Articles: What Ever Happened To Policy Implementation? An Alternative Approach

ARTICLES
What Ever Happened to Policy Implementation?

An Alternative Approach
Peter deLeon and Linda deLeon
University of Colorado, Denver
Downloaded from http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of Arizona on June 6, 2016

ABSTRACT
One of the earliest topics addressed by policy analysts was

public policy implementation. Starting with the seminal work of
Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, policy implementation has
burgeonedfroma largely overlooked interest to perhaps the policy
analysis growth industry over the last thirty years. However, even
though an enormous set of books and articles deals with implemen-
tation, it has been described by some as leading to an intellectual
dead end because of its problematic relationship to a generalized
theory of policy implementation. In this article we examine three
generations of policy implementation theory research, emphasizing
its basic reliance on a command (i.e., top-down) orientation, and
we argue that an alternativeframework,one stressing a more
democratic (i.e., bottom-up) approach, would be a morefruitfulline
of inquiry.
Almost fifty years ago, Harold Lasswell (1956) broached the

concept of the policy sciences and its usage of the policy process
approach. He suggested that policy implementation was one of a
number of necessary steps or stages in the policy process. While he
was not the first to highlight the importance of policy implementa-
tion—and to emphasize, as had public administration, its frequent
reliance on intergovernmental relations (Wright 1998)—he did
Prepared for presentation at the sixth enter the term into public policy lexicon. Since then, it seems,
meeting of the National Public Manage- policy implementation as a field of scholarly inquiry and practical
ment Research Conference, Indiana recognition has come and gone like an elusive spirit. Sometimes
University, Bloomington, October 18-20,
2001. We are grateful to many of the when it has seemed virtually to disappear, it has merely been sub-
participants for their insightful comments. sumed or coopted into an adjacent field, such as public manage-
ment (Lynn 1996) or it has transmogrified into studies of specific
J-PART 12(2002):4:467-492 functional areas (e.g., welfare policy studies). In any event, it has
467'/Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

An Alternative Approach to Policy Implementation
been around long enough to have produced several generations of

implementation studies—Malcolm Goggin and his colleagues
(1990) count three such periods—all within a time span of less than
twenty years.
Recently there has been a bit of a renaissance in policy

implementation studies, as new venues and interests appear. Lester
and Goggin (1998) have specifically suggested that, rather than
focusing on developing general theoretical insights, the generic
study of policy implementation has been transformed into the study
of specific governmental programs. Ann Chih Lin's (2000) splendid
study of how five different prisons implement penal policies (e.g.,
rehabilitation) is but one example. On the other hand, O'Toole

(2000) has argued that there is a world of viable theoretic constructs
(e.g., principal-agent, rational choice, and game theories) upon
which implementation can draw.
In this article we will move forward from this rediscovery

period. We will attempt, first, to recount briefly the development of
policy implementation. After a short interlude for a discussion of
definitions and assumptions, we will examine the parallels between
key concerns in implementation theory and some enduring ques-
tions drawn from public administration. Finally we will make two
suggestions regarding policy implementation's continued study and
practice.
In particular, we will argue that policy implementation has too

often been practiced as a top-down or governing-elite phenomenon
and that its study and practice would be much better served were its
practitioners to adopt a more participatory, more directly democratic
orientation. We will suggest that implementation theory should
address more carefully the kinds of democratic processes that are
called forth by varying specific conditions. Although implemen-
tation may be among the most devilish of wicked problems, it
remains a critical part of public policy studies. As Lester and
Goggin (1981, 1) remind us, "[P]ublic policy implementation
continues to hold much practical interest for policymakers [both]
because it is a major stumbling block in the policy process [and] . . .
one of the most heavily utilized areas of policy analysis."
THREE GENERATIONS OF
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION RESEARCH
Policy implementation, as a field of study, lay relatively

dormant from the time of Lasswell's first suggestion in the 1950s
until the early 1970s. Brewer and P. deLeon (1983) speculated that
earlier attention to implementation, while surely considered critical,
46S/J-PART, October 2002

was stymied by the perception that it was either too difficult to study
(administrators characteristically acted under their own authority, at
times not even informing the policy maker) or, conversely, too
simple (under the assumption that administrators automatically
carried out whatever policies they were charged with). Harvard
researchers, wondering about the difficulties (well, failures) of
President Johnson's War on Poverty, hit upon the realization of a
shortcoming in policy implementation; they concluded that, for
some, "One clear source of failure emerged: political and bureau-
cratic aspects of the implementation process were . . . left outside
both the considerations of participants of government and the
calculations of formal policy analysts. . . . " (quoted in Brewer and

P. deLeon 1983, 249). Erwin Hargrove (1975) recognized a similar
problem and, in a defining metaphor, referred to implementation
studies as the missing link, that is, the elusive policy catalyst that
somehow transformed good intentions into good policy. Jeffrey
Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky largely defined the field of policy
implementation in their Implementation (1973 edit.) volume, with
others (e.g., Martha Derthick [1972] and Eugene Bardach [1977]),
comprising what was later to be called the first generation of
implementation studies.
The first generation of implementation studies usually con-

sisted of case study analyses that considered the immense vale of
troubles that lay between the definition of a policy and its execu-
tion. These observations of New Towns, In-Town, the twin travails
of the Economic Development Administration (EDA) and the city
of Oakland, and the deinstitutionalization of mental health facilities
in California did much more than examine their respective imple-
mentation case studies; in many ways, they forcefully brought the
complexities of policy implementation front and center for public
administrators and policy analysts. In many instances, policy
implementation was seen as two (and often more) parties acting in
opposition to one another, not so much because one was correct but
because both thought they were doing the right thing (e.g., Allison
1971). Barbara Ferman (1990, 39-40) put this situation in a
Madisonian perspective, viewing implementation "as another check
in the American system of government. Like the entire system . . . ,
it can be a source of delay and diversion of objectives, but it can
also protect against the concentration and abuse of power." The end
product of the first generation was a cornucopia of fascinating idio-
graphic case studies, each with its own prescribed lessons, but little
in terms of a generic implementation theory.
The second generation was much more sophisticated and

consciously theoretic, as authors such as Daniel Mazmanian and
Paul Sabatier (1983), Robert Nakamura and Frank Smallwood
469/J-PART, October 2002

(1980), and the largely overlooked Paul Berman (1980) brought

their empirical lenses to bear, proposing a series of institutional and
commitment-oriented hypotheses that assumed (more or less) a
command and control orientation, or what came to be known as a
top-down perspective. In this manner, they brought an empiricist
perspective to policy implementation, dedicated to finding the best
way to move a policy proposal to its successful fruition. Their
proposed models often neglected parsimony (principally as a result
of admitted complexity); however, as Peter deLeon subsequently
observed, "they posed a relatively rigorous, empirically based
model, although even they admitted that many of their measures
were subjective and ordinal, maybe suffering from the analytic
tendency of well-meaning but misplaced precision" (P. deLeon,

