Takeoff Safety Training Aid PDF

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Takeoff Safety Training Aid
Revision Highlights
Revision 2 to the Takeoff Safety Training Aid, dated December 20, 2005
This revision is a complete revision. All pages of the previous document are replaced and a
detailed itemization of each revised page is not provided. There are several primary reasons
for this revision:
1) Updated the accident and incident statistics.
2) Updated the nomenclature and discussion to reflect recent revisions to the airworthiness
regulations. Specifically, this includes the introduction of the Joint Airworthiness
Regulations(JARs), along with Amendments 25-42 and 25-92 to the Federal Aviation
Regulations(FARs). The main issues include the requirement for all engine RTO, wet
runway takeoff certification, worn brake consideration, and changes to the RTO transition.
The wording was therefore appropriately changed to include the new regulations, while
still recognizing that many airplanes are still certified to the previous rules.
3) Changed the software platform to allow digital delivery and ease of future revisions.
In the process of doing this, a number of inconsistencies, typos and grammatical errors
were corrected. We did not include revision bars for these items.
4) Reformatted Appendix 3-C in Powerpoint format. No revision bars appear in this
appendix because it is a printout of the Powerpoint slides and notes.
TOC
Takeoff Safety Training Aid

Table of Contents
Section Page
1 Takeoff Safety - Overview for Management.....................................................................1.i
1.0 Introduction.................................................................................................................... 1.1
1.1 General Goal and Objectives......................................................................................... 1.2
1.2 Documentation Overview.............................................................................................. 1.2
1.3 Industry Consensus........................................................................................................ 1.3
1.4 Resource Utilization....................................................................................................... 1.3
1.5 Conclusion..................................................................................................................... 1.3
2 Pilot Guide to Takeoff Safety.............................................................................................2.i
2.0 Introduction.................................................................................................................... 2.1
2 .1 Objectives....................................................................................................................... 2.1
2.2 “Successful Versus Unsuccessful” Go/No Go Decisions............................................... 2.1

2.2.1 An In-service Perspective On Go/No Go Decisions.................................................. 2.2
2.2.2 “Successful” Go/No Go Decisions............................................................................ 2.3
2.2.3 RTO Overrun Accidents and Incidents...................................................................... 2.4
2.2.4 Statistics..................................................................................................................... 2.5
2.2.5 Lessons Learned........................................................................................................ 2.6
2.3 Decisions and Procedures —What Every Pilot Should Know........................................ 2.7
2.3.1 The Takeoff Rules —The Source of the Data............................................................ 2.8
2.3.1.1 The “FAR” Takeoff Field Length......................................................................... 2.8
2.3.1.2 V1 Speed Defined..................................................................................................... 2.10
2.3.1.3 Balanced Field Defined...................................................................................... 2.11
2.3.1.4 (Not Used).......................................................................................................... 2.12
2.3.2 Transition to the Stopping Configuration................................................................ 2.12
2.3.2.1 Flight Test Transitions........................................................................................ 2.12
2.3.2.2 Airplane Flight Manual Transition Times.......................................................... 2.12
2.3.3 Comparing the “Stop” and “Go” Margins............................................................... 2.14
2.3.3.1 The “Stop” Margins........................................................................................... 2.15
2.3.3.2 The “Go” Option................................................................................................ 2.16
2.3.4 Operational Takeoff Calculations............................................................................ 2.18
2.3.4.1 The Field Length Limit Weight.......................................................................... 2.18
2.3.4.2 Actual Weight Less Than Limit Weight............................................................. 2.19
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2.3.5 Factors that Affect Takeoff and RTO Performance................................................. 2.19

2.3.5.1 Runway Surface Condition................................................................................ 2.20
2.3.5.1.1 Hydroplaning..................................................................................................... 2.21
2.3.5.1.2 The Final Stop.................................................................................................... 2.22
2.3.5.2 Atmospheric Conditions..................................................................................... 2.22
2.3.5.3 Airplane Configuration....................................................................................... 2.23
2.3.5.3.1 Flaps................................................................................................................... 2.23
2.3.5.3.2 Engine Bleed Air................................................................................................ 2.23
2.3.5.3.3 Missing or Inoperative Equipment . .................................................................. 2.23
2.3.5.3.4 Wheels, Tires, and Brakes.................................................................................. 2.25
2.3.5.3.5 Worn Brakes....................................................................................................... 2.27
2.3.5.3.6 Residual Brake Energy....................................................................................... 2.28
2.3.5.3.7 Speedbrake Effect on Wheel Braking................................................................ 2.28
2.3.5.3.8 Carbon and Steel Brake Differences.................................................................. 2.30
2.3.5.3.9 High Brake Energy RTOs................................................................................... 2.31
2.3.5.4 Reverse Thrust Effects....................................................................................... 2.32
2.3.5.5 Runway Parameters............................................................................................ 2.33
2.3.5.6 (Not Used).......................................................................................................... 2.34
2.3.5.7 Takeoffs Using Reduced Thrust......................................................................... 2.34
2.3.5.8 The Takeoff Data the Pilot Sees......................................................................... 2.34
2.3.6 Increasing the RTO Safety Margins......................................................................... 2.35
2.3.6.2 Flap Selection..................................................................................................... 2.35
2.3.6.3 Runway Lineup.................................................................................................. 2.36
2.3.6.4 Setting Takeoff Thrust........................................................................................ 2.36
2.3.6.5 Manual Braking Techniques............................................................................... 2.37
2.3.6.6 Antiskid Inoperative Braking Techniques.......................................................... 2.38
2.3.6.7 RTO Autobrakes................................................................................................. 2.38
2.3.6.8 (Not Used).......................................................................................................... 2.39
2.3.6.9 The V1 Call......................................................................................................... 2.39
2.3.6.10 Crew Preparedness............................................................................................. 2.40
2.4 Crew Resource Management....................................................................................... 2.40

2.4.1 CRM and the RTO.................................................................................................. 2.40
2.4.2 The Takeoff Briefing................................................................................................ 2.40
2.4.3 Callouts.................................................................................................................... 2.41
2.4.4 The Use of All Crew Members................................................................................ 2.41
2.4.5 Summary.................................................................................................................. 2.42
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3 Example Takeoff Safety Training Program . ...................................................................3.i
3.0 Introduction........................................................................................................................ 3.1
3.1 Academic Training Program.......................................................................................... 3.2

3.1.1 Training Objectives.................................................................................................... 3.2
3.1.2 Academic Training Program Modules....................................................................... 3.2
3.1.3 Academic Training Syllabus...................................................................................... 3.2
3.1.4 Additional Academic Training Resources................................................................. 3.3
3.2 Simulator Training Program........................................................................................... 3.3

3.2.2 Simulator Training Syllabus...................................................................................... 3.3
3.2.3 Pilot Simulator Briefing............................................................................................. 3.6
3.2.4 Simulator Exercises................................................................................................... 3.6
3.2.4.1 Exercise 1, Initial Introduction to RTOs.............................................................. 3.7
3.2.4.2 Exercise 2, RTO with engine failure 5 knots prior to V1 – Manual Braking....... 3.8
3.2.4.3 Exercise 3, RTO with engine failure 5 knots prior to V1 – Autobrakes............... 3.9
3.2.4.4 Exercise 4, RTO with engine failure 5 knots prior to V1 – Wet runway with no
corrections to weight or V1................................................................................ 3.10
3.2.4.5 Exercise 5, RTO with engine failure 5 knots prior to V1 – Wet runway with wet
runway corrections............................................................................................. 3.11
3.2.4.6 Exercise 6, Takeoff continued with engine failure 5 knots prior to V1.............. 3.12
3.2.4.7 Exercise 7, Blown tire at V1-10 knots................................................................ 3.13
3.2.4.8 Exercise 8, Indicator failure/cockpit alert or advisory light at V1-10 knots....... 3.14
3.2.5 Exercises With Other Models.................................................................................. 3.14
3.3 Simulator Implementation Guide................................................................................. 3.15

3.3.1 Simulator Fidelity Checks....................................................................................... 3.15
3.3.2 Tuning for Accomplishment of Objectives.............................................................. 3.15
3.3.3 Grooved Runways................................................................................................... 3.15
Appendix 3-A Instructor Pilot Syllabus Briefing Supplement
Appendix 3-B Pilot Guide to Takeoff Safety Questions
Appendix 3-C Takeoff Safety Briefing
Appendix 3-D Simulator Exercises
4 Takeoff Safety Background Data.......................................................................................4.i
4.0 Introduction.................................................................................................................... 4.1
4.1 Objectives ..................................................................................................................... 4.1
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4.2.4 Statistics..................................................................................................................... 4.6
4.2.5 Lessons Learned........................................................................................................ 4.8
4.3.1.1 The “FAR” Takeoff Field Length....................................................................... 4.11
4.3.1.2 V1 Speed Defined............................................................................................... 4.12
4.3.1.4 Other Rules Affecting Takeoff Field Length...................................................... 4.14
4.3.3.1 The “Stop” Margins........................................................................................... 4.17
4.3.3.2 The “Go” Option................................................................................................ 4.18
4.3.5.1.1 Hydroplaning..................................................................................................... 4.25
4.3.5.1.2 The Final Stop.................................................................................................... 4.26
4.3.5.3.1 Flaps................................................................................................................... 4.27
4.3.5.3.2 Engine Bleed Air................................................................................................ 4.28
4.3.5.3.3 Missing or Inoperative Equipment . .................................................................. 4.28
4.3.5.3.4 Wheels, Tires, and Brakes.................................................................................. 4.29
4.3.5.3.5 Worn Brakes....................................................................................................... 4.31
4.3.5.3.6 Residual Brake Energy....................................................................................... 4.32
4.3.5.3.7 Speedbrake Effect on Wheel Braking................................................................ 4.33
4.3.5.3.8 Carbon and Steel Brake Differences.................................................................. 4.35
4.3.5.3.9 High Brake Energy RTOs................................................................................... 4.37
4.3.5.6 Lineup Distance Accountability......................................................................... 4.40
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4.3.6.2 Flap Selection..................................................................................................... 4.45
4.3.6.3 Runway Lineup.................................................................................................. 4.46
4.3.6.7 RTO Autobrakes................................................................................................. 4.48
4.3.6.8 Reduced V1 Techniques..................................................................................... 4.49
4.3.6.9 The V1 Call......................................................................................................... 4.52
4.4.1 CRM and the RTO................................................................................................... 4.53
4.4.3 Callouts.................................................................................................................... 4.54
4.4.5 Summary.................................................................................................................. 4.54
Appendix 4-A National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Special Investigation
Report (SIR-90/02) Runway Overruns Following High Speed Rejected
Takeoffs
Appendix 4-B RTO Accident/Incident List 1959 to 2003
Appendix 4-C Other Takeoff Rules
Appendix 4-D Reverse Thrust Effectiveness
Appendix 4-E Takeoff Safety Training Aid Human Performance Study
Appendix 4-F Airplane Flight Manual Transition Time Details
Appendix 4-G Brake Pedal Force Data
Appendix 4-H Reduced Thrust and Reduced V1 Examples
Appendix 4-I Lineup Distance Charts - Boeing Airplanes
Appendix 4-J The Effect of Procedural Variations on Stopping Distance
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TOC.vi
SECTION 1
Takeoff Safety - Overview for Management
Section
Table of Contents
Page
1
1.0 Introduction.................................................................................................................... 1.1
1.1 General Goal and Objectives......................................................................................... 1.2
1.2 Documentation Overview.............................................................................................. 1.2
1.3 Industry Consensus........................................................................................................ 1.3
1.4 Resource Utilization....................................................................................................... 1.3
1.5 Conclusion..................................................................................................................... 1.3
1.i
SECTION 1
1.ii
SECTION 1
Takeoff Safety - Overview for Management

1
1.0 Introduction 3) Only slightly more than one fifth of the
accidents and incidents actually involved
Airframe manufacturers, airlines, pilot groups, any loss of engine thrust.
and government and regulatory agencies, have
4) Nearly one fourth of the accidents and
developed this training resource dedicated
incidents were the result of wheel/ tire
to reducing the number of rejected takeoff
failures.
(RTO) accidents. The training package
consists primarily of this document. However, 5) Approximately 82 percent of the over run
a companion video developed by the Training events were avoidable.
Aid Working Group is also available.
Most of the participants in the RTO Safety Task
Rejected takeoff accidents have been and Force conclude that the recommendations to
continue to be, a significant contributor to enhance RTO training and operational practices
the worldwide commercial aviation accident have the highest probability of significantly
statistics. The National Transportation Safety improving the RTO safety record. They believe
Board (NTSB), in a report on RTO overruns1, enhancing the pilot’s understanding of airplane
stated that historical evidence from two decades and human performance and providing the
of RTO related accidents “suggests that pilots opportunity to experience a greater variety of
faced with unusual or unique situations may realistic takeoff decision scenarios in simulators
perform high speed RTOs unnecessarily or will result in pilots making better Go/ No Go
may perform them improperly.” decisions and improve their RTO procedure
execution.
An Airline Transport Association (ATA)/
Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) This training aid is intended to be a
organized, all industry team (the “RTO Safety comprehensive training package which airlines
Task Force”), studied past RTO overrun events can present to their crews in a combination
and made nine recommendations to the U.S. of classroom and simulator programs. It is
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) structured in a manner which should allow
and Joint Airworthiness Authority (JAA) in either stand alone use, incorporation into
19902. Three of the recommendations dealt existing programs, or customizing by the airline
with the need for improved crew training and to meet its unique requirements. This document
operational practices, and where it was lacking, provides instructors with technical information
improved simulator fidelity to support improved on takeoff performance for specific airplanes
training. in an operator’s fleet.
Key points relating to the need for improved
training can be summarized as follows (updated Whether operators choose to adopt the Takeoff
to reflect the RTO history through 2003): Safety Training Aid as the foundation of their
RTO safety training program or extract portions
1) Over half of the RTO accidents and of the material to enhance their existing training
incidents in the past thirty years were program, a significant and measurable return is
initiated from a speed in excess of V1. expected. Major airlines who have takeoff safety
2) Approximately one third were reported training programs in place, are experiencing
as having occurred on runways that were significantly fewer unnecessary high speed
wet or contaminated with snow or ice.
1
Section 4, Appendix A, NTSB/SIR-90/02 Special Investigation Report-Runway Overruns Following High Speed Rejected
Takeoffs, 27 February 1990.
2
ATA letter to the FAA, Standardization of FAA and JAA Rules For Certification of Aircraft Takeoff Performance,
April 5, 1990.
1.1
SECTION 1
rejected takeoffs and their passengers, crews 1.2 Documentation Overview

and equipment are exposed to fewer potentially
dangerous events. In addition to the Takeoff Safety-Overview
training for Management, the Takeoff
It is anticipated that the cost of implementing this Safety Training Aid package consists of the
enhanced training will be minimal. An operator following:
who is already doing a credible job of training
flight crews will find the implementation of Section 2 Pilot Guide to Takeoff
the training aid to be principally a change in Safety
emphasis, not a replacement of existing training Section 3 Example Takeoff Safety
syllabi. Except in unique instances where Training Program
training devices may need upgrading to address Section 4 Takeoff Safety -
significant pre-existing limitations, there should Background Data
be virtually no hardware costs associated with
this improved takeoff training. Video (optional) Rejected Takeoff and the
Go/No Go Decision
In the final analysis, the pilots operating the
flight are the ones who must make the Go/No Section 2 Pilot Guide to Takeoff Safety,
Go decision and when necessary, carry out a summarizes the material from Section 4
successful RTO. They need appropriate training (Background Data) and is organized in a like
to assure that they can and will do the best manner to facilitate cross referencing. The
job in the very difficult task of performing a guide is a highly readable, concise treatment
high speed RTO. Achieving this objective of of pilot issues, written by pilots, for pilots. It is
having flight crews well prepared for a possible intended for self study or classroom use.
RTO requires it to be a high priority of top
management. Section 3 Example Takeoff Safety Training
Program, is a stand alone resource designed
to serve the needs of a training department.
1.1 General Goal and Objectives Both an example academic training program
and an example simulator training program
The goal of the Takeoff Safety Training are included. Academic training lends itself
Aid is to reduce the number of RTO related to decision making education and planning
accidents and incidents by improving the pilot’s strategies, while actual practice in making good
decision making and associated procedure takeoff decisions and correctly completing the
accomplishment through increased knowledge appropriate procedures is best accomplished in
and awareness of the factors affecting the the simulator.
successful outcome of the Go/ No Go decision.
Objectives in support of this goal are to: The Simulator Implementation Guide
1) Establish an industry wide consensus addresses the verification of required simulator
on effective Go/No Go decision training performance and possible “tuning” that might
methods. be required to insure accomplishment of the
training program objectives. This section is
2) Develop appropriate educational offered as guidance for an airline’s simulator
material. technical staff.
3) Develop an example training program,
thereby providing a basis from which Section 4 Takeoff Safety-Background Data,
individual airlines may develop their forms the basis for the document and provides
own programs. technical reference material for the statements
and recommendations in the training program.
1.2
SECTION 1
Section 4 includes information on: 1.3 Industry Consensus

• Past RTO overrun accidents and the
In the initial stages, those involved in defining
lessons learned;
the Takeoff Safety Training Aid included
• A review of the basic factors involved in The Boeing Company, the Airline Transport
determining takeoff weights and speeds; Association, numerous airlines, the FAA,
• A review of the atmospheric, airplane Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), and
configuration, runway, and human the National Transportation Safety Board
performance factors that affect takeoff (NTSB). The final draft reviews expanded
performance; the list to include many international airlines
and regulatory agencies, and several other
• A summary of what the flight crew can major airframe manufacturers. In all, a total of
do to increase safety margins of every four review cycles were conducted, in which
takeoff; the comments and recommendations of all
• The results of the Human Performance participants were considered for inclusion in
Simulator Study conducted as a part of the final material.
the development of the training aid.
This section is written in as generic a manner as 1.4 Resource Utilization

possible, subject to the limitation that specific
This document has been designed to be of
airplane model data is occasionally required
maximum utility both in its current form and
to make meaningful examples. However, an
as a basis for an airline to design or modify its
additional objective of Section 4 is to be a
current programs as it sees fit.
definitive source of information to the airline
instructors with respect to the correct data
Both academic and practical simulator training
on takeoff related subjects for all the airplane
should be employed to achieve a well balanced,
models operated by the airline. For this reason,
effective training program. For some operators,
space has been provided for the insertion of data
the adoption of the Takeoff Safety Training Aid into
from airframe manufacturers. Operators who
their existing training programs will require
desire this model-specific data should contact
little more than a shift in emphasis. For those
the appropriate manufacturers.
airlines that are in the process of formulating
a complete training program, the Takeoff Safety
Video Program (optional) Rejected Takeoff
Training Aid will readily provide the foundation
and the GolNo Go Decision, is intended for
of a thorough and efficient program.
use in an academic program in conjunction
with Section 2, the Pilot Guide. Although the
The allocation of training time within recurrent
video is specifically designed to be used in a
and transition programs will vary from airline
pilot briefing scenario, it can also be used to
to airline. A typical program may be expected
heighten the takeoff safety awareness of all
to consume a maximum of 15 minutes in each
people in an airline who are involved in areas
of four simulator sessions, backed up by at least
which may contribute to the pilot needing to
one half hour of academic training.
make a Go/No Go decision.
1.5 Conclusion
This document and the optional video are

intended to assist all operators in creating or
1.3
SECTION 1
updating their own takeoff safety training

program. Effective training in the areas of
takeoff decision making and rejected takeoff
procedure execution will reduce RTO overrun
accidents and incidents. Management is
encouraged to take appropriate steps to ensure
that they have an effective takeoff safety
training program.
1.4
SECTION 2
Pilot Guide to Takeoff Safety
Section
Table of Contents
Page
2
2.0 Introduction.................................................................................................................... 2.1
2 .1 Objectives....................................................................................................................... 2.1

2.2.4 Statistics..................................................................................................................... 2.5
2.2.5 Lessons Learned........................................................................................................ 2.6
2.3.1.1 The “FAR” Takeoff Field Length......................................................................... 2.8
2.3.1.2 V1 Speed Defined..................................................................................................... 2.10
2.3.1.4 (Not Used).......................................................................................................... 2.12
2.3.3.1 The “Stop” Margins........................................................................................... 2.15
2.3.3.2 The “Go” Option................................................................................................ 2.16
2.3.5.1.1 Hydroplaning................................................................................................ 2.21
2.3.5.1.2 The Final Stop............................................................................................... 2.22
2.3.5.3.1 Flaps.............................................................................................................. 2.23
2.3.5.3.2 Engine Bleed Air........................................................................................... 2.23
2.3.5.3.3 Missing or Inoperative Equipment ............................................................... 2.23
2.i
SECTION 2
Section Page
2.3.5.3.4 Wheels, Tires, and Brakes............................................................................. 2.25
2.3.5.3.5 Worn Brakes.................................................................................................. 2.27
2.3.5.3.6 Residual Brake Energy.................................................................................. 2.28
2.3.5.3.7 Speedbrake Effect on Wheel Braking............................................................ 2.28
2.3.5.3.8 Carbon and Steel Brake Differences............................................................. 2.30
2.3.5.3.9 High Brake Energy RTOs.............................................................................. 2.31
2.3.5.6 (Not Used).......................................................................................................... 2.34
2.3.6.2 Flap Selection..................................................................................................... 2.35
2.3.6.3 Runway Lineup.................................................................................................. 2.36
2.3.6.7 RTO Autobrakes................................................................................................. 2.38
2.3.6.8 (Not Used).......................................................................................................... 2.39
2.3.6.9 The V1 Call......................................................................................................... 2.39

2.4.1 CRM and the RTO.................................................................................................. 2.40
2.4.3 Callouts.................................................................................................................... 2.41
2.4.5 Summary.................................................................................................................. 2.42
2.ii
SECTION 2
Pilot Guide to Takeoff Safety

2
2.0 Introduction 2 .1 Objectives
The Pilot Guide to Takeoff Safety is one The objective of the Pilot Guide to Takeoff
part of the Takeoff Safety Training Aid. The other Safety is to summarize and communicate key
parts include the Takeoff Safety Overview for RTO related information relevant to flight
Management (Section 1), Example Takeoff crews. It is intended to be provided to pilots
Safety Training Program (Section 3), Takeoff during academic training and to be retained
Safety Background Data (Section 4), and an for future use.
optional video. The subsection numbering used
in Sections 2 and 4 are identical to facilitate
cross referencing. Those sub sections not used 2.2 “Successful Versus Unsuccessful” Go/
in Section 2 are noted “not used”. No Go Decisions
The goal of the training aid is to reduce the Any Go/No Go decision can be considered
number of RTO related accidents by improving “successful” if it does not result in injury or
the pilot’s decision making and associated airplane damage. However, just because it was
procedural accomplishment through increased “successful” by this definition, it does not mean
knowledge and awareness of the factors the action was the “best” that could have been
affecting the successful outcome of the “Go/No taken. The purpose of this section is to point
Go” decision. out some of the lessons that have been learned
through the RTO experiences of other airline
T h e e d u c a t io n a l m a t e r i a l a n d t h e crews since the 1950s, and to recommend ways
recommendations provided in the Takeoff of avoiding similar experiences by the pilots of
Safety Training Aid were developed through an today’s airline fleet.
extensive review process to achieve consensus
of the air transport industry.
Takeoffs, RTOs, and Overruns

Figure 1
Through 2003 Typical Recent Year Takeoffs, RTOs,
and Overrun
Takeoffs 430,000,000 18,000,000 Statistics
RTOs (est.) 143,000 6,000
RTO Overrun
97 4*
Accidents/Incidents
• 1 RTO per 3,000 takeoffs

• 1 RTO overrun accident/incident per 4,500,000 takeoffs
*Accidents/incidents that would occur if historical rates continue.
2.1
SECTION 2
2.2.1 An In-service Perspective On Go/No Go The probability that a pilot will ever be required
Decisions to perform an RTO from high speed is even
less, as is shown in Figure 2.
Modern jet transport services began in the
early 1950s and significantly increased later Available data indicates that over 75% of all
that decade after introduction of the Boeing RTOs are initiated at speeds of 80 knots or less.
707 and the Douglas DC-8. As shown in These RTOs almost never result in an accident.
Figure 1, the western built jet transport fleet Inherently, low speed RTOs are safer and less
has accumulated approximately 430 million demanding than high speed RTOs. At the other
takeoffs by the end of 2003. Recently there have extreme, about 2% of the RTOs are initiated
been nearly 18 million takeoffs in a typical year. at speeds above 120 knots. Overrun accidents
That’s approximately 34 takeoffs every minute, and incidents that occur principally stem from
every day! these high speed events.
Since no comprehensive fleet-wide records What should all these statistics tell a pilot?
are available, it is difficult to identify the total First, RTOs are not a very common event. This
number of RTOs that have occurred throughout speaks well of equipment reliability and the
the jet era. However, based on those events preparation that goes into operating jet transport
which have been documented, our best estimate airplanes. Both are, no doubt, due in large part
is that one in 3,000 takeoff attempts ends with to the certification and operational standards
an RTO. At this rate, there will be nearly 6000 developed by the aviation community over many
RTOs during a typical year. That means that years of operation. Second, and more important,
every day, 16 flight crews will perform an RTO. the infrequency of RTO events may lead to
Statistically, at the rate of one RTO per 3000 complacency about maintaining sharp decision
takeoffs, a pilot who flies short haul routes and making skills and procedural effectiveness. In
makes 80 departures per month, will experience spite of the equipment reliability, every pilot
one RTO every three years. At the opposite must be prepared to make the correct Go/No
extreme, the long haul pilot making only eight Go decision on every takeoff-just in case.
departures per month will be faced with only
one RTO every 30 years.
Figure 2
Distribution of
RTO Initiation
Speeds

24/OVERRUN
ACCIDENTS
0ERCENT PRINCIPALLYCOME
OFTOTAL FROMTHEOFTHE
24/STHATARE
HIGHSPEED

KNOTS TO TO !BOVE
ORLESS KNOTS KNOTS KNOTS
2.2
SECTION 2
2.2.2 “Successful” Go/No Go Decisions the takeoff after experiencing a nose

landing gear shimmy. Airspeed at the
As was mentioned at the beginning of Section time was approximately Vl-10 knots. All
2.2, there is more to a “good” Go/No Go decision four main gear tires subsequently blew
than the fact that it may not have resulted in during the stop, and fires at the number 3
any apparent injury or aircraft damage. The and 4 tires were extinguished by the fire
following examples illustrate a variety of
department.
situations that have been encountered in the
past, some of which would fit the description 6. Blown Tire: The takeoff was rejected at
of a “good” decision, and some which are, at 140 knots due to a blown number 3 main
least, “questionable”. gear tire. Number 4 tire blew turning
onto the taxiway causing the loss of both
Listed at the beginning of each of the following A and B hydraulic systems as well as
examples is the primary cause or cue which major damage to flaps, spar, and spoilers.
prompted the crew to reject the takeoff:
1. Takeoff Warning Horn: The takeoff These examples demonstrate the diversity of
warning horn sounded as the takeoff roll rejected takeoff causes. All of these RTOs were
commenced. The takeoff was rejected “successful”, but some situations came very
at 5 knots. The aircraft was taxied off close to ending differently. By contrast, the
the active runway where the captain large number of takeoffs that are successfully
discovered the stabilizer trim was set continued with indications of airplane system
at the aft end of the green band. The problems such as caution lights that illuminate
stabilizer was reset and a second takeoff at high speed or tires that fail near V1, are
was completed without further difficulty. rarely ever reported outside the airline’s
2. Takeoff Warning Horn: The takeoff was own information system. They may result
rejected at 90 knots when the takeoff in diversions and delays but the landings are
warning horn sounded. The crew found normally uneventful, and can be completed
the speed brake lever slightly out of using standard procedures.
the detent. A normal takeoff was made
following a delay for brake cooling. This should not be construed as a blanket
3. Engine Power Setting: The throttles were recommendation to “Go, no matter what.” The
advanced and N1 increased to slightly goal of this training aid is to eliminate RTO
over 95%. N1 eventually stabilized accidents by reducing the number of improper
at 94.8% N1. The target N1 from the decisions that are made, and to ensure that the
correct procedures are accomplished when
FMC Takeoff Page was 96.8% N1. The
an RTO is necessary. It is recognized that the
throttles were then moved to the firewall
kind of situations that occur in line operations
but the N1 stayed at 94.8%. The takeoff are not always the simple problem that the
was rejected due to low N1 at 80 knots. pilot was exposed to in training. Inevitably,
4. Compressor Stall: The takeoff was the resolution of some situations will only
rejected from 155 knots due to a bird be possible through the good judgment and
strike and subsequent compressor stall discretion of the pilot, as is exemplified in the
on the number three engine. Most of the following takeoff event:
tires subsequently deflated due to melted After selecting EPR mode to set takeoff
fuse plugs. thrust, the right thrust lever stuck at 1.21
EPR, while the left thrust lever moved to
5. Nose Gear Shimmy: The crew rejected
2.3
SECTION 2
the target EPR of 1.34. The captain tried to 40 serious incidents have been identified which
reject the takeoff but the right thrust lever likely would have been accidents if the runway
could not be moved to idle. Because the overrun areas had been less forgiving. The
light weight aircraft was accelerating very following are brief accounts of four actual
rapidly, the Captain advanced the thrust on accidents. They are real events. Hopefully, they
the left engine and continued the takeoff. will not be repeated.
The right engine was subsequently shut
down during the approach, and the flight ACCIDENT: At 154 knots, four knots after
was concluded with an uneventful single V1, the copilot’s side window opened, and the
engine landing. takeoff was rejected. The aircraft overran,
hitting a blast fence, tearing open the left wing
The failure that this crew experienced was not and catching fire.
a standard training scenario. Nor is it included
here to encourage pilots to change their mind ACCIDENT: The takeoff was rejected by the
in the middle of an RTO procedure. It is simply
captain when the first officer had difficulty
an acknowledgment of the kind of real world
maintaining runway tracking along the 7,000
decision making situations that pilots face. It is
perhaps more typical of the good judgements foot wet runway. Initial reports indicate that the
that airline crews regularly make, but the world airplane had slowly accelerated at the start of
rarely hears about. the takeoff roll due to a delay in setting takeoff
thrust. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR)
readout indicates there were no speed callouts
2.2.3 RTO Overrun Accidents and Incidents made during the takeoff attempt. The reject
speed was 5 knots above V1. The transition to
The one-in-one-thousand RTOs that became stopping was slower than expected. This was
accidents or serious incidents are the ones
to have been the last flight in a long day for the
that we must strive to prevent. As shown in
crew. Both pilots were relatively inexperienced
Figure 3, at the end of 2003, records show 57 in-
service RTO overrun accidents for the western in their respective positions. The captain had
built jet transport fleet. These 57 accidents about 140 hours as a captain in this airplane
caused more than 400 fatalities. An additional type and the first officer was conducting
Figure 3 10
97 RTO overrun
accidents/incidents
1959-2003
Number
of events 5
per year
0
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Year
2.4
SECTION 2
his first non-supervised line takeoff in this 2.2.4 Statistics

airplane type. The airplane was destroyed when
it overran the end of the runway and broke Studies of the previously mentioned 97
apart against piers which extend off the end accidents/incidents have revealed some
of the runway into the river. There were two interesting statistics, as shown in Figure 4:
fatalities. Subsequent investigation revealed • Fifty-five percent were initiated at speeds
that the rudder was trimmed full left prior to in excess of V1.
the takeoff attempt.
• Approximately one third were reported as
having occurred on runways that were wet
ACCIDENT: A f lock of sea gulls was
or contaminated with snow or ice.
encountered “very near V1.” The airplane
reportedly had begun to rotate. The number Both of these issues will be thoroughly
one engine surged and flamed out, and the discussed in subsequent sections.
takeoff was rejected. The airplane overran
the end of the wet 6,000 foot runway despite a An additional, vitally interesting statistic
good RTO effort. that was obser ved when the accident
records involving Go/No Go decisions were
ACCIDENT: At 120 knots, the flight crew noted reviewed, was that virtually no revenue
the onset of a vibration. When the vibration flight was found where a “Go” decision
increased, the captain elected to reject and was made and the airplane was incapable
assumed control. Four to eight seconds elapsed of continuing the takeoff. Regardless of the
between the point where the vibration was first ability to safely continue the takeoff, as will be
noted and when the RTO was initiated (just seen in Section 2.3, virtually any takeoff can be
after V1). Subsequent investigation showed two “successfully” rejected, if the reject is initiated
tires had failed. The maximum speed reached early enough and is conducted properly. There
was 158 knots. The airplane overran the end of is more to the Go/No Go decision than “Stop
the runway at a speed of 35 knots and finally before V1” and “Go after V1.” The statistics of
stopped with the nose in a swamp. The airplane the past three decades show that a number of
was destroyed. jet transports have experienced circumstances
near V1 that rendered the airplane incapable of
These four cases are typical of the 97 reported
accidents and incidents. being stopped on the runway remaining. It also Figure 4
Major factors
in previous RTO
24/)NITIATION3PEED incidents and
accidents
'REATERTHAN6

2UNWAY#ONDITION
.OT ,ESSTHAN
REPORTED EQUALTO6
7ET
$RY

)CESNOW
.OTREPORTED

2.5
SECTION 2
must be recognized that catastrophic situations 2.2.5 Lessons Learned

could occur which render the airplane incapable
of flight. Several lessons can be learned from these
RTO accidents. First, the crew must always
Reasons why the 97 “unsuccessful” RTOs be prepared to make the Go/No Go decision
were initiated are also of interest. As shown prior to the airplane reaching V1 speed. As
in Figure 5, approximately one-fifth were will be shown in subsequent sections, there
initiated because of engine failures or engine may not be enough runway left to successfully
indication warnings. The remaining seventy- stop the airplane if the reject is initiated after
nine percent were initiated for a variety of V1. Second, in order to eliminate unnecessary
reasons which included tire failures, procedural RTOs, the crew must differentiate between
error, malfunction indication or lights, noises situations that are detrimental to a safe takeoff,
and vibrations, directional control difficulties and those that are not. Third, the crew must be
and unbalanced loading situations where the prepared to act as a well coordinated team. A
airplane failed to rotate. Some of the events good summarizing statement of these lessons
contained multiple factors such as an RTO on is, as speed approaches V1, the successful
a contaminated runway following an engine completion of an RTO becomes increasingly
failure at a speed in excess of V1. The fact that more difficult.
the majority of the accidents and incidents
occurred on airplanes that had full thrust A fourth and final lesson learned from past
available should figure heavily in future Go/No RTO history is illustrated in Figure 6. Analysis
Go training. of the available data suggests that of the 97
Figure 5 %NGINE

Reasons for
initiating the RTO 7HEELTIRE
(97 accidents/
incident events) %NGINE
#ONFIGURATION

)NDICATORLIGHT
#REWCOORDINATION .ON %NGINE

"IRDSTRIKE
!4#
/THERAND
)NCLUDINGEVENTS
.OTREPORTED
NOTREPORTED

0ERCENTOFTOTALEVENTS
2.6
SECTION 2
RTO accidents and incidents, approximately at rotation speed, which then produces loss of
82% were potentially avoidable through thrust on both engines of a two engine airplane,
appropriate operational practices. These is a clear example.
potentially avoidable accidents can be divided
into three categories. Roughly 15% of the RTO Although these are all valid points, debating
accidents of the past were the result of improper them here will not move us any closer to
preflight planning. Some of these instances the goal of reducing the number of RTO
were caused by loading errors and others by accidents. Several industry groups have recently
incorrect preflight procedures. About 15% of studied this problem. Their conclusions and
the accidents and incidents could be attributed recommendations agree surprisingly well. The
to incorrect pilot techniques or procedures in areas identified as most in need of attention are
the stopping effort. Delayed application of the decision making and proficiency in correctly
brakes, failure to deploy the speedbrakes, and performing the appropriate procedures. These
the failure to make a maximum effort stop until are the same areas highlighted in Figure 6.
late in the RTO were the chief characteristics It would appear then, that an opportunity
of this category. exists to significantly reduce the number of
RTO accidents in the future by attempting to
Review of the data from the 97 RTO accidents improve the pilots’ decision making capability
and incidents suggests that in approximately and procedure accomplishment through better
52% of the events, the airplane was capable of training.
continuing the takeoff and either landing at the
departure airport or diverting to an alternate. In
other words, the decision to reject the takeoff 2.3 Decisions and Procedures —
appears to have been “improper.” It is not What Every Pilot Should Know
possible, however, to predict with total certainty
There are many things that may ultimately affect
what would have happened in every event if the
the outcome of a Go/No Go decision. The goal of
takeoff had been continued. Nor is it possible
the Takeoff Safety Training Aid is to reduce the
for the analyst of the accident data to visualize
number of RTO related accidents and incidents
the events leading up to a particular accident
by improving the pilot’s decision making and
“through the eyes of the crew”, including all the
associated procedure accomplishment through
other factors that were vying for their attention
increased knowledge and awareness of the
at the moment when the “proper” decision
related factors. This section discusses the
could have been made. It is not very difficult
rules that define takeoff performance limit
to imagine a set of circumstances where the
weights and the margins that exist when the
only logical thing for the pilot to do is to reject
actual takeoff weight of the airplane is less
the takeoff. Encountering a large flock of birds
Figure 6
82% of the RTO
accidents and
"YCONTINUINGTHETAKEOFF incidents were
avoidable

"YBETTERPREFLIGHT
PLANNING 5NAVOIDABLE
"YCORRECTSTOP
TECHNIQUES
2.7
SECTION 2
than the limit weight. The effects of runway 2) Engine-Out Accelerate-Go Distance:
surface condition, atmospheric conditions, and The distance required to accelerate with
airplane configuration variables on Go/No Go all engines operating, have one engine
performance are discussed, as well as what the fail at VEF at least one second before V1,
pilot can do to make the best use of any excess continue the takeoff, liftoff and reach a
available runway. point 35 feet above the runway surface
at V2 speed (Figure 8).
Although the information contained in this
section has been reviewed by many major 3) Accelerate-Stop Distance: The distance
airframe manufacturers and airlines, the required to accelerate with all engines
incorporation of any of the recommendations operating, have an engine failure or
made in this section is subject to the approval other event at VEVENT at least one
of each operator’s management. second before V1, recognize the event,
reconfigure for stopping and bring
the airplane to a stop using maximum
2.3.1 The Takeoff Rules — wheel braking with the speed brakes
The Source of the Data extended. Reverse thrust is not used
to determine the FAR accelerate-stop
It is important that all pilots understand the
distance (Figure 9), except for the wet
takeoff field length/weight limit rules and the
runway case for airplanes certified under
margins these rules provide. Misunderstanding
FAR Amendment 25-92.
the rules and their application to the operational
situation could contribute to an incorrect FAR criteria provide accountability for
Go/No Go decision. wind, runway slope, clearway and stopway.
The U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) FAA approved takeoff data are based on the
have continually been refined so that the details performance demonstrated on a smooth, dry
of the rules that are applied to one airplane runway. Recent models certified according to
model may differ from another. However, FAR Amendment 25-92 also have approved data
these differences are minor and have no effect based on wet, and wet skid-resistant runways.
on the basic actions required of the flight Separate advisory data for wet, if required, or
crew during the takeoff. In general, it is more contaminated runway conditions are published
important for the crew to understand the basic in the manufacturer’s operational documents.
principles rather than the technical variations These documents are used by many operators
in certification policies. to derive wet or contaminated runway takeoff
adjustments..
2.3.1.1 The “FAR” Takeoff Field Length Other criteria define the performance weight
limits for takeoff climb, obstacle clearance, tire
The “FAR” Takeoff Field Length determined speeds and maximum brake energy capability.
from the FAA Approved Airplane Flight Any of these other criteria can be the limiting
Manual (AFM) considers the most limiting of factor which determines the maximum dispatch
each of the following three criteria: weight. However, the Field Length Limit Weight
1) All-Engine Go Distance: 115% of the and the amount of runway remaining at V1 will
actual distance required to accelerate, be the primary focus of our discussion here
liftoff and reach a point 35 feet above since they more directly relate to preventing
the runway with all engines operating RTO overruns.
(Figure 7).
2.8
SECTION 2
sFEET Figure 7
sFEET
s6 All-engine go
TOKNOTS distance
s6TOKNOTS
!CTUAL$ISTANCE
TIMESTHEACTUALDISTANCE
!CTUAL$ISTANCE
sFEET
6 Figure 8
6 s6
sFEET
Engine-out
s6
6%& 6 6 accelerate-go
6%& 62 2 6,/& ,/& distance
SECONDMINIMUM
SECONDMINIMUM
6 24/TRANSITION
6%6%.4 COMPLETE!&-
24/TRANSITION Figure 9
SECONDMINIMUM 6
4RANSITION 3TOP Accelerate-stop
6%6%.4 COMPLETE!&-
distance
2UNWAYUSEDTOACCELERATETO6 2UNWAYAVAILABLETO'O.O'O
TYPICALLY
SECONDMINIMUM
TYPICALLY
3TOP
4RANSITION
TYPICALLY TYPICALLY
2.9
SECTION 2
2.3.1.2 V1 Speed Defined
V
1
What is the proper operational meaning of the is initiated, and if the airplane is at a Field
key parameter “V1 speed” with regard to the Length Limit Weight, an overrun is virtually
Go/No Go criteria? This is not such an easy assured.
question since the term “V1 speed” has been
redefined several times since commercial jet Another commonly held misconception: “V1 is
operations began more than 30 years ago and the engine failure recognition speed”, suggests
there is possible ambiguity in the interpretation that the decision to reject the takeoff following
of the words used to define V1. engine failure recognition may begin as late as
V1. Again, the airplane will have accelerated to
Paragraph 25.107 of the FAA Regulations a speed higher than VI before stopping action
defines the relationship of the takeoff speeds is initiated.
published in the Airplane Flight Manual, to
various speeds determined in the certification The certified accelerate-stop distance calculation
testing of the airplane. For our purposes here, is based on an engine failure at least one second
the most important statement within this prior to V1. This standard time allowance1
“official” definition is that V1 is determined from has been established to allow the line pilot
“...the pilot’s initiation of the first action to stop to recognize an engine failure and begin the
the airplane during the accelerate-stop tests.” subsequent sequence of stopping actions.
One common and misleading way to think of In an operational Field Length Limited context,
V1 is to say “V1 is the decision speed.” This is the correct definition of V1 consists of two
misleading because V1 is not the point to begin separate concepts:
making the operational Go/No Go decision. The First, with respect to the “No Go” criteria,
decision must have been made by the time the V1 is the maximum speed at which
airplane reaches V1 or the pilot will not have the rejected takeoff maneuver can
initiated the RTO procedure at V1. Therefore, be initiated and the airplane stopped
by definition, the airplane will be traveling at within the remaining field length under
a speed higher than V1 when stopping action the conditions and procedures defined
1
The time interval between VEF and Vl is the longer of the flight test demonstrated time or one second. Therefore, in determining
the scheduled accelerate-stop performance, one second is the minimum time that will exist between the engine failure and the
first pilot stopping action.
2.10
SECTION 2
in the FAR’s. It is the latest point in section provides a closer examination of how
the takeoff roll where a stop can be the choice of V1 actually affects the takeoff
initiated. performance in specific situations.
Second, with respect to the “Go” criteria,
Since it is generally easier to change the weight
V1 is also the earliest point from which
of an airplane than it is to change the length
an engine out takeoff can be continued
of a runway, the discussion here will consider
and the airplane attain a height of 35
the effect of V1 on the allowable takeoff weight
feet at the end of the runway. This aspect
from a fixed runway length.
of V1 is discussed in a later section.
The Continued Takeoff—After an engine
The Go/ No Go decision must be made before
failure during the takeoff roll, the airplane
reaching V1. A “No Go” decision after passing
must continue to accelerate on the remaining
V1 will not leave sufficient runway remaining
engine(s), lift off and reach V2 speed at 35 feet.
to stop if the takeoff weight is equal to the
The later in the takeoff roll that the engine
Field Length Limit Weight. When the airplane
fails, the heavier the airplane can be and still
actual weight is less than the Field Length
gain enough speed to meet this requirement.
Limit Weight, it is possible to calculate the
For the engine failure occurring approximately
actual maximum speed from which the takeoff
one second prior to V1, the relationship of the
could be successfully rejected. However, few
allowable engine-out go takeoff weight to V1
operators use such takeoff data presentations.
would be as shown by the “Continued Takeoff”
It is therefore recommended that pilots consider
line in Figure 10. The higher the V1, the heavier
V1 to be a limit speed: Do not attempt an RTO
the takeoff weight allowed.
once the airplane has passed V1 unless the
pilot has reason to conclude the airplane is The Rejected Takeoff— On the stop side of the
unsafe or unable to fly. This recommendation equation, the V1/weight trade has the opposite
should prevail no matter what runway length trend. The lower the V1, or the earlier in the
appears to remain after V1. takeoff roll the stop is initiated, the heavier the
airplane can be, as indicated by the “Rejected
Takeoff” line in Figure 10.
2.3.1.3 Balanced Field Defined
The point at which the “Continued and Rejected
The previous two sections established the
Takeoff” lines intersect is of special interest. It
general relationship between the takeoff
defines what is called a “Balanced Field Limit”
performance regulations and V1 speed. This
Figure 10
Increasing
Continued Effect of V1 speed

takeoff on takeoff weight
(from a fixed
runway length)
Field limit weight
Airplane
weight
Limit V1 speed
Balanced field
Rejected
takeoff
Increasing
V 1 speed
2.11
SECTION 2
takeoff. The name “Balanced Field” refers to is “failed” by selecting fuel cut off, and the
the fact that the accelerate-go performance pilot flying rejects the takeoff. In human
required is exactly equal to (or “balances”) factors circles, this is defined as a “simple task”
the accelerate-stop performance required. because the test pilot knows in advance that an
From Figure 10 it can also be seen that at the RTO will be performed. Exact measurements
“Balanced Field” point, the allowable Field of the time taken by the pilot to apply the
brakes, retard the thrust levers to idle, and to
Limit Takeoff Weight for the given runway is
deploy the speedbrakes are recorded. Detailed
the maximum. The resulting unique value of
measurements of engine parameters during
V1 is referred to as the “Balanced Field Limit spooldown are also made so that the thrust
V1 Speed” and the associated takeoff weight actually being generated can be accounted for
is called the “Balanced Field Weight Limit.” in the calculation.
This is the speed that is typically given to flight
crews in handbooks or charts, by the onboard The manufacturer’s test pilots, and pilots
computer systems, or by dispatch. from the regulatory agency, each perform
several rejected takeoff test runs. An average
of the recorded data from at least six of
2.3.1.4 (Not Used) these RTOs is then used to determine the
“demonstrated” transition times. The total flight
test “demonstrated” transition time, initial brake
2.3.2 Transition to the Stopping Configuration application to speedbrakes up, is typically one
second or less. However this is not the total
In establishing the certified accelerate-stop transition time used to establish the certified
distance, the time required to reconfigure the accelerate-stop distances. The certification
airplane from the “Go” to the “Stop” mode regulations require that additional time delays,
is referred to as the “transition” segment. sometimes referred to as “pads”, be included in
This action and the associated time of the calculation of certified takeoff distances.
accomplishment includes applying maximum
braking simultaneously moving the thrust
levers to idle and raising the speedbrakes. 2.3.2.2 Airplane Flight Manual Transition
The transition time demonstrated by flight Times
test pilots during the accelerate-stop testing
is used to derive the transition segment times Although the line pilot must be prepared for
used in the AFM calculations. The relationship an RTO during every takeoff, it is fairly likely
between the flight test demonstrated transition that the event or failure prompting the Go/No
times and those finally used in the AFM is Go decision will be much less clear-cut than
another frequently misunderstood area of RTO
an outright engine failure. It may therefore be
performance.
unrealistic to expect the average line pilot to
perform the transition in as little as one second
2.3.2.1 Flight Test Transitions in an operational environment. Human factors
literature describes the line pilot’s job as a
Several methods of certification testing that “complex task” since the pilot does not know
produce comparable results have been found to when an RTO will occur. In consideration of
be acceptable. The following example illustrates this “complex task”, the flight test transition
the intent of these methods. times are increased to calculate the certified
During certification testing the airplane is accelerate-stop distances specified in the AFM.
accelerated to a pre-selected speed, one engine These additional time increments are not
2.12
SECTION 2
intended to allow extra time for making the transition distances have remained essentially
“Go/No Go” decision after passing V1. Their the same. For early jet transport models, an
purpose is to allow sufficient time (and distance) additional one second was added to both the
for “the average pilot” to transition from the flight test demonstrated throttles-to-idle time
takeoff mode to the stopping mode. and the speedbrakes-up time, as illustrated
in Figure 11. The net result is that the flight
The first adjustment is made to the time required test demonstrated recognition and transition
to recognize the need to stop. During the RTO time of approximately one second has been
certification flight testing, the pilot knows increased for the purpose of calculating the
that he will be doing an RTO. Therefore, his AFM transition distance.
reaction is predictably quick. To account for
this, an event recognition time of at least one In more recent certification programs, the AFM
second has been set as a standard for all jet calculation procedure was slightly different.
transport certifications since the late 1960s. An allowance equal to the distance traveled
V1 is therefore, at least one second after the during two seconds at the speedbrakes-up speed
was added to the actual total transition time
event. During this recognition time segment,
demonstrated in the flight test to apply brakes,
the airplane continues to accelerate with the
bring the thrust levers to idle and deploy the
operating engine(s) continuing to provide full speedbrakes, as shown in Figure 12. To insure
forward thrust. If the event was an engine “consistent and repeatable results”, retardation
failure, the “ failed” engine has begun to spool forces resulting from brake application and
down, but it is still providing some forward speed brake deployment are not applied
thrust, adding to the airplane’s acceleration. during this two second allowance time, i.e. no
deceleration credit is taken. This two second
Over the years, the details of establishing the distance allowance simplifies the transition
transition time segments after V1 have varied distance calculation and accomplishes the same
slightly but the overall concept and the resulting goal as the individual one second “pads” used
%NGINE Figure 11
Early method of
&AILURE
establishing AFM
transition time
&LIGHTTESTDEMONSTRATEDTRANSITIONTIME
&LIGHTTEST
4H 3PE
RO E
"R
TTLE DBR
AKE
AK
STO S
ES
ID !&-TRANSITION
ON
LE
COMPLETE
!&-EXPANSION
6
SEC SEC
2ECOGNITION
!&-
SECOND
MINIMUM
!&-TRANSITIONTIME
2.13
SECTION 2
for older models. simultaneously initiate maximum braking,

retard the thrust levers to idle and then quickly
Even more recently, FAR Amendments 25-42 raise the speedbrakes.
and 25-92 have revised the way in which the
two second distance allowance is calculated.
Regardless of the method used, the accelerate- 2.3.3 Comparing the “Stop” and “Go”
stop distance calculated for every takeoff from Margins
the AFM is typically 400 to 600 feet longer than
the flight test accelerate-stop distance. When performing a takeoff at a Field Length
Limit Weight determined from the AFM, the
These differences between the past and present pilot is assured that the airplane performance
methodology are not significant in so far as will, at the minimum, conform to the
the operational accelerate-stop distance is requirements of the FARs if the assumptions
concerned. The keypoint is that the time/distance of the calculations are met. This means that
“pads” used in the AFM transition distance following an engine failure or event at VEVENT,
calculation are not intended to allow extra time the takeoff can be rejected at V1 and the airplane
to make the “No Go” decision. Rather, the “pads” stopped at the end of the runway, or if the takeoff
provide an allowance that assures the pilot has is continued, a minimum height of 35 feet will
adequate distance to get the airplane into the be reached over the end of the runway.
full stopping configuration.
This section discusses the inherent conservatism
Regardless of the airplane model, the transition, of these certified calculations, and the margins
or reconfiguring of the airplane for a rejected they provide beyond the required minimum
takeoff, demands quick action by the crew to performance.
Figure 12
More recent %VENT
method of
establishing AFM
transition time &LIGHTTESTDEMONSTRATEDTRANSITIONTIME
&LIGHTTEST
4H
RO
3ER
3P
VICE
TTL
"R
EE
ALLO
ES
AK
DB
WAN
TO
!&-TRANSITION
ES
CE
RA
ID
ON
KE
COMPLETE
LE
!&-EXPANSION
6
2ECOGNITION
!&- &4 SEC
SECOND DEMO
MINIMUM
!&-TRANSITIONTIME
2.14
SECTION 2
2.3.3.1 The “Stop” Margins The horizontal axis of Figure 13 is the

incremental speed in knots above V1 at which
From the preceding discussion of the a maximum effort stop is initiated. The vertical
certification rules, it has been shown that at axis shows the minimum speed in knots at which
a Field Length Limit Weight condition, an the airplane would cross the end of the runway,
RTO initiated at V1 will result in the airplane assuming the pilot used all of the transition
coming to a stop at the end of the runway. This time allowed in the AFM to reconfigure the
accelerate-stop distance calculation specifies an airplane to the stop configuration, and that a
engine failure or event at VEVENT, the pilot’s maximum stopping effort was maintained. The
initiation of the RTO at V1, and the completion data in Figure 13 assumes an engine failure not
of the transition within the time allotted in the less than one second prior to V1 and does not
AFM. If any of these basic assumptions are not include the use of reverse thrust. Therefore, if
satisfied, the actual accelerate-stop distance the pilot performs the transition more quickly
may exceed the AFM calculated distance, and than the AFM allotted time, and/or uses reverse
an overrun will result. thrust, the line labeled “MAXIMUM EFFORT
STOP” would be shifted slightly to the right.
The most significant factor in these assumptions However, based on the RTO accidents of the
is the initiation of the RTO no later than V1. past, the shaded area above the line shows what
Yet as was noted previously, in approximately is more likely to occur if a high speed RTO is
55% of the RTO accidents the stop was initiated initiated at or just after V1. This is especially true
after V1. At heavy weights near V1, the airplane if the RTO was due to something other than an
is typically traveling at 200 to 300 feet per engine failure, or if the stopping capability of
second, and accelerating at 3 to 6 knots per the airplane is otherwise degraded by runway
second. This means that a delay of only a surface contamination, tire failures, or poor
second or two in initiating the RTO will require technique. The data in Figure 13 are typical of a
several hundred feet of additional runway to large, heavy jet transport and would be rotated
successfully complete the stop. If the takeoff slightly to the right for the same airplane at a
was at a Field Limit Weight, and there is no lighter weight.
excess runway available, the airplane will reach
the end of the runway at a significant speed, as In the final analysis, although the certified
shown in Figure 13. accelerate-stop distance calculations provide

