists will
eventually find ‘the correct and absolute’ answer. This idea is reinforced when
students are expected to come up with ‘the’ correct answer to end-of-chapter
textbook exercises; choose the one correct answer on multiple choice tests; or reach
the right conclusion in ‘cook-book’ laboratory sessions.
These notions and experiences are not consistent with the way scientific
knowledge is produced. There seldom is, at least initially, and most often
indefinitely, one answer to the questions that scientists investigate. This is because
scientific knowledge is partly a product of human inference, imagnation, and
creativity, even though it is, at least partially, supported by empirical evidence. As
such, scientific knowledge is never absolute or certain. This knowledge (including
theories and laws) is tentative and subject to change.
The following activities are designed to help students make the crucial distinction
between observation and inference, and appreciate the tentativeness of scientific
knowledge and the role of creativity in science.
Tricky Tracks!
This activity can be typically used to introduce students to the NOS. You can use the
activity to establish an atmosphere that supports your students’ active participation
in classroom discussion. This is crucial if you are to derive the benefit from these
activities.
‘Tricky Tracks!’ conveys to students the message that every idea counts
irrespective of it being the ‘correct’ answer. Students completing this activity will
gain experience in distinguishing between observation and inference and realizing
that, based on the same set of evidence (observations, or data), several answers to the
same question may be equally valid.
Level: Upper elementary, middle, or high school.
Materials: Overheads (Figures 1, 2 & 3)
Procedure / Scenario:
1. Show Figure 3 to students and ask them to write down an account of what
they think might have happened as indicated by what they see. A typical
story line is that “two birds approached each other over the snow, had a
fight, and the big bird ate the smaller one and went on its way.” Make sure
that each student writes his/her own account. This written record will render
students’ dissatisfaction with their accounts greater and facilitate their
attending to the ideas being presented.
2. Place Figure 1 on overhead. Ask students: “What do you observe?”

Typically students would answer: “Bird (or any other animal) tracks” or
“Tracks left by birds (or other animals) as they walked toward the same
spot,” etc. Accept all answers at this point and avoid making any judgment.
You can list those answers on the board.
3. To continue with the bird scenario, at this point you may ask: “Can you see
the birds?” or “How can you tell that these tracks are left by birds?” The fact
that we can not see birds makes the statement “bird tracks” an inference
rather than an observation. A possible observation would be: “Two sets of
black marks of different shapes and sizes left on a transparency!” It is the
case that based on this observation and probably on our familiarity with the
kind of tracks that some animals leave behind, we inferred that birds made
these tracks, but they may be something else. The tracks may be those of two
different species of dinosaurs, or a mother (or father!) and a baby dinosaur
of the same species. The tracks may as well be those of two different kinds
of birds, or a large and a small bird of the same species. Even our claim that
larger tracks are left by the larger animal is an inference. The important
point to emphasize is that student statements similar to the ones above are
inferences as contrasted to observations.
4. You may ask your students: “Why were the two animals heading toward the
same spot?” Again the answers may vary: Students may say that the animals
were aiming at a common prey, or moving toward a source of water. One
animal may have been attacking the other, or the two had to move to the
same spot by virtue of the nature of the terrain, etc. It is important to point
out that all of these statements are inferences and that all those inferences
are equally plausible. Emphasize that based on the same set of observations
or evidence, you and your students were able to come up with several, but
equally plausible answers (inferences) to the same question: “What has
happened?”
5. Place Figure 2 on overhead. Ask your students: “What do you observe?”

Some may answer: “The two sets of marks now appear to be close and
randomly mingled,” which is a possible observation. Others may say: “The
two birds are having a fight,” which is an inference. Point out to students
the difference between the two. Again note that many inferences are
possible: The two animals are fighting, or engaged in a mating ritual, or
battling over a prey that one of them has captured, etc.
6. Now place Figure 3 on overhead and ask students what they observe. By
now the answer should typically be: “The set of the larger marks is left on
the transparency. The smaller marks are not visible any more.” Ask them:
“What do you infer?” Again the possibilities are many: One animal may
have eaten the other, one may have grabbed the other and moved on, one
animal may have flown while the other kept walking, etc. Again stress the
point that all these inferences are equally justified by the evidence available.
7. Now ask each pair of students to compare their written accounts and what
they think of them after the class discussion. (You can ask younger students
to write in their journals whether and how the discussion made them change
their mind about their own accounts). Next, ask students whether we can
ever know, based on the evidence available, what has “really” happened (see
extensions, below).
8. Conclude by making explicit the two main points: a) the difference between
observation and inference, and b) based on the Same set of evidence many
equally warranted answers to the same question can be inferred. Continue
that scientists make similar inferences as they attempt to derive answers to
questions about natural phenomena. And even though their answers are
consistent with the evidence available to them, no single answer (or story)
may solely account for that evidence. Several answers are often plausible.
And similar to the case of our tracks, scientists may simply never find the
answer as to what has really happened. Alternatively, this activity can be
presented in an inductive manner. You can show students Figures 1,2 and
3 respectively, each time asking them to make observations and draw
inferences as to what might have happened. Thus, as you proceed, students
would be provided with additional data or evidence that they need to
incorporate into their accounts.
Upper middle and high school extensions: Half way through the activity, encourage
the student to rule out those inferences that seem to be inconsistent with the
observations. For example that the tracks were caused by a car! Or a fish! Take
all student responses seriously even if they were meant to be humorous. It is
important to convey the idea, and then to explicitly explain, that inferences must be
consistent with the evidence. Even though a certain collection of evidence may
equally justify several inferences, not all inferences can be based on that evidence.
Eventually, scientific knowledge should be based on and consistent with empirical

evidence.
High school extensions:
Another possibility to pursue in the scenario with older students is the time frame.
What guarantees, or what evidence do we have that both sets of marks were made at
the same time. It could equally well be that each animal made its tracks at a
different time, and that both were never actually present in the same place at the
same time. Moreover, the whole thing may not have ever happened.
Figure 1. Tricky Tracks, Set # 1

Figure 2. Tricky Tracks, Set #2

Figure 3. Tricky Tracks, Set #3

It may simply be a set of marks on a transparency! There is no evidence to rule out

the possibility that these marks were simply left by the touch of a pen on paper. This
can be pursued all the way to the notion that certain concepts in science, even though
based on some evidence, may only exist in the scientists’ minds (for example, see
Lewin, 1983, for an account of the recent controversy about the actual viability of the
concept of ‘competition’ in community ecology). The issue of whether we can ever
know through inference only what has actually happened can be further pursued. A
case in point is the disclosure by the American space agency of evidence that
supports the claim that life once existed on Mars. Ask students to research the issue
and argue whether inference is at play, and to what extent. Of course, remember that
there is no single answer to this question!
The Hole Picture!
This activity is intended to reinforce students’ understanding of observation and

inference in science and to introduce them to the notion of creativity and its role in
constructing scientific knowledge. Students should be able to appreciate that
scientific knowledge is partly a product of human inference, imagination, and
creativity, even though it is, at least partially, supported by empirical evidence.
Moreover, students should be helped to realize that science does not produce absolute
or certain knowledge. All scientific knowledge is subject to change (i.e. tentative)
as more evidence is accumulated or as already available evidence is re-interpreted
in liglit of newly formulated hypotheses, theories, and/or laws.
Level: Upper elementary and middle school
Materials: One manila file folder, a sheet of construction paper that will fit inside
the folder, one overhead transparency (per student or group of students). Paper
sheets of various colors, adhesive tape, glue.
Construction: On the large or tab side of the manila file folder, punch a number of
holes randomly (Figure 4). It may be necessary to cover the folder with an opaque
material to prevent seeing the shapes in the folder. Next, tape the folder leaving the
tab end open creating an envelope (Figure 5). Create an insert by gluing differently
colored, randomly shaped pieces of paper to the sheet of construction paper (Figure
6). The inserts need not be the same for all prepared folders. Insert the construction
paper into the envelope with the colored pieces of paper facing the holes (Figure 7).
Figure 4. Open file folder with randomly-spaced holes on one side.
Figure 5. Closed file folder showing the sides taped.
Figure 6. Illustration of the construction paper shapes glued to the insert.
Figure 7. Illustration of the insert being placed into the file folder.
At this point, tape an overhead transparency over the side of the folder with
the holes. With non-permanent pen, students can draw on the transparency
and erase their drawing.
Procedure / Scenario
1. Hand each student, or group of students, a manila folder (with the insert
inside) and an erasable or non-permanent pen.
2. Inform students that the inserts have certain colored shapes glued to them.
Students, without removing the inserts, are instructed to figure out those
shapes and colors. The only available information to the students is what
they see of the colored paper through the holes.
3. Have students trace their proposed shapes on the overhead transparency.

Using transparencies and erasable pens allows you to re-use the folders in
other or future classes.
4. The activity aims to put students in a situation similar to the ones that
scientists face when going about their work. When your students finish their
proposed shapes, take the time to make explicit the similarities between what
they are doing and what scientists usually do: Faced with a natural
phenomenon (the insert), scientists pose certain questions to which there
usually are no readily available answers (What is the shape of the colored
pieces of paper on the insert?)
5. Just like your students, scientists would rather handle the phenomenon first
hand, which in the present case would be to simply pull out the insert and
see how it looks. This, however, is rarely possible. For example, for a few
hundred years physicists have theorized the presence of atoms, formulated
many atomic theories, investigated the structure of the atom, and
accumulated a great deal of knowledge about the atom and its components.
This knowledge in turn has allowed many advances in physics and other
related fields. This was the case without the scientists being able to actually
see an atom. (It is true that using super-accelerators / super-colliders
physicists were able to break atoms into smaller pieces. However, another
problem of ‘visibility’ arose. The now- famous “Higgs” particle seems to
‘block the vision’ of scientists who again seem not able to ‘see’ what they
would like to see firsthand). In a similar fashion, astrophysicists have
produced scientific knowledge about the inside of the sun and the kinds of
reactions taking place within, all without splitting the sun open!
6. The question arises, “How do scientists produce a seemingly reliable body

of knowledge about such phenomena?” Scientists collect data about the
phenomena they study. The holes on the folder represent data points
allowing us to view a part of the object of investigation. The data points that
can be collected about different phenomena vary in several ways. Some of
those ways include the:
Amount (e.g., number of holes) which may depend on the feasibility

and practicality of collecting the data. For example, in geological
surveys, it is possible, but not at all practical, to collect rock samples
from every square meter of terrain. Samples are usually collected
from a much larger unit area.
Quality (such as small versus larger holes) which relates to the

accuracy, precision, etc., of the data. The quality of data depend on
a multitude of factors. Technology is one. For example, the quality
of the Hubble telescope photos of distant galaxies now available to
astronomers are by far more informative than earlier photos taken by
observatories on Earth.
Availability (for example, it may not be possible for us to indefinitely

punch holes in the folder to see the whole insert below). For example,
astrogeologists would certainly like to put their hands on rock
samples from every meteorite they can observe. In reality, however,
they can only hope to locate meteorite samples available on Earth as
a result of collisions that took place in distant times.
7. After collecting data, scientists, much like what your students did, infer
answers to their questions that are consistent with the data. Creativity and
imagination are essential to this process. In much the same way that your
students have literally filled in the gaps between the holes to generate a final
picture of what they thought the colored pieces of paper look like, scientists
engage in a creative process to make sense of the data they have collected
and come up with a final picture or an answer.
8. Now ask a few of your students to remove the insert from their folders (other
students should keep their inserts inside). Ask those students to compare, in
front of the class, their proposed drawings with what the inserts actually look
like. If you were careful to glue randomly shaped pieces of paper to the
insert, your students’ surprise is sure to follow. Point out that scientists, very
often, do not have the luxury of ‘pulling out their inserts and examining
them’. Rather, they have to infer an answer from the available data.
9. Ask some of your students whose inserts are still inside their folders how
certain they are about their proposed drawings! Ask your students whether
they think scientific knowledge can be absolute or certain (A good discussion
usually results).
10. With older students it might be a good idea not to permit they to remove
their inserts. This provides an experience that is more consistent with actual
scientific investigations. With younger students you might have to let all of
them remove their inserts, especially if they show signs of frustration. (Note,
it is true that in most cases scientists do not stop at the initial phase of
collecting and inferring. Next, they derive predictions based on their
hypothesized answers and test those predictions by collecting more direct or
indirect data. This aspect is dealt with in the following activities.)
Real Fossils, Real Science
This activity helps students realize that scientific knowledge is partly a product of
human inference, imagination, and creativity. The advantage of this activity is that
students work with the same artifacts and data (i.e, fossil fragments) as
paleobiologists.
Materials: Fossil fragments (not complete fossils), construction paper, scissors (per
student or pair of students).
Procedure / Scenario :
1. Give each student (or pair of students) a fossil fragment and ask them to
make a detailed diagram of it. The diagrams may be larger than the actual
fragments. The students, however, must include the appropriate scale with
their diagrams. If possible, obtain sets of similar or identical fossil
fragments so that different students may get similar or identical fragments.
2. Ask students to trace the outline of their fossil fragment on a separate sheet
of colored construction paper. This tracing is cut out and discarded to form
a window so that when the construction paper border is placed over the
paper containing the fossil fragment diagram, only the diagram appears.
3. Using a different color pencil instruct students to completetheirfossil

drawing (to scale) on the construction paper containing the fossil fragment
diagram. Students should end up with a drawing of an organism from
which, they believe, the fossil fragment has come. You can have your
students complete their fossil diagrams in class or assign this as homework.
4. Each student ends up with a complete fossil drawing having two parts: the
original fossil fragment drawing in one color and the inferred drawing of a
complete organism in another color.
5. Ask students to staple together the construction paper with the previously cut
window and the paper with the complete drawing. The papers should be
stapled on one side such that they can be flipped open. Moreover, the fossil
fragment diagram should only show through the construction paper window.
This format enhances the presentation of original (fossil fragment) and
completed diagrams to other students (see Figures 8 and 9).
6. Ask students to make an oral presentation in which they describe the habitat,
diet, behavior, and other characteristics of the organisms they have
extrapolated from the fossil fragments. At this point you might ask whether
some students knew in advance what organism their fossil fragment came
from (e.g., coral). Ask those students, if any, whether their knowledge
affected the inferences they made about the habitat, diet, etc., of the complete
organism that they inferred from the fossil fragment. You might want to
explain that scientists’ prior knowledge often influences their interpretations
of the data and affects their conclusions.
7. It would be interesting to compare those organisms that different students

have inferred from similar or identical fossil fragments. If those organisms
were different, ask your students: “Can we tell for certain from which
organism the original fossil fragment come?” Explain to students that we
might not be able to give a definite answer. Continue by asking: “Is it
possible that scientists face a similar situation?” “Can scientists differ in the
inferences they derive from evidence?’ “If yes. How can such differences
be settled?” Explain to students that all too often scientists may reach
differing conclusions based on the same evidence, just as the students have
done in this activity. Scientists also often hold their views strongly and do
not give them up easily.
8. Make explicit to students that what they have done is very similar to what
paleobiologists and other scientists that investigate fossils often do. Point
out that much creativity is involved in extrapolating or inferring from fossils

the kind, habitat, and life style of the organisms whose fossils or fossil
fragments are investigated.
9. You can conclude this activity by talking about the famous case of the
dinosaur Iguanodon. When it was first reconstructed, the thumb was
originally placed as a spike above the nose! It is useful to remind students
that any reconstruction should be considered tentative --just like all of the
products of science.
High School Extensions
You can initiate a discussion about the extent to which creativity plays a role in
science with the case of hominid evolution: Telling the story of the evolution of man
( Homo sapiens ) over the course of the past five million years. Scientists have
formulated several elaborate and differing story lines about this evolution. It is
noteworthy that all that is available to those scientists is a few teeth, tools, and parts
of skulls and skeletons that can be spread over one moderately-sized table!
Inference, imagination, and creativity serve to fill in the gaps, which in this case
seem to be enormous!
The same discussion can be carried further to introduce students to the notion
that scientific knowledge is affected, to varying degrees, by the social and cultural
context in which it is produced. The differing story lines in the above example about
the evolution of humans were heavily influenced by social and cultural factors. Until
recently, the dominant story was centered about ‘the man-hunter’ and his crucial role
in the evolution of humans to the form we now know (see Lovejoy, 1981). The
hunter scenario was consistent with the white-male culture that dominated scientific
circles up to the 1960s and early 1970s. As the feminist movement grew stronger
and women claimed recognition in the various scientific disciplines, the story about
hominid evolution changed. One story more consistent with a feminist approach is
centered about ‘the female-gatherer’ and her central role in the evolution of humans
(see Hrdy, 1986). It is noteworthy that both story lines are consistent with the
available evidence.
SECTION II: SUBJECTIVITY, AND SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXT
Scientists are often portrayed as being objective. As they engage in their work,
scientists are thought to set aside their personal prejudices, perspectives, and beliefs.
This objectivity, among other things, is believed to allow scientists to:
Conduct ‘objective’ observations. Scientists make theory-free observations:

They simply describe and measure things as they are. These observations
are independent of what the scientists know, believe or how they view the
world.
Figure 8. View of the original fossil fragment.
Reach ‘objective’ conclusions. Based solely on their objective observations,

scientists use the rules of logic and inference to formulate hypotheses or
theories to explain the phenomenon under investigation.
Evaluate new evidence objectively. After they formulate a hypothesis or

theory, scientists collect more evidence to test the adequacy of their
hypotheses or theories or to test their predictive power. Hypotheses and
theories are ‘objectively’ evaluated against this evidence. Confirmatory
evidence tends to strengthen the hypothesis or theory and eventually leads
to its acceptance by scientists. However, if the hypothesis or theory is not
supported by the evidence, it is rejected.
Figure 9. View of the completed fossil diagram.
It may be tempting to accept the above claims. The history of science, however,
is replete with instances that counteract each of them. It is often the case that
scientists interpret the same evidence differently, formulate different hypotheses to
explain that evidence, and fiercely defend those explanations or hypotheses. It fact,
controversies are commonplace in science. This is the case even though the various
parties collect and present abundant evidence to champion their views (see the
discussion of mass extinction in Chapter 16 for a recent example). The above notions
of objectivity have been discounted by many philosophers and historians of science.
For instance, Kuhn (1970), suggested that all scientific observations and
interpretations are in some respect subjective. Kuhn advanced the notion of
‘paradigm’ to account for what usually happens in science. A paradigm defines, for
a certain research community, the phenomena that are worth researching, acceptable
questions to ask of those phenomena, appropriate research methodologies, adequate
instrumentation, and the relevant and admissible evidence. For a scientist, a
paradigm acts as a lens through which his/her observations are filtered. In a sense,
the interpretations and explanations that a scientist formulates are consistent With
that paradigm.
Although you may not want, and rightly so, to formally introduce your students
to all the above notions, certain ideas are worth emphasizing to your upper middle
and high school students. Scientists’ beliefs, previous knowledge, training,
experiences, and expectations actually influence their work. All these background
factors form a mind-set that affects what scientists observe (and don’t observe) and
how they make sense of or interpret their observations. It is this individuality that
accounts for the role of subjectivity in the production of scientific knowledge.
That’s Part of Life!
Level: Upper middle and high school
Materials: Overhead (Figure 10)
1. Place Figure 10 on the overhead projector and ask your students to carefully
read the text and tell you what it means.
2. It is usually quite difficult to make sense of the text, even though the
individual words and sentences are easily comprehensible. Tease students
for possibilities. After a while, suggest that the passage may simply have no
meaning at all. Ask how many students agree with that. (The idea is to
make the activity as discrepant as possible.)
3. Next tell your students that this passage is about ‘doing the laundry’. Ask
them to read the text again and tell you whether things now make more
sense to them, and whether, after all, there was a sensible meaning to that
collection of words and sentences.
4. Ask students what they think is the idea behind this exercise.
5. Context is very important for tnaking sense of what we observe, and how we
interpret those observations. The individual words and sentences, even
though each by itselfwas comprehensible, made little sense to your students.
In the same manner, for a scientist, a mere collection of data or facts, lacking
any context, may not make any sense.
6. In order to put things in context, we need to bring in our prior knowledge,

experiences, and expectations into a situation. Consider someone who
understands English very well, but who has never seen or used a washing
machine, but rather hand washed his/her clothes. Ask your students whether
they expect such a person to make sense of the text if he/she were told that
the text is about ‘doing the laundry’? It is because we know about washing
machines, either by using them, or through watching others use them, that
we were able to interpret the text meaningfully.
7. In conclusion you should emphasize that trying to make sense of a mere

collection of data may not get a scientist anywhere. Scientists bring their
prior knowledge, experiences, and expectations in order to put the data into
context. Only then can scientists make sense of or interpret available data.
The procedure is actually quite simple. First arrange things into

different groups. Of course, one pile may be sufficient depending
on how much there is to do. If you have to go somewhere else due
to lack of facilities, that is the next step, otherwise you are pretty
well set. It is important not to overdo things. That is, it is better
to do too few things at once than too many. In the short run this
may not seem important but complications can easily arise. A
mistake can be expensive as well. At first, the whole procedure
will seem complicated. Soon, however, it will become just another
facet of life. It is difficult to foresee any end to the necessity of
this task in the immediate future, but then one never can tell.
After the procedure is completed one arranges the materials into
different groups again. Then they can be put into their
appropriate places. Eventually they will be used once more and
the whole cycle will then have to be repeated. However, that is
part of life.
Figure 10. “The Instructions”

Young? Old?
Level: Upper middle and high school
Materials: Overheads (Figures 11, 12a, b and c.)
1. Place Figure 12a on the overhead. Ask students what they see.
2. Students usually first recognize the face of an old lady. A few usually see the
profile of an attractive young woman.
3. If students can not see the young lady, insist that it shows in the drawing,
and that they can see it if they look hard enough. Do not at this stage point
at the drawing to help students ‘see’ one image or the other.
4. Now point out, for example, how the nose of the old lady forms the cheek
and chin of the young women to help students recognize the image. Many
students will still not be able to see one or the other image.
5. Ask students, “How come we are looking at the very same drawing and
seeing two different things?” If this was a piece of evidence, for example,
a witness’s recollection of a murder’s face which she saw at a crime scene,
then the police would end up looking for two women: an old lady and a
young one!
6. Ask, “How can it be that some of us see only one face and not the other?”
“Is it possible that some scientists may look at the same piece of evidence or
set of data and see different things?” You can at this point discuss with
students how a scientist’s training, previous knowledge, and experiences
dispose him/her to ‘see’ a certain set of evidence from a certain perspective.
In the same manner that your students were not able to see the face of the
young lady in the drawing, scientists sometimes fail to ‘see’ (or perceive of)
a certain set of evidence as relevant to their questions. Scientists sometimes
tend to infer different things from the same set of data in the same manner
that your students inferred totally different things from the same piece of
evidence: the drawing.
7. To help students see both images, show them Figure 12b of the old lady and
Figure 12c of the young women. Now students can look at Figure 12a and,
with some effort, see both faces. Students can now shift from one face to the
other. They, however, can never see both faces at the same time. Figure 11
can be used in the same manner, by asking, is it a rabbit or a duck?
Figure 11. Is it a duck or a rabbit? From Atkinson (1975), p. 102.
The Aging President
This activity gives students a feel of what it means to approach a phenomenon

with a certain paradigm or mind-set or perspective (if you do not wish to introduce
the term paradigm). Even though certain facts change, a paradigm lingers on and
sets expectations. A paradigm will very much make us see what we expect to see.
Level: High school
Materials: Individual overhead transparencies created from Figure 13a-h.
Procedure / Scenario :
1. Enlarge the panels from Figure 13 as individual images for use on the
overhead projector or as hand outs
2. Put the first panel on the overhead projector and tell students that this is a
caricature of President Regan at the beginning of his term. Next, tell
students that you are going to show other caricatures of the president made
at later stages in his two terms. Ask the students to observe the caricatures
and describe what changes took place as the president ages.
Figure 12a. Young Woman, Old Woman1. From McNeil & Rubin, (1977), p. 89.
Figure 12b. Young Woman, Old Woman1. From McNeil & Rubin, (1977), p. 89.
Figure 12c. Young Woman, Old Woman1. From McNeil & Rubin, (1977), p. 89.
3. Place the next panel on the overhead. Students usually note things such as
the “chin has flattened,” or “a piece is lost from his ear,” etc.
4. Repeat the above step with the next three panels. Till now students usually
keep reporting the changes they observe in the president’s face.
Figure 13a-h. The Aging President? From Atkinson, (1975), p. 103.

5. Usually, it will not be until the middle of the series that students start to note
something other than the face, but may still not ‘see’ the body of a female.
6. Place Figure 13h on the overhead. And ask students to describe what they
see now. You can go back to the earlier panels and it would not be easy for
students to recognize the female body.
7. Now you can show students the drawings next to each other (Figure 13) and
ask them where do they start to see the female body.
8. Ask students why they were first able to see only a man’s face? Did telling
them that the drawing is a caricature of the president anything to do with it?
Ask them whether they would have realized the female body earlier had you
told them from the beginning that the drawing was that of a female body?
9. The kind of knowledge and expectations with which we approach any

phenomenon may affect the way we interpret that phenomenon. A certain
perspective may even determine what we see (a man’s face) and what we do
not (the female body) in the same data (drawing). Likewise, the kind of
knowledge, training, experiences, and expectations that scientists bring into
an investigation affect what they discern in the available data. And, most of
the time, scientists do not give up their perspective (e.g., that the drawing
was a face) even if evidence to the contrary is made available to them (let
students now look at Figure 13c and ask them whether they wonder how
could they have seen this drawing as a man’s face!) It usually takes
dramatic evidence, over a relatively long period of time (contrast for students
Figure 13h with 13a) before scientists exchange their old views for new ones.
SECTION III: BLACK-BOX ACTIVITIES
Black-box activities provide students with challenges similar to those of encountered

by scientists. Students examine phenomena and attempt to explain how they work.
They make observations, collect data, draw inferences, and suggest hypotheses to
explain their data. Next, based on those hypotheses, students make predictions and
devise ways to test them (these ‘ways’ need not be limited to controlled experiments).
Based on their tests, they judge whether their hypotheses are appropriate or not.
Students finally construct models to explain the phenomena investigated and test
whether their models ‘work’. Black-box activities can be used to convey to students
appropriate conceptions of many aspects of the nature of science.
General Learning Objectives for Black Box Activities:
Students will learn:
The distinction between observation and inference.
That scientific knowledge is partly a product of human inference,

imagination, and creativity.
That scientific knowledge is, eventually, empirically based (i.e., based on

and/or derived from experiment and observation).
That scientific knowledge (both theories and laws) is tentative and subject
to change.
That scientific models (e.g., atom, gene) are not copies of reality. Rather,
these are inferred constructs that help to explain observable phenomena.
Scientific theories are analogous to scientific models in the sense that
theories are inferred explanations for observable phenomena. It should
prove useful to explain to students the crucial distinction between scientific
theories and laws. While theories attempt to explain observable phenomena,
laws are descriptions of discernable patterns or regularities in these
phenomena.
In addition, these activities provide students with opportunities to practice some

science process skills. Among these processes are observing and collecting data,
inferring, hypothesizing and devising ‘ways’ to test those hypotheses (or inferences)
and constructing models.
A Generalized Model for Black Box Activities
The activities in this section are all black-box activities and share a common
presentation model. Aspects of the model are illustrated by reference to one or more
of the activities included in this section so you might find it useful to shim through
the activities before examining the generalized model. In addition, you will find it
useful to adapt many other activities to fit this model and use them to convey to
students appropriate conceptions of the NOS. Black-box activities can be presented
in a single class session or it can span several days. The amount of time you decide
to dedicate to a certain activity depends on several factors such as time availability,
grade level, and student interest.
The ‘Phenomenon’
Present students with a demonstration that simulates a natural phenomenon or the

universe around us. The demonstration should have three essential aspects:
a) It should be discrepant. This will serve to capture students’ attention and

arouse their Curiosity. For instance, you can pour about 60 milliters of water
into the water-making machine and recover about 330 milliters!
b) It should provide students with an open-ended situation so it is vital that the

answer as to how the activity works should not be readily known to students.
This open-ended nature is essential if you wish your students to conduct inquiries
the way scientists do. This feature, for instance, makes a black-box activity
genuinely different from a cook-book laboratory experience. Students are often
perplexed as to how the cans demonstration works, Their answers usually range
from there being a small pump inside the cans, all the way to very complex chemical
reactions. In the case of the tube, there are many workable possibilities: One can use
a plastic ring to connect the upper and lower (or left and right) ropes, or simply loop
the upper and lower (or left and right) ropes, or twist the left and right ropes, etc.
c) Students should not be able to ‘see’ what is going on. Most phenomena that
scientists investigate are ‘black’ in the sense that they can not be ‘directly’
observed (e.g., atoms, black holes, radiation, reaction dynamics, temperature,
gravity, etc.) Students are asked to explain the phenomenon without actually
opening the box or demonstration to ‘see’ what is inside. You may elect at
the conclusion of an activity to let students see how it is set up. However,
not having students see the actual solution by looking inside the box is more
consistent with the way science works. Scientists cannot open an atom and
‘see’ inside it. Despite that, scientists are able to produce relatively reliable
bodies of knowledge about the phenomena they investigate.
Observing and Inferring
While demonstrating, ask students to make observations. Students can either call out
or make records of their observations (data). Take time to go through student
responses and differentiate observations from inferences. Make sure students
understand that distinction by asking them to make further observations. You may
discuss with students the extent to which their inferences are consistent with the
observations they make.
In tlie cans demonstration: “Water is cycling between the two cans” and
“Gaseous pressure from a chemical reaction pushes the water” are
inferences. Possible observations would be more like: “No water is passing
through the glass-tube piece between the rubber tubes” and “There was a
change in color from blue to red. In the water-making machine demo: “We
poured 60 mL in funnel 1 and collected 330 mL in the recovery beaker” is
an observation. “The machine made water” or “There is water inside the
machine” are inferences. We can not observe that there is water inside the
box, we can only claim that by inference.
Hypothesizing
a) Based on their observations and inferences, ask students (or groups of

students) to suggest hypotheses to explain how the phenomenon (or demo)
works. Have students present their hypotheses to the class.
b) Take time to discuss these hypotheses. Ask students to judge whether their
hypotheses are consistent with tlie data that they have collected. Discuss
how these data can support or weaken their hypotheses. Emphasize that
scientists’ hypotheses must be consistent with the available evidence.
In the cans demonstration, students may hypothesize that a chemical

reaction produces a gas that pushes the water from one can to the other. Ask
students whether such a hypothesis is consistent with the evidence. For
instance, a change in temperature and/or the production of a gas, are
possible indications of chemical change. Students can feel the cans and
observe whether gas fumes pass through the small piece of glass tubing.
Discuss how these data can support or weaken their hypotheses. For
example, many, but not all, chemical reactions are accompanied by a change
in color. Ask students whether we can infer with confidence that the change
in color in tlie demo is the result of a chemical reaction, etc.
c) At this point accept all hypotheses consistent with the evidence or prior
knowledge, even though they do not completely explain what is going on.
“There was water in the water-making machine at the start.” This inference
is based on the simple observation that the water-making works only once.
This is an opportunity to discuss the role that prior knowledge plays in
science. It is because we know that in the physical world “matter is not
created nor destroyed,” we can conclude that there is water inside the
machine at the start. This knowledge has greatly reduces the number of
acceptable explanations for our observations.
Testing Hypotheses
a) After making their initial hypotheses, ask students to design tests to

determine whether their hypotheses are supported by evidence. Based on a
hypothesis, a student (or group of students) can make a prediction and then
test this prediction by collecting more evidence.
In the water-making machine, students may hypothesize that there was water
in the machine to start with. If this hypothesis is correct, then colored water
poured into the machine should become diluted when collected in the
recovery beaker. Students can pour water colored with food coloring into
funnel 1 (you would have to prepare more than one water-making machine
before class) and then observe the collected water. If the water collected has
a lighter color, then this water ‘must’ have been diluted (see below). The
prediction is thus observed and the hypothesis is supported (not proved).
b) Ask students whether they can, through testing, prove their hypotheses?
Through testing (and experimentation) we can never prove an hypothesis for
certain. Tests can only add support to a certain hypothesis. Irrespective of
the amount of evidence collected, a hypothesis can never be proven with
absolute certainty. However, when sufficient supportive evidence is
collected, a certain hypothesis gains more acceptance as a plausible
explanation. As such, scientific knowledge is never certain, and is subject
to change (tentative).
In the example given above, it was suggested that because the intensity of the
water coloration decreased, we concluded that the water must have been
diluted. This, however, is just another inference. There is another plausible
explanation for the color dilution: The machine ‘makes’ water and not food
coloring. As such, any colored amount of water will necessarily be diluted
as the machine increases the amount of water but not that of the food
coloring!
Designing and Testing Models
a) Based on their hypotheses students can now design actual models of the
phenomenon they observed. A model is acceptable only as long as it
‘behaves’ like the phenomenon it is supposed to represent.
In the tube demonstration, each student can bring to class the core of a toilet
paper roll. You can provide students with rope. Ask students to build their own
model of the tube. Next ask students whether their model ‘behaves’ like yours. You
can start pulling on one end of the rope and students can do the same step to see
whether their model accords with yours.
1. When students have a working model of the phenomenon, ask whether they
know what is inside the demo you showed them (which represents the
natural phenomenon). If we can never ‘open’ the box and look inside, can
we ever tell whether our model is an exact copy of what is inside? Can we
ever be certain how the phenomenon ‘actually’ works? Scientific models are
never exact copies of natural phenomena. These models are rather inferred
or hypothesized from the behavior of the phenomenon. They are workable
representations of those phenomena. Scientific knowledge, in this sense, is
never certain. It is a product of human inference, even though it is based on
empirical evidence.
In the tube demonstration for example, students’ models can never be like
yours, since you do not provide them with rings, but the tube can be built
without them.
You might, later on, open the black box. This is especially helpful for
students to see how far off their models or inferences might have been. This
will help them get a feeling of the role of inference in science, and that
models are not copies of reality.
In the cans, the hypothesis box, and the water-making machine demos, you might
find it to be time consuming for students to build their own models, or that students
do not show a sustained interest in going through the model construction phase. In
such cases, have students draw sketches of their models on overheads which can be
reproduced from the schematics provided (see Figures 14, 15,16 and 17) by covering
the ‘inside’ of the demonstration. Have students defend their models by explaining
how each accounts for the collected data. You can tell students whether their models
might work or not.
Discussion
It is essential at the conclusion of each activity you take time to explicitly point out
to students the aspects of the NOS that the activity emphasized (these aspects were
pointed out in each of the above sections). Discuss with students the implications of
such aspects of the NOS on the way they view scientists, scientific knowledge, and
the conduct of science.
The Tube
The way the ropes are set inside the tube will cause a seemingly complex and
amazing movement pattern of the ropes. When the teacher pulls one end of the rope,
another end will be pulled in with a seemingly random pattern. The teacher can pull
on rope ends clockwise at one time, then across the tube at another.
Level: Elementary and middle school
Prerequisite knowledge: None
Model Construction: Individual students (See Figure 14).
Materials: 1 tube (mailing tube or PVC pipe, approx. 30 cm), 1 plastic ring
(optional, you can simply loop the lower rope over the upper rope), rubber stoppers
or tape (to seal tube ends), 1 roll of clothesline rope (for whole class), 1 toilet paper
roll core (each student can get his/hers).
Figure 14. The construction of the mystery tube. Students see only the knotted ropes
that appear on the outside of the tube.
The Hypothesis Box
Students can only see the front of the box with the top funnel and outlet tube. The
teacher can pour clear water from top funnel and re-collect it from the outlet. By
changing the position of the tubing inside the box to funnels with food coloring
soaked paper-cones, the teacher can pour clear water but collect solutions of different
colors!
Prerequisite knowledge: None
Model Construction: Groups of 4 or 5 students (See Figure 15).
Materials: 1 cardboard box (approx. 70 x 50 x 30 cm) with back open, 1 wood sheet
(approx. 50 x 30 cm), 4 funnels, rubber tubing, 2 three-way rubber tube connectors,
2 filter-paper cones soaked with 2 different food colorings, 300 mL beakers.
Figure 15. The is the view of the apparatus facing the instructor. On the other side,
students can only see the top funnel and the liquid outlet.
The Cans
The initial levels of liquid in cans A & B appear in Figure 16. Using a beaker, pour
enough water into thistle funnel until water starts flowing into the funnel from the
glass tubing above. The water will now keep running for a long time. The cans will
appear to be a self-perpetuated or closed system in which the liquid Seems to cycle
by itself! Instead of clear water in can B, fill half with colored water and pour above
ethyl alcohol colored with iodine. A more complex pattern will now be apparent.
Level: Upper middle and High School
Prerequisite knowledge: Liquid Pressure
Model Construction: Groups of 4 or 5 students. (See Figure 16).
Materials: 2 ditto-master fluid or camping fuel cans (if not available use 2 500-mL
Erlenmeyer flasks wrapped with aluminum foil), 2 rubber stoppers, rubber tubing,
1 thistle funnel, glass tubing, (Optional materials include ethyl alcohol, iodine and
food coloring).
Figure 16. The design of the can apparatus.

The Water-Making Machine
Before class pour about 270 mL of water through funnel 1. Tell students you have
a water making machine. You can pour approximately 60 mL of water through
funnel 1 and recover approximately 330 mL ! Make sure students record the initial
and final (recovered) volumes of water.
Level: Upper middle and High School
Prerequisite knowledge: Liquid pressure and the siphon effect
Model Construction: Groups of 4 or 5 students. (See Figure 17).
Materials: 1 cardboard box (approx. 35 x 25 x 15 cm), 2 empty softdrink cans, 1

goose-necked straw, 2 500-mL beakers, 2 funnels, rubber tubing, 1 tube of silicone.
Figure 17. The design of the water making machine. The students only see the two
funnels, the cardboard box and the two catch containers. From BouJaoude
(1995), pp. 46-49.
118 N. LEDERMAN AND F. ABD-EL-WICK
The Cube Activity
This activity is similar to black-box activities in several respects. It has the

additional advantage of giving students a sense of, and experience with another
creative activity that scientists often undertake: The search for patterns. Scientists
often search the data they collect for certain patterns or regularities. Based on these
regularities, scientists can, for instance, extrapolate their data in order to predict
possible future behaviors of the phenomenon under investigation. A common
example comes from meteorology. Meteorologists collect data on several relevant
phenomena (eg., atmospheric pressure, temperature, humidity, wind direction and
speed, cloud formations, etc.), and then attempt to single out patterns that would
allow them to anticipate or predict the behavior of the ‘weather’ in the near future
based on what they know. Such anticipation or prediction is only approximate and
probabilistic (we have all regularly experienced ‘unexpected’ weather). Scientists
can not invariably predict the future (since science does not provide absolute
knowledge); they can only suggest what might happen in the near future by
extrapolation from past and present evidence and experiences.
It should be noted that the patterns that scientists often single out, may or may
not exist in the natural world. On the one hand, for example, planetary movements
in our solar system do seem to follow a certain pattern that allows scientists to make
fairly accurate predictions about the position of a certain planet at a certain point in
time. On the other hand, for instance, one group of community ecologists advocates
‘competition’ as a pattern common to the behavior of all groups of animals. Another
group of scientists claims that such ‘competition’ is not an actual natural
phenomena, but was rather imposed on the behavior of animals by the scientists
themselves. (For example, see Lewin (1983) for an account of the recent controversy
regarding the concept of ‘competition’ in community ecology). Whether some
patterns or regularities actually exist in nature, is a question similar to asking
whether the models that students build to account for the black-box phenomena that
they investigated are actual copies of what exists inside the boxes. The main point
to emphasize to your students is that patterns are partly based on evidence, but are
also partly the product of the scientists’ imagination and Creativity. The activity aims
to convey to students the notions that scientific knowledge is partly a product of
human inference and creativity, is empirically based (based on and/or derived from
observation and experiment), and tentative (subject to change).
Level: Upper elementary, middle, and high school.
Materials: One cube per group of four students (black-line masters are provided as
Figures 18-22). A single black-line master can be used to prepare the cubes needed
for a single activity.
Procedure/ Scenario:
1. Have students form groups of four. Place the cubes on the center of the
tables where the students are working. All cubes should have the same face
on the bottom. Use the bottom square of the black-line masters to serve as
the face on the bottom. Students should not turn or lift the cubes.
2. Tell students they have to answer the question: “What is on the bottom of the
cube?” Their answers should be supported by evidence. They should also
include an explanation of how an answer was reached.
3. Ask students in each group to make observations and record the data each
from his/her position (for instance, what is the number or word that a student
can see on the cube surface facing him/her). Then ask them to share their
observations. Each student in the group can verbalize his/her observations
to the ‘recorder’ who compiles all the data. This is intended to simulate
scientists working together and sharing data.
4. Based on their observations, students in each group should be able to figure

out the pattern on the cube, and consequently infer what is on the bottom.
Each group should then prepare a written report of the suggested answer and
corresponding pattern and explanation.
5. Put the cubes away without showing the bottom. (You can make the
experience more genuine by gluing the bottom of the cubes to a piece of
cardboard). Scientists often have no way of ‘seeing’ the phenomena they are
investigating. (This makes ‘The Cubes’ a black-box activity.)
6. Ask one or more groups to present their suggested answer to the class,
including the pattern they discerned, and the way they reasoned to formulate
that pattern. If different groups come up with different answers, then all
differing views should be presented.
If all groups come up with the same answer, you can initiate a discussion of the
role of evidence (or observation) in deciding the pattern, and how the answers were
consistent with the available data. If different groups come up with different
answers, the two scenarios are possible. In some cases, some groups may have
inferred patterns that are obviously inconsistent with the data. Here, you can
emphasize the importance of evidence in supporting or weakening a certain
conclusion by asking students to identify how a certain pattern is consistent or
otherwise inconsistent with the data. In other instances, two or more patterns may
be equally consistent with the data and consequently legitimate. In this latter case,
120 N. LEDERMAN ANDF. ABD-EL-KHALICK
you can discuss with students whether it is possible to tell who is ‘right’ and who is
‘wrong’! If differing explanations are consistent with all available evidence, is it
possible to decide which might correspond with the answer on the bottom of the
cubes, which we cannot see? The patterns in the cubes vary in difficulty. You might
want to match those difficulty levels to your students’ grade level(s). Table I gives
a brief description of possible patterns for the different cubes. (In certain cases, more
than one pattern is possible, and students often come up with new patterns that are
consistent with the evidence).
TABLE I
The Cubes Activity: Possible Patterns.
Cube Figure Possible pattern (with the bottom square of black-line

# # master serving as bottom face)
1 18 First letters vary as consecutive consonant letters of the alphabet that
form meaningful words with _AT: the bottom is PAT (‘e’ is a v owel and
does not count).
2 19 2 faces are not divided; 2 faces are divided in two; 1 face is divided in
four: bottom is divided in four. Number on upper left represents the
number of divisions on face: bottom has 4 o n upper left, etc. The lower
right corner numbers follow a pattern in which sequential numbers (1,2,
3,4,5) are added as follows: 1 + 1 = 2, the result is taken and added to
the next number in the sequence: 2 + 2 = 4 , and so on: 4 + 3 = 7,7 + 4 =
11: bottom should have 1 1 + 5 = 16 on lower right corner.
3 20 No real pattern in mind. Useful with older students to discuss whether

scientists may in certain cases impose a pattern on nature. This is
especially pertinent if students do come up with some pattern(s).
4 21 Exposed sides have either a male or female name; opposing sides have a
male name on one side and a female name on the other, names on
opposite sides begin with the same letters. On this data any one of four
possibilities can be on the bottom: Fran, Frances, Francene, and
Francine. The number in the upper right corner of each side corresponds
to the number of letters in the name on that side; the number in the lower
left corner of each side corresponds to the number of the first letters the
names on opposite sides have in common. This new evidence leads to
put either Francene or Francine on the bottom. We still are, however,
not sure what is exactly on the bottom because we can not see it. We can
only infer it ! Note, another option is to use this cube without the
numbers.
5 22 If the alphabet is numbered, then the numbers on the cube correspond to

the numbers of the 6 vowels (a is 1, e is 5 , etc.): the bottom is 23.
Figure 18. Mystery cube # 1.

Figure 19. Mystery cube #2.

Figure 20. Mystery cube #3.

Figure 2 1. Mystery cube #4.

Figure 22. Mystery cube # 5.

Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oregon, USA
NOTE1
The image of the young woman/old woman has had a lengthy history. It was drawn
by the cartoonist W. E. Hill and appeared in the November 6, 1915 issue of Puck
titled “My wife and my mother-in-law.” The psychological utility of the image
seems first to have been noted by E.G. Boring (1930) in a short article appearing in
the American Journal of Psychology, pp. 444-45.
REFERENCES
Atkinson, R.C. (1975). Psychology inprogress: Readings from Scientific American, New York, Freeman.
BouJaoude, S. (1995). ‘Demonstrating the nature of science’, The Science Teacher, (62), 46-49.
Hrdy, S. B. (1986). ‘Empathy, polyandry, and the myth of the coy female’, in R. Bleier (ed.), Feminist
approaches to science, New York, Pergamon Publishers, 119-146.
Kuhn, T. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions, 2nd ed., Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.
Lederman, N.G. (1992). ‘Students’ and teachers’ conceptions about the nature of science: A review of the
Lederman, N. G. (1994, April). Scientific hypotheses, theories, laws, and other dangerous ideas, paper
presented at the National Convention of the National Science Teachers Association, Anaheim, CA.
Lederman, N.G., & Niess, M. (1997). ‘The nature of science: Naturally?’, School Science and Mathematics,
(97), 1-2.
Lewin, R. (1983). ‘Santa Rosalia was a goat’, Science, (222), 636-639.
Lovejoy, C.O. (1981). ‘The origin of man’, Science, (211), 341-350.
Luchessa, K., & Lederman, N.G. (1992). ‘Real fossils, real science’, The Science Teacher, (59), 68-92.
McNeil, E.B. & Rubin, Z. (1977). The psychology of being human, 2nd edition, San Francisco, CA, Canfield
press.
Shoresman, P. (1965). ‘Atechnique to clarify the nature oftheories’, The Science Teacher, (32), 53-54.
Social Science Education Consortium & Biological Sciences Cumculum Study (1994). Teaching about
the history and nature of science and technology: Teacher’s resource guide (field test ed.), Boulder,
CO, Social Science Education Consortium.
PENNY L. HAMMERICH
6. CONFRONTING STUDENTS’ CONCEPTIONS

OF THE NATURE OF SCIENCE WITH
COOPERATIVE CONTROVERSY
Have you learned lessons only of those who admired you, and were
tender with you, and stood aside for you?
Have you not learned great lessons from those who braced themselves
against you, and disputed the passage with you?
Walt Whitman, 1860
Among the fundamental principles shaping students’ understanding of science are

the conceptions they hold about the nature of science itself. Students’ conceptions
of the nature of science influence their thoughts, feelings and actions associated with
doing, understanding, and teaching science (Smith, 1990). Constructivism implies
that teachers cannot assume students have the same conception of science, nor are
their conceptions necessarily accurate. It is important for teachers to find out what
conceptions of the nature of science students hold so that lessons and activities can
be developed which challenge conceptions of the nature of science.
One ideal instructional strategy for examining students’ nature of science
conceptions is cooperative controversy. Cooperative controversy exists when one’s
ideas, conclusions, theories, or opinions are incompatible with those of another and
the two then seek to reach an agreement (Johnson & Johnson, 1979). This strategy
forces students to actively engage in a debate of two opposing sides of an issue.
Research indicates that cooperative controversy dramatically enhances critical
thinking (Johnson et al. 1985; Scharman 1990; Solomon et al. 1992).
The conception or understanding of the nature of science as socially constructed
and validated has important implications for science education. Although learning
is individually processed, further learning is constructed when individuals engage
socially in talk and debate about issues. Learning science thus involves being
confronted with the ideas and practices of tlie science community and making these
ideas and practices individually meaningful (Driver et al., 1994). The aim of
cooperative controversy is to have students examine their conceptions of the nature
of science.
Throughout their life experiences, students develop many interconnected and
valid conceptions about the scientific world. Some argue there are many
understandings among students, teachers, philosophers, and science educators of the
127
W. F. McComas (ed.) The Nature of science in Science Education, 127-136.
128 P. HAMMERICH
nature of science (Millar, Driver, Leach & Scott, 1993). Science is both symbolic in
nature and socially constructed. The role of the science educator is to mediate
learners’ understanding of science in order to help them make sense of the way in
which scientific concepts are generated and validated. It is not the role of the science
educator to present science as the only way of knowing. The cooperative controversy
lesson is important because the way teachers teach science is linked to the teachers’
own understanding of science. If this is the case, then it can be inferred that
students’ conceptions of the nature of science are linked to how they learn science
material.
The concept of the nature of science is a foundation for the knowledge base for
teaching and learning science. It is likely that the nature of science is a global
conception that frames a learner’s total scientific knowledge. It is similar to what
Bohm and Peat (1987) call the infrastructure of scientific knowledge, the set of tacit
beliefs and skills which allow one to understand and build scientific knowledge. If
a learner’s infrastructure contains misconceptions and contradictions, subsequent
knowledge and concepts built upon these faulty ideas are likely to be both erroneous
and fragmented. Smith (1990) has found that the conceptions learners hold about
the nature of science influence the kinds of information they find relevant and
therefore tend to seek and value. Thus, these conceptions have consequences in the
course of the development of science teaching. An effort is made in the following
cooperative controversy lesson to recognize and better understand college students’
conceptions of the nature of science.
THE METHOD
The lesson presented here has been used successfully in a college science methods
class. Thirty-seven upper-level elementary education majors at an urban university
participated in a cooperative controversy lesson designed to reveal and challenge
their conceptions of the nature of science. Students are asked to write down their
conception of the nature of science before and after participating in the cooperative
controversy lesson. Students are told that by writing down their conceptions of the
nature of science they will be able to discover and to reflect upon their own
conceptions. The question is open-ended and the responses are analyzed by
measuring patterns and trends related to students definitions of the nature of science.
Both the author and another science educator analyzed the responses. The author
analyzed the responses twice for an agreement of 93% (intrarater reliability). The
agreement between the author’s and the independent science educator’s analysis was
89% (interrater reliability). Results and examples of responses appear in a
subsequent section.
CONFRONTING STUDENTS’ CONCEPTIONS 129
USING A COOPERATIVE CONTROVERSY LESSON

TO TEACH ASPECTS OF THE NATURE OF SCIENCE
Conflicts over conceptions within the nature of science are inevitable but these
conflicts can provide a positive experience and increase learning. The cooperative
controversy lesson is designed to engage students actively in personal knowledge
construction. Figure 1 identifies the cooperative controversy model.
Figure 1: The Process of Confronting Students’ Conceptions withCooperative

Controversy
When any controversial issue such as the nature of science is approached there
tends to be a “choosing of sides” behavior where learners take a position on the issue.
This is described as “cooperative controversy.” If an individual conception is left
unchanged, it will continue to exist and be strengthened as new knowledge is built
upon it. During the lesson, individual conceptions are challenged by other ideas.
The challenge happens face to face in what is called the “discrepant viewpoint.”
The uncertainty resulting from the “discrepant viewpoint” leads to a search for more
information and the desire to determine the origin of individual conceptions. This
is referred to as “active reflection” and occurs when students are focused on the goal
of the exercise: to come to a consensus on the most accepted conception of the nature
of science. Students may change their conceptions several times during the activity
based on the ideas put forth by others.
In the following cooperative controversy lesson, the two opposing sides of the
nature of science are science as fact or scientific knowledge as etched in stone to
science knowledge as myth and belief. Figures 2 and 3 identify the two opposing
130 P. HAMMERICH
views of the nature of science. Although neither is considered “correct,” the two
opposing sides are seen as opposite ends of a continuum with “science as fact” at the
far left and “science as myth and beliefs” at the far right. Most students have
conceptions of the nature of science that fall somewhere between the two extremes.
Science as FACT
Adopt the perspective that science is factual as your own and prepare a brief
presentation of the idea for your group. Add examples and statements that will
help you argue your point of view successfully. (What do you suppose the other
point of view is?)
Further points to consider:
The American College dictionary defines science as “a branch of knowledge

of study dealing with a body of facts or truths systematically arranged and sharing
the operations of general laws . . .” From this definition it is assumed that science
is a series of facts about nature that are static and fixed collections of truths about
the world. These facts are discovered by scientists who make observations of the
world and carefully record and organize the facts or truths in a systematic way.
Facts exist in nature, can be observed, recorded and classified to produce a

body of knowledge about the world. Facts are truths in the past, present, and
future. This definition implies that nature is separate from the observer and
exists whether or not anyone is looking. The role of scientists in this case is to
record what exists and systematically organize the resulting body of knowledge.
In this interpretation of science the role of a science teacher is to point out the
facts of nature and organize these facts for the student.
Figure 2. The position of science knowledge as etched in stone.
Science as BELIEF
Adopt the perspective that science is uncertain as your own and prepare a brief
presentation of the idea for your group. Add examples and statements that will
help you argue your point of view successfully. (What do you suppose the other
point of view is?)
CONFRONTING STUDENTS’ CONCEPTIONS 13 1
Further points to consider:
The universe is seen as full of uncertainties and mysteries that individuals

experience every day. In this view, science is the seeking of approximate answers
to questions about nature. There are many interpretations of nature and these
interpretations constantly change with new experiences, conceptions, and
understandings of information discovered.
Our understandings of the universe are abandoned through scientific progress;

explanations and theories of tlie universe are only working hypotheses that are
abandoned one day when another discovery supersedes and causes new
conceptions of the universe. For example, at the beginning of the 20th century
the scientific conception of the atom was simply a model, which proved its truth
only after it had been surpassed by another scientific explanation.
In this view, the teaching of science is seen as a process of discovering new

scientific conceptions instead of focusing on the fact of content.
Figure 3. The position of science knowledge as myth and belief.
Each pair of students is given a written passage that describes one of the two
opposing sides. Students are asked to read, discuss, and write a persuasive argument
defending the position they are given. Then two pairs, with opposing sides, engage
in the cooperative controversy activity by presenting their side to the other pair and
defending their position. Students are encouraged to ask questions of clarification
on any point made that they do not understand. After the discussion, the two pairs
are asked to reverse roles by taking the opposite side to read and defend. The goal
in the role reversal is for each pair to elaborate on what members of the other pair
said previously. The final goal in the cooperative controversy is for the two pairs,
representing opposing sides, to reach a group decision on their conception of the
nature of science. Table I identifies the steps involved in setting up the cooperative
controversy.
TABLE I
The steps involved in setting up the controversy
1. Assign cooperative groups of four students which are then further divided
into pairs of two.
132 P. HAMMERICH
2. Students meet with their partner, read their position and plan how to argue
effectively for their position.
3. Each pair presents their position while tlie other pair takes notes and asks for
clarification on anything they don’t understand.
4. Open discussion takes place where each group argues forcefully and
persuasively for their position, presenting as many facts as they can to
support tlieir point of view. Students as an entire group are to make sure
they understand the facts that support both points of view.
5. Role Reversal occurs wliere each pair in the group argues the opposing pair’s
position. The goal is to elaborate on what already was said by the other pair.
6. Group members develop a position upon which all members can agree. They
summarize the best arguments for both points of view. When a decision is
made the group organizes their arguments to present to tlie entire class. The
group needs to be able to defend the validity of their position.
ASSUMPTIONS FOR APPROPRIATE COOPERATIVE CONTROVERSY
Conflict which results when students discuss their personal conceptions of science
can increase learning and improve student relationships. The cooperative nature of
the activity serves to negate competitive experiences which can close off logical
thought and damage relationships. The following assumptions are critical to
construct an appropriate cooperative controversy.
1. Conflicts among alternative conceptions of tlie nature of science are frequent

and inevitable in any science classroom. No two students can ever see the
nature of science in exactly the same way. The question is not whether there
are differences in conceptions, but how different are the conceptions among
students. Knowing that there are potential differences in the conceptions of
the nature of science, it would make sense to explore all the possible
alternative conceptions before trying to decide which is most accurate. This
divergence before convergence procedure enhances scientific thinking and
is the focus of the cooperative controversy lesson.
2. Cooperative Controversy requires a cooperative context. An important point

is that controversy is inevitable when students are put in a situation of
disagreement. The most effective controversy exists when students are
allowed to cooperatively strive toward an agreed upon conception of the

nature of science. Research supporting cooperative relationships in the
classroom have been well documented (Johnson and Johnson, 1983;
Johnson, Maruyama, Johnson, Nelson, Skon, 198 1; Slavin, 1977; Deutsch,
1962). The cooperative format is essential to the controversy lesson. If
students see themselves in a competitive situation they will lose sight of the
objective at arriving at a consensus and move into a “lose-win” situation.
The most appropriate context for conflict resolution is a cooperative situation
where students are engaged in finding the most appropriate conception for
the group.
3. Students must have cooperative skills needed to work toward resolution.

