FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 136292. January 15, 2002.]

RUDY CABALLES y TAIÑO , petitioner, vs . COURT OF APPEALS and

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , respondents.

De Jesus Orioste & Lim for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

The Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna convicted petitioner Rudy Caballes of
the crime of theft for stealing aluminum cable conductors worth P55,244.45 belonging to
the National Power Corporation. Accordingly, it sentenced petitioner to a prison term and
ordered him to indemnify private complainant. On appeal, the Court of Appeals a rmed
the judgment of conviction but deleted the award of damages and modi ed the penalty
imposed.
Hence, this appeal by certiorari. Petitioner questioned the validity of the warrantless
search and seizure made by the police o cers, and the admissibility of the evidence
obtained by virtue thereof.
The searches without warrant of moving vehicles is allowed provided such searches
are made at borders or 'constructive borders', like checkpoints. The mere mobility of these
vehicles, however, does not give the police o cers unlimited discretion to conduct
indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in
the absence of probable cause. In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was agged
down because the police o cers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when
they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which, according
to them, was unusual and uncommon. The Court held that the fact that the vehicle looked
suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves
does not constitute "probable cause'' as would justify the conduct of a search without a
warrant. In addition, the police authorities did not claim to have received any con dential
report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle,
which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Our jurisprudence is replete with
cases where tipped information has become a su cient probable cause to effect a
warrantless search and seizure. Unfortunately, none exists in this case. Furthermore, it
cannot be said that the cable wires found in petitioner's vehicle were in plain view, making
its warrantless seizure valid. It was clear from the records that the cable wires were not
exposed to sight because they were placed in sacks and covered by kakawati leaves. The
police o cers even have to ask petitioner what was loaded in his vehicle. Moreover, it was
not established by clear and positive proof that the petitioner consented to the search or
intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable search. Thus, the articles seized
from petitioner could not be used as evidence against him. For lack of evidence to
establish his guilt, the Court acquitted petitioner of the crime charged.

SYLLABUS
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 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; EXCLUSIONARY RULE; BARS ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE
OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT; EXCEPTIONS. — Enshrined in our Co nstitution is
the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and properties against
unreasonable searches and seizures, as de ned under Section 2, Article III thereof. The
exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of
evidence obtained in violation of such right. The constitutional proscription against
warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of certain exceptions,
namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in
plain view; (3) search of moving vehicles; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs
search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (7) exigent and emergency
circumstances.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE;
REASONABLENESS OR UNREASONABLENESS OF SEARCH OR SEIZURE IS PURELY A
JUDICIAL QUESTION; CASE AT BAR. — In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps
prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied with.
In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure,
or when the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a
reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable
from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or
seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured.
3. ID.; ID.; WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF MOVING VEHICLES; ALLOWED PROVIDED
THE SAME WAS MADE AT CONSTRUCTIVE BORDERS. — Highly regulated by the
government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when
its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to
probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity. Thus, the rules governing
search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle
is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a
warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be
described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge — a requirement which borders on the
impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can
transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a
warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justi ed on the ground that it is not practicable
to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Searches without warrant of automobiles
is also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws,
provided such searches are made at borders or 'constructive borders' like checkpoints
near the boundary lines of the State.ACaDTH