3HADEDAREAINDICATESDEGRADED Figure 13
STOPPINGPERFORMANCE Overrun Speed for
an RTO initiated
s#ONTAMINATEDRUNWAY
after V1
s0ILOTTECHNIQUE
OP
s3YSTEMFAILURES F F O RTST
M E
IMU
3PEEDOFFENDOF -AX
RUNWAYKNOTS

!BORTINITIATIONSPEEDABOVESCHEDULED6KNOTS
2.15
SECTION 2
sufficient runway for a properly performed performance than the airplane will have if the
RTO, the available margins are fairly small. actual airplane weight is at or near the takeoff
Most importantly, there are no margins to Climb Limit Weight. Engine-out rate of climb
account for initiation of the RTO after V1 or and acceleration capability at a Climb Limit
extenuating circumstances such as runway Weight may appear to be substantially less than
contamination. the crew anticipates or is familiar with.
The minimum second segment climb gradients

2.3.3.2 The “Go” Option required in the regulations vary from 2.4%
to 3.0% depending on the number of engines
FAR rules also prescribe minimum performance installed. These minimum climb gradients
standards for the “Go” situation. With an engine translate into a climb rate of only 350 to 500
failed at the most critical point along the takeoff feet per minute at actual climb limit weights
path, the FAR “Go” criteria requires that the and their associated V2 speeds, as shown in
airplane be able to continue to accelerate, rotate, Figure 14. The takeoff weight computations
liftoff and reach V2 speed at a point 35 feet above performed prior to takeoff are required to
the end of the runway. The airplane must remain account for all obstacles in the takeoff flight
controllable throughout this maneuver and must path. All that is required to achieve the
meet certain minimum climb requirements. anticipated flight path is adherence by the flight
These handling characteristics and climb crew to the planned headings and speeds per
requirements are demonstrated many times their pre-departure briefing.
throughout the certification flight test program.
While a great deal of attention is focused on Consider a one-engine-inoperative case
the engine failure case, it is important to keep where the engine failure occurs earlier than
in mind, that in over three quarters of all RTO the minimum time before V1 specified in
accident cases, full takeoff power was available. the rules. Because engine-out acceleration is
It is likely that each crew member has had a less than all-engine acceleration, additional
good deal of practice in engine inoperative distance is needed to accelerate to VR and,
takeoffs in prior simulator or airplane training. as a consequence, the liftoff point will be
However, it may have been done at relatively moved further down the runway. The altitude
light training weights. As a result, the crew may (or “screen height”) achieved at the end of the
conclude that large control inputs and rapid runway is somewhat reduced depending on
response typical of conditions near minimum how much more than one second before V1 the
control speeds (Vmcg) are always required in engine failure occurs. On a field length limit
order to maintain directional control. However, runway, the height at the end of the runway
at the V1 speeds associated with a typical may be less than the 35 feet specified in the
Field Length Limit Weight, the control input regulations.
requirements are noticeably less than they are
at lighter weights. Figure 15 graphically summarizes this
discussion of “Go” margins. First, let VEF
Also, at light gross weights, the airplane’s be the speed at which the Airplane Flight
rate of climb capability with one-engine Manual calculation assumes the engine to fail,
inoperative could nearly equal the all-engine (a minimum of one second before reaching
climb performance at typical in-service V ). The horizontal axis of Figure 15 shows
1
weights, leading the crew to expect higher the number of knots prior to V that the
EF
2.16
SECTION 2
-INIMUM Figure 14
GRADIENT 4YPICALRATEOFCLIMB “GO” perfomance
at climb limit
REQUIRED weights
ENGINE
&0-AT6^KNOTS
ENGINE
&0-AT6^KNOTS
ENGINE
&0-AT6^KNOTS
DEGREEBANKTURNWILLREDUCETHESE
CLIMBRATESBYAPPROXIMATELY&0-
engine actually fails instead of the time, and failure occurring two seconds prior to V1 will
the vertical axis gives the “screen height” result in a screen height of 15 to 30 feet for a
achieved at the end of the runway. A typical Field Length Limit Weight takeoff.
range of acceleration for jet transports is 3 to 6
knots per second, so the shaded area shows the Figure 15 also shows that the “Go” performance
range in screen height that might occur if the margins are strongly influenced by the number
engine actually failed “one second early”, or of engines. This is again the result of the larger
approximately two seconds prior to V1. In other proportion of thrust loss when one engine fails
words, a “Go” decision made with the engine on the two-engine airplane compared to a
All engines
(150) Figure 15
V2 + 10 to 25 knots Effect of engine
failure before VEF
on screen height
40
One-engine inoperative
(35)
V2
30
Height at end
of runway, ft ne
e airpla
20 4-engin
lane Typical
airp ane
ine V1 range
3-eng airpl
10 ng ine One second
2-e minimum
0
-20 -16 -12 -8 -4 0 +4 +8
Speed at actual engine failure
relative to V EF, knots
2.17
SECTION 2
three or four-engine airplane. On two-engine 2.3.4.1 The Field Length Limit Weight
airplanes, there are still margins, but they are
not as large, a fact that an operator of several Instead of solving for the required runway
airplane types must be sure to emphasize in length, the first step in an operational takeoff
training and transition programs. calculation is to determine the maximum
airplane weight which meets the rules for
It should also be kept in mind that the 15 the fixed runway length available. In other
to 30 foot screen heights in the preceding words, what is the limit weight at which the
airplane:
discussion were based on the complete loss
of thrust from one engine. If all engines are 1) Will achieve 35-ft altitude with all
operating, as was the case in most of the engines operating and a margin of 15 %
RTO accident cases, the height over the end of the actual distance used remaining;
of the Field Length Limit runway will be 2) Will achieve 35-ft altitude with the
approximately 150 feet and speed will be critical engine failed one second prior
V2+10 to 25 knots, depending on airplane to V1;
type. This is due to the higher acceleration and
climb gradient provided when all engines are 3) Will stop with an engine failure or other
operating and because the required all engine event prior to V1 and the reject initiated
takeoff distance is multiplied by 115%. If the at V1;
“failed” engine is developing partial power,
…all within the existing runway length
the performance is somewhere in between, available.
but definitely above the required engine-out
limits. The result of this calculation is three allowable
weights. These three weights may or may not be
the same, but the lowest of the three becomes the
2.3.4 Operational Takeoff Calculations Field Length Limit Weight for that takeoff.
As we have seen, the certification flight testing, An interesting observation can be made at this
in accordance with the appropriate government point as to which of these three criteria will
regulations, determines the relationship typically determine the Takeoff Field Limit
between the takeoff gross weight and the Weight for a given airplane type. Two-engine
required runway length which is published in the airplanes lose one-half their total thrust when
AFM. By using the data in the AFM it is then an engine fails. As a result, the Field Length
possible to determine, for a given combination Limit Weight for two-engine airplanes is usually
of ambient conditions and airplane weight, the determined by one of the engine-out distance
required runway length which will comply criteria. If it is limited by the accelerate-stop
with the regulations. Operational takeoff distance, there will be some margin in both
calculations, however, have an additional and the all-engine and accelerate-go distances. If
obviously different limitation. The length of the limit is the accelerate-go distance, some
the runway is the Limit Field Length and it is margin would be available for the all-engine
fixed, not variable. go and accelerate-stop cases.
By comparison, four-engine airplanes only

lose one-fourth of their takeoff thrust when an
engine fails so they are rarely limited by engine-
out go performance. The Field Length Limit
2.18
SECTION 2
Weight for a four-engine airplane is typically Weight. There are only two possible outcomes
limited by the 115% all-engine distance criteria of this check.
or occasionally by the accelerate-stop case. As
1) The actual airplane weight could equal or
a result, a slight margin frequently exists in the
exceed the Field Length Limit Weight, or
engine-out go and accelerate-stop distances on
four-engine airplanes. 2) The actual airplane weight is less than the
Field Length Limit Weight.
Three-engine airplanes may be limited by
engine-out performance, or for some models, by The first case is relatively straightforward,
a more complex criterion wherein the rotation the airplane weight cannot be greater than the
speed VR becomes the limiting factor. Since limit weight and must be reduced. The result
is a takeoff at a Field Length Limit Weight as
the regulations prohibit V1 from exceeding
we have just discussed. The second case, which
VR, some tri-jets frequently have V1=VR, and
is typical of most jet transport operations, is
a small margin may therefore exist in the worthy of further consideration.
accelerate-stop distance. Two-engine airplanes
may occasionally be limited by this V1=VR By far, the most likely takeoff scenario for the
criterion also. line pilot is the case where the actual airplane
weight is less than any limit weight, especially
The possible combinations of airport pressure the Field Length Limit Weight. It also is possibly
altitude, temperature, wind, runway slope, the most easily misunderstood area of takeoff
clearway, and stopway are endless. Regardless performance since the fact that the airplane is
of airplane type, they can easily combine to not at a limit weight is about all the flight crew
make any one of the three previously discussed can determine from the data usually available on
takeoff field length limits apply. Flight crews the flight deck. Currently, few operators provide
have no convenient method to determine which any information that will let the crew determine
of the three criteria is limiting for a particular how much excess runway is available; what it
takeoff, and from a practical point of view, it means in terms of the V1 speed they are using;
really doesn’t matter. The slight differences or how to best maximize the potential safety
that may exist are rarely significant. Most RTO margins represented by the excess runway.
overrun accidents have occurred on runways
where the airplane was not at a limit takeoff
weight. That is, the accidents occurred on 2.3.5 Factors that Affect Takeoff and RTO
runways that were longer than required for the Performance
actual takeoff weight. Combining this historical
evidence with the demanding nature of the high Both the continued and the rejected takeoff
speed rejected takeoff, it would seem prudent performance are directly affected by atmospheric
that the crew should always assume the takeoff conditions, airplane configuration, runway
is limited by the accelerate-stop criteria when characteristics, engine thrust available, and
the takeoff weight is Field Length Limited. by human performance factors. The following
sections review the effects of these variables
on airplane performance. The purpose is not
2.3.4.2 Actual Weight Less Than Limit to make this a complete treatise on airplane
Weight performance. Rather, it is to emphasize that
changes in these variables can have a significant
Returning to the operational takeoff calculation, impact on a successful Go/ No Go decision. In
the second step is to then compare the actual many instances, the flight crew has a degree of
airplane weight to the Field Length Limit direct control over these changes.
2.19
SECTION 2
2.3.5.1 Runway Surface Condition The certification testing is performed on a

smooth, ungrooved, dry runway. For airplanes
The condition of the runway surface can have certified under FAR Amendment 25-92, testing
a significant effect on takeoff performance, is also performed on smooth and grooved wet
since it can affect both the acceleration and runways. Any contamination not covered in the
deceleration capability of the airplane. The certification data which reduces the available
actual surface condition can vary from perfectly
friction between the tire and the runway surface
dry to a damp, wet, heavy rain, snow, or slush
will increase the required stopping distance for
covered runway in a very short time. The entire
length of the runway may not have the same an RTO. Runway contaminants such as slush
stopping potential due to a variety of factors. or standing water can also affect the continued
Obviously, a 10,000-ft runway with the first takeoff performance due to “displacement
7,000 feet bare and dry, but the last 3,000 feet and impingement drag” associated with the
a sheet of ice, does not present a very good spray from the tires striking the airplane.
situation for a high speed RTO. On the other Some manufacturers provide advisory data for
hand, there are also specially constructed adjustment of takeoff weight and/or V1 when
runways with a grooved or Porous Friction the runway is wet or contaminated. Many
Coat (PFC) surface which can offer improved operators use this data to provide flight crews
braking under adverse conditions. The crews with a method of determining the limit weights
cannot control the weather like they can the for slippery runways.
airplane’s configuration or thrust. Therefore, to
maximize both the “ Go” and “ Stop” margins, Factors that make a runway slippery and how
they must rely on judiciously applying their they affect the stopping maneuver are discussed
company’s wet or contaminated runway policies in the following sections.
as well as their own understanding of how the
performance of their airplane may be affected
by a particular runway surface condition.
2.20
SECTION 2
&LOODEDRUNWAY
,OCKEDTIRE
3TREAMPRESSURE
Figure 16A Figure 16B

Dynamic Hydroplaning Reverted Rubber Hydroplaning
2.3.5.1.1 Hydroplaning water depth due to heavy rain activity. In the

extreme case, total dynamic hydroplaning can
Hydroplaning is an interesting subject since occur where the tire to runway contact area
most pilots have either heard of or experienced vanishes, the tire lifts off the runway and rides
instances of extremely poor braking action on on the wedge of water like a water ski. Since
wet runways during landing. The phenomenon the conditions required to initiate and sustain
is highly sensitive to speed which makes it an total dynamic hydroplaning are unusual, it
especially important consideration for RTO is rarely encountered. When it does occur,
situations. such as during an extremely heavy rainstorm,
it virtually eliminates any tire braking or
As a tire rolls on a wet runway, its forward cornering capability at high speeds.
motion tends to displace water from the tread
contact area. While this isn’t any problem at Another form of hydroplaning can occur
low speeds, at high speeds this displacement where there is some tread contact with the
action can generate water pressures sufficient runway surface but the wheel is either locked
to lift and separate part of the tire contact area or rotating slowly (compared to the actual
from the runway surface. The resulting tire-to- airplane speed). The friction produced by
ground friction can be very low at high speeds the skidding tire causes the tread material to
but fortunately improves as speed decreases. become extremely hot. As indicated in Figure
16B, the resulting heat generates steam in the
Dynamic hydroplaning is the term used to contact area which tends to provide additional
describe the reduction of tire tread contact upward pressure on the tire. The hot steam also
area due to induced water pressure. At high starts reversing the vulcanizing process used
speeds on runways with significant water, in manufacturing the rubber tread material.
the forward motion of the wheel generates a The affected surface tread rubber becomes
wedge of high pressure water at the leading irregular in appearance, somewhat gummy in
edge of the contact area, as shown in Figure nature, and usually has a light gray color. This
16A. Depending on the speed, depth of water, “reverted” rubber hydroplaning results in very
and certain tire parameters, the portion of the low friction levels, approximately equal to icy
tire tread that can maintain contact with the runway friction when the temperature is near
runway varies significantly. As the tread contact the melting point. An occurrence of reverted
area is reduced, the available braking friction rubber hydroplaning is rare and usually results
is also reduced. This is the predominant factor from some kind of antiskid system or brake
leading to reduced friction on runways that malfunction which prevented the wheel from
have either slush, standing water or significant rotating at the proper speed.
2.21
SECTION 2
In the last several years, many runways 2.3.5.2 Atmospheric Conditions

throughout the world have been grooved,
thereby greatly improving the potential wet In general, the lift the wings generate and thrust
runway friction capability. As a result, the the engines produce are directly related to the
number of hydroplaning incidents has decreased airplane’s speed through the air and the density
considerably. Flight tests of one manufacturer’s of that air. The flight crew should anticipate
airplane on a well maintained grooved that the airplane’s takeoff performance will be
runway, which was thoroughly drenched with affected by wind speed and direction as well
water, showed that the stopping forces were as the atmospheric conditions which determine
approximately 90% of the forces that could be air density. Properly accounting for last minute
developed on a dry runway. Continued efforts changes in these factors is crucial to a successful
to groove additional runways or the use of other Go/No Go decision.
equivalent treatments such as porous friction
overlays, will significantly enhance the overall The effect of the wind speed and direction on
safety of takeoff operations. takeoff distance is very straightforward. At any
given airspeed, a 10-knot headwind component
The important thing to remember about wet lowers the ground speed by 10 knots. Since
or contaminated runway conditions is that for V1, rotation, and liftoff speeds are at lower
smooth runway surfaces there is a pronounced
ground speeds, the required takeoff distance
effect of forward ground speed on friction
is reduced. The opposite occurs if the wind
capability, aggravated by the depth of water.
For properly maintained grooved or specially has a 10-knot tailwind component, producing
treated surfaces, the friction capability is a 10-knot increase in the ground speed. The
markedly improved. required runway length is increased, especially
the distance required to stop the airplane from
V1. Typical takeoff data supplied to the flight
2.3.5.1.2 The Final Stop crew by their operations department will
either provide takeoff weight adjustments to be
A review of overrun accidents indicates that, in applied to a zero wind limit weight or separate
many cases, the stopping capability available
columns of limit weights for specific values
was not used to the maximum during the
of wind component. In either case, it is the
initial and mid portions of the stop maneuver,
because there appeared to be “plenty of runway responsibility of the flight crew to verify that
available”. In some cases, less than full reverse last minute changes in the tower reported winds
thrust was used and the brakes were released for are included in their takeoff planning.
a period of time, letting the airplane roll on the
portion of the runway that would have produced The effect of air density on takeoff performance
good braking action. When the airplane moved is also straight forward in so far as the crew
onto the final portion of the runway, the crew is normally provided the latest meteorological
discovered that the presence of moisture on the information prior to takeoff. However, it is the
top of rubber deposits in the touchdown and responsibility of the crew to verify the correct
turnoff areas resulted in very poor braking pressure altitude and temperature values used
capability, and the airplane could not be stopped in determining the final takeoff limit weight
on the runway. When an RTO is initiated on wet and thrust setting.
or slippery runways, it is especially important
to use full stopping capability until the airplane
is completely stopped.
2.22
SECTION 2
2.3.5.3 Airplane Configuration 2.3.5.3.2 Engine Bleed Air
The planned configuration of the airplane at the Whenever bleed air is extracted from an engine,
time of takeoff must be taken into consideration and the value of the thrust setting parameter
by the flight crew during their takeoff planning. is appropriately reduced, the amount of thrust
This should include the usual things like flap the engine generates is reduced. Therefore, the
selection, and engine bleed configuration, as use of engine bleed air for air conditioning/
well as the unusual things like inoperative pressurization reduces the airplane’s potential
equipment covered by the Minimum Equipment takeoff performance for a given set of runway
List (MEL) or missing items as covered by length, temperature and altitude conditions.
the Configuration Deviation List (CDL). This
section will discuss the effect of the airplane’s When required, using engine and/or wing
configuration on takeoff performance capability anti-ice further decreases the performance
and/or the procedures the flight crew would use on some airplane models. This “lost” thrust
to complete or reject the takeoff. may be recoverable via increased takeoff
EPR or N1 limits as indicated in the airplane
operating manual. It depends on engine type,
2.3.5.3.1 Flaps
airplane model, and the specific atmospheric
The airplane’s takeoff field length performance conditions.
is affected by flap setting in a fairly obvious way.
For a given runway length and airplane weight, 2.3.5.3.3 Missing or Inoperative Equipment
the takeoff speeds are reduced by selecting a
greater flap setting. This is because the lift Inoperative or missing equipment can
required for flight is produced at a lower V2 sometimes affect the airplane’s acceleration
speed with the greater flap deflection. Since the or deceleration capability. Items which
airplane will reach the associated lower V1 speed are allowed to be missing per the certified
earlier in the takeoff roll, there will be more Configuration Deviation List (CDL), such
runway remaining for a possible stop maneuver. as access panels and aerodynamic seals, can
On the “Go” side of the decision, increasing cause airplane drag to increase. The resulting
the takeoff flap deflection will increase the decrements to the takeoff limit weights are,
when appropriate, published in the CDL.
airplane drag and the resulting lower climb
With these decrements applied, the airplane’s
performance may limit the allowable takeoff
takeoff performance will be within the required
weight. However, the takeoff analysis used by distances and climb rates.
the flight crew will advise them if climb or
obstacle clearance is a limiting factor with a Inoperative equipment or deactivated systems,
greater flap setting. as permitted under the Minimum Equipment
List (MEL) can also affect the airplane’s
dispatched “Go” or “Stop” performance.
For instance, on some airplane models, an
inoperative in-flight wheel braking system may
require the landing gear to be left extended
during a large portion of the climbout to
allow the wheels to stop rotating. The ‘Go”
performance calculations for dispatch must be
made in accordance with certified “Landing
Gear Down” Flight Manual data. The resulting
2.23
SECTION 2
new limit takeoff weight may be much less

than the original limit in order to meet obstacle
clearance requirements, and there would be
some excess runway available for a rejected
takeoff.
An MEL item that would not affect the “Go”

performance margins but would definitely
degrade the “Stop” margins is an inoperative
anti-skid system. In this instance, not only is the
limit weight reduced by the amount determined
from the AFM data, but the flight crew may also
be required to use a different rejected takeoff
procedure in which throttles are retarded first,
the speedbrakes deployed second, and then
the brakes are applied in a judicious manner to
avoid locking the wheels and failing the tires.3
The associated decrement in the Field Length
Limit Weight is usually substantial.
Other MEL items such as a deactivated brake

may impact both the continued takeoff and
RTO performance through degraded braking
capability and loss of in-flight braking of the
spinning tire.
The flight crew should bear in mind that

the performance of the airplane with these
types of CDL or MEL items in the airplane’s
maintenance log at dispatch will be within the
certified limits. However, it would be prudent
for the flight crew to accept final responsibility
to assure that the items are accounted for in
the dispatch process, and to insure that they,
as a crew, are prepared to properly execute any
revised procedures.
3
UK CAA procedure adds “...apply maximum reverse thrust.”
2.24
SECTION 2
2.3.5.3.4 Wheels, Tires, and Brakes
The airplane’s wheels, tires, and brakes are recognize that fuse plugs cannot protect against
another area that should be considered in light all types of heat induced tire failures. The
of the significant part they play in determining location of the fuse plug in the wheel is selected
the results of a Go/No Go decision. to ensure proper response to brake heat. This
location in combination with the inherent low
One design feature which involves all three thermal conductivity of tire rubber means that
components is the wheel fuse plug. All jet the fuse plugs cannot prevent tire failures from
transport wheels used for braking incorporate the rapid internal heat buildup associated with
thermal fuse plugs. The function of the fuse plug taxiing on an underinflated tire. This type of heat
is to prevent tire or wheel bursts by melting if the buildup can cause a breakdown of the rubber
heat transferred to the wheels from the brakes compound, ply separation, and/or rupture of the
becomes excessive. Melting temperatures of plies. This damage might not cause immediate
fuse plugs are selected so that with excessive tire failure and because it is internal, it may
brake heat, the inflation gas (usually nitrogen) not be obvious by visual inspection. However,
is released before the structural integrity of the weakened tire is more prone to failure on a
the tire or wheel is seriously impaired. Both subsequent flight. Long taxi distances especially
certification limitations and operational at high speeds and heavy takeoff weights can
recommendations to avoid melting fuse plugs aggravate this problem and result in a blown
are provided to operators by the manufacturer, tire. While underinflation is a maintenance
as is discussed in Section 2.3.5.3.6 under the issue, flight crews can at least minimize the
heading, Residual Brake Energy. possibility of tire failures due to overheating
by using low taxi speeds and minimizing taxi
While fuse plugs provide protection from braking whenever possible.
excessive brake heat, it is also important to
2.25
SECTION 2
Correct tire inflation and fuse plug protection tire being thrown into an engine must also be
are significant, but will never prevent all tire considered.
failures. Foreign objects in parking areas,
taxiways and runways can cause severe cuts in An airplane’s climb gradient and obstacle
tires. The abrasion associated with sustained clearance performance with all engines
locked or skidding wheels, which can be caused operating and the landing gear down exceeds
by various antiskid or brake problems, can grind the minimum certified engine-out levels that
through the tire cords until the tire is severely are used to determine the takeoff performance
weakened or a blow out occurs. Occasionally, limits. Therefore, leaving the gear down after
wheel cracks develop which deflate a tire and a suspected tire failure will not jeopardize the
generate an overloaded condition in the adjacent aircraft if all engines are operating. However, if
tire on the same axle. Some of these problems are the perceived tire failure is accompanied by an
inevitable. However, it cannot be overstressed indication of thrust loss, or if an engine problem
that proper maintenance and thorough walk should develop later in the takeoff sequence,
around inspections are key factors in preventing the airplane’s climb gradient and/or obstacle
tire failures during the takeoff roll. clearance capability may be significantly
reduced if the landing gear is not retracted. The
Tire failures may be difficult to identify from the decision to retract the gear with a suspected
flight deck and the related Go/No Go decision tire problem should be in accordance with the
is therefore not a simple task. A tire burst may airline’s /manufacturer’s recommendations.
be loud enough to be confused with an engine
compressor stall, may just be a loud noise, or If a tire failure is suspected at fairly low speeds,
may not be heard. A tire failure may not be it should be treated the same as any other
felt at all, may cause the airplane to pull to one rejectable failure and the takeoff should be
side, or can cause the entire airplane to shake rejected promptly. When rejecting the takeoff
and shudder to the extent that instruments may with a blown tire, the crew should anticipate
become difficult to read. Vibration arising out of that additional tires may fail during the stop
failure of a nosewheel tire potentially presents attempt and that directional control may be
another complication. During takeoff rotation, difficult. They should also be prepared for the
vibration may actually increase at nosewheel possible loss of hydraulic systems which may
liftoff due to the loss of the dampening effect cause speedbrake or thrust reverser problems.
of having the wheel in contact with the runway. Since the stopping capability of the airplane may
A pilot must be cautious not to inappropriately be significantly compromised, the crew should
conclude, under such circumstances, that not relax from a maximum effort RTO until the
another problem exists. airplane is stopped on the pavement.
Although continuing a takeoff with a failed Rejecting a takeoff from high speeds with
tire will generally have no significant adverse a failed tire is a much riskier proposition,
results, there may be additional complications especially if the weight is near the Field Limit
as a result of a tire failure. Failed tires do not Weight. The chances of an overrun are increased
in themselves usually create directional control simply due to the loss of braking force from
problems. Degradation of control can occur, one wheel. If additional tires should fail during
however, as a result of heavy pieces of tire the stop attempt, the available braking force is
material being thrown at very high velocities even further reduced. In this case, it is generally
and causing damage to the exposed structure better to continue the takeoff, as can be seen
of the airplane and/or the loss of hydraulic in Figure 17. The subsequent landing may take
systems. On airplanes with aft mounted advantage of a lower weight and speed if it is
engines, the possibility of pieces of the failed possible to dump fuel. Also, the crew will be
2.26
SECTION 2
!VAILABLE2UNWAY Figure 17
Margins associated
s4AKEOFFFLAPS 62 with continuing or
s#ERTIFIEDPERFORMANCE 'O FT rejecting a takeoff
s$RYRUNWAY %NGINE with a tire failure
FAIL
s&IELDLENGTHLIMITWEIGHT
6 4RANSITION
6%& COMPLETE
&ULLSTOPPING
2EJECT NOREVERSE
!PPROX
62 FT
'O
4IRE
• 3AMEINITIALCONDITIONS FAIL
6 4RANSITION
COMPLETE TO
s,ANDINGFLAPS 2EDUCEDBRAKING KTS
s#ERTIFIEDPERFORMANCE CAPABILITYPLUSALL
2EJECT ENGINEREVERSE TOFT
LESSBLOWNTIREEFFECTS OVERRUN
s4AKEOFFWEIGHTMINUS
FT BURNOFFANDFUELDUMPOPT
TO 3TOP
ZONE -ARGIN
TO
better prepared for possible vibration and/or which was initiated “very near V1”, revealed
control problems. Most important, however, is that the overrun was the result of 8 of the 10
the fact that the entire runway will be available wheel brakes failing during the RTO. The
for the stop maneuver instead of perhaps, as failed brakes were later identified to have been
little as 40% of it. at advanced states of wear which, while within
accepted limits, did not have the capacity for a
As can be seen from this discussion, it is high energy RTO.
not a straightforward issue to define when a
takeoff should be continued or rejected after This was the first and only known accident in
a suspected tire failure. It is fairly obvious the history of commercial jet transport operation
however, that an RTO initiated at high speed that can be traced to failure of the brakes during
with a suspected tire failure is not a preferred an attempted RTO. The National Transportation
situation. McDonnell Douglas Corporation, Safety Board (NTSB) investigated the accident
in an All Operator Letter4, has addressed this and made several recommendations to the FAA.
dilemma by recommending a policy of not The recommendations included the need to
rejecting a takeoff for a suspected tire failure require airplane and brake manufacturers to
at speeds above V1−20 knots. The operators verify by test and analysis that their brakes,
of other model aircraft should contact the when worn to the recommended limits, meet
manufacturer for specific recommendations the certification requirements. Prior to 1991,
regarding tire failures. maximum brake energy limits had been derived
from tests done with new brakes installed.
2.3.5.3.5 Worn Brakes Virtually all brakes in use today have wear
indicator pins to show the degree of wear and
The investigation of one recent RTO incident when the brake must be removed from the
4
McDonnell Douglas All Operators Letter FO-AOL-8-003, -9-006, -10-004, -11-015, Reiteration of Procedures and Techniques
Regarding Wheels, Tires, and Brakes, dated 19 AUG 1991
2.27
SECTION 2
airplane. In most cases, as the brake wears, the 2.3.5.3.7 Speedbrake Effect on Wheel
pin moves closer to a reference point, so that Braking
when the end of the pin is flush with the reference
(with full pressure applied), the brake is “worn While jet transport pilots generally understand
out”. As of late 1991, tests have been completed the aerodynamic drag benefit of speedbrakes
which show that brakes at the allowable wear and the capability of wheel brakes to stop an
limit can meet AFM brake energy levels. As airplane, the effect of speedbrakes on wheel
a result, “wear pin length” is not significant brake effectiveness during an RTO is not always
to the flight crew unless the pin indicates that appreciated. The reason speedbrakes are so
the brake is worn out and should be removed critical is their pronounced effect on wing lift.
from service. There are no changes to flight Depending on flap setting, the net wing lift
crew or dispatch procedures based on brake can be reduced, eliminated or reversed to a
wear pin length. down load by raising the speedbrakes, thereby
increasing the vertical load on the wheels
which in turn can greatly increase braking
2.3.5.3.6 Residual Brake Energy capability.
After a brake application, the energy which the Speedbrakes are important since for most
brake has absorbed is released as heat and until braking situations, especially any operation
this heat is dissipated, the amount of additional on slippery runways, the torque output of the
energy which the brake can absorb without brake, and therefore the amount of wheelbrake
failure is reduced. Therefore, takeoff planning retarding force that can be developed is highly
must consider the effects of residual brake dependent on the vertical wheel load. As a
energy (or brake temperature) if the previous result, speedbrakes must be deployed early in
landing involved significant braking and/or the the stop to maximize the braking capability.
airplane turnaround is relatively short. There During RTO certification flight tests, the
are two primary sources of information on stopping performance is obtained with prompt
this subject. The brake temperature limitations deployment of the speedbrakes. Failure to raise
and/or cooling charts in the airplane operating the speedbrakes during an RTO or raising
manual provide recommended information on them late will significantly increase the
temperature limitations and/or cooling times stopping distance beyond the value shown
and the procedures necessary to dissipate in the AFM.
various amounts of brake energy. In addition,
the Maximum Quick Turnaround Weight Figures 18 and 19 summarize the effect of
(MQTW) chart in the AFM is a regulatory speedbrakes during an RTO. For a typical
requirement that must be followed. This chart mid-sized two-engine transport, at a takeoff
shows the gross weight at landing where the weight of 225,000 lb, the total load on the main
energy absorbed by the brakes during the wheels at brake release would be approximately
landing could be high enough to cause the 193,000 lb. As the airplane accelerates along the
wheel fuse plugs to melt and establishes a runway, wing lift will decrease the load on the
minimum waiting/cooling time for these cases. gear, and by the time the airplane approaches
The MQTW chart assumes that the previous V1 speed, (137 knots for this example), the main
landing was conducted with maximum braking gear load will have decreased by nearly 63,000
for the entire stop and did not use reverse thrust, lb. The data in Figure 19 graphically depicts
so for many landings where only light braking how the forces acting on the airplane vary with
was used there is substantial conservatism built airspeed from a few knots before the RTO is
into the wait requirement. initiated until the airplane is stopped. When the
pilot begins the RTO by applying the brakes and
2.28
SECTION 2
7EIGHT Figure 18
ONTIRE Effect of
&ORWARDMOTION speedbrakes on the
4OTALSTOPPINGFORCECAPABILITY stopping capability
2OLLING 3PEED of a typical mid-
,IFT
BRAKES size two-engine
INCREASE DOWN
"RAKE transport
$RAG $RAG
TORQUE "RAKINGFORCE 3PEED
BRAKES "RAKES
"RAKES UP ,OADON
"RAKINGFORCEBRAKINGFRICTIONXLOADONTIRE
WHEELS

"RAKETORQUENOTLIMITING
3PEEDBRAKEPOSITION $IFFERENCE
$OWN SPEEDBRAKEUP
5P
$RAG LBS LBS
,IFT LBS
.ETLOADONWHEELS
-AXBRAKINGFORCE
-AXSTOPPINGFORCE
BRAKESANDDRAG

Figure 19
"RAKINGFORCEWITHSPEEDBRAKESUP Summary of forces
during a typical
mid-size two-
engine airplane
RTO

"RAKINGFORCEWITHSPEEDBRAKESDOWN

!ERODRAGWITHSPEEDBRAKESUP

4WO ENGINEREVERSETHRUSTFORCE

2ETARDING
FORCELB
!ERODRAGWITHSPEEDBRAKESDOWN

3PEED+4!3
2.29
SECTION 2
closing the thrust levers, the braking force rises ft. to the stop distance of a typical mid-sized
quickly to a value in excess of 70,000 lb. The two-engine jet transport, including the effects
nearly vertical line made by the braking force of engine-out reverse thrust. As a worst case
curve in Figure 19 also shows that the airplane illustration, if reverse thrust was not used
began to decelerate almost immediately, with and the speedbrakes were not deployed at all,
virtually no further increase in speed. stopping distance would be increased by more
than 700 ft. Although the exact figures of this
The next action in a typical RTO procedure example will vary with different flap settings
is to deploy the speedbrakes. By the time this and from one airplane model to another, the
action is completed, and the wheel brakes general effect will be the same, namely that
have become fully effective, the airplane will speedbrakes have a very pronounced effect on
have slowed several knots. In this example of stopping performance.
an RTO initiated at 137 knots, the airspeed
would be about 124 knots at this point. The
weight on the main gear at 124 knots would be 2.3.5.3.8 Carbon and Steel Brake Differences
approximately 141,600 lb with the speedbrakes
down, and would increase by 53,200 lb when Recent emphasis on the apparent tendency for
the speedbrakes are raised. The high speed carbon brakes to wear out in proportion to the
braking capability is substantially improved by total number of brake applications, as opposed
this 38% increase in wheel load from 141,600 to to steel brakes which wear out in proportion to
194,800 pounds, which can be seen by noting energy absorbed by the brakes, has generated
the increase in braking force to 98,000 pounds. interest in other operational differences
In addition, the speedbrakes have an effect between the two types of brakes. While the
on aerodynamic drag, increasing it by 73%, emphasis on wear difference is necessary,
from 8,500 to 14,700 pounds. The combined since the economics of brake maintenance is so
result, as indicated by the table in Figure 18, significant, for most other operational aspects
is that during the critical, high speed portion the two brakes can be considered equivalent.
of the RTO, the total stopping force acting on
the airplane is increased by 34% when the As far as RTO capability is concerned, the type
speedbrakes are deployed. of brake involved does not matter since each
brake installation is certified to its particular
Since both the force the brakes can produce takeoff energy capability. This means that
and the aerodynamic effect of the speedbrakes either carbon or steel brakes, even fully worn,
vary with speed, the total effect for the RTO will be able to perform the maximum certified
stop is more properly indicated by averaging RTO condition applicable to that installation in
the effect of the speedbrakes over the entire a satisfactory manner.
stopping distance. For this example, the over all
effect of raising the speedbrakes is an increase One difference between steel and carbon brakes
of 14% in the average total stopping force acting that is often claimed is an increased tolerance
throughout the RTO. to thermal overload. To understand this in
proper perspective, recognize that although the
One common misconception among pilots friction elements in a carbon brake (rotating
is that the quick use of thrust reversers will and stationary disks) are made of carbon
offset any delay or even the complete lack of material, which has good strength and friction
speedbrake deployment during an RTO. This characteristics at high temperatures, the brake
is simply not true. On a dry runway, delaying structure, brake hydraulics, the wheel, and
the deployment of the speedbrakes by only the tire are essentially the same as used for an
5 seconds during the RTO will add over 300 equivalent steel brake. Within the limitations
2.30
SECTION 2
represented by this non-carbon equipment then, each particular airplane. Therefore, brake fade
an overheated carbon brake will continue to does not need to be an operational concern to
function reasonably well in situations where the flight crew.
an equivalent steel brake with its metallic
disks might not. An overload condition could A second factor with steel brakes is the potential
be caused by excessive taxi braking, riding the loss of structural strength of the rotors and
brakes, or inappropriate turnaround procedures stators at the extreme operating temperatures
after landing. In this type of situation, carbon associated with limiting energy values. This
brakes will generally demonstrate better friction could cause a structural failure of one or more
characteristics and therefore develop more brake stators near the end of the stop. In this
torque and stopping force than equivalent steel case the brake will continue to function but
brakes. with reduced torque capability. The remaining
components, which are common to carbon and
The difficulty with this carbon brake thermal steel brakes, are less likely to be affected.
advantage is that it is nearly impossible to judge
the extra amount of braking that could be done An RTO from at or near the brake energy
before affecting the ability of the non-carbon limits can also mean that after stopping on
components to perform in an RTO situation. This the runway, the brakes may not be capable of
is because the thermal effects on the limiting stopping the airplane again, even from low taxi
hardware are so highly time and ambient speeds. This is especially true for steel brakes
condition dependent. For instance, whether an due to the increased chance of structural failure.
airplane has carbon brakes or steel brakes will Therefore, it is important that the crew consider
not matter if enough time has elapsed after a the probable condition of the airplane wheels,
heavy brake application such that the wheel fuse brakes, and tires after completing a high speed
plugs release before the airplane can complete RTO before attempting to move the airplane
the next takeoff or a subsequent RTO attempt. from the runway.
Pilots should concentrate on proper braking
procedures rather than attempt to capitalize on One other difference between carbon and steel
any extra carbon brake advantage. Attention brakes that might be evident in certain RTOs is
to the brake cooling chart recommendations brake welding. Steel brakes, which usually have
will avoid these thermal problems and ensure rotors of steel and stators of a copper-iron mix
that the airplane stopping performance can be (with a number of special ingredients) can weld
achieved regardless of whether steel or carbon together, preventing further wheel rotation. This
brakes are installed. can even happen before the airplane comes to a
full stop, particularly in the last several knots
The increased thermal overload capability of where the antiskid system is not effective.
carbon brakes is closely related to the idea that
carbon brakes do not “fade”. In other words, they
always produce the same torque throughout the 2.3.5.3.9 High Brake Energy RTOs
stop even as the brake temperature increases.
Although many carbon brakes do develop Brake rotor and stator temperatures associated
nearly constant torque, some fade considerably with RTOs which involve brake energies
in certain conditions. On the other hand, some at or near certified maximum values, reach
steel brakes do not fade very much at all, approximately 2000 °F for steel brakes, and
depending to a large extent on the degree of 2500 °F for most carbon brakes. These high
conservatism built into the brake. In either case, temperatures may, in some situations, ignite
brake fade is taken into account in the AFM certain items in the wheel, tire, and brake
performance, for the specific brake installed on assembly. While considerable design effort is
2.31
SECTION 2
made to preclude fires whenever possible, the energy during the stop. Flight crews can use the
regulations recognize the rarity of such high Brake Cooling Chart of the airplane operating
energy situations and allow brake fires after a manual to determine brake energy values if
maximum energy condition, provided that any the situation warrants such a review. In cases
fires that may occur are confined to the wheels, where an extremely high brake energy might
tires and brakes, and do not result in progressive be encountered, the possibility of a brake fire
engulfment of the remaining airplane during should therefore be considered by the flight
the time of passenger and crew evacuation. It is crew during the pre-takeoff briefing. If a high
important then, for flight crews to understand speed RTO is subsequently performed, the
the nature of possible fires and the airplane tower should immediately be advised that the
takeoff parameters that could involve these airplane is still on the runway, that a high brake
very high brake energies. energy stop was made, and that emergency
equipment is requested to observe the tires and
There are two primary combustibles in the brakes for possible fires.
assembly, namely the tire, and brake grease.
Brake hydraulic fluid will also burn if there
is a hydraulic leak directed at a very hot 2.3.5.4 Reverse Thrust Effects
brake disk. Tire fires can occur if the rubber
compound temperature exceeds approximately Most of the takeoffs planned in the world do not
650 °F. Tire fires usually burn fairly slowly include reverse thrust credit. This is because
for the first several minutes when started by the rejected takeoff certification testing under
brake heat. Grease fires are even less active, FAA rules does not include the use of reverse
typically involving a small, unsteady, flickering thrust, except for the wet runway case for
flame, sometimes with considerable smoke. airplanes certified under FAR Amendment 25-
The probability of a crew experiencing a brake 92. An additional stopping margin is produced
fire at the conclusion of an RTO is very low, by using maximum reverse thrust. We stress
considering brake design factors, the dispatch the word “maximum” in relation to the use of
parameters, and service history. reverse thrust because of another commonly
held misconception. Some pilots are of the
In terms of practical guidelines for flight opinion that idle reverse is “equally or even
crews, takeoffs at or near VMBE are normally more” effective than full or maximum reverse
encountered at high altitude airports or at thrust for today’s high bypass ratio engines.
very hot temperatures. An RTO from close to This is simply not true. The more EPR or N1
V1 speed under these conditions will require that is applied in reverse, the more stopping
the brakes to absorb a significant amount of force the reverse thrust generates. The data
+NOTS4!3
Figure 20

Effect of engine
RPM and airspeed
on reverse thrust

of a typical high
bypass engine .ETREVERSE
THRUSTFORA
TYPICALLB
THRUSTENGINE
LBPERENGINE

0ERCENT.
2.32
SECTION 2
shown in Figure 20 is typical for all high bypass further along the runway than was planned.
engines. If no event occurs which would precipitate an
RTO, the final acceleration to VR and liftoff
On wet or slippery runways, the wheel brakes will be higher than planned and the overall
are not capable of generating as high a retarding performance will probably come out close to
force as they are on a dry surface. Therefore, the what was scheduled.
retarding force of the reversers generates a larger
percentage of the total airplane deceleration. On the other hand, if an event worthy of an RTO
should occur just prior to the airplane reaching
V1, most, if not all of the stop maneuver will
2.3.5.5 Runway Parameters have to be carried out on a 2% downhill slope
surface instead of the equivalent single slope
Runway characteristics which affect takeoff value, and the RTO will have been initiated
performance include length, slope, clearway with less runway remaining than was assumed
and/or stopway. The effect of runway length in determining the limit weight for that takeoff.
is straightforward, however, slope, clearway, There is little the crew can do in this type of
and stopway deserve some discussion. situation, other than in the vein of situational
awareness, emphasize in their briefing that
A single value of runway slope is typically an RTO near V1 for anything other than a
chosen by the operator to perform takeoff catastrophic event is not advisable.
analysis calculations. This single value is
usually taken from information published by A clearway is an area at least 500 ft wide
the navigation chart services or the airport centered about the extended centerline of
authorities. On closer inspection however, many the runway with a slope equal to or less than
runways are seen to have distinct differences 1.25%. This area is called the clearway plane.
in slope along the length of the runway. No obstructions, except threshold lights,
The single published value may have been can protrude above this clearway plane. The
determined by a variety of methods, ranging acceleration to V2 and 35 feet is completed over
from a simple mathematical average of the the clearway. The use of clearway to increase
threshold elevations, to some weighted average takeoff weight “unbalances the runway” and
methods proposed by ICA0 in an advisory results in a lower V1 speed. The maximum
publication5. clearway used to calculate takeoff performance
is restricted by the regulations to one half the
As a simple example, consider a runway demonstrated distance from liftoff to 35 ft.
which has only one slope discontinuity. The
first two thirds of the runway has an uphill A stopway is an area at least as wide as the
slope of +2% and the last third has a downhill runway and centered about the extended
slope of −2%. The equivalent single slope for centerline. It must be capable of supporting
this runway, as determined from the ICAO the weight of the airplane without causing
Circular methods, could vary from +1.3% to damage. Use of stopway also “unbalances the
−0.3%. When the takeoff analysis is made runway” resulting in a higher takeoff weight
for this runway, the limit weights will be the and increased V1 speed. An RTO initiated at this
same as would be determined for an actual V1 will come to a stop on the stopway. For the
single slope runway. However, as the airplane sake of completeness, it should be pointed out
commences a takeoff on the 2% upslope runway, that not all stopways will qualify as clearways,
it will accelerate more slowly than it would on nor will a clearway necessarily qualify as a
any of the equivalent single slope runways, stopway. The specified criteria for each must
which will result in its achieving V1 speed be met independently before it can be used for
5
ICAO Circular 91-AN/75, The Effect of Variable Runway Slopes on Take-Off Runway Lengths for Transport Aeroplanes,
dated 1968.
2.33
SECTION 2
takeoff performance calculations. Fixed derates and the Assumed Temperature