Students should be encouraged to emphasize the alternative conceptions of
science, differentiate alternative conceptions from their own, listen to
alternative ideas, negotiate alternative conceptions in consideration of their
own ideas, and emphasize rationality in seeking the group’s consensus
regarding the best conception of the nature of science.
THE TEACHER’S ROLE IN STRUCTURING

COOPERATIVE CONTROVERSY
The science teacher has the important job of structuring the cooperative controversy
exercise by informing the students about the nature of the controversy. Specific
information on structuring cooperation is detailed in Johnson and Johnson (1975)
and Johnson, Johnson, Holubec and Roy (1984). The second important role for a
science teacher is to facilitate the controversy and to intervene when necessary. The
third role for a science teacher is to encourage controversy by questioning viewpoints,
playing alternative conceptions, taking alternative sides, encouraging students to take
alternative conceptions and monitoring and helping students.
IMPACT OF THIS STRATEGY ON STUDENTS’ CONCEPTIONS OF

THE NATURE OF SCIENCE
I have found that elementary methods students hold varying conceptions of the
nature of science. While reflecting upon their ideas, students noted that it was
difficult for them to “figure out why” they held various alternative conceptions. In
many cases when asked to think about how they obtained or why they held
alternative conceptions, students attributed them to the teaching practices of science
teachers when they were students in science classrooms both in the precollege and
college environment. From this discussion came the comment that because of their
134 P. HAMMERICH
previous experience in science classes, science had not become one of their favorite
classes. Further, the students agreed that they wanted to teach science in a manner
different from their past experience, using hands-on, discovery, or inquiry oriented
approaches.
The cooperative controversy lesson is useful in challenging students’ alternative
conceptions of the nature of science. Many of the students’ conceptions of the nature
of science fell somewhere on a continuum between the two sides, science as a “fact”
or science as a “belief.” The responses were analyzed to reveal trends of students’
views of the nature of science.
Before the cooperativecontroversy lesson, 73% of the students felt that the nature
of sciencewas fact based. After participating in the cooperativecontroversy exercise,
60% of the students felt that the nature of science was a combination of factual
information and belief. Table II illustrates the character of the students’ conceptions
of the nature of science before and after the lesson.
TABLE II
Students’ conceptions of the nature of science before and after participation
in the cooperative controversy lesson.
Responses before the Cooperative Controversy Exercise
Fact Belief Fact/Belief No Response

27 (73%) 7 (19%) 2 (5%) 1(3%)
Responses after the Cooperative Controversy Exercise
Fact Belief Fact/Belief No Response

8 (21%) 7 (19%) 22 (60%) 0 (0%)
Further analysis of students’ responses revealed that their conceptions of the

nature of science vary and that they were influenced by the cooperative controversy
lesson. For example, one student’s conception of the nature of science before
participating in the cooperative controversy lesson was that science is fact based,
“learning about the world to find out the true answers.” This same student’s
conception of the nature of science after participating in the cooperative controversy
lesson changed to viewing science as both belief and fact based, “science is a
combination of beliefs and facts . . . science is always changing.” There were also
students who changed their conceptions of the nature of science from one of belief
that “science is a series of beliefs that we construct in our minds,” to science as fact
based that “science is facts that have been proven.” Finally, some students’
conceptions changed from one of belief, “science is a group of our beliefs that are
ever-changing,” to one of both belief and fact, “science as a combination of fact and
belief, some science is constant while some science is changing.” Of 37 students,
only three remained constant in their conception of science after participating in the
cooperative controversy lesson.
CONCLUSIONS
Students’ conceptions of the nature of science do vary but are influenced by

participating in the cooperative controversy lesson. Whether or not the cooperative
controversy lesson results in a permanent conceptual change on the part of the
students remains to be seen. Logical steps for further research and exploration of
students’ conceptions of the nature of science are to determine how effective the
cooperative controversy lesson is at producing long-lasting conception changes on
the part of the students and whether or not students’ conceptual changes concerning
the nature of science impacts how they will eventually teach science.
The students participating in the cooperative controversy lesson were elementary
teacher candidates and they indicated that their conception of the nature of science
did influence how they perceived the teaching of science. The majority of students
stated before participating in the cooperative controversy lesson that their conception
of the nature of science was fact based. The students further indicated that they did
not have favorable experiences in science classes due to the manner in which the
courses were structured. This experience led the students to state that they wanted
to teach science in a manner different from the way they had been taught. Therefore,
this lesson provides the opportunity for students to come to an understanding not
only of how their conception of the nature of science affects how they learn science
content, but also how they perceive the teaching of science. Teacher educators can
use the opportunity in the cooperative controversy lesson to assess students’ prior and
alternative conceptions of the nature of science, which can guide the development of
activities around this awareness.
College of Education, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA
REFERENCES
Bohm, B. & Peat, F. (1987). Science, order, & creativity, New York, Bantam.
Deutsch, M. (1962). ‘Cooperation and trust- Some theoretical notes’, in M. Jones (ed.), Nebraska Symposium
on Motivation (Vol. IO), Lincoln, NE, University ofNebraska Press.
Driver, R., Asoko, H., Leach J., Mortimere, M. & Scott, P. (1994). ‘Constructing scientific knowledge in the
classroom’, Educational Researcher, (23) 5-12.
136 P. HAMMERICH
Johnson, R.T. & Johnson, D. W. (1979, April). Structuring conflict in science classrooms, paper presented
at the annual meeting of the National Association of Research in Science Teaching, French Link, IN.
Johnson, D.W., & Johnson, R.T. (1975). Learning together and alone: Cooperation. competition, and
individualization, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall.
Johnson, D. W., & Johnson, R.T. (1983). ‘The socialization and achievement crisis: Are co-operative learning
experiences the solution?’, in L. Bickman (ed.),Applied Social Psychology Annual 4, Beverly Hills, CA,
Sage Publications.
Johnson, D.W., Johnson, R.T., Holubec, E., & Roy, P. (1984). Circles of learning: Cooperation in the
classroom, Alexandria, Virginia, Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development.
Johnson, D.W., Manryama, G., Johnson, R., Nelson, D., & Skon, L. (1981). ‘Effects ofcooperative
competitive, and individualistic goal structures on achievement: A meta-analysis’, Psychological Bulletin,
(89), 47-62.
Johnson, D.W., Johnson, R.T., Pierson, W.T. & Lyons, V. (1985). ‘Controversy versus concurrence seeking
in multi-grade and single-grade learning groups’, Journal of Research in Science Teaching, (2),
835-848.
Millar, R., Driver, R., Leach, J., & Scott, P. (1993). Students’ understanding of the nature of science:
Philosophical and sociological foundations to the study, working Paper Two from the project The
development of understanding the nature of science, Centre for Studies in Science and Mathematics
Education, The University ofLeeds, United Kingdom.
Scharman, L.C. (1990). ‘Enhancing an understanding of the premises of evolutionary theory: The influence
of a diversified instructional strategy’, School Science and Mathematics, (90), 9 1-100.
Slavin, R. (1977). ‘Classroom reward structure: Analytical and practical review’, Review of Educational
Research, (47), 633450.
Smith E. L. (1990, April). Implications of teachers’ conceptions of science teaching and learning, paper
presented at the annual meeting of the National Science Teachers Association
Solomon, J., Duveen, J., Scot, L. & McCarthy, S. (1992). ‘Teaching about the nature of science through
history: Action research in the classroom’, Journal of Research in Science Teaching, (29), 409-421.
CATHLEEN C. LOVING
7. NATURE OF SCIENCE ACTIVITIES USING THE

SCIENTIFIC PROFILE: FROM THE HAWKING-GOULD
DICHOTOMY TO A PHILOSOPHY CHECKLIST
The purpose of this chapter is to provide many strategies for teaching different
aspects of the nature of science to enlighten undergraduate or graduate science
education students. These strategies include becoming familiar with the variety of
positions held by equally distinguished scientists, philosophers and science educators.
Also included are activities designed to highlight how science is portrayed in texts,
curriculum guides, informal settings and in the media. The important role of
scientific theory is dealt with in a way that emphasizes both its uniqueness and value
and its limitations. The chapter introduces these aspects of the nature of science
through a series of enablers with specific concepts and activities listed — enough for
a whole course or for use individually.
The Scientific Theory Profile (STP) (Figure 1) plots positions of twelve
well-known philosophers, historians and sociologists of science relative to their
written positions about two crucial attributes of theories in science. Theories are the
detailed explanations for how phenomena in nature are thought to work. According
to Duschl (1990) theories can be viewed as Core, Central or Fringe--depending on
how accepted, tentative or wacky they are. The first attribute (on the x-axis) of the
STP is how theories are judged for acceptance or rejection. The extremes on the
x-axis are judgments by purely rational means versus “natural” means--those
involving psychological, social or cultural factors rather than rational (that is, purely
intellectual based on logical thinking). The second attribute of theories (on the
y-axis) is what scientific theories represent--from an external Truth at one end of the
axis (a staunch realist perspective) to an individual human construction at the other
end (radical constructivist; anti-realist)--with “what works best for the time being”
somewhere in the middle (instrumentalist, for example). Views on these two
attributes of scientific theories--judgment and representation--help establish one’s
position on the nature of science, perhaps more than any other. The reader is
encouraged to consult Appendix A where a representation of the primary works used
to establish positions on the STP are listed. In addition, Loving (199 1) gives a brief
description of the essence of the views on theories held by each of the twelve on the
profile. This helps clarify comparisons one might wish to make with contemporaries
in science, philosophy or science education. Students can be assigned to develop
expertise on one or more positions--a tactic used successfully with graduate students.
137
W. F. McComas (ed.) The Nature of Science in Science Education, 137-1 50.
0 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
138 C. LOVING
Not only did Giere provide the idea for the STP, his maverick position on the
Profile itself also serves as fodder for discussion among science educators in
particular, since he bases his notions about scientific theories on the cognitive
activity, what he calls the “constructive realism,” of the scientist. A number of
colleagues have indicated that they use the STP to introduce their science education
students to the world of philosophy of science and the various positions held by
well-known scholars. This chapter, however, gives numerous specific ideas for using
the STP to show the central role of theory in science; it then expands to other
concepts and activities on the nature of science, including suggestions for plotting
well-known science educators.
KEY
1) Thomas Kuhn 2) Carl Hempel 3) Karl Popper

4) Science Sociologists 5) Paul Feyerabend 6) Gerald Holton
7) Stephen Toulmin 8) Dudley Shapere 9) Larry Laudan
10) Imre Lakatos 11) Clark Glymour 12) Ronald Giere
Figure 1. The scientific theory profile illustrating the positions of various philosophers
and sociologists of science on a vertical axis from realist to anti-realist and
horizontal axis from rational to natural. The x-axis is judgment (theory’s
value) and the y-axis is representation (theory’s truth).
NATURE OF SCIENCE ACTIVITIES 139
“The farther from the origin of the STP, the more radical (Feyerabend) or unique
(Giere) is the position on scientific theories. “Balance” is indicated by closeness to
the origin of the graph. Those nearest (Holton, Shapere) are perhaps most balanced,
acknowledging in their writings the rational, fragile and sometimes stubborn nature
of judgment (X-axis) and the moderate ontological position that what works as best
explanations may be a truth, but not necessarily the truth (Y-axis). One of the major
thrusts of my research has been to suggest that science teachers, more than bench
scientists, need to be familiar with this profile enough to be aware of various
positions on science theories and to be able to settle into a position--preferably near
the middle. They then need to be able to analyze what they do and say with students
in terms of how they are portraying science and its explanations.”
Finally, in support of Lederman (1992) who uncovered a wide array of teacher
and student conceptions of the nature of science and emphasized the importance of
not trying to oversimplify our judgment of these views, this chapter describes
activities that will facilitate the development of views by science education students
informed by knowledge from all sides and appreciative of the complex nature of this
thing called “science,” which, in fact, has many different modes.
METHOD OF PRESENTATION
Various nature of science activities are described here as part of a course outline.
The activities emerged as a result of the development of a carefully stated mission,
course goals, and performance proficiencies one would hope teacher-students would
achieve well enough to influence their views and teaching behavior. While space will
not permit listing these, some key phrases serve to summarize the essence of the
overall purpose of these activities. For the mission, the key phrase might be to “learn
how scientific theories are derived, judged and represented . . . leading to more
accurate perceptions of what science is and what it is not.” While there are nine
course goals, summary phrases might be to “develop a philosophy and recognize it
in others . . .” “ to become . . . aware of the developmental nature of knowledge . .
.” “consider . . cultural significance and validity of past scientific explanations” .
. . “create bridges between the culture of science and the culture of humanities.” The
ten proficiencies can be highlighted with a few phrases: “make teaching congruent
with dynamic nature of science . . .” “. . . avoid final form science . . .” “ . . . avoid
treating all knowledge claims equally. . . ” “ . . . recognize difference between good
and bad science, pseudoscience and real science . . .” “facilitate changing flaws in
students’ intuitive thinking.”
Finally, ten “enablers” were developed based on the mission, goals and
proficiencies. These enablers are described in detail in the next section. Once
conceived, the enablers led this author to investigate current scientists, current
controversies, current media interpretations of science and the extent to which they
140 C. LOVING
can be explored using the tenets of the Scientific Theory Profile.

The ten enablers, along with the resulting sample concepts and activities
described below are not prioritized, but each has been selected because if carried out
by students it would support certain course goals and performance proficiencies.
Enablers with Concepts and Activities
1. Distinguish between philosophers’ assigned positions on the Scientific

Theory Profile and attempt to determine a comfortable position for yourself
(both at beginning and end of course).
Sample Concept :
a) How do various experts use the term theory, science, truth, rational,
explanation?
Sample Activities:
a) Using the Scientific Theory Profile and suggested readings, students become
expert on one philosopher and roleplay or debate some predetermined issue.
b) Students read Horwood (1988) who addresses the differences between
scientific explanations, teacher explanations and descriptions.
2. Describe, plot on the STP, and compare philosophical perspectives (stated

or implied) of various scientists based on the way they are presented in the
popular press. This strategy may also be applied to well-known science
educators.
Sample Concepts:
a) Compare the value placed on metaphysical, mystical, beliefs vs. knowledge.

b) Contrast their descriptions of rational, logical, and science or their views on
the nature of knowledge (epistemology), of reality (ontology) and that
relationship to pedagogy in science teaching.
c) Look for evidence of postmodern vs. Baconian modern science views in
descriptions of actual scientific work.
Sample Activities:
a) Compare descriptions by Hawking and Gould of why scientists resist certain

theory change; determine the degree to which these writers connect the
NATURE OF SCIENCE ACTMTES 141
emotional significance of certain theories to their power.

b) Have a debate on four views of the value of the mystical--Einstein, Hawking,
Medawar, Gould.
c) Determine to what extent consistency and symmetry are driving the scientific
fields you read about.
d) Invite local scientists, philosophers, or historians of science to join the class
in a discussion of one of more of the books recommended at the end of this
monograph or arrange a seminar with a panel of local experts serving to
answer questions the class provides ahead of time--based on what they
learned from their reading. (This author spoke with a well-respected
engineering professor who, when discussing the nature of science said, “You
know, biology isn’t a real science, don’t you?’).
e) Invite a group of local scientists in various fields to discuss the degree to
which techniques like meta-analysis are anti-theory or “indirect” versus
precise observation--like the French electron microscope which “sees” an
atom as small as two angstroms--is acceptable in their particular field; this
compares methods and aims in different disciplines.
f) Student groups read works on the nature of science from selected science
educators (e.g., Matthews, Duschl, Aikenhead, Brickhouse, Lederman,
Good) then attempt to plot these scholars on the STP and compare plots.
3. Analyze current scientific debates about quality of rival theories.
Sample Concepts:
a) Compare validation procedures, predictive power; look for language

distortion, social pressures, good vs. bad science, and quality of an
explanation.
Sample Activities:
a) Read the New York Times and other popular press summaries of debates,
then compare to peer reviewed scientific publications on debate issues; report
on which if either appears more philosophically valid.
Examples include:
Freud’s theories today--New York Times, 3/6/90, B5; 3/25/90, A18

Bellak’s theories on German aggression--New York Times, 4/25/90, A15;
5/10/90, A18;
Turco’s nuclear winter theory-- New York Times, 1/23/90, B5;
Nazi Data on hypothermia--New York Times, 5/17/90, A14;
142 C. LOVING
Kepler’s “fudged” data--New York Times, 1/23/90, B5; 2/13/90, A18;

Freeman’s vs. Mead’s vs. Geertz’s anthropological theories, Chronicle of
Higher Education, 8/2/89, A5; New York Times, 5/11/88, Y23;
Dinosaur Extinction Debate--New York Times, 1/15/88, B5; 1/19/88, B19;
Chronicle of Higher Education, 9/1/88, A5; New York Times, 8/15/89, B5;
Cold Fusion Debate -- Chronicle of Higher Education, 5/24/89, Al; New
York Times, 6/10/90;
Global Warming Theories-New York Times, 6/24/88, Al;
Antelman’s controversial drugs/brain theory--New York Times,
6/2 1/88,Y25;
Masters’ and Johnson’s AIDS Study--New York Times, 3/6/88, Y14.
4. Critically evaluate philosophical perspectives in texts and curriculum guides

in your field.
Sample Concepts:
a) Determine if science is presented as a process or a product, if it is

distinguished from technology, ifvarious disciplines of science are compared
at all for nature of methods, aims, or theories, or if historical, philosophical
or sociological aspects of science are apparent.
b) What is actually mentioned in the text or curriculum guide about the nature
of science versus implied or left for the reader to infer.
c) Determine if “final form science” is predominant in order to cover
everything.
Sample Activities:
a) Students design a philosophical checklist for use in evaluating texts and

curriculum guides with a criteria for judging.
b) Students examine current texts and/or teachers’ editions and curriculum
guides in their specialty to determine what classroom practice is encouraged
explicitly or implicitly.
c) Students read Hodson’s (1988) comments on the philosophically valid
curriculum and augment his suggestions with personal ideas.
5. Describe several current controversies related to the culture of science, rather

than to the formal propositions within particular disciplines.
Sample Concept :
a) Evaluate controversies related to the ability to make something truly random,

the issue of publication bias, gender bias in science, journal bias, the
militarization of science, and dishonesty among scientists.
Sample Activities:
a) Select from the articles listed below for discussion related to above concepts.
“The Quest for True Randomness Finally Appears Successful,” New York
Times, 4/18/88, Y23;
“They Had Reason to Be Humble” (a review of the book, The Launching of
Modern American Science 1846-1876), New York Times Book Review,
5/17/87, 26-27;
“Science Writing: Too Good to Be True?,” (shows how science writing, both
popular and professional, probably makes science look “far more precise and
reliable that it really is”), New York Times Book Review, 9/27/87, 1,45-47;
“Nobel Winner is Caught Up in a Dispute Over Study,” (controversy
surrounding Nobel Prize winner David Baltimore’s raw data versus his
published work), New York Times, 4/12/88, Y19, 24;
“Nova” Television Show on the Public Broadcasting System, “Do Scientists
Cheat?”;
“Scientists Must Demonstrate to Would-Be Regulators That They’re Capable
of Responsible Self-Regulation,’’ The Chronicle of Higher Education,
5/10/89, A44;
“Publication Bias Said to Skew Information in Medical Journals,” The
Chronicle of Higher Education (Research Notes Section) 1/4/89;
“A Flaw in the Research Process: Uncorrected Errors in Journals,” New
York Times, 5/3 1/88, Y21;
“Impossible Idea Published on Purpose,” New York Times, 6/30/88, Y9
(Biologists tell of a reaction between something and nothing--this was later
shown to be seriously flawed, but “science” fell for it as this article reveals);
“Two Critics of Science Revel in Their Role,” New York Times, 4/20/89,
23, 28 (Regarding two National Institutes of Health scientists whose job is
to weed out misconduct and error in science--have since lost their positions
and the office has been disbanded)
“Vast Sums for New Discoveries Pose a Threat to Basic Science,” New York
Times, 5/27/90, 1, 13 (highlights 18 big projects which will cost an estimated
$64 billion and the controversies surrounding their effect on the rest of
science--since then SSC has been abandoned and Congress has spoken
against that Big Science), New York Times Editorial, “Big Science, Little
Gain,” 6/24/90,20;
“Military Spending, the SDI, and Government Support of Research and
Development: Effects on the Economy and the Health of Science,” in Public
144 C. LOVING
Interest Report (Federation of American Scientists), 1987, Holdren & Green.

“Science’s Anti-Female Bias,” New York Times, 6/4/90, A19 (using the
example of all the reports showing effects of alcohol on pregnancy and what
the author terms the “pregnancy police,” she shows that our society is “drunk
on random bits of information wrested from scientific journals before the ink
has dried.”).
6. Elaborate on ways that informal science entities present a philosophical

perspective about science (planned or unplanned).
Sample Concepts:
a) Determine if science is portrayed as process, product or both at science

museum exhibits and in the media.
b) Evaluate media presentations of the role of scientific theories.
Sample Activities:
a) Students are assigned one video or television show related to the nature of
science to evaluate in terms of whether a clear philosophical perspective is
stated, is crafted but implicit, or is clearly unplanned. Examples are: Search
for Solutions (Phillips Petroleum), The Ascent of Man, (Jacob Bronowski’s
Public Television (PBS) series), Newton ’s Apple and Nova (both PBS TV
series), Cosmos (Carl Sagan’s video series), Ring of Truth (Phillip
Morrison’s PBS series depicting how we know what we know), and the
recent series bringing physics alive, Mechanical Universe.
b) Students design a “misconceptions” exhibit for younger children (can use the
Exploratorium Science Snackbook obtained from Exploratorium
Publications, 3601 Lynn, San Francisco, CA 94123 to get the “recipes” for
accurate exhibits, then can adjust them).
c) Students evaluate a museum known for its “hands-on” approach.
7. Relate current models of cognition to improved understanding of key

concepts, theory formation, and the developmental nature of science.
Sample Concepts:
a) Use concept maps to depict both accepted and erroneous theories (see Novak
1981, 1984, 1987).
b) Compare expert vs. novice methods of arriving at conceptual understanding
and depiction of theories.
c) Compare the history of a theory’s development and stages of common

misconceptions.
d) Compare the value of “less is better” related to material covered and notion
of situated cognition.
e) Compare the value of specific procedural knowledge and pedagogical content
knowledge in various domains.
Sample Activities:
a) Student uses Inquire computer program (Hawkins and Pea, 1987) to explore
their personal understanding in a weak scientific area; have partner who is
more expert in field act as teacher--get “steered” to expert.
b) Student draws a detailed concept map of a familiar theory, then compares to
drawing asked of volunteer experts.
c) Read Wandersee and Mintzes’ (1987) account of how the history of the
development of a theory (photosynthesis in this case) parallels stages of
cognitive misconceptions students go through; students could then do
historical study of another theory’s development (including the various
people’s work that contributed to the understanding) and compare it to
concept maps they draw (or have various novices draw).
d) Have guest scientist provide just enough of the relevant math and science
background for students to investigate several stages in the development of
a new, important theory in science to see the process involved and the
developmental nature of scientific knowledge. Example ideas include chaos
theory, string theory, and the punctuated equilibrium theory of evolution.
e) Students read key ideas regarding how to teach based on how students think.
Examples include Reif, 1986; Linn, 1987; Sherwood et al, 1987.
8. Analyze current topics that exemplify the limitations of scientific theories as

explanations of the human condition.
Sample Concepts:
a) Cosmology theories (which affect overall world view of a particular culture)

seem to change every few years and have since recorded history--showing
limitations of scientific theories.
b) Explanations of cell aging have provided many possible causes for aging and
have resulted in a number of medical breakthroughs related to cancer
treatments and other age-related afflictions. But the human species has had
the same life span (100-110 maximum) for over 25,000 years and none of
this knowledge has changed that.
146 C. LOVING
c) Social science theories about the causes of aggressive behavior in humans

have done little to lessen such behavior in our culture.
d) Scientific theories about the effects overpopulation has on so many aspects
of life have done little to lessen the problem in most developing countries.
e) Theories such as those describing the causes and effects of acid rain are so
politicized that they often lose their effectiveness.
Sample Activities:
a) Compare Hawking’s current theories of origin and patterns in the universe

with several others in the last twenty years.
b) Compare Ptolemy’s world view, Einstein’s world view, and the Navajo
Indian world view and the effect of a reigning world view on culture,
science, and theory choice (See Cobern, 1991).
c) Investigate the different theories on causes of certain life spans in different
species (i.e. 20 minutes for bacteria, 2,000 years for a Bristlecone pine tree);
determine which species do not “age,” the various theories on that process,
and try to connect to life span studies.
9. Critically evaluate a scientific idea which was once accepted and then shown
to be unsuccessful
Sample Concept :
a) Compare criteria for acceptance (through time) in various disciplines and

sub-disciplines in science (e.g., evolutionary biology versus taxonomy).
Sample Activities:
a) Students choose from a list of “failed theories and theorists (caloricists,

phlogistonists, Lamarck, Ptolemy etc.); try to evaluate the degree of the
“failure” of their theory (their method versus their luck, their timing, and the
reigning criteria for acceptance).
10. Describe the stages in the development of a successll scientific explanation.
Sample Concepts:
a) Evaluate serendipity vs. logic in science--to what extent are both necessary?
Distinguish between the logic of discovery and the logic of justification.
Read recent work of Beclitel (1993) describing varied, non-linear search
paths leading to discovery in science.
b) Determine possible sociological effects on theory choice, methods, aims.
Sample Activities:
a) Students design an interview questionnaire that would help uncover the

working philosophy of a living scientist, her/his theoretical “bedrock,”
degree of scientific community dependence etc.
b) Interview a living scientist who has developed a “revolutionary” theory (e.g.
John Archibald Wheeler, the “father” of black holes, Steven Weinberg, who
proposed the Weinberg-Salam unified theory of forces, or Stephen Jay Gould
and Nils Eldredge who developed the punctuated equilibrium theory of
evolution) to determine what they think the primary reasons for their
“theoretical success” were. John Wheeler, reminiscent of Newton’s
comment about standing on the shoulders of giants, once told my class that
he believed a long chain of mentors probably led up to all great scientists,
and that someone ought to write a book about it. Students then read a few
of the publications related to that scientist’s theory over a span of time,
looking for evidence of change, process, and re-appraisal. Students compare
their results with each other to see if new or common information emerges.
CONCLUSIONS
The goal of this chapter has been to provide activities that can develop better
conceptual understanding of the nature of science for prospective and experienced
science teachers, as well as graduate students who will become science teacher
educators. The ultimate intent is not for science teachers to go into the classroom
and teach the Scientific Theory Profile to fourth, seventh, ninth or even twelfth
graders. The intent is for teachers to profit from this exposure, to use their texts and
curriculum guides more judiciously, and to give their students some opportunities to
read about and do real science. In addition, their students are more likely to meet
real scientists or historians and philosophers of science, and to spend more time on
less material to discover how this knowledge came to be and just how “human” are
the people who have constructed this picture of nature.
There are several examples which illustrate how this exposure has helped
students. I have used some of these activities while teaching two courses--one an
existing graduate course on science curriculum, the other a special problems course
on the nature of science and science teaching. One slightly resistant graduate student
with a master’s degree in geology and twenty years teaching in community college
described his learning as “opening doors I never knew existed.” Another physics
teacher was able to view his summer work at the Los Alamos labs in New Mexico as
an opportunity to do a little of what Giere did in a cyclotron--watch and record how
148 C. LOVING
scientists do what they do--and then compare his first hand experience with what he
had read. Two master science teachers said they understood much better the unique
attributes of each others’ disciplines--physics and biology--so as to be in a better
position to highlight and maintain the uniqueness while encouraging integration of
disciplines where appropriate. Creating course work in this area has encouraged me
to hold discussions with philosophers and historians of science on our campus, and
to explore ways to encourage graduate students from departments such as
Educational Psychology as well as the Colleges of Science, Geosciences and
Agriculture to come over to the Curriculum and Instruction Department for a few
lessons on the nature of science.
In some ways the goals for students involved in these nature of science activities
are similar to those of Steven Shapin and Philip Kitcher when they launched a new
science studies program at the University of California, San Diego about six years
ago. In an interview Shapin described his desire to “make science a glass box instead
of a black box. . .” (Raymond, 1990, A7). Providing students with an opportunity
to see science in new and deeper ways is critical to their development as science
educators.
Texas A&M University CoIIege Station, Texas, USA
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I wish to acknowledge a debt to philosopher Ronald Giere (1988) whose suggestions

gave me the idea for the development of the Scientific Theory Profile (STP) (Loving,
1990, 1991, 1992), the heuristic device which provides a framework for many of the
activities described in this chapter.
REFERENCES
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research, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
Cobern, W.W. (1991) . World view theory and science education research, (National Association for
Research in Science Teaching, Monograph 3. Manhattan, KS, National Association for Research in
ScienceTeaching.
Duschl, R.A. (1990). Restructuring science education: The importance of theories and their development,
Hawkins, J & Pea, R. D. (1987) . ‘Tools for bridging the cultures of everyday and scientific thinking’,
Journal of Researchin Science Teaching, (24), 29 1-307.
Hodson, D. (1988). ‘Toward a philosophically more valid science curriculum’, Science Education, (72),
19-40.
Horwood, R.H. (1988). ‘Explanation and description in science teaching’, Science Education, (72), 41-49.
research’, Journal of Researchin Science Teaching, (29), 33 1-359.
Linn, M.C. (1987). ‘Establishing a research base for science education: Challenges, trends, and
recommendations’, Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 24,191-216.
Loving, C.C. (1990). ‘Current models in philosophy of science: Their application in science teacher
education’, Dissertation Abstracts International, 51-10, 3376A. (University Microfilms No. 9145,603).
Loving, C.C. (1991). ‘The scientiftc theory profile: A philosophy of science model for science teachers’,
Loving, C.C. (1992) . ‘From constructive realism to deconstructive anti-realism: Helping science teachers
find a balanced philosophy ofscience’, Proceedings of the Second International Conference on History
and Philosophy of Science in Science Education, Kingston, Ontario, Queens University Press.
Novak, J. (1981). ‘Applying learning psychology and philosophy of science to biology teaching’, The
American Biology Teacher, (43), 12-20,
Novak, J. (1984). ‘Applications of advances in learning theory and philosophy of science to the improvement
of chemistry teaching’, Journal of Chemical Education, (61), 607-613.
Novak, J. (1987, July). Human constructivism: Toward a unity of psychological and epistemological
meaning making, paper presented at the Second Intemational Seminar on Misconceptions and Educational
Strategies in Science and Mathematics Education, Ithaca, NY.
Raymond, C. (1990, May 9). ‘Scholars take a new approach in studyingthe institution of science’, Chronicle
of Higher Education, A7.
Reif, F. (1986). ‘Scientific approaches to science education’, Physics Today, 49.
Sherwood, R.D., Kinzer, C.K., Bransford, J.D., & Franks, J.J. (1987). ‘Some benefits of creating
macro-contexts for science instruction: Initial findings’, Journal of Research in Science Teaching, (24),
41 7-435.
Wandersee, J.H. & Mintzes J.J. (1987, July). A bibliography of research on students’ conceptual
development in the life sciences, paper presented at the Second International Seminar on Misconceptions
and Educational Strategies in Science and Mathematics, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.
APPENDIX A: SOURCES FOR SCIENTIFIC THEORY PROFILE DEVELOPMENT
Barnes, B., & Edge, D. (1982). Science in context: Readings in the sociology ofscience, Cambridge, MIT
Press.
Feyerabend, P.K. (1975). Against method: Outline of an anarchistic theory of knowledge, London, NLB.
Giere, R.N. (1988). Explaining science: A cognitive approach, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press.
Glymour, C. (1980). Theory and evidence. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
Hempel, C. (1965). Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays in the philosophy of science, New
York, The Free Press.
Hempel, C. (1966). Philosophy of natural science, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall.
Hempel, C. (1974). ‘Formulation and formalization of scientific theories’, in F. Suppe (ed.), The structure
of scientific theories), Urbana, IL, University of Illinois Press, 244-265.
Holton, G. (1978). The scientific imagination: Case studies, London, Cambridge University Press.
Holton, G. (1986). The advancement of science and its burdens: The Jefferson lectures and other essays,
London, Cambridge University Press.
Kuhn, T.S. (1970a). ‘Logic of discovery or psychology of research’, in I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (eds.),
Criticism and the growth of knowledge, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1-22.
Kuhn, T.S. (1970b). The structure of scientific revolutions. (2nd ed..), Chicago, The University of Chicago.
Kuhn, T.S. (1974). ‘Second thoughts on paradigms’, in F. Suppe (ed.), The structure of scientific theories.
Urbana, IL, University of Illinois Press, 459-482.
Kuhn, T.S. (1977). The essential tension, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.
Lakatos, 1. (1970). ‘Falsitication and the methodology of scientific research programs’, in I. Lakatos & A.
Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the growth of knowledge, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
91-196.
Laudan, L. (1977). ‘Progress and its problems’, Berkeley, The University of California Press.
Laudan, L. (1984). Science and values, Berkeley, The University of California Press.
Popper, K. (1959). The logic of scientific discovery, London, Hutchinson.
150 C. LOVING
Popper, K. (1965) Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge (2nd ed.), New York,
Basic Books.
Popper, K. (1983). Realism and the aim of science, Totowa, NJ, Rowman and Littlefield.
Shapere, D. (1974). ‘Scientific theories and their domains’, in F. Suppe (ed.), The structure of scientific
theories , Urbana, The University of Illinois Press, 5 18600.
Shapere, D. (1982, March ). ‘The concept ofobservation in science and philosophy’, Philosophy of Science,
1-23.
Shapere, D. (1984). Reason and the search for knowledge: Investigations in the philosophy of science,
Dordrecht,Holland, Reidel.
Toulmin, S. (1961). Foresight and understanding. Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press.
Toulmin, S. (1982). ‘The construal ofreality: Criticism inmodem and post-modemscience’, Critical Inquiry,
(9), 93-1 11.
FRED JANSEN AND PETER VOOGT
8. LEARNING BY DESIGNING
A CASE OF HEURISTIC DIRECTED THEORY
DEVELOPMENT IN SCIENCE TEACHTNG
In teaching, science is often presented as a black box. Students are typically

confronted with only the results of scientific research. They are not given any insight
into what is actually happening in the black box which is the often tedious process
of formulating and testing theories. Science presented in this way, characterized by
Joseph Schwab (1962) as the “rhetoric of conclusions,” can easily lead students to
an incorrect image of both the products and processes of scientific research. Students
typically consider theories not as provisional solutions to problems, but rather as
facts that are simply gathered from nature by scientists.
OPENING THE BLACK BOX
How can we give students a more adequate and complete picture of science? In order
to do this, the black box must be opened to provide students with an insight into how
a theory is developed and on what grounds it is accepted or rejected. This can be
achieved by telling them about theory development (through autobiographies,
scientific papers, etc.), but better still is to allow students to participate themselves
in the process of theory development. This assignment is not an easy one for the
teacher. In the typical classroom it is the teacher’s responsibility simply to explain
the theory and subsequently test to see if students understand it. On the other hand,
allowing students to participate in theory development, the teacher must first teach
students how to formulate problems, how to create possible solutions and how to test
these solutions. In this chapter, we will discuss the content and framework of a
course in which teachers learn how to help students participate in the process of
theory development.
We will first ascertain what we mean by theory development. On the basis of two
lesson fragments we will illustrate and describe our view of theory development. The
concept of a heuristic (search strategy) is central to this discussion. Such heuristics
can generally be derived from the basic principles of a discipline and are thus
specific to a particular discipline. We have developed a heuristic for teaching
biology. We have called this heuristic a “design heuristic” because pupils use it to
develop theories related to various biological systems by designing them from scratch
— learning by designing.
151
© 1998 KluwerAcademic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
152 F. JANSEN AND P. VOOGT
Next we will describe how a teacher can prepare and supervise the process of
heuristic directed theory development. Then, we consider how teachers can reflect
on the premises and method of theory development together with the students.
Preparation, supervision and reflection on theory development are illustrated using
several examples from biology education. Finally, we focus on the effectiveness of
our approach.
THEORY DEVELOPMENT
We will illustrate our conception of theory development by referring to two lesson

fragments (Table I). In the first fragment, pupils are taught a theory in a traditional
manner. In the second, pupils actually participate in developing the theory. The
lessons are in biology with specific focus on the immune system. The pupils are in
their final year of a high level, secondary school, biology course. The teacher has
given a short introduction on bacteria and viruses before both lessons.
Table I
Lesson fragments illustrating two instructional strategies
Lesson Fragment 1 : Typical instructional discourse
Teacher: White blood cells are responsible for eliminating bacteria and viruses.
There are three types of white blood cells. I shall begin with the
macrophages. Who thinks he knows what the word macrophage means?
Joost: Doesn’t macro mean big?
Teacher: Exactly. Macro means big and phage means an eater - a big eater, in other
words! When a macrophage encounters a bacterium, it envelops the
bacterium and subsequently digests it. We call this process phagocytosis.
Where do you think that we can find this macrophage in the body?
Anja: In the blood - you just said that they are white blood cells!
Cees: I think near the skin that is where the bacteria enter the body.
Teacher: You are both correct actually. Macrophages can be found in blood, but also
in tissues where bacteria enter the body, such as skin and lungs.
Lesson Fragment 2: Discourse leading to theory development
Teacher: We now know that bacteria and viruses can be harmful. How can a
bacterium or virus be rendered harmless?
Klaas: With a sort of stabbing cell. This could stab through the bacterium.
Marjon: But then you still haven’t got rid of the bacterium.
LEARNING BY DESIGNING 153
Teacher: What do you mean?

Marjon: Toxic substances inside the bacterium will be released. You will get sick.
Teacher: Very good. Has anyone a solution to this problem?
Carla: You have little gobbling cells in the body and they just gobble up the
bacteria whenever they come across them.
Joop: No, that can’t be correct - that type of cell would also gobble up your own
body cells.
Teacher: Exactly. Devouring a bacterium is much better than just bursting it open.
There are in fact such “gobbling” cells in the body. They are called
macrophages. But we still have the problem that Joop has mentioned. How
do you prevent a macrophage ingesting the body’s own cells and
substances?
In both lessons pupils receive instruction on macrophage function and solve a

number of problems. Yet, there are important differences. In lesson fragment one,
the pupils are first given information about the macrophage theory, subsequently
students are presented with a problem. In order to solve the problem of where the
macrophages can be found, students are required to apply the knowledge they have
just acquired.
In lesson fragment two, the sequence of events is reversed. The teacher begins by
introducing a problem (how can pathogens be rendered harmless?). Pupils devise a
trial hypothesis for this problem (such as a stabbing or gobbling cell). The solutions
are evaluated by the pupils and any errors in the hypothesis are identified (stabbing
cell is not an option because of the release of toxic substances). This error
elimination results in an adjustment of the proposed solution (not a stabbing cell but
gobbling cell) and in the formulation of a new problem (how do you prevent the
gobbling cell eating your own body’s cells?). Finally, the teacher presents a part of
the scientifically-accepted theory (in this case, the macrophage).
The lesson fragments are represented schetnatically in the following diagrams:
Lesson Fragment 1: Theory (T) Problem (P) [T P]

Lesson Fragment 2: Problem (P) Hypothesis (H) Error Elimination
(EE) Problem (P) [P H EE P]
The first lesson represents a structure that figures prominently in traditional

natural science education (Kuhn, 1977; Schwab, 1962). The explanatory theory is
taught first, and subsequently the pupils apply their newly acquired knowledge to
solving problems. The science historian Thomas Kuhn refers to the former not as
problems but as puzzles since a solution to the problem (the theory) has already been
given to the pupils, albeit in a broad outline. This advance knowledge would affect
students’ future consideration of the problems. Using this instructional method,
pupils are introduced to the theory and its applications but do not learn how the
theory originated and on what grounds it was evaluated.
In the second lesson we can recognize several important aspects of hypothetical
deductivism, in the form characterized by Karl Popper (1972). Theory development
begins with a problem, for which a hypothesis is formulated. This hypothesis is
subsequently tested to identify and eliminate inherent errors. This process leads to
a provisional acceptance, a modification or a rejection of the hypothesis and often to
new problems. The fruitfulness of a hypothesis is tested against a preconceived
criterion (in this case, minimal disadvantages for the rest of the organism). In
science, a hypothesis will, of course, also be tested empirically. In this case,
observable predictions are deduced from the hypotheses, and tested. The major defect
of Popper’s scheme is that no attention is paid to the generation of hypotheses, a
central issue in the model discussed here.
HEURISTIC-DIRECTED THEORY-DEVELOPMENT
During the past twenty-five years, Herbert Simon has developed a scheme of
scientific discovery that draws on his own and others’ problem-solving research (see
Langley, 1987). In his plan, scientists are seen as searching in an enormous problem
space consisting of all possible solutions for the problem at hand. There are at least
two search methods one can use. One can conduct trial and error searches or one can
use an appropriate heuristic. Such heuristics serve as quick and effective ways of
generating problem solutions by reducing the size of the set of possible solutions one
needs to test.
To illustrate the role of heuristics in problem solving, consider an example put
forward by Langley et al. (1987). If a safe has 10 dials numbered 0 to 99 and it will
open when all the dials are set correctly, than it will take, on average, 50 billion
billion (½ x 10010) trials to open it. However if one knows that each dial emits a faint
click when it is turned to the correct setting one can open the safe with only 500 (½
x 1010) trials. In this case, the heuristic could be expressed as the rule “if you detect
a click when turning a dial, then leave the dial on the setting that produced the
click.” This example illustrates the need for information about the problem domain
for the construction of useful heuristics. The trouble with most scientific problems
is that specific information about the problem domain is lacking. In fact, when we
propose to investigate a given subject that is to say that we are, in large part, ignorant
of it. So what kind of information is available for the construction of heuristics?
The science philosopher Imre Lakatos (1978) has shown that heuristics can be
adopted from very general hypotheses about the research object (the so-called hard
core). Consider the usefulness of the following hypotheses:
atoms are very small particles that cannot be further divided or changed (the
atomic programme)
gasses are composed of moving molecules (the kinetic programme)
organisms have certain characteristics that function in the maintenance and
reproduction of the organism (the functional programme)
Such general hypotheses generate problems and lend direction to the formulation
of more specific hypotheses (see Schwab, 1962). Dalton’s atom concept, for example,
allowed chemists to pose a question on how the realignment of particles takes place
following a given reaction. The kinetic programme allowed physicists to explain
phenomena such as pressure and temperature in terms of the movement of molecules.
We can convert these very broad ideas into powerful heuristics, which in turn can
assist students with formulating problems and hypotheses. We have developed such
a heuristic for biology education based on the broad idea of function.
Our biology education heuristic is based on the simple idea that we can accrue
knowledge of a functioning system (biological or man made), by redesigning the
system from scratch (Jansen & Voogt, 1995; Dennett, 1995). In this manner we can
discover the function of each part of the system and how this function is carried out
(see the final section where we discuss the differences between biological and man
made systems). Our design heuristic allows students to design a biological system
from scratch (see Table 2).
TABLE II
The design heuristic
1. What is the function of the system as a whole?

2. Reformulate this function in a problem.
3. Devise a simple solution for this problem.
4. Consider what could be a disadvantage of this solution.
5. Reformulate this disadvantage in a problem.
6. Go back to step three.
Table 3 offers an example of the design heuristic in action. A student teacher uses
the heuristic to design several components of the immune system. An immunology
textbook is used to control the devised solutions. Textbook definitions are printed in
italics.
TABLE III
The design heuristic in action
Function: To destroy invading pathogens

Problem Solution Disadvantage
1. How can 1. By an “eating cell” that 1. It can also ingest its
pathogens (bacteria ingests viruses and bacteria own body cells and
and viruses) be (macrophage) material.
rendered harmless?
2. How can a 2a. Recognition of self (own 2a. Bacteria can imitate
distinction be made body cells): the host’s own cells the label, and
between self (the carry a label on their surface that Ifthe receptor on the
body’s own cells) can be bound by macrophages macrophage changes, then
and non-self (via a receptor); once the the cell will fail to
(pathogens)? macrophage has been bound, the recognize self(its own
cells will not be ingested. cell and material). This
is fatal (X).
2b. Recognition of the pathogen; 2b. Bacteria and viruses

the pathogen carries its own all carry different
specific label (antigen). If the antigens for which
macrophage’s receptor binds to corresponding receptors
this antigen then the pathogen must be made.
will be ingested.
3. How can a
different receptor be
made for every
antigen?
PREPARING HEURISTIC-DIRECTED
THEORY DEVELOPMENT
The teaching situation which we hope to encourage begins with theory development
which must start with the initial situation (prior knowledge and interests) given to
-
the students and via successive problem solving steps (P1 H1 - EE1 - P2 etc.).
Students gradually arrive at the accepted scientific theory. It is clear that when we
allow the students to follow their instincts, there is a significant chance that each
student will follow different problem solving routes and that many will not arrive at
the accepted scientific theory. The teacher must therefore decide, prior to the lesson,
which problems and what order for those problems will be presented. We call such
a sequence of problems a problem-structure.
The problem structure can be developed in two steps. First, the teacher formulates
problems and hypotheses using the design heuristic (see Table II). Designing a
biological system in this manner provides us with a starting point for developing a
problem structure. The problems that can arise are set out in Table III. Second, this
problem structure, based on the teachers’ background knowledge and interests, must
be adapted to the background knowledge and interests of the students. To do so for
every problem we must determine if the students want to solve the problem and if the
students able to formulate and evaluate a hypothesis for this problem.
The first question compels us to ensure that the first problem to be solved concur
with the global interests of the students. We must offer a problem situation that
students cannot immediately answer with their background knowledge but have the
willingness to do so. The question as to how pathogens can be rendered harmless
is only interesting and relevant for students when they know what damage bacteria
and viruses can cause and how difficult it is to keep these pathogens outside our
body. When the first problem has been formulated, we can use as a rule of thumb,
the notion that the formulation of the next problem must arise from the evaluation
of the solutions that the students had devised for solving the aforementioned first
problem. In lesson fragment two (Table 1) we see how the evaluation of the
“gobbling cell” hypothesis leads to a new problem: how can it be prevented that the
“gobbling cell” also destroys the body’s own cells and substances. In this way, every
problem prepares the student for the following problem and students experience the
process of theory development as a process which they themselves had guided by
posing relevant questions.
The second question compels us to consider how big the steps are between the
problems. We must continually strive to place ourselves in the position of the student
and ask: Can students, possessing the background knowledge that they do at that
moment, devise a solution by themselves for the given problem, and can they
critically evaluate this solution? Let us once again consider the problem: How can
we ensure that a “gobbling cell” does not also destroy the body’s own cells and
substances? A “gobbling cell” solves this problem by having receptors specific for
substances foreign to the body. Once the foreign substances have reacted with the
receptors, they are subsequently ingested and destroyed. Pupils from the last two
years of secondary school education, higher level, cannot formulate such a problem
in one step. We need to split the problem into subproblems. For example, we need
to ask how a “gobbling cell” can recognize a foreign component? It must be able to
recognize what it ingests. Other problems include the question of how a “gobbling
cell” can recognize a foreign component by feeling? A “gobbling cell” can “feel”
something by using receptors. We can ask which type of receptor does a “gobbling
cell” need to ensure it does not ingest its own body components? There are specific
receptors for foreign components. We must, therefore, make the steps between the
problems big enough to allow students to independently bridge the gap between
problem and solution.
ASSISTING STUDENTS WITH HEURISTIC DIRECTED

THEORY DEVELOPMENT
When a problem structure has been developed, we can supervise the pupils during
the development of the theory. Using the following example, we will demonstrate
how this works in practice. In the lesson fragment provided below, the following
problem is discussed with pupils in their final year of secondary school: How can it
be prevented that a “gobbling cell” (macrophage) ingests the body’s own material?
The pupils have already discovered that recognition is necessary and that recognition
takes place by way of receptors. They are now faced with the problem as to with
which set of receptors a distinction can be made between self and foreign or non-self.
The following lesson fragment illustrates this point.
TABLE IV
A lesson fragment
Teacher: So, the question is: How can a macrophage ensure that it ingests foreign
material and not material from the body?
The pupils write down their solutions on worksheets.
Teacher: May I have a look?

Marjon: I don’t really know how to write it down. You can’t have receptors for things
that you already have in your body, otherwise you’ll get them. Therefore, you
must have receptors for material foreign to the body. I’m afraid I can’t go any
deeper than that.
Teacher: That’s O.K. You don’t have to.
Mischa: But is it not so that every time a new bacterium comes along, a new receptor
is necessary?
Teacher: Yes, very good. Write that down as a disadvantage of this solution. Joost, do
you have another possible solution?
Joost: Well, its in fact the same. The white blood cells - macrophages, or whatever
they’re called, only possess receptors for foreign material, and not for the
body’s own material. So it’s actually exactly the same as what she has
written down.
Crista: Yes, it is.
Mischa: Yes, but what if a new bacterium comes along that you don’t know yet?
Teacher: Yes, we will discuss that later. First, I want to propose a simpler solution.
You have all said: “Make receptors for foreign material.” If a macrophage
recognizes a foreign antigen, it will ingest it. Now, I have a more simple
solution.
In the lesson described above the following methodology was used:
1. The teacher introduced the problem.
2. Students, individually or in groups, are given the assignment to devise one

or more hypotheses and their possible disadvantages. They write these
hypotheses in their notebooks. Students are given certain elements from the
heuristic, in this case: look for the simplest possible solution to the problem
-- the one with the lowest number of disadvantages for the rest of the
organism.
3. The teacher then, together with the students, makes an inventory of all
hypotheses students devised and their possible disadvantages. This is then
evaluated. This evaluation of the hypotheses often leads to new hypotheses.
In cases where the students come up with a solution that does not occur with
the accepted scientific solution, the teacher can give hints to help them
along. The teacher may also introduce incorrect alternative hypotheses, to
stimulate students into critical evaluation of their own hypotheses. At this
stage of making inventories and evaluation, the teacher must ensure that all
pupils remain working on the same problem.
4. The teacher then presents the scientifically-accepted solution to the problem

(this step has not been included in the lesson fragment above). Eventually,
we can give the pupils some problems to which they can apply their newly
acquired knowledge. The teacher then reformulates the disadvantage
inherent to this solution into a new problem (See step 1).
REFLECTING ON HEURISTIC DIRECTED THEORY DEVELOPMENT
When students themselves participate in theory development, it offers a good

opportunity to pupils to reflect on the nature of science. To illustrate this point we
will show here how we can stimulate pupils to reflect on the true nature of biological
systems and the consequences for the method of theory development. Using the
method of teaching by designing, students regularly fonnulate a solution that appears
to be “better” (i.e., simpler and with fewer disadvantages) than the “correct” (i.e.,
scientifically accepted) solution. When, in this case, the teacher proceeds with the
“correct” solution, the pupils respond by saying, “But I thought my solution was
better?’ This question allows us to reflect on the aim of theory development in
biology. The aim is more fully to understand an existing biological system and not
(as in technology) to design the best system.
We can then pose the following question to students: Why shouldn’t biological
systems always be optimal? This question refers to the historical beginnings of
biological systems. We generally expect from a good design (such as a watch) that
it has been assembled with a clear purpose, by a designer. However, Charles Darwin
has shown that a designer is not strictly necessary for the existence of biological
systems (Dawkins, 1986). Biological designs can originate through a process of
natural selection. This process of inheritable mutation and selection generally leads
to good designs. This process is, however, also responsible for the multitude of less
than optimal characteristics of biological systems (Gould and Lewontin, 1979).
Think, for example, of the fact that light must first pass four layers of neurons before
reaching the photoreceptor in the eye. One of the reasons for this is that evolution,
as opposed to technology, does not begin with a clean slate. Variations are always
based on existing structures and this imposes restrictions. The inefficient position of
our photoreceptor is probably an inheritance from the period when primitive
chordates lived in muddy soil. When we have established that biological systems
cannot always be considered as an optimal design, this can lead to the following
question by students: “If we know that biological systems are not always optimally
designed, why is this assumption such a central point in theory development?’ Using
this question, we can explain the heuristic function of this assumption. By accepting
that all components have been optimally adapted to fulfil a certain function, we can
trace the components and their associated functions. If we do not work from this
assumption, then we cannot even begin our research. If a certain component has not
been optimally adapted, we can discover this using the same assumption. In this case,
however, we will have to adjust our assumption for this component.
TEACHING ABOUT HEURISTIC-DIRECTED THEORY-DEVELOPMENT
Heuristic-directed theory-development is a teaching-approach demanding much both

of teachers and students. The following fragment of a conversation between four
teachers who have explored this strategy is illustrative. Patricia and Frank have
already applied the learning by designing strategy in their own classrooms, but Peter
and Petra have not. Frank and Patricia are enthusiastic about learning by designing.
This approach corresponds with their view of teaching. Peter and Petra are still
reserved. They still use the traditional approach; they instruct the theory and the
students apply it.
TABLE V
A lesson fragment
Patricia: I’ve applied learning by designing in teaching immunology. I’ve also

applied it at other occasions. After teaching photosynthesis I asked them:
Now we have to find something to prevent the plant from losing too much
water. Well, they devised very creative solutions. Andnot in the first place
the stomata.
Petra: No, really?
Patricia: In fact, you can use it whenever you talk about form and function.
Peter: But isn’t it time-consuming?
Patricia: Well, it turned out better than expected. And now I have the feeling that
they actually think about the subject.
Peter: Yes, that could be.
Frank: And in addition you make it very clear to them. I remember that you
(Patricia: F. J.) told me enthusiastically about the lesson in kidney
working. Students first invented filtration but then realized the same time
that the nutrients were lost. So they have to be pumped back. This is just
an example.
Patricia: While in former lessons they couldn’t imagine what resorption meant.
Frank: No, exactly. And now they do.
Patricia: They remember it better.
Frank: They remember it better and put it in a bigger context. And it is, let me put
it this way, a pleasant surprise for them. Yes, now I’m exaggerating a
little, but they really like playing with ideas.
Petra: Yes, but Frank, I understand that you already worked a little bit like this.
You didn’t instruct so much, did you?
Peter: Therefore it must be easier for you.
Frank: Well, I was glad to get an impulse in the opposite direction at last.
Although I already preferred the attitude: “Keep your mouth shut until they
don’t know any more.”
Patricia: Yes, but now they have to think more than they used to do. One can say:
we have always demanded more of our students. But how often are you
instructing anyway, while they don’t think about it.
For teachers who are not used to letting students think for themselves, we advise
implementing learning by designing gradually. To assist in this process, we offer
some suggestions below:
It is not easy to develop a problem structure for complex systems such as the
immune-system. Therefore, it’s better to let students design parts of a system
first. In order to design stomata we can pose the problem; how can the plant
prevent itself from losing water (see Patricia)?
The teacher has to compare and evaluate alternative solutions in the

design-approach. When students come up with a lot of alternative solutions,
this is not an easy task. Therefore, it’s advisable to keep the number of
solutions limited. For instance, the teacher can present a restricted number
of solutions to choose from. It is also possible to break the problems into
subproblems to limit the possible solutions. Of course, the teacher could also
pose problems to the class and decide which the students are to address.
Finally, many problems can be prevented by preparing the lessons well.

Think especially about the solutions which students could give and how they
relate to the scientifically accepted solutions.
The following is a list of topics and problems that could be explored by

students using the design strategy. How:
to transmit signals to individual target cells (transmission along

neurons)
to maintain a relatively constant body temperature (thermoregulation)
to pump the blood out of the heart (ventricles)
plants absorb light (chlorophyll) and/or make food (photosynthesis)
mammals exchange oxygen and carbon dioxide (lungs)
to ventilate the lungs (negative pressure breathing)
University of Utrecht, The Netherlands
REFERENCES
Dawkins, R. (1986). The blind watchmaker, Harlow, Longman.

Dennett, D.C. (1995). Darwin’s dangerous idea, New York, Simon & Schuster.
Gould, S.J. & Lewontin, R. (1979). ‘The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian paradigm. A critique
ofthe adaptionist programme’, Proc. R. Soc. London, 205, 581-598.
Janssen, F. & Voogt, P.A. (1995). ‘Learningby designing in biological education’, in F. Finley and D. Alchin
(eds.), Proceedings of the Third History, Philosophy and Science Teaching Conference, University of
Minnesota, Minneapolis, 557-563.
Klaassen, C. (1995). A problem-posing approach to teaching the topic of radioactivity, Utrecht, Centrum
for Science and Mathematics Education Press.
Kuhn, T. (1977). The essential tension: Tradition and innovation on scientific research, Chicago,
Univetsity of Chicago Press.
Lakatos, I. (1978). ‘Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes’, in J. Worrall & G.
Currie (eds.), The methodology of scientific research programmes. Vol I. Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press., 8-93.
Langley, P., Simon, H, Bradshaw, G. & Zytkow, J.M. (1987). Scientific discovey, Cambridge, MA, MIT.
Popper, K.R. (1972). Objective knowledge, Oxford, Claredon Press.
Schwab, J.J. (1964). ‘The teaching of science as enquiry’, in The Teaching of science, Cambridge, MA,
Harvard University Press.
KAREN R. DAWKINS AND ALLAN A. GLATTHORN
9. USING HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES IN BIOLOGY TO

EXPLORE THE NATURE OF SCIENCE: A PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR HIGH SCHOOL TEACHERS
This chapter provides a discussion of a strategy to meet North Carolina’s new nature
of science objectives. In an attempt to bridge the gap between the state mandate and
teachers’ resources, an inservice pilot project was designed involving eight biology
teachers from three high schools in a predominantly rural county. For purposes of
evaluation, eight biology teachers from different high schools in the same district
served as a control group in assessing the impact of the program on teachers’
understandings of the nature of science.
DESCRIPTION OF THE PLAN
Key Considerations
Two major considerations influenced the design and implementation of the project,
including knowledge of the general criteria for effective professional development
programs (Fullan & Steigelbauer, 1991; Sparks & Loucks-Horsley, 1990) and
appropriate choices for instructional strategies and content. Decisions based on
exemplary practices in professional development included recognition of teachers’
time limitations in scheduling sessions; provision of opportunities for teachers to
develop instructional materials for use in their classrooms using available resources;
providing models of appropriate teaching strategies; and personal encouragement
through the instructor’s classroom visits. The decisions regarding the content and
delivery focused on connecting selected issues related to the nature of science with
biology content topics through historical cases, a strategy that has been
recommended for use with students at both the high school and college level (Arons,
1988; Bentley & Garrison, 1991; Wandersee, 1985).
Project Design and Scheduling Considerations
Beginning with the considerations mentioned above, a detailed plan was developed
to focus on a narrow range of issues, conforming to the time restrictions necessarily
imposed on an after-school project. The nature of science program consisted of eight
163
164 K. DAWKINS AND A. GLA’ITHORN
two-hour sessions scheduled over a four-month period during the spring semester.
Although the instructor determined a starting date and ending date, a timetable for
the other sessions was determined in consultation with the participants at the first
meeting. The raised schedule included a four-week interval between Session 7 and
Session 8 to permit classroom visits by the instructor during implementation efforts.
Each session began half an hour after school closed so that participants could travel
from outlying schools to the workshop site.
Selection of Topics
The scope of the content focused on the most critical aspects of the nature of science
for these particular teachers. Three criteria guided the topic selection task: issues
naturally embedded in historical cases in biology; nature of science misconceptions
targeted in the literature; and nature of science topics included in North Carolina’s
statewide curriculum. Historical cases in biology logically lent themselves to
considerations of interactions between scientists (both antagonistic and collegial), the
progression of scientific thinking related to particular theories, and the influence of
personal and community values on scientists’ thinking. The literature on
misconceptions suggested the inclusion of topics such as the objectivity of scientists
(Duschl, 1994; Longino, 1983; Zoller, Donn, Wild, & Beckett, 1991), the nature of
scientific methodologies (Gallagher, 1991), the tentativeness of scientific knowledge
(Horner and Rubba, 1978), and distinctions between facts, hypotheses, theories, and
laws (Homer & Rubba, 1979; Lorsbach, 1992). North Carolina’s Standard Course
of Study for Science (1994) addressed five topics within its nature of science
competency goal: the public nature of science, the historic nature of science, the
replicability of scientific work, the tentativeness of scientific knowledge, and the
probabilistic nature of scientific data. Except for the subject of probability, these
components reflected issues appearing in historical cases and in the misconceptions
literature.
A synthesis of the information resulted in the selection of the following topics:
scientific methodologies; tentativeness of scientific knowledge, including the public
nature of science (the role of the scientific community in confirmation/rejection of
ideas) and the historical development of science; and the nature and role of theories,
including theories as inventions, the role of theories in limiting objectivity of
scientists, and distinctions between facts, hypotheses, theories, and laws.
Since it takes historians and philosophers of science decades of study to derive
generalizations about the nature of science from the historical evidence, it is
unrealistic to expect teachers or students to develop profound understandings from
a necessarily limited exposure to the world of science. For that reason, the project
included readings and discussions related to the selected issues before the teachers
began their research into historical cases in biology. In essence, the historical studies
USING HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES 165
in biology provided evidence to confirm or refute generalizations from the current

literature on the history and philosophy of science, emphasizing that the views on the
nature of science are themselves tentative. Ideas about the nature of science have
changed through history, and even current philosophers and historians of science are
not necessarily in agreement on every issue. Resources used by the instructor to
prepare discussion topics are listed in Appendix A. In general, the books were used
as a source for the preparation of a background paper by the instructor for the
teachers, summarizing major ideas from the philosophy of science. The articles were
copied and distributed to the teachers. Assigned as out of class readings, the
background paper and the articles provided a basis for discussion as well as resources
for the teachers in preparation of their instructional units.
Model lesson
Addressing the nature of science through historical cases was a new approach for the
teachers; therefore, the instructor presented a model lesson to illustrate one way to
connect biology content with nature of science issues. With cell theory as the biology
content focus, the lesson used the strategy of a dramatization with a narrator and
characters from history whose work contributed to our modem ideas about cells as
the structural and functional basis of organisms. In their assigned roles, the teachers
read from a script written by the instructor (see Appendix B) which recounted major
historical events from the perspective of the scientists. The narrator’s script
introduced the characters and provided connections between the historical vignettes
and ideas about the nature of science embedded implicitly in the accounts.
Developing instructional units
An important component of the project design was the development of instructional

units by the teachers. Applying Little’s (1993) principle of offering meaningful
intellectual engagement with ideas, with materials, and with colleagues, this task
served two key purposes--to reinforce the teachers’ learning and to increase the
likelihood that ideas from the workshop would move to the classrooms. The group
of eight teachers formed two groups of four, each of which focused on a single
biology content topic. Although the teachers were free to choose any topic in biology
(such as cells, genetics, ecology), in reality they were restricted by their curriculum
and by the resource books and articles available to them. Textbooks provided little
or no relevant information about historical cases or about the nature of science.
Although it was originally thought that each group could develop two units, the
process of selecting appropriate topics was very time-consuming; thus, the research
and development process for one unit consumed all the time available. One group
166 K. DAWKINS AND A. GLATTHORN
chose “evolution theories” and the other group selected “circulatory/respiratory

systems.”
During the research and development process, the teachers identified key players
(both early philosopher-scientists and modern experimental scientists), noting their
methodologies, their findings, their interactions with each other or with the written
records of other scientists, the influence of society’s reaction, and the influence of the
prevailing scientific paradigms. Using nature of science issues as a framework,
participants connected the historical accounts as evidence to support or refute
contemporary views of the nature of science. Once the teachers determined which
issues could appropriately be addressed in the context of history, they developed
instructional strategies to involve their students in making connections. As an
example, one teacher developed a subunit focusing on the nature of science to
incorporate into a larger traditional unit on circulatory and respiratory systems in
animals. She modified the research and development model used in the professional
development project, identifying historical cases and library resources in advance and
assigning student groups to research one case each. A summary of the teacher’s unit
is included as Appendix C.
Resource materials
Since teachers were unlikely to have appropriate resources related to history and
philosophy of science or to historical cases in biology, the instructor provided copies
of selected readings and a collection of books from the university library to the
teachers for their historical case study research. The only helpful resources found in
the high school libraries were histories of medicine which addressed studies in
human anatomy and physiology. The resources used by the teachers in the
development of instructional materials are listed in Appendix A.
COURSE SYLLABUS
The sessions included in the syllabus occurred at two to three week intervals.
Session 1: As an introduction, the instructor briefly presented excerpts from the

