Saluday V People, GR 215305, Apr 3, 2018

10/26/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 860

G.R. No. 215305. April 3, 2018. *

MARCELO G. SALUDAY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on

Certiorari; Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.—Only questions of law may
be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. As a result, the Court, on appeal, is not duty-bound to weigh and sift
through the evidence presented during trial. Further, factual findings of the
trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are accorded great
respect even finality.
Criminal Law; Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition; Illegal
Possession of Explosives; Elements of.—Petitioner assails his conviction for
illegal possession of high-powered firearm and ammunition under PD 1866,
and illegal possession of explosive under the same law. The elements of
both offenses are as follows: (1) existence of the firearm, ammunition or
explosive; (2) ownership or possession of the firearm, ammunition or
explosive; and (3) lack of license to own or possess. As regards the second
and third elements, the Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court that
petitioner was in actual or constructive possession of a high-powered
firearm, ammunition, and explosive without the requisite authority.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Searches and Seizures; When
a search is “reasonable,” Section 2, Article III of the Constitution
does not apply.—Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, which was
patterned after the Fourth Amendment to the United States (U.S.)
Constitution, reads: SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
_______________
* EN BANC.

www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017564b43d51f960fbe1003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/25
232
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Saluday vs. People
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and

particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized. Indeed, the constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition.
Rather, it operates against “unreasonable” searches and seizures only.
Conversely, when a search is “reasonable,” Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution does not apply. As to what qualifies as a reasonable search,
the pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme Court, which are doctrinal in this
jurisdiction, may shed light on the matter.
Same; Same; Same; Right to Privacy; The prohibition of unreasonable
search and seizure ultimately stems from a person’s right to privacy.—The
prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure ultimately stems from a
person’s right to privacy. Hence, only when the State intrudes into a
person’s expectation of privacy, which society regards as reasonable, is the
Fourth Amendment triggered. Conversely, where a person does not have an
expectation of privacy or one’s expectation of privacy is not reasonable to
society, the alleged State intrusion is not a “search” within the protection of
the Fourth Amendment.
Same; Same; Same; The reasonableness of a person’s expectation of
privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the
factual circumstances surrounding the case.—Indeed, the reasonableness of
a person’s expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis
since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case. Other
factors such as customs, physical surroundings and practices of a particular
activity may diminish this expectation. In Fortune Express, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 305 SCRA 14 (1999), a common carrier was held civilly liable for
the death of a passenger due to the hostile acts of armed men who boarded
and subsequently seized the bus. The Court held that “simple
precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers, such as
frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages, preferably with
nonintrusive gadgets such as metal detectors, before allowing them on
board could have been employed without violating the passenger’s
constitutional rights.” In Costabella Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA
333 (1991), a compulsory right-of-way was found improper for the failure
of the owners of the dominant estate to allege that the passageway they
sought to be reopened was at a point least prejudicial

233
VOL. 860, APRIL 3, 2018 233

Saluday vs. People
to the owner of the servient estate. The Court thus explained,

“[c]onsidering that the petitioner operates a hotel and beach resort in its
property, it must undeniably maintain a strict standard of security within its
premises. Otherwise, the convenience, privacy, and safety of its clients and
patrons would be compromised.” Similarly, shopping malls install metal
detectors and body scanners, and require bag inspection as a requisite for
entry. Needless to say, any security lapse on the part of the mall owner can
compromise public safety.
Same; Same; Same; A person’s expectation of privacy is diminished
whenever he or she enters private premises that are accessible to the public.
—Concededly, a bus, a hotel and beach resort, and a shopping mall are all
private property whose owners have every right to exclude anyone from
entering. At the same time, however, because these private premises are
accessible to the public, the State, much like the owner, can impose
nonintrusive security measures and filter those going in. The only difference
in the imposition of security measures by an owner and the State is, the
former emanates from the attributes of ownership under Article 429 of the
Civil Code, while the latter stems from the exercise of police power for the
promotion of public safety. Necessarily, a person’s expectation of privacy is
diminished whenever he or she enters private premises that are accessible to
the public.
Same; Same; Same; The constitutional immunity against unreasonable
searches and seizures is a personal right, which may be waived.—
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and
seizures is a personal right, which may be waived. However, to be valid, the
consent must be voluntary such that it is unequivocal, specific, and
intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Relevant to
this determination of voluntariness are the following characteristics of the
person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (a)
the age of the consenting party; (b) whether he or she was in a public or
secluded location; (c) whether he or she objected to the search or passively
looked on; (d) his or her education and intelligence; (e) the presence of
coercive police procedures; (f) the belief that no incriminating evidence will
be found; (g) the nature of the police questioning; (h) the environment in
which the questioning took place; and (i) the possibly vulnerable subjective
state of the person consenting.