Method also differ in terms of the performance
The use of clearway and/or stopway does not margins that are inherent to their use. As was
necessarily offer any additional margin for RTO previously mentioned, at limit weights, a takeoff
stopping. In both cases, the takeoff performance performed using a fixed derate takeoff thrust
is “unbalanced” by adjusting V1 speed to plan will conform to the minimum performance
that the stop will be completed by the end of levels of the regulations, just as a limit weight
the paved surface. takeoff would when using full rated takeoff
thrust. The associated V1 speed provides the
standard certification “margins” of a 35 foot
2.3.5.6 (Not Used) screen height or a stop at the end of the runway
in the event of an engine failure.
2.3.5.7 Takeoffs Using Reduced Thrust When using the Assumed Temperature Method,
additional “margins” are created in both the
There are two methods of performing a reduced “Go” and “Stop” cases. As the name implies,
thrust takeoff. The first is to use a fixed derate of the technique used to calculate the performance
the engine to a lower thrust rating. For example, with the Assumed Temperature Method is to
a JT9D-7F engine operated at a JT9D-7 rating, assume that the temperature is higher than it
or a CFM56-3C-1 engine operated at 20,000 lb actually is, and to calculate takeoff thrust and
of thrust (-B1 rating) instead of the full 23,500 speeds at the higher temperature.
lb rating. When a fixed derate is used, the engine
EGT and RPM limits are reduced and the crew The primary reason that the use of the Assumed
are not to exceed the reduced limits in normal Temperature Method results in performance
operation. As a result of the lower limit thrust margins is that the true airspeed of the
with a fixed derate, the minimum control speeds airplane is lower than would be the case if the
Vmcg and Vmca are also reduced. Since the actual temperature were equal to the assumed
choice of derate thrust levels is usually restricted temperature.
to one or two preselected values, it is rare that
the takeoff performance at the derated thrust
would be reduced to field length limit levels. 2.3.5.8 The Takeoff Data the Pilot Sees
The second way of reducing takeoff thrust is The typical takeoff data table (sometimes
to use the Assumed Temperature Method. The referred to as runway analysis or gross weight
fundamental difference between fixed derates tables) shows the limit takeoff weight for
and the Assumed Temperature Method is that a specific runway over a range of ambient
the operating limits of the engine are not reduced temperatures. There may also be corrections for
when using Assumed Temperature Method wind, pressure altitude, bleed configurations,
reduced thrust. The flight crew may increase and runway surface conditions. Each table
the thrust to the full engine rating at any time usually shows the limit weights for only one
during the takeoff if it is deemed appropriate. flap setting. Some airlines show the takeoff
For instance, British CAA Flight Manuals speeds and the takeoff thrust EPR or N1 setting
include a recommendation to increase thrust along with the limit weights. The tables can
on the operating engines to the full rating in display limit weights for Field Length, Climb,
the event that an engine fails during the takeoff. Obstacle Clearance, Tire Speed and Brake
As a result, the Vmcg and Vmca speeds are not Energy, and tell which factor is limiting for each
reduced below the full rating values when using wind and temperature. This tabular display of
the Assumed Temperature Method. the takeoff data has become the standard tool
2.34
SECTION 2
for using the assumed temperature method to 2.3.6 Increasing the RTO Safety Margins
reduce the takeoff power setting and thereby
improve engine life. There are a number of choices and techniques
the crew can make and practice that will increase
This takeoff data is some of the most important the RTO margins for takeoff. Some involve
data used on any flight. It is essential that airline policy and require the publication of
flight crews know their actual takeoff weight additional data (such as multiple flap setting
and that they use the proper takeoff speeds. takeoff weight and speed data) and some are
It is equally important that the flight crew be just good personal technique.
aware of their proximity to the limit weights
for that takeoff’s ambient conditions. These
limit weights and speeds are more than just 2.3.6.1 Runway Surface Condition
numbers. They represent the maximum certified
takeoff performance of the airplane. If the actual The crew cannot control the weather like
takeoff weight is equal to or near the runway they can the airplane’s configuration or
limit weight, the crew should note that fact thrust. Therefore, to maximize both the
and be extra alert that a reject from near or at “Go” and “Stop” margins, they must rely on
V1 will require prompt application of the full judiciously applying their company’s wet or
stopping capability of the airplane to assure contaminated runway policies as well as their
stopping on the runway. own understanding of how the performance of
their airplane may be affected by a particular
If the actual airplane weight is less than the runway surface condition.
limit weight, the crew should treat the normally
obtained V1 speed as a “limit speed” unless
their operations department has provided them 2.3.6.2 Flap Selection
with a specific method of unbalancing the V1
speed to utilize the excess runway available. Often the RTO safety margin can be increased
The operator should assure that a suitable, by selection of an alternative takeoff flap setting.
non-ambiguous method of presenting the V1 Consider for example, the effect of takeoff flap
speed is chosen, whether it is a balanced or selection on the performance limit weights of
unbalanced speed. a typical large two engine airplane, as shown
in Figure 21.
Figure 21
8,700 ft runway Flap setting Typical large
Sea Level two-engine jet
transport takeoff
37° C 1 5 15 20 performance
Runway limit weight, 358,300 374,200 389,000 393,600

lb (kg) (162,494) (169,705) (176,417) (178,503)
Climb/Obstacle limit 414,100 407,300 393,600 383,000

weight, lb (kg) (187,800) (184,717) (178,503) (173,696)
2.35
SECTION 2
If a flight requires the absolute maximum 2.3.6.3 Runway Lineup

takeoff weight, the above weight limits would
dictate choosing Flaps 15 since 389,000 lb is Positioning the aircraft on the runway in
the highest weight allowed. Flaps 20 is Climb/ preparation for takeoff is an important element
Obstacle limited to a lower weight and Flaps in maximizing the amount of pavement available
1 and 5 are Runway limited to lower weights. for a possible RTO maneuver. Correction to the
If the actual takeoff weight desired is equal available runway length can be made to the
to the maximum limit weight, there is no flap takeoff analysis on those runways where it
selection option. The takeoff will need to use is not possible to position the airplane at the
Flaps 15. beginning of the published distance.
More typically, however, the airplane’s actual Correct runway lineup technique should always
takeoff weight is well below the maximum. be practiced regardless of whether or not there
There are then two viable ways to improve is excess runway available. Even if an allowance
RTO stopping distance margin: either by flap has been made, it is up to the crew operating
selection or by reduced V1 techniques. the flight to align the airplane on the runway
using the shortest possible distance. If they
If the flight’s actual takeoff weight was 374,200 can do it in a shorter distance than taken into
pounds, investigating the above table indicates account by their company, then there is that
Flaps 5, Flaps 15, or Flaps 20 are all acceptable. much extra margin for the takeoff.
Flaps 5 is runway limited so it offers no
additional RTO margin. However, Flaps 15 and
Flaps 20 both offer an opportunity for additional
stopping distance margin. These additional
stopping margins have been calculated for this
example and are shown in Figure 22.
Figure 22
Effect of flap Flap setting 5 15 20
selection on RTO
stopping margins
Stopping margin Zero 850 ft 1,000 ft
Thus, if there are no other constraints such as 2.3.6.4 Setting Takeoff Thrust
obstacles or critical noise abatement procedures
that would prevent the selection of a greater flap At takeoff thrust settings, gas turbine (jet)
setting, the crew could give themselves 1000 engines operate at very high RPM. It typically
feet of extra stopping distance in case an RTO takes several seconds for the engines to spool up
was required on this takeoff. from a low idle or taxi thrust to takeoff power
after the thrust levers are advanced. During
Remember that there are some disadvantages this time, the aircraft is not accelerating at
to selecting a higher flap setting. These full potential because the engines are not yet
disadvantages include diminished climb developing full power.
performance and slightly more fuel consumed
due to the higher drag configuration and the The demonstrated takeoff distance is achieved
additional flap retraction cleanup time that will when the takeoff thrust is set prior to releasing
be required. the brakes, but this technique is often not
practical in line operations due to expedited
2.36
SECTION 2
takeoff clearances, engine FOD hazards, and conditions were less than favorable. This
passenger comfort. As a result, most takeoffs are prevented sustained skids and therefore afforded
performed as “rolling takeoffs”, with the thrust both better braking and directional control.
being set as the airplane begins the takeoff roll. Both benefits occur because a skidding tire
However, this technique must be accomplished produces less frictional force than a tire which
promptly to avoid compromising the takeoff continues to rotate. Flight deck observation and
performance. A delayed application of takeoff simulator testing, however, both indicate that
thrust will increase the time and distance to this technique has at times been carried over into
reach V1 speed. Consequently, less runway will the cockpit of jet transports. With the antiskid
be left to stop the airplane should an RTO be control systems in jet transport airplanes this
necessary. The thrust should be set promptly, technique is not only unnecessary, it results
according to the airframe manufacturer’s in degraded stopping capability and therefore
recommendations. The non-flying pilot or excessive stopping distance especially for
flight engineer then typically makes any final adverse runway conditions. Proper braking
adjustments and monitors the engines for any technique in an RTO is to apply full brake
abnormalities. pedal force (“stand on it”) and maintain full
brake pedal force until the airplane comes
On airplanes equipped with autothrottles, an to a complete stop.
additional item to be aware of is that some
autothrottle systems incorporate “Thrust The pilot’s foot position relative to the rudder
Hold” features which will stop advancing pedal can also have an effect on the achievement
the thrust levers after the airplane reaches a of full brake pressure. It was noted during a
predetermined threshold airspeed value. A study conducted by the Training Aid Working
delay in engaging the autothrottle can result in Group6 that foot position during the takeoff roll
the thrust stabilizing below the takeoff target tends to be an individual preference. Some pilots
setting and the initial acceleration being less prefer to have their feet “up on the pedals” to
than required. be ready to apply full brakes if required. Pilots
who prefer this technique also noted that their
The engine instruments should be monitored toes are “curled back” to avoid unwanted brake
closely for any abnormal indications. Past applications when applying rudder. The other
RTO accidents have occurred after an engine technique is to rest the heels on the floor during
problem was identified early in the takeoff roll, the takeoff roll, and then raise them to be on
but no action was initiated until the airplane the pedal to apply full braking. No problems
had reached or exceeded V1. were noted with either technique.
Company operations manuals or training One technique which did not work well was
manuals contain correct procedures for setting also noted. It is not possible to apply maximum
takeoff thrust. Observing these procedures brake pedal deflection, and hence full brake
assures efficient engine acceleration and, as pressure, if the heel of the foot is left on the
a consequence, proper aircraft acceleration floor, unless the pilot has very big feet. In an
throughout the entire takeoff roll. RTO stop maneuver, the feet should be up on
the rudder pedals and steady, heavy pressure
applied until the airplane is completely stopped.
2.3.6.5 Manual Braking Techniques Pilots should develop a habit of adjusting their
seat and the rudder pedals prior to leaving the
Modulation of brake pressure or “pumping the gate. The ability to apply maximum brake pedal
brakes” was the way most people were taught force as well as full rudder should be checked
to apply automobile brakes when braking by both pilots.
6
The Training Aid Working Group is the industry and regulatory team that developed the Takeoff Safety Training Aid.
2.37
SECTION 2
The importance of maintaining maximum available runway length. Full brake pressure
braking and full reverse thrust during an RTO should not be applied with the antiskid system
until the airplane “rocks to a stop” cannot be inoperative due to the risk of tire failure. To
over-stressed. During a reject from V1, the minimize the possibility of skidding a tire,
goal is safety, not passenger comfort. The which can lead to a blowout, the speedbrakes
amount of distance required to decelerate from should be deployed before brakes are applied.
a given speed at the high weights associated This provides the highest possible wheel loads
with takeoff is significantly greater than from to keep the wheels rotating with the forward
the same speed at a typical landing weight. If motion of the airplane.
the pilot tries to judge the amount of runway
remaining against the current speed of the
airplane, the visual perception that the airplane 2.3.6.7 RTO Autobrakes
will stop on the runway (“we’ve got it made”),
will prompt a decrease in the stopping effort. Autobrake system functions and crew actions to
It is precisely at this point in the RTO that the initiate these functions vary from one airplane
difference between a successful Go/No Go model to another. For example, some systems
decision and an accident can occur. The brakes include automatic spoiler extension, others do
may be nearing their energy absorption limits not. Therefore, training in use of the system must
and the airplane may be entering a portion of be tailored to the particular system installed.
the runway contaminated with rubber deposits, The following discussion illustrates the general
which can be very slick if wet. In several of intent of autobrake systems.
the RTO accidents and incidents of the past,
there was excess runway available to complete Brake application is an immediate pilot action
the stop, but the premature relaxation of the when initiating an RTO, and this application
stopping effort contributed to an overrun. should be of maximum effort. An automatic
brake application system called “RTO
An additional consideration in completing a AUTOBRAKES” is being installed on more and
successful RTO is that the crew should assess the more airplanes today to insure that this critical
condition of the airplane after it comes to a stop. step is performed as rapidly as possible when
If there is evidence of a fire or other significant an RTO is initiated. This system is designed to
hazard to the passengers, an evacuation on the automatically apply maximum brake pressure
runway is definitely preferable to “clearing if during the takeoff roll, all the thrust levers
the active.” Every second counts in an actual are retarded to idle, and the aircraft speed is
emergency evacuation. In at least one RTO above a specified value (usually 85-90 knots).
accident, many of the fatalities were caused by RTO Autobrakes therefore, achieve the same
delaying the evacuation until the aircraft was airplane stopping performance as a proper,
clear of the runway. manual application of full foot pedal braking.
No time delays are built in to the RTO autobrakes
such as are used in some landing autobrake
2.3.6.6 Antiskid Inoperative Braking settings.
Techniques
The use of “RTO AUTOBRAKES” eliminates
Antiskid inoperative dispatches represent a any delay in brake application and assures
special case for brake application techniques. that maximum effort braking is applied
In this situation the pilot executing the RTO promptly. Possible application delays arising
should apply steady moderate pedal pressure from distractions due to directional control
consistent, in his judgement, with runway requirements in crosswinds, or application of
conditions, airplane dispatch weight and the less than maximum brake force, are completely
2.38
SECTION 2
eliminated. The results of a simulator study 2.3.6.9 The V1 Call

conducted by the Training Aid Working
Group also suggest that, on the average, One important factor in avoiding RTO overrun
those RTOs performed with RTO autobrakes accidents is for the crew to recognize reaching
ARMED resulted in more runway distance V1 when the airplane does, in fact, reach V1—not
remaining after the stop than did the RTOs after. The airplane’s stopping performance
performed using manual braking only. This cannot match that specified in the Airplane
result is more significant because few pilots Flight Manual if the assumptions used to derive
left the autobrakes engaged for more than that performance are violated, knowingly or
a few seconds before overriding them and inadvertently. Operationally, careful attention
applying full manual braking. The difference to procedures and teamwork are required to
in stopping performance is attributed to the match the human performance recognized by
first few seconds of high deceleration with the the AFM.
autobrakes at full pressure.
Basic operating procedures call for the pilot
When the RTO autobrakes are ARMED for flying the airplane to include airspeed in his
takeoff, the pilot not flying must monitor the instrument scan during the takeoff ground roll.
system and advise the pilot flying if a DISARM Hence he is always aware of the approximate
condition occurs. The pilot flying should also speed. The pilot not flying monitors airspeed
monitor the deceleration of the airplane for in more detail and calls out “Vee One” as a
acceptability and be prepared to apply manual confirmation of reaching this critical point in
braking if required or, the pilot performing the acceleration.
the reject procedure should apply maximum
manual braking during the RTO. In this latter The pilot flying cannot react properly to V1
case arming the RTO autobrake function only unless the V1 call is made in a timely, crisp, and
serves as a backup if for some reason manual audible manner. One method of accomplishing
braking is not applied. this by a major U.S. carrier is their adoption of a
policy of “completing the V1 callout by the time
The brake pedal forces required to disarm the the airplane reaches V1.” This is an excellent
autobrakes may vary significantly between example of the way airlines are implementing
the landing autobrake settings and the RTO procedures to improve RTO safety. It is a good
autobrake setting of any given airplane, between procedure and it should preclude a situation
one airplane model and another of the same where the “No Go” decision is inadvertently
manufacturer, as well as between the various made after V1. However, the success of such
manufacturers’ airplanes. It is not surprising a policy in reducing RTOs after V1, without
that this point is not fully understood in the unduly compromising the continued takeoff
pilot community. It is important that pilots be safety margins, hinges on the line pilot’s
made aware of how the details of any particular understanding of the specific airplane model’s
airplane’s autobrake system might affect RTO performance limitations and capabilities.
performance and that they obtain the necessary
information from their training department. Another proposal for calling V1 is to use a call
such as “Approaching V1” with the V1 portion
occurring as the airspeed reaches V1. Either of
2.3.6.8 (Not Used) these proposals accomplish the task of advising
the flying pilot that the airplane is close to the
speed where an RTO for all but the most serious
failures is not recommended.
2.39
SECTION 2
A frequently cited factor in RTO accidents that is made, the crew must quickly use all of the
occurred when the First Officer was flying is the stopping capability available. Too often, the
lack of any airspeed calls by the Captain during records show uncertainty in the decision process
the takeoff. This type of poor crew coordination and a lack of completeness in the procedures.
may be overcome by the use of automated Be ready to decide and be ready to act.
“V1” and “Engine Failure” calls which will
eliminate much of the variability experienced
in today’s operations. Even with an automated 2.4 Crew Resource Management
call system however, an “Approaching” call
by the non-flying pilot would still seem to be Crew Resource Management (CRM) is a term
an appropriate method of ensuring airspeed that can mean many things. In this context it
situational awareness for both pilots. is simply intended to encompass the factors
associated with having the crew members work
effectively together to make optimal Go /No
2.3.6.10 Crew Preparedness Go decisions and effectively accomplish related
procedures. It is recognized that the content of
Important crew factors directly related to a CRM discussion on Go/No Go decisions must
eliminating RTO overrun accidents and reflect the needs and culture of each individual
incidents are: operator. Therefore, the material contained in
this section is provided only as an example of
- Brief those physical conditions which
the type of CRM information which could be
might affect an RTO that are unique to
provided to the line pilot.
each specific takeoff.
- Both pilots must be sure to position the
seat and rudder pedals so that maximum 2.4.1 CRM and the RTO
brake pressure can be applied.
Effective CRM can improve crew performance
- Both pilots should maintain situational and in particular, decision making during
awareness of the proximity to V1. takeoff. Often, Go/ No Go decisions must be
- Use standard callouts during the takeoff. made “instantaneously” and as a result, the
significance of CRM is not readily apparent.
- Transition quickly to stopping
However, the fact that a critical decision must be
configuration.
made and implemented using rapidly changing,
- Don’t change your mind. If you have often incomplete information in a dynamic
begun an RTO, stop. If you have reached environment in which the time available
V1, go, unless the pilot has reason to decreases as the criticality of the decision
conclude that the airplane is unsafe or increases, is reason for effective CRM. Some
unable to fly. aspects of CRM are especially important with
respect to the Go/ No Go decision.
- Use maximum effort brake application.
- Assure deployment of speedbrakes.
2.4.2 The Takeoff Briefing
- Use maximum reverse thrust allowable.
Crew members must know what is expected
The accident records frequently show that slow
of them and from others. For optimum crew
or incomplete crew action was the cause of,
effectiveness, they should share a common
or contributed to, an RTO overrun event. The
perception — a mental image — of what is
crew must be prepared to make the Go/ No Go
happening and what is planned. This common
decision on every takeoff. If a “No Go” decision
perception involves a number of CRM areas:
2.40
SECTION 2
communications, situational awareness, 2.4.3 Callouts

workload distribution, cross-checking, and
monitoring. Meaningful communication, however brief,
regarding a non-normal situation during
A variety of means are used to achieve this takeoff and RTO can often mean the difference
common perception. This begins with airline between success and disaster. For this reason,
standard operating policies (SOPs) that clearly communications must be precise, effective,
define captain and first officer as well as pilot and efficient. Standard callouts contribute to
flying and pilot not flying responsibilities and improved situational awareness. These callouts,
duties. Training reinforces the crew’s knowledge coupled with all crewmembers being aware
and skill, while standardization insures of airspeed, maximize the opportunity for a
acceptable, consistent performance, across all common understanding of what actions are
fleets and cultures within an airline. proper in the event of a non-normal situation.
The crewmember noting a problem should
A takeoff briefing is another means of communicate clearly and precisely without
improving the crew’s awareness, knowledge, inferring things that may not be true. For
and team effectiveness, especially when example, the loss of fuel flow indication alone
special circumstances or conditions exist. does not necessarily mean an engine failure.
The briefing is not necessarily a one-way Use of standard terms and phraseology to
process. In fact, asking for clarification or describe the situation is essential. The pilot
confirmation is an excellent way to insure tasked to make the RTO decision should clearly
mutual under standing when required. A simple, announce this decision, whether it be to continue
“standard procedures” takeoff briefing might or reject.
be improved by adding “I’m not perfect, so
back me up on the speedbrakes and my use
of the RTO autobrakes” or, “if we’re not sure 2.4.4 The Use of All Crew Members
of an engine failure 5 knots before V1, we’ll
continue the takeoff and I’ll state ‘CONTINUE It’s important to understand that all crew
TAKEOFF”’. These briefings can improve team members on the flight deck play an important
effectiveness and understanding of the Go/No role in the Go/No Go decision and RTO
Go decision planning and communications to maneuver. Company policies shape these
be used. Such additions might be especially roles. However, how the team is organized for
appropriate on the first segment of a flight with each takeoff can make a difference in team
a relatively new first officer or a crew’s first performance. Knowing your own capabilities
flight of the month. and that of the other crewmembers is part of
situational awareness and should be used in
A review of actions for a blown tire, high speed planning for a given takeoff. Although it’s “the
configuration warning, or transfer of control first officer’s leg”, it might not be an effective
are examples of what might be appropriate plan to task an inexperienced first officer with
for before takeoff (or before engine start) a marginal weather takeoff when weight is also
review. Such a briefing should address items limited by field length. Consider the possibility
that could affect this takeoff, such as runway of an RTO when assigning takeoff duties.
contamination, hazardous terrain or special
departure procedures. The briefing should not
be a meaningless repetition of known facts, but
rather a tool for improving team performance,
that addresses the specific factors appropriate
to that takeoff.
2.41
SECTION 2
2.4.5 Summary
Each airline approaches CRM in a slightly

different manner, but the goal of effective
teamwork remains the same. This material is an
example of the type of CRM information that
could be used to promote a common perception
of RTO problems and actions.
2.42
SECTION 3
Example Takeoff Safety Training Program
Section
Table of Contents
Page
3
3.0 Introduction........................................................................................................................ 3.1
3.1 Academic Training Program.......................................................................................... 3.2

3.1.2 Academic Training Program Modules....................................................................... 3.2
3.1.3 Academic Training Syllabus...................................................................................... 3.2
3.1.4 Additional Academic Training Resources................................................................. 3.3
3.2 Simulator Training Program........................................................................................... 3.3

3.2.2 Simulator Training Syllabus...................................................................................... 3.3
3.2.3 Pilot Simulator Briefing............................................................................................. 3.6
3.2.4 Simulator Exercises................................................................................................... 3.6
3.2.4.1 Exercise 1, Initial Introduction to RTOs.............................................................. 3.7
3.2.4.2 Exercise 2, RTO with engine failure 5 knots prior to V1 – Manual Braking....... 3.8
3.2.4.3 Exercise 3, RTO with engine failure 5 knots prior to V1 – Autobrakes............... 3.9
corrections to weight or V1................................................................................ 3.10
3.2.4.5 Exercise 5, RTO with engine failure 5 knots prior to V1 – Wet runway with wet
runway corrections............................................................................................. 3.11
3.2.4.6 Exercise 6, Takeoff continued with engine failure 5 knots prior to V1.............. 3.12
3.2.4.7 Exercise 7, Blown tire at V1-10 knots................................................................ 3.13
3.2.4.8 Exercise 8, Indicator failure/cockpit alert or advisory light at V1-10 knots....... 3.14
3.2.5 Exercises With Other Models.................................................................................. 3.14
3.3 Simulator Implementation Guide................................................................................. 3.15

3.3.1 Simulator Fidelity Checks....................................................................................... 3.15
3.3.2 Tuning for Accomplishment of Objectives.............................................................. 3.15
3.3.3 Grooved Runways................................................................................................... 3.15
Appendix 3-A Instructor Pilot Syllabus Briefing Supplement
Appendix 3-B Pilot Guide to Takeoff Safety Questions
Appendix 3-C Takeoff Safety Briefing
Appendix 3-D Simulator Exercises
3.i
SECTION 3
(This page intentionally left blank)
3.ii
SECTION 3
to complete the Takeoff Safety Program. These

3
3.0 Introduction
sections are described as follows:
The overall goal of the Takeoff Safety Training
Aid is to reduce the number of RTO related Section 3.1, the Academic Training Program
accidents and incidents by improving the pilot’s consists of a description and suggested method
decision making and associated procedure for applying the academic training portions of
accomplishment through appropriate education the Takeoff Safety Training Aid. For those pilots
and training. The example training program who are not provided simulator training, this
illustrates the type of training that should be section will provide a comprehensive review
conducted to meet that goal. This program of Go/ No Go concepts. For those pilots who
is primarily directed at improving the pilot’s undergo simulator training, this section will
decision making capability by increased prepare them for the decision making and
understanding of the takeoff decision situation, critical RTO performance they will experience
and the pilot’s performance in RTO situations in the simulator.
through practical experience.
Section 3.2, the Simulator Training Program
Although structured to stand alone, the consists of a pre-simulator briefing outline and
example Takeoff Safety Training Program can a set of example simulator exercises. These
be integrated with existing initial, transition, exercises are designed to practice the RTO
and recurrent/ refresher training and checking procedure and to demonstrate to the crew the
programs. The training program is designed particular stopping and going characteristics
to facilitate flight crews in reaching and of their airplane in critical situations. Decision
maintaining proficiency in: making is also practiced.
• Recognizing and understanding situations Section 3.3, the Simulator Implementation
and factors that make high speed RTO Guide is provided to assist in incorporating
decisions critical. the takeoff situations chosen from the
• Making appropriate Go/No Go decisions. simulator training program. The simulator
implementation guide provides guidance to
• Executing RTO procedures and employing
develop a simulator program that accurately
techniques that maximize the stopping
reflects the airplane’s RTO performance.
capability of the airplane, should a high
speed RTO be necessary. The example Takeoff Safety Training Program
• Continuing the takeoff safely, should that utilizes the 737-300 with CFM56-3B-2 engines
be deemed the most appropriate action. to discuss and demonstrate potential RTO
situations. However, the program can be adapted
An Academic Training Program (Section 3.1), to any airplane type using the information
and a Simulator Training Program (Section provided by the manufacturer and can be stored
3.2) provide the opportunity to attain this in Appendix 3-D.
required knowledge and skill. A Simulator
Implementation Guide (Section 3.3) is provided
3.1
SECTION 3
3.1 Academic Training Program In a takeoff safety training curriculum these

questions may be utilized in one of two
The Academic Training Program focuses on ways:
the elements that are important to good RTO
decision making and good RTO execution. 1) As part of a pilot’s review of the Pilot
Guide.
2) As an evaluation to determine the
3.1.1 Training Objectives effectiveness of the pilot’s self study
prior to subsequent academic or
The objectives of the Academic Training
simulator training for RTOs.
Program are to provide the pilot with the
knowledge to: Takeoff Safety Briefing—A paper copy of
• Be able to recognize and understand the viewfoils with descriptive words for each one
situations and factors that make high that can be used for a classroom presentation
speed RTOs hazardous. is contained in Appendix 3-C. The briefing
supports a classroom discussion of the Pilot
• Understand the dynamics of making the
Guide.
Go/No Go decision and performing the
associated maneuver. Video (optional) —Rejected Takeoffs and the
Go/No Go Decision —This video presents
A suggested syllabus is provided with the
the RTO problem and suggests two areas of
knowledge that no single training format or
concern, namely that pilots may perform rejects
curriculum is best for all operators or training
unnecessarily and when rejects are performed,
situations. All of the training materials have
they may be performed improperly. It shows
been designed to “stand alone.” As a result,
the causes of RTO accidents and incidents and
some redundancy of the subject material
illustrates proper stopping techniques. It also
occurs. However, using these materials together
discusses reasons to reject and how to handle
in the suggested sequence will enhance overall
wheel or tire problems.
training effectiveness.
3.1.3 Academic Training Syllabus

3.1.2 Academic Training Program Modules
Combining all of the previous academic training
The following academic training modules
modules into a comprehensive training syllabus
are available to prepare an academic training
results in the following suggested Academic
curriculum:
Training Program:
Pilot Guide—The Pilot Guide to Takeoff Safety
Training Module Method of Presentation
(Takeoff Safety Training Aid, Section 2.0) is a
comprehensive treatment of the rejected take off • Pilot Guide Self Study/classroom
and lessons learned from past RTO accidents • Pilot Guide Self Study/evaluation
and incidents. The Pilot Guide is designed as a Questions
document that maybe reviewed by an individual
• Video Classroom
pilot at any time prior to formal RTO academic
(optional)
or simulator training.
Rejected Takeoffs
Pilot Guide Questions —A set of questions and the Go/No Go
based on the material contained in the Pilot Decision
Guide is contained in Appendix 3-B. These • Takeoff Safety Classroom
questions are designed to test the pilot’s Briefing
knowledge of each section of the Pilot Guide.
3.2
SECTION 3
3.1.4 Additional Academic Training • Better understand the performance

Resources margins in the Airplane Flight Manual.
• Understand the stopping characteristics
The Takeoff Safety Background Data (Takeoff
of the airplane.
Safety Training Aid, Section 4) is an excellent
source of background information for an
instructor desiring a more detailed explanation 3.2.2 Simulator Training Syllabus
of the material contained in the Pilot Guide
to Takeoff Safety or the optional video, The training given during initial, transition
Rejected Takeoffs and the Go/No Go Decision. and recurrent training should follow a building
Additionally, this section contains charts and block approach.
graphs which could be utilized by an instructor
to emphasize specific points. The first time the RTO is introduced it should
be well briefed in terms of the mechanics of
the RTO and the order of the items performed.
3.2 Simulator Training Program Good crew coordination should be emphasized,
particularly when the first officer is making
The Simulator Training Program addresses the takeoff. During these training sessions, the
the goals of decision making and procedure procedure should be practiced to proficiency
accomplishment. Training and practice are by both crew members. The training should
provided to allow the pilot to experience realistic include first officer takeoffs because the crew
situations requiring timely decisions and correct coordination requirements are different from
procedures to succeed. captain takeoffs.
To be most effective, the simulator training The rejected takeoff should be covered again
requires the student pilot to be familiar with the after engine out takeoff proficiency has been
material in the Academic Training Program. attained. The advantages and disadvantages
of rejecting versus continuing a takeoff should
be presented. Each operator should consider
3.2.1 Training Objectives
incorporating unique airports/conditions from
The objective of the Simulator Training their route structure into their training program.
Program is to provide the flight crews with the It is recommended that two planned rejected
necessary experience and skills to: takeoffs be performed with an engine failure
one second (5 knots) before V1. One should be
• Recognize those situations requiring a done using manual braking and the other should
rejected takeoff. be done using RTO autobrakes (if available) for
• Recognize those situations where it is the entire stop. This should enable the pilots
better to continue a takeoff. to contrast the two techniques and increase
their confidence in the autobrakes. Ideally the
• Perform a required rejected takeoff in a airplane should stop just prior to the end of the
safe and effective manner. runway. Assuming the simulator accurately
• Perform a successful takeoff after reflects airplane performance, any additional
experiencing a malfunction and making a stopping margin observed can be attributed to
decision to continue. quick pilot reaction and the effects of reverse
thrust. Overruns can be attributed to delayed
• Communicate and coordinate on the flight brake application, inadequate brake pressure,
deck during critical takeoffs. excessive runway lineup distance, or delayed
takeoff thrust setting.
3.3
SECTION 3
The maneuver should be repeated a third time

with a wet runway applying whatever rules the
company normally uses. An optional method
for airlines who do apply wet runway rules is
to do the exercise with and without application
of these rules. This should reinforce the impact
of wet runways on flight operations.
The final exercise is to fail an engine once

again at one second prior to V1 and pre-brief the
pilot to continue the takeoff. With appropriate
instructor assistance, the non flying pilot should
note the radio altimeter height crossing the end
of the runway to emphasize the performance
that is available under the regulations.
From this lesson on, takeoff malfunctions

should be introduced during other simulator
lessons to enhance decision making. Items that
historically have caused accidents and incidents
such as wheel/tire problems, configuration
warning, noncritical indicators or lights, or
other items of current interest within the airline
(such as ATC or crew coordination problems)
should be introduced.
The simulator lesson prior to the evaluation

should include a representative sample of the
types of RTOs given on evaluation flights, again
emphasizing good decision making and proper
procedure execution.
The content of the evaluation flight is normally

dictated by the regulatory agency.
3.4
SECTION 3
Table 3.2-1
Exercise Exercise Description Training Objectives Example Simulator
Training Program
1 Engine Failure at approximately Demonstrate ground handling characteristics

Vl -20 knots. Gross weight not limited with an engine inoperative.
by runway length.
2 Engine failure V1 -5 knots. Prebrief Demonstrate certified performance limit and

failure, request RTO using manual illustrate effort required to stop the airplane
braking. Gross weight at runway limit. within the field length.
3 Engine failure at V1 -5 knots. Prebrief Increase familiarity with stopping

failure, request RTO using autobrakes. performance available. Increase confidence
Gross weight at runway limit. in and appreciation for autobrakes.
4 Engine Failure at V1 -5 knots. Use wet Demonstrate that wet runways are
runway. Prebrief failure and request not automatically accounted for.
RTO be done. Gross weight at runway Show stopping capability when no correction
limit. is made to weight or V1.
5 Engine failure at V1 -5 knots. Use wet Increase confidence in wet runway rules.
(optional) runway. Apply company wet runway Confirm importance of applying appropriate
rules. Prebrief failure and request rules.
RTO be done. Compare stopping
performance with previous stops.
Gross weight at runway limit.
6 Engine failure at V1 -5 knots. Prebrief Demonstrate flight manual provided height

failure and request takeoff be over end of runway with engine failure.
continued. Non-flying pilot should note Build confidence in pilot’s ability to fly
radio altitude passing end of runway. airplane with engine failure and confidence
Gross weight at runway limit. in climb capability available.
7 Blown tire at V1 -10 knots. Gross Familiarize crew with feeling of blown tire.
weight at runway limit. (optional) If stop decision is made, illustrates decreased
Done during any takeoff with no other stopping performance.
specific teaching point.
8 Indicator failure/cockpit alert or Reinforce guidance to continue takeoffs in

advisory light at V1-10 knots. Done such situations.
during any takeoff with no other
specific teaching point.
3.5
SECTION 3
3.2.3 Pilot Simulator Briefing Discuss the captain’s takeoff and the procedure
General Briefing: to be followed. Discuss the first officer’s takeoff
and the procedure to be followed. Discuss crew
Pilots should be familiar with the material in the coordination including transfer of control, if
Ground Training Program prior to beginning appropriate.
rejected takeoff training. However, a briefing
on the following flight crew actions should be Discuss the actions to be taken after the stop
given, specifically as they apply to the simulator including informing the tower, notifying the
training program: passengers/flight attendants, performing the
non-normal checklist (if required), checking the
Prior to the first RTO exercise: brake cooling charts and evacuating the airplane
Explain that in the “low speed regime” (if required). A brake/tire fire can possibly
(company defined) a takeoff should be rejected occur following a high energy RTO. The flight
for: crew should request fire fighting equipment as
• Systems failures a precautionary measure in such cases.
• Unusual noise or vibration
Prior to the Second Lesson with RTOs:
• Tire failure
• Review each maneuver to be performed
• Abnormal acceleration
• Review benefits of reverse thrust and
• Fire or fire warning quick action
• Engine failure • Review wet runway rules/policies
• Unsafe takeoff configuration • Review procedure and common errors
• Unsafe or unable to fly
In the “high speed regime” (company defined) 3.2.4 Simulator Exercises
the takeoff should be rejected for:
• Engine failure or fire The following sections contain detailed
• Unsafe or unable to fly descriptions of example simulator training
exercises. They illustrate the type of information
Remind crews that other system failures or that should be provided to training departments
warnings may be added to these lists by the to do takeoff safety training. These exercises
manufacturer or the airline, so they should should be modified by operators to fit their
refer to their operations manual for additional particular syllabus and training devices to
guidance. optimize learning. The General Description
section of each exercise explains which of the
Review the sequence of events in the RTO initial conditions is of particular importance.
procedure. Emphasize the importance of:
• Maintaining directional control These examples are for the 737-300, see
Appendix 3-D for example simulator exercises
• Brakes: Primary stopping device
for other aircraft models.
• Thrust Levers: Starts autobrakes working
• Speedbrake: Puts weight on wheels for The Basic Simulator Training Syllabus –
braking, aerodynamic drag Instructor Pilot Syllabus Briefing Supplement
• Reverse Thrust: Not included in the flight (Appendix 3-A) provides an example
manual calculation combination of exercises with other material
previously referenced to produce such a
• Speed of Procedure: Possible to do syllabus. This type of handout can be used by
procedure faster than the flight manual an instructor to conduct the training program
model shown in Table 3.2-1.
3.6
SECTION 3
3.2.4.1 Exercise 1, Initial Introduction to RTOs
General Description
The initial conditions for this exercise should be typical for the airfield and airplane model.
None of the initial conditions should be limiting so as not to detract from the primary purpose
of developing proficiency in the mechanics of the RTO procedure. The RTO should be prompted
by a clear indication of a problem such as an Engine Failure. The speed at which the malfunction
occurs should be one that is low enough to ensure that the pilot will reject, yet high enough to
enable the crew to get a good “feel” of it. Approximately 20 knots prior to V1 works well. The
exercise is specifically designed to develop proficiency in the mechanics of the RTO procedure
for both the captain and first officer. It will also demonstrate ground handling characteristics
of an airplane with an engine failed.
Initial Conditions
Runway: KMWH Rwy 32R
Airplane: 737-300 (CFM-56-3B-2 engines)
Airplane Gross Weight: 113,000 lb/51,300 kg
Takeoff Flaps: 5
Center of Gravity: 24%
Takeoff Thrust: Max rated
V1:129 VR:131 V2:141 Stabilizer Setting: 4.0
Ceiling and Visibility: Clear
Wind: Calm
Temperature: 68ºF/20ºC
Runway Condition: Dry
Airport Elevation: 1,185 ft
Runway Length: 13,502 ft
QNH: 29.92/1,013
Piloting Technique Requirements
The pilot will conduct a normal takeoff. When the malfunction is encountered, the Rejected
Takeoff procedure should be executed. The pilot should maintain maximum brake pressure and
reverse thrust until it is clear that the airplane will stop prior to the end of the runway. After
stopping the crew should insure the tower is aware of the rejected takeoff, notify the passengers/
flight attendants, discuss the non-normal event, check the brake cooling charts, and taxi clear
of the runway as appropriate.
3.7
SECTION 3
3.2.4.2 Exercise 2, RTO with engine failure 5 knots prior to V1 – Manual Braking
General Description
The initial conditions for this exercise should put the airplane at the maximum weight allowable
for a dry runway and prescribed atmospheric conditions. Insure that this weight does not exceed
the climb limit weight. The exercise uses an engine failure 5 knots (1 second) prior to V1 to
teach the pilot the stopping capabilities of the airplane and the margins that are incorporated in
the Airplane Flight Manual. The pilot is instructed to reject the takeoff when the malfunction
is observed. The RTO autobrakes are not available and should be selected to OFF. The pilot
must perform the procedure properly in order to succeed.
Initial Conditions
Runway: KYKM Rwy 27
Airplane Gross Weight: 129,400 lb/ 58,800 kg
Takeoff Flaps: 5
Takeoff Thrust: Maximum thrust
Vl: 143 VR: 144 V2: 151 Stabilizer Setting: 4 1/2
Ceiling and Visibility: Clear
Wind: Calm
Temperature: 86ºF/ 30ºC
QNH: 29.92/1,013
As the aircraft passes Vl minus 5 knots, the engine should fail. Following engine failure the
pilot should immediately bring the thrust to idle simultaneously applying maximum manual
wheel brakes and complete the rejected takeoff procedure. The pilot must maintain maximum
braking and full reverse thrust until the aircraft is completely stopped. Rudder must be used to
counteract asymmetric thrust during the engine failure and when using reverse thrust. After
stopping, the crew should insure the tower is aware of the rejected takeoff, notify the passengers/
flight attendants, discuss the non normal event, check the brake cooling charts, and taxi clear
of the runway as appropriate.
3.8
SECTION 3
3.2.4.3 Exercise 3, RTO with engine failure 5 knots prior to V1 – Autobrakes
General Description
the climb limit weight. The exercise uses an engine failure 5 knots (1 second) prior to Vl to
teach the pilot the stopping capabilities of the aircraft and the margins that are incorporated in
the Airplane Flight Manual. The exercise will demonstrate the effectiveness of the autobrakes
and increase pilot confidence in their use.
Initial Conditions
Runway: KYKM Rwy 27
Takeoff Flaps: 5
Vl:143 VR:144 V2:151 Stabilizer Setting: 4 1/2
Ceiling and Visibility: 3,000 ft overcast/3 miles
Wind: Calm
Temperature: 86ºF / 30ºC
QNH: 29.92/1,013
As the aircraft passes Vl minus 5 knots, the engine should fail.. Following engine failure the
pilot should immediately bring the thrust to idle and complete the rejected takeoff procedure.
The pilot must monitor proper operation of the autobrakes and use full reverse thrust until the
aircraft is completely stopped. After stopping, the crew should insure the tower is aware of the
rejected takeoff, notify the passengers/flight attendants, discuss the non normal event, check
the brake cooling charts, and taxi clear of the runway as appropriate.
3.9
SECTION 3
corrections to weight or V1
General Description
the climb limit weight. The runway should be wet. The exercise uses an engine failure 5 knots
(1 second) prior to V1 to teach the pilot the stopping capabilities of the aircraft and the margins
that are incorporated in the Airplane Flight Manual. The exercise will also demonstrate the
impact of wet runways on stopping performance. If no correction is made to weight or V1, the
aircraft should overrun the runway.
Initial Conditions
Runway: KYKM Rwy 27
Takeoff Flaps: 5
V1:143 VR:144 V2:151 Stabilizer Setting: 4 1/2
Wind: Calm
Runway Condition: Wet
QNH: 29.92/1,013
As the aircraft passes V1 minus 5 knots, the engine should fail. Following engine failure the
pilot should execute the Rejected Takeoff procedure. The pilot must maintain maximum braking
and use full reverse thrust until the aircraft is completely stopped. Estimate the speed passing
the end of the runway. After stopping, the crew should insure the tower is aware of the rejected
takeoff, notify the passengers/flight attendants, discuss the non-normal event and check the
brake cooling charts.
3.10
SECTION 3
3.2.4.5 Exercise 5, RTO with engine failure 5 knots prior to V1 – Wet runway with wet runway
corrections
General Description
for a wet runway and prescribed atmospheric conditions. Insure that this weight does not exceed
the climb limit weight. The runway should be wet. The exercise uses an engine failure 5 knots
prior to Vl to teach the pilot the stopping capabilities of the aircraft and the margins that are
incorporated in the Airplane Flight Manual. The exercise will also demonstrate the impact of
wet runways on stopping performance and the importance of correcting weight and Vl to reduce
stopping distance.
Initial Conditions
Runway: KYKM Rwy 27
Takeoff Flaps: 5
Wind: Calm
Runway Condition: Wet
Airport Elevation. 1,095 ft
QNH: 29.92/1,013
As the aircraft passes Vl minus 5 knots, the engine should fail. Following engine failure, the pilot
should execute the Rejected Takeoff procedure. The pilot must maintain maximum braking and
full reverse thrust until the aircraft is completely stopped. After stopping, the crew should insure
the tower is aware of the rejected takeoff, notify the passengers/flight attendants, discuss the non-
normal event, check the brake cooling charts, and taxi clear of the runway as appropriate.
3.11
SECTION 3
3.2.4.6 Exercise 6, Takeoff continued with engine failure 5 knots prior to V1
General Description
the climb limit weight. The exercise uses an engine failure 5 knots prior to V1 to teach the pilot
the margins that are incorporated in the Airplane Flight Manual for the takeoff case. The pilot is
instructed to continue the takeoff when the malfunction is observed. With instructor assistance,
the pilot not flying will note the radio altitude of the airplane as it passes the end of the runway.
The pilot flying should concentrate on maintaining proper aircraft control.
Initial Conditions
Runway: KYKM Rwy 27
Airplane Gross Weight: 129,400 lbs/58,800 kg
Takeoff Flaps: 5
Wind: Calm
QNH: 29.92/1,013
As the aircraft passes V1 minus 5 knots, the engine should fail. Expertise gained during previous
lesson(s) regarding engine failure during takeoff should be used to maintain aircraft control,
and complete the climb out.
3.12
SECTION 3
3.2.4.7 Exercise 7, Blown tire at V1-10 knots
General Description
The initial conditions for this exercise are not defined, however a demonstration of a field length
limit weight stop can be useful. The malfunction can be introduced in the course of normal
training during a takeoff in which no other specific teaching point is being made. A failure
at 10 knots prior to V1 gives the crew adequate time to consider the proper course of action.
It is generally considered most appropriate to continue the takeoff in this situation. If this is
the decision that is made, it should be positively reinforced. If the “stop” decision is made, the
merits of that course of action should be discussed.
Initial Conditions
No special initial conditions are required for this training.
Unusual malfunctions require good crew coordination and communication. If the pilot chooses
to continue the takeoff, it should be flown under control with consideration of whether or not to
retract the gear. If the pilot chooses to reject the takeoff, the RTO must be performed accurately
with good crew coordination including notification of passengers and ATC. The proper use of
the appropriate checklists and brake cooling charts should be emphasized.
3.13
SECTION 3
3.2.4.8 Exercise 8, Indicator failure/cockpit alert or advisory light at V1-10 knots
General Description
Such malfunctions are unique to specific airplane models and should be chosen to reflect operational
experience to enhance realism and learning. The purpose of the training is to emphasize company
guidance to “Go” in such cases. Positive reinforcement with a brief explanation should follow
a decision to continue the takeoff. A rejected takeoff should be followed with a discussion of
the merits of that decision and a clarification of company policy.
Initial Conditions
No special initial conditions are required for this training.
Unusual malfunctions require good crew coordination and communication. If the pilot chooses
to continue the takeoff, it should be flown under control. If the pilot chooses to reject the takeoff,
the RTO must be performed accurately with good crew coordination including notification of
passengers and ATC. The proper use of the appropriate checklists and brake cooling charts
should be emphasized.
3.2.5 Exercises With Other Models
Similar exercises for other airplane models are contained in Appendix 3-D.
3.14
SECTION 3
3.3 Simulator Implementation Guide in the airplane’s flight manual or performance

manual and doing a proper RTO without reverse
This section is designed to assist the simulator thrust and observing the stopping distance. If
programming/checkout department. No the brakes are applied and held to the maximum
new models have to be added to the current at V1 while simultaneously bringing the thrust
simulators to enable quality RTO training to idle, then raising the speedbrake handle, the
to be done. The challenge is to ensure that simulator should stop prior to the end of the
the simulator accurately reflects the current runway with a small distance margin remaining.
simulator ground handling documents and If this is not the case, the simulator should be
that it accurately introduces malfunctions in a modified so that it will be able to successfully
timely manner. replicate a flight manual stop.
3.3.1 Simulator Fidelity Checks 3.3.2 Tuning for Accomplishment of

Objectives
Operators that use this training aid should
assure that simulator scenarios accurately Manufacturer’s ground handling simulator
reflect aircraft characteristics and performance documents contain tire to ground friction
to the extent necessary to achieve training characteristics for a variety of runway surface
objectives. Scenarios should not be used that conditions including dry, wet (smooth,
have unrealistic simulator characteristics that ungrooved pavements) and contaminated (ice,
contribute to negative training. In general, snow, and rubber deposits). Due to the wide
certified simulators contain testing programs variation of friction available from wet run
that enable simulator engineers to confirm ways depending on the surface texture, tire
the accuracy of the aircraft simulation. These parameters and the depth of the water film,
tests are normally done automatically from a manufacturer’s simulator documents provide a
landing and are adequate to give good braking range of friction values versus groundspeed for
simulation during an RTO. When purchasing wet runway simulation. This allows the airline
new simulators, assure that data from the and/or simulator manufacturer to adjust the
manufacturer is up to date in order to do stopping performance as required to represent
appropriate RTO training. When simulator particular runway situations by selecting a
characteristics do not adequately model aircraft specific friction versus speed curve function.
performance, it may be necessary to adjust If the stopping distance appears to be too short
weights, friction coefficients, runway lengths (too long), the wet runway friction curve can
or other appropriate parameters to assure the be factored down (up) until the desired result
scenario supports the training objective sought. is obtained.
For example, if the simulator is found to out
perform the airplane, the instructor might set
a gross weight that is higher than called for 3.3.3 Grooved Runways
in the lesson, but causes an outcome that is
consistent with the training objective. The For grooved runways, which now comprise
concept is to meet the training objectives taking 87% of the runways used by large jet transport
full advantage of the existing simulator quality airplanes within the US, the wet friction
and improve that quality when the opportunity characteristic is substantially better than
presents itself. for smooth pavements. Very little airplane
stopping performance has been established
A simple check of simulator fidelity can be for wet grooved runways. However, flight
conducted by looking up the applicable numbers tests on at least one model show that for the
3.15
SECTION 3
landing speed range, a wet grooved runway

develops an average of approximately 95% of
the dry runway friction. Since the speed range
for RTOs is generally higher than for landing,
it is suggested that operators use 85% of the
dry runway friction curve from the simulator
document until further analysis or other
substantiating data is obtained.
3.16
SECTION 3

List of Appendices
Training Aid
Appendix Number Title and Contents
3-A Instructor Pilot Syllabus Briefing Supplement

Additional information intended to assist the instructor in
preparation of academic and simulator training programs
3-B Pilot Guide to Takeoff Safety Questions

Questions designed to test a pilots knowledge of the material
contained in the Pilot Guide to Takeoff Safety. The questions
are multiple choice and an instructor examination guide and
answer key are included.
3-C Takeoff Safety Briefing

A paper copy of view foils with descriptive words for each
one that can be used for a classroom presentation. The brief-
ing supports a classroom discussion of the Pilot Guide and/or
the optional video.
Manufacturers’ Model
Specific Data
3-D Simulator Exercises

Example training exercises for specific airplane models pro-
vided to operators by airframe manufacturers.
3-E Optional Takeoff Safety Video Script

A written copy of the script for the optional video program,
REJECTED TAKEOFF AND THE “GO/NO GO” DECI-
SION.
3.17
SECTION 3
3.18
APPENDIX
Instructor Pilot Syllabus

Briefing Supplement
3-A
The rejected takeoff (RTO), as presented in 2) V1 – Training Aid Definition: The speed
the Operations Manual, is a comprehensive selected for each takeoff, based upon
procedure to accomplish any rejected takeoff. approved performance data and specified
This procedure is based on the worst case conditions, which represents:
situation: i.e.; field length limited with an engine
failure or other event just prior to V1. Clearly a. The maximum speed by which a
there are legitimate reasons other than an rejected takeoff must be initiated to
engine failure for rejecting a takeoff, especially assure that a safe stop can be com-
at lower speeds. As the speed approaches V1, pleted within the remaining runway
however, the reasons to reject become limited or runway and stopway, and
to a fire or fire warning, an engine failure, or b. The minimum speed which assures
a situation judged by the Captain to constitute that a takeoff can be safely com-
an emergency that could endanger the safety of pleted within the remaining runway,
the aircraft if the takeoff were continued. The or runway and clearway, after fail-
Captain is responsible by FAR for the safety ure of the most critical engine at a
of the passengers, crew, and airplane and may designated speed and
exercise decisions and actions as required up
c. The single speed which permits a
to the provisions of emergency authority (FAR
successful stop or continued takeoff
121.557 or .559, Atch 1) if deemed necessary.
when operating at the minimum
The following information may be used to allow able field length for a particu-
enhance simulator prebriefings. The pilot’s lar weight.
“mindset” concerning what V1 actually Note 1: Safe completion of the takeoff
represents in the Go/No Go decision process includes both attainment of the designated
is of primary importance. screen height at the end of the runway or
clearway, and safe obstacle clearance along
the designated takeoff flight path.
I. Basic Education Factors:
Note 2: Reference performance conditions
A. Definitions for determining V1 may not necessarily
account for all variables possibly affecting
Certain definitions are needed to explain the a takeoff, such as runway surface friction,
concepts discussed in the training aid. Some of failures other than a critical engine, etc.
the definitions used are taken from the FARs or 3) Minimum V1: The minimum permis-
other references, and some are defined in the sible V1 speed for the reference conditions
training aid. Where appropriate, the training from which the takeoff can be safely com-
aid definition has been written from the point of pleted from a given runway or runway and
view of the pilot and may clarify or expand on clearway, after the critical engine has failed
the regulatory definition to the extent necessary at the designated speed.
to assure appropriate flight crew action.
4) Maximum V1: The maximum permis-
1) V1 – FAR definition: V1 means first sible V1 speed for the reference conditions
action speed (formerly denoted as decision at which a rejected takeoff can be initiated
speed or critical engine failure speed).
App. 3-A.1
APPENDIX
3-A
and the airplane stopped within the remain- 12) Accelerate Go Distance: The horizon-
ing runway or runway and stopway. tal distance from the start of the takeoff to
the point where the airplane reaches the
5) Reduced V1: A V1 less than the maxi-
prescribed screen height above the take-
mum V1 or the normal V1 but more than the
off surface with the critical engine having
minimum V1, selected to reduce the RTO
failed at the designated speed.
stopping distance required.
13) Accelerate-Stop Distance: The horizon-
Note: Wet or slippery V1 speeds are
tal distance from the start of the takeoff to
reduced V1s, used to adjust the RTO stop-
the point where the airplane is stopped on
ping distance for the degraded stopping
the runway or runway and stopway, when
capability associated with these condi-
the stop is initiated at V1 and completed
tions. Reducing V1 for a dry runway take-
using the approved procedures and speci-
off, when conditions permit, will provide
fied conditions.
additional stopping margin in the event of
an RTO. In either case, the reduced V1 must 14) Balanced Field length: The runway
be determined so as to also assure the con- length (or runway plus clearway and/or
tinued takeoff criteria are met (i.e. screen stopway) where, for the takeoff weight, the
height, obstacle clearance and Vmcg). engine-out accelerate-go distance equals the
accelerate-stop distance. In more detail, it
6) Decision time: The time between failure
exists when the airplane performance is such
of the critical engine and/or any other event
that for an engine failure or other event one
which requires the pilot to make a Go/No
second prior to V1, the distance required to
Go decision, and V1.
accelerate on the remaining engine(s), take
After V1, there is no decision time allow- off, climb to the prescribed screen height
ance provided in the airplane performance and reach V2 speed, is equal to the distance
data. To stop within the predetermined required to initiate the reject at V1 and
accelerate stop distance, stopping action stop. When this distance is equal to the
must begin no later than V1. runway length it is termed a “Balanced
7) VR: Rotation speed Field Length”. The weight associated with
this is termed the “Balanced Field Weight
8) VLOF: Liftoff speed Limit”. The V1 that results in a balanced
9) V2: Minimum takeoff safety speed field length is the speed typically given to
flight crews.
10) Screen Height: The height of an imagi-
nary screen which the airplane would just 15) Critical Field length: The minimum
clear at the end of the runway or runway runway length (or runway plus clearway
and clearway in an unbanked attitude with and/or stopway) required for a specific take-
the landing gear extended. off weight. This distance may be the longer
of the balanced field length, 115% of the all
11) Takeoff Distance: The horizontal dis- engine takeoff distance, or established by
tance from the start of the takeoff to the point other limitations such as maintaining V1 to
where the airplane reaches the prescribed be less than or equal to VR.
screen height above the surface with a criti-
cal engine having failed at the designated 16) Derated Takeoff Thrust: A takeoff thrust
speed or, 115% of the horizontal distance level less than the maximum takeoff thrust
from the start of takeoff to the point where approved for an airplane/engine for which
the airplane reaches the prescribed screen a separate and specific set of data which
height above the surface with all engines complies with all of the requirements of
operating. part 25 of the FARs exists. When operating
App. 3-A.2
APPENDIX
3-A
with a derated takeoff thrust, the thrust set- Reasons to reject at high speed: Engine failure or
ting parameter used to establish thrust for fire, or the aircraft is unsafe or unable to fly.
takeoff is presented in the AFM and is con-
sidered an operating limit for that takeoff. Other system failures or warnings may be
added to these lists as recommended by the
17) Reduced Takeoff Thrust: A takeoff
manufacturer or airline.
thrust level less than the maximum (or
derated) takeoff thrust. The takeoff perfor- C. Flight Manual Margins
mance and thrust settings are established by
approved simple methods, such as adjust- To stop within the precomputed accelerate-
ments or corrections to the takeoff perfor- stop distance, the first stopping action must
mance and thrust settings defined for the begin by V1. The RTO procedure must be
maximum thrust (or derated) performance executed accurately and expeditiously. Doing
and thrust settings. When operating with the procedure quickly and using maximum
a reduced takeoff thrust, the thrust setting available reverse thrust give additional stopping
parameter used to establish thrust for take- margin.
off is not considered an operating limit;
The thrust may be restored to the maximum
(or derate) level as appropriate for the con- II. Practical
ditions of the flight at any time during the
takeoff. A. Guidelines
18) Clearway: A cleared area beyond the
The following practical guidelines will be
end of the runway, not less than 500 ft
used in the instruction and education of pilots
wide, centrally located about the extended
concerning a Go/No Go decision during
centerline of the runway, that contains no
takeoff:
obstructions and under the control of the
airport authorities. 1) The Operations Manual/ Aircraft Oper-
ating Manual procedure.
19) Stopway: An area beyond the end of
the runway, at least as wide as the runway 2) A thorough understanding of the defini-
and centered along the extended centerline tions/factors governing V1 speeds and their
of the runway, able to support the airplane effects on the reject process as outlined in
during a rejected takeoff without caus- Section I.
ing structural damage to the airplane, and
3) Captain’s responsibilities:
designated by the authorities for use in
decelerating the airplane during a rejected a. Make all Go/No Go decisions
takeoff. b. Exercise emergency authority as
20) Rejected Takeoff: A takeoff that is required.
discontinued after takeoff thrust is set and c. Ensure a departure briefing is made,
initiation of the takeoff roll has begun. including a comprehensive takeoff
plan based on: gross weight, runway
B. Reasons to reject.
length, field conditions, weather,
Reasons to reject at low speed: System and any other factors that may affect
failure(s), unusual noise or vibration, tire a particular takeoff as it relates to a
failure, abnormally slow acceleration, fire or Go/No Go decision.
fire warning, engine failure, unsafe takeoff
d. Know airplane’s performance capa-
configuration warning, or the aircraft is unsafe
bilities.
or unable to fly.
App. 3-A.3
APPENDIX
3-A
4) Rejected takeoffs can have an opera- III. Syllabus Rejected Takeoffs

tional range from a low speed situation to a
high speed balanced field length condition. The following discussion refers to Appendix
The primary training goal is to recognize 3-D which contains example simulator exercises
the variables that may affect the decision appropriate for the specific airplane model of
and to become proficient in the high risk, interest. These simulator exercises should be
critical end of the reject scenario. modified for use by each operator. The examples
given are illustrative in nature and are not
a. Low speed rejected takeoffs are
designed to be used by any specific operator.
characterized by speeds of approxi-
mately 80 knots or less. Use normal
During the first lesson in which RTOs are
Operations Manual reject proce-
introduced to a crew, it is suggested that
dures but the maneuver may require
Exercise 1 be used to develop crew proficiency
less than maximum braking during
in the RTO.
deceleration to safely stop.
b. High speed/field length limited More challenging RTOs should be introduced in
rejected takeoffs - reject decision a lesson after engine out proficiency is attained.
time is influenced by systematically It is suggested that Exercises 2 through 6 be
disregarding system malfunctions up presented one after another, so the crew can
to a point approaching V1. At this compare stopping performance. Exercise 5 is
point, a decision to stop is recom- only for operators who actually do make wet
mended only for an engine failure or runway corrections to takeoff data.
fire, or a malfunction where there is
doubt that the aircraft will fly safely. In the lessons that follow this lesson, additional
This requires the use of operations exercises such as a blown tire or an indicator
manual reject procedures with failure/cockpit alert or advisory light can be
maximum braking and deceleration introduced during takeoffs in which there is not
techniques. Note that there may be a conflicting teaching point in order to enhance
additional reasons to reject in the decision making.
high speed regime as recommended
by the manufacturer or airline. Normally, the simulator lesson prior to the
evaluation should include a representative
5) Because Vl marks the end of the Go/No sample of the type of RTO’s given on evaluation
Go decision time, the PNF must complete flights, again emphasizing good decision
the Vl call by Vl in a clear, crisp manner. making and proper procedure execution. The
6) Discuss: content of the evaluation flight is normally
dictated by the regulatory agency.
a. Tower communications including
the request for fire fighting equip-
ment if required
b. Non-normal procedure
c. Passenger notification/evacuation
d. Brake cooling charts
e. Log book write-up
f. Clearing the runway/advisability of
returning to the gate
App. 3-A.4
APPENDIX
3-A
Attachment 1
PART 121 AIR CARRIERS AND COMMERCIAL OPERATORS OF LARGE AIRCRAFT 89
(as of amendment 121-253, effective 2/26/96)
§ 121.557 Emergencies: domestic and flag In such a case, he may deviate from pre-
air carriers scribed operations, procedures and meth-
ods, weather minimums, and this chapter,
(a) In an emergency situation that requires
to the extent required in the interests of
immediate decision and action the pilot in
safety.
command may take any action that he con-
siders necessary under the circumstances. (b) In an emergency situation arising dur-
In such a case he may deviate from pre- ing flight that requires immediate decision
scribed operations procedures and methods, and action by appropriate management per-
weather minimums, and this chapter, to the sonnel in the case of operations conducted
extent required in the interests of safety. with a flight following service and which
is known to them, those personnel shall
(b) In an emergency situation arising dur-
advise the pilot in command of the emer-
ing flight that requires immediate decision
gency, shall ascertain the decision of the
and action by an aircraft dispatcher, and
pilot in command, and shall have the deci-
that is known to him, the aircraft dispatcher
sion recorded. If they cannot communicate
shall advise the pilot in command of the
with the pilot, they shall declare an emer-
emergency, shall ascertain the decision of
gency and take any action that they con-
the pilot in command, and shall have the
sider necessary under the circumstances.
decision recorded. If the aircraft dispatcher
cannot communicate with the pilot, he shall (c) Whenever emergency authority is exer-
declare an emergency and take any action cised, the pilot in command or the appro-
that he considers necessary under the cir- priate management personnel shall keep
cumstances. the appropriate ground radio station fully
informed of the progress of the flight. The
(c) Whenever a pilot in command or dis-
person declaring the emergency shall send
patcher exercises emergency authority,
a written report of any deviation, through
be shall keep the appropriate ATC facility
the certificate holder’s director of opera-
and dispatch centers fully informed of the
tions, to the Administrator within 10 days
progress of the flight. The person declaring
after the flight is completed or, in the case
the emergency shall send a written report
of operations outside the United States,
of any deviation through the certificate
upon return to the home base.
holder’s operations manager, to the Admin-
istrator. A dispatcher shall send his report
within 10 days after the date of the emer- § 121.561 Reporting potentially hazardous
gency, and a pilot in command shall send meteorological conditions and
his report within 10 days after returning to irregularities of ground and
his home base. navigation facilities.
(a) Whenever he encounters a meteorolog-
§ 121.559 Emergencies: supplemental air ical condition or an irregularity in a ground
carriers and commercial operators or navigational facility, in flight, the knowl-
edge of which he considers essential to the
(a) In an emergency situation that requires
safety of other flights, the pilot in command
immediate decision and action, the pilot in
shall notify an appropriate ground station
command may take any action that he con-
as soon as practicable.
siders necessary under the circumstances.
App. 3-A.5
APPENDIX
3-A
(b) The ground radio station that is notified

under paragraph (a) of this section shall
report the information to the agency direct-
ly responsible for operating the facility.
§ 121.563 Reporting mechanical irregularities
The pilot in command shall ensure that all

mechanical irregularities occurring during
flight time are entered in the maintenance log
of the airplane at the end of that flight time.
Before each flight the pilot in command shall
ascertain the status of each irregularity entered
in the log at the end of the preceding flight.
App. 3-A.6
APPENDIX
Pilot Guide to Takeoff Safety Questions
3-B
Included in the following appendix are questions designed to test a pilot’s knowledge of the
material contained in the Pilot Guide to Takeoff Safety. The questions are all multiple choice.
The first part of this appendix is the Student Examination. Instructions for answering the
questions are provided.
The second part of this appendix is the Instructor Examination Guide. This part contains the
questions in the Student Examination, the correct answers to each question and the section in
the Pilot Guide to Takeoff Safety where the correct answer may be found.
Table of Contents
Section Page
Student Examination............................................................................................................ 3-B.1
Instructor’s Guide................................................................................................................ 3-B.9
Summary of Answers......................................................................................................... 3-B.17
App. 3-B.i
APPENDIX
3-B
App. 3-B.ii
APPENDIX
3-B
Student Examination
Instructions
These questions are based on the material in the Pilot Guide to Takeoff Safety. The answers to
each question can be found in that document. The questions are all multiple choice. Circle the
one answer to each question which is most correct.
Questions
1) Statistically, 1 RTO occurs for every _______ takeoffs.

