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VOL. 70, APRIL 30, 1976 477

Castro vs. Pabalan

*
No. L-28642. April 30, 1976.

MARIA CASTRO and CO LING, petitioners, vs.

HONORABLE JAVIER PABALAN, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of La Union, and SGT. ERNESTO
LUMANG, respondents.

Constitutional law; Search and seizure; Requisites for

issuance of valid search warrant; Existence of probable cause;
Examination of the applicant; Case at bar.—The averments as to
the alleged commission of the offenses imputed to petitioner were
abstract. As admitted in the challenged order, the inquiry was
brief. Subsequently, reference was made to “the routine taking of
(their oath) and examination questions and answers * * *.” Nor
can such perfunctory manner in which respondent Judge
conducted the required “examination under oath” be justified
merely because respondent Lumang was “a Sergeant of the PC,
with a long service behind (him).” Moreover, contrary to the Rules
of Court, he did not even bother to take the depositions of the
witnesses in writing, attaching them to the record. There was
thus a manifest and palpable violation of the constitutional
standard as to the quantum of proof to show the existence of
probable cause.
Same; Same; Same; Particular description of things to be
seized; Case at bar.—The Constitution requires, for the validity of
a search warrant, that there be a particular description of “the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” The
Constitution is quite explicit that there be a particular description
of the things to be seized. That requisite was not complied with in
this case. That would explain why the searching party felt it had
a free hand and did take possession of various kinds of goods,
including personal effects, which respondent Judge himself would
have them return. What was aptly characterized as a “major
objective” of this constitutional provision, the elimination of
general warrants, was thus frustrated.
Same; Same; Mandatory character of constitutional provision
on search and seizure.—The Court is resolutely committed to the

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doctrine that this constitutional provision is of a mandatory

character and therefore must be strictly complied with. To quote
from the landmark American decision of Boyd v. United States:
“It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights
of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.
Their motto should be obsta principiis.”

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* SECOND DIVISION

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Castro vs. Pabalan

Same; Same; Issuance of search warrant in connection with

one specific offense; Case at bar.—Another infirmity was the
failure to comply with the basic procedural requisite that a search
warrant “shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense.” Here reference was made to “an illegal
traffic of narcotics and contraband.” The latter is a generic term
covering all goods exported from or imported into the country
contrary to applicable statutes. Necessarily then, more than one
offense could arise from the activity designated as illegal traffic of
narcotics and contraband.
Same; Same; Seizure of property the possession of which is
prohibited by law; Effect of irregularity in the issuance of search
warrant.—The illegality of the search warrant does not call for
the return of the things seized, the possession of which is
prohibited by law. This is the established doctrine in this
jurisdiction.

PETITION for certiorari from an order of the Court of First

Instance of La Union.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Marcelino B. Florentino for petitioners.
     Jose I. Yumang for respondent Sgt. Ernesto Lumang.
     Hon. Javier Pabalan for and in his own behalf.

FERNANDO, Acting C.J.:

This Court is confronted anew in this certiorari proceeding

with the claim that a search warrant issued1 without
complying with2
the requisites of the Constitution and the
Rules of Court
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________________

1 The search warrant was issued on July 10, 1967 at a time when the
1935 Constitution was still in force. As set forth in Art. III, Sec. 1, par. (3):
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Under the present
Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 3, the provision remains unaltered except for
the vesting of the competence on any other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law to issue a search warrant or a warrant of arrest where
formerly only a judge may do so.
2 Rule 126 of the Rules of Court defines with particularity how a search
warrant may be issued. Sections 3 and 4 are particularly