234

Saluday vs. People
Same; Same; Same; A reasonable search, on the one hand, and a

warrantless search, on the other, are mutually exclusive. While both State
intrusions are valid even without a warrant, the underlying reasons for the
absence of a warrant are different.—To emphasize, a reasonable search, on
the one hand, and a warrantless search, on the other, are mutually exclusive.
While both State intrusions are valid even without a warrant, the underlying
reasons for the absence of a warrant are different. A reasonable search arises
from a reduced expectation of privacy, for which reason Section 2, Article
III of the Constitution finds no application. Examples include searches done
at airports, seaports, bus terminals, malls, and similar public places. In
contrast, a warrantless search is presumably an “unreasonable search,” but
for reasons of practicality, a search warrant can be dispensed with.
Examples include search incidental to a lawful arrest, search of evidence in
plain view, consented search, and extensive search of a private moving
vehicle.
Same; Same; Same; Prior to entry, passengers and their bags and
luggages can be subjected to a routine inspection akin to airport and
seaport security protocol.—In the conduct of bus searches, the Court lays
down the following guidelines. Prior to entry, passengers and their bags
and luggages can be subjected to a routine inspection akin to airport and
seaport security protocol. In this regard, metal detectors and x-ray scanning
machines can be installed at bus terminals. Passengers can also be frisked.
In lieu of electronic scanners, passengers can be required instead to open
their bags and luggages for inspection, which inspection must be made in
the passenger’s presence. Should the passenger object, he or she can validly
be refused entry into the terminal.
Same; Same; Same; While in transit, a bus can still be searched by
government agents or the security personnel of the bus owner.—While in
transit, a bus can still be searched by government agents or the security
personnel of the bus owner in the following three instances. First, upon
receipt of information that a passenger carries contraband or illegal articles,
the bus where the passenger is aboard can be stopped en route to allow for
an inspection of the person and his or her effects. This is no different from
an airplane that is forced to land upon receipt of information about the
contraband or illegal articles carried by a passenger on board. Second,
whenever a bus picks passengers en route, the prospective passenger can be
frisked

235
VOL. 860, APRIL 3, 2018 235

Saluday vs. People
and his or her bag or luggage be subjected to the same routine

inspection by government agents or private security personnel as though the
person boarded the bus at the terminal. This is because unlike an airplane, a
bus is able to stop and pick passengers along the way, making it possible for
these passengers to evade the routine search at the bus terminal. Third, a bus
can be flagged down at designated military or police checkpoints where
State agents can board the vehicle for a routine inspection of the passengers
and their bags or luggages.
Same; Same; Same; The search of persons in a public place is valid because
the safety of others may be put at risk.—The search of persons in a public place is
valid because the safety of others may be put at risk. Given the present
circumstances, the Court takes judicial notice that public transport buses and their
terminals, just like passenger ships and seaports, are in that category. Aside from
public transport buses, any moving vehicle that similarly accepts passengers at the
terminal and along its route is likewise covered by these guidelines. Hence,
whenever compliant with these guidelines, a routine inspection at the terminal or of
the vehicle itself while in transit constitutes a reasonable search. Otherwise, the
intrusion becomes unreasonable, thereby triggering the constitutional guarantee
under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. To emphasize, the guidelines do not
apply to privately owned cars. Neither are they applicable to moving vehicles
dedicated for private or personal use, as in the case of taxis, which are hired by only
one or a group of passengers such that the vehicle can no longer be flagged down by
any other person until the passengers on board alight from the vehicle.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of

the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Public Attorney’s Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
_______________
** Designated Acting Chief Justice.

236

Saluday vs. People
CARPIO, ** J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing
the Decision dated 26 June 20141 and the Resolution dated 15
2
October 2014 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 01099.
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Sentence dated
15 September 20113 rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
11, Davao City in Criminal Case No. 65,734-09, finding petitioner
Marcelo G. Saluday (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal possession of high-powered firearm, ammunition, and
explosive under Presidential Decree No. 1866,4 as amended (PD
1866).

The Antecedent Facts

On 5 May 2009, Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged
down by Task Force Davao of the Philippine Army at a checkpoint
near the Tefasco Wharf in Ilang, Davao City. SCAA Junbert M.
Buco (Buco), a member of the Task Force, requested all male
passengers to disembark from the vehicle while allowing the female
passengers to remain inside. He then boarded the bus to check the
presence and intercept the
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 25-34. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren, with

Associate Justices Edward B. Contreras and Rafael Antonio M. Santos, concurring.
2 Id., at pp. 41-42.
3 CA Rollo, pp. 22-25. Penned by Judge Virginia Hofileña Europa.
4 Entitled “CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE,
DEALING IN ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION, OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES OR
INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES, AND

IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR RELEVANT
PURPOSES.” Effective 29 June 1983.