1999a, 316; also see Meier and McFarlane 1995; Matland 1995).
At the same time as the top downers were making their case,
an alternative second generation approach was forwarding what it
claimed was a bottom-up orientation. Scholars like Michael Lipsky
(1971 and 1980) and Benny Hjern (1982; Hjern and Hull 1983)
proposed that street level bureaucrats were the key to successful
implementation and that the top downers ignored them at their peril.
From their vantage point, implementation occurred only when those
who were primarily affected were actively involved in the planning
and execution of these programs. Bottom-up proponents argued that
they were better able to capture the full range of implementation's
intricacies. In consequence, they began to argue that implementa-
tion needed to be part and parcel of the policy formulation calcula-
tions. In this sense, they were in agreement with Brinton Milward
(1980, 247) when he argued, "If policy researchers wish to improve
the prospects for policy success, they would do well to focus their
research on the relationship between agenda-setting and implemen-
tation."
Sooner or later, the bottom-uppers claimed, implementation

costs (in terms of programmatic compliance or at least acquies-
cence) associated with any new program had to be realized, and
better they be taken into account earlier than later in the process,
that is, before the political (or bureaucratic) sunk costs incurred by
the program were added into the policy calculus. The problem, of
course, is that the bottom-up model undermined any idea of a
relatively expeditious implementation process; moreover, there
'Partially in reaction to problems with were occasions when a top-down perspective or command orienta-
implementation difficulties, authors began
to propose policy design frameworks, in tion seemed more in order than a bottom-up approach (e.g., national
which policy formulation exercises explic- security, many legal judgments, or technically driven decisions).1
itly considered issues relating to imple- Some (e.g., Sabatier 1986) have attempted to synthesize the two
mentation (see, for instance, Bobrow and
Drzck 1987; Ingraham 1987; and approaches while others (i.e., O'Toole 2000, 267) have observed
Schneider and Ingram 1988 and 1990). that the bottom-up/top-down controversy is little more than a
MOIJ-PART, October 2002

different way of looking at the same phenomenon and that the field
has "moved past the rather sterile top-down, bottom-up dispute."
As we noted earlier, Malcolm L. Goggin and his colleagues

(1990) proposed a third generation of policy implementation studies
in their Implementation Theory and Practice. They sought to
explain "why behavior varies across time, across policies, and
across units of government and by predicting the type of implemen-
tation behavior that is likely to occur in the future. In a word, the
objective of third-generation research is to be more scientific . . ."
(p. 171; emphasis in original). Completely cognizant of the com-
plexity of implementation among agencies, the authors proposed a
number of hypotheses ripe for testing (often utilizing concepts of

game theory or principal-agent theory), but hopelessly awash in
ambiguities. For example: hypothesis 12 states, "the greater the
agent's legitimacy, credibility, and capability of advancing the inter-
ests of the principal, the more responsive is the principal" (p. 186),
with little attention to defining terms and calibrating measurements.
In much the same time frame, implementation scholars were

beginning to propose contingency theories as a way of adapting to
the obvious complexity of implementation studies. That is, rather
than make one shoe fit all, people such as Richard Matland (1995),
Helen Ingram (1990), and Denise Scheberle (1997) offered 2x2
matrices, which suggested that different conditions might require
different implementation strategies.2 The most important observa-
tion to be gleaned from Matland and other contingency theorists is
that there is no single best implementation strategy, that the appro-
priate strategy is very much contextual in terms of what are the con-
tingencies surrounding the policy issues and how they can best be
addressed in terms of implementation. To second Garrett's (1993,
1249) words, "[T]here is . . . much skepticism among students in
this field about the claims of rational management concerning a
'holy grail' that defines the implementation process." Rather, a
number of variables can rise (or diminish) in importance as a func-
tion of other defining parameters. There is, under a contingency
theory model, little reason to require one shoe to fit all situations.
Peter deLeon delivered a paper at the 1997 annual meeting of

the American Political Science Association (APSA), which was
entitled "The Missing Link Revisited: Contemporary Implementa-
tion Research" (deLeon 1999a). In this paper, he recounted much of
the policy literature devoted to the role and effects of policy
2 implementation since the early 1970s and concluded that all this
James Thompson (1967; and with
Arthur Tuden 19S9) used a similar matrix work had developed little in the way of an operational theory of
as a diagnostic methodology; also see implementation. He claimed that "the study of policy implemen-
L.deLeon(1993). tation has reached an intellectual dead end" (p. 313). DeLeon's
A1MJ-PART, October 2002

observation was hardly a blinding or even a particularly original

insight; Helen Ingram (1990, 462) had reached much the same
conclusion in the early 1990s when she wrote: "Even though the
bibliographic population explosion of implementation studies has
done a great deal to heighten appreciation for the policy implemen-
tation of administration, the field of implementation has yet to reach
conceptual clarity" (see also Garrett 1993; Matland 1995).
Nevertheless, a veritable academic firestorm erupted. The

following February, James Lester chaired a panel of noted policy
implementation scholars at the Western Political Science Associa-
tion that was (at least in some ways) designed to counter the thesis
of deLeon's earlier APSA paper. However, no consensus could be

reached on which of these paths showed the most promise. In
September 1998, Lester and Goggin presented a paper at the APSA
meeting that stood in direct opposition to the earlier characteriza-
tions of policy implementation (P. deLeon 1999a; and others, e.g.,
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), pointedly deriding what they
referred to as this "array of rather fustian dismissals" (Lester and
Goggin 1998, 1). In it, they indicated that a profusion of implemen-
tation studies went by a different set of names (e.g., environmental
policy studies) and a wealth of potentially viable approaches.3
Laurence O'Toole (2000) recently has written on implementa-

tion at some length in this journal, again effectively countering (or
at least seriously questioning) the intellectual poverty of the field,
but even he (whom we might admiringly cast in the role of an
avatar of implementation theory) admits that an implementation
"consensus is not close at hand, and there has been relatively little
emphasis on parsimonious explanation" (O'Toole 2000, 267). With
Lester and Goggin (1998), O'Toole (p 284) argues that a great deal
of scholarly work has been "sorta" done on policy implementa-
tion—"sorta" in that its linkages are not always obvious, its promise
not always lambent, nor the necessary applications articulated—but,
nevertheless, he concludes, the study of "implementation . . . is
alive and lively." Still, one is forced to question the proposed target,
for as Lester and Goggin (p. 6) concluded (largely singularly, we
might add, if we read the Policy Currents papers accurately): "By
incorporating the insights of communications theory, regime theory,
rational choice theory (especially game theory), and contingency
theories, a 'meta-theory' may perhaps be developed."
•'The discussion continued in Policy Cur-
rents, the newsletter of the APSA Public
Policy Section, which published Lester A few observations, then, can safely be made. First, a great
and Goggin's paper and subsequently deal of recent literature has addressed policy implementation, some-
printed six additional papers commenting
on it (Winter 1999; P. deLeon 1999b;
times so labeled and sometimes not, such that the boundaries of the
Schneider 1999; Meier 1999; Kettunen study of implementation have become less clear. For instance, Anne
2000; and Potoski 2001). Schneider (1999, 2; emphasis added), in responding to Lester and

