EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 140961-63. January 14, 2003.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs . BOBBY GALIGAO ,

accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

For sexually violating his daughters Dorivie Galigao, aged ten, Deborah Galigao, aged
eight, and Daisy Galigao, aged thirteen, on three separate occasions, the Regional Trial
Court found accused-appellant guilty of three counts of rape and sentenced him to suffer
three death penalties.
Hence, this automatic review.
Appellant argued that the trial court erred in not considering the exempting
circumstance of insanity in his favor and in the imposition of death penalty.
A defendant in a criminal case who interposes the defense of mental incapacity has
the burden of establishing the fact that he was insane at the very moment when the crime
was committed. There must be complete deprivation of reason in the commission of the
act, or that the accused acted without discernment, which must be proven by clear and
positive evidence. The mere abnormanity of his mental faculties does not preclude
imputability. Indeed, a man may act crazy but it does not necessarily and conclusively
prove that he is legally so. The non-medical opinion of defense counsel that appellant was
bordering on insanity hardly measures up to the foregoing yardsticks. Thus, the Court held
that in the light of the positive testimony of the victims proving appellant's criminal
accountability, this bare and unsubstantiated defense must perforce fail. Accordingly, the
Court a rmed the conviction of appellant, but only for two counts of rape committed
against his daughters, Dorivie and Deborrah. It struck down the conviction of appellant for
the rape allegedly committed against Daisy Galigao because neither a criminal complaint
was presented nor a trial was ever conducted in the said case. The Court also found the
imposition of death penalty excessive and unwarranted. It held that the circumstances
attendant to this case justify the reduction of the penalty to reclusion perpetua.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE: CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; TESTIMONY OF

VICTIM GIVEN FULL FAITH AND CREDIT IF STRAIGHTFORWARD, CANDID, UNSHAKEN BY
RIGID CROSS-EXAMINATION AND UNFLAWED BY INCONSISTENCIES OR
CONTRADICTIONS IN ITS MATERIAL POINTS. — Su ce it to state that the testimonies of
the victims bear the hallmarks of truth. They are consistent in their material points. When a
victim's testimony is straightforward, candid, unshaken by rigid cross-examination and
un awed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its material points, the same must be
given full faith and credit. SaAcHE

