The Commonwealth

Research Paper 97/47

29 April 1997

This Paper gives a brief history of the Commonwealth and an overview of the role of the
organisation today.

Paul B owers
International Affairs and Defence Section

House of Commons Library

Library Research Papers are compiled for the benefit of Members of Parliament and their
personal staff. Authors are available to discuss the contents of these papers with Members
and their staff but cannot advise members of the general public.
 CONTENTS

Page

I Background 5

II Selected Commonwealth B odies 7

III Expansion 11

IV Attitudes Abroad 13

V Harare Declaration 14

VI Prospects 16

References and Selected Further Reading

 Research Paper 97/47

I B ackground

The Commonwealth has always been a flexible organisation, reflecting a range of

constitutional and historical links with the British Crown.

The term 'Commonwealth' originated in the 15th century as an English equivalent to the Latin
res publica, meaning the public good, or 'common weal', and has been used to describe many
different political systems. It was first used to describe the British Empire by Lord Rosebery
in a speech in Adelaide in 1884; General JC Smuts coined the phrase 'the British
Commonwealth of Nations' to embrace the Dominions (parts of the Empire which had full
internal self-government and degrees of latitude in foreign affairs) in 1917.1 By the 1920s,
there were six Dominions: Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and
the Irish Free State. These were, with the United Kingdom,

autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate to
one another in any aspect of their domestic or internal affairs, though united by a common
allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth.2

Throughout the early years of this century ambiguities remained over the precise meaning of
terms such as 'dominion' and 'commonwealth' and how they might differ from 'colony' or
'empire'. Nevertheless, it was clear that the use of 'commonwealth' was intended to encourage
different connotations to those of 'empire'. The shift in language appeared to tie in with the
ideology of a shared liberal destiny for the Empire, and this gradually translated into fact.

The Dominions were granted full legislative independence under the Statute of W estm inster,
1931 , a special Act of Parliament which consolidated the independent status of the Dominions
by giving effect to resolutions of the Imperial Conferences of 1926 and 1930. No longer
could the British Parliament enact laws which would have effect in the Dominions, nor could
it void those of the Dominions' laws which were repugnant to it.3 The preamble to the
Statute of W estm inster referred to 'the British Commonwealth of Nations', meaning the
independent Dominions: the identity of the Commonwealth was hardening as a group of
former colonies still owing some kind of allegiance to the British Crown, and enjoying a more

1 On the blurred origins of the Commonwealth see 'What's in a Name?: A Perspective on the
Transition of Empire/Commonwealth, 1918-50', Sturgis J, Round Table, April 1995.
2 Report of the Inter-Imperial Relations Committee of the Imperial Conference of 1926 (Cmd
2768), cited in Halsbury's Statutes of England and W ales, 4th ed, 1985, vol 7 p4.
3 The Dominions adopted the provisions of the Statute of Westminster with varying degrees
of enthusiasm, andthewhole progress to independence of these countries was more gradual
and indeterminate than was the case withthe post-War decolonisations. The latter were
characterised by a period of internal self-government,aconstitutional conference and an
independence act in the British Parliament which created a clean break.

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mature and symbiotic relationship than within the Empire. With the independence and
partition of India in 1947, the modern identity of the Commonwealth was cemented and the
adjective 'British' was dropped from official use.4 In 1949, again following developments in
India, it was accepted that republican status should not be an obstacle to membership. This
allowed recognition of the British Monarch as Head of the Commonwealth, a purely formal
title, without any constitutional implications. Members of the Commonwealth recognise the
British Monarch as the symbol of their free association, regardless of any other constitutional
role she may or may not play in relation to them individually.

Through the 1960s and 1970s the Commonwealth grew with waves of African, Asian,
Caribbean and Oceanic nations gaining independence and joining the organisation. Today
there are 53 member states, with a total population of around 1.5bn, and representation on
every continent (though no members in the Middle East). The Queen is Head of State of 16
members of the Commonwealth: in these, other than the United Kingdom, she is represented
personally by a Governor-General, who is appointed on the advice of the Government of the
country concerned and has no link with the British Government. Governors-General perform
roughly similar functions to the British Monarch and, with the notable exception of the
Governor-General of Australia during the Whitlam Affair in 1975, they are largely
uncontroversial figures, providing, ideally, a symbol of continuity above the political fray.
The Commonwealth also includes 32 republics and five countries with monarchs other than
the Queen.