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIRES PROBABLE CAUSE; EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE NOT
DETERMINED BY FIXED FORMULA BUT IS RESOLVED ACCORDING TO THE FACTS OF
EACH CASE. — The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police
o cers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made
within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause. Still and all, the
important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which
must still be present in such a case. Although the term eludes exact de nition, probable
cause signi es a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances su ciently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty
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 of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances
which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said
offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. The
required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not
determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; "STOP-AND-SEARCH" AT POLICE CHECKPOINTS; NOT ILLEGAL PER
SE; ROUTINE INSPECTIONS; NOT VIOLATIVE OF RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES; LIMITATIONS; CASE AT BAR. — One such form of search of moving vehicles is
the "stop-and-search" without warrant at military or police checkpoints which has been
declared to be not illegal per se, for as long as it is warranted by the exigencies of public
order and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. A checkpoint may either be a
mere routine inspection or it may involve an extensive search. Routine inspections are not
regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search. The search
which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to the following instances: (1)
where the o cer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the
public fair grounds; (2) simply looks into a vehicle; (3) ashes a light therein without
opening the car's doors; (4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body
search; (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual
inspection; and (6) where the routine check is conducted in a xed area. None of the
foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The police o cers did not merely
conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein petitioner's vehicle. They had to reach
inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able
to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine check.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXTENSIVE CHECK OF VEHICLE, WHEN PERMISSIBLE. — In the case
of United States vs. Pierre, the Court held that the physical intrusion of a part of the body
of an agent into the vehicle goes beyond the area protected by the Fourth Amendment, to
wit: "The Agent . . . stuck his head through the driver's side window. The agent thus
effected a physical intrusion into the vehicle . . . [W]e are aware of no case holding that an
o cer did not conduct a search when he physically intruded part of his body into a space
in which the suspect had a reasonable expectation of privacy. [The] Agent['s] . . . physical
intrusion allowed him to see and to smell things he could not see or smell from outside the
vehicle . . . In doing so, his inspection went beyond that portion of the vehicle which may be
viewed from outside the vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or diligent police o cers,
and into the area protected by the Fourth amendment, just as much as if he had stuck his
head inside the open window of a home." On the other hand, when a vehicle is stopped and
subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search would be constitutionally
permissible only if the o cers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause
to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or they will nd the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched. This Court
has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial warrant an extensive
search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated from a package the
distinctive smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the
Philippine National Police ("PNP") had received a con dential report from informers that a
sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along the route where the search was
conducted; (3) Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom
agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his
waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identi cation papers when requested
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 to do so; (4) Narcom agents had received con dential information that a woman having
the same physical appearance as that of the accused would be transporting marijuana; (5)
the accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had
earlier received con dential reports that said accused would transport a large quantity of
marijuana; and (6) where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of
intelligence information and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy — one
who participated in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused
belonged — that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the country.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; FACT THAT VEHICLE LOOKS SUSPICIOUS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
PROBABLE CAUSE. — In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was agged down
because the police o cers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw
that the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them,
was unusual and uncommon. We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious
simply because it is not common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not
constitute "probable cause" as would justify the conduct of a search without a warrant.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; TIPPED INFORMATION; A SUFFICIENT CAUSE TO EFFECT
WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE. — In People vs. Chua Ho San, we held that the fact
that the watercraft used by the accused was different in appearance from the usual shing
boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas coupled with the suspicious behavior
of the accused when he attempted to ee from the police authorities do not su ciently
establish probable cause. In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received
any con dential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable
wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Our
jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped information has become a su cient
probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure. Unfortunately, none exists in
this case.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE; OBJECT ITSELF IS PLAINLY EXPOSED TO
SIGHT; CASE AT BAR. — It cannot likewise be said that the cable wires found in petitioner's
vehicle were in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid. Jurisprudence is to the
effect that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. Where
the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and
therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its
contents, whether by its distinctive con guration, its transparency, or if its contents are
obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other
words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance
that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. It is clear from the records of this case
that the cable wires were not exposed to sight because they were placed in sacks and
covered with leaves. The articles were neither transparent nor immediately apparent to the
police authorities. They had no clue as to what was hidden underneath the leaves and
branches. As a matter of fact, they had to ask petitioner what was loaded in his vehicle. In
such a case, it has been held that the object is not in plain view which could have justi ed
mere seizure of the articles without further search.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSENTED WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURE; CONSENT
MUST BE VOLUNTARY AND MUST BE SHOWN BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE;
BURDEN OF PROOF LIES ON THE STATE. — Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against
unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived. The consent
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 must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the
consent is unequivocal, speci c, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion. Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by
clear and convincing evidence. The question whether a consent to a search was in fact
voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.
Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving
consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2)
whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or
passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence
of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will
be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the
questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
consenting. It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony,
that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given. This
Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity of consented warrantless searches
and seizure. But in these cases, the police o cers' request to search personnel effects
was orally articulated to the accused and in such language that left no room for doubt that
the latter fully understood what was requested. In some instance, the accused even
verbally replied to the request demonstrating that he also understood the nature and
consequences of such request.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASES UPHOLDING VALIDITY THEREOF, CITED. — In Asuncion vs.
Court of Appeals, the apprehending o cers sought the permission of petitioner to search
the car, to which the latter agreed. Petitioner therein himself freely gave his consent to said
search. In People vs. Lacerna, the appellants who were riding in a taxi were stopped by two
policemen who asked permission to search the vehicle and the appellants readily agreed.
In upholding the validity of the consented search, the Court held that appellant himself who
was "urbanized in mannerism and speech expressly said that he was consenting to the
search as he allegedly had nothing to hide and had done nothing wrong. In Peole vs.
Cuizon, the accused admitted that they signed a written permission stating that they freely
consented to the search of their luggage by the NBI agents to determine if they were
carrying shabu. In People vs. Montilla, it was held that the accused spontaneously
performed a rmative acts of volition by himself opening the bag without being forced or
intimidated to do so, which acts should properly be construed as a clear waiver of his
right. In People vs. Omaweng , the police o cers asked the accused if they could see the
contents of his bag to which the accused said "you can see the contents but those are only
clothings." Then the policemen asked if they could open and see it, and accused answered
"you can see it." The Court said there was a valid consented search. ScAaHE

