Josephine Wee vs. Felicidad Mardo

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ATAYDE, GARRI A.

JOSEPHINE WEE, Petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD MARDO, Respondent | G.R. No. 202414, June
4, 2014

TOPIC: REGISTRATION OF TITLE UNDER P.D. 1529 (Sec. 14); REQUISITES | IN RELATION
TO INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE

Respondent Felicidad Gonzales was granted a registered Free Patent No. (IV-2) 15284,
dated April 26, 1979, covering Lot No. 8348, situated in Puting Kahoy, Silang, Cavite.

On February 1, 1993, respondent allegedly conveyed to petitioner, Josephine Wee, through a


Deed of Absolute Sale, a portion of Lot No. 8348 known as Lot No. 8348-B, for a consideration
of ₱250,000.00 which was fully paid. Respondent, however, refused to vacate and turn over
the subject property claiming that the alleged sale was falsified.

On December 22, 1994, petitioner filed an Application for Original Registration of a parcel of
land located at Barangay Putting Kahoy, Silang, Cavite, known as Lot No. 8349. Said
application was amended on September 19, 1996, this time covering a parcel of land known as
Lot 8348-B situated in Barangay Puting Kahoy, Silang, Cavite. Petitioner claimed that she is
the owner of the said unregistered land by virtue of a deed of absolute sale.

On September 19, 1997, respondent filed her Opposition to the Amended Application alleging

1) That she is the true and lawful owner of the parcel of land which is the subject of the
amended application; and

2) That petitioner’s deed of absolute sale is surreptitious.

On October 28, 2000, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Application alleging that the
land described in the application was different from the land being claimed for titling. The
motion was, however, denied. A motion for reconsideration and second urgent motion for
reconsideration were subsequently filed by respondent, but both were denied by the RTC.

Thereafter, petitioner completed her presentation of evidence and filed a formal offer which was
admitted by the RTC.

On June 10, 2003, during the pendency of the case, respondent managed to register the
land in her name under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. OP-1840. Petitioner filed a
Notice of Lis Pendens with the Registry of Deeds of Cavite on May 10, 2005 which was
annotated on the title.

Consequently, respondent presented her own evidence, through the testimony of her counsel,
who testified that the parcel of land subject of the application for registration was the
property she bought ten (10) years ago. Respondent, however, did not state from whom
she bought it. As proof of her alleged ownership, she presented copies of tax declarations in
the absence of any deed of sale in her favor.

DISPOSITION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

On September 4, 2009, the RTC rendered a Decision granting the application of


petitioner. A motion for reconsideration was filed by respondent which was denied by the RTC.
Hence, respondent appealed the decision before the CA, which case was docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 96934.

CA REVERSED AND SET ASIDE THE RTC DECISION

On June 26, 2012, the CA handed down a Judgment reversing and setting aside the
RTC decision.

The CA held, among others, that petitioner was not able to comply with the
requirement of possession and occupation under Sec. 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529. Her
admission that the subject lot was not physically turned over to her due to some objections and
oppositions to her title suggested that she was not exercising any acts of dominion over the
subject property, an essential element in the requirement of possession and occupation
contemplated under Sec. 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529.

On August 15, 2012, petitioner filed this subject petition for review challenging the CA
decision.

As she elevates her case with the High Court, petitioner presents the theory that she
must be deemed to have been in possession and occupation of the subject property through
respondent, her predecessor-in-interest, who after the sale in 1993 and despite demands from
her, unexpectedly and unjustifiably continued to occupy the property and refused to turn over
physical possession to her. Petitioner argues that it is not necessary that the person in
possession should himself be the occupant as the occupancy can be held by another in his
name.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WEE (through her predecessors-in-interest)


IS ENTITLED TO THE POSSESSION, OCCUPATION AND THE SUBSEQUENT
REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LAND UNDER HER NAME

HELD: The petition deserves no merit.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

ON THE ISSUE OF POSSESSION IN THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER

P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Decree, governs the original
registration proceedings of unregistered land. The subject application for original registration
was filed pursuant to Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529, which provides the condition necessary for
registration. Thus, the said provision states, among others, that “those who by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier” may apply for registration of title to
land.

Based on these legal parameters, applicants for registration of title under Section 14(1) must
sufficiently establish:

1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain;

2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and

3) That it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

The CA denied the application on the issue of open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land. It was of the view that she could not
have complied with the requirement of possession and occupation under Sec. 14 (1) of P.D. No.
1529 considering that she had admitted that it was not physically turned over to her. As she
was not in actual and physical possession, she could not have exercised any acts of
dominion over the subject property which was essential to the requirement of
possession and occupation contemplated under Sec. 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529.