The Commonwealth is a voluntary association and, although it has a Secretariat, it does not
have a charter. Its most formal political activity is the biennial Commonwealth Heads of
Government Meeting (CHOGM), the successor to a long line of similar meetings stretching
back to the Colonial Conferences which began in 1887, and taking their present form since
1971. A number of CHOGMs have produced Declarations indicating the shared values and
priorities of member states. A Declaration of Com m onwealth Principles was adopted at the
CHOGM in Singapore in 1971, and this is often regarded as the organisation's most
fundamental document.

The last CHOGM was held in Auckland, New Zealand, from 10-13 November 1995. The
next will be held in Edinburgh from 24-27 October 1997.

4 For instance, when the Dominions Office became the Commonwealth Relations Office, the
adjective' British' was not appended in the name, and Prime Minister Atlee announced
thechange as a means of conveying the correct impression' of the relations between the
United Kingdom and the other members of the Commonwealth' (HC Deb 2 July 1947,
c1320).

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II Selected Commonwealth B odies

The Commonwealth Secretariat was established by the Heads of Government in 1965. It

organises consultative and cooperative activities and acts as a central administrator for
Commonwealth business, but it does not have powers of initiative in relation to high level
policy. The head of the Secretariat is the Secretary-General, currently Chief Emeka Anyaoku,
who is elected by the Heads of Government. His three deputies have responsibility for
political affairs, economic and social affairs and development cooperation. There are 13
divisions, covering such matters as legal and constitutional affairs, women's and youth affairs,
science and technology and a range of economic questions.

The budget for the Secretariat for 1996-97 was around £10m, paid for according to a scale
of assessments related to income and population. The UK pays 30% of the total.5 The
Political Affairs Division is responsible for Commonwealth election monitoring, as well as
organising CHOGMs and other meetings on political matters. It also maintains an office at
the United Nations in New York which can be used by smaller member states who could not
otherwise afford representation at the UN. Other divisions offer training opportunities,
seminars and study visits, and organise cooperative projects, especially in development work.
In this area there is a Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation, which has an annual
budget of around £25m, to which the UK again contributes 30%.

There are many other Commonwealth bodies, such as CAB (Commonwealth Agricultural
Bureaux) International, an international organisation concerned with sustainable development
through agriculture, the Institute of Commonwealth Studies (a centre for postgraduate study
on Commonwealth topics in Russell Square), and other Societies and Associations in fields
such as health, education, law, public administration, science, the media and youth
development.

The Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA) brings together parliamentarians from

around the Commonwealth. It was formed in 1911 to promote understanding and cooperation
between the Parliaments of the Commonwealth and now has over 130 branches. It holds an
annual Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference and organises other seminars on a variety
of themes, as well as providing information services on the Commonwealth and parliamentary
topics.

As the Commonwealth continues to expand and its members continue to experience transitions
from one form of governance to another, the CPA has a role in sharing experience with

5 Further details on the British contribution can be found in the FCO's 1997 Departm ental
Report, Cm 3603, March 1997, pp55-6, 62 & 131.

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parliamentarians from such countries. An important part of its work takes the form of
seminars at which members from the more mature democracies discuss with and advise
politicians and officials in the host country on some of the problems they may expect to face
and some of the models which have been developed elsewhere for dealing with them. With
Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the Gambia all experiencing periods of military rule currently or
recently and other members likely to experience constitutional changes and developments in
the years to come, this kind of work will continue to be of importance.

The Commonwealth Institute was established in 1893 as the Imperial Institute and moved to
its current Kensington High Street location in 1962. It has combined a permanent exhibition
and other short-term exhibitions and artistic performances with educational activities,
workshops, seminars and conferences.

There has been controversy over the funding of the Institute. A number of Commonwealth
countries contributed substantially to the cost of the building and the creation of the
collections, but in recent years almost all the recurrent funding has been provided in the form
of an annual grant from the British Government, falling to the FCO external relations vote.6
This reached £3.6m in 1993-94.