Goggin (1998), noted, "Implementation needs to be studied both as

a dependant variable and as an independent variable." Similarly,
Ken Meier (1999, 6) has commented that with the current plethora
of theories and variables, "[a]ny new policy implementation scholar
who adds a new variable or a new interaction should be required to
eliminate two existing variables. Second, given the complexity that
every implementation author has accepted as an inherent part of the
process, contingency theories (e.g., Matland 1995; Ingram 1990)
might be posed as one possible clarifying device. And third,
deLeon's (1999a) main theme—a lack of anything resembling a
consensual theory of implementation—has apparently been vindi-
cated (or, more accurately, has not been rejected), for in spite of his

seeming act of intellectual auto-da-fe", few alternatives or proposi-
tions (as opposed to promises or opportunities) have been ad-
vanced. While one can legitimately subscribe to multiple ap-
proaches, especially when a field is as conceptually daunting as
policy implementation has proven to be, even after thirty years of
careful study, one would have to hope for more theory than is
currently on the policy implementation plate. Even a latter-day
Candide would have to admit that the best one can say about
implementation theory is "lots of leads, little results."4
A FEW DETAILS OF DEFINITION AND ASSUMPTION
We need to hesitate here and address a few necessities of

exposition, particularly what it is that we mean by policy implemen-
tation, and what the relationship of implementation is to the other
stages of the policy process, especially policy formulation and
program evaluation. Lastly, we should examine the basic assump-
tions that underlie the different modes of implementation analysis.
Addressing the problem of definition is hardly straightforward:

Remembering Browne and Wildavsky's (1984, 234) caution that
"[i]mplementation is no longer solely about getting what you once
wanted but, instead, it is about what you have since learned to
prefer until, of course, you change your mind again," the definition
clearly becomes murky, and too often has been as complex and
extended as implementation itself. Perhaps the most detailed (and,
by natural extension, the most cumbersome) definition has been
offered by Mazmanian and Sabatier(1983, 20-21):
Implementation is the carrying out of a basic policy decision, usually incorpo-

rated in a statute but which can also take the form of important executive orders
or court decisions. Ideally, that decision identifies the problem(s) to be
'Which is probably equivalent to Ken
addressed, stipulates the objectivc(s) to be pursued, and, in a variety of ways,
Meier's (1999, 5) well-tuned saw charac-
terizing implementation theory as "forty- "structures" the implementation process. The process normally runs through a
seven variables that completely explain number of stages beginning with passage of the basic statute, followed by the
five case studies." policy outputs (decisions) of the implementing agencies, the compliance of
4WJ-PART, October 2002

target groups with those decisions, the actual impacts of agency decisions, and,
finally, important revisions (or attempted revisions) in the basic statute.
Such definitions (also see Bardach 1977 and 1980) attempt to

capture the full range of implementation activities and, in that
sense, might attempt to cover too much, even if one somehow over-
looks the posed definitional problems, which may be debilitating.
For instance, Meier and McFarlane (1995) tested the Mazmanian
and Sabatier model through a series of ingenious measures and
found that many of the posited relationships were statistically
significant. However, they were forced to conclude that the "opera-
tionalization of several of the independent variables was problem-
atic. Admittedly, some of our own measures are crude, and there is

a reasonable distance between the measures selected and the broad
concepts embodied in the statutory variables" (p. 294).
A more satisfying definition would work to simplify the under-

lying concepts of implementation. Take, for instance, Ferman's
(1990) definition of implementation as what happens between
policy expectations and (perceived) policy results. O'Toole (2000,
266) takes a similar tack when he writes that "[p]olicy implementa-
tion is what develops between the establishment of an apparent
intention on the part of government to do something, or to stop
doing something, and the ultimate impact in the world of action."
Schneider and Ingram (1993) talk about affecting changes in
behavioral patterns (i.e., getting constituents to cease doing one
activity [say, speeding] in place of another). The problem here, of
course, is the issue of expectations and their subsequent evaluation
(andreformulation).As many implementation scholars (e.g., Ingram
1990; Rein and Rabinovitz 1975; Matland 1995) indicate, legisla-
tive decision makers are notably reluctant to provide exact maps
that outline their expectations of policy results. The courts are
similarly reluctant in this regard, and all of this might easily be
rendered moot when programs change midstream to consider new
contextual factors. Indeed, excessive precision in defining goals
may be counterproductive and deprive implementors of a valued
flexibility.5 This stream of thought runs directly counter to that of
others (e.g., Goggin et al. 1990) who suggest that the clearer the
initial policy directive, the clearer the policy mandate and the more
valuable the direction that is provided for the implementors to
follow. This discussion does not even begin to take into account the
'As Matland (1995, 158) notes, "One of expectations of the intended clientele, assuming they are of one
the ways to limit conflict is through mind or even that they can be identified.
ambiguity. The clearer goals are, the
more likely they are to lead to conflict"
Lipslcy (1980, 14) seems to concur: The pivotal assumption in implementation is that policy
"Rules may actually be an impediment to
supervision. They may be so voluminous
makers can be of one mind when it comes to operationalizing a
and contradictory that they can only be policy, for, at base, when multiple players are involved (and they
enforced or invokedselectively." almost always are—see Hall and O'Toole [2000]), implementation

becomes a battle to determine a correct reading of the mandate and

its accurate execution. Failing this test, implementation is certain to
become a welter of confusion. In the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis,
when President John Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara ordered the navy to quarantine Cuba at the specified
distance from the island, the navy command unilaterally (and
without informing the president) extended that distance, recogniz-
ing that the closer distance would have exposed navy vessels to
Cuban air strikes (see Allison 1971). In short, both sides agreed on
the quarantine (what Mazmanian and Sabatier [1983] would term
the policy mandate) but they had very different motivations as they
carried out the implementation of the order and, hence, its ultimate

effectiveness.
Most implementation scholars agree on the importance of

program evaluation as a key to good implementation (Mazmanian
and Sabatier 1983; Browne and Wildavsky 1984), viewing evalua-
tion as a way assess the implemented program and make sugges-
tions as to how it can be improved. As Browne and Wildavsky attest
(p. 205), in many ways implementation and evaluation are com-
pletely interactive in practice, although necessarily remaining dis-
tinctive in concept. But to enlarge policy implementation to include
program evaluation introduces yet another inherent problem: how
does one assess policy implementation and, subsequently, policy
evaluation in anything more tangible than expectation—an always
dicey metric, especially when contexts and programs are constantly
subject to change. Moreover, formative evaluation (particularly in
real time) is a notably imprecise activity (Browne and Wildavsky
1984), one that makes judging the relative success or failure of
implementation as an end product improbable at best, and illusion-
ary at worst. In a complex policy environment, it is rare that one set
of variables can be identified as decisive (Rossi and Freeman 1985),
let alone dictate new policy implementation strategies.
Policy implementation is often extended backwards in the