A more important consideration, however, is that the subject land is already registered
under OCT No. OP-1840 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite, under the name of respondent
Felicidad Gonzales.

CORRELATED TO RULE ON REGISTERED PATENT

Citing Republic vs. Umali, the Supreme Court ruled that once a patent is registered
and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of public
domain and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has neither
control nor jurisdiction.

A public land patent, when registered in the corresponding Register of Deeds, is a


veritable Torrens title, and becomes as indefeasible upon the expiration of one (1) year from
the date of issuance thereof. Said title, like one issued pursuant to a judicial decree, is subject to
review within one (1) year from the date of the issuance of the patent.

Accordingly, respondent’s registered patent in the corresponding Registry of


Deeds is a veritable Torrens title and becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens title upon the
expiration of one (1) year from the date of its issuance.
SECOND DECREE FOR THE SAME LAND IS NULL AND VOID

For said reason, the order of the RTC directing the Administrator of LRA to issue a
corresponding decree in petitioner’s name is null and void. A land registration court has no
jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier
land registration case. A second decree for the same land would be null and void, since the
principle behind the original registration is to register a parcel of land only once.

Verily, once a title is registered, as a consequence either of judicial or administrative


proceedings, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the
court sitting in the mirador de su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land.

CERTIFICATE OF TITLE CANNOT BE DEFEATED BY ADVERSE POSSESSION

The certificate of title cannot be defeated by adverse, open and notorious possession.
Neither can it be defeated by prescription. As provided under Sec. 47 of PD 1529, no title to
registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession.

DISPOSITION: Petition was denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED, without prejudice to any remedial action by
the petitioner to protect her claimed interest.

COMMENT | ADDENDUM

Re: Remedies in case of FRAUDULENT REGISTRATION (Reconveyance, as elucidated in this


case)

While the Court ruled against the Petitioner, the High Court nonetheless did not take in toto any
possible hopes for her alleged interest, as the Court partly sympathized on her cause.

Note that the dispositive portion of the case, as herein cited, adds the phrase “without prejudice to any
remedial action by the petitioner to protect her claimed interest”. Taking the latter into consideration, for the purpose
also of fully comprehending the dynamics of the case, I find it enlightening to somehow include, at least in a separate
column, the collateral issue propounded by the petitioner – that is, the alleged fraud perpetrated by the respondent in
securing registration over the title. Such that the petitioner also seeks reconveyance of the subject property arguing
that by virtue of its fraudulent registration, the respondent became a trustee of an implied trust for her benefit, as its
real owner, having validly acquired the same from respondent through an absolute deed of sale.

This is especially significant for the Supreme Court partly gave recommendatory remarks in favor of the
petitioner, ostensibly recognizing that the latter is not entirely bereft of any other legal remedy. While the Court ruled
that, and pursuant to the provisions of PD 1529, certificates of title are not subject to collateral attack, such may
nevertheless be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose and in the proper proceeding. This is under
the assumption whatsoever that the petitioner’s arguments were true. In the case at bar, what the petitioner alleged
was that the respondent fraudulently registered its title on the subject land. On that score, it would appear that such
ground constitutes a collateral attack of which certificates of title cannot therein be subjected. Thus, simply, the Court
categorically stated that the averments of the petitioner do not complement the proceedings for which the same were
made.

In this wise, the Court emphasized that, after all, a certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership.
While definitive enough to establish a lawful claim, it is not absolute in a sense that it automatically vests ownership in
favor of the person possessing it. Stated otherwise, registration of land under Torrens System is not a modality of
acquiring ownership. In order then to so protect the alleged interest of the petitioner, she may file a separate
proceeding or action to protect her alleged interest. As she claimed that she bought the subject property for value
from the respondent as evidenced by a deed of sale, she can file an action for specific performance to compel the
respondent to comply with her obligation in the alleged deed of sale and/or an action for reconveyance of the
property. She can also file an action for rescission. Needless to state, petitioner must prove her entitlement because
the respondent claims that the sale was falsified.

Accordingly, the Court added that reconveyance also may be a good alternative. Reconveyance is
applicable in cases where there is registration procured by fraud. Consequently, the owner may pursue all his legal
and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent
holder for value of a certificate of title. It is an action in personam available to a person whose property has been
wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in another's name. It does not seek to set aside the decree but,
respecting it as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, seeks to transfer or reconvey the land from the
registered owner to the rightful owner. Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has not passed to
an innocent third person for value.

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