1939 Geographic Objectives in Foreign Policy I

Geographic Objectives in Foreign Policy, I
Author(s): Nicholas J. Spykman and Abbie A. Rollins

Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Jun., 1939), pp. 391-410
Published by: American Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1948794
Accessed: 03-06-2015 16:10 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
American Political Science Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The American
Political Science Review.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 139.18.5.57 on Wed, 03 Jun 2015 16:10:25 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The American
Political Science Review
VOL. XXXIII JUNE, 1939 NO. 3
GEOGRAPHIC OBJECTIVES IN FOREIGN POLICY, I

NICHOLAS J. SPYKMAN AND ABBIE A. ROLLINS
Yale University
The attempt to give international society a minimum of govern-

ment and order through the establishment of a League of Nations
has proved only moderately successful. It is true that states have
begun to play politics in Geneva, but they have not ceased the
older and grimmer struggle for power in the world at large. The
state is still today, as far as its international relations are con-
cerned, primarily a military organization. Its specific aims in its
struggle for power may be many, but among them the geographic
objectives, the attainment of which will increase the state's rela-
tive military strength, are the oldest and the most persistent.
There are several types of geographic objectives, but in this
analysis we shall concern ourselves with the strategic geographic
objectives of foreign policy. Before we attempt to analyze these
specific objectives, however, it is essential to consider briefly the
phenomenon of expansion as such, which may be defined as a
mere advancement of frontier in contrast to the conquest of a
particular bit of territory for strategic reasons.
I. EXPANSION
In order to form any conclusions, however general and tenta-
tive, regarding expansion as such, the behavior of states as it has
found expression in extension of territory must be viewed over
very long periods. Such a time-scale avoids the tendency to regard
either war or peace as the normal state and reveals states, in
their relations with each other, in their true light as struggling
power organizations. Specific boundaries at any given historical
period become then merely the political geographic expression
of the existing balance of forces at that period, and reveal the
combinations and conflicts of forces in a dynamic international
391
392 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
society. Boundary changes will be indications of a shift in the

balance of forces, caused either by an increase in driving force on
one side of the frontier or by a decrease in resistance on the other.
At any given moment, certain states are expanding, others are
contracting, and still others are stationary. So far, no satisfactory
comparative study has been made which provides an adequate
explanation of the emergence of an expansionist policy. Nor has
there been any explanation why certain states, after periods of
rest during which they remain stationary or even lose territory,
again embark upon a period of expansion. Apparently the very
dynamic force of the power organization called the state, which
in origin at least was primarily a military organization, like the
dynamic force of every organic entity, varies in intensity from
time to time, and calls forth an expansionist policy when the
dynamic pressure becomes too great to be contained within the
existing limits of the state. If it is not possible to isolate the
effective cause of expansion as such, it is possible, none the less, to
observe the forms in which it manifests itself, and to analyze
certain patterns which recur constantly in the shift of frontiers.
Expansion seems to follow the line of least resistance and to
occur in waves. New territories are conquered, held, assimilated,
and serve as a starting point for a new advance. It is therefore
not surprising to find a correlation between amount of expansion
and ease of movement. In almost every case, maximum land
expansion in the ancient world took place in the thinly populated
steppe regions. The enormous empires of Genghis Khan and Tam-
erlane were steppe empires. The large political units of antiquity,
except for Persia, were based mainly on lowland regions, and the
Caliphate and the Turkish empire obtained their maximum ex-
pansion in the lowlands of the coastal regions south of the Med-
iterranean. Only China and Rome expanded into difficult terrain.
Modern history records but two instances of great land ex-
pansion-the United States, which found west of the Alleghenies
a practically empty continent, and Russia, which encountered no
resistance east of the Urals. Accordingly, when with the develop-
ment of navigation in the Renaissance period man achieved
greater mobility on sea than on land, it is not surprising to find
that maximum expansion was at that time attained by empires
based on sea power.
Innumerable cases of expansion illustrate the maxim that it is
GEOGRAPHIC OBJECTIVES IN FOREIGN POLICY 393
easier to conquer than to hold. The advance is pushed beyond the

limit of effective control and a large empire begins to crumble at
the periphery, either because of exposure to attack or because of
centrifugal forces insufficiently counteracted from the controlling
center. Rome lost territory at the edges and split in the center;
the Caliphate began in 755 to retreat from its furthest outposts;
and the Turkish empire, which in 1529 reached its high point,
has been decreasing in size ever since. Sea powers follow the same
sequence of advance and retreat; the Spanish empire bowed not
to foreign invaders, but to centrifugal forces within its overseas
territories; and the same trend is visible in the British Empire
today.
This process of expansion, viewed over long periods, exhibits
other patterns than the simple ones of advance, assimilation, and
retreat. Advances that suggest the tactical military operations of
outflanking, encirclement, and a break through the center recur
persistently. Examples of flanking can be drawn from any period
-the threats of Persia to Babylonia after the former's annexation
of Armenia and Lydia, the Mongolian advance toward India, the
Roman attack on western Germany, the British conquest of
Poitou, Guyenne, and Gascony, British opposition to Russia in
Asia Minor, and Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzgovina are
but a few chosen at random.1
The process of encirclement often begins by forcing a neighbor-
ing country into a wedge position, and was well illustrated by the
configuration of the former Czechoslovakia with regard to Ger-
many. Carthage, and later Rome, encircled the Iberian peninsula,
the Romans surrounded the Germans, and the Franks, the Bur-
gundians.2 From the election of Charles Quint to the Peace of
Utrecht, France was apprehensive of the Hapsburg circle around
her, as she is apprehensive today about the political friendship be-
tween Hitler, Mussolini, and Franco.
During the nineteenth century, Sweden and Norway were con-
cerned by attempted Russian expansion to the Varanger and
Tana Fjords and west toward Tromso and Narvik. In West
Africa, France encircled the English and Spanish colonies, and
in East Africa Great Britain surrounds the new Italian empire
and in South Africa the Portuguese colony of Mozambique. In
contrast to these flanking and encircling maneuvers, Poland broke
1 Cf. Otto Maull, Politische Geographie(Berlin, 1925), p. 96. 2 Ibid.
through Germany to the sea both in 1920 and earlier, Prussia