237
VOL. 860, APRIL 3, 2018 237

Saluday vs. People
entry of any contraband, illegal firearms or explosives, and

suspicious individuals.
SCAA Buco checked all the baggage and personal effects of the
passengers, but a small, gray-black pack bag on the seat at the rear
of the bus caught his attention. He lifted the bag and found it too
heavy for its small size. SCAA Buco then looked at the male
passengers lined outside and noticed that a man in a white shirt (later
identified as petitioner) kept peeping through the window towards
the direction of the bag. Afterwards, SCAA Buco asked who the
owner of the bag was, to which the bus conductor answered that
petitioner and his brother were the ones seated at the back. SCAA
Buco then requested petitioner to board the bus and open the bag.
Petitioner obliged and the bag revealed the following contents: (1)
an improvised .30 caliber carbine bearing Serial Number 64702; (2)
one magazine with three live ammunitions; (3) one cacao-type hand
grenade; and (4) a ten-inch hunting knife. SCAA Buco then asked
petitioner to produce proof of his authority to carry firearms and
explosives. Unable to show any, petitioner was immediately arrested
and informed of his rights by SCAA Buco.
Petitioner was then brought for inquest before the Office of the
City Prosecutor for Davao City. In its Resolution dated 7 May
2009,5 the latter found probable cause to charge him with illegal
possession of high-powered firearm, ammunition, and explosive
under PD 1866. The Information dated 8 May 2009 thus reads:

That on or about May 5, 2009, in the City of Davao, Philippines,

and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
mentioned accused, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly, with intent
to possess, had in his possession and under his custody an improvised
high-powered firearm caliber .30 carbine bearing Serial No. 64702
(made in Spain) with one (1) magazine loaded with three
_______________
5 Records, pp. 2-3.

238

Saluday vs. People
(3) live ammunitions and one (1) “cacao” type hand grenade explosive,
without first securing the necessary license to possess the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty.

During the trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses namely,
NUP Daniel Tabura (Tabura), a representative of the Firearms and
Explosives Division of the Philippine National Police, and SCAA
Buco. NUP Tabura identified the Certification dated 5 November
20097 attesting that petitioner was “not a licensed/registered holder
of any kind and caliber per verification from records.” Meanwhile,
SCAA Buco identified petitioner and the items seized from the bag,
and testified on the details of the routine inspection leading to the
immediate arrest of petitioner. On cross-examination, SCAA Buco

further elaborated on the search conducted:
ATTY. MAMBURAM
Q And that checkpoint, which was conducted along Ilang [R]oad, Davao City, was
by virtue of a memorandum?
A Yes, Your Honor.
x x x x
Q Now, you said that at around 5:00 of said date, you were able to intercept a
Metro Shuttle passenger bus and you requested all passengers to alight?
A Yes.
Q All female passengers were left inside?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q And, after all passengers were able to alight, you checked all cargoes of the
passengers in the bus?
A Yes.
_______________
6 Id., at p. 1.
7 Exhibit “F”; Folder of Exhibits, p. 2.

239
VOL. 860, APRIL 3, 2018 239

Saluday vs. People
x x x x
Q And, you testified that one of those things inside the bus was a black-gray
colored pack bag which was placed at the back portion of the bus?
A Yes.
Q You said that the bag was heavy?
A Yes.
Q And you picked up or carried also the other belongings or cargo[e]s inside the
bus and that was the only thing or item inside the bus which was heavy. Is that
correct?
A There were many bags and they were heavy. When I asked who is the owner of
the bag because it was heavy but the bag was small, when I asked, he said
the content of the bag was a cell phone. But I noticed that it was heavy.
x x x x
Q And you said that somebody admitted ownership of the bag. Is that correct?
A Yes.
Q Who admitted ownership of the bag?
A (WITNESS POINTS TO THE ACCUSED)
Q Now, you said that while you are looking at the bag, you noticed that one male
passenger you pointed as the accused kept looking at you?
A Yes.
Q And, aside from the accused, all the other male pas-sengers were not looking at
you?
A The other passengers were on the ground but he was in front of [the] window
looking towards his bag.
x x x x
Q And the accused admitted that he owned the bag, you requested him to open
the bag?
A Not yet. I let him board the bus and asked him if he can open it.

240

Saluday vs. People
Q And, when he opened it?

A I saw the handle of the firearm.8 (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, the defense presented petitioner as sole

witness. On direct examination, petitioner denied ownership of the
bag. However, he also admitted to answering SCAA Buco when
asked about its contents and allowing SCAA Buco to open it after
the latter sought for his permission:
ATTY. MAMBURAM
Q x x x [A]fter the conductor of the bus told the member of the task force that you
and your brother were seated at the back of the bus, can you please tell us
what happened next?
A The member of the task force asked who is the owner of the bag and what were
the contents of the bag.
Q To whom did the member of the task force address that question?
A To me because I was pointed to by the conductor.
Q And what was your reply to the question of the member of the task force?
A I told him it was only a cell phone.
Q By the way, Mr. Witness, who owned that bag?
A My elder brother.
Q And why did you make a reply to the question of the member of the task force
when, in fact, you were not the owner of the bag?
A Because I was pointed to by the conductor that it was me and my brother who
were seated at the back.
x x x x
_______________
8 TSN, 11 November 2009, pp. 14-16.

