VOL.

454, MARCH 31, 2005 653

Habagat Grill vs. DMCUrban Property Developer, Inc.

*
G.R. No. 155110. March 31, 2005.

HABAGAT GRILL Through LOUIE BIRAOGO,

Proprietor/Manager, petitioner, vs. DMCURBAN
PROPERTY DEVELOPER, INC., respondent.

Actions Elements Jurisdictions Pleadings and Practice

Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations
pleaded in the complaint.Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is
determined by the allegations pleaded in the complaint. As long
as these allegations demonstrate a cause of action either for
forcible entry or for unlawful detainer, the court acquires
jurisdiction over the subject matter. This principle holds, even if
the facts proved during the trial do not support the cause of action
thus alleged, in which instance the courtafter acquiring
jurisdictionmay resolve to dismiss the action for insufficiency of
evidence.
Evidence Words and Phrases Preponderance of evidence
means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole,
superior to or has greater weight than that of the other.
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced
by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than
that of the other. Where the evidence presented by one side is
insufficient to ascertain the claim, there is no preponderance of
evidence. In criminal cases in which the quantum of evidence
required is greater than in civil cases, the testimony of only one
witnessif credible, straightforward, and worthy of beliefis
sufficient to convict. With more reason then, Garcias testimony, if
clear and positive, may be sufficient to establish respondents
claim.
Same Witnesses Among the facts and circumstances to be
considered by the court in determining which of the presented
evidence has superior weight is the witnesses means and
opportunity to know the facts to which they testify Considerations
in Determining the Extent of Witnesses Means and Opportunity to
Know the Facts. Under Section 1 of Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court, among the facts and circumstances to be considered by the
court in determining which of the presented evidence has superior
weight is the witnesses

_______________

* THIRD DIVISION.

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654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Habagat Grill vs. DMCUrban Property Developer, Inc.

means and opportunity to know the facts to which they testify.

The extent of such means and opportunity are determined by the
following considerations: First, the Actor Rule. This rule
maintains that a persons recollection of his own acts and of the
attendant circumstances is more definite and trustworthy than
another persons recollection of it, especially if it was an act done
in the performance of a duty, or if the other persons testimony is
little more than an expression of opinion or judgment. Apart from
comparative tenacity of memory, the actor usually knows better
than any one else what he did or did not do, and his testimony is
generally, but not always, entitled to superior weight on that
account. Thus, the execution and attestation of a will or other
legal document may be so far regarded as the act of the lawyer
who superintends the transactions and knows the formalities
required by law, and his testimony to the circumstances will
generally outweigh that of a nonprofessional witness. The Actor
Rule has been applied in a multitude of admiralty cases and any
other cases where a persons testimony concerning his own
conduct conflicts with the testimony of a nonparticipating
observer or with inconclusive inferences from facts proved,
especially where the actor witness testifies to an act which the
duties of his employment required him to perform. But it said
that the testimony of one who evidently speaks rather to his
custom than to his acts on the particular occasion will hardly
suffice to put him in the category of those who are specially
favored by the Actor Rule. Second, the witness who had the
greater interest in noticing and remembering the facts is to be
believed in preference to the one that had a slighter interest to
observe or was wholly indifferent. Interest has effect on the power
of observation of witness. Thus, it has been held that it was not
remarkable that witnesses would not have observed traces of
blood along the route through which the deceased was taken
because said witnesses had no reason to suspect that the crime
was not committed in the place where the dead body was found.
Similarly, the failure of witnesses to notice whether or not there
were houses at the place where they say the accused maltreat the
offended party was attributed as due to the fact that their
attention was concentrated to what they say, and they had no
interest in knowing whether or not there were houses in or
around the place. Third, the witness who gives reasons for the
accuracy of his observations is preferred to him who merely states
the fact to be so, without adverting to any circumstances showing
that his attention was particularly called to it. Thus, the
testimony of the crew of a