12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE AGAINST

OBTRUSIVE SEARCHES; REQUISITES; CONSENT GIVEN UNDER COERCIVE
CIRCUMSTANCES IS NO CONSENT WITHIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE; CASE AT
BAR. — In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against
obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must rst appear that
(1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right, and (3) the said person had an actual intention
to relinquish the right. In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner
intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. The manner by which
the two police o cers allegedly obtained the consent of petitioner for them to conduct
the search leaves much to be desired. When petitioner's vehicle was agged down, Sgt.
Noceja approached petitioner and "told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he
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 answered in the positive." We are hard put to believe that by uttering those words, the
police o cers were asking or requesting for permission that they be allowed to search the
vehicle of petitioner. For all intents and purposes, they were informing, nay, imposing upon
herein petitioner that they will search his vehicle. The "consent" given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSENT OF ACCUSED TO BE SEARCHED MUST BE
ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND POSITIVE PROOF. — In addition, in cases where this Court
upheld the validity of consented search, it will be noted that the police authorities
expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to be searched. And
the consent of the accused was established by clear and positive proof. In the case of
herein petitioner, the statements of the police o cers were not asking for his consent;
they were declaring to him that they will look inside his vehicle. Besides, it is doubtful
whether permission was actually requested and granted because when Sgt. Noceja was
asked during his direct examination what he did when the vehicle of petitioner stopped, he
answered that he removed the cover of the vehicle and saw the aluminum wires. It was
only after he was asked a clari catory question that he added that he told petitioner he will
inspect the vehicle. To our mind, this was more of an afterthought. Likewise, when Pat. de
Castro was asked twice in his direct examination what they did when they stopped the
jeepney, his consistent answer was that they searched the vehicle. He never testi ed that
he asked petitioner for permission to conduct the search.
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE OF ACCUSED TO OBJECT NOT CONSTRUED AS IMPLIED
ACQUIESCENCE TO THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH. — Neither can petitioner's passive
submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless search. In People
vs. Barros, appellant Barros, who was carrying a carton box, boarded a bus where two
policemen were riding. The policemen inspected the carton and found marijuana inside.
When asked who owned the box, appellant denied ownership of the box and failed to
object to the search. The Court there struck down the warrantless search as illegal and
held that the accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted
simply because he failed to object, citing the ruling in the case of People vs. Burgos, to wit:
"As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any a rmative act of the citizen, the
courts do not place the citizens in the position of either contesting an o cer's authority by
force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission
to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a
demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law."

DECISION

PUNO , J : p

This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals

dated September 15, 1998 which a rmed the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial
Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna, nding herein petitioner, Rudy Caballes y Taiño, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of theft, and the resolution 2 dated November 9, 1998 which
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
In an Information 3 dated October 16, 1989, petitioner was charged with the crime
of theft committed as follows:

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 "That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of
Pagsanjan, and/or elsewhere in the Province of Laguna, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain,
and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, the NATIONAL
POWER CORPORATION, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and carry away about 630-kg of Aluminum Cable Conductors, valued
at P27,450.00, belonging to and to the damage and prejudice of said owner
National Power Corp., in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

During the arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the merits
ensued.
The facts are summarized by the appellate court as follows:
"[At] about 9:15 p.m. of June 28, 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex
de Castro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna,
spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police
o cers agged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by appellant. When asked
what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer; he appeared pale and nervous.
With appellant's consent, the police o cers checked the cargo and they
discovered bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires
exclusively owned by National Power Corporation (NPC). The conductor wires
weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55,244.45. Noceja asked appellant where the
wires came from and appellant answered that they came from Cavinti, a town
approximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan. Thereafter, appellant and the
vehicle with the high-voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station.
Danilo Cabale took pictures of the appellant and the jeep loaded with the wires
which were turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna.
Appellant was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail.
In defense, appellant interposed denial and alibi. He testi ed that he is a
driver and resident of Pagsanjan, Laguna; a NARCOM civilian agent since
January, 1988 although his identi cation card (ID) has already expired. In the
afternoon of June 28, 1989, while he was driving a passenger jeepney, he was
stopped by one Resty Fernandez who requested him to transport in his jeepney
conductor wires which were in Cavinti, Laguna. He told Resty to wait until he had
nished his last trip for the day from Santa Cruz, Laguna. On his way to Santa
Cruz, Laguna, he dropped by the NARCOM headquarters and informed his
superior, Sgt. Callos, that something unlawful was going to happen. Sgt. Callos
advised him to proceed with the loading of the wires and that the former would
act as back-up and intercept the vehicle at the Sambat Patrol Base in Pagsanjan.