On 21 September 1993 the Government announced its intention to cease funding the Institute
in 1996. Following this announcement there was a good deal of discussion about the future
of the Institute and of its buildings. It was estimated that the building required a minimum
of £3m worth of essential repairs to bring it to an acceptable state and that desirable repairs
and refurbishment would cost £8-10m. The matter was complicated by the fact that the
building has Grade II listed status and that the existence of the Institute is based on the
Com m onwealth Institute A ct, 1958, which would have to be amended or repealed if the
Institute were to close completely.

Lord Armstrong was asked to conduct a review of the Institute, and he presented his findings
on 31 March 1993.7 He set out four possible ways forward. The first two involved a
continuation of Government funding at the existing or a higher level and appeared to have
been rejected. The third option was that the Institute would continue as a legal entity, but
seek to transfer its collections and some of its educational functions to another museum,
vacating the Kensington buildings for an alternative use. This option does not appear to have
been pursued. The fourth option would be closure.

6 Supply Estimates, Class II, Vote 2. The Supply Estim ates 1997/98 are available as HC
335 of March 1997.
7 Dep 2/10342.

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The Government's favoured option was for the Institute to seek private funding in order to
continue its presence in Kensington. In an Adjournment Debate of 31 March 1994 on the
general future of the Commonwealth Mr Lennox-Boyd said,

we want the Institute to use the fine building on Kensington High Street, provided by the
Government, to promote the Commonwealth but to draw after 1996 on non-Government funds
to do so.8

By continuing funding until March 1996 the Government sought to allow time for the
Trustees to explore their options. The minister also mentioned that the Government had
recently made an extra £2.4m available to meet redundancy costs at the Institute.

On 13 July 1994, Mr Lennox-Boyd announced additional funding of £2.4m for the triennium
1996-99.9 This money was intended to enable the Institute to 'regenerate its galleries and
become self-supporting by March 1999'. It was dependent on a further £5m being raised in
sponsorship and self-financing by July 1995 and satisfactory building and maintenance plans
being submitted. Critics pointed out that this compared unfavourably with the £6m the
Institute would have received if the previous level of support had been maintained over the
same period. The Institute was not able to raise the required £5m by July 1995, nor by the
end of a six month extension period which the Government offered.

In March 1996 the Foreign Secretary announced that an additional grant of £1.5m was to be
made to allow one further year of operating, but that no assurances could be given over the
continued public funding of the running costs of the Institute beyond March 1997.

However, in a Written Answer of 30 January 1997, Mr Rifkind announced further funding

up to 1999:

I value the work of the Commonwealth Institute and recognise the efforts it has made to
modernise its operations, increase revenue and seek private sector investment. I am therefore
pleased to confirm that we have decided to give the institute a grant in aid of £800,000 for the
financial year 1997-98; and £600,000 for the year 1998-99. The question of funding beyond
1999 will be subject to normal public expenditure constraints and procedures. The Foreign and
Commonwealth Office will continue to support the institute's attempts to obtain further private
sector investment.10

Before this announcement The Tim es reported that, 'the Institute insists that it was given until
1999 to become self-supporting, and that moving the date forward means that it now faces

8 HC Deb, c1105.
9 HC Deb, cc980-1.
10 HC Deb, c323w.

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total closure'.11 The same article noted that the staff of the Institute had fallen to 26 from
96 in 1993. The Foreign Affairs Committee commented that

if by the end of 1996, the Institute has not secured private finance sufficient to give it a
reasonable prospect of being self-financed from April 1997, there must be a real prospect of
permanent closure. This must be avoided.12

Supporters would forward similar arguments for the future after 1999.