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Castro vs. Pabalan

should have been nullified, but was not in the challenged

3
order of respondent Judge Javier Pabalan. More
specifically, it was the failure of the application for the
search warrant as well as the search warrant itself to
specify the specific offense, to examine the applicant as
well as his witnesses on the part of respondent Judge, and
to describe with particularity the place to be searched and
the things to be seized, that were singled out to justify the
assertion of illegality. When required to answer,
respondent Judge did not bother to refute specifically the
allegations of the petition for certiorari, but merely
contented himself with inviting attention to the challenged
order as well as the resolutions denying the motion for
reconsideration and with the statement that he “has no
particular prayer to ask the Supreme Court,” an assertion
thereafter repeated in the second paragraph of his two-
paragraph answer that he “has no request to make in this
particular case leaving the
4
issues entirely to the discretion
of the Supreme Court.” The tone of diffidence, almost of
apology, is easy to understand. It is difficult to resist the
thought that respondent Judge failed to pay heed to
authoritative decisions of this Court. The most cursory 5
perusal of the application for search warrant 6
by
respondent Lumang and the search warrant itself yields
no other conclusion. Respondent Judge ignored what the
Constitution requires on two points, the existence of a
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probable cause and the particular description of the things

to be seized. The limitation as to the specific offense as
mandated by the Rules of Court was not observed either.
Even on the assumption then that he could not

_________________

relevant According to the former: “A search warrant shall not issue but
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined by the municipal or city judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized. No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense.” Section 4 provides: “The municipal or city judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine on oath or affirmation the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions
in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits
presented to him.”
3 Ernesto Lumang, a Philippine Constabulary Sergeant who applied for
the search warrant, was included likewise as a respondent.
4 Answer of Respondent Judge Pabalan dated February 28, 1968.
5 Petition, Annex A.
6 Ibid, Annex B.

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Castro vs. Pabalan

be held chargeable
7
with knowledge of the leading Stonehill
decision, announced barely twenty days before the search
warrant in question8
Was issued, still from Alvarez v. Court
of First Instance, the first to be decided under the 19359
Constitution, promulgated in 1937, to Oca v. Marquez,
that came out in 1965, this Court had adhered firmly to the
view that for a search warrant to escape the imputation of
being unreasonable, there should be strict conformity with
the requirements of the Constitution and the applicable
procedural rules. The finding then should have been
against the validity of the search warrant. Nonetheless,
insofar as such order limited itself to requiring the return
solely of the liquor, the pack of playing cards, the bottle of
distilled water and five bottles of Streptomycin, all of which
may be considered as personal effects of petitioners, with
the rest of the goods taken falling under the category of
things forbidden
10
by law and therefore need not be
restored, it can be sustained. So we rule.

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In the opening paragraph of the application for search

warrant, respondent Ernesto I. Lumang admitted that “he
has been informed“ and therefore was of the belief that
petitioners Maria Castro and Co Ling, whose place of
residence was not even indicated, although subsequently
mention was made of their being at Barrio Padasil, Bangar,
La Union, 11“have in possession narcotics and other
contraband.” There is a claim that he had verified the
report and that therefore he had “reasons to believe that a
Search Warrant should be issued to enable the undersigned
to take possession”
12
of such narcotics and other
contraband. The application was accompanied by the joint
affidavit of a Sergeant Francisco C. Molina and a Corporal
13
Lorenzo G. Apilado of the Philippine Constabulary. Again,
mention was merely made of their information about
narcotics and other contraband being kept by petitioners.
They did allege therein that they conducted rigid
surveillance, but all they could come out with is that
petitioner Co Ling is an overstaying alien

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7 Stonehill v. Diokno, L-19550, June 19, 1967, 20 SCRA 383.

8 64 Phil. 33.
9 L-20749, July 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 735.
10 Cf. Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 (1920); Magoncia v. Palacio,
80 Phil. 770 (1948).
11 Petition, Annex A.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid, Annex B.