After receiving those instructions, he went back to see Resty. Although

Resty had his own vehicle, its tires were old so the cable wires were loaded in
appellant's jeep and covered with kakawati leaves. The loading was done by
about ve (5) masked men. He was promised P1,000.00 for the job. Upon
crossing a bridge, the two vehicles separated but in his case, he was intercepted
by Sgt. Noceja and Pat. De Castro. When they discovered the cables, he told the
police o cers that the cables were loaded in his jeep by the owner, Resty
Fernandez. But despite his explanation, he was ordered to proceed to police
headquarters where he was interrogated. The police o cers did not believe him
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 and instead locked him up in jail for a week." 4

On April 27, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgment 5 the dispositive portion of
which reads:
"WHEREFORE, nding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Theft of property worth P55,244.45, the Court hereby sentences him to
suffer imprisonment from TWO (2) [YEARS], FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY
o f Prision Correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of Prision Mayor, as
maximum, to indemnify the complainant National Power Corporation in the
amount of P55,244.45, and to pay the costs."

On appeal, the Court of Appeals a rmed the judgment of conviction but deleted the
award for damages on the ground that the stolen materials were recovered and modi ed
the penalty imposed, to wit:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modi cation that appellant RUDY CABALLES is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principal in theft, de ned and penalized under Articles 308 and 309, par.
1, Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstances, he is hereby
meted an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years, Nine (9) months and Eleven
(11) days of prision correccional, as minimum term, to Eight (8) years, Eight (8)
months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum term. No civil indemnity
and no costs." 6

Petitioner comes before us and raises the following issues:

"(a) Whether or not the constitutional right of petitioner was violated when
the police o cers searched his vehicle and seized the wires found therein without
a search warrant and when samples of the wires and references to them were
admitted in evidence as basis for his conviction;
(b) Whether or not respondent Court erred in rejecting petitioner's defense
that he was engaged in an entrapment operation and in indulging in speculation
and conjecture in rejecting said defense; and

(c) Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish the
guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt and thus failed to overcome the
constitutional right of petitioner to presumption of innocence."

The conviction or acquittal of petitioner hinges primarily on the validity of the

warrantless search and seizure made by the police o cers, and the admissibility of the
evidence obtained by virtue thereof.
In holding that the warrantless search and seizure is valid, the trial court ruled that:
"As his last straw of argument, the accused questions the constitutionality
of the search and validity of his arrest on the ground that no warrant was issued
to that effect. The Court cannot again sustain such view. In the case of People v.
Lo Ho [Wing], G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991, it has been held that 'considering
that before a warrant can be obtained, the place, things and persons to be
searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge — a
requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected
by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to
another with impunity, a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justi ed on
grounds of practicability.' The doctrine is not of recent vintage. In the case of
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 Valmonte vs. de Villa, G.R. No. 83988, May 24, 1990 (Resolution on Motion for
Reconsideration, September 29, 1989), it was ruled that 'automobiles because of
their mobility may be searched without a warrant upon facts not justifying
warrantless search of a resident or o ce. . . . To hold that no criminal can, in any
case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a
warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest,
the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in
many instances' (Ibid.). In Umil v. Ramos , 187 SCRA 311, and People vs. Ortiz,
191 SCRA 836, the Supreme Court held that a search may be made even without
a warrant where the accused is caught in flagrante. Under the circumstances, the
police o cers are not only authorized but are also under obligation to arrest the
accused even without a warrant." 7

Petitioner contends that the agging down of his vehicle by police o cers who
were on routine patrol, merely on "suspicion" that "it might contain smuggled goods," does
not constitute probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure. He insists
that, contrary to the ndings of the trial court as adopted by the appellate court, he did not
give any consent, express or implied, to the search of the vehicle. Perforce, any evidence
obtained in violation of his right against unreasonable search and seizure shall be deemed
inadmissible.
Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their
persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as de ned under
Section 2, Article III thereof, which reads:
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or a rmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized."

