Securing Internet Home Banking: Security For Today's Online Transactions
Securing Internet Home Banking: Security For Today's Online Transactions
Securing Internet Home Banking: Security For Today's Online Transactions
Banking
in the implementation often falsely rejecting valid users or impinging on civil liberty and rights.
The banking industry has been using the first two mechanisms of what you have and know for
years in its ATM cards and associated PINs. In order to implement this in the Internet environ-
ment a card reader and secure PIN entry pad is required at every PC and Internet usage de-
vice. While this is possible there are a wide variety of devices in the market and finding, man-
aging and supporting the distribution of suitable devices can be problematic. From the user’s
perspective the requirement for an additional device associated with identification brings its
own problems. Now a card reader as well as the card has to be available when needed and
while the card will normally be kept in the wallet the card reader or PIN entry device must be
separate. Such an extra both causes inconvenience to the user and costs the system provider
on a per user incremental basis.
Faced with these obstacles most banks and system implementers have adopted what can best
be described as multi-password mechanisms in the hope of increasing the complexity and
hopefully the “security”. Unfortunately the greater the complexity the more likely the user is to
record the multiple passwords required as the task of remembering them becomes onerous.
Users may also be asked to agree to terms which are less than attractive essentially signing
Typical Internet Home away all their rights for the privilege of using an insecure medium. In any case it is important to
Banking Log-on Screen make the solution match the risk and, for example, to avoid the more onerous user authentica-
tion practices just so the user can obtain an online statement!
tomer Browser when requested by the relevant Web Page. Once loaded to the browser the
applet is called and runs as specified in the Web Page. The applet creates a protective enve-
lope for the data, which can only be opened by the WebPIN Security Module. This tamper
resistant hardware security module ensures that the sensitive data protected by the applet is
maintained in a secure state as it is delivered onward into the Bank’s existing system. Web-
PIN therefore provides an end-to-end protection for the data that is not available from
the use of the industry norm, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) encryption.
Host
Implementing WebPINTM
The following implementation details will need considering:
1. Suitable Java Applets will need to be coded to execute the desired functions. These will
be compiled using the Thales WebPIN Java Classes.
2. The applets will need to be called from within the appropriate Web Pages as required.
3. At the Web Server the applet(s) will need to be stored and delivered when demanded.
4. Server side controls or scripting will be required to receive the data from the applet en-
abled Web Page and to have that data processed by the WebPIN Security Module (WSM).
5. Finally the server will pass the data on in to the existing Host system for appropriate trans-
actional processing using a suitable messaging format.
There are a number of system or key management tasks which are needed to ensure the sys-
tem runs smoothly. WebPIN supports these standard business and banking security practices.
1. An RSA Public Key will need to be encoded into the applets and this must be generated by
the WebPIN Security Module and stored for subsequent use. The RSA private Key will be
provided by the WSM encrypted under a Local Master Key (LMK) and can safely be stored
in a file for later retrieval or loading into the WSM.
2. The finished applets should be signed using a suitable RSA Public and Private key pair
obtained from a respected source. This will help Bank customers ensure the applet has
come from the Bank and not some other source. Customers will need to be encouraged to
set their browsers to check such code signatures and the corresponding public key certifi-
cate issued by the bank and certificate authority.
3. In order to protect PINs in transit to the ATM Host PIN validation system a Zone PIN Key
(ZPK) must be established between the WSM and the HSMs attached to the ATM system.
This is done using a manually transferred Zone Master Key (ZMK) as per normal Banking
practices.
Provision should be made in the design for the routine update or change of keys such as the
WSM Local Master Keys (LMKs), the ZMK and ZPK. While the LMK and ZMK need only
change relatively infrequently, say annually, the ZPK will typically change frequently depending
on the number of transactions it has been used to protect.
WebPIN SM
5
WebPIN Log-On
4
Application
Firewall
Shows message flow for PIN 7
Web Application
protection and validation with
the PIN being verified by the Internet Server Server 6
ATM system
1
Host
2 HSM
3
The following examples each explore how WebPIN is used to execute the above functions and
show the true end-to-end nature of the solution.
Note the numbered message flows on each diagram are described in the steps in the exam-
ples.
The first example covers the use of PIN encryption to check a customer’s identity at Log-on.
1. The customer opens an Internet session to the Bank’s Web Server, which sets up an en-
crypted SSL session.
2. In the appropriate Web Page the WebPIN enabled applet is downloaded to the Browser
typically for the login screen.
3. The user is invited to enter the login data, Account number, PIN etc. and the applet then
forms the PIN block, encrypts it and constructs and MACs the packet of data to go back to
the Web Server. The packet will also contain the randomly generated 3DES key material
for the PIN encryption and MACing keys encrypted under the Public RSA Key embedded
in the applet.
4. The server side application passes the packet of data created by the applet to the WSM
where the MAC is checked, the PIN decrypted and re-encrypted under the Zone PIN Key
(ZPK) for transfer to the Host system.
5. The WSM passes back the re-encrypted PIN Block (under the ZPK) and calculates a new
MAC (using a Zone Authentication Key) over the data to be passed to the Host.
The WebPINTM Security 6. The Host passes the data string on to its HSM which first checks the MAC. The Host uses
Module is based on the the HSM to verify the PIN as being the one for use against that particular account.
Thales HSM 7. The HSM returns to the host an indication of whether the MAC and PIN passed verifica-
tion. The Host will then pass back a suitable confirmation to the Web Server or Application
Server which will action this in the session with the customer’s browser.
In the same way MACed messages are verified at the WSM, which may also be used to create
a MAC over messages transmitted to the Host. In each case the WSM will return an indication
to the application as to whether the MAC verified satisfactorily.
Since the WSM has access to the Private RSA Key used in the Applet it has a function that
allows it to create Digital Signatures at the request of the application over data to be sent to the
customer browser. At the Browser Web Page receiving this data a WebPIN enabled Applet is
invoked which checks the signature using its Public RSA Key.
Page 6 S e c u r i n g I n t e r n e t Ho m e B a nk i n g
WebPIN SM
In the second example WebPIN at the customer browser is interacting with an application and
a WebSentry hardware security module installed at an Application server within the Bank’s
Host computer site. This configuration does not require the WSM and will probably use a dif-
ferent RSA Key pair from that used for an Applet operating with the WSM. Here the application
has to handle details that the customer would like kept private, for example while applying for a
Loan.
1. The customer opens an Internet session to the Bank’s Web Server, which sets up an en-
crypted SSL session.
2. In the appropriate Web Page the WebPIN enabled applet is downloaded to the Browser,
typically where the customer is being asked to provide private details in an on-line loan
application.
3. Once the data has been collected from the customer the WebPIN enabled Applet encrypts
the data using a randomly generated 3DES Key. This Key, encrypted under the WebSen-
try’s Public RSA Key, is included in the message which is then submitted to the Web
Server. If a ciphered reply is expected from the Host Application Server the 3DES key is
also protected and reserved locally pending the arrival of the reply.
WebSentry™ offers 4. The Web Server passes the Ciphered data packet, complete with Key material, directly on
hardware cryptographic to the Host Application Server. Here the response from the customer is decrypted by the
services supporting WebSentry security module and returned to the Application.
WebPIN’s end-to-end 5. If an encrypted reply to the customer is required this is submitted to the WebSentry secu-
data privacy functional- rity module which returns the cipher text. The application forwards the reply to the Web
ity. Server for onward transmission to the customer’s browser.
When the reply arrives at the Customer’s Browser the 3DES key is recovered from local stor-
age and the Applet decrypts the data ready for displaying to the Customer.