241
VOL. 860, APRIL 3, 2018 241

Saluday vs. People
Q Now, after you told the member of the task force that probably the content
of the bag was cell phone, what happened next?
A He asked if he can open it.
Q And what was your reply?
A I told him yes, just open it.
x x x x
Q Now, you said that the owner of the bag and the one who carried that bag was
your brother, what is the name of your brother?
A Roger Saluday.
Q Where is your brother Roger now?
A Roger is already dead. He died in September 2009.9 (Emphasis supplied)
On cross-examination, petitioner clarified that only he was

pointed at by the conductor when the latter was asked who owned
the bag. Petitioner also admitted that he never disclosed he was with
his brother when he boarded the bus:
PROS. VELASCO
Q You said that you panicked because they pulled you but as a way of saving
yourself considering you don’t own the bag, did you not volunteer to inform
them that [the] bag was owned by your brother?
A I told them I have a companion but I did not tell them that it was my brother
because I was also afraid of my brother.
Q So, in short, Mr. Witness, you did not actually inform them that you had a
brother at that time when you were boarding that bus, correct?
A No, sir, I did not.
x x x x
_______________
9 TSN, 22 March 2010, pp. 5-6, 8.

242

Saluday vs. People
Q So, you were answering all questions by saying it is not your bag but you
confirm now that it was the conductor of that bus who pointed you as the
owner of the bag, correct?
10
A Yes, sir, the conductor pointed at me as the one who [sic] seated at the back.
(Emphasis supplied)
The defense subsequently rested its case and the prosecution

waived the right to present rebuttal evidence. Upon order from the
trial court, the parties submitted their respective memoranda.

The Decision of the Trial Court

Finding the denials of petitioner as self-serving and weak, the
trial court declared him to be in actual or constructive possession of
firearm and explosive without authority or license. Consequently, in
the dispositive portion of the Sentence dated 15 September 2011,
petitioner was adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
possession of firearm, ammunition, and explosive under PD 1866:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby

rendered finding Marcelo Gigbalen Saluday GUILTY of illegal
possession of high-powered firearm, ammunition and explosive. For
the offense of illegal possession of high-powered firearm and
ammunition, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment
of prisión mayor in its minimum period. He is likewise ordered to
pay a fine of P30,000.00. For the offense of illegal possession of
explosive, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment
of prisión mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal. He is
likewise ordered to pay a fine of P50,000.00.
x x x x
SO ORDERED.11
_______________
10 Id., at p. 10.

243
VOL. 860, APRIL 3, 2018 243

Saluday vs. People
On 12 October 2011, petitioner timely filed his Notice of

Appeal.12

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, petitioner challenged his conviction raising as

grounds the alleged misappreciation of evidence by the trial court
and the supposed illegality of the search.13 On the other hand, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that the warrantless
search was valid being a consented search, and that the factual
findings of the trial court can no longer be disturbed.14
In its Decision dated 26 June 2014, the Court of Appeals
sustained the conviction of petitioner and affirmed the ruling of the
trial court with modification:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Sentence

dated September 15, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial
Region, Branch 11, Davao City, in Criminal Case No. 65,734-09,
finding Marcelo Gigbalen Saluday guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal possession of high-powered firearm, ammunition and
explosive is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that:
(1) for the offense of illegal possession of high-powered
firearm and ammunition, he is imposed an indeterminate
sentence of four (4) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days of prisión correccional maximum, as the minimum
term, to seven (7) years and one (1) day of prisión
mayor minimum, as the maximum term, in addition to the fine
of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00); and
_______________
11 CA Rollo, pp. 24-25.

12 Id., at p. 8.
13 Id., at pp. 15-19.
14 Id., at pp. 46-60.

244

Saluday vs. People
(2) for the offense of illegal possession of explosive, he is

sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole.
SO ORDERED.15
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration,16 to which the

OSG filed its Comment.17 In its Resolution dated 15 October
2014,18 the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration for being pro forma. Hence, petitioner filed this
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court.

The Issue

Petitioner assails the appreciation of evidence by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals as to warrant his conviction for the
offenses charged.

The Ruling of this Court

We affirm.
Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.19 As a result, the
Court, on appeal, is not duty-bound to weigh and sift through the
evidence presented during trial.20 Further, factual findings of the trial
court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are accorded great
respect even finality.21
_______________
15 Rollo, pp. 33-34.

16 Id., at pp. 35-39.
17 CA Rollo, pp. 87-90.
18 Rollo, pp. 41-42.
19 Section I, Rule 45, RULES OF COURT.
20 Jose v. People, 479 Phil. 969, 978; 436 SCRA 294, 302 (2004).
21 De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 333 Phil. 126, 135; 265 SCRA 299, 306
(1996). See also Castillo v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 150,

245
VOL. 860, APRIL 3, 2018 245

Saluday vs. People
Here, petitioner assails his conviction for illegal possession of

high-powered firearm and ammunition under PD 1866, and illegal
possession of explosive under the same law. The elements of both
offenses are as follows: (1) existence of the firearm, ammunition or
explosive; (2) ownership or possession of the firearm, ammunition
or explosive; and (3) lack of license to own or possess.22 As regards
the second and third elements, the Court of Appeals concurred with
the trial court that petitioner was in actual or constructive possession
of a high-powered firearm, ammunition, and explosive without the
requisite authority. The Decision dated 26 June 2014 reads in