The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the
admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right.
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not
absolute but admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence; 8 (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; 9 (3) search of moving vehicles; 10 (4)
consented warrantless search; 1 1 (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search); 12 and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. 1 3
In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and
reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied with. In the exceptional events where
warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be
performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable
search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the
circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or
absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the
place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured. 1 4
It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police o cers in
the case at bar was not authorized by a search warrant. The main issue is whether the
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 evidence taken from the warrantless search is admissible against the appellant. Without
said evidence, the prosecution cannot prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable
doubt.
I. Search of moving vehicle
Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity. 15 Thus, the rules governing search and seizure have over the years been
steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of
practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place,
things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing
judge — a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected
by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another
with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justi ed on
the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. 16 Searches
without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of
smuggling or immigration laws, provided such searches are made at borders or
'constructive borders' like checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State. 17
The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police o cers
unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within
the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause. 18 Still and all, the
important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which
must still be present in such a case.
Although the term eludes exact de nition, probable cause signi es a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances su ciently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which
he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to
seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. 1 9 The required probable
cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by a xed
formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case. 20
One such form of search of moving vehicles is the "stop-and-search" without
warrant at military or police checkpoints which has been declared to be not illegal per se,
21 for as long as it is warranted by the exigencies of public order 22 and conducted in a
way least intrusive to motorists. 23 A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection
or it may involve an extensive search.
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against
unreasonable search. The search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited
to the following instances: (1) where the o cer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant
vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; 24 (2) simply looks into a vehicle; 25 (3)
ashes a light therein without opening the car's doors; 26 (4) where the occupants are not
subjected to a physical or body search; 27 (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is
limited to a visual search or visual inspection; 28 and (6) where the routine check is
conducted in a fixed area." 2 9

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 None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The police
o cers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein petitioner's
vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the
sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple
routine check.
In the case of United States vs. Pierre, 30 the Court held that the physical intrusion of
a part of the body of an agent into the vehicle goes beyond the area protected by the
Fourth Amendment, to wit:
"The Agent . . . stuck his head through the driver's side window. The agent
thus effected a physical intrusion into the vehicle . . . [W]e are aware of no case
holding that an o cer did not conduct a search when he physically intruded part
of his body into a space in which the suspect had a reasonable expectation of
privacy. [The] Agent[s] . . . physical intrusion allowed him to see and to smell
things he could not see or smell from outside the vehicle . . . In doing so, his
inspection went beyond that portion of the vehicle which may be viewed from
outside the vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or diligent police o cers, and
into the area protected by the Fourth amendment, just as much as if he had stuck
his head inside the open window of a home."

On the other hand, when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search,
such a warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the o cers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search,
that either the motorist is a law-offender or they will nd the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched. 31
This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial
warrant an extensive search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated
from a package the distinctive smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics Command
("Narcom") of the Philippine National Police ("PNP") had received a con dential report
from informers that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along the route
where the search was conducted; (3) Narcom agents had received information that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited
drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a
conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other
identi cation papers when requested to do so; (4) Narcom agents had received
con dential information that a woman having the same physical appearance as that of the
accused would be transporting marijuana; 32 (5) the accused who were riding a jeepney
were stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier received con dential reports
that said accused would transport a large quantity of marijuana; and (6) where the moving
vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information and clandestine
reports by a deep penetration agent or spy — one who participated in the drug smuggling
activities of the syndicate to which the accused belonged — that said accused were
bringing prohibited drugs into the country. 33
In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was agged down because the police
o cers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the
vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and
uncommon.
Pat. Alex de Castro recounted the incident as follows:
"ATTY. SANTOS
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 Q Now on said date and time do you remember of any unusual incident while you
were performing your duty?

A Yes, sir, at that time and date myself and Police Sgt. Noceja were conducting
patrol in the said place when we spotted a suspicious jeepney so we
stopped the jeepney and searched the load of the jeepney and we found
out (sic) these conductor wires.

Q You mentioned about the fact that when you saw the jeepney you became
suspicious, why did you become suspicious?
A Because the cargo was covered with leaves and branches, sir.

