Paper Industries Corp. Vs Asuncion
Paper Industries Corp. Vs Asuncion
Paper Industries Corp. Vs Asuncion
*
G.R. No. 122092. May 19, 1999.
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* THIRD DIVISION.
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jury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are
false. x x x x x x x x x “It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing
and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed probable
cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash
the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and
justification of the application.”
Same; Same; Same; The Constitution and the Rules limit the place to
be searched only to those described in the warrant.—In view of the
manifest objective of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable
search, the Constitution and the Rules limit the place to be searched only to
those described in the warrant.Thus, this Court has held that “this
constitutional right [i]s the embodiment of a spiritual concept: the belief that
to value the privacy of home and person and to afford it constitutional
protection against the long reach of government is no less than to value
human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of
overriding social need, and then only under stringent procedural
safeguards.” Additionally, the requisite of particularity is related to the
probable cause requirement in that, at least under some circumstances, the
lack of a more specific description will make it apparent that there has not
been a sufficient showing to the magistrate that the described items are to be
found in a particular place.
Same; Same; Same; The place to be searched cannot be changed,
enlarged or amplified by the police.—Indeed, the place to be searched
cannot be changed, enlarged or amplified by the police, viz.: “x x x. In the
instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies
outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of the minds
as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the
Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute for the place
that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that the
executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been done. It
[was] neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different
from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched
—although not that specified in the warrant—[was] exactly what they had in
view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their
supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search
is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their
thoughts, or had
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represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant.
Indeed, following the officers’ theory, in the context of the facts of this case,
all four (4) apartment units at the rear of Abigail’s Variety Store would have
been fair game for a search. “The place to be searched, as set out in the
warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers’ own personal
knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their
application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution
which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the
place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would
concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched,
even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door
to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search
warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from
them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched
may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it
cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.”
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; The exclusion of unlawfully seized
evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.—Because the search
warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of
Court, all the firearms, explosives and other materials seized were
“inadmissible for any purpose in any proceed-ing.” As the Court noted in an
earlier case, the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence was “the only
practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures.”Verily, they are the “fruits of the
poisonous tree.” Without this exclusionary rule, the constitutional right
“would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus
with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence x x x.”
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PANGANIBAN, J.:
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The Case
1
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying for (1)
the nullification of Search Warrant No. 799 (95) and the Orders
dated March 23, 1993 and August 3, 1995, issued by2 the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 104, of Quezon City; and (2) the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) or an injunction
against State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera III, ordering him to desist
from proceeding
3
with IS No. 95-167. In its October 23, 1995
Resolution, this Court issued the TRO prayed for and required the
respondents to comment on the said Petition. On December 20,
1995, Respondent4 PNP Traffic Management Command filed its 31-
page Opposition
5
to the Petition, together with 90 pages of
annexes. On February
6
22, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General
filed its Comment agreeing with petitioners that the writs prayed for
must be granted. After petitioners filed a Reply to the Opposition,
the Court gave due course to the Petition and required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda.
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The Facts
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7 Rollo, p. 377.
8 Rollo, p. 380.
9 Rollo, p. 404.
10 Rollo, p. 55.
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“2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the
law to take possession and bring to this Honorable Court the
following described properties:
‘Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal. 5.56, ten (10) M16 US rifles, two (2) AK-47
rifle[s], two (2) UZI submachinegun[s], two (2) M203 Grenade Launcher[s] cal.
40mm., ten (10) cal. 45 pistol[s], ten (10) cal. 38 revolver[s], two (2) ammunition
reloading machine[s], assorted ammunitions for said calibers of firearms and ten (10)
handgrenades.’
11
Attached to the application were the joint Deposition
12
of SPO3
Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. Morito, as well as a
summary of the information and the supplementary statements of
Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno.
After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge 13
Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the contested search warrant, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
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12 This Court notes that the supposed deposition was not signed by Judge Asuncion and that
the stamp of receipt was not signed by a responsible court employee.
13 In their Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash, petitioners questioned the
jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon City to issue the search warrant to be served in Mindanao
(Rollo, pp. 64-66). Although petitioners did not repeat this argument before this Court, the trial
court’s refutation is instructive (Rollo, p. 52). Circular No. 13, as amended by Circular No. 19,
series of 1987, provides that a search warrant may be served only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court issuing it. As an exception, however, Supreme Court Administrative
Order No. 51-94, dated August 18, 1994, authorized respondent judge and, in his absence,
Judges Perlita J. Tria Tirona and Marina Lozada Buzon, all of whom are Quezon City RTC
judges, to act on all applications for search warrant filed by the Philippine National Police with
respect to the crimes of illegal gambling, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, illegal
possession of firearms and other “major crimes.”
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14 Rollo, p.45.
15 Rollo, pp. 47-49.
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MAKE/TYPE CALIBER
NEW ARMORY
SERIAL
POSTNUMBER
NO. 16 BRAND
Believing that the warrant was invalid and 16the search unreasonable,
the petitioners filed a “Motion to Quash” before the trial court.