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vessel that their light on the night of a collision was red, and
nothing more, was easily overcome by testimony of witnesses on
the other vessel that the light was white, not red, and that fact
was a matter of remark among them when the light was observed.
Fourth, the witness in a state of excitement, fear, or terror is
generally incapable of observing accurately. This is so because, if
men perceive the most insignificant facts in the most diverse
ways, even when it is impossible that these facts should produce
on the observer any emotion preventing him from observing with
absolute calm, even much more will their impressions be
diversified under circumstances calculated to produce in the
onlookers excitement, fear or terror. Fifth, intoxication tends to
impair accuracy both of observation and memory of a witness.
Same Same Relationship will not by itself determine the true
worth of ones testimonythe essential test is whether such
testimony is disencumbered, credible, and in accord with human
experience. The lower courts dismissed the testimony of Garcia
regardless of how clear, positive and straightforward it was
solely on the ground that he was not a disinterested witness.
True, he was an employee of respondent relationship, however,
will not by itself determine the true worth of ones testimony. The
essential test is whether such testimony is disencumbered,
credible, and in accord with human experience. It cannot easily be
dismissed by the mere invocation of the witness relationship with
respondent. In sum, we have no reason to disagree with the CAs
evaluation that, being credible, Garcias direct testimony was
sufficient to establish respondents claim that petitioner had
entered the premises on December 1, 1993.
 Same Judicial Notice Municipal Ordinances Words and
Phrases Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which
judges may properly take and act on without proof because they
already know them Municipal courts may take judicial notice of
the municipal ordinances in force in the municipality in which
they sit, but such notice is limited to what the law is and what it
states. Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which
judges may properly take and act on without proof because they
already know them. Its object is to save time, labor and expense
in securing and introducing evidence on matters that are not
ordinarily capable of dispute or actually bona fide disputed, and
the tenor of which can safely be assumed from the tribunals
general knowledge or from a

656

656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Habagat Grill vs. DMCUrban Property Developer, Inc.

slight search on its part. Indeed, municipal courts may take

judicial notice of the municipal ordinances in force in the
municipality in which they sit. Such notice, however, is limited to
what the law is and what it states.
Same Same A court may take discretionary judicial notice
where the boundaries of the lot covered by the law are not a matter
of public knowledge capable of unquestionable demonstration.
The location of Habagat Grill cannot be resolved by merely taking
judicial notice of Presidential Proclamation No. 20 such location
is precisely at the core of the dispute in this case. Moreover,
considering respondents allegation that the supposed lot covered
by the Ordinance has been lost due to inundation by the sea, we
cannot fathom how the trial court could have known of the actual
location of the metes and bounds of the subject lot. Neither may
the MTC take discretionary judicial notice under Section 2 of Rule
129 of the Rules of Court, because the exact boundaries of the lot
covered by that law are not a matter of public knowledge capable
of unquestionable demonstration. Neither may these be known to
judges because of their judicial functions. Hence, the CA was
correct in disregarding the findings of the trial courts, because
they had erred in taking judicial notice of the exact metes and
bounds of the property. The appellate court aptly relied on the
Report submitted by the survey team that had been constituted
by the trial court, precisely for the purpose of determining the
location of Habagat Grill in relation to respondents lot.
 Same Ejectment There is only one issue in ejectment proceed
ingswho is entitled to physical or material possession of the
premises, that is, to possession de facto, not possession de jure?
There is only one issue in ejectment proceedings: who is entitled
to physical or material possession of the premises that is, to
possession de facto, not possession de jure? Issues as to the right
of possession or ownership are not involved in the action evidence
thereon is not admissible, except only for the purpose of
determining the issue of possession.
Same Same Words and Phrases Forcible Entry and
Unlawful Detainer, Distinguished.The two forms of ejectment
suitsforcible entry or unlawful detainermay be distinguished
from each other mainly by the fact that in forcible entry, the
plaintiffs must