A) 1,000
B) 3,000
C) 7,000
D) 10,000
2) Most RTOs are initiated at speeds _________.

A) of 80 knots or less
B) between 80 and 120 knots
C) near V1 (within 10 knots)
D) above V1
3) Every pilot must be prepared to make the correct Go/No Go decision _________.
A) in the event of an engine failure or fire
B) if it is certain the airplane is unsafe or unable to fly
C) either A or B
D) on every takeoff
4) Most RTOs are _________.

A) engine-related events
B) wheel/tire events
C) non-engine events
5) The majority of past RTO overrun accidents/incidents were initiated at _________.

A) speeds below V1
B) speeds above V1
App. 3-B.1
APPENDIX
3-B
6) Of past RTO overrun accidents and serious incidents about _______ of the RTOs were
initiated because of engine failures or indication warnings.
A) one fifth
B) half
C) three fourths
D) all
7) Full takeoff power was available during approximately _________ of past RTO accidents.
A) 25%
B) 50%
C) 79%
D) 100%
8) In a review of past accident records of revenue flights involving Go/No Go decisions, of

the cases where a GO decision was made, _________ of the airplanes failed to make a
safe landing.
A) virtually none
B) 10%
C) 25%
D) More than 75%
9) In the majority of past RTO overrun accidents and serious incidents, if the takeoff had
been continued,
A) an uneventful landing would probably have resulted.
B) the airplane probably would have crashed.
10) In a situation where the gross weight is limited by field length, _________ of the runway
is typically left from V1 to stop the airplane.
A) 60%
B) 50%
C) 40%
App. 3-B.2
APPENDIX
3-B
11) On a dry runway, if an engine fails approximately 1 second before V1, the FAR criteria
requires the airplane to reach a minimum height of _________ by the end of the runway.
A) 15 ft
B) 35 ft
C) 50 ft
12) V1 is _________.
A) the latest point during a takeoff in which the gross weight is limited by the field length,
where a stop can be initiated and the airplane stopped by the end of the runway.
B) the earliest point during a takeoff in which the gross weight is limited by the field
length, at which an engine out takeoff can be continued and the airplane reach a height
of 35 ft at the end of the runway.
C) an action speed.
D) all of the above.
13) In a situation in which the gross weight is limited by field length, the Go/No Go decision
must be made _________.
A) before reaching V1.
B) after reaching V1.
14) During a takeoff in which the gross weight is limited by field length, if an engine
fails approximately 1 second prior to Vl and the decision is made to reject the takeoff,
according to the AFM the airplane will come to a stop _________.
A) at the very end of the runway.
B) well before the end of the runway.
C) beyond the end of the runway.
D) before the end of the rtmway, only if aerodynamic braking is used.
15) In a Balanced Field takeoff, _________.

A) the runway required to accelerate to V1 exactly equals the runway length required to
decelerate from V1 to a stop.
B) the runway length required to accelerate, lose an engine approximately one second
before Vl and either bring the airplane to a stop, or continue the takeoff and reach
35 ft above the runway at V2 is exactly the same.
C) takeoff roll exactly equals landing roll if an emergency return is required.
D) the cost of the passengers tickets exactly equals the salaries of the crew.
App. 3-B.3
APPENDIX
3-B
16) Actual flight test accelerate-stop distances are increased by several hundred feet in the
AFM _________ .
A) to allow the crew more time to make the decision to stop or not to stop.
B) because reverse thrust was not used in the flight tests.
C) to allow for unknown variables such as runway condition or contamination and pilot
technique.
D) to allow the line crew more time to execute the stopping action.
17) In a situation in which the gross weight is limited by field length, if an engine fails 2
seconds before V1, the airplane will be able to cross the end of the runway at a height
of _________ .
A) 2 - 10 ft.
B) 15 - 30 ft.
C) 35 ft or more.
18) During a takeoff in which the gross weight is limited by field length, if an engine fails
two seconds before V1 and the decision is made to continue the takeoff, the airplane
will _________ .
A) not reach rotate speed before the end of the runway.
B) reach V2 at less than 35 ft above the end of the runway.
C) reach takeoff speed at the end of the runway.
19) When an RTO is necessary on a wet or slippery runway, the pilot should _________ .
A) pump the brakes to minimize excessive antiskid cycling.
B) avoid large puddles.
C) wait until near the end of the runway to apply full braking.
D) bring the airplane to a complete stop once an RTO has been initiated.
20) Selecting a larger flap setting for takeoff will result in _________ .
A) a longer takeoff roll.
B) a lower V1 speed.
C) improved climb performance.
D) decreased airplane drag.
App. 3-B.4
APPENDIX
3-B
21) The use of engine bleed air for air conditioning/pressurization _________ .
A) has no effect on takeoff performance.
B) reduces takeoff performance.
C) increases the thrust the engine provides.
22) The pilot can minimize the probability of a tire failure during takeoff by _________ .
A) taxiing quickly to avoid excessive delays getting to the runway.
B) using low taxi speeds and minimum braking whenever possible.
C) ignoring the time and weight limits of the Max Quick Turnaround Weight Charts.
D) maintain steady pressure on the brakes throughout the taxi to avoid excessive speed.
23) In the event of a tire failure during takeoff, _________ .

A) the crew should always reject the takeoff because of the possibility of other associated
problems, such as hydraulic system failures or tire pieces ingested into the engines.
B) the crew should always continue the takeoff so that the entire runway can be used for
stopping on the subsequent landing.
C) the crews indication is always a loud bang and a significant pulling to one side.
D) the stopping capability of the airplane may be significantly degraded.
24) Delaying or not raising the speedbrake during an RTO _________ .

A) will have no effect on stopping distance.
B) can be compensated for by proper aerodynamic braking technique.
C) can be compensated for by using reverse thrust.
D) will result in a longer stopping distance.
25) On today’s high bypass ratio engines, reverse thrust _________ .

A) greater than idle reverse should not be used in order to minimize stopping distance
required.
B) is less effective at higher speeds.
C) generates a larger percentage of the total airplane deceleration on wet or slippery run-
ways.
D) is extremely effective, particularly on dry runways.
App. 3-B.5
APPENDIX
3-B
26) Use of a clearway for takeoff results in _________ .

A) a lower V1 speed and increased maximum weight.
B) a lower V1 speed and decreased maximum weight.
C) a higher V1 speed and increased maximum weight.
D) a higher V1 speed and decreased maximum weight.
27) When using the Assumed Temperature Method for reducing takeoff thrust _________ .
A) Vmcg and Vmca are reduced to correspond to the takeoff thrust being used.
B) with an engine failure at the associated V1 speed, a 35-ft height above the end of the
runway may not be attainable without increasing thrust to the actual maximum rated
thrust.
C) the actual true air speed is lower than it would be if the actual temperature were equal
to the assumed temperature.
D) the actual true airspeed is higher than it would be if the actual temperature were equal
28) Which of the following is not a correct guideline for crews related to eliminating RTO
overrun incidents?
A) Do not initiate a stop after V1 unless you suspect that a tire has failed or a catastrophic
engine failure has occurred.
B) Don’t change your mind, if you have begun an RTO, stop. If you have passed V1, go,
unless the pilot has reason to conclude that the airplane is unsafe or unable to fly.
C) Both pilots must be sure to position the seat and rudder pedals so that maximum brake
pressure can be applied.
D) Use maximum effort brake application.
29) Minimum takeoff distance can be achieved by _________ .

A) sacrificing some runway line-up distance, so that thrust can be advanced for takeoff
during the turn onto the runway.
B) minimizing runway line-up distance by a sharper turn to line-up and setting takeoff
power prior to releasing the brakes.
C) slowly advancing thrust while rolling down the runway before engaging the
autothrottle.
D) line-up distance and setting takeoff thrust have minimal impact on takeoff distance.
App. 3-B.6
APPENDIX
3-B
30) If you use manual braking for a rejected takeoff, _________ .

A) pump the brakes to minimize skidding.
B) maintain full brake pedal force.
C) release braking when reverse thrust is applied.
31) During a rejected takeoff from V1, a good technique is to use maximum braking and full
reverse thrust _________ .
A) until the airplane comes to a complete stop.
B) until below 60 knots, then decrease reverse thrust to reduce the likelihood of compres-
sor stalls.
C) until the crew judges the remaining runway is sufficient for stopping with less than
maximum effort.
D) at high speeds, reducing braking at lower speeds to prevent fuse plugs from melting
since reverse thrust will further decrease stopping distance.
32) For an RTO with anti-skid inoperative _________ .

A) the RTO procedure is unchanged.
B) brakes should be applied immediately after reducing power to idle.
C) brakes should be applied after the speedbrake is raised.
D) full brake pressure should only be applied at high speeds.
33) On the average, RTOs performed with RTO autobrakes armed result in _______ runway
distance remaining after a stop than do RTOs performed using manual braking only.
A) more
B) less
C) the same
34) The Go/No Go decision must be made by _________ .

A) the chief pilot and in training staff.
B) the crew flying.
C) airline policies and guidelines.
D) developing correct regulations.
App. 3-B.7
APPENDIX
3-B
App. 3-B.8
APPENDIX
3-B
Instructor’s Guide
Instructions
This guide contains questions based on the material in the Pilot Guide to Takeoff Safety. The
answers to each question can be found in that document. The questions are all multiple choice.
There is one answer to each question which is most correct.
The correct answer is listed after each question, along with the section in the Pilot Guide to
Takeoff Safety where the correct answer may be found.
Questions
1) Statistically, 1 RTO occurs for every ________ takeoffs.

A) 1,000
B) 3,000
C) 7,000
D) 10,000
Answer: B (Section 2.2.1)
2) Most RTOs are initiated at speeds _________ .

A) of 80 knots or less.
B) between 80 and 120 knots.
C) near V1 (within 10 knots).
D) above V1.
Answer: A (Section 2.2.1)
3) Every pilot must be prepared to make the correct Go/No Go decision _________ .
A) in the event of an engine failure or fire.
B) if it is certain the airplane is unsafe or unable to fly.
C) either A or B.
D) on every takeoff.
Answer: D (Section 2.2.1)
4) Most RTO’s are _________ .

A) engine related events.
B) wheel/tire events.
C) non-engine events.
Answer: C (Section 2.2.4)
App. 3-B.9
APPENDIX
3-B
5) The majority of past RTO overrun accidents/incidents were initiated at _________ .

A) speeds below V1.
B) speeds above V1.
Answer: B (Section 2.2.4)
6) Of past RTO overrun accidents and serious incidents about _________ of the RTOs were
initiated because of engine failures or indication warnings.
A) one fifth
B) half
C) three fourths
D) all
7) Full takeoff power was available during approximately _________ of past RTO accidents.
A) 25%
B) 50%
C) 79%
D) 100%
Answer: C (Section 2.2.4, 2.3.3)
8) In a review of past accident records of revenue flights involving Go/No Go decisions, of

the cases where a GO decision was made, _______ of the airplanes failed to make a safe
landing.
A) virtually none
B) 10%
C) 25%
D) More than 75%
9) In the majority of past RTO overrun accidents and serious incidents, if the takeoff had
been continued, _________ .
A) an uneventful landing would probably have resulted.
B) the airplane probably would have crashed.
App. 3-B.10
APPENDIX
3-B
10) In a situation where the gross weight is limited by field length, ________ of the runway
is typically left from V1 to stop the airplane.
A) 60%
B) 50%
C) 40%
Answer: C (Section 2.3.1.1)
11) On a dry runway, if an engine fails approximately 1 second before V1, the FAR criteria
requires the airplane to reach a minimum height of ________ by the end of the runway.
A) 15 ft
B) 35 ft
C) 50 ft
Answer: B (Section 2.3.1.1)
12) V1 is _________ .
A) the latest point during a takeoff in which the gross weight is limited by the field length,
where a stop can be initiated and the airplane stopped by the end of the runway.
B) the earliest point during a takeoff in which the gross weight is limited by the field
length, at which an engine out takeoff can be continued and the airplane reach a height
of 35 ft at the end of the runway.
C) an action speed.
D) all of the above.
Answer: D (Section 2.3.1.2)
13) In a situation in which the gross weight is limited by field length, the Go/No Go decision
must be made _________ .
A) before reaching V1
B) after reaching V1
Answer: A (Section 2.3.1.2)
14) During a takeoff in which the gross weight is limited by field length, if an engine
fails approximately 1 second prior to V1 and the decision is made to reject the takeoff,
according to the AFM the airplane will come to a stop _________ .
A) at the very end of the runway.
B) well before the end of the runway.
C) beyond the end of the runway.
D) before the end of the runway, only if aerodynamic braking is used.
App. 3-B.11
APPENDIX
3-B
15) In a Balanced Field takeoff, _________ .

A) the runway required to accelerate to V1 exactly equals the runway length required to
decelerate from V1 to a stop.
B) the runway length required to accelerate, lose an engine approximately one second
before V1 and either bring the airplane to a stop, or continue the takeoff and reach
35 ft above the runway at V2 is exactly the same.
C) takeoff roll exactly equals landing roll if an emergency return is required.
D) the cost of the passengers tickets exactly equals the salaries of the crew.
16) Actual flight test accelerate-stop distances are increased by several hundred feet in the
AFM _________ .
A) to allow the crew more time to make the decision to stop or not to stop.
B) because reverse thrust was not used in the flight tests.
C) to allow for unknown variables such as runway condition or contamination and pilot
technique.
D) to allow the line crew more time to execute the stopping action.
Answer: D (Section 2 3.2 2)
17) In a situation in which the gross weight is limited by field length, if an engine fails 2
seconds before V1, the airplane will be able to cross the end of the runway at a height
of _________ .
A) 2 - 10 ft.
B) 15 - 30 ft.
C) 35 ft or more.
18) During a takeoff in which the gross weight is limited by field length, if an engine fails
two seconds before V1 and the decision is made to continue the takeoff, the airplane
will _________ .
A) not reach rotate speed before the end of the runway.
B) reach V2 at less than 35 ft above the end of the runway.
C) reach takeoff speed at the end of the runway.
App. 3-B.12
APPENDIX
3-B
19) When an RTO is necessary on a wet or slippery runway, the pilot should _________ .
A) pump the brakes to minimize excessive antiskid cycling.
B) avoid large puddles.
C) wait until near the end of the runway to apply full braking.
D) bring the airplane to a complete stop once an RTO has been initiated.
Answer: D (Section 2.3.5.1.2)
20) Selecting a larger flap setting for takeoff will result in _________ .
A) a longer takeoff roll.
B) a lower V1 speed.
C) improved climb performance.
D) decreased airplane drag.
Answer: B (Section 2.3.5.3.1)
21) The use of engine bleed air for air conditioning/pressurization _________ .
A) has no effect on takeoff performance.
B) reduces takeoff performance.
C) increases the thrust the engine provides.
22) The pilot can minimize the probability of a tire failure during takeoff by _________ .
A) taxiing quickly to avoid excessive delays getting to the runway.
B) using low taxi speeds and minimum braking whenever possible.
C) ignoring the time and weight limits of the Max Quick Turnaround Weight Charts.
D) maintaining steady pressure on the brakes throughout the taxi to avoid excessive
speed.
23) In the event of a tire failure during takeoff, _________ .

A) the crew should always reject the takeoff because of the possibility of other associated
problems, such as hydraulic system failures or tire pieces ingested into the engines.
B) the crew should always continue the takeoff so that the entire runway can be used for
stopping on the subsequent landing.
C) the crew’s indication is always a loud bang and a significant pulling to one side.
D) the stopping capability of the airplane may be significantly degraded.
App. 3-B.13
APPENDIX
3-B
24) Delaying or not raising the speedbrake during an RTO _________ .

A) will have no effect on stopping distance.
B) can be compensated for by proper aerodynamic braking technique.
C) can be compensated for by using reverse thrust.
D) will result in a longer stopping distance.
25) On today’s high bypass ratio engines, reverse thrust _________ .

A) greater than idle reverse should not be used in order to minimize stopping distance
required.
B) is less effective at higher speeds.
C) generates a larger percentage of the total airplane deceleration on wet or slippery run-
ways.
D) is extremely effective, particularly on dry runways.
26) Use of a clearway for takeoff results in _________ .

A) a lower V1 speed and increased maximum weight.
B) a lower V1 speed and decreased maximum weight.
C) a higher V1 speed and increased maximum weight.
D) a higher V1 speed and decreased maximum weight.
27) When using the Assumed Temperature Method for reducing takeoff thrust, _________ .
A) Vmcg and Vmca are reduced to correspond to the takeoff thrust being used.
B) with an engine failure at the associated V1 speed, a 35-ft height above the end of the
runway may not be attainable without increasing thrust to the actual maximum rated
thrust.
C) the actual true air speed is lower than it would be if the actual temperature were equal
D) the actual true airspeed is higher than it would be if the actual temperature were equal
to the assumed temperature
App. 3-B.14
APPENDIX
3-B
28) Which of the following is not a correct guideline for crews related to eliminating RTO
overrun incidents?
A) Do not initiate a stop after V1 unless you suspect that a tire has failed or a catastrophic
engine failure has occurred.
B) Don’t change your mind, if you have begun an RTO, stop. If you have passed V1, go,
unless the pilot has reason to conclude that the airplane is unsafe or unable to fly.
C) Both pilots must be sure to position the seat and rudder pedals so that maximum brake
pressure can be applied.
D) Use maximum effort brake application.
29) Minimum takeoff distance can be achieved by _________ .

A) sacrificing some runway line-up distance, so that thrust can be advanced for takeoff
during the turn onto the runway.
B) minimizing runway line-up distance by a sharper turn to line-up and setting takeoff
power prior to releasing the brakes.
C) slowly advancing thrust while rolling down the runway before engaging the auto-
throttle.
D) line-up distance and setting takeoff thrust have minimal impact on takeoff distance.
30) If you use manual braking for a rejected takeoff, _________ .

A) pump the brakes to minimize skidding.
B) maintain full brake pedal force.
C) release braking when reverse thrust is applied.
31) During a rejected takeoff from V1, a good technique is to use maximum braking and full
reverse thrust _________ .
A) until the airplane comes to a complete stop.
B) until below 60 knots, then decrease reverse thrust to reduce the likelihood of compres-
sor stalls.
C) until the crew judges the remaining runway is sufficient for stopping with less than
maximum effort.
D) at high speeds, reducing braking at lower speeds to prevent fuse plugs from melting,
since reverse thrust will further decrease stopping distance.
App. 3-B.15
APPENDIX
3-B
32) For an RTO with anti skid inoperative _________ .

A) the RTO procedure is unchanged.
B) brakes should be applied immediately after reducing power to idle.
C) brakes should be applied after the speedbrake is raised.
D) full brake pressure should only be applied at high speeds.
33) On the average, RTOs performed with RTO autobrakes armed result in _______ runway
distance remaining after a stop than do RTO’s performed using manual braking only.
A) more
B) less
C) the same
34) The Go/No Go decision must be made by _________ .

A) the chief pilot and training staff.
B) the crew flying.
C) airline policies and guidelines.
D) developing correct regulations.
App. 3-B.16
APPENDIX
3-B
Summary of Answers
1. B
2. A
3. D
4. C
5. B
6. A
7. C
8. A
9. A
10. C
11. B
12. D
13. A
14. A
15. B
16. D
17. B
18. B
19. D
20. B
21. B
22. B
23. D
24. D
25. C
26. A
27. C
28. A
29. B
30. B
31. A
32. C
33. A
34. B
App. 3-B.17
APPENDIX
3-B
App. 3-B.18
APPENDIX
Takeoff Safety Briefing
3-C
Takeoff Safety Briefing – A paper copy of the presentation with descriptive words for each one that can
be used for a classroom presentation is contained in this Appendix. The briefing supports a classroom
discussion of the Pilot Guide and/or the optional video.
Presentation
App. 3-C.i
APPENDIX
3-C
App. 3-C.ii
APPENDIX
3-C
3-C
Takeoff Safety Briefing App. 3-C.1

APPENDIX
3-C
DAILY NEWS
35 cents NEW YORK’S PICTURE NEWSPAPER Friday, September 22, 1989
R!
TO NT ED
CU
UE E T
OCS
IN CID LA
NT AC -RE
O
RT
CO
Takeoff Safety.2
Rejected Takeoff accidents have been and continue to be a significant contributor to worldwide
commercial aviation statistics. We see these accidents and incidents on the evening TV news
and read about them in the newspapers. The media’s explanations of the causes of the accidents
are seldom correct. The real cause is often a complex series of events.

APPENDIX
3-C
NTSB:
“…pilots faced with unusual or unique
situations may perform high-speed RTOs
unnecessarily or may perform them
improperly.”
Takeoff Safety.3
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has highlighted two basic reasons for RTO
accidents and incidents. In a report on RTO overruns, they stated that historical evidence from
two decades of RTO-related accidents “suggests that pilots faced with unusual or unique
situations may perform high-speed RTOs unnecessarily or may perform them improperly.”

APPENDIX
3-C
Events Per Year
10
Number
of events 5
per year
0
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Year
Takeoff Safety.4
From 1959 to 2003, there have been 97 RTO overrun accidents or incidents recorded for the
western built jet transport fleet. The rate of the events continues unabated.

APPENDIX
3-C
Takeoffs, RTOs, and Overruns
Through 2003 Typical recent year
Takeoffs 430,000,000 18,000,000
RTOs (est.) 143,000 6,000
RTO overrun 97 4*
accidents/incidents

Takeoff Safety.5
Since no comprehensive fleet-wide records are available, it is difficult to identify the total number
of rejected takeoffs that have occurred throughout the jet era. However, based on those events
that have been documented, the best estimate is that one in 3,000 takeoff attempts ends with an
RTO. At this rate, there will be nearly 6,000 rejected takeoffs during a typical year. That means
that every day 16 flight crews will perform an RTO. Statistically, at the rate of one RTO per 3,000
takeoffs, a pilot who flies short-haul routes and makes 80 departures per month, might
experience one RTO every three years. At the opposite extreme, the long-haul pilot making only
eight departures per month may be faced with as few as one RTO every 30 years.

APPENDIX
3-C
80
76%
60
Percent RTO overrun accidents

40 prinicpally come from
of total
the 2% of the RTOs
that are high speed
20 18%
4%
2%
0
80 kt 80 to 100 kt 100 to 12 kt Above 120 kt
or less
Takeoff Safety.6
The probability that a pilot will ever be required to perform an RTO from high speed is even less.
Available data indicates that over 75% of all RTOs are initiated at speeds of 80 knots or less.
These RTOs almost never result in an accident. Obviously, low speed RTOs are safer and less
demanding than those at high speed. The overrun accidents and incidents that do occur
principally stem from the approximately 2% of the RTOs that occur at high speed.

APPENDIX
3-C
RTO Accidents/Incidents
97 Events
Initiation Speed
Unknown
21%
Less than/ Greater than V1

equal to V1 55%
25%
Takeoff Safety.7
Studies of the previously mentioned 97 accidents/incidents have revealed some interesting

statistics:
• Fifty-five percent were initiated at speeds in excess of V1.
• Approximately one-third were reported as having occurred on runways that were wet or
contaminated with snow or ice.

APPENDIX
3-C
RTO Accidents/Incidents
97 Events (continued)
Runway Condition
Not reported Dry

30% 38%
Snow
8% Wet
24%
Takeoff Safety.8

APPENDIX
3-C
Reasons for Initiating RTO
Engine 21%
Wheel/tire 22%
Engine
Configuration 12% 21%
Indicator/light 14%
Crew coordination 10%

Non-Engine*
Bird strike 7% 79%
ATC 2%
Other/not reported 11%

*Including events
“Not reported”
0 5 10 15 20
Percent of total (97 events)
Takeoff Safety.9
Reasons why these unsuccessful RTOs were initiated vary, but approximately one fifth were
prompted by engine failures or engine indication warnings.
Although historically training has centered on engine failure as the primary reason to reject, the
statistics show that wheel or tire problems have caused just about as many accidents and
incidents as have engine events.
Other reasons that rejects occurred were for unsafe configuration, indication or light, crew
coordination problems, bird strikes, or ATC. Undetermined causes make up the rest. What is
important to note here is that the majority of past RTO accidents were not engine failure events.
Full takeoff power from all engines was available.

APPENDIX
3-C
82% Were Avoidable
By continuing
the takeoff
52%
By better
Unavoidable
preflight
planning 18%
15%
By correct stop
techniques
15%
Takeoff Safety.10
Analysis of the available data suggests that of these RTO accidents and incidents, approximately
82% were avoidable. These potentially avoidable accidents can be divided into three categories.
Roughly 15% of the RTO accidents of the past were the result of improper preflight planning.
Some of these instances were caused by loading errors and others by incorrect preflight
procedures. About 15% of the accidents and incidents could be correlated with incorrect pilot
technique or procedures in the stopping effort. Delayed application of the brakes, failure to deploy
the speedbrakes, and the failure to make a maximum effort stop until late in the RTO were the
chief characteristics of this category. Finally, in approximately 52% of these events, the airplane
was capable of continuing the takeoff and landing safely.

APPENDIX
3-C
What Do The Statistics Mean?
• RTOs are not common

• Infrequency leads to complacency
• Pilot must be prepared
Takeoff Safety.11
What should all these statistics tell a pilot? First, RTOs are not a very common event. This speaks
well of equipment reliability and the preparation that goes into operating commercial jet airplanes.
Both are no doubt due in large part to the certification and operational standards developed by
the aviation community over the thirty plus years of operation. Second, and more important, the
infrequency of RTO occurrence may lead to complacency. Every pilot must be prepared to make
the correct “Go/No Go” decision on every takeoff.

APPENDIX
3-C
What Every Pilot Should Know
• V1/Takeoff rules
• Transitions
• Takeoff calculations
• Performance factors
• Configuration
• Increase safety margins
Takeoff Safety.12
In this presentation we are going to look at what every pilot should know to make better Go/No
Go decisions.
We’ll look at:
• V1 and the associated takeoff rules
• Transition to the stop configuration
• Takeoff calculations
• Performance factors affecting takeoffs and RTOs such as atmospheric conditions
• Airplane configuration
• Ways to increase RTO safety margins including runway lineup, braking techniques, and crew
resource management

APPENDIX
3-C
Decision Time?
“Oops, I think I should have already made my decision”
Takeoff Safety.13
The term V1 was used several times in the preceding definitions and discussion. However,
studies have shown that many pilots may not clearly understand the definition of V1 or how the
choice of V1 can affect their takeoff performance.

APPENDIX
3-C
Official Definition
V1:
“…pilot’s initiation of the first action to stop the
airplane during accelerate-stop tests…”
Takeoff Safety.14
Paragraph 25.107 of the FAA Regulations defines the relationship of the takeoff speeds VEF, V1,
VR, and V2 as published in the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM), to various speeds determined in the
certification testing of the airplane. The most important statement within this “official” definition is
that V1 is determined from...” the pilot’s initiation of the first action to stop the airplane during the
accelerate-stop tests.”

APPENDIX
3-C
V1 Is Two Concepts
V1 - Stop
( Maximum “STOP” Speed )
V1 - Go
( Minimum “GO” Speed )
35 ft
Takeoff Safety.15
In the context of a Field Length Limit Weight takeoff, the correct definition of V1 consists of two
separate concepts.
• First, with respect to the “No-Go” criteria, “V1 is the maximum speed at which the rejected
takeoff maneuver can be initiated and the airplane stopped within the remaining field length
under the conditions and procedures defined in the FARs.”
• Second, with respect to Field Length Limit Weight “Go” criteria, V1 is also the earliest point from
which an engine-out takeoff can be continued and the airplane attain a height of 35 feet at the
end of the runway.

APPENDIX
3-C
Takeoff Rules
FAR Takeoff Field Length (Case #1)
• 35 feet
• V2 + 10 to 25 knots*
*(Varies with airplane type)
All engines V1
Go Distance VR VLOF
+15%
Actual distance * 1.15
Takeoff Safety.16
It is important that all pilots understand the takeoff field length/weight limit rules and the margins
these rules provide. Misunderstanding the rules and their application to an operational takeoff
situation could contribute to an incorrect Go/No Go decision.
First, we need to establish the basic definitions of the takeoff from the viewpoint of the “rules”.
The “FAR” Takeoff Field Length determined from the Airplane Flight Manual considers the most
limiting of each of the following three criteria:
1. The “All-Engine Go Distance”
This is 115% of the actual distance required to accelerate, liftoff and reach a point 35 feet
above the runway with all engines operating.

APPENDIX
3-C
Takeoff Rules (continued)

• 35 feet
V1 • V2
One engine inoperative
Accelerate-Go Distance VEF VR VLOF
1 sec
Takeoff Safety.17
2. “Engine-Out Accelerate-Go Distance”

This is the distance required to accelerate with all engines operating to the engine failure
speed VEF, have one engine fail at least one second before V1, continue the takeoff, liftoff
and reach a point 35 feet above the runway surface at V2 speed.

APPENDIX
3-C

One engine inoperative/

all-engine V
V 1 RTO transition
Accelerate-Stop Distance event complete
Stop
Transition
1 sec
Takeoff Safety.18
3. “Accelerate-Stop Distance”
This is the distance required to accelerate with all engines operating to the engine
failure/event speed VEVENT, have an engine failure or other event at least one second before
V1, recognize the failure or event, reconfigure for stopping and bring the airplane to a stop
using maximum wheel braking with the speedbrakes extended. Reverse thrust is not used in
the FAR distance calculation, except for the wet runway case on airplanes certified under FAR
Amendment 25-92.

APPENDIX
3-C

FAR Takeoff Field Length
• 35 feet
All engines
Go Distance (115% actual) • V2 + 10 to 25 knots*
*(Varies with airplane type)
1.15 times the actual distance
• 35 feet
• V2
One engine inoperative V1
1 sec
One engine inoperative/ all engine V1

RTO transition
Accelerate-Stop Distance V
EVENT complete
Stop
Transition
1 sec
Takeoff Safety.19
These three criteria determine the length of runway required to perform a legal takeoff when the
weight of the airplane is specified. For a given length runway, if the actual weight of the airplane
is equal to the limiting weight, as determined by any of these three criteria, the takeoff is
described as being at a Field Length Limit Weight. (It is estimated that on the average, few of the
world’s takeoffs are performed at Field Length Limit Weights, but, for some operators, a Field
Length Limit Weight takeoff may be the normal situation.)
If a takeoff is rejected, it will take time and distance for the airplane to come to a full stop.

APPENDIX
3-C
Transition to Stopping
Configuration
Distance
V1 allowance
Decision
Brakes Speedbrakes
applied raised
Thrust
levers to
idle
Takeoff Safety.20
First, let’s look at how this time and distance are calculated. Then we will examine how the
calculated numbers relate to what the line pilot does during an operational RTO.
From the certification flight testing, the average demonstrated time for the test pilot to apply
maximum braking, bring the thrust levers to idle, and raise the speedbrakes is about one second.
The regulations acknowledge that the line pilot does not know when or if a reject will occur, so an
additional two second distance allowance is added.
This additional distance allowance is provided to give the line pilot adequate distance to get the
airplane into the full stopping configuration. It is not there to give additional time for the Go/No Go
decision.
“Prompt” accomplishment of the RTO procedure is therefore essential to a successful stop
maneuver. Rapid completion of the RTO procedure can represent a stopping distance advantage
over the calculated distance of up to 600 feet.

APPENDIX
3-C
Maximum Stopping Performance
• Maximum brakes
• Thrust idle
• Speedbrakes
• Reverse thrust
Takeoff Safety.21
The objective of the rejected takeoff procedure is to quickly reconfigure the airplane to produce
the maximum retarding forces possible under the prevailing conditions. The “correct” procedure
for accomplishing a rejected takeoff is contained in company approved training manuals and pilot
handbooks. It is important that these procedures be followed in order to achieve the maximum
stopping performance.
Basically, full brakes must be applied, the thrust must come to idle, the speedbrakes/spoilers
must be raised, and maximum reverse thrust consistent with airplane controllability must be
applied until the crew is assured that the airplane will stop within the remaining runway.

APPENDIX
3-C
Reverse Thrust
Takeoff Safety.22
Under FAA rules, reverse thrust is not used in the flight test demonstration, nor is credit for
reverse thrust allowed when calculating takeoff performance, except for the wet runway case for
airplanes certified under FAR Amendment 25-92. Since reverse thrust is typically available to the
line pilot, this can provide an additional stopping margin.
However, the potential margin associated with reverse thrust will not adequately compensate for
incomplete or slow procedures.

APPENDIX
3-C
Effect of V1 Speed on Takeoff Weight

(For a Fixed Runway Length)
115% all-engine
Increasing
Continued
takeoff
Field limit weight

Airplane
weight Balanced field
V1 speed
Rejected
takeoff
V1 speed Increasing
Takeoff Safety.23
Another concept that is essential in discussing rejected takeoffs is that of the Balanced Field.
From the standpoint of the “STOP” criteria, the V1 speed establishes the point at which the stop is
initiated. Therefore, if a high speed is chosen for V1, the weight of the airplane must be restricted
to enable the stop to be completed within the available runway. Conversely, if the V1 speed is
low, the airplane can weigh more and still stop on the runway. This result is shown by the line
labeled “REJECTED TAKEOFF”.
The trade between V1 and allowable takeoff weight is exactly the opposite for the “GO” case. If a
low value of V1 is chosen, the airplane will need to be at a lower weight in order to accelerate to
flying speed with one engine failed. If a higher value of V1 is chosen, the airplane weight can be
increased because all engines are operating for more of the takeoff run. This result is shown by
the line labeled “CONTINUED TAKEOFF” in the slide.
The intersection of the “REJECTED TAKEOFF” and the “CONTINUED TAKEOFF” lines defines
the maximum airplane weight that will satisfy both of the engine-out go and accelerate-stop
criteria. If this weight is less than the all-engine Field Length Limit Weight, it then becomes the
limiting weight for the takeoff. The takeoff is then described as being at a “Balanced Field Limit
Weight” because the “GO” and “STOP” distances are equal. It is characterized by the fact that the
airplane will require the entire runway length to reach 35 feet or to stop if an engine fails at V1 and
the RTO is initiated at V1.

APPENDIX
3-C
Balanced Field
Engine-out go distance = Accelerate-stop distance
But the actual runway available is usually longer than

the minimum Balanced Field Length Required
Takeoff Safety.24
Simply put, a “Balanced Field” condition means the engine-out go distance equals the accelerate-
stop distance.
If an engine failure or other event should occur in a typical operational situation where the actual
airplane weight is less than the Field Length Limit Weight, the pilot can either continue or reject
the takeoff, (depending on when the engine failure or event occurred relative to V1), and achieve
35 feet or stop before reaching the end of the runway. Although the takeoff was planned using
the “balanced V1” there was excess runway available for both the GO and STOP cases.
In either case, the associated V1 speed is correctly referred to as a “Balanced V1 Speed.”
However, many pilots assume that they are field length limited because they are using a
balanced V1 speed, which is obviously not the case.

APPENDIX
3-C
Details of the “Go” versus “Stop” Decision

• 35 feet
V1 • V2
1 second minimum
V1
Accelerate-Stop Distance RTO transition
VEVENT complete (AFM)
1 second minimum Stop

Transition
Runway used to accelerate to Runway available
V1 (typically 60%) to Go/Stop
(typically 40%)
Takeoff Safety.25
It is important to note that at a Field Length Limit Weight, it typically requires approximately 60%
of the runway to accelerate to V1. This means that there may be as little as 40% of the runway
available to either STOP or GO from V1.
That means for an 820,000-lb large jet transport, with V1 equal to 163 knots, on a 12,000-ft
runway, you might have only 4,800 ft to transition to the stopping configuration and come to a
stop, or, for a typical small jet transport weighing 110,000 lb, with V1 at 129 knots on a 6,000-foot
runway, you could have only 2,400 feet to transition and stop.
Prompt accomplishment of the correct procedure is required to successfully accomplish this
maneuver. It is within the capabilities of every line pilot to accomplish this successfully. However,
misunderstanding what is meant by “prompt and correct” can have a very detrimental effect on
the outcome of any RTO.

APPENDIX
3-C
All-Engine Takeoff
150 ft
Takeoff Safety.26
Let’s now turn our attention to the Go decision. With all engine takeoff power, the airplane will
reach a height of approximately 150 feet over the end of a minimum length runway.

APPENDIX
3-C
One-Engine Inoperative
35 ft and V2
Takeoff Safety.27
Even if an engine fails one second or less before V1, in a runway limited situation, the FAR “GO”
criteria require that the airplane be able to continue to accelerate, rotate, liftoff and reach V2
speed at a point 35 feet above the end of the runway. The airplane must remain controllable
throughout this maneuver and must meet certain minimum climb requirements. These handling
characteristics and climb requirements are demonstrated many times throughout the certification
flight test program. While a great deal of attention is focused on the engine failure case, it is
important to keep in mind that the majority of past “GO/NO GO” decisions were made when full
takeoff power was available. As you recall, in fully 79% of all RTO accident cases, full takeoff
power was available.

APPENDIX
3-C
Takeoff Sample “Go” Margins
All engines
(150) V2 + 10 to 25 kt
40
(35)
Height at end V2
30
of runway, ft
e
e airplan
4 engin e
20 lan
airp lan
e
ine irp
3 eng e a
gin One
10 en
2 second
early
0
-20 -16 -12 -8 -4 0 +4 +8
Speed relative to V1, kt
Takeoff Safety.28
Consider a one-engine-inoperative case where the engine failure occurs more than the
prescribed one second before V1. In this situation, additional distance is needed to accelerate to
VR and, as a consequence, the liftoff point will be moved further down the runway. The altitude
(or “screen height”) achieved at the end of a limit runway length is somewhat reduced depending
on how much more than one second before V1 the engine failure occurs.
A typical range of accelerations for jet transports is 3 to 6 knots per second when near V1, so the
shaded area shows the range in screen height that might occur if the engine failed “one second
early”, or two seconds prior to V1. In other words, a “GO” decision made with the engine failure
occurring two seconds prior to V1 will result in a screen height of 15 to 30 feet for a Field Length
Limit Weight takeoff.

APPENDIX
3-C
FMS Speeds and Weights
TAKEOFF REF f/f

OAT V1
23º C 130 K T
• No safety SEL TEMP
- - - º C
SEL TEMP
131 K T
VR
V2
92 . 5 / 9 2 . 5 % 139 K T
margin data - - - - - - - PRE-FLT COMPLETE - - - - - - -
available - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
>INDEX
Takeoff Safety.29
By far, the most likely takeoff scenario for the line pilot is the case where the actual airplane
weight is less than any limit weight. It also is possibly the most easily misunderstood area of
takeoff performance since the fact that the airplane is not at a limit weight is about all the flight
crew can determine from the data usually available on the flight deck. They know there is more
runway in front of them at brake release than the rules require. However, few operators provide
any information that will let the crew determine how much excess runway is available, what it
means in terms of the V1 speed they are using, or how to best maximize the potential safety
margins represented by the excess runway.

APPENDIX
3-C
Climb Gradients
Minimum gradient Typical rate of climb

required
4-engine 3%
520 FPM at V2~170 knots
3-engine 2.7%
2-engine 2.4%
15-degree bank turn will reduce these

climb rates by approximately 100 FPM
Takeoff Safety.30
There is another case for the engine-out “GO” situation that may occur more often in service. This
is the takeoff scheduled at or near the takeoff climb limit weight. The rate of climb and the
acceleration capability may appear to be substantially less than the crew anticipates or is familiar
with.
The FARs require that the takeoff climb gradient for the second segment portion of the takeoff (V2
speed, landing gear retracted, takeoff flaps, one-engine inoperative) be at least 2.4%. If V2 is 150
knots, this converts to a rate of climb of 364 feet per minute. If maneuvering is required, a 15-
degree bank will reduce the climb rate by approximately 100 feet per minute. Crews should be
aware of this low rate of climb capability and not be unduly alarmed if they experience it.

APPENDIX
3-C
Factors Affecting Takeoff

and RTO Performance
• Atmospheric conditions
• Airplane configuration
• Runway characteristics
• Engine thrust
• Human performance
Takeoff Safety.31
Now let’s look at some of the factors affecting takeoff and RTO performance:
• Both the continued and the rejected takeoff performance are directly affected by atmospheric
conditions, airplane configuration, runway characteristics, engine thrust available, and by
human performance factors.
• Changes in these variables can have a significant impact on a successful “GO/NO GO”
decision, and in many instances, the flight crew has a degree of direct control over these
changes.

APPENDIX
3-C
Atmospheric Conditions
Verify takeoff weight adjustments
Takeoff Safety.32
Atmospheric Conditions
The effect of the wind speed and direction on takeoff distance is very straight forward. At any
given airspeed, a 10 knot headwind component lowers the ground speed by 10 knots. Since V1,
rotation, and liftoff speeds are at lower ground speeds, the required takeoff distance is reduced.
The opposite occurs if the wind has a 10 knot tailwind component, producing a 10 knot increase
in the ground speed. The required runway length is increased. Typical takeoff data supplied to
the flight crew by their operations department will either provide takeoff weight adjustments to be
applied to a zero wind limit weight or separate columns of limit weights for specific values of wind
component. In either case, it is the responsibility of the flight crew to verify that last minute
changes in the tower reported winds are included in their takeoff planning.

APPENDIX
3-C
Flap Selection
Typical Large Two-Engine Airplane Takeoff Performance
8,700-ft runway Flap setting

sea level 37° C
1 5 15 20
Runway limit 358,300 374,200 389,000 393,600

weight, lb. (kg) (162,494) (169,705) (176,417) (178,503)
Climb/obstacle 414,100 407,300 393,600 383,000

limit weight, lb. (kg) (187,800) (184,717) (178,503) (173,696)
Takeoff Safety.33
Flaps
The airplane’s takeoff field length performance is affected by flap setting in a fairly obvious way.
For a given runway length and airplane weight, the takeoff speeds are reduced by selecting a
larger flap setting. This is because the lift required for flight is produced at a lower speed with the
larger flap deflection. Since the airplane will reach the associated lower V1 speed earlier in the
takeoff roll, there will be more runway remaining for a possible stop maneuver. On the “GO” side
of the decision, increasing the takeoff flap deflection will increase the airplane drag and the
resulting lower climb performance may limit the allowable takeoff weight. However, the takeoff
analysis used by the flight crew will advise them if climb or obstacle clearance is a limiting factor
with a larger flap setting.
Flap Selection: Most airplanes have two or more takeoff flap settings in order to provide optimal
takeoff weight capability for the variety of runway conditions found around the world. Most
takeoffs are not at the runway limit weight and crews frequently select a low flap setting for a
variety of reasons. Some airlines have elected to use only one setting for simplicity. Regarding
RTO safety, the higher the flap setting used, the lower the V1 speed and consequently, the larger
the stopping margin for a given runway length should an RTO be attempted. If an airline wishes
to increase the number of takeoff flap options provided the crew, they must insure the crews are
familiar with the advantages and limitations of one setting versus another.

APPENDIX
3-C
Engine Bleed Air
• Bleed air reduces thrust

– Air conditioning
– Anti-ice
• Increase takeoff EPR or N1
– Consult Operations Manual
Takeoff Safety.34
Engine Bleed Air

Whenever bleed air is extracted from an engine, the amount of thrust the engine generates is
reduced. Therefore, the use of engine bleed air for air conditioning and pressurization reduces
the airplane’s potential takeoff performance for a given set of runway length, temperature and
altitude conditions.
When required, using engine and/or wing anti-ice further decreases the performance on some
airplane models. This “lost” thrust may be recoverable through increased takeoff EPR or N1 limits
as indicated in the operations manual. It depends on engine type and the specific atmospheric
conditions.

APPENDIX
3-C
Minimum Equipment List (MEL) and

Configuration Deviation List (CDL)
• May affect ability to

accelerate/decelerate
** Check Revised Procedures **

Takeoff Safety.35
Missing or Inoperative Equipment

Inoperative or missing equipment can sometimes affect the airplane’s acceleration or
deceleration capability.
For instance, MEL items such as a deactivated brake may impact both the continued takeoff and
RTO performance through degraded braking capability and loss of in-flight braking of the spinning
tire.
The flight crew should bear in mind that the performance of the airplane with these types of
Configuration Deviation List (CDL) or MEL items in the airplane’s maintenance log at dispatch will
be within the certified limits. However, it would be prudent for the flight crew to accept final
responsibility to assure that the items are accounted for in the dispatch process and to insure that
they, as a crew, are prepared to properly execute any revised procedures.

APPENDIX
3-C
Tires and Brakes

Excessive braking
Heat Buildup
Long taxi Foreign objects
Visual Inspection
Wheel cracks
Takeoff Safety.36
Tires and Brakes

Heat buildup can cause a breakdown of the rubber compound, ply separation, and/or rupture of
the plies. This damage might not cause immediate tire failure and because it is internal, it may not
be obvious by visual inspection. However, the weakened tire is more prone to failure on a
subsequent flight. Long taxi distances especially at high speeds and heavy takeoff weights can
aggravate this problem and result in a blown tire. While under-inflation that causes a rapid heat
buildup is a maintenance issue, flight crews can minimize tire failures due to overheating by using
low taxi speeds and minimizing braking whenever possible.
Foreign objects in parking areas, taxiways, and runways can cause severe cuts in tires. The
abrasion associated with sustained locked or skidding wheels that can be caused by various
antiskid or brake problems can grind through the tire cords until the tire is severely weakened or a
blow-out occurs. Occasionally, wheel cracks develop which deflate a tire and generate an
overloaded condition in the adjacent tire on the same axle. Some of these problems are
inevitable, however it cannot be over-stressed that proper maintenance and thorough walk
around inspections are key factors in eliminating tire failure during the takeoff roll.

APPENDIX
3-C
Go and Stop Margins with a Tire Failure

• Takeoff flaps VR
• Certified performance Go 35 ft
• Dry runway Engine
fails
• Field length limit weight Transition
V1
VEF complete
Full stopping
Reject no reverse
Approx
VR 150 ft
Go
Tire
fails
• Same initial conditions
V1 Transition
complete 40 to
• Landing flaps Reduced braking 60 kts
• Certified performance less Reject capability plus all 300 to 500 ft
blown tire effects engine reverse overrun
• Takeoff weight minus burnoff
50 ft and fuel dump (opt)
40 to 60% Stop
Zone
Margin 60 to 40 %
Available Runway
Takeoff Safety.37
Tires and Brakes

If you hear a bang or feel a vibration, how do you know it is a tire failure?
You may only have a second or two to analyze the problem and decide.
The British government Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) has also been investigating tire
failure and reject decisions. They reported that pilots often incorrectly interpret a tire failure as an
event that threatens the safety of flight. As a result the pilots do an unnecessary reject.
When a tire fails at high speed it is possible that pieces of it can be thrown against the aft body or
the flaps, but it is usually not going to affect the ability of the airplane to fly.
Unless a tire failure in the high speed regime has produced damage that puts the ability of the
airplane to fly in serious doubt, it is recommended that the takeoff be continued.
Also, there will be more distance available for the stop with a blown tire if the takeoff is continued
and the airplane returns to land.

APPENDIX
3-C
Residual Brake Energy

• Observe brake temperature
limitations and/or minimum
cooling times
• Follow maximum quick

turnaround weight
(MQTW) chart
Takeoff Safety.38
Residual Brake Energy

After a brake application, the energy which the brake has absorbed is released as heat and until
this heat is dissipated, the amount of additional energy which the brake can absorb without failure
is reduced. Therefore, takeoff planning must consider the effects of residual brake energy (or
brake temperature) if the previous landing involved significant braking and/or the airplane
turnaround is relatively short. There are two primary sources of information on this subject. The
brake temperature limitations and/or cooling charts in the airplane operating manual provide
recommended information on temperature limitations and/or cooling times and the procedures
necessary to dissipate various amounts of brake energy. In addition, the Maximum Quick
Turnaround Weight (MQTW) chart in the AFM is a regulatory requirement that must be followed.
This chart shows the gross weight at landing where the energy absorbed by the brakes during the
landing could be high enough to cause the wheel fuse plugs to melt and establishes a minimum
waiting/cooling time for these cases. The MQTW chart assumes that the previous landing was
conducted with maximum braking for the entire stop and did not use reverse thrust, so for many
landings where only light braking was used there is substantial conservatism built into the wait
requirement.

APPENDIX
3-C
Speedbrake Effects
Weight
on tire
Forward
motion
Rolling Total stopping force capability
Speed- Lift
34%
brakes down
Brake increase
torque Speed- Drag
Braking force
brakes up Brakes
Drag Brakes
(Braking force = Load on
braking friction x load on tire)* wheels
* Brake torque not limiting
Speedbrake position Difference
Down Up speedbrake up
Drag 8,500 lb 14,700 lb +73%
Lift 52,000 lb -1,200 lb -102%
Net load on wheels 141,600 lb 194,800 lb +38%
Maximum braking force 75,500 lb 98,000 lb +29%
Maximum stopping force
84,400 lb 112,700 lb +34%
(brakes and drag)
Takeoff Safety.39
Speedbrake Effect on Wheel Braking Performance

While jet transport pilots generally understand the aerodynamic drag benefit of speedbrakes and
the capability of wheel brakes to stop an airplane, the effect of speedbrakes on wheel brake
effectiveness during an RTO is not always appreciated. The reason speedbrakes are so critical is
their pronounced effect on wing lift. Depending on flap setting, the net wing lift can be reduced,
eliminated, or reversed to a download by raising the speedbrakes, thereby increasing the vertical
load on the wheels which in turn can greatly increase braking capability.
The speedbrakes increase the total drag by 70% to 100%. With the speedbrakes up, the total
high speed stopping force that can be generated is 30% to 50% more than the stopping capability
with the speedbrakes left down (takeoff flap settings). At low speeds the speedbrakes are less
effective and thus have a lesser impact on the stopping performance.