National Science Education Standards (1996) and North Carolina’s Standard Course
of Study in Science (1994) to show the presence of nature of science goals in both
national and state reform documents. Teachers informally assessed their personal
ideas about the nature of science by using Cobern’s card exchange game. This
strategy is available in an enhanced version in this volume or as published earlier
(Cobern, 1991). The instructor contrasted traditional views of science with
contemporary views, providing teachers with a written background summary, articles
focused on misconceptions, and a raview of the literature to be read before the second
session. The assigned readings are listed in Appendix A.
Session 2: The second session consisted of three elements: a conversation about

misconceptions, focusing on the assigned readings from Session 1 ; introduction to
the use of historical cases to build understandings about the nature of science, using
a model lesson to illustrate; and a discussion about teacher logs. In reference to logs,
the instructor gave the teachers stenographer pads, asking them to begin making
brief entries each time they addressed a nature of science topic in their classes
(including the date, the biology context, the nature of science issue, and other details
which they chose to include) and to turn in their logs at the last session of the project.
Sessions 3 and 4: Working in groups of four, the teachers chose a biology topic
and traced its historical development, using tlie resources in lustory of biology listed
in Appendix A.
Sessions 5 and 6: The teachers completed their research and developed

instructional plans appropriate for implementation in their biology classes. Although
the research element was a collaborative effort, teachers chose to develop individual
units, sharing some elements with each other but creating unique products for their
own use.
Session 7: The teachers presented their units to the group for critique, discussed
their plans for implementation, and scheduled classroom visits by the instructor to
be completed before the final session.
Session 8: Focusing primarily on evaluation of the project, the final meeting

included brief reports by the teachers on their implementation efforts, a focus group
interview conducted by the instructor, and the administration of a questionnaire
addressing teacher understandings of the nature of science. The instructor collected
the teachers’ logs, which documented their formal and informal attention to nature
of science topics in their classrooms.
MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
We gauged the effectiveness of the project on improving teachers’ understandings

of the nature of science and on supporting their incorporation of these
understandings into their planning and their teaching. Methods of evaluation
included a focus group interview, analysis of unit plans, analysis of teacher logs,
classroom observations, and a questionnaire administered to both the participants
and a control group composed of biology teachers from different high schools in the
same district. The data from the questionnaires indicated that teachers participating
in the project increased their understandings of the issues and provided stronger
rationales for their views than did the control group teachers. Furthermore, as
indicated by the log entries, participating teachers incorporated nature of science
topics not only in the units prepared during the course of the project but also into
other biology units presented during the semester.
East Carolina University, Greenville, North Carolina, USA
REFERENCES
Arons, A.B.( 1988). ‘Historical and philosophical perspectives attainable in introductory physics courses’,
Educational Philosophy and Theory, 20, 13-23.
Bentley, M.L., & Garrison, J. W. (1991). ‘The role of philosophy of science in science teacher education’,
Journal of Science Teacher Education, 2, 67-71.
Cobern, W. W. (1991). ‘Introducing teachers to the philosophy of science: The card exchange’, Journal of
Science Teacher Education, 2,45117.
Duschl, R.A. (1994). ‘Research on the history and philosophy of science’, in D.L. Gabel (ed.), Handbook of
research on science teaching and learning (pp. 443-465), New York, Macmillan.
Fullan, M.G., & Steigelbauer, S. (1991). The new meaning of educational change, New York, Teachers
College Press.
Gallagher, J. J. (1991). ‘Prospective and practicingsecondaryschool science teachers’ knowledge and beliefs
about the philosophy of science’, Science Education, 75, 121-134.
Homer, J., & Rubba, P. (1978). ‘The myth of absolute truth’, The Science Teacher, 45,29-30.
Homer, J., & Rubba, P. (1979). ‘The laws are mature theories fable’, The Science Teacher, 45,3 1.
Little, J. W. (1993). ‘Teachers’ professional development in a climate of educational reform, Educational
Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 15, 129- 15 1.
Longino, H. (1983). ‘Beyond “bad science”: Skeptical reflections on the value-freedom of scientific inquiry’,
Science, Technology, and Human Values, 8, 7-17.
Lorsbach, A (1992, March). An interpretive study of prospective teachers’ beliefs about the nature of
science, paper presented at the meeting of the National Association for Research in Science Teaching,
Boston, MA.
National Research Council (1996). National science education standards, Washington, D.C., National
Academy Press.
North Carolina Department of Public Instruction (1 994). Standard course of study for science, Raleigh..
Sparks, D., & Loucks-Horsley, S.(1990). ‘Models of staff development’, in W.R. Houston (ed.), Handbook
of research on teacher education (pp. 234-250), New York, Macmillan
Wandersee, J. H. (1985). ‘Can the history of science help science educators anticipate students’
misconceptions?’, Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 23, 58 1-597.
Zoller, U., Donn, S., Wild, R., & Beckett, P. (1991). ‘Students’ versus their teachers’ beliefs and positions on
science/technology/society-oriented issues’, International Journal of Science Education, 13, 25-36.
APPENDIX A:
INSTRUCTIONAL RESOURCES
Resources Used by Instructor to Prepare Background Paper on

Philosophy of science
Brown, H.I. (1977). Perception, theory, and commitment, Chicago, IL, Precedent Publishing Inc.
Chalmers, A.F. (1982). What is this thing called science? (2nd ed.), St. Lucia, Queensland, University of
QueenslandPress.
Kuhn, T.S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd ed.), Chicago, IL, University of Chicago
press.
Matthews, M. R. (1994). Science teaching: The role of history and philosophy of science, New York,
Routledge.
Articles Provided to Teachers as Reading Assignments
Homer, J., & Rubba, P. (1978). ‘The myth of absolute truth’, The Science Teacher, 45,29-30.
Horner, J., & Rubba, P. (1979). ‘The laws are mature theories fable’, The Science Teacher, 45,3 1.
research, Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 29, 331- 359.
Storey, R. D., & Carter, J. (1992). ‘Why THE scientific method?’, The Science Teacher, 59,18-21.
Resources Used by Teachers to Explore Historical Cases in Biology

Bender, G.A. & Thom, R.A (1966). Great moments in medicine, Detroit, MI, Northwood Institute Press.
Buck, AH. (1978). The dawn of modern medicine, New York, AMS Press.
Canguithem, G. (1988). Ideology and rationality in the history of the life sciences, Cambridge, MA, MIT
Press.
Gardner, E. J. (1972). History of biology, Minneapolis, Burgess.
Lanham, U. (1968). Origins of modern biology, New York, Columbia University Press.
Magner, L. N. (1994). A history of the life sciences, New York, M. Dekker.
Nitecki, M. H., & Nitecki, D.V. (1992). History and evolution. Albany, NY SUNY Press.
Oliver, R. P. (1963). History and biology, Oxnard, CA, Griff Press.
Rogers, F.B. (1962). A syllabus of medical history, Boston, MA, Little, Brown.
Shippen, K. B. (1957). Men of medicine, New York, Viking.
Silverberg, R. (1967). The dawn of medicine, New York, Putnam
Singer, C. J. (1950). A history of biology, New York, H. Schuman.
Singer, C. J. (1959). A history of biology to about the year 1900, New York, Abelard-Schuman.
Walker, K. M. (1955). The story of medicine, New York, Oxford University Press.
Wilder, A. (1901). History of medicine, New Sharon, ME, New England Eclectic Publishing.
APPENDIX B:
THE CELL THEORY AS A MODEL LESSON
Objective: Through historical cases, students will infer the following about the nature of science:
1) Science is public: the scientific community plays an essential role in the confirmation and rejection
of theories, so publication of research and presentations at scientific meeting is the means for
judging reliability and value of research finding
2) Science shows historical development, but is not necessarily cumulative in that some ideas are
“erased” as better replacements occur
3) Theories play a role in providing the context for a scientist’s work-scientistsdo not start with a
theory-free mind
4) Scientists are not individually objective because they all come with a certain mental framework
which means a degree of subjectivity, but the scientific community helps to keep scientific
knowledge from being totally at the mercy of individual biases
5) All scientific knowledge remains tentative, subject to revision as new findings emerge-itis never
authoritative
6) All serious scientific findings are valuable, even those which may eventually be replaced, because
they may stimulate productive research in a field of study
7) AIthough thereareoccasional revolutionary breakthroughssuch as theearlycell theory of Schleiden,

Schwann, and Virchow, the work of most scientists is focused on supporting, enlarging, or refining
theories that already exist
8) Ifthere are two competing theories in a particular area, the better of the two is, in the final analysis,
a matter of consensus among scientists arising from critical scrutiny
9) Replication ofscientific studies is an important part of the role of the scientific community - studies
conducted by only one scientist are generally viewed with skepticism until validated by replication
10) Some people think that theories have not been proved; therefore they are not very useful. In reality,
it is not important to “prove” a theory, just to support it with evidence, in which case it plays a
fundamental role in the work of most scientists
11) Theories are broad explanations which are made up of related hypotheses that have gained
substantial support.
A Dramatizahon of the Cell Theory
Narrator: Occasionally new theories or explanations of natural phenomena create a scientific revolution,
dispelling all previous attempts to provide reasons for what we observe in the world. That was the case with
the explanation of structure and function of organisms based on cell theory which developed in the nineteenth
century. Previous thinking explained the functions of plants and animals on all kinds of“vital forces” such as
humors or vapors, none of which were supported by experimental evidence.
Remember, a theory is an explanation of some natural phenomenon. So cell theory is an explanation of the
structure and function of living things in terms of the individual units we have come to call cells. This idea,
which we accept without question, was not always so obvious-aswe shall see form our version of“The History
of Cell Theory.”
The first character I will introduce to you is Marie Francois Xavier Bichat, a French doctor and anatomist who
performed at least 600 autopsies per year during his short career, which ended when he died at the age of 31.
(Probably overworked.)
Please meet Dr. Bichat:
Dr. Bichat: I must say that I owe a debt to one ofmy predecessors in France, Phillipe Pinel, who contended
that diseases must be understood by tracing them back to organs in the body, which he thought to be composed
of different elements. I decided, however, that there must be sub-components smaller than we had previously
imagined-and I found those sub- components to be tissues. In fact, through my dissections of cadavers, I
discovered 21 kinds of tissues which I categorized into systems such as respiratory, nervous, and digestive.
I cannot for the life of me understand why some scientists insist on studying human anatomy through those
confounded microscopes. The way I see it, “When one gazes into the darkness, everyone sees in his own way
and is affected accordingly.”
Narrator : Did you hear what Bichat just said? He implied that scientists may not be entirely objective in
their observations. Some may see differently from others. Interesting point of view!
Another historical note of interest: Even after cell theory had been well grounded for plants and animals, some
reactionary French physicians still considered tissue as the natural unit of structure and function for organisms.
They were highly influenced by Bichat and tended to disregard new evidence based on microscope studies, even
after microscopes had been improved to the point of providing almost indisputable observations of cells. It just
shows that even the best supported theories may be accepted very reluctantly by the “establishment”
It could be argued that Bichat had some justification for his disdain of the microscope. In fact, the sight of
“cells” (actually plant cell walls) by Robert Hooke much earlier in the 17th century still influenced many in
the 19th century and misled them into thinking of cells as walls surrounding empty spaces. Even though Hooke
and his colleague Nehemiah Grew also described the appearance of fluid inside the cells of younger plant
growth, there did not seem to be any comparable structures in bodies of animals. Listen to our old microscope
maker friend, Leeuwenhoek.
Leeuwenhoek : I made the most beautiful microscopes in the world. I even saw corpuscles in animal blood.
They certainly didn’t look anything like those cells Mr. Hooke saw in slices of cork! I’m afraid I did not make
the connection between plant cells and animal cells. In fad, I wasn’t really interested in all that scientific
theorizing. I just wanted to create beautiful lenses and look at all kinds of strange things through them.
Nobody ever said I was an Einstein!
Narrator : So–even though the primitive microscopes provided the technology for seeing cells in both plants
and animals, the scientific players had conceptual limits which did not make a connection between the two.
Perhaps there must be a historical “readiness” to accept new ideas in a particular field of study.
You might be surprised to know that one of the contributors to the development of cell theory is a fellow mast
noted for his work in physics--Robert Brown (the Brownian effect).
Robert Brown: Actually, I was interested in studying pollen grains in the context ofreproduction in orchid
plants. As I viewed them under the microscope, I saw tiny little specks that seemed to be in constant motion.
I thought maybe the specks might also be in nonliving materials such as coal dust, powdered glass, and
minerals. I did not observe the phenomena in these materials.
In 1832, I published a scientific paper on reproduction in orchids, and described my observation of a “circular
areola” in each cell, a dark area that appeared to be more opaque than the cell membrane. I saw these. spots
in the cells of other plants as well.
Narrator : Note that Brown published his findings–otherwise, his observation of what we now know to be
cell nuclei would not have been used by other scientists and added to the collection of knowledge that was
beginning to form the cell theory.
Other minor, but essential, players in the evolution of cell theory include Lorenz Oken, Johanna Evangelista
Purkinje, and Johanna Peter Muller. I’ll let them describe their work.
Lorenz Oken : I was a German naturalist heavily influenced by the Romanticists including the poet, Johann
Goethe. My speculations on the nature of living things was more philosophical than scientific. I did use
172 K. DAWKINS AND A. GLA’ITHORN
microscopic observations, but I used a lot of creativity to come up with the idea ofa jelly-like materials from
which spherical vesicles arose to produce the simplest living things, which I called “infusoria.” All animals
and plants are just colonies of infusoria which have given up their independence to subordinate their life to the
organism as a whole. Isn’t that a beautiful, poetic idea!
Narrator: Oken’s ideas lacked rigorous experimental verification, but perhaps his imaginative speculations
stimulated more serious scientists to undertake the necessary investigations.
Here is Purkinje.
Johannes Evangelisfa Purkinje : My area of interest was physiology, how organisms function, as well as
histology, the study of tissues. Unfortunately, my university did not always support my progressive research
and provide adequate space and equipment, I had to do a lot of my work at home. That’s sometimes what
happens when you have a bunch of old fuddy duddies in charge of the budget. I finally persuaded them to buy
one of the new achromatic microscopes, the compound ones without the distortions they had at first. That
really helped me with my research. Although I publishedmany papers in the areas of physiology and histology,
those most influential in the development of cell theory were my descriptions of nerve cells, their nuclei and
dendrites.
Narrator: Remember that observations of animal cells came along later than plants-so Purkinje’s work with
animal tissues was particularly valuable.
Let me introduce Johannes Peter Muller.
Johannes Peter Muller: 1 am probably best known in the realm of cell theory as the professor of Rudolf
Virchow and Theodor Schwann, whom you will meet momentarily. I was a professor in human and
comparative anatomy, embryology, physiology, and pathological anatomy at the University of Berlin. I was
Rector ofthe University when the revolution of 1848 broke out, and I had to deal with violent disturbances
among the students and staff. The mental and physical stress ruined my health. It gives me great pleasure to
tell you, however, that when I died three people were appointed to replace me.
Narrator: Now what you have all been waiting for–the main event–the big dogs of cell theory--Matthias
Jacob Schleiden and Theodor Schwann. I will let them tell their own stories. Here’s Herr Schleiden.
Matthias Jacob Schleiden : Some people say I was a mental and emotional cripple. I studied law at
Heidelberg and practiced as a barrister in Hamburg, but I was such a failure that I tried to commit suicide. I
couldn’t even do that very well. I aimed at my forehead and just managed to skim my scalp enough to cause
a lot of bleeding and pain but no permanent damage. How embarrassing!. After I recovered, I decided to study
science. I enrolled in botany and medicine at the Universities of Gottingen and Berlin and earned doctorates
in both medicine and philosophy. SO–you may say I’m crazy, but I sure am not stupid I worked as a professor
of botany for a while, but I got bored and decided to wander around Germany. It was good for my frazzled
nerves.
A fortuitous event was my meeting with Herr Schwann in Berlin–which would provide a very productive
collaboration. You’ll hear about that from him a little later.
I published apaper in 1838, referring to the work by Robert Brown on the nucleus and elaborated on its special
relationship to cell development. From my observations of plants, I came to understand that all plants of any
complexity were aggregates of ‘‘fully individualized, independent, separate beings, namely the cells
themselves.” Furthermore, I conjectured that all aspects of plant physiologywere fundamentallymanifestations
of the vital activity of cells. In other words, the cell runs the whole plant.
As far as how cells are formed, I emphasized the theory of “free-cell formation” which likened cell growth to
the simple physical process of crystallization–a new cell crystallized inside an old cell. I realize that the idea
was soon to be dropped like a hot potato, but give me some credit. 1 certainly never thought that cells could
arise from spontaneous generation--from nonliving things. Some of my predecessors did.
Narrator: Oops. Did you hearthat version ofcell reproduction? Should we ignore everythingthat Schleiden
said just because he messed up on that one? Heavens no. Over time, the helpful ideas will last and the less
useful ones will be replaced. That is a very natural part of historical development of theories. Ideas that seem
really goofy to us today might have been very reasonable at the time and might have been valuable in paving
the way to more useful knowledge.
Now you will hear from Theodor Schwann, who was quite a contrast with the abrasive Schleiden. In fact,
Schwann was viewed by his peers as a timid, introspective, and excessively pious person. But here--let him
tell you himself.
Theodor Schwann : I studied medicine at three universities, graduating from the University of Berlin in 1834,
where I studied with Professor Muller, whom you met earlier. Dr. Muller provided much encouragement for
me and great opportunities to make new observations in the areas of histology, physiology, and
microbiology--not to mention the work that made me famous: my contributions to cell theory. I know that
violent quarrels are a natural part of the academic tradition, but I just could not take the criticism which one
always had to endure within the German scientific establishment. I essentially retreated into scientific exile.
I had observed nuclei in the process of making slides of animal tissue for Professor Muller as a student, but I
really did not think much about the meaning until I met Herr Schleiden in Berlin on that momentous day in
1838. We were having lunch together one day, and he pointed out to me the important role the nucleus plays
in the development of plant cells. I at once recalled having seen a similar organ in the cells of the notochord,
and in the same instant I grasped the extreme importance that my discovery would have if I succeeded in
showing that this nucleus plays the same role in the cells of animals as does the nucleus of plants in the
development of plant cells.
My job was difficult because animal cells are so diverse, and since they are generally quite transparent, they
are hard to see, even with the new and improved compound microscopes. One thing was obvious to me,
however. All the cells had a nucleus. I published my findings and my hypotheses in a work that I must
modestly admit became a classic: Microscopical Researches. I observed that, like plant tissues, animal tissues
contained cells, cell membranes, cell contents, nuclei, and nucleoli. I set up an analogy between plant and
animal tissue. But it was quite an ambitious task to provide convincing evidence that most or all animals
tissues developed from cells. I did, however, put forth a theorythat there is universal principle of development
for all organisms, both plants and animals and this principle is the formation of cells.
Narrator: A sad note in Schwann’s career which I will tell since it would be painful for him to recount. It
concerns his description of yeast cells. From what we now know, he was quite correct in describing
fermentation granules as fungi and fungal cells similar to all other cells. His idea was accepted only after a
bitter controversy between a German chemist, Liebig, and the famous French scientist, Louis Pasteur. Liebig
published an anonymous cartoon satire of Schwann’s theory which really embarrassed the timid scientist. He
was destroyed psychologically and left the field to be defended and conquered by the more self-confidant
Pasteur, who continued research into fermentation and established that living organisms produced the carbon
dioxide and alcohol products and were not themselves produced by the chemicals as some opponents thought.
Ultimately, it was the scientific community which decided which theory was correct--Pasteur’s or Liebig’s, and
they chose Pasteur’s which was essentially the same conclusion that Schwann had made.
Back to Schleiden and Schwann: As important as their work was in the development of cell theory, there were
some corrections that were yet to come. Specifically, two ideas were replaced: free-cell formation and the
notion ofthe cytoblastema. They thought that cells arose from amucous-like material called the cytoblastema
and went on to change into different kinds of cells dictated by “the blind laws of necessity.” (Remember:
nobody knew about DNA back then.)
A number of scientists added to an identifcation of protoplasm and to division of the nucleus-- but I am going
to hurry along to introduce a man who put two and two together to get four: Rudolf Ludwig Carl Virchow.
Herr Virchow.
Rudolf Vichow : I am very grateful for the influence of my professor, Dr. Muller. I worked as a pathologist
with a special interest in infectious diseases and ended up at the University of Berlin where 1 became involved
in politics as well as academics. I was elected to the City Council and to the Prussian Legislature. Although
I respected my colleagues, Schleiden and Schwann, I just could not accept their idea about free cell formation
from the cytoblastema. I replicated many of their studies, using the best microscopic evidence I could attain,
hut my observations led me to a different conclusion from theirs. I came to understand that “there is no life hut
through direct succession.” I was certain enough of my hypothesis that I published it in 1855--stating that all
cells come from pre-existing cells. I was very adamant to convince other scientists of the importance of using
the microscope in medicine and of recognizing the cell as the locus of disease. In fact, I saw cells as “the last
constant link in the great chain of mutually subordinated formations that form tissues, organs, systems, the
individual.”
Narrator : Since Virchow’s publications in the mid-1880s, many refinements of cell theory have been
made-newobservations of cells, and parts of cells, discoveries of entities only observable after the development
ofthe electron microscope. But after about 1875, the scattered diverse observations of cell division and nuclear
inclusions were finally organized and cell theory came to include two more generalizations: cells in animals
and plants are formed by equal division of existing cells and division of the nucleus precedes division ofthe
cell. At this point, the cell theory was a strong unifying idea in our understanding of the structure and function
of all living organisms. But, as with all theories, it has continued to evolve as we constantly learn new things
about cells. Just think of the research into DNA science, all of which adds hits and pieces to the cell theory.
No scientist in our modern day world would attempt to start from scratch in understanding the function of a
plant or an animal. They would start with the preconceived notion that everyihing they observe in living things
originates with activity in cells. Every serious biologist working today does research in the context of cell
theory--it guides their thinking and helps direct the focus of their research.
One other thing I would point out as we think hack over our historical analysis. Probably the most important
thing we can learn about the nature of science from looking at its history: There is no idea which is absolutely
proved forever and ever. All scientific findings are considered tentative, even those on which we depend and
in which we have great confidence. It is part of the mind-set of scientists to leave open the possibility for
change as new evidence comes to light.
Questions to Guide Discussion. What does the history of cell theory illustrate? :
1. the importance of making scientific findings public through publications and through presentations
2. the idea that scientific knowledge shows historical development, though it is not necessarily
cumulative
3. that theories play a role in guiding the work of a scientist
4. that scientists are not necessarily objective when they begin their research
5. the tentativeness of scientific knowledge
6. that all scientific findings have value, even those which may eventually he replaced
7. much scientific work is focused not on revolutionary new theories but on enlarging supporting or
refining existing theories
8. that a consensus among the scientific community is the criterion for judging how good a theory is
9. the importance of replication of studies by other scientists

10. that theories don’t have to be “proved” to be useful
11. that theories are broad explanations which are made up of related hypotheses that have gained
substantial support?
APPENDIX C
SAMPLE UNIT PLAN PREPARED BY TEACHER:
CIRCULATORY AND RESPIRATORY SYSTEMS
Objectives
Biology Content and Nature of Science Objectives: To
Conduct activities relative to major anatomical features and systems of organisms.

Illustrate correlation between structure and function.
Document with examples how scientific knowledge is tentative.
Discuss how scientific findings of the past provide a basis for modern science.
Daily Lesson Plans
Day 1: Describe the assignment and state that science is notjust about test tubes, lab coats, and stuffy old fads
that never change. On the contrary, this discipline is quite a human endeavor and a dynamic endeavor. For too
long we have neglected this human, historical component. Therefore, you will help unearth the long forgotten
roots of science, learning who the early scientists were, what they did, how they did it, and how they learned
from each other. Specifically, we will look at scientists’ work in the circulatory and respiratory systems of
animals. Through our research and presentations, we will clearly see how science is an ever-changing realm
of knowledge that both influences and is influenced by society.
Each group will pick one scientist and will conduct library research on that scientist. After gathering
information, a narrative script will be written. Each member of the group must have a speaking part. One
member will be the scientist and the other members will play roles such as mother, spouse, news reporters, etc.
Each group will make a class presentation in a creative, dramatic, and interesting manner. Group members
should dress in costume of the scientists’ era. Answer as many of the following questions as possible to ensure
that your group has the information necessary for a good presentation.
1. When did the scientist live?

2. What was his nationality?
3. What was his contribution to scientific knowledge?
4. What contribution (if any) did he make to knowledge about the circulatory and respiratory systems?
5. Were there any ideas concerning circulation and respiration that he was able to refute?
6. Explain the idea of tentativeness in science.
7. What were some interesting circumstances that led to your scientist’s discoveries?
8. Which part of his work was replication ofstudies done by other scientists? Is this important? Why?
9. Identify any facts that this scientist learned and communicated.
10. Identlfy any hypotheses that this scientist put forth.
11. Identify any theories that this scientist supported with evidence. Do scientists prove theories?
12. Did this scientist work to develop a new theory, or was he trying to support or enlarge a pre-existing
theory? (Discuss the preexisting theory if that is the case.)
13. How did the public receive the new information?
14. Should scientific knowledge be shared with the public? Why or why not?
15. What part of this scientist’s work has been replaced by a more modern idea?
Students will pick from this list of people who researched respiratory and/or circulatory systems and can be
found in the school library. An approximate time is included with each scientist.
3000 B.C.E. Sekhetenach 1516 Columbo

2980 B.C.E. Imhotep 1578 William Harvey
700 B.C.E. Asclepios 1628 Malpighi
500 B.C.E. Pythagoras 1665 Leeuwenhoek
460 B.C.E. Hippocrates 1722 Leopold Auenbugger
129 Galen 1781 Lannec
1514 Versalius 1900 Landsteiner
The remainder of the class period will be spent in the library using reference books previously pulled from the
collection.
Days 2-4 : Student groups will work in the library, collecting research and writing their scripts.
Day 5: Each group will give a five minute presentation. The audience members will take notes.
Day 6: Each student will choose a scientist with whom to compare and contrast their scientist in an essay.
NAHUM KIPNIS
10. A HISTORY OF SCIENCE APPROACH TO THE

NATURE OF SCIENCE:
LEARNING SCIENCE BY REDISCOVERING IT
My interest in teaching the nature of science came from attempts to integrate history
into physics courses for teachers at the Bakken Library and Museum beginning in
1985. My background in the history of science and in teaching physics appeared
ideal for helping teachers transform the science of facts and equations they typically
teach into science as a human activity. Michael Matthews labels this a distinction
between “technical” and “liberal” science. The trouble was that many course
participants had degrees in biology or chemistry, and were unfamiliar even with
“technical physics.” Having no foundation to build on, I choose to teach both, and
the question was how to do it.
By that time, I had already been convinced that physics could be taught to all
students by shifting the emphasis from the memorization of facts to developing skills
of thinking, reasoning, and systematic purposeful work by students. I decided to try
investigative laboratory experiments as one of the main vehicles for achieving this
purpose. Teachers conducted experiments in groups and individually. When they
brought the new labs to their schools, they appealed to the majority of students and
raised their interest in learning science. The peculiar feature of these laboratory
activities was that many of them recreated historical experiments.
The idea of reproducing historical experiments in the classroom came from
Devons and Hartmann (1970). I could have achieved my goal with other experiments
as well, but I wanted to use history as much as possible, and the historical
experiments did have an advantage over the “real-life investigations” practiced by
some teachers, such as finding the cause of the clogged classroom sink or
determining which paper towel is most absorbent. First, with the historical
approach, the result is always known to the instructor, which is not the case with the
sink and towels. Second, a historical experiment can be chosen so as to help teach
a narrow scientific topic, while most real-life phenomena are too complex and
complicated for students’ study. Third, for the first two reasons, the students’
chances to succeed are higher with the historical experiments than with the other
ones. Finally, a success in repeating a historical scientific discovery may boost
students’ self-confidence much more than in fixing the plumbing. It is not that
technological problems are unusable; if carefully chosen, they are. However, it is
easier to learn the necessary investigative skills in historical scientific experiments
and then use them to tackle the frequently more complicated problems in technology.
177
W. F. McComas (ed.) The Nature of Science in Science Educahon, 177-1 96.
178 N. KIPNIS
Soon, it became clear that with all its advantages, the historical approach brings
to the forefront very difficult questions of science usually suppressed in textbooks,
such as the changeability of theories, the meaning of experimental support and its
application in selecting one of several competing theories, and others. Some teachers
came up with such questions on their own, while others recalled similar challenges
from their brighter students, who having found out from popular science books and
television programs that theories come and go concluded that scientific knowledge
is of no real value. Teachers realized a necessity in answering those questions, but
they did not know how to do so.
Thus, I realized that in the environment that emphasizes thinking and usage of
history, teachers had no choice but to address basic issues of the nature of science,
and they must be taught how to do it. Teachers certainly could have benefitted from
proper philosophy of science courses (Matthews, 1990; McComas, 1995), but I
expected them to obtain such training elsewhere. On my part, I tried a more
practical approach that could be complementary to theoretical courses: to bring up
the issues of the nature of science from within the science, in particular when
engaging teachers into “doing science.” This chapter will give an example of such
an activity and the way it addressed the questions related to the scientific method’.
THE NATURE OF SCIENCE: A HISTORICAL APPROACH
The historical approach in science teaching has had several periods of popularity.
In the late 1950s, James Conant suggested that all necessary knowledge of the nature
of science could be gained from studying a few historical cases. The cases must come
from the “old” science (usually, this means scientific ideas from the 17-19th
centuries), for only the old science can allow a nonspecialist a sufficiently good grasp
of the subject matter (Conant, 1959).
While Conant’s cases were written for universities, several authors incorporated
his idea into the secondary school curriculum, some explicitly and others implicitly.
At one extreme, the nature of science was advocated as a separate instructional
element, the understanding of which is emphasized more strongly than that of the
science content involved (Klopfer, 196 1, 1992). In Klopfer’s scheme, student
booklets, prepared for each case, contain excerpts from primary sources alternated
with the author’s narrative, and also questions directing students’ attention to various
aspects of science as described in the text. Blank spaces are provided for student to
write answers to these questions. Some of the questions refer to various aspects of the
nature of science (Klopfer, 1964). The idea of using original historical materials
1The term “scientific method” used here means the common features of research strategies applied by scientists
in modem times that we want students to learn.

HISTORY OF SCIENCE APPROACH 179
together with questions to answer was appealing, however, I found its practical
realization unsatisfactory. While some historical experiments were included, their
purpose was largely illustrative. Most important, I did not believe that “nature of
science” can survive in the secondary school as a separate subject.
At the other extreme, history was used solely to aid in learning scientific
concepts, and if students were expected to draw conclusions about science and
scientists, they had to do this on their own, using historical examples incorporated
in the text (Rutherford et al., 1964). There were also attempts to provide a middle
ground between these two extremes by balancing the study of nature of science with
that of scientific concepts, or using inquiry as a vehicle for learning science (Schwab,
1964). The general approach is appealing, but the role of a historical element in it
is rather limited. In general, Schwab’s approach appears sound, but the historical
element in it plays only a casual role, if any. For instance, although Galileo’s name
is mentioned, students’ experiments with pendulums have nothing to do with the
historical ones.
After a period of neglect, historical approaches reappeared in the 1980s, with the
emphasis on evaluating case studies, role playing and doing historical reading.
Some issues of the nature of science come up when students discuss historical
accounts in the class (Lochhead & Dufresne, 1989). Unfortunately, while the role-
playing activities will be of some interest to all students, only those few who are
actively involved as panelists or actors will get the full intellectual benefit from these
activities, because only they had done all the reading. For the majority of students,
a better way to integrate the historical element would be to recreate history in action
rather than on stage. Some historical experiments have already found their way into
teachers’ education (Devons & Hartmann, 1970; Teichmann, 1986). My intention
was to do it on a more comprehensive basis and to make history an organic
component of science.
Learning the Nature of Science While Learning Science
Although teachers report that they like learning about the history of science, they fell
that it is unlikely that they will pass much of that knowledge on their students,
because they have no time for any “extra” units, such as those devoted specifically
to the history and nature of science. For this reason, I subordinated the discussion
of historical and philosophical issues of science to learning scientific concepts
superimposing them so as to make them inseparable. The topics of units are the
same as in regular science courses, such as “electrical conductors and
nonconductors,” and the goal is the same: to formulate the laws of phenomena. The
difference is in the ways the unit is taught.
History and the nature of science are involved in three areas. The first concerns
the way a new scientific concept is introduced. I have found that understanding of
180 N. KIPNIS
a concept improves if it is “rediscovered” with active participation on the part of the

learner. Usually, it begins with the instructor’s demonstration of a relevant
historical experiment, for instance, the first experiment of Stephen Gray2. After a
short discussion, students begin repeating and modifying this experiment following
a certain plan (see Table I). The instructor stops students every 10-15 minutes to
discuss the intermediate results. If some groups differ in their results, this particular
experiment is repeated until a consensus is established. After the final conclusion
is formed, the instructor informs students of Gray’s subsequent procedures and
results, and the participants can compare how closely they came to the scientist.
Although technically the experiments are simple, it is not easy to draw a conclusion
from them, because it involves introducing a new concept of conductivity (Kipnis,
1996). Thus, students get a lesson about a possibility of various interpretations of
experimental results (including the erroneous ones) and a difficulty of making the
best general conclusion (it was not Gray who introduced the general concept of
“conductors and “nonconductors”).
If pedagogically advisable, the chain of “rediscoveries” follows historical events.
This is the case with static electricity, for instance, which led some teachers to
replace their whole static electricity unit with the one developed at The Bakken
(Bakken, 1995). However, occasionally, history defies what we call “common
sense,” as with the case of interference of water waves being discovered after
interference of light. In such cases, I prefer to sequence instruction in ways that
students will find easier to grasp. Later, we discuss that scientific developments are
not always “logical” and may be very convoluted.
The second area concerns the type of experiment used. I emphasize investigative
experiments which require students to imitate scientists rather than use artificial or
contrived experiments. In another lesson from history we see that since much of
physics remained a qualitative science up to the middle of the nineteenth century, an
obsession with measurements in high-school physics appears unjustified. Thus, I
began to emphasize qualitative experiments where students study a certain
phenomenon to find a qualitative empirical law to describe it (Kipnis, 1995). The
result is considered “true” if obtained by all groups. These experiments are preceded
and followed with theoretical discussions in such a way as to “recreate” an
introduction into science of a new physical concept (potential, for instance) or a law
(such as the relationship between potential and capacitance) (Kipnis, 1992, 1996).
The investigation is, to a certain extent, guided by the teacher. However, since
students have some freedom of action, we can consider this imitation of the work of
2
In 1731, the English physicist Stephen Gray observed, while rubbing a glass tube corked at the ends, that not
only glass attracted a feather, but so did the cork. Gray supposed that electricity produced in glass by rubbing
somehow moved to the cork. When he inserted a nail in the cork, eletricity reached the nail too. Through his
work with long “communicating lines,” Gray discovered the concept of “conductors” and “non-conductors.”
scientists sufficient to give students a taste of the problems scientists face. By

making students “discoverers” we achieve two objectives. First, we remove some of
the “mystery” from science by showing it to be a professional activity that requires
certain skills, and that everyone with necessary skills and motivation can discover
something new and useful. Involving history has additional advantages. Seeing that
they are capable of repeating on their own certain important steps of famous
scientists or deciding who was right in a scientific dispute (Lawrenz & Kipnis, 1990)
gives students a tremendous boost to their self-confidence. Second, they will see how
easy it is to choose an incorrect direction of research, how difficult it is to invent a
good procedure, and how easy it is to reach a false conclusion. Students will realize
that while not everyone can become Newton or Volta, everyone can discover
something. This will teach them a proper appreciation of great discoveries of the
past, on the one hand, and a habit of critically analyzing information about modem
discoveries, on the other.
The third area deals with the strategy of experimenting. The one discussed here
is distilled from scientific treatises of the past (Table I). The strategy consists of two
stages: Preliminary and Main Parts. The Preliminary Part is the one with which
teachers are least familiar. It comprises the origin of tlie problem and initial
experiments, which do not follow any plan but aim at discovering a few plausible
variables and a reliable experimental procedure. The problem with the widely
spread method of doing open- ended experiments is that usually a teacher solicits
students’ suggestions about the variables to study after they observe a single
demonstration. Having received a considerable number of ideas, the teacher asks
each group to investigate a different variable, with the idea that all these partial
results can be combined at the end into a general one. One problem with this
approach is that bringing variables “out of the blue” is inefficient. In our case,
students do a sufficient number of modifications of the original experiments until
they can say which changes appear to affect the result, and select the corresponding
parameters as variables. Also, only the most obvious two or three variables are
selected for the further examination in tlie Main Part, which allows all groups to
study all variables eliminating a possibility of false results due to poor statistics.
The Main Part is the planned stage of an investigation (Table I). Each variable
is examined while keeping the rest constant, and this examination follows a certain
plan identical for all variables. We start with preliminary experiments which result
in a certain hypothesis about the way this variable affects the phenomenon.
Although students may have some idea of this hypothesis from the Preliminary Part,
this knowledge is not definite, for in some initial experiments several variables are
clanged at a time. Unlike those, the preliminary experiments are “clean,” for
everything but one variable reinains constant. To advance a hypothesis even two
experiments may be enough. But to test it more experiments are needed, and they
must be different from the preliminary ones. If the test shows that the hypothesis
is false, we do additional experiments and suggest another hypothesis. Finally, we
182 N. KIPNIS
summarize all conclusions about separate variables and formulate a law or a rule.
While studying each subsequent variable we use the results about the variables
previously examined. Thus, it makes sense to insist that all groups investigate the
variables in the same order, at least, during the period when students learn how to
investigate and need more assistance.
It must be noted that teachers cannot have too many full-scale investigations with
2-3 variables, similar to the one in the example, because they take from one to three
hours and require a careful preparation on the teachers' part. For this reason,
teachers supplement them with a greater number of shorter experiments (10-20
minutes each), which deal only with a single variable.
TABLE I
A strategy for investigation
I. PRELIMINARY PART
1. Background (origin of the problem)

2. Initial observations and experiments
3. Formulating a problem
4. Selecting variables
5. Selecting a procedure
II. MAIN PART
Variable 1
a. Preliminary experiments
b. Hypothesis
c. Test
d. Conclusion
Variable 2
a. Preliminary experiments
b. Hypothesis
c. Test
d. Conclusion
Additional Variables
General Conclusion Formation

An Example of the Strategy in Action:

Does Light Travel Along a Straight Line?
Some features of this technique are illustrated in the following example. In this
context, “student” can refer to any learner, while “teacher” can be either a university
instructor or a secondary school teacher who knows this strategy. The description
of the experiment is a hypothetical student report which follows the plan illustrated
in Table I, in which several possible answers imitate results from different groups.
In an actual experimental report, a student can use the same format writing in the
the blank space under relevant headings.
The law of rectilinear propagation of light is one of many that may be
“rediscovered’ during a unit on optics and vision. This example is based on the
book for teachers Rediscovering Optics (Kipnis, 1992), and the following discussion
includes excerpts from it. This study is recommended for secondary students (12-18
years of age), although its modified version is quite applicable for those in upper
primary grades (9-12 years of age). If students have not had geometry, the teacher
should familiarize them with the concept of similar figures using models and
drawings.
The teacher begins the unit on light with the question: “what conditions are
necessary to see a certain object?” Students provide a variety of answers, including:
“a healthy eye,” “a sufficient amount of light,” “the requirement that the tine of
vision should not be blocked,” etc. Subsequently these answers serve to introduce
a variety of topics to study, beginning with the eye and the meaning of “vision.”
During this first lesson the teacher describes some early theories of vision using a
combination of lecture and discussion. In particular, in the “extromission” theory,
the eye sends out a “fire” which touches an object and receives information of its
shape, size, and color (something similar to a radar). According to the
“intromission” theory, something (a “mask” or an ‘‘image” of the object) detaches
itself from its surface and moves toward the eye. When students start smiling at such
“naive” ideas, it is useful to challenge them to refute any of these notions. Students
will quickly realize that the matter is not as obvious as it may have appeared at first,
and the teacher may use this case as an example of an important maxim of science
that “obvious is something you have never thought about.”
The teacher summarizes that ancient philosophers finally realized they could not
resolve the problem of vision in full, and began focusing on some part of it that could
be resolved. That was done by Euclid (ca. 300 BC) who ignored what agent is
moving between the eye and the object, which direction, and how it interacts with
the eye, and paying attention only to the trajectory of the agent’s motion. That is
how the concept of a ray was born. While Euclid was thinking of a visual ray
coming from the eye, to Ibn al-Haytham (ca. 965-1039 AD) it was a light ray coming
from the object. Whatever the case, they agreed that the trajectory must be a straight
line. The teacher challenges students to prove this experimentally. As illustrated
184 N. KIPNIS
by the following interaction, students will probably come up with the following idea
that many teachers use to study reflection and refraction.
Mary. I would use three pins and a ruler. First, draw a straight line on paper
using a ruler and place two pins at its ends. Second, move a third pin between
the two until all three appear to coincide. Finally, check whether the third pin
is on the same straight line with the others.
Teacher. This sounds like an easy experiment. Let us do it following Mary’s

instructions. . . . we’ll repeat the experiment three times. What are the results?
John. It’s true, and all the pins make the same straight line.
Teacher. Incidentally, do you take it for granted that a ruler’s edge is straight?
John. No, I can prove it. For instance, if I look along the edge of a ruler and see
all its points on a straight line, the edge is straight.
David. Wait a second! We’ve just proved experitnentally that light moves
rectilinearly on the basis of the coincidence of the line of vision with the line
drawn with a ruler. Now, you are saying that the ruler’s edge is straight because
it coincides with the line of vision. This is circular reasoning!
Indeed, it appears that the proof is impossible. For this reason, Euclid simply
postulated that a ray is a straight line. However, to al-Haytham that was not good
enough, and he tried to find a physical demonstration.
To test whether the light of a flame spreads rectilinearly, Ibn al-Haytham
employed a tube with a pinhole. To extend his proof to the light scattered in the
atmosphere, he let light into a room through a one-foot hole into the outer wall and
two identical holes in the inner wall. He found that a luminous spot C (Figure 1)
on the floor appeared only when this spot and the holes B and A on both walls were
on the same straight line as verified by a stretched thread.
Students may say that because the holes are big, points A and B have a large
range of movement within each hole, which implies many different lines connecting
them and producing different projections C on the floor. Then the teacher suggests
another test based on comparing the shape of an object and of its shadow. The idea
came from Aristotle (384-322 BC), who claimed to deduce from it that light rays
cannot be straight lines. Students may look surprised at this conclusion, and the
teacher suggests to investigate whether Aristotle was right. The following excerpt
from Rediscovering Optics (Kipnis, 1992) describes a hypothetical student’s
investigation. The discussion is dramatized to present different possible views or
results achieved by different groups.
Figure 1. Alhazen’s demonstration of the rectilinear propagation of light
As discussed with reference to Table I, the actual investigation consists of two

elements, the preliminary part and the main part. Each of these elements has
subsections. The lesson begins with a short overview of the previous lesson on
vision and a short demonstration by which the teacher introduces the subject for an
investigation connecting it with Aristotle’s problem -- what should the shadow
resemble: the object or the sun?
Teacher. Here I have two holes cut in an index card, one circular and the other
rectangular. I will shine light on them from a desk lamp, and you watch their
images on a white screen. What do you see?
John: Both images are round. But this is impossible!
Teacher: What would you expect?
John: A circle and a rectangle.
Teacher: That was what Aristotle thought too. He asked:
Why is it that when the sun passes through quadrilaterals [a rectangular grid],
as for instance in wickerwork, it does not produce a rectangularly-shaped figure,
but one that is circular? Is it because the sun’s rays fall in the form of a cone and
the base of a cone is a circle, so that no matter what object they fall upon, the rays
of the sun must appear circular? For if the rays were straight the figure formed
by the sun would necessarily be bounded by straight lines. For when the rays fall
straight onto a straight line they do produce a rectilinear figure (Aristotle,
Problems, 334-5).
186 N. KlPNlS
Here Aristotle is referring to the geometrical theorem that if the straight lines
originating from a single point touch the extremities of a figure, its projection on
a parallel plane must be similar to the original (Figure 2).
Figure 2. An illustration of Aristotle’s argument.
However, having seen a round image instead of a rectangular one made him
suggest that perhaps the sun’s rays are cones with their apexes on the sun rather
than straight lines. While observing a solar eclipse, Aristotle discovered again
that the sun’s image resembled the sun rather than the opening in a screen:
Why is it that in an eclipse of the sun, if one looks at it through a sieve, or

through the leaves of a broad-leaved tree, or if one joins the fingers of one hand
over the fingers of the other, the rays are crescent-shaped where they reach the
earth? Is it for the same reason as that when light shines through a rectangular
peephole that it appears circular and cone-like? (Aristotle, Problems, 341).
The problem raised by Aristotle of why the image made by sunlight passing
through an opening is similar to the luminous body and not to the opening, had
baffled scientists for almost two thousand years.
Let us investigate this problem with the following simple supplies: index
cards, masking tape, razor blade or scissors, paper or cardboard white screen. In
each index card make two round holes with a paper-punch and several square
holes of different size using a razor blade or by cutting pieces with scissors and
pasting them together.
The teacher should explain the significance of each step of this procedure. The
Preliminary Part (Table I) begins with background, which shows the origin of the
problem, in this case a chance observation by Aristotle. The teacher should
emphasize that although scientists do not rely on chance, sometimes they benefit
from it. An accidental observation becomes a discovery only when a scientist
recognizes something new and unusual.
TABLE II
An illustration of the strategy in action
PRELIMINARY PART OF THE INVESTIGATION
Background
Teacher. We begin this investigation with a problem suggested by Aristotle. The

problem is that a rectangular hole produces a round image of the sun? We can
repeat Aristotle’s experiment by observing an image produced by sunlight
passing through a square hole in a cardboard sheet. Incidentally, some 16th
century astronomers also became interested in this problem, but their curiosity
came not from reading Aristotle but from the needs of their science.
Initial experiments
Ruth. Our group discovered that Aristotle’s conclusion is correct only when the
screen is far away from the index card. He probably never tried to bring the
screen close to the hole, for if he did, he would have seen a square image instead
of a round one.
John. Distance is not the only thing that matters. We've found that at the same
distance between the screen and the card a large square opening produced a
square image, and a small square hole projected a circle.
Formulating a problem
Teacher. We see that Aristotle was only partially right. This finding suggests
that we examine a more general problem than his: why does the image produced
by sunlight coming through the same opening at some circumstances resemble
the sun and at others, the opening?
Selecting variables
Mary. We found that two factors affect the shape of the image: 1) the distance
from the hole to the screen, and 2) the size of the hole. These could be our
variables.
188 N. KIPNIS
The next stage (initial experiments) consists of reproducing the phenomenon a

number of times to be sure it is real and not spurious. Also, by modifying the
experimental conditions, the scientist tries to determine which factors affect the
phenomena: these will be selected for further study as “variables.” In addition to this,
during the initial experiments, the scientist develops a satisfactory experimental
procedure. Unlike the Main Part, in the Preliminary Part the experiments are
conducted without any plan, and several factors can be changed simultaneously. For
this reason, all conclusions made, for instance, about the choice of relevant variables,
are tentative. In the Main Part, each variable is studied with other variables kept
constant. The study of each variable begins with preliminary experiments, from
which students deduce a hypothesis about how this variable changes. This
hypothesis is tested by additional experiments. If different groups disagree on the
conclusion about a specific variable, they conduct additional experiments until they
reach a consensus.
TABLE III
The example continued
MAIN PART OF THE INVESTIGATION
Variable 1 : Distance between an Opening and a Screen
Preliminary experiments
David. I would suggest placing the screen in the shadow and moving the index
card to and from it.
Ruth. It looks as if all square holes produce square images when close to the
screen.
Hypothesis
John. The closer the hole is to the screen, the more the image resembles the
opening.
Mary. Why do you call this conclusion a hypothesis? Haven’t we just proved
it?
Teacher. We compared only two holes of a specific shape (square). Are we sure
that holes of other shapes behave in the same way? Do we know that the result
will not change if we make the hole either very large or very small? In both
cases, the answer is “No.” That is why we need addltional experiments. The
preliminary experiments are necessary to advance a hypothesis, but to prove it
one has to perform more experiments and of a somewhat different kind.
Test
Ruth. Let us see how holes of different shape but about the same size behave at
different distances. Instead of cutting additional holes we changed the shape of
the original openings by covering them partially with tape. In our experiments
the images of triangles and rectangles closely resembled the apertures when the
screen was no further than 15 cm from the card.
John. We tried parallelograms and trapezoids. In our view, the similarity was
preserved for distances up to 20 cm.
Conclusion
The image resembles a middle size opening only when the latter is close to the
screen.
Variable 2: The Size of the Opening
Preliminary experiments
John. Let us watch the images of two different squares, first, when the card is
close to the screen, and then when the card is far from it. Apparently, in both
cases the larger square hole makes a sharper square image.
Hypothesis
Mary. The larger the opening, the closer its picture resembles the original,
whatever its distance from the screen.
Test
John. We can check this in two ways: 1) by making the hole much larger and
much smaller; 2) by studying openings of other shape (for instance, triangles of
different size).
190 N. KIPNIS
Conclusion
The hypothesis is true, and the conclusion of the previous part is confirmed
again. Note: if there is a disagreement among different groups, all groups repeat
the experiment at the conditions that produced the “different” result.
General Conclusion Formation
Sunlight reproduces the shape of any given opening only when the screen is close
to it. On the other hand, at a sufficiently large distance any opening produces a
round image. Perhaps at large distances we obtain the image of the luminous
body. This hypothesis can be tested by experimenting with light sources of
different shapes.
Again, as in the Prcliminary Part, the teacher explains to students the necessity
of various steps in the Main Part (see Table 1). In particular, students may argue
that they have already obtained the necessary Hypotheses in the Preliminary Part,
and thus no more Preliminary Experiments are necessary. The teacher explains that
any hypothesis from the Preliminary Part is tentative, because the experiments
leading to it were conducted without keeping everything but one variable constant.
While the Preliminary Experiments are necessary for formulating a hypothesis, the
Test aims at confirming it, which requires experiments different from those used to
suggest the hypothesis.
To extend the importance of solving Aristotle’s problem, the teacher notes that
the rounding-off of the shadow’s corners at large distances was not understood until
the work of Johannes Kepler (1571-1630). The teacher can provide a geometrical
drawing representing Kepler’s ideas, which high-school students can follow. Since
this drawing is based on straight lines representing light rays, the conclusion is made
that Aristotle was mistaken about his phenomenon contradicting the concept of light
rays being geometrical straight lines.
Then the teacher discusses with students several points this unit offers about the
nature of science. First, we see that even famous scientists can err. If students
wonder why they were able to get better results than Aristotle, the teacher may
explain that the scientific method of Greek scientists somewhat differed from the
modern one. The ancient Greeks were keen observers of phenomena in nature, but
their experimentation was sporadic. If instead of limiting his observations to the
“natural objects” (the shadow of a fence), Aristotle recreated this phenomenon
artificially the way we did, he would have discovered the correct result. Second, we
see that solving some problems require a tremendous amount of time (in this case
about 2000 years!). Third, the case provides an opportunity to talk about the
meaning of an experiment supporting a theory. Perhaps, some students will

challenge the teacher’s final conclusion that Kepler demonstrated the rectilinearity
of light. The teacher answers that a theory is confirmed when none of the
experiments contradicts it. To decide whether there is an agreement or a
contradiction, a scientist must make certain assumptions about the phenomenon,
which may be true or not. For instance, Aristotle based his conclusion on the idea
of a point source of light, while the sun is not one because its angular size is quite
large.
There may be other more generic questions as well, such as: 1) How many
experiments are enough to test a hypothesis? 2) What would have happened if we
picked a false variable? The teacher explains that repeating an experiment involves
varying a parameter to be sure that its quantitative change alters the result. For
instance, if an experiment is conducted with only two different sizes of the opening,
one would never be certain of tlie results at much larger or smaller dimensions. If
a false variable (the shape of an opening, for one) is selected, changing it does not
affect the result. Since the time invested by a scientist in a given investigation is
limited, an unlucky choice of a variable may lead to failure. Failure may also occur
because of an inadequate experimental procedure. Aristotle, for instance, could not
see a rectangular shadow if lie never changed the distance between the aperture and
the “screen.” There are other difficulties as well. That is why, although all scientists
use a similar research strategy, some of them make great discoveries, while others
only minor ones.
It is worth noting that the plan of investigation described here was tested with
such subjects as electricity and bioelectricity, optics and vision, acoustics and
hearing, waves and vibrations, and graduates of our programs have applied it to
topics in mechanics, chemistry, biology, astronomy, and car troubleshooting. By
consulting an appropriate work on the history of science (see Appendix A for
suggestions), the general strategy provided here could be used in any science
discipline.
CONCLUSIONS
Teaching aspects of the “nature of science” through an historical approach appeals

to teachers if it is intertwined with teaching science content so that it makes the
latter more stimulating without taking additional classroom time.
Historical reading combined with investigative experimentation, especially of a

historical nature, appears to be a promising way for students to learn the basics of
the scientific method and understand some other issues of the nature of science even
when this subject is presented unobtrusively. While reading and a discussion with
a teacher may be sufficient for a few motivated and curious students, this will not
192 N. KJPNIS
work for the majority of them. Teachers may try to appeal to their practical sense,
by explaining that their future job opportunities depend on their ability of systematic
and critical thinking, but this is a too far-fetched perspective to many. On the other
hand, involving any student on a daily basis in investigative experimentation where
they can show their creativity without fear of being punished for errors, can
gradually change their attitude toward science and learning it.
However, to teach students how to do investigative experiments, teachers must
be trained in a similar way. This requires an investment of time and effort, but the
benefits are considerable. This skill is applicable for life and may be used with any
science subject and beyond science. Reading without experimentation, naturally,
takes less preparation on the teacher’s part, but its benefits are more limited; an
experiment described in a book does not provide as much information as the real
one, nor does it create a sense of participation.
Taking into account that few educators have an interest in experimentation and
probably even fewer in the history of science, the value of my recommendations
seems to be very limited. However, it is possible to split a course on the nature of
science into two parts, theoretical and experimental, taught by two people.
Moreover, the experiments must not necessarily be historical: one can find other
experiments for investigations, the results of which are known and comprehensible
to teachers (two important advantages of historical ones!). And it is very possible
that some educators will decide to try the fruit of history and find it interesting, if not
delicious.
Bakken Library and Museum, Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA
NOTE
The Bakken Library and Museum, founded by Earl E. Bakken, inventor of the first transistorized cardiac
pacemaker, is a center for education and learning that furthers the understanding of the history, cultural
context, and applications of electricity and magnetism in the life sciences and medicine. It holds a vast
collection of rare books and scientific instruments relating to the historical role of “electricity in life.” In
addition to serving as a research center, The Bakken is a pioneer in using the history of science to enhance K-
12 science education, through in-service training programs for science teachers, workshops for students in
grades 4-12, publications and kits.
REFERENCES
Aristotle XV, Problems I (1970). In the Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
Bakken Library and Museum (1995). Sparks and shocks: experiments from the golden age of static
electricity, Dubuque, IA, Kendall/Hunt.
Conant, J. B. (Ed.). (1959). Harvard case histories in experimental science, Cambridge, MA, Harvard
University Press.
Devons, S. & Hartmann, L. (1970). ‘A history-of-physics laboratory’, Physics today, (2), 44-49.
Kipnis, N. (1992). Rediscovering optics, Minneapolis, MN, BENA Press.
Kipnis, N. (1995). ‘Qualitative Physics in High School: A Lesson from History’, Proceedings ofthe Third
International History, Philosophy, and Science Teaching Conference, Minneapolis, MN, (pp. 624-435).
Kipnis, N. (1996). ‘The ‘Historical-investigative’ approach to teaching science’, Science and Education, (5),
277-292.
Klopfer, L. & Cooley, W. (1961). Use of case histories in the development of student understanding of
science and scientists, Unpublished manuscript, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
Klopfer, L. (196466). History of science cases, Chicago, IL, Science Research Associates.
Klopfer, L. (1992). Historical perspective on the history and nature of science on school science programs in
BSCS/SSEC, Teaching about the history and nature of science and technology: Background papers,
Colorado Springs, CO, The Biological Sciences Curriculum Study, 105-129.
Lawrenz., F. & Kipnis, N. (1990). ‘Hands-on history of physics’,Journal of science TeacherEducation, (I),
54-59.
Lochhead, J. & Dufresne, R. (1989). ‘Helping students understand difficult science concepts through the use
of dialogues with history. History and philosophy of science in science education (Proceedings of the
First International Conference), 22 1-229
Matthews, M. R. (1990). ‘History, philosophy and science teaching. What can be done in an undergraduate
McComas, W. (1995). ‘A thematic introduction to the nature of science’, Proceedings of the Third
International History, Philosophy, and Science Teaching Conference, Minneapolis, MN, 726-737.
Rutherford, J. et al. (1970). Harvardprojectphysics, New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
Schwab, J. (1964) ‘The teaching of science as enquiry’, in J. Schwab & P. Brandwein (eds.), The Teaching
OfScience, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 31-102.
Teichmann, J. (1986). ‘The historical experiments in physics education: theoretical observations and practical
examples. Science Education and the History of Physics’, (Proceedings of the multinational teacher and
teacher-trainer conference at the Deutsches Museum, Munich), 189-22 1.
APPENDIX A
This list of references, added by editor, addresses episodes from the history of science that may be useful in
constructing scenarios for use with the strategy described in this chapter. This list was abridged from one
originally developed by Robert Lovely and updated by HsingChi Wang. The editor sincerely appreciates the
willingness of these two individuals to allow their work to be used here.
Teaching the History of Science
Conant, J. B. (ed.). (1952). Case studies in experimental science, 1-2, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University
Press.
Routledge.
Shortland, M., & Warwick, A (eds.), (1989). Teaching the history of science, Oxford, Blackwell.
General Studies of the History of Science
Boorstin, D. J. (1983). The discoverers. New York, Random House.

Bronowski, J. (1978). The origins of knowledge and imagination. London, Yale University Press.
Cohen, I. B. (1985). Revolution in science, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
Conant, J. B. (1951). On understanding science: An historical approach, New York, Yale University Press.
Kuhn, T. S. (1977). The essential tension: Selected studies in tradition and change, Chicago, IL, University
of Chicago Press.
Harré, R. (1981). Great scientific experiments, Oxford, Phaidon.
Lloyd, G. E. R. (1996). Advisaries and authorities: Investigation into ancient Greek and Chinese science,
New York, Cambridge University Press.
194 N. KIPNIS
Ronan, C. A. (1982). Science: Its history and development among the world’s cultures, New York, Facts on
File.
Sarton, G. (1936). The study of the history of science. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
Sarton, G. (1952). Horus: A guide to the history of science, Waltham, MA, Chronica Botanica.
Thagard, P. (1 992). Conceptual revolutions, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
History of Science: Antiquity through the Renaissance
Goldstein, T. (1995). Dawn of modern science: From the ancient Greeks to the renaissance, New York,
Da Capo Press.
Hall, A. R. (1984). The revolution in science 1500-1750, New York, Longman Inc.
Hall, M. B. (1994). The scientific renaissance: 1450-1630, New York, Dover.
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Coleman, W. (1987). Biology in the nineteenth century: Problems of forms, function, & transformation,
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Darwin, C. (1859). The origin of species, London, Penguin Books.
Darwin, C. (1988). The voyage of the Beagle, New York, Mentor.
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Keller, E. F. (1983). A feeling for the organism: The life and work of Barbara McClintock. New York W.H.
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commentary, reviews, original papers, (Gunther S. Stent, ed.). New York, W. W. Norton.
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Hall, M. B. (1958). Robert Boyle and seventheenth century chemistry. Cambridge University Press.
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Hsu, K. J. (1986). The great dying. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Hsu, K. J. (1983). The Mediterranean was a desert. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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Brush, S. G. (1972). Resources for the history of physics. Hanover: University Press of New England.
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Hofmann, J. R. (1995). Andre-Marie Ampere: Enlightenment and Electrodynamics. New York: Cambridge
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University Press.
MICHAEL P. CLOUGH
11. INTEGRATING THE NATURE OF SCIENCE

WITH STUDENT TEACHING:
RATIONALE AND STRATEGIES
Preservice science teacher education programs typically culminate with student

teaching. Because science teacher education programs vary widely in their quality
of instruction concerning the nature of science, and because individual student
teachers have unique strengths and weaknesses, the cooperating teacher’s role in
promoting science teaching that accurately portrays the nature of science is critical.
Those entering the teaching profession have markedly different experiences and
impressions about the nature of science. Some preservice teachers have had courses
in the history and philosophy of science taught by a science educator who tailors the
experiences to the needs of classroom science teachers. In spite of such a thorough
introduction when these individuals become student teachers they still need guidance
concerning how to incorporate accurate portrayals of the nature of science when
teaching science content. Other student teachers have taken a course in the social
studies of science taught in the history or philosophy departments. Such courses
typically lack explicit connections to science teaching. While some of these student
teachers do show an interest in the nature of science, they are not always aware of
its value for science education, nor do they possess strategies to incorporate it into
instruction. Finally, the majority of student teachers come from universities
requiring no formal study in the nature of science nor is it integrated within their
science methods courses. These student teachers typically are not aware of their
misconceptions concerning the nature of science, and seem genuinely surprised when
introduced to contemporary views on the subject. Obviously, these new teachers
have not developed strategies to accurately portray the nature of science. A recent
study (Bell, Lederman and Abd-Khalick, 1997) provides a glimpse of just how
difficult incorporating the nature of science is for student teachers. This chapter is
a description of my strategies I have developed as a former cooperating teacher to
address these varying backgrounds of expertise.
DEVELOPING GOALS FOR SCIENCE INSTRUCTION
The student teachers working in my high school science classroom begin their
experience by reading several articles addressing a desired state of science education
197
198 M. CLOUGH
Included in this list are readings addressing the importance of accurately portraying
the nature of science when teaching science content (AAAS, 1993; Clough, 1994;
Gibbs and Lawson, 1992; Lederman, 1992; Matthews, 1989; NRC, 1996; NSTA,
1982). After several meetings during which we talk about these and other readings,
my student teachers create a list of general student goals (i.e., what he or she would
like to see students doing as a result of science instruction). Because these goals
provide a foundation for the entire student teaching experience, prolonged discussion
and refinement of the goals ensues. Invariably, among all the other student goals,
having students demonstrate an understanding of the nature of science emerges in
some format. A typical list of student goals is presented in Table I.
TABLE I
Student goals consistent with the desired state of science education
Students will:
Use critical thinking skills.