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prove that they were in prior possession of the premises until they
were deprived thereof by the defendant in unlawful detainer, the
plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession.
Same Same Possession Possession can be acquired not only
by material occupation but also by the fact that a thing is subject
to the action of ones will or by the proper acts and legal formalities
established for acquiring such right.Spouses Benitez v. CA has
held that possession can be acquired not only by material
occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the
action of ones will or by the proper acts and legal formalities
established for acquiring such right. Possession can be acquired
by juridical acts. These are acts to which the law gives the force
of acts of possession. Examples of these are donations, succession,
x x x execution and registration of public instruments, and the
inscription of possessory information titles. For one to be
considered in possession, one need not have actual or physical
occupation of every square inch of the property at all times. In the
present case, prior possession of the lot by respondents
predecessor was sufficiently proven by evidence of the execution
and registration of public instruments and by the fact that the lot
was subject to its will from then until December 1, 1993, when
petitioner unlawfully entered the premises and deprived the
former of possession thereof.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Lucilo B. Sarona, Jr. for petitioner.
Inobobby P. Pinili for DMCUPDI.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Entitlement to physical or material possession of the

premises is the issue in an ejectment suit. The two forms of
ejectment suitsforcible entry and unlawful detainer
may be distinguished from each other mainly by the fact
that in forcible entry, the plaintiffs must prove that they
were in prior possession of the premises until they were
deprived thereof by

658

658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Habagat Grill vs. DMCUrban Property Developer, Inc.

the defendants in unlawful detainer, the plaintiffs need

not have been in prior physical possession.

The Case
1
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the2
Rules of Court, challenging the April 312, 2002 Decision
and the August 19, 2002 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CAGR SP No. 53524. The assailed
Decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding merit in the petition, the Court

REVERSES the appealed Decision and renders judgment:

1. Commanding [Petitioner] Louie Biraogo and all

persons acting for and in his behalf or by his
authority to remove the Habagat Grill and all
improvements he has introduced into the lot in
question and to vacate said lot and
2. Ordering said [petitioner] to pay the [respondent]
P10,000.00 monthly compensation for the
occupation of the land in question until the
possession from December 1, 1993 of said property
shall have been completely restored to the
[respondent] and
 3. Ordering [petitioner] to 4 pay [respondent]
P10,000.00 as attorneys fees.

The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for

Reconsideration.

The Facts

The antecedents were ably summarized by the CA as

follows:

_______________

1 Rollo, pp. 1233.

2 Id., at pp. 3742. Seventeenth Division. Penned by Justice Hilarion L.
Aquino (Division chairperson), with the concurrence of Justices Edgardo
P. Cruz and Amelita G. Tolentino (members).
3Id., at pp. 5455.
4 Assailed CA Decision, p. 6 Rollo, p. 42.

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Habagat Grill vs. DMCUrban Property Developer, Inc.

On June 11, 1981, David M. Consunji, Inc. acquired and became

the owner of a residential lot situated in Matina, Davao City and
covered by TCT No. T82338. This lot shall henceforth be called
the lot in question. On June 13, 1981, David M. Consunji, Inc.
transferred said lot to its sister company, the DMC Urban
Property Developers, Inc. (DMC) in whose favor TCT No. T
279042 was issued. Alleging that Louie Biraogo forcibly entered
said lot and built thereon the Habagat Grill in December, 1993,
DMC filed on March 28, 1994 a Complaint for Forcible Entry
against Habagat Grill and/or Louie Biraogo. The Complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. 1233D94 in the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Branch 4, in Davao City. The Complaint alleged
that as owner DMC possessed the lot in question from June 11,
1981 until December 1, 1993 that on that day, December 1, 1993,
Louie Biraogo, by means of strategy and stealth, unlawfully
entered into the lot in question and constructed the Habagat Grill
thereon, thus illegally depriving DMC of the possession of said lot
since then up to the present that the reasonable rental value of
said lot is P10,000.00 a month.
Louie Biraogo in his Answer denied illegally entering the lot
in question. He averred that Habagat Grill was built in 1992
inside Municipal Reservation No. 1050 (Presidential Proclamation
No. 20) and so DMC has no cause of action against him. Since one
of the vital issues in the case was the location of Habagat Grill,
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities constituted a team composed
of three members, one a Geodetic Engineer representing the
DMC, another Geodetic Engineer representing Biraogo and the
third from the DENR which was tasked with the duty of
determining where precisely was Habagat Grill located, on the lot
in question or on Municipal Reservation No. 1050. Biraogo was
directed by the court to furnish the team with a copy of Municipal
Reservation No. 20. Biraogo never complied. Worse, his
designated Geodetic Engineer Panfilo Jayme never took oath as
such and did not participate in the Relocation survey. The ones
who conducted the survey were Engr. Edmindo Dida of the DENR
and Engr. Jose Cordero, DMCs representative. After conducting
the relocation survey on March 30, 1998, engineers Dida and
Cordero submitted their report to the Court specifically stating
that the Habagat Grill Restaurant was occupying 934 square
meters of the lot in question.
After necessary proceedings, the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities rendered a Decision on August 6, 1998 dismissing the case
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action.
DMC ap