Subsequently, they also filed a “Supplemental Pleading 17
to the
Motion to Quash” and a “Motion to Suppress Evidence.”
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On March 23, 1995, the RTC18issued the first contested Order which
denied petitioners’ motions. On August
19
3, 1995, the trial court
rendered its second
20
contested Order denying petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration.
Hence, this recourse to this Court on pure questions of law.
Issues
“I
“II
“III
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Preliminary Issue:
Alleged Factual Questions
Main Issue:
Validity of the Search Warrant
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“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”(Emphasis supplied)
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“SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant.—A search warrant shall not
issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.”
“SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record.—The judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions
and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses
he mayproduce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record
their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.”
More simply stated, the requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1)
probable cause is present; (2) such presence is determined
personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or
she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing
and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses
testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically
25
describes the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.
In the present case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the
trial court failed to examine personally the complain-
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24 As amended in 1988.
25 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 255 SCRA 438, 481-482, March 29, 1996.
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ant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who
appeared during the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant,
had no personal knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to
possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not
described with particularity.
“COURT:
Where is the witnessfor this application for search warrant?
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Chief Inspector Pascua was asked nothing else, and he said nothing
more. In fact, he failed even to affirm his application. Contrary to his
statement, the trial judge failed to propound questions, let alone
probing questions, to the applicant and to his witnesses other than
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“Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient.
The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record. Such
written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to
properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to
hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his
declarations are false.
x x x x x x x x x
“It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not
merely routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be
established. The examining magistrate must not sim-
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ply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on
29
the intent and justification of the application.”
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Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur. How come that you have
knowledge that there are illegal firearms in that place?
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29 Pendon v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 429, 438, November 16, 1990, per
Medialdea, J.; citing Mata v. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388, 391, March 26, 1984; and
Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687, 694-695, November 25, 1986.
30 See page 2 of “Deposition of Witnesses (of Bacolod and Morito).”
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Q So, it is possible that the firearms used by the security guards are
illegally obtained?
A I believe they have no licenseto possess high-powered firearms.
As far as the verification at FEU, Camp Crame, [is concerned,]
they have no license. (Emphasis supplied.)
Q Have you investigated the Blue Guards Security Agency?
A I conducted the inquiry.
Q What did you find out?
A They are using firearms owned by PICOP.
Q Using firearms owned by PICOP?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean to say that this Blue Guard Security Agency has no
firearms of their own?
A No high-powered firearms.
Q By the way, Mr. Witness, what kind of firearms have you seen
inside the compound of PICOP?
A There are M-16 armalite rifles.
Q What else?
A AK-47, armalites, M-203 Grenade Launcher, M-14 US rifles, .38
caliber revolvers, .45 caliber pistols, several handgrenades and
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ammos.” (Emphasis supplied)
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“The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the
best evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances. The
introduction of such evidence is necessary in cases where the issue is the
existence of the negative ingredient of the offense charged—for instance,
the absence of a license required by law, as in the present case—and such
evidence is within the knowledge and control of the applicant who could
easily produce the same. But if the best evidence could not be secured at the
time of the application, the applicant must show a justifiable reason therefor
during the examination by the judge.”
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32 G.R. No. 124461, p. 397, 296 SCRA 383, September 25, 1998, per Martinez, J.
33 See Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886, September 21, 1920.
34 Villanueva v. Querubin, 48 SCRA345, 350, December 27, 1972, per Fernando,
CJ.; cited in People v. Judge Estrada, G.R. No. 124461, 296 SCRA 383, September
25, 1998.
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35 LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, 2nd ed., Vol.
2, § 4.5, p. 207.
36 Petition, p. 11; rollo, p. 13. (Evidenced by a location plan attached as Annex
“C.”)
37 Rollo, pp. 47-49.
38 Opposition, p. 16; rollo, p. 205.
39 Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, 218 Phil. 754 (1984).
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40 G.R. No. 126379, 291 SCRA 400, June 26, 1998, pp. 411-412, per Narvasa, CJ.
274
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41 Petition, p. 6; rollo, p. 8.
42 §2, Article III of the Constitution.
43 Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383, 394, June 19, 1967, per Concepcion, CJ.
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ily, they are the “fruits of the poisonous tree.” Without this
exclusionary rule, the constitutional right “would be so ephemeral
and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with 44
the freedom
from all brutish means of coercing evidence x x x.”
In the present case, the complaint for illegal possession of
firearms is based on the firearms and other materials seized pursuant
to Search Warrant No. 799 (95). Since these illegally obtained pieces
of evidence are inadmissible, the Complaint and the proceedings
before State Prosecutor Dacera have no more leg to stand on.
This Court sympathizes with the police effort to stamp out
criminality and to maintain peace and order in the country; however,
it reminds the law enforcement authorities that they must do so only
upon strict observance of the constitutional and statutory rights of
our people. Indeed, “there is a 45right way to do the right thing at the
right time for the right reason.”
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition
is hereby GRANTEDand Search Warrant No. 799 (95) accordingly
declared NULL and VOID.Thetemporary restraining order issued by
this Court on October 23, 1995 is hereby MADE PERMANENT.No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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