policy process framework, as scholars have tended to include policy
formulation in its purview (see Milward quotation, above) as they
remedy the implementation problems by addressing their origins in
policy initiation. These views typically are attributed to those who
preach policy implementation as a function of varying contingen-
cies, although not invariably (see Sabatier 1993). For instance, if a
policy requires what Berman (1980) calls an adaptive (as opposed
to a. programmatic) strategy as a function of his five precursor
variables, it would necessitate an examination of the context of the
problem from which the policy ensued. Again, this moves the
implementation analyst closer to what others have termed policy
design (see note 1). The fundamental problem with policy design is
A1SIJ-PART, October 2002

that it presupposes a policy prescience—an ability to foresee future

contingencies—that would be splendid if available but which all
too often is not. This expansion does begin to indicate just how
interactive the policy process stages appear to be, for to understand
one, an analyst seemingly has to understand the mechanics of all
(see P. deLeon 1999). Still, the accumulation of uncertainties within
each stage and how they are to feed into policy implementation
again suggests just how daunting a theory of implementation is for
anybody but the tried and true incremental ist.
Finally, we need to appreciate two underlying assumptions

behind policy implementation and its major schools of thought (i.e.,
top down and bottom up). The first assumption has been pointed

out by Michael Lipsky (1975), who argued persuasively that top-
down studies assumed the existence of an authoritative, hierarchical
(i.e., Weberian)prime mover, and therefore one need only minimize
the communication distortions between that person (the principal)
and his/her subordinate agents in order to effect successful imple-
mentation. Therein, Lipsky observes, lies the root of the implemen-
tation problem:
By setting up the analysis using assumptions of hierarchy, they focus attention

on the possibilities of constructing or reconstructing policy processes that
would operate with less slippage between processes as they should work and
processes as that actually do work (emphasis added).
A second assumption underlying implementation studies is

that programs usually fail, despite the best intentions of the public
administrators. Ann Chih Lin (1996, 3) has observed that "the
implementation literature shows that faulty implementation is
commonplace, non-random, and patterned." Martha Derthick
(1972, xiii), in her analysis of new federal housing construction
under the New Towns, In-Towns program, draws this conclusion for
the federal government:
If the federal government is unable to do in domestic affairs what its leaders say
it will, this is not necessarily because the men who run it, either as elected
officials, presidential appointees, or high-ranking civil servants, are lazy,
incompetent, or deceitful. If they delude the public as to what to expect of
government, it is because they delude themselves as well. They too are puzzled
and disillusioned when things go wrong and government programs do not
fulfill their promise.
Likewise, Stephen Bailey and Edith Mosher (1968), in their bench-

mark study of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, pro-
posed that the central culprit is the sheer complexity of administra-
tive responsibility (cf, Pressman and Wildavsky 1984). In light of
these difficulties, perhaps implementation failures are really just
overt failures of optimistic expectations. Lin (1996, 4) supports this
A16IJ-PART, October 2002

when she observes that "successful implementation is often acci-

dental, while failed implementation is the result of design."
The analyst or administrator should therefore evince little

surprise when the majority of implementation case studies describe
various degrees of failure. For one thing, the attention of both
scholars and practitioners is focused on problems, that is, situations
in which reality diverges from expectations. Problems cry out for
explanations in a way that successes ordinarily do not. Don Kettl
(1993, 60-61) speaks to this specific condition:
[I]mplementation research is largely a study of why things go wrong. The

predominantly negative focus comes because implementation scholars have

been drawn irresistibly to delicious tales of government program gone sour.
Moreover, implementation research has largely (but not exclusively) been
based in intergovernmental programs, where organizational interrelationships
are even stickier than usual, where goals are always harder to define than usual,
and where success therefore seems especially elusive.
But it is also unfortunate, for it is clear that a large majority of

government programs—every day and on every level—work pretty
much as they were designed. Even some very complex programs
have been successful—Kettl nominates the air traffic control
system—and operate without the debilities often ascribed to
implementation. Yet the principal corpus of implementation studies
has consistently been viewed from a hierarchical perspective that
focuses on and draws its lessons from the exceptional failures.
O'Toole (2000, 282-83) carefully demurs, noting that
the supposed bias of implementation research towards the cases of failure is

an outdated generalization. Even decades ago, scholars took pains to avoid
such bias toward failure in the selection of cases for investigation. Cross-state
larger-n studies have substantially reinforced this effort..., and the third-
generation work of Goggin et al. (1990) was explicitly designed to avoid any
trace of preoccupation with the "exceptional failure."
Still, the "less than success" tattoo is pervasive, underlining

Lipsky's (1975) contention. Even for those scholarly studies that
purposely encompass a wide range of implementation activities,
many of which were successful, the emphasis is generally on the
less successful.
To summarize: top-down policy implementation is prone to

hierarchical, unduly optimistic expectations, which in the face of
complexity are more likely than not to be disappointed, thus visiting
further ignominy on implementation studies. It is possible—some
theorists of the virtues of participation would assert it as true—that
this proclivity is less likely to be true in the case of bottom-up
implementation. The reasoning is straightforward—bottom-up
A11IJ-PART, October 2002

implementation is a reflection of communal interest. Rather than

having a policy imposed by a policy maker who is counseled by
select (hardly representative) and narrowly focused interest groups,
the potential clientele are proposing a policy that will directly affect
them. In short, a bottom-up policy implementation will tend to be
more realistic and practical, in that it suggests that the vox populi
have a great deal of say about where they are going and how they
choose to arrive. Moreover, a bottom-up orientation will be more
conducive to a democratic approach to the policy implementation
process than will the top-down (or a command) model. This
requires a discussion of the second major tenet of our argument,
conceiving the role of a discursive, more democratic orientation to
implementation analysis.