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660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Habagat Grill vs. DMCUrban Property Developer, Inc.

pealed from said Decision to the Regional Trial Court and the
same was docketed in Branch 12, in Davao City as Civil Case No.
x x x 26,860.98. On February 16, 1999, said court rendered
judgment affirming the appealed Decision. A Motion for
Reconsideration was 5filed but was denied in the courts Order
dated April 21, 1999.

Consequently, respondent interposed an appeal to the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Granting respondents appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled

that the court of origin
6
had jurisdiction over the Complaint
for Forcible Entry. The CA gave greater weight to the
testimony of respondents real property manager, Bienamer
Garcia,
7
that Habagat Grill had been built on December 1,
1993. The appellate court opined that his testimony was
credible, because he had personal knowledge of the facts he
had testified toit was his task to know such matters. On
the other hand, it was not clear in what capacity
petitioners witness, Samuel
8
Ruiz, came to know of the
facts he had testified to. The CA further held that the
minutes of the Urban Planning and Economic Development
hearingssubmitted by petitioner to prove the
construction of Habagat Grill in 1992were
9
immaterial, as
these referred to another establishment.
The CA faulted petitioner for not presenting any other
documentary evidence 10
to establish the date of Habagat
Grills construction. It added that the court of origin had
improperly adjudged the subject property as part of the
public domain. The appellate court explained that the
lower court could take cognizance of Presidential
Proclamation No. 20, but not of the situational relation
between the property cov

_______________

5Id., at pp. 12 & 3738.

6Id., at pp. 3 & 39.
7Ibid.

8Ibid.

9Ibid.

10Ibid.

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Habagat Grill vs. DMCUrban Property Developer, Inc.

ered by the Proclamation and the land in question. The CA

further criticized petitioner for not presenting any evidence
to show the basis of the latters11
alleged authority to build
Habagat Grill on the property.
12
Hence, this Petition.

The Issues

In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues

for our consideration:

1. That, with due respect, the Honorable Court of

Appeals erred in not finding that the Honorable
Court of First Level has no jurisdiction over this
case as petitioners possession and occupation of the
lot where Habagat Grill was constructed on the
subject premises was yet in 1992 or for more than
one (1) year prior to the filing of this case on April
7, 1994 and that respondents predecessor (David
 M. Consunji, Inc.) had not been in prior and
physical possession of the subject premises, as a
matter of fact, it failed to allege the same in its
Complaint in this case and
2. That, with due respect, the Honorable Court of
Appeals erred in not finding that the Complaint of
respondents predecessor (David M. Consunji, Inc.)
in this case failed to state a valid cause of action as
the lot referred to therein is not particularly
described and is different from the
13
lot on which the
Habagat Grill was constructed.

_______________

11Id., at pp. 5 & 41.

12 The case was deemed submitted for decision on May 22, 2003, upon
this Courts receipt of respondents Memorandum, signed by Antonio P.
Avelino (respondents general administration manager) assisted by Atty.
Inobobby P. Pinili. Petitioners Memorandum, signed by Atty. Lucilo B.
Sarona Jr., was received by this Court on May 20, 2003.
13 Petitioners Memorandum, p. 8 Rollo, p. 109. Original in upper case.