pertinent part:
In the present case, the prosecution proved the negative fact that
appellant has no license or permit to own or possess the firearm
ammunition and explosive by presenting NUP Daniel Tab[u]ra
(Tab[u]ra), a representative of the Firearms and Explosives Division
(FED) of the PNP. He identified the Certification issued by the Chief,
Records Section, FED of the PNP, stating that appellant “is not a
licensed/registered holder of any kind and caliber per verification
from records of this office.”
Appellant, however, questions the competence of Tab[u]ra to
testify on the veracity or truthfulness of the Certification. He claims
that the officer who issued it should have been the one presented so
he would not be denied the right to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him.
There is no merit to petitioner’s claim. The following is pertinent:
x x x x
_______________
158-159; 260 SCRA 374, 381 (1996); Navallo v. Sandiganbayan, 304 Phil. 343, 354;
234 SCRA 175, 185-186 (1994); People v. Cabalhin, 301 Phil. 494, 504; 231 SCRA
486, 496 (1994).
22 People v. Dela Cruz, 400 Phil. 872, 879-880; 347 SCRA 100, 106 (2000),
citing People v. Bergante, 350 Phil. 275, 291; 286 SCRA 629, 643-644 (1998).

246

Saluday vs. People
The Court on several occasions ruled that either the

testimony of a representative of, or a certification from, the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Firearms and Explosive
Office attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm
would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second
element of possession of illegal firearms. The prosecution
more than complied when it presented both.
x x x x
Also, appellant denies having physical or constructive possession
of the firearms, ammunition and explosive. However, his denial flies
in the face of the following testimonies which he himself made:
xxxx
Appellant gave information, albeit misleading, on the contents of
the bag. He even allowed the police officer to open it. Based on his
actuations, there could be no doubt that he owned the bag containing

the firearm, ammunition and explosive.
Shifting the blame to his dead brother is very easy for appellant to
fabricate. Besides, the allegation that his brother owned the bag is
uncorroborated and self-serving.23
As above quoted, the presence of the second and third elements

of illegal possession of firearm, ammunition, and explosive raises
questions of fact. Considering further that the Court of Appeals
merely echoed the factual findings of the trial court, the Court finds
no reason to disturb them.
As regards the first element, petitioner corroborates the testimony
of SCAA Buco on four important points: one, that petitioner was a
passenger of the bus flagged down on 5 May 2009 at a militaty
checkpoint in Ilang, Davao City; two, that SCAA Buco boarded and
searched the bus; three, that the bus
_______________
23 Rollo, pp. 28-31.

247
VOL. 860, APRIL 3, 2018 247

Saluday vs. People
conductor pointed at petitioner as the owner of a small, gray-black pack bag

on the back seat of the bus; and four, that the same bag contained a .30-
caliber firearm with one magazine loaded with three live ammunitions, and
a hand grenade. Notably, petitioner does not challenge the chain of custody
over the seized items. Rather, he merely raises a pure question of law and
argues that they are inadmissible on the ground that the search conducted by
Task Force Davao was illegal.
The Court disagrees.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, which was patterned
after the Fourth Amendment to the United States (U.S.)
Constitution,24 reads:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, the constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition.

Rather, it operates against “unreasonable” searches
_______________
24 The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution reads:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons of things to be
seized. (Emphasis supplied)

248

Saluday vs. People
and seizures only.25 Conversely, when a search is “reasonable,” Section

2, Article III of the Constitution does not apply. As to what qualifies as a
reasonable search, the pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme Court, which
are doctrinal in this jurisdiction,26 may shed light on the matter.
In the seminal case of Katz v. United States,27 the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the electronic surveillance of a phone conversation without a
warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. According to the U.S. Supreme
Court, what the Fourth Amendment protects are people, not places such that
what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his or her own home
or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection in much the same
way that what he or she seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected, thus:
Because of the misleading way the issues have been formulated, the
parties have attached great significance to the characterization of the
telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls. The petitioner has
strenuously argued that the booth was a “constitutionally protected area.”
The Government has maintained with equal vigor that it was not. But this
effort to decide whether or not a given “area,” viewed in the abstract, is
constitutionally protected” deflects attention from the problem presented by
this case. For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. See Lewis v. United
States, 385 U.S. 206, 210; United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563. But what
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected. See Rios v.
_______________
25 People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868, 878; 288 SCRA 626, 636 (1998).
26 People v. Marti, 271 Phil. 51, 57; 193 SCRA 57, 63 (1991).
27 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

249
VOL. 860, APRIL 3, 2018 249

Saluday vs. People
United States, 364 U.S. 253; Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733.28
(Emphasis supplied)
Further, Justice John Harlan laid down in his concurring opinion

the two-part test that would trigger the application of the Fourth
Amendment. First, a person exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy.29 Second, the expectation is one that society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).30
The prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure ultimately
stems from a person’s right to privacy. Hence, only when the State
intrudes into a person’s expectation of privacy, which society
regards as reasonable, is the Fourth Amendment triggered.
Conversely, where a person does not have an expectation of privacy
or one’s expectation of privacy is not reasonable to society, the
alleged State intrusion is not a “search” within the protection of the
Fourth Amendment.
A survey of Philippine case law would reveal the same
jurisprudential reasoning. To illustrate, in People v. Johnson,31 the
Court declared airport searches as outside the protection of the
search and seizure clause due to the lack of an expectation of
privacy that society will regard as reasonable:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by
exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a
lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport
security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and
terrorism has come increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers
attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their
carry-on baggage as well as
_______________
28 Id., at p. 351.
29 Id., at p. 361.
30 Id.
31 401 Phil. 734; 348 SCRA 526 (2000).