Convey an understanding of the nature(s) of science (i.e., social studies of
science).
Identify and solve problems effectively.
Use communication and cooperative skills effectively.
Work toward solutions of local, national and global problems.
Be creative and curious.
Set goals, make decisions, and self-evaluate.
Convey a positive attitude about science.
Access, retrieve and use the existing body of scientific knowledge in the
process of investigating phenomena.
Demonstrate deep robust understanding of science concepts rather than
mastery of many insignificant/isolated facts.
Demonstrate an awareness of the importance of science in many careers.
These discussions also serve as vehicles which enable me to probe what student
teachers think the nature of science means and its place in science instruction. The
development and discussion of student goals are critical because student teachers
must come to see each goal, including an understanding of the nature of science, as
important in a student’s science education experience. Science teachers too often see
the nature of science as an “add on” rather than a central theme to be integrated with
other student goals throughout the course. Goodlad (1983, p. 468), for instance,
NATURE OF SCIENCE AND STUDENT TEACHING 199
lamented how teachers often placed emphasis only on content acquisition at the
expense of all other student goals.
At this point, my student teachers begin the process of building a research- based
framework for teaching science using pedagogical research to ensure that decisions
in the classroom are directed toward eliciting student actions consistent with the
stated goals of instruction. The fundamental components of a research-based
framework illustrated in Figure 1 also provide a common ground for discussions
concerning how preservice teaclicrs will facilitate their goals for students, including
an understanding of the nature of science.
Figure 1. Components of a research-based framework for teaching
After having settled on an initial list of student goals, student teachers then
describe student actions that are consistent and inconsistent with each goal,
including those actions related to an understanding of the nature of science. These
lists of student actions are not static and as the student teachers gain experience
through reading nature of science materials and teaching, the initial list is often
modified. Table II contains a compilation of student actions consistent with an
understanding of the nature of science.
200 M. CLOUGH
TABLE II
Student actions consistent with an understanding of the nature of science
Students should:
Accurately describe what is meant by the “nature of science.”

List questions that those who study the nature of science might ask.
Describe the differences and interactions between basic science, applied
science, and technology. Provide examples of each.
Describe how laboratory work and puzzle-solving are alike.
Articulate why scientific explanations are couched in naturalistic terms with
no recourse to the supernatural.
Describe how science affects society through the technological innovations
that flow from it. Provide several examples illustrating this.
Describe how science affects society through the philosophical issues that its
ideas raise. Provide several examples illustrating this.
Provide examples of how society affects science and technology.
Provide arguments against a universal step-by-step scientific method.
Explain the value of imagination and creativity in doing science.
Provide examples of how scientific ideas are not exact descriptions of
laboratory data.
Justify that science ideas, while durable, are not absolutely certain.
Properly use significant nature of science language (e.g., “law” and
“theory”).
Relate each of the above to laboratory experiences throughout the year.
Question readings that distort the nature of science.
With these objectives in mind, teaching can now become the purposeful activity of
selecting behaviors, strategies, materials and activities to assess students’ views and
to facilitate desired changes. However, this may be problematic if, as is often the
case, preservice teachers themselves have misconceptions concerning the nature of
science.
MODELING NATURE OF SCIENCE INSTRUCTION
Early in the school year I teach a unit on the nature of science to high school
students, and the student teachers participate alongside those students, taking part
in the pretest, activities, discussions, note-taking, and a posttest. In a previous
manuscript (Clough, 1997), I set out in greater detail what transpires during this
two-week unit and how the nature of science is portrayed for the remainder of the
school year. To ensure that this experience occurs for student teachers working with
me in the spring semester, for their benefit I explicitly revisit the nature of science
with my high school students at this time in the year. Two weeks of instruction are
not likely to fundamentally change high school students’ or preservice teachers’
notions about the nature of science, but the unit raises interest, introduces several
fundamental issues that we revisit throughout the course, and serves notice of the
importance of the nature of science. The unit also serves as one model for assessing
and addressing students’ conceptions of the nature of science.
During the two weeks of explicit nature of science instruction, the student
teachers and I meet often to discuss the lessons. For those student teachers with an
extensive and appropriate nature of science background, these discussions deal
primarily with the strategies I use to engage my high school students in nature of
science instruction. Discussions often involve: 1) the value of assessing students’
preconceptions about the nature of science, 2) the rationale for selecting the readings
and activities, 3) the types of questions asked during the lesson and why these, as
opposed to other possible questions, were asked, 4) strategies to ensure that students
were mentally active during the lesson, and 5) why students’ views may not change
during this two-week period despite the extensive instruction. However, most
student teachers ask additional questions concerning the content of required readings
and other basic issues in the nature of science. These discussions help the student
teacher grapple with nature of science content and instruction, and help me visualize
what the student teacher is thinking, as well as the cognitive conflict taking place as
they wrestle with teaching the nature of science. After this two-week experience, the
student teachers resume responsibility for teaching one or two classes. At this point,
the focus of both the modeling and the character of our discussions shifts toward the
incorporation of the nature of science into daily science content instruction.
Nature of Science in the Context of Laboratory Activities
Student teachers need explicit ideas for incorporating the nature of science into the
context of daily lessons. One powerful way of doing so is to use laboratory
experiences to illustrate important nature of science ideas. Clough and Clark (1994a,
1994b) have suggested modifying chemistry laboratory activities to facilitate student
learning of science content and the nature of science. In these investigations,
students working in small research teams are responsible for developing experiments
to investigate a particular question posed by the instructor. Students must figure out
which equipment to use and what type of result might support their investigative
approach. Although some groups begin by using trial-and-error, most quickly begin
applying what they know to the research question. After having collected what they
determine are worthwhile data (students are often asked to justify the use of
202 M. CLOUGH
particular data), each group must then deal with the ambiguity of data when
interpreting their results. This experience, sometimes the first for many students
(and preservice teachers), forces students back into the lab for additional testing and
rechecking of data. At the end of the lab experience, a classroom discussion occurs
where each group presents their evidence and interpretation. After much debate and
an occasional return to the laboratory, a group consensus is typically, but not
inevitably, reached. In these types of laboratory experiences, students are not told
whether or not their work is correct. Rather, student skepticism is directed back to
their laboratory procedures, evidence accumulated, and interpretations made. In
these sorts of activities, my student teachers observe students doing science, and
experiencing the frustration, enjoyment, and uncertainty inherent in this distinctly
human endeavor!
Such laboratory activities also provide an opportunity to model for the student
teachers how explicit instruction in the nature of science can be made a normal part
of everyday science instruction. To facilitate reflection on the nature of science as
a result of the lab activity, students are often required to keep a journal discussing not
only why they performed each experiment and what they learned, but also their
thoughts and feelings about the experience. Each student group then reports their
findings as if their paper were to be published in a scientific journal. This
comparison between personal accounts of science and what appears in the final
formal report provides an excellent experience both for students and student teachers
to reflect on how poorly scientific papers tell the entire story of the laboratory
experience. This is later recalled when students read Medawar’s (1963) “Is the
Scientific Paper a Fraud?’ which argues that scientific papers distort how science
research actually occurs. Students and student teachers are asked to reflect on how
theory guided the experimental set-up, what criteria were used to decide what
observations were relevant, and how the results were interpreted. Laboratory
activities such as these force students to think about the science content and how
content and process are intricately tied together. Post-lab discussions often involve
considerable time discussing significant issues in the nature of science such as
whether a universal scientific method exists; the role of theories in influencing
questions, experimental set-up, observations and interpretations and the truth-value
of scientific conclusions.
Nature of Science in the Context of Content Lectures and Reading Assignments
Student teachers also need to see how the nature of science may be effectively
integrated into lectures and content readings. Historical case studies, stories about
science and scientists, and having students critically analyze their science textbook’s
portrayal of the nature of science are effective ways to merge science content and the
nature of science. Incorporating portions of The Double Helix (Stent, 1980) and
Jurassic Park (Crichton, 1990) while teaching genetics, or The Big Splash (Frank,
1990) when studying the origin of our planet’s water, make excellent science reading
while also facilitating reflection on how science works. These sources are far more
interesting than dry science textbooks, and if used properly they can show science
in the making rather than science ready-made (Latour, 1987). In chemistry, articles
such as Seeing Atoms (Trefil, 1990) and For the First Time, You Can See Atoms
(Hoffmann, 1993) can make for a lively discussion on science content and the nature
of science. The key here is that student teachers see instruction about the nature of
science spiraling through my students’ entire science experience.
The Role of Teacher Behaviors in Accurately Portraying the Nature of Science
Cooperating teachers must ensure that student teachers do not adopt the mistaken
notion that a teacher’s understanding of the nature of science and choice of
appropriate activities are sufficient to facilitate student understanding of the nature
of science. Both these conditions are critical, but what a teacher does with activities
is more important than the activities themselves. The activities suggested in this
chapter will enhance students’ long-term understanding of the nature of science only
ifappropriate teacher behaviors and strategies are utilized. Lederman (1992, pp. 346
& 35 1) writes,
. . . some method of influence must exist; naturally the influence must be mediated by teacher behaviors and
classroom ecology. . . . it appears that the most important variables that influence students’ beliefs about the
nature of science are those specific instructional behaviors, activities, and decisions implemented within the
context of a lesson.
Students cannot be rushed through conceptual change experiences, nor can

teachers transfer their personal understanding directly to students. Science educators
are increasingly calling for less breadth and more depth of science content.
Approaches similar to those discussed above to improve students’ conceptions of the
nature of science require more time and effort than most student teachers are
accustomed. Second, transforming existing activities into ones that more accurately
portray the nature of science also require thoughtful consideration of pedagogical
research. Students must be held responsible for seriously reflecting on and
struggling through a number of abstract notions. Eliciting students’ conceptions and
reasoning is often more difficult than student teachers realize, and facilitating
movement from naive to more informed conceptions even more so. Essential teacher
behaviors that facilitate desired student reflection include the use of extended-answer
questions that build on students’ earlier ideas, questions requiring students to
elaborate on their ideas, the application of wait-time, responding behaviors that
accept rather than judge student ideas, encouragement rather than praise, and a great
204 M. CLOUGH
deal of teacher observation and listening. The teacher’s use of language in the
classroom is alsocritical. Zeidler and Lederman (1987, pp. 6-7) conclude that, “the
ordinary language teachers use to communicate science content does provide the
context in which students formulate their own conceptions of the nature of science.”
Hence, cooperating teachers must carefully consider what they say about science and
how they use significant language in the social studies of science both in
communicating with students and modeling for student teachers.
COOPERATING TEACHER/STUDENT TEACHER INTERACTIONS
During the initial three to four-week period when my student teacher and I share
responsibility for teaching, extensive discussions occur before and after lessons.
While reviewing lessons that student teachers are planning, I typically ask the
following questions:
How is the nature of science valuable for sequencing science content to be

taught?
How does this material, activity, or content portray the nature of science?
How can tlus lesson be changed so it better illustrates the nature of science?
What questions will you ask to facilitate student understanding of NOS?
What will your post-lab discussion entail? How does this address the nature
of science?
How will your language accurately portray the nature of science?
Then I often create scenarios to force the student teacher to consider how to respond
to particular situations. For instance, I might play the role of a frustrated student
who wants simple answers concerning how science works, or I might play the role
of a student who disagrees with what my student teachers promote.
After a lesson I might ask my student teacher questions such as:
What did you observe happening that is relevant to the nature of science?
In what ways was the nature of science accurately and inaccurately
portrayed?
What would you do differently next time?
How would these changes better facilitate student understanding of the
nature of science?
From observing/listening to students, what conceptions of the nature of
science do they have?
How will you structure future instruction to address these conceptions?
Periodically the student teachers’ lessons are videotaped and they examine their
teaching for a number of instructional issues regarding the nature of science.
Sometimes we discuss their individual analysis and at other times we analyze
portions of their videotaped lessons together. By analyzing my own teaching in the
same fashion, and by requiring student teachers to do the same, I model the
reflection-on-action that all effective teachers should exhibit.
Recognizing that conceptual change in both students and teachers requires a
great deal of time and effort, at an appropriate point during the semester I provide
the student teachers with a lengthy list of resources concerning the nature of science
content and teaching strategies to pursue during and after our experience together.
Appendix A contains a partial listing of valuable readings for teachers to pursue
when time permits. Throughout the student teaching semester, student teachers are
encouraged to reflect on teaching behaviors and activities to determine what they
illustrate about the nature of science. Emphasis is placed on how teachers can “keep
the heat on” students’ misconceptions concerning the nature of science while
teaching science content. Activities, strategies, and reflection are designed to
confront students’ misconceptions and suggest more plausible/accurate alternatives
concerning the nature of science. With respect to nature of science instruction, the
cooperating teacher should design experiences with student teachers so that they
begin to adopt some of the objectives set forth in Table III.
TABLE III
Desired student teacher outcomes regarding the nature of science
Student teachers should:
Use the precise meaning(s) of significant language in the social studies of

science and explain possible consequences of the precise or imprecise use
of language on students’ perceptions of the nature of science.
Express potential explicit and implicit view(s) of the nature of science
portrayed in several activities (lab or otherwise).
Evaluate textbooks, audiovisual materials, and other curriculum materials
for their accuracy in portraying the nature of science.
Modify existing materials and activities so they more adequately portray the
nature of science.
Demarcate (using consensus views from the social studies of science) science
from non-science and pseudo-science.
Implement correct historical examples (where appropriate) that effectively
convey a more accurate portrayal of the nature of science.
206 M. CLOUGH
Convey a research-based rationale for science teaching which includes the

necessity of an accurate understanding of the nature of science.
Self-evaluate classroom performance as it pertains to an accurate portrayal
of the nature of science. Demonstrate both reflection-on-action and
reflection-in-action.
Use the nature of science in articulating what learning and teaching science
encompasses.
Evaluate materials designed to assess students’ understanding of the social
studies of science.
MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
Not surprisingly, the approaches described here significantly impact the manner in
which my student teachers teach, but even more meaningful is how former student
teachers have incorporated the nature of science into their present teaching and
professional development. Many of my former student teachers have developed
novel ways of incorporating nature of science instruction appropriate for the grade
level and courses they currently teach. This indicates that they are not simply
copying what they experienced with me, but are applying what they learned to their
own unique situations. In addition, while I continue to suggest readings to them and
share ideas for teaching the nature of science, I am pleased how often they now
suggest useful readings and activities.
All of my former student teachers have presented papers and activities at science
teacher conferences and often incorporate the nature of science into these
presentations. One such former student teacher recently wrote an article describing
how he modified a chemistry activity so that it better engages students while more
accurately portraying the nature of science. Another former student teacher has
taken additional courses in the nature of science. Empirical evidence (Clough, 1995)
and anecdotal incidents gathered in my class show my student teachers that the
strategies incorporated in my class significantly improve students’ views concerning
the nature of science. Integrating the nature of science throughout student teaching
provides preservice teachers with the confidence, strategies, and models necessary
to implement such instruction as they begin their own careers.
University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, USA

REFERENCES
American Association for the Advancement of Science (1993). Benchmarks for science literacy, New York
Oxford
Bell, R., Lederman, N. G., Abd-El-Khalick, F. (1997). Developing and acting upon one’s conception of
science: The reality of teacher preparation, paper presented at the AETS international meeting,
Cincinnati, OH, January 9-12.
Clough, M.P. (1994). ‘Diminish students’ resistance to evolution education’, The American Biology Teacher
(56), 409-415.
Clough, M.P. (1995). ‘ Longitudinal Understanding ofthe Nature of Science as Facilitated by an Introductory
High School Biology Course’, Proceedings of the Third International History, Philosophy, and science
Teaching Conference, pp. 2 12-221, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN.
Clough, M.P. (1997). Strategies and activities for initiating and maintaining pressure on students’ naive
nviews concerning the nature of science, Interchange, 28(1-2), 191-204.
Clough, M.P. and Clark, R. L. (1994a). ‘Cookbooks and constructivism: A better approach to laboratory
activities’, The Science Teacher, (61), 34-37.
Clough, M.P. and Clark, R. L. (1994b). ‘Creative constructivism: challenge your students with an authentic
science experience’, The Science Teacher, (61),46-49.
Crichton, M. (1990). Jurassic park, New York, Ballantine.
Frank, L.A. (1990). The big splash, New York, Birch Lane.
Gibbs, A and Lawson, AE. (1992). The nature of scientific thinking as reflected by the works of biologists
and by biology textbooks, The American Biology Teacher, (54), 137-151.
Goodlad, J. J. (1983). ‘A study of schooling: some findings and hypotheses’, Phi Delta Kappan,
(64), 465-470.
Hoffmann, R. (1 993). ‘For the first time, you can see atoms’, American Scientist, January-February, 11-12.
Latour, B. (1987). Science in action, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University.
Lederman, N.G. (1992). ‘Students’ and teachers’ conceptions of the nature of science: a review of the
Matthews, M. R. (1989). ‘A role for history and philosophy in science teaching’, Interchange, (20), 3-15.
Medawar, P.B. (1963). ‘Is the scientific paper a fraud?’, in Medawar, P.B. (1990), The threat and the glory:
reflections on science and scientists, New York, HarperCollins
National Research Council (1 996). National science education standards, Washington, D. C., National
Academy Press.
National Science Teachers Association (1982). Science-Technology-Society: Science Education for the
1980’s, an NSTA Position Statement, Washington, D.C.
Stent, G. S. (Ed.) (1980). The double helix: text, commentary, reviews, and original papers, New York,
Norton.
Trefil, James (1990). ‘Seeing atoms’, Discover, June, pp. 55-60.
Zeidler, D.L. and Lederman, N.G. (1987). The Effect of Teachers’ Language on Students’ Conceptions of
the Nature of Science, paper presented at the 60th Annual Meeting for the National Association for
Research in ScienceTeaching, Washington, D.C., ERIC Document Reproduction ServiceNo. ED286734.
APPENDIX A
ADDITIONAL NATURE OF SCIENCE READINGS
FOR STUDENT TEACHERS
Aikenhead, G. S. (1988). ‘An analysis of four ways of assessing student beliefs about STS topics’, Journal
of Research in Science Teaching, 25, 607-629.
208 M. CLOUGH
Aikenhead, G. S. and Ryan, AG. (1992). ‘The development of a new instrument: “Views on science-
technology-society” (VOSTS)’, Science Education, (76), 477-491.
Bednarek, D. I. (1993). ‘Friction: heat-loving bacterium roils two worlds. Business, academia spar when
product of basic research proves practical’, The Milwaukee Journal, May 9.
Begley, S. (1992). ‘Math has on its face: The foundations of mathematics have serious flaws. And that may
imperil all the sciences’, Newsweek, November 30.
Bridgman, P. W. (1960). ‘Explanation’, in The Logic of Modern Physics, pp. 37-39. New York, Macmillan.
Campbell, N.A. (1993). ‘A conversation with. . . David Suzuki’, The American Biology Teacher, (55),
31-36.
Campbell, N.A. (1992). ‘A conversation with . . . Michael Bishop & Harold Varmus’, The American
Biology Teacher, (54), 476-481.
Einstein, A. and Leopold, I. (1938). The evolution of physics, New York, Simon and Schuster.
Elmer-Dewitt, P. (1994). ‘Don’t Tread on my Lab, Time, (143), 44-45.
Feynman, R. P. (1985). ‘The value of science’, in What do you care what other people think? New York,
Norton.
Johnson, R. L. and Peeples, E.E. (1987). ‘The role of scientific understanding in college: Student acceptance
of evolution’, The American Biology Teacher, (49), 93-96.
Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago.
Latour, B. and Woolgar, S. (1986). Laboratory life: The construction of scientific facts, New Jersey,
Princeton.
Matthews, M. R. (1994). Science teaching: The role of history andphilosophy of science. New York,
Routledge.
Medawar, P. B. (1973a). ‘The cost-benefit analysis of pure research’, in Medawar, P.B. (1990), The Threat
and the Glory: Reflections on Science and Scientists, New York, Harper Collins.
Medawar, P. B. (1973b). ‘The pure science’, in Medawar, P.B. (1990), The Threat and the Glory:
Reflections on Science and Scientists, New York, Harper Collins.
Moore, J. A (1983). ‘Evolution, education, and the nature of science and scientific inquiry’, in Zettderg,
J. Peter (ed.), Evolution versus Creationism: The Public Education Controversy, Phoenix AZ, Oryx
Press.
Munby, H. (1976). ‘Some implications oflanguage in science education’, Science Education, (60), 115-124.
National Institutes of Health (1984). Why do basic research? NIH Publication Number 84-660.
Bethesda, Maryland.
Overbye, D. (1993, April 26). Who’s afraid of the big bad bang? Time.
Ryan, A G. and Aikenhead, G. S. (1992). ‘Students’ preconceptions about the epistemology of science’
Science Education. (76),559-580.
Shamos, M. H. (1995). The myth of scientific literacy, New Brunswick, Rutgers.
Thomas, L. (1983). Late night thoughts on listening to Mahler’s Ninth Symphony, New York, Viking
Press.
Van Allen, J. A (1964, February 3-7). ‘Science as a human enterprise’, Current Science.
Westfall, R. S. (1977). The construction of modern science, New York, Cambridge.
SECTION III

COURSES AND COURSE ELEMENTS
WILLIAM F. McCOMAS
12. A THEMATIC INTRODUCTION TO THE NATURE OF

SCIENCE: THE RATIONALE AND CONTENT OF A COURSE
FOR SCIENCE EDUCATORS
This chapter describes the content elements and pedagogical orientation of a

semester-long nature of science course designed for science teachers. The central
learning tool is discussion based on an extensive set of selections from the works of
and commentaries on philosophy, history, sociology and psychology of science. The
course content is arranged around a number of overarching nature of science ideas
that are both accessible and useful to those involved in science teaching. Major
course ideas include knowledge production in science, research programs and
revolutions, the development and status of laws and theories, the interrelationships
of science and society, and philosophically valid science teaching models.
Through its standards documents, the science education community worldwide
has generally defined the content of the nature of science that should be part of the
knowledge base of secondary school graduates. By inference, science teachers should
also have acquired both the nature of science content background and the strategies
for communicating this content if they are accurately to represent what scientists do,
how scientific knowledge is generated and the goals and limits of science.
THE COURSE OUTLINE
The Thematic Introduction to the Nature of Science is a three-credit course designed

for students interested in science and/or science teaching who would like to know
more about the “game” of science, the role and work of scientists, the generation of
knowledge in science, and the place of science in society. The primary learning tool
is discussion with reference to an extensive set of selections from the works of major
plulosophers of science and commentaries on the relationship between science
education and the social studies of science. The course content is drawn from the
foundation of scholarship in the nature of science provided by Matthews (1990,
1994), Martin (1972) and Robinson (1968) and from new descriptions of what
students should know about how science operates (National Research Council, 1996;
AAAS, 1994).
To assist students in what is likely their first encounter with the nature of science,
readings have been selected that directly or indirectly address these big ideas. These
211
212 W. McCOMAS
readings are grouped into themes (see Table I). The themes and related sub-themes
contain a number of overarching ideas within the nature of science that are both
accessible to students and useful to those with interests in science teaching and
learning. In most instances, fundamental notions within the discipline are addressed
not only within their thematic unit, but throughout the course. The nature of the
selections, the sequence of the readings, and full citations is included in Table I.
TABLE I
Titles, descriptions and readings included in each of the eight thematic units
Reading Set #1 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIAL STUDIES OF SCIENCE
These articles provide background perspectives on the varied definitions of science

from a historical perspective. In addition, students become familiar with the domain
of the nature of science with descriptions of the scientific enterprise from the history,
sociology, psychology and the philosophy of science. The Gould (1990) selection
discusses the unusual fossils of the Burgess shale is the beginning of a recurring
theme about the evaluation of new ideas by the scientific community developed later
in the course.
1. Lindberg, D. C. (1992). ‘What is Science?’, in The Beginnings of Western Science,

Chicago, IL, The University of Chicago Press, 1-4.
2. Definitions of Science and Other Statements about its Nature (See Appendix A).
3. Gjertsen, D. (1 989). ‘Science and Philosophy: Past and Present ’, in Science and
Philosophy: Past and Present, London, Penguin Press, 1-7.
4. Klemke, E. D., Hollinger, R. and Kline, A. D. (1988). ‘What is Philosophy of
Science?’, in Introductory Reading in the Philosophy of Science, Revised Edition,
Buffalo, NY, Prometheus Books, 1-5.
5. Rhodes, R. (1986). ‘Atoms and Void’, in Making ofthe Atomic Bomb, New York,
Simon and Schuster, 29-39.
6. Gould, S. J. (1990). ‘Selections’, in Wonderful Life, New York, W. Norton and
Company, 277-79 and 282-291.
7. Casti, J. L. (1989). , ‘Hope and Asperity’, in Paradigms Lost, New York, William
Morrow and Company, Inc., 1-15.
Reading Set #2 THEORIES & LAWS: PRODUCTS AND TOOLS OF SCIENCE
These articles provide an opportunity to discuss the role of facts, hypotheses, theories
and laws so students can both use these terms correctly and anticipate sources of
confusion when these words are misapplied in textbooks and by the general public.
THEMATIC INTRODUCTION TO THE NATURE OF SCIENCE 213
8. Dilworth, C. (1994). ‘On the Nature of Scientific Laws and Theories’,in Scientific
Progress, Third Edition, Boston, MA, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 174-194.
9. Trusted, J. (1979). ‘Theories and Laws’, in The Logic of Scientific Inference, New
York, Macmillan, 70-77.
10. Rhodes, G. and Schaible, R. (1 989). ‘Fact, Law and Theory: Ways of Thinking in
Science and Literature’, Journal of College Science Teaching (19), 228-232, 288.
11. Sonleitner, F. J. (1 989). ‘Theories, Laws and All That’, National Center for Science
Education. Newsletter, 9,3.
12. Fleisher, P. (1987). ‘What is a Natural Law’, in Secrets of the Universe:
Discovering the Universal Laws of Science, New York, Athenaeum, 1-4.
13. Crick, F. (1988). ‘Selection’, in What Mad pursuit, New York, Basic Books, Inc.,
137-142.
Reading Set #3 THE LOGIC AND METHODS OF SCIENCE
This section features a discussion of the knowledge generating aspects of science

with particular emphasis on the strengths and limitations of induction and deduction.
The second set of readings in this theme examine the issue of what constitutes
scientific method from varying perspectives.
14. Wallace, W. L. (1971). ‘Selections’, in The Logic of Science, New York, Aldine
Publishing Company, 15-19, 24-29 and 34-39.
15. Anderson, 0. R. (1976). ‘Contemporary Perspectives’, in The Experience of Science,
New York, Teachers College Press, 9-13.
16. Richards, S. (1983). ‘Scientific Argument: The Role of Logic’, in Philosophy and
Sociology of Science; An Introduction, Oxford, Basic Blackwell, 14-27.
17. Gjertsen, D. (1989). ‘Is There A Scientific Method?’, in Science and Philosophy:
Past and Present, New York, Penguin Books, 87-113.
18. Richards, S. (1983). ‘Philosophies of Scientific Methods and Theories of Science
(Part of Chapter 4)’, in Philosophy and Sociology of Science: An Introduction,
Oxford, Basic Blackwell, 44-59.
19. Hempel, C. G. (1966). A Philosopher Gives His Account of the Scientific Method
from Philosophy of Natural Science, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 3-18.
20. Mayr, E. (1991). ‘Darwin’s Scientific Method’, in One Long Argument,
Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 9-11.
21. Chamers, A. (1990). ‘Against Universal Method’, in Science and Its Fabrication,
Minneapolis, MN, University of Minnesota Press, 11-23.
22. Millar, R. (1988). ‘What is the ‘Scientific Method’ and Can It be Taught?’, in Skills
and Processes in Science Education: A Critical Analysis, Wellington, J. J. (ed.),
London, Routledge, 47-62.
23. Horgan, J. (May, 1993). ‘Paul K. Feyerabend: The Worst Enemy of Science’,
Scientific American, 36-37.
214 W. McCOMAS
Reading Set #4 INDUCTIVIST-EMPIRICISM, HYPOTHETICO-DEDUCTIVISM

AND THE ROLE OF CREATIVITY IN SCIENCE
These articles continue the discussion ofknowledge generation with added emphasis
on the creative element central to science. The science education applications of
hypotheticodeductivism are discussed along with the descriptions of how Einstein
and others viewed the knowledge generation process.
24. Joshua, S. and Dupin, J. (1986) ‘Is Systematization of Hypothetico-Deductive

Reasoning Possible in a Class Situation?’, European Journal of Science Education.
8, 381- 388.
25. Holton, G. (1975). ‘Selection from Mainsprings of Scientific Discovery’, in The
Nature of Scientific Discovery, Gigerich, O. (ed.), Washington, D.C., Smithsonian
Institution Press, 203-208.
26. Medawar, P. (1982). ‘Two Conceptions of Science’, in Pluto’s Republic, New
York, Oxford University Press, 28-34.
27. Trefil, J. (1989). ‘Science in Context’, in Reading the Mind of God: In Search of the
Principle of Universality, New York, Anchor Books, 31-44.
28. Rachelson, S. (1977). ‘A Question of Balance: A Wholistic View of Scientific
Inquiry’, Science Education, 61, 109-117.
29. Atkin, J. M. and Karplus, R. (1962). ‘Discovery or Invention?’, The Science
Teacher, 29, 45-51.
30. Medawar, P. B. (1963). ‘Is the Scientific Paper a Fraud?’, in P. B. Medawar (1 990),
The Threat and the Glory, New York, Harper.
Reading Set #5 IMAGES OF SCIENCE AND ITS METHODS
Kuhn’s interpretation of the progress of science is featured in this readings set along
with discussion of elements of the “new” post-positivist philosophy of science.
Included are the first articles making the connection between the nature of science
and science education.
31. Richards, S. (1 983). ‘Philosophies of Scientific Method: Theories of Science’, in

Philosophy and Sociology of Science: An Introduction (concluding part of chapter
4), Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 60-70.
32. Nadeau, R. and Desautel, J. (1984). The Kuhnian Development in Epistemologyand
the Teaching of Science, Toronto, Canada, Guidance Center of the University of
Toronto, 11-21.
33. Wallace, B. A. (1989). ‘Views of Science and Reality Through History’, in
Choosing Reality: A Contemplative View of Physics and the Mind, Boston, MA,
New Science Library, 24-33.
34. Barrow, J. D. (1988). ‘The Different Views of Science’, in The World Within the
World, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 10-12.
35. Hodson, D. (1 982). ‘Selection from Science – The Pursuit of Truth? Part I’, School
Science Review, (63), 643-652.
36. Gould, S. J. (1993). ‘Selection from The First Unmasking of Nature’, Natural
History, (102), 14-21 .
37. Elkana, Y. (1970). ‘Science, Philosophy of Science and Science Teaching’,
Educational Philosophy and Theory, (2), 15-35.
38. Margetson, D. (1 982). ‘Some Educational Implications of the Uncertain Identity of
Science’, European Journal of Science Education, (4), 357-365.
Reading Set #6 VISIONS OF REALITY AND THE ROLE OF OBSERVATION

IN SCIENCE
The initial focus in this set is on the distinction between realism and instrumentalism
as an important element of the nature of science. A second element examines the
special problem and role played by observation in science and in science learning.
Students are encouraged to think of all observation as theory-based, an issue that has
important implications in both science and science learning.
39. Chalmers, A. F. (1982). ‘Realism, Instrumentation and Truth’, in What is This

Thing Called Science? 2nd ed., St Lucia, Australia, University of Queensland Press.
146-160.
40. Munby, A. H. (1976). ‘Some Implications of Language in Science Education’,
41. Casti, J. L. (1989). ‘Faith, Hope and Asperity’, in Paradigms Lost, New York,
William Morrow and Company, Inc., 15-55.
42. Hodson, D (1 986). ‘The nature of scientific observation’, School Science Review
(68), 17-29.
43. Hainsworth, M. D. (1956). ‘The effect of previous knowledge on observation’,
School Science Review, (37), 234-242.
Reading Set #7 CONCEPTUAL CHANGE IN SCIENCE AND IN THE

CLASSROOM
Here we reexamine the controversy over the interpretation of the Burgess Shale to
make the point that most learners and scientists are resistant to change in their
thinking. The science education implications of this issue and a discussion of the
parallels between change in science and conceptual change in students are explored.
44. Barber, B. (1 961). ‘Resistance by scientists to scientific discovery’, Science, (134),

596- 602.
216 W. McCOMAS
45. Richards, S. (1 983). ‘Scientific Argument: The Role of Logic ’, in Philosophy and
Sociology of Science; An Introduction, Oxford, Basic Blackwell.
46. Lessem, D. (1993). ‘Weird Wonders Fuel the Battle over Evolution’s Path’,
Smithsonian, (23), 107-1 15.
47. Lewin, R. (1 992). ‘Whose View of Life?’, Discover, (1 5) 18-1 9.
48. Strike, K. A. and Posner, G. J. (1982). ‘Conceptual Change and Science Teaching’,
European Journal of Science Education, (4), 23 1-240.
49. Gauld (1989). ‘A Study of Pupil’s Responses to Empirical Evidence’, in Doing
Science, R. Millar (ed.), Philadelphia, PA, The Falmer Press/Taylor and Francis,
62-82.
50. Millar, R. (1 989). Bending the Evidence: The Relationship Between Theory and
Experiment in Science Education, Philadelphia, PA, The Falmer Press/Taylor and
Francis, 38-6 1.
51. Finley, F. (1983). ‘Science Processes’, Journal of Research in Science Teaching,
(20), 47-54.
52. Driver, R. (1983). ‘Invention and Imagination’, in The Pupil as Scientist?,
Philadelphia, PA, Open University Press, 41-49.
Reading Set #8 THE SOCIETY OF SCIENCE, SCIENCE, SOCIETY & SCIENCE

EDUCATION
In this final set of readings, there are several elements of interest. First, students
discuss the ethical aspects of science which flows nicely into the social production
of scientific knowledge. The final selections examine, in more detail, the link
between the nature of science and science education with reference to selections on
the nature of science from the national standards projects.
53. Kiefer, G. F. (1979). ‘Science and Society’, in Bioethics: A Textbook of Ideas,

Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley, Inc., 413-442.
54. Thompson, D. (November 23, 1992). ‘Science’s Big Shift’, Time, 34-35.
55. Collins, H. M. (1983). ‘The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge: Studies of
Contemporary Science’,. Annual Review of Sociology, (9), 265-285.
56. Mendelsohn, E. (1977). ‘The Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge’, E.
Mendelsohn, P. Weingart and R. Whitley (eds.), ‘The Social Production of Scientific
Knowledge’, Boston, MA, D. Reidel Publishing Company, 3-26.
57. Abimbola, I. O. (1 983). ‘The Relevance of the ‘New’ Philosophy of Science for the
Science Curriculum’, School Science and Mathematics, (83), 182-190.
58. Duschl, R. A. (1985). ‘Science Education and Philosophy: Twenty-five Years of
Mutually Exclusive Development’, School Science and Mathematics, (85), 541-555.
59. Matthews, M. (1989). ‘A Role for History and Philosophy in Science Teaching’,
Interchange, (20), 3-15.
60. Hodson, D. (1 988). ‘Toward a Philosophically More Valid Science Curriculum’,
61. Matthews, M. (1992). ‘History, Philosophy and Science Teaching: The Present
Rapprochement’, Science and Education, (1), 11-47.
62. American Association for the Advancement of Science (1 994). The Nature of
Science: Benchmarks for Science Literacy, New York, Oxford University Press.
63. The National Research Council (1996). ‘The Nature and History of Science’ from
The National Education Standards, Washington, D.C., National Academy Press.
Instructional Orientation
There is a constructivist teaching philosophy underlying the course. The general

direction of the discussions is, of course, directed by the nature of the readings
provided. However, the authors of the readings are permitted to speak for
themselves. Students find meaning by reading several views of the same unifying
idea frequently from different and occasionally contradictory perspectives. In
support of this goal, students form discussion groups to read, discuss, critique and
cooperatively evaluate the ideas exhibited by the authors. The instructor guides the
small group discussions by acting as a facilitator and occasionally presenting mini-
lectures on the more difficult aspects of a readings set. In addition, class time is also
devoted to relevant video presentations (such as selections from the Day the Universe
Changed by Burke to support the historical perspective) or to small group activities
such as black box investigations (in support of the discussions of laws, theories and
logic). Generally each of the eight themes is discussed over a two-week period
covering six hours of class time. Throughout the entire course, students are engaged
in a number of formal assessment plans discussed in the next section.
ASSESSMENT
Students are evaluated with reference to a multifaceted scheme which includes a

theory/law comparison paper, a theory/law application paper, brief written overviews
of the most important ideas in each readings set and a final examination. Each of
these elements will be discussed here in some detail.
Theory/Law Assignments
Comparison Paper
The distinction between theories and laws is established in several ways. First,
students are asked to consult science content and philosophy of science texts and
produce a list of ten definitions of the term “theory” and of the term “law.”
Following this elucidation of definitions, students are instructed to synthesize what
218 W. McCOMAS
they have found in terms of similarities and differences between these definitions.
Invariably, students discover that there is much confusion in the ways these
important terms are defined. This is particularly true in science textbooks where the
term “law” is used but rarely defined.
Application Paper
The theory/law paper, due late in the course, provides an opportunity for each student
to select a specific law or theory (such as the theory of plate tectonics, the first law
of motion, the theory of evolution by natural selection or the kinetic-molecular theory
of matter) and accomplish several tasks with respect to that law or theory. Students
describe what the law or theory states, review what a law or theory is, examine
several textbooks and compare the way(s) in which the words law and theory are
defined and actually used in the body of the text and analyze the way in which the
specific law or theory is presented in those texts.
Points of Most Significance (POMS)
For each of the eight themes, students are asked to write no more than four short
overviews (a maximum of 35 words) of the essential ideas communicated in that
theme. These short reviews are called “points of most significance” or POMS. The
technique of having students write brief review statements serves to increase student
opportunities to make connections between important ideas while encouraging them
to extract the big course concepts from the readings. Students receive differential
credit for this assignment related to the complexity of their POMS. Three points are
awarded for appropriate POMS related only to a single set of readings. Four points
are awarded for POMS that relate the content of one readings set to an earlier one.
Students may receive up to five points if their POMS discusses a significant
application for teaching the nature of science not stated explicitly by the author(s).
Final Examination
The final examination is an opportunity for students to synthesize what they have
learned by drawing on the readings to evaluate statements such as, “Analyze the
statement that scientific insights are in part imposed upon phenomena by the
scientists who created these insights.” Another part of the examination requires
students to present and defend the eight major ideas from the entire set of readings.
Not only does this requirement focus students’ attention throughout the course, but
provides feedback to the instructor about what ideas seem most significant.
TABLE II
Percent of students naming a particular idea as one of the
eight most important in the course.
% of naming
a particular Rank Issue
issue
90 1 The role and distinction of laws and theories

75 2 Realism vs. instrumentalism
74 3 The issue of the scientific method
67 4 The role of creativity in science
61 5 Paradigms, revolutions and the progress of science
57 6 Modes of knowledge generation (deduction vs. induction)
49 7 The role of theory-driven (laden) observations

48 8 Conceptual change in science and science learning
39 9 Definitions of the social studies of science
30 10 Philosophy of science in science teaching
26 11 Human aspects of science
25 12 The role of history in understanding science
N = 87 students surveyed during four semesters of the course.
COURSE IMPACT
It is always difficult to know how much any course impacts the professional lives and
practices of the students involved, but some measure of what course elements make
the most powerful impression has been established. Table II presents a list of the
kinds of ideas that students feel are the most important in the course as extracted
from the final examinations. Each student is asked to name eight such issues. There
has been some variation in this list from semester to semester since the readings list
is constantly being modified and the accompanying discussion is always unique to
a particular class. However, over time, the list has stabilized considerably.
CONCLUSIONS
It is clear from a review of the new science education standards that elements of the
nature of science must play a role in the education of the next generation of science
220 W. McCOMAS
learners. This course was developed to provide teachers a strong background of

relevant content knowledge regarding the nature of science. Even if this mode of
content delivery is effective for university learners, this knowledge must now be
translated through appropriate curriculum models and through the skills of
individual educators into an appropriate form for the classroom.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The author is pleased to acknowledge that the course described here was inspired by
a pair of classes -- the Nature of Science and the Meaning of Science -- developed
by Dr. George W. Cossman of the University of Iowa. Although there are now
signifcant differences between this course and those he developed, the experience
described here would not exist without Dr. Cossman’s fundamental contributions
and inspiration.
University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California, USA
REFERENCES
American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) (1994). Benchmarks for science literacy,
New York, Oxford University Press.
Burke, J., Lynch, J. (Producer). The day the universe changed. [videotape], Los Angeles, CA, Churchill
Films (6901 Woodley Avenue, Van Nuys, CA 91406).
Martin, M. (1972). Concepts of science education: A philosophical analysis, Glenview, IL, Scott, Foreman.
Routledge.
Matthews, M. R. (1990). ‘History, philosophy and science teaching. What can be done in an undergraduate
National Research Council. (1996). National science education standards, Washington, D.C., National
AcademyPress.
Robinson, T. (1968). The nature ofscience and science teaching, Belmont, CA, Wadsworth.
APPENDIX A
DEFINITIONS OF SCIENCE AND OTHER STATEMENTS
ABOUT ITS NATURE
1. A branch of study which is concerned with a connected body of demonstrated truths, or with
observed fads systematically classified and more or less colligated by being brought under general
laws, and which includes trustworthy methods for the discovery of new truth within its own domain.
(Oxford English Dictionary)
2. Science is built up with facts as a house is with stones. but a collection of facts is no more a science
than a heap of stones is a house. (J. H. Poincaré)
3. It cannot be that the axioms established by argumentation can suffice for the discovery of new
works, since the subtlety of Nature is greater many times over than the subtlety of argument. (F.
Bacon)
4. Scientists are concerned with the generalized, the ideal. Artists are usually concerned with the
particular, the individual. The artist is nearer to the scientist in his capacity as problem poser,
theorizer, hypothesizer, than he is to the scientist as problem solver, or checker. This latter function
is usually the sole prerogative of science. (A. H. Maslow)
5. The beliefthat science proceeds from observation to theory is still so widely held that my denial of
it is often met with incredulity. (K. Popper )
6. The aim of science is the recording and rational correlation of those parts of our experience which
are actually or potentially common to all normal people. (H. Dingle)
7. Science is an interconnected series of concepts, and conceptual schemes that have developed as a
result of experimentation and observation. ( J. B. Conant )
8. Science searches for relations which are thought to exist independently of the searching individual.
(A. Einstein)
9. It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit
theories, instead oftheories to suit facts. (A. Doyle as “Sherlock Holmes”)
10. Surveyingtheexperimental literature ... makes onesuspectthat something like a paradigm (a theory)
is prerequisite to perception itself. (T. S. Kuhn )
11. Science is organized knowledge. (H. Spencer )
12. Science is not for the common public, but only for those spiritually prepared. Otherwise it is like
pouring pure water into a muddy well; you only stir up the mud and lose the water. ( Thorn (1873)
in his preface to a translation of “De Revolutionibus. ” )
13. We need very much a name to describe a cultivator of science in general. I should incline to call
him a scientist. (W. Whewell)
14. Science is what scientists do. (J. D. Bernal )
15. Science is the study of those judgements concerning which universal agreement can be obtained.
(N. Campbell)
222 W. McCOMAS
16. The whole of science is nothing more than a refinement of everyday thinking. (A. Einstein)
17. Science is a method for testing claims about the natural world, not an immutable compendium of
absolute truths. (S. J. Gould )
18. The true scientific altitude is "utterly different from the dogmatic altitude which constantly claimed
to find "verification" for its favourite theories. Thus I arrived. . . at the conclusion that the scientific
attitude was the critical attitude, which did not look for verifications but for crucial tests; tests which
could refute the theory tested, though they could never establish it." (K. Popper)
19. Science is the attempt to make the chaotic diversity of our sense experience correspond to a logically
uniform system of thought. (A. Einstein)
20. Science is the interpretation of nature and man is the interpreter. (C. Gore)
21. Science is concerned with the general conditions which are observed to regulate physical
phenomenon; whereas religion is wholly wrapped up in the contemplation of moral and aesthetic
values. (A.N. Whitehead)
22. Every grand advance in science has issued from a new audacity of imagination. (J. Dewey)
23. A scientist experiences no failures, only unprofitable avenues to pursue. (J. Salk)
24. Science contributes to our culture in many ways, as a creative intellectual activity in its own right,
as a light which has served to illuminate man's place in the universe, and as the source of
understanding man's own nature. (J. F. Kennedy)
25. Science is a little bit like the air you breathe -- it is everywhere. (D. Eisenhower)
26. Science is a great game. It is inspiring and refreshing. The playing field is the universe itself (J.
I. Rabi)
27. Man loves to wonder, and that is the seed of our science. (R. W. Emerson)
28. It is a good morning exercise for a research scientist to discard a pet hypothesis every morning before
breakfast. (K. Lorenz)
29. . . . science is the quest for knowledge, not the knowledge itself (H. D. Roller)
30. . . . no human inquiry can be called science unless it pursues its path through mathematical
exposition and demonstration. (L, da Vinci)
31. . . . science is the collection of scientific subjects taught in universities. (D. Flunagan.)
32.. It is one of the hopes of science that, by careful analysis of past discovery, we shall find a way of
separating the effects of good organization from those of pure luck, and enabling us to operate on
calculated risks rather than blind chance. (J.D. Bernal)
33. Science tends of be created as it is needed. (R. Feynman)
34. The theorists . . . often repeated the truism that progress in science comes when experiments
contradict theory. (R. Feynman)
35. Science when well digested is nothing but good sense and reason. (Stanislaus, Maxims (No. 43))
JOHN 0. MATSON AND SHARON PARSONS
13. THE NATURE OF SCIENCE:

ACHIEVING SCIENTIFIC LITERACY BY DOING SCIENCE
Inquiry teaching is once again advocated as a central element in science teaching

(NRC 1990, 1995; AAAS 1989, 1993). This requirement makes it vital for science
teachers to know and understand the basic processes and philosophies of science.
Unfortunately, we rarely provide useful experiences in this domain to students
participating in teacher education programs. The science education program at our
university incorporates into its curriculum several strategies and courses where the
processes and nature of science are stressed. This chapter describes the means by
which the nature of science is blended with a science education program for both
preservice and inservice teachers. First, we briefly describe the preservice programs
leading to both the elementary credential (grades K-8) and the secondary credential
in science (grades K-12); second, we describe how we incorporate the nature of
science into the inservice program.
RATIONALE
It has been our experience that few science majors and even fewer teachers are
prepared to take on the role of scientists simply by earning a bachelor’s degree in
science. Most undergraduate course work is content rather than process oriented.
The laboratory experiences of undergraduate students tend to be verification
experiments, with known results, or are designed to teach techniques rather than
investigate processes. Our experience suggests that many practicing teachers are
inadequately prepared to satisfactorily teach science via inquiry methods.
An understanding of the processes and nature of science and an ability to do
scientific inquiry is a requirement for effective science teaching. It does not suffice
to simply teach facts and have students perform “cookbook” laboratory experiments;
therefore, science teachers must understand the thinking and behavior of scientists
and develop methods to communicate this understanding to students. All those
engaged in science teaching and learning must be able to carryout research projects
by asking pertinent questions, construct hypotheses, predict outcomes, design
experiments, analyze data, and reach conclusions. In brief, science teachers must be
able to do science. However, experiencing the processes of science by itself is not
sufficient. A teacher of science must also bring to the classroom the attitude and
world view of scientists. To achieve this, a basic understanding of the philosophies
223
W. F. McComas (ed.) The Nature of Science in Science Educahon, 223-230.
224 J. MATSON AND S. PARSONS
of science is necessary. With a basic science content background and the ability to
carry-out the process of science, science teachers can teach science as a conceptually
oriented, hands-on/minds-on, problem solving, critical thinking activity which will
promote science literacy among students.
One approach that emphasizes the importance of a constructivist epistemology
in education waspresented byvon Glasersfeld (1989). Essentially, in constructivism,
knowledge is not considered an absolute. Knowledge is the result of the social,
cultural, and historical milieu. In this sense, knowledge is constructed individually
based upon a person’s socio-cultural background (Saunders 1992). In our program
we have noticed that while many science faculty members profess a constructivist
philosophy of knowledge, in reality they act as logical positivists, or objectivists in
their teaching. In essence, they teach a set of “truths.” It would appear that there
exists a vestigial transcendentalism among many logical positivists who wish to
maintain an idealized concept of ‘truth’ in nature rather than to embrace the notion
of multiple truths dependent upon the perceptions of the viewer. While
constructivism would appear to be a powerful epistemological philosophy to bring
about conceptual change in the classroom (Nussbaum 1989, von Glasersfeld 1989),
few teachers actually use such an approach (Tobin et al. 1991).
Most science educators and philosophers of science view scientific knowledge as
tentative (Hempel 1966, Lawson 1995 and others; with Lewis (1993) for an alternate
view). Because scientific knowledge is constantly being questioned, re-evaluated,
and tested, changes in what we teach will inevitably occur. The conditional nature
of scientific knowledge is distressing to some people. They feel that knowledge
should be stable; you can add to it but unless it was wrong to begin with it should not
change. Interestingly, professional scientists frequently make the same comments.
These scientists may have been involved with doing “normal science’’ in the Kuhnian
(1970) sense. I have had similar comments from both preservice and practicing
science teachers. Science itself is not static nor should science teaching be
unchanging. We need to insure that teachers are aware of this aspect of science.
The faculty of the science education program at our university essentially view
knowledge as temporary constructs by which we attempt to make sense of the world.
Therefore, our preservice and inservice classes and programs emphasize the nature
and processes of science. We have also encouraged change among our university
colleagues and their teaching, especially, of basic introductory science courses.
The basic philosophies of science, whether directly taught or modeled within the
classroom and laboratory, are integral to our program. In the research courses
described below, professors actively discuss with preservice teachers the nature of
science, the temporary nature of scientific knowledge, and problems involved in
interpreting and analyzing data. Many courses within the sciences also do this but
in the science methods courses (both elementary and secondary), the nature of
science is a major theme.
THE NATURE OF SCIENCE 225
NATURE OF SCIENCE STRATEGIES IN PRESERVICE SCIENCE

EDUCATION
The Character of our Science Education Program
The preservice education program discussed here is a fifth year program that requires
and builds upon a bachelor’s degree. For those students pursuing the elementary (K-
8) credential, Natural Science is the only science academic major available. The
secondary credential builds on a student’s bachelors degree in one of the sciences by
providing a teaching emphasis (or equivalent course work or experience). Both
credentials include, in addition to an array of education courses, a science teaching
methods course and two semesters of student teaching.
The major in Natural Science for the elementary credential has relied on courses
that historically emphasize a survey of subject content. The Natural Science major
is currently being revised to require students to take the core introductory courses
required of science majors. An overview of these courses and the inclusion of the
nature of science strategies follows those given below for the secondary credential.
Students who seek a Single Subject Credential and earn their science degree at
our university are introduced early to the nature of science because we have
encouraged the faculty in the various science departments to make drastic changes
in their conceptual approaches to teaching by increasing coverage of the processes
and nature of science. All science teaching majors are required to take at least one
year in each of the four majors (biology, chemistry, geology, and physics) sciences.
Integrating Nature of Science with Science Education
We have changed our conceptual approach most dramatically in the biological

sciences. An introductory course “Computers in Biology” introduces students to the
basic idea of scientific inquiry and statistics. This causes students early in their
academic careers to think quantitatively and ask questions about how we know what
we know. Major revisions have occurred in the three-semester introductory core
courses for biology majors (Plant Biology, Animal Biology, and Cell and Molecular
Biology). These courses now include more guided and open inquiry-based laboratory
activities. More emphasis has been placed on concepts rather than the traditional
content orientation that is so prevalent in introductory courses. Similar changes and
modifications are taking place in the other disciplines. Table I summarizes the
similarities and differences between the elementary and secondary programs.
In biology, for instance, “Hypothesis Testing” is an upper division course
required of all majors that has had a tremendous effect on the ability of students to
conduct real science investigations (Appendix A). Students learn basic univariate
and multivariate statistical techniques and use a set of computer generated data to
design experiments to test hypotheses. Since this course was initiated, students
entering the credential program have shown a much greater understanding of the
process of science.
TABLE I
Summary of the nature of science concepts introduced to prospective science
teachers in the elementary and secondary programs discussed here.
Elementary Program Secondary

Program
Epistemological Constructivism Constructivism
Approach
Approach Sociocultural Sociocultural
Inquiry-based Science Process of Science: Process of Science:

Focuses on directed inquiry Focuses on directed
inquiry
Majors Natural Science Major in one of the

science such as
biology, chemistry,
geology, meteo-
Non-science Majors Several majors that meet the rology or physics
multiple subjects criteria
Science Concepts Limited to general education All majors in

science courses science teaching
take one year in
each of the four
major science areas
(biology, chemistry,
geology/ meteo-
rology and physics)
in addition to
specialized courses
in their major
Science Methods Elementary Science Teaching Secondary School

courses (2 hrs/wk) Science
(6 hours per week)
Nature of Science No special course, the nature of Biology majors:

Instruction science is embedded in the Hypothesis
methods course Testing (3 hours)
All majors:
Research and
Investigation
Techniques in
Science (3 hrs)
and NOS content
embedded in the
secondary methods
course
Biology majors who enter the teaching emphasis concentration are required to
complete an experiment-based Senior Thesis. This thesis must include defining a
problem, forming a hypothesis, designing an experiment to test the hypothesis, and
analyzing data using accepted statistical procedures.
Prior to admission to the science credential program, we require that all science
credential candidates demonstrate the ability to engage in the processes of science.
First, students in our undergraduate program are required to complete both the
Hypothesis Testing course and prepare a Senior Thesis. Students who come to us
from other institutions must show evidence of similar work as demonstrated by a
research paper from a class project or industrial research of which they are the
primary or sole author.
If these conditions are not met, we offer a course “Research and Investigation
Techniques in Science” (see Appendix B). This course requires students to complete
a preliminary research paper. Then, using the results of that first paper the student
generates another related hypothesis; evaluates that second hypothesis and writes a
second paper that incorporates both research questions. We believe that these
experiences, at least, give preservice teachers an authentic view of what science is.
It is a basic introduction to the process of science. These requirements are in line
with new guidelines and standards for teacher preparation at both the state
(Commission on Teacher Credentialing, 1992) and national (NRC 1995) levels.
We have recently designed and implemented a capstone course for senior science
and mathematics majors, and available to inservice teachers, that emphasizes
integration of science and mathematics. Using the Science Framework for the State
of California (California Department of Education, 1990) as a guide, the course
includes a curriculum based upon the theme of Evolution. The major thrust of this
course is to demonstrate to preservice mathematics and science teachers how the
various disciplines interact, rely upon each other, and form the basis for scientific
knowledge. It emphasizes the nature of scientific inquiry in bringing about or
modifying knowledge. In the course, we are more interested in how scientific
knowledge is constructed rather than on the end product itself.
During a fifth year, credential students are in one of the two (elementary or
secondary) programs. During this year, they take a course in science teaching
methods and student teach. These courses emphasize the nature of science as it
applies directly to teaching science.
An “Elementary Science Teaching” course (two hours per week) is taken by all
elementary teaching credential candidates. Few of these students have a rich science
background. While the course places priority on the nature of science, via inquiry,
it is not sufficient to prepare students to teach science. Students who major in
Natural Science take a separate science methods course taught by science faculty.
This course emphasizes the nature of science and builds upon the science
background of its students. In these methods courses there is an emphasis on science
from a sociocultural perspective (Barba, 1998).
Essentially, faculty members share a constructivist view of knowledge (Saunders
1992) from a socio-cultural position. A constructivist view of knowledge fits in well
with the “new philosophy of science” described by Strahler (1992) who contrasts
previous philosophies of science (e.g., logical positivism) with our current
understanding of how scientific knowledge is acquired. While scientific knowledge

may be viewed through a number of different lenses, constructivism is a more
appropriate approach when the multicultural nature of our students is taken into
account.
Recently, a science emphasis student teaching section (Parsons and Reynolds
1995) was initiated in the elementary teaching credential program to assist student
teachers interested in science teaching regardless of their science background. This
section tends to attract students who have had science or technology related work
experiences, or who have recently discovered that they have an interest in science.
This special section places student teachers with science teacher leaders during their
field experience. The science teacher leaders help to facilitate science teaching by
the student teachers. While this is still an experimental student teaching experience,
the idea has received support from local school districts, science teachers, and
science educators. The majority of students in this section plan to complete a
supplemental authorization in science which will enable them to teach science
through grade 8..
In the secondary science methods course (six hours a week), we include
discussions and activities dealing with the limits of scientific inquiry, the tentative
nature of scientific knowledge, the differences between science and technology,
controversial topics in science, and how science interfaces with society. Students
identify major concepts in their field and prepare a teaching unit that addresses one
of those concepts. In the preparation of their teaching unit, students address the
nature of science by preparing a series of inquiry-based lessons using a variety of
teaching techniques.
During the student teaching phases of the secondary credential program, students
are teamed with science teacher leaders (described below in the inservice program
ISISS). These lead teachers have been chosen because of their science expertise and
understanding of the importance of the nature of science in science education.
It is important for future teachers to understand that science is but one way to
know and that they have a basic understanding of the process and nature of science.
Teachers thus prepared are better able to address the educational concerns and needs
of the majority of our population who will not become scientists, nor go on to
college.
INSERVICE SCIENCE EDUCATION AND THE NATURE OF SCIENCE
We maintain and cultivate an active and positive relationship with local science
teachers. Two of our recent inservice programs, Improving Science Instruction in
Secondary Schools (ISISS) and Evolution and The Nature of Science (ENSI), both
funded by the National Science Foundation, were directed at improving high school
science teaching by improving the basic understanding of the nature of science.
The primary objective of the ENSI project is founded on three basic theses:
. . . first, that a clear understanding of the tentative and self-revising nature ofscience is an especially powerful
vehicle for fostering higher order critical thinking; second, that evolution can only be appropriately understood
and taught within a framework emphasizing the nature of science and third, that the teaching of both evolution
and the nature ofscience can be enhanced considerably by helping teachers make curricular and lesson revision
ongoing, self-correcting, and experimental enterprises.
The Evolution and Nature of Science Institute is not limited to local science teachers,
but it brings together educators from throughout the country to act as catalysts for
change in science teaching. (See Nelson, et al. in this volume for a description).
The ISISS project has had a more local effect. It is designed primarily to update
science teachers’ content knowledge, give them experience in the process of science,
and to develop a cadre of lead teachers that will be able to bring about change in
science teaching. During two recent summers the participating science teachers
were involved in experimental field investigations and subsequent curriculum
development based upon the results of these field studies. The idea was to have the
teachers conduct ‘real science’ investigations of their own design and use the results
to generate inquiry-based lessons for the classroom. A series of meetings in the
spring and early summer allowed the teachers time to pose questions, develop
hypotheses, and design field experiments to test their hypotheses. We then spent two
to three weeks in the field to collect data. During the following fall and winter the
results were used to generate curricula for use in the classroom. One such unit that
was developed involves the population ecology of small mammals implemented this
year. Another involves a study of changes in the water chemistry along the entire
drainage of the American River system.
San Jose State University, San Jose, California, USA
REFERENCES
AAAS (1993). Benchmarks for science literacy, New York, Oxford University Press.
AAAS (1989). Project 2061: Science for all Americans, Washington, D.C., American Association for the
Advancement of Science.
Barba, R. (1998). Science in the multicultural classroom, 2nd ed, Boston, MA, Allyn and Bacon.
California Department of Education (1990). Science framework, Sacramento, CA, California State
Department of Education.
Cobern, W. W. (1993). ‘College Students’ Conceptualizations of Nature: An Interpretive World View
Analysis’, Journal of Research in Science Teaching, (30), 935-95 1.
Commission on Teacher Credentialing (1992). Science teacher preparation in California: Standards of
qualify and effectiveness for subject matter programs, Sacramento, CA, California State Department
of Education
Hempel, C. G. (1966). Philosophy of Natural Science, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall, Inc.
Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions, 2nd ed., Chicago, IL, The University of Chicago
Press.
Lawson, A. E. (1995). Science teaching and the development of thinking, Belmont, CA, Wadsworth
Publishing Co.
Lewis, R. W. (1993). ‘The nature of scientific knowledge debated, Letter to the Editor’, The American
Biology Teacher, (55), 262.
National Research Council (1990). Fulfilling the promise: Biology education in the nation’s schools,
Washington, D. C., National Academy Press.
National Research Council (1995). National Science Education Standards, Washington, D.C, National
Academy Press.
Nussbaum, J. (1989). ‘Classroom conceptual change: Philosophical perpectives’, in D. E. Herget (ed.), The
History and Philosophy of Science in Science Teaching, Tallahassee, FL, Florida State University,
278-91.
Parsons, S. and Reynolds, K. (1995). Establishing an action research agenda for preservice and inservice
teachers collaboration on self-empowerment in science, Paper presented at the Annual General Meeting
of the National Association of Research in Science Teaching, San Francisco, CA
Saunders, W. L. (1992). ‘The constructivist perspective: Implications and teaching strategies for science’,
School Science and Mathematics, (92), 136-14 1.
Strahler, A N. (1992). Understanding science: An introduction to concepts and issues, Buffalo, NY,
Prometheus Books.
Tobin, K. , Davis, N. , Shaw, K. , and Jakubowski, E. (199 1). ‘Enhancing science and mathematics teaching’,
Journal of Science Teacher Education, (2), 85-89.
von Glasersfeld, E. (1989). ‘Cognition, construction of knowledge, and teaching, Synthese,(80),
121-140.
APPENDIX A
Hypothesis Testing: A Course Description
This is a course in applied statistics for biologists planning to conduct manipulative experiments. The intent
of the course is to provide biologists with training in experimental design and quantitative analyses in cases
where specific experimental hypotheses are to be tested. Material for the course will consist of lecture, readings
from the textbook, and practical experience in computing statistical procedures by hand and with the aid of a
computer. Theory and concepts will be covered in lectures and reading assignments. Practical experience is
provided through assigned problems requiring both hand calculations and computer-based computation.
APPENDIX B
Experimentation and Investigation Techniques in Science:
A Course Description
This course deals with analytical thinking and experimental design in science – processes that are vital to the
success of the scientific enterprise. Together, these processes are often called the scientific method, but, in
reality, there exists not one method, but a series of variations on the general investigative theme that can be
logically applied to selected cases. In this course you will apply the skills of analytical thinking to scientific
investigations.
This course is designed primarily to meet the needs of future science teachers, who must understand
scientific processes in order to teach science effectively, but any student of science should understand these
principles as part of their training. This course requires considerable independence and assumes the student is
motivated to pursue the methodology ofscience. In effect, this course has more of the format of an independent
research project than it does the format of conventional science courses. Furthermore, this course deals with
the skill of scientific thinking, rather than with any specific knowledge of scientific content. Thus, evaluation
of student performance in this course is based on the student’s competence and productivity in the skills of
scientific design, experimentation, and written communication.
Skills are learned by practice in a laboratory experience with students performing most ofthe design and
analysis required. The instructor is a coach and not a lecturer and beginning in the second week of the
semester, students will be the “thinkers in charge” of projects. Consequently, students must assume a high
degree of independence and responsibility for your own learning.
Because scientific investigation requires the collection and data analysis, the experimental protocols must
be exact and allow quantification when possible. To simplify the need for complex equipment while
simultaneously providing experience with software that can be used in science teaching, students will use
instruments that interface with a computer. The software will display and record the data so you will not be
burdened with these details initially.
The course begins by having students gain familiarity with microcomputer-based laboratory probes
followed by the generation of research questions that can be subjectedto classic hypothesis testing procedures.
Each student then performs the specific experiment to test the prediction. Students are evaluated based on their
experimental design, analysis (including the use of basic statistical tests) and written presentation.
YVONNE MEICHTRY
14. ELEMENTARY SCIENCE TEACHING METHODS:

DEVELOPING AND MEASURING STUDENT VIEWS ABOUT
THE NATURE OF SCIENCE
This chapter provides an overview of the nature of science components within a

3-credit hour elementary science methods course. These components include both
scientific inquiry and the character of scientific knowledge. Scientific inquiry is
described as those processes used to generate and test scientific knowledge. The
nature of scientific knowledge, as defined by Rubba and Anderson (1978), is
portrayed as developmental (tentative), testable (capable of empirical test), creative
(partially a product of human creativity), and unified (the specialized sciences
contribute to an interrelated network of laws, theories, and concepts). Although a
distinction is made between scientific inquiry and the character of scientific
knowledge, the interdependent nature of these two areas is made evident. Defining
the nature of science in this way has proven useful with this student population not
only because their understanding of these aspects of the nature of science is very
limited, but because these definitions are applicable to the teaching of elementary
grade students.
DESCRIPTION OF THE COURSE
During the course, strategies are used to reveal, change, and assess student views
about the nature of science prior to, during, and upon completion of the course.
Various teaching approaches and activities are integrated within the course to help
students develop more adequate views about the nature of science. In addition to
strategies designed to develop understandings about the nature of science, an attempt
is made to help these students relate what they learned in their methods class about
the nature of science to the teaching of elementary science.
Instructional strategies applied throughout the semester enhance the learning of
preservice teachers in a number of ways. By modeling effective teaching strateges
for use with elementary students, providing “real” science experiences for preservice
teachers to construct their own knowledge of the nature of science, allowing time for
reflection on new understandings, and making an explicit connection between the
learning of preservice and elementary students, preservice teachers not only develop
their own understandings while learning effective teaching strategies; they also gain
insights about the ways that their future students experience learning.
231
W. F. McComas (ed.) The Nature of Science in Science Educahon, 231-241.
232 Y. MEICHTRY
The study of the nature of science throughout the semester is addressed through
the broader context of scientific literacy. The definition of scientific literacy used in
this science methods course is characterized by four general themes. These themes
are: 1) basic understandings of the knowledge base of science, 2) the understanding
of and ability to use scientific processes, 3) the use of higher order thinking skills,
and 4) scientific attitudes and values. Specific attitudes and values discussed include
objectivity, openness, the value of trial and error, intellectual honesty, and tolerance
for ambiguity.
DESCRIPTION OF TEACHING METHODS
During the one-semester elementary science methods course, students receive direct
classroom instruction for a period of 12 weeks and complete a 4-week field
experience in the schools. The class meets for a period of 75 minutes, twice weekly.
Major course requirements and experiences include the following elements designed
to integrate the nature of science:
1) daily hands-on, inquiry learning,

2) teaching a learning cycle lesson to peers and to elementary students,
(including a reflective analysis about what was learned about science and
science teaching),
3) conducting a controlled research experiment involving observations made
over time, writing a research report, and sharing results with peers, as well
as a follow-up reflective analysis of the long-range experiment, summarizing
what was learned about the nature of scientific inquiry and how such an
experiment might be structured in an elementary classroom,
4) field assignments involving science teaching, interviewing children for a
variety of purposes, and describing science programs used in schools and
classrooms,
5) development of a unit that integrates science with other subject areas,
6) quizzes and a final exam.
Students enrolled in this methods course are college seniors and graduate
students seeking teacher certification. The vast majority of these students participate
in the methods sequence the semester before student teaching. At minimum, students
have taken a biology course taught by science faculty members and two physical
science courses taught by science education faculty specifically for elementary
education majors. Each of these three science courses has a laboratory component.
ELEMENTARY SCJENCE METHODS 233
Learning Cycle Lessons
One strategy used to develop student understanding of the nature of science is the
learning cycle approach. This approach is taught and modeled by the instructor
during the beginning of the semester. After students have participated in three
different lessons taught by the instructor using a learning cycle approach, the various
phases of concept exploration, invention, and application are defined and discussed.
The discussion of this approach focuses on the learning benefits in the context of the
four areas of scientific literacy mentioned previously: the science content knowledge
base is learned through an exploration and discovery process actually used by
scientists in their work to generate scientific knowledge, students are engaged in
higher-order thinking using the processes of science, and the attitudes and values of
scientific inquiry are developed through a trial and error method and atmosphere of
openness.
After experiencing the learning cycle in the role of an elementary student, these
preservice teachers are then required to select a concept and teach this concept to
their peers, using the learning cycle approach. As part of this requirement, students
write a reflective analysis about what they learned about science and science teaching
as a result of using the learning cycle approach to teach a peer lesson. Questions to
which students respond are shown in Table I. Questions three and four, in
particular, are designed to elicit changes in students’ understandings and beliefs
about scientific inquiry and the nature of scientific knowledge.
TABLE I
Reflective analysis of peer lesson
1) Describe what you believe went very well (strengths of the lesson). Explain
your response.
2) Would you do anytlung differently next time you teach the same lesson? If
so, what would you do differently and why? If not, why?
3) Describe what you have learned about science and science teaching as a
result of teaching this lesson.
4) Explain any change(s) in attitudes or beliefs about science teaching that took
place as a result of planning and teaching this lesson.
5) Describe any fears that existed about teaching this lesson to your peers.
Were these fears realized or diminished as a result of teaching the lesson?
234 Y. MEICHTRY
Students’ peer lessons are scheduled throughout the semester. The length of peer
lessons averages thirty minutes. An attempt is made to schedule all of the peer
lessons prior to the field experience. The idea is to allow students to “practice” with
their peers prior to teaching a learning cycle lesson with elementary students.
Design and Implementation of a Long-Range Research Experiment
Another teaching strategy resulting in improved understanding of the nature of

science is to have students conduct a long-range experiment. Research questions
have included how light affects the quality of plant life, which household cleaner is
most effective at stopping bacterial growth, what factors affect the spoiling of a
banana, and how will the addition of oil affect the evaporation rate of water?
Students, working alone or in small groups, are in complete control of this
experience, from the development of a research question which interests them to the
formulation of a hypothesis, the design of a controlled experiment, the collection and
recording of data, the interpretation of results, and the drawing of conclusions based
on their results. Students are required to submit a written report of their work and
share their results with the “scientific community” of their peers. The guidelines for
the written report are presented in Figure II.
TABLE II
Guidelines for the completion of the long-range experiment
1. Research question - state clearly the question you are investigating.
2. Hypothesis - state your prediction regarding the answer to the

research question.
3. Materials - list all materials and amounts/number of materials used

to conduct the experiment.
4. Procedure written clearly enough so that other “scientists” could

easily replicate the experiment with a step by step list including how
you set up the experiment, what are the controls and variables, and
what methods were used to collect and record data.
5. Record of data collected - include all data collected during the

experiment, in an easy to interpret form. This form could be a table,
ELEMENTARY SCIENCE METHODS 235
graph, organized notes, photographs, or a combination of these. Be

as specific as possible in your descriptions of data.
6. Results - write a narrative which describes the data collected

throughout the experiment. Information presented in visual displays
should be interpreted for the reader.
7. Conclusions - begin this part of your report by stating whether the

hypothesis is accepted or rejected. State your reasons for this
decision. Explain what the “research community” can learn from the
results of your experiment. Include any research questions which you
would recommend for follow-up or future research about the same
topic or similar topics.
8. Bibliography - list references used to help conduct the experiment.
Students submit their written research report and make an oral presentation of
their research study to classmates, and are then given a follow-up written assignment
to be due the following class period. This follow-up assignment requires that
students summarize the individual learning that occurred as a result of conducting
the long-range experiment. Students are asked what they learned about the nature
of scientific inquiry as a result of conducting this experiment and what ideas about
structuring long-range experimentation and observation with elementary students
they developed.
The questions and instructions provided for this summary are open-ended. The
intent of the instructor, employing a constructivist approach, is to assess learning
about the nature of science “constructed” by students as a result of actually using the
scientific inquiry process. For that reason, the students are asked to respond to the
two questions immediately upon completion of the experiment, written report and
oral presentation, prior to any class discussion.
A constructivist approach is used during the learning cycle lessons and
long-range experiment by providing students with a common, first-hand experience
upon which they construct their own understandings about the nature of science.
Topics related to the nature of science are not discussed by the instructor until
students first have the opportunity to construct their own understandings.
Instructional emphasis is placed on the inquiry process of generating knowledge, the
developmental, testable and creative nature of scientific knowledge, and the scientific
attitudes and values of objectivity, openness, importance of basing conclusions on
scientific evidence, intelligent “failure,” and the social context of science.
Instructions for the reflective analyses following both experiences are consistent with
236 Y. MEICHTRY
the constructivist approach in that students are provided with open-ended questions,
which allow them to construct and synthesize their own learning.
Quiz: The Nature of Science
Once the long-range experiment and reflective analysis are completed and discussed,
students take one of four quizzes given during the semester. The quiz requires
students to react to the appropriateness of any one of the following three statements
below: The results of my experiment proved that mold grows best under moist and
warm conditions; The hypothesis of my experiment was wrong, or The results of my
experiment are wrong. Students are also presented with the following scenario and
asked to explain what it tells thetn about the nature of scientific knowledge: Natural
philosophers once held that the earth was the center of the solar system. They now
have shifted their view and have put the sun in the center.
In addition to these two questions, students are presented with a hypothetical
situation in which an elementary student has set up an experiment with two control
variables. Students are to read the scenario and then determine whether the
conclusions of the experiment were valid. They are not told that there are two
control variables. This scenario is as follows:
Clarietta Rutherford, a student at Mayfield Elementary School, developed the

following research question, “How do the emotions of hate and love affect
plant growth?” She plants Bermuda grass in two separate containers and
shows hate toward one plant and love toward the other. After three days, the
plant toward which she showed love is thriving, a healthy green color, and
several inches taller than the plant toward which she showed hate, which is
visibly dying. She concluded from this experiment that showing the emotion
of love toward a plant positively affects its growth, while showing an emotion
of hate toward a plant will have negative effects on the growth. When asked
by her teacher if she had watered both plants equally. “NO,” she replied,
“Why should I water I plant that I hate?” Are the conclusions drawn by
Clarietta valid?
EVALUATING THIS STRATEGY:

MEASURES OF STUDENT VIEWS ABOUT THE NATURE OF SCIENCE
Several tools and techniques are used to measure student views on the first and last
day of class, in addition to gauging their evolving views at several points during the
semester. The intent is to determine the extent and nature of change in student views
about the nature of science and science teaching as a result of different classroom
experiences and as a result of the combined classroom work during the semester.
Learning Cycle Lesson
Student responses as part of the reflective analysis frequently indicate that they have
developed understandings about the nature of science. These understandings include
the objectivity and open-mindedness involved in drawing conclusions, the
tentativeness of scientific results, the importance of “scientific evidence,” the
importance of trial and error, and the importance of replicating results. In addition
to developing an understanding of the nature of science, students become aware of
the importance of developing the same understandings of their future students.
Conducting Long-Range Experiments: Understandings Developed
Student responses to the question, “What did you learn about the nature of scientific
inquiry as a result of conducting this experiment?” overwhelmingly reveal a greater
depth of student understanding, and in many cases, the development of a more
positive attitude toward the usefulness of scientific inquiry. Although a great
number of students said explicitly that they developed a greater understanding of
scientific inquiry as a result of conducting the long-range experiment, it is evident
that all respondents acquire a greater understanding. Examples of student responses
are presented in Table III.
TABLE III
Student responses to the long range experiment
Students have indicated that:
The inquiry process generates more questions.

Having an open mind about experimental results is important.
The inquiry process is a never-ending search for knowledge.
The usefulness of the steps of the scientific method is evident.
The meaning of trial and error in science is more clear.
Conclusions are often inconclusive and lead to other questions, hypotheses,
and experiments.
Results can change each time you do an experiment.
238 Y. MEICHTRY
When an experiment has been done many times, you should still say that the
results “indicate” that . . .
Repeating experiments is important to get valid results.
Hypotheses are never wrong. They’re just not supported by results.
Experiments don’t fail - you learn from results.
The results of an experiment don’t “prove” anything.
Inquiry involves creative thinking.
Science experiments can and should be simple.
The simplest of experiments can yield much information.
An area of positive change that occurs as a result of students conducting the

long-range experiment, not reflected in Table III, concerns an internal shift in
student belief systems that is very important to understanding the nature of science.
Many of the students describe a shift in feelings from initially being very
disappointed by having to reject their hypothesis to feelings of “it’s really okay if the
hypothesis is rejected.” One student even said she was glad her hypothesis was
rejected because of what she learned!
Another interesting result is that many students state the experience of
conducting a long-range experiment was their first ever. One student said it was his
second experience, the first being a 7th grade science fair project.
Conducting Long-Range Experiments With Elementary Students
Although many responses to the question, “What are your ideas about structuring
long-range experimentation with elementary students?” relate to areas of learning
not directly related to the nature of science, such as structure of student groups and
time issues, there are numerous and varied responses related to the nature of science.
First, virtually every student notes the importance of doing long-range
experimentation with elementary students. This in itself, is viewed as a remarkable
and significant result of students conducting their own experiment in a methods
course.
The most frequent response given is the importance of teaching children that they
have not failed if their experimental results are not what they expected. Another
frequent response is the importance of children being involved in the development
and progress of the experiment from beginning to end. Several students mention the
importance of having students develop their own questions to investigate. Other
responses include the importance of teaching the processes of scientific methods, the
relevance of experimentation to real life, development of clear research questions,
hypothesizing, observation skills, the concept of controls and variables, methods of
reliable data collection, and basing conclusions on experimental evidence.

The developmental, testable, and creative nature of scientific knowledge are
represented in student responses to how long-range experimentation should be
conducted with elementary students. The most significant growth in understanding,
as reported by students, relates to the developmental nature of scientific knowledge.
Semester Results: Qualitative Analysis
As part of the final semester assessment, students are asked to respond to the
questions, “What is science?,” and “How do you think science should be taught at
the elementary level?”
Regarding the question, “What is science?,” on the first day of class, students
heavily emphasize the knowledge element of science in their definition of science
and description of how it should be taught. Their views about the processes of
science are largely incomplete. Pre- and post-responses relating to science content
include the environment, the branches of science, use of fact, theories, and laws,
ways of describing the world, physical and abstract view of world, an answer to
many questions, and core subjects dealing with both known and unknown factors.
Most important, the number of student responses related to science as a process
doubled when comparing the post responses to the pre-responses. Examples of
process-oriented responses include a way of thinking about problems and curiosities,
a method of discovery, an organized process in which ideas are tested, conducting
an experiment to test a hypothesis, science is ever-changing and growing with new
information, systematic approach to obtain knowledge, involves repeated trials,
science is an ever-changing experience, discovery-inquiry-exploration, and going
through a process that involves thinking and may involve attitudes and values.
With respect to the question about how elementary science should be taught,
there is a significant decrease in the number of content-oriented responses relating
the teaching of elementary science when comparing the post- and pre-responses.
Examples of content-oriented responses include how science affects students,
teaching basic facts, understanding versus memory, teaching of concepts
sequentially, and teaching about animals, habitats, substances, etc. The number of
responses which relate directly to teaching about the nature of science more than
double from pre- to post-response. Examples of responses which relate to the nature
of science include the following: teach basic methods of discovery, teach and apply
scientific methods, hands-on learning for the purpose of teaching process, as a
process to gain knowledge, finding answers to self-questions, design their own
means of solving problems, and allow students to test theories.
240 Y. MEICHTRY
Semester Results: Quantitative Analysis
The Modified Nature of Scientific Knowledge Scale (MNSKS), developed by

Meichtry (1992), is also used to measure and compare student views about four
dimensions of the nature of scientific knowledge at the beginning and end of the
semester. The four dimensions of scientific knowledge measured are the
developmental, testable, creative, and unified nature of science. The MNSKS is a
modified version of the Nature of Scientific Knowledge Scale (NSKS), developed by
Rubba and Anderson (1978). Original modifications of the NSKS, based on
readability, reliability issues, and changing views of the nature of scientific
knowledge, were made to create a more suitable instrument for use with middle
school students.
The MNSKS is administered as a pretest on the first day of class after students
responded to the questions, “What is science” and “How should science be taught at
the elementary level?” The MNSKS is administered after students have responded
to the same two questions as a pretest. In addition to an overall score on the
MNSKS, mean scores for each of the four subscales (developmental, testable,
creative, and unified) are calculated.
To determine whether the post-test mean scores of each of the four subscales of
the MNSKS and the overall instrument differ significantly from pre-test mean
scores, a paired comparison t-test analysis is conducted. To determine statistical
significance at the .05 level, t statistics are calculated.
TABLE IV
Paired-comparison t-test for the MNSKS pretest and posttest
Variable Mean Difference STD Error t PROB
Developmental 1.31 0.38 0.0009

Testable 2.03 0.53 0.0003
Creative 2.30 0.56 0.0001
unified 1.39 0.39 0.0007
MNSKS Overall 6.49 1.19 0.0001
N=67
The results of the paired t-test analysis, presented in Table IV, indicate that the
increase in student understanding of the nature of scientific knowledge during the
semester is statistically significant at the 0.001 level. The results presented here,
based on three classes of students during the same semester, are typical.
CONCLUSIONS
Given the time constraints on the one-semester elementary science methods course,
instructors must be selective about what they teach to best prepare students to teach
science. Developing student understandings of the nature of science is one of many
areas to be addressed. The results reported here indicate that students begin their
methods course with understandings of the nature of science which are largely
incomplete. The results also indicate the potential of developing more complete
understandings about the nature of science as a result of integrating teaching
strategies throughout the semester. The students enrolled in this elementary science
methods course develop significantly greater understanding about the nature of
science throughout the semester, providing a sound foundation upon which students
can continue to develop their understandings. These newly-acquired understandings
increase the potential that these prospective teachers will assist their own students
in developing authentic understandings and beliefs related to the nature of science.
Northern Kentucky University, Highland Heights, Kentucky, USA
REFERENCES
Meichtry, Y. (1992). ‘Influencing student understanding of the nature of science: Data from a case of
curriculum development’ Journal of Research in Science Teaching, (29), 389-407.
Rubba, P. & Anderson, H. (1978). ‘Development of an instrument to assess secondary school students’
understanding of the nature of scientific knowledge’, Science Education, (62) 449-458.
KAREN SULLENGER AND STEVE TURNER
15. NATURE OF SCIENCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION

AN UNDERGRADUATE COURSE FOR PROSPECTIVE
TEACHERS
The Nature of Science: Implications for Education is an introductory science

education course offered as part of a Bachelor of Education degree program by the
Faculty of Education at the University of New Brunswick in Fredericton, New
Brunswick, Canada. The course was developed and is taught by a science educator
and a historian of science, who share concerns about the limited understanding of
science and the nature of science that most prospective teachers demonstrate.
After teaching undergraduate science methods courses for six years, the science
educator believes that the majority of preservice teachers interested in teaching
secondary level science represent the minority who found high school science a
successful experience; they represent those who are interested and succeed in
university science programs. Further, the science educator believes that the greatest
barrier to most beginning teachers’ becoming effective teachers of science is their
own science experience. Those who had predominantly positive science experiences
see no need to change either their views of science or the understanding of science
we should expect of high school graduates. Those who had negative and less
successful science experiences have little self-confidence in either discussing what
science is or how it should be taught. Regardless of background, the science educator
has yet to find a preservice teacher who challenges the notion of science as defined
by topics alone. Prospective elementary teachers generally talk about science as the
study of such topics as rocks, butterflies, trees, clouds, or magnets; these students
portray science as “owning parts of the world.” Prospective secondary teachers often
describe science as disciplines, such as biology, chemistry, physics, or sometimes
more specifically, astronomy, biochemistry, or ecology; these students parcel science
as knowledge into clearly bounded units and subunits. The textbooks, curricula, and
science classes these students experienced, which also generally portray science as
a series of topics or disciplines to be covered, are the context within which their
notions of science were constructed.
The historian of science was aware that students, including science students, lack
understanding of the radically revised conceptions of science that have come out of
work in the philosophy, history, and sociology of science in the past four decades.
In this period, a new and historically-informed philosophy of science began to
challenge traditional models of scientific change, especially falsificationist models.
243
244 K. SULLENGER AND S. TURNER
More recent trends, mainly rooted in sociology, have emphasized the

social-constructivist aspect of science and the “negotiated” nature of scientific
knowledge-claims. More recently still, science has been subjected to more explicitly
political criticism for its alleged masculine and Western ethnocentric assumptions.
In different ways, each of these trains of thought envisions science as an enterprise
much more firmly embedded in, and more deeply conditioned by, society and culture
than was believed to be the case thirty years ago or than is widely assumed today.
Yet most science teachers still enter upon their careers with only a fleeting
awareness of these revised concepts of science.
Together we wanted to find a way to encourage preservice teachers to clarify and
articulate their own tacit notions of science and teaching science by challenging
them with alternate conceptions of science shown within the history of science, and
held by the science education and science communities. We not only wanted to
introduce prospective teachers to the debates concerning science and its nature, but
we wanted to involve them as participants in these debates. Further, we wanted
prospective science teachers to construct more complete understandings of science,
particularly for making pedagogical decisions.
After sixteen years of schooling, students are adept at being intellectually
engaged in learning the content of their courses without becoming personally
involved. However, we believe being personally involved is critical if preservice
teachers’ beliefs about science and its teaching are to be influenced. Consequently,
we tried to create a course that would be a context for involving prospective teachers
in conversations concerning what is science, what is the nature of science, what
counts as understanding science, and what our beliefs about these questions mean
for the way we teach science. The course allows those who were successful at and
interested in science to hear the voices of those with science anxiety.
THE COURSE
This course is a modified seminar with the instructors identifying and introducing
ideas and issues for discussion through readings, lectures, guests, and assignments.
The course aims to help prospective teachers identify and articulate their current
beliefs about science and about teaching science, exposes them to new arguments and
perspectives, and shares examples of other educators who question traditional
practices and approaches to science teaching.
Course Participants
The course currently draws prospective teachers from the elementary, middle, and
UNDERGRADUATE COURSE FOR PROSPECTIVE TEACHERS 245
high school-level education programs. Course participants include prospective

teachers who have wide differences in their science backgrounds and with distressing
to highly successful science experiences. The majority of prospective teachers who
enroll are at the beginning of their education program, having already completed an
undergraduate degree. A few participants are pursing two bachelor’s degrees
concurrently, and are taking this course as their first education course. Some
participants are completing their four-year B.Ed. degree (a program currently being
phased out); these students have substantial education background but little or no
science background. We found the participants’ varying backgrounds a worthwhile
challenge and considered that diversity critical to the success of the course.
We try to limit the course to thirty participants, but due to the demand we have
accepted more. Most of the preservice teachers in the course are specializing in
science education. For them, the course is one of four required for a concentration.
A few preservice teachers who are in the generalist program which requires only one
science methods course use this course to fulfill that requirement.
Course Structure and Format
The prospective teachers in our course are responsible for participating in

discussions, asking questions, and synthesizing ideas. Most prospective teachers in
this introductory course are generally unfamiliar with the ideas, issues, and
language associated with education in general, and with science education and the
history of science, in particular. To feel comfortable in their class interactions, we
found that participants need a level of background concerning the ideas and issues
being introduced, a level of trust that conversations/discussions are safe contexts in
which to speak, and a sense that such conversations lead to new understandings
either about themselves, others’ experiences, or science and the teaching/learning
of science. The first half of the course is designed to provide the background, create
such a context, and coax conversations that explore alternative perspectives,
questions, and explanations. As the course progresses, the instructors withdraw more
and more from the class conversations, leaving the structural mechanisms of the
course, e.g., the weekly question, readings, lectures, and class assignments, to create
the context for participant interaction.
To bring prospective teachers to a level of interaction where they feel comfortable
participating in discussions, the course is structured in two ways. First, classes meet
for three, one-hour sessions each week for thirteen weeks. On Mondays and
Wednesdays we introduce ideas through invited lectures and guest participants,
discussion of readings, and sharing of experiences. Fridays are reserved for small
group discussion in which participants share their responses to the week’s question
followed by class discussion. The course syllabus is provided in Appendix A.
Second, the term is organized into three sections, introducing increasing

complexity. The sections move from discussions about the understandmg of science
that guides current teaching practices, to introductory discussions of the nature of
science, to more specific discussions about the relationship between one’s beliefs
about the nature of science and teaching science. We believe that prospective
teachers usually have strong beliefs about teaching, especially about how they will
teach, when they enter the education program. Given their often-naive notions about
science as a method and enterprise, our first challenge is to make these beliefs about
science and about teaching science problematic. In the first section of the course, for
example, we present prospective teachers with data and articles indicating the
limited number of high school students who pursue science studies beyond the time
mandated and the negative attitudes that the majority of students and adults evince
about science. Participants are asked to reflect on weekly questions such as “Why
teach science in schools?” “What isn’t science?” “Is there a difference between the
public’s views of science and those of scientists’? In the views of science as taught
in schools and science as practiced?” and “Are there boundaries to science?”
Examples of assigned readings are located in Appendix A.
The goal of the first section is to encourage participants to critically examine
their notions of science, but another goal is to help participants learn to talk and
listen to one another. Reflecting on the weekly questions in journals gives everyone
something to share and encourages everyone to speak. To make the whole class
discussion equally interactive is more challenging. The instructor must provide links
between comments, pose the provocative question, and open discussion by drawing
comments and experiences from participants. The instructor must also object to
unacceptable behavior, discussion techniques, and arguments. Prospective teachers
need to be reminded of their unusual position as both “traditional student” and
“prospective teacher.” As prospective teachers, they are looking for strategies that
encourage participation and open discussions. They are asked to consider how they
would respond if the others in their class were students in their own classes and they
wanted to encourage discussion.
The next section gives participants some insight into the issues and debates raised
in contemporary science studies about the nature of science and the relationship
between science and society and science and technology. The historian of science
presents a series of five lectures over a period of as many weeks. These lectures all
carry the general title, “The Nature of Science,” and deal with science sequentially
as (a) a body of knowledge, (b) as a putative method for getting knowledge about
nature and ensuring consensus about that knowledge, (c) as a reflection of human
society and social values, (d) as technology, and (e) as “Western metaphysics.”
Under these themes, the lectures briefly introduce students to contemporary
challenges to the adequacy of scientific method for the purpose of establishing and
maintaining consensus, to the ideas of Kuhn and other revisionist philosophers of
science, and to Strong Programme theorists and the notion of science as

“construction” rather than “discovery.” The lectures invite students to consider
science as “unnatural” knowledge, the concepts of which frequently run counter to
commonsense perceptions of the world. Using several historical examples, they ask
students to question the common assumption that technological change has been a
simple outgrowth of deeper scientific understanding of the world. By discussing the
“mechanical philosophy,” of the seventeenth century, the lectures introduce the
reductionist and quasi-mechanistic commitments of mainstream science, and how
these commitments can conflict with the religious and philosophical beliefs of some
minority groups.
Following the Monday lecture presentation, the lecture and accompanying
readings are discussed at Wednesday’s class meeting. The discussion is also used
to synthesize ideas across the weeks and monitor understanding. Examples of weekly
questions include, “Is science ‘unnatural knowledge’ and if so, what are the
implications for education?” “Is science really about social issues and driven by
social interests?” “Is a Science, Technology and Society (STS) curriculum the way
to save science in our schools?” “Is science created or discovered?” and “What is
science’s contribution to understanding natural phenomena?”
During this part of the course we urge participants to begin to identify those ideas
about the nature of science with which they agree or disagree. For many of the
participants, these ideas are so new, and in some cases extreme, so that their ability
to understand, much less take a stand is very limited. We do not force participants
to choose, and for many their response after describing the various perspectives is
a fully-acceptable, “I can’t decide.”
In the third section we consider how our beliefs about science and the nature of
science influence our beliefs about teaching and learning science. We discuss such
issues as gender equity and the masculinity of science, the relationship between
science and science curricula, the nature of technology and teaching/learning
science, and the pedagogical implications for portraying science as a socially- and
culturally-influenced endeavor. We focus on the consequences of our beliefs for the
decisions we make as teachers. Participants are asked to consider what practices or
what teaching strategies they would choose if they held one belief about science
rather than another. For this section, we select readings that illustrate the struggle
for congruence between theory and practice, between one’s beliefs about
understanding science or what should count as an understanding of science and
strategies for teaching science. Examples of readings used in this section can be
found in Table I.
In this section, the weekly questions shift from the nature of science to teachers
as professionals and pedagogical decision-makers. For example, “Is science itself
responsible for the exclusion of women from scientific practice or are science
educators more responsible?” “To what extent are science and science classrooms
gender- or culture-biased?” “If science is about theory and technology is about

practice, what is the role of teaching practice versus theory in schools?” “Are
learners’ alternative constructions or models or explanations of the world ‘primitive
science’ or should we think of them as something else?” “Who is entitled to label
something as science?” “Is an STS curriculum the way to save science in our
schools?” “Should we also consider our beliefs about the nature of schools when we
consider how our beliefs about the nature of science influence teaching decisions?”
Course Assignments and Assessment
There are no formal examinations in this course, but four types of assignments are
designed to provide insight into the kinds of understandings each participant is
constructing.
1) Reflection journals are assigned to encourage reactions and provide a

mechanism for sharing ideas. Because of their varied backgrounds, many
participants are hesitant at first to talk or share their ideas during the whole
class discussion. Sharing the journal entries each Friday has been a
successful way to equip each person with a ready contribution and help them
to gain confidence in their ideas. Our goal is to encourage class members to
synthesize, react, and share without censure. We hope having to explain and
defend their ideas to others will help clarify ideas and arguments.
Participants are asked to write about assigned readings, class discussions,
and their response to the weekly question. These journals are not graded, but
are turned in at the end of the course. Completing the reflection journal
accounts for 20% of the course grade.
2) A Research Paper exploring some issue or argument of interest in more

depth than can be considered in class discussion is assigned. Participants
work individually or in groups of two or three. Few of these preservice
teachers seem familiar with writing papers that go beyond reporting bare
summaries of facts and others’ opinions. For this reason, in introducing the
research paper, we suggest that participants consider the research and
scholarly articles, individuals whom they interview, and other resources. Our
prospective teachers chose a diverse range of research paper topics. These
included “What Are the Implications of Integrating Physics and Technology
for Education?” “Integration and Science”; “History and Science: How are
They Related and How Does that Affect Student’s Views of Them as they are
Taught in the Public School System?” “Girls and Science Education” “Do
Inherent Differences Really Exist Between the Scientist and the Humanist?”
“What Counts as Understanding Science in Elementary Schools” “Science

Anxiety” “Outdoor Education and the Science Cumculum: Can We Learn
Science through Hands-On Discoveries in the Natural World?” “Informal
Science Education” “Science Literacy” and “Science and Technology.”
Participants are asked to share their topics with one another early in the
course and to jointly discuss the major ideas they uncover. The instructor
reads drafts of the papers and assists with literature searches when asked.
The research paper composes 30% of the course grade.
3) Class Assignments consisting of informal interviews, provocative questions,

and reaction papers provide participants with opportunities to introduce new
ideas and/or perspectives and to share what they have learned. They also
provide the instructors with insight into the participants’ thinking. To
provide prospective teachers with opportunities to compare their thinking
with practicing classroom teachers or research scientists, we suggest
participants ask others for their response and reactions to questions and
ideas that we are discussing in class. Often, we pose critical questions when
we introduce readings or suggest a topic for discussion at the next class.
These assignments are not graded, but we try to recognize each contribution
by refemng back to these resources and ideas during that and subsequent
discussions. Often participants bring in articles from the newspaper,
magazines, or journals. We set up a folder on reserve in the library to
provide general access to the readings. Participants write response papers in
reaction to sets of readings, guest speakers and the five lectures delivered by
the historian of science.
A typical example of these exercises, and one that we have found very successful,
is the following challenge given to students:
The Atlantic Provinces of Canada are in the process of developing a common science curriculum. One
challenge that faces those with responsibility for developing this new science program is, what understanding
of science should guide the committee’s decisions about choosing cumculum approaches and materials. What
do we want graduates of our public schools to have as an understanding of science? Our students are assigned
to provide the committee with a two-page analysis of the concerns people have about the current understanding
of science used to guide curricular decisions.
In addition to assigned readings and class discussions, students are encouraged

to use other resources, including discussions with other members of the education
or science communities. They are allowed to attach a separate page of references.
For this and for similar exercises, the members of the class are encouraged to meet
with one another, to discuss their ideas and to share resources. Our only requirement
is that each person write their own response paper. Unlike other class assignments,
the response papers are graded and figure 20% of the course grade.
4) A “Position Paper” is the final assignment of the course. This paper is an

opportunity for personal reflection, delivered in the context of the students’
describing their position on some issue or some teaching strategy related to
the course. The paper is assigned to help participants make sense of their
experience and begin to identify useful and sensible ideas. We also use the
paper as an opportunity for prospective teachers to “talk” about their
teaching practices and strategies as outgrowths of their beliefs.
STUDENTS’ REACTIONS TO THE COURSE
We were curious about the students’ reactions to the course and their experience in
it. In the term following their participation, we asked the preservice teachers to share
their reactions by responding to a questionnaire or participating in fucus group
interviews. Fourteen of the thirty-four participants responded. In their responses the
term “frustration” surfaced. Some felt frustrated that the course offered what they
perceived as insufficient practical direction for actual classroom procedure; one
commented that students were frustrated “because they were not being told how to
teach science.” Another elaborated that “people would comment on how the
approach was quite different from anything they had been exposed to before. I
believe that they were here to learn how to teach science and were angry that they
weren’t spoon fed. I was one of them.”
More commonly, however, students expressed frustration about the challenges
the course had offered to their traditional conceptions of science and its nature. One
asserted that the class had been primarily composed of successful science students,
“yet I think very few had an understanding of ‘science.’ The questions posed to us
forced us to rethink our entire school careers. This alone caused great discomfort.”
Many students were frustrated by the critical fucus of the course, in which many
competing historical, philosophical, and political conceptions of science were raised
one after the other and offered for discussion and analysis, yet in which no single
conception was labeled as adequate or correct. One complained that “every time we
thought we had an understanding of [the professor’s] view of science, we would be
frustrated again in class.” Another noted that “for a period of time students were
disoriented, became confused about how to proceed because the professor acted only
as a facilitator and responded to questions with even more questions.” One noted that
“I think you were frustrating us all the time. And so we would go talk it out and then
we would start to understand and then we think we would have what you wanted us
to think. And then you would go and frustrate us again.” Several referred to intense
discussions of the more controversial issues that had spilled over into time outside
class. One noted that “the lunch hour conversations that took place on a regular basis
allowed us to clarify what was said, why someone felt a certain way . . . The debate
always continued until die next class.” Students felt freer to express themselves
outside class, and that in turn helped to facilitate freer discussions in class.
We asked if participants believed that the course had been a success in its
long-tenn objectives: to problematize conceptions of science and prepare them to
think about the deeper pedagogical problems of science teaching. Not all of our
respondents were unifonnly positive. One questioned the abstract approach of the
course, including instructors’ basic assumption that classroom methods would
benefit from a more thoughtful and sophisticated understanding of the nature of
science. “Ask yourself,” he challenged us, “if you are doing justice by presenting this
method of teaching in a preservice class. Survival is the name of the game for
beginning teachers. Trust me -- they need substance -- otherwise we are perpetuating
the textbook approach to teaching . . .”
Other respondents, however, were more positive. They agreed that for most
individuals if not all, the course had produced changes in conceptions of science that
would lead to their teaching differently than they had been taught. As well, they
agreed that die open-ended nature of the course debates had promoted intellectual
flexibility and a tolerance for disagreement. One person noted that “the biggest
success of [the course] was in tearing down the building, not rebuilding . . . , using
[it] as a tool to rethink, not necessarily to rebuild.” “Yes,” commented another, “the
course was successful because it encouraged me to think about science teaching and
education in general. It made me realize that teaching is about creating lessons
instead of doing someone else’s prepared work.”
University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada
APPENDIX A
The Course Syllabus and Related Readings
Section I: Questing Beliefs about Science
Week 1 - Should We Be Teaching Science in Public Schools?

Week 2 - What Is This Thing Called Science?
Week 3 - What Do We Mean When We Say Someone Understands Science?
Examples of assigned readings (or portions of books as indicated by the sets of page numbers) to support the
goals of section I:
Campbell, D. N. (1989). ‘All talk: Why our students don’t learn’, Educational Horizons, (68), 3- 4.
Glasersfeld, E. von (1987). The logic of scientific fallibility, paper presented at the Eighth Biennial Conference
of the Mental Research Institute, San Francisco, CA
Hazen, R. M. (1991). ‘Why my kids hate science’, Newsweek, February 15.
Stinner, A (1 989). ‘Science, humanities, and society -- The Snow-Leavis controversy’, Interchange, (20),
16-23.
Jacobs, E. (1993). ’Bridging the gap between the two cultures’, in Stephen Tchudi (ed), The astonishing
curriculum: Integrating science and humanities through language, Urbana, IL, National Council of
Teachers of English.
Winchester, I. (1990). ‘Thought experiments and conceptual revision’, Studies in Philosophy and Education
(10) 73-80.
Wynstra, S. & Cummings, C. (1993). ‘High school science anxiety’, The Science Teacher, (60), 19-20.
Section II: Exploring Issues Concerning the Nature of Science
Weeks 4 thru 8 - What are ways in which scientists and people interested in science conceptualize (e.g.
through theories and/or philosophies) and challenge the nature of science? A series of lectures by the
historian of science.
Weeks 4 thru 8 (related discussions)
• Examining issues related to the nature of science

• Science literacy
• Who should determine what counts as knowing science in public schools?
• So what is the nature of science?
goals for section II:
Chalmers, A. F. (1976). What is this thing called science?, St Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 63-97.
Collins, H. & Pinch, T. (1993). The Golum: What everyone should know about science, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1-3, 57-78, 109-151.
Driver, R., Asoko, H., Leach J., Mortimer, E., & Scott, P. (1994). ‘Constructing scientific knowledge in the
classroom’, Educational Researcher, (23), 5-12.
Gross, P. R. & Levitt, N. (1994). Higher superstition: The academic left and its quarrels with science,
Baltimore, John’s Hopkins University Press, 1-15.
Raymond, J. (1982). ‘Rhetoric: The methodology of the humanities’, College English. (44), 778- 783.
Toffler, A (1986). ‘The third wave’, in A H. Teich (ed.), Technology and the future, 4th edition, New York,
St. Martin’s Press, 59-71.
Weinberg, AM. (1986). ‘Can technologyreplace social engineering?’, in A H. Teich (ed.), Technology and
the future, 4th edition, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 21-30.
Section III: Exploring the Relationship Between One’s Beliefs about Science and the Nature of Science
and One’s Beliefs about Teaching and Learning Science
Week 9 - Whose Science?
Week 10 - What is the relationship between the nature of science and the science curriculum?
Week 11 - Do our beliefs about the nature of science match our pedagogy?
Week 12 - In what ways does how we learned science influence our beliefs about how we should be
teaching science? Do we ever change our own thinking? How do we rethink the way we will teach when
we haven’t been in the classroom?
Week 13 - Reflection: What should count as knowing science in public schools, any answers yet?
goals of Section III:
Aikenhead, G. (1992). ‘The integration of STS into science education’, Theory Into Practice, (31), 27-35.
Apple, M. W. (1988). ‘Social crisis and curriculum accords’, Educational Theory, (38), 191-201.
Burbules, N. C & Linn, M.C. (1991). ‘Science education and philosophy of science: Congruence or
contradiction?’, International Journal of Science Education, (13), 227-241.
DeBoer, G. E. (1991). ‘A history of ideas in science education: Implications for practice, New York
Teachers College Press.
Eisner, E. W. (1991). ‘What really counts in schools’, Educational Leadership, 948), 10-11, 14- 17.
Gaskell, P. J. (1992). ‘Authentic science and school science’, International Journal of Science Education,
(14), 265-272.
Harding, S. (1991). Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?: Thinking from women’s lives, lthaca, NY, Cornell
University Press.
Heath, P. A (1992). ‘Organizing for STS teaching and learning: The doing of STS’, Theory Into Practice,
(31), 52-58.
Hills, G. L. C. (1989). ‘Students’ “untutored” beliefs about natural phenomena: Primitive science or
commonsense?’, Science Education, (73), 155-1 86.
Hodson, D. (1 988). ‘Experiments in science and science teaching’, Educational Philosophy and Theory, (20),
53-66.
Hodson, D. (1992). ‘In search of a meaningful relationship: An exploration of some issues relating to
integration in science and science education’, International Journal of Science Education, (14), 541 -562.
Mathews, M. (1994). Science teaching: The role ofhistory and of science. New York Routledge.
Mura, R. (1991). Searching for subjectivity in the world of the sciences: Feminist Viewpoints, Ottawa
CRIAW/ICREF.
Pitt, J. C. (1990). ‘The myth of science education’, Studies in Philosophy and Education, (10), 7-17.
Selley, N. J. (1989). ‘The philosophy of school science’, Interchange, (20), 24-32.
Shamos, M. (1995). The myth of scientific literacy, New Brunswick, NJ, Rutgers University Press.
Stanley, W. B. & Brickhouse, N. W. (1994). ‘Multiculturalism, universalism, and science education’, Science
Education, (78), 387-398.
DAVID BOERSEMA
16. THE USE OF REAL AND IMAGINARY CASES IN

A COURSE OUTLINE
This chapter features a discussion of a three-pronged course-based approach to the

nature of science within an upper level philosophy of science course at a small liberal
arts university. Students in this course are typically undergraduate science majors
who have chosen it as an elective to fulfill a general education requirement in the
humanities. The three elements that form the focus of instruction include an
examination of science as doctrine (i.e., content), as process (i.e., methods), and as
social institution (i.e., values). I suggest that this approach is more informative and
productive for students than traditional approaches which focus on topics such as
confirmation, explanation, realism, etc. In my course I have found it profitable and
interesting to use case studies as the basis for discussion of science and its nature.
One such case, the mass extinction debate, is particularly illustrative and will serve
as a central example of my instructional strategy in this chapter.
ORGANIZATION OF THE COURSE
Science as doctrine means that one way in which the sciences are conceived and
demarcated from non-science is in terms of what it investigates, or in terms of its
content. Many students quickly accept this distinction. After all, what students
study in biology classes is quite different from what they study in foreign language
courses. Science as process characterizes the sciences not in terms of what they
investigate — even poets and philosophers talk about evolution -- but in terms of
how they study what they study. Most students enter the philosophy of science
course proclaiming reliance on and a belief in “the scientific method.” Science as
a social institution looks at the sciences as enterprises conducted by scientists,
real-live members of society, who reflect and shape social perspectives and values.
Students are often quick to identity (and misidentify) where the sciences and society
drectly interface (e.g., nuclear power). Table I is an outline of the course, with the
section on “epistemic concepts” focusing on doctrine, “change and progress”
examining process, and “values and society” investigating social institutions.
255
256 D. BOERSEMA
TABLE I
Course Outline
Weeks 1-4 Epistemic concepts (e.g., observation, measurement,

experimentation, models, theories, explanation, confirmation)
Weeks 5-7 Scientific change and progress (e.g., inductivism,

falsificationism, historicism, rational reconstructionism,
pragmatism)
Weeks 8-1 1 Values and society (e.g., science and values, technology and
culture)
Weeks 12-15 Mass extinctions case study
What is Science?
An Analysis of an Imaginary Case Study
These three foci of doctrine, process, and institution are illustrated with an
opening-day discussion based on an excerpt from an article entitled
“Umbrellaology,” by Somerville (1941). (See Appendix A for an abridged version).
This article encourages students to offer their own assumptions, presuppositions, and
intuitions about the nature of science. Not only has this piece generated immediate
and profitable dissidence in class, but also, since students see it again on the last day
of the term, it has served as a useful “pretest-posttest” tool for the students’ own
thinking about science relative to the course. Class discussions ensue after students
spend a few minutes reading the excerpt, after which I call for a show of hands of
students who believe that umbrellaology is a science and who believe it is not. Of
course, students are asked to provide justification for their positions. Students
typically offer reasons for and against umbrellaology that parallel the arguments
given in the excerpt itself. After discussion, including the writing of arguments and
responses on the board, we conclude by noting that many of the claims made during
the discussion appear to be based on varying views of what science is. Some of those
views reveal a notion of science as doctrine, some of science as process, and some
of science as institution. This allows me to indicate to the class the sorts of topics
which will be covered throughout the term.
While the point of this exercise is not to get to “the right answer” regarding the
status of umbrellaology as a science, students often want to know the right answer.
NATURE OF SCIENCE AND MASS EXTINCTION 257
A major course goal is to have students appreciate the complexities involved in

identifying any endeavor as science, and I indicate that as the course proceeds
fruitful perspectives will emerge on just what constitutes science. Nevertheless, there
are features of umbrellaology that philosophers of science would see as scientific,
though few philosophers of science would suggest that those features clearly
constitute science. For example, while few current philosophers of science would
claim that science can or does begin with interest-neutral observation, a focused
gathering of data is necessary for science. Likewise, the extrapolation and
subsequent testing of data, which occurs in umbrellaology, is necessary for science.
Without question, there are features of science within umbrellaology, which is why
it is a useful case to foster discussion and analysis among students. What, then, are
arguments against umbrellaology’s claim to be science? Besides the questionable
assumption of disinterested observation as a starting point for investigation,
umbrellaology seems to lack any theoretical explanatory power. In Lakatos’s terms,
there is no positive heuristic suggestive of a progressive research programme. In
Laudan’s terms there is no problem-solving focus, recognizing - and distinguishing
- empirical and conceptual problems to be solved. The only fruitful aspect of
umbrellaology seems to be that it provides more descriptive information. The course
is set up, of course, to look at just these sorts of issues throughout the term.
Besides having students wrestle with their views on the nature of science, the
discussion of this article allows us to pursue several pedagogical and philosophical
goals. First, the types of arguments presented both pro and con on the scientific
status of “umbrellaology” permit the analysis of science as doctrine, process, and
institution. Second, it easily enables me to address (and investigate throughout the
term) basic elements and activities of science such as modes of information gathering
and organizing, of testing and accounting for phenomena, of enhancing upon and
extrapolating data, etc. Third, it helps foster a conceptual understanding of science
and the “doing” of philosophy of science (i.e., using philosophical methods of
analysis on concepts within and about science). The enunciation and appreciation
of these three goals are piqued by the umbrellaology discussion, and, as a result, they
are more easily met later in the term by the incorporation of a sustained case study,
namely, the presently ongoing debates concerning mass extinctions of life.
SCIENCE AS DOCTRINE, PROCESS AND SOCIAL INSTITUTION
Science As Doctrine
With respect to science as doctrine, the focus is not on specific scientific claims, but
on conceptual issues related to scientific claims, or “epistemic concepts.” Such
258 D. BOERSEMA
concepts are connected to science as a body of knowledge. Included in this

discussion are concepts and issues such as the nature and role of observation,
measurement, experimentation, models, and theories. For example, in looking at the
issue of observation, the article by Hanson (1972) argues for the interest- and
theory-ladenness of observation, while the article by Scheffler (1982) challenges
Hanson’s view. Or as we consider the notion of experimentation in science, we look
at the conceptual complexities of experimentation by analyzing Duhem’s (1954)
claim that no experiment is “crucial” in the sense of settling the status of hypotheses,
since in the context of experimentation many auxiliary hypotheses are also being
tacitly tested.
TABLE II
Readings to support the discussion of epistemic concepts
‘The Lonely Bird’ (August 17, 1991), Science News, (140), 104.
‘Fossil jaw offers clue to human ancestry’ (October 30, 1993), Science News, (144),
277.
‘Earth’s heart beats with a magnetic rhythm’ (October 30, 1993), Science News,
(144), 327.
‘Babies’ brains charge up to speech sounds’ (July 30, 1994), Science News, (146),
71.
‘Catching the flutter of a falling leaf‘ (September 17, 1994), Science News, (146),
183.
‘Genetic sleuths explain insects’ resistance’ (September 17, 1994), Science News
(148), 247.
Achinstein, P. (1968). ‘Theories’, in Concepts of Science, Baltimore, MD, Johns
Hopkins University Press, 121-137.
Duhem, P. (1954). ‘Physical theory and experiment’, in The aim and structure of
physical theory, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 180-218.
Ellis, B. (1966). ‘Fundamental measurement’, in Basic concepts of measurement,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 74-89.
Friedman, M. (1974). ‘Explanation and scientific understanding’, The Journal of
Philosophy (71), 5-19.
Gooding, D. (1993). ‘What is experimental about thought experiments?’, D. Hull,
M. Forbes, and K. Okruhlik (eds.), PSA 1992, Volume 2. East Lansing,
Philosophy of Science Association, 280-290.
Hacking, I. (1983). ‘Experimentation and scientific realism’, Philosophical Topics
(13), 71-87.
Hanson, N. R. (1972). ‘Observation’, in Patterns of discovery, Cambridge,

Cambridge University Press, 4-30.
Hempel, C. (1965). ‘Studies in the logic of confirmation’, in Aspects of Scientific
Explanation, New York, Free Press, 3-46.
Hempel, C. (1965). ‘Studies in the logic of explanation’, in Aspects of Scientific
Explanation, New York, Free Press, 245-258.
Ravetz, R. (1971). ‘Scientific inquiry: problem-solving on artificial objects’, in
Scientific knowledge and its social problems, Oxford, Oxford University press,
109-145.
Scheffler, I. (1982). ‘Observation and objectivity’, in Science and subjectivity, 2nd
edition, Indianapolis, Hackett, 21-44.
Science as Process
With respect to science as process, the focus is on five perspectives on the nature of
scientific change and progress including inductivism (such as espoused by Bacon or
Mill), Popper’s falsificationism, historicism (e.g., Kuhn), rational reconstructionism
(eg, Lakatos), and Laudan’s version of pragmatism. After reviewing the
philosophical views of these perspectives, we use historical case studies to apply
these various perspectives to actual scientific practices. We explore these issues with
reference to the sections in Table III. I have found the historical case of plate
tectonics to be particularly useful. There are a number of accessible historical
summaries available. (See Table IV). Students explain how the historical events do
or do not match up with these philosophical perspectives on scientific change and
progress.
TABLE III
Readings to support the discussion of scientific change and progress
Chalmers, A. F. (1976). ‘Inductivism’, in What Is this thing called science?, St.

Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 1-11.
Kuhn, T. (1970). ‘The nature of normal science and crisis and the emergence of
scientific theories and the nature and necessity of scientific revolutions’, in The
structure of scientific revolutions, 2nd edition, Chicago, IL, University of
Chicago Press, 23-34, 66-76 & 92-110.
Lakatos, I. (1981). ‘History of science and its rational reconstructions’, I. Hacking
(ed.), Scientific revolutions, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 107-127.
260 D. BOERSEMA
Laudan, L. (198 1). ‘A problem-solving approach to scientific progress’, I. Hacking

(ed.), Scientific revolutions, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 144-155.
Popper, K. (1963). ‘Science: Conjectures and refutations’, in Conjectures and
refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge, New York, Harper Torchbook,
33-65.
TABLE IV
Works on plate tectonics
Frankel, H. (1978). ‘The non-Kuhnian nature of the recent discoveries in the earth
sciences’, P. Asquith and I. Hacking (eds.), PSA 1978, Volume 2, East Lansing,
Philosophy of Science Association, 197-2 14.
Gohau, G. (1990). A history of geology, New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press,
187-200.
Hallam, A. (1 989). Great geological controversies, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 135-183.
Hallam, A. (1973). A revolution in the earth sciences, Oxford, Clarendon.
LeGrand, H.E. (1988). Drifting continents and shifting theories, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press.
Science as Social Institution
With respect to science as a social institution, the focus is on three basic topics
including science and values, science and technology, and science and culture.
Under “science and values” we look at epistemic values, such as simplicity,
experimental replicability, quantifiability (i.e., values relating to the reliability of
science as an epistemic endeavor). We also look at ethical values, like whether, how,
and to what extent ethical values enter into scientific practices. The reading by
McMullin (1988) speaks to epistemic values directly while the reading by Rescher
focuses on the persistence of ethical values throughout the workings of scientists,
from the choice of research goals to the specification of standards of proof to the
dissemination of research findings. “Science and technology” spotlights how and
to what extent science is related to and distinct from technology. Feibleman (1972)
and Jarvie (1972), for example, both deal with the epistemic viability and
interrelations of pure science, applied science, and technology, while Mesthene
(1990) and McDermott (1990) speak to the social role of technology. Finally,
“science and culture” includes issues such as the politicization of science (Hiskes &
Hiskes, 1986), feminist critiques of science (Hubbard, 1989), and Snow’s Two
Cultures doctrine (Sellars, 1991 and Snow, 1959).
TABLE V
Readings to support the discussion of values and society
Feibleman, J. (1972). ‘Pure science, applied science, and technology’, in C.