662

662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Habagat Grill vs. DMCUrban Property Developer, Inc.

Simplified, the issues are (1) whether the MTC had

jurisdiction over the case, and (2) whether respondent
alleged a sufficient cause of action in its Complaint.

This Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

First Issue:
Jurisdiction
Petitioner argues that the lower court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case, because mere allegation of
ownership did not, by itself, show14
that respondent had
prior possession of the property.
We disagree. Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is 15
determined by the allegations pleaded in the complaint.
As long as these allegations demonstrate a cause of action
either for forcible entry or for unlawful detainer, the court
acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter. This principle
holds, even if the facts proved during the trial do not
support the cause of action thus alleged, in which instance
the courtafter acquiring jurisdictionmay resolve to
dismiss the action for insufficiency of evidence.
The necessary allegations in a Complaint for ejectment
are set forth in Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,
which reads thus:

SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.Subject

to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived
of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
person against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the
right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or
implied, or

_______________

14Id., at pp. 13 & 114.

15Lizo v. Carandang, 73 Phil. 649, August 17, 1942.

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Habagat Grill vs. DMCUrban Property Developer, Inc.

the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor,

vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year
after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession,
bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the
person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the
restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.

In the present case, the Complaint filed before the trial

court on March 28, 1994, stated:

2. That [respondent] had been in lawful and peaceful

possession of a residential lot at Tulip Drive,
Ecoland and Subdivision covered by TCT T82338 of
the Registry of Deeds of Davao City being owner
thereof, since June 11, 1981, until the day and
incident in the following paragraph hereof.
3. That on or about December 1, 1993, [petitioner] by
means of strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered
and occupied a portion of said residential lot and
constructed what is now known as the Habagat
Grill, thereby illegally depriving
16
[respondent] of
the possession of the premises.
Notably, petitioner alleged (1) prior possession, (2)
deprivation thereof by strategy and stealth, and (3) the
date such unlawful deprivation started, which was less
than one year from the filing of the Complaint. Considering
the presence17
in the Complaint of all the necessary
allegations, the trial court evidently acquired jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case.

Date of Entry

Petitioner further contends that, as determined by the

court of origin and the regional trial court, respondent has
not adduced preponderance of evidence to prove that this
case

_______________

16 Complaint, p. 1 Rollo, p.63.

17 See Herrera v. Bollos, 374 SCRA 107, January 18, 2002.

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664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Habagat Grill vs. DMCUrban Property Developer, Inc.

18
was filed within the oneyear prescriptive period.
Petitioner presented the testimony of a certain Samuel
Ruiz and offered the minutes of the hearings conducted by
the Urban Planning and Economic Development (UPED) to
prove19that the construction of the Habagat Grill began in
1992.
Respondent counters that the CA properly relied on the
testimony of the formers real property manager, Bienamer
20
Garcia, as he had personal knowledge of the facts. On the
other hand, the two trial courts allegedly relied on the
hearings conducted by the UPED in resolving that
petitioner had been in possession of the property since
1992. Respondent avers that those hearings referred to 21a
restaurant located 330 meters away, not to Habagat Grill.
The determination of the date of entry into the subject
lot is a question of fact. This Court has held in a long line of
cases that the review of cases brought before it via Rule 45
of the Rules of Court is limited to errors of law. Findings of
fact by the CA are conclusive except in a number of
instances, one of which is when its factual findings are
contrary
22
to those of the courts below, as in the present
case.
 The appellate court held that the minutes of the UPED
hearing pertained to matters relating 23
to a different
establishment, the Kawayan Restaurant. Thus, the UPED
minutes did not have any material bearing on the
resolution of the present case. Consequently, the
determination of the date of entry into the subject lot boils
down to the appreciation of the testimonies of Garcia and
Ruiz.
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence
adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has
greater

_______________

18 Petitioners Memorandum, p. 10 Rollo, p. 111.

19Ibid.