250

Saluday vs. People
checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these

procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical
searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is
little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal
intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the
reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed,
travelers are often notified through airport public address systems,
signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to
search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such
would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers
on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless
searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.32
(Citations omitted)
Similarly, in Dela Cruz v. People,33 the Court described seaport

searches as reasonable searches on the ground that the safety of the
traveling public overrides a person’s right to privacy:
Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although

done without search warrants, are not unreasonable searches per se.
Constitutional provisions protecting privacy should not be so literally
understood so as to deny reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety of the
traveling public.
x x x x
Thus, with port security personnel’s functions having the color of
state-related functions and deemed agents of government, Marti is
inapplicable in the present case. Nevertheless, searches pursuant to
port security measures are not unreasonable per se. The security
measures of x-ray scanning and inspection in domestic ports are akin
to routine security procedures in airports.
x x x x
_______________
32 Id., at p. 743; p. 534.

33 776 Phil. 653; 779 SCRA 34 (2016).

251
VOL. 860, APRIL 3, 2018 251

Saluday vs. People
Port authorities were acting within their duties and functions

when [they] used x-ray scanning machines for inspection of
passengers’ bags. When the results of the x-ray scan revealed the
existence of firearms in the bag, the port authorities had probable
cause to conduct a search of petitioner’s bag. Notably, petitioner did
not contest the results of the x-ray scan.34
In People v. Breis,35 the Court also justitied a bus search owing to

the reduced expectation of privacy of the riding public:
Unlike the officer in Chan Fook, IO1 Mangili did not exceed his
authority in the performance of his duty. Prior to Breis’ resistance, IO1
Mangili laid nary a finger on Breis or Yumol. Neither did his presence in the
bus constitute an excess of authority. The bus is public transportation, and is
open to the public. The expectation of privacy in relation to the constitutional
right against unreasonable searches in a public bus is not the same as that in a
person’s dwelling. In fact, at that point in time, only the bus was being
searched, not Yumol, Breis, or their belongings, and the search of moving
vehicles has been uphold.36

Indeed, the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy
must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the
factual circumstances surrounding the case.37 Other factors such as
customs, physical surroundings and practices of a particular activity
may diminish this expectation.38 In Fortune Express, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,39 a com-
_______________
34 Id., at pp. 661, 681, 683-684; pp. 39, 61, 64.

35 766 Phil. 785; 767 SCRA 40 (2015).
36 Id., at p. 812; p. 67.
37 Hing v. Choachuy, Sr., 712 Phil. 337, 350; 699 SCRA 667, 679 (2013).
38 Ople v. Torres, 354 Phil. 948, 981; 293 SCRA 241, 164 (1998).
39 364 Phil. 480; 305 SCRA 14 (1999).

252

Saluday vs. People
mon carrier was held civilly liable for the death of a passenger due
to the hostile acts of armed men who boarded and subsequently
seized the bus. The Court held that “simple precautionary
measures to protect the safety of passengers, such as frisking
passengers and inspecting their baggages, preferably with
nonintrusive gadgets such as metal detectors, before allowing
them on board could have been employed without violating the
passenger’s constitutional rights.”40 In Costabella Corp. v. Court
of Appeals,41 a compulsory right-of-way was found improper for the
failure of the owners of the dominant estate to allege that the
passageway they sought to be reopened was at a point least
prejudicial to the owner of the servient estate. The Court thus
explained, “[c]onsidering that the petitioner operates a hotel and
beach resort in its property, it must undeniably maintain a strict
standard of security within its premises. Otherwise, the convenience,
privacy, and safety of its clients and patrons would be
compromised.”42 Similarly, shopping malls install metal detectors
and body scanners, and require bag inspection as a requisite for
entry. Needless to say, any security lapse on the part of the mall
owner can compromise public safety.
Concededly, a bus, a hotel and beach resort, and a shopping mall are all
private property whose owners have every right to exclude anyone from
entering. At the same time, however, because these private premises are
accessible to the public, the State, much like the owner, can impose
nonintrusive security measures and filter those going in. The only difference
in the imposition of security measures by an owner and the State is, the
former emanates from the attributes of ownership under Article 429 of the
Civil Code, while the latter stems from the exercise of police power for the
promotion of public safety. Necessarily, a person’s expectation of privacy is
_______________
40 Id., at p. 490; p. 21.

41 271 Phil. 350; 193 SCRA 333 (1991).
42 Id., at p. 359; pp. 341-342.