ISSUES OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Within the past decade, a number of policy scholars have made

the brief for a more democratic approach to policy analysis,
wherein constituents have a greater voice regarding the policies that
will affect them. This brief has been stated in general terms (e.g.,
Drzek 1990; P. deLeon 1997; Schneider and Ingram 1997), with
respect to specific policy stages (Fischer [1995] on policy evalua-
tion; Fox [1990] on implementation), and in regard to substantive
policy issues (Press [1994], and Fischer [2000] on environmental
studies). Recent studies by Lin (2000) on implementing correctional
reforms in prisons and Heather Hill (2000) on community policing
and mathematical curricular reforms have stressed the contextual
and networking elements of these activities, thereby emphasizing an
environmental richness that would be all but impossible to capture
in a statistical analysis. All of these (and, of course, others) indicate
a trend toward a more discursive form of policy implementation,
one that recognizes that there is somebody whose behavior needs to
be modified in order that implementation will be considered
successful, and that those somebodies might be more willing to
conform to the new mandates if they were informed, and even more
so if they consent, before the decision.
In this vein, Peter deLeon (1997) has suggested that the policy
sciences have largely neglected their democratic roots, largely
because of the discipline's orientation toward efficiency as a value
primus inter pares but also for reasons as workaday as simple con-
venience.6 Ingram and Schneider (1993, 71) likewise identify as
their central focus "policies that foster democratic participation"
(also see Ingram and Smith 1993).
'For other illustrations of this perspective, , . . . . . . , . . . . . .
see Drzek (1990); and Bobrow and Drzek Isolating this democratic approach to policy implementation, it
(1987); more moderately, Lynn (1999). is straightforward to deduce that the top-down orientation (which
AIM-PART, October 2002

we earlier described as hierarchical) is less democratic in its

approach than is the bottom-up (or street-level) perspective.
Matland (1995), however, wishes to differ, preferring to give the
democratic edge to the top downers. He contends that elected
representatives are likely to be more representative of the general
populace than the (typically unelected) street-level bureaucrats who
define and later execute the bottom-up approach.
However, Matland's contention neglects a number of issues,

the most central being whether by democracy we mean direct or
indirect popular involvement (i.e., participation by individuals or by
their representatives). Jane Mansbridge (1980) thoughtfully argues
that direct and local—that is, participatory—democracy is impera-

tive for popular support to ensue. Top downers indicate that imple-
mentation failures can occur the more distant one is from an
authoritative policy maker (hence, the core of the policy devolution
movement; see Osborne and Gaebler [1992]), but they seem
staunchly opposed to a more participatory aspect of implementation
(i.e., bottom up), arguing that it adds greater confusion to an already
convoluted implementation process. Moreover, Schneider and
Ingram (1997) stress that top downers are typically far removed
from the target population's perspective, basing their understanding
of citizen needs and wishes on surveys and focus groups rather than
on contacts with citizens themselves. The psychological distance
between top-down policy makers and citizens is even greater for
those groups who are considered to be dependent or deviant.
Matland's (1995) normative arguments on democracy and

bottom-up implementation—that street-level bureaucrats are not
formally accountable or responsible to their constituents—remains.
However, this seems to be a peculiar contention. Street-level
bureaucrats might indeed be protected from their clients by civil
service rules, unions, and limited liability, but citizens nevertheless
have considerable influence over their actions, particularly when
citizens and bureaucrats are engaged in coproduction—that is, the
joint production of public services by the citizen and administra-
tion—of policy outcomes.7 Lipsky (1980, 57) addresses this
codependence:
[Cjlicnts are [not] helpless in this relationship. Street-level bureaucrats . . . are

also dependent upon clients. Clients have a stock of resources and thus can
impose a variety of low-level costs. This is because street-level bureaucrats
must obtain client compliance with their decisions, particularly when they are
evaluated in terms of their clients' behavior or performance.
The concept of coproduction is articu-
lated by, among others, Brudney (1989); Furthermore, if local officials do not pay attention to the needs
Hupe (1993); Alford (2002). Maynard-
Moody and Leland (1997) authored an
and opinions of target populations, they may soon find themselves
excellent study along this line. out of touch and surrender their professional identity as street-level

bureaucrats. We need only to remember the administrative head-

aches described with great humor by Tom Wolfe (1970) in "mau-
mauing the flak catchers" to understanding the fragile nature of the
relationship between citizens and the street-level bureaucrats.
Heather Hill (2000) reminds us that a major requirement of any
police department is to gain and retain their particular public's
confidence. Indeed, Lin (2000) makes the case that even though
they are incarcerated, inmates still have a powerful voice in the
governing of a prison.8 So to say (as Matland does) that street-level
bureaucrats are less responsive to local conditions and attitudes
than are elected representatives is to misread seriously their profes-
sional responsibilities. Similarly, Matland cannot imply that street-
level bureaucrats are further removed from their clientele than are

administrators who are cloistered in state legislatures or federal
bureaucracies. Berry, Portney, and Thompson's (1993) thorough
study of urban democracies in mid-sized American cities dispels
that contention. This is not to declare that bottom up wins the
normative democratic derby, just that the bottom uppers appear to
be more in tune with a participatory democratic approach (cf.,
Barber 1984).
OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES:

THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PERSPECTIVE
This extended debate in the policy implementation literature

between bottom-up and top-down theorists resonates with remark-
able familiarity with public administration scholars. The latter
discipline has a well-established framework for considering the
ways by which citizens participate in the development of public
policy and the administration of public programs. The problem of
administrative legitimacy, as it is called, is that statutory law cannot
fully dictate administrative action, for every law or rule requires
interpretation. These interpretive decisions of administrators, how-
ever, must have legitimacy, which in a democracy must derive in
some way from the consent of the governed.
Early theories concerning the source of administrative legiti-

"Richard Elmore (1979-80, 611) would macy were, in the policy implementation cant, top-down theories. A
seem to agree, when he writes, "Unless
the initiators of a policy can galvanize well-known statement of this position is Emmette Redford's (1969,
the energy, attention, and skills of those 70) description of overhead democracy:
affected by it, thereby bringing these
resources into a loosely structured bar-
This "simple model" asserted that democratic control should run through a
gaining arena, the effects of a policy are
unlikely to be anything but weak or single line from the representatives of the people to aJI those who exercised
diffuse." Such conditions lead to what power in the name of the government The line ran from the people to their
Lin (2000) has described as "abandoned," representatives in the Presidency and the Congress, and from there to the Presi-
"subverted," and "neglected" implemen- dent as chief executive, then to departments, then to bureaus, then to lesser
tations. units, and so on to the fingertips of administration.