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 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN A WOMAN, MORE SO IF SHE IS A MINOR, SAYS SHE HAS
BEEN RAPED, SHE SAYS, IN EFFECT, ALL THAT IS NECESSARY TO PROVE THAT RAPE
WAS COMMITTED. — Established is the rule that testimonies of rape victims, especially
child victims, are given full weight and credit. In the case at bar, the victims were barely
eight, ten and thirteen years old when they were raped. In a litany of cases, we have ruled
that when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says she has been raped, she says, in effect,
all that is necessary to prove that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are generally
badges of truth. Courts usually give greater weight to the testimony of a girl who is a
victim of sexual assault, especially a minor, particularly in cases of incestuous rape,
because no woman would be willing to undergo a public trial and put up with the shame,
humiliation and dishonor of exposing her own degradation were it not to condemn an
injustice and to have the offender apprehended and punished.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ILL-MOTIVE BECOMES INCONSEQUENTIAL WHERE THERE ARE
AFFIRMATIVE, NAY, CATEGORICAL DECLARATIONS TOWARDS ACCUSED'S
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE FELONY. — The embarrassment and stigma of allowing an
examination of their private parts and testifying in open court on the painfully intimate
details of their ravishment effectively rule out the possibility of false accusations of rape
by the private complainants. Indeed, it would be most unnatural for young and immature
girls to fabricate a story of rape by their father; allow a medical examination of their
genitalia, subject themselves to a public trial and expose themselves to public ridicule at
the instigation of their mother in order that the mother can carry on an alleged illicit
relation with a paramour. Verily — Ill motive is never an essential element of a crime. It
becomes inconsequential where there are a rmative, nay, categorical declarations
towards the accused-appellant's accountability for the felony.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPELLATE COURTS ARE BOUND BY THE FINDINGS OF THE
TRIAL COURT WITH RESPECT THERETO. — The evaluation of the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies is a matter that is best undertaken by the trial court because of its
unique opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor, conduct and attitude,
especially under cross-examination. Appellate courts are bound by the ndings of the trial
court in this respect, unless it is shown that it has overlooked, misunderstood or
misappreciated certain facts and circumstances which if considered would have altered
the outcome of the case. We nd no reason to disturb the factual ndings of the trial court
in this case.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WILLINGNESS OF COMPLAINANTS TO FACE POLICE
INVESTIGATION AND TO UNDERGO THE TROUBLE AND HUMILIATION OF A PUBLIC TRIAL
IS ELOQUENT TESTIMONY OF THE TRUTH OR THEIR COMPLAINTS. — Indeed, the
revelation of young innocent girls, aged barely eight, ten and thirteen, deserves full credit.
The willingness of complainants to face police investigation and to undergo the trouble
and humiliation of a public trial is eloquent testimony of the truth of their complaints. In
short, it is most improbable for innocent and guileless girls such as complainants to
brazenly impute a crime so serious as rape to any man, let alone their father, if it were not
true.
6. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; APPEAL; REVIEWING TRIBUNAL MAY CORRECT
ERRORS IN THE JUDGMENT EVEN IF NOT SPECIFICALLY ASSIGNED IF THEIR
CONSIDERATION IS NECESSARY IN ARRIVING AT A JUST RESOLUTION THEREOF. — In
stark contrast to the clear and categorical declarations of the private complainants,
accused-appellant interposes the defense of mental incapacity and argues that at the time
of the commission of the offenses, he was bordering on insanity. While this issue is being
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 raised for the rst time in this appeal, the same will be addressed consistent with the
dictum that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review and the
reviewing tribunal may correct such errors it may nd in the appealed judgment even if
they have not been speci cally assigned if their consideration, as in this case, is necessary
in arriving at a just resolution thereof.
7. CRIMINAL LAW; EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES; INSANITY; ACCUSED MUST
PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT HE WAS INSANE BEFORE THE COMMISSION
OF THE CRIME OR AT THE VERY MOMENT OF ITS EXECUTION. — The defense of insanity
is in the nature of confession and avoidance. Like the justifying circumstance of self-
defense, the burden is on the defense to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-
appellant was insane immediately before the commission of the crime or at the very
moment of its execution. In other words, a defendant in a criminal case who interposes the
defense of mental incapacity has the burden of establishing the fact that he was insane at
the very moment when the crime committed. There must be complete deprivation of
reason in the commission of the act, or that the accused acted without discernment, which
must be proven by clear and positive evidence. The mere abnormality of his mental
faculties does not preclude imputability. Indeed, a man may act crazy but it does not
necessarily and conclusively prove hat he is legally so. The non-medical opinion of defense
counsel that accused-appellant was bordering on insanity hardly measures up to the
foregoing yardsticks. In the light of the positive testimony of the victim proving accused-
appellant's criminal accountability, this bare and unsubstantiated defense must perforce
fail.
8. ID.; RAPE; DEATH PENALTY; IMPOSITION THEREOF UNWARRANTED IN CASE
AT BAR. — Nevertheless, while accused-appellant's guilt was proved beyond reasonable
doubt, we nd the imposition of the three death penalties against him excessive and
unwarranted. In imposing upon accused-appellant the supreme penalty of death, the trial
court erroneously cited Article 266-A (formerly Article 335), as well as Article 266-B, (1), of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. Considering that the
crimes were committed prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353 on October 22, 1997, the
provisions of R.A. No. 7659, which was the law in effect at the time the rapes were
committed should have been applied.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN IMPOSABLE. — The pertinent provisions of Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659, read as follows: . . . .
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: . . . The death penalty
shall also be imposed if the crime is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances: 1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or a nity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. . . . . However, the
fact that rape was committed with the foregoing attendant circumstance does not
automatically merit the imposition of the death penalty. As held in People v. Echegaray: . . .
. The elements that call for the imposition of the supreme penalty of death in these crimes
would only be relevant when the trial court, given the prerogative to impose reclusion
perpetua, instead actually imposes the death penalty because it has, in appreciating the
evidence proffered before it, found the attendance of certain circumstances in the manner
by which the crime was committed, or in the person of the accused on his own or in
relation to the victim, or in any other matter of signi cance to the commission of the crime
or its effects on the victim or in society, which circumstances characterize the criminal act
as grievous, odious or hateful or inherently or manifestly wicked, vicious, atrocious or
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 perverse as to be repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of
decency and morality in a just and civilized and ordered society. HCSEIT