split the German states into a northern and a southern group, and
England broke through the Portuguese spheres of interest in
Africa.3
It must be remembered that a policy of flanking or encirclement
can be carried out by means of actual physical expansion or by the
conclusion of treaties or alliances. Such supplementing of national
resources with those of their allies is one of the most common
expedients employed by foreign offices, but must be considered a
political rather than a purely geographic objective, even though
it may be destined to serve a similar end.
Other things being equal, all states have a tendency to expand.
States like the Netherlands, Sweden, and Spain, which today give
no indication of territorial ambitions, once controlled extensive
areas-the Netherlands and Spain, far overseas, and Sweden, the
lands around the Baltic. The most that can justly be said about
Switzerland, Afghanistan, and Thibet is not that. they wholly lack
the dynamic force which causes expansion, but that they lack
sufficient force to carry them against their neighbors over the
topographical barriers with which nature has surrounded them.
In South America, there has so far been little manifestation of
expansion as such, although wars have been waged for the attain-
ment of specific objectives such as access to the sea and access
to certain raw materials. It is possible, however, that a period of
wars is yet to come on that continent during which some of the
smaller states may disappear. At the present stage of development,
the dynamic forces of the social structure of even the larger South
American states are still incapable of utilizing fully the natural
resources within their boundaries, and history suggests that in
general states do not embark upon a policy of expansion as such
until they have assimilated and utilized to a considerable extent
the possibilities of their own territory.
There are limits of expansion, both temporary and permanent,
such as natural barriers and the tendency of imperfectly consoli-
dated empires to crumble at the periphery or break in the center,
which we have already noted. There are also the limits provided
by the counter-pressure of the military strength of other states
across the frontier. Whenever such pressures become unequal,
boundaries will move. The problem of collective security is the
3 Ibid.
problem of equalizing these pressures; and, as long as that problem

remains unsolved, the phenomenon of expansion as such will con-
tinue to appear.
Shifts in frontier, which are the physical manifestation of the
dynamics of expansion, are not, however, the only or the first
indication of a shift in the balance of forces. The realm of inter-
national politics is like a field of forces comparable to a magnetic
field. At any given moment, there are certain large powers which
operate in that field as poles. A shift in the relative strength of
the poles or the emergence of new poles will change the field and
shift the lines of force. A reorientation and realignment of the
small powers in such a field may be the first result of a shift in the
balance of forces between the large powers. The reorientation in
the foreign policy of many of the central European states after the
remilitarization of Germany and the increase in Italian strength
is an illustration of this' phenomenon.
If our task were to analyze the effect of expansion on the inter-
national relations of a certain area, such secondary indications
would have to be considered. Our immediate purpose, however,
is rather to attempt to dissect the phenomenon of expansion as
such, and to discover certain specific forms in which the geographic
objectives of states appear. States exhibit throughout history a
tendency to expand along certain definite lines-to rectify their
frontiers from a strategic point of view, to follow river valleys, to
gain access to the sea, to conquer opposite coasts, to gain control
of sea routes, and by circumferential and transmarine expansion
to make certain marginal seas their own.
II. FRONTIERS
A consideration of forms of expansion will obviously begin with

a consideration of the frontier. We have seen the frontier from an
international point of view as an expression of a relative power
relationship, as that line where conflicting pressures become equal-
ized. From a national point of view, which is the point of view of
the individual state, the frontier is the front trench held during the
temporary armistice called peace. It is the starting point for the
next wave of expansion if viewed in terms of offensive policy, or
the first bulwark if viewed in terms of defensive policy.
Geographers distinguish countless kinds of frontiers, primarily
in terms of border zones rather than boundary lines, and they
have written learned tomes and drawn beautiful maps indicating

