THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 144090. June 26, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MICHAEL MAGUING y SALIGUMBA, appellant.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

When the identity of the appellant is not established beyond reasonable doubt, acquittal necessarily
follows. Conviction for a crime rests on the strength of the prosecutions evidence, never on the
weakness of that of the defense.

The Case

Michael Maguing y Saligumba appeals the December 1, 1997 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Antipolo, Rizal (Branch 74) in Criminal Case No. 93-9911. The RTC found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder, as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Michael Maguing GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of Murder charged in the Information, as qualified by the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength and hereby sentences the accused to suffer the indivisible penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Crisanto Saul for the death of the latter the amounts of P50,000.00 x
x x; actual damages of P41,000.00 for burial expenses; and moral damages of P100,000.00; and to pay
the costs.[2]

The Information[3] dated August 18, 1993, charged appellant in these words:

That on or about the 12th day of August, 1993, in the Municipality of Cainta, Province of Rizal,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating with a certain John Doe whose true [name] and whereabout[s] is unknown and
mutually helping and aiding one another, both of them armed with guns, with intent to kill and by
means of treachery did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully, feloniously shoot one Crisanto Saul thereby
inflicting upon him gunshot wound which directly caused his death.[4]

During his arraignment on February 8, 1994, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel de oficio,[5]
pleaded not guilty to the charge.[6] After a trial on the merits, appellant was found guilty of murder.

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

In its Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecutions version of the facts in this
manner:

On August 12, 1993, around 11:30 p.m., spouses Crisanto and Evelyn Saul were in the house of the
Jamias couple (Aniceto and Angelita) located at Block 29, Lot 28, Kabisig Floodway, Cainta, Rizal. With
them were Honoria Ontanillas and Nestor Jamias. The group was talking animatedly concerning the
deployment abroad of Honorio Ontanillas as well as Crisantos deployment on the last week of that
month of August. In the course of their conversation, two (2) masked intruders suddenly appeared from
the door. One of the intruders pointed a gun at the temple of Crisanto then a shot rang out. Crisanto
slumped on the floor. Evelyn was shoved inside a room by Aniceto Jamias and a scuffle ensued between
the second intruder and the rest of the group of the Jamiases. The second intruder was subdued. Evelyn
vividly recalled that the gunman who shot her husband had the letter M tattooed between his thumb
and forefinger.

Post mortem examination conducted on the corpse of Crisanto Saul showed that the cause of his death
was penetrating gunshot wound, left eye.[7] (Citations omitted)

Version of the Defense

Appellant, on the other hand, relates his version of the facts simply as follows:
Accused Michael Maguing interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that on August 12, 1993, he
together with a certain Alex, Tetet and Dante were in the house of his uncle, Reynaldo Tanco, doing
some repair works. They started working at 8:00 oclock in the morning and finished their job at 5:30
oclock in the afternoon. Thereafter, they engaged in a drinking session until 7:30 in the evening. They
then took their dinner and watched television. After his companions left, he stayed in the house of his
uncle.

The foregoing testimony of the accused was corroborated by Reynaldo Tanco and Alex Agustin.[8]

The Trial Courts Ruling

The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution sufficient to establish appellants criminal liability
for murder. It gave full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses -- especially the wife of
the victim. She was allegedly able to see the actual shooting and to identify the assailant through the
tattoo mark on his right hand.

Hence, this appeal.[9]

The Issues

In his Brief, appellant raises the following alleged errors for our consideration:

The trial court erred in rendering a verdict of conviction despite the fact that the identification of the
accused-appellant as the alleged perpetrator of the offense charged was not clear, positive and
convincing.

II
The trial court erred in giving credence to the incredible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and in
disregarding the evidence adduced by the accused-appellant which was corroborated on material
points.

III

The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime charged notwithstanding the fact
that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

IV

On the assumption that the accused-appellant is guilty, the trial court erred in convicting him of murder
instead of homicide.[10]

Simply stated, the main issue is the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence.

The Courts Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

Main Issue:

Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

Positive Identification Required

to Sustain a Conviction
In every criminal prosecution, the prosecution must prove two things: (1) the commission of the crime
and (2) the identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.[11] Cursory identification does
not suffice to convict the accused. What is needed is positive identification made with moral certainty as
to the person of the offender.[12] Verily, the critical consideration in this appeal is whether the identity
of the assailant was sufficiently established by the prosecution.