Mitchem and R. Mackey (eds.), Philosophy and technology, New York, Free Press,
33-41.
Hiskes, A. and Hiskes, R. (1986). ‘Science and technology: public image and public
policy’, in Science, technology, and policy decisions, Boulder, CO, Westview
Press, 5-33.
Hubbard, R. (1989). ‘Science, facts, and feminism’, in N. Tuana (ed.), Feminism
and science, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 119-131.
Jarvie, I. C. (1972). ‘Technology and the structure of knowledge’, in C. Mitchem
and R. Mackey (eds.), Philosophy and technology, New York, Free Press, 54-
61.
McDermott, J. (1990). ‘Technology: the opiate of the intellectuals’, in A. Teich
(ed.), Technology and the future, 5th edition, New York, St. Martin’s Press,
89-107
McMullin, E. (1988). ‘Values in science’, E. D. Klemnke, et al. (eds.), Introductory
readings in the philosophy of science, Revised Edition, Buffalo, NY, Prometheus
Books, 349-371.
Mesthene, E. (1990). ‘The role of technology in society’, in A. Teich (ed.),
Technology and the future, 5th edition, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 73-88.
Rescher, N. (1980). ‘The ethical dimension of scientific research’, in E. D. Klemke,
et al. (eds.), Introductory readings in the philosophy of science, Buffalo,
Prometheus Books, 238-253.
Sellars, W. (1991). ‘Philosophy and the scientific image of man’, in Science,
perception and reality, Atascadero, Ridgeview Press, 1-40.
Snow, C. P. (1959). ‘Two cultures: and a second look’, in Two cultures: And a
second look, New York: New American Library, 45-57.
WHAT IS SCIENCE?
AN ANALYSIS OF AN ACTUAL CASE STUDY: MASS EXTINCTION
Having addressed science as doctrine, process, and social institution, and having
acquainted students with well-known and not-so-well-known readings related to
these topics, we spend several weeks using a case study both to apply the
262 D. BOERSEMA
philosophical issues and analyses and to test the philosophical claims made. A
particularly effective case study is that of the debates about mass extinctions of life
on the earth. This case works well for several reasons. First, because the
controversy is ongoing, the scientific and philosophical issues are current and
students are more interested in wrestling with those issues than with historical cases
that are resolved. Second, the underlying science concepts can be easily accessed by
students regardless of their disciplines and training. Third, there is a wealth of
material to draw from, ranging from an insider’s perspective (Raup, 1986) to edited
volumes (Glen, 1994) to up-to-date secondary reports and original research articles.
Finally, students of all ages are captivated by dinosaurs and are particularly
interested in why they died. See Table V for a list of books and articles to help
students investigate this controversy.
The Extinction Debate: An Overview
Approximately 65 million years ago at the end of the Cretaceous period the
dinosaurs and all other large creatures on both land and in the seas became extinct
in a relatively short time geologically. By the time the Tertiary period began, the
world was a very different place. With the dominant dinosaurs removed from the
scene, the small mammals formally existing in the margins, rapidly evolved to fill
many of the niches vacated by the dinosaurs.
Many suggestions have been put forward to explain the cause for the Cretaceous
extinction, but both consensus and evidence were lacking. In the early 1980's
geologist Walter Alvarez, son of Nobel prize-winning physicist Luis Alvarez,
discovered that a layer of clay deposited at the boundary of the Cretaceous and
Tertiary periods outside the town of Gubbio, Italy contained a strange concentration
of the element iridium. Extraterrestrial rocks such as meteorites were known to
contain high concentrations of iridium. In addition, a variety of quartz called
shocked quartz or schistovite, which forms under extreme pressure, was also found
in the same rock layers. This discovery led to the suggestion by Luis Alvarez, that
the earth was hit by a huge meteorite (Alvarez & Asaro, 1990). Such an impact
would have caused a dust cloud that blocked out sunlight for years, stopping plant
growth, destroying the food chain, and killing all large species of animal life
including the dinosaurs. Others are not so sure that the extraterrestrial impact idea
is the only viable explanation. Courtillot (1990), for example, has suggested that a
series of volcanic eruptions could have caused the Same effect while throwing
iridium from deep within the earth into the atmosphere.
Using the Extinction Case Study: A Strategy
We first spend several weeks on the historical and scientific details of the case, and
I make a point of presenting the events chronologically so that students can better
observe the processes of working scientists. We then spend two weeks covering
relevant nature of science issues. For example, with respect to epistemic concepts
we look at the nature and role of measurement. Questions arise such as what
exactly are the “things” that are being measured, what factors influence those
measurements, how and to what extent are those measurements theorydependent?
With respect to models of scientific change and progress, we look at questions such
as whether or not the details of this case fit a Kuhnian model; if so, what is the
paradigm under which the researchers are working, is what is going on normal or
extraordinary science? If events don’t fit the Kuhnian model, is a Lakatosian model
of competing research programmes more appropriate? If so, what exactly constitutes
the positive and negative heuristics in this case? Looking at science as a social
institution, we consider such questions as what epistemic values Seem most salient
to researchers, how, if at all, has the extra-scientific community influenced actual
scientific practices.
Certainly, one can use other case studies to ask the sorts of questions just
presented and pursue the sorts of goals mentioned at the beginning of this paper. In
addition to the plate tectonics case mentioned above, one could use the 19th century
debate between those holding Darwin’s evolutionary views and those supporting
Lamarck’s inheritance of acquired characteristics or the debate over spontaneous
generation. Another recent controversy is that of cold fusion. Nevertheless, because
this specific case represents an ongoing and unresolved issue, and because it involves
scientists across disciplines, and because it is accessible to students, it is particularly
fruitful in terms of addressing issues in the nature of science. In addition, as noted
earlier, by dealing with these issues under the rubric of science as doctrine, process,
and institution, the various standard topics in the philosophy of science (such as the
nature of explanation, the nature of theories, and the nature of values in science)
make more sense to students. Consequently, students are more attuned to the
importance of such topics and are more interested in pursuing them.
TABLE VI
Books and articles related to the mass extinction controversy
Allaby, M. and Lovelock, J. (1985). The great extinction, London, Paladin Books.
Alvarez, W. and Asaro, F. (October, 1990). ‘An extraterrestrial impact’, Scientific
American, 78- 84.
264 D. BOERSEMA
Archibald, J. David. (1996). Dinosaur extinction and the end of an era, New York,
Columbia University Press.
Carlisle, D. (1996). Dinosaurs, diamonds, and things from outer space, Stanford,
Courtillot, V. (October, 1990). ‘A volcanic eruption’, Scientific American, 85-92.
Glen, W. (1990). ‘What killed the dinosaurs?’, American Scientist, 78, 354-370.
Glen, W. (Ed.). (1994). The Mass-extinction debates: How science works in a
crisis, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press.
Hallam, A. (1989). Great geological controversies, Oxford, Oxford University
Press.
Monastersky, R. (January, 1992). ‘Closing in on the killer’, Science News, (141),
56-58.
Monastersky, R. (February, 1992). ‘Counting the dead’, Science News, (141),
72-75.
Raup, D. (1986). The Nemesis affair, New York, W. W. Norton.
Raup, D. (1991) Extinction: Bad genes or bad luck?, New York, W. W. Norton.
Stanley, S. (1987). Extinction, New York: Scientific American Library.
Pacific University, Forest Grove, Oregon, USA
REFERENCES
Alvarez, W. and Asaro, F. (October, 1990). ‘An extraterrestrial impact’, Scientific American, 78-84.
Courtillot, V. (October, 1990). ‘A volcanic eruption’, Scientific American, 85-92.
Duhem, P. (1954). Physical theory and experimentfrom the aim and structure ofphysical theory,
Princeton, MA, Princeton University Press, 180-218.
Fiebleman, J. (1972). ‘Pure science, applied science, and technology’ in C. Mitchem and R. Mackey (eds.),
Philosophy and technology, New York, Free Press, 33-41.
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Somerville, J. (1941). ‘Umbrellaology’, Philosophy of Science 8, 557-566.
APPENDIX A
UMBRELLAOLOGY
Dear Sir:
I am taking the liberty of calling upon you to be a judge in a dispute between me and
an acquaintance who is no longer a friend. The question at issue is this: Is my
creation, umbrellaology, a science? Allow me to explain this situation. For the past
eighteen years I have been collecting materials on a subject hitherto almost wholly
neglected by scientists, the umbrella. The results of my investigation to date are
embodied in the nine volumes which I am sending to you under separate cover.
Pending their receipt, let me describe to you briefly the nature of their contents and
the method I pursued in compiling them. I began on the Island of Manhattan.
Proceeding block by block, house by house, family by family, and individual by
individual, I ascertained (1) the number of umbrellas possessed, (2) their size, (3)
their weight, (4) their color. Having covered Manhattan, I eventually extended the
survey.
It was at this point that I approached my erstwhile friend. . . I felt I had the right
to be recognized as the creator of a new science. He, on the other hand, claimed that
umbrellaology was not a science at all. First, he said, it was silly to investigate
umbrellas. Now this argument is false because science scorns not to deal with any
object, however humble, even to the ‘hind leg of a flea.’ Then why not umbrellas?
Next he said that umbrellaology could not be recognized as a science because it was
of no use or benefit to mankind. But is not the truth the most precious thing in life?
And are not my nine volumes filled with the truth about my subject? ... When he
asked me what was the object of umbrellaology I was proud to say, “To seek and
discover the truth is object enough for me.” I am a pure scientists: I have no ulterior
motives . . . Next, he said my truths were dated and that any one of my findings
might cease to be true tomorrow. But this, I pointed out, is not an argument against
umbrellaology, but rather an argument for keeping it up to date, which is exactly
what I propose. . . His next contention was that umbrellaology had entertained no
hypotheses and had developed no theories or laws. This is a great error. In the
course of my investigations, I employed numerous hypotheses. Before entering each
new block and each new section of the city, I entertained an hypothesis as regards
266 D. BOERSEMA
the number and characteristics of the umbrellas that would be found there, which
hypotheses were either verified or nullified by my subsequent observations, in
accordance with proper scientific procedure, as explained in authoritative texts. . .
As for theories and laws, my work presents an abundance of them. I will here
mention only a few by way of illustration. There is the Law of Color Variation
Relative to Ownership by Sex. (Umbrellas owned by women tend to a great variety
of color, whereas those owned by men are almost all black.) . . . There is also the
Law of Tendency towards Acquisition of Umbrellas in Rainy Weather. To this law
I have given experimental verification . . . Thus I feel that my creation is in all
respects a genuine science, and I appeal to you for substantiation of my opinion.
Excerpted from J. Somerville: 1941, “Umbrellaology” Philosophy of Science 8,

557-566.
BARBARA SPECTOR, PASCHAL STRONG AND THOMAS LA PORTA
17. TEACHING THE NATURE OF SCIENCE AS AN

ELEMENT OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY
We came here not knowing what to expect, but we

are leaving expecting not to know, but wanting to learn.
Student in STS class
This chapter describes the teaching and learning opportunities in a unit used to
introduce aspects of the nature of science to preservice teachers within a
Science/Technology/Society (STS) course. The course teaches the nature of science
while modeling processes used in science to generate new knowledge. We begin
with an overview of the course, its students, and the way the learning opportunities
have been arranged to encourage students to use processes of science to generate
personal knowledge. Then we describe the unit that introduces the nature of science
explicitly, including commercially available materials used and excerpts from a
lecture series that describe science as an outgrowth of biological evolution. Finally,
we present strategies for assessment and comments about the impact of the course
on students.
The nature of science unit in our STS course has been adapted and tested with
a variety of audiences, including preservice and inservice secondary and elementary
teachers of science. Some may elect to adapt this unit for use in preservice methods
classes or as a freestanding workshop for inservice teachers.
SCIENCE/TECHNOLOGY/SOCIETY INTERACTION COURSE OVERVIEW
This five-credit STS course containing the nature of science unit is a required part
of the preservice science education program at the University of South Florida for
students wishing to obtain middle school or secondary school certification to teach
science. (Those preparing to teach science in elementary schools are not required
to take this course.) The course is taught by a team including university faculty
members, experienced secondary level STS teachers, and business/industry
representatives. The classes meet in five-hour blocks each week on campus for nine
weeks (45 contact hours) and for five six-hour blocks (30 contact hours) in an STS
demonstration school. The science teachers in the demonstration school were part
267
268 B. SPECTOR, P. STRONG AND T. LA PORTA
of the group that developed the course and are an integral part of the instructional
team for the course. These teachers model constructivist teaching and learning
approaches both with the preservice teachers and with their own middle school
students. The teachers answer questions with questions that foster systematic
inquiry, and use open-ended tasks, concept mapping, cooperative learning, authentic
assessment, assessment embedded in instruction and other related techniques. The
BSCS (1991) Middle School Science and Technology program is the curriculum
upon which teachers base much of the instruction in their schools. It has both a
constructivist epistemology with emphasis on the nature of science.
Assignments beyond the contact hours require students to view videotapes for
twenty-two hours, and to read books and journal articles. (More is said about these
assignments and how they are integrated in classroom activities later.) Student
products include writing weekly reflective journals, developing an action plan,
teaching an STS topic to their peers, and doing a final project of their own design
that illustrates their personal understandings constructed from experiences in the
course.
THE STUDENTS
The students are completing, or have completed, a major in either physics,

chemistry, or biology, but have not yet had school field experiences. The science and
usually the middle and high school science methods courses they have completed are
taught traditionally. Students typically report that their prior educational
experiences failed to provide much background in the nature of science. Students
come to class expecting to learn through didactic lectures and expect deductive
science to be presented. They assume learning is memorizing information as it is
presented. Learning in a formal education setting by “doing science” is usually a
new experience for them. In this course they gather data from seemingly disparate
experiences, search data for patterns, generate hypotheses, tie them into theory, and
test these emergent hypotheses and theories by sharing their interpretations with the
community of co-learners in class. This course is their first encounter with the nature
of science as a topic of study and science as a way to learn personally.
STRUCTURE OF LEARNING OPPORTUNITIES
The way students “do science” by participating in structured learning opportunities

in the STS course can be most easily understood if the learning opportunities are
considered as two groups that are interdependent strands woven together and
running concurrently. The first strand provides a sense of immersion in a wide
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY 269
variety of STS interactions. Strand One experiences constitute the information about
STS provided to students. These are the course experiences from which students are
expected to gather initial data to begin constructing understandings of the nature of
science. The iterative design of the course fosters continuous reflection on science
and its nature beyond the explicit unit on the nature of science. Thus, students’
concepts of the nature of science continue to be enhanced throughout the semester.
The second strand stimulates the social interactions necessary to construct
meanings and assimilate the concepts of science, technology, society and the
interactions among the three. Students discuss their reflections, analyses, and views
of experiences in Strand One activities with peers and experts as a community of
co-learners. The dialogue enables everyone to articulate and compare the patterns
emerging for each one personally and the interpretations, hypotheses, and theories
they generate from the patterns. The evidence and reasoning used to establish each
person’s perspective are discussed. Potential biases are explored. Students are
directed to rely on the expertise exhibited within the group and not on the authority
of the instructional team as “the teacher.” Constructions are thus tested within the
community of co-learners. Ultimately a group meaning, though not necessarily a
single perspective, is socially constructed.
Most Strand One learning opportunities take place outside of class. Strand Two
learning opportunities take place in class. In Strand One, students read, view video
tapes, reflect on these inputs, and record their reflections in journals. For the
journals, students are asked to “reflect on the way you are integrating data into your
thinking about the nature of science and STS from the various course experiences,
from related outside events, and from your prior experiences and knowledge.” In
Strand Two, students discuss their journal reflections. The flow of conversation in
class is then directed by the students as they share and explore each other’s
reflections, As discussions progress, they notice they are generating more questions
than answers and seek additional data. Thus, students are beginning to experience
the expansive and iterative nature of science.
Together, these learning opportunities promote an environment in which students
perceive it is safe to use a blend of logic and imagination to speculate, hypothesize,
and explore novel ideas to explain and predict phenomena. Encouraging students
to ask questions and formulate lines of inquiry, in contrast to rewording a set of
predetermined answers, and emphasizing the importance of multiple perspectives in
generating new knowledge contribute to the perceptions of intellectual and emotional
safety. Science and learning are experienced as a dynamic ongoing process, rather
than one with fixed end points, because the knowledge being constructed feeds back
to students’ needs and desires for further knowledge. This positive feedback system
emulates the positive feedback system that characterizes the expansive nature of
science in which scientific activity leads to further increases in activity.
Students acknowledge that they are engaging in a process similar to that used by
scientists to socially construct knowledge. They note that they share their reactions
to, and syntheses of, out of class experiences with the class; challenge each other’s
observations, interpretations, and biases; and assess the soundness and validity of
each other’s understandings. They perceive these interactions as modeling the
processes scientists use when they interpret data, and submit papers at conferences
and journal manuscripts to peer review, before their findings are accepted by the
community of scientists as new information to be added to the knowledge base in a
particular field.
The Nature of Science Unit
Although many elements of the nature of science are embedded throughout the
course, there is a unit explicitly introducing the nature of science which occupies
three consecutive class sessions of five hours each. It follows three or four sessions
in which the paradigm shifts in society and in science education are discussed.
The nature of science unit begins formally with students constructing individual
concept maps of their personal understandings of the nature of science as an out of
class assignment. The maps serve as a pretest upon which future instruction is
based. Students’ maps typically reveal they perceive science to be an accrued body
of facts segmented into specific disciplines. Some students indicate the facts have
accumulated through research which adheres to one arbitrary formal approach to
knowledge gathering. They do not refer to the underlying causal roots of science,
to science as a socio-cultural endeavor, to the nature of science as thought provoking
or relevant, or to science as a way of knowing.
In order to ease our students, who are lecture bound, into reflecting on input
about the nature of science, analyzing what they encounter, and integrating the
nature of science into their own cognitive frameworks through induction, we
combine a lecture- discussion series titled, “On the Nature of Science: What are its
Roots and Characteristics?” (Explicated later in Appendices A and B with a
cooperative learning concept mapping process.) These class sessions serve as a
framework for integrating many perspectives on the nature of science.
During the three weeks while the lecture-discussion-concept mapping sessions
are occurring in class, students concurrently complete additional learning
opportunities outside of class that were assigned during the first class meeting.
These include viewing the twenty video tapes in Connections and the Day the
Universe Changed series (Burke, 1980, 1985) and reading the chapter titled,
“Nature of Science” in Science and Technology as Human Enterprises (Spector and
Lederman, 1990), followed by reading Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions
(1970). The Burke tapes give students mosaic views of the history of science within
the context of cultural and technological developments that shape it. Spector and
Lederman’s chapter provides students with a primer about the nature of science.
Kuhn’s book provides a philosophical and sociological lens through which to
construct an understanding of the nature of science.
Students are asked to use each of the preceding learning opportunities as a data
base from which to infer the nature of science and to record these inferences in their
weekly journals. These inferences then become an integral part of the
lecture-discussion classes through questions and comments students share. In class,
students pause an hour into the lecture-discussion format to work in cooperative
groups, concept mapping their understandings of the first portion of information.
Team members move from group to group responding to students’ questions, usually
with questions to encourage discussions. For example, a student may ask, “Have we
related concept x to concept y correctly?” An instructor might respond, “Why did
your group think it linked that way?” Groups then circulate to view each other’s
maps and discuss differences and similarities. Students are encouraged to evaluate
the varied perspectives encountered as they review each other’s maps for potential
enhancements to their own maps.
This process of breaking the lecture-discussion by concept mapping and
discussions of what the various groups interpreted and constructed is repeated five
times in class. Outside of class students rearrange, delete, or add new
understandings to their personal nature of science concept maps. They build on
insights developed from the in-class group mapping during the
lecture-discussion-concept mapping sessions and the preceding outside-of-class
activities.
ON THE NATURE OF SCIENCE:

WHAT ARE ITS ROOTS AND CHARACTERISTICS?
In contrast with other sources of information about the nature of science, the
lecture-discussion-concept mapping series uses a lens of biological evolution to
introduce science as an outgrowth of the human genetic characteristic called,
“curiosity” and a culturally derived method for systematically and efficiently
exercising curiosity. Pseudoscience as an outgrowth of the human characteristic
called, “safety seeking” is also addressed. The presentation concludes with a
comparison of characteristics of science with characteristics of pseudoscience. This
lecture series by Paschal Strong, an expert in the nature of science and in motivation
theory, would require about six hours if it were presented without any discussion.
Blurring Discipline Boundaries
The approach to content used in these lecture-discussion-concept mapping sessions

integrates perspectives from biology, physics, biochemistry, psychology, sociology,
and philosophy. Evolution, energetics, uric acid, curiosity, language, Epicurus,
religion, and pseudoscience are some of the seemingly disparate topics from the
preceding disciplines that are integrated in these lecture-discussion-concept mapping
sessions to explain the biological basis of curiosity and, therefore, of science.
Landmarks along the evolutionary trail presented by Strong are noted in Appendix
A. Appendix B contains a comparison of characteristics of science to characteristics
of pseudoscience that is summarized in the final lecture-discussion-concept mapping
session in this series explicitly focusing on the nature of science.
The processes used to search the topics in the preceding paragraph for patterns
and tie them together to construct an understanding of the nature of science illustrate
the usefulness of breaking down artificial barriers among traditional disciplines.
Having the experience of searching for patterns in this unit helps students construct
a cognitive template they use to continue elaborating their concepts of the nature of
science throughout the remainder of the course.
Integrating Learning Opportunity Strands
Here is an example of the way students use this lecture-discussion-concept mapping

as a framework to integrate information from an outside-of-class experience.
Students talk about Kuhn’s analysis (1970) of the scientific enterprise as an
illustration of the curiosity/safety seeking conflict occurring in the scientific
enterprise. The safety- seeking scientist is talked about as one who looks to existing
theories as truth and verities and is threatened by attempts to upset current scientific
dogma. The highly curious, exploratory scientist is talked about as one who sees
existing dogma as something to be attacked, confronted, changed, and even
destroyed. The latter is identified as a paradigm pioneer.
STRATEGIES FOR ASSESSMENT
Assessment is embedded throughout the course. Students generate numerous

concept maps, one action (lesson) plan, an STS lesson to teach to their peers, and an
original project illustrating what they have constructed from experiences with the
course. They write ongoing reflective journals and weekly exit memos. The
instructional team observes, records, and transcribes class interactions for analysis.
These items comprise the data base for assessment.
The action plan, the STS lesson, and the final project are made public within the
community of co-learners. Students are encouraged to be creative in the way they
approach the process of making their products public. Poetry, drawing, music,
dance, wood carving, video, and computer-generated multimedia are some vehicles
students have elected to use for their final products to express what STS means to
them.
A sample of a non-threatening technique used to critique a publicly shared
product follows: After each student presents an action plan, the course participants
are given five minutes to write answers to this question: “What more do you want to
know if you had to implement this action plan tomorrow?” Each person, including
the instructional team, reads his or her questions and gives the paper to the
presenter. Presenters do not respond to the questions in class. They each have the
option of revising the action plan to include whatever revisions seem meaningful to
them before turning in a final product.
Some indicators of success developed by the students and instructors which are
used to analyze the data base include the degree to which students do the following:
a) reveal they understand and value the expansive nature of science;

b) see science as a way of knowing, a way of learning;
c) make public presentations that reflect the nature of science;
d) initiate participation in the collaborative process;
e) ask questions and challenge each other’s constructions;
f) illustrate pertinent connections in successive concept maps;
g) increase risk taking by testing creative constructions; and
h) look to the group to establish acceptable knowledge rather than to
the instructors to know if they are “right.”
An Appraisal of Course Impact
Indicators of the impact of this course have emerged from three qualitative research
studies in progress. Students perceived the course made a difference in their
understanding of science and what it means to be a science teacher. The nature of
science went from being “so what” to being an exciting adventure central to
understanding science and teaching and learning. In the minds of students, the
nature of science changed from static facts in books to relevant, dynamic, and
socially constructed knowledge. They demonstrated sensitivity to the way paradigms
influence the work of scientists. Their views of scientists changed from persons
engaged in a solitary endeavor to people engaged in vital collaborative processes.
Experiencing science as a way of knowing (learning) that is expansive, open-ended
inquiry generated excitement about changing teaching. Memorizing and the 3T’s
(Teacher, Talk, and Textbook) gave way to learning science as an expression of

curiosity and exploration that crosses traditional discipline boundaries. Students
acknowledged themselves as empowered learners with increased self efficacy
regarding their future as science teachers.
University of South Florida, Tampa, Florida
REFERENCES
BSCS, (1991). Middle school science and technology, Dubuque, IA, Kendall/Hunt.
Burke, J., Jackson, M. & Kennard, D. (Producers), (1980). Connections. [videotape]. NY, Ambrose Video
Publishing
Burke, J., Lynch, J. (Producer). (1985). The day the universe changed. [video tape] Los Angeles, CA,
Churchill Films.
Glickman, S.E., & Schiff, B.B. (1967). ‘A biological theory of reinforcement’, Psychological Review, 74,
83-87.
Kuhn, T. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions, Chicago, IL, The University of Chicago Press.
Spector, B.S. & Lederman, N. (1990). ‘Science and technology as human enterprises’, Dubuque, I.A,
Kendall/Hunt.
APPENDIX A
THE EVOLUTIONARY TRAIL
The lecture posits that the uniquely human enterprise called “science” has its roots in the
biological evolution of humans. The energetics of the evolutionary trail are traced from
prokaryotic cells to eukaryotic cells, to multicellular organisms, to cell specialization, to large
complex terrestrial forms, to ectotherms and endotherms that are herbivorous and carnivorous,
and ultimately to omnivorous humans. Changes in food ingestion, energy production, and
energy use are noted. Omnivores are highlighted as opportunistic feeders who must build
cognitive maps of their environments and have a sense of time to capitalize on the seasonal
nature of their diets.
A ten-fold increase in brain size and the development of new brain structures occurred
along with the increase in energy consumption. Brain development included neural-hormonal
structures which generate the urge we label “curiosity” and was accompanied by the evolution
of a counter balancing urge labeled “safety seeking”. Omnivores, including humans, have a
high level of curiosity that helps them learn and exploit the environment.
A mutation occurred that led to chimpanzees and humans with an increased uric acid
level. Uric acid acts as a nervous system stimulant resulting in chimpanzees and humans
being awake for many hours more than are needed for ingestion and metabolic house keeping
alone. Exploratory and manipulative interactions with the environment increased.
Eventually, language developed which enabled the symbolic representation ofthe world
and the ability to explore the natural world both physically and mentally. Humans were then
able to substitute mental exploration for physical exploration. They could deal with symbolic
representations of events previously experienced or not experienced which may not even exist.
Prescientific humans developed some systematic observational skills which led to a

descriptive form of astronomy. They also developed technologies through their exploratory
and manipulative behaviors which led to domestication of animals, smelting and metallurgy,
grain and fruit strains, etc. Technology, developed through trial and error procedures, often
outpaced understanding of the underlying processes involved. Trial and error exploration
later evolved into the systematic processes today we call “science.” The conventions of
science represent one of the many ways humans exercise their instinctual curiosity and
exploratory behaviors.
The two opposing tendencies, curiosity and safety seeking, lead to two basic opposing
emotional and mental life styles in humans. The curiosity-based life style is explorative and
adventurous, while the safety-seeking-based life style is constrictive. Both have genetic and
cultural/environmental roots.The insatiable curiosity of the human organism is put forth as
the underlying motive force for science. Science has developed as a highly efficient, effective
means of exercising curiosity which is capable of being taught and culturally transmitted. It
is a synergistic, positive feedback system which is expansive in nature.
The tendencies of safety-seeking and harm-avoidance lead to an emotional approach to
life that seeks certainty, assurance, and stasis. It is, therefore, a negative feedback system
which is constrictive asopposed to expansive. The urge for safety seeking that evolved along
with curiosity is essentially constrictive and inimical to the exercise of curiosity and
questioning. It discourages mental confrontation and skepticism and rather looks for
unquestioning acceptance. These tendencies are characteristic of pseudoscience, charismatic
religions, and ideological dogma.
Development of Formal Science
Science as the expression of curiosity in western European societies is a culturally derived

pattern ofthought grounded in Greek philosophical tradition. Two basic Greek philosophies
developed; one that said the physical world, its structures and laws, are knowable and
controllable and subject to rational study and understanding. This approach was embodied in
the philosophical writings of the Ionian school of philosophers such as Democritus,
Anaxamander, Epicurus, and Hippocrates. The second stated that humans are subject to
supernatural forces which are essentially beyond human understanding and control. One can
learn techniques of propitiation and seeking of divine intervention, but direct control is not
possible. This represents the pseudoscientific and charismatic religious approach to
understanding and manipulation ofnature. Science is a manifestation ofthe curiosity instinct.
The pseudosciences and charismatic religions are a manifestation of the safety seeking
instinct. Since these derive from opposite neurological / hormonal systems it is little wonder
that in society, the two forces are often in conflict.
Science has been so successful, because it leads to a highly satisfactory method of
exercising curiosity. Note that this specifically does not say “to satisify curiosity.” According
to the work of Glickman and Schiff (1967), the questions and discovering methods to answer
them are the primary reinforcing mechanisms, not the answers. Certainly, there is
satisfaction in finding an answer and having a theory supported, but there is also a postpartum
depression at the end of an experiment unless the results suggest further experiments.
Scientists don’t look for end points and certainty, but rather new questions and pathways.
APPENDIX B: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF SCIENCE
What is it about “scientific method” that characterizes it and delineates it from the
pseudoscientific or charismatic religious approaches to knowledge? Since exercising curiosity
has been shown to be reinforcing in and of itself, science is a positive feedback system.
Scientific activity leads to new questions and lines of inquiry that further increase the activity,
thus a positive feedback system exists. Science is synergistic. Various parts come together
to generate new, emergent results and findings that add to the feedback system. Science leads
to a mental life style which is growth oriented and constantly expansive. It seeks and
encourages skepticism, questioning of established doctrines, and intellectual confrontation.
Scientists are willing to expose their theories and findings to the heartless scrutiny of their
colleagues.
Science has developed into an enterprise with self-correcting mechanisms to save
scientists from the all too human propensity to feel they are right and infallible. These
include peer review, publications, replication of experiments, various control mechanisms to
guard against bias, etc. Although human hubris, ambition, and sometimes even greed
occasionally rear their ugly heads, they are pitfalls that scientists are aware of and consciously
strive to avoid.
The enterprise consciously strives to achieve an egalitarian society in which a person’s
status in the enterprise is determined by his/her performance and contributions in contrast to
potential societal barriers such as race, gender, ethnicity and other characteristics of the
individual. Science is as close to a truly cooperative international enterprise as exists. As
science has become more complex, cooperation and collaboration have emerged as important
features of the scientific enterprise.
Characteristics of Pseudosciences
The pseudosciences, (e.g., parapsychology, astrology, etc.) charismatic religions, and

ideological dogma stand in marked contrast to the above. These enterprises reflect safety
seeking, the biological counter part of curiosity. They can be considered to be constrictive, not
expanding, negative feedback systems seeking stasis and stability.
The practitioners do not seek new knowledge but merely confirmation of fixed, “eternal
truths”. Confrontation and skepticism within the group are discouraged. Conformity is the
watchword. Often these movements center around a charismatic leader. Statements of
certainty, not the probabilistic statements made by scientists, are typical. “Truth” is often
revealed, not discovered.
MICHAEL L. BENTLEY AND STEVE C. FLEURY
18. OF STARTING POINTS AND DESTINATIONS:

TEACHER EDUCATION AND THE NATURE OF SCIENCE
STARTING POINTS:
THE NATURE OF SCIENCE IN TEACHER EDUCATION
An old Chinese saying is that the fish is the last one to know that it lives in the
water. The current educational reform movement involving constructivism and
reconceptualizing the nature of knowledge calls upon classroom teachers to change
both the curriculum and patterns of instruction. But Battista (1994) reminds us that
teachers themselves are the products of an old curriculum and have developed beliefs
incompatible with the spirit and substance of these innovations (p. 468). If teachers
are going to teach children about the nature of science, most will need first to
examine their own understandings.
Unfortunately, tertiary (college) students preparing to become elementary
teachers enter teacher education programs with largely unexamined beliefs about the
nature of science. Typically these beliefs remain unchallenged in teacher education
and science content courses (Haggerty, 1992; O’Brien & Korth, 1991). The strategy
outlined here is an approach to address this situation.
Given the importance placed on understanding the nature of science by Project
2061 (American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1989) and by the
National Science Education Standards (NRC, 1996), our purpose here is to describe
how a focus on the history and philosophy of science can be incorporated through a
science-technology-society approach.
The ideal approach for increasing pre-service teachers’ awareness of the nature
of science would be for tertiary science educators and science teacher educators to
work together to assess the portrayal of science in the whole institution’s program.
In the best of all possible worlds, we would recommend thoroughly reengineering the
science coursework taken by pre-service teachers.
But we are pragmatists and our intent is to make realistic suggestions--steps that
can be taken in the right direction. A feasible step, we believe, is to create a formal
science-technology-society course that would be required in addition to the standard
science methods course in an institution’s teacher education program. Alternatively,
additional hours could be added to the science methods course for an extended
history-philosophy-sociology-of-science-in-science-teaching (HPSS/ST) unit that
could address much the same content.
277
W. E McComas (ed.) The Nature of Science in Science Education, 277-291.
278 M. BENTLEY AND S. FLEURY
OF DESTINATIONS:
EDUCATING TEACHERS ABOUT THE NATURE OF SCIENCE
Hollon, Roth, and Anderson (1991) note that science teachers need to develop the
type of knowledge that will enable them to make both curricular and instructional
decisions. If prospective teachers are to learn how to engage children in conceptual
change instruction related to the nature of science, they will need to further develop
their own understanding of the nature of science in such a way as to enable them to
plan the curriculum and choose appropriate teaching strategies in their classrooms.
They will need to learn ways to guide and support children in considering alternative
views and constructing meanings for science.
For science teacher educators, the instructional problem is how to help their
students--present and future teachers--understand post-positivist perspectives of
science and what they mean for curriculum and instruction. No teacher educator can
transfer his or her own knowledge about science to the student, but he or she can
provide opportunities for conceptual change and model appropriate instruction.
THE POTENTIAL OF AN STS COURSE
Bringing about structural changes is a daunting task given the tenacity of most
teacher education practices. Foltz and Roy (1991) indicate that tertiary level STS
courses have existed since the 1960s and are now offered at over 2,000 colleges and
universities across the United States. Nearly all of these courses are offered as
electives in the general education program, rather than designed specifically for
teachers, as we advocate here.
An effective STS course addresses two distinct, but related, educational goals:
1. Teaching students about the nature and culture of science and technology as
experienced by practitioners and understood through the conceptual lenses
of sociology, history, psychology, anthropology, and philosophy, and
2, Introducing students to personal, local, national, and/or global issues at the

interface between science, technology and society . . . (which) entails
personal decision making and informed, premeditated action. (Cheek, 1992,
p. 199)
The unique strength of an STS approach is that it involves an interactive set of

concepts, content, and skills that demonstrate how science and technology are
socially mediated and value-laden fields; that every technology creates unanticipated
effects; that the system is the matrix for work in science and technology, and that
every technological device or system requires tradeoffs.
TEACHER EDUCATION AND THE NATURE OF SCIENCE 279
The Social Studies of Science
The STS approach we emphasize is on the social study of science. Rather than
merely examining the impact of scientific and technological developments on
society, the social study of science is concerned with how historic and contemporary
humanvalues influence the meanings and workings of science. In this sense we refer
to science as both manufactured knowledge and as a way of knowing. This particular
emphasis has implications for teacher education. Clough (1994, pp. 4-5) believes
that pre-service teachers should be able to understand and appropriately use the
terminology of the social studies of science, i.e., terms like theory, law, etc.
Additionally, they should be able to explain possible consequences of the use or
misuse of terms on how students will perceive the nature of science, and on the
implications for learning activities, curriculum, etc.
Table I suggests some of the instructional outcomes for an STS course designed
specifically for teachers.
TABLE I
Sample student outcomes for an STS course for teacher preparation.
Participation in an STS course should enable students (pre-service teachers) to:
identify interactions between science and technology and society;

relate the significance of particular persons and events in the historical
development of science and technology;
understand processes and models of knowledge generation and confirmation
in the natural sciences;
evaluate assumptions, propositions, evidence, and arguments in science;
demarcate science from other disciplines and from non-science and
pseudo-science;
identify local, regional, national and global social and environmental
conditions and trends related to science and technology;
evaluate curriculum materials related to STS education;
identify STS-related curriculum goals and instructional outcomes;
develop STS-related teaching strategies and skills.
In a survey of two decades of literature related to the STS approach, Cutcliffe

(1990) found no studies of STS course effectiveness at the tertiary level. Cutcliffe
concluded that the jury was still out as to whether or not STS courses achieve the
kinds of understandings that are intended by their instructors. More recently,

Bradford, Rubba, and Harkness (1995) compared outcomes related to understanding
the nature of science for university students who had completed a general education
STS course to students who took a general physics course. As a measure they used
selected items from the Views on Science-Technology-Society (VOSTS) item pool.
They concluded the STS course enhanced student understanding of science, while
the physics course had almost no impact on students’ views of STS interactions . .
.” (p. 369). The particular STS course studied by Bradford, Rubba, and Harkness
was essentially a series of lectures given by different university faculty regarding
STS issues in their fields. Student outcomes were not as strong as the researchers
would have expected and they concluded that the course could be improved by the
use of conceptual change teaching methods.
To our knowledge, there have been no studies of the outcomes of tertiary level
STS courses designed specifically for pre-service elementary and middle school
teachers. That kind of course would address the need for teachers who are more
knowledgeable about the nature of science. Such a course addresses the two goals
identified by Cheek, as well as the related curriculum and instruction issues.
Some study of the nature of science can be provided for within the regular
pre-service science education methods course. The methods instructor can develop
an HPSS/ST or STS unit consisting of a series of lessons that engage students in
talking about key ideas. Students can compare views of science discussed in the
methods course and the depiction of science drawn from their experiences in high
school and university science courses. The dissonance that is likely to result in the
minds of students who are unfamiliar with post-positivist and constructivist
perspectives may produce the kind of intellectual doubt Dewey claimed was the
foundation for serious learning.
One way to begin is to ask students to sketch what first comes to mind when a
scientist is imagined--essentially the Draw-A-Scientist Test. The pictures can be
discussed and compared, for example, on the basis of scientists’ personal
characteristics such as gender, age, dress, etc. Students also can be asked to respond
to selected items on the VOSTS item bank, or to react to particular statements about
science, indicating agreement/disagreement about science. Table II is a set of such
statements that have been used successfully by the authors in previous classes. Note
that positivists and constructivists would likely have divergent responses to many of
these statements when asked to mark a Likert scale from “strongly agree” to
“strongly disagree.”
The methods instructor’s pedagogical approach is a critical variable in catalyzing
what is learned by the pre-service teachers. The instructor is the students’ present
model for science educators, if not scientists. The pedagogy should be symmetrical
with the constructivist view of the nature of science the instructor wants the students
to understand. The constructivist view of the nature of science has implications for
science teaching and thus for instruction in the methods classroom (Duschl, 1988,
1990; Duschl & Hamilton, 1992; Matthews, 1994; Garrison & Bentley, 1990).
TABLE II
Statements to elicit student views about the nature of science
Science is the search for truth.

Compared to knowledge in other disciplines, scientific knowledge is more
objective and unbiased.
In research, scientists use the scientific method to solve problems and verify
findings.
In science, if a theory is proven true, it becomes a law.
Biological knowledge would be different today if the historic proportion of
men and women biologists had been reversed.
Most of the new ideas in science are produced by brilliant individuals.
If experimental results fail to support a theory, scientists reject the theory
and seek other alternatives.
Disagreements among scientists about a theory are normally solved when
new data are generated related to the problem.
For example, in working with students to interpret their data in an investigation,

it is more consistent with constructivism that they realize the refutation and
elimination of alternatives gives power to the predictions that survive the
investigative process, rather than that their prediction has been confirmed just
because it is still a possibility. To promote this realization, teachers might ask
questions that emphasize refutation rather than confirmation. Garrison and
Hoskisson (1989) provide an example of this subtle but critical reframing with the
questions, “Do you have any evidence that your prediction is wrong?” or “Have you
found your prediction to be false?”
It is consistent with a constructivist perspective for the methods instructor to
challenge students to critique and make explicit their initial understandings about
science. This might sometimes include the instructor playing the role of agent
provacateur in dealings with students (Lemke, 1990). Other relevant roles the
instructor might enact are mapped in Figure 1.
Consistent with a constructivist perspective, methods instructors can structure
activities and investigations in the field and in the classroom more like the
open-ended investigations of real scientific work and less like the cookbook type labs
often found in traditional instructional materials. Instructional activities also can be
designed to engage students in more student-to-student discussion and debate
focused upon scientific ideas, and more collaborative group work (Lemke, 1990;
Larochelle & Desautels, 1991). This kind of classroom experience communicates to

students that ideas are negotiated in the world of science.
Figure 1. Methods related to teaching about the nature of science. Teaching about the
nature of science, especially at the elementary school level, requires the flexible integration
of a number of teaching strategies.
As a result of their HPSS/ST unit activities, students should examine actual

science, technology, and society interactions in the world around them. Activities
that facilitate this objective engage students in looking for STS connections in
current events. Table III provides a list of STS topics students could investigate
either individually or as group projects.
TABLE III
Potential STS topics for student investigation
An emerging controversial technology in the physical sciences and its

potential impact, such as superconduction, cryoscience, solar power, new
synthetic materials, cold fusion.
An emerging controversial technology in the life sciences and its potential
impact, e.g., biotechnology, genetic engineering, human and non-human
primate experimentation, invitro fertilization, embryo transfer, fetal tissue
research, cloning, psychosurgery and behavior control, drugs and behavior
control, organ transplantation, sex preselection and sex change.
The history, purpose, and potential of the Human Genome Project.
The history and future of nuclear power, including issue of nuclear waste
disposal.
Animal rights and the use of animals in research.
Artificial intelligence and robotics.
Case studies of the lives and work of scientists.
For STS education, it is important that students develop the skills and attitudes
that enable them to understand different vantage points.
A problem becomes an “issue” when different people have different ideas of how
to respond. This means that students need to define at least two different perspectives
(sides) for each issue. To prevent polarized thinking in students, it is preferable to
require the search for at least three perspectives about any particular issue.
“Players” refers to individuals, groups, organizations, and institutions having a
vested role in how the problem will be resolved. The “positions” they hold will be
powerfully influenced by the assumptions they hold about the particular issue, the
nature of people, the nature of the world, and the nature of knowledge. The beliefs
that different people bring to any social issue are guided by their values, which
reflect the relative importance of beliefs in a given situation. Table IV describes
different categories of values typically operating in STS issues.
SAMPLE COURSE OR UNIT ASSIGNMENTS AND ACTIVITIES
The final portion of this chapter has some practical classroom-tested suggestions for
assignments and activities for an STS course or unit in a methods class. Student
engagement in these activities likely will generate opportunities to introduce and
work with many STS concepts.
TABLE IV
Types of values in STS issues
peep-seated preferred beliefs of how each should operate).
Political: The activities, functions, and policies of governments and their agents.
Economic: The distribution of resources and goods in society.
Religious: The use of belief systems based on faith or dogma.
Ecological: The maintenance of the integrity of natural systems.
Scientific: Concerning attributes associated with empirical studies.
Cultural: Pertaining to the continuation of societal knowledge, habits.
Educational: Concerning accumulation, use, communication of knowledge.
Aesthetic: The appreciation of form, composition, and color through senses.
Social: Pertaining to shared human empathy, feelings, and status.
Recreational: Pertaining to leisure activities.
Egocentric: Pertaining to a focus on individual self-satisfaction.
Health: The maintenance of positive human physiological conditions.
Ethical/moral: Pertaining to present/future responsibilities, rights and wrongs.
Sample #1 Assignment: The New Media
One sample assignment involving the analysis of news media addresses a number
of our intended objectives of promoting student thinking skills about a particular
topic as well as about the nature of knowledge itself.
Purpose: To increase student awareness of the range of STS issues covered by the
news media and provide student practice in analyzing STS issues.
What to do: Collect and analyze three STS-related articles from newspapers or
other media. The three articles should represent a range of issues, e.g., local to
global, biological to engineering. Properly cite each article. Limit each analysis to
two pages or fewer. Respond to the following for each case:
What is (are) the main issue(s)?

What are the different “sides” for each issue?
Who are the “players” involved?
What assumptions have not been examined for each position?
What values are related to the decisions?
What type of values are these?
What kind of data would help inform decision-making?
Criteria for Grading Rubric:
Complete Understanding 2 Points

Partial Understanding 1 Point
Little Understanding 0 Points
Points
1. Articles selected illustrate science and society issues.

2. Diversity of issues represented
3. Analysis identifies issue(s), positions, players,
assumptions, values, needed data.
4. Analysis identifies and specifies values in conflict.
5. Mechanics at professional standard (organization, focus,
clarity, references, format)
Classroom drama is a teaching strategy with particular potential in an HPSS/ST

or STS unit or course. Joan Solomon (1989) has provided a model for this kind of
activity in her “Retrial of Galileo” skit which students or teams of students play the
roles of Galileo and the witnesses at his Inquisition trial in 1633. The drama
illustrates the tenacity of an old theory and raises issues like rationality, reasons,
evidence, the relationship of science and religion, and the use of authority.
Sample #2 Activity: Classroom Drama on Evolution & Creationism
Another example of a classroom drama activity involves the issue of evolution and
creationism. Following the role play, the participants can form groups to discuss any
of the questions and create webs linking concepts and issues. Relevant to this
particular classroom drama activity would be the 1987 Louisiana Supreme Court
ruling that no state can require the teaching of creationism in the public schools
(U.S. vs. Louisiana).
The criteria, cited from testimony by Judge Overton, were that:
1) Science is guided by natural law;

2) Science has to be explanatory by reference to natural law;
3) Science is testable against the empirical world;
4) Science is tentative;
5) Science is falsifiable.
I. The Situation: Parkview Junior High School Science Department Meeting. The
science department chairperson shares a memo from the Assistant Superintendent.
She wants to hear from the science faculty and would like to be able to reach
consensus on the place of evolution and creationism in the science program. She
would like the group to draft a Science Department position statement on the issue.
II. The Memo:
Parkview School District

6543 Caramba Blvd.
Parkview, Illinois 6000 1
To: Chris Rhodes, Science Department Chair

From: Rhonda McElvoy, Assistant Superintendent
Date: July 10, 1997
Re: School Board request for information on science program
If you read last week’s Pioneer Press coverage of the school board meeting, you
know that a group of parents brought up the issue of the teaching of evolution in our
science program. The Board has asked me for information about our program. I must
rely on you in this regard since my background is not in science and I, too, need to
be updated on what we are teaching in this area. The parents complained that their
children are being taught the Big Bang and Darwinian evolution but not taught other
theories of the origin of the universe, such as creationism.
Is this true? One parent claimed that many scientists are creationists--is this true?
Can you briefly describe the content of our science program in grades 5 to 8 on these
matters. If we do not also teach about creationism, do you feel we should change our
curriculum to provide a more open forum about the alternative views? Please give
me some reasons for your views on this, because we expect inquiries from the press.
Also, how do you suggest we respond to this group of parents?
I’m sorry to drop this on you in the middle of your summer vacation, but the
Board and my office were equally unprepared for this complaint. Please get
something to me by Thursday, the 15th. You might want to check with other life
science teachers too. Thank you for attending to this issue.
III. The Players
Chris - JHS Science Chairperson, life science teacher, good biology and
chemistry background, single parent of an adolescent son, interested in
environmental preservation, active member of mainstream church.
Mickey - Veteran physical science teacher from a family of engineers, parent of

two college students, veteran of Viet Nam War, pro-nuclear power, non-church
goer, considered “tough by students but respected because also serves as
basketball coach.
Sandy - Earth science and general science teacher, single/never married, former
“1960s person,” popular with students, leader of annual Earth Week activities,
considers self spiritual but avoids organized religion.
Jerry - teaches sixth grade science, newest member of faculty, recently married,
father a Methodist minister in a small town, knows a chemistry teacher from
college who professed creationist beliefs.
Cam - Has taught fifth grade science for five years, married with a four-year-old
daughter, non-practicing Jew, member of ACLU, active in the teacher’s union,
technology buff (surfs the Net in spare time), helped start local children’s science
museum.
Jo - teaches sections of life and physical science, in third year as teacher after
leaving law career, divorced, no children, agnostic, sister an anthropologist.
IV. The Questions
1. What position will each player most likely take on the curriculum issue?
Why?
2. What should middle school children be taught about human origins?
3. Does creationism merit consideration in the science program?
4. How should teachers respond to religious beliefs of students in conflict with
the science content of the curriculum?
5. Are there real conflicts between science and religion? Is this one?
6. How should the public school system respond to patrons who question the
curriculum?
7. What is the role in all of this of the Constitution’s prohibition of the
establishment of religion (i.e., the principle of separation of church and
state)?
8. How should the contlict in the community be explained to the children?
Another activity which involves students in considering the role of evidence in

science and in distinguishing what is science compared to non-science is borrowed
from Giere (1 984).
Sample #3 Activity: The Full Moon and Sexual Offenses
The following article appeared on the front page of the Louisville Courier-Journal,
July 29, 1977.
Not only do people like to “spoon” by the light of the silvery moon, they are also
more inclined to commit rape, sexual assault, and indecent exposure when the moon
is full. The evidence of moon madness can be found in police statistics. A recent
study by Dr. Ronald Holmes, a Jefferson Community College sociologist, found that
reports of a range of sexual offenses increased significantly during a full moon.
Dr. Holmes analyzed the timing of the 1274 sexual crimes reported to the
Louisville and Jefferson County Police Departments during 1974 and 1975. He found
that 404 of those reported crimes (3 1.6% of the total) took place in the full moon
cycle - 82 more cases (6.8% more) than the next most frequent of the moon’s four
phases.
Dr. Holmes cautioned, however, that the study does not point to the strength of
moonbeams as the primary cause of a sex crime. “There’s no one explanation for any
kind of behavior,” he said. “A person who is inclined to behave in a certain way may
be more inclined to behave that way when his brain is under added pressure from
certain acids normally produced by the body. When the moon is full, the bodily
tides - levels of body water - are at their highest and more of those pressure-creating
acids are shoved through the brain, he said.
Dr. Holmes rejected the tenets of astrology or lunar-based religions. It hasn’t got
anything to do with the position of the planets or any religion, he said. However,
Nolaan Meyers, an astrologist with whom Holmes consulted on the project, said he
thinks that the signs of the zodiac are important in analyzing the effect of the moon
on sexual violence. The effect of those full moons during a person’s sun sign will be
especially powerful, he said.
Student activity: Based on the information given in the article, indicate your attitude
toward the statements below by writing the letter a,b,c,d,or e in the space provided.
a) Strongly inclined to agree

b) Somewhat inclined to agree
c) Cannot say. Insufficient information to form any opinion
d) Somewhat inclined to disagree
e) Strongly inclined to disagree
A. In 1974-75, there were more reports of sexual crimes in the

Louisville-Jefferson County area during full moons than during any of the
other three phases of the moon.
B. In 1974-75, there were significantly more reports of sexual crimes in the

Louisville-Jefferson County area during full moons than during any of the
other three phases of the moon.
C. In 1974-75, there were more actual sexual crimes in the Louisville-Jefferson
County area during the full moon than during the other three phases.
D. In general, there are more sexual crimes during the full moon than in other
phases; that is, there will likely be more such crimes during full moons than
during other phases this coming year in other cities.
E. The full moon causes some people to go off their beams with sexual offenses.
F. There are more sexual crimes during the full moon because of the stronger
bodily tides that send pressure-creating acids to the brain.
G. The position of the planets has nothing to do with the higher
percentages of sexual crimes during full moons.
H. The signs of the zodiac are important in analyzing the effect of the moon on
sexual violence.
I. A person inclined to commit sexual crimes will be more inclined to do
during full moons associated with his sun sign.
J. In 1974-75 one’s chances of being the victim of a sexual crime in the
Louisville-Jefferson county area were roughly 7% greater during full moons
than during other times of the month.
K. Women should probably be a little more careful about going out alone
during full moons than during other times of the month.
L. Women should avoid going out alone during full moons except in cases of
extreme emergency.
History of Science Case Studies
Case studies in the history of science, like classroom drama, can be a useful strategy
for those who learn from narrative. Researchers have documented the potential of
narrative in teaching about the nature of science (Roach, 1992; Roach & Wandersee,
1995; Wastnage, 1994). Stories about scientists and historical events can be
springboards for talking about any number of issues related to the nature of science.
The discovery of Neptune, for example, illustrates how evidence which appears to
refute a theory may actually lead to new knowledge. Astronomers in the 19th century
noted that the perturbations of the orbit of Uranus seemed to refute Newtonian
celestial mechanics. The French and English astronomers Leverrier and Adams
independently proposed, ad hoc, the existence of a planet beyond Uranus to account
for the observed discrepancy. Astronomers looked for, and found, Neptune. Selected
resources for science stories are listed in the references. Numerous other resources
are available, including the abundant resources of the Internet.
CONCLUSION
We began by arguing that the nature of science is often misrepresented in K-12 and
tertiary (college) science education programs. As a result, most students preparing
to become elementary and middle school teachers come into the teacher education
program with unexamined beliefs about the nature of science. Scholarship in the
history, philosophy, and sociology of science, over the past thirty years, has led to a
post-positivist or constructivist understanding of science. This is a dramatic shift
from the 19th century perspective. Because schooling has not kept pace with this
change in the foundational disciplines, and also because what teachers believe about
the nature of science influences their instructional planning and how they interact
with children, teacher education programs should make instruction related to the
nature of science a high priority.
In this chapter, we discussed how science teacher educators need to help teachers
develop their understandings of the nature of science. They also need to help
teachers come to terms with the curriculum and instruction implications of
alternative perspectives of the nature of science. One approach is to add an STS
course requirement in the teacher preparation programs. Another approach is to
incorporate an HPSS/ST unit in existing science methods courses. We suggested a
number of resources and instructional activities related to the nature of science which
can be incorporated in either approach.
1
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia, USA
2
State University of New York, Oswego, New York, USA
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Cheek, D. (1992). ‘Introduction’, in Thirunarayanan, M.O. Think and act - make and impact: Handbook
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Clough, M.P. (1994, January). Nature of science: Recommendations from the field, paper presented at the
annual meeting of the Association for the Education of Teachers of Science, El Paso, TX.
Cutcliffe, S.H. (1990). ‘The STS curriculum: What have we learned in twenty years?’, Science, Technology,
& Human Values, (IS), 360-372.
Duschl, R.A. (1988). ‘Abandoning the scientistic legacy of science education’, Science Educahon, (72),
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Duschl, R.k (1990). Restructuring science education: The importance of theories and their development,
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Duschl, R.A. & Hamilton, R.J. (Eds.). (1992). Philosophyof science, cognitive psychology, and educational
theory and practice, Albany, New York, State University ofNew York Press.
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MICK NOTT1 AND JERRY WELLINGTON2
19. A PROGRAMME FOR DEVELOPING UNDERSTANDING

OF THE NATURE OF SCIENCE IN TEACHER EDUCATION
This chapter outlines a teaching programme we have developed with both trainee
and experienced teachers. The length of this chapter may look daunting but it
includes comprehensively the things we say, the things we put on projectors and
hand out to students. While this chapter is practical, it is not atheoretical. Our aim
in this chapter is to explain the activities we did, why we did them and to discuss
their value and purpose. But before we start the programme we begin by explaining
why the NOS is important and where it lies in the curriculum
A NATURE OF SCIENCE PROGRAMME: AN INTRODUCTION
We describe three main strategies, a profiling activity which provides students and
teachers with a ‘profile’ of their own view of the nature of science (NOS), a set of
‘critical incidents’ which explore participants’ understandings of the NOS in a
classroom context and exemplars of practical approaches which participants can use
in their own teachings in schools. All these strategies have been used within a
particular course - the one year post-graduate course for student teachers. They have
also been used with experienced teachers participating in inservice courses. One of
our expectations in running this programme is that science teachers will not be fully
conversant with an accurate and up-to-date account of the history, sociology and
philosophy of science, and nor should we expect them to be.
As an introduction we indicate to students that there are two domains of the
nature of science in the science curriculum:
Children’s first hand experience; how and what are the children learning
about science with practical experiences;
Children’s second hand experience; how and what are the children learning
about science from stories about scientists and scientific ideas.
We tell participants that an important part for classroom practice is that pupils
(i.e., school children) should reflect on their own experience. This could involve
teachers asking questions like: “What do you think will happen and why?”; “What
293
294 M. NOTT AND J. WELLINGTON
is in this set of results which convinces you that . . .”; “Can you explain why . . .
?” “Why do you think this experiment was a test of this theory?” so that their pupils
consider questions concerning predictions, evidence, explanations and evaluations
at different stages of practical work.
We also tell participants that pupils should develop from science teaching an
appreciation and understanding that scientific ideas have developed in response to
different needs both historically and in different cultures.
Pupils should move from first or second hand experience into constructing and
perhaps altering their scientific models of the world back and forth (see Figure 1).
An example we share with teachers are the lessons that they may organize around
the practical experience that copper turns black when heated in a flame. The initial
experience would be organized by the teacher. After all, pupils are hardly going to
be spontaneously putting copper foil into Bunsen flames. But the subsequent
interpretations, predictions and practical experiences would be a matter of
negotiation between the children themselves and between the children and the
teacher. We offer teachers the following simple models of science (see Figures. 1
and 2).
Figure 1. An indication of how practical experience is connected to theory.

TEACHING TEACHERS THE NATURE OF SCIENCE 295
The strand of second hand experience is the one that links the scientific ideas to
culture and time as represented in Figure 2. This is linked with the model in Figure
1 because the “theories” on the right-hand side of Figure 1 are the ideas that
scientists have which is central in Figure 2.
For example, we suggest that when teaching the germ theory, science teachers
do demonstration work analogous to Pasteur’s experiments with broth and
swan-necked flasks. This would be an ideal time to highlight that the school
demonstrations are frequently analogous replicas of previous experiments.
Figure 2. Our representation that scientific ideas grow and change, are rooted in people
and vary across cultures and with time.
If time allows, we go on to mention further examples of how scientific ideas are

created by people and will interact with the culture and times that the people live in.
The kind of examples we outline are: how scientific ideas about the nature of matter,
theories of disease etc. have changed in time; how science interacts with values and
beliefs, e.g., changing from a geocentric picture to a heliocentric one changed
people’s conceptions of the position of mankind; how Malthus, market economics
and Adam Smith influenced Darwin; how technologies can not only change the data
collected but can actually provide new scientific ideas, e.g., Harvey explaining the
heart as a pump whereas previous anatomists wouldn’t be able to do this as they
hadn’t seen a pump; how computer architecture affects some explanations of the
working of the brain.
Having given a brief exposition the programme moves onto a stage where the
participants have to examine, and reflect upon, their own understanding of the NOS.
THE PROFILE ACTIVITY
The profile activity (requiring at least 40 minutes) is a way of eliciting teachers’

views of the nature of science. This activity requires students to read through, and
reflect upon, twenty-four statements about science. The views expressed in these
statements come from a range of sources: science curriculum developers,
philosophers and sociologists of science, and science teacher/educators. They
reflect different perspectives on the nature of science, from both teachers and
practicing scientists. We have tailored each one so that a student’s response to it
eventually indicates their position on five axes, all shown in Appendix A.
Students’ responses, ranging from +5 (strongly agree) to - 5 (strongly disagree)
are added, using the scoring system in Appendix A. Participants then plot their own
“profile of science” and check their profiles against our interpretation of each axis.
These interpretations are shown in the third part of Appendix A. Participants then
compare profiles with each other. This can be done in a rather tongue-in-cheek
manner by asking each student to plot their own profile on a sticky label which can
then be worn during the ensuing discussion! We have also found it valuable to
collect all the profiles of the group and display them collectively either on a
transparency or flip chart. It is then interesting to note any extreme positions (are
there any raving relativists, pushy positivists, rampant realists or innocent
instrumentalists?) What is the distribution of positions amongst the group? Are
people happy with their position on the axes which the profiling activity has
allocated? How do students’ own backgrounds and life histories (e.g., as a school
pupil, as a university student, perhaps as a trainee teacher, or as a researcher)
determine their profile and their view of science as an activity?
We make it clear that the purpose of the profiling activity is not to determine
their position on some objective scale, but simply to encourage them to reflect on and
compare their individual views of science. The activity is an excellent way of
breaking the ice and provoking discussion. However, it is no substitute for other
“probes,” such as critical incidents, which explore teachers’ reactions to real
classroom situations so that the participants articulate and add to their “pedagogical
knowledge” (Shulman, 1987) or “knowledge-in-action’’ (Schon, 1983).
We think the profile is a good activity for getting people to talk about and reflect
on the nature of science but we are not convinced that it either “measures” a Nature
of Science or helps in the type of interactions that teachers have with pupils. Many
of the participants, who had helped in the development of the profile, thought the
results challenged their ideas about the nature of science and after the discussion
work most recognized that having done the exercise once and discussed it they would
not answer in the same way the next time. This confirmed our suspicions not to
place too much faith in paper and pencil tests of teachers’ understandings of the
nature of science which is one of the reasons we developed the critical incidents.
USING CRITICAL INCIDENTS
We define a critical incident as an event which makes a teacher decide on a course

of action which involves some kind of explanation of the scientific enterprise. It may
be either an event like some practical work going wrong or an event which raises
moral and ethical issues about scientific knowledge or the conduct of scientists.
These events are often stimulated by pupils saying and doing things but they may
also arise through the action of the teacher, particularly when a demonstration goes
wrong.
Part of the incidents’ criticality is that they evoke authentic responses from the
teacher which provide an insight into the teacher’s view of science as well as matters
to do with teaching and learning. We have argued (Nott and Wellington, 1996) that
teachers’ knowledge of the nature of science will be grounded in their pedagogical
content knowledge as well as subject content knowledge. By using critical incidents
which are qualitative and rooted in classroom experience we believe that we get
teachers to talk about the nature of science and then get them to reflect on that talk
so that they have a wider repertoire of responses next time a similar incident occurs
and reflect on their own understanding of the scientific enterprise.
We have used these incidents as an interactive small group discussion activity;
alternatively, colleagues have used them with participants individually and then
shared responses. A set of incidents is given to each group. They are then asked to
work through them by each person choosing one, reading it to the others and then
the entire group giving and discussing their responses in line with the guidance
below. The groups discuss the incidents, the tutor circulates to join in and ensure
that groups keep on task or that groups are discussing a range of incidents. We have
found that the discussions stay focused, while frequently becoming intense and
sometimes quite heated! After discussion we have selected practical incidents and
non-practical incidents one at a time. Each time we have asked a group to give their
responses and then asked other groups to comment. We can’t stop them after that
and it is very difficult to get them out of the room!
Participants are asked to respond in terms of what they would do (the convergent
or reactive perspective), what they could do (divergent or proactive) and what they
should do (ethical or moral). The first type of response involves a kind of
off-the-cuff, pragmatic reaction to the incident. The second involves a more
divergent approach, by asking what they could do if perhaps they had fewer
constraints and more time to reflect. The third category of response leads perhaps
from the ethical/conduct area to the area of what they really ought to do as science
teachers (i.e., the moral area). Each response was thrown open to the larger group
for discussion. Responses were noted from the lists and the discussion.
Examples of critical incidents
Four examples of critical incidents are provided below with paraphrases of the
responses that teachers have made and with our interpretations of what they tell us
about teachers’ knowledge of the nature of science.
Incident A: A class of 14 year old students are heating magnesium ribbon in a

crucible with a lid. The purpose of the lesson is to test a consequence of oxygen
theory that materials gain in weight when burnt.
During the summary at the end of the lesson, four groups report a loss in weight,
two groups report no difference and two groups report a gain in weight.
List the kinds of things you could say and do at this point.
Responses. Teachers talk about:
the need for everybody to make sure they have followed the same procedure
that experiments don’t always “work” (i.e., fit accepted theory)
that if experiments don’t work then they need to be critically evaluated
that results can be averaged and/or discounted
Understanding of NOS. Teachers demonstrate knowledge about the procedures that

scientists use to check experimental results and that experiments are as much the
result of the experimenters’ skills as they are the mirror of nature.
Incident B: A class of 11 year olds are working with microscopes and you want
them to observe and draw onion skin cells. They set up the slides and you check that
they have focused the microscopes competently and then they start to look and draw.
You find their drawings to be nothing like your image of onion skin cells.
Responses. Teachers say and do things like:
are you sure that you can’t see something which looks like . . .
show the children drawings of what they are supposed to see
arrange for prepared slides or images to be shown to the children
Understanding of NOS relative to incident B: Teachers demonstrate knowledge that

the work of scientists is guided by other scientists’ images and pictures of what is to
be perceived - all observations are theory laden and neophytes have to be trained to
see in the ways of more experienced scientists.
Incident C : You have set up a demonstration of the production of oxygen by

photosynthesis with Canadian pond weed. Just before the lesson when the class are
to look at the apparatus again, you notice that there is a small amount of gas in the
test tube but not enough with which to do the oxygen test.
List the kinds of things you could say and do before or during the lesson.
explaining why it doesn’t work, such as the lack of light intensity. Teachers
will invoke auxiliary theories.
“tweak” the experiment, for instance, increase light intensity, add sodium
bicarbonate to the water
Cheat, by adding oxygen from a tank prior to the lesson, for instance.
Understanding of NOS relative to incident C: Teachers will demonstrate either

norms of criticality, e.g., use of auxiliary theories and/or evaluation of the
experimental set up so that the discrepancy is explained or teachers will use counter
norms which are fraudulent.
Incident D: The children are doing an investigation. They have all made
predictions and are now well into their practical work. Some children’s results
conflict with their predictions. They go back and cross out their predictions and
change them to agree with their results.
they ought to understand why their predictions don’t match their outcomes
they ought to maintain an integrity in their written records
require the children to amend their prediction to the original form.
Understanding of NOS relative to incident D: Teachers demonstrate knowledge that

science is an activity which involves critical reflection and values such as integrity.
It is the scientists’ job to explain discrepancies and change their mind and theories.
All of these responses tell us something about the respondents’ knowledge of the
nature of science and their attitudes to the connections, and differences, between
science and other ways of knowing the world. Following the presentation of each
of these incidents, it will be useful to list the things that teachers could say or do in
response.
Additional Critical Incidents
Incident E: 11 year old pupils are doing experiments with circuit boards. With two
lamps in series, many find that one is lit brightly while the other appears to be unlit.
Incident F: You are demonstrating wave phenomena using a ripple tank. The
children are unable to observe refraction clearly and frankly you find it hard to see
with the apparatus available.
Incident G: You are conducting a lesson on the big bang theory of the origin of the
universe. An 11 year old pupil at the front interrupts in the middle of your account
of the big bang and says, “My family believe that the Earth was created by God in
six days. This is what it says in Genesis and we believe the Bible to be true.”
Incident H: You are six weeks into semester 1 with a group of eleven year olds. The
unit you are doing is on Life and Living Processes. One of the pupils states
impatiently at the start of a lesson, “When are we going to start cutting up rats
then?”
Incident I: You are teaching a class of 14 year old students about contraception with
a lesson about different methods of birth control. One of the pupils asks, “Do you
believe it’s right for the Catholic Church to say that only the rhythm method is
acceptable? The rest are sinful.”
Incident J: You have a particularly reluctant 15 year old learner in a chemistry class.
The pupil is not aggressive but assertive that this work on chemistry is not something
she or he likes doing. When you ask why, the pupil says, “Because if it hadn’t been
for chemists, we wouldn’t have these chemicals ruining the Earth.”
Incident K : Two episodes from lessons:
A teacher is doing the starch test on leaves. For inexplicable reasons the
tests are indecisive.
A teacher is demonstrating the nonmagnetic properties of iron sulphide.