The exhibition galleries were closed from the beginning of 1996. There is some controversy
over the circumstances of this closure. In oral evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee on
19 December 1995 the Foreign Secretary said:

what we have said is that with regard to the Commonwealth Institute in London the galleries,
which were having to close in any event because of a need for refurbishment, are being closed,
I hope, temporarily, while further work is done to identify sponsorship. That does not apply to
the educational work or the Conferences of the Commonwealth Institute.13

The FCO's 1996 Departm ental Report states that,

in a message to the Institute's AGM on 5 December 1995, the Foreign and Commonwealth
Secretary regretted that the Institute had not so far secured sponsorship to redevelop its galleries
and proposed that they close temporarily while the search for sponsorship continued. The
education, library and conference operations will be financed in 1996-97 from the Institute's own
earned resources supplemented by Government funds to pay essential salary costs and maintain
the Institute building. This will allow the Institute to continue its major programmes (education,
library and conference operations), and provides a further year to put the organisation on a new
footing, better adapted to modern ways of projecting the Commonwealth and its members.14

By contrast, spokesmen for the Institute were reported as claiming that the galleries were
closed for the foreseeable future, but that there had been no intention to close all of them
anyway. A special exhibition, on Malaysia, has now been arranged and is scheduled to open
on 24 May 1997.

11 11 March 1996.
12 The Future Role of the Com m onwealth, Foreign Affairs Committee, First Report of
1995-96, HC 45, 27 March 1996, para 143.
13 HC 45-iii 1995-96, Q312.
14 Cm 3203, March 1996, pp 63-4.

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III Expansion

The Commonwealth is still developing, as several new admissions in recent years indicate.
A significant event was the readmission of South Africa. Hendrik Verwoerd took South
Africa out of the organisation on 31 May 1961, turning a likely expulsion into an act of
defiance; Nelson Mandela led the new South Africa back into the organisation on 1 June
1994, completing a symbolic return to the international fold.15 The Commonwealth has also
contemplated the admission of new members which are not former British colonies.

Several such countries in Africa have sought membership. Namibia was admitted in 1990,
never having been a British dependency. Its former relationship with South Africa could be
seen as grounds for admission parallel to those of former dependencies of Australia and New
Zealand, since it was administered by South Africa as a League of Nations mandate.
However, it had an ambiguous status after the birth of the UN, and the South African
presence was finally declared illegal by the UN Security Council in 1970.

Cameroon and Mozambique were admitted to the Commonwealth in 1995. Cameroon

includes part of the former League of Nations mandate/UN Trust Territory of the British
Cameroons, which joined the independent state of Cameroon in 1961, that state having been
the former French Cameroons until 1960. Mozambique was never part of the British Empire:
its links with the Commonwealth date from its independence in 1975 and arose from its
position as a 'frontline state' at a time when the Commonwealth was preoccupied with the
implications of the situation in South Africa.

Angola, Yemen, Eritrea, Rwanda and the Palestinian Authority have also shown an interest
in joining. Many of the newer and prospective members see joining the Commonwealth as
part of the symbolism of state legitimacy, following the changes which have taken place in
their countries. A range of improbable contenders could be imagined on the basis of a brush
with the British Empire, but only those who see it as being in their interests to join will do
so. China is hardly likely to seek to use the Hong Kong connection to follow Cameroon into
the Commonwealth, and Burma is a precedent for a former colony not joining after achieving
independence.

15 Other withdrawals were those of Ireland in 1949 and Pakistan in 1972. Pakistan
rejoined in 1989. Fiji's membership lapsed in 1987 after the declaration of a republic
following a coup: it is normal for states becoming republics to seek approval for their
continued membership, and this was not done. Nigeria was suspended in 1995.

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'Non-traditional' members and aspirants also see the Commonwealth as a means of cementing
their relationships with other developing countries, and of forging a link with the UK (and
hence the EU) and other developed economies, such as Australia and Canada. The view in
the organisation itself has been that a fairly widespread use of English and a commitment to
human rights and democracy are sufficient in principle to allow membership. Cameroon's
efforts to join were held up by concerns over its human rights record, but on 1 November
1995 the country was admitted to the Commonwealth, six years after its initial application.
The application of Mozambique was accepted shortly after, at the Auckland CHOGM, as an
exceptional case, and the Secretary-General was requested to set up an intergovernmental
group to advise on criteria for assessing future applications. The Inter-governmental Group
on the Criteria for Commonwealth Membership has since been established and comprises
representatives of all those countries which have hosted CHOGMs in the past.16 Its report
will be considered at Edinburgh.