20 RTC Decision, p. 3 Rollo, p. 79.

21 Respondents Memorandum, pp. 1516 Rollo, pp. 136137.
22Siguan v. Lim, 318 SCRA 725, November 19, 1999.
23 Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 34 Rollo, pp. 3940.

665

VOL. 454, MARCH 31, 2005 665

Habagat Grill vs. DMCUrban Property Developer, Inc.

24
weight than that of the other. Where the evidence
presented by one side is insufficient to25 ascertain the claim,
there is no preponderance of evidence. In criminal cases in
which the quantum of evidence required is greater than in
civil cases, the testimony of only one witnessif credible,
straightforward,
26
and worthy of beliefis sufficient to
convict. With more reason then, Garcias testimony, if
clear and positive, may be sufficient to establish
respondents claim.
Under Section 1 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court,
among the facts and circumstances to be considered by the
court in determining which of the presented evidence has
superior weight is the witnesses means
27
and opportunity to
know the facts to which they testify.
The extent of such means and opportunity are
determined by the following considerations:

_______________

24 Municipality of Moncada v. Cajuigan, 21 Phil. 184, January 12, 1912

Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 619,
May 29, 1989 Metro Manila Transit Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 223 SCRA
521, June 21, 1993.
25Sapuan v. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 701, October 19, 1992.
26 People v. Candado, 84 SCRA 508, August 1, 1978 People v. Ferrer,
325 Phil. 269 255 SCRA 19, March 14, 1996 People v. Sotto, 325 Phil.
646 255 SCRA 344, March 29, 1996 People v. Canuzo, 325 Phil. 840 255
SCRA 497, March 29, 1996.
27 SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined.In civil
cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or
superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may
consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses manner
of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing
the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they
testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or
want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may
legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the
number of witnesses though the preponderance is not necessarily with the
greater number.

666

666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Habagat Grill vs. DMCUrban Property Developer, Inc.

First, the Actor Rule. This rule maintains that a persons

recollection of his own acts and of the attendant circumstances is
more definite and trustworthy than another persons recollection
of it, especially if it was an act done in the performance of a duty,
or if the other persons testimony is little more than an expression
of opinion or judgment. Apart from comparative tenacity of
memory, the actor usually knows better than any one else what
he did or did not do, and his testimony is generally, but not
always, entitled to superior weight on that account. Thus, the
execution and attestation of a will or other legal document may be
so far regarded as the act of the lawyer who superintends the
transactions and knows the formalities required by law, and his
testimony to the circumstances will generally outweigh that of a
nonprofessional witness.
The Actor Rule has been applied in a multitude of admiralty
cases and any other cases where a persons testimony concerning
his own conduct conflicts with the testimony of a non
participating observer or with inconclusive inferences from facts
proved, especially where the actor witness testifies to an act
which the duties of his employment required him to perform. But
it said that the testimony of one who evidently speaks rather to
his custom than to his acts on the particular occasion will hardly
suffice to put him in the category of those who are specially
favored by the Actor Rule.
Second, the witness who had the greater interest in noticing
and remembering the facts is to be believed in preference to the
one that had a slighter interest to observe or was wholly
indifferent. Interest has effect on the power of observation of
witness. Thus, it has been held that it was not remarkable that
witnesses would not have observed traces of blood along the route
through which the deceased was taken because said witnesses
had no reason to suspect that the crime was not committed in the
place where the dead body was found. Similarly, the failure of
witnesses to notice whether or not there were houses at the place
where they say the accused maltreat the offended party was
attributed as due to the fact that their attention was concentrated
to what they say, and they had no interest in knowing whether or
not there were houses in or around the place.
Third, the witness who gives reasons for the accuracy of his
observations is preferred to him who merely states the fact to be
so, without adverting to any circumstances showing that his
attention was particularly called to it. Thus, the testimony of the
crew of a