253
VOL. 860, APRIL 3, 2018 253

Saluday vs. People
diminished whenever he or she enters private premises that are

accessible to the public.
In view of the foregoing, the bus inspection conducted by Task
Force Davao at a military checkpoint constitutes a reasonable
search. Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was a vehicle of public

transportation where passengers have a reduced expectation of
privacy. Further, SCAA Buco merely lifted petitioner’s bag. This
visual and minimally intrusive inspection was even less than the
standard x-ray and physical inspections done at the airport and
seaport terminals where passengers may further be required to open
their bags and luggages. Considering the reasonableness of the bus
search, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds no application,
thereby precluding the necessity for a warrant.
As regards the warrantless inspection of petitioner’s bag, the
OSG argues that petitioner consented to the search, thereby making
the seized items admissible in evidence.43 Petitioner contends
otherwise and insists that his failure to object cannot be construed as
an implied waiver.
Petitioner is wrong.
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable
searches and seizures is a personal right, which may be
waived.44 However, to be valid, the consent must be voluntary such
that it is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given,
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.45 Relevant to this
determination of voluntariness are the following characteristics of
the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is
given: (a) the age of the consenting party; (b) whether he or she was
in a public or secluded location; (c) whether he or she objected to
the search or passively looked
_______________
43 Rollo, pp. 108-110.

44 Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 263, 286; 373 SCRA 221, 239 (2002).
45 Id., citing 68 Am Jur 2d Searches and Seizures, § 135.

254

Saluday vs. People
on;46 (d) his or her education and intelligence; (e) the presence of coercive
police procedures; (f) the belief that no incriminating evidence will be
found;47 (g) the nature of the police questioning; (h) the environment in
which the questioning took place; and (i) the possibly vulnerable subjective
state of the person consenting.48
In Asuncion v. Court of Appeals,49 the apprehending officers
sought the permission of petitioner to search the car, to which the
latter agreed. According to the Court, petitioner himself freely gave
his consent to the search. In People v. Montilla,50 the Court found
the accused to have spontaneously performed affirmative acts of
volition by opening the bag without being forced or intimidated to
do so, which acts amounted to a clear waiver of his right. In People
v. Omaweng,51 the police officers asked the accused if they could see
the contents of his bag, to which the accused said “you can see the
contents but those are only clothings.” The policemen then asked if
they could open and see it, and the accused answered “you can see
it.” The Court held there was a valid consented search.
Similarly in this case, petitioner consented to the baggage inspection
done by SCAA Buco. When SCAA Buco asked if he could open petitioner’s
bag, petitioner answered “yes, just open it” based on petitioner’s own
testimony. This is clear consent by petitioner to the search of the contents of
his bag. In its Decision dated 26 June 2014, the Court of Appeals aptly held:
A waiver was found in People v. Omaweng. There, the police

officers asked the accused if they could see the contents of his bag
and he answered “you can see the
_______________
46 Id., citing United States v. Barahona, 990 F. 2d 412.

47 Id., citing United States v. Lopez, 911 F. 2d 1006.
48 Id., citing United States v. Nafzger, 965 F. 2d 213.
49 362 Phil. 118, 127; 302 SCRA 490, 499 (1999).
50 349 Phil. 640, 661; 285 SCRA 703, 722-723 (1998).
51 288 Phil. 350, 358-359; 213 SCRA 462, 470 (1992).

255
VOL. 860, APRIL 3, 2018 255

Saluday vs. People
contents but those are only clothings.” When asked if they could open and
see it, he said “you can see it.” In the present case, accused-appellant told the
member of the task force that “it was only a cellphone” when asked who
owns the bag and what are its contents. When asked by the member of the
task force if he could open it, accusedappellant told him “yes, just open it.”
Hence, as in Omaweng, there was a waiver of accused-appellants right
against warrantless search.52
To emphasize, a reasonable search, on the one hand, and a

warrantless search, on the other, are mutually exclusive. While both
State intrusions are valid even without a warrant, the underlying
reasons for the absence of a warrant are different. A reasonable
search arises from a reduced expectation of privacy, for which
reason Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds no application.

Examples include searches done at airports, seaports, bus terminals,
malls, and similar public places. In contrast, a warrantless search is
presumably an “unreasonable search,” but for reasons of practicality,
a search warrant can be dispensed with. Examples include search
incidental to a lawful arrest, search of evidence in plain view,
consented search, and extensive search of a private moving vehicle.
Further, in the conduct of bus searches, the Court lays down the
following guidelines. Prior to entry, passengers and their bags and
luggages can be subjected to a routine inspection akin to airport and
seaport security protocol. In this regard, metal detectors and x-ray
scanning machines can be installed at bus terminals. Passengers can
also be frisked. In lieu of electronic scanners, passengers can be
required instead to open their bags and luggages for inspection,
which inspection must be made in the passenger’s presence. Should
the passenger object, he or she can validly be refused entry into the
terminal.
_______________
52 Rollo, p. 32.