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN MAY BE REDUCED TO RECLUSION PERPETUA; COURT
HAS A GUIDED DISCRETION IN THE IMPOSITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. — We
pointed out in the Echegaray case that the imposition of the death penalty in those cases
where the law provides for a penalty ranging from reclusion perpetua to death does not
give the trial court an unfettered but, rather, a guided discretion in the imposition of capital
punishment. Particularly enlightening on how such discretion is to be exercised is the
recent case of People v. Antonio Roque, where the accused was likewise sentenced by the
trial court to death for raping his two daughters aged nine and eleven. In the said case, we
reduced the penalties from death to reclusion perpetua, to wit: The death penalty could
thus be decreed; nevertheless, Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 47
of the Revised Penal Code, recognizes that in death penalty cases the High Tribunal puts to
a vote not only the issue of guilt of an appellant but also the question on the imposition of
the death penalty itself. The law provides thusly: . . . . The Court heretofore acknowledged
that circumstances could exist to warrant an exercise of such forbearance. In People v.
Santos, the Court considered the acts of the deceased victim, a former municipal mayor, in
clearing and working on the land claimed by the Ilongots which could have been seen by
the accused as an act of oppression and abuse of authority which he felt morally bound to
forestall, as well as the limited schooling of the accused, as justi cation to reduce the
penalty of death to reclusion perpetua. In People v. De la Cruz, the Court took into account
in lowering the penalty to reclusion perpetua on the accused most of whom were already
death row convicts, the deplorable sub-human conditions of the National Penitentiary
where the crime was committed. In People v. Marcos, the failure of appellant to realize the
gravity of his offense was held to justify the reduction of the penalty to reclusion perpetua.
Where, as in the above-mentioned Santos case, accused-appellant's limited schooling was
taken into consideration to reduce his penalty to reclusion perpetua, we can do no less
herein considering that accused-appellant is an unlettered fisherman.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; REDUCED TO RECLUSION PERPETUA IN CASE AT BAR. — We are
convinced of the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of accused-appellant for two counts of
rape committed against his daughters, Dorivie and Deborrah. But given the circumstances
attendant to this case, there is su cient justi cation in imposing on accused-appellant the
reduced penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape.
12. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; INDEMNITY EX DELICTO; AWARD THEREOF
REDUCED TO P50,000.00 CONSISTENT WITH CONTROLLING JURISPRUDENCE IN CASE
AT BAR; MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, AWARDED. — The indemnity ex delicto
awarded is hereby reduced to P50,000.00 consistent with controlling jurisprudence on the
matter. The amount of moral damages will not be disturbed as they are in accord with
case law thereon. However, the award of exemplary damages must be reduced to
P25,000.00.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO , J : p

A woman's cherished chastity is hers alone to surrender of her own free will, and
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 whoever violates that will descends to the level of an odious beast. The act becomes twice
repulsive when the outrage is perpetrated on one's own esh and blood for the culprit is
reduced to a level lower than an animal, which yields only to biological impulses, unfettered
by social inhibitions when it mates with its own kin. On the other hand, the man who rapes
his daughter violates not only her purity and her trust but also the mores of society which
he has scornfully de ed. By in icting his bestial instincts on her in a disgusting coercion of
incestuous lust, he forfeits all respect as a human being and is justly spurned, not the least
by the fruit of his own loins whose progeny he has forever stained with his shameful and
shameless lechery. 1
In the case at bar, the sexual depravity of the accused-appellant plumbs into hitherto
unreached depths of the revolting for he satiated his lust not on one but three of his
daughters. This case is their sordid story. SIDEaA

For ravishing his three daughters, Dorivie Galigao y Calderon, aged ten, Deborrah
Galigao y Calderon, aged eight, and Daisy Galigao y Calderon, aged thirteen, Bobby Galigao
was charged with Rape in three Informations, 2 similarly worded except for names and
ages of the victims and the dates of commission of the crimes, led before the Regional
Trial Court of Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 40, as Criminal Cases Nos. C-4974, C-
4975 and C-4976. The indictments similarly aver —
That on or about and sometime during the month of February 1996, in the
evening, in Sitio Paho, Barangay Canubing 1, Municipality of Calapan, Province of
Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, motivated by lust and lewd desire, and by means of
force and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously did lie, and succeeded
in having carnal knowledge of his own daughter DORIVIE GALIGAO y CALDERON,
an eight-year old girl against the latter's will and consent, and in full view of the
victim's brother and sisters.
Contrary to law.