At the outset it must be noted that the assailants wore masks, which completely covered their faces
during the entire course of the shooting. The prosecution never denied this vital piece of information at
any stage of the proceedings. Further, even the trial court took cognizance of this fact. Given this factual
premise, the prosecution had the task of showing that one of the masked assailants and appellant were
one and the same person. Regrettably, it failed to discharge this task.

Masked Man

Unrecognized by Witnesses

First, not having had any chance at all to see the face of the masked gunman, none of the eyewitnesses
was able to recognize or give a definite description of him later on. Thus, their act of positively pointing
to the accused as the assailant during the police lineup and the trial was the result of pure speculation
and was contrary to human knowledge and common experience.

In recent cases, this Court has upheld the validity of the identification of masked assailants by
prosecution witnesses, but only because of peculiar circumstances that served as reliable bases for
pointing to the accused as the culprits.

In People v. Mante,[13] the accused was convicted because the yellow sando (undershirt), which he had
used to mask his face, was the same apparel he was wearing when he was seen by witnesses in the
vicinity of the crime scene prior to the killing. In People v. Nang,[14] appellants were deemed to have
been positively identified, because the mask worn by one of them accidentally dropped from his face in
the course of a struggle with the victim. In the same vein, we ruled in People v. Sotto[15] that the
prosecution witness had positively identified the masked assailant, because the two of them were
previously known to each other. The witness was therefore familiar with the body contour and
movements of the accused. Moreover, the gun used in the shooting belonged to the latter. He also
tested positive for powder burns after undergoing a paraffin test.
Indubitably, the identification of the accused in the aforecited cases was based on significant facts and
on circumstantial evidence other than the prosecution witnesses self-serving declarations or
statements.

In the present case, it was not established that the prosecution witnesses had previously known
appellant or were familiar with his voice, gestures and mannerisms. Neither was it shown that the mask
he was wearing was dislodged from his face, so as to allow thereby a reasonable view or even a slight
glimpse of his facial features.

Unreliable Basis

for Identification

Second, the prosecutions basis for identifying the assailant was belatedly established, unsubstantiated,
uncorroborated and therefore unreliable.

From the testimony of Prosecution Witness Evelyn Saul, it is clear that in identifying the assailant, her
only point of reference was the tattoo on his right hand. Nonetheless, she audaciously declared that she
was able to recognize the assailant, who was wearing a mask the whole time, as herein appellant. She
testified as follows:

Q: So, there were 5 persons present [on] x x x August [12] 1993 at 11:30 P.M.?

A: Yes, [maam].

Q: What were you and your husband doing at the residence of Mrs. Angelita Jamias?

A: We were talking because her cousin has just had a medical examination and he was about to leave on
that coming Saturday while my husband [was] going to leave on the last week of August.
Q: So, what this group, you and your husband and Mrs. Jamias and a brother of Mrs. Jamias and who
else?

A: Honorio.

Q: Is he also with your group?

A: Yes, [maam].

Q: Cousin Honorio Ontanillas did anything unusual happen?

A: While we were talking then suddenly entered two armed men. And they entered the house and one
of them poked a gun to my husband.

Q: How many person entered?

A: Two (2), [maam].

ATTY. OLEDAN

Q: Did they [enter] x x x to a door?

A: Yes, [maam].

Q: And how did they enter, they just entered slowly or what?
A: They suddenly entered forcibly and then I just had transferred to the seat near my husband.

xxxxxxxxx

Q: So, you said the two armed men forcibly entered and immediately one proceeded, what did the one
do?

A: One of them entered through the other door because there were two doors.

Q: Now, what did the one who entered the place where you were did? What did the one who entered
exactly where you and your husband and the others were seated [did]?

A: The man who entered through the door poked a gun to my husbands left temple while the other man
entered to the other door.

Q: Now when this man who poked a gun on the left side temple and pointed near the eyelid of your late
husband what happen[ed]?

A: I was pushed inside by Mr. Aniceto Jamias and when I was pushed inside there was already a shot.

Q: And did you know where did the shot come from?

A: Yes, [maam].

Q: Where?

A: When he entered there was already a shot.

A: Yes, [maam].

Q: Aside from you, you said that Mr. Jamias pushed you in the room, is that true?

A: Yes, [maam].