16 For its deliberations see, 'Criteria for Commonwealth Membership', Collinge J, Round
Table, July 1996.

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IV Attitudes Abroad

Africa, and in particular the south, is perhaps the area where the Commonwealth is seen in
the most positive light today. African leaders feel themselves weakened in international terms
by the loss of superpower interest and rivalry played out in their continent, by the diminishing
level of shared interests with Asia and by the arguably more inward gaze of Europe. The
rapid economic development of much of Asia, the development of the European Union, the
opening of Eastern Europe to aid and trade links, as well as the security concerns there, and
the continuing importance of events in the Middle East, have all served to squeeze Africa out
of the main focus of international attention. As a result of this sense of marginalisation, and
perhaps paradoxically, what seems to some a relic of Empire, is to others an opportunity for
national self-promotion.

The Commonwealth appears to some African leaders as a channel through which they may
make their voices heard. It is not the only channel for former colonies of the European
powers: the link between the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) countries and the EU under the
Lomé apparatus is more inclusive and it has more direct implications for trade. States with
membership in both the Commonwealth and the ACP tend not to regard the two as competing
fora, however, but rather regard the British presence within the EU as an important protection
of their interests.

Other options include the grouping of former French colonies and French-speaking countries
and regions, la Francophonie. This has been very much a French initiative, and France still
tends to take a paternalistic view of its former colonies. Cameroon was always keen to
maintain its separation from France when membership of la Francophonie appeared its most
obvious alliance, but it was happy to join the Commonwealth once internal developments
made this a possibility. While la Francophonie lacks the broader, non-governmental and
cooperative aspect of the Commonwealth, and it is a much more recent invention (meeting
regularly at Heads of State level only since 1986), it can be put forward as evidence that the
Commonwealth is not merely the product of Anglocentric nostalgia.

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V Harare Declaration

The role of the Commonwealth today has come to include the promotion of democracy and
human rights, principles enshrined in the 1991 Harare Declaration, adopted at the CHOGM
in Zimbabwe that year. The areas listed at Harare in which the Commonwealth would work
with 'renewed vigour' opened with

the protection and promotion of the fundamental political values of the Commonwealth:

democracy, democratic processes and institutions which reflect national circumstances, the rule
of law and the independence of the judiciary, just and honest government;

fundamental human rights, including equal rights and opportunities for all citizens regardless of
race, colour, creed or political belief.17

These principles have come to form part of the basis for British aid policy. Although the
organisation has little material sanction when respect for these principles breaks down, it can
provide a source of moral pressure and a channel of communication.

The Auckland CHOGM of November 1995 saw developments in this area. The M illbrook
Com m onwealth A ction Program m e on the Harare Com m onwealth Declaration was adopted,
and offered mechanisms to promote adherence to the Harare principles, including measures
which might be taken in response to a violation. This represented a modest development
towards a greater level of political coordination among the members of the Commonwealth
than had sometimes been the case in the past. A Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) was set
up to oversee measures in the case of serious or persistent violation of the Harare principles.
This includes Foreign Ministers from eight countries (including the UK), to be supplemented
as appropriate by representatives from the region concerned. As James Barber pointed out
in the W orld Today , the 1990s have seen a general concern for human rights and good
governance replace the concern over racism which animated the Commonwealth from the
early 1960s until the onset of liberalisation in South Africa. And if,

in the struggle against racism, it had been South Africa; in the struggle for human rights, it is
Nigeria.18

If the focus on the former sometimes led to awkard feelings on the part of the British, the
focus on the latter has certainly led to mixed feelings among the African states. At and
immediately following the Auckland CHOGM, South Africa took the lead in condemning the
military régime in Nigeria, while neighbouring states such as Sierra Leone, the Gambia and

17 Harare Declaration, as reproduced in The Com m onwealth Y earbook, 1993-94.

18 'Reaching for Values: the Commonwealth and Nigeria', Barber J, The W orld Today ,
January 1997.

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Ghana were less strident. Some neighbouring countries have their own sensitivities over
questions of democracy, and others are concerned not to antagonise a powerful regional player
and risk disrupting further an area of great volatility. In time South Africa came to tone down
its approach as well: there remains a divergence between those in the ANC who feel it is
wrong to vilify a black African régime, representing a country which was a staunch ally
during the apartheid era, and those who perceive a greater obligation to oppose unjust forms
of governance wherever they occur.