APPENDIX
3-C
Stopping With Brakes

But No Speedbrakes
60-70 kts
400- to 600-feet
overrun
Takeoff Safety.40
Speedbrakes
During the RTO certification flight test, the stopping performance was obtained with prompt
deployment of the speedbrakes. Failure to deploy the speedbrakes during an RTO or deploying
them late will significantly increase the stopping distance.
On a dry runway, raising the speedbrakes 5 seconds late during the RTO will increase the
stopping distance of a typical jet transport by nearly 300 feet. Not raising the speedbrakes will
extend the stopping distance by up to 600 feet, or result in an overrun speed of up to 70 knots.

APPENDIX
3-C
Speedbrakes Versus Reverse Thrust
Field length limit dry runway
One engine-out RTO

Brakes + speedbrakes + reverse thrust
100- to 300-ft
One engine-out RTO margin
Brakes + reverse thrust
300- to 600-ft
overrun
Takeoff Safety.41
Speedbrakes Versus Reverse Thrust

Most of the takeoffs performed in the world do not include reverse thrust credit. This is because
the rejected takeoff certification testing under FAA rules does not include the use of reverse
thrust, except for the wet runway case for airplanes certified under FAR Amendment 25-92. As a
result, an additional stopping margin is produced by using maximum reverse thrust.
One common misconception among pilots is that the quick use of thrust reversers will offset any
delay or even the complete lack of speedbrake deployment during an RTO. This is simply not
true. On a dry runway, failure to raise the speedbrakes will result in a substantial overrrun, even if
maximum engine-out reverse thrust is used.

APPENDIX
3-C
Runway Surface Condition

Wet or Contaminated
Affects friction between runway and tires
Takeoff Safety.42
Runway Surface Condition

The term “runway surface condition” can cover everything from a heavy rain, snow, or slush
covered runway with poor stopping potential to a specially constructed runway with a grooved or
Porous Friction Coat (PFC) surface which can offer improved braking under adverse conditions.
The certification testing is performed on a dry clean runway and in the case of airplanes certified
under FAR Amendment 25-92, also on a wet runway. Any contamination which reduces the
available friction between the tire and the runway surface will increase the required stopping
distance for an RTO.

APPENDIX
3-C
Dynamic Hydroplaning
• Tire braking virtually eliminated

• Highly sensitive to speed
Flooded runway
Must Apply Steady Brake Pressure!
Takeoff Safety.43
Hydroplaning is a particularly interesting subject since most pilots have either heard of or
experienced instances of extremely poor braking action on wet runways during landing. The
phenomenon is highly sensitive to speed which makes it an especially important consideration for
RTO situations. Since the conditions required to initiate and sustain total dynamic hydroplaning
are unusual, it is rarely encountered. When it does occur, however, it virtually eliminates any tire
braking or cornering capability. The pilot remedies are fairly simple: apply steady pressure and
depend on the antiskid system to provide the best possible braking capability and confirm that the
speedbrake handle is raised and apply maximum reverse thrust.

APPENDIX
3-C
The Crew
• Preflight briefing
• Cockpit callouts
• Positive action if malfunction occurs
Takeoff Safety.44
There are several areas in which a crew can improve their performance:
• Good preflight preparation to include the briefing
• Use of standard callouts during the takeoff
• Take positive preconsidered action if a malfunction occurs

APPENDIX
3-C
The Briefing
• Clear agreement on responsibilities

• Concise roles understood
Takeoff Safety.45
The pretakeoff briefing should be clear and concise including a description of the departure path
with emphasis on the anticipated track and altitude restrictions
Additional briefing items may be required when any elements of the takeoff and departure are
different from those routinely used. These may include inclement weather, adverse runway
conditions, unique noise abatement requirements, dispatch using minimum equipment list or any
other situation where it is necessary to review or define crew responsibilities.
There should be no doubt in any crew member’s mind what his or her role will be during the
takeoff.

APPENDIX
3-C
Callouts
• Standard
• Malfunctions
• V1
Takeoff Safety.46
During takeoff, callouts fall into three general categories:

• Those normally made prior to V1
• Malfunctions
• The V1 callout itself

APPENDIX
3-C
Items to Reject For

Low speed: High speed:
• System failures • Engine failure or fire
• Tire failure
• Abnormal acceleration
• Unsafe takeoff configuration
• Fire or fire warning
• Engine failure
Takeoff Safety.47
As was recommended by the NTSB, it is important to clearly announce when entering the
company-defined “high speed” regime.
In the low speed regime it is reasonable to reject for:
• System failures
• Tire failure
• Abnormally slow acceleration
• Unsafe takeoff configuration warning
• Fire or fire warning
• Engine failure
• The airplane is unsafe or unable to fly
However, in the high speed regime, it is only recommended to reject for the most critical items:
• Engine failure or fire
• The airplane is unsafe or unable to fly
Other system failures or warnings may be added to these lists as recommended by the
manufacturer or airline.

APPENDIX
3-C
Communication
• Precise • Clear
Use Standard Callouts
Takeoff Safety.48
The few seconds of communication regarding a non-normal situation during takeoff can mean the
difference between success and disaster. For this reason, communications must be precise,
effective, and efficient. Standard callouts contribute to situation awareness. The callouts, coupled
with both/all crew members monitoring airspeed, leave the crew with a common perception of
what actions are proper in the event of a non-normal indication. The crew member noting a
problem should communicate this clearly and precisely without inferring things that may not be
true. The pilot tasked to make the RTO decision should clearly announce the decision to continue
or reject the takeoff using the standard airline words.

APPENDIX
3-C
Timely V1 Callout
0
60 Finish the callout as the
80
400 MACH 100
airplane reaches V1
350
120
300
KNOTS 7 140 Ensures a “No Go”
250 126
240 160 decision will not be
5
220 200 180 made after V1
Takeoff Safety.49
Basic operating procedures call for the pilot flying the airplane to include airspeed in his
instrument scan during the takeoff ground roll. Hence he is always aware of the approximate
speed. The pilot not flying monitors airspeed in more detail and calls “Vee-One” as a confirmation
of reaching this critical point in the acceleration.
The pilot flying cannot react properly to V1 unless the V1 call is made in a timely, crisp, and
audible manner. One method used by a major U.S. carrier is their adoption of a policy of
“completing the V1 callout by the time the airplane reaches V1.” This is an excellent example of
the way airlines are implementing procedures to improve RTO safety. It is a good procedure and
it should preclude a situation where the “NO GO” decision is inadvertently made after V1.

APPENDIX
3-C
Be ready to Decide
Be ready to Act
Takeoff Safety.50

APPENDIX
Simulator Exercises
The data in this appendix is supplied as a reference for an operator’s training department. The example
simulator training exercises are for specific airplane models and should be modified by operators to fit
3-D
their particular syllabus and training devices to optimize learning. Any or all of the exercises may be
combined into a simulator training syllabus as described in Section 3.2.2 of the basic training aid docu-
ment. The General Description section for each exercise explains which of the initial conditions is of
particular importance.
The Simulator Exercise data supplied to operators by the various manufacturers should be retained in
this appendix as follows:
Table of Contents
Manufacturer Page
Airbus Airplanes...........................................................................................................3-D.ABI.i
Boeing Airplanes.......................................................................................................... 3-D.TBC.i
Other Manufacturers Airplanes....................................................................................3-D.OTH.i
The data contained in this appendix is provided for training purposes only and should not be used for
any other purpose. Each manufacturer assumes responsibility only for the data which applies to their
specific airplane models. Questions regarding any information presented in this appendix should be
addressed to the responsible manufacturer.
App. 3-D.i
APPENDIX
3-D
App. 3-D.ii
APPENDIX
Takeoff Safety Video
3-E
Some manufacturers have produced videos that illustrate and summarize the concepts of this training
aid. The videos can be used to supplement an operator’s training program. Transcripts of these videos, or
other printed material related to the videos, may be supplied by the manufacturer.
Any printed materials pertaining to videos supplied to operators by the various manufacturers should be
retained in this appendix as follows:
Table of Contents
Manufacturer Page
Airbus Airplanes........................................................................................................... 3-E.ABI.i
Boeing Airplanes.......................................................................................................... 3-E.TBC.i
Other Manufacturers Airplanes.................................................................................... 3-E.OTH.i
App. 3-E.i
APPENDIX
3-E
App. 3-E.ii
SECTION
Takeoff Safety Background Data
Section
Table of Contents
Page
4
4.0 Introduction........................................................................................................................ 4.1
4.1 Objectives ......................................................................................................................... 4.1

4.2.4 Statistics..................................................................................................................... 4.6
4.2.5 Lessons Learned........................................................................................................ 4.8
4.3.1.1 The “FAR” Takeoff Field Length....................................................................... 4.11
4.3.1.2 V1 Speed Defined............................................................................................... 4.12
4.3.1.4 Other Rules Affecting Takeoff Field Length...................................................... 4.14
4.3.3.1 The “Stop” Margins........................................................................................... 4.17
4.3.3.2 The “Go” Option................................................................................................ 4.18
4.3.5.1.1 Hydroplaning................................................................................................ 4.25
4.3.5.1.2 The Final Stop............................................................................................... 4.26
4.3.5.3.1 Flaps.............................................................................................................. 4.27
4.3.5.3.2 Engine Bleed Air........................................................................................... 4.28
4.3.5.3.3 Missing or Inoperative Equipment ............................................................... 4.28
4.3.5.3.4 Wheels, Tires, and Brakes............................................................................. 4.29
4.3.5.3.5 Worn Brakes.................................................................................................. 4.31
4.3.5.3.6 Residual Brake Energy.................................................................................. 4.32
4.i
SECTION 4
Section Page
4.3.5.3.7 Speedbrake Effect on Wheel Braking............................................................ 4.33

4.3.5.3.8 Carbon and Steel Brake Differences............................................................. 4.35
4.3.5.3.9 High Brake Energy RTOs.............................................................................. 4.37
4.3.5.6 Lineup Distance Accountability......................................................................... 4.40
4.3.6.2 Flap Selection..................................................................................................... 4.45
4.3.6.3 Runway Lineup.................................................................................................. 4.46
4.3.6.7 RTO Autobrakes................................................................................................. 4.48
4.3.6.8 Reduced V1 Techniques..................................................................................... 4.49
4.3.6.9 The V1 Call......................................................................................................... 4.52

4.4.1 CRM and the RTO................................................................................................... 4.53
4.4.3 Callouts.................................................................................................................... 4.54
4.4.5 Summary.................................................................................................................. 4.54
Appendix 4-A National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Special Investigation
Report (SIR-90/02) Runway Overruns Following High Speed Rejected
Takeoffs
Appendix 4-B RTO Accident/Incident List 1959 to 2003
Appendix 4-C Other Takeoff Rules
Appendix 4-D Reverse Thrust Effectiveness
Appendix 4-E Takeoff Safety Training Aid Human Performance Study
Appendix 4-F Airplane Flight Manual Transition Time Details
Appendix 4-G Brake Pedal Force Data
Appendix 4-H Reduced Thrust and Reduced V1 Examples
Appendix 4-I Lineup Distance Charts - Boeing Airplanes
Appendix 4-J The Effect of Procedural Variations on Stopping Distance
4.ii
SECTION
Takeoff Safety
Background Data
4
4.0 Introduction 4.1 Objectives
The rejected takeoff (RTO) is a maneuver The objective is to reduce the number of RTO
performed at any time during the takeoff roll if accidents and incidents while preserving the
the flight crew determines that the takeoff should excellent record of takeoffs safely continued.
not be continued. A review of the available data Flight crews play a significant role in
over the history of western built transport jet accomplishing this objective. The RTO begins
operations shows that approximately one in with a decision by the crew to reject the takeoff
3,000 takeoffs has been rejected. Of these RTOs and the crew will be responsible for the result.
about one in 1,500 was unsuccessful, resulting The airline’s responsibility is to establish good
in an overrun accident or incident.1 That is an standard operating procedures and provide
accident/incident rate of one per 4,500,000 the best possible training. The flight crew’s
takeoff attempts. responsibility is to correctly analyze all the
data they receive prior to and during the takeoff
The National Transportation Safety Board roll and perform the “best” procedure for the
(NTSB), in a report on RTO overruns, 2stated circumstances.
that historical evidence from two decades of
RTO related accidents “suggests that pilots The material in this section is intended to be
faced with unusual or unique situations may a resource for those responsible for policy,
perform high speed RTOs unnecessarily or procedures and training standards. It can also
may perform them improperly.” It is the goal be used by training department personnel in
of this Training Aid to reduce the number the development of classroom material and
of RTO related accidents and incidents by as a resource for answering questions raised
improving the pilot’s decision making and in the training process. It is recognized that
associated procedure accomplishment through there is more than one way for an airline to
increased knowledge and awareness of the operate safely, therefore this section may not
related factors. be appropriate for direct release to line pilots
due to the requirements of operators to maintain
This section provides a thorough review of standardization in the cockpit. The underlying
aspects of the takeoff that affect the Go/No Go message of this section for flight crew members
decision. It reviews standard operating practices is: be familiar with your airplane’s basic
some airlines have adopted to maximize RTO performance characteristics and the margins
stopping margins. It also reviews training associated with either continuing or rejecting
practices that prepare crews to make sound a takeoff. Know the procedures that will be
Go/No Go decisions while using effective RTO used for either option, and be prepared to
techniques when an RTO is necessary. perform them promptly.
Some of the Appendices3 to this section contain

data related to specific airplane models. This
data is prepared and delivered by each airplane
manufacturer and is the exclusive responsibility
of that manufacturer.
1
Following generally accepted conventions, in this document an accident is defined as an event which involves a fatality and/or
serious airframe damage. An incident is defined as an event which results in serious damage to the airplane only, but not
fatalities.
2
Apendix 4-A, NTSB/SIR-90/02 Special Investigation Report—Runway Overruns Following High Speed Rejected Takeoffs,
27 February 1990.
3
Appendix 4-F through 4-J contain airplane model specific data. 4.1
SECTION 4
4.2 “Successful Versus Unsuccessful” there have been nearly 18 million takeoffs in a
Go/No Go Decisions typical year. That is approximately 34 takeoffs
every minute, every day!
Any Go/No Go decision can be considered
“successful” if it does not result in injury or Since no comprehensive fleet-wide records
airplane damage. However, just because it was are available, it is difficult to identify the total
“successful” by this definition, it does not mean number of RTOs that have occurred throughout
the action was the “best” that could have been the jet era. However, based on those events
taken. The purpose of this section is to point which have been documented, our best estimate
out some of the lessons that have been learned is that one in 3,000 takeoff attempts ends with
through the RTO experiences of airline crews an RTO. At this rate, there will be nearly 6,000
since the 1950s, and to recommend ways of RTOs during a typical year. That means that
avoiding similar experiences by the pilots of every day, 16 flight crews will perform an RTO.
today’s airline fleet. Statistically, at the rate of one RTO per 3,000
takeoffs, a pilot who flies short haul routes and
makes 80 departures per month, will experience
4.2.1 An In-service Perspective On Go/No Go one RTO every three years. At the opposite
Decisions extreme, the long haul pilot making only eight
departures per month will be faced with only
Modern jet transport services began in the one RTO every 30 years.
early 1950s and significantly increased later
that decade after introduction of the Boeing 707 The probability that a pilot will ever be required
and the Douglas DC-8. The western built jet to perform an RTO from high speed is even
transport fleet accumulated approximately 430 less, as is shown in Figure 2.
million takeoffs by the end of 2003. Recently,
Figure 1 Takeoffs, RTOs, and Overruns

Takeoffs, RTOs,
and Overrun
Statistics Through 2003 Typical Recent Year
Takeoffs 430,000,000 18,000,000
RTOs (est.) 143,000 6,000
RTO Overrun
97 4*
Accidents/Incidents

4.2
SECTION 4
Figure 2
Distribution of
RTO Initiation
Speeds

24/OVERRUN
ACCIDENTS
0ERCENT PRINCIPALLYCOME
OFTOTAL FROMTHEOFTHE
24/STHATARE
HIGHSPEED

KNOTS TO TO !BOVE
ORLESS KNOTS KNOTS KNOTS
Available data indicates that over 75% of all 4.2.2 “Successful” Go/No Go Decisions
RTOs are initiated at speeds of 80 knots or less.
These RTOs almost never result in an accident. As was mentioned at the beginning of Section
Inherently, low speed RTOs are safer and less 4.2, there is more to a “good” Go/No Go decision
demanding than high speed RTOs. At the other than the fact that it may not have resulted in
extreme, about 2% of the RTOs are initiated any apparent injury or aircraft damage. The
at speeds above 120 knots. Overrun accidents following examples illustrate a variety of
and incidents that occur principally stem from situations that have been encountered in the
these high speed events. past, some of which would fit the description
of a “good” decision, and some which are, at
What should all these statistics tell a pilot? least, “questionable”.
First, RTOs are not a very common event. This
speaks well of equipment reliability and the Listed at the beginning of each of the following
preparation that goes into operating jet transport examples is the primary cause or cue which
airplanes. Both are, no doubt, due in large part prompted the crew to reject the takeoff:
to the certification and operational standards 1. Takeoff Warning Horn: The takeoff
developed by the aviation community over many warning horn sounded as the takeoff roll
years of operation. Second, and more important, commenced. The takeoff was rejected
the infrequency of RTO events may lead to at 5 knots. The aircraft was taxied off
complacency about maintaining sharp decision the active runway where the captain
making skills and procedural effectiveness. In discovered the stabilizer trim was set
spite of the equipment reliability, every pilot at the aft end of the green band. The
must be prepared to make the correct Go/No stabilizer was reset and a second takeoff
Go decision on every takeoff-just in case. was completed without further difficulty.
4.3
SECTION 4
2. Takeoff Warning Horn: The takeoff was at high speed or tires that fail near V1, are
rejected at 90 knots when the takeoff rarely ever reported outside the airline’s
warning horn sounded. The crew found own information system. They may result
the speed brake lever slightly out of in diversions and delays but the landings are
the detent. A normal takeoff was made normally uneventful, and can be completed
following a delay for brake cooling. using standard procedures.
3. Engine Power Setting: The throttles were
advanced and N1 increased to slightly This should not be construed as a blanket
over 95%. N1 eventually stabilized recommendation to “Go, no matter what.” The
at 94.8% N1. The target N1 from the goal of this training aid is to eliminate RTO
FMC Takeoff Page was 96.8% N1. The accidents by reducing the number of improper
throttles were then moved to the firewall decisions that are made, and to ensure that the
correct procedures are accomplished when
but the N1 stayed at 94.8%. The takeoff
an RTO is necessary. It is recognized that the
was rejected due to low N1 at 80 knots.
kind of situations that occur in line operations
4. Compressor Stall: The takeoff was are not always the simple problem that the
rejected from 155 knots due to a bird pilot was exposed to in training. Inevitably,
strike and subsequent compressor stall the resolution of some situations will only
on the number three engine. Most of the be possible through the good judgment and
tires subsequently deflated due to melted discretion of the pilot, as is exemplified in the
fuse plugs. following takeoff event:
5. Nose Gear Shimmy: The crew rejected After selecting EPR mode to set takeoff
the takeoff after experiencing a nose thrust, the right thrust lever stuck at 1.21
EPR, while the left thrust lever moved to
landing gear shimmy. Airspeed at the
the target EPR of 1.34. The captain tried to
time was approximately Vl-10 knots.
reject the takeoff but the right thrust lever
All four main gear tires subsequently could not be moved to idle. Because the
blew during the stop, and fires at the light weight aircraft was accelerating very
number 3 and 4 tires were extinguished rapidly, the Captain advanced the thrust on
by the fire department. the left engine and continued the takeoff.
6. Blown Tire: The takeoff was rejected at The right engine was subsequently shut
140 knots due to a blown number 3 main down during the approach, and the flight
gear tire. Number 4 tire blew turning was concluded with an uneventful single
onto the taxiway causing the loss of both engine landing.
A and B hydraulic systems as well as
major damage to flaps, spar, and spoilers. The failure that this crew experienced was not
a standard training scenario. Nor is it included
here to encourage pilots to change their mind
These examples demonstrate the diversity of
in the middle of an RTO procedure. It is simply
rejected takeoff causes. All of these RTOs were an acknowledgment of the kind of real world
“successful”, but some situations came very decision making situations that pilots face. It is
close to ending differently. By contrast, the perhaps more typical of the good judgements
large number of takeoffs that are successfully that airline crews regularly make, but the world
continued with indications of airplane system rarely hears about.
problems such as caution lights that illuminate
4.4
SECTION 4
10 Figure 3
97 RTO overrun
accidents/incidents
1959-2003
Number
of events 5
per year
0
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Year
4.2.3 RTO Overrun Accidents and Incidents thrust. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR)
readout indicates there were no speed callouts
The one-in-one-thousand RTOs that became made during the takeoff attempt. The reject
accidents or serious incidents are the ones speed was 5 knots above V1. The transition to
that we must strive to prevent. As shown in stopping was slower than expected. This was
Figure 3, at the end of 2003, records show 57 in- to have been the last flight in a long day for the
service RTO overrun accidents for the western
crew. Both pilots were relatively inexperienced
built jet transport fleet. These 57 accidents
in their respective positions. The captain had
caused more than 400 fatalities. An additional
40 serious incidents have been identified which about 140 hours as a captain in this airplane
likely would have been accidents if the runway type and the first officer was conducting
overrun areas had been less forgiving. The his first non-supervised line takeoff in this
following are brief accounts of four actual airplane type. The airplane was destroyed when
accidents. They are real events. Hopefully, they it overran the end of the runway and broke
will not be repeated. apart against piers which extend off the end
of the runway into the river. There were two
ACCIDENT: At 154 knots, four knots after fatalities. Subsequent investigation revealed
V1, the copilot’s side window opened, and the that the rudder was trimmed full left prior to
takeoff was rejected. The aircraft overran, the takeoff attempt.
hitting a blast fence, tearing open the left wing
and catching fire. ACCIDENT: A f lock of sea gulls was
encountered “very near V1.” The airplane
ACCIDENT: The takeoff was rejected by the reportedly had begun to rotate. The number
captain when the first officer had difficulty one engine surged and flamed out, and the
maintaining runway tracking along the 7,000 takeoff was rejected. The airplane overran
foot wet runway. Initial reports indicate that the the end of the wet 6,000 foot runway despite a
airplane had slowly accelerated at the start of good RTO effort.
the takeoff roll due to a delay in setting takeoff
4.5
SECTION 4
ACCIDENT: At 120 knots, the flight crew noted 4.2.4 Statistics

the onset of a vibration. When the vibration
increased, the captain elected to reject and Studies of the previously mentioned 97
assumed control. Four to eight seconds elapsed accidents/incidents have revealed some
between the point where the vibration was first interesting statistics, as shown in Figure 4:
noted and when the RTO was initiated (just • Fifty-five percent were initiated at speeds
after V1). Subsequent investigation showed two in excess of V1.
tires had failed. The maximum speed reached
• Approximately one third were reported as
was 158 knots. The airplane overran the end of
having occurred on runways that were wet
the runway at a speed of 35 knots and finally or contaminated with snow or ice.
stopped with the nose in a swamp. The airplane
was destroyed. Both of these issues will be thoroughly
discussed in subsequent sections.
These four cases are typical of the 97 reported
accidents and incidents. A list of the 97 cases is An additional, vitally interesting statistic
included in Appendix 4-B as a reference.
that was obser ved when the accident
Figure 4
Major factors 24/)NITIATION3PEED
in previous
RTO accidents
and incidents 'REATERTHAN6

2UNWAY#ONDITION
.OT ,ESSTHAN
REPORTED EQUALTO6
7ET
$RY

)CESNOW
.OTREPORTED

4.6
SECTION 4
records involving Go/No Go decisions were Reasons why the 97 “unsuccessful” RTOs
reviewed, was that virtually no revenue were initiated are also of interest. As shown
flight was found where a “Go” decision in Figure 5, approximately one-fifth were
was made and the airplane was incapable initiated because of engine failures or engine
of continuing the takeoff. Regardless of the indication warnings. The remaining seventy-
ability to safely continue the takeoff, as will be nine percent were initiated for a variety of
seen in Section 2.3, virtually any takeoff can be reasons which included tire failures, procedural
“successfully” rejected, if the reject is initiated error, malfunction indication or lights, noises
early enough and is conducted properly. There and vibrations, directional control difficulties
is more to the Go/No Go decision than “Stop and unbalanced loading situations where the
before V1” and “Go after V1.” The statistics of airplane failed to rotate. Some of the events
the past three decades show that a number of contained multiple factors such as an RTO on
jet transports have experienced circumstances a contaminated runway following an engine
near V1 that rendered the airplane incapable of failure at a speed in excess of V1. The fact that
being stopped on the runway remaining. It also the majority of the accidents and incidents
must be recognized that catastrophic situations occurred on airplanes that had full thrust
could occur which render the airplane incapable available should figure heavily in future Go/No
of flight. Go training.
%NGINE
Figure 5
Reasons for
7HEELTIRE initiating the RTO
%NGINE (97 accidents/
#ONFIGURATION incident events)

)NDICATORLIGHT
#REWCOORDINATION .ON %NGINE

"IRDSTRIKE
!4#
/THERAND
)NCLUDINGEVENTS
.OTREPORTED
NOTREPORTED

0ERCENTOFTOTALEVENTS
4.7
SECTION 4
4.2.5 Lessons Learned the failure to make a maximum effort stop until
late in the RTO were the chief characteristics
Several lessons can be learned from these of this category.
RTO accidents. First, the crew must always
be prepared to make the Go/No Go decision Review of the data from the 97 RTO accidents
prior to the airplane reaching V1 speed. As and incidents suggests that in approximately
52% of the events, the airplane was capable of
will be shown in subsequent sections, there
continuing the takeoff and either landing at the
may not be enough runway left to successfully
departure airport or diverting to an alternate. In
stop the airplane if the reject is initiated after other words, the decision to reject the takeoff
V1. Second, in order to eliminate unnecessary appears to have been “improper.” It is not
RTOs, the crew must differentiate between possible, however, to predict with total certainty
situations that are detrimental to a safe takeoff, what would have happened in every event if the
and those that are not. Third, the crew must be takeoff had been continued. Nor is it possible
prepared to act as a well coordinated team. A for the analyst of the accident data to visualize
good summarizing statement of these lessons the events leading up to a particular accident
is, as speed approaches V1, the successful “through the eyes of the crew”, including all the
completion of an RTO becomes increasingly other factors that were vying for their attention
more difficult. at the moment when the “proper” decision
could have been made. It is not very difficult
A fourth and final lesson learned from past to imagine a set of circumstances where the
RTO history is illustrated in Figure 6. Analysis only logical thing for the pilot to do is to reject
of the available data suggests that of the 97 the takeoff. Encountering a large flock of birds
RTO accidents and incidents, approximately at rotation speed, which then produces loss of
82% were potentially avoidable through thrust on both engines of a two engine airplane,
appropriate operational practices. These is a clear example.
potentially avoidable accidents can be divided
into three categories. Roughly 15% of the RTO Although these are all valid points, debating
accidents of the past were the result of improper them here will not move us any closer to
preflight planning. Some of these instances the goal of reducing the number of RTO
were caused by loading errors and others by accidents. Several industry groups have recently
incorrect preflight procedures. About 15% of studied this problem. Their conclusions and
the accidents and incidents could be attributed recommendations agree surprisingly well. The
to incorrect pilot techniques or procedures in areas identified as most in need of attention are
the stopping effort. Delayed application of the decision making and proficiency in correctly
brakes, failure to deploy the speedbrakes, and performing the appropriate procedures. These
are the same areas highlighted in Figure 6.
Figure 6
82% of the RTO
accidents and
incidents were
avoidable "YCONTINUINGTHETAKEOFF

"YBETTERPREFLIGHT
PLANNING 5NAVOIDABLE
"YCORRECTSTOP
TECHNIQUES
4.8
SECTION 4
It would appear then, that an opportunity achieve the expected results. Misunderstanding
exists to significantly reduce the number of the rules and their application to the operational
RTO accidents in the future by attempting to situation could contribute to an incorrect Go/No
improve the pilots’ decision making capability Go decision.
and procedure accomplishment through better
training. The U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs)
have continually been refined so that the details
of the rules that are applied to one airplane
4.3 Decisions and Procedures— model may differ from another. However, these
What Every Pilot Should Know differences are minor and have no effect on the
basic actions required of the flight crew during
There are many things that may ultimately affect
the takeoff. Some differences, as discussed
the outcome of a Go/No Go decision. The goal of
in Section 4.3.1.4 and in Appendix 4-C, also
the Takeoff Safety Training Aid is to reduce the
occur between FAA certified performance
number of RTO related accidents and incidents
levels and the criteria applied by other
by improving the pilot’s decision making and
regulatory agencies. Recent regulatory activity
associated procedure accomplishment through
has essentially eliminated any differences in
increased knowledge and awareness of the
takeoff certification of new airplanes around
related factors. This section discusses the
the world, at least as far as wet and dry runway
rules that define takeoff performance limit
is concerned. One major step occurred when
weights and the margins that exist when the
the Joint Aviation Authorities(JAA) developed
actual takeoff weight of the airplane is less
a unified set of regulations (JARs) that was
than the limit weight. The effects of runway
adopted by JAA member states. In addition,
surface condition, atmospheric conditions, and
there have been two FAR/JAR rule changes
airplane configuration variables on Go/No Go
that affected the takeoff calculation, and had
performance are discussed, as well as what the
the effect of harmonizing the FARs and JARs.
pilot can do to make the best use of any excess
FAR Amendment 25-42 was adopted in 1978,
available runway.
and Amendment 25-92 was adopted in 1998.
Although the information contained in this JAR Change 5 and Change 15 adopted similar
section has been reviewed by many major rule making. These amendments to the FARs
airframe manufacturers and airlines, the and JARs mandated the following changes that
incorporation of any of the recommendations have significance to the Go/No Go decision.
made in this section is subject to the approval 1) The description of V1 as “Decision Speed”
of each operator’s management. was changed to emphasize that V1 is the
maximum speed at which the pilot must
take the first action to stop the airplane,
4.3.1 The Takeoff Rules —
and is also the minimum speed at which
The Source of the Data
the pilot can continue the takeoff following
Let’s look at the takeoff from a distance. It may an engine failure.
appear that basic common sense would assure a 2) The accelerate-stop transition distance
safe conclusion. Common sense will go a long calculation was modified. Amendment
way, but skill and preparedness are necessary 25-42 replaced the existing service
also. It is important that all pilots understand allowances with a 2 second service
the takeoff field length/weight limit criteria and allowance immediately after V1. Under
the margins these criteria provide. The rules, Amendment 25-42, the airplane would
in effect, define the window within which the continue to accelerate for these 2 seconds
airplane and the pilot must perform in order to prior to any action to stop the airplane.
4.9
SECTION 4
Amendment 25-92 recognized that 5) Worn brakes must be accounted for.

the 2 second acceleration was unduly This assures that the airplane will
conservative. Therefore, the acceleration be capable of stopping as shown in
was deleted and replaced with a distance the AFM even with the brakes at the
allowance equal to 2 seconds at V1 speed. wear limit. Although this requirement
This results in stopping distances only was not adopted in the regulations
slightly longer than pre-Amendment 25- until Amendment 25-92, an FAA
42 levels. Airworthiness Directive (AD) required
worn brake accountability on all FAR
3) Wet runway must be accounted for
Part 25 certified airplanes.
on takeoff for airplanes certified
to Amendment 25-92. Previous In general, it is more important for the
certifications only required accountability crew to understand the basic principles
for dry runway conditions on takeoff. rather than the technical variations in
Amendment 25-92 allows the use of certification policies. However, some
available reversers when stopping significant differences exist between
on a wet runway, and also reduces commercial airplane certification
the screen height from 35 ft to 15 ft. rules and U.S. military rules which
Because of this, it is possible under can foster misunderstanding by pilots
certain conditions to calculate better with a background of military flying.
performance on a wet runway than on a These differences are also discussed in
dry runway. However, Amendment 25-92 Appendix 4-C.
requires that the wet runway performance
cannot be better than the dry runway
performance.
4) An all-engines operating accelerate-
stop must be accounted for. This change
was introduced in Amendment 42 and
addresses the case where the pilot
decides to execute an RTO for some
reason other than an engine failure,
which actually accounts for the majority
of RTO accidents and incidents as can
be seen in the RTO statistics presented
in section 4.2.4. On a dry runway, the
all-engines operating accelerate-stop
is always more critical because of the
higher thrust during the accelerate-stop
transition. On a wet runway, the engine-
out stop is usually the critical case
because thrust reverser credit is allowed.
The ability to use all-engine reverse
thrust instead of engine-out reverse thrust
generally overrides the effect of the
higher all-engines operating acceleration
during transition.
4.10
SECTION 4
4.3.1.1 The “FAR” Takeoff Field Length distance (Figure 9), except for the wet
runway case for airplanes certified under
The “FAR” Takeoff Field Length determined FAR Amendment 25-92.
from the FAA Approved Airplane Flight
Manual (AFM) considers the most limiting of FAR criteria provide accountability for
each of the following three criteria: wind, runway slope, clearway and stopway.
FAA approved takeoff data are based on the
1) All-Engine Go Distance: 115% of the
performance demonstrated on a smooth, dry
actual distance required to accelerate,
runway. Recent models certified according to
liftoff and reach a point 35 feet above
FAR Amendment 25-92 also have approved data
the runway with all engines operating
based on wet, and wet skid-resistant runways.
(Figure 7).
Separate advisory data for wet, if required, or
2) Engine-Out Accelerate-Go Distance: contaminated runway conditions are published
The distance required to accelerate with in the manufacturer’s operational documents.
all engines operating, have one engine These documents are used by many operators
fail at VEF at least one second before V1, to derive wet or contaminated runway takeoff
continue the takeoff, liftoff and reach a adjustments..
point 35 feet above the runway surface
at V2 speed (Figure 8). Other criteria define the performance weight
3) Accelerate-Stop Distance: The distance limits for takeoff climb, obstacle clearance, tire
required to accelerate with all engines speeds and maximum brake energy capability.
operating, have an engine failure or Any of these other criteria can be the limiting
other event at VEVENT at least one factor which determines the maximum dispatch
second before V1, recognize the event, weight. However, the Field Length Limit Weight
reconfigure for stopping and bring and the amount of runway remaining at V1 will
the airplane to a stop using maximum be the primary focus of our discussion here
wheel braking with the speed brakes since they more directly relate to preventing
extended. Reverse thrust is not used RTO overruns.
to determine the FAR accelerate-stop
sFEET
Figure 7
s6TOKNOTS
All-engine go
distance
!CTUAL$ISTANCE
sFEET Figure 8
6 Engine-out
s6
accelerate-go
6%& 62 6,/&
distance
SECONDMINIMUM
6 24/TRANSITION Figure 9
6%6%.4 COMPLETE!&- Accelerate-stop
distance
SECONDMINIMUM 4RANSITION 3TOP

TYPICALLY TYPICALLY
4.11
SECTION 4
4.3.1.2 V1 Speed Defined
V
1
What is the proper operational meaning of the Another commonly held misconception: “V1 is
key parameter “V1 speed” with regard to the the engine failure recognition speed”, suggests
Go/No Go criteria? This is not such an easy that the decision to reject the takeoff following
question since the term “V1 speed” has been engine failure recognition may begin as late as
redefined several times since commercial jet V1. Again, the airplane will have accelerated to
operations began more than 30 years ago and a speed higher than VI before stopping action
there is possible ambiguity in the interpretation is initiated.
of the words used to define V1.
The certified accelerate-stop distance calculation
Paragraph 25.107 of the FAA Regulations is based on an engine failure at least one second
defines the relationship of the takeoff speeds prior to V1. This standard time allowance3
published in the Airplane Flight Manual, to has been established to allow the line pilot
various speeds determined in the certification to recognize an engine failure and begin the
testing of the airplane. For our purposes here, the subsequent sequence of stopping actions.
most important statement within this “official”
definition is that V1 is determined from “...the In an operational Field Length Limited context,
pilot’s initiation of the first action to stop the the correct definition of V1 consists of two
airplane during the accelerate-stop tests.” separate concepts:
First, with respect to the “No Go” criteria,
One common and misleading way to think of V1 is the maximum speed at which
V1 is to say “V1 is the decision speed.” This is the rejected takeoff maneuver can
misleading because V1 is not the point to begin be initiated and the airplane stopped
making the operational Go/No Go decision. The within the remaining field length under
decision must have been made by the time the the conditions and procedures defined
airplane reaches V1 or the pilot will not have in the FAR’s. It is the latest point in
initiated the RTO procedure at V1. Therefore, the takeoff roll where a stop can be
by definition, the airplane will be traveling at initiated.
a speed higher than V1 when stopping action Second, with respect to the “Go” criteria,
is initiated, and if the airplane is at a Field V1 is also the earliest point from which
Length Limit Weight, an overrun is virtually an engine out takeoff can be continued
assured.
3
The time interval between VEF and Vl is the longer of the flight test demonstrated time or one second. Therefore, in determining
the scheduled accelerate-stop performance, one second is the minimum time that will exist between the engine failure and the
first pilot stopping action.
4.12
SECTION 4
and the airplane attain a height of 35 Since it is generally easier to change the weight
feet at the end of the runway. This aspect of an airplane than it is to change the length
of V1 is discussed in a later section. of a runway, the discussion here will consider
the effect of V1 on the allowable takeoff weight
The Go/ No Go decision must be made before from a fixed runway length.
reaching V1. A “No Go” decision after passing
V1 will not leave sufficient runway remaining The Continued Takeoff—After an engine
to stop if the takeoff weight is equal to the failure during the takeoff roll, the airplane
Field Length Limit Weight. As will be must continue to accelerate on the remaining
discussed in Section 4.3.4.2, when the airplane engine(s), lift off and reach V2 speed at 35 feet.
actual weight is less than the Field Length The later in the takeoff roll that the engine
Limit Weight, it is possible to calculate the fails, the heavier the airplane can be and still
actual maximum speed from which the takeoff gain enough speed to meet this requirement.
could be successfully rejected. However, few For the engine failure occurring approximately
operators use such takeoff data presentations. one second prior to V1, the relationship of the
It is therefore recommended that pilots consider allowable engine-out go takeoff weight to V1
V1 to be a limit speed: Do not attempt an RTO would be as shown by the “Continued Takeoff”
once the airplane has passed V1 unless the line in Figure 10. The higher the V1, the heavier
pilot has reason to conclude the airplane is the takeoff weight allowed.
unsafe or unable to fly. This recommendation
should prevail no matter what runway length The Rejected Takeoff— On the stop side of the
appears to remain after V1. equation, the V1/weight trade has the opposite
trend. The lower the V1, or the earlier in the
takeoff roll the stop is initiated, the heavier the
4.3.1.3 Balanced Field Defined airplane can be, as indicated by the “Rejected
Takeoff” line in Figure 10.
The previous two sections established the
general relationship between the takeoff The point at which the “Continued and Rejected
performance regulations and V1 speed. This Takeoff” lines intersect is of special interest. It
section provides a closer examination of how defines what is called a “Balanced Field Limit”
the choice of V1 actually affects the takeoff takeoff. The name “Balanced Field” refers to
performance in specific situations. the fact that the accelerate-go performance
Figure 10
Increasing
Effect of V1 speed
on takeoff weight Continued
(from a fixed takeoff
runway length)
Field limit weight
Airplane
weight
Limit V1 speed
Balanced field
Rejected
takeoff
Increasing
V 1 speed
4.13
SECTION 4
required is exactly equal to (or “balances”) thorough standardization, but the attainment
the accelerate-stop performance required. of this goal may be hindered if the training
From Figure 10 it can also be seen that at the program does not recognize some of the biases
“Balanced Field” point, the allowable Field and preconceptions of the student. Typical areas
Limit Takeoff Weight for the given runway is of potential misunderstanding would be pilots
the maximum. The resulting unique value of who are hired from another airline; have flown
previously under the regulations of a different
V1 is referred to as the “Balanced Field Limit
country; or are transitioning to commercial
V1 Speed” and the associated takeoff weight
aviation from a military background.
is called the “Balanced Field Weight Limit.”
This is the speed that is typically given to flight As an aid to the operator in developing a training
crews in handbooks or charts, by the onboard program which adequately addresses these
computer systems, or by dispatch. concerns, Appendix 4-C contains a discussion
of the takeoff rules for other countries and for
The concept of a balanced field condition the U.S. military, as they relate to the Go/No
is revisited in Section 4.3.4 as it relates to Go decision. It is also intended as a place
operational takeoff situations. for operators to include any other regulatory
definitions which they feel are pertinent to their
particular pilot training program.
4.3.1.4 Other Rules Affecting Takeoff Field
Length
4.3.2 Transition to the Stopping Configuration
In the past, some regulatory agencies had
adopted takeoff rules different from the In establishing the certified accelerate-stop
FAA. For the most part, the differences have distance, the time required to reconfigure the
minimal effect on takeoff performance and, airplane from the “Go” to the “Stop” mode
as a consequence, do not impact the Go/No is referred to as the “transition” segment.
Go decision. Most significantly, however, are This action and the associated time of
historical differences in the requirements for accomplishment includes applying maximum
including the effects of wet, contaminated braking, simultaneously moving the thrust
and slippery runways on maximum allowable levers to idle and raising the speedbrakes.
takeoff weight and V1. FAR and JAR The transition time demonstrated by flight
harmonization efforts have largely eliminated test pilots during the accelerate-stop testing
these differences on recently certified airplanes. is used to derive the transition segment times
The detailed considerations of runway surface used in the AFM calculations. The relationship
condition on takeoff safety are discussed in between the flight test demonstrated transition
Section 4.3.5.1. times and those finally used in the AFM is
another frequently misunderstood area of RTO
Since the Go/ No Go decision made at a speed performance.
near V1 must be essentially an instinctive
reaction based on previous planning and
training, a pilot’s prior flying experience
will play a significant role in the decision
process. Ideally, it would be best if the training
received on one airplane model was completely
applicable when a pilot is transitioning to a
different airplane. This ideal situation may
be achievable over time at a given airline via
4.14
SECTION 4
4.3.2.1 Flight Test Transitions 4.3.2.2 Airplane Flight Manual Transition

Times
Several methods of certification testing that
produce comparable results have been found to Although the line pilot must be prepared for
be acceptable. The following example illustrates an RTO during every takeoff, it is fairly likely
the intent of these methods. that the event or failure prompting the Go/No
Go decision will be much less clear-cut than
During certification testing the airplane is
accelerated to a pre-selected speed, one engine an outright engine failure. It may therefore be
is “failed” by selecting fuel cut off, and the unrealistic to expect the average line pilot to
pilot flying rejects the takeoff. In human perform the transition in as little as one second
factors circles, this is defined as a “simple task” in an operational environment. Human factors
because the test pilot knows in advance that an literature describes the line pilot’s job as a
RTO will be performed. Exact measurements “complex task” since the pilot does not know
of the time taken by the pilot to apply the when an RTO will occur. In consideration of
brakes, retard the thrust levers to idle, and to this “complex task”, the flight test transition
deploy the speedbrakes are recorded. Detailed times are increased to calculate the certified
measurements of engine parameters during accelerate-stop distances specified in the AFM.
spooldown are also made so that the thrust These additional time increments are not
actually being generated can be accounted for
intended to allow extra time for making
in the calculation.
the “Go/No Go” decision after passing V1.
The manufacturer’s test pilots, and pilots from Their purpose is to allow sufficient time
the regulatory agency, each perform several (and distance) for “the average pilot” to
rejected takeoff test runs. An average of the transition from the takeoff mode to the
recorded data from at least six of these RTOs stopping mode4.
is then used to determine the “demonstrated”
transition times for applying the brakes, The first adjustment is made to the time required
retarding the throttles to idle, and extending to recognize the need to stop. During the RTO
the speedbrakes. These three actions determine certification flight testing, the pilot knows
when the forces acting to accelerate (thrust) or that he will be doing an RTO. Therefore, his
decelerate (braking and drag) the airplane take reaction is predictably quick. To account for
place. It is the integration of these acceleration this, an event recognition time of at least one
and deceleration forces that will ultimately
second has been set as a standard for all jet
determine the runway distance required. The
transport certifications since the late 1960s.
total flight test “demonstrated” transition time,
initial brake application to speedbrakes up, is V1 is therefore, at least one second after the
typically one second or less. However this is event. During this recognition time segment,
not the total transition time used to establish the airplane continues to accelerate with the
the certified accelerate-stop distances. The operating engine(s) continuing to provide full
certification regulations require that additional forward thrust. If the event was an engine
time delays, sometimes referred to as “pads”, be failure, the “ failed” engine has begun to spool
included in the calculation of certified takeoff down, but it is still providing some forward
distances. thrust, adding to the airplane’s acceleration.
Over the years, the details of establishing the

transition time segments after V1 have varied
slightly but the overall concept and the resulting
4
The data in Appendix 4-J, Takeoff Safety Training Aid Human Performance Study, corroborate this statement.
4.15
SECTION 4
Figure 11 %NGINE
Early method of
&AILURE
establishing AFM
transition time
&LIGHTTEST
4H 3PE
RO E
"R
TTLE DBR
AKE
AK
STO S
E
ID !&-TRANSITION
SO
LE
N
COMPLETE
!&-EXPANSION
6
SEC SEC
2ECOGNITION
!&-
SECOND
MINIMUM
!&-TRANSITIONTIME
transition distances have remained essentially In more recent certification programs, the AFM
the same. For early jet transport models, an calculation procedure was slightly different.
additional one second was added to both the flight An allowance equal to the distance traveled
test demonstrated throttles-to-idle time and the during two seconds at the speedbrakes-up speed
speedbrakes-up time, as illustrated in Figure 11. was added to the actual total transition time
The net result is that the flight test demonstrated demonstrated in the flight test to apply brakes,
bring the thrust levers to idle and deploy the
recognition and transition time of approximately
speedbrakes, as shown in Figure 12. To insure
one second has been increased for the purpose
“consistent and repeatable results”, retardation
of calculating the AFM transition distance. forces resulting from brake application and
Figure 12
More recent %VENT
method of
establishing AFM
transition time
&LIGHTTEST
4H
RO
3ER
3P
VICE
TTL
"R
EE
ALLO
ES
AK
DB
WAN
TO
!&-TRANSITION
ES
CE
RA
ID
ON
KE
COMPLETE
LE
!&-EXPANSION
6
2ECOGNITION
!&- &4 SEC
SECOND DEMO
MINIMUM
!&-TRANSITIONTIME
4.16
SECTION 4
speed brake deployment are not applied following an engine failure or event at VEVENT,
during this two second allowance time, i.e. no the takeoff can be rejected at V1 and the airplane
deceleration credit is taken. This two second stopped at the end of the runway, or if the takeoff
distance allowance simplifies the transition is continued, a minimum height of 35 feet will
distance calculation and accomplishes the same be reached over the end of the runway.
goal as the individual one second “pads” used
for older models. T h is sect ion d iscusses t he i n herent
conservatism of these certified calculations, and
Even more recently, FAR Amendments 25-42 the margins they provide beyond the required
and 25-92 have revised the way in which the minimum performance.
two second distance allowance is calculated.
Regardless of the method used, the accelerate- 4.3.3.1 The “Stop” Margins
stop distance calculated for every takeoff from
the AFM is typically 400 to 600 feet longer than From the preceding discussion of the
the flight test accelerate-stop distance. Details certification rules, it has been shown that at
of the certified transition times for specific a Field Length Limit Weight condition, an
airplane models are included in Appendix 4-F RTO initiated at V1 will result in the airplane
as a reference for the instructor. coming to a stop at the end of the runway. This
accelerate-stop distance calculation specifies an
These differences between the past and present
engine failure or event at VEVENT, the pilot’s
methodology are not significant in so far as
initiation of the RTO at V1, and the completion
the operational accelerate-stop distance is
concerned. The keypoint is that the time/distance of the transition within the time allotted in the
“pads” used in the AFM transition distance AFM. If any of these basic assumptions are not
calculation are not intended to allow extra time satisfied, the actual accelerate-stop distance
to make the “No Go” decision. Rather, the “pads” may exceed the AFM calculated distance, and
provide an allowance that assures the pilot has an overrun will result.
adequate distance to get the airplane into the
full stopping configuration. The most significant factor in these assumptions
is the initiation of the RTO no later than V1.
Regardless of the airplane model, the transition, Yet as was noted previously, in approximately
or reconfiguring of the airplane for a rejected 55% of the RTO accidents the stop was initiated
takeoff, demands quick action by the crew to after V1. At heavy weights near V1, the airplane
simultaneously initiate maximum braking, is typically traveling at 200 to 300 feet per
retard the thrust levers to idle and then quickly second, and accelerating at 3 to 6 knots per
raise the speedbrakes.
second. This means that a delay of only a
second or two in initiating the RTO will require
4.3.3 Comparing the “Stop” and “Go” several hundred feet of additional runway to
Margins successfully complete the stop. If the takeoff
was at a Field Limit Weight, and there is no
When performing a takeoff at a Field Length excess runway available, the airplane will reach
Limit Weight determined from the AFM, the the end of the runway at a significant speed, as
pilot is assured that the airplane performance shown in Figure 13.
will, at the minimum, conform to the
requirements of the FARs if the assumptions The horizontal axis of Figure 13 is the
of the calculations are met. This means that incremental speed in knots above V1 at which
4.17
SECTION 4
a maximum effort stop is initiated. The vertical sufficient runway for a properly performed
axis shows the minimum speed in knots at which RTO, the available margins are fairly small.
the airplane would cross the end of the runway, Most importantly, there are no margins to
assuming the pilot used all of the transition account for initiation of the RTO after V1 or
time allowed in the AFM to reconfigure the extenuating circumstances such as runway
airplane to the stop configuration, and that a contamination.
maximum stopping effort was maintained. The
data in Figure 13 assumes an engine failure not
4.3.3.2 The “Go” Option
less than one second prior to V1 and does not
include the use of reverse thrust. Therefore, if FAR rules also prescribe minimum performance
the pilot performs the transition more quickly standards for the “Go” situation. With an engine
than the AFM allotted time, and/or uses reverse failed at the most critical point along the takeoff
thrust, the line labeled “MAXIMUM EFFORT path, the FAR “Go” criteria requires that the
STOP” would be shifted slightly to the right. airplane be able to continue to accelerate, rotate,
However, based on the RTO accidents of the liftoff and reach V2 speed at a point 35 feet above
past, the shaded area above the line shows what the end of the runway. The airplane must remain
is more likely to occur if a high speed RTO is controllable throughout this maneuver and must
initiated at or just after V1. This is especially true meet certain minimum climb requirements.
if the RTO was due to something other than an These handling characteristics and climb
engine failure, or if the stopping capability of requirements are demonstrated many times
the airplane is otherwise degraded by runway throughout the certification flight test program.
surface contamination, tire failures, or poor While a great deal of attention is focused on
technique. The data in Figure 13 are typical of a the engine failure case, it is important to keep
large, heavy jet transport and would be rotated in mind, that in over three quarters of all
slightly to the right for the same airplane at a RTO accident cases, full takeoff power was
lighter weight. available.
In the final analysis, although the certified It is likely that each crew member has had a
accelerate-stop distance calculations provide good deal of practice in engine inoperative
Figure 13
Overrun Speed for 3HADEDAREAINDICATESDEGRADED
an RTO initiated STOPPINGPERFORMANCE
after V1
s#ONTAMINATEDRUNWAY
s0ILOTTECHNIQUE P
STO
s3YSTEMFAILURES E FFORT
M
IMU
3PEEDOFFENDOF -AX
RUNWAYKNOTS