However, the freshly made sample sticks to the magnet.
In both cases pupils say the following, how would you respond?:
“Oh well . . . science experiments never work

“Anyway, we’ll believe you, if you’ll tell us the result.”
Incident L : You have prepared a science lesson which involves discussion and
debate, but no practical work. Several pupils ask as they enter the lab, “Are we
getting the Bunsen burners out today?’’ What would you say or do?
During the course of a class doing their own investigations you experience the
following incidents:
A child, who has just finished planning an investigation, asks, “Can I do this
investigation on my own?”
A pupil writing in her exercise book looks up and asks, “Why do we have to
write every part of the investigation up?”
Twenty minutes before the end of the lesson a pupil comes up and says,
“What shall we do now that we’ve finished our investigation?’
What could you say or do in response to these questions?
Incident M: You are teaching a Y10 group introductory theory about bonding and
shell models of the atom when one of the class says, “We were taught before that
atoms are hard and indivisible. What do you want us to believe?”
What could you say or do in response to this question?
Incident N : You are starting a module on light which will introduce the wave theory
of light. One of the class puts their hand up - you stop, and ask, “Yes . . . what is
it?”. The pupil says: “But we’ve done light before.”
What could you say and do at this point?
Ethical and Moral Dilemmas Associated with Critical Incidents
Participants recognize that they face ethical and moral dilemmas in dealing with the
critical incidents. Initial responses are what they, as teachers, would do. We have
found that participants need to be encouraged to be divergent and think of the range
of things they could possibly do. These responses may well conflict with what they,
as teachers, felt they should do.
The incidents where laboratory activities ‘go wrong’ appear to elicit three
categories of response. These are ‘talking your way out of it’, ‘rigging’ and
‘conjuring’ (Nott and Smith, 1995). The majority of responses are in the first
category of ‘talking your way out of it’ or as we would like to say more positively
‘talking your way through it’. When science teachers talk their way through
practicals that have gone wrong they often engage the children in a critical
evaluation of practical work. ‘Rigging’ is the use of strategies that teachers have
learned over the years to ensure that the apparatus or procedure works. The last
category, ‘conjuring’, is where the teacher fraudulently produces the correct result
for an experiment by sleight of hand. We have found that student teachers can start
to conjure spontaneously or are inducted into it by science staff and technicians.
The answers to the practical incidents demonstrate knowledge of the
experimental and social procedures of science. It is important to stress that talking
your way through it is by far and away the majority response. However participants
recognize the moral dilemma that what they could and should do, does not always
coincide with what they would do. There are many other constraints operating on
classroom life.
Responses to the critical incidents indicate that trainees and experienced teachers
do have a depth of knowledge about the nature of science but the knowledge is
expressed in the form of pedagogical content knowledge. We speculate that this
pedagogical content knowledge may become subject content knowledge as teachers
learn about the nature of science from having to teach science. Teachers frequently
encounter classroom episodes where they have to make explicit how scientific
knowledge is reasonably and ethically constructed and validated. Thus, much
teaching about the Nature of Science takes place spontaneously in science classrooms
as an everyday occurrence. We refer to this as covert teaching about NOS as
opposed to overt teaching about NOS discussed in the next section on practical
approaches.
PRACTICAL CLASSROOM APPROACHES TO TEACHING THE

NATURE OF SCIENCE IN SCHOOLS
This next section (requiring at least one hour) illustrates practical approaches which
can be used overtly to teach secondary school pupils about the nature of science.
Three case studies are used to illustrate a range of classroom methods appropriate
to teaching the NOS. Specific advice was written for teachers, in England and
Wales, about teaching children the NOS (NCC, 1989). In order for children to learn
to move between practical exploration and scientific ideas and to understand that
scientific ideas have a history it was recommended that there should be:
structured discussion amongst small groups of children;

structured reading or listening or watching of items which involve stories

about scientists or scientific ideas;
drama and role play to develop qualities of sympathy and empathy with
people in the past and different cultures;
practical (hands-on or laboratory) work where children are asked both to

explain and predict.
The case studies are drawn from curriculum materials published in Exploring the
Nature of Science (Solomon, 1991) and in Practical Approaches to Teaching about
the Nature of Science (Nott, 1994).
Using Case Studies to Communicate Aspects of the Nature of Science
If time is short then the case studies are talked through by a tutor. If more time is
available, participants would be asked to work through the case studies themselves.
The curriculum materials and their rationale are described and demonstrated to the
participants and advice is offered on how to use them and what kind of learning may
occur.
Case One. The first case study illustrates how the history of science could provide
ideas to structure classroom activities. The materials are designed so that children
will already have read about how Arabic scientists worked with a ray model. Then
children go on to tnodel rays of light using threads (an idea “borrowed’ by the artists
from Kepler). Paper cutouts of a pinhole camera and a carbon filament lamp (see
Figure 3) can be placed on a wooden board and fixed with thumb tacks.
Figure 3. Using threads to model the passage of light rays through a pinhole camera.
A transparency prepared with threads is used to demonstrate these ideas that the
pupils can use one thread “ray” from the top of the lamp and the other from the
bottom of the lamp to make predictions about the image. The important part is that
with careful organization the teacher should be able to encourage the children to
move to and fro between practical experience and scientific model via evidence and
prediction (Figure 1). If children experience these activities they are learning to use
and apply standard scientific models. This example draws on the history of science
but it isn’t teaching children the history of science. Scientists’ work from different
times and cultures have been anachronistically juxtaposed to provide practical work
to help the learning of a currently acceptable model. This doesn’t stop teachers
telling stories about past scientists or scientific ideas and this may help children
understand that scientific ideas have been created and developed in different cultures
and in different times (Figure 2).
However, it is stressed with participants that the prime motivation for creating
the activity is for children to learn, use and understand the ray model of light and
that they as teachers provide the model. This is not to say that time shouldn’t be
spent eliciting children’s ideas on how shadows and images are formed but once they
are elicited then they could test their ideas against the scientists’ (teachers’) model.
We believe that children in school laboratories and with school apparatus will not
rediscover or uncover many scientific theories. The teachers’ role is to offer
reasonable explanations which, in most circumstances, can be reasonably tested.
Case Two. The next case study concerns some curriculum materials called “Jabs for
James Phipps.” The specific topic is the story of Edward Jenner’s work on
vaccination. Participants are shown a short (five minutes) cartoon of the story of
Edward Jenner and the famous vaccination of the small boy called James Phipps
(Yorkshire Television, 1984). The experimental procedure is described in a clear
chronologcal order. A rationale is also provided for Jenner’s actions. The cartoon
suggests with its imagery that James was not necessarily a willing volunteer to an
“untested” procedure. We show participants the cartoon and then we ask them to do
the following activities which are identical to what they can do with a class of pupils.
1) Telling a Story. This is an activity to process the information in the cartoon

story in the video. The students are split into groups of approximately four
in size. Each group is given an envelope with jumbled chunks of text which
describe the story. The group task is to put the chunks of text in the right
chronological sequence. All the curriculum materials are in Solomon
(1991). The purpose of this activity is to provide an alternative way of
processing the information in the cartoon, in other words to retell the story
in a different manner. If done in mixed ability groups it provides an
opportunity for all children to contribute to the telling of the story.
2) Evaluating an Experiment. The second part of the activity is to then open

a second envelope with the statements “MAKING A HYPOTHESIS,”
“OBSERVING,” “PREDICTION,” “REACHING A CONCLUSION” and
“DOING AN EXPERIMENT‘‘ each on a separate piece of paper with a brief
explanation of its meaning. The task is then to match these words to the
places where participants think they occur in the story of Jenner’s
experiment that they have just put in order. The purpose of this second
activity is to help children to analyze the structure of the experiment.
We then tell participants that teachers who have used these materials agree that
the evaluation of Jenner’s experiment happens but it has also been reported that the
analysis of the structure of the experiment has a transferability across to other
scientific investigations (Nott, 1992a). It appears that the children, having analyzed
(and criticized) the structure of experimental work as exemplified in the Jenner
story, learned something about the structure of experiments. That learning had then
been transferred to the planning of future experiments in terms of hypothesis,
prediction, experiment, etc. The conclusion is that learning “processes” through
stories is as important as learning them by doing experiments. The processes of
experimental planning could be seen as the identical processes in the Jenner story.
3) Values and experiments. Participants can be invited to discuss whether they

think Jenner’s experiment was a “fair test.” They can suggest improvements
to Jenner’s experimental design. They can be asked to discuss whether all
improvements would be right and proper in terms of whether they would be
allowed to do them, or whether they felt it would be right to do them. The
purpose of this activity is to encourage the participants to evaluate the
experiment and hence to consider whether there are any ethical and moral
limits on the nature of the experiment and hence medical experiments in
general. We then point out that they can do this when teaching pupils.
4) Role play. Watching the cartoon raises feelings. The cartoon implies that
the procedure involved some risk and possible hurt to James. The materials
contain a role play activity so that children can sympathize and empathize
with the characters in the Jenner story. The characters are the obvious
characters in the cartoon - Jenner, James Phipps and Sarah Nelmes - the
milkmaid. Fictitious characters, whose views represent contemporary
arguments for and against Jenner’s work, are also added. A “role” card is
available for each character and questions at the end stimulate discussion
and help to build a character on the information presented. Participants are
told how pupils can be split into small groups so that the roles can be built
in groups and then one person from each group can act out the role - and
even be prompted by her/his colleagues.
The scenario for the role play is a press conference where those not playing a role
can act as journalists. This format has worked extremely well - perhaps because
pupils are familiar with press conferences from the news. It is mentioned that
teachers have been inventive and creative with it as well. One teacher reported
creating the scenario for the role play as “the Phipp’s family tea” - another familiar
Occurrence for children to use and there have also been children working the story
up into the Jenner rap (Nott, 1992a) and even a ballet! These materials deal only
with a very narrow case, i.e., the experiment on James Phipps by Edward Jenner.
It is important to add that the textbook impressions that it was solely Jenner who
invented a safe technique of immunization are wrong (see Smith, 1987). The story
of immunization in England is one that involves other cultures and a determined
woman, Lady Mary Wortley Montague (Alic, 1986). There is also available some
excellent classroom material, “The long war against smallpox” (Science Education
Group York, 1990) which adds to the historical dimension of the materials above
and introduces the multicultural dimension.
Case three. The last case study we use is a case to help children understand that
scientists have interpreted the same phenomena differently in order that children
understand that different interpretations are possible and even desirable. The tutor
talks the participants through the curriculum materials as in the account below. The
particular case is studying Brownian Motion. Some details of this story can be found
in a piece on the nature of science for school teachers (Nott 1992b). School texts
never tell you why Brown was looking at pollen particles. He did have a clear
research programme in mind but it was nothing to do with atomistic theories. The
materials present pupils with one possible interpretation (Brown’s original
hypothesis) followed by our current interpretation and then the pupils have to
suggest experiments and predicted results which will decide between the two
interpretations.
The pupils work with Brown’s ideas about pollen being active and then all
organic material being active and then finally that all material, organic or inorganic,
provided it was small enough would demonstrate activity. The materials lead the
pupils through Brown’s research programme in stages and get the pupils to discuss
it and evaluate Brown’s work from his perspective. This enables them to work with
his interpretations. The next stage is the demonstration of the smoke cell and a three
dimensional kinetic model of a gas. At this stage the teacher can present the
contemporary interpretation of Brownian motion. In English high schools we have
a piece of apparatus called a smoke cell. This is used in various years and pupils are
expected to look at the smoke particles and explain their movement in terms of
uneven bombardment from the air molecules in the cell. So the materials stress
Figure 1 above, first hand experience, but do it by providing participation in a story
and a practical demonstration. This also provides the opportunity to share Brown’s
motivation for looking at pollen through a microscope - hardly a chance occurrence!
The last element is to ask the pupils to imagine that they could write to or send
a fax to Robert Brown to explain the modern interpretation and to suggest to Brown
experiments he could do to persuade him of the modern point of view. The purpose
being to work with both but to argue the case against Brown using our
interpretations so that the contemporary scientists’ model becomes more familiar and
reasonable to the children. A full report on using the materials with pupils and the
way that they responded is discussed in Nott (1994).
SUMMARY ACTIVITY WITHIN THE PROGRAMME:

FINAL DISCUSSION WITH STUDENTS
We go on to say (in an activity taking about 30 minutes) to students and teachers

participating in our nature of science courses that the above cases are based on
stories of three scientists, but that it is not necessary to know every story in science
to teach about the Nature of Science. In our view a teacher only needs a small range
of stories to convey key ideas of the Nature of Science to children. Not every lesson
is going to be, nor needs to be, based on historical information. An expectation that
science teachers will be fully conversant with an accurate sociology, history and
philosophy of science is unrealistic. The classroom resources cited and given out in
further reading provide any teacher with an ample supply of ideas and stories to get
going. We suggest to teachers that the point to recognize is that it is vital to have
some stories and to recognize that stories are an important part of the culture of
science. As Medawar has said, “Scientific theories are the stories that scientists tell
each other.”
In discussion, we also allay students’ and teachers’ anxieties that perhaps they
are becoming history teachers. Similarly we argue that it would be a mistake to see
the nature of science in the school curriculum as a course in the philosophy of
science. Children have direct experiences of science and these can be used to
present the NOS. There is little value in 14 year olds being told they are ‘naive
falsifkationists’ or discussing whether they are in a degenerative research
programme or not!
REFLECTIONS ON AND DISCUSSION OF OUR

NATURE OF SCIENCE PROGRAMME
Anecdotal evidence and course evaluations indicates that the session we do on the
nature of science is very well received on teacher education programmes
(pre-service and in-service). We also find that our approach of affirming what
teachers do know rather than finding out what they don’t know is welcomed and
raises self-esteem.
308 M. NOTT AND J. WELLNGTON
The critical incidents have certainly proved to be productive as a springboard for

discussion with practicing teachers, trainee teachers and even our own colleagues.
They raise questions about the norms, counter-norms and values of science and of
standard scientific education; about the purposes of practical activities in science
lessons; about what is possible or legitimate in classrooms or laboratories, and about
the knowledge and skills a teacher needs to realize those possibilities. Lastly, all
participants find the activity on practical approaches useful and they perceive them
as achievable and realizable in the classroom.
Underlying our teaching programme is the view that teachers do not necessarily
have ‘inadequate’ Views of the nature of science. They have teachers’ views of the
nature of science which are determined by their academic and professional histories.
Teachers do not talk about science as science researchers or even science education
researchers. Nor do they do talk about science as professional philosophers,
historians or sociologists. They talk about science as teachers.
When teachers talk about school science as opposed to ‘other’ science then the
‘other’ science is science as done by science researchers - the people who create and
discover scientific knowledge or apply scientific knowledge to particular
technological problems. Teachers’ knowledge about science is illustrated by
examples from their own professional practice as much as scientific researchers’
knowledge about the nature of science is illustrated by examples from their
professional practice. Researcher-scientists know science through their professional
practice and, we would argue, so do teachers.
However, we are not arguing that teachers’ understandings of the nature of
science are sufficient in themselves or immune from criticism. We believe that we
will be left with extreme relativism if the nature of science is that ‘anything goes’
and that ‘anything goes’ for understanding the nature of science. There would be
no point in having the nature of science in the curriculum! We recognize that
teachers need to be aware of the nature of science as expressed by researchers,
historians, philosophers and sociologists and those understandings should be
reciprocated. We also believe there is a need to forge a broad consensus about the
nature of science in school science - in other words what ought to be taught and how.
We would like to extend the time we have for this kind of work in teacher
training and in-service work. We are currently extending our work on critical
incidents to look at everyday incidents which at first sight don’t seem critical but
under analysis do become critical. However, we have never had the time to work
with teachers on feedback and further coaching, all of which Joyce and Showers
(1988) indicate are essential elements for professional development to effectively
change teachers’ practice.
Whether what we do actually changes the way that teachers’ teach, we don’t yet
know. We do know that it is changing the way that we teach.
1
Shefield Hallam University, Shefield, United Kingdom
2
University of Shefield, Shefield, United Kingdom
REFERENCES
Alic, M (1986). Hypatia’s heritage, London, Women’s Press.
Joyce, B. and Showers, B. (1988). Student achievement through staff development, NY, Longmans.
National Curriculum Council (1989). Non-stafutoryguidance for the national curriculum (science). York,
England, NCC.
Nott, M. (1992a). ‘History in the school science curriculum: Infection or immunity’ in S. Hills (ed),
Proceedings ofthe Second lnternational Conference on the History and Philosophy of Science and Science
Teaching, Kingston, Ontario, Queen’s University, 215-228.
Nott M (1992b). ‘The nature of science or Why teach Brownian motion?’ in M. Atlay, et al. (eds.), Open
chemistry, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 3-16.
Nott, M. (1 994). ‘Practical approaches to teaching about the nature of science’, in J. Wellington Secondary
Science: Contemporary Issues and Practical Approaches, London, Routledge, 258-283.
Nott, M. and Wellington, J. (1993). ‘ Your nature ofscience: An activity for science teachers’, School Science
Review, (75), 109-1 12
Nott, M. and Smith, R. (1995). ‘Talking your way out of it’, ‘rigging’ and ‘conjuring’: What science teachers
do when practicals ‘go wrong’b‘, International Journal of Science Education (17), 399 - 410.
Nott, M. and Wellington, J. (1995). ‘Critical incidents in the science classroom and the nature of science’,
School Science Review, (76), 41-46.
Nott, M. and Wellington, J. (1996) ‘Probing teachers’ views ofthe nature ofscience: How should we do it
and where should we be looking?’, in G. Welford, J. Osborne and P. Scott (eds.), Science education
research in Europe, London, The Falmer Press, 283-294.
Science Education Group (1990). The Salters’ approach. Key Stage 4. Unit Guide: Keeping healthy,
London, Heinemann.
Schön, D. (1983). The reflective practitioner., NY, Norton.
Shulman, L. (1987). ‘Knowledge and teaching: Foundations of the new reforms’, Harvard Educational
Review, (57), 1-22.
Smith, J.R. (1987). The speckled monster, Chelmsford, Essex Record Office.
Solomon, J. (1991). Exploring the nature of science, Glasgow, Blackie.
Yorkshire Television (1984) Scientific Eye Leeds, YTV
APPENDIX A: ‘YOUR OWN NATURE OF SCIENCE PROFILE’
The aim of the activity which follows (Nott and Wellington, 1993) is to encourage
teachers to reflect upon their own view of the nature of science. It is intended to be
a way of getting them to think, learn and reflect rather than a valid measurement of
a position on some sort of objective scale. Teachers should not worry if, at the end
of the activity, their profile is not as expected. The thing to do then is to consider
why - this is an important part of the process.
PART ONE: Please read each of the twenty-four statements in Table 1 carefully.
Table I. Questionnaire for the nature of science profile.
This questionnaire is designed to give you some indication ofyour own philosophy of science.
Score your response to each statement on a scale of +5 (strongly agree) to -5 (strongly
disagree). A score of 0 will indicate a balanced view. (For the time being, ignore the initials
in brackets.) Write down the score for each statement.
Questionnaire
1. Results that pupils get from their experiments are as valid as any others. (RP)
2. Science is essentially a masculine subject. (CD)
3. Science facts are what scientists agree they are. (CD, RP)
4. The object of scientific activity is to reveal reality. (IR)
5. Scientists have no idea of the outcome of an experiment before they do it (ID)
6. Scientific research is economically and politically determined. (CD)
7. Science education should be more about the learning of scientific processesthan the
learning of scientific facts. (PC)
8. The process of science are divorced from moral and ethical considerations. (CD)
9. The most valuable partof a scientific education is what remains afterthe facts have been
forgotten. (PC)
10. Scientific theories are valid ifthey work. (IR)
11. Science proceeds by drawing generalizable conclusions (which later become theories )
from available data. (ID)
12. There is no such thing as a true scientific theory. (RP, IR)
13. Human emotion plays no part in the creation of scientific knowledge. (CD)
14. Scientific theories describe a real external world which is independent ofhuman perception.
(RP, IR)
15. A good solid grounding in basic scientific facts and inherited scientific knowledge is
essential before young scientists can go on to make discoveries of their own. (PC)
16. Scientific theories have changed over time simply because experimental techniques have
improved. (RP, CD)
17. Scientific method is transferable from one scientific investigation to another. (PC)
18. In practice, choices between competing theories are made purely on the basis of
experimental results. (CD, RP)
19. Scientific theories are as much a result of imagination and intuition as inference from
experimental results. (ID)
20. Scientific knowledge is different from other kinds of knowledge in that it has higher status.
(RP)
2 1. There are certain physical events in the universe which science can never explain. (RP,
IR)
22. Scientific knowledge is morally neutral - only the application of the knowledge is ethically
determined. (CD)
23. All scientific experiments and observations are determined by existing theories. (ID)
24. Science is essentially characterized by the methods and processes it uses. (PC)
PART TWO: Work out your profile by scoring each statement. Refer to Figure II.
Each statement has at least two letters in brackets after it e.g. PC - some have four e.g. RP,
CD. Put your score for each question into the appropriate box or boxes in Figure Three i.e.
some score once, some twice. NOTE CAREFULLY that some scores have to have their sign
reversed (i.e. multiply by -1) before they can be entered into the box.
After you have entered all your numbers into the boxes add up the totals, then transfer the
marks from the columns to the correct position on each of the five relevant axes. Join up the
five options to show your profile of science. Are you a raving relativist? A proud positivist?
Or a coy contextualist? What do all these terms mean anyway?
PART THREE: Your Nature of Science
Many of the terms used may be unfamiliar. In fact, many of them are problematic and a
matter of debate. Their meanings change and shift and can be seen as insults or praise
depending on to whom you are talking.
Definitions for the meanings attached to the four continua above are offered below.
1. Relativism/Positivism Axis
Relativist: You deny that things are true or false solely based on an independent reality.
The ‘truth’ of a theory will depend on the norms and rationality of the social group
considering it as well as the experimental techniques used to test it. Judgements as to the
truth of scientific theories will vary from individual and from one culture to another i.e.
truth is relative not absolute.
Positivist: You believe strongly that scientific knowledge is more ‘valid’ than other forms
of knowledge. The laws and theories generated by experiments are our descriptions of
patterns we see in a real, external objective world. To the positivist, science is the
primary source of truth. Positivism recognizes empirical facts and observable phenomena
as the raw material of science. The scientist’s job is to establish the objective
relationships between the laws governing the facts and observables. Positivism rejects
inquiry into underlying causes and ultimate origins.
2. Inductivism/Deductivism
Inductivism: You believe that the scientist’s job is the interrogation of Nature. By
observing many particular instances, one is able to infer from the particular to the general
and then determine the underlying laws and theories. According to inductivism, scientists
generalize from a set of observations to a universal law ‘inductively’. Scientific
knowledge is built by induction from a secure set of observations.
Deductivism: In our definition this means that you believe that scientists proceed by
testing ideas produced by the logical consequences of current theories or of their bold
imaginative ideas. According to deductivism (or hypothetico- deductivism) scientific
reasoning consists of the forming of hypotheses which are not established by the empirical
data but may be suggested by them. Science then proceeds by testing the observable
consequences of these hypotheses, i.e. observations are directed or led by hypotheses -
they are theory laden.
3. Contextualism/Decontextualism
Contextualism: You hold the view that the truth of scientific knowledge and processes is
interdependent with the culture in which the scientists live and in which it takes place.
Decontextualism: You hold the view that scientific knowledge is independent of its
cultural location and sociological structure.
4. Process/Content
Process: You see science as a characteristic set of identifiable method/processes. The

learning of these is the essential part of science education.
Content: You think that science is characterized by the facts and ideas it has and that the
essential part of science education is the acquisition and mastery of this ‘body of
knowledge’.
5. Instrumentalism/Realism
Instrumentalism: You believe that scientific theories and ideas are fine if they work, that
is they allow correct predictions to be made. They are instruments which we can use but
they say nothing about an independent reality or their own truth.
Realism: You believe that scientific theories are statements about a world that exists in
space and time independent of the scientists’ perceptions. Correct theories describe
things which are really there, independent of scientists e.g. atoms, electrons.
PART FOUR: Reflect on your profile by reading the working definitions and
considering the points below:
How do you feel about your profile? Has it really ‘measured’ your views about
science?
Do you feel confident that you understand it all?
Do you think your viewdopinions have been challenged or changed by this activity?
CRAIG E. NELSON1, MARTIN K. NICKELS2, AND JEAN BEARD3
20. THE NATURE OF SCIENCE AS A FOUNDATION FOR

TEACHING SCIENCE: EVOLUTION AS A CASE STUDY
This chapter presents the approach applied in several inservice institutes for
secondary school biology teachers with a focus on evolution and the nature of
science. Here we present the rationale, review the pedagogical strategies and several
of the lessons, and provide the evidence that the institutes made a major difference
in how teachers taught both the science of evolution and the nature of science. In
this chapter we will provide sufficient detail so that others can evaluate and adapt
our approach in working with inservice and preservice high school teachers.
The combination of evolution and the nature of science is particularly effective
in addressing many of the core issues within the nature of science. We feel that it
is essential to present evolution in the context of the nature of science — specifically,
to present it as the better choice of those so far proposed for explaining whole classes
of facts in biology and anthropology. This allows teachers to emphasize that
explanation is the central task of science and otherwise to explain the nature of
science and the criteria used in science for selecting among alternative theories. It
is important to help teachers and students understand that this exemplifies the nature
of science generally. In addition, the teaching of evolution and related topics
remains perhaps the single greatest content-related problem that high school science
teachers must confront. Since evolution is the central organizing theory for all of
biology, this problem is most severe in secondary school biology, but it also affects
much of the rest of the science curriculum.
BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM
In working with college undergraduates, we each independently realized that two

strateges made the teaching of evolutionary ideas much more effective. First, it
seemed essential to present evolution in the context of the nature of science. Second,
we found it fundamental to help students understand the nature of science generally.
Otherwise, they often felt that our approach to teaching evolution was necessary
because it was more dubious than the rest of science, which remained, in their
minds, “truth.” This is not an unreasonable attitude since science is so often taught
more as stuff (the “right” answers) to be memorized than as comparisons of
alternative explanations — the process.
315
316 C. NELSON, M. NICKELS AND J. BEARD
Emphasizing the nature of science was also especially important since many of
our students were not science majors. These students would be unlikely to learn
about the processes of science while presented with a view of science as an
unassailable body of facts. Furthermore, we encountered increasing numbers of
students who had mistaken notions of the nature of scientific inquiry and knowledge.
This was exacerbated by widely-disseminated “creationist” views that present a
distorted view of the nature of science. Based on our experiences at the college level
and our prior work with high school teachers in other contexts, we were convinced
that our approach to evolution and the nature of science instruction would work at
the high school level as well.
EVOLUTION AND NATURE OF SCIENCE INSTITUTES
In 1989, we began what became an externally funded six-year program for

experienced high school biology teachers titled Evolution and the Nature of Science
Institutes (ENSI). The goal of this program was to improve the teaching of evolution
in high school biology courses. We asked the teachers: 1) to begin their biology
courses by considering the nature of science at length; 2) to introduce evolution early
in the course as an illustration of the nature of science and modern scientific
thinking; 3) to use evolution and the nature of science as central themes throughout
the course; 4) to emphasize humans as a key example whenever possible; 5) to teach
science in a manner compatible with how science is really done; and, 6) to monitor
the effects of their revised courses.
Each ENSI began with a three-week, residential summer session followed by a
two-day session in the fall and another in the spring. During six years (1989-1994)
we worked directly with 180 biology teachers. In addition, from 1992 to 1997 we
worked indirectly with nearly 650 additional teachers through forty-five “satellite”
institutes conducted by 50 selected ENSI “graduates” whom we trained for a second
summer to be “lead teachers.”
The Summer ENSI program began with an extensive treatment of the nature of
science. This was followed by the development of fundamental evolutionary
processes and patterns, each presented within the nature of science framework. The
latter part of each session included time devoted to the review, modification, and
development of teaching activities on both the nature of science and evolution.
Also, each teacher was asked to design a teaching experiment (typically termed
an action research project) for implementation during the following school year that
monitored a designed change in their course content, their teaching practices, or
both. These changes were intended to improve their teaching of some aspect of
either the nature of science or evolution. The projects served both to foster
improvements in their teaching and to illustrate for them and their students a
practical application of investigative processes.
EVOLUTION AS A CASE STUDY 317
The focus of the fall follow-up (midway through the semester) was on their
successes and problems in teaching their first units on the nature of science. The
spring follow-up (midway through the semester) focused on their teaching of
evolution. These pre-announced topics served to reinforce our first and second
charges to the teachers.
A vital component of ENSI was the use of a variety of pedagogical activities that
both illustrated and modeled different aspects of the scientific process. Open-ended
brainstorming sessions on different topics (such as attributes of science) led to the
teachers discovering one another’s sometimes contradictory perceptions of what is
most important to include. Concept mapping (Novak and Gowin, 1984) led to
similar experiences. A traditional “Black Box” or Mystery Box activity (in which
the teachers were asked to describe the barriers within a sealed box also containing
a marble) was modified by not allowing them to open the boxes at the end of the
session. This inability to get absolute verification of their descriptions underscored
the uncertainty inherent in much of scientific knowledge--and generated much
frustration as well! Hands-on labs (e.g., comparing ape, human and fossil skull
casts) illustrated the inter-observer variation in scientific measurements. It also
showed how preconceptions can differ as to what constitutes appropriate evidence
for scientific decision-making (here, on phylogenetic relationships). Structured
discussions (of both readings and lecture-posed questions) were used extensively to
maximize the active processing of information and ideas, the sharing of alternative
interpretations of the same material and a consideration of the consequences of
adopting various alternatives.
Most of these activities were done in small groups, thus modeling the cooperative
and collaborative nature of much scientific research. It is quite important that such
groups be required to develop a consensus group-product generated as a social
dynamic involving sharing, discussing and, usually, a compromising of diverse
perspectives. Variation in the ethnic, socio-economic and gender composition of the
groups contributed to this dynamic. These aspects of the small-group setting
mirrored the socio-cultural context in which science is done. Taken together, these
active, student-centered activities occupied well over two-thirds of the participants’
time during the summer institute. Didactic, teacher-centered activities occupied less
than one-third of the available time.
We believe that the most unique part of our approach was helping the teachers
reconceptualize the nature of science in ways that made it easier for them to
understand the strength of evolutionary theory and better able to deal with popular
challenges to it. The rest of this chapter presents this conjunction in detail intended
to be sufficient to allow those who like it to use it.
RECONCEPTUALIZING THE NATURE OF SCIENCE
We concentrated on four key aspects of the nature of science. The first examined the
realm of science. The second focused on scientific knowledge as fundamentally
uncertain. The third focused on science as a set of procedures for comparing
alternative ideas and judging some to be “better,” procedures that explain how
science can be fundamentally uncertain yet quite useful and reliable. The fourth
emphasized that scientific ideas are known with various degrees of confidence. It
follows from this that one must consider the possible consequences of an idea in
deciding when the evidence is good enough to accept the idea for a particular
purpose.
We thus presented a constrained constructivist view of the nature of science.
Here, the acceptability of alternative views is constrained by the extent to which they
reflect and explain natural phenomena as well as by historically and socio-culturally
influenced judgements of the value of their positive and negative consequences. To
help develop these ideas, and to emphasize that they were not idiosyncratic to us, we
made extensive use of selected readings from Strahler (1987), and more limited use
of readings from Gould (1980a, 1980b, 1985), Kitcher (1 982) (especially chapter 2),
Ridley (1985), Strickberger (1996), and Glen (1994). Our overall approach to the
nature of science and evolution was grounded in current understandings of
intellectual development. Please refer to Nelson (1989, 1997) for further elaboration.
The Realm of Science
A delineation of the realm of scientific inquiry helps emphasize both the strengths
and weaknesses of science as a way of knowing. For example, noting that scientists
can only study the natural world helps alleviate any problems that might arise
relating to issues involving the “supernatural.” By “natural” scientists mean
empirically and reliably detectable using the human senses, whether or not these are
amplified technologically. Consequently, questions such as “How many angels can
dance on the head of a pin?” or “Did God create the universe?” may be intriguing
but are outside the province of science.
Within its realm, science can be seen as operating on two main levels. First, it
provides summaries of empirical patterns. The summarization of patterns can be
valid science even if the causes of the patterns are totally unknown. Galileo and
Linneaus were great scientists even though they did not know the natural causes of
the patterns they summarized. However, science is even better when the patterns
can be explained. Thus, the second level of science is to provide natural
explanations for the empirical patterns. Darwin’s importance lay in providing
explanations for patterns observed earlier by Linneaus and others.
The delineation of natural causes typically does not provide a scientific
explanation for the origin of the systems studied. Newton and Einstein each did
great science without explaining the origin of the systems with which they worked.
Similarly, evolution can be great science if it delineates what happened after the
origin of life and why it happened, even if our explanations for the origin of life are
still quite tentative or even largely speculative at some points.
It is useful to contrast the two scientific levels with a third. One could say that
God makes the planets go around the sun in ellipses (the pattern) due to the
interaction of inertia and warped space (the natural causal explanation). Science
provides no guidance as to whether one should attribute the existence of the system
to a Creator. Similarly, religion is of no help in working out either the empirical
patterns or their natural causes.
In the specific case of evolution, one further elaboration of these ideas is quite
helpful. In current public discourse, “creationist” is essentially synonymous with the
young-earth, flood-geology, no-new-kinds, perspective whose advocates call
themselves “scientific creationists.” Either terminology has two problems. First, it
suggests that if one believes in a Creator, one must accept the tenets of scientific
creation. Second, it suggests that the scientific creationist viewpoint is somehow
more scientific than alternative theological viewpoints that combine at least some
science with a belief in a Creator. Both of these ideas are patently false. It is quite
helpful for both students and teachers to note that there is an array or spectrum of
theological positions. These range from the “scientific” or (as we prefer) “quick”
creation through the “progressive” creationist’s idea of an old earth with the direct
creation of new forms intermittently across hundreds of millions of years to
“gradual” creation (often termed theistic evolution), the most scientific of the three.
The gradual creation perspective states that God made organisms become more
complex and diverse through time (the pattern) due primarily to the interaction of
inheritance and natural selection (the causal natural explanation). Science is, in
practice, non-theistic, meaning that it operates only at the levels of empirical
patterns and natural causes. Once again, it provides no guidance as to whether or
not we should attribute the existence of the biological systems to a creator.
Uncertainty in Science: Scope and Sources
There are two key questions about the nature of uncertainty in science. First, is the
idea of scope. How much of science is really uncertain and subject to further major
change? Second, after the answer to this first question is clear (i.e., most or all of
science is really uncertain), the question of the sources of this uncertainty arises
naturally. What prevents science from coming up with enduring truth?
Scope
The most powerful arguments that scientific knowledge is fundamentally uncertain

come from the history of science. The history of virtually any scientific idea, such
as evolution in biology or plate tectonics in geology, consists of any number of
mistaken ideas and conclusions that may well once have been deemed the final word.
For example: What kinds of things did physicists believe with absolute certainty in
the last century that are now known to be quite wrong? Answers to this question
include the notions that space is Euclidian, motion is Newtonian, and matter can
neither be created nor destroyed. Complete agreement among scientists is not a
guarantee of truth, even if that agreement persists for centuries (Newtonian motion)
or even millennia (Euclidian rather than warped space)! And who is to say that our
best ideas today will not be replaced eventually by better ones? In teaching that
scientific knowledge if fundamentally uncertain it is important to invoke examples
of both historical and current uncertainty from across all of science to counter the
common impression that physics, in contrast to evolution and much of the rest of
science, is largely free from doubt.
Sources
Once it appears that science is indeed broadly uncertain, a second question naturally
arises. What prevents the processes of science from yielding certainty? The first
task here is to understand that even direct observations can be misleading. Human
senses have only a limited range of detection (for instance, we cannot “see
ultraviolet). Hence, we directly perceive only a limited part of the universe of
potential stimuli. Compounding these sensory limitations, we actually perceive the
world with our minds rather than our senses. For example we “see” depth only in
the sense that our minds construct it. Optical illusions designed to mislead observers
into thinking that two figures differ in size, when in reality they do not, illustrate this
point well. Similarly, our minds are shaped by previous experiences and, thus,
predisposed to recognize only some parts of reality. The famous “young woman or
old hag” drawing illustrates that our minds unconsciously impose a biased
interpretation on sensory data. (See Lederman and Abd-el-Khalick in this volume
for a complete description of this activity.)
However, the more important sources of uncertainty in science are much deeper.
It is useful to invert the question of uncertainty and ask: How might we get
certainty? Logic and data are the two potential sources. Logic fails because nature
often refuses to abide by it. Consider the question of whether 2 + 2 is always 4 in
reality. An easy and surprising demonstration combines two liters of water and two
of alcohol. They dissolve in each other, yielding visibly less than four liters. Thus,
in reality 2 + 2 is only sometimes 4! Similarly, if logic yielded certain answers,
space would have been Euclidian rather than warped. Logic tells us what would be
true in an imaginary universe where the assumptions were absolutely true, but it can
only provide approximations when dealing with the real universe.
Scientific data also fail to provide certainty. Two sets of assumptions are always
problematic in any scientific study. One is that all of the uncontrolled variables are
irrelevant--which they sometimes are not. The other is that one has at hand all the
possible alternative interpretations. We could only claim that any explanation was
absolutely correct if we knew that we had eliminated every possible other
explanation. But how could we know that we had even conceived every possible
alternative? Indeed, a scientist in the future may come up with a new idea that leads
to a reinterpretation with no new data whatsoever (Kitcher, 1982).
More frequently in the history of science, new data elsewhere leads to a
reinterpretation of other, older ideas. That is essentially what happened in geology
in the 1960s when evidence suggesting that the sea floor was spreading led to the
reinterpretation of many previously existing data sets on a wide array of geological
phenomena (Glen, 1982).
Comparisons and Criteria: Science as the Set of Currently Better Models
Once general uncertainty in science is acknowledged, a key task becomes

understanding how scientists pick better theories. Fundamentally, this task is one
of comparing alternative patterns and explanations and using appropriate criteria to
tell which are scientifically stronger. Both scientists and science teachers have often
learned these criteria, to whatever extent they have learned them, more tacitly than
explicitly. However, effective science teaching requires making both the
comparisons and the criteria explicit.
Consider, for example, the fossil record. Darwin (1859) is sometimes credited
with inventing a new form of scientific reasoning, one in which he explained not
only the strengths of his theory but also the problems (Dewey, 1910). Among the
chief problems was the lack of a clearly evolutionary sequence in the fossil record
(the oldest fossiliferous rocks then known had quite diverse marine invertebrates).
There was no prior reason to expect that the sequence of fossils in an adequately
worked out record would have come to show the kinds of changes required by
Darwin’s theory. Indeed, several alternatives seemed much more likely to some of
his contemporaries. Sedgewick, for example, thought he saw evidence for a series
of independent creations. Lyell, in contrast, suggested that the fossil record would
be found to be cyclical in nature, and even speculated that the giant reptiles might
again come to rule the earth. Alternatively, the quick creationist idea that all
organisms were created together in a single week would suggest that the oldest sets
of fossiliferous rocks should contain fossils of all of the major kinds of organisms
that have ever existed. We would like to have a fair test by which these various
alternatives could be compared. An ideal fair test would have two key properties.
It would be based on a line of evidence that was independent of alternative
explanations. And, it would potentially allow any one of them to be supported as
better than the others.
Fortunately, the methods used to put the fossil record in order are independent
of any ideas of biological change or permanence and would have allowed it to
support any of these alternatives. That is, the fossil sequence provides a fair test of
evolution and of the various alternatives to it, including quick creation.
The initial criterion for deciding the temporal ordering of the rocks was the
relative age as indicated by superposition. The sequence worked out on this basis
has been confirmed, with some revisions, by radiometric or “absolute” dating (see
Strahler, 1987) that does not depend on the position of the stratum. As is now well
known, the fossil record starts, as Darwin explicitly predicted life must have started
with only a few kinds of simple organisms, all of them of the bacterial (prokaryotic)
grade, and only slowly (not necessarily gradually) shows increases in the diversity
and complexity of organisms.
Thus, scientists reject “quick” creation of the organisms on earth not because the
original idea was based on religious texts. Rather, scientists reject it because it has
failed a substantial fair test, a test that could have supported it but did not.
A number of additional criteria allow us to support or tentatively reject scientific
theories. For example, radiometric dating is part of a larger body of nuclear science
that has allowed the prediction and design of nuclear reactors and nuclear bombs.
These successes increase our confidence in the power of nuclear theory, and,
therefore, in the basic ideas underlying radiometric dating. Similarly, the successes
of molecular genetics increase our confidence in the reality of the explanations we
use for evolution.
We developed a number of such criteria in comparing evolution with
“Lamarckian,” quick creationist and other alternatives. By the end of ENSI, and by
the ends of our courses, it is clear that evolution is supported by the results of a large
series of fair tests, that it has immense predictive power, that its mechanisms are
supported by all of modem molecular genetics, and that its acceptance illustrates a
number of other criteria that are used in science to separate better from worse ideas.
Further, because our approach has been comparative throughout, it has become clear
that scientists reject quick creation, as science, because it has failed a substantial
series of fair tests and is inferior to evolution on a number of other criteria, including
the ad hoc or untestable nature of many of its assertions.
This same approach can and should be used repeatedly in any field of science.
Ask what the alternatives are and what scientific criteria can be used to distinguish
among them. Popular misconceptions and pseudoscience should be included in these
comparisons wherever they can be made pertinent.
Additional Applications To Evolution
In dealing with each evolutionary pattern or process we laid out alternative

hypotheses, asked how they could be compared, ideally by fair tests as defined above,
and laid out the currently evident uncertainty for each conclusion. In looking at
patterns, we took the approach, pioneered by Darwin (1859), that evolution uniquely
explains “whole great classes of facts.” We included an updated version of
Darwin’s argument that evolution both explains adaptation, via natural selection,
and explains, via inheritance from variously remote ancestors, many aspects of
development, structure and behavior that are not explicable in terms of current
adaptation. We also developed a cladistically informed version of Darwin’s insight
that evolution explains the causes of the patterns of relationships first adequately
captured in Linnaeus’ eighteenth century, hierarchical classification as well as the
causes of the dominant patterns of biogeography. Major sources of post-Darwinian
support for evolution include the sequences in the fossil record (above), the
abundance of intermediate fossils and the records of evolution that persist in
molecular sequences. In each case, we emphasized examples from human evolution,
both because of their intrinsic interest to students and because the evidence for
human evolution provides one of the most comprehensive examples (Nickels, 1987).
Decisions in Context: Consequences and Their Value
So far we have summarized and provided explanations of how we asked teachers to

understand and teach three key aspects of the nature of science. These ideas include
the notion that science is limited to natural patterns and causes, that it is
fundamentally uncertain, and that, never the less, by comparing alternative ideas and
using a variety of criteria, scientists can distinguish better ideas from less satisfying
ones. This process of comparison typically, but not inevitably, produces a series of
increasingly more useful models of reality.
There remains one key property of the nature of science that we asked the
teachers to understand and use. Scientists do not, and indeed, should not, always
accept the idea which has the strongest support. Consider, the situation with
traditional hypothesis testing. Conventionally, we reject hypotheses unless the
chance that the most relevant null hypothesis adequately explains the data is less
than five percent. That is, even if the new hypothesis is more probable we do not
accept it unless it is substantially more probable. This means that with standard
hypothesis testing we frequently reject the more probable hypothesis.
The nub of the idea here can be grasped better by asking: Why five percent,
rather than ten percent, one percent or some other number? If we were to be more
generous towards new hypotheses and accept them whenever the relevant null had
less than, say, a ten percent chance of explaining the data, more of the ideas that
3 24 C. NELSON, M. NICKELS AND J. BEARD
were published would turn out to be wrong on further examination. Alternatively,

if we were to be more demanding of new hypotheses and only accept them whenever
the relevant null had less than, say, a two percent or one percent chance of
explaining the data, then we would fail to publish many good ideas and research
would become more time consuming and otherwise expensive.
Thus, the answer to “Why five percent?” is that it is a value-based tradeoff
between the importance of avoiding the publication of too many wrong ideas and the
slowing of scientific progress that being more rigorous would inevitably produce.
The fundamental point is that, rather than being “objective,” the tradeoff is
“subjective” in the sense of being based on the relative value placed on these two
different consequences.
A key to understanding most of the controversies at the interface of science and
society is the recognition that scientific ideas often have substantial consequences
that were not taken into account in choosing the standard five percent rule,
consequences that vary from idea to idea and that may vary further with context.
Consider for example, the safety of new medicines. The evidence we should demand
for their effectiveness will vary with the kinds and severity of the side effects, with
the severity of the condition being treated, and with the alternatives available. Thus
individuals often choose to take drugs with substantial side effects when the
condition itself is severe enough and there are no reasonable alternatives.
Chemotherapy and radiation therapy for cancer provide clear examples of this
phenomenon.
When the negative consequences are seen to be quite large and the benefits are
seen to be small, we typically set aside large amounts of strong evidence in making
decisions on what to do or on what ideas to accept. Some creationists likely see the
negative consequences of mistakenly accepting the idea of evolution, were it actually
false, as quite severe. In contrast, they see only small benefits, at best, from the idea
of evolution, even if it were right. Would any rational person accept the idea of
evolution if these were the relative benefits and risks envisioned?
Those of us who accept evolution do so not just because the evidence is strong but
also because we see different benefits and risks than those emphasized by the quick
creationists. Evolution explains substantial bodies of data and has led to predictions
that are both scientifically important and economically beneficial. And we see the
risks as different, different either because we believe that our risk of eternal
damnation is essentially independent of our scientific ideas, or because, like Saint
Augustine (1988), we believe that there are severe religious costs (specifically,
increased risk of disbelief) in denying scientific ideas “the truth of which is written
in the skies,” or, even, in some cases, because we do not believe in damnation.
With the ENSI teachers, as with many of our own students, we have found that
an approach which directly compares evolution with quick creation across a broad
range of data and using a full array of scientific criteria, leads to the conclusion that
the support for evolution has become so strong that its “truth” is essentially written
in the skies. Overwhelmingly clear except to those who will not see. For many of
the teachers and for many of our students, this led to a reassessment of both the
scientific and religious risks and benefits involved in accepting evolution.
EVALUATION
Several instruments were used in assessing the effects of our efforts. Extensive
informal assessment was also included, both for feedback, for modifying of our
ongoing efforts and as a summative overview of the effects of the institute. A
detailed presentation of the results is clearly beyond the scope of this chapter but is
being prepared for separate publication. Only a few highlights can be included here.
Teachers in ENSI increased their coverage of the nature of science from an
average of less than four class days prior to participation in ENSI to nearly fourteen
days afterwards. By the end of the institute they projected a further increase of three
days. This represented a quadrupling of the amount of time spent on a topic that
cuts across all scientific disciplines and is basic to scientific literacy. The amount
of time spent discussing evolution-related topics increased from an average of 19
days prior to teachers’ exposure to the institute to almost 32 days during the ENSI
year with a projection for the following year of an additional 6.5 days on evolution
topics. This represented a doubling of the time devoted to evolution, the central
organizing principle in all of biology. Our data also show a significant increase in
the understanding by teachers of the ENSI concepts including both those on the
nature of science and those on evolution. Teachers also indicated an increased
teaching emphasis on the concepts we taught in ENSI. We conclude from this that
after ENSI they were more comfortable with evolution concepts, dealt with evolution
more completely in their classes, and linked it more clearly to the nature of science.
In addition, a shift occurred in the way the teachers thought about the nature of
science and its relationship to teaching science. Almost all of the teachers came to
the various versions of the institute because they wanted to learn more about
evolution or wanted to learn how to teach it more safely in a system where it felt
controversial, Generally, they felt that the nature of science was irrelevant to why
they chose to come. Teachers felt that they already knew all about the scientific
method and generally felt that in most of the areas they taught, science had reached
a state not functionally different from the truth. By the end of the ENSI experience,
the prevailing opinion was that their teaching had been transformed by the new
approaches they had learned for thinking and teaching about the nature of science.
Perhaps even more important, was the overall pedagogical “paradigm shift”
teachers experienced and brought into their teaching throughout their courses. They
were more inclined to involve their own students in the process of scientific
discovery and research by letting them design open-ended labs. They engaged them
in comparative critical thinking as a method for determining better from worse
proposed explanations (and not “absolutely true” ones from “absolutely false” ones).
By understanding the social context in which every scientist works, the teachers were
able to enrich their students’ understanding of how science is conducted in the “real”
world in contrast to the imaginary world of “the” scientific method. And these Same
active learning approaches were applied to evolution and to other units in biology.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Our work in ENSI with experienced high school teachers of General Biology
produced substantial changes in how the teachers taught both evolution and the
nature of science. We attribute this success to the following conjunction of factors.
We strongly recommend each of these individually to others who are working with
either experienced or preservice teachers, and especially urge others to consider
using several of them together.
1. A reconceptualizing by the teachers of tlie nature of science was clearly

fundamental to both tlie changes in pedagogy and content. Central to this
was the movement from a standard “steps of the scientific method” and
“(almost) true” characterization of modern science to one emphasizing the
uncertainty and comparative basis of scientific knowledge.
2. This reconceptualization allowed a reassessment of the strength both of the

support for evolution and of its explanatory and predictive power. Strength
is not nearly as evident until alternatives are directly compared.
3. Comparing evolution with alternatives including quick creation

paradoxically makes it seem less challenging to fundamentalist religion, as
it is no longer a confrontation of dogmas. This allowed the teachers to feel
safer in teaching it. Other important pieces that contributed to this feeling
of increased safety (besides point 2, above) were the idea of a spectrum of
theological positions (quick to gradual creation), with its broaching of the
dichotomy usually envisioned, and tlie provision to the teachers of copies of
Strahler and group discussion of some of his analyses of quick creationist
assertions. The teachers frequently cotnmented that they felt newly prepared
to deal with fundamentalist claims.
4. The focus on humans as a central case study whenever possible was also
crucial. Using humans to illustrate various aspects of evolutionary processes
and patterns throughout ENSI took advantage of perhaps the most
interesting species that students can relate to. It also had the advantage of
directly dealing with the species that most people have trouble accepting as
a product of natural processes. By learning about the abundant evidence for

human evolution, the ENSI teachers were especially well-prepared to deal
with concerns and objections to evolution.
These first four points represent in our minds the most innovative aspects of what
we did. However, three more points were, we believe, critical to our success and thus
also require emphasis here.
5. The extensive use of active social learning (concept mapping, small group
work, structured small group discussions, open-ended laboratory projects,
etc.) was clearly one of the strongest effects on the outcomes of the institute.
With this was the switch from tests to more authentic forms of assessment.
6. It was clear that having the teachers find, present and, especially, directly
participate in activities that were appropriate for use in their own classrooms
was central to the transformations in both content and in pedagogy.
7. A final important lesson from ENSI is the immense value of providing

continuing support for teachers who are attempting radical changes in their
teaching and in their courses. In the case of ENSI, this consisted of
requiring the teachers to attend a fall and a spring follow-up in addition to
attending the residential summer session. The additional support that the
ENSI faculty were able to provide may well have been secondary to that
provided by the teachers themselves acting as a “support group” during the
time of transition from the old teaching to the new. We strongly encourage
the incorporation of such sequenced education opportunities for anyone
working with in-service teachers. Such support opportunities can be
emulated somewhat even in pre-service settings by having faculty coordinate
and overlap their treatment of topics, such as the nature of science, that
transcend any one scientific course or discipline.
1 Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, USA

2 Illinois State University. Normal, Illinois, USA
3
San Jose State University, San Jose, California, USA
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Funding for the Institutes came from the National Science Foundation (NSF/TPE:
88-555-60 and 90-555-85 to Indiana University and 91-552-59 to San Jose State
University).
REFERENCES
Saint Augustine (1988). The literal meaning of Genesis., translated and annotated by John Hammond Taylor,
NY, Neuman Press.
Darwin, C. (1859). On the origin of species, London, John Murray.
Dewey, J. (1910). The influence of Darwin and philosophy and other essays in contemporary thought,
New York, Holt.
Gould, S. J. (1980). Ever since Darwin, New York, W. W. Norton.
Gould, S. J. (1980). The panda’s thumb, New York, W. W. Norton.
Gould, S. J. (1985). The flamingo’s smile, New York, W. W. Norton.
Glen, W. (1982). The road to Jaramillo: Critical years of the revolution in earth science. Stanford, CA,
Glen, W. (Ed.) (1994). The mass extinction debates: How science works in a crisis, Stanford, CA, Stanford
University Press.
Kitcher, P. (1982). Abusing science: The case against creationism, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Nelson, C.E. (1997). ‘Tools For Tampering With Teaching Taboos’ in William E. Campbell and Karl A
Smith (eds.), New paradigms for college teaching, Edina, MN, Interaction Book Company, 5 1-77.
Nelson, C.E. (1986). ‘Creation, Evolution, or Both? A Multiple Model Approach’ in R. W. Hanson (ed.),
Science and Creation, New York, Macmillian, 158-159.
Nickels, M. K. (1987). ‘Human Evolution: A Challenge For Biology Teachers’, The American Biology
Teacher, (49),143-148.
Novak, J. D. and Gowin, R. (1984). Learning How to Learn, Cambridge University Press.
Ridley, M. (1985). The Problems Of Evolution, New York, Oxford University Press.
Strahler, A (1987). Science and Earth History: The Evolution/Creation Controversy, Buffalo, NY,
Prometheus.
Strickberger, M. W. (1996). Evolution. 2nd ed., Boston, MA, Jones and Bartlett.
SECTION IV
ASSESSING THE NATURE OF SCIENCE

NORMAN LEDERMAN, PHILIP WADE AND RANDY L. BELL
21. ASSESSING UNDERSTANDING OF THE

NATURE OF SCIENCE: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The nature of science typically refers to “the values and assumptions inherent to
science, scientific knowledge, and/or the development of scientific knowledge”
(Lederman, 1992). These values and assumptions include, but are not limited to,
independence of thought, creativity, tentativeness, an empirical base, subjectivity,
testability, and cultural and social embeddedness (Duschl, 1990; Lederman, 1992;
Matthews, 1994). In brief, the nature of science is directly related to the
epistemology of science as distinct from science process and content.
The development and assessment of students’ and teachers’ conceptions of
the nature of science has been a concern of science educators for over 30 years. In
spite of this focus on the nature of science as a goal for science instruction, a vast
number of research investigations consistently indicate that students, as well as
teachers, do not possess what are considered to be adequate conceptions of the nature
of science (Aikenhead, 1973; Aikenhead, 1987; Cooley & Klopfer, 1963; Korth,
1969, Lederman & O’Malley, 1990; Lederman, 1992; Mackay, 1971, Rubba &
Anderson, 1978; Wade & Lederman, 1995; Welch, 1981; among others). This
finding makes the continued communication and assessment of aspects of the nature
of science a vital part of the science curriculum as we enter the new century.
BACKGROUND ON NATURE OF SCIENCE ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS
The history of the assessment of the nature of science mirrors the evolution that has
occurred in both psychometrics and in educational research design. The first formal
assessments, beginning in the early 1960s, emphasized a quantitative approach to
assessment, as was characteristic of the overwhelming majority of science education
research. Prior to the mid-1980s, with few exceptions, researchers were content to
develop instruments that allowed for easily “graded” and quantified measures of
individuals’ understandings. In some cases, standardized scores were derived.
Within the context of the development of various instruments, some open-ended
questioning was involved in construction and validation of items. However, little
emphasis was placed on providing an expanded view of an individual’s beliefs
regarding the nature of science.
Research on the nature of science over the last three decades has provided at least
four consistent findings, regardless of the instruments used in the investigations:
331
332 N. LEDERMAN, P. WADE AND R. BELL
1) Science teachers appear to have inadequate conceptions of the nature of

science.
2) Efforts to improve teachers’ conceptions of the nature of science have

achieved some success when either historical aspects of scientific knowledge
or direct attention to the nature of science have been included.
3) Academic background variables have not been significantly related to

teachers’ conceptions of the nature of science.
4) The relationship between teachers’ conceptions of the nature of science and

classroom practice is not clear, and the relationship is mediated by a large
array of instructional and situational concerns.
The assertion that there is a strong and continuing interest in the nature of
science among science educators is supported by the wide number and variety of
assessment instruments developed to gauge teachers’ and students’ understandings
of the nature of science. Indeed, so much work has been done with regard to
instrument development that it constitutes a distinct line of research. The purpose
of this review is to describe and summarize the characteristics of the various
instruments and techniques that have been used to ascertain a person’s beliefs and
knowledge about the nature of science. We hope that this review will better enable
the reader to understand the meaning of research findings and claims related to the
nature of science in general and to specific instruments in particular.
NATURE OF SCIENCE ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS: A CRITIQUE
Table I presents a comprehensive list of the more formal instruments constructed and
validated to assess various aspects of the nature of science. Most of the instruments
address only certain aspects of the nature of science and often inappropriately
confuse the issue by addressing areas other than the nature of science, including
science process skills and attitudes toward science. Instruments considered to have
poor validity as nature of science assessments have the following characteristics:
1) largest proportion of the instrument concentrates on a student’s ability and

skill to engage in the process of science (e.g. to make a judgment and/or
interpretation concerning data),
2) emphasis is on the affective domain (the realm of values and feelings) rather
than knowledge (i.e., over 50% of items deal with a student’s attitude toward
or appreciation of science and scientists), and
ASSESSING UNDERSTANDING 333
3) primary emphasis is placed upon “science as an institution” with little or no

emphasis placed upon the epistemological characteristics of the development
of scientific knowledge.
TABLE I
Nature of science instruments
Date Instrument Author(s)
1954 Science Attitude Questionnaire Wilson

1958 Facts About Science Test (FAST) Stice
1959 Science Attitude Scale Allen
1961 Test on Understanding Science (TOUS) Cooley & Klopfer
1962 Processes of Science Test BSCS
1966 Inventory of Science Attitudes, Interests, swan
and Appreciations
1966 Science Process Inventory (SPI) Welch
1967 Wisconsin Inventory of Science Scientific Literacy
Processes (WISP) Research Center
1968 Science Support Scale Schwirian
1968 Nature of Science Scale (NOSS) Kimball
1969 Test on the Social Aspects of Science (TSAS) Korth
1970 Science Attitude Inventory (SAI) Moore & Sutman
1974 Science Inventory (SI) Hungerford &
Walding
1975 Nature of Science Test (NOST) Billeh & Hasan
1975 Views of Science Test (VOST) Hillis
1976 Nature of Scientific Knowledge Scale (NSKS) Rubba
1978 Test of Science-Related Attitudes (TOSRA) Fraser
1980 Test of Enquiry Skills (TOES) Fraser
1981 Conception of Scientific Theories Test (COST) Cotham & Smith
1982 Language of Science (LOS) Ogunniyi
1987 Views on Science-Technology-Society (VOSTS) Aikenhead,
Fleming & Ryan
1990 Nature of Science Survey Lederman &
O’Malley
1992 Modified Nature of Scientific Knowledge Meichtry
Scale (MNSKS)
1995 Critical Incidents Nott & Wellington
The validity of many of these instruments is questionable because their primary

focus is on areas beyond the scope of “nature of science.” Consequently, to assess
individuals’ understanding of the nature of science, such instruments should be used
in conjunction with other, more validly focused instruments. Those instruments with
questionable validity (as measures of the nature of science) include the Science
Attitude Questionnaire (Wilson, 1954), Facts About Science Test (Stice, 1958),
Science Attitude Scale (Allen, 1959), Processes of Science Test (BSCS, 1962),
Inventory Of Science Attitudes, Interests, and Appreciations (Swan, 1966), Science
Support Scale (Schwirian, 1968), Test on the Social Aspects of Science (Korth,
1969), Science Attitude Inventory (Moore & Sutman, 1970), Science Inventory
(Hungerford & Walding, 1974), Test of Science-Related Attitudes (Fraser, 1978), the
Test of Enquiry Skills (Fraser, 1980), and the Language of Science, (Ogunniyi,
1982). For a comprehensive discussion and analysis of many of these instruments,
the reader is referred to Munby’s (1983), An Investigation into the Measurement of
Attitudes in Science Education.
Nature of Science Instruments: A Look at the Best
The remaining instruments are considered for purposes of this review to be valid and
reliable measures of the nature of science by virtue of their focus on one or more
ideas that have been traditionally considered under the label of “nature of science,”
as well as their reported validity and reliability data. These instruments have been
used in numerous studies and some continue to be used even though there is a
significant movement away from such types of paper and pencil assessments.
Although the validity of the assessment instruments described below has been
severely criticized (and justifiably so) in the past few years, they are presented here
as being the most valid (in focus) attempts to assess understandings of the nature of
science using a written response format. Following is a brief discussion of each
instrument.
Test on Understanding Science (TOUS) (Cooley & Klopfer, 1961). This instrument
has been, by far, the most widely used assessment tool in “nature of science”
research. It is a four-alternative, 60-item multiple choice test. In addition to an
“overall” or “general” score, three subscale scores can be calculated: (I)
understanding about the scientific enterprise; (II) the scientist; (III) the methods and
aims of science. The topics of subscale (III) are specifically stated as follows:
1) Generalities about scientific methods