Q When you became suspicious upon seeing those leaves on top of the load what
did you do next, if any?
A We stopped the jeepney and searched the contents thereof, sir." 34

The testimony of Victorino Noceja did not fare any better:

"ATTY. SANTOS

Q When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?
A Because I saw that the vehicle being drawn by Caballes was covered by
kakawati leaves, I became suspicious since such vehicle should not be
covered by those and I flagged him, sir." 35
We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not
common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable
cause" as would justify the conduct of a search without a warrant.
In People vs. Chua Ho San, 36 we held that the fact that the watercraft used by the
accused was different in appearance from the usual shing boats that commonly cruise
over the Bacnotan seas coupled with the suspicious behavior of the accused when he
attempted to ee from the police authorities do not su ciently establish probable cause.
Thus:
"In the case at bar, the Solicitor General proposes that the following details
are suggestive of probable cause — persistent reports of rampant smuggling of
rearm and other contraband articles, CHUA's watercraft differing in appearance
from the usual shing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas,
CHUA's illegal entry into the Philippines . . ., CHUA's suspicious behavior, i.e., he
attempted to ee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by
which CHUA can return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch
towards the high seas, beyond the reach of Philippine laws.

This Court, however, nds that these do not constitute "probable cause."
None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of
marijuana or other prohibited drug, con dential report and/or positive
identi cation by informers of courier of prohibited drug and/or the time and place
where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or behavior, and
suspicious bulge in the waist — accepted by this Court as su cient to justify a
warrantless arrest exists in this case. There was no classi ed information that a
foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the
date in question. CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or
agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to
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 the shing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of
perpetrating an offense. . . .." (italics supplied)
In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any con dential
report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle
which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Our jurisprudence is replete with
cases where tipped information has become a su cient probable cause to effect a
warrantless search and seizure. 37 Unfortunately, none exists in this case.
II. Plain view doctrine
It cannot likewise be said that the cable wires found in petitioner's vehicle were in
plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid.
Jurisprudence is to the effect that an object is in plain view if the object itself is
plainly exposed to sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object
itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the
package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive con guration, its transparency,
or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be
seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer
from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in
plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe
may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. 38
It is clear from the records of this case that the cable wires were not exposed to
sight because they were placed in sacks 39 and covered with leaves. The articles were
neither transparent nor immediately apparent to the police authorities. They had no clue as
to what was hidden underneath the leaves and branches. As a matter of fact, they had to
ask petitioner what was loaded in his vehicle. In such a case, it has been held that the
object is not in plain view which could have justi ed mere seizure of the articles without
further search. 40
III. Consented search
Petitioner contends that the statement of Sgt. Victorino Noceja that he checked the
vehicle "with the consent of the accused" is too vague to prove that petitioner consented
to the search. He claims that there is no speci c statement as to how the consent was
asked and how it was given, nor the speci c words spoken by petitioner indicating his
alleged "consent." At most, there was only an implied acquiescence, a mere passive
conformity, which is no "consent" at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures
is a personal right which may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate
an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, speci c, and
intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. 41 Hence, consent to a
search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. 4 2
The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to
be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. 43 Relevant to this determination
are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in
which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or
secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked on; 44 (4) the
education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police
procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; 45 (7)
the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took
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 place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. 46 It is the
State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary
consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given. 47
In the case at bar, Sgt. Victorino Noceja testi ed on the manner in which the search
was conducted in this wise:
"WITNESS

Q On June 28, 1989, where were you?

A We were conducting patrol at the poblacion and some barangays, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q After conducting the patrol operation, do you remember of any unusual incident
on said date and time?
A Yes, sir.

Q What is that incident?

A While I was conducting my patrol at barangay Sampalucan, I saw Rudy
Caballes driving a vehicle and the vehicle contained aluminum wires, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?
A Because I saw that the vehicle being driven by Caballes was covered by
kakawati leaves, I became suspicious since such vehicle should not be
covered by those and I flagged him, sir.
Q Did the vehicle stop?

A Yes, sir, and after said vehicle stop[ped], I removed the cover of said vehicle and
by so doing, I saw the aluminum wires.
Q Before you saw the aluminum wires, did you talk to the accused?
A Yes, sir, I asked him what his load was.

Q What was the answer of Caballes?