!BORTINITIATIONSPEEDABOVESCHEDULED6KNOTS
4.18
SECTION 4
takeoffs in prior simulator or airplane training. translate into a climb rate of only 350 to 500
However, it may have been done at relatively feet per minute at actual climb limit weights
light training weights. As a result, the crew may and their associated V2 speeds, as shown in
conclude that large control inputs and rapid Figure 14. The takeoff weight computations per
response typical of conditions near minimum formed prior to takeoff are required to account
control speeds (Vmcg) are always required in for all obstacles in the takeoff flight path. All
order to maintain directional control. However, that is required to achieve the anticipated
at the V1 speeds associated with a typical flight path is adherence by the flight crew to
Field Length Limit Weight, the control input the planned headings and speeds per their pre-
requirements are noticeably less than they are departure briefing.
at lighter weights.
Consider a one-engine-inoperative case
Also, at light gross weights, the airplane’s where the engine failure occurs earlier than
rate of climb capability with one-engine the minimum time before V1 specified in
inoperative could nearly equal the all-engine the rules. Because engine-out acceleration is
climb performance at typical in-service less than all-engine acceleration, additional
weights, leading the crew to expect higher
distance is needed to accelerate to VR and, as
performance than the airplane will have if the
a consequence, the liftoff point will be moved
actual airplane weight is at or near the takeoff
Climb Limit Weight. Engine-out rate of climb further down the runway. The altitude (or
and acceleration capability at a Climb Limit “screen height”) achieved at the end of the
Weight may appear to be substantially less than runway is somewhat reduced depending on
the crew anticipates or is familiar with. how much more than one second before V1 the
engine failure occurs. On a field length limit
The minimum second segment climb gradients runway, the height at the end of the runway
required in the regulations vary from 2.4% may be less than the 35 feet specified in the
to 3.0% depending on the number of engines regulations.
installed. These minimum climb gradients
-INIMUM Figure 14
4YPICALRATEOFCLIMB “GO” perfomance
GRADIENT at climb limit
REQUIRED weights
ENGINE
&0-AT6^KNOTS
ENGINE
&0-AT6^KNOTS
ENGINE
&0-AT6^KNOTS
DEGREEBANKTURNWILLREDUCETHESE
CLIMBRATESBYAPPROXIMATELY&0-
4.19
SECTION 4
Figure 15 graphically summarizes this on the two-engine airplane compared to a

discussion of “Go” margins. First, let VEF three or four-engine airplane. On two-engine
be the speed at which the Airplane Flight airplanes, there are still margins, but they are
Manual calculation assumes the engine to fail, not as large, a fact that an operator of several
(a minimum of one second before reaching airplane types must be sure to emphasize in
V1). The horizontal axis of Figure 15 shows training and transition programs.
the number of knots prior to VEF that the
engine actually fails instead of the time, and It should also be kept in mind that the 15
the vertical axis gives the “screen height” to 30-foot screen heights in the preceding
achieved at the end of the runway. A typical discussion were based on the complete loss
range of acceleration for jet transports is 3 to 6 of thrust from one engine. If all engines are
knots per second, so the shaded area shows the operating, as was the case in most of the
range in screen height that might occur if the RTO accident cases, the height over the end
engine actually failed “one second early”, or of the Field Length Limit runway will be
approximately two seconds prior to V1. In other approximately 150 feet and speed will be
words, a “Go” decision made with the engine V2+10 to 25 knots, depending on airplane
failure occurring two seconds prior to V1 will type. This is due to the higher acceleration and
result in a screen height of 15 to 30 feet for a climb gradient provided when all engines are
Field Length Limit Weight takeoff. operating and because the required all engine
takeoff distance is multiplied by 115%. If the
Figure 15 also shows that the “Go” performance “failed” engine is developing partial power,
margins are strongly influenced by the number the performance is somewhere in between,
of engines. This is again the result of the larger but definitely above the required engine-out
proportion of thrust loss when one engine fails limits.
All engines
Figure 15 (150)
Effect of engine V2 + 10 to 25 knots
failure before VEF on
screen height
40
One-engine inoperative
(35)
V2
30
Height at end
of runway, ft ne
e airpla
20 4-engin
e Typical
air plan
gine lane V1 range
3-en e airp
10 ngin One second
2-e minimum
0
-20 -16 -12 -8 -4 0 +4 +8
Speed at actual engine failure
relative to V EF, knots
4.20
SECTION 4
4.3.4 Operational Takeoff Calculations An interesting observation can be made at this

point as to which of these three criteria will
As we have seen, the certification flight testing, typically determine the Takeoff Field Limit
in accordance with the appropriate government Weight for a given airplane type. Two-engine
regulations, determines the relationship airplanes lose one-half their total thrust when
between the takeoff gross weight and the an engine fails. As a result, the Field Length
required runway length which is published in the Limit Weight for two-engine airplanes is usually
AFM. By using the data in the AFM it is then determined by one of the engine-out distance
possible to determine, for a given combination criteria. If it is limited by the accelerate-stop
of ambient conditions and airplane weight, the distance, there will be some margin in both
required runway length which will comply the all-engine and accelerate-go distances. If
with the regulations. Operational takeoff the limit is the accelerate-go distance, some
calculations, however, have an additional and margin would be available for the all-engine
obviously different limitation. The length of go and accelerate-stop cases.
the runway is the Limit Field Length and it is
fixed, not variable. By comparison, four-engine airplanes only lose
one-fourth of their takeoff thrust when an engine
fails so they are rarely limited by engine-out go
4.3.4.1 The Field Length Limit Weight performance. The Field Length Limit Weight
for a four-engine airplane is typically limited
Instead of solving for the required runway by the 115% all-engine distance criteria or
length, the first step in an operational takeoff occasionally by the accelerate-stop case. As a
calculation is to determine the maximum result, a slight margin frequently exists in the
airplane weight which meets the rules for engine-out go and acclerate-stop distances on
the fixed runway length available. In other four-engine airplanes.
words, what is the limit weight at which the
airplane: Three-engine airplanes may be limited by
engine-out performance, or for some models, by
1) Will achieve 35-ft altitude with all engines a more complex criterion wherein the rotation
operating and a margin of 15 % of the speed VR becomes the limiting factor. Since
actual distance used remaining; the regulations prohibit V1 from exceeding
2) Will achieve 35-ft altitude with the VR, some tri-jets frequently have V1=VR, and
critical engine failed one second prior a small margin may therefore exist in the
to V1; accelerate-stop distance. Two-engine airplanes
may occasionally be limited by this V1=VR
3) Will stop with an engine failure or other criterion also.
event prior to V1 and the reject initiated at
V1; The possible combinations of airport pressure
altitude, temperature, wind, runway slope,
…all within the existing runway length clearway, and stopway are endless. Regardless
available. of airplane type, they can easily combine to
make any one of the three previously discussed
The result of this calculation is three allowable takeoff field length limits apply. Flight crews
weights. These three weights may or may not be have no convenient method to determine which
the same, but the lowest of the three becomes the of the three criteria is limiting for a particular
Field Length Limit Weight for that takeoff. takeoff, and from a practical point of view, it
really doesn’t matter. The slight differences
4.21
SECTION 4
that may exist are rarely significant. Most RTO the potential safety margins represented by the
overrun accidents have occurred on runways excess runway. Later on, in Section 4.3.6.8, we
where the airplane was not at a limit takeoff will work an example takeoff weight problem
weight. That is, the accidents occurred on which will show how one major U.S. operator
runways that were longer than required for the uses this “excess” runway. In this section,
actual takeoff weight. Combining this historical however, the discussion is aimed more at the
evidence with the demanding nature of the high technical definitions side of what it means when
speed rejected takeoff, it would seem prudent the actual airplane weight is less than the Field
that the crew should always assume the takeoff Length Limit Weight.
is limited by the accelerate-stop criteria when
the takeoff weight is Field Length Limited. As a preface to this discussion, it should be
kept in mind that the use of any V1 adjustment
procedure by a flight crew must be contingent
4.3.4.2 Actual Weight Less Than Limit on the implementation of a standard operating
Weight procedure by an operator which will take into
account all the appropriate variables. Unless
Returning to the operational takeoff calculation, this data has been provided to the flight crew
the second step is to then compare the actual by their operations department, there is simply
airplane weight to the Field Length Limit no way the crew can make the judgment of how
Weight. There are only two possible outcomes much before V1 they could lose an engine and
of this check. still have adequate “Go” performance. Neither
do they have any way to estimate with sufficient
1) The actual airplane weight could equal or
accuracy, how far beyond Vl a successful “No
exceed the Field Length Limit Weight, or
Go” maneuver can be initiated. Therefore, we
2) The actual airplane weight is less than the can only recommend that if no adjustment
Field Length Limit Weight. information is provided to the crew, the value
of V1 given in their standard takeoff analysis
The first case is relatively straightforward, the should be treated as a “limit speed” for rejecting
airplane weight cannot be greater than the limit the takeoff.
weight and must be reduced. The result is a
takeoff at a Field Length Limit Weight as we Let’s look again at the figure used in discussing
have just discussed. The second case, which is the definition of a Balanced Field condition,
typical of most of jet transport operations, is only this time, the actual airplane weight is less
worthy of further consideration. than the Field Limit Weight for the runway. As
a result, it is not necessary to show the Balanced
By far, the most likely takeoff scenario for the Field Limit V1 Speed, since it does not apply
line pilot is the case where the actual airplane to the lower actual weight of our example.
weight is less than any limit weight, especially Figure 16 shows that for a given runway length,
the Field Length Limit Weight. It also is possibly if the actual weight is less than the limit weight,
the most easily misunderstood area of takeoff there is actually a range of speeds which could
performance since the fact that the airplane be called “Vl ”. The minimum V1 speed still
is not at a limit weight is about all the flight satisfies the continued takeoff criteria and the
crew can determine from the data usually maximum V1 speed meets the rejected takeoff
available on the flight deck. Currently, few requirements. Of interest here is that any speed
operators provide any information that will let between these two limit speeds would actually
the crew determine how much excess runway provide performance in excess of that specified
is available; what it means in terms of the V1 by the continued or rejected takeoff criteria.
speed they are using; or how to best maximize
4.22
SECTION 4
)NCREASING
Figure 16
#ONTINUED Range of
TAKEOFF Permissible V1
speeds when actual
weight is less than
&IELDLIMITWEIGHT the limit weight
!IRPLANE
WEIGHT
!CTUALWEIGHT
-AXIMUM6
-INIMUM6
ACTUALWEIGHT
BALANCED6
12(6
2EJECTED
TAKEOFF
)NCREASING
6SPEED
In this situation the operator can choose from Choice 2

several possible courses of action: Adjust the V1 speed to a lower value. This
results in the actual engine-out continued
Choice 1
takeoff distance being closer to the limit
Make no adjustment to the V1 speed
condition of 35 feet over the end of the
provided in the airlines takeoff
runway, and creates an additional margin
performance data sheet normally supplied
in the stopping distance required since
to the crew. Typically this data is based
the stop would begin from a lower speed.
on a “Balanced Field” analysis similar
Additional details on how this has been
to what was discussed in Section 4.3.1.3,
implemented by one operator is covered
but with a slightly different perspective.
in Section 4.3.6.8.
As was the case in the previous discussion
of a Balanced Field condition, with an Choice 3
engine failed, the point at which the Adjust the V1 speed to a higher value. This
airplane will achieve a 35-foot altitude, creates additional altitude over the end of
or come to a complete stop is the same the runway for the “Go” case but puts the
physical point, but now this point is before actual stopping distance required closer to
the end of the runway. The associated the end of the runway remaining at V1.
V1 speed is the one normally listed in
Choice 4
the manufacturers Operations Manual,
Conduct a reduced thrust takeoff, either
Quick Reference Handbook (QRH), or by
using a Fixed Derate and/or the Assumed
onboard computers, where gross weight,
Temperature method, to reduce engine
altitude and temperature determine the V1
stresses and maintenance costs. Reducing
speeds with no reference to runway length.
the takeoff thrust causes both the “Stop”
These speeds are correctly referred to as
and ‘Go” distances to increase since
“Balanced Field speeds” because they
it takes more distance to accelerate to
were picked such that the corresponding
V1. Using the typical takeoff analysis
actual “Stop” and “Go” distances are
data to accomplish this produces a new
equal. However, it is not correct to think
“Balanced Field” condition at the lower
of them as the runway limited Vl speeds
thrust setting.
because that is true only if the actual
airplane weight is equal to the Field Unless the fixed derate chosen exactly
Length Limit Weight. matches the thrust required by the actual
4.23
SECTION 4
weight/runway combination, there is still airplane. Dispatch assembled the flight plan,
a margin remaining in the “Stop” and weather briefing, load and trim sheet, and the
“Go” distances, but the original margin is takeoff performance data. ATC assigned a slot
reduced. for your departure. The flight crew configured
the airplane and are prepared to work as an
Using the Assumed Temperature method
effective team.
of reducing thrust results in margins
in both the “Stop” and “Go” distance
With all the preparation that goes into making a
requirements, even when the maximum
flight, it is not difficult to imagine that most of the
assumed temperature is used. This is
thought energy is directed toward completing
primarily due to the True Airspeed effects
the flight uneventfully, not encountering a
inherent to this method of reducing
significant difficulty. The passengers, as well
thrust. Both the fixed derate and assumed
as the flight crew are anxious to reach their
temperature methods of reducing thrust
destination.
are discussed in Section 4.3.5.7.
Choice 5 It is an abnormal situation when something goes
A combination of reduced thrust with wrong requiring an air turnback or a rejected
either choice 2 or 3 is possible. Since the takeoff. It cancels all of the hard preparation
primary emphasis here is to maximize work done by so many and it can result in
the “Stop” margins, the combination of expensive delays. In the case of a takeoff
Choice 2, a lower V1, with reduced thrust, performed at a limit weight, it can require
Choice 4 is recommended. the crew to use the maximum performance
capability of the airplane to successfully
The next two sections will discuss some of the complete whichever course of action they
major factors and physical conditions which choose.
affect RTO stopping margins and some general
recommendations on how stopping margins Both the continued and the rejected takeoff
are maximized by control of these factors. The performance are directly affected by atmospheric
example takeoff problem worked in Section conditions, airplane configuration, runway
4.3.6.8 provides an easy way to get a feel for characteristics, engine thrust available, and
the magnitude of the potential margins. by human performance factors. The following
sections review the effects of these variables
on airplane performance. The purpose is not
4.3.5 Factors that Affect Takeoff and RTO to make this a complete treatise on airplane
Performance performance. Rather, it is to emphasize that
changes in these variables can have a significant
The airplane rolls onto the active runway and impact on a successful Go/No Go decision, and
the power is applied immediately. The airplane in many instances, the flight crew has a degree
quickly accelerates along the smooth dry of direct control over these changes.
runway, rotates and climbs briskly into the clear
blue sky. You may have done this many times
and seen it happen many more while waiting 4.3.5.1 Runway Surface Condition
for your turn for takeoff. It is a truly majestic
sight and makes you proud to be in aviation. The condition of the runway surface can have
a significant effect on takeoff performance,
In reality, you know that a lot of preparation since it can affect both the acceleration and
went into that seemingly simple maneuver. deceleration capability of the airplane. The
The ground crew checked and serviced the actual surface condition can vary from perfectly
4.24
SECTION 4
dry to a damp, wet, heavy rain, snow, or slush wet runways during landing. The phenomenon
covered runway in a very short time. The entire is highly sensitive to speed which makes it an
length of the runway may not have the same especially important consideration for RTO
stopping potential due to a variety of factors. situations.
Obviously, a 10,000-foot runway with the first
7,000 feet bare and dry, but the last 3,000 feet As a tire rolls on a wet runway, its forward
a sheet of ice, does not present a very good motion tends to displace water from the tread
situation for a high speed RTO. On the other contact area. While this isn’t any problem at
hand, there are also specially constructed low speeds, at high speeds this displacement
runways with a grooved or Porous Friction action can generate water pressures sufficient
Coat (PFC) surface which can offer improved to lift and separate part of the tire contact area
braking under adverse conditions. The crews from the runway surface. The resulting tire-to-
cannot control the weather like they can the ground friction can be very low at high speeds
airplane’s configuration or thrust. Therefore, to but fortunately improves as speed decreases.
maximize both the “Go” and “Stop” margins,
they must rely on judiciously applying their Dynamic hydroplaning is the term used to
company’s wet or contaminated runway policies describe the reduction of tire tread contact
as well as their own understanding of how the area due to induced water pressure. At high
performance of their airplane may be affected speeds on runways with significant water,
by a particular runway surface condition. the forward motion of the wheel generates a
wedge of high pressure water at the leading
Certification testing is performed on a smooth, edge of the contact area, as shown in Figure
ungrooved, dry runway. For airplanes certified 17A. Depending on the speed, depth of water,
under FAR Amendment 25-92, testing was also and certain tire parameters, the portion of the
performed on smooth and grooved wet runways. tire tread that can maintain contact with the
Any contamination which reduces the available runway varies significantly. As the tread contact
friction between the tire and the runway surface area is reduced, the available braking friction
win increase the required stopping distance for is also reduced. This is the predominant factor
an RTO. Runway contaminants such as slush leading to reduced friction on runways that
or standing water can also affect the continued have either slush, standing water or significant
takeoff performance due to “displacement water depth due to heavy rain activity. In the
and impingement drag” associated with the extreme case, total dynamic hydroplaning can
spray from the tires striking the airplane. occur where the tire to runway contact area
Some manufacturers provide advisory data for vanishes, the tire lifts off the runway and rides
adjustment of takeoff weight and/or Vl when on the wedge of water like a water ski. Since
the runway is wet or contaminated. Many the conditions required to initiate and sustain
operators use this data to provide flight crews total dynamic hydroplaning are unusual, it
with a method of determining the limit weights is rarely encountered. When it does occur,
for slippery runways. Factors that make a such as during an extremely heavy rainstorm,
runway slippery and how it affects the stopping it virtually eliminates any tire braking or
maneuver are included here for reference. cornering capability at high speeds.
Another form of hydroplaning can occur

4.3.5.1.1 Hydroplaning where there is some tread contact with the
runway surface but the wheel is either locked
Hydroplaning is an interesting subject since or rotating slowly (compared to the actual
most pilots have either heard of or experienced airplane speed). The friction produced by
instances of extremely poor braking action on the skidding tire causes the tread material to
4.25
SECTION 4
become extremely hot. As indicated in Figure The important thing to remember about wet
17B, the resulting heat generates steam in the or contaminated runway conditions is that for
contact area which tends to provide additional smooth runway surfaces there is a pronounced
upward pressure on the tire. The hot steam also effect of forward ground speed on friction
starts reversing the vulcanizing process used capability, aggravated by the depth of water.
in manufacturing the rubber tread material. For properly maintained grooved or specially
The affected surface tread rubber becomes treated surfaces, the friction capability is
irregular in appearance, somewhat gummy in markedly improved.
nature, and usually has a light gray color. This
“reverted” rubber hydroplaning results in very
low friction levels, approximately equal to icy 4.3.5.1.2 The Final Stop
runway friction when the temperature is near
the melting point. An occurrence of reverted A review of overrun accidents indicates that, in
rubber hydroplaning is rare and usually results many cases, the stopping capability available
from some kind of antiskid system or brake was not used to the maximum during the
malfunction which prevented the wheel from initial and mid portions of the stop maneuver,
rotating at the proper speed. because there appeared to be “plenty of runway
available”. In some cases, less than full reverse
In the last several years, many runways thrust was used and the brakes were released for
throughout the world have been grooved, a period of time, letting the airplane roll on the
thereby greatly improving the potential wet portion of the runway that would have produced
runway friction capability. As a result, the good braking action. When the airplane moved
number of hydroplaning incidents has decreased onto the final portion of the runway, the crew
considerably. Flight tests of one manufacturer’s discovered that the presence of moisture on the
airplane on a well maintained grooved top of rubber deposits in the touchdown and
runway, which was thoroughly drenched with turnoff areas resulted in very poor braking
water, showed that the stopping forces were capability, and the airplane could not be stopped
approximately 90% of the forces that could be on the runway. When an RTO is initiated on wet
developed on a dry runway. Continued efforts or slippery runways, it is especially important
to groove additional runways or the use of other to use full stopping capability until the airplane
equivalent treatments such as porous friction is completely stopped.
overlays, will significantly enhance the overall
safety of takeoff operations.
&LOODEDRUNWAY
,OCKEDTIRE
3TREAMPRESSURE
Figure 17A Figure 17B

Dynamic Hydroplaning Reverted Rubber Hydroplaning
4.26
SECTION 4
4.3.5.2 Atmospheric Conditions 4.3.5.3 Airplane Configuration
In general, the lift the wings generate and thrust The planned configuration of the airplane at the
the engines produce are directly related to the time of takeoff must be taken into consideration
airplane’s speed through the air and the density by the flight crew during their takeoff planning.
of that air. The flight crew should anticipate This should include the usual things like flap
that the airplane’s takeoff performance will be selection, and engine bleed configuration, as
affected by wind speed and direction as well well as the unusual things like inoperative
as the atmospheric conditions which determine equipment covered by the Minimum Equipment
air density. Properly accounting for last minute List (MEL) or missing items as covered by
changes in these factors is crucial to a successful the Configuration Deviation List (CDL). This
Go/No Go decision. section will discuss the effect of the airplane’s
configuration on takeoff performance capability
The effect of the wind speed and direction on and/or the procedures the flight crew would use
takeoff distance is very straightforward. At any to complete or reject the takeoff.
given airspeed, a 10-knot headwind component
lowers the ground speed by 10 knots. Since
4.3.5.3.1 Flaps
V1, rotation, and liftoff speeds are at lower
ground speeds, the required takeoff distance
The airplane’s takeoff field length performance
is reduced. The opposite occurs if the wind
is affected by flap setting in a fairly obvious way.
has a 10-knot tailwind component, producing
For a given runway length and airplane weight,
a 10-knot increase in the ground speed. The
the takeoff speeds are reduced by selecting a
required runway length is increased, especially
greater flap setting. This is because the lift
the distance required to stop the airplane from
required for flight is produced at a lower V2
V1. Typical takeoff data supplied to the flight
speed with the greater flap deflection. Since the
crew by their operations department will
airplane will reach the associated lower V1 speed
either provide takeoff weight adjustments to be
earlier in the takeoff roll, there will be more
applied to a zero wind limit weight or separate
runway remaining for a possible stop maneuver.
columns of limit weights for specific values
On the “Go” side of the decision, increasing
of wind component. In either case, it is the
the takeoff flap deflection will increase the
responsibility of the flight crew to verify that
airplane drag and the resulting lower climb
last minute changes in the tower reported winds
performance may limit the allowable takeoff
are included in their takeoff planning.
weight. However, the takeoff analysis used by
The effect of air density on takeoff performance the flight crew will advise them if climb or
is also straight forward in so far as the crew obstacle clearance is a limiting factor with a
is normally provided the latest meteorological greater flap setting.
information prior to takeoff. However, it is the
responsibility of the crew to verify the correct
pressure altitude and temperature values used
in determining the final takeoff limit weight
and thrust setting.
4.27
SECTION 4
4.3.5.3.2 Engine Bleed Air during a large portion of the climbout to

allow the wheels to stop rotating. The ‘Go”
Whenever bleed air is extracted from an engine, performance calculations for dispatch must be
and the value of the thrust setting parameter made in accordance with certified “Landing
is appropriately reduced, the amount of thrust Gear Down” Flight Manual data. The resulting
the engine generates is reduced. Therefore, the new limit takeoff weight may be much less
use of engine bleed air for air conditioning/ than the original limit in order to meet obstacle
pressurization reduces the airplane’s potential clearance requirements, and there would be
takeoff performance for a given set of runway some excess runway available for a rejected
length, temperature and altitude conditions. takeoff.
When required, using engine and/or wing An MEL item that would not affect the “Go”
anti-ice further decreases the performance performance margins but would definitely
on some airplane models. This “lost” thrust degrade the “Stop” margins is an inoperative
may be recoverable via increased takeoff anti-skid system. In this instance, not only is the
EPR or N1 limits as indicated in the airplane limit weight reduced by the amount determined
operating manual. It depends on engine type, from the AFM data, but the flight crew may also
airplane model, and the specific atmospheric be required to use a different rejected takeoff
conditions. procedure in which throttles are retarded first,
the speedbrakes deployed second, and then the
brakes are applied in a judicious manner to
4.3.5.3.3 Missing or Inoperative Equipment
avoid locking the wheels and failing the tires.4
Inoperative or missing equipment can The associated decrement in the Field Length
sometimes affect the airplane’s acceleration or Limit Weight is usually substantial.
deceleration capability. Items which are allowed
to be missing per the certified Configuration Other MEL items such as a deactivated brake
Deviation List (CDL), such as access panels may impact both the continued takeoff and
and aerodynamic seals, can cause airplane RTO performance through degraded braking
drag to increase. The resulting decrements to capability and loss of in-flight braking of the
the takeoff limit weights are, when appropriate, spinning tire.
published in the CDL. With these decrements
applied, the airplane’s takeoff performance The flight crew should bear in mind that
will be within the required distances and the performance of the airplane with these
climb rates. types of CDL or MEL items in the airplane’s
maintenance log at dispatch will be within the
Inoperative equipment or deactivated systems, certified limits. However, it would be prudent
as permitted under the Minimum Equipment for the flight crew to accept final responsibility
List (MEL) can also affect the airplane’s to assure that the items are accounted for in
dispatched “Go” or “Stop” performance. the dispatch process, and to insure that they,
For instance, on some airplane models, an as a crew, are prepared to properly execute any
inoperative in-flight wheel braking system may revised procedures.
require the landing gear to be left extended
4
UK CAA procedure adds “...apply maximum reverse thrust.”
4.28
SECTION 4
4.3.5.3.4 Wheels, Tires, and Brakes
The airplane’s wheels, tires, and brakes are recognize that fuse plugs cannot protect against
another area that should be considered in light all types of heat induced tire failures. The
of the significant part they play in determining location of the fuse plug in the wheel is selected
the results of a Go/No Go decision. to ensure proper response to brake heat. This
location in combination with the inherent low
One design feature which involves all three thermal conductivity of tire rubber means that
components is the wheel fuse plug. All jet the fuse plugs cannot prevent tire failures from
transport wheels used for braking incorporate the rapid internal heat buildup associated with
thermal fuse plugs. The function of the fuse plug taxiing on an underinflated tire. This type of heat
is to prevent tire or wheel bursts by melting if the buildup can cause a breakdown of the rubber
heat transferred to the wheels from the brakes compound, ply separation, and/or rupture of the
becomes excessive. Melting temperatures of plies. This damage might not cause immediate
fuse plugs are selected so that with excessive tire failure and because it is internal, it may
brake heat, the inflation gas (usually nitrogen) not be obvious by visual inspection. However,
is released before the structural integrity of the weakened tire is more prone to failure on a
the tire or wheel is seriously impaired. Both subsequent flight. Long taxi distances especially
certification limitations and operational at high speeds and heavy takeoff weights can
recommendations to avoid melting fuse plugs aggravate this problem and result in a blown
are provided to operators by the manufacturer, tire. While underinflation is a maintenance
as is discussed in Section 4.3.5.3.6 under the issue, flight crews can at least minimize the
heading, Residual Brake Energy. possibility of tire failures due to overheating
by using low taxi speeds and minimizing taxi
While fuse plugs provide protection from braking whenever possible.
excessive brake heat, it is also important to
4.29
SECTION 4
Correct tire inflation and fuse plug protection tire being thrown into an engine must also be
are significant, but will never prevent all tire considered.
failures. Foreign objects in parking areas,
taxiways and runways can cause severe cuts in An airplane’s climb gradient and obstacle
tires. The abrasion associated with sustained clearance performance with all engines
locked or skidding wheels, which can be caused operating and the landing gear down exceeds
by various antiskid or brake problems, can grind the minimum certified engine out levels that
through the tire cords until the tire is severely are used to determine the takeoff performance
weakened or a blow-out occurs. Occasionally, limits. Therefore, leaving the gear down after
wheel cracks develop which deflate a tire and a suspected tire failure will not jeopardize the
generate an overloaded condition in the adjacent aircraft if all engines are operating. However, if
tire on the same axle. Some of these problems are the perceived tire failure is accompanied by an
inevitable. However, it cannot be overstressed indication of thrust loss, or if an engine problem
that proper maintenance and thorough walk should develop later in the takeoff sequence,
around inspections are key factors in preventing the airplane’s climb gradient and/or obstacle
tire failures during the takeoff roll. clearance capability may be significantly
reduced if the landing gear is not retracted. The
Tire failures may be difficult to identify from the decision to retract the gear with a suspected
flight deck and the related Go/No Go decision tire problem should be in accordance with the
is therefore not a simple task. A tire burst may airline’s /manufacturer’s recommendations.
be loud enough to be confused with an engine
compressor stall, may just be a loud noise, or If a tire failure is suspected at fairly low speeds,
may not be heard. A tire failure may not be it should be treated the same as any other
felt at all, may cause the airplane to pull to one rejectable failure and the takeoff should be
side, or can cause the entire airplane to shake rejected promptly. When rejecting the takeoff
and shudder to the extent that instruments may with a blown tire, the crew should anticipate
become difficult to read. Vibration arising out of that additional tires may fail during the stop
failure of a nosewheel tire potentially presents attempt and that directional control may be
another complication. During takeoff rotation, difficult. They should also be prepared for the
vibration may actually increase at nosewheel possible loss of hydraulic systems which may
liftoff due to the loss of the dampening effect cause speedbrake or thrust reverser problems.
of having the wheel in contact with the runway. Since the stopping capability of the airplane may
A pilot must be cautious not to inappropriately be significantly compromised, the crew should
conclude, under such circumstances, that not relax from a maximum effort RTO until the
another problem exists. airplane is stopped on the pavement.
Although continuing a takeoff with a failed Rejecting a takeoff from high speeds with
tire will generally have no significant adverse a failed tire is a much riskier proposition,
results, there may be additional complications especially if the weight is near the Field Limit
as a result of a tire failure. Failed tires do not Weight. The chances of an overrun are increased
in themselves usually create directional control simply due to the loss of braking force from
problems. Degradation of control can occur, one wheel. If additional tires should fail during
however, as a result of heavy pieces of tire the stop attempt, the available braking force is
material being thrown at very high velocities even further reduced. In this case, it is generally
and causing damage to the exposed structure better to continue the takeoff, as can be seen
of the airplane and/or the loss of hydraulic in Figure 18. The subsequent landing may take
systems. On airplanes with aft mounted advantage of a lower weight and speed if it is
engines, the possibility of pieces of the failed possible to dump fuel. Also, the crew will be
4.30
SECTION 4
!VAILABLE2UNWAY Figure 18
Margins associated
s4AKEOFFFLAPS 62 with continuing or
s#ERTIFIEDPERFORMANCE 'O FT
rejecting a takeoff
s$RYRUNWAY %NGINE
FAIL with a tire failure
s&IELDLENGTHLIMITWEIGHT
6 4RANSITION
6%& COMPLETE
&ULLSTOPPING
2EJECT NOREVERSE
!PPROX
62 FT
'O
4IRE
• 3AMEINITIALCONDITIONS FAIL
6 4RANSITION
COMPLETE TO
s,ANDINGFLAPS 2EDUCEDBRAKING KTS
s#ERTIFIEDPERFORMANCE CAPABILITYPLUSALL
2EJECT ENGINEREVERSE TOFT
LESSBLOWNTIREEFFECTS OVERRUN
s4AKEOFFWEIGHTMINUS
FT BURNOFFANDFUELDUMPOPT
TO 3TOP
ZONE -ARGIN
TO
better prepared for possible vibration and/or 4.3.5.3.5 Worn Brakes

control problems. Most important, however, is
the fact that the entire runway will be available The investigation of one recent RTO incident
for the stop maneuver instead of perhaps, as which was initiated “very near V1”, revealed
little as 40% of it. As shown in Figure 18, as that the overrun was the result of 8 of the 10
much as 60% of the runway may remain after wheel brakes failing during the RTO. The
stopping the airplane from a landing if fuel failed brakes were later identified to have been
dumping is an option. Even in a case where only at advanced states of wear which, while within
the minimum fuel is burned off in returning accepted limits, did not have the capacity for a
to the field, approximately 40% of the runway high energy RTO.
would remain available for contingencies.
This was the first and only known accident in
As can be seen from this discussion, it is the history of commercial jet transport operation
not a straightforward issue to define when a that can be traced to failure of the brakes during
takeoff should be continued or rejected after an attempted RTO. The National Transportation
a suspected tire failure. It is fairly obvious Safety Board (NTSB) investigated the accident
however, that an RTO initiated at high speed and made several recommendations to the FAA.
with a suspected tire failure is not a preferred The recommendations included the need to
situation. McDonnell Douglas Corporation, require airplane and brake manufacturers to
in an All Operator Letter5, has addressed this verify by test and analysis that their brakes,
dilemma by recommending a policy of not when worn to the recommended limits, meet
rejecting a takeoff for a suspected tire failure the certification requirements. Prior to 1991,
at speeds above V1−20 knots. The operators maximum brake energy limits had been derived
of other model aircraft should contact the from tests done with new brakes installed.
manufacturer for specific recommendations
regarding tire failures. The FAA mandated a program to test and
5
McDonnell Douglas All Operators Letter FO-AOL-8-003, -9-006, -10-004, -11-015, Reiteration of Procedures and Techniques
Regarding Wheels, Tires, and Brakes, dated 19 AUG 1991
4.31
SECTION 4
demonstrate the energy capacity of worn brakes. 4.3.5.3.6 Residual Brake Energy
The test program used the brake manufacturer’s
dynamometer facilities and was completed for After a brake application, the energy which the
all FAA certified transport airplanes. Worn brake has absorbed is released as heat and until
brake energy certification is an extensive this heat is dissipated, the amount of additional
program which has redefined brake wear limits. energy which the brake can absorb without
For most steel brake part numbers, the allowable failure is reduced. Therefore, takeoff planning
wear of the brake has been reduced so that the must consider the effects of residual brake
remaining heat-sink material could absorb the energy (or brake temperature) if the previous
required energy. landing involved significant braking and/or the
airplane turnaround is relatively short. There
Worn brake stopping force capability also are two primary sources of information on
underwent review by the regulatory agencies. this subject. The brake temperature limitations
Test have shown that at high energy levels some and/or cooling charts in the airplane operating
worn brakes exhibit some decrease in stopping manual provide recommended information on
force capability as compared to new brakes. temperature limitations and/or cooling times
This loss in force capability translates into and the procedures necessary to dissipate
an increase in the stopping distance required. various amounts of brake energy. In addition,
However, the loss is generally less than the force the Maximum Quick Turnaround Weight
that can be made up by considering the effect (MQTW) chart in the AFM is a regulatory
of the thrust reversers. Furthermore, in many requirement that must be followed. This chart
cases, the full capability of the new brakes as shows the gross weight at landing where the
demonstrated during certification testing was energy absorbed by the brakes during the
not utilized in the development of the AFM. landing could be high enough to cause the
As a result, worn brake capabiltiy, even though wheel fuse plugs to melt and establishes a
less than new brake capability, often meets or minimum waiting/cooling time for these cases.
exceeds the performance that had been reflected The MQTW chart assumes that the previous
in the AFM. landing was conducted with maximum braking
for the entire stop and did not use reverse thrust,
Virtually all brakes in use today have wear so for many landings where only light braking
indicator pins to show the degree of wear and was used there is substantial conservatism built
when the brake must be removed from the into the wait requirement.
airplane. In most cases, as the brake wears, the
pin moves closer to a reference point, so that Most brakes have been designed so that the
when the end of the pin is flush with the reference limiting fuse plug energy is quite high and
(with full pressure applied), the brake is “worn therefore in most cases, the requirement of the
out”. As of late 1991, tests have been completed AFM to wait a specified time is not reached. The
which show that brakes at the allowable wear large majority of dispatches are in this category
limit can meet AFM brake energy levels. As and no special brake cooling considerations
a result, “wear pin length” is not significant are involved. There are however, cases where
to the flight crew unless the pin indicates that landing energies can be significant, especially
the brake is worn out and should be removed at high temperature, high altitude fields such
from service. There are no changes to flight as Denver, Johannesburg and Mexico City.
crew or dispatch procedures based on brake For this type of dispatch, the most important
wear pin length. case is where the wheel fuse plugs are very
hot but do not melt. If on the other hand,
one or more fuse plugs do melt as a result of
brake energy at landing, the associated wheel
4.32
SECTION 4
and tire assemblies must be replaced and the the recommended cooling times. Therefore, this
maintenance will usually take much longer than system can be a convenient means to predict
any MQTW wait requirement. The required cooling requirements. Strict adherence to the
brake cooling will be accomplished while brake cooling and the MQTW charts will avoid
maintenance is performed. any operational problems with excessive brake
heat in a subsequent RTO.
If the MQTW chart shows that the mandatory
waiting period is required, the airplane can
legally be dispatched as soon as the cooling time 4.3.5.3.7 Speedbrake Effect on Wheel Braking
period has elapsed. If heavy braking was used
While jet transport pilots generally understand
during the preceding landing, the wheels and
the aerodynamic drag benefit of speedbrakes
tires may still be at relatively high temperatures,
and the capability of wheel brakes to stop an
i.e.., just below the fuse plug release point.
airplane, the effect of speedbrakes on wheel
Even if the mandatory waiting period was not
brake effectiveness during an RTO is not always
required, nearly the same temperatures can
appreciated. The reason speedbrakes are so
be involved if the landing parameters were
critical is their pronounced effect on wing lift.
close to the limiting values. The brake energy
Depending on flap setting, the net wing lift
requirements of the subsequent takeoff should
can be reduced, eliminated or reversed to a
be carefully considered since wheels and tires
down load by raising the speedbrakes, thereby
cool very slowly, especially in high ambient
increasing the vertical load on the wheels
temperature and low wind conditions. An RTO
which in turn can greatly increase braking
performed with the initial wheel temperature
capability.
at near fuse plug melt temperatures, may
result in fuse plug releases before the airplane Speedbrakes are important since for most
can be brought to a complete stop. In extreme braking situations, especially any operation
cases, this type of situation can lead to thrown on slippery runways, the torque output of the
tire tread damage and/ or increased stopping brake, and therefore the amount of wheelbrake
distances. While service history shows that the retarding force that can be developed is highly
combination of heavy braking on landing, with dependent on the vertical wheel load. As a
a minimum length (MQTW) turnaround, and result, speedbrakes must be deployed early in
a significant speed RTO is rare, flight crews the stop to maximize the braking capability.
should be aware of the potential brake cooling During RTO certification flight tests, the
problems and consult the manufacturer’s stopping performance is obtained with prompt
guidance material. deployment of the speedbrakes. Failure to raise
the speedbrakes during an RTO or raising
The guidance information for critical brake them late will significantly increase the
energy conditions is contained in the Brake stopping distance beyond the value shown
Cooling Chart and/or the brake temperature in the AFM.
limitations of the Operations Manual. This
chart provides the recommended cooling times Figures 19 and 20 summarize the effect of
and/ or brake temperature limits for defined speedbrakes during an RTO. For a typical
landing conditions which are translated into mid-sized two-engine transport, at a takeoff
brake energy values. The chart takes into weight of 225,000 lb, the total load on the main
consideration a number of practical factors such wheels at brake release would be approximately
as the level of braking used, thrust reverser 193,000 lb. As the airplane accelerates along the
activity, and the amount of taxi roll distance. runway, wing lift will decrease the load on the
Many cooling charts also correlate Brake gear, and by the time the airplane approaches
Temperature Monitoring System readouts to V1 speed, (137 knots for this example), the main
4.33
SECTION 4
Figure 19 7EIGHT
ONTIRE
Effect of
speedbrakes on the &ORWARDMOTION 4OTALSTOPPINGFORCECAPABILITY
stopping capability
of a typical mid- 2OLLING 3PEED
,IFT
size two-engine BRAKES
INCREASE DOWN
transport "RAKE $RAG
TORQUE "RAKINGFORCE $RAG 3PEED
BRAKES "RAKES
"RAKES UP ,OADON
"RAKINGFORCEBRAKINGFRICTIONXLOADONTIRE
WHEELS

"RAKETORQUENOTLIMITING
3PEEDBRAKEPOSITION $IFFERENCE
$OWN SPEEDBRAKEUP
5P
$RAG LBS LBS
,IFT LBS
.ETLOADONWHEELS
-AXBRAKINGFORCE
-AXSTOPPINGFORCE
BRAKESANDDRAG

Figure 20
Summary of forces "RAKINGFORCEWITHSPEEDBRAKESUP
during a typical
mid-size two-
engine airplane
RTO

"RAKINGFORCEWITHSPEEDBRAKESDOWN

!ERODRAGWITHSPEEDBRAKESUP

4WO ENGINEREVERSETHRUSTFORCE

2ETARDING
FORCELB
!ERODRAGWITHSPEEDBRAKESDOWN

3PEED+4!3
4.34
SECTION 4
gear load will have decreased by nearly 63,000 offset any delay or even the complete lack of
lb. The data in Figure 20 graphically depicts speedbrake deployment during an RTO. This
how the forces acting on the airplane vary with is simply not true. On a dry runway, delaying
airspeed from a few knots before the RTO is the deployment of the speedbrakes by only
initiated until the airplane is stopped. When the 5 seconds during the RTO will add over 300
pilot begins the RTO by applying the brakes and ft. to the stop distance of a typical mid-sized
closing the thrust levers, the braking force rises two-engine jet transport, including the effects
quickly to a value in excess of 70,000 lb. The of engine-out reverse thrust. As a worst case
nearly vertical line made by the braking force illustration, if reverse thrust was not used
curve in Figure 20 also shows that the airplane and the speedbrakes were not deployed at all,
began to decelerate almost immediately, with stopping distance would be increased by more
virtually no further increase in speed. than 700 ft. Although the exact figures of this
example will vary with different flap settings
The next action in a typical RTO procedure and from one airplane model to another, the
is to deploy the speedbrakes. By the time this general effect will be the same, namely that
action is completed, and the wheel brakes speedbrakes have a very pronounced effect on
have become fully effective, the airplane will stopping performance.
have slowed several knots. In this example of
an RTO initiated at 137 knots, the airspeed Appendix 4-H contains additional data on the
would be about 124 knots at this point. The effect of these and other procedural errors on
weight on the main gear at 124 knots would be the stopping distance requirements of specific
approximately 141,600 lb with the speedbrakes airplane models.
down, and would increase by 53,200 lb when
the speedbrakes are raised. The high speed
braking capability is substantially improved by 4.3.5.3.8 Carbon and Steel Brake Differences
this 38% increase in wheel load from 141,600 to
Recent emphasis on the apparent tendency for
194,800 pounds, which can be seen by noting
carbon brakes to wear out in proportion to the
the increase in braking force to 98,000 pounds.
total number of brake applications, as opposed
In addition, the speedbrakes have an effect
to steel brakes which wear out in proportion to
on aerodynamic drag, increasing it by 73%,
energy absorbed by the brakes, has generated
from 8,500 to 14,700 pounds. The combined
interest in other operational differences
result, as indicated by the table in Figure 19,
between the two types of brakes. While the
is that during the critical, high speed portion
emphasis on wear difference is necessary,
of the RTO, the total stopping force acting on
since the economics of brake maintenance is so
the airplane is increased by 34% when the
significant, for most other operational aspects
speedbrakes are deployed.
the two brakes can be considered equivalent.
Since both the force the brakes can produce
and the aerodynamic effect of the speedbrakes As far as RTO capability is concerned, the type
vary with speed, the total effect for the RTO of brake involved does not matter since each
stop is more properly indicated by averaging brake installation is certified to its particular
the effect of the speedbrakes over the entire takeoff energy capability. This means that
stopping distance. For this example, the over all either carbon or steel brakes, even fully worn,
effect of raising the speedbrakes is an increase will be able to perform the maximum certified
of 14% in the average total stopping force acting RTO condition applicable to that installation in
throughout the RTO. a satisfactory manner.
One common misconception among pilots One difference between steel and carbon brakes
is that the quick use of thrust reversers will that is often claimed is an increased tolerance
4.35
SECTION 4
to thermal overload. To understand this in Although many carbon brakes do develop

proper perspective, recognize that although the nearly constant torque, some fade considerably
friction elements in a carbon brake (rotating in certain conditions. On the other hand, some
and stationary disks) are made of carbon steel brakes do not fade very much at all,
material, which has good strength and friction depending to a large extent on the degree of
characteristics at high temperatures, the brake conservatism built into the brake. In either case,
structure, brake hydraulics, the wheel, and brake fade is taken into account in the AFM
the tire are essentially the same as used for an performance, for the specific brake installed on
equivalent steel brake. Within the limitations each particular airplane. Therefore, brake fade
represented by this non-carbon equipment then, does not need to be an operational concern to
an overheated carbon brake will continue to the flight crew.
function reasonably well in situations where
an equivalent steel brake with its metallic A second factor with steel brakes is the potential
disks might not. An overload condition could loss of structural strength of the rotors and
be caused by excessive taxi braking, riding the stators at the extreme operating temperatures
brakes, or inappropriate turnaround procedures associated with limiting energy values. This
after landing. In this type of situation, carbon could cause a structural failure of one or more
brakes will generally demonstrate better friction brake stators near the end of the stop. In this
characteristics and therefore develop more case the brake will continue to function but
torque and stopping force than equivalent steel with reduced torque capability. The remaining
brakes. components, which are common to carbon and
steel brakes, are less likely to be affected. As
The difficulty with this carbon brake thermal a generalization, a steel brake is more exposed
advantage is that it is nearly impossible to judge to the possibility of structural failure when the
the extra amount of braking that could be done temperatures are excessive.
before affecting the ability of the non-carbon
components to perform in an RTO situation. This An RTO from at or near the brake energy
is because the thermal effects on the limiting limits can also mean that after stopping on
hardware are so highly time and ambient the runway, the brakes may not be capable of
condition dependent. For instance, whether an stopping the airplane again, even from low
airplane has carbon brakes or steel brakes will taxi speeds. This is especially true for steel
not matter if enough time has elapsed after a brakes due to the increased chance of structural
heavy brake application such that the wheel fuse failure. Therefore, it is important that the crew
plugs release before the airplane can complete consider the probable condition of the airplane
the next takeoff or a subsequent RTO attempt. wheels, brakes, and tires after completing a
Pilots should concentrate on proper braking high speed RTO before attempting to move the
procedures rather than attempt to capitalize on airplane from the runway. One other difference
any extra carbon brake advantage. Attention between carbon and steel brakes that might be
to the brake cooling chart recommendations evident in certain RTOs is brake welding. Steel
will avoid these thermal problems and ensure brakes, which usually have rotors of steel and
that the airplane stopping performance can be stators of a copper-iron mix (with a number
achieved regardless of whether steel or carbon of special ingredients) can weld together,
brakes are installed. preventing further wheel rotation. This can even
happen before the airplane comes to a full stop,
The increased thermal overload capability of particularly in the last several knots where the
carbon brakes is closely related to the idea that antiskid system is not effective.
carbon brakes do not “fade”. In other words, they
always produce the same torque throughout the If this does happen, it increases the possibility
stop even as the brake temperature increases. of a tire blowout as the locked wheel skids
4.36
SECTION 4
to a stop. The energy range where this type regulations recognize the rarity of such high
of welding can occur is often well below the energy situations and allow brake fires after a
maximum AFM dispatch energy level but maximum energy condition, provided that any
usually above the wheel fuse plug melting level. fires that may occur are confined to the wheels,
For most very high energy RTOs, the surfaces tires and brakes, and do not result in progressive
of the brake disks remain above the melting engulfment of the remaining airplane during
point through the entire stop and sometimes the time of passenger and crew evacuation. It is
for several minutes after. Carbon brakes do not important then, for flight crews to understand
have any tendency to weld together. the nature of possible fires and the airplane
takeoff parameters that could involve these
Some of the other brake differences are unique very high brake energies.
to particular designs or to particular design
philosophies. For instance, carbon brakes There are two primary combustibles in the
can operate at higher temperatures than steel assembly, namely the tire, and brake grease.
brakes - provided extra attention is given to Brake hydraulic fluid will also burn if there
protecting the associated equipment. This is is a hydraulic leak directed at a very hot
typical of most carbon brake designs. However, brake disk. Tire fires can occur if the rubber
for some airplane models, commonality and/ compound temperature exceeds approximately
or interchangeability requrements are more 650 °F. Tire fires usually burn fairly slowly
important and have resulted in carbon brakes for the first several minutes when started by
with the same specified temperature and energy brake heat. Grease fires are even less active,
limits as steel brakes. typically involving a small, unsteady, flickering
flame, sometimes with considerable smoke.
The probability of a crew experiencing a
4.3.5.3.9 High Brake Energy RTOs brake fire at the conclusion of an RTO is very
low, considering brake design factors, the
Brake rotor and stator temperatures associated dispatch parameters, and service history. The
with RTOs which involve brake energies following discussion will assist flight crews
at or near certified maximum values, reach in understanding the factors associated with a
approximately 2,000 °F for steel brakes, and very high energy stop.
2,500 °F for most carbon brakes. These high
temperatures may, in some situations, ignite First, not all airlines identify the factor that is
certain items in the wheel, tire, and brake limiting for a particular takeoff, such as Field
assembly. While considerable design effort is Length, Tire Speed, or Brake Energy. Therefore,
made to preclude fires whenever possible, the the crew may not know if they are at or near a
+NOTS4!3
Figure 21

Effect of engine
RPM and airspeed
on reverse thrust
of a typical high
.ETREVERSE
bypass engine
THRUSTFORA
TYPICALLB
THRUSTENGINE
LBPERENGINE

0ERCENT.
6
Boeing Flight Operations Review, Effect of Engine RPM And Airspeed On Reverse Thrust, 26 June 1990
4.37
SECTION 4
brake energy limit weight. Since the maximum should immediately be advised that the airplane
brake energy condition is reflected in the AFM is still on the runway, that a high brake energy
performance by the Maximum Brake Energy stop was made, and that emergency equipment
Speed, VMBE, and since the regulations prevent is requested to observe the tires and brakes for
V1 from exceeding VMBE, the crew does not possible fires.
necessarily need to know they are brake energy
limited to perform a successful RTO. The RTO
procedures remain the same. 4.3.5.4 Reverse Thrust Effects
Most of the takeoffs planned in the world