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vessel that their light on the night of a collision was red, and
nothing more, was easily overcome by testimony of witnesses on
the other vessel that the light was white, not red, and that fact
was a matter of remark among them when the light was observed.
Fourth, the witness in a state of excitement, fear, or terror is
generally incapable of observing accurately. This is so because, if
men perceive the most insignificant facts in the most diverse
ways, even when it is impossible that these facts should produce
on the observer any emotion preventing him from observing with
absolute calm, even much more will their impressions be
diversified under circumstances calculated to produce in the
onlookers excitement, fear or terror.
Fifth, intoxication tends to impair28
accuracy both of
observation and memory of a witness. (Citations omitted)

Based on the foregoing criteria, the testimony of Garcia

must be given greater weight, considering that it was his
taskas the real property manager of respondentto
know about matters involving the latters properties. In
contrast, it was not explained how Ruiz could be deemed
competent and credible in his testimony as to those
matters.
The lower courts dismissed the testimony of Garcia
regardless of how clear, positive and straightforward it was
solely on the ground that he was not a disinterested
witness. True, he was an employee of respondent
relationship, however, will29not by itself determine the true
worth of ones testimony. The essential test is whether
such testimony is disencumbered,
30
credible, and in accord
with human experience. It cannot easily be dismissed by
the mere invocation of the witness relationship with
respondent. In sum, we have no reason to disagree with the
CAs evaluation that, being credi

_______________

28 Francisco, Basic Evidence, 2nd ed. (1999), pp. 493494.

29 People v. Nitcha, 240 SCRA 283, January 19, 1995 People v.
Magsombol, 322 Phil. 196 252 SCRA 187, January 23, 1996 People v.
Magallano, 334 Phil. 276 266 SCRA 317, January 16, 1997.
30 People v. Gapasan, 312 Phil. 964 243 SCRA 53, March 29,
1995People v. Reyes, 312 Phil. 304 242 SCRA 264, March 9, 1995.

668

668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Habagat Grill vs. DMCUrban Property Developer, Inc.

ble, Garcias direct testimony was sufficient to establish

respondents claim that petitioner had entered the
premises on December 1, 1993.

Second Issue:
Cause of Action
Petitioner avers that no cause of action was alleged by
respondent, as shown by the following circumstances: (1)
the latters property was not encroached upon by Habagat
Grill, which had allegedly been constructed on a 31portion of
land owned by the City Government of Davao and (2)
respondent failed to prove that its 32predecessorininterest
had prior possession of the property.
On the other hand, respondent argues that the trial
court indiscriminately ignored the Report of the survey
team that had been constituted to determine the exact
location of Habagat Grill. Respondent further contends
that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the
metes and bounds of the property covered by Presidential
33
Proclamation No. 20. Although the lower court may take
 33
Proclamation No. 20. Although the lower court may take
judicial notice of PD No. 20, it may not do so in regard to
the metes and bounds of Times Beach. Neither, may it
claim knowledge of the situational relation between the
land in question and Times Beach.

Location of the Property

We agree with respondent. Judicial notice is the

cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take
and act
34
on without proof because they already know
them. Its object is to save time, labor and expense in
securing and introducing evidence on matters that are not
ordinarily capable of dispute

_______________

31 Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 1415 Rollo, pp. 115116.

32Id., at pp. 34 & 104105.
33 It declared Times Beach as a recreation site in Davao City. CA
Decision, p. 5 Rollo, p. 41.
34 Francisco, supra, p. 23.

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Habagat Grill vs. DMCUrban Property Developer, Inc.

or actually bona fide disputed, and the tenor of which can

safely be assumed from the tribunals general knowledge or
from a slight search on its part.
Indeed, municipal courts may take judicial notice of the
municipal35
ordinances in force in the municipality in which
they sit. Such notice, however,
36
is limited to what the law
is and what it states. As can be gleaned from its
discussions, the trial court took judicial notice of the
existence of Presidential Proclamation No. 20, which
declared Times Beach a recreation center. The MTC also
took judicial notice of the location of the beach, which was
from the shoreline to the road towards the shoreline. On
the basis of these premises, the trial court resolved that the
lot on which petitioners restaurant was located should
necessarily be inside Times Beach, which was owned by the
City of Davao. Hence, it was the Citynot respondent
that had a cause of action against petitioner. To arrive at
this conclusion, the MTC made its own estimate of the
location of the
37
metes and bounds of the property mentioned
by the law.
 The location of Habagat Grill cannot be resolved by
merely taking judicial notice of Presidential Proclamation
No. 20 such location is precisely at the core of the dispute
in this case. Moreover, considering respondents allegation
that the supposed lot covered by the Ordinance has been
lost due to inundation by the sea, we cannot fathom how
the trial court could have known of the actual location of
the metes and bounds of the subject lot.
Neither may the MTC take discretionary judicial notice
under Section 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, because
the exact boundaries of the lot covered by that law are not
a matter of public knowledge capable of unquestionable
demonstra