A He did not answer and I observed him to be pale, "nagpapamutla" (sic), so I told
him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the
positive.
Q And after you saw for yourself the aluminum wires loaded on the jeep, what did
you do?
A I asked him where those wires came from and he answered those came from
the Cavinti area, sir." 48

This Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity of consented warrantless
searches and seizure. But in these cases, the police o cers' request to search personnel
effects was orally articulated to the accused and in such language that left no room for
doubt that the latter fully understood what was requested. In some instance, the accused
even verbally replied to the request demonstrating that he also understood the nature and
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 consequences of such request. 49
I n Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals, 50 the apprehending o cers sought the
permission of petitioner to search the car, to which the latter agreed. Petitioner therein
himself freely gave his consent to said search. In People vs. Lacerna, 51 the appellants who
were riding in a taxi were stopped by two policemen who asked permission to search the
vehicle and the appellants readily agreed. In upholding the validity of the consented search,
the Court held that appellant himself who was "urbanized in mannerism and speech"
expressly said that he was consenting to the search as he allegedly had nothing to hide
and had done nothing wrong. In People vs. Cuizon, 52 the accused admitted that they
signed a written permission stating that they freely consented to the search of their
luggage by the NBI agents to determine if they were carrying shabu. In People vs. Montilla,
53 it was held that the accused spontaneously performed a rmative acts of volition by
himself opening the bag without being forced or intimidated to do so, which acts should
properly be construed as a clear waiver of his right. In People vs. Omaweng , 5 4 the police
o cers asked the accused if they could see the contents of his bag to which the accused
said "you can see the contents but those are only clothings." Then the policemen asked if
they could open and see it, and accused answered "you can see it." The Court said there
was a valid consented search.
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against
obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must rst appear that
(1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention
to relinquish the right. 55
In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner intentionally
surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. The manner by which the two police
o cers allegedly obtained the consent of petitioner for them to conduct the search leaves
much to be desired. When petitioner's vehicle was agged down, Sgt. Noceja approached
petitioner and "told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the
positive." We are hard put to believe that by uttering those words, the police o cers were
asking or requesting for permission that they be allowed to search the vehicle of
petitioner. For all intents and purposes, they were informing, nay, imposing upon herein
petitioner that they will search his vehicle. The "consent" given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. In
addition, in cases where this Court upheld the validity of consented search, it will be noted
that the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the
accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused was established by clear and
positive proof. In the case of herein petitioner, the statements of the police o cers were
not asking for his consent; they were declaring to him that they will look inside his vehicle.
Besides, it is doubtful whether permission was actually requested and granted because
when Sgt. Noceja was asked during his direct examination what he did when the vehicle of
petitioner stopped, he answered that he removed the cover of the vehicle and saw the
aluminum wires. It was only after he was asked a clari catory question that he added that
he told petitioner he will inspect the vehicle. To our mind, this was more of an afterthought.
Likewise, when Pat. de Castro was asked twice in his direct examination what they did
when they stopped the jeepney, his consistent answer was that they searched the vehicle.
He never testified that he asked petitioner for permission to conduct the search. 56
Neither can petitioner's passive submission be construed as an implied
acquiescence to the warrantless search. In People vs. Barros, 57 appellant Barros, who
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 was carrying a carton box, boarded a bus where two policemen were riding. The policemen
inspected the carton and found marijuana inside. When asked who owned the box,
appellant denied ownership of the box and failed to object to the search. The Court there
struck down the warrantless search as illegal and held that the accused is not to be
presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted simply because he failed to
object, citing the ruling in the case of People vs. Burgos, 5 8 to wit:
"As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any a rmative act
of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizens in the position of either
contesting an o cer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but
instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a
consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the
supremacy of the law."

Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are
insu cient to sustain petitioner's conviction. His guilt can only be established without
violating the constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable search and seizure.
WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused
Rudy Caballes is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. Cost de oficio. EDATSI

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, with Salome A. Montoya and Eloy R. Bello, Jr.,
JJ., concurring; Annex A, Petition; Rollo, pp. 32-45.
2. Annex B, id.; Ibid., p. 48.

3. Original Record, p. 37.

4. Rollo, pp. 33-36.

5. Penned by Judge Jose Catral Mendoza; Original Record, pp. 187-194.

6. Rollo, p. 45.
7. Original Record, pp. 193-194.

8. People vs. Figueroa, 248 SCRA 679 (1995); Morfe vs. Mutuc, et al., 22 SCRA 424 (1968);
Davis vs. United States, 328 U.S. 582.
9. Obra, et al. vs. CA, et al., 317 SCRA 594 (1999); People vs. Bagista, 214 SCRA 63 (1992);
Padilla vs. CA, et al., 269 SCRA 402 (1997); People vs. Lo Ho Wing, et al., 193 SCRA 122
(1991); Coolidge vs. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443.