Deborrah was allegedly raped on March 17, 1996; while Daisy was allegedly raped
on March 19, 1996.
Upon arraignment on July 24, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the
charges. 3 Thereafter, the three cases were jointly tried on the merits.
On October 13, 1999, the court a quo found accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Rape on three counts and was sentenced as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, nding herein accused Bobby Galigao y Marcelino guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crimes of Rape (3 counts) with the
qualifying circumstance that in all these cases, the victims were all under 18
years of age, and that the offender is the parent of the victims, the Court hereby
sentences said accused to suffer THREE (3) DEATH PENALTIES together with all
the accessory penalties imposed by law and to indemnify the victims: Dorivie
Galigao y Calderon in Criminal Case No. C-4974, the amount of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages; Deborrah Galigao y Calderon in Criminal Case No. C-4975, the amount
of P75,000.00, as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00
as exemplary damages; and Daisy Galigao y Calderon in Criminal Case No. C-
4976, the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
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 SO ORDERED. 4

Before us on automatic review, pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as

amended, accused-appellant argues that the trial court erred —
I
IN BASING ITS DECISION ON THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONIES OF THE
ALLEGED VICTIMS WITHOUT CONSIDERING THAT THE SAME WERE MERELY
FORCED ON THEM BY THEIR MOTHER WITH THE EVIL INTENTION TO
DECAPITATE (sic) THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WHO IS A HINDRANCE TO HER
ILLICIT RELATIONSHIP WITH HER PARAMOUR.
II
IN NOT BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

III
IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS UNLETTERED AND
LACKS EVEN THE INSTINCTIVE DECENCY AND UPRIGHT MANNER
TANTAMOUNT TO INSANITY SUFFICIENT TO EXEMPT HIM FROM ANY
CRIMINAL LIABILITY.
IV
IN SENTENCING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WITH DEATH PENALTY EACH ( sic)
FOR THE THREE (3) RAPES WHEN IN FACT RAPE AS A HEINOUS CRIME WAS
NOT YET PUNISHABLE BY DEATH WHEN THE SAME WERE COMMITTED BY HIM
SOMETIME IN FEBRUARY 1996, ON 17 MARCH 1996 AND ON 19 MARCH 1996
AGAINST DIFFERENT VICTIMS. 5

The details of their ravishment is graphically narrated by the victims themselves.

Dorivie Galigao, who was twelve years old when she took the witness stand, testified
that sometime in the night of February 1996, her sisters Deborrah and Daisy, together with
their brother Dexter, were sleeping in their house at Canubing 1, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro.
They slept in the living room because it was hot. Their mother, Lourdes Calderon-Galigao,
had left for Manila. Dorivie was roused from her sleep when she felt someone taking off
her panties. She woke up and saw that it was her father, accused-appellant Bobby Galigao.
Accused-appellant took off his briefs and lay on top of her. He inserted his penis into
Dorivie's vagina. She felt pain but could not do anything because accused-appellant
threatened her with bodily harm if she reported the incident to anybody. 6
After satisfying his lust, accused-appellant went to the bathroom to wash himself.
Then, he put on his briefs and told Dorivie to wash herself, which she did. She put on her
panties and went back to sleep. Meanwhile, accused-appellant went to his room. Dorivie
revealed that prior to the incident, her father had raped her several times beginning when
she was nine years old. 7
Dorivie also narrated how Deborrah and Daisy were ravished by her father. At one
time, she saw accused-appellant crawling towards Deborrah and lay under the blanket
beside her. Dorivie, who was only one meter away, noticed that there was movement
underneath the covers. Dorivie further testi ed that she saw her father rape Daisy, her
eldest sister. However, she did not do anything for fear that accused-appellant will kill her.
As in Deborrah's case, Dorivie was only a meter away when she witnessed Daisy's sexual
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 abuse in the hands of their father. 8
Deborrah Galigao was ten years old when she took the witness stand. She
corroborated Dorivie's testimony that accused-appellant raped Dorivie and Daisy several
times at night in the living room of their house. 9 More importantly, she testi ed that in the
evening of March 17, 1996, while she was sleeping with her siblings in the living room of
their house, accused-appellant removed her panties and his briefs, inserted his penis into
her private parts, and made thrusting motions. After a while, he went to the comfort room
to wash. Deborrah also washed herself. 1 0
In his defense, accused-appellant admitted having raped Daisy, but claimed he did
so to get back at her mother who left him for a man with whom she already had a child. He
denied having raped Dorivie and Deborrah and argued that the charges against him were
led at the instigation of his wife. When asked why he did not le the appropriate charges
against his wife for her alleged in delity, accused-appellant claimed that nobody was
willing to help him because she had a brother who was a policeman. 1 1
On cross-examination, accused-appellant admitted that he raped his three
daughters because he suspected that his wife was carrying an illicit affair with another
man:
COURT:
Q Do you still confirm your testimony during your direct examination that the
reason you raped Daisy Galigao was because it was a revenge against
your wife who according to you went away with her paramour?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q So that is the only reason why you committed the crime of rape against
your daughter?
A Yes. But I have already asked for forgiveness for the acts that I have
committed and I have already repented for what I have done, Your Honor.
Q How about the charges against you by Deborrah and Dorivie, what can you
say about that?
A They are the only ones who can tell the truth of the matter, Your Honor.
Q Is it not a fact that it is sad to say that you might have done what you did
to Daisy Galigao with respect to Deborrah and Dorivie because of your
revenge with your wife who according to you went away with her
paramour?
A No, Your Honor.
Q So it is clear now that you are admitting the rape charges to Daisy Galigao
and so with Deborrah and Dorivie Galigao?
Q Yes, Your Honor. 1 2
Daisy was presented as a defense witness however, she only made matters worse
for accused-appellant because, while she admitted to her ravishment and her plans to
forgive him, she later turned hostile upon learning that she was raped out of revenge:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
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 ATTY. GARING:
With the kind permission of this Honorable Court.