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for almost ten years conducting such traffic and that after
verification,
14
he was not registered in the Immigration
Office. Then, on the very same day, July 10, 1967, the
search warrant was15
issued for illegal traffic of narcotics
and contraband. Again, there was reference to the
possession by petitioners of such forbidden goods. As to the
complete and detailed description of the properties to be
seized, the search warrant merely mentioned illegal traffic
of narcotics and contraband
16
inside the warehouse and
premises of petitioners. In the resolution upholding the
validity of the search warrant, respondent Judge did state
the following: “On July 10, 1967, Ernesto Lumang, Sgt. of
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the PC, with a long service behind, appeared in chamber

before the Presiding Judge of Branch I of this Court. With
him were Sgt. Molina and Cpl. Apilado both of the PC
Command of La Union. The three submitted to the
Presiding Judge in chamber an application for search
warrant which is Exhibit I in this case and a joint affidavit
supporting the search warrant asked. As Sgt. Lumang said,
testifying regarding this incident, those appearing were
asked, although not in writing and not recorded, some
questions by the Presiding Judge regarding their request of
the search warrant on the knowledge of Molina and
Apilado on the facts stated on the application and on the
joint affidavit. The inquiry was brief. The barrio to be
searched was handwritten in ink, Maria Cristina cancelling
the typewritten name Padasil. But this correction was not
done in the duplicates. Anyhow Padasil and Maria Cristina
are adjoining barrios. After the routine taking of their oath
and examination questions and answers, the Presiding
Judge of this Branch signed the application for search
warrant, the joint affidavits, and17 forthwith issued the
search warrant which is Exhibit C.”
As set forth at the outset, failure to abide by both the
Constitution and the procedural law in terms of the
existence of a probable cause, a particular description of
the property to be seized and the requirement that there be
only one specific offense, is quite manifest.
1. This excerpt from the epochal opinion of former Chief

_______________

14 Ibid.
15 Ibid, Annex C.
16 Ibid.
17 Resolution dated September 12, 1967, Ibid, Annex H.

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18
Justice Concepcion in Stonehill v. Diokno is highly
relevant: “Two points must be stressed in connection with
this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2)
that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to
be seized. None of these requirements has been complied
with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were
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issued upon applications stating that the natural and

juridical persons therein named had committed a ’violation
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.’ In other words,
no specific offense had been alleged in said applications.
The averments thereof with respect to the offense
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was
impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have
found the existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the
party against whom it is sought has performed particular
acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the
applications involved in this case do not allege any specific
acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal
heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a
‘violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,’—as
alleged in the aforementioned applications—without
reference
19
to any determinate provision of said laws or
codes.” That same approach is reflected in the20 two
subsequent cases of Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Ruiz
21
and
Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Herrera. It bears
repeating, as was emphasized in Stonehill v. Diokno, that
the averments as to the alleged commission of the offenses
imputed to petitioner were abstract. As admitted in the
challenged order, the inquiry was brief. Subsequently,
reference was made to “the routine taking of [their
22
oath]
and examination questions and answers * * *.” Nor can
such perfunctory manner in which respondent Judge
conducted the required “examination under oath” be
justified merely because respondent Lumang was “a
Sergeant of the PC, with a long

_______________

18 L-19550, June 19, 1967, 20 SCRA 383.

19 Ibid, 391-392.
20 L-32409, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 823.
21 L-25232, December 20, 1973, 54 SCRA 312.
22 Resolution, Annex H.

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23
service behind [him].” Moreover, contrary to the Rules of
Court, he did not even bother to take the depositions 24
of the
witnesses in writing, attaching them to the record. There
was thus a manifest and palpable violation of the
constitutional standard as to the quantum of proof to show
the existence of probable cause, as so clearly enunciated in
Stonehill.
2. Then again, the Constitution requires, for the validity
of a search warrant, that there be a particular description
of “the place
25
to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.” As was admitted by the judge in the challenged
resolution, there was a mistake concerning the residence of
petitioners, which was set forth in the search warrant as
being in Barrio Padasil when in fact it is in Barrio Maria
Cristina. He would gloss over such inaccuracy by saying
that they were, anyway, adjoining barrios. As to the
premises to be searched, it may be admitted that the
deficiency in the writ is not of sufficient gravity to call for
its invalidation. Nonetheless, and again in line with
Stonehill v. Diokno, the Constitution is quite explicit that
there be a particular description of the things to be seized.
That requisite was not complied with in this case. That
would explain

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