Q: What about the others, what happened to them?

A: They also went inside the room. Mr. Jamias, myself, my husband and the [gunmen] were the ones
who were left.

Q: So, what else happened after that?

A: There was already a commotion while we were inside and I was trying to peep to see my husband if
he was already dead and Mr. Jamias was able to wrestle from the other gunman the gun by self defense.

Q: What happened to the gunman who shot your husband?

A: There were shooting at the door, because they were trying to enter the room.

xxxxxxxxx

Q: Did you see the gunman who shot your husband?

Q: If he is around the courtroom, will you be able to identify him?

A: Yes, [maam].

Q: Will you please point him out.

INTERPRETER:

Witness pointing to a man inside the courtroom who when asked gave the name Michael Maguing.

ATTY. OLEDAN:

Q: Was there any particular mark this gunman have that you specifically can recall?

A: He has a tattoo in his right hand with letter m.

ATTY. OLEDAN:

Your Honor, the accused has a tattoo on his right hand with letter m between his thumb and his
forefinger.[16] (Italics supplied)

On cross-examination, she candidly admitted that the gunman indeed had a mask on.
Q: After the crime took place you reported the matter to the police?

A: After the incident police arrived and we were brought to the police station.

Q: And you [told] the police about the incident that transpired on that day?

A: Yes, [maam].

Q: What was your description of the accused?

A: I stated that he has a mask on, he is a big man but I recall on the second time that he had [an] initial
marked letter M in his hand.[17] (Italics supplied)

We note that Evelyn mentioned noticing the tattoo only during the second time. By second time she
meant August 16, 2002, when the followup investigation was conducted and her Sworn Testimony[18]
executed. The initial investigation was conducted on August 13, 1993, or the day following the shooting
incident.[19] During both investigations, particularly during a police lineup, she pointed to appellant as
the killer. Surprisingly, she made no reference to any tattoo or identification mark on his person during
either of these investigations. It was only in open court that she mentioned the tattoo for the first time.

We find it strange why in her Sworn Testimony taken only a few days after the killing, this witness did
not even refer to any supposedly noticeable identification mark or tattoo on the gunman. Neither did
she disclose the fact that the assailant was wearing a mask. It seems that she deliberately omitted this
information to make it appear that she had a clear and positive view of the killer.

Verily, it is baffling why the information about the tattoo was completely disregarded in the Sworn
Testimony, only to be used during trial as the sole determining factor to establish the identity of the
killer. The material omissions therein gravely affect her credibility as to her identification of the accused.
[20]
It is beyond comprehension how she could have failed to mention an important factual detail such as
the tattoo, especially in the initial stages of the investigation, when she knew that it was the only means
by which her identification of the assailant could be substantiated. We cannot repeat often enough that
for evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must
itself be credible.[21] Thus, it must also be reasonable and in accord with human experience; failing to
be so, it must be rejected.[22]

Discrepancies and Inconsistencies

in the Testimonies of Witnesses

Third, the eyewitness testimonies as to the identification of appellant are replete with irreconcilable
inconsistencies and inherent improbabilities pertaining to material facts. When they contradict
themselves on a vital question such as the identity of the offender, the element of reasonable doubt is
injected and cannot be lightly disregarded.[23] Consequently, their credibility is seriously impaired,[24]
the veracity of their claim is negated,[25] and their probative value greatly diminished -- if not rendered
useless altogether. On the whole, the impression they create is that they were feigned or fabricated.

While Evelyn spoke much of the supposedly ostentatious tattoo on the assailants hand, nowhere in the
testimony of the corroborating witnesses was there any mention of it. In fact, Prosecution Witness
Angelita Jamias, who was also present during the shooting, denied having seen it, much less the person
who had shot the victim.

This denial notwithstanding, Angelita conveniently and casually pointed to appellant as the killer, even
as she admitted her inability to recognize him then. Moreover, contrary to Evelyns narration, her claim
was that she saw three killers instead of just two. She testified as follows:

Q: And on the evening at 11:30, you said [that] there were persons who entered, who came in first?
Were there [persons] who came first or they came in inside this [terrace] through that door?

A: They entered all at the same time at the side of the [terrace].

Q: You mean to say they entered all of the three?

xxxxxxxxx

Q: What about the third person, where did he enter?

A: He entered to the portion [of the] marked door.