Q Your father admitted the rape charges against your person, what can you
say about that?

A What he said is true that he raped me, sir.

Q When you take the witness stand, what is your purpose?
A A while ago when my father sat down on the witness stand my sister and I
were planning to forgive him. But when I heard that the reason he raped me
was because he wanted to take revenge because my mother left us with
her paramour, I would like to say that my mother did not leave us because
she left with her paramour, but she left us in order to work.
Q It was our understanding. Actually I advised your sister before the hearing
of this case that you will pardon your father for the crime of rape, but is
seems that your testimony is going to [be] different now and that you are
now pursuing with the case against your father. Was there anybody who
coerced to tell the contrary in this case?
A Nobody threatened me, sir. I only changed my mind because of what he
testified this morning, I also witnessed what he did to my sister. If he only
admitted to me what he did to my sister, I can forgive him, but he did not
admit it to me, sir.
Q Why did you tell it to me this morning?
PROS. SEÑOREN:
Objection, Your Honor.
COURT:
Don't ask leading questions.

ATTY. GARING:
Q Considering that he is your father, can you not possibly reconsider your
statement that you are continuing with the prosecution of this case?
A What you mean is you want me to forgive him?
Q What I want to emphasize is to forgive your father and let the law take its
course.
PROS. SEÑOREN:
To prevent any complications later, may we suggest that the line of
questioning be changed, Your Honor.
COURT:
Reform. Do not ask leading questions.
ATTY. GARING:

We believe we are withdrawing this witness, Your Honor.

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 COURT:
You are not yet through with your direct examination.
ATTY. GARING:

We are withdrawing the witness from further testifying, Your Honor.

COURT:
Q You stated that you and your other sisters Deborrah and Dorivie came to an
agreement that you will already pardon your father for what he had done to
all of you. But upon hearing the testimony of your father during the cross
examination that the reason why your father abused you is because your
mother went away with her paramour and that your father made that as a
revenge against your mother. Did you say that?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q And you stated also during the direct examination that you were present
and a witness during the time that you[r] father was abusing your two
sisters Dorivie and Deborrah, is that correct?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q And so you confirmed the testimony given by your two sisters Deborah and
Dorivie that they were really abused by your father?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q During the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, why did you
not testify with respect to these cases when according to you you were
present and a witness when your sisters Dorivie and Deborrah were abused
by your father and also with respect to the rape case filed by you against
your father?
A Because my uncle told me not to testify anymore because I am already
grown up, Your Honor.
COURT (to Atty. Garing)
So you are asking to defer the testimony of this witness?