Foreshadowing Matland's line of argument (that top-down imple-

mentation is more democratic than bottom-up), Redford ends his
book with a peroration on the prerequisites of "workable democ-
racy" (1969, 196-204). He begins by insisting that elites (elected
officials or administrators) must be "supersensitive" (p. 202) to the
needs of all people. But then he emphasizes that his model of over-
head or indirect democracy is not sufficient to produce a workable
system. It is also necessary, he writes, that "all must be able to par-
ticipate meaningfully in politics" (p. 201). Nor is it sufficient that
hindrances to participation—barriers to free speech, peaceable
assembly, and so on—be removed; there is also a need for positive
measures to ensure that individuals have education, economic
benefit, and status such that they feel empowered to assert their

claims upon the political-administrative system.
Two decades before Redford, another giant in the field of

public administration, Dwight Waldo, had forcefully urged the
democratic case. In 1948, he published his landmark The Adminis-
trative State, criticizing what was then called administrative
management, a perspective that advocated the separation of admin-
istration from politics, an emphasis on efficiency, and the impor-
tation of administrative techniques from private business. Waldo's
seminal idea was that a theory of administration is by necessity
political theory as well, and uncritical acceptance of the assump-
tions of administrative management constituted a rejection of
democratic values. As Denhardt (1984, 6) writes, Waldo saw "the
authoritarian bias of organizational thought, with its emphasis on
hierarchy, control and discipline" as restricting the development of
a theory of democratic administration. However, Waldo did not so
much advocate direct citizen involvement in program implementa-
tion as suggest that the professionalism of public administrators
might be trusted to protect their interests (1980, 78).
Paul H. Appleby (1949; see also Martin 1965) differed with

Waldo, but he also castigated those who would separate politics
from administration. Appleby saw public administrators as inextri-
cably involved in the political process, both at the policy level
(advising legislators on policy options) and at the program level
(using administrative discretion in the implementation process).
Appleby's contribution to the analysis of discretion was to view it
as normal, natural, and desirable: The perspective of bureaucrats
working at street level could act to check the arbitrary exercise of
bureaucratic power.
In the 1970s, reliance on the professionalism of administrators

and the supersensitivity of political leaders—in short, the whole
apparatus of overhead democracy—was challenged by the new
481IJ-PART, October 2002

public administration (Marini 1971). Particularly in the essay by

Michael Harmon (1971), the argument was advanced that authorita-
tive decisions in a democracy should not be made by the legislature
only in the policy selection phase of the process; rather they should
be made by administrators as well. Harmon vigorously challenged
the argument that administrators "will act selfishly and irresponsi-
bly unless forced to act otherwise by vigilant guardians of the
public trust" (p. 178). In George Frederickson's words (1997, 210):
In this view, civil servants are sworn to uphold the same constitution as are
other officers of government, and they may in fact be competent to define the
public interest on their own authority. Administrators may be as close to
citizens as elected representatives. In fact, legislators may be far removed and

preoccupied with the legislative processes or captured by special interests.
The new public administration (NPA) gave a more proactive role

(what Marini called "confrontational administration and client-
focused bureaucracies" in his concluding note [p. 351]) to bureau-
crats in advocating and shaping policy on behalf of society's dis-
advantaged; moreover, it strongly supported "maximum feasible
participation" of citizens in administrative activities.9
For public policy scholars, a direct democratic approach10

subscribes to an interpretive or postpositivist approach (see Fox
1990; Yanow 1996), based on what JUrgen Habermas (e.g., 1987)
has termed "communicative rationality." Habermas has presented a
discursive strategy that addresses such issues as how people arrive
at social change and policy learning through social discourse, as
opposed to the more representative channels through which policy
makers exercise political power. In one of Habermas's more cele-
brated phrases, the political and social worlds suffer from "system-
atically distorted communications," in which (to oversimplify) one
party or coalition (e.g., interest groups or governmental agencies)
has a clear and persistent dominance in a policy arena over other
relevant parties and consistently avails itself of that authority." In
Habermas' terms, this distribution leads to a "one-sided rationaliza-
tion," a dysfunction that does not occur as a random act of political
nature but as an overt and clear political mechanism, one that surely
'Daniel Patrick Moynihan (1969) drew undermines "communicative rationality," or the consensual basis of
upon this usage to describe the War on governance
Poverty, giving it a certain national cachet
'"Among those who have drawn a distinc- Habermas's systematically distorted communication represents
tion between direct and indirect democ- the age-old conflict between the government (with its representative
racy are Barber (1984); Morone (1990): Z J i_ *• j • •* * \ j •* •*• J •*
andP deLeond997/ members and bureaucratic administrators) and its citizens, and it
would no doubt affect most policy implementation strategies,
"Schneider and Ingram (1997), utilizing a particularly those proposed by the top-down school. In short, a
social construction orientation, refer to d e m o c r a t i c or j en tation founded on citizen participation contributes
y v
such groups as dependents or devi-
ants." more to the bottom-up approach than to its top-down sibling—if not
4S2/J-PART, October 2002

perhaps in its present form, then surely in its promise. Whether this
particular avenue has been examined is open to legitimate question.
O'Toole (2000,283) has observed that top-down and bottom-up
"investigations" are predicated on "quite different notions of
democracy." He goes on to assert, however, that "[searching for an
implementation approach built around a normative theory of discur-
sive democracy would generate a fascinating scholarly agenda, but
it is not the case that an interest in democratic theory has simply
been ignored until now." O'Toole does not offer supporting illustra-
tions, although few implementation scholars are as thoroughly
immersed in the literature as he is.

Most academics are intellectually well equipped to deal
critically with concepts, so it is relatively easy to criticize existing
approaches to policy implementation, either for what they lack
substantively or for what they promise conceptually. Let us there-
fore turn to a more problematic task, one of proposing an alterna-
tive approach to policy implementation.
A DEMOCRATIC APPROACH
TO POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
The core of the proposed option is an explicit recognition that

while conceptual clarity and empirical rigor are important goals of
implementation theory, it is equally essential that such theory be
based on democratic values. Conceptually, this would align policy
implementation with a broader trend in the policy sciences toward a
greater emphasis on the democratic ethos and citizen participation
(Drzek and Torgerson 1993; Yanow 1996). We suggest that more
democracy is better than less; that is, more direct forms should be
preferred unless there are strong and articulated reasons to avoid
them. Such a position does not necessarily require a nationwide
return to New England-style town meetings or to ongoing universal
referenda, but it does require that policy makers do more than listen
to themselves, their in-house analysts, and extant interest groups. It
requires that they make a participatory orientation more than a
theoretic talisman (one honored more in the breach than in practice)
and more realized in operations. A democratic approach to policy
implementation would include reaching back in the policy process
framework to include the policy formulation deliberations as a
means to help define policy goals by talking with the affected
parties well before the policy is adopted by the authorized policy
"A greater inclusion of citizens' perspec-
tives has, of course, an additional major maker.12
attribute; in terms of social capital, it
begins to counter the widespread perspec-
tive that the government and the governed
Let us acknowledge (with O'Toole 2000) that the analytic data
are only occasionally acquainted (Nye, base supporting a democratic approach to policy implementation
Zelikow, and King 1997; Putnam 2000). would indeed be fascinating, if for no other reason than, at the

present time, its illustrations are sparse and indirect. Some valuable
evidence can be gleaned from the participatory policy analysis
literature, for example, in case studies depicting citizen juries,
during which a public policy was defined in a participatory manner
and then implemented (e.g., see Crosby, Kelley, and Shaefer 1986;
Kathlene and Martin 1991). However, these focus more on policy
formulation than implementation. Still, as we shall see, this linkage
is to be fostered. There are some examples we can employ.
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (1996) have described