10. People vs. Escaño, et al., 323 SCRA 754 (2000); Aniag, Jr. vs. Comelec , 237 SCRA 424
(1994); People vs. Saycon, 236 SCRA 325 (1994); People vs. Exala, 221 SCRA 494
(1993); Valmonte vs. de Villa, 178 SCRA 211 (1989); Carroll vs. United States, 267 U.S.
132.

11. People vs. Montilla, 285 SCRA 703 (1998); People vs. Cuizon, 256 SCRA 325 (1996);
Mustang Lumber vs. CA, et al., 257 SCRA 430 (1996); People vs. Ramos, 222 SCRA 557
(1993); People vs. Omaweng, 213 SCRA 462 (1992).
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 12. People vs. Solayao, 262 SCRA 255 (1996); Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA 288
(1990) citing Terry vs. Ohio, 20 L. Ed. 2d 896.

13. People vs. de Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 (1994) citing People vs. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401
(1991) and Umil, et al. vs. Ramos, et al., 187 SCRA 311 (1990).
14. Posadas vs. CA, et al., supra note 12, citing People vs. CFI of Rizal, 101 SCRA 86 (1996).

15. Padilla vs. CA, et al., supra note 9, citing United States vs. Rem, 984 F 2d 806; United States
vs. McCoy, 977 F 2d 706; United States vs. Rusher, 966 F 2d 868; United States vs.
Parker, 928 F 2d 365.
16. Asuncion vs. CA, et al., 302 SCRA 490 (1999); People vs. Lo Ho Wing, supra note 9.

17. Almedia-Sanchez vs. United States, 37 L.ed. 2d 596; Carrol vs. United States, supra note 10.
18. People vs. Malmstedt, supra note 13.

19. People vs. Valdez, 304 SCRA 140 (1999).

20. People vs. Barros, 231 SCRA 557 (1994); United States vs. Robinwitz, 94 L. ed. 653; Martin
vs. United States, 183 F 2d 436.
21. People vs. Exala, supra note 10; Valmonte vs. de Villa, supra note 10.

22. The Court has held in a case that checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart
plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. At the cost of
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints
during abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we
pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community. Valmonte vs. de Villa, supra.

23. People vs. Escaño, supra note 10, citing U.S. vs. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543.
24. Valmonte vs. de Villa, supra note 10, citing People vs. Case, 27 A.L.R. 686.

25. Id., citing State vs. Gaina, 3 A.L.R. 1500.

26. Id., citing Rowland vs. Commonwealth, 259 S.W. 33.

27. People vs. Barros, supra note 20.

28. People vs. Lacerna, 278 SCRA 561 (1997).

29. People vs. Escaño, supra note 10.

30. 932 F. 2d 377 cited in Hermann, Search and Seizure Checklists, 1994 ed., p. 246.
31. Obra, et al. vs. CA, et al., supra note 9; People vs. Bagista, supra note 9.

32. People vs. Barros, supra note 27.

33. People vs. Lacerna, supra note 28.

34. TSN, January 31, 1991, pp. 9-10.

35. TSN, August 9, 1990, p. 3.

36. 308 SCRA 432 (1999).

37. People vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 121877, September 12, 2001; People vs. Valdez, supra note
19; People vs. Malmstedt, supra note 13; People vs. Tangliben , 184 SCRA 220 (1990);
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 People vs. Maspil, 188 SCRA 751 (1990); People vs. Bagista, supra note 9.
38. People vs. Doria, 301 SCRA 668 (1999).

39. Exhibit E; Original Record, p. 104.

40. People vs. Musa, 217 SCRA 597 (1993); People vs. Evaristo, 216 SCRA 431 (1992); Harris
vs. United States, 390 U.S. 234.
41. 68 Am Jur 2d Searches and Seizures, § 135.
42. Supra, § 136.

43. Schneckloth vs. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218.

44. United States vs. Barahona, 990 F. 2d 412.

45. United States vs. Lopez, 911 F. 2d 1006.

46. United States vs. Nafzger, 965 F. 2d 213.

47. United States vs. Tillman, 963 F. 2d 137; Florida vs. Royer, 460 U.S. 491; United States vs.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544.
48. TSN, August 9, 1990, pp. 2-3.

49. People vs. Chua Ho San, supra note 36.

50. 302 SCRA 490 (1999).

51. 278 SCRA 561 (1997).

52. 256 SCRA 325 (1996).

53. 285 SCRA 703 (1998).

54. 213 SCRA 462 (1992).

55. People vs. Figueroa, 335 SCRA 249 (2000).

56. TSN, January 31, 1991, p. 10.

57. 231 SCRA 557 (1994).

58. 144 SCRA 1 (1986).

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