ATTY. GARING:
The total withdrawal of the testimony of this witness, Your Honor.
COURT:
She has already testified and the Court will not allow that anymore. Any
more questions Fiscal?
PROS. SEÑOREN:
On the basis of the testimony during the direct examination and also on the
basis of the follow-up questions, we have no cross-examination. 1 3

Su ce it to state that the testimonies of the victims bear the hallmarks of truth.
They are consistent in their material points. When a victim's testimony is straightforward,
candid, unshaken by rigid cross-examination and un awed by inconsistencies or
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 contradictions in its material points, the same must be given full faith and credit. 1 4
Established is the rule that testimonies of rape victims, especially child victims, are
given full weight and credit. 1 5 In the case at bar, the victims were barely eight, ten and
thirteen years old when they were raped. In a litany of cases, we have ruled that when a
woman, more so if she is a minor, says she has been raped, she says, in effect, all that is
necessary to prove that rape was committed. 1 6 Youth and immaturity are generally
badges of truth. 1 7 Courts usually give greater weight to the testimony of a girl who is a
victim of sexual assault, especially a minor, particularly in cases of incestuous rape,
because no woman would be willing to undergo a public trial and put up with the shame,
humiliation and dishonor of exposing her own degradation were it not to condemn an
injustice and to have the offender apprehended and punished. 1 8
The embarrassment and stigma of allowing an examination of their private parts
and testifying in open court on the painfully intimate details of their ravishment effectively
rule out the possibility of false accusations of rape 1 9 by the private complainants. Indeed,
it would be most unnatural for young and immature girls to fabricate a story of rape by
their father; allow a medical examination of their genitalia, subject themselves to a public
trial and expose themselves to public ridicule at the instigation of their mother in order that
the mother can carry on an alleged illicit relation with a paramour. 2 0 Verily —
Ill motive is never an essential element of a crime. It becomes
inconsequential where there are a rmative, nay, categorical declarations towards
the accused-appellant's accountability for the felony. 2 1

In stark contrast to the clear and categorical declarations of the private

complainants, accused-appellant interposes the defense of mental incapacity and argues
that at the time of the commission of the offenses, he was bordering on insanity. aECTcA

While this issue is being raised for the rst time in this appeal, the same will be
addressed consistent with the dictum that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole
case open for review and the reviewing tribunal may correct such errors it may nd in the
appealed judgment even if they have not been speci cally assigned 2 2 if their
consideration, as in this case, is necessary in arriving at a just resolution thereof. 2 3
The defense of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance. Like the
justifying circumstance of self-defense, the burden is on the defense to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that accused-appellant was insane immediately before the commission
of the crime or at the very moment of its execution. 2 4 In other words, a defendant in a
criminal case who interposes the defense of mental incapacity has the burden of
establishing the fact that he was insane at the very moment when the crime committed. 2 5
There must be complete deprivation of reason in the commission of the act, or that the
accused acted without discernment, 2 6 which must be proven by clear and positive
evidence. 2 7 The mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not preclude imputability.
2 8 Indeed, a man may act crazy but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is
legally so. 2 9 The non-medical opinion of defense counsel that accused-appellant was
bordering on insanity hardly measures up to the foregoing yardsticks. In the light of the
positive testimony of the victim proving accused-appellant's criminal accountability, this
bare and unsubstantiated defense must perforce fail.
The evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter that is
best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses and their demeanor, conduct and attitude, especially under cross-examination.
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 Appellate courts are bound by the ndings of the trial court in this respect, unless it is
shown that it has overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated certain facts and
circumstances which if considered would have altered the outcome of the case. 3 0 We nd
no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court in this case.

Indeed, the revelation of young innocent girls, aged barely eight, ten and thirteen,
deserves full credit. The willingness of complainants to face police investigation and to
undergo the trouble and humiliation of a public trial is eloquent testimony of the truth of
their complaints. 3 1 In short, it is most improbable for innocent and guileless girls such as
complainants to brazenly impute a crime so serious as rape to any man, let alone their
father, if it were not true. 3 2
Nevertheless, while accused-appellant's guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt,
we find the imposition of the three death penalties against him excessive and unwarranted.
In imposing upon accused-appellant the supreme penalty of death, the trial court
erroneously cited Article 266-A (formerly Article 335), as well as Article 266-B, (1), 3 3 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. Considering that the
crimes were committed prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353 on October 22, 1997, 3 4
the provisions of R.A. No. 7659, 3 5 which was the law in effect at the time the rapes were
committed should have been applied.
The pertinent provisions of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659, read as follows:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by
having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime is committed with any
of the following attendant circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
a nity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of
the victim. . . . .