Second, consider that few of the world’s
do not include reverse thrust credit. This is
departures are conducted at a Field Length Limit
because the rejected takeoff certification testing
Weight, and only a small proportion of these
under FAA rules does not include the use of
would be at the Brake Energy Limit Weight
reverse thrust, except for the wet runway case
where V1 equals VMBE. More significantly,
for airplanes certified under FAR Amendment
only a small portion of the RTOs that might
25-92. An additional stopping margin is
occur during these brake energy limited
produced by using maximum reverse thrust.
takeoffs would involve a stop from or near V1.
We stress the word “maximum” in relation to
Service history shows that there have been
the use of reverse thrust because of another
very few brake fires as a result of high brake
commonly held misconception. Some pilots
energy RTOs. Brake/tire fires occur in service
are of the opinion that idle reverse is “equally
occasionally, but are almost always due to
or even more” effective than full or maximum
some equipment failure condition during a
reverse thrust for today’s high bypass ratio
landing. Fires have also occurred during some
engines. This is simply not true. The more
airplane brake certification flight test RTOs
EPR or N1 that is applied in reverse, the more
while attempting to establish maximum brake
stopping force the reverse thrust generates. The
energy levels. A few have been dramatic and
data shown in Figure 21 is typical for all high
highly publicized but usually result in changes
bypass engines. Similar data on other specific
which are incorporated in the wheel/brake
airplane models can be found in Appendix 4-
design to reduce any unacceptable risk. The
D.6
final, certified capability is either less than
originally tested or the equipment is improved On wet or slippery runways, the wheel brakes
to meet the required capability. are not capable of generating as high a retarding
force as they are on a dry surface. Therefore, the
In terms of practical guidelines for flight
retarding force of the reversers generates a larger
crews, takeoffs at or near VMBE are normally
percentage of the total airplane deceleration.
encountered at high altitude airports or at
very hot temperatures. An RTO from close to
V1 speed under these conditions will require 4.3.5.5 Runway Parameters
the brakes to absorb a significant amount of
energy during the stop. Flight crews can use the Runway characteristics which affect takeoff
Brake Cooling Chart of the airplane operating performance include length, slope, clearway
manual to determine brake energy values if and/or stopway. The effect of runway length
the situation warrants such a review. In cases is straightforward, however, slope, clearway,
where an extremely high brake energy might and stopway deserve some discussion.
be encountered, the possibility of a brake fire
should therefore be considered by the flight A single value of runway slope is typically
crew during the pre-takeoff briefing. If a high chosen by the operator to perform takeoff
speed RTO is subsequently performed the tower analysis calculations. This single value is
7
ICAO Circular 91-AN/75, The Effect of Variable Runway Slopes on Take-Off Runway Lengths for Transport Aeroplanes,
dated 1968.
4.38
SECTION 4
usually taken from information published by A clearway is an area at least 500 feet wide
the navigation chart services or the airport centered about the extended centerline of
authorities. On closer inspection however, many the runway with a slope equal to or less than
runways are seen to have distinct differences 1.25%. This area is called the clearway plane.
in slope along the length of the runway. No obstructions, except threshold lights,
The single published value may have been can protrude above this clearway plane. The
determined by a variety of methods, ranging acceleration to V2 and 35 feet is completed over
from a simple mathematical average of the the clearway. The use of clearway to increase
threshold elevations, to some weighted average takeoff weight “unbalances the runway” and
methods proposed by ICA0 in an advisory results in a lower V1 speed. The maximum
publication7. clearway used to calculate takeoff performance
is restricted by the regulations to one half the
As a simple example, consider a runway demonstrated distance from liftoff to 35 feet.
which has only one slope discontinuity. The
first two thirds of the runway has an uphill A stopway is an area at least as wide as the
slope of +2% and the last third has a downhill runway and centered about the extended
slope of −2%. The equivalent single slope for centerline. It must be capable of supporting
this runway, as determined from the ICAO the weight of the airplane without causing
Circular methods, could vary from +1.3% to damage. Use of stopway also “unbalances the
−0.3%. When the takeoff analysis is made runway” resulting in a higher takeoff weight
for this runway, the limit weights will be the and increased V1 speed. An RTO initiated at this
same as would be determined for an actual V1 will come to a stop on the stopway. For the
single slope runway. However, as the airplane sake of completeness, it should be pointed out
commences a takeoff on the 2% upslope runway, that not all stopways will qualify as clearways,
it will accelerate more slowly than it would on nor will a clearway necessarily qualify as a
any of the equivalent single slope runways, stopway. The specified criteria for each must
which will result in its achieving V1 speed be met independently before it can be used for
further along the runway than was planned. takeoff performance calculations.
If no event occurs which would precipitate an
RTO, the final acceleration to VR and liftoff The use of clearway and/or stopway does not
will be higher than planned and the overall necessarily offer any additional margin for RTO
performance will probably come out close to stopping. In both cases, the takeoff performance
what was scheduled. is “unbalanced” by adjusting V1 speed to plan
that the stop will be completed by the end of
On the other hand, if an event worthy of an RTO the paved surface.
should occur just prior to the airplane reaching
V1, most, if not all of the stop maneuver will
have to be carried out on a 2% downhill slope
surface instead of the equivalent single slope
value, and the RTO will have been initiated
with less runway remaining than was assumed
in determining the limit weight for that takeoff.
There is little the crew can do in this type of
situation, other than in the vein of situational
awareness, emphasize in their briefing that
an RTO near V1 for anything other than a
catastrophic event is not advisable.
4.39
SECTION 4
4.3.5.6 Lineup Distance Accountability accelerate-stop distance adjustments as shown

in Figure 22.
Historically, most operators did not adjust the
available takeoff runway for the distance needed The takeoff distance (TOD) adjustment is made
to align the airplane with the runway for takeoff. based on the initial distance from the main
There was no regulatory requirement to do so, gear to the beginning of the runway since the
except in Australia and Germany. However, screen height is measured from the main gear,
in 1998, JAR OPS-1 was enacted, which as indicated by distance “A” in Figure 22. The
requires that a lineup distance be considered accelerate-stop distance (ASD) adjustment is
in determining limit takeoff weights. A similar based on the initial distance from the nose gear
FAA regulation is in work. As a result, many to the beginning of the runway, as indicated by
airlines are now accounting for lineup distance. distance “B” in Figure 22.
Accounting for runway lineup distances will
reduce the available runway length and hence When determining a runway lineup allowance,
the allowable limit takeoff weight from any the characteristics for maneuvering each
given runway. Operators can minimize the airplane model onto each runway should be
impact of runway alignment accountability used in calculating the required corrections.
by rebalancing the limit takeoff weight/V1 For example, runways with displaced takeoff
calculation using separate accelerate-go and thresholds or ample turning aprons should
Figure 22
Line-up distance
FT
adjustment
!3$AVAILABLE
"
4/$AVAILABLE
!
2UNWAYLENGTH
! !DJUSTMENTTOTAKEOFFDISTANCE
" !DJUSTMENTTOACCELERATE STOPDISTANCE
4.40
SECTION 4
not need further adjustment. As shown in and accelerate-stop (ASD) cases that result
Figure 23, runways that require a 90-degree from a 90-degree turn onto the runway and a
turn on, or taxiing on the runway with a 180-degree turn maneuver on the runway, for
180-degree turn at the end may require a all Boeing airplanes. Operators should develop
lineup adjustment. Appendix 4-I contains or obtain similar information on other airplanes
the appropriate minimum lineup distance in their fleet from the manufacturer.
adjustments to both the accelerate-go (TOD)
$EGREE4URNTO#ENTERLINE Figure 23
Typical line-up
0UBLISHEDRUNWAY
maneuver
THRESHOLD 4AKEOFF$ISTANCE
!DJUSTMENT4/$
- !CCELERATE 3TOP$ISTANCE
!DJUSTMENT!3$
4URNCENTER
$EGREE4URNONAM2UNWAY
0UBLISHEDRUNWAYTHRESHOLD
-
/UTEREDGE
MAINGEAR • .OSEGEAR
TIRES • /UTERTIREEDGE
4URN
4AKEOFF
CENTER
$ISTANCE
!DJUSTMENT
4/$
!CCELERATE
- 3TOP$ISTANCE
!DJUSTMENT!3$
2UNWAY
#,
FTM
4.41
SECTION 4
4.3.5.7 Takeoffs Using Reduced Thrust thrust. The associated V1 speed provides the
standard certification “margins” of a 35 ft screen
There are two methods of performing a reduced height or a stop at the end of the runway in the
thrust takeoff. The first is to use a fixed derate of event of an engine failure.
the engine to a lower thrust rating. For example,
a JT9D-7F engine operated at a JT9D-7 rating, When using the Assumed Temperature Method,
or a CFM56-3C-1 engine operated at 20,000 lb additional “margins” are created in both the
of thrust (-B1 rating) instead of the full 23,500 “Go” and “Stop” cases. As the name implies,
lb rating. When a fixed derate is used, the engine the technique used to calculate the performance
EGT and RPM limits are reduced and the crew with the Assumed Temperature Method is to
are not to exceed the reduced limits in normal assume that the temperature is higher than it
operation. As a result of the lower limit thrust actually is, and to calculate takeoff thrust and
with a fixed derate, the minimum control speeds speeds at the higher temperature.
Vmcg and Vmca are also reduced. Since the
choice of derate thrust levels is usually restricted The primary reason that the use of the
to one or two preselected values, it is rare that Assumed Temperature Method results in
the takeoff performance at the derated thrust performance margins is that the true airspeed
would be reduced to field length limit levels. of the airplane is lower than would be the case
However, if the actual airplane weight should if the actual temperature were equal to the
equal the Field Length Limit Weight for the assumed temperature. A typical performance
derated thrust, the performance margins are comparison is provided in Figure 24 showing
identical to that described in Section 4.3.4.1. margins in both climb gradient and stopping
distance required. A similar comparison
The second way of reducing takeoff thrust is for other airplane models is included in
to use the Assumed Temperature Method. The Appendix 4-H for reference.
fundamental difference between fixed derates
and the Assumed Temperature Method is that It should also be pointed out that the Assumed
the operating limits of the engine are not reduced Temperature Method of reduced thrust can be
when using Assumed Temperature Method used in combination with Fixed Derate thrust
reduced thrust. The flight crew may increase reduction. The only difference is that the “full
the thrust to the full engine rating at any time Rated Thrust becomes the Derate value, not the
during the takeoff if it is deemed appropriate. maximum possible engine rating.
For instance, British CAA Flight Manuals
include a recommendation to increase thrust An example of the margins inherent in the use
on the operating engines to the full rating in of the Assumed Temperature Method is shown
the event that an engine fails during the takeoff. in Figure 24 for a typical large four-engine jet
As a result, the Vmcg and Vmca speeds are not transport. The Field Length Limit Weight for
reduced below the full rating values when using the 10,100-ft runway is 762,200 lb when the
the Assumed Temperature Method. OAT is 16ºC, but the actual airplane weight is
only 717,500 lb. This excess weight capability
Fixed derates and the Assumed Temperature permits the use of an assumed temperature
Method also differ in terms of the performance of 40ºC.
margins that are inherent to their use. As was
previously mentioned, at limit weights, a takeoff In this example, if an engine were to fail one
performed using a fixed derate takeoff thrust second before V1, the airplane would reach a
will conform to the minimum performance height of 35 ft and V2 speed 750 ft before the
levels of the regulations, just as a limit weight end of the runway. If the takeoff were rejected at
takeoff would when using full rated takeoff Vl, there would be 750 ft more runway available
4.42
SECTION 4
to stop the airplane than would be required. airplane is about 270 ft, means that there would
Adding the additional distance margin due to be approximately 1,020 ft of additional runway
the use of reverse thrust, which for this example available for the RTO.
Conditions: Figure 24
An example of
Typical Large Four-Engine Jet Transport the conservatism
inherent in the use
Sea Level of the assumed
OAT = 16˚C (60˚F) temperature
method of
10,100 ft runway reduced thrust
Field Length Limit Weight = 762,200 lb

Actual Airplane Weight = 717,500 lb which permits an
assumed temperature of 40˚C. (104˚F)
Actual temp is 16˚C

Parameter and assumed temp Actual temp is 40˚C Resulting margin
is 40˚C
EPR 1.376 1.376 —
V1 (KIAS/TAS) 146/146 146/152 -6 KTAS
VR (KIAS/TAS) 156/156 156/163 -7 KTAS
V2 (KIAS/TAS) 164/164 164/171 -7 KTAS
Thrust at V1, lb/engine 31,210 30,960 250 lb

FAR Field Length, ft 9,310 10,100 790 ft
Accelerate-stop distance
9,050 9,800 750 ft
(engine-out), ft
Accelerate-go distance
9,050 9,800 750 ft
(engine-out), ft
Accelerate-go distance
8,100 8,800 700 ft
(all engine), ft
Second segment gradient 3.54% 3.42% +0.12%
Second segment rate of

582 586 -4 fpm
climb, ft per minute
4.43
SECTION 4
4.3.5.8 The Takeoff Data the Pilot Sees If the actual airplane weight is less than the
limit weight, the crew should treat the normally
The typical takeoff data table (sometimes obtained V1 speed as a “limit speed” unless
referred to as runway analysis or gross weight their operations department has provided them
tables) shows the limit takeoff weight for with a specific method of unbalancing the V1
a specific runway over a range of ambient speed to utilize the excess runway available.
temperatures. There may also be corrections for The operator should assure that a suitable,
wind, pressure altitude, bleed configurations, non-ambiguous method of presenting the V1
and runway surface conditions. Each table speed is chosen, whether it is a balanced or
usually shows the limit weights for only one unbalanced speed.
flap setting. Some airlines show the takeoff
speeds and the takeoff thrust EPR or N1 setting
along with the limit weights. The tables can 4.3.6 Increasing the RTO Safety Margins
display limit weights for Field Length, Climb,
Obstacle Clearance, Tire Speed and Brake There are a number of choices and techniques
Energy, and tell which factor is limiting for each the crew can make and practice that will increase
wind and temperature. This tabular display of the RTO margins for takeoff. Some involve
the takeoff data has become the standard tool airline policy and require the publication of
for using the assumed temperature method to additional data (such as multiple flap setting
reduce the takeoff power setting and thereby takeoff weight and speed data) and some are
improve engine life. just good personal technique.
This takeoff data is some of the most important

data used on any flight. It is essential that 4.3.6.1 Runway Surface Condition
flight crews know their actual takeoff weight
and that they use the proper takeoff speeds. The crew cannot control the weather like
It is equally important that the flight crew be they can the airplane’s configuration or
aware of their proximity to the limit weights thrust. Therefore, to maximize both the
for that takeoff’s ambient conditions. These “Go” and “Stop” margins, they must rely on
limit weights and speeds are more than just judiciously applying their company’s wet or
numbers. They represent the maximum certified contaminated runway policies as well as their
takeoff performance of the airplane. If the actual own understanding of how the performance of
takeoff weight is equal to or near the runway their airplane may be affected by a particular
limit weight, the crew should note that fact runway surface condition.
and be extra alert that a reject from near or at
V1 will require prompt application of the full
stopping capability of the airplane to assure
stopping on the runway.
4.44
SECTION 4
Figure 25
8,700 ft runway Flap setting Typical large
Sea Level two-engine jet
transport takeoff
37° C 1 5 15 20 performance
Runway limit weight, 358,300 374,200 389,000 393,600

lb (kg) (162,494) (169,705) (176,417) (178,503)
Climb/Obstacle limit 414,100 407,300 393,600 383,000

weight, lb (kg) (187,800) (184,717) (178,503) (173,696)
4.3.6.2 Flap Selection If the flight’s actual takeoff weight was 374,200
pounds, investigating the above table indicates
Often the RTO safety margin can be increased Flaps 5, Flaps 15, or Flaps 20 are all acceptable.
by selection of an alternative takeoff flap setting. Flaps 5 is runway limited so it offers no
Consider for example, the effect of takeoff flap additional RTO margin. However, Flaps 15 and
selection on the performance limit weights of Flaps 20 both offer an opportunity for additional
a typical large two engine airplane, as shown stopping distance margin. These additional
in Figure 25. stopping margins have been calculated for this
example and are shown in Figure 26.
If a flight requires the absolute maximum
takeoff weight, the above weight limits would Thus, if there are no other constraints such as
dictate choosing Flaps 15 since 389,000 lb is obstacles or critical noise abatement procedures
the highest weight allowed. Flaps 20 is Climb/ that would prevent the selection of a greater flap
Obstacle limited to a lower weight and Flaps setting, the crew could give themselves 1000
1 and 5 are Runway limited to lower weights. feet of extra stopping distance in case an RTO
If the actual takeoff weight desired is equal was required on this takeoff.
to the maximum limit weight, there is no flap
selection option. The takeoff will need to use Remember that there are some disadvantages
Flaps 15. to selecting a higher flap setting. These
disadvantages include diminished climb
More typically, however, the airplane’s actual performance and slightly more fuel consumed
takeoff weight is well below the maximum. due to the higher drag configuration and the
There are then two viable ways to improve additional flap retraction cleanup time that will
RTO stopping distance margin: either by flap be required.
selection or by reduced V1 techniques.
Figure 26
Flap setting 5 15 20 Effect of flap
selection on RTO
stopping margins
Stopping margin Zero 850 ft 1,000 ft
4.45
SECTION 4
4.3.6.3 Runway Lineup passenger comfort. As a result, most takeoffs are

performed as “rolling takeoffs”, with the thrust
Positioning the aircraft on the runway in being set as the airplane begins the takeoff roll.
preparation for takeoff is an important element However, this technique must be accomplished
in maximizing the amount of pavement available promptly to avoid compromising the takeoff
for a possible RTO maneuver. Correction to performance. A delayed application of takeoff
the available runway length can be made to thrust will increase the time and distance to
the takeoff analysis on those runways where reach V1 speed. Consequently, less runway will
it is not possible to position the airplane at be left to stop the airplane should an RTO be
the beginning of the published distance. As necessary. The thrust should be set promptly,
discussed in Section 4.3.5.6, optimum runway according to the airframe manufacturer’s
lineup procedures can be developed by reference recommendations. The non-flying pilot or
to the turning diagrams presented in Appendix flight engineer then typically makes any final
4-I or by contacting the manufacturer. The flight adjustments and monitors the engines for any
crew should be familiar with their airline’s abnormalities.
policy on line-up distance and be proficient in
executing the proscribed maneuvers. Operators On airplanes equipped with autothrottles, an
should also encourage airport authorities to additional item to be aware of is that some
provide turn guidance striping on runways autothrottle systems incorporate “Thrust
requiring 180 deg turns. Hold” features which will stop advancing
the thrust levers after the airplane reaches a
Correct runway lineup technique should always predetermined threshold airspeed value. A
be practiced regardless of whether or not there delay in engaging the autothrottle can result in
is excess runway available. Even if an allowance the thrust stabilizing below the takeoff target
has been made, it is up to the crew operating setting and the initial acceleration being less
the flight to align the airplane on the runway than required.
using the shortest possible distance. If they
can do it in a shorter distance than taken into The engine instruments should be monitored
account by their company, then there is that closely for any abnormal indications. Past
much extra margin for the takeoff. RTO accidents have occurred after an engine
problem was identified early in the takeoff roll,
but no action was initiated until the airplane
4.3.6.4 Setting Takeoff Thrust had reached or exceeded V1.
At takeoff thrust settings, gas turbine (jet) Company operations manuals or training
engines operate at very high RPM. It typically manuals contain correct procedures for setting
takes several seconds for the engines to spool up takeoff thrust. Observing these procedures
from a low idle or taxi thrust to takeoff power assures efficient engine acceleration and, as
after the thrust levers are advanced. During a consequence, proper aircraft acceleration
this time, the aircraft is not accelerating at throughout the entire takeoff roll.
full potential because the engines are not yet
developing full power.
4.3.6.5 Manual Braking Techniques
The demonstrated takeoff distance is achieved
when the takeoff thrust is set prior to releasing Modulation of brake pressure or “pumping the
the brakes, but this technique is often not brakes” was the way most people were taught
practical in line operations due to expedited to apply automobile brakes when braking
takeoff clearances, engine FOD hazards, and conditions were less than favorable. This
4.46
SECTION 4
prevented sustained skids and therefore afforded pedal force required to set the parking brake is
both better braking and directional control. essentially the same as that required to achieve
Both benefits occur because a skidding tire maximum manual braking. On other airplanes,
produces less frictional force than a tire which it may be significantly less. It is up to each crew
continues to rotate. Flight deck observation and member to be sure that their understanding
simulator testing, however, both indicate that of the airplane they are currently operating is
this technique has at times been carried over into correct. The data in Appendix 4-G gives the
the cockpit of jet transports. With the antiskid actual brake pedal forces required to achieve
control systems in jet transport airplanes this maximum brake pressure, to set the parking
technique is not only unnecessary, it results brake, and to disarm the RTO autobrake.
in degraded stopping capability and therefore
excessive stopping distance especially for The importance of maintaining maximum
adverse runway conditions. Proper braking braking and full reverse thrust during an RTO
technique in an RTO is to apply full brake until the airplane “rocks to a stop” cannot be
pedal force (“stand on it”) and maintain full over-stressed. During a reject from V1, the
brake pedal force until the airplane comes goal is safety, not passenger comfort. The
to a complete stop. amount of distance required to decelerate from
a given speed at the high weights associated
The pilot’s foot position relative to the with takeoff is significantly greater than from
rudder pedal can also have an effect on the the same speed at a typical landing weight. If
achievement of full brake pressure. It was the pilot tries to judge the amount of runway
noted during the Takeoff Safety Training Aid remaining against the current speed of the
Human Performance Study8 that foot position airplane, the visual perception that the airplane
during the takeoff roll tends to be an individual will stop on the runway (“we’ve got it made”),
preference. Some pilots prefer to have their will prompt a decrease in the stopping effort.
feet “up/on the pedals” to be ready to apply It is precisely at this point in the RTO that the
full brakes if required. Pilots who prefer this difference between a successful Go/No Go
technique also noted that their toes are “curled decision and an accident can occur. The brakes
back” to avoid unwanted brake applications may be nearing their energy absorption limits
when applying rudder. The other technique is and the airplane may be entering a portion of
to rest the heels on the floor during the takeoff the runway contaminated with rubber deposits,
roll, and then raise them to be on the pedal to which can be very slick if wet. In several of
apply full braking. No problems were noted the RTO accidents and incidents of the past,
with either technique. there was excess runway available to complete
the stop, but the premature relaxation of the
One technique which did not work well was stopping effort contributed to an overrun.
also noted. It is not possible to apply maximum
brake pedal deflection, and hence full brake An additional consideration in completing a
pressure, if the heel of the foot is left on the successful RTO is that the crew should assess the
floor, unless the pilot has very big feet. In an condition of the airplane after it comes to a stop.
RTO stop maneuver, the feet should be up on If there is evidence of a fire or other significant
the rudder pedals and steady, heavy pressure hazard to the passengers, an evacuation on the
applied until the airplane is completely stopped. runway is definitely preferable to “clearing
Pilots should develop a habit of adjusting their the active.” Every second counts in an actual
seat and the rudder pedals prior to leaving the emergency evacuation. In at least one RTO
gate. The ability to apply maximum brake pedal accident, many of the fatalities were caused by
force as well as full rudder should be checked by delaying the evacuation until the aircraft was
both pilots. On some airplane models, the brake clear of the runway.
8
Takeoff Safety Training Aid Human Performance Study, Appendix 4-E.
4.47
SECTION 4
4.3.6.6 Antiskid Inoperative Braking The use of “RTO AUTOBRAKES” eliminates

Techniques any delay in brake application and assures
that maximum effort braking is applied
Antiskid inoperative dispatches represent a promptly. Possible application delays arising
special case for brake application techniques. from distractions due to directional control
In this situation the pilot executing the RTO requirements in crosswinds, or application of
should apply steady moderate pedal pressure less than maximum brake force, are completely
consistent, in his judgement, with runway eliminated. The results of a simulator study
conditions, airplane dispatch weight and the conducted by the Takeoff Safety Training Aid
available runway length. Full brake pressure Human Performance Study9 also suggest that,
should not be applied with the antiskid system on the average, those RTOs performed with
inoperative due to the risk of tire failure. To RTO autobrakes ARMED resulted in more
minimize the possibility of skidding a tire, runway distance remaining after the stop than
which can lead to a blowout, the speedbrakes did the RTOs performed using manual braking
should be deployed before brakes are applied. only. This result is more significant because
This provides the highest possible wheel loads few pilots left the autobrakes engaged for more
to keep the wheels rotating with the forward than a few seconds before overriding them and
motion of the airplane. applying full manual braking. The difference
in stopping performance is attributed to the
first few seconds of high deceleration with the
4.3.6.7 RTO Autobrakes
autobrakes at full pressure.
Autobrake system functions and crew actions to
When the RTO autobrakes are ARMED for
initiate these functions vary from one airplane
takeoff, the pilot not flying must monitor the
model to another. For example, some systems
system and advise the pilot flying if a DISARM
include automatic spoiler extension, others do
condition occurs. The pilot flying should also
not. Therefore, training in use of the system must
monitor the deceleration of the airplane for
be tailored to the particular system installed.
acceptability and be prepared to apply manual
The following discussion illustrates the general
braking if required or, the pilot performing
intent of autobrake systems.
the reject procedure should apply maximum
Brake application is an immediate pilot action manual braking during the RTO. In this latter
when initiating an RTO, and this application case arming the RTO autobrake function only
should be of maximum effort. An automatic serves as a backup if for some reason manual
brake application system called “RTO braking is not applied.
AUTOBRAKES” is being installed on more and
The brake pedal forces required to disarm the
more airplanes today to insure that this critical
autobrakes may vary significantly between
step is performed as rapidly as possible when
the landing autobrake settings and the RTO
an RTO is initiated. This system is designed to
autobrake setting of any given airplane, between
automatically apply maximum brake pressure
one airplane model and another of the same
if during the takeoff roll, all the thrust levers
manufacturer, as well as between the various
are retarded to idle, and the aircraft speed is
manufacturers’ airplanes. It is not surprising
above a specified value (usually 85-90 knots).
that this point is not fully understood in the
RTO Autobrakes therefore, achieve the same
pilot community. It is important that pilots be
airplane stopping performance as a proper,
made aware of how the details of any particular
manual application of full foot pedal braking.
airplane’s autobrake system might affect RTO
No time delays are built in to the RTO autobrakes
performance and that they obtain the necessary
such as are used in some landing autobrake
information from their training department. For
settings.
9
Takeoff Safety Training Aid Human Performance Study, Appendix 4-E.
4.48
SECTION 4
this reason, Appendix 4-G has been included to If V1 were reduced to a speed below the QRH
give the brake pedal forces required to disarm value, an additional surplus of accelerate-stop
the autobrakes. distance is available. However, the lower the
V1 speed, the greater the spread between V1
and V2 and the greater the distance required
4.3.6.8 Reduced V1 Techniques to accelerate (with one-engine out) to the
takeoff safety speed, V2. This added engine-
When the actual airplane weight is less than out acceleration requirement increases the
the Field Length Limit Weight, there is more accelerate-go distance. In fact, it may be
runway available than is required by the possible to reduce V1 to the minimum V1 so
regulations to perform the takeoff. As was that the accelerate-go distance exactly matches
discussed in Section 4.3.4.2, V1 can be chosen the runway available, as shown in the lower
from a range of permissible speeds between portion of Figure 27. The resulting lower V1
the minimum V1 and the maximum V1. The must be checked to insure that it conforms to
minimum Vl speed still satisfies the continued the Vmcg limit criteria for that aircraft.
takeoff criteria, the maximum Vl speed meets
the rejected takeoff requirements, and any If the V1 speed were chosen to be less than the
value of V1 chosen between these two limit balanced V1 but greater than the minimum V1,
speeds would actually provide performance in additional distance margins would exist for both
excess of that specified by the continued or the continued and rejected takeoff conditions.
rejected takeoff criteria. An example would Any V1 speed that meets this criteria is referred
be if the V1 speed is determined in the usual to as a “reduced V1 speed” in the remainder
manner from simplified presentations in the of this discussion, and any method used by an
airplane operating manual, Quick Reference operator to determine reduced V1 speeds is
Handbook (QRH), or most onboard computer referred to as a “reduced V1 policy”.
systems. This speed is typically a balanced V1
which means the actual accelerate-stop and Initiating a reduced Vl policy will require
accelerate-go distances will be equal to each additional procedural and performance
other but less than the actual runway available. information to be disseminated by the
This is pictured in Figure 27. operator.
2UNWAY!VAILABLE Figure 27
Additional
stopping margin
,IMITWEIGHTATBALANCED
FIELDLENGTH is available by
6BALANCED
using reduced
%& 'O
V1 procedures
2EJECT
,IMITWEIGHTATBALANCED
FIELDPERFORMANCE 6BALANCED
%& 'O -ARGIN
2EJECT
,IMITWEIGHTATUNBALANCED
FIELDPERFORMANCE -INIMUM6BALANCED
%& 'O
2EJECT
!DDITIONAL
MARGIN
4.49
SECTION 4
The basic information required to determine a unless an appropriate delta V1/weight trade has
reduced V1 speed is currently published in each been established by the operator.
Airplane Flight Manual. Airline performance
engineers can readily establish some simple and As was seen in Section 4.3.5.7, when the actual
conservative delta V1/excess weight trades for weight of the airplane is less than the Field
in-service use. For example one operator has Length Limit Weight, the use of the Assumed
determined that for its area of operation, it is Temperature Method to reduce takeoff thrust
conservative to reduce V1 by one knot for each results in margins in both the Go and Stop
1,000 lb that actual takeoff weight is below distances required.
the allowable runway weight on one aircraft
model in their fleet. A V1 reduction of one A reduced V1 policy can also be effectively used
knot per 2,000 lb is used for a different model in combination with the Assumed Temperature
aircraft. Note, these example trade values are Method of reduced thrust, thereby maximizing
only appropriate for their particular airframe both engine life and RTO stopping margins. An
engine combinations and area of operation. It example of this procedure is shown in Figure 28
is cautioned that a reduced V1 technique such for a typical large four-engine jet transport.
as this should not be used by the flight crew
Figure 28 Elevation 0 ft Typical Airport
Combining reduced Flaps 20 JT9D-7 Engines/Wet
thrust and reduced A/C on Normal V1 Dry Runway Zero Wind
V1 to increase Runway 26L Runway 26R
stopping margins
Climb RWY limit Takeoff RWY limit Takeoff
OAT weight weight speeds weight speeds
˚C 100 lb 100 lb V1-VR-V2 100 lb V1-VR-V2
54 6568 6720F 39-48-55 6963F 39-48-55
52 6664 6786F 40-49-56 7032F 40-49-56
50 6760 6852F 41-50-58 7101F 41-50-58
48 6856 6917F 42-52-59 7168F 42-52-59
46 6952 6982F 44-53-60 7235F 44-53-60
44 7048 7046F 45-54-62 7302F 45-54-62
42 7144 7111F 46-55-63 7369F 46-56-63
40 7240 7175F 46-56-64 7436F 47-57-65
38 7336 7239F 47-57-65 7502F 48-58-66
36 7432 7303F 48-57-65 7568F 50-59-67
34 7534 7369F 49-58-66 7637F 51-61-69
32 7642 7439F 50-59-67 7709F 52-62-70
30 7750 7508F 50-60-68 7781F 54-64-72
28 7750 7117F 50-60-68 7778F 54-64-72
26 7750 7524F 51-60-69 7798F 54-64-72
24 7750 7544F 51-60-69 7818F 54-64-72
22 7750 7564F 51-61-69 7838F 54-64-72
20 7750 7584F 51-61-69 7858F 54-64-72
18 7750 7603F 52-61-70 7877F 54-64-72
16 7750 7622F 52-62-70 7896F 54-64-72
14 7750 7641F 52-62-70 7914F 54-64-72
12 7750 766OF 53-62-71 7933F 54-64-72
10 7750 768OF 53-63-71 7952F 54-64-72
Maximum brake release weight must not exced structural limit of 800,000 lb
Maximum flap retraction height is 400 ft
Limit code is F = Field, T = Tire, B = Brake energy, V = VMCG, * = Obstacle
Runway 26L is 10,100 ft long with 0 ft clearway, 0 ft stopway, 0% slope
Runway 26R is 11,100 ft long with 0 ft clearway, 0 ft stopway, 0% slope
Obstacles considered are (from liftoff end of runway, height/distance in ft/ft):
Runway Height Distance
26L None
26R None
4.50
SECTION 4
Recalling the reduced thrust example of section Since the airplane’s climb gradient is not
4.3.5.7, if the actual airplane weight was 717,500 affected by the value of V1 used, it is now
lbs and the actual OAT was 16ºC, an assumed possible to utilize at least a portion of the 1000
temperature takeoff using thrust calculated for ft of excess runway to accelerate to V2 and
40ºC could be made from a 10,100-ft runway. climb to 35 ft by reducing the V1 speed. Using
For this example, both the accelerate-stop and a previously established and conservative delta
accelerate-go actual distances were 750 ft less V1/excess weight trade of 1 knot per 2,000 lb,
than would be calculated from the AFM. V1 could be reduced by 13 knots. With this
lower value of V1, the accelerate-stop distance
But what if a 1,000-ft longer runway was required is decreased by 2,130 ft. At the same
available for this takeoff? In this example, the time, the required accelerate-go distance is
original runway will be referred to as Runway increased by 380 ft.
26L and the longer runway is Runway 26R. As
shown in Figure 28, The Field Length Limit Taking into account the possible additional
Weight for Runway 26R at 40ºC is 26,100 lb distance margins resulting from the use of the
higher than for Runway 26L. This excess weight longer runway (1,000 ft), engine-out reverse
capability could be used to further reduce the thrust (270 ft), Assumed Temperature Method
takeoff thrust setting. However, in this example, reduced thrust (750 ft), and reduced V1, the
the use of a higher assumed temperature is not total additional runway margins for this
possible because the Climb Limit (714,400 lb) example takeoff situation are shown in
is less than the actual weight (717,500 lb) for Figure 29. The data in Appendix 4-H provides
temperatures above 40ºC. additional model specific examples of the use
of Assumed Temperature Method reduced
thrust and a reduced V1 policy.
Figure 29
Source Takeoff Distance (TOD) Accelerate-Stop Distance (ASD)
Operational
Runway 26R 1,000 ft 1,000 ft margins associated
with reverse thrust,
Reverse thrust — 270 ft reduced thrust, and
reduced V1
Reduced thrust 750 ft 750 ft
Reduced V1 380 ft 2,130 ft
Total Margin 1,370 ft 4,150 ft
4.51
SECTION 4
4.3.6.9 The V1 Call A frequently cited factor in RTO accidents that

occurred when the First Officer was flying is the
One important factor in avoiding RTO overrun lack of any airspeed calls by the Captain during
accidents is for the crew to recognize reaching the takeoff. This type of poor crew coordination
V1 when the airplane does, in fact, reach V1 may be overcome by the use of automated
–not after. The airplane’s stopping performance “V1” and “Engine Failure” calls which will
cannot match that specified in the Airplane eliminate much of the variability experienced
Flight Manual if the assumptions used to derive in today’s operations. Even with an automated
that performance are violated, knowingly or call system however, an “Approaching” call
inadvertently. Operationally, careful attention by the non-flying pilot would still seem to be
to procedures and teamwork are required to an appropriate method of ensuring airspeed
match the human performance recognized by situational awareness for both pilots.
the AFM.
Basic operating procedures call for the pilot 4.3.6.10 Crew Preparedness
flying the airplane to include airspeed in his
instrument scan during the takeoff ground roll. Important crew factors directly related to
Hence he is always aware of the approximate eliminating RTO overrun accidents and
speed. The pilot not flying monitors airspeed incidents are:
in more detail and calls out “Vee One” as a - Brief those physical conditions which
confirmation of reaching this critical point in might affect an RTO that are unique to
the acceleration. each specific takeoff.
The pilot flying cannot react properly to V1 - Both pilots must be sure to position the
unless the V1 call is made in a timely, crisp, and seat and rudder pedals so that maximum
audible manner. One method of accomplishing brake pressure can be applied.
this by a major U.S. carrier is their adoption of a - Both pilots should maintain situational
policy of “completing the V1 callout by the time awareness of the proximity to V1.
the airplane reaches V1.” This is an excellent
example of the way airlines are implementing - Use standard callouts during the takeoff.
procedures to improve RTO safety. It is a good - Transition quickly to stopping
procedure and it should preclude a situation configuration.
where the “No Go” decision is inadvertently
made after V1. However, the success of such - Don’t change your mind. If you have
a policy in reducing RTOs after V1, without begun an RTO, stop. If you have reached
unduly compromising the continued takeoff V1, go, unless the pilot has reason to
safety margins, hinges on the line pilot’s conclude that the airplane is unsafe or
understanding of the specific airplane model’s unable to fly.
performance limitations and capabilities. - Use maximum effort brake application.
Another proposal for calling V1 is to use a call - Assure deployment of speedbrakes.

such as “Approaching V1” with the V1 portion - Use maximum reverse thrust allowable.
occurring as the airspeed reaches V1. Either of
these proposals accomplish the task of advising The accident records frequently show that slow
the flying pilot that the airplane is close to the or incomplete crew action was the cause of,
speed where an RTO for all but the most serious or contributed to, an RTO overrun event. The
failures is not recommended. crew must be prepared to make the Go/ No Go
decision on every takeoff. If a “No Go” decision
4.52
SECTION 4
is made, the crew must quickly use all of the communications, situational awareness,
stopping capability available. Too often, the workload distribution, cross-checking, and
records show uncertainty in the decision process monitoring.
and a lack of completeness in the procedures.
Be ready to decide and be ready to act. A variety of means are used to achieve this
common perception. This begins with airline
standard operating policies (SOPs) that clearly
4.4 Crew Resource Management define captain and first officer as well as pilot
flying and pilot not flying responsibilities and
Crew Resource Management (CRM) is a term duties. Training reinforces the crew’s knowledge
that can mean many things. In this context it and skill, while standardization insures
is simply intended to encompass the factors acceptable, consistent performance, across all
associated with having the crew members work fleets and cultures within an airline.
effectively together to make optimal Go /No
Go decisions and effectively accomplish related A takeoff briefing is another means of
procedures. It is recognized that the content of improving the crew’s awareness, knowledge,
a CRM discussion on Go/No Go decisions must and team effectiveness, especially when
reflect the needs and culture of each individual special circumstances or conditions exist.
operator. Therefore, the material contained in The briefing is not necessarily a one way
this section is provided only as an example of process. In fact, asking for clarification or
the type of CRM information which could be confirmation is an excellent way to insure
provided to the line pilot. mutual under standing when required. A simple,
“standard procedures” takeoff briefing might
be improved by adding “I’m not perfect, so
4.4.1 CRM and the RTO back me up on the speedbrakes and my use
of the RTO autobrakes” or, “if we’re not sure
Effective CRM can improve crew performance of an engine failure 5 knots before V1, we’ll
and in particular, decision making during continue the takeoff and I’ll state ‘CONTINUE
takeoff. Often, Go/ No Go decisions must be TAKEOFF”’. These briefings can improve team
made “instantaneously” and as a result, the effectiveness and understanding of the Go/No
significance of CRM is not readily apparent. Go decision planning and communications to
However, the fact that a critical decision must be be used. Such additions might be especially
made and implemented using rapidly changing, appropriate on the first segment of a flight with
often incomplete information in a dynamic a relatively new first officer or a crew’s first
environment in which the time available flight of the month.
decreases as the criticality of the decision
increases, is reason for effective CRM. Some A review of actions for a blown tire, high speed
aspects of CRM are especially important with configuration warning, or transfer of control
respect to the Go/ No Go decision. are examples of what might be appropriate
for before takeoff (or before engine start)
review. Such a briefing should address items
4.4.2 The Takeoff Briefing that could affect this takeoff, such as runway
contamination, hazardous terrain or special
Crew members must know what is expected
departure procedures. The briefing should not
of them and from others. For optimum crew
be a meaningless repetition of known facts, but
effectiveness, they should share a common
rather a tool for improving team performance,
perception — a mental image — of what is
that addresses the specific factors appropriate
happening and what is planned. This common
to that takeoff.
perception involves a number of CRM areas:
4.53
SECTION 4
4.4.3 Callouts 4.4.4 The Use of All Crew Members
Meaningful communication, however brief, It’s important to understand that all crew
regarding a non-normal situation during members on the flight deck play an important
takeoff and RTO can often mean the difference role in the Go/No Go decision and RTO
between success and disaster. For this reason, maneuver. Company policies shape these
communications must be precise, effective, roles. However, how the team is organized for
and efficient. Standard callouts contribute to each takeoff can make a difference in team
improved situational awareness. These callouts, performance. Knowing your own capabilities
coupled with all crewmembers being aware and that of the other crewmembers is part of
of airspeed, maximize the opportunity for a situational awareness and should be used in
common understanding of what actions are planning for a given takeoff. Although it’s “the
proper in the event of a non-normal situation. first officer’s leg”, it might not be an effective
The crewmember noting a problem should plan to task an inexperienced first officer with
communicate clearly and precisely without a marginal weather takeoff when weight is also
inferring things that may not be true. For limited by field length. Consider the possibility
example, the loss of fuel flow indication alone of an RTO when assigning takeoff duties.
does not necessarily mean an engine failure.
Use of standard terms and phraseology to
describe the situation is essential. The pilot 4.4.5 Summary
tasked to make the RTO decision should clearly
announce this decision, whether it be to continue Each airline approaches CRM in a slightly
or reject. different manner, but the goal of effective
teamwork remains the same. This material is an
example of the type of CRM information that
could be used to promote a common perception
of RTO problems and actions.
4.54
SECTION 4

List of Appendices
Training Aid
4-A Runway Overruns Following Hgh Speed Rejected Takeoffs

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Special
Investigation Report (SIR -90/02), Dated 27 FEB 90
4-B RTO Accident/Incident List 1959 to 2003

Listing of the RTO accidents and incidents on which the
statistics of the Takeoff Safety Training Aid were developed.
4-C Other Takeoff Rules

Discussion of the regulations of various countries that affect
the takeoff performance calculation with respect to RTOs. Also
included is a discussion of the U.S. military takeoff rules.
4-D Reverse Thrust Effectiveness

Graphical presentation of the retarding force generated by reverse
thrust as a function of speed for typical high bypass jet engines.
4-E Takeoff Safety Training Aid Human Performance Study

Summary report on a Boeing simulator study of airline pilot
takeoff decision making and performance.
4.55
SECTION 4

List of Appendices (Continued)
Manufacturer’s Model
Specific Data
4-F Airplane Flight Manual Transition Time Details

Graphical presentation of the various certified transition time
segments for specific airplane models.
4-G Brake Pedal Force Data

Tabular presentation of the brake pedal pressures required
to disarm the Autobrakes, achieve maximum manual brake
pressure, and to set the parking brake
4-H Reduced Thrust and Reduced V1 Examples

Example calculations showing the inherent margins
associated with the Assumed Temperature Method of
reduced thrust operation for specific airplane models.
Also, as a continuation of the reduced thrust example for
each airplane model, a sample calculation of a reduced V1
speed is performed and the resulting Go and Stop margins
are tabulated.
4-I Lineup Distance Charts

Graphical and tabular presentation of the minimum distance
required to make a 90 degree turn entry to the runway and 180
degree turns on the runway.
4-J The Effect of Procedural Variations on Stopping Distance

Examples of the effect of airplane configuration and variations in
RTO procedures on stopping distances, including wet runways.
4.56
APPENDIX
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
4-A
Special Investigation Report (SIR-90/02)
Runway Overruns Following High Speed
Rejected Takeoffs
App. 4-A.i
APPENDIX
4-A
App. 4-A.ii
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Penalty for Private Use, $300

APPENDIX
RTO Accident/Incident List 1959 to 2003
4-B
Introduction for RTO Overrun Accident/Incident Summary
The following table lists the 74 events involving the Western built commercial jet fleet included
in the NTSB RTO Overrun Accident and Incident Study. It also includes 23 events that occurred
after the original study, and together they are the basis for the statistical analyses presented
in Sections 2 and 4. These events include rejected takeoff accidents wherein the airplane was
unable to stop on the runway available (i.e. those events associated with runway length). These
incident events were reviewed and only the significant ones were included. These were generally
relatively high speed overruns which occurred in hospitable surroundings; Had the same event
occurred in less hospitable surroundings, the incident would have been an accident. The study
did not include events where directional control was lost during the takeoff roll and the airplane
departed the runway side boundaries as a result of the loss of control
Many of these events involved a combination of factors and some are not thoroughly documented
by investigation reports. A degree of judgement was sometimes required in identifying a prime
RTO decision factor. Users of these data are cautioned that the reason the crew decided to
initiate an RTO and the reason their RTO was unsuccessful may be totally unrelated. Few of
these events occurred while operating at field length limit weight.
The reader may be aware of additional RTO overrun events (either accidents or incidents) that
are not included in this study. If an event does not appear, it is only because there was no record
available as of the time of the study.
App. 4-B.i
APPENDIX
4-B
App. 4-B.ii
APPENDIX
4-B
RTO Overrun Accidents/incidents Summary
DATE OPER A/P TYPE LOCATION A/11 RTO INT2 CAUSE3 R/W4
SPEED COND
1 011961 AMX DC8 NEW YORK A >V1 CREW COORD SNOW
2 060362 AFA 707 PARIS A >V1 CONFIG DRY
3 082062 POR DC8 RIO DE JANEIRO A >V1 CONFIG DRY
4 110663 ACN DC8 LONDON A >V1 CREW COORD WET
5 112364 TWA 707 ROME A <V1 IND/LIGHT DRY
6 013066 TWA 707 FRANKFURT A >V1 CONFIG DRY
7 100166 VAR CV990 BOGOTA I >V1 TIRES DRY
8 110567 CAT CV880 HONG KONG A <V1 TIRES DRY
9 110667 TWA 707 CINCINNATI A >V1 CREW COORD DRY
10 032168 UAL 727 CHICAGO A >V1 CONFIG SNOW
11 080368 DLH 707 FRANKFURT I <V1 IND/LIGHT WET
12 120169 PAA 707 SIDNEY A >V1 ENGINE DRY
13 020970 EGP CMT MUNICH A >V1
14 071970 UAL 737 PHILADELPHIA A >V1 ENGINE DRY
15 112770 CIA DC8 ANCHORAGE A >V1 CREW COORD ICY
16 062371 ONA DC9 NORTHFORK I TIRES
17 070871 AVI 727 MEDELLIN I V1 TIRES
18 041872 ETH VC10 ADDIS ABABA A >V1 TIRES DRY
19 071872 BCA BAC111 CORFU A >V1 ENGINE WET
20 081372 JAT 707 NEW YORK A >V1 CREW COORD DRY
21 091372 TWA 707 SAN FRANCISCO A >V1 TIRES DRY
22 013073 SAS DC9 OSLO A >V1 IND/LIGHT ICY
23 040373 BRT 737 I TIRES
24 012874 COS 720 I TIRES
25 082575 AAL DC10 NEW YORK A >V1 TIRES DRY
26 091575 BAB TRID BILBAO A >V1 ENGINE WET
27 111275 ONA DC10 NEW YORK A BIRDS WET
28 012576 DAL L1011 DETROIT I >V1 ENGINE
29 111676 TEX DC9 DENVER A >V1 IND/LIGHT DRY
30 121676 IAL CV880 MIAMI A >V1 CONFIG
31 011477 CDD 707 I >V1 IND/LIGHT SNOW
32 050877 SWS DC 10 ZURICH I <V1 ENGINE WET
33 052577 EAL 727 WASH D.C. I >V1 ENGINE WET
34 030178 CAL DC10 LOS ANGELES A ~V1 TIRES WET
35 050278 CMA 727 MEXICO CITY I
36 052578 SEN CV880 MIAMI A >V1 CONFIG
37 062678 ACN DC9 TORONTO A <V1 TIRES WET
1
A =Accident, I = Incident
2
RTO Initiation Speed = the speed at which the first action was taken relative to V l.
3
Cause = the underlying cause of the RTO decision being made.
Engine: Actual, temporary or perceived loss of thrust
Tires: Main or nose gear tire vibration or failure.
Configuration: Incorrect control or high lift surface setting for takeoff.
Indicators/Lights: A reading observed on an indicator or a warning light illuminating.
Crew Coordination: Miscellaneous events where inappropriate crew action resulted in the RTO decision.
Bird Strikes: Crew observed birds along runway and experienced or perceived a subsequent problem.
ATC: ATC or other radio messages caused crew to elect to reject takeoff.
4
Runway Condition = reported runway surface condition at the time of the event.
App. 4-B.1
APPENDIX
4-B
DATE OPER A/P TYPE LOCATION A/I1 RTO INT2 CAUSE3 R/W4
SPEED COND
38 082978 AIN 747 NEW DELHI I ~V1 ENGINE DRY
39 112778 NWA 727 MINNEAPOLIS I >V1 ENGINE SNOW
40 121778 IND 737 HYDERABAD A >V1 CONFIG DRY
41 032379 BAL DC9 ZURICH I ~V1 BIRDS WET
42 062479 ARL 737 IBIZA I BIRDS
43 072979 SIA 747 DUBAI I <V1 TIRES DRY
44 100879 BNF 747 HONOLULU I V1 ENGINE DRY
45 032980 MON CV880 PANAMA CITY A TIRES
46 062480 CPA 737 FORT NELSON I BIRDS
47 081781 PAA 727 FT LAUDERDALE A >V1 ENGINE WET
48 082781 SAA 747 WINDHOEK I TIRES
49 091581 KAL 747 MANILA A <V1 ENGINE DRY
so 020382 UAL DC10 PHILADELPHIA A >V1 ATC5 WET
51 070582 REP DC9 BOISE I >V1 IND/LIGHT DRY
52 091382 SPN DC10 MALAGA A >V1 TIRES DRY
53 101883 DLH 747 HONG KONG A ~ V1 ENGINE DRY
54 112383 DAN BAE146 BERNE I
55 012685 IBE 747 BUENOS AIRES I >V1 ENGINE WET
56 062785 AAL DC10 SANJUAN A >V1 TIRES DRY
57 092485 EAL 727 WASH D.C. I ~V1 ATC DRY
58 072086 QUE 737 WABUSH A >V1 ENGINE WET
59 081486 IRN 747 HAMBURG I CREW COORD
60 092986 IND A300 MADRAS A >V1 ENGINE DRY
61 112786 CH6 CVL ARAUCA A >V1
62 010687 TNS CVL STOCKHOLM A >V1
63 022787 ARG 747 BUENOS AIRES I
64 080387 CAL A300 DENVER I <V1
65 052188 AAL DC10 DALLAS A ~ V1 IND/LIGHT DRY
66 052388 LAC 727 SAN JOSE (CR) A >V1 CONFIG DRY
67 062888 UNK BAC111 NEW CASTLE I ENGINE
68 072488 AFA 747 NEW DELHI A >V1 ENGINE DRY
69 111588 USA DC9 MINNEAPOLIS I <V1 TIRES WET
70 092089 USA 737 NEW YORK A >V1 CONFIG WET
71 051789 SOM 707 NAIROBI A >V1 WET
72 081689 LDE F28 SAN CARLOS A SNOW
73 041290 TMP DC8 BOGOTA A
74 072590 ETH 707 ADDIS ABABA A >V1 BIRDS WET
75 041890 OKD BAC11 LAGOS I >V1 IND/IT
1
2
3
4
5
Radio call from a waiting aircraft directed to another aircraft with a similar flight number, mistakenly understood by the
accident aircraft.
App. 4-B.2
APPENDIX
4-B
DATE OPER A/P TYPE LOCATION A/I1 RTO INT2 CAUSE3 R/W4
SPEED COND
76 031291 ATI DC8 NEW YORK A >V1 CONFIG
77 041592 USA F28 CHARLOTTE I <V1 CREW
78 112092 ARG 737 SAN LUIS A V1-10 CREW DRY
79 032093 DLH 747 FRANKFURT I V1+10 BIRD DRY
80 030294 CAL MD80 NEW YORK A V1+5 IND/LIGHT ICE/SNOW
81 092495 SWS A3xx TEL AVIV I IND/LIGHT
82 101995 CDI DC10 VANCOUVER A >V1 ENGINE DRY
83 050196 FLF 727 QUITO A <V1 CREW WET
84 061396 AHMAD AIR 707 CAIRO I CREW DRY
85 070896 SWA 737 NASHVILLE I >V1 BIRD DRY
86 080296 ALG 737 TLEMCEN A IND/LIGHT DRY
87 111796 LAM 737 JOHANNESBURG I >V1 IND/LIGHT DRY
88 011097 AFR A300 JEDDAH A >V1
89 012097 COP 737 PANAMA CITY I <V1 TIRE DRY
90 062597 SUS 727 BOGOTA A <V1 TIRE WET
91 072097 SHY MD80 DALIAN A <V1 IND/LIGHT WET
92 080397 AFR 737 DOUALA A <V1 TIRE WET
93 122897 PIA 747 DUBAI I ENGINE DRY
94 091198 AFA 747 PARIS I >V1 IND/LIGHT WET
95 020799 AVISTAR 707 BRATISLAVIA I >V1 CONFIG
96 101400 NWA 747 ANCHORAGE I TIRE
97 061703 ONU MD80 GRONINGEN A >V1 CONFIG
1
2
3
4
App. 4-B.3
APPENDIX
4-B
App. 4-B.4
APPENDIX
Other Takeoff Rules
4-C
This appendix contains information on takeoff regulations other than the U.S. FAA rules, which have an
impact on takeoff decision making, including United States military takeoff regulations.
It is intended that operators who require additional regulatory coverage contact the manufacturer for model
specific information, which can be retained in this appendix for easy reference.
Table of Contents
Chapter Page
U.S. Military Rules Versus FAA Rules................................................................................ 4-C.1
(FAR part 25)....................................................................................................................... 4-C.4
U.K. CAA Regulations........................................................................................................ 4-C.7
Australian CAA Regulations................................................................................................ 4-C.9
French DGAC Regulations................................................................................................ 4-C.11
Joint Air Regulations (JARS)............................................................................................ 4-C.13
App. 4-C.i
APPENDIX
Chapter 1 4-C
U.S. Military Rules Versus FAA Rules calculations for each model can be found in
Appendix 4-F. In general terms, the field length
Historically, military services have been the calculations required by FAR Part 25 can be
single largest source of airline pilots. Military summarized as follows:
pilots are generally highly trained and fly in a
very structured environment. Military services “Takeoff distance on a dry runway is the
require their pilots to memorize numerous greater of:
items including performance definitions. Most a. The horizontal distance along the takeoff
lieutenants/ensigns can quote verbatim the path from the start of the takeoff to the
definition of the fundamental terms of aircraft point at which the airplane is 35 feet
performance. above the takeoff surface after an engine
failure at least one second prior to V1, or
However, when these pilots turn to civil
aviation, performance is not always trained b. 115 percent of the horizontal distance
to the degree that it is in the military. The along the takeoff path, with all engines
differences between the two standards are not operating, from the start of the takeoff to
always clearly defined. This can lead the pilot the point at which the airplane is 35 feet
to assume that the rules are the same. This, in above the takeoff surface.”
turn, can lead to confusion or inappropriate
application of techniques. This Appendix The certified accelerate-stop distance on a dry
reviews the fundamental differences between runway is the greater of:
civil certification rules and military standards a. The total distance required to accelerate
regarding takeoff speeds and accelerate-stop and stop in the case of an engine failure
distances. at least one second prior to V1.
It should be noted that some military airplanes b. The total distance required to accelerate
that are derivatives of commercial models and stop with a pilot initiated all engine
have been certified to FAA rules. Examples operating reject at V1. This applies to
of this are Air Force One, C-40, and C-32. For airplanes certified to FAR Amendment
pilots transferring from one of these programs 25-42 or later.
to a commercial fleet, there will be minimal
differences in airplane performance. V1 is a speed that ensures that both the takeoff
distance and accelerate-stop requirements
can be met. Federal Aviation Regulations do
FAA Certification not provide a precise operational definition
of V1, and in fact the description of V1 in
During certification of transport category the Regulations has changed over the years.
airplanes, the applicants for certification Consequently, the phrases “Takeoff Decision
conduct a series of tests to determine takeoff Speed” and “Critical Engine Failure Velocity”
speed schedules and to establish representative have been associated with V1. However,
distances needed in the event of a rejected the association of those phrases may lead to
takeoff. Takeoff distance, accelerate-stop confusion and misunderstanding of QRH and
distance, and V1 speed are critical products AFM performance. V1 is neither a decision
of the applicants testing. Section 4.3.1 of this speed nor an engine failure speed. Per FAR
document describes the rules used to calculate Part 25.107, V1 defines the “instant at which
distance and discusses the variations in the rules the pilot recognizes and reacts to an engine
that have occurred. Details of the field length failure, as indicated by the pilot’s initiation
App. 4-C.1
APPENDIX
4-C
of the first action to stop the airplane during reflect the definitions in the various versions
accelerate-stop tests.” of MIL-M-7700, which was used as the basis
for takeoff calculations for most of the existing
Engine Failure Speed (VEF) is the airspeed at Air Force transports. Takeoff terminology
which the critical engine is assumed to fail. used among Air Force pilots includes terms
Federal Aviation Regulation Part 25 states, like Critical Field Length (CFL), Critical Engine
“V1 may not be less than VEF plus the speed Failure Speed (Vcef ), and Refusal Speed (Vref )
gained with the critical engine inoperative defined in accordance with MIL-STD-3013.
during the time interval between the instant at US Air Force Pilots do not routinely use the
which the critical engine failed and the instant at term V1.
which the pilot reacts.” For AFM data expansion
purposes, in order to provide a recognition time Critical Engine Failure Speed (Vcef ) is “the speed
increment that can be executed consistently in during the takeoff run at which an engine can
service, the time interval between VEF and V1 fail and the same distance is required to either
must be equal to that demonstrated in testing liftoff or stop the air vehicle.”
or one second, whichever is greater.
Critical Field Length (CFL) is the sum of the
It is important to note, whether the pilot distance required to accelerate to critical engine
rejects with all engines operating or due to an failure speed with all engines operating, plus
engine failure, AFM provided accelerate-stop the distance to accelerate to Liftoff Speed
calculations assume the pilot takes his first (Vlo) with the critical engine inoperative or to
action (applying brakes, reducing thrust, or decelerate to a stop from critical engine failure
deploying speed brakes for example) to reject speed in the same distance.
at V1.
MIL-STD-3013 establishes ground rules for
The term “balanced field length” implies that computation of critical field length, which
the accelerate-stop distance equals the takeoff include:
distance. The V1 that results in a balanced
1. “At engine failure, the air vehicle
field length is called the “balanced V1”. The
continues to accelerate for 3 seconds
AFM not only provides takeoff numbers for
with the operating engine(s) at the
the “balanced field length” case, but also for a
thrust setting used for takeoff, while the
wide range of unbalanced cases.
inoperative engine is at a drag level that
represents the most critical engine failure
Two important points to remember about
condition.”
civilian certification rules are: 1) the calculations
assume pilot reject actions are initiated no 2. “At the end of the 3-sec period,
later than V1 and 2) takeoff distance includes brakes are instantly applied and
the distance from liftoff to 35 feet above the action initiated to reduce thrust on the
takeoff surface. operating engine(s) to idle and to deploy
deceleration devices.”
US Air Force Standards Liftoff Speed (Vlo) is “the speed at which the
air vehicle leaves the ground.” In addition
In this discussion we will use terminology as to several other stipulations, Vlo must permit
defined in MIL-STD-3013. This standard is obstacle clearance speed (Vobs) at or before
relatively new, and is an attempt by the military the air vehicle clears a height of 50 ft above
to standardize definitions. The definitions in the runway.
MIL-STD-3013 regarding takeoff very closely
App. 4-C.2
APPENDIX
4-C
Obstacle Clearance Speed (Vobs) is “the flight and the airborne distance needed to accelerate
path speed, with landing gear extended, at and climb to clear the 50-ft height at Vobs.”
which the air vehicle clears a 50-ft height above
the runway during climb out.” In addition to Important points to remember about MIL-
other stipulations, Vobs provides a climb gradient STD-3013 are: 1) Critical Field Length equates
potential of 2.5-percent (0.025), with flaps in the accelerate-stop distance to the distance to
the takeoff position, landing gear retracted, liftoff in the event of an engine failure at Critical
with the thrust (power) setting being used for Engine Failure Speed; 2) Critical Field Length
takeoff, out-of-ground effect. Multi-engine air includes distance traveled during a 3-second
vehicles must be able to reach this potential pilot recognition and react time delay.
with the most critical engine inoperative (engine
windmilling, propeller feathered).
Analysis
Refusal Speed (Vref ) is “the maximum speed
during takeoff from which the air vehicle can An analysis of military operations at Critical
stop within the available remaining runway Field Length and civil operations under runway-
length.” Some military pilots use the term Vgo limited conditions highlights the fundamental
during takeoff to indicate the refusal speed. differences.
When available runway length exceeds critical The military’s Critical Field Length correlates
field length, Vcef is normally used as Go/No-Go loosely to the civilian term “balanced field
speed. If engine failure occurs below Vcef, the length”. The takeoff distance equated to
airplane should be stopped. If an engine failure accelerate-stop distance in the “balanced field
occurs between critical engine failure speed and length” case includes the horizontal distance
refusal speed, the takeoff should normally be from liftoff to the point at which the airplane
continued; however, the airplane can takeoff is 35 feet above the takeoff surface; whereas,
or stop within the remaining runway. If engine the distance equated to accelerate-stop distance
failure occurs above Vref , the pilot must continue in the military’s Critical Field Length is the
the takeoff since the airplane cannot stop within distance to liftoff. A military pilot who elects
the remaining runway. to GO with an engine failure at Vcef, when
available runway equals Critical Field Length,
When critical field length equals available will liftoff at the last brick of the runway. A
runway length, Vcef and Vref are the same. pilot of an airplane, certified under Part 25
Therefore, if an engine failure occurs below rules, who elects to GO with an engine at Vef
Vcef , the airplane must be stopped, and if an (1 sec before V1), when balanced field length
engine failure occurs above Vcef , the takeoff equals available runway length, will cross the
should be continued. departure threshold at 35 feet above the takeoff
surface. A civilian pilot faced with a field length
Ground Run Distance is “the distance from limited balanced field takeoff, who experiences
brake release (zero velocity) to main wheel an engine failure more than 1 second prior to
liftoff.” V1 and elects to continue the takeoff will see
a reduction in the height over the end of the
Total Takeoff Distance is “the horizontal runway. During a critical field length takeoff, a
distance required for the air vehicle, with military pilot who elects to GO with an engine
landing gear extended, to clear a 50-ft obstacle failure prior to Vcef will be forced to liftoff at a
height above the runway for a specified altitude, lower than normal speed or liftoff beyond the
weight, configuration, and thrust (power) end of the runway.
setting. It is the sum of the ground run distance
App. 4-C.3
APPENDIX
4-C
Also note that, although military rules refer to Electing to reject after V1 will likely result in
a 50 ft height, this is not analogous to the FAA a runway overrun.
35 ft screen height. The FAA 35 ft screen height
is reached at the end of the runway, while the Some commercial airlines today advocate
military 50 ft height is reached beyond the end continuing a takeoff once speed is within
of the runway. approximately 10 knots of V1 unless the
airplane is clearly unsafe or unable to fly.
In the STOP case, the accelerate-stop distance The reasoning is that there are more margins
calculated per Part 25 rules assumes the pilot in the GO case than in the STOP case. The
initiates reject procedures at V1 not 3 seconds application of this technique to military aviation
after attaining V1. The accelerate-stop distance is inappropriate.
used in the military’s Critical Field Length
calculation includes distanced traveled during a Graphic depictions of rejected takeoff and
3-second pilot recognition and react time delay. continued takeoff according to FAA and MIL-
Whether flying a military or a civil transport STD-3013 rules are presented in Figures 1, 2
airplane, the pilot should begin reject action and 3.
no later than the “action” speed (V1 of Vcef ).
Figure 1 FAA Rules
Rejected V1
Takeoff 2 seconds
Times 1 second Approx 1 sec (constant speed)
Engine Brakes Thrust Speed-
fail on idle brake
raised
MIL-STD-3013
Refusal speed
3 seconds
(accelerating)
Engine Brakes on,
fail thrust idle,
speedbrake raised
Figure 2 FAA Rules