how the town of Ruston (population 636, located outside Tacoma,
Washington) was confronted by the Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA) with a wicked problem; the main source of employ-
ment and air pollution in Ruston was Asarco, "the only producer of
industrial arsenic in this country" (p. 167). William Ruckleshaus,
who was then administrator of the EPA, came to Ruston and urged
the citizens to give him first-hand information about their personal
preferences. As the local newspaper headlines reported the appar-
ently irreconcilable issues, "Smelter Workers Have Choice: Keep
Their Jobs or Their Health." Gutmann and Thompson have charac-
terized Ruckleshaus's dilemma thus: The EPA administrator could
have been "calculating costs and benefits with a method that citi-
zens could not comprehend and assuming rational preferences that
they might or might not hold." Ruckleshaus saw the situation rather
differently; he argued that the citizens "know that the right to be
heard is not the same thing as the right to be heeded." In his own
words: "For me to sit here in Washington and tell the people of
Tacoma what is an acceptable risk would be at best arrogant and at
worst inexcusable" (all quotations from Gutmann and Thompson
1996, 170). The outcome was salutary (p. 197):
Ruckleshaus hoped that if he took the options to the people, providing not only
information but also opportunities to discuss the options among themselves,
one would come to be seen as more acceptable. Or perhaps an even better
policy would emerge from the discussion. To some extent, that is just what
happened.
In short, once a decision had been agreed upon, implementa-

tion became more a tactic than a strategy. While tactics can turn out
to be problematic, achieving a consensus after the major disputes
have been argued and resolved (nominally in the formulation stage)
reduces the matter of implementation tactics to a second-order
consideration.
As we have suggested, the application of democratic principles

to implementation theory requires a sound understanding of the
contingencies that govern a choice of strategy. Citizen involvement
in the processes of government (including electoral politics, policy
4&4/J-PART, October 2002

making, and administration) can take many forms, and even with
the generic guideline that more democracy is better than less, the
choices among them need to be strategic. Several contingency
matrices have been proposed. To offer just one extended illustra-
tion, let us utilize Matland's ambiguity/conflict matrix (exhibit 1):
Exhibit 1
Ambiguity-Conflict Matrix: Policy Implementation Processes
CONFLICT
AMBIGUITY Low High

Low Administrative Political
Implementation Implementation
High Experimental Symbolic

Implementation Implementation
Source: Matland (1995, 160).
As we noted earlier, there is a workaday world full of proce-

dural or administrative policies and decisions whose implementa-
tions are basically designed and concluded without a hitch. The
measures of ambiguity and conflict are both minimal. In short, these
are, as Matland indicates, administrative implementations, and
while they are important in the daily functions of government they
are not contentious. Implementations in this cell are basic exercises
in traditional public administrative practices, largely due to the low
levels of conflict and ambiguity.
In the low ambiguity/high conflict cell—what Matland terms

political implementation—there could be disagreement on the goals
of the policy. Alternatively, if the players agree as to what ends to
advance (say, public education), there could be great uncertainty
(leading to conflict) as the best way to achieve those goals (busing,
vouchers, charter schools, home schooling, privatization, etc.). In
Matland's words (1995, 163; emphasis in original): "The central
principle in political implementation is that implementation out-
comes are decided by power." In such an arena, implementation is
perilous unless and until a compromise can somehow be forged.
A democratic orientation would want to avoid simple coercion
whenever possible. In this cell, the most effective means to this end
would be to negate or overcome what we earlier described as
"systematically distorted communications," in which group domi-
nance is achieved (e.g., through a monopoly on technical informa-
tion or authority). And this is best accomplished in a discursive
4&5/J-PART, October 2002

environment. While discourse is typically a time-intensive

approach, the total time and energy consumed might easily be
reduced if it alleviates some of the friction that would otherwise
occur later during implementation. Matland argues that a top-down
orientation is best able to capture the power elements in this cell,
but we would argue that democratic methods might well produce
better, less contentious decisions. Matland's chosen example for
working in this cell is not completely supportive, as public educa-
tion is still an rancorous an issue as ever.
In the high ambiguity/low conflict cell (experimental imple-

mentation), "outcomes will depend largely on which actors are

active and most involved. The central principle driving this type of
implementation is that contextual conditions dominate the process"
(Matland 1995, 165-66; emphasis in original). The Clean Air Act of
1970 is a good example. There is general uncertainty (for instance,
in goals, technology, and tactics), but the participants seem to agree
among themselves as to the value of the policy. While this cell
generally (sooner or later) reaches an implementation solution, part
of the solution is a recognition that this cell represents an experi-
mental implementation, with ongoing corrections realized from
formative evaluations. In short, while the outcomes might be mixed,
a consensus that activity is considered to be experimental permits
time and (what Sabatier [1993] calls) policy learning. Matland
(1995, 167) suggests that "[t]he bottom-up description of the policy
implementation process is superior to the top-down in describing
conditions in this category.... The top-down models emphasize
command, control, and uniformity and fail to take into account the
diversity inherent in much implementation that occurs." It would
thus seem as if a democratic approach—in which these issues over
ambiguity could be hashed-out prior to adoption—would be the
most appropriate strategy for policies that fall into this cell.
Of course, the final cell—mixing high ambiguity with high

levels of conflict—is the most difficult for considering any imple-
mentation strategy. The current conflict in Congress over the
advisability of faith-based partnerships is a good example, mixing
elements of the Constitution (church-state involvements) with
uncertainty among the various religious factions as to their partici-
pation. Similarly, one can imagine that the EDA's attempts to foster
employment in Oakland (Pressman and Wildavsky 1974) could be
placed in this cell. It comprises such intractable cases that Matland
(1995) can only refer to them as symbolic implementation, which
appears to be code for "not much hope here." The policy implemen-
tation landscape is littered with these casualties (for example,
almost the entire War on Poverty, Model Cities, or Superfund-
sponsored clean-ups).