However, the fact that rape was committed with the foregoing attendant
circumstance does not automatically merit the imposition of the death penalty. As held in
People v. Echegaray: 3 6
. . .. The elements that call for the imposition of the supreme penalty of
death in these crimes would only be relevant when the trial court, given the
prerogative to impose reclusion perpetua, instead actually imposes the death
penalty because it has, in appreciating the evidence proffered before it, found the
attendance of certain circumstances in the manner by which the crime was
committed, or in the person of the accused on his own or in relation to the victim,
or in any other matter of signi cance to the commission of the crime or its effects
on the victim or in society, which circumstances characterize the criminal act as
grievous, odious or hateful or inherently or manifestly wicked, vicious, atrocious or
perverse as to be repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms
of decency and morality in a just and civilized and ordered society.

We pointed out in the Echegaray case that the imposition of the death penalty in
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 those cases where the law provides for a penalty ranging from reclusion perpetua to death
does not give the trial court an unfettered but, rather, a guided discretion in the imposition
of capital punishment. Particularly enlightening on how such discretion is to be exercised
is the recent case of People v. Antonio Roque , 3 7 where the accused was likewise
sentenced by the trial court to death for raping his two daughters aged nine and eleven. In
the said case, we reduced the penalties from death to reclusion perpetua, to wit:
The death penalty could thus be decreed; nevertheless, Section 22 of
Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, recognizes
that in death penalty cases the High Tribunal puts to a vote not only the issue of
guilt of an appellant but also the question on the imposition of the death penalty
itself. The law provides thusly:
Sec. 22. Article 47 of the same Code is hereby amended to read
as follows:

ART. 47. In what cases the death penalty shall not be

imposed; Automatic review of Death Penalty Cases. — The death
penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed
under existing laws, except when the guilty person is below eighteen
(18) years of age at the time of the commission of the crime or is
more than seventy years of age or when upon appeal or automatic
review of the case by the Supreme Court, the required majority vote
is not obtained for the imposition of the death penalty, in which
cases, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.
The Court heretofore acknowledged that circumstances could exist to
warrant an exercise of such forbearance. In People v. Santos , 3 8 the Court
considered the acts of the deceased victim, a former municipal mayor, in clearing
and working on the land claimed by the Ilongots which could have been seen by
the accused as an act of oppression and abuse of authority which he felt morally
bound to forestall, as well as the limited schooling of the accused, as justi cation
to reduce the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua. In People v. De la Cruz, 3 9 the
Court took into account in lowering the penalty to reclusion perpetua on the
accused most of whom were already death row convicts, the deplorable sub-
human conditions of the National Penitentiary where the crime was committed. In
People v. Marcos , 4 0 the failure of appellant to realize the gravity of his offense
was held to justify the reduction of the penalty to reclusion perpetua. (italics ours)

Where, as in the above-mentioned Santos case, accused-appellant's limited

schooling was taken into consideration to reduce his penalty to reclusion perpetua, we can
do no less herein considering that accused-appellant is an unlettered fisherman. 4 1
Finally, the conviction of accused-appellant in Criminal Case No. 4976, as to the
alleged rape of Daisy Galigao should be struck down. Although the Information in Criminal
Case No. 4976 speaks of a "criminal complaint," none was ever presented. 4 2 Indeed, SPO4
Calderon, uncle of Daisy Galigao, testi ed that Daisy herself insisted in not pursuing the
case against accused-appellant as she was already grown up and did not want to be the
subject of gossip in the school where she was enrolled. 4 3
Apparently, the trial court convicted accused-appellant of three counts of rape on
the belief that he was being tried under the provisions of R.A. No. 8353. However, the
crimes for which he was convicted were committed in 1996, before R.A. No. 8353 took
effect in 1997. The said statute can not be made to apply retroactively for reasons earlier
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 stated. Prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 8353, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
required a criminal complaint before an Information is led. There being no such complaint
in Criminal Case No. C-4976, it was palpable error for the lower court to convict accused-
appellant for the crime of rape on Daisy Galigao. Moreover, as earlier stated, no trial was
ever conducted in the said case.
All told, we are convinced of the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of accused-appellant
for two counts of rape committed against his daughters, Dorivie and Deborrah. But given
the circumstances attendant to this case, there is su cient justi cation in imposing on
accused-appellant the reduced penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the indemnity ex delicto awarded is hereby
reduced to P50,000.00 consistent with controlling jurisprudence on the matter. 4 4 The
amount of moral damages will not be disturbed as they are in accord with case law
thereon. 4 5 However, the award of exemplary damages must be reduced to P25,000.00. 4 6
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Calapan City, Oriental
Mindoro, Branch 40, in Criminal Cases Nos. C-4974 and C-4975, nding accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua for each count of rape; he is ordered to pay each of the offended parties the
amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity ex delicto; P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Accused-appellant is ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. C-4976. TIEHDC