Nigeria was suspended from the Commonwealth at the Auckland CHOGM in 1995 over its
continued military rule and human rights abuses, and the executions of Ken Saro-Wiwa and
other minority rights activists. It became the main focus of the CMAG initiative, under which
representatives of eight countries were to consider developments in Nigeria and also in the
Gambia and Sierra Leone. The limitations on Commonwealth action have become
increasingly evident here. While CMAG at first seemed a fairly powerful response to the
Nigerian problem, it has been unable to deliver real pressure as a result of the intransigence
of the régime of General Sani Abacha, the qualms of African members and the non-binding
nature of its decisions.

After an attempt by the Foreign Ministers of Ghana, Jamaica, Malaysia, New Zealand and
Zimbabwe to visit Nigeria was thwarted, CMAG recommended further sanctions at its second
meeting, in April 1996. The recommendations included the freezing of foreign assets of the
leadership, an embargo on the export of arms, and bans on sporting links and air travel.
However, these were entirely optional, and the prospect of economic sanctions, including an
oil embargo, was deferred pending further discussions with the EU and the USA, largely on
British insistence. Canada and New Zealand took a more hawkish position, New Zealand's
Foreign Minister Don McKinnon hinting at the possible expulsion of Nigeria from the
Commonwealth, but the divided attitudes among the membership as a whole led CMAG to
turn its efforts more to the pursuit of dialogue. A meeting was held in London in June 1996
with the Nigerian Foreign Minister Tom Ikimi and a visit was made in November 1996 to
Nigeria, which concluded with CMAG recommending continued dialogue: effectively the
strategy has become one of 'constructive engagement', the policy which threatened to break
the Commonwealth apart when it was pursued by the UK in relation to South Africa.

The most recent CMAG meeting was held in London in February 1997. The Group again
delayed further action on the question of sanctions, and reacted to criticisms from the Nigerian
opposition that its November 1996 trip was ineffectual and did not include meetings with their
representatives. CMAG invited written submissions from interested parties, which it would
consider before presenting its report to the Edinburgh CHOGM. According to comments by
Canada's Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy some of those submitting written comments would
be invited to address CMAG in July 1997.19

19 Reuter News, 19 February 1997.

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VI Prospects

The Commonwealth can be viewed in three ways: culturally, politically and economically.

Traditionally, the Commonwealth has put itself forward as a model of multi-cultural, multi-
ethnic cooperation. Activities such as the four-yearly Commonwealth Games or the annual
Commonwealth Day help to promote this ideal. There is an emphasis on educational
activities: indeed Commonwealth Day is observed each year on the second Monday in March,
which is a schoolday throughout the Commonwealth, partly in order to allow children to focus
on the Commonwealth in their work on that day. In the past, this kind of activity has been
regarded as well-meaning, but perhaps of less than vital importance: with the preponderance
of ethnic conflict in the last three to four years, it may come to be seen in a different light.

At the political level, the organisation remains a voluntary association of states which agree
to pool nothing at all of their freedom of action. As a result it does not always function well
as a coordinating body, but it may be thought to have a useful function of encouraging
dialogue and contact on - at least formally - equal terms. It also serves as one of the arenas
in which certain dominant values may be articulated, values which seem to form part of the
orthodoxy of a particular historical period, such as support for peaceful and constitutionally-
based progress to independence, or anti-racism, or respect for human rights, and to which the
member states seek to present their actions as approximating.20 It may be easy to dismiss
this as part of the ceremonial function of the two-yearly CHOGM, a simulation of a unity
which is actually missing, but there is nevertheless an opportunity to express and contest large
ideas and to seek to apply them to specific issues, and to some extent a broad community of
value may be encouraged in these contacts. The importance of the attempt to project a
specifically Anglophone set of values can perhaps be seen in the eagerness which France has
shown in recent years to consolidate la Francophonie and to project a distinctive Francophone
position in world affairs.