Linda deLeon (1993 and 1998) has used a framework similar

to Matland's to describe different types of accountability under
varying conditions of ambiguity and conflict. Labeling the high-
conflict, high-ambiguity decision situation anarchic (cf., the
garbage can model or organized anarchy described by Cohen,
March, and Olson 1972), she argues, "The more anarchic a decision
situation . . . the more it is true that participation is the most appro-
priate—indeed the only—means of linking organizational action to
public preferences" (p. 552; emphasis in original). In very fluid,
unstructured decision situations, conditions are changing and policy
responses are experimental. The only way that affected parties can
monitor these situations and exert any influence is to remain
involved and to participate in the ongoing process. In this set of

intractable domains, democracy must be more direct and pervasive
than in any other.
A final and admittedly weak argument in favor of a democratic

approach is that so many policies have fallen short—at least under a
nominally acceptable time frame—under current implementation
regimes. The abysmal failure of the Reagan administration (as well
as the Congress, itself a central pillar to the construct of a represen-
tative democracy) to consult with the intended Medicare population
led to Congress's repeal of the 1988 Medicare Catastrophic Cover-
age Act legislation within a year of its passage, once the outcry
from senior citizens had the chance to register (Himelfarb 1995).
Again, while admitting that this third thread is not the strongest
argument, something must have been wrong to rack up such a long
list of implementation failures. Even Steve Kelman (1984), who
during a stint in the federal bureaucracy tried to bring implementa-
tion scholarship to Washington, ended up questioning its practical
or operational applications. Whatever else one can say about the
study of implementation, in the public policy and administration
disciplines that pride themselves on applications as well as theoretic
insights, this is not a healthy situation in either scholarship or
application.13
CONCLUSIONS
This article has been predicated on the rediscovery theme

regarding policy implementation, offering an alternative mode for
designing implementation studies and practice. There is, however,
"Linda deLeon and Peter deLeon (2002)
little doubt that there is much more to be done in terms of develop-
have suggested that many elements of ing a well-articulated and internally consistent democratic
public management have a distinctly approach. Moreover, as we have suggested, implementation
democratic approach (e.g., 360-degree
feedback and workplace democracy) but
research has reached a stage where it can and should specify the
have yet failed to attract sufficient contingencies that govern a choice of implementation strategy.
scholarly attention. There may certainly be implementation conditions in which a

classic bottom-up or democratic approach would be ill advised. As

Matland (1995, 150) has pointed out in his critique of bottom-up
analysis, "The institutional structure, the available resources, and
the access to an implementation arena may be determined centrally,
and substantially can affect policy outcomes" (also, see Sabatier
1986). But we would suggest that the conventional identification of
national security, crises, and political exigencies should not auto-
matically be identified as conditions wherein democracy should be
obviated; too often automatic is interpreted as convenient. Con-
comitantly, there also may be conditions under which a democratic
approach would be the dominant strategy. On balance, we are pre-
pared to pose the following premise: when a policy implementation

strategy is designed, a democratic approach should be the preferred
(i.e., default) option. Implementation should follow democratic
procedures (and preferably in the most direct democracy practices)
unless prior analysis demonstrates that another model (e.g., a top-
down, or command, implementation) is superior. In a more bal-
anced rhetoric, the burden of proof regarding both policy imple-
mentation theory and practice lies upon those scholars who would
move away from, that is, recommend against, democratic processes.
There are, to be sure, important questions to be asked and

answered before a democratic imperative is widely acknowledged;
similar doubts are debated within the participatory policy analysis
camp (cf., P. deLeon 1997; Lynn 1999; Weimer 1998). We have, for
instance, not examined issues of resources, political commitment,
level of government, bureaucratic incentives, or a host of other
central implementation variables. What, one might ask, is the role
of time (e.g., a crisis vs. a more leisurely situation)? Or the courts?
What weights should be given to efficiency versus effectiveness
measures, as might be posed by new public management propo-
nents? More substantively, O'Toole and Montjoy (1984; also see
Hall and O'Toole 2000) have observed that implementation is
usually a multigroup activity, a condition not addressed here.
Furthermore, it would be foolhardy to assume that simply bringing
together people in a room (or a stadium!) to discuss policy formula-
tion and subsequent implementation will find them of one mind,
even if they somehow adhere to Habermas's injunctions. Directly
put, people can and will disagree, with some justification. At the
very least, institutions can be designed that will promote and protect
social discussions (Ostrom 1998). Pivotally, in terms of workaday
practice, how are preference aggregation problems resolved? In
short, there should be no suspicion of implementation legerdemain.
These and many other elements would benefit from greater explica-
tion. But it is equally our intention that a democratic approach to
policy implementation should be a central focus of the implementa-
tion renaissance.

This article has laid an initial chip on the policy implementa-

tion poker table, one supporting a democratic framework, with the
understanding that others will see it as a viable consideration,
perhaps even garnering some additional bets. It is demonstrably not
meant to be an end-all or be-all, designed to resolve all implementa-
tion dilemmas. If we have learned little else from past decades of
policy implementation studies, we should have learned that one size
never fits all, that context matters, and that when we face an
extremely complex condition, we are better off if we try to under-
stand the particular issues than if we propose some form of generic
metatheory. Still, we believe that a democratic approach to policy
implementation warrants a place at the table.

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ARTICLES

What Ever Happened to Policy Implementation?

Downloaded from http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of Arizona on June 6, 2016

One of the earliest topics addressed by policy analysts was

Almost fifty years ago, Harold Lasswell (1956) broached the

467'/Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

been around long enough to have produced several generations of

Recently there has been a bit of a renaissance in policy

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In this article we will move forward from this rediscovery

In particular, we will argue that policy implementation has too

Policy implementation, as a field of study, lay relatively

46S/J-PART, October 2002

Downloaded from http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of Arizona on June 6, 2016

The first generation of implementation studies usually con-

The second generation was much more sophisticated and

469/J-PART, October 2002

(1980), and the largely overlooked Paul Berman (1980) brought

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Sooner or later, the bottom-uppers claimed, implementation

MOIJ-PART, October 2002

As we noted earlier, Malcolm L. Goggin and his colleagues

Downloaded from http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of Arizona on June 6, 2016

In much the same time frame, implementation scholars were

Peter deLeon delivered a paper at the 1997 annual meeting of

A1MJ-PART, October 2002

observation was hardly a blinding or even a particularly original

Nevertheless, a veritable academic firestorm erupted. The

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Laurence O'Toole (2000) recently has written on implementa-

412/J-PART, October 2002

Goggin (1998), noted, "Implementation needs to be studied both as

Downloaded from http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of Arizona on June 6, 2016

A FEW DETAILS OF DEFINITION AND ASSUMPTION

We need to hesitate here and address a few necessities of

Addressing the problem of definition is hardly straightforward:

Implementation is the carrying out of a basic policy decision, usually incorpo-

4WJ-PART, October 2002

Such definitions (also see Bardach 1977 and 1980) attempt to

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A more satisfying definition would work to simplify the under-

474/J-PART, October 2002

becomes a battle to determine a correct reading of the mandate and

Downloaded from http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of Arizona on June 6, 2016

Most implementation scholars agree on the importance of

Policy implementation is often extended backwards in the

A1SIJ-PART, October 2002

that it presupposes a policy prescience—an ability to foresee future

Finally, we need to appreciate two underlying assumptions

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By setting up the analysis using assumptions of hierarchy, they focus attention

A second assumption underlying implementation studies is

Likewise, Stephen Bailey and Edith Mosher (1968), in their bench-

A16IJ-PART, October 2002

when she observes that "successful implementation is often acci-

The analyst or administrator should therefore evince little

[I]mplementation research is largely a study of why things go wrong. The

Downloaded from http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of Arizona on June 6, 2016

But it is also unfortunate, for it is clear that a large majority of