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., in the result.

Footnotes

1. People v. Queigan, 352 SCRA 150, 152 [2001], citing People v. Ramos, 165 SCRA 400
[1988].
2. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. C-4974, Record, Vol. 1, p. 1; C-4975, Record, Vol. 2, p. 1;
and C-4976, Record, Vol. 3, p. 1 of Branch 40, RTC of Oriental Mindoro sitting at Calapan
City.
3. Record, Vol. 1, pp. 25, 27.

4. Ibid., pp. 153–154; penned by Judge Tomas C. Leynes.

5. Rollo, pp. 168–169.
6. TSN, 26 February 1998, pp. 9–13.

7. Ibid., pp. 9, 13–16, 28.

8. Id., pp. 16–20.
9. TSN, 13 April 1998, pp. 3–8.

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 10. Ibid., pp. 8–20.
11. TSN, 16 June 1999, pp. 5–12.
12. TSN, 26 July 1999, pp. 4–5; emphasis and italics ours.

13. TSN, 26 July 1999, pp. 8–12.

14. People v. Caratay, 316 SCRA 251 [1999], citing People v. Bonghanoy, 308 SCRA 383
[1999].

15. People v. Lusa, 288 SCRA 296, 303 [1998].

16. People v. Mariño, G.R. No. 132550, 19 February 2001.
17. People v. Nardo, G.R. No. 133888, 1 March 2001.
18. People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441, 467 [1997].
19. People v. Pontilar, 275 SCRA 338, 350 [1997].
20. See People v. Perez, G.R. No. 113265, 5 March 2001.

21. People v. Segundo, 228 SCRA 691 [1993].

22. People v. Taño, 331 SCRA 449 [2000]; People v. Castillo, 325 SCRA 613 [2000].
23. People v. Cleopas, 327 SCRA 552 [2000].
24. People v. Bañez, 301 SCRA 248, 261 [1999].
25. People v. Diaz, 320 SCRA 168, 177 [1999].
26. People v. Cañeta, 309 SCRA 199, 208 [1999].
27. People v. Espanola, 271 SCRA 689 [1997].
28. People v. Tabugoca, 285 SCRA 312 [1998]; People v. Puno, 105 SCRA 151 [1981];
People v. Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451 [1986].

29. People v. So, 247 SCRA 708 [1995].

30. People v. Campos, 340 SCRA 517 [2000].
31. People v. Bali-balita, 340 SCRA 450 [2000]; People v. Victor, 292 SCRA 186 [1998].
32. People v. Marquez, 347 SCRA 510 [2000]; see also People v. Segovia, G.R. No. 138794,
19 September 2002.
33. ART. 266-B. Penalties —

xxx xxx xxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

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 34. See Section 5, R.A. No. 8353 stating that the Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after
completion of its publication in two newspapers of general circulation. Publication was
in fact made in the Malaya newspaper on 7 October 1997 and, hence, took effect fifteen
(15) days thereafter or on 22 October 1997.

35. Which took effect 31 December 1993.

36. 267 SCRA 682 [1997].

37. G.R. Nos. 130659 & 144002, 14 August 2002.

38. 19 SCRA 445 [1967].

39. 122 SCRA 227 [1983].

40. 147 SCRA 204 [1987].

41. TSN, 16 June 1999, p. 4.

42. Formal Offer of Exhibits, Record, pp. 128–130; italics ours.

43. TSN, 11 November 1998, p. 11.

44. People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 140676, 31 July 2002.

45. See People v. Pruna, G.R. No. 138471, 10 October 2002.
46. People v. Puzon, 339 SCRA 164 [2000].

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