D. Chaum Et Al. (Eds.), Advances in Cryptology © Springer Science+Business Media New York 1983

BLIND SIGNATURES FOR UNTRACEABLE PAYMENTS
David Chaum
Department of Computer Science

University of California
Sant<.l Barbara, CA
INTRODUCTION
Automation of the way we pay for goods and services is already
underway, as can be seen by the variety and growth of electronic
banking services available to consumers. The ultimate structure of
the new electronic payments system may have a substantial impact on
personal privacy as well as on the nature and extent of criminal use
of payments. Ideally a new payments system should address both of
these seemingly conflicting sets of concerns.
On the one hand, knowledge by a third party of the payee,
amount, and time of payment for every transaction made by an
individual can reveal a great deal about the individual's
whereabouts, associations and lifestyle. For example, consider
payments for such things as transportation, hotels, restaurants,
movies, theater, lectures, food, pharmaceuticals, alcohol, books,
periodicals, dues, religious and political contributions.
on the other hand, an anonymous payments systems like bank notes
and coins suffers from lack of controls and security. For example,
consider problems such as lack of proof of payment, theft of payments
media, and black payments for bribes, tax evasion, and black markets.
A fundamentally new kind of cryptography is proposed here, which
allows an automated payments system with the following properties:
(1) Inability of third parties to determine payee, time or amount of

payments madP- by an individual.
(2) Ability of individuals to provide proof of payment, or to

determine the identity of the payee under exceptional
circumstances.
199
D. Chaum et al. (eds.), Advances in Cryptology

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1983
200 David Chaum
(3) Ability to stop use of payments media reported stolen.
BLIND SIGNATURE CRYPTOSYSTEMS

The new kind of cryptography will be introduced first in terms
of an analogy and then by description of its parts, their use, and
the resulting security properties. No actual example cryptosystem is
presented .
Basic Idea
------
The concept of a blind signature can be illustrated by an
example taken from the familiar world of paper documents. The paper
analog of a blind signature can be implemented with carbon paper
lined envelopes. Writing a signature on the outside of such an
envelope leaves a carbon copy of the signature on a slip of paper
within the envelope.
Consider the problem faced by a trustee who wishes to hold an
election by secret ballot, but the electors are unable to meet to
drop their ballots into a single hat. Each elector is very concerned
about keeping his or her vote secret from the trustee, and each
elector also demands the ability to verify that their vote is
counted.
A solution can be obtained by use of the special envelopes.
Each elector places a ballot slip with their vote written on it in a
carbon lined envelope; places the carbon lined envelope in an outer
envelope addressed to the trustee, with their own return address; and
mails the nested envelopes to the trustee. When the trustee receives
an outer envelope with the return addre!;s of an elector on it, the
trustee removes the inner carbon lined envelope from the outer
envelope; signs the outside of the carbon lined envelope; and sends
the carbon lined envelope back, in a new outer envelope, to the
retur·n address on the old outer envelope . Thus, only authorized
electors receive signed ballot slips. Of course, the trustee uses a
special signature which is only valid for the election!
When an elector receives a signed envelope, the elector removes
the outer envelope; checks the signature on the carbon lined
envelope; removes the signed ballot slip from the carbon lined
envelope; and mails the ballot to the trustee on the day of the
election in a new outer envelope, without a return address.
When the trustee receives the ballots, they can be put on public
display. Anyone can count the displayed ballots and check the
signatures on them. If electors remember some identifying aspect of
their ballot, such as the fiber pattern of the paper, they can check
that their ballot is on display. But since the trustee never
actually saw the ballot slips while signing them (and assuming every
signature is identical), the trustee can not know any identifying
aspect of the ballot slips. Therefore, the trustee can not know
anything about the correspondence between the ballot containing

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BLIND SIGNATURES FOR UNTRACEABLE PAYMENTS

Department of Computer Science

(1) Inability of third parties to determine payee, time or amount of

(2) Ability of individuals to provide proof of payment, or to

D. Chaum et al. (eds.), Advances in Cryptology

(3) Ability to stop use of payments media reported stolen.

BLIND SIGNATURE CRYPTOSYSTEMS

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