Q: Did you come to know who was this person who entered to this door?

A: I did not [notice] him.

Q: Did you come to know who he was?

A: I cannot recognize him.

Q: Will you please look around the courtroom who is that person if he is around?

A: Yes, sir.

INTERPRETER:

Witness is pointing to a person inside the courtroom who when asked x x x gave the name Michael
Maguing.
ATTY. OLEDAN:

Witness pointed to the accused.

Q: When the accused entered this door, what did he do?

A: I did not exactly notice.

Q: You mean to say he just entered, he did not do anything?

A: I saw him entered but I did not see what he did but he entered inside.[26] (Italics supplied)

Upon inquiry from the trial court, Angelita affirmed her statements and categorically denied having seen
the person who had shot the victim. She further testified thus:

COURT:

You did not see the victim from the very moment when he was shot?

A: No, sir.

Q: You did not know how the victim was shot?

A: No, sir.

Q: Neither do you know who shot him?

Q: Neither did you see who shot him?

A: No, sir.[27] (Italics supplied)

When the testimonies of key witnesses cannot cohere to form a positive depiction of the criminal act as
well as its perpetrator, the inevitable conclusion is that one or more of them must be lying and merely
concocting a story.[28]

In Madrid v. Court of Appeals,[29] this Court acquitted the accused because of the inconsistent
testimonies and contradictory statements of the alleged eyewitnesses to the crime. The story of one of
them was obviously fabricated to feign credibility, thus exposing even further her predilection to
prevaricate. The Court ruled in this wise:

Inconsistencies on negligible details do not destroy the truth of a witness testimony, so long as they
refer only to collateral or incidental matters. But by no means can the inconsistencies and contradictions
in Merdelyns testimony be characterized as trivial or insignificant. Her propensity to make contradictory
statements reflects her own uncertainty as to the actual events leading to her fathers death. It is clear
that she speaks not from memory or experience. She cannot even give a definite chronology of the
events that transpired before her father was killed. We are convinced that she was simply fashioning her
story and making spur-of-the-moment improvisations in an attempt to render her testimony credible.
Instead of so doing, she exhibited a disposition to fabricate that makes her testimony unworthy of belief
and credence.[30]

By and large, the only piece of evidence linking appellant to the crime is the tattoo, which one of the
eyewitnesses claimed was identical to the one she had seen on the assailants right hand. As explained
above, such testimony hardly serves as reliable basis for identifying the assailant. Thus, the trial courts
conviction based on the uncorroborated claim of Evelyn Saul -- that she recognized appellant as the
assailant by the tattoo on his right hand -- must be regarded as erroneous and set aside.
When the records are bereft of any indication that an eyewitness has given a description that will enable
an anonymous person to point to the accused as the perpetrator of the crime, the court cannot judge
whether a correct and proper identification has been made.[31]

To be sure, the identification of appellant as the assailant in this case cannot in any way be considered
positive and credible.[32] It is a settled rule that when the identification is doubtful, inconclusive or
unreliable, an acquittal is called for.[33] The doubtful identification of the accused herein, when taken
with the absence of any other evidence showing his guilt, justifies his acquittal.[34]

When Positive Identification

Does Not Prevail Over Alibi

In passing, we shall discuss the jurisprudential rule regarding the defense of alibi vis--vis the positive
identification made by a credible witness. Although such defense is inherently weak, the prosecution is
not released from its burden of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.[35] More
important, before a court can apply the rule that positive identification prevails over alibi, it is necessary
to first establish beyond question the credibility of the eyewitness as to the identification of the
accused.[36] In the present case, such credibility was not established. Hence, there can be no positive
identification to speak of, and no application of the aforementioned rule.

The defense of alibi becomes irrelevant when the prosecution fails to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.[37] A conviction for the crime of murder cannot be based on the appellants
inherently weak defenses of denial and alibi.[38] Rather, guilt should be premised on the strength of the
prosecutions evidence.