256

Saluday vs. People
While in transit, a bus can still be searched by government

agents or the security personnel of the bus owner in the following
three instances. First, upon receipt of information that a passenger
carries contraband or illegal articles, the bus where the passenger is
aboard can be stopped en route to allow for an inspection of the
person and his or her effects. This is no different from an airplane
that is forced to land upon receipt of information about the
contraband or illegal articles carried by a passenger onboard.
Second, whenever a bus picks passengers en route, the prospective
passenger can be frisked and his or her bag or luggage be subjected
to the same routine inspection by government agents or private
security personnel as though the person boarded the bus at the
terminal. This is because unlike an airplane, a bus is able to stop and
pick passengers along the way, making it possible for these
passengers to evade the routine search at the bus terminal. Third, a
bus can be flagged down at designated military or police checkpoints
where State agents can board the vehicle for a routine inspection of
the passengers and their bags or luggages.
In both situations, the inspection of passengers and their effects

prior to entry at the bus terminal and the search of the bus while in
transit must also satisfy the following conditions to qualify as a valid
reasonable search. First, as to the manner of the search, it must be
the least intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the person or
persons being searched, minimizing, if not altogether eradicating,
any cause for public embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule. Second,
neither can the search result from any discriminatory motive such as
insidious profiling, stereotyping and other similar motives. In all
instances, the fundamental rights of vulnerable identities, persons
with disabilities, children and other similar groups should be
protected. Third, as to the purpose of the search, it must be confined
to ensuring public safety. Fourth, as to the evidence seized from the
reasonable search, courts must be convinced that precautionary
measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted
against the accused.

257
VOL. 860, APRIL 3, 2018 257

Saluday vs. People
The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety

of others may be put at risk. Given the present circumstances, the
Court takes judicial notice that public transport buses and their
terminals, just like passenger ships and seaports, are in that category.
Aside from public transport buses, any moving vehicle that
similarly accepts passengers at the terminal and along its route is
likewise covered by these guidelines. Hence, whenever compliant
with these guidelines, a routine inspection at the terminal or of the
vehicle itself while in transit constitutes a reasonable search.
Otherwise, the intrusion becomes unreasonable, thereby triggering
the constitutional guarantee under Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution.
To emphasize, the guidelines do not apply to privately owned
cars. Neither are they applicable to moving vehicles dedicated for
private or personal use, as in the case of taxis, which are hired by
only one or a group of passengers such that the vehicle can no
longer be flagged down by any other person until the passengers
onboard alight from the vehicle.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 26
June 2014 and the Resolution dated 15 October 2014 of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 01099 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del

Castillo, Leonen, Caguioa, Martires, Tijam and Gesmundo, JJ.,
concur.
Sereno, CJ., On Leave.
Perlas-Bernabe and Reyes, Jr., JJ., On Wellness Leave.
Jardeleza, J., No part.

258

Saluday vs. People
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Notes.—In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right

to privacy, courts use the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test.
This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation
of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated. (Hing vs.
Choachuy, Sr., 699 SCRA 667 [2013])
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code protects an individual’s right to
privacy and provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be
committed against him by other individuals; This provision
recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his right to privacy
cannot be denied or even restricted by others. (Id.)

——o0o——
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

Saluday V People, GR 215305, Apr 3, 2018

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Saluday V People, GR 215305, Apr 3, 2018

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Saluday V People, GR 215305, Apr 3, 2018

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

10/26/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 860

G.R. No. 215305. April 3, 2018. *

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on

232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

afﬁrmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and

VOL. 860, APRIL 3, 2018 233

Saluday vs. People

to the owner of the servient estate. The Court thus explained,

234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Same; Same; Same; A reasonable search, on the one hand, and a

VOL. 860, APRIL 3, 2018 235

and his or her bag or luggage be subjected to the same routine

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of

** Designated Acting Chief Justice.

236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

1 Rollo, pp. 25-34. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren, with

INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES, AND

VOL. 860, APRIL 3, 2018 237

entry of any contraband, illegal ﬁrearms or explosives, and

That on or about May 5, 2009, in the City of Davao, Philippines,

5 Records, pp. 2-3.

238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty.

immediate arrest of petitioner. On cross-examination, SCAA Buco

VOL. 860, APRIL 3, 2018 239

240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Q And, when he opened it?

On the other hand, the defense presented petitioner as sole

8 TSN, 11 November 2009, pp. 14-16.

VOL. 860, APRIL 3, 2018 241

On cross-examination, petitioner clariﬁed that only he was

9 TSN, 22 March 2010, pp. 5-6, 8.

242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The defense subsequently rested its case and the prosecution

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby

VOL. 860, APRIL 3, 2018 243

On 12 October 2011, petitioner timely ﬁled his Notice of

On appeal, petitioner challenged his conviction raising as

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Sentence

11 CA Rollo, pp. 24-25.

244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

(2) for the offense of illegal possession of explosive, he is

Petitioner then ﬁled a Motion for Reconsideration,16 to which the

Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

15 Rollo, pp. 33-34.

VOL. 860, APRIL 3, 2018 245

Here, petitioner assails his conviction for illegal possession of

requisite authority. The Decision dated 26 June 2014 reads in

246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The Court on several occasions ruled that either the

actuations, there could be no doubt that he owned the bag containing

As above quoted, the presence of the second and third elements

23 Rollo, pp. 28-31.

VOL. 860, APRIL 3, 2018 247

conductor pointed at petitioner as the owner of a small, gray-black pack bag

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

Indeed, the constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition.

24 The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution reads:

248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED