PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

ARMANDO RODAS1 and

JOSE RODAS, SR., Accused-Appellants.
G.R. NO. 175881: August 28, 2007

Facts:
Jose Rodas, Sr. with his 3 children, co-appellant Armando Rodas, Charlito
Rodas and Jose Rodas, Jr., were charged for murdering victim Titing Asenda. When
arraigned, the four accused, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged. Before the prosecution could rest its case, accused Charlito Rodas and
Jose Rodas, Jr. withdrew their previous pleas of "NOT GUILTY" and entered their
respective pleas of "GUILTY" for the lesser crime of Homicide.
Titing Asenda was at a dance near the presence of Alberto Asonda and Ernie
Anggot, the two eyewitnesses to the crime. The two eyewitnesses testified that they
saw the Rodas family suddenly surround Titing Asenda. Charlito stabbed Titing in the
back. Then Armando clubbed Titing with a chako (nunchucks) causing him to fall. Then
Jose Sr. handed Jose Jr. with a bolo which Jr. used to hack Titing in the elbow. The
eyewitnesses tried to help Titing but Armando pointed a gun at them. The Rodas Family
left and when the eyewitnesses approached Titing he was already dead. The defense of
Appellants Jose Sr. and Armando was alibi that they were not present in the dance and
it was only Charlito and Jose Jr. who killed Titing, the two who pleaded guilty. Despite
the alibi, the RTC convicted appellant Jose Sr. and Armando of murder qualified by
Treachery.
With a Notice of Appeal filed by accused-appellants, the trial court forwarded the
entire records of the case to this Court. However, pursuant to our ruling in People v.
Mateo, the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and
disposition. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC's decision.
With the Court of Appeals' affirmance of their convictions, accused-appellants are
now before this Court via a notice of appeal. As a final attempt to lower their conviction
to Homicide, appellants, citing People v. Alba, argue that although treachery was
alleged in the Information and proven according to the trial court, the same was not
specified as a qualifying circumstance.
Issue:
Whether or not treachery alleged in the information must be specified as a
qualifying circumstance.
Held:
SC finds Jose Sr. and Armando guilty of Murder, qualified by treachery. Denial or
Alibi cannot override the positive and credible testimony of two eyewitness. In People v.
Aquino, the court held that even after the recent amendments to the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such
as "qualifying" or "qualified by" to properly qualify an offense.
We therefore reiterate that Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 merely require that the
Information allege, specify or enumerate the attendant circumstances mentioned in the
law to qualify the offense. These circumstances need not be preceded by the words
"aggravating/qualifying," "qualifying," or "qualified by" to be considered as qualifying
circumstances. It is sufficient that these circumstances be specified in the Information to
apprise the accused of the charges against him to enable him to prepare fully for his
defense, thus precluding surprises during the trial. When the prosecution specifically
alleges in the Information the circumstances mentioned in the law as qualifying the
crime, and succeeds in proving them beyond reasonable doubt, the Court is constrained
to impose the higher penalty mandated by law. This includes the death penalty in proper
cases.

PO3 BENITO SOMBILON, JR., Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
G.R. NO. 175528: September 30, 2009

Fact:
The victim was brought to the police station for investigation in connection with a
complaint for theft.  To extract a confession from the victim (who was 15 years old), the
accused, who was a police officer, brought her inside one of the rooms in the police
station, pointed a gun at her; she was interrogated and electrocuted.  Not satisfied, the
police officer asked her: “Dalaga ka na ba?” And was told by the officer: “I am single
too”.  Thereafter, the police officer touched different parts of her body, mashed her
breast, kissed her in the cheek and touched her private parts.  An information for acts of
lasciviousness was filed against the police officer.  She was found by the trial court
guilty as charged.  In handing its judgment, the trial court, despite its absence in the
information, appreciated the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public
position.  On appeal the accused contended that there was no lewdness in his acts
hence, the best that can imposed upon him is the crime of unjust vexation and not acts
of lasciviousness. Further he contended that since the aggravating circumstance of
public position was not alleged, the same must not be appreciated against him.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the trial and the appellate courts correct in convicting the accused.

2. Whether or not the trial and appellate courts correct in appreciating the aggravating
circumstance of public position.
Held:
On the first issue, the trial and appellate courts were correct in finding the
accused guilty of the crime charged. For an accused to be convicted of acts of
lasciviousness under the foregoing provision, the prosecution is burdened to prove the
confluence of the following essential elements: (1) that the offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness; and (2) that it is done under any of the following
circumstances: (a) by using force or intimidation; (b) when the offended woman is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) when the offended party is under
twelve (12) years of age. The term "lewd" is commonly defined as something indecent
or obscene; it is characterized by or intended to excite crude sexual desire. That an
accused is entertaining a lewd or unchaste design is necessarily a mental process the
existence of which can be inferred by overt acts carrying out such intention, i.e., by
conduct that can only be interpreted as lewd or lascivious. The presence or absence of
lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the environmental
circumstances.
Undoubtedly, petitioner committed acts which fall within the above described
lascivious conduct. It cannot be viewed as mere unjust vexation as petitioner would
have the Court do. The intention of petitioner was intended neither to merely annoy or
irritate the victim nor to force her to confess the theft. He could have easily achieved
that when he electrocuted the latter. Petitioner intended to gratify his sexual
desires.  Undeniably, appellant committed lewd acts against AAA. "Lewd" is defined as
obscene, lustful, indecent, and lecherous. The evidence shows that appellant committed
lewd acts against AAA when he touched her "all over her body" which includes mashing
her breasts, touching her private parts, and kissing her on the cheek. These acts were
clearly done with lewd designs as appellant even previously asked AAA, as if it was a
prelude for things to come, "Dalaga ka na ba?" and thereafter conveyed to her that "he
is single too."
Moreover, appellant employed force and intimidation when he committed these
acts on AAA. In fact, as found by the trial court, appellant pointed a gun at the forehead
of AAA as evidenced by the bruises on her forehead. Further, the medical Certificate
shows that AAA suffered slight physical injuries which include "multiple slight contusion
of bilateral breast areas" which supports AAA’s claim.
As to the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of
public position, petitioner points out that said circumstance was not alleged in the
information. It is now a requirement that the aggravating as well as the qualifying
circumstances be expressly and specifically alleged in the complaint or information.
Otherwise, they cannot be considered by the trial court in its judgment, even, if they are
subsequently proved during trial. A reading of the Information shows that there was no
allegation of any aggravating circumstance.
 Judgement was therefore affirmed with modification of the penalty by eliminating
the appreciation of the above-discussed aggravating circumstance.
Sec. 13 Duplicity of the offense

HILARIO P. SORIANO and ROSALINDA ILAGAN, Petitioners, vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (BSP), and
PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC), Respondents.
G.R. No. 159517-18 June 30, 2009

Facts:
Hilario P. Soriano (Soriano) and Rosalinda Ilagan (Ilagan) were the President
and General Manager, respectively, of the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan).
Allegedly, on June 27, 1997 and August 21, 1997, during their incumbency as president
and manager of the bank, petitioners indirectly obtained loans from RBSM. They
falsified the loan applications and other bank records, and made it appear that Virgilio J.
Malang and Rogelio Mañaol obtained loans of P15,000,000.00 each, when in fact they
did not. Soriano was faced not with one information charging more than one offense,
but with more than one information, each charging a different offense - violation of
DOSRI rules in one, and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in the others.
Ilagan, on the other hand, was charged with estafa thru falsification of commercial
documents in separate informations. Petitioners moved to quash the informations on
grounds that: (i) more than one (1) offense is charged; and (ii) the facts charged do not
constitute an offense. Specifically, petitioners argued that the prosecutor charged more
than one offense for a single act. Soriano was charged with violation of DOSRI
(Directors, Officers, Stockholders and. Related Interests) rules and estafa thru
falsification of commercial document for allegedly securing fictitious loans. They further
argued that the facts as alleged in the information do not constitute an offense.
RTCs’ denied the motion to quash Thus, each Information charges only one
offense for lack of merit and held that perusal of the criminal information filed in the
above cases indubitably show that each information charges only but one offense.
Issue:
Whether or not the filing of the informations charging more than one offense
constitutes duplicity of offenses
Held:
No. By duplicity of charges is meant a single complaint or information that
charges more than one offense.15 Section 13 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure clearly states:
 Duplicity of Offense. – A complaint or information must charge but one offense,
except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for
various offenses. Otherwise stated, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a
single Information charges more than one offense.
In this case, however, Soriano was faced not with one information charging more
than one offense, but with more than one information, each charging a different offense
- violation of DOSRI rules in one, and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents
in the others. Ilagan, on the other hand, was charged with estafa thru falsification of
commercial documents in separate informations. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke
duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations.
The information filed contains material allegations charging Soriano with violation
of DOSRI rules and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents. The RTC
committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the motions. Petitioners made it
appear that Virgilio J. Malang and Rogelio Mañaol obtained loans and received the
proceeds thereof when they did not in fact secure said loans or receive the amounts
reflected in the promissory notes and other bank records.
There are differences between the two (2) offenses. A DOSRI violation consists
in the failure to observe and comply with procedural, reportorial or ceiling requirements
prescribed by law in the grant of a loan to a director, officer, stockholder and other
related interests in the bank, i.e. lack of written approval of the majority of the directors
of the bank and failure to enter such approval into corporate records and to transmit a
copy thereof to the BSP supervising department. The elements of abuse of confidence,
deceit, fraud or false pretenses, and damage, which are essential to the prosecution for
estafa, are not elements of a DOSRI violation. The filing of several charges against
Soriano was proper.

MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ Petitioner, vs.

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, et al.
G.R. No. 193459 February 15, 2011

Facts:
Before the 15th Congress opened its first session, private respondents known as
the Baraquel group filed an impeachment complaint against petitioner, upon the
endorsement of Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.
A day after the opening of the 15th Congress, the Secretary General of the
House of Representatives transmitted the impeachment complaint to House Speaker
Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. who directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order
of Business. Private respondents collectively known as the Reyes group filed another
impeachment complaint against petitioner with a resolution of endorsement by Party-
List Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares, et al.
The Secretary General transmitted the Reyes group’s complaint to Speaker
Belmonte who also directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of
Business. After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution, found the two complaints,
which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,
sufficient in substance.
Petitioner filed with this Court the present petition with application for injunctive
reliefs. The Court En Banc RESOLVED to direct the issuance of a status quo ante
order and to require respondents to comment on the petition in 10 days.
Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition.
They argue that public respondent was not exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two impeachment complaints as it was
exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature, and that its function is
inquisitorial that is akin to a preliminary investigation.
QPetitioner invokes the Court’s expanded certiorari jurisdiction, using the special civil
actions of certiorari and prohibition as procedural vehicles.
Issues:
Whether or not the simultaneous referral of the two complaints violated the
Constitution
Held:
The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two
impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner
cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she took the cue from the
constitutional limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated
against an impeachable officer within a period of one year.
Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: “No impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of
one year.” However, the term “initiate” means to file the complaint and take initial action
on it. The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which must be accompanied
with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the impeachment
complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint. The initial
action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the
Committee on Justice. DISMISSED.
 Sec. 14 Amendment or substitution

BIENVENIDO DIÑO and RENATO COMPARATIVO, Petitioners, vs. PABLO

OLIVAREZ, Respondent.
G.R. No. 170447 June 23, 2009

Facts:
Petitioners instituted a complaint for vote buying against respondent Pablo
Olivarez. Based on the finding of probable cause in the Joint Resolution issued by
Assistant City Prosecutor Antonietta Pablo-Medina, with the approval of the city
prosecutor of Parañaque, two Informations were filed before the RTC charging
respondent Pablo Olivarez with Violation of Section 261, paragraphs a, b and k of
Article XXII of the Omnibus Election Code. Respondent filed before the Law Department
of COMELEC an appeal of the Joint Resolution. Respondent argued that the pendency
of the appeal of the Joint Resolution before the COMELEC should prevent the filing of
the Informations before the RTC as there could be no final finding of probable cause
until the COMELEC had resolved the appeal. Law Department of the COMELEC
directed the city prosecutor to transmit or elevate the entire records of the case and to
suspend further implementation of the Joint Resolution dated 20 September 2004 until
final resolution of the said appeal before the COMELEC en banc.
Assistant Prosecutor Pablo-Medina, with the approval of the city prosecutor,
"Opposition to the Motion to Quash and Motion to Admit Amended Informations." The
Amended Informations sought to be admitted charged respondent with violation of only
paragraph a, in relation to paragraph b, of Section 261, Article XXII of the Omnibus
Election Code. Respondent filed an "Opposition to the Admission of the Amended
Informations," arguing among others that the city prosecutor was no longer empowered
to amend the informations, since the COMELEC had already directed it to transmit the
entire records of the case and suspend the hearing of the cases. Judge Madrona issued
an order denying respondent’s Motion to Quash dated 11 October 2004, and admitted
the Amended Informations. Judge Madrona reset the arraignment however, respondent
failed to appear before the RTC. Thereupon, Judge Madrona, in open court, denied the
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying the Motion to Quash and admitting the
Amended Informations, and ordered the arrest of respondent and the confiscation of the
cash bond.
Law Department of the COMELEC filed before the RTC a Manifestation and
Motion wherein it alleged that pursuant to the COMELEC’s powers to investigate and
prosecute election offense cases, it had the power to revoke the delegation of its
authority to the city prosecutor. Pursuant to these powers, the COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 7457. The appellate court granted the appeal declared that the
COMELEC had the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of election
offenses and to prosecute the same. As such, the COMELEC may delegate such
authority to the Chief State Prosecutor, provincial prosecutors, and city prosecutors.
The COMELEC, however, has the corresponding power, too, to revoke such authority to
delegate. Thus, the categorical order of the COMELEC to suspend the prosecution of
the case before the RTC effectively deprived the city prosecutor of the authority to
amend the two informations.
Issue:
Whether or not the city prosecutor defied the order or directive of the COMELEC
when it filed the amended information
Held:
Yes. Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Fiscals, and/or their
respective assistants have been given continuing authority, as deputies of the
Commission, to conduct a preliminary investigation of complaints involving election
offenses under the election laws and to prosecute the same. Such authority may be
revoked or withdrawn anytime by the COMELEC, either expressly or impliedly, when in
its judgment such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the
process to promote the common good, or where it believes that successful prosecution
of the case can be done by the COMELEC. Moreover, being mere deputies or agents of
the COMELEC, provincial or city prosecutors deputized by it are expected to act in
accord with and not contrary to or in derogation of its resolutions, directives or orders in
relation to election cases that such prosecutors are deputized to investigate and
prosecute. Being mere deputies, provincial and city prosecutors, acting on behalf of the
COMELEC, must proceed within the lawful scope of their delegated authority.
It was COMELEC Resolution No. 7457 that revoked the deputation of the City
Prosecutor of Parañaque. However, when the COMELEC Law Department directed the
City Prosecutor of Parañaque to transmit the entire records of the case to the Law
Department, Commission on Elections, Intramuros, Manila, by the fastest means
available and to suspend further implementation of the questioned resolution until final
resolution of said appeal by the Comelec En Banc,. The order issued by the COMELEC
Law Department was with the authority of the COMELEC En Banc. In other words, it
was as if the COMELEC En Banc was the one that ordered the public prosecutor to
transmit the entire records and to suspend further implementation of the questioned
resolution until it finally resolves the appeal.
In the case at bench, public respondent city prosecutor clearly exceeded his authority
as a COMELEC-designated prosecutor when he amended the two informations. Instead
of filing a motion to suspend proceedings and hold abeyance the issuance of warrants
of arrest against petitioner and to defer the latter’s arraignment until after the appeal
shall have been resolved, public respondent city prosecutor took it upon himself to
substitute his own judgment or discretion for that of the COMELEC, by proceeding with
the prosecution of the criminal cases. Such act was a clear defiance of a direct and
explicit order of the COMELEC, which was to suspend further implementation of the
questioned resolution until the final resolution of said appeal by the COMELEC En
Banc. Indubitably, there was, on the part of the public respondent city prosecutor,
inordinate, if not indecent, haste in the filing of the amended informations, thereby
depriving petitioner of due process. In fact, it was only on December 11, 2004 that he
forwarded the records, and these were not even the original copies, but mere
photocopies.
In filing the Amended Informations despite the order to hold the proceedings in
abeyance until final resolution of said appeal, the City Prosecutor of Parañaque clearly
exceeded the legal limit of its delegated authority. As a deputy of the COMELEC, the
public prosecutor acted on its own and wantonly defied the COMELEC’s
directives/orders. Thus, the filing of the amended informations and the amended
informations themselves, is declared VOID and of NO EFFECT.

QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, Petitioners, vs.

The HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, 4th DIVISION and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 184537 April 23, 2010

Facts:
An information was filed for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 by causing undue
injury to the Government being the Municipal Mayor and PNP Member of Lavezares,
Northern Samar in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office,
conniving, confederating and mutually helping with one another, and with the late
Limpio Legua, a private individual, with deliberate intent, with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter into a
Pakyaw Contract for the Construction of Barangay Day Care Centers for several
barangays, without conducting a competitive public bidding, thus depriving the
government the chance to obtain the best, if not, the most reasonable price, and
thereby awarding said contracts to Olimpio Legua, a non-license contractor and non-
accredited NGO.
In a Resolution, the Third Division granted petitioners’ Motion to Quash and
dismissed the information "for failure of the prosecution to allege and prove the amount
of actual damages caused the government, an essential element of the crime charged."
In a Memorandum, the Ombudsman directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP)
to study the possibility of having the information amended and re-filed with the
Sandiganbayan.
 Thus, the OSP re-filed the Information with the Fourth Division of the
Sandiganbayan, charging the petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019,
by giving unwarranted benefit to a private person, to the prejudice of the government
which now reads “That in or about the months of November and December, 1997 at the
Municipality of Lavezares, Province of Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA, a high ranking
public official being then the Mayor of Lavezares, Northern Samar, and committing the
crime herein charged while in the discharge of his official administrative function,
conspiring and conniving with accused SPO2 FIEL B. GENIO, a member of Lavezares
Police Force (PNP) and with the late OLIMPIO LEGUA, a private individual, with
deliberate intent, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted
benefit or advantage to the late Olimpio Legua, a non-license contractor and non-
accredited NGO, through evident bad faith and manifest partiality by then and there
entering into a Pakyaw Contract with the latter for the Construction of Barangay Day
Care Centers for barangays Mac-Arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar, in
the amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P48,500.00)
each or a total of NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P97,000.00) Philippine
Currency, without the benefit of a competitive public bidding to the prejudice of the
Government and public interest.
The accused moved for a new preliminary investigation to be conducted on the
ground that there is substitution and/or substantial amendment of the first information.
Sandiganbayan Fourth Division issued the assailed Resolution denying the petitioners’
motion for preliminary investigation. The graft court found that there is no substituted
information or substantial amendment that would warrant the conduct of a new
preliminary investigation. It gave the following ratiocination
Issue:
Whether or not there is substitution and/or substantial amendment of the
information that would warrant a new preliminary investigation.
Held:  
No, there is no substitution and/or substantial amendment of the information that would
warrant a new preliminary investigation. Petitioners erroneously concluded that giving
undue injury, as alleged in the first Information, and conferring unwarranted benefits,
alleged in the second Information, are two distinct violations of Section 3 (e) of RA
3019. The shift from giving undue injury to conferring unwarranted benefit do not
constitute a substantial amendment. It should be noted that the Information is founded
on the same transaction as the first Information, which pertains to the plan of entering
into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction of day care centers for barangays Mac‐
Arthur, Urdaneta, and Lavezares, Northern Samar. These two (2) different modes of
committing the offense may be charged under either mode or under both. Considering
the case at bar, the evidentiary requirements for the prosecution and defense remain
the same, hence, a new preliminary investigation is unnecessary.

JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE, Petitioner, vs. HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, HON.

RAUL M. GONZALEZ, HON. EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, HEIRS OF THE LATE
RAFAEL DE LAS ALAS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 182677 August 3, 2010

Facts:
On January 16, 2007, an Information was filed against Jose Antonio Leviste
charging him with homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007
before the RTC of Makati. The private complainants-heirs of de las Alas filed an Urgent
Omnibus Motion praying for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the public
prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to
determine the proper offense. The RTC thereafter issued the Order granting the motion
by the complainants, thus, allowing the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation. Later,
the trial court issued the other order that admitted the Amended Information for murder
and directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioner questioned these two orders
before the appellate court.
Upon arraignment, the petitioner refused to plead. The trial court entered the plea of
"not guilty" for him. Prior to this, the petitioner filed an Urgent Application for Admission
to Bail Ex Abundanti Cautela, which the trial court granted on the ground that the
evidence of guilt of the crime of murder is not strong. The trial court went on to try the
petitioner under the Amended Information. Then, the trial court found the petitioner
guilty of homicide. From the trial court's decision, the petitioner filed an appeal to the
CA. The appellate court confirmed the decision of the trial court. The petitioner's motion
for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition to the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is
considered a substantial amendment, which would make it not just a right but a duty of
the prosecution to ask for a preliminary investigation.
Held:
Yes. A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the
offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are
merely of form. The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is
whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after
the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be
equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other.
 An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime
alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive
the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one
of form and not of substance. here is no substantial distinction between a preliminary
investigation and a reinvestigation since both are conducted in the same manner and
for the same objective of determining whether there exists sufficient ground to engender
a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably
guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from
the charge of murder after the claimed circumstances were made known to him as early
as the first motion. Petitioner did not, however, make much of the opportunity to present
countervailing evidence on the proposed amended charge. Despite notice of hearing,
petitioner opted to merely observe the proceedings and declined to actively participate,
even with extreme caution, in the reinvestigation.

LETICIA I. KUMMER, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013

Facts:
An information was filed against petitioner Leticia Kummer and her son, Johan, a
minor, for homicide. According to the prosecution's evidence, on June 19, 1988 Jesus
Mallo, the victim, accompanied by Amiel Malana went to the house of Kummer. When
Kummer opened the door, her son Johan shot Mallo twice.
Kummer denied the charge and claimed in her defense that she and her children
were already asleep in the evening of June 19, 1988. The prosecution filed an
information for homicide on January 12, 1989 against the petitioner and Johan. Both
accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. They waived the
pre-trial, and the trial on the merits accordingly followed.
Meanwhile, the prosecutor made some amendment in the date of the complaint
that was from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of only one month. Both
RTC and Court of Appeals found both the petitioner and Johan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Petitioner questioned the sufficiency of
prosecution’s evidence. She claimed that she was not arraigned on the amended
information for which she was convicted.
Issue:
Whether or not the change in the date of commission of crime requires formal
amendment of complaint
Held:
 No. The change in the date of the commission of the crime, where the disparity is
not great, is merely a formal amendment, thus, no arraignment is required.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a
complaint even after the plea but only if it is made with leave of court and provided that
it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. However, any
amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or
excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion
by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court
shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished
all parties, especially the offended party.
Applying these rules and principles to the prevailing case, the records of the case
evidently show that the amendment in the complaint was from July 19, 1988 to June 19,
1988, or a difference of only one month. It is clear that consistent with the rule on
amendments and the jurisprudence cited above, the change in the date of the
commission of the crime of homicide is a formal amendment, it does not change the
nature of the crime, does not affect the essence of the offense nor deprive the accused
of an opportunity to meet the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused.
Further, the defense under the complaint is still available after the amendment, as this
was, in fact, the same line of defenses used by the petitioner. This is also true with
respect to the pieces of evidence presented by the petitioner. The effected amendment
was of this nature and did not need a second plea.