While the defenses of denial and alibi are concededly weak, appellants conviction cannot be based
thereon. It is a well-settled doctrine that it is incumbent upon the prosecution to uphold the Peoples
cause based on the strength of its own evidence on the guilt of the accused. The burden of proof is on
the prosecution to show to the court to the point of moral certainty that the accused indeed committed
the offense charged. In the case at hand, the prosecution, armed with evidence secured by police
investigators, failed to discharge its appointed task of proving the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Hence, by constitutional mandate, appellant deserves exoneration.[39]
In our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is whether the court reasonably doubts, not
the innocence, but the guilt of the accused.[40] Unless the identity of the culprit is established beyond
reasonable doubt to the exclusion of all others, the charge must be dismissed on the ground that the
constitutional presumption of innocence has not been overcome.[41] While proof beyond reasonable
doubt does not mean absolute certainty, it connotes that degree of proof which, after an investigation
of the whole record, produces in an unprejudiced mind the moral certainty that the accused is culpable.
[42]

In this case, the quantum of proof required to justify a conviction for a criminal offense was not satisfied
by the prosecution. Thus, the Court has no option but to uphold the constitutional presumption of
innocence in favor of appellant.[43]

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal (Branch 74) in Criminal Case No. 93-
9911 is hereby REVERSED. Appellant is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and is ordered RELEASED from
custody, unless he is being held for some other lawful cause.

The director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this Decision forthwith and to
INFORM this Court, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was actually released
from confinement, or of the reasons why he could not be freed therefrom. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, pp. 23-50. Penned by Judge Francisco A. Querubin.

[2] Id., p. 50.

[3] Id., p. 7. The Information was signed by 4th Assistant Prosecutor Lucila A. Tiongson.
[4] Ibid.

[5] Atty. Bonifacia V. Garcia of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO).

[6] See Order dated February 8, 1994; records, Vol. I, p. 24.

[7] Appellees Brief, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp. 139-140. Signed by Assistant Solicitors General Carlos N. Ortega
and Amy C. Lazaro and Solicitor Romeo R. Ramolete.

[8] Appellants Brief, pp. 3-4; id., pp. 95-96. Signed by Attorneys Amelia G. Garchitorena, Elpidio C.
Bacuyag and Maximo B. Usita Jr. of PAO.

[9] This case was deemed submitted for decision on October 28, 2002, upon receipt by this Court of
appellees Brief. Appellants Brief was received on June 18, 2002. No reply brief was filed within the
reglementary period.

[10] Appellants Brief, pp. 1-2; rollo, pp. 93-94. Original in upper case.

[11] People v. Santos, 333 SCRA 319, June 8, 2000.

[12] People v. Gamer, 326 SCRA 660, February 29, 2000.

[13] 312 SCRA 673, August 18, 1999.

[14] 289 SCRA 16, April 15, 1998.

[15] 341 Phil. 184, July 8, 1997.

[17] TSN, April 19, 1994, p. 10.

[18] Records, Vol. I, p. 6.

[19] Id., p. 5.

[20] People v. Balinad, 340 SCRA 27, September 7, 2000.

[21] People v. Ramos, 365 SCRA 477, September 20, 2001.

[22] People v. Almazan, 365 SCRA 373, September 17, 2001.

[23] People v. Aranas, 345 SCRA 377, November 22, 2000.

[24] People v. Malacura, 346 SCRA 781, December 4, 2000.

[25] People v. Decillo, 341 SCRA 591, October 2, 2000.

[26] TSN, June 27, 1994, pp. 4-5.

[27] TSN, July 6, 1994, pp. 5-6.

[29] 332 SCRA 570, May 31, 2000.

[30] Id., pp. 592-593, per Mendoza, J.

[31] People v. Caedo, 335 SCRA 81, July 5, 2000.

[32] People v. Saturno, 355 SCRA 578, March 28, 2001.

[33] People v. Cabiles, 341 SCRA 721, October 3, 2000; People v. Giganto Sr., 336 SCRA 294, July 20,
2000.

[34] People v. Ragay, 342 Phil. 785, August 11, 1997.

[35] People v. Salazar, 346 SCRA 735, December 4, 2000.

[36] People v. Mansueto, 336 SCRA 715, July 31, 2000; People v. Crispin, 327 SCRA 167, March 2, 2000.

[37] People v. Gonzales, 341 SCRA 688, October 3, 2000.

[38] People v. Sinco, 355 SCRA 713, March 30, 2001.

[39] Id., p. 728, per Kapunan, J.

[41] People v. Malacura, supra.

[42] People v. Mariano, 345 SCRA 1, November 17, 2000.

[43] People v. Velarde, GR No. 139333, July 18, 2002; People v. Bravo, 318 SCRA 812, November 22,
1999