The Commonwealth can be seen as having an economic edge to it as well.21 It includes

important sub-regions such as Southern Africa and South Asia. In the former, mutual

20 Or in the case of Nigeria,which they seek to present as being in conflict with one
another. The stress on human rights and democracy is held by the Nigerian authorities
to conflict with their absolute sovereignty and to represent a form of racist
interference.
21 A detailed discussion of the relative trade, investment and aid relationships between
the UK, other OECD members in the Commonwealth and the developing
countries of the Commonwealth is given in HC 45 1995-96, Chapter V.

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membership of the organisation may be helpful in promoting shared interests between the
countries of that area; in the latter, it may play a part in promoting dialogue and cooperation
in circumstances which are otherwise less than cordial. It is unlikely that the Commonwealth
will ever have a decisive role to play, say in heading off confrontation between India and
Pakistan, but its supporters would argue that it does at least have a positive contribution to
make.

Including the developing markets of India alongside dynamic economies such as Singapore
and Malaysia, the Commonwealth presents trading and other business opportunities for the
developed economies of the UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The most optimistic
of its advocates would doubtless regard the organisation as a balance to or a link between the
groupings which tempt its members away from one another: the EU (for the UK), ASEAN
and the Pacific Rim (for the South East Asian and Oceanic members) and NAFTA (for
Canada and the Caribbean). Whether this hope will become reality is open to debate: the
Commonwealth is not generally an organisation which can pursue an internal dynamic
separate from the will of its more powerful members. Nevertheless the practice of similar
legal systems and the common use of English are often cited as factors tending to facilitate
contact, particularly in business.

In its Report on the Future Role of the Com m onwealth, the Foreign Affairs Committee laid
emphasis on the potential advantage to British commercial interests which the established ties
within the Commonwealth provide. It sought to replace the image of a pyramidic structure,
with the UK at the top devolving benefits onto a sprawling recipient group at the bottom, with
an image of a network of mutually beneficial relationships, and argued that

the old Commonwealth ties could therefore become, for the United Kingdom, the new
Commonwealth opportunities.22

As the post-colonial order in which the modern Commonwealth developed is overtaken by

a world of regional blocs, the organisation itself continues to develop. Given its modest
institutional structure and limited resources, the Commonwealth, as identified with the
Secretariat, may never play a truly leading role in world affairs, but the membership may
continue to find new opportunities and see new benefits in their mutual relations.

22 HC 45 1995-96, para 9.

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References and Selected Further Reading

HL Deb 29 January 1997, cc1171-211, Debate on Motion to call attention to the forthcoming
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting to be held in Edinburgh.

'Reaching for Values: the Commonwealth and Nigeria', Barber J, The W orld Today , January
1997.

'Global Consensus Building: the role of the Commonwealth and its Parliamentarians',
Parliam entarian, October 1996.

'Criteria for Commonwealth Membership', Collinge J, Round Table, July 1996.

'The Commonwealth must not wake up feeling terrible: the Commonwealth towards the 21st
century', R Sanders, Round Table, July 1996.

Concluding Statement of Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group following second meeting

at Marlborough House on 23 April 1996, Dep 3/3326.

'Joint Responsibility: human rights across the Commonwealth', Kilgour D, Parliam entarian,
April 1996.

'The Commonwealth Parliamentary Association', Donahoe A, Round Table, April 1996.

The Future Role of the Com m onwealth, Foreign Affairs Committee, First Report of 1995-96,
HC 45, 27 March 1996.

'Royaume-Uni, Commonwealth et coopération', Chesneau J, Défence Nationale, February

1996.

'The Kia Kaha CHOGM', Round Table, January 1996.

'The Commonwealth and Britain's Global Interests', Howell D, The European Journal,
December 1995 (a response, by West K, to this article, and to a review article in same
volume, is in The European Journal, January 1996).

'Judicial Murder Puts Democratic Values on Trial', Mayall J, The W orld Today , December
1995.

'What's in a Name?: A perspective on the transition of Empire/Commonwealth, 1918-50',

Sturgis J, Round Table, April 1995.

'Britain, the Commonwealth and the Global Economy', MacLean N, Round Table, April 1995.

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 Research Paper 97/47

Econom ic Opportunities for Britain and the Com m onwealth, West K, 1995.

19
International Affairs
Recent Research Papers:

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Prospects and Implications