the boundaries between climatic zones, types of natural vegetation
and fauna, limits of cultivated plants, racial and ethnic frontiers,
and even economic frontiers. What concerns us in this chapter is
the political boundary, that line of demarcation which divides
two governmental and administrative systems, the shifting or
maintenance of which is necessarily an objective of foreign policy.
In the determination of a desirable political frontier, so-called
natural, topographical, climatic, and ethnic boundaries may play
a role, but it is well to recall at the outset that a political frontier
is by definition a creation of man, and therefore an unnatural
frontier. The location of the line which the state will try to achieve
depends on the significance of the region as a border zone, certain
types of which we have sketched in the previous article.
When the world was primitive and relatively empty, the deter-
mination of an ideal frontier and the formulation of a frontier
policy were very easy. The goal was simple and clear-cut -to
obtain security through isolation. Nomadic peoples hunting and
watching over their grazing flocks had no conception of a frontier
as a definite line of demarcation; they had merely a vague notion
of a broad zone which separated their customary grazing and
hunting territory from that of another group, and beyond which
they might not wander without coming into conflict. Only with
the development of agriculture and a settled population did the
idea of property in land, and therefore the need for definite dividing
lines rather than broad intervening zones, begin to emerge. All
these factors accompanied the establishment of the state, but even
the earliest states still sought separation through natural or arti-
ficially created waste border zones. This idea of dividing zones is
closely connected historically with the identification by primitive
man of frontiers and thinly populated regions. Lands that were
unproductive, and hence unfriendly to man, remained uninhabited
and unclaimed, and so the boundary zone tended to begin where
population ceased.
Where such zones did not exist naturally, early states began
to createIthem artificially in order to obtain the security that
resulted from isolation. This arrangement soon became an impossi-
bility for the Greek city-states and for Phoenicia, whose lack of
sufficient territory early forced them to adopt a linear boundary.
Such a boundary was not considered desirable, however, and every
city which acquired any military superiority attempted to create

an unoccupied zone around itself. Rome transformed twenty-three
Volscian cities into the Pontine marshes and destroyed the towns
of Latium in order to surround herself with waste territory.4 An
area of about five thousand square miles was set aside between
China and Korea, and settlement in it was prohibited and passage
across it limited to a particular route. At the head of Solway Firth
in medieval times, a so-called "Debatable Ground" served the
same purpose, and until recently the frontier between Persia and
Turkey was marked by a border zone of indefinite width harassed
by almost constant border warfare.'
Unfortunately, however, the world filled up, and wide unin-
habited waste zones between political units were a luxury that
men could not longer afford. Occupied areas began to approach
each other across dividing territories, the frontier zone became,
instead of an area of peace and isolation, a zone of struggle, and
with the rise of the modern state and its concept of territorial
sovereignty there appeared the frontier we know today as a
definite line separating two systems of authority.
The problem for each state of determining the most advanta-
geous location for this line became more and more complex as con-
tradictory elements struggled for predominance in the formulation
of policy. The first conflict arises out of the opposing demands of
separation and communication. If a state is pursuing a policy of
pure defense, the more completely its frontiers separate it from
the rest of the world, the better. With the development of modern
world economy, however, it has become desirable for a state to
have as much contact with the rest of the world as possible, and
therefore to have a frontier that will facilitate communication.
Political isolation and economic cooperation have been the ideal
of all peaceful states, but few of them have been provided, as has
the United States, with ocean frontiers to make that ideal even
remotely attainable.
Moreover, mere contact with world economy is not the only
economic consideration that influences the formulation of an ideal
I Jean Brunhes and Camille Vallaux, La Gdographie de l'Histoire (Paris, 1921),
p. 341.
5 C. B. Fawcett, Frontiers (London, 1919), p. 63. There is a striking modern
revival of this custom in the recently announced Russian determination to depopu-
late a zone on the Russian western border (New York Times, October 13, 1938, p. 1).
frontier policy. There may be valuable raw materials in the neigh-

borhood which should obviously be included within the borders,
and there may also be important railroad centers which it is de-
sirable to control. In addition to these economic considerations,
the theory of the national state which has become generally popu-
lar during the last century may demand that a few thousand
fellow nationals be included within the boundaries. Such economic
and ethnic geographic objectives must be kept constantly in mind
in any attempt to establish a satisfactory strategic frontier, for a
bad ethnic frontier may hamper the strategic value of a topograph-
ically natural frontier, and failure to secure necessary raw materials
may prove more disadvantageous to defense than an open frontier.
Complete subordination of the economic to the ethnic factor in
the post-war peace treaties resulted in the economic destruction
of central Europe.
Every frontier policy is therefore necessarily a compromise be-
tween various conflicting demands. The task of determining where
the frontier should be in order best to satisfy these demands is
not made easier when the boundary-makers are not the statesmen
of the state concerned but disinterested outsiders. Boundaries are
political, not only because they separate political units, but be-
cause they are formulated as objectives by politicians. Well-mean-
ing experts make the error of considering boundaries as fixed, for-
getting that every state has frontier objectives, and forgetting that
political life, like all other forms of animate existence, is not static
but dynamic. The helpful Americans who assisted to such an ex-
tent in fixing the boundaries of Central Europe after the World
War failed to remember that pressure will inevitably develop be-
hind boundaries that bar from the sea a state that has once had
access to that sea, or behind boundaries that divide one section
of a country from another, and that when pressures become un-
equal boundaries move.
The "metaphysics" of the "natural" frontier, notwithstanding
its pretended scientific basis, has been more confusing than helpful,
and a study of frontier changes over the last five thousand years
must lead one to the conclusion either that nature was not very
clear in its suggestions as to where man should draw his political
boundaries, or that man was hard of hearing. The very human
habit of calling natural what is desirable, and viewing as unnatural
that which is undesirable, still characterizes many students of
GEOGRAPITC OBJECTIVnS IN FORnIGN POLICY 399
political geography. Moreover, the prophets who are leading their

peoples in a quest for the "natural frontier" are apt to forget that
most frontiers have two sides, and that the more natural a frontier
looks from one side the more unnatural it very probably appears
from the other.
Even if one focuses on the frontier question from the compara-
tively simple military and strategic point of view, it remains com-
plex and confused. Immediately the problem of offense and defense
arises. An excellent frontier for a primarily defensive policy be-
comes a very bad frontier for a policy directed at expansion. If
statesmen become imbued with the quaint military philosophy
that the best defense is a good offense and that security lies in
expansion, there is no hope of attaining a natural or satisfactory
frontier until the world has been conquered. For Korea must be
taken to provide security for Japan, Manchuria to secure Korea,
Inner Mongolia to secure Manchuria, Outer Mongolia to secure
Inner Mongolia, and so on until the globe is circled. When Rome
took Gaul she needed the Rhine as a strategic frontier, and when
she took the Rhine she needed the bridgeheads and a neutral zone
on the right bank, and then the Elbe to protect this land. In 1879,
Great Britain claimed the watershed between India and Afghan-
istan a natural and proper frontier. Then, as Russia advanced her
frontier to the northern boundary of Persia and Afghanistan,
Great Britain found it necessary to take Beluchistan and, in 1901,
the Northwest Provinces.
But even if the search for a natural frontier has proved increas-
ingly vain, it has been so consistently a part of the foreign policy
of almost every state that no analysis of policy is complete without
an investigation of the forms which the search has assumed. In
earlier historical periods, one of the most frequent frontier objec-
tives was a river. It was viewed as a natural frontier par excellence
and had the obvious advantage of being a clear line of demarcation.
This latter quality allowed it to retain popularity in council rooms
where dignified diplomats divided up unknown continents long
after it had proved useless as a frontier in Europe. It was indeed a
clear line of demarcation, provided the diplomats were all talking
about the same river, which was not always the case, as the con-
fusion over the St. Croix river boundary proved.
Rivers, however, once had other merits as boundaries. The space
devoted by historians to Alexander's bridge construction over the
Indus, Caesar's report of crossing the Rhine, the accounts of

Trajan's and Mark Aurelius' crossing of the Danube, all reveal
that a river was once a very considerable obstacle to the advance
of an army. When the Romans had surrounded their empire with
rivers, they therefore had achieved a certain measure of security.
Certain writers like Haushofer and von Scheliha nevertheless tend
to minimize the importance of rivers as protective frontiers, and
explain the tendency of early states to desire them as boundaries
on the ground of a need for water and also of the religious tradition
and significance that once attached to water.6
With the development of any degree of economic life, rivers of
course became routes of communication instead of barriers, and
river valleys quickly became economic units. This trend is strik-
ingly demonstrated by the fact that early states which secured
access to a river almost without exception showed a tendency to
expand up and down stream on both sides of the water. As they
ceased to be barriers, rivers obviously lost desirability as frontiers,
and, except in relatively new lands like those of the American
continents, they seldom function as boundaries today. Only where
an unnavigable stream flows at the bottom of a deep gorge which
cannot be easily bridged does a river really obstruct movement. An
expanding power may set a large river as its goal, but with the
ultimate intention of using that river as a base for further conquest,
just as Rome used the Rhine and Danube lines. France still claims
that the Rhine is her "natural" northeastern limit, but bases her
claim rather on tradition than on reason, for the Rhine valley is
very obviously an economic unit; and the "military frontier" of
the Austrian Empire against Turkey used the Sava and the Danube
for the southern boundary of pre-war Hungary, though the people
of the valley were Slavs and the valley an ethnic and economic unit.
River boundaries today, therefore, may be suspected of being
for the most part only temporary expedients, since they are so
clearly economic anachronisms. They abound in the New World,
especially in Central and South America, where boundaries are
still in dispute, and where in many cases difficult terrain for survey-
ing has made rivers the most convenient line of demarcation. In
Africa, the Kavalli forms the eastern boundary of Liberia, the
6 Karl Haushofer, Grenzen in ihrer Geographischenund Politischen Bedeutung
(Berlin, 1927), p. 74; Renata von Scheliha, Die Wassergrenzeim Altertum (Breslau,
1931), pp. 97-100.
Congo and the Ubangi mark most of the frontier between French
West Africa and the Belgian Congo, and the Ruvuma separates
Tanganyika from Mozambique. Russia has many miles of river
boundary, for the Dniester, the Oxus, the Arares, the Ussuri, and
the Amur all flow along various sections of her long frontiers. It
is significant, however, that these boundaries have practically all
been established recently, and that on many of them, especially
in the Far East, there continue to be frontier incidents-all of
which suggests that the Russian frontiers may not be very per-
manently fixed. The other Asiatic river boundary, the Mekong,
which separates French Indo-China and Siam, gives promise of
being permanent because, flowing at the bottom of a deep gorge,
it presents a genuine obstacle to movement. Certainly the Drava,
which marks the border between Hungary and Yugoslavia for a
distance of about one hundred miles, and the Danube, which flows
along the Rumanian-Bulgarian and part of the Rumanian-Yugo-
slavian borders, are neither strategic nor economic boundaries.
Another frontier that has been the constant goal of many states
is the seacoast. Like a river, the coast sets no real limit to expan-
sion, for the tendency of states to expand across inland and mar-
ginal seas to the opposite coast indicates that the mere arrival of
a state at the coast does not mean that it has reached a natural
stopping point in its territorial development. Access to the sea
has been such a universal objective in the foreign policy of states
that it seems to merit detailed consideration as a specialized form
of expansion. It will, therefore, be discussed later in connection
with other special forms of expansion.
Forests, swamps, and deserts, which provided genuine protection
in days of primitive technology and communication systems, were
ideally suited to function as zones of isolation, but have seldom
been sought as frontiers by modern states. Of all the so-called
natural frontiers which have been desired by states, the only one
which has retained much of its protective value is a high mountain
range, which still makes movement definitely difficult and there-
fore facilitates defense. Mountains are not absolute barriers to
movements, as the emergence of many pass-states has proved; but
they hamper movement and provide a barrier zone in which it is
comparatively easy to draw as the boundary the line of the peaks
or that of the watershed. These two lines will not necessarily
coincide, but their divergence will create a problem of only minor
adjustment. Such a boundary has an economic as well as a strategic

justification, for there is always an unmistakable orientation of
the population toward a valley which they can see from the moun-
tain crest. But even these so-called strategic mountain frontiers
are not barriers to growing, dynamic states. They have never
checked expansion if the pressures on opposite sides became too
uneven-the Caucasus did not stop Russia, nor the Rockies, the
United States-and the development of new means of communica-
tion and constant changes in the technique of warfare bring per-
ennial changes in the strategic value of a particular border region.
No frontier appears to offer a natural defense against enemy attack
except perhaps the waste areas that were the earliest solution to
the problem; and there is no hope of re-creating such intervening
zones, because the effective radius of bombing planes is constantly
increasing.
Nevertheless, just as Rome for centuries sought what seemed to
her the ideal frontiers of ocean and river, just as Louis XIV de-
sired to perfect the French frontier by taking Luxemburg, Strass-
burg, and Kehl, and just as Italy disregarded the handicap of a
dissatisfied German minority within her borders in order to im-
prove her strategic frontier by possession of the South Tirol, so
states will continue to strive for the frontier that seems to them
most nearly ideal at the moment; for the nature of the state is
such that frontiers can never lose their significance.'
About the topography of the ideal frontier little more can be
said than that, once having determined on a defensive or an offen-
sive policy, a state can use certain geographic configurations more
easily than others for certain types of artificial military systems
of defense and offense. If the policy of a -state is directed toward
expansion, the ideal frontier becomes one which provides for glacis
and bridgeheads in enemy territory. Calais was for England a
bridgehead which not only protected her but provided an excellent
"Supprimons par hypothise la demarcation lineaire; supprimons mtme les
travaux militaires de protection et d'attaque: la masse de conflits latents qui forme
la base solide de la frontiere de tension subsiste toujours, tant que le pays reste fait
pour attirer les hommes et tant que de grands groupes organismsen nations ont
besoin de la place au soleil que represente la zone de demarcation. Supprim6e par
un acte de la volont6 humaine, la frontiere militaire et politique renattrait spontan6-
ment de l'imp~rissable frontiere ethnique, 6conomique et sociale. Les frontieres de
tension ne peuvent r~ellement disparaitre que si les Ptats autonomes et souverains
disparaissent aussi. La fin des frontieres serait la fin des Ptats, expressions concretes
des nations vivantes . . . " (Brunhes and Vallaux, op. cit., p. 352).
starting point for further English invasions. When Sweden in 1720

was forced to relinquish the territory won by Gustavus Adolphus,
she retained the bridgehead of Wismar, which she did not formally
renounce until 1903. France has always been eager to hold the
Rhine bridgeheads. She took Breisach in 1639 and Strassburg in
1681, and, to protect Strassburg, claimed the bridgehead of Kehl,
which she held from 1801 to 1803 and from 1918 to 1930.8 In
other words, for a state which is expanding, a strategic frontier is
one from which an offensive can be launched effectively. For a
state whose policy is defensive, a strategic frontier is the limit
which that state has set to its expansion for the time being.
Many so-called natural frontiers like the forests and rivers of
Europe have been disregarded and discarded, and many appar-
ently unnatural frontiers like the boundaries between the United
States and Canada and between Canada and Alaska have stood
the test of time. Whether their aims were offensive or defensive,
however, men have always been forced to supplement the gifts
of nature in order to secure a satisfactory frontier. Even natural
defensive barriers have been reinforced by military and political
means-by fortifications and specific types of military border or-
ganizations like the "marches," and by political creations such as
buffer states. The Chinese, the Persians, and the Romans built
walls; the French and the Germans still build walls. The Middle
Ages created that type of border organization known as the
"march" states, and the modern age has evolved the expedient
of the buffer state.
The march states were frontier provinces commanded by per-
manent military chiefs, known in England as lords of the marches
and in the Holy Roman Empire as markgrafs, charged with the
duty of guarding the frontier and of guarding it with their own
efforts and resources. Behind these frontier provinces, whose sole
function was that of protectors, the inland territory could carry
8 Note also that the same bridgehead can be an offensive position for one state,
but a defensive position for the other. Already in 1697 Ludwig von Baden said of
Strassburg: "Fur Deutschland dient diese Stadt zu nichts anderem als einer stindi-
gen Versicherung des Friedens, fMrFrankreich aber ist sie eine immerfort aufste-
hende Kriegspforte, woraus es, so oft es nur will, in das platte Land vorbrechen
kann." Quoted in Richard Hennig, Geopolitik (Leipzig, 1931), p. 140. In this con-
nection it is interesting to note that the foreign concessions in China have been
used as bridgeheads for military operations in the interior by the Western powers
and Japan.
on its normal activity in comparative security. Some of these

marches were eventually absorbed; others, situated between two
strong states, became genuine buffer states; still others eventually
developed strength of their own, expanded, and took their places
among the European powers. It may or may not be significant
that two of these eastern marches ultimately grew stronger than
the overlords whom they protected, and emerged as the independ-
ent states of Prussia and Austria. The post-war states of Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, which France in 1920
forged into a "cordon sanitaire" against Russia, are strikingly
reminiscent of the march provinces that guarded the eastern fron-
tier of the Holy Roman Empire against Slav advances. Attempts
are now being made to make them serve as a "cordon sanitaire"
against Germany.
Among political devices to increase frontier security, the buffer
state is the most persistent type. It bears a strong resemblance to
the zones of waste land which were man's first solution of the de-
fense problem. The strip of uninhabited land served the cause of
peace and security by keeping apart two dynamic powers that
otherwise would have come into conflict; the function of the buffer
state is precisely the same. Where it is impossible to arrive peace-
fully at a common frontier, two states may be able to avoid conflict
by preserving or establishing between them a third state which
retains its independence by virtue of their mutual desire to main-
tain it. The small state survives because each of its strong neigh-
bors refrains from conquest upon condition that the other displays
a similar restraint and is willing to defend the territorial integrity
of the buffer. In a previous article we considered the limitations on
foreign policy which derive from the fact of being a buffer state.9
Here we must consider the creation, preservation, and destruction
of buffer states as objectives in foreign policy.
At the Congress of Vienna, Switzerland was neutralized and her
independence guaranteed by the European powers in order to
provide a buffer between France, Italy, and Bavaria; and the
Austrian Netherlands was united with Holland to form a bulwark
against any further northward moves on the part of France. Fifteen
years later, Belgium became independent and her neutrality was
guaranteed so that she might stand between Great Britain and
Germany and France and Germany. In the Treaty of London of
I See this REvIEw, Feb. and Apr., 1938.
1839, British influence so arranged the Belgian boundaries that

the open and direct land route from Germany to Antwerp is barred
by the Dutch province of Limburg, and the sea approach by the
Dutch province of Zeeland, putting every possible obstacle in the
way of German use of Antwerp as a base for an attack on Great
Britain.
A number of European states created at Versailles in 1919,
although not established specifically as buffer states, have func-
tioned as such to a certain degree. Austria was a buffer in both
position and strength, although the relationship between her and
her neighbors was already in its later phase characterized by con-
stant attempts on the part of both strong powers to gain control
of the buffer. She owed her precarious existence between 1920 and
1938 to the equality of strength of Germany and Italy, and it was
inevitable that she should be absorbed as soon as that power
equilibrium was disturbed.
During the nineteenth century, Russia moved slowly into Cen-
tral Asia and gradually approached the Indian frontier, to the
great anxiety of the British. British and Russian influence clashed
in Afghanistan, Persia, and Turkestan, where each power was
trying to establish its own domination in order to check the ad-
vance of the other. Boundary agreements between 1887 and 1889
offered no final solution, and it was not until the Anglo-Russian
agreement of 1907 that danger of a conflict was finally past. This
agreement recognized the suzerainty of China over Thibet, recog-
nized Afghanistan as a British sphere of influence, and divided
Persia into three zones, the northern to be a Russian sphere of
influence, the southeastern, a British sphere, and the third, a
neutral zone between the other two. The agreement remained in
force until after the World War, when it was repudiated by the
Soviet government. Great Britain was forced to recognize the
complete independence of Persia and Afghanistan, the latter in
1919 in the peace of Rawalpindi. Afghanistan then became polit-
ically the perfect buffer state that she has always been geograph-
ically, since a buffer state in the strict sense of the term must be
no more dependent on one than on the other of the strong powers
that it separates.
The evolution of Siam as a buffer state offers much the same
sequence -of events. An Anglo-French convention of 1896 neutral-
ized central Siam, and a second convention in 1907 confirmed the
first and definedthe territory west of the Menam and the Gulf of
Siam as in the British sphere of influence and the territory east of
these lines as in the French sphere. After the War, the full inde-
pendenceof Siam was recognized.
In northeastern Asia, the constant expansion of Russia and
Japan has called into being a series of buffer states. Japan at-
tempted to make Korea an independent buffer state between
herself and China, until the Sino-Japanesewar definitely ended
Chinese influence in the peninsula. During the next ten years,
Korea served as a buffer between Russia and Japan, but after
Japan defeated Russia was incorporatedinto the Japaneseempire.
Manchuria then became the Russo-Japanesebuffer. In 1932, as
the Japanese advance continued, Inner Mongolia replaced Man-
churia in this capacity, and in 1936 Outer Mongolia in turn
assumed the r6le.
We have already noted that the phenomenonof expansion as
such has not yet appearedin South America.The type of situation
which leads to the creation of a buffer state has therefore arisen
but rarely, and Uruguay, whose independencewas recognizedby
Argentina and Brazil and guaranteed by Great Britain in 1828,
is the only buffer on the continent. The African continent, like
eastern Asia, affordsa striking exampleof a bufferthat ultimately
failed to function because of too great pressurefrom one side and
none from the other direction to counteract it. The Congo still
separates England and France in central Africa, but Ethiopia,
which once stood between England, France, and Italy, has been
absorbedbecause a bufferstate can fulfill its function only whenit
lies between two or more states of approximatelyequal strength,
and the pressureof Italian expansionhad become overwhelmingly
strongerthan the opposing French or British pressure.
It is interestingto recall that the bufferstate is not a nineteenth-
century invention. To mention but two early examples-in the
fifteenth century B.C. the Mitannian king attempted to re-create
the kingdom of Kadesh as a buffer between himself and Egypt,
and fifteen hundredyears later Pompey tried to use Syria to check
the expansion of Iran.10
From the point of view of location, a distinction may be drawn
between buffer states which separate two land powers and those
10 Cf. James H. Breasted, A History of Egypt (London, 1912), p. 285, and
Michael Rostovtzeff, Caravan Cities (London, 1932), p. 101.
which stand between a land power and a sea power, and whose
function is to bar the land power from the ocean and thus prevent
a conflict. In the latter case, the buffermay or may not occupy a
central position between the two strong powers that it separates.
Belgium and Holland, which keep Germany from the coast op-
posite Great Britain, lie directly between the two; but Persia,
whose function is to keep Russia from the Persian Gulf as well as
from India, does not occupy a central position between Great
Britain and Russia. Rumania and Bulgaria did not anywhere
touch British territory, but in so far as they were created to bar to
Russia the road to Constantinople,and so prevent a Russo-British
conflict, they functioned as buffer states-as did Turkey during
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when Great Britain
supportedher to keep Constantinopleout of Russian hands. So it
appears that, when one of the strong powers concerned is a sea
power, a buffer state may lie directly between its territory and
that of a land power or merely between the land power and the
sea, access to which would bring the land power into conflict with
the sea power.
A buffer state is particularlyeffective if, due to topography or
general lack of technical development, it functions as a genuine
barrierto communication.In 1932, Albaniawas the only European
state that had no railroad, and by that token was an ideal buffer.
Afghanistanis without railroads and with very few roads in any
way suitable for armies or the movement of material, and accord-
ingly an effective attack from Russia against Kabul or Kandahar
is practicallyimpossible.The Afghan climate, which has taken toll
of every Occidentalinvader, also acts as a barrier.Thibet is like-
wise without communication systems, and until 1914 there was
no railroad in Persia except a local one near Teheran. On the
other hand, Belgium, although a bufferstate, is by topographyand
location essentially a passage state and not a barrierstate. It is
the political factor rather than the geographic,therefore, that is
responsiblefor her continued existence.
As time goes on, however, systems of communicationwill de-
velop in the most backward of the barrier states regardless of
attempts of the great powers to delay such progress and retain
the states as perfect buffers. When this development comes, the
great powers concerned will immediately become competitors in
attempts to cause the construction of systems of communication
that will be of strategic advantage to one and a strategic handicap

to the other. When, between 1896 and 1898, Russia extended a
branch of its trans-Caspian road to Kushka, near the Afghan
border, Great Britain tunnelled through the Chodscha-Amrun on
the Indian-Afghan border so that a strategic road could be built
to Kandahar with as little loss of time as possible should Russia
try to dominate Kabul.1" There is now a railroad in Baluchistan
running from Nushki to Mirjawa on the Iranian border, roughly
parallel to the Afghan frontier and about fifty miles from it, and
the road from Krasnovadsk to Tejend is parallel and near to the
Iranian frontier for several hundred miles. A trans-Persian railroad
is being built from Bandar Shah on the Caspian through Teheran
to Hamadan and the Persian Gulf, which might offer an opportunity
for Russia to advance through Persia to the British oil sources.
In Korea, Japan constructed a railway system, and the railroads
in Manchuria have been the constant object of Russo-Japanese-
Chinese rivalry.
It appears that the neighbors of a buffer state come to regard
it not as a no man's land, but as a two man's land, as a zone of
intervention, the moment communication becomes feasible. This
is inescapable, because the possibility of transportation transforms
the territory of these weak states into exposed frontier zones for
both the neighbors, and therefore significant elements in the de-
fense systems. As such, they must be secured against penetration
by the enemy, and each power concerned is accordingly engaged
in strengthening its own political influence in the buffer territory.
This parallel in the political field of the military principle of an
offensive as a form of defense explains the British spheres of in-
fluence in Persia and Thibet, the Russian spheres in Persia, Mon-
golia, and Turkestan, and the Japanese spheres in Manchuria and
Inner Mongolia.
Over a long period of time, buffer states usually undergo a cer-
tain process of evolution. Occasionally they grow strong enough to
cast aside the protection of others and stand alone. Rumania and
Bulgaria, created to bar the way to Constantinople, now pursue
more or less independent policies, and even Afghanistan and Persia
are attempting to shake off foreign control. The Teheran protocol
of June, 1928, created a common Turkish-Afghan-Persian front
11 Hennig, op. cit., p. 210.
against foreign aggression, and Persia has been very emphatic in

defending her rights against British encroachment.
But more frequently the evolution is in the direction of domina-
tion and absorption. Since by definition buffer states separate two
or more powers that desire to expand, there is a constant tendency
for those powers to encroach on the territory of the buffer states.
Russia has taken the Pamir area, and Great Britain has pushed
her boundary north to the "natural" frontier of the Hindu Kush
watershed until there remains of Afghanistan in that particular
spot only a "schmaler, schlauchartiger, wirtschaftlich wertloser
Nordostzipfel' 12 a few hundred miles long and less than fifteen
miles wide. Such a process of encroachment may continue for a
long time, but if the political need for the buffer state remains
constant, its territory may approach zero as a limit, though it
will not entirely disappear. From the point of view of frontier
dynamics, buffer states are subject to the same set of forces that
operate on boundaries. If the pressures on either side are approxi-
mately equal, the buffer, like the boundary, will be stable; if the
pressures become sufficiently unequal, the buffer will crumble and
eventually be swallowed by one of its large neighbors, just as
Ethiopia and Albania have been absorbed by Italy, Manchukuo by
Japan, and Austria by Germany. Buffer states will also tend to dis-
appear after a war in which one of the two great powers is decisively
defeated, whether or not the buffer itself was the sole object of the
war. Korea did not become legally Japanese until 1910, but her
fate was sealed in 1905; for a buffer state by definition stands
between two powers of approximately equal strength, and the
defeated Russia was no longer a menace to Japan, so that a buffer
was no longer necessary.
The creation of buffer states is therefore merely one more goal
of the search for an ideal frontier. States which are expanding will
be less apt to favor them, since buffer states set at least a temporary
limit to expansion; but states which are willing to set such a limit
for the time being, and which have neighbors approximately their
equals in strength, will frequently, if circumstances make such an
arrangement at all possible, revert to the wisdom of the ancients
and attempt to reproduce the no man's land that protected early
states. Unless geography comes to the aid of politics, buffer states
12 Hennig, op. cit., p. 211.
are at best, like other frontier defenses, only temporary expedients;

for if pressures become too unequal, boundaries will move. When
this situation arises, even the guaranty of third powers will prob-
ably fail to preserve a buffer state. When, however, pressures are
approximately equal, and it still proves difficult to arrive at a
stable common frontier, a buffer state provides a certain degree
of security for both sides by acting as a neutral zone, and functions
as a keeper of the peace by effecting at least temporary physical
separation of the potential combatants.
It seems possible, then, to view the frontiers and buffer states
existing at any given moment as a political-geographic expression
of temporary power-relationships in a dynamic world in which
expansion is a normal by-product of an inevitable struggle for
power. Since there is no reason to assume that the present distribu-
tion of power will remain constant, it appears safe to predict that
the frontiers existing in the world today will prove to have been
fixed for only a relatively short period of time. Until such time,
therefore, as an effective international government shall deprive
the frontier of its military and economic functions, frontier changes
will remain a persistent objective in the foreign policies of states.
(To be concludedin the next issue)

1939 Geographic Objectives in Foreign Policy I

Uploaded by

Copyright:

1939 Geographic Objectives in Foreign Policy I

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

1939 Geographic Objectives in Foreign Policy I

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Geographic Objectives in Foreign Policy, I

Author(s): Nicholas J. Spykman and Abbie A. Rollins

GEOGRAPHIC OBJECTIVES IN FOREIGN POLICY, I

The attempt to give international society a minimum of govern-

society. Boundary changes will be indications of a shift in the

easier to conquer than to hold. The advance is pushed beyond the

through Germany to the sea both in 1920 and earlier, Prussia

problem of equalizing these pressures; and, as long as that problem

A consideration of forms of expansion will obviously begin with

have written learned tomes and drawn beautiful maps indicating

city which acquired any military superiority attempted to create

frontier policy. There may be valuable raw materials in the neigh-

political geography. Moreover, the prophets who are leading their

Indus, Caesar's report of crossing the Rhine, the accounts of

adjustment. Such a boundary has an economic as well as a strategic

starting point for further English invasions. When Sweden in 1720

on its normal activity in comparative security. Some of these

1839, British influence so arranged the Belgian boundaries that

that will be of strategic advantage to one and a strategic handicap

against foreign aggression, and Persia has been very emphatic in

are at best, like other frontier defenses, only temporary expedients;

You might also like