Rejected
Takeoff V1
Speeds VEF
Velocity
1 2
sec sec
Start Stop
Transition
MIL-STD-3013 time
VCEF
Velocity
Start 3 seconds Stop
App. 4-C.4
APPENDIX
4-C
Commercial Rules
FT Figure 3
OFOBSTACLE Continued
B
OUTCLIM DISTANCE Takeoff
%N GINE
(FAR part 25)
FTSCREENHEIGHT
ATENDOFRUNWAY
2UNWAY
/BSTACLEDISTANCE
,IFTOFF
MlL-STD-3013
.OOBSTACLE
CLEARANCE
LIMB
OUTC MARGIN
INE
%NG
2UNWAY
,IFTOFFAT
ENDOFRUNWAY
U.S. Naval Aviation be allowed for advancing the operating engine

throttles to Maximum Thrust. The time period
The U.S. Navy has historically been governed to be used shall be applicable to the airplane
by MIL-M-85025 (AS), which has some configuration and be approved by the procuring
differences from the Air Force rules that are activity. Vl shall not be less than VMCG, Ground
significant to takeoff safety. Minimum Control Speed.”
The use of Runway Condition Reading, Paragraph 3.19.11.2.3g “Maximum Abort

although not identical, is fundamentally the Speed, VMAX ABORT, shall be the maximum
same as the U.S. Air Force. airspeed at which an abort may be started
and the aircraft stopped within the remaining
Some useful definitions are: runway length. The data are based on a 3-second
Paragraph 3.19.11.2.3d “Minimum Go Speed, decision period after reaching maximum abort
Vl, shall be the minimum airspeed at which speed, with the engines operating at the initial
the aircraft can experience an engine failure, thrust setting during this time. At the end of
and then continue to accelerate to liftoff speed the 3-second decision period, a time period
VLOF, within the remaining runway length. The shall be allowed for brake application, and a
data is based on an engine failure occurring time delay allowed for movement of engine
at the Minimum Go Speed. Engine failure is throttles to the idle position and activation of
followed by a 3-second decision period with deceleration devises (if applicable). The time
the remaining engines operating at the initial periods to be used shall be applicable to the
thrust setting. In the case of an intermediate airplane configuration and be approved by the
thrust takeoff, an additional time period shall procuring activity.”
App. 4-C.5
APPENDIX
4-C
A comparison with previous definitions makes uses an RCR of 9 for wet whereas the C-141B
it clear that the margins associated with the uses 12, and MIL-STD-3013 specifies 15.
Naval V1 and that of the FAA V1 are not the
same. To summarize, in the FAA model, the
engine fails one second prior to V1, the airplane Conclusion
accelerates to V1, continues to accelerate
somewhat during the transition period, then Due to the fundamental differences in standards
is kept at constant speed for 2 seconds after used during military developmental testing
the transition prior to braking to a stop. In the and certification of civil transport category
Navy model, the engine fails at V1, the aircraft airplanes, the application of procedures and
continues to accelerate with the critical engine techniques learned in military aviation to
out for 3 seconds, then a negotiated period of civil aviation can be inappropriate at best
time passes analogous to the FAA transition and potentially dangerous at worst. Likewise,
period, prior to the airplane braking to a stop. application of civil procedures can be potentially
It is clear that the naval system is quite close to dangerous when operating a military airplane.
the U.S. Air Force system. Unfortunately the The bottom-line is; understand the assumptions
term V1 is used, identical to the FAA V1, but behind the AFM performance numbers, plan
the definition is different. for takeoff contingences, brief the plan, and
should you be confronted with a contingency
during takeoff, execute the briefed plan.
Line-Up Distance
Under current FAA rules, line-up distance is References

not required to be taken into account. Military 1. Federal Aviation Regulation, Part 25,
aircraft must account for it. For the C-141B, Airworthiness Standards: Transport
T.O. 1C-141B-1-1 reads: “Runway available is Category Airplanes, Subpart B—Flight,
actual runway length less the aircraft line-up Performance.
distance. When takeoff EPR is set prior to
brake release, subtract 200 feet. When making 2. Federal Aviation Administration,
a rolling or standing takeoff, subtract 400 feet.” Advisory Circular AC 25-7A, Flight
Other models are less specific, requiring only Test Guide for Certification of Transport
that the takeoff data be computed based on Category Airplanes, 31 March 1998.
runway available. 3. MIL-STD-3013, Department of
Defense Standard Practice, Glossary
and Definitions, Ground Rules, and
Wet Runway Mission Profiles to Define Air Vehicle
Performance Capability, 14 February
Under FAA rules, corrections are not required
2003.
to dry performance numbers when a runway is
wet, except for the more recent models certified
under FAR Amendment 25-92. However, some
carriers voluntarily make use of manufacturer
provided wet runway data. Military manuals
use the Runway Condition Reading (RCR)
system. Basically, the person calculating the
takeoff data either uses the reported RCR or a
default value for wet. Again, this value is not
standard. The T-43A (737-200 ADV, JT8D-9)
App. 4-C.6
APPENDIX
Chapter 2 4-C
U.K. CAA Regulations
Operators who wish to include information on United Kingdom Civil Avaition Authority
regulations should contact the manufacturer for specific information relating to the certification
of their airplanes.
App. 4-C.7
APPENDIX
4-C
App. 4-C.8
APPENDIX
Chapter 3 4-C
Australian CAA Regulations
Operators who wish to include information on Australian Civil Avaition Authority regulations
should contact the manufacturer for specific information relating to the certification of their
airplanes.
App. 4-C.9
APPENDIX
4-C
App. 4-C.10
APPENDIX
Chapter 4 4-C
French DGAC Regulations
Operators who wish to include information on French Civil Avaition Authority regulations
should contact the manufacturer for specific information relating to the certification of their
airplanes.
App. 4-C.11
APPENDIX
4-C
App. 4-C.12
APPENDIX
Chapter 5 4-C
Joint Air Regulations (JARS)
Operators who wish to include information on Joint Aviation Authority regulations should contact
the manufacturer for specific information relating to the certification of their airplanes.
App. 4-C.13
APPENDIX
4-C
App. 4-C.14
APPENDIX
Reverse Thrust Effectiveness
This appendix contains information on effectiveness of thrust reverser systems on modern high bypass
engines. Boeing airplanes with various engine combinations are used as specific examples but the trends
4-D
noted are typical for similar installations on other manufacturers’ airplanes.
The data contained in this appendix is provided for training purposes only and should not be used
for any other purpose.
App. 4-D.i
APPENDIX
4-D
App. 4-D.ii
APPENDIX
4-D
Effect of Engine RPM and
Airspeed On Reverse Thrust
For engines with fan reversers, net reverse thrust is A significant increase in net reverse thrust is achieved
defined as the reverse thrust developed by the fan as engine RPM is increased up to the maximum rec-
reverser system minus the forward thrust generated ommended power setting. Airspeed also has a very
by the engine core plus ram drag. significant effect on net reverse thrust. The airspeed
effect is due to ram drag, which is the product of
A misconception may exist that it is not beneficial the engine inlet airflow and the airplane forward
to use high power settings for reverse thrust during speed. The combination of high engine RPM and
a rejected takeoff, or after landing. It appears that high airspeed can increase the net reverse thrust by
some flight crew personnel believe that at the higher a factor of approximately 3 to 4 (depending on the
power settings, the reverse thrust developed by the engine model) above the net reverse thrust available
fan reverser system will be canceled by the forward at idle power settings. For this reason, when stopping
thrust developed by the engine core. This assump- distance is critical, maximum reverse thrust should
tion is not true for thrust reverser systems installed be applied immediately after landing touchdown or
on Boeing airplanes. The net reverse thrust on high upon initiating a rejected takeoff, concurrently with
bypass engines is significantly greater at the higher speedbrakes and maximum braking.
power settings than at idle reverse.
In summary, it is a misconception that high power
Data shown on figures 1 through 4 are examples settings, during reverse thrust operation, are not
of net reverse thrust versus engine RPM up to the beneficial. A significant difference exists between
maximum recommended thrust setting and airspeed. the reverse thrust obtained at idle power settings
Data for other airplanes and engine combination and at the maximum recommended power settings.
would result in very similar trends. The net reverse Further, reverse thrust should be applied immediately
thrust (installed), figures 1 through 4, have been cor- after landing touchdown or upon initiating a rejected
rected to account for the decrease in airplane drag takeoff because reverse thrust is significantly more
due to reverse thrust operation. The actual reverse effective at high speeds than at low speeds. Proper
thrust (uninstalled) is greater than indicated on the utilization of reverse thrust will result in minimum
charts. However, the net reverse thrust shown is field lengths under adverse runway conditions or
the effective reverse thrust available for airplane increased brake life during normal conditions.
deceleration.
App. 4-D.1
APPENDIX
4-D
Figure 1 +NOTS4!3

42!).).').&/2-!4)/./.,9

2EVERSETHRUST
#&-

3,3TDDAY
.ETREVERSE &LAPS

THRUST

LBENGINE

0ERCENT.
+NOTS4!3
Figure 2
42!).).').&/2-!4)/./.,9

2EVERSETHRUST
#& #
3,3TDDAY
&LAPS
.ETREVERSE
THRUST
LBENGINE

0ERCENT.
App. 4-D.2
APPENDIX
4-D
+NOTS4!3
Figure 3

42!).).').&/2-!4)/./.,9

2EVERSETHRUST
2" %

3,3TDDAY
.ETREVERSE &LAPS

THRUST
LBENGINE

0ERCENT.
Figure 4
+NOTS4!3
42!).).').&/2-!4)/./.,9

2EVERSETHRUST
07
3,3TD$AY
&LAPS
.ETREVERSE
THRUST
LBENGINE

0ERCENT.
App. 4-D.3
APPENDIX
4-D
App. 4-D.4
APPENDIX
Takeoff Safety Training Aid Human

Performance Study
Introduction 3. Evaluate RTO stopping performance
4-E
under the following conditions:
The Boeing Company has compiled the A. Engine failure
information needed to produce a Takeoff Safety
Training Aid. This training aid, similar to the B. Manual braking
Windshear Training Aid, is used in the crew C. Autobraking stop
training environment. The goal of this training D. Crosswind effects
aid is to reduce RTO incidents and accidents. To E. Blown tire performance
achieve this goal, the Takeoff Safety Training F. Exchange of aircraft control
Aid’s objective is to improve Go/No Go decision
making and crew performance in the execution 4. Evaluate the relationship between the
of necessary RTOs. A simulator study was pilot’s knowledge level about RTOs and
conducted to obtain a better understanding his performance in the simulator.
of the areas in which performance can be
improved. The study could be used as a Test Subjects
baseline to confirm that the Aid does provide A total of 48 experienced transport pilots were
an improvement in RTO performance. used in this study. A mix of Boeing pilots and
airline captains was necessary to achieve valid
Test Objectives human factors results. The pilots were type
rated in the 737 and had current operational
The primary purpose of this study was to experience.
evaluate pilot decision making and performance
under various RTO situations. A 737 full flight Test Facility and Requirements
simulator was used to accomplish the study. The The facility used for this test was a 737 Flight
specific objective of this research effort was to Crew Training simulator at Boeing Customer
examine the following factors involved with Training. It is a state of the art simulation facility,
RTO decision making and execution: and is fully certified for flight crew training by
1. Evaluate decision making involved with the FAA and CAA. A qualified 737 pilot was
making Go/No Go decisions due required to occupy the first officer’s seat and
to the following: a qualified simulator instructor was needed to
A. Engine failure conduct the test as well as operate the simulator.
Simulator engineering assistance was required
B. Master Caution illumination to retrieve data as well as prepare the simulator
C. Fire fights and warning bells for testing. A pre-flight questionnaire, post-
D. Blown tire flight questionnaire, and method of debriefing
2. Evaluate RTO procedure accomplishment was required.
under the following conditions:
A. Engine failure
B. All manual stop
C. Maximum use of automatics stop
D. Blown tire
E. Exchange of aircraft control
App. 4-E.1
APPENDIX
4-E
Test Method The variables chosen for investigation

included:
The basic design for this study was to compare
1. Crosswinds
stopping performance with the Airplane Flight
Manual (AFM) predicted distance. 2. Various malfunctions
3. Forced manual braking RTO
All takeoffs were conducted at a runway limited
condition configured as follows: 4. Exchange of aircraft control during RTO
situations
1. Takeoff weight: 130,000 lb
2. Temperature: 30ºC Exposure to the various RTOs and normal
takeoffs was randomized to minimize learning
3. Flaps: 5
effects and reduce the anticipation normally
4. Field length: 6,700 ft associated with tests of this type. One and
one half hours were required for each pilot to
complete the test program. Figure 1 shows a
sample test scenario schedule for a pilot.
Figure 1 A. Normal takeoff, Captain flying E. Engine failure at V1+2 knots, F/0 flying
RTO Sample Test
Profile B. Engine failure at V1–8 knots, Captain flying F. Fire warning at V1–5 knots, Captain flying
C. Engine failure at V1–8 knots, F/0 flying G. Blown tire at V1–10 knots, Captain flying
D. Engine failure at V1+2 knots, Captain flying H. Master Caution light at V1–10 knots,
Captain flying
App. 4-E.2
APPENDIX
4-E
The initial prebrief questionnaire was designed • Left and Right brake force (lb) versus
to quickly assess the pilot’s relative knowledge time (sec)
about RTOs. The remainder of the prebrief was
• Speed brake deployed (UP/DOWN)
devoted to the understanding of the simulator
versus time (sec)
and test configuration. The pilot then entered
the simulator for a quick orientation prior to • Heading (deg) versus time (sec)
the test starting. The order in which the pilots • Deviation from centerline (ft) versus time
received the events was randomized to prevent (sec)
order bias from influencing the results. The
debriefing consisted of a short questionnaire • Rudder pedal deflection (deg) versus time
and debriefing to answer any questions the (sec)
pilot may have had. An informal interview was • Column deflection (deg) versus time (sec)
recorded to obtain pilot comments.
• Pitch (deg) versus time (sec)
The prebrief questions were: • Altitude (ft, RA) versus time (sec)
• Write a definition of V1. • Yoke deflection (deg) versus time (sec)
• Can a pilot beat the flight manual • Roll angle (deg) versus time (sec)
performance predicted for rejecting
at V1? If so, how? • Crosswind velocity (kt) versus time (sec)
• If your takeoff weight equals the runway Data Reduction and Analysis
limit weight in the airfield analysis, what
does that mean to you as a pilot? The data is classified into two general catego-
ries: Objective performance measurements
and subjective data from questionnaires and
Performance Measures debriefing.
Performance measures were taken in the The results from this analysis provided
two areas of decision making and Go/ No information to determine if the following
Go performance. The measures of the stop were true:
decision were recorded as the initiation of
thrust reduction, brake application, or spoiler 1. There is no effect on RTO performance
deployment. Go/No Go performance was with crosswinds.
assessed by comparison of the following 2. There is no effect on RTO performance
parameters: with the exchange of aircraft control.
• Speed (knots) versus time (sec) 3. There is no effect on RTO performance
• Distance to runway end (ft) versus time when using full automatic capability as
(sec) compared to manual performance.
• %Nl, L Engine versus time (sec) 4. Non engine related problems have no
effect on RTO decision time or perfor-
• %N1, R Engine versus time (sec) mance.
• Left and Right thrust lever (lever angle)
versus time (sec)
• RTO autobrakes (ON/OFF) versus time
(sec)
App. 4-E.3
APPENDIX
4-E
Simulator Test Results Phase 2 began on July 16, 1991 and was
completed on September 12, 1991. Twenty
Phase 1 of the simulator tests began April 17, four 737 Line Captains (no Check Airmen, no
1991 and was completed on May 3, 1991. During simulator instructors, no Training Captains)
this time period, twenty four 737 Training were evaluated from five airlines. There were
Captains were tested. These pilots averaged no more than eight pilots per airline to keep
3.5 years with Boeing. After participating as from biasing the results in the favor of one type
the first captain, one pilot became the first of training or one airline’s policies.
officer for the remaining captains. He was
a training captain with considerable line Two Boeing Training Captains were used as
experience and was able to closely emulate the first officers for these captains. The original
characteristics of a good line first officer. first officer was used again along with another
training captain of similar background and
After evaluating the data and confirming the experience. This second first officer had also
test process and data reduction techniques, a participated in Phase 1 of the study.
meeting was held in Seattle with the airlines
and agencies participating in the development of As illustrated in Figure 2, the two pilot groups
the Training Aid. The test results were presented were surprisingly similar in background and
and volunteers were solicited to participate in experience.
Phase 2 of the study.
Figure 2
Comparison of
Boeing Airline
Boeing subjects
with airline subjects Total time, hrs 11,546 12,308
737 time, hrs 1,918 3,748
Airline years 11 16
Military years 9 6
Number of rejects 3.3 4.8
App. 4-E.4
APPENDIX
4-E
Test Results – As can be seen in Figure 3, the number of

Go/No Go Decision Making rejects per event varied by 1 in all cases except
engine fire. As a result of this similarity, later
Although results varied considerably between findings will be presented for the 48 pilots as
airlines, when the airline pilots were taken as one group.
one group and Boeing as another, the basic
decisions made when presented the study
scenario were remarkably similar.
Figure 3
2EJECTS .UMBEROFREJECTS
%VENT “Go/No Go”
"OEING !IRLINE decision
%NGINEFAIL6 CAPTAINFLYING
%NGINEFAIL6 FIRSTOFFICERFLYING
%NGINEFAIL6CAPTAINFLYING
"OEING
%NGINEFAIL6FIRSTOFFICERFLYING
!IRLINE
-ASTERCAUTION6 CAPTAIN
&IREWARNING6 CAPTAIN
"LOWNTIRE6 CAPTAIN
.ORMALTAKEOFF
4OTALREJECTS
App. 4-E.5
APPENDIX
4-E
As seen in Figure 4, pilots did not reject their Caution light which in this case came on due
takeoffs as often as was anticipated in the to a hydraulic pump overheat 10 knots below
“classical” cases that are normally trained, V1. Boeing, along with most airlines, specifies
namely engine failures and fires. Another that “Once thrust is set and takeoff roll has
surprise occurred in the “nonclassical” cases. been established, rejecting a takeoff solely for
Almost one-third of the pilots rejected for the illumination of the amber MASTER CAUTION
blown tire although the only indication was a light is not recommended.”
vibration. There were seven rejects for a Master
Figure 4
“Go/No Go”
2EJECTS 2EJECTS0ERCENTAGE
%VENT
decision making TOTAL

"LOWNTIRE6 CAPTAIN
.ORMALTAKEOFF
App. 4-E.6
APPENDIX
4-E
Test Results – airlines represented also had this as their

Procedure Accomplishment procedure, while others had a procedure to raise
the speedbrakes through the use of the reverse
When a captain did reject a takeoff, his thrust levers and monitor the speedbrake handle
procedure was evaluated against his published for proper operation. As can be seen in Figure
company policy. All Boeing pilots have a 5, the number of incorrect procedures used was
procedure which says to “Simultaneously close rather high. The incorrect procedure used in
the thrust levers (disengage the autothrottle, each case was selecting reverse thrust prior to
if required) and apply maximum brakes. If raising the speedbrake. This was only applied to
RTO autobrakes are selected, monitor system those airlines/Boeing which have that procedure
performance and apply manual wheel brakes if in their manuals. For the Boeing subjects, it is
the AUTO BRAKE DISARM light illuminates immediately apparent that the rate of incorrect
or deceleration is not adequate. Rapidly raise procedures is much higher for “nonclassical”
the speedbrakes and apply maximum reverse cases than for “classical”
thrust consistent with the conditions.” Some
Figure 5
0ERCENTAGE 0ERCENTAGEINCORRECT
%VENT Procedural
"OEING !IRLINE accomplishment
"OEING
!IRLINE
"LOWNTIRE6 CAPTAIN
.ORMALTAKEOFF
4OTALS
App. 4-E.7
APPENDIX
4-E
It would seem that the Boeing Pilots have a During the course of the study, a new variable
greater propensity to incorrectly accomplish was unintentionally introduced. Due to a
the procedure than airline pilots. However, simulator malfunction, the auto speedbrake
from Figure 6, it is apparent that airlines using failed for a period of time resulting in an
manual speedbrake have about the same error opportunity to observe the ability of pilots
rate as the Boeing pilots. Pilots using auto using that device to monitor its deployment. It
speedbrake did the procedural steps correctly is apparent that it is not very well monitored.
every time. The first officer would only raise the speedbrake
if he was briefed by the captain to do so. Only
one captain did, so in those 2 out of 11 cases,
the first officer raised the speedbrake.
Figure 6 -ANUAL !UTO

Procedure 3" 3"
accomplishment for 0ROCEDURE 0ROCEDURE
airline pilots only
.UMBERREJECTS
.UMBERINCORRECT
0ERCENTCORRECT
!UTO3"FAIL
-ANUAL
#APTAINNOTICED !UTO
App. 4-E.8
APPENDIX
4-E
Test Results – occurred with the greatest margin before V1.

Stopping Performance The worst case was the reject initiated after V1,
followed closely by the rejects for the blown
Stopping performance as measured by runway tire. The simulator eliminates braking force
remaining was averaged for all rejects for each from the wheel with the failed tire reducing
situation presented. Pilots were able to stop the the total brake retarding force to 75% of what
airplane with the greatest margin in the few it normally would be. As a result, only 3 of 15
cases when the Master Caution illuminated pilots were able to stop the aircraft prior to the
ten knots prior to V1. In this case the pilot had end of the runway, and those, just barely.
two engine reverse thrust and the malfunction
Figure 7
.O 279
%VENT !VERAGE2UNWAY2EMAINING&EET Stopping
2EJECTS 2EMAIN performance
"LOWNTIRE6 CAPTAIN
.ORMALTAKEOFF

App. 4-E.9
APPENDIX
4-E
Test Results – Test Results –

Responses to Questions Versus Simulator Training Versus RTO Performance
Performance
Training and company policy appear to play
The data taken did not show any correlation a significant role in the decisions pilots make.
between performance in the simulator and From Figure 8, it can be seen that as expected,
response to the questions asked. Boeing contributed 50% of the pilots to the study
and accomplished 47% of the rejected takeoffs.
However, Airline 1 and Airline 2 contributed
the same number of pilots yet Airline 1 pilots
rejected almost twice as many times as did
Airline 2 pilots.
Figure 8
Participation versus Percentage
RTOs accomplished
Percentage
Training Pilots Rejects
Contributed Performed 10 20 30 40 50
Boeing 50% 47%
Airline 1 17% 28%
Airline 2 17% 15%
Airline 3 10% 5%
Airline 4 4% 4%
Pilots contributed
Airline 5 2% 1% Rejects performed
App. 4-E.10
APPENDIX
4-E
Data Reduction and Analysis expected result of an increase in distance with

a crosswind was clearly there. The increase
Once all the data was received it was used to results from pilots steering with differential
answer the questions posed in the Test Plan. braking and thus reducing the total braking
1. There is no effect on RTO performance with force applied.
crosswinds.
As can be seen in Figure 9, crosswinds had a

minor effect on stopping margins although the
Calm winds – 390 ft remaining Figure 9

Crosswind effect
15 knot crosswinds – 330 ft remaining on stopping
margins
App. 4-E.11
APPENDIX
4-E
2. There is no effect on RTO performance with performed the reject, the stopping distance
the exchange of aircraft control. margins were smaller yet. During first officer
takeoffs with the captain performing the reject,
As can be seen in Figure 10, exchange of there were few crew coordination problems.
aircraft control did have an effect on stopping However, in the situation when the first officer
performance. The stopping margins achieved performed the reject, there often were crew
when the captain was performing the takeoff coordination difficulties. There is an inherent
exceeded those of all first officer takeoffs. delay when the captain is required to make the
There were variations regarding the ability of reject decision and verbalize it, then the first
the copilot to make the reject decision and what officer reacts and performs the procedure. There
technique would be used if the reject decision is also a physical difficulty in the first officer
was made. When the first officer actually raising the speedbrake.
Figure 10 Engine fail V1-8
• Captain flying (25) – 500 feet remaining
• F/O flying (21) – 430 feet remaining

– F/0 rejects (7) – 320 feet remaining
Note: All airline rejects done by the captain
App. 4-E.12
APPENDIX
4-E
3. There is no effect on RTO performance autobrakes come on as soon as the thrust levers
when using full automatic capability as come to idle, autobrakes gave a 1-2 second
compared to manual performance. earlier brake application. RTO autobrakes also
applied more consistent braking force. The
The use of autobrakes significantly increased negative side of autobrakes is that they can
stopping margins. The most common stopping be inadvertently disengaged resulting in no
technique was to apply manual wheel brakes braking force being applied for a few seconds
as the last step in the RTO procedure. Since until the crew notices it.
RTO autobrakes increased stopping margin Figure 11

Stopping margins
• Autobrakes armed: 450 ft remaining (36 cases) with autobrakes
ARMED versus OFF
• Manual brakes: 270 ft remaining (40 cases)
• Autobrake on more than 4 sec: 610 ft remaining (4 cases)
App. 4-E.13
APPENDIX
4-E
4. Non-engine related problems have no effect time from event to first action occurred for the
on RTO decision time or performance. engine fire warning given at 5 knots prior to V1.
This time was taken as the reference to compare
Decision Time the other times. It should be noted that “Go”
decision time was not measured since there is
As suspected, decision times increased for no clear activity other than a continued takeoff
events that were more difficult to recognize to indicate the decision.
and that are not as well practiced. The shortest
Figure 12
Fire warning V1-5, captain Reference time
Type of event
versus decision Engine fail V1-8, captain Reference time + .2 sec
time*
Master caution V1-10, captain Reference time + .4 sec
Engine fail V1-8, first officer Reference time + .6 sec
Blown tire V1-10, captain Reference time +.6 sec
*Time between event and first stopping action
App. 4-E.14
APPENDIX
4-E
Procedural Performance
Procedural accomplishment was very similar

to the decision time statistics. Again, it appears
that the less familiar or more difficult to discern
the event is, the more likely the pilot is to do the
manual speedbrakes procedure incorrectly.
For Boeing and airlines whose procedure is manual speed Figure 13

brake, 32% of the RTOs were done using auto speedbrake Procedure
accomplishment
Boeing/Airlines
• 42% for blown tire, captain flying using manual
speedbrake
• 35% for the engine fail V1-8, first officer flying
• 30% for the engine fail V1-8, captain flying
• 25% for the master caution, captain flying
• 14% for the fire warning V1-5, captain flying
App. 4-E.15
APPENDIX
4-E
Lessons Learned Stopping Performance

The use of improper procedure and techniques
Certain observations can be made from the
increases stopping distance.
data taken. These are divided into the areas of
decision making, procedure accomplishment, Non optimal techniques included:
stopping performance, and knowledge.
• Improper foot position
Decision Making • Modulating brake pressure (pumping
brakes)
The pilots tested were more “Go” oriented than
anticipated. From the briefings it was discovered • Disconnecting RTO Autobrakes and
that many of the pilots used an informal “pad” delayed manual application
of 5-20 knots less than V1 as a speed beyond
which they will not begin a reject when in a Crew Coordination Difficulties
runway limit situation. Crew coordination when first officer flying:
This “Go” orientation appears to be stronger Worst Case

when the first officer is making the takeoff. Captain calling the reject and first
It was even more apparent when the first officer doing the RTO
officer is responsible for performing the reject Best Case
procedure. Captain controlling the thrust levers and
doing the RTO
The vibration associated with a blown tire
appears to induce pilots to reject with no other Manual versus RTO Autobraking
malfunction indications. Most distance remaining:
RTO Autobrakes left on for entire stop
In spite of clear recommendations to the Few pilots matched or exceeded the
contrary, a few pilots rejected for illumination performance of the autobrakes
of the Master Caution light in the high speed
regime. Most common technique:
Autobrakes initiate the braking and the
pilot completes the stop
Procedure Accomplishment
For Boeing and Airlines using manual speed Knowledge versus Performance
brake: The data taken does not show a correlation
32% of the RTOs were done using incorrect between performance in the simulator and
procedures responses to the questions asked. However,
the questions asked did reveal some general
42% for BLOWN TIRE RTOs, CAPT
misconceptions about RTOs:
FLYING
35% for ENG FAIL, V1-8 RTOs, - 50% said it was not possible to stop shorter
FIRST OFFICER FLYING than the AFM predicted distance
30% for ENG FAIL, V1-8 RTOs, - Few stated an awareness of the altitude over
CAPT FLYING the end of the runway when continuing a
takeoff after an engine failure
25% for MASTER CAUTION RTOs,
CAPT FLYING - Most gave an incomplete definition of V1
14% for FIRE WARNING V1-5 RTOs,
CAPT FLYING
App. 4-E.16
APPENDIX
4-E
Takeoff Continued Procedure Accomplishment
Although it was not a specific study item, it is Proper (accurate) accomplishment of the RTO
very significant that of the 70 takeoffs continued procedure needs additional emphasis
by the captains tested with an engine failure,
• Improved crew communication and
there was not a single crash.
coordination
• Inservice procedure review
Opportunities for Improvement
or
The results of the study bring up several areas • Change the procedure to incorporate the
of operation that can be improved: use of auto speedbrake so that it is more
like the well-practiced landing procedure.
Decision Making • However, pilots relying on auto speed-
Emphasize an accurate meaning of V1 brake for conducting the RTO must devise
a reliable method of confirming that the
• Assure an accurate understanding of Go/
speedbrake has raised.
No Go margins
• Pilots must understand the effects of the A recommendation to standardize the RTO
reduction in screen height resulting from procedure to have the captain control the thrust
a continued takeoff with an engine failure levers once takeoff thrust is set and perform
prior to V1 the rejected appears to be appropriate.
• The impact of using reverse thrust and
quick reaction time to enhance stopping Stopping Performance
performance requires emphasis
Include training/information about foot position
The blown tire problem needs significant for takeoff and landing.
emphasis in training
Greater emphasis should be given to the
• Academic training emphasizing the value of RTO autobrakes. Demonstration of
adverse impact on stopping performance autobrake rejected takeoffs may add value.
needs to be included However, manual braking techniques should
• Simulator training to demonstrate the be emphasized in training.
“feel” of the blown tire and the merits
of continuing the takeoff should be done Experience, Knowledge, and Training
During simulator training, realistic rejected

takeoffs should be presented in field length limit
situations to confirm proper braking techniques
and crew coordination.
The training given should reflect known
causes of RTO accidents and incidents.
App. 4-E.17
APPENDIX
4-E
App. 4-E.18
APPENDIX
Airplane Flight Manual Transition Time Details
The data in this appendix is provided as a reference for the instructor. The individual diagrams
show the relationship between the average time required to reconfigure the airplane from an
4-F
RTO in the certification flight tests and the expanded times used in the computation of certified
takeoff performance in the AFM.
The AFM transition time data supplied to operators by the various airframe manufacturers
should be retained in this appendix as follows:
Table of Contents
Manufacturer Page
Airbus Airplanes............................................................................................................4-F.ABI.i
Boeing Airplanes........................................................................................................... 4-F.TBC.i
Other Manufacturers Airplanes.....................................................................................4-F.OTH.i
App. 4-F.i
APPENDIX
4-F
App. 4-F.ii
APPENDIX
Brake Pedal Force Data
The data in this appendix is provided as a reference for the instructor. The individual charts
show the brake pedal force required to apply full brake system pressue, to set the parking brake,
4-G
and to disarm the RTO autobrake function if applicable.
The brake pedal force data supplied to operators by the various airframe manufacturers should
be retained in this appendix as follows:
Table of Contents
Airplane Manufacturer Page
Airbus Airplanes...........................................................................................................4-G.ABI.i
Boeing Airplanes.......................................................................................................... 4-G.TBC.i
Other Manufacturers Airplanes....................................................................................4-G.OTH.i
App. 4-G.i
APPENDIX
4-G
App. 4-G.ii
APPENDIX
Reduced Thrust and Reduced V1 Examples
The data in this appendix is provided as a reference for the instructor. The first page for each
airplane model shows the inherent margins associated with the use of the Assumed Temperature
4-H
Method (ATM) of reduced thrust, as described in Section 4.3.5.7 of the main document.
The second page for each airplane model contains an example of using ATM in combination
with a reduced V1 policy as described in Section 4.3.4.2 and 4.3.6.8 of the main document. The
DC series and MD series airplanes do not have this page.
These examples are generally typical of the margins for the derivatives of a given airplane model
also, so not all airplane/engine combinations are included.
The reduced thrust and reduced V1 data supplied to operators by the various airframe manufacturers
should be retained in this appendix as follows:
Table of Contents

Airbus Airplanes...........................................................................................................4-H.ABI.i
Boeing Airplanes.......................................................................................................... 4-H.TBC.i
Other Manufacturers Airplanes....................................................................................4-H.OTH.i
App. 4-H.i
APPENDIX
4-H
App. 4-H.ii
APPENDIX
Lineup Distance Charts
The data in this appendix is provided as a reference for the instructor. The tables show the
lineup distance required to position the airplane on the runway from a 90- or 180-degree
4-I
taxiway entry.
The lineup distance data supplied to operators by the various airframe manufacturers should
Table of Contents
Airbus Airplanes............................................................................................................ 4-I.ABI.i
Boeing Airplanes............................................................................................................4-I.TBC.i
Other Manufacturers Airplanes..................................................................................... 4-I.OTH.i
App. 4-I.i
APPENDIX
4-I
App. 4-I.ii
APPENDIX
The Effect of Procedural Variations

on Stopping Distance
The data in this appendix is provided as a reference for the instructor. The individual diagrams
show the approximate effects of various configuration items and procedural variations on the
4-J
stopping performance of the airplane. These calculations are frequently based on generalized
data, and are intended for training discussion purposes only. The data are based on the certified
transition time for each specific model.
The stopping distance data supplied to operators by the various airframe manufacturers should
Table of Contents
Airbus Airplanes............................................................................................................ 4-J.ABI.i
Boeing Airplanes........................................................................................................... 4-J.TBC.i
Other Manufacturers Airplanes.....................................................................................4-J.OTH.i
App. 4-J.i
APPENDIX
4-J
App. 4-J.ii
INDEX
A
Academic Training Program 3.2
objectives 3.2
program modules 3.2
syllabus 3.2
Accidents 2.4-2.5, 4.5-4.6
List 1959 to 2003 App 4-B
statistics 2.1-2.7, 4.2-4.8
Airplane configuration 2.23, App 3-C.31-41, 4.27
Amendment 25-42 4.9-4.10
Amendment 25-92 4.9-4.11
Answers, examination App 3-B.17
Anti-skid 2.21, 2.24, 2.26, 2.31, 4.25, 4.28, 4.30, 4.36
Anti-skid inoperative braking 2.38, 4.48
Atmospheric conditions 2.19, 2.22, 2.23, App 3-C.32, 4.24, 4.27, 4.28
Autobrakes 2.38, 4.48
Autothrottle 2.37, 4.46
B
Balanced Field Defined 2.11, 4.13
Brakes 2.25–2.32, 4.29–4.38
actuation times App 4-F
automatic 2.38, 4.48
carbon 2.30, 4.35-4.37
energy 2.27, 2.28, 2.31, 4.31, 4.32, 4.37
fires 2.32, 4.37
manual 2.37, 4.46
pedal force data App 4-G
reverse thrust effects 2.32, 4.38
RTO autobrakes 2.38, 4.48
steel 2.30, 4.35-4.37
worn 2.27, 4.31
Braking
speedbrake effect 2.28, 4.33
while hydroplaning 2.21, 4.25
Braking Techniques
accident factor 2.7, 4.8
antiskid inoperative 2.38, 4.48
autobrakes 2.38, 4.48
flight manual 2.12-2.14, 4.14-4.16
manual 2.37, 4.46
performance study App 4-E
Briefing
instructor pilot App 3-A
takeoff 2.41, App 3-C.45, 4.53
Takeoff Safety App 3-C

INDEX
C
Callouts 2.40, 2.41, App 3-C.46-48, 4.52, 4.54
Carbon Brakes 2.30, 4.35-4.37
Configuration Deviation List (CDL) 2.23, 2.24, App 3-C.35, 4.28
Configuration 2.23, App 3-C.31-41, 4.27
Crew Members 2.40, 2.41, App 3-C.44, 4.52-4.54
Crew Preparedness 2.40, 4.52
Crew Resource Management (CRM) 2.41, 2.42, 4.51, 4.52
briefing 2.41, App 3-C.45, 4.53
callouts 2.40, 2.41, App 3-C.46-48, 4.52, 4.54
summary 2.42, 4.54
use of crew members 2.41, 4.54
with the RTO 2.40, 4.53
D
Decisions 2.1-2.4, 2.41, 4.2-4.4, 4.53
Definitions App 3-A.1-3, App 4-C
Documentation Overview 1.2
E
Effect of Procedural Variation on Stopping Distance App 4-J
Engine
accident factor 2.6, 4.7
bleed air 2.23, 4.28
Examination Questions App 3-B
Exercises
simulator 3.5-3.14, App 3-D
F
Factors that affect takeoff and RTO performance 2.19, App 3-C.31, 4.24
Flaps 2.23, 4.27
selection 2.35, App 3-C.33, 4.45
G
“Go” margins 2.16-2.18, 2.23, 2.34-2.36, App 3-C.28, 4.18-4.20, 4.28, 4.42, 4.44, App 4-E.17,
App 4-H
Grooved Runways 2.20, 2.22, 3.15, 3.16, 4.25, 4.26
H
High brake energy RTOs 2.31, 4.37
Human Performance Study App 4-E
Hydroplaning 2.21, App 3-C.43, 4.25, 4.26
ii
INDEX
I
Instructor Examination Guide 3-B.9
Instructor Pilot Syllabus Briefing Supplement App 3-A
Introduction 1.1, 2.1, 3.1, 4.1
L
Landing gear retraction 2.26, 4.30
Lessons Learned 2.6, 4.8, App 4-E.16
Lineup Distance 2.36, 3.3, 4.40, 4.41
charts App 4-I
M
Manual Braking Techniques 2.37, 4.46, App 4-E.13, App 4-E.16
Margins
“Go” 2.16-2.18, 2.23, 2.34-2.36, App 3-C.28, 4.18-4.20, 4.28, 4.42, 4.44, App 4-E.17,
App 4-H
“Stop” 2.15, 2.24, 2.27, 2.34-2.36, App 3-C.37, 4.17-4.20, 4.24, 4.25,
4.28, 4.42, 4.44, 4.50, App 4-E.11-4-E.13
Military Rules App 4-C
Minimum Equipment List (MEL) 2.23, App 3-C.35, App 3-C.45, 4.27, 4.28
Missing or inoperative equipment 2.23, App 3-C.35, 4.28,
N
NTSB 1.1, 1.3, 2.27, 4.1, 4.31, App 4-A, App 4-B.i
Special Investigation Report SIR-90/02 App 4-A
O
Objectives 1.2, 2.1, 3.3, 3.5, 3.15, 4.1
Overview for Management 1.1-1.4
conclusion 1.3
documentation overview 1.2
general goal and objectives 1.2
industry consensus 1.3
introduction 1.1
resource utilization 1.3
Other Takeoff Rules App 4-C
P
Pilot Guide to Takeoff Safety Questions App 3-B
Procedural Variations App 4-J
effect on stopping distance App 4-J
iii
INDEX
Q
Questions App 3-B
R
Reduced Thrust 2.34, 4.42,4.43, 4.50, 4.51, App 4-H
Reduced V1 Techniques 2.36, 4.45, 4.49, 4.50, App 4-H
Regulations
Air Force App 4-C
Amendment 25-42 4.9-4.10
Amendment 25-92 4.9-4.11
FAR 4.9-4.11, 4.14
JAR 4.9, 4.14
Navy App 4-C
Residual brake energy 2.28, App 3-C.38, 4.32
Reverse Thrust Effectiveness 2.32, 4.38, App 4-D, App 4-J
RTO autobrakes 2.38, 3.3, 3.8, App 3-D, 4.48, App 4-E.3, 4-E.13, 4-E.16, 4-E.17
Rules App 4-C
Runway
excess 2.15, 2.19, 2.24, 2.35, 2.36, 2.38, 4.17, 4.22, 4.28, 4.44, 4.46, 4.47, 4.51,
grooved 2.20, 2.22, 3.15, 3.16, 4.25, 4.26
lineup 2.36, 3.3, 4.40, 4.41, App 4-I
parameters 2.33, 4.38
Runway Surface Condition 2.5, 2.20, 2.35, App 3-C.42, 4.6, 4.24, 4.25, 4.44
S
Safety Margins 2.14, 2.35, 4.17, 4.44
Script, Video App 3-E
Setting Takeoff Thrust 2.36, 4.46
Simulator
exercises 3.5-3.14, App 3-D
fidelity checks 3.15
grooved runways 3.15
Implementation Guide 3.15
tuning for accomplishment of objectives 3.15
Simulator Study App 4-E
Simulator Training Program 3.3-3.14
objectives 3.3
pilot simulator briefing 3.6
training syllabus 3.3
syllabus 3.3
Speedbrake
effect on braking 2.28-2.30, App 3-C.39, 4.33-4.35
iv
INDEX
Statistics 2.1-2.7, 4.2-4.8

Steel Brakes 2.30, 4.35-4.37
“Stop” margins 2.15, 2.24, 2.27, 2.34-2.36, App 3-C.37, 4.17-4.20, 4.24, 4.25,
4.28, 4.42, 4.44, 4.50, App 4-E.11-4-E.13
Stopping Distance
effect of procedural variations App 4-J
effect of runway surface condition 2.20, 3.15, 4.24
effect of speedbrake 2.28-2.30, App 3-C.39, 4.33-4.35
Student Examination App 3-B.1
Summary 2.42, 4.54, 4-B.1
Summary of Answers App 3-B.17
T
Takeoff
atmospheric conditions 2.19, 2.22, 2.23, App 3-C.32, 4.24, 4.27, 4.28
briefing 2.41, App 3-C.45, 4.53
calculations 2.18, 4.21
callouts 2.40, 2.41, App 3-C.46-48, 4.52, 4.54
configuration 2.23, App 3-C.31-41, 4.27
data 2.34, 4.44
factors 2.19-2.34, App 3-C.31, 4.24-4.43
FAR Definitions 2.8-2.11, App 3-A.1, 3-A.2, 3-A.3, 4.9-4.11
field length 2.8, 2.18, 4.11, 4.21
flap selection 2.35, App 3-C.33, 4.45
lineup distance 2.36, 3.3, 4.40, 4.41, App 4-I
reduced thrust 2.34, 4.42,4.43, 4.50, 4.51, App 4-H
rolling 2.37, 4.46
rules 2.8-2.14, App 3-C.16, 4.9-4.17, App 4-C
setting thrust 2.36, 4.46
Takeoff Safety Briefing App 3-C
Takeoff Safety Video Script App 3-E
Taxi Technique 2.25, 4.29
Thrust
loss 2.17, 2.23, 4.20, 4.28
reduced 2.34, 4.42,4.43, 4.50, 4.51, App 4-H
reverse 2.32, App 3-C.22, 4.38, App 4-D
setting 2.36, 4.46
Tires 2.25-2.27, 2.31, 2.32, App 3-C.36, 4.29-4.31, 4.37, 4.38
Training Programs (see Academic Training Program, Simulator Training Program)
Transitions 2.12, 4.15, App 4-F

INDEX
V
V1
callout 2.40, 2.41, App 3-C.46-48, 4.52, 4.54
defined 2.10, App 3-A.1, 4.9, 4.12
reduced 2.36, 4.45, 4.49, 4.50, App 4-H
VLOF 3-A.2
Vmca 2.34, 4.42
Vmcg 2.16, 2.34, 4.19, 4.42, 4.49
VR 3-A.2
V2 3-A.2
Video Script App 3-E
W
Wheels 2.25-2.32, App 3-C.36, 4.29-4.38
vi

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What are the primary reasons for revising the Takeoff Safety Training Aid?

What are the primary reasons for revising the Takeoff Safety Training Aid?

What are some of the main issues addressed in the updated airworthiness regulations?

What are some of the main issues addressed in the updated airworthiness regulations?

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Takeoff Safety Training Aid

1 Takeoff Safety - Overview for Management.....................................................................1.i

1.0 Introduction.................................................................................................................... 1.1

1.1 General Goal and Objectives......................................................................................... 1.2

1.2 Documentation Overview.............................................................................................. 1.2

1.3 Industry Consensus........................................................................................................ 1.3

1.4 Resource Utilization....................................................................................................... 1.3

1.5 Conclusion..................................................................................................................... 1.3

2 Pilot Guide to Takeoff Safety.............................................................................................2.i

2.0 Introduction.................................................................................................................... 2.1

2.2 “Successful Versus Unsuccessful” Go/No Go Decisions............................................... 2.1

2.3.5 Factors that Affect Takeoff and RTO Performance................................................. 2.19

2.4 Crew Resource Management....................................................................................... 2.40

3 Example Takeoff Safety Training Program . ...................................................................3.i

3.0 Introduction........................................................................................................................ 3.1

3.1 Academic Training Program.......................................................................................... 3.2

3.2 Simulator Training Program........................................................................................... 3.3

3.3 Simulator Implementation Guide................................................................................. 3.15

4 Takeoff Safety Background Data.......................................................................................4.i

4.0 Introduction.................................................................................................................... 4.1

4.1 Objectives ..................................................................................................................... 4.1

4.2 “Successful Versus Unsuccessful” Go/No Go Decisions............................................... 4.2

4.2.1 An In-service Perspective On Go/No Go Decisions.................................................. 4.2

4.3.6.10 Crew Preparedness............................................................................................. 4.52

Takeoff Safety - Overview for Management

1.1 General Goal and Objectives......................................................................................... 1.2

1.2 Documentation Overview.............................................................................................. 1.2

1.3 Industry Consensus........................................................................................................ 1.3

1.4 Resource Utilization....................................................................................................... 1.3

1.5 Conclusion..................................................................................................................... 1.3

Takeoff Safety - Overview for Management

rejected takeoffs and their passengers, crews 1.2 Documentation Overview

Section 4 includes information on: 1.3 Industry Consensus

This section is written in as generic a manner as 1.4 Resource Utilization

This document and the optional video are

updating their own takeoff safety training

Pilot Guide to Takeoff Safety

2.2 “Successful Versus Unsuccessful” Go/No Go Decisions............................................... 2.1

2.4 Crew Resource Management....................................................................................... 2.40

Pilot Guide to Takeoff Safety

Takeoffs, RTOs, and Overruns

RTOs (est.) 143,000 6,000

• 1 RTO per 3,000 takeoffs

2.2.2 “Successful” Go/No Go Decisions the takeoff after experiencing a nose

his first non-supervised line takeoff in this 2.2.4 Statistics

must be recognized that catastrophic situations 2.2.5 Lessons Learned

Figure 5 %NGINE 

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2.3.1.2 V1 Speed Defined

Continued Effect of V1 speed

for older models. simultaneously initiate maximum braking,

2.3.3.1 The “Stop” Margins The horizontal axis of Figure 13 is the

The minimum second segment climb gradients

By comparison, four-engine airplanes only

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Figure 5 %NGINE

#REWCOORDINATION .ON %NGINE