2) Tactics and strategy of sciencing
3) Theories and models
4) Aims of science
5) Accumulation and falsification
6) Controversies in science
7) Science and technology
8) Unity and interdependence of the sciences
It is this subscale (III) that most directly assesses characteristics relative to the nature
of science. Subscales (I) and (II), however, are concerned with aspects of science that
are quite distinct from the nature of science. A few sample items from these two
subscales follow:
Item #2: Among the hundreds of scientific societies in various countries

throughout the world, we find that
a) Scientists voluntarily join the societies related to their specific field.

b) National governments generally direct these societies.
c) Membership is generally restricted to scientists of one nation.
d) National governments are seldom interested in these societies.
Item #9: If we compare successful scientists with successful people in most other
professions, we find that these
a) Scientists tend to have higher incomes than other professionals.

b) Scientists require more specialized training than other professionals.
c) Scientists and other professionals have set rigid certification laws
wluch keep out those who are not qualified.
e) Scientists and other professionals tend to devote most of their
energies to their work.
Item #27: The American Chemical Society (ACS) is one of the largest scientific
societies in the United States. Which of the following functions would the ACS
be least likely to carry on?
a) Negotiate contracts with companies employing chemists.

b) Assist its members in finding new jobs.
c) Publish chemical journals and books.
d) Establish standards of terminology in chemistry.
Although the three TOUS items cited here are concerned with science and the
scientific enterprise, they are not related to a student’s conception of scientific
knowledge. Such questions are clearly more relevant to the institution of science and
the profession of “scientist” than to one’s understanding of the nature of science.
In addition to this criticism, others have stated objections to the TOUS. Welch
(1969) suggested that the test could be improved through revision and stronger
validity evidence. Wheeler (1968) stated that too many items embrace a negative
viewpoint of science. He felt that items could be rewritten to minimize their
reflection of current stereotypes of science and scientists and suggested the addition
of more items to increase the test’s comprehensiveness. In a factor analysis study,
Hukins (1963) found that the TOUS loaded strongly on a verbal factor. He surmised
that the complexity of some items obscured the meaning for his tenth grade students.
Aikenhead (1973) suggested that some TOUS items evoke a response of attitude. He
felt that students perceive the test as concerning their appreciation or lack of
appreciation for science and scientists. Thus, he felt, some items are answered
according to a scientist’s “good guy” image.
Indeed, one of the developers, (Klopfer, personal communication, 1981), stated
that he did not feel the TOUS to be a very good measure of the nature of science. In
all fairness, one must consider the context and time within which the TOUS was
developed. It was an excellent beginning for those interested in assessing
understandings of the nature of science. Currently, however, the TOUS exam
appears inappropriate as a sole assessment instrument for the study of an
individual’s understanding of the nature of science.
Wisconsin Inventory of Science Processes (WISP) (Scientific Literacy Research

Center, 1967). The WISP consists of 93 statements that the respondent evaluates as
“accurate,” “inaccurate,” or “not understood.” However, in scoring the exam,
“inaccurate” and “not understood responses are combined to represent the opposite
of “accurate.” Thus, it is analogous to an “agree/disagree” response format. With
the exception of the TOUS exam, this instrument has been used more than any other
assessment instrument. The WISP was developed and validated for high school
students. Subsequent to its development, WISP has been the preferred choice by
researchers as a nature of science assessment instrument. Although this instrument
has excellent validity and reliability data, a few concerns should be considered prior
to its use. Of primary concern is its length. The 93-item test takes over an hour to
administer, which precludes it from use in a single class period. However, with
block schedules and laboratory periods, this concern may not continue to be a
significant problem. In addition, this instrument does not possess discrete subscales
which, unfortunately, means that only unitary scores can be calculated.
Science Process Inventory (SPI) (Welch, 1966). This instrument is a 135-item

forced-choice inventory (agree/disagree) purporting to assess an understanding of the
methods and processes by which scientific knowledge evolves. The content of the
SPI is almost identical to that of WISP and TOUS subscale III. The validation of
SPI was achieved in the usual manner for such instruments: literature review,
devising a model, employing the judgment of “experts,” getting feedback from pilot
studies, and testing the instrument’s ability to distinguish among different groups of
respondents. Although the SPI appears to possess a multitude of the values and
assumptions specific to one’s understanding of the nature of science, caution must
be applied. The length (135 items) is obviously too long for a single class period
administration. Also of concern is its forced response nature. Students are unable
to express “neutral” or uncertain answers. In general, we feel that Likert scale
response formats are best for such assessment instruments as they afford respondents
a maximum amount of freedom in expressing their views toward an instrument item.
Finally, like the WISP, the SPI does not possess subscales. The importance of
subscales has been recognized and there have been unsuccessful attempts to establish
these for the SPI.
Aikenhead (1972) performed a factor analysis on the SPI and found that the
factors did not correspond to Welch’s predicted factors. Bates (1974) also factor
analyzed the instrument but could not reveal any meaningful factors. Both studies
emphasized the difficulty of interpreting scores obtained from instruments like the
SPI that attempt to assess understanding of a wide variety of aspects of the nature of
science.
Nature of Science Scale (NOSS) (Kimball, 1968). This instrument was developed
to determine whether science teachers have the same view of science as scientists.
It consists of 29 items to which the respondent may “agree,” “disagree” or register
a “neutral” response. Kimball’s model of the nature of science is based upon the
literature of the nature and philosophy of science and is consistent with the views of
Bronowski (1956) and Conant (1951). The model is composed of the following eight
assertions:
The fundamental driving force in science is curiosity concerning the

physical universe.
Science is a dynamic, on-going activity, rather than a static accumulation of
information.
Science aims at ever-increasing comprehensiveness and simplifications
using mathematics as a simple, precise method of stating relationships.
There is no “one” scientific method, but as many methods as there are
practitioners.
The methods of science are better characterized by some value-type
attributes than by techniques.
A basic characteristic of science is faith in the susceptibility of the physical
universe to human ordering and understanding.
Science has a unique attribute of openness, both of mind and of the realm of
investigation.
Tentativeness and uncertainty are characteristics of all science.
The specific content of NOSS was validated by nine science educators who
judged whether the item were related to the model. The development, validation,
and reliability measures were carried out with college graduates. Thus, it lacks
reliability and validity data with respect to high school populations. Another
concern is that the instrument lacks subscales and is, therefore, subject to the Same
criticism as WISP or any other unitary measure of the nature of science.
Nature of Science Test (NOST) (Billeh & Hasan, 1975). This instrument consists of
60 multiple choice items addressing the following components of the nature of
science:
Assumptions of science (8 items)

Products of science (22 items)
Processes of science (25 items)
Ethics of science (5 items)
The test consists of two types of items. The first type measures the individual’s
knowledge of the assumptions and processes of science, and the characteristics of
scientific knowledge. The second type of question presents situations that require
the individual to make judgments in view of his/her understanding of the nature of
science. The major shortcoming of this instrument is not its content, but rather, that
no subscales exist. Thus, only a global or unitary score can be calculated. Certainly,
the nature of scientific knowledge is too complex to be measured in terms of such a
unitary measure and, therefore, this assessment instrument should be used only in
a broad context.
Views of Science Test (VOST) (Hillis, 1975). This instrument was developed
specifically to measure understanding of the tentativeness of science. It consists of
40 statements that are judged to imply either that scientific knowledge is tentative
or absolute. Respondents express their agreement with either view using a
five-option Likert scale response format. For what it is measuring this instrument
is quite effective. However, not only does it lack subscales but its measurement of
the nature of science is restricted to a single attribute of scientific knowledge.
Nature of Scientific Knowledge Scale (NSKS) (Rubba, 1976). This instrument is a

48-item Likert scale response format consisting of five choices (strongly agree,
agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disagree). The test is purported to be an objective
measure of secondary students’ understanding of the nature of science. The model
of scientific knowledge used in the development of this instrument is quite basic and
common to all delineations of the nature of science (Rubba & Andersen, 1978). The
NSKS and its subscales are based upon the nine factors of the nature of science
specified by Showalter (1974). Rubba (1977) listed these nine factors as tentative,
public, replicable, probabilistic, humanistic, historic, unique, holistic, and empirical.
He noted a certain amount of shared overlap between the factors and proceeded to
collapse them into a six-factor or six-subscale model of the nature of science. Rubba
and Andersen (1 978) described the six subscales as follows:
1) Amoral: Scientific knowledge provides humans with many capabilities but

does not instruct us on how to use them. Moral judgment can be passed only
on the application of scientific knowledge, not on the knowledge itself;
2) Creative: Scientific knowledge is a product of the human intellect. Its
invention requires as much creative imagination as does the work of an
artist, a poet, or a composer. Scientific knowledge embodies the creative
essence of the scientific inquiry process;
3) Developmental: Scientific knowledge is never “proven” in an absolute and
final sense. It changes over time. The justification process limits scientific
knowledge as probable. Beliefs that appear to be good ones at one time may
be appraised differently when more evidence is at hand. Previously accepted
beliefs should be judged in their historical context;
4) Parsimonious: Scientific knowledge tends towards simplicity, but not to the
disdain of complexity. It is comprehensive as opposed to specific. There is
a continuous effort in science to develop a minimum number of concepts to
explain the greatest number of observations;
5) Testable: Scientific knowledge is capable of public empirical testing. Its
validity is established through repeated testing against accepted
observations. Consistency among test results is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for the validity of scientific knowledge;
6) Unified: Scientific knowledge is born out of an effort to understand the unity
of nature. The knowledge produced by the various specialized sciences
contributes to a network of laws, theories, and concepts. This systematized
body of knowledge gives science its explanatory and predictive power.
These six subscales can be individually scored with validity and reliability
established for each. The instrument was developed, validated and found to be
reliable for high school level students. The five-option Likert scale response format
affords maximum freedom of expression to the respondent. Cotham (1979)
unleashed a rather strong attack aimed at invalidating many of the previously
discussed assessment instruments; however, with respect to NSKS, he only remarked
on its insensitivity to alternative viewpoints. However, despite Cotham’s
comparatively weak criticism of the NSKS, there is reason for concern about the
instrument’s validity, Many pairs of items within specific subscales are identical,
except that one item is worded negatively. This redundancy could encourage
respondents to refer back to their answers on previous, similarly-worded items. This
cross-checking would result in inflated reliability estimates which could cause
erroneous acceptance of the instrument’s validity.
Conceptions of Scientific Theories Test (COST) (Cotham & Smith, 1981). The
structure of this instrument was dictated by the developers’ concern that previously
existing instruments were based on single (supposedly enlightened) interpretations
of the nature of science. Thus, the COST provides for non-judgmental acceptance
of alternative conceptions of science. That is, no single point of view is considered
to be the “correct” one. The instrument is an attitude inventory consisting of 40
Likert scale items (with four options) and four subscales, each corresponding to a
particular aspect of scientific theories. These include (I) ontological implications of
theories; (II) testing of theories; (III) generation of theories; and (IV) choice among
competing theories,
The COST provides a theoretical context for four item-sets by prefacing each set
with a brief description of a scientific theory and some episodes drawn from its
history. The items following each theory description refer to that description. The
four theoretical contexts are 1) Bohr’s theory of the atom, 2) Darwin’s theory of
evolution, 3) Oparin’s theory of abiogenesis, and 4) the theory of plate tectonics. A
fifth context contains items that refer to general characteristics of scientific theories
and is, therefore, not prefaced by a description.
Two concerns must be addressed prior to using COST as an instrument to assess
high school students’ understandings of the nature of science. The first of these is
the cognitive level of the instrument. It was designed for teachers and validated with
undergraduate college students. The four theory descriptions used to provide context
for the items are presented at a level that may be above the capabilities of many high
school students. Individual items may be difficult to decipher as well. Consider these
two items that deal with the general characteristics of scientific theories:
Item #35: When a scientific theory is well supported by evidence, the objects
postulated by the theory must be regarded as existing.
Item #37: Observation is not a basis for evaluating scientific theories because of
the influence of theory on observation.
It is likely that the average high school student would find such items difficult to
comprehend, which would negatively impact the reliability and validity of the
instrument. Evidence for this problem exists in unpublished results (Bell &
Lederman, 1996) where COST responses had very low reliability coefficients
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.28 - 0.35) for even above-average high school students and
a large sample of undergraduate college students.
A second concern with the COST instrument rests with the authors’ claim that
it, as opposed to all extant instruments, is sensitive to alternative conceptions of
science. Unfortunately, close examination reveals this claim to be false. Cotham
and Smith feel that it is extremely important for education to promote the view that
science is tentative and revisionary. We certainly agree. In their zealous
commitment to this concern, they actually specify which subscale viewpoints are
consistent with the tentative and revisionary conception. Thus, although they claim
to place no value judgments upon the various conceptions of science, Cotham and
Smith actually do just that by linking certain viewpoints to the “highly prized”
tentative and revisionary conception of scientific knowledge. The problem which
Cotham and Smith try to resolve (i.e., placing value judgments upon various
conceptions of science, as if one view were the “correct one”) can be eliminated
through a slight variation in test scoring (discussed in the Some Thoughts About
“Traditional” Assessment Instruments section of this review). Regardless, validity
of the COST instrument remains suspect.
Views on Science-Technology-Society (VOSTS) (Aikenhead, Ryan &Fleming, 1989).

The VOSTS was developed to assess students’ understanding of the nature of
science, technology, and their interactions with society. It consists of a “pool” of 114
multiple-choice items that address a number of science-technology-society (STS)
issues. These issues include Science and Technology, Influence of Society on
Science/Technology, Influence of Science/Technology on Society, Influence of
School Science on Society, Characteristics of Scientists, Social Construction of
Scientific Knowledge, Social Construction of Technology, and Nature of Scientific
Knowledge.
The VOSTS was developed and validated for grade 11 and 12 students. A
fundamental assumption underlying the development of this instrument was that
students and researchers do not necessarily perceive the meanings of a particular
concept in the Same way. Aikenhead and Ryan (1992) recognized the importance
of providing students with alternative viewpoints based upon student
“self-generated” responses to avoid the “constructed” responses offered by most of
the previous nature of science assessment instruments. The Science Process
Inventory (SPI) provides a typical example of a “constructed” forced response. The
SPI includes the statement “Scientific knowledge is tentative” (Welch, 1966) with
which high school students are asked to agree or disagree. Aikenhead (1979)
discovered that when offered the chance to respond “I do not understand,” more than
a quarter of grade 11 and 12 students did so. Therefore, whenever students
responded “agree” or “disagree” to the SPI item “scientific knowledge is tentative,”
a number of those students may not have really understood the meaning of the
statement. Unlike most other instruments, the VOSTS does not provide numerical
scores; instead it provides a series of alternative “student position” statements.
These statements were obtained from extensive open-ended student “argumentative”
paragraphs in which students defended their stated position on a STS issue or topic.
On the VOSTS, students choose from a number of choices (sometimes up to 10
different views) to respond to a “situation” based upon a STS issue or topic.
Included as a choice in every question is the statement, “I don’t understand,” or “I
don’t know enough about this subject to make a choice.” This response format
eliminates the “forced” answer that many of the preceding multiple-choice response
or Likert-type response instruments use.
It should be noted that several statements in this instrument refer to a specific
nationality, such as Canadian scientist/issue or United States scientist/issue, so some

caution or adjustments are suggested when administering this to students from other
nationalities to avoid “nationalistic feelings” influencing responses. The extensive
work on developing and validating the VOSTS instrument took approximately six
years to complete (Aikenhead & Ryan, 1992). This effort included the enormous
undertaking of surveying a stratified sample of approximately 10,800 Canadian
students comprised principally of graduating high school students. Results of this
undertaking are reported in a series of research articles published in a special edition
of the journal Science Education (Volume 71, 1987).
Nature of Science Survey (Lederman & O’Malley, 1990). In an attempt to

ameliorate some of the problems noted by Aikenhead, et. al (1987) during the
development of the VOSTS and those noted in the use of the NSKS (Rubba, 1976)
relative to the use of paper and pencil assessments, Lederman and O’Malley
developed a rather open-ended survey consisting of seven items. This instrument
was designed to be used in conjunction with follow-up interviews and each of the
seven items focused on a different aspect of tentativeness in science. The seven
items were as follows:
1) After scientists have developed a theory (e.g., atomic theory), does the theory
ever change? If you believe that theories do change, explain why we bother
to learn about theories. Defend your answer with examples.
2) What does an atom look like? How do scientists know that an atom looks
like what you have described or drawn?
3) Is there a difference between a scientific theory and a scientific law? Give
an example to illustrate your answer.
4) How are science and art similar? How are they different?
5) Scientists perform scientific experiment/investigations when trying to solve
problems. Do scientists use their creativity and imagination when doing
these experiment/investigations?
6) Is there a difference between scientific knowledge and opinion? Give an
example to illustrate your answer.
7) Some astrophysicists believe that the universe is expanding while others
believe that it is shrinking; still others believe that the universe is in a static
state without any expansion or shrinkage. How are these different
conclusions possible if all of these scientists are looking at the same
experiments and data?
Several problems were noted in the wording of some of the questions. In

particular, items 4, 5, 6 did not necessarily yield responses relative to students’ views
of the “tentativeness” aspect of the nature of science. For item #2, students tended
to describe various experiments instead of discussing whether inferences had been
made, as was intended. While these difficulties were alleviated by subsequent

interviews, they served to reinforce the problems associated with attempting to
interpret students’ understandings solely from their written responses to researcher
generated questions.
Modified Nature of Scientific Knowledge Scale (M-NSKS) (Meichtry, 1992). This

instrument is a modified NSKS instrument with 32 statements from four of the
NSKS subscales. These subscales are: (I) creative, (II) developmental, (III) testable,
and (IV) unified. M-NSKS was developed, with reliability and validity reported, for
use with 6th, 7th, and 8th graders.
Critical Incidents (Nott & Wellington, 1995). The use of “critical incidents” to
assess teachers’ conceptions of the nature of science is a significant departure from
the usual paper and pencil assessment. In particular, Nott and Wellington are of the
opinion that teachers do not effectively convey what they know about the nature of
science in “direct response to abstract, context-free questions of the sort, ‘What is
science?’ (Nott & Wellington, 1995). Instead, they have created a series of “critical
incidents” that are description/scenarios of actual classroom events. Teachers are
expected to respond to the incidents by answering the following three questions: 1)
What would you do?, 2) What could you do?, and 3) What should you do? So, for
example, the teacher may be confronted with a situation in which a demonstration
or laboratory activity does not yield the desired data. How the teacher responds to
the aforementioned questions is believed to communicate what the teacher believes
about the nature of science. The Critical Incidents instrument is very much a project
under development in that additional incidents are continually being added to the
total repertoire. Although the use of critical incidents appears to be an excellent
instructional tool to generate meaningful discussions in preservice and inservice
courses (indeed, Nott and Wellington have used the incidents in this manner),
whether the teachers’ responses are related to their views about the nature of science
is still questionable. In short, the approach is based on the assumption that teachers’
views of the nature of science automatically and necessarily influence classroom
practice, an assumption that is simply not supported by the existing literature.
SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT “TRADITIONAL” ASSESSMENT

INSTRUMENTS
The validity of many instruments purporting to assess the nature of science has long
been criticized on the grounds that each instrument assumes its interpretation of
science to be an enlightened view (Cotham & Smith, 1981). This assumption has
been criticized because many aspects of the nature of science do not enjoy consensus
within the community of scholars interested in the nature of science (Lederman,
1992; Lucas, 1975; Martin, 1972). Perhaps Cotham and Smith’s (1981) example
will best illustrate the point. An item from the Science Process Inventory (Welch,
1966) states, “Science is a series of successively closer approximations to the truth.”
The scoring key for the instrument indicates an “agree” response for this item to be
correct. However, scholars such as Thomas Kuhn (1970) disallow any claims
concerning the ontological implications of scientific developments. Lucas ( 1975)
discussed the scoring of responses to the instrument item, “It is important for a
physicist to be able to throw away widely held ideas and think without restriction.”
He postulated that a Popperian, who views science as progressing by experimental
tests that attempt to refute a hypothesis arrived at by conjecture, would agree with
this statement, while a Kuhnian who views science as progressing by the
consolidation and articulation of a guiding paradigm during normal science, would
favor a “disagree” response.
Such problems of “hidden” biases implicit in assessment instruments can be
avoided quite easily and do not require the development of a new instrument as
advocated by Cotham and Smith (1981). The problem lies not within the test, but
rather in the interpretations of those scoring the test. If one interprets test scores
simply as a measure of an individual’s adherence to a particular conception of
science, then no implicit value judgments are made. In such a manner no individual
is said to understand science “better” than someone else. Thus, a score of 40, for
example, on Rubba’s (1976) NSKS Amoral subscale would be a strong indication
that this individual believes that scientific knowledge is amoral, while a score of 5
would indicate a belief that scientific knowledge is moral by nature. No statement
as to who understands science “better” would need to be made. To make such a
statement would assume that a “correct” view exists. Thus, the valid concerns of
Cotham and Smith (1981), Lucas (1975), and Martin (1972) can be eliminated by
using non-judgmental scoring of student and teacher conceptions.
Having viewed the various research emphases specifically related to the nature
of science, we are left with at least two salient points: 1) assessment instruments are
interpreted in a biased manner, and 2) some assessment instruments appear to be
poorly constructed. These criticisms not withstanding, it is interesting to note that
research conclusions based on these instruments have been unusually uniform.
Thus, although the various instruments suffer from specific weaknesses, if these were
significant, it would seem improbable that the research conclusions would be so
consistent.
There is a more critical concern, however, about the “traditional” paper and
pencil approach to the assessment of an individual’s understanding of the nature of
science. Although not a new insight, Lederman and O’Malley’s (1990) investigation
clearly highlighted the problem of paper and pencil assessments. They documented
discrepancies between their own interpretations of students’ written responses and
the interpretations that surfaced from actual interviews of the same students. This
unexpected finding (i.e., the purpose of the interviews was to help validate the paper
and pencil survey that was used) was quite timely, as it occurred when educational
researchers were making a serious shift toward more qualitative, open-ended
approaches to assess individuals’ understanding of any concept.
THE FUTURE: CONCERNS, CAUTIONS, AND POSSIBLE DIRECTIONS
The VOSTS is arguably tlie result of tlie last systematic attempt to develop a paper
and pencil assessment of the nature of science. However, the VOSTS is not similar
to its “traditional” predecessors. There was a clear attempt to value students’ views
and an attempt to probe students’ reasons for the responses they recorded.
Investigations of students’ and teachers’ understandings of the nature of science have
continued since the appearance of the VOSTS, but these investigations have
carefully combined a number of research methodologies including field observations
of classrooms and teachers, quantitative assessment (using many of the previously
discussed instruments) and qualitative techniques involving both structured and
informal interviews (Brickhouse, 1990; Briscoe, 1991; Duschl & Wright, 1989;
Gallagher, 1991; Hodson, 1993; Lantz & Kass, 1987; Lederman & O’Malley, 1990;
Lederman & Zeidler, 1987; Meichtry, 1992; Smith & Anderson, 1984; among
others).
What seems to be recognized is that while paper and pencil instruments can
reveal something about students’ views of the nature of science, they cannot tell us
everything we would like to know. Very often, tlie significant question is not
whether a person’s view of the nature of science conforms to a particular espoused
viewpoint, but rather, what are the limits of the person’s understandings and how do
these understandings affect instructional choices and behaviors? These questions
require more detailed descriptions of a person’s beliefs than paper and pencil
instruments alone are able to provide.
However, less traditional assessment techniques, such as interviews, observations,
and reviews of lesson plans and classroom documents, are not without their own
problems. Too often, researchers (e.g. Brickhouse, 1990; Gallagher, 1991) discuss
the results of interviews without documenting the questions that were used to elicit
the responses. Failing to record interview questions prevents adequate assessment
of the validity of the interview and precludes the possibility of replication in other
settings.
Furthermore, researchers commonly mention the use of classroom documents
such as lesson plans, class notes, handouts, and assignments in their assessments of
teachers’ knowledge and practice concerning the nature of science. However, they
frequently fail to adequately describe liow these materials were collected and
analyzed.
Classroom observations have been inadequately described as well. The purpose,
number, length, and recording method are all important considerations that can
impact the results of field observations. These factors should be, but are not always,
included in the description of research methods. The observer’s background and
knowledge of the sampled subjects can also influence what is “seen” and should be
described and considered in the research results. For example, to avoid the
introduction of bias in making field observations, researchers should not assess
teachers’ views prior to the initiation of the field observations. Failure to take this
precaution can cause observers to “see” what they expect to see and to interpret
classroom behavior into a framework predetermined by the assessment results.
Indeed, tlus is a clear instance of the biasing influence of the unsupported
assumption that a teacher’s understanding of the nature of science influences
classroom practice. This assumption has been explicit since Robinson (1969) and
it continues to be held independent of the empirical data from research on the nature
of science. Quite simply, a circular loop exists in which the assumption guides the
interpretation of classroom observation data, which is then used to support the initial
assumption (e.g., Nott & Wellington, 1995). The obvious remedy is to sequence
assessments of the subject’s views of the nature of science after field observations
and document analysis have been completed, or to keep results of the assessments
hidden if assessments and observations are completed by different individuals. This
is analogous to the “blind” studies often used in medical studies to reduce the impact
of the researcher’s and subjects’ bias on the results.
In addition to using combinations of research methodologies to assess
understandings of the nature of science, more authentic assessment tools should be
developed. For example, students could be asked to develop an instructional model
that they could use to teach other students about the characteristics of a scientific
theory. If a student can create such a model, it would seem to be a much more
trustworthy assessment of the student’s understanding than with either directed
questions on paper or interviews.
The uniform consistency of the results of studies that have used the instruments
reviewed here attest to their ability to assess relevant aspects of teachers’ and
students’ knowledge of the nature of science. We have, however, taken paper and
pencil assessments about as far as they can be expected to go. What we need to
concentrate more on now are assessments that help us answer other critical
questions. We know that students have many misconceptions about the nature of
science. What is the source of these views, how are they learned, and how might
more accepted views of science be learned efficiently? We know that teachers’
knowledge of the nature of science is often inadequate despite heroic and costly
efforts in teacher education in this domain. What is the impact of teachers’ beliefs
about the nature of science on their classroom practice and their students’ beliefs?
Given the strong evidence that teachers’ beliefs do not necessarily influence
classroom practice, perhaps a more appropriate question is what can be done to
facilitate the translation of teachers’ views into classroom practice? Emerging
research (e.g., Lederman, 1995) seems to indicate that teachers’ intentions and
priorities and the uncontrollable realities of classroom life are critical factors to be
investigated. Recent research attempting to answer such questions (Lederman,
Abd-El-Khalick, & Bell, 1997) has necessitated the compilation of extensive data
from diverse sources. These data sources have included classroom observations,
video-taped lessons, supervisor notes, all unit and lesson plans for an entire term,
and classroom documents, as well as responses to questionnaires and interviews.
Obviously, this type of assessment is both more complete and more laborious than
past efforts but has yielded important results. Although the teachers in this
investigation possessed an adequate understanding of the critical aspects of the
nature of science as expressed in the reforms and were well versed in various
instructional approaches, little attention to the nature of science was evident in their
classroom practice. Interestingly, these same teachers cited lack of confidence in
their knowledge of the nature of science and inability to teach the nature of science
as primary causes for not including it in classroom instruction. These findings are
quite similar to what has previously been found in research on elementary teachers’
attention to science. Up to this point, attempts to answer the research approaches to
the question of why teachers spend little time addressing the nature of science have
lacked a theoretical basis. It would seem that theories of self-efficacy and related
research have clear implications for future research into the still critical, and
unanswered, question concerning teachers’ explicit attention to the nature of science
during instruction. In terms of assessment, it is time that we move on to questions
of classroom practice and lay to rest the continued focus of descriptive assessments
of teachers’ and students’ conceptions.
Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oregon, USA
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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
FOUAD ABD-EL-KHALICK
Fouad Abd-El-Khalick is a doctoral student in the Department of Science and

Mathematics Education at Oregon State University. He is a former high school
physical science instructor at the American School in Beirut. His research interests
include teachers’ and students’ understandings of the nature of science and
pedagogical content knowledge.
HIYA ALMAZROA
Hiya Almazroa received her Ph.D. in Curriculum and Instruction with a science
education focus from the University of Southern California. She received her B.S.
degree in Zoology from Girls College of Education at Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and her
M.S. degree in curriculum and instruction from the University of Southern
California. Her dissertation research focuses on Saudi science teachers conceptions
of the nature of science and factors which influence them. Her research interests
focus on science teacher education and the application of issues in the history and
philosophy of science to science teaching and learning.
JEAN BEARD
Jean Beard is the Director of the Science Education Program in the College of
Science at San Jose State University and a Professor in the Biological Science
Department. She also has directed the NSF grant for the Evolution and the Nature
of Science Institutes since 1992 and served on the National Research Council
Committee on Biology Teacher In-service Programs. Outside of Science Education
she most often teaches a general education course titled: Science and the Citizen.
She holds a Ph.D. in Science Education from Oregon State University.
RANDY L. BELL
Randy L. Bell is a doctoral student in the Department of Science and Mathematics

Education at Oregon State University. He is a former high school biology/physical
351
352 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
science teacher and practicing scientist. Bell’s research focuses on the relationship
between teachers’ beliefs and understandings of the nature of the science with actual
classroom practice.
MICHAEL L. BENTLEY
Michael L. Bentley has worked for 27 years in the field of science education as a
classroom teacher, science supervisor, museum educator, school principal, and
researcher. Currently, lie is an Associate Professor of Science Education at Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University. His undergraduate degree in biology was
earned at King’s College, PA with graduate studies in science education at the
University of Pennsylvania and the University of Virginia. His publications include
journal articles, several chapters in books, and five books, the latest of which are,
Astronomy Smart, Jr. (The Princeton Review, 1996) and Science Timelines: A
Multicultural Resource (Rigby Education, 1996). Michael is interested in K-12
curriculum and teaching and learning in science, as well as in environmental
education and informal science education. He lives in Salem, Virginia with his wife,
the Rev. Susan E. Bentley, and three children, Sarah, Alexander, and Matthew.
DAVID BOERSEMA
David Boersema is the Douglas C. Strain professor of Natural Philosophy at Pacific

University where he serves as a full professor in the philosophy department and
chairs the Peace and Conflict Studies program. He received an undergraduate degree
in philosophy and economics from Hope College in Holland, Michigan and the MA
and Ph.D. degrees in philosophy from Michigan State University.
MICHAEL C. CLOUGH
Michael C. Clough taught high school biology and chemistry for seven years in
Illinois and Wisconsin before accepting his current position as an assistant professor
of science education at the University of Iowa. The nature of science has always
been an integral part of his teaching, both at the high school and college level.
Michael enjoys teaching, research, writing and making a difference in science
education. His passion is to improve science teacher education and, in turn, enhance
science teaching. Michael lives in Iowa City with his wife Sara, and their son Issac.
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS 353
KAREN R. DAWKINS
Karen R. Dawkins now serves as interim Director of the Science and Mathematics
Education Center at East Carolina University in Greenville, North Carolina
following a twenty year science teaching career in public high schools in Kentucky,
Mississippi and North Carolina. Karen specializes in providing professional
development programs for K-12 science and mathematics teachers in the largely
rural northeastern counties of the state.
STEPHEN C. FLEURY
Stephen C. Fleury is a social studies instructor and Associate Dean of the School of
Education at the State University of New York at Oswego. His interest in science,
technology, and society (STS) steins from his activity-oriented experiential approach
to the study of current social issues, first developed while working as a middle-school
social studies teacher. His research interest in social constructivism and the
philosophy of science focuses on the relationship of science as a way of “human
cooperative knowing” and democracy as a way of “human cooperative living.”
Publications include perspectives on the role of STS in the social studies curriculum,
analyses of the politics of knowledge, and examinations of the impact of science on
social knowledge as it is transmitted through public schooling.
ALLAN A. GALLTHORN
Allan A. Gallthorn is Distinguished Research Professor of Education in the School

of Education, East Carolina University. He has written more than twenty books in
the fields of curriculum and supervision. For many years, he was a high school
teacher, supervisor, principal and faculty member at the University of Pennsylvania.
PENNY L. HAMMERICH
Penny L. Hammerich, is an Assistant Professor in Science Education at Temple

University in Philadelphia, PA. In this capacity, she coordinates the elementary
science education program and teaches both undergraduate and graduate courses.
Dr. Hammrich is Principal Investigator of the National Science Foundation
sponsored Model Project for Women and Girls in Science, Mathematics, and
Engineering grant called “Sisters in Science,” and the U. S. Department of Education
sponsored programs called “A Head Start on Science.” Dr. Hammrich is also a
Senior Research Associate with the Laboratory for Student Success Mid-Atlantic
Regional Lab located at Temple University. She has presented numerous papers at
international and national conferences and has published articles in the areas of
gender equity, nature of science, conceptual development of science teachers, and
world view theory.
FRED JANSEN
Fred Jansen is a Ph.D. candidate in biology education in the Department of

Biological Education of the University of Utrecht. His dissertation research focuses
on the identification of heuristics for biology education that allow students to
participate in the process of theory development. The heuristic presented in this
book has been developed for teaching and learning about immunology.
NAHUM KIPNIS
Nahum Kipnis is the science educator at the Bakken Library and Museum in
Minneapolis. He was born and educated in the former U.S.S.R., where he received
an MS in physics and mathematics. He taught high school and college physics and
did research in experimental physics and the history of science. In 1979, he
emigrated to the United States and in 1984, he received a Ph.D. in the history of
science from tlie University of Minnesota. In addition to a number of articles on
science education and the history of science, he is author of two books, Historyof the
Principle of Interference of Light (Basel/Boston: Birkhauser Verlad, 1991) and
Rediscovering Optics (Minneapolis: BENA Press, 1992).
THOMAS LAPORTA
Thomas LaPorta is a social science teacher at Tarpon Springs High School in the
Pinellas County School District of Florida and is a doctoral candidate at the
University of South Florida (USF). His research area is secondary school curriculum
and instruction emphasizing science, technology, and society (STS) issues. In 1994-
96 he directed an STS research project at USF while he was on special assignment
to the university and is currently a research associate for the SALISH project.
NORMAN LEDERMAN
Norman Lederman is a professor of science and mathematics education at Oregon

State University. He is a past president of the Association for the Education of
Teachers in Science (AETS) and a former high school biology/general

science/chemistry teacher in Illinois and New York. His research focuses primarily
on students’ and teachers’ conceptions of the nature of science. He is currently
National Science Teachers Association director of teacher education an editor of
School Science and Mathematics.
CATHLEEN C. LOVING
Cathleen C. Loving is an assistant professor in Curriculum and Instruction at Texas

A&M University where she recently completed a four year term as director of field
experiences. She currently teaches undergraduate and graduate courses in science
education, instructional supervision and middle school philosophy. Her research in
the relationship between science education and the nature of science has been
published in journals including Science Education, the Journal of Science Teacher
Education and the Journal of Research in Science Teaching. Dr. Loving received
her doctorate from the University of Texas at Austin following almost 20 years as a
high school science teacher in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, California, North Carolina
and Texas. She has led funded projects involving science teachers and professional
development schools.
MICHAEL R. MATTHEWS
Michael R. Matthews is a senior lecturer in education at the University of New South

Wales. He has degrees from the University of Sydney in science, philosophy,
psychology, philosophy of science and education. He has taught in high school,
Sydney Teachers’ College and was the Foundation Professor of Science Education
at the University of Auckland (1992-93). He has published in philosophy of
education, philosophy of science and science education. His recent books include
Science Teaching: The Role of History and Philosophy of Science (Routledge, 1994),
Challenging New Zealand Science Education (Dunmore Press, 1995), Time for
Science Education (Plenum, 1998). He has edited The Scientific Background to
Modern Philosophy (Hackett, 1989), History, Philosophy and Science Teaching:
Selected Readings (OISE Press/Teachers College Press, 199 1) and Philosophy and
Constructivism in Science Education (Kluwer, 1998). He is founding editor of the
international quarterly Science & Education (Kluwer Academic Publishers)
JOHN O. MATSON
John O. Matson is Associate Professor in Biological Sciences and the Science

Education Program at San Jose State University. He took his Ph.D. in Zoology from
Michigan State University. His biological research interests include mammalian

biogeography, evolution, and systematics. The nature of science and school-
university collaborations are his major interests in science education.
WILLIAM F. MCCOMAS
William F. McComas began his career as a physical science, biology and

environmental science instructor in Pennsylvania where he taught for 13 years while
earning masters degrees in biology and physical science. He received the Ph.D. in
science education from the University of Iowa in 1991. He is a science education
professor and founding director of the Center to Advance Science Education at the
University of Southern California in Los Angeles teaching courses in the philosophy
of science, issues in science education and advanced science teaching methods. His
research interests include informal science learning, the relationship of the nature
of science to science instruction, the problem associated with evolution education,
and the role of the laboratory in science instruction. He recently received the
Outstanding Science Teacher Educator award from AETS.
YVONNE MEICHTRY
Yvonne Meichtry has a B.S. degree in Elementary Education, a M.S. degree in

Education and an Ed.D. in Curriculum and Instruction. Since 1988, she has taught
courses in science methods and environmental science education as a member of the
Teacher Education faculty. Previous to her work as a university faculty member, she
taught middle school science for 10 years. Currently she is investigating the impact
of curricula on student understanding, conceptual change and the varied definitions
of the nature of science as a faulty member of the School of Education at Northern
Kentucky University.
CRAIG E. NELSON
Craig E. Nelson is Professor of Biology and of Public and Environmental Affairs at

Indiana University at Bloomington since 1966. He has received awards for
distinguished teaching from IU, Vanderbilt arid Northwestern and has been a Sigma
Xi National Lecturer. He frequently presents invited workshops on fostering critical
thinking and on diversity and teaching at national meetings, as Chautauqua Short
Courses, and at individual colleges He is on the editorial boards of the Journal for
Excellence In College Teaching and Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across The
Disciplines and has been a consulting editor for College Teaching. His biological
research explores the interface of evolution and ecology, resulting in the publication
of over 70 papers.
MARTIN K. NICKELS
Martin K. Nickels is Professor of Physical Anthropology at Illinois State University

in Normal. His research interests include the history of human evolutionary studies,
hominid paleontology and prehistory, primate behavior, and the biological basis of
human behavior. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Kansas in 1975. He
was selected as the Outstanding University Teacher at Illinois State in 1991-92 and
1996-97. He was a Sigma Xi National Lecturer in 1995-96. He co-authored a
college textbook titled The Study of Physical Anthropology and Archaeology and has
authored or co-authored articles in The Sciences, The American Biology Teacher and
Creation/Evolution. He is a member of several professional organizations.
MICK NOTT
Mick Nott is a senior lecturer in physics and science education at the Centre for
Science Education, Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield, UK. His curriculum
development interests are in using the history and sociology of science to teach
science. His current research interests are in teachers’ understandings of the nature
of science.
JOANNE K. OLSON
Joanne K. Olson is a Ph.D. candidate in Curriculum and Instruction with a science

education focus at the University of Southern California. She received a Master’s
degree in Education from The Claremont Graduate School. She is currently
teaching a multiage class in South Central Los Angeles, and instructs elementary
science methods classes at USC. Her research interests include the nature of science
and its instruction at the middle school level, as well as the intersection of
neurobiology, cognitive psychology, and science learning.
SHARON PARSONS
Sharon Parsons is Assistant Professor of Science Education in the Teacher Education

Science, Math, Technology Academy at San Jose State University. She holds a
doctorate in science education from the University of British Columbia, Vancouver,
Canada. Other than nature of science her interests include multicultural and equity
issues in science education, school-university collaborations, and international
science education.
BARBARA SPECTOR
Barbara Spector is a professor of science education at the University of South Florida

where she directs the Science/Technology/Society Center, an umbrella for multiple
innovative programs in science teacher preparation implementing a vision of the
schools of tomorrow and the Project 2061 Research and Development Center. She
has been awarded 43 grants supporting the restructuring of science teacher
education. She has authored more than 300 articles, chapters, books, and
presentations and served as a consultant to state and local education agencies and
professional associations. She has been Research Director for the National Science
Teachers Association and the National Association for Science, Technology, and
Society. She has served on the Board of Directors of the Association for the
Education of Teachers in Science.
PASCHAL N. STRONG
Paschal N. Strong recently retired from the psychology department at the University
of South Florida where he was a full professor for 30 years. His areas of specialities
include neuropsychology, and Comparative psychology. He has thirty publications,
five book chapters, and several grants. He has worked in the areas of hippocampus
functions, Alzheimer’s disease, and comparative intelligence of animal species,
including primates up to chimpanzees. He has also been a part of the laboratories
involved in training chimpanzees for the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration.
KAREN SULLENGER
Karen Sullenger is a science educator and member of the Curriculum and Instruction
Department of the University of New Brunswick (Fredericton, N.B., Canada). Her
professional and research interests include the natures of science, teacher/self-
directed change, cooperative learning, and the role of writing in teaching and
learning science. She holds a Ph.D. in science education from the University of
Georgia.
STEVE TURNER
Steve Turner holds a Ph.D. in the history of science from Princeton University and
has taught in the History Department of the University of New Brunswick
(Fredericton, N.B., Canada) since 1971. His research and publications deal with
science in the German university system of the nineteenth century, with the career
of Hermann von Helmholtz., and with contemporary techno-scientific controversies
over agricultural biotechnology. He is the author of In the Eye’s Mind: Vision and
the Helmholtz-Hering Controversy (Princeton University Press, 1994).
JERRY WELLINGTON
Jerry Wellington is reader in education and chair of the Educational Research Centre
in the Division of Education, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK. He has
published extensively in science education. His most recent book is Secondary
Science: Contemporary Issues and Practical Approaches (Routledge, 1994)
PETER VOOGT
Peter Voogt is Emeritus Professor of Biology Education. Research within the

Department focuses on biology education at the secondary level with special
emphasis on the themes of stability and change in living systems.
PHILIP WADE
Philip Wade is interested in using an earth systems approach as a means to increase

nonscierice major understanding of the world and the scientific enterprise. His
research work addresses nonscience majors' conceptions of science. He has
developed new undergraduate baccalaureate core courses for the Geoscience
Department at Oregon State University and recently completed his first book,
Investigating the Earth. Currently he is completing a doctoral degree in Science
Education from the Department of Science and Mathematics Education at Oregon
State University.
Index
abduction 61 conceptions, students’ xx, 11, 23, 37, 39,

al-Haytham, Ibn 183f 52f, 83, 108f, 126ff, 139, 148, 169,
attitudes 15, 22, 28, 192, 198, 222f, 201, 203f, 207, 243, 250f, 331, 344,
232f, 235, 237, 246, 315, 331ff, 347ff
338 conceptual approach 225
Aristotle 75, 184ff, 190f conceptual change 14, 78, 135, 203,
beliefs, 14, 18, 21, 23, 34, 36, 38f, 79, 205, 215, 216, 219, 224, 229, 278,
130, 140, 233, 247, 251ff, 277, 280,356
284, 287, 290, 347f, 352 confirmation xvii, 43, 55, 164, 169,
biology instruction 13, 22, 34, 36f, 255f, 259,276,279,281
146ff, 155, 160, 163ff, 175, 207, constructivism xv, xxf, 34, 127, 149,
225, 229, 146ff, 243, 255, 325\6, 207, 224, 226, 228, 277, 281, 353,
328, 348 355
biology 8, 13, 14, 34, 36, 126, 151, cookbook science 22, 54, 55, 223, 281
155, 157, 159f, 162,193,225,267, cooperative controversy 7, 127ff, 131ff
271f, 274, 276, 281, 284, 319, 322 cooperative learning 136,268,270,358
348, 351, 354ff cooperating teacher 197, 203ff
black box 108ff, 148, 151, 217, 317 creativity 7, 23, 34, 47, 50, 53 58ff,
Brown, Robert 171, 306, 307 83ff, 91, 94ff, 109, 118, 135, 161,
case studies xvii, xix, 34, 38, 77, 149, 172, 175, 192, 200, 207, 214, 219,
165ff, 179, 193, 196, 202, 255, 22, 231, 235, 238ff, 273, 306, 339,
259, 263, 283, 289, 302f 342f
chemistry instruction xix, 7, 18f, 36, creation “science” 14, 61f
149, 201, 203, 206, 229, 243,268, creationist 13, 35, 61, 286f 316, 319,
287, 300, 348 321f, 324, 326
cognitive conflict 201 credential, teaching 223, 225, 227f,
community 4, 11, 14f 26, 33, 51, 65, critical incidents 29, 37, 297f, 300, 302,
68, 75, 100, 118, 127, 147, 164, 308f, 343
169, 170, 173f, 211f, 234f, 263, critical thinking 127, 192, 198, 224, 228,
268, 269f, 273, 287, 342 325
concept mapping 268, 270ff, 317, 327 culture xi, xvi, xix, 7, 10f, 13, 46f, 51,
Conant, J. xviii, 7, 178, 193, 221, 337 76ff, 81, 83f, 97, 137f, 142, 145ff,
Conception of Scientific Theories Test 192, 194, 222, 244, 247, 252, 256,
333 260f, 265, 275, 278, 284, 294f, 303f,
conceptions, teachers’ 18ff, 23f, 39, 312f, 317f, 331,352,358f
126, 136, 139, 148, 169,207,244, curiosity 110, 187,271f, 274f, 336
291, 331f, 343, 347ff deduction 58f, 213, 219, 268
361
362 INDEX
demonstration 18,27,29, 1 10ff, 180f, 137ff, 145, 148, 170, 200, 245ff,
184f, 295, 297, 306, 320, 343 258f, 262, 295f, 304f, 315, 318, 322,
discrepant 66, 110, 129 326
diversity 76ff, 222, 245, 285, 322, 356 exploration 21, 64, 77, 135, 233, 239,
Driver, R. xv, 11, 13, 126ff, 252 253, 274f, 302
elementary teaching 17, 26, 74, 85, 91, extinction 99, 142, 255ff, 261ff, 328
95, 114f, 118, 128, 133, 135, 223ff, extraordinary science 263
238ff, 243f, 249, 267, 277, 280, Facts About Science Test 333f, 349
282, 290, 347, falsification 61, 256, 259, 285
empirical 8, 10, 13f, 16f, 20f, 26, 38, feminism xiv, xviii, xixf, 11, 97, 126,
44, 49f, 54, 58, 76, 80, 83, 85, 91, 253,261,264
109, 113, 118, 154, 180, 206,214, Feyerabend, P. 138f, 149, 213
216, 231, 257, 284f, 312, 318f, fossil 95ff, 126, 194, 196, 212, 258,
331,338f, 346 317, 321ff
enquiry (see inquiry) gender 75, 143, 247f, 276, 280, 317,
epistemic 255, 256, 257, 258, 260, 263 354
epistemology (epistemological) 10f, 13, Giere, R. 21, 138f, 147ff, 287, 291
15, 16, 19, 21f, 34, 37f, 78, 140, Glymour, C. 138, 149
208, 214, 224, 268, 331 graduate students 27f, 30, 74f, 137,
ethics 42, 338 147f, 232
ethnocentrism 244 goals for science instruction 68, 197
Euclid xviii, 183, 184, 320, 321 hands-on instruction (see inquiry)
evidence xvi, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, 19, Harding, S. 15, 20, 76, 79, 253
21, 23, 27, 41, 43ff, 49ff, 54, 56, Hempel, C. 138, 149, 213, 229, 259
58ff, 76, 80, 85ff, 91, 96f, 100, heuristic (design) 148, 151, 152, 154,
103, 108, 111ff, 118ff, 147, 164ff, 155, 157, 158, 159, 160, 257, 263,
170ff, 202, 206, 216, 235, 237, 354
239, 262, 269, 279, 285, 288f, 294, history of science xvi, xxi, 7f,, 10, 14,
304, 317f, 321,324,327,338 25, 34, 36ff, 43f, 49, 51,63f, 75,77,
evolution 11ff, 34, 37, 38, 54, 97, 145, 99, 168, 177, 179 191ff, 217, 244f,
147, 166, 169, 193ff, 208, 216f, 259,270, 289, 304, 320f, 354,359
221, 227ff, 263, 267, 272, 274, historical 7,34, 177ff, 191, 193
285f, 315ff, 319, 320, 323ff, 328, historicism 256, 259
340,348, 351, 356f, Holton, G. 138f, 149, 196, 214
experiment xvi, 3,6f, 11, 17f, 21f, 43, hypothesis 9, 16, 18, 19, 46, 54ff, 69,
50,64f, 76,80, 108f, 112, 118, 166, 98, 111ff, 153f, 157, 174, 181f,
170, 172, 177ff, 187ff, 196, 201f, 188ff, 222, 225ff, 230, 234ff, 238f,
216, 221ff, 225, 227ff, 232, 234ff, 265,305f, 323, 344
252f, 256, 258, 260, 264, 266, imagination 35, 58, 83,85, 91, 94f, 97,
275f, 281, 283, 295, 298ff, 304ff, 109, 118, 149, 193, 196, 200, 216,
310, 312, 316, 342, 344 222, 269, 310, 339, 342
expectation 17, 49, 50, 63, 65, 66, 73, induction 35, 58ff, 63, 74f, 77f, 83, 85,
79, 100, 101, 108,293 91, 94f, 97, 109, 118, 149, 193, 196,
explanation xvi, 8, 26, 54, 67, 78, 99f, 200, 213, 216, 219, 222, 256, 259,
INDEX 363
269f, 310, 312, 339, 342 312, 320f

inference 33, 46, 79, 84ff, 91, 95ff, logical positivist 224
108ff, 118, 211, 213, 271,310,342 measurement 3,57, 180,2 56, 258, 263,
inquiry xiv, xviii, xxi, 5,8, 11, 14, 34f, 309,317,334,338,347,349
37f, 62, 70, 80, 83, 134, 144, 150, Medawar, P. 58, 69, 141, 202, 207f,
162,168,179, 193, 208, 214,2 22ff, 214,307
231ff, 237ff, 249, 259, 268f, 273, metaphysics xvi, 62, 140,246
276, 3 12, 3 16ff, 333f, 339, 348, methods instruction 27, 29f, 74, 84, 128,
350 223ff, 231f, 239, 241, 251, 267,
inservice 27, 29, 35, 84, 163, 223f, 280ff, 302
227f, 230, 267, 293, 315, 343 Mill, J. S. 259
interpretation 15, 22, 51, 60, 65, 96, misconceptions xxi, 9, 11, 14, 38f, 53f,
99f, 130f, 139,180, 202, 214f, 222, 68, 128, 144f, 149, 164, 167f, 197,
234, 268ff, 294, 296, 298, 306f, 200,205,322,346
317, 321, 332, 339, 343f, 346 Modified Nature of Scientific Knowledge
instructional outcomes 15f, 279 Scale 240,343
instrumentalism 16, 21, 36, 215, 219, multicultural 11, 79, 228, 229, 306, 352,
3 13 358
Inventory of Science Attitudes, Interests nature of science defined 4
and Appreciations 333f Nature of Science Scale 25, 333, 337
investigation (see experiment) Nature of Science Survey 333, 342
Koertge, N. 15, 21 Nature of Science Test 27, 333, 338
Kuhn, T. 14, 21, 26, 36, 63, 69, 126, Nature of Scientific Knowledge Scale 18,
138, 149, 153, 162, 169, 193, 195, 23, 25, 240, 333, 338, 343, 349
208,229,259,274,348 normal science 17, 26, 224, 259, 344
laboratory instruction 18, 22, 27, 56, objective 13, 49, 62f, 98f, 164,224,232,
60, 63, 177, 200, 202, 207, 230, 235, 237, 259, 265
343 observation xvi, 17f, 36, 43, 45ff, 50,
Lakatos, I. 60, 138, 149, 154, 162, 57f, 62ff, 69,75, 79f, 82, 84ff, 91,
257, 259,2 63 98ff, 108ff, 118f, 130, 141, 150,
Laudan, L. 51, 138, 149, 257,259f 167, 171ff, 182,185, 190,193,202,
law 6f, 10, 12, 20, 46, 51, 54ff,, 69f, 204, 215, 219, 222f, 232,235,238,
83, 85, 91, 109, 126, 130, 139, 256ff, 264ff, 298, 310, 320, 339f,
164, 168f, 172f, 179f, 182f, 200, 345ff
208, 211ff, 217ff, 231, 239, 265f, paradigm 15, 26, 36, 47, 49, 63ff, 99f,
275, 279, 281, 285, 287, 312, 335, 103, 149, 162, 166, 212, 215, 219,
339,342 221,263, 270, 272f, 325,328, 344,
learning cycle 232ff, 237 348
learning game 73ff, patterns 23, 54, 109, 118ff, 128, 146,
literacy; science 42, 48, 224 259, 264, 268f, 272, 277, 312, 316,
Locke, John 18, 19, 21 318f, 321 323, 326
logic 17, 32, 45, 49f, 57, 67, 69, 80, physics instruction xii, xix, 144, 147,
98, 135, 137, 146, 149, 164, 180, 168, 177, 180, 193, 196, 243, 248,
208, 213, 216f, 251, 259, 269,291, 268, 280, 290,320
364 INDEX
plate tectonics 218, 259,250,263,320, 341, 348, 3 4 9

340 Science Support Scale 333f
Popper, K. xiii, 49, 52, 60ff, 69, 138, science, technology and society (STS)
149f, 154, 162, 221f, 259f, 344 33, 207, 277, 280, 290, 333, 341,
Portland Baseline Essay 14f, 2 1 347
positivism 227, 312 science wars xiii
positivist 10, 14, 16, 18, 214, 224, 278, scientific method(s) xviii, xxi, 6f, 10,26,
280, 290, 296, 312 53, 57f, 69, 81, 83, 164, 169, 178,
postmodern xiii, xv, 17, 19, 140 190f, 200, 202, 213f, 219, 230,
pragmatism 256,259 237ff, 246, 255, 276,281,291,310,
preconceptions (see conceptions) 325f, 334, 337
preservice xvi, xx, 10f, 18, 24, 27ff, scientific theory profile 20, 37, 79,
34f, 37, 39, 53, 73f, 78, 84, 197, 137ff, 147ff
119ff, 206, 223ff, 227, 230f, 233, scientism 73,76, 78, 81
243ff, 248, 250f, 267f 315, 326, secondary level teaching environment
343 243
prior knowledge 58, 63, 96, 101, 111, Shapere, D. 138, 150
156 skepticism 6,45, 50, 68, 168, 170, 202,
problem solving 16, 154, 156 224 275f
process science 33,73, 224ff, 229,332 social construction xvi, 53, 127f, 216,
Processes of Science Test 333f, 348 269,273,341
pseudoscience 14, 21, 139, 271f, 275f sociological xv, xxf, 4f, 32, 37f, 41,44,
rational reconstruction 256, 259 46, 49f, 136, 142, 147, 149, 211ff,
reductionism 13,247 243f, 271f, 278, 290,293,307,313,
reflection (reflective thought) 16, 37, 357
129, 152, 168, 184, 202f, 205, standards, science teaching xii, 6, 41ff,
207f, 231ff, 237, 246, 248, 250, 166, 211,216,219,227,277
252,268f, 272, 299,307,309,336 STS (see science, technology and
reflection-on-action 205f society)
relativism xvi, 308, 312 student teaching 28, 198f, 205f, 225,
reliability 128, 169, 240, 260, 334, 228,232
336f, 339f, 343 student teachers 28, 35, 197ff, 228,291,
research design 24, 223, 331 293,302
role playing 179 subjective 23,84, 97,99, 100, 170,253,
Science Attitude Inventory 333, 334 259, 265, 324, 331
Science Attitude Questionnaire 333f Test of Enquiry Skills 333f, 348
Science Attitude Scale 333,334 Test of Science-Related Attitudes 333f
science, characteristics of 6f, 271f Test on the Social Aspects of Science,
science, pure 67, 208, 260f, 264 333f
science, applied 67, 200, 260f, 264 Test on Understanding Science 24, 38,
Science & Education 12, 16, 20ff, 35, 333f, 348
37, 39 technologyxix, xx, xxi, 3, 7, 10, 13, 33,
Science Inventory 333f 39, 47f, 51, 62, 67, 94, 126, 142,
Science Process Inventory 22, 333,336, 160, 168, 171, 177, 193f, 200, 207,
INDEX 365
228, 246ff, 252, 256, 260f, 264,

267ff, 274f, 277ff, 282f, 287,290f,
333f 341,347
tentative 6, 12, 42f, 55f, 60, 83ff, 91,
97, 109, 112, 118, 137, 164f, 170,
174f, 188, 190,224,228,231,237,
285, 319, 322, 331, 337f, 340ff,
348f
testable 23, 45, 79f, 82, 231, 235, 239f,
285,339,343
textbooks 4, 9, 20ff, 35f, 53, 68f, 73,
85, 165, 178, 203, 205, 207, 212,
218, 243
theory xvii, xx, 3ff, 12, 14, 17f, 35, 37,
43,46f, 51f, 54, 62f, 67, 69, 54ff,
theory, view of 15 1
theory development 151f, 154, 156ff
theory-laden observation 7, 47, 63, 219,
258,298, 312,340
Toulmin, S. 138, 150, 194, 195
trial and error 154, 232f, 237,275
unified science 349
values xv, 9, 10, 14, 16, 20, 79f, 159,
164, 168, 222, 232f, 235,239,246,
255f, 260ff, 279, 283ff, 2990f, 299,
305, 308, 331f, 336,348
variable 15, 18ff, 23ff, 37,64, 181f,
187ff, 203, 234, 236, 238, 240,
280, 321 332
verification 16f, 22,60, 172,222f, 266,
317
von Glasersfeld, E. 224, 230
Wisconsin Inventory of Science
Processes 336, 349
Science & Technology Education Library
Series editor: Ken Tobin, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA
Publications
1. W.-M. Roth: Authentic School Science. Knowing and Learning in Open-Inquiry
Science Laboratories. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-3088-9; Pb: 0-7923-3307-1
2. L.H. Parker, L.J. Rennie and B.J. Fraser (eds.): Gender, Science and Mathematics.
Shortening the Shadow. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-3535-X; Pb: 0-7923-3582-1
3. W.-M. Roth: Designing Communities. 1997
ISBN 0-7923-4703-X; Pb: 0-7923-4704-8
4. W.W. Cobern (ed.): Socio-Cultural Perspectives on Science Education. An Interna-
tional Dialogue. 1998 ISBN 0-7923-4987-3; Pb: 0-7923-4988-1
5. W.F. McComas (ed.): The Nature of Science in Science Education. Rationales and
Strategies. 1998 ISBN 0-7923-5080-4
KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS -

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THE NATURE OF SCIENCE IN SCIENCE EDUCATION

Science & Technology Education Library

Ken Tobin, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA

Beverly Bell, University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand

KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS

Foreword and Introduction xi

SECTION I: RATIONALES FOR THE NATURE OF SCIENCE

1. The Role And Character of The Nature of Science 3

2. The Nature of Science in International Science 41

3. The Principal Elements of the Nature of Science: 53

SECTION II: COMMUNICATING THE NATURE OF SCIENCE

4. The Card Exchange: 73

5. Avoiding De-Natured Science: Activities that Promote 83

6. Confronting Students’ Conceptions of the Nature of Science 127

7. Nature of Science Activities Using the Scientific Theory Profile: 137

8. Learning By Designing: A Case of 151

9. Using Historical Case Studies in Biology to Explore the 163

10. A History of Science Approach to the Nature of Science: 177

11. Integrating the Nature of Science with Student Teaching: 197

PART III: COMMUNICATING THE NATURE OF SClENCE

12. A Thematic Introduction to the Nature of Science: The Rationale 211

13. The Nature of Science: 223

14. Elementary Science Methods: Developing and Measuring 231

15. Nature of Science: Implications for Education: An Undergraduate 243

17. Teaching the Nature of Science as an Element of Science, 267

18. Of Starting Points and Destinations: Teacher Education and 277

19. A Programme for Developing Understanding of the 293

20. The Nature of Science as a Foundation for Teaching Science: 315

SECTION IV: ASSESSING NATURE OF SCIENCE UNDERSTANDING

21. Assessing Understanding of the Nature of Science: A 331

Notes on Contributors 351

The editor wishes to acknowledge

René Stofflett, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and J. Steve Oliver, of the

Michael Clough for insightful conversation and countless useful suggestions;

FOREWORD AND INTRODUCTION

Curriculum documents in the US (especially Project 2061 and the National

Epistemological questions are also prompted by much environmentalist, ‘deep

It is in everyone’s interest that students, and trainee teachers, develop ‘a more

It is unrealistic to expect students, or trainee teachers, to become competent

And then proceeded, memorably, to say:

If Locke’s argument holds against truths it certainly holds against contested or

University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia

RATIONALES FOR INCLUDING NATURE OF SCIENCE

1. THE ROLE AND CHARACTER OF THE NATURE OF

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF SCIENCE?

CONSENSUS VIEWS REGARDING THE NATURE OF SCIENCE

Before embarking on the development of any course or unit of study designed to

Scientific knowledge while durable, has a tentative character.

THE NATURE OF SCIENCE IN SCIENCE EDUCATION:

THE NATURE OF SCIENCE IN SCIENCE EDUCATION: A RATIONALE

A number of studies exist that document students’ misconceptions concerning the

collected the responses of more than two-thousand upper secondary students,

While acknowledging that a number of out-of-school factors misrepresent the

The Value of Nature of Science for Teaching and Learning

NOS to Enhance the Learning of Science Content

NOS Knowledge to Enhance Understanding of Science

Furthermore, those who comprehend the durable, yet revisionary, nature of

NOS to Enhance Interest in Science

NOS Knowledge to Enhance Decision Making