_______________

35Id., at p. 25.
36United States v. Pons, 34 Phil. 729, August 12, 1916.
37 MTC Decision, pp. 23 Rollo, pp. 7374.

670

670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Habagat Grill vs. DMCUrban Property Developer, Inc.

tion. Neither may these be known to judges because of

their judicial functions.
Hence, the CA was correct in disregarding the findings
of the trial courts, because they had erred in taking judicial
notice of the exact metes and bounds of the property. The
appellate court aptly relied on the Report submitted by the
survey team that had been constituted by the trial court,
precisely for the purpose of determining the location of
Habagat Grill in relation to respondents lot.

Prior Possession

Finally, petitioner avers that respondent failed to prove

that the latters predecessorininterest
38
had prior
possession of the property. Conversely, respondent alleges
that its predecessor was in prior physical possession of the
property
39
as the registered owner thereof since June 11,
1981. Again, we rule for respondent.
There is only one issue in ejectment proceedings: who is
entitled to physical or material possession of the premises
that is, to possession de facto, not possession de jure?
Issues as to the right of possession or ownership are not
involved in the action evidence thereon is not admissible,
except only40 for the purpose of determining the issue of
possession.
The two forms of ejectment suitsforcible entry or
unlawful detainermay be distinguished from each other
mainly by the fact that in forcible entry, the plaintiffs must
prove that they were in prior possession of the premises
until they were deprived thereof by the defendant in
unlawful detainer, the
41
plaintiff need not have been in prior
physical possession.

_______________

38 Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 34 Rollo, pp. 104105.

39 Respondents Memorandum, pp. 2021 Rollo, pp. 141142.
40Pitrague v. Sorilla, 92 Phil. 5, September 17, 1952.
41 Sumulong v. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 372, May 10, 1994
Javelosa v. Court of Appeals, 333 Phil. 331 265 SCRA 493, December 10,
1996.

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Habagat Grill vs. DMCUrban Property Developer, Inc.

42
Spouses Benitez v. CA has held that possession can be
acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the
fact that a thing is subject to the action of ones will or by
the proper acts and legal formalities established for
acquiring such right.
Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are
acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession.
Examples of these are donations, succession, x x x
execution and registration of public instruments,
43
and the
inscription of possessory information titles. For one to be
considered in possession,
44
one need not have actual or
physical occupation of every square inch of the property at
all times. In the present case, prior possession of the lot by
respondents predecessor was sufficiently proven by
evidence of the execution and registration of public
instruments and by the fact that the lot was subject to its
will from then until December 1, 1993, when petitioner
unlawfully entered the premises and deprived the former of
possession thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the
challenged Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 SandovalGutierrez, Corona, CarpioMorales and
Garcia, JJ., concur.

Petition denied, challenged decision and resolution

affirmed.

_______________

42 334 Phil. 216 266 SCRA 254, January 16, 1997 (citing Pharma
Industries, Inc. v. Pajarillaga, 100 SCRA 339, October 17,1980).
43 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, (1992 ed.), p. 262.
44Spouses Benitez v. Court of Appeals, supra.

672

672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Decena vs. Piquero

Notes.The assessment of the trial court of the

credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect and
weight for having had the opportunity of observing the
conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying.
(Lustan vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 663 [1997])
It is of judicial notice that people in rural communities
generally know each other both by face and name. (People
vs. Caguing, 347 SCRA 374 [2000])

o0o

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