[ G.R. No.

191759, March 02, 2020 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. GERALD MORENO Y TAZON, ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.

DECISION
HERNANDO, J.:

On appeal is the August 27, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03204, affirming
the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 53, Manila in Criminal Case No. 01-197519 which found
appellant Gerald Moreno y Tazon (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.

The Information3 alleged:

That on or about the 16th day of November 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, said accused, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously x x x at about 2:15 a.m., with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one CECIL MIJARES Y LEOCADIO by
then and there stabbing him with a bladed weapon on his body, thereby inflicting upon said CECIL MIJARES Y
LEOCADIO mortal stab wounds at the back and chest which were the direct and immediate cause of his death,
thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Version of the Prosecution

On November 16, 2001, at around 2:15 in the morning, Adelriza Mijares ("Adelriza") was awakened from her sleep
when a hard object hit her head. When she turned on the lights, a man, wearing khaki shorts and white t-shirt, leap
on their bed and repeatedly stabbed her husband, Cecil Mijares ("Mijares"), on the leg and chest. Mijares was able
to kick the man out of the room and even close the door. Immediately thereafter, Mijares collapsed and fell on the
floor. Adelriza shouted for help and their neighbor, Virgie Perey ("Virgie"), came to their rescue. Virgie sought
assistance from their neighbors, Noli Corrales and Michael Buenaflor, in bringing Mijares to the Philippine General
Hospital (PGH). Unfortunately, Mijares died while undergoing treatment.4

Senior Police Officer 1 Raul Olavario ("SPO1 Olavario") and other police officers from the Western Police District,
Homicide Division, arrived at the PGH after receiving a report about a stabbing incident in their area of jurisdiction.
SPO1 Olavario interviewed Adelriza and conducted a physical examination of the cadaver. He observed multiple
stab wounds on different parts of Mijares' body, particularly at the front and at the back. After the examination,
SPO1 Olavario asked Adelriza to accompany them to the crime scene. Upon arrival, the police officers discovered
that four pieces of glass jalousies at the front window of Adelriza's house were removed and the window screen was
broken. They likewise saw bloodstains on the floor where Mijares collapsed.5 The police officers and Adelriza
proceeded to the police station where Adelriza executed a Sworn Statement6 dated November 16, 2001. At this
point, Adelriza still did not know the name of her husband's killer but she vividly remembered his face after having
witnessed the stabbing. A police cartographer prepared a sketch of the suspect based on Adelriza's description.7

In the afternoon of the same day, the police received a call from Virgie informing them that appellant, who fitted the
description of the suspect, was in the vicinity of his house. According to Virgie, she heard rumors that appellant was
responsible for the killing of Mijares.8 Acting on Virgie's tip, SPO1 Olavario invited appellant to the police station for
an interview regarding the killing that transpired to which appellant acceded.9 The police officers then summoned
Adelriza to the police station. Upon her arrival, she positively identified appellant as the person who stabbed her
husband. It was only at this point that she learned of Moreno's name.10

SPO1 Olavario thus arrested appellant and informed him of his constitutional right to remain silent and to have a
competent counsel of his choice. Appellant however did not respond. Hence, SPO1 Olavario merely asked for his
name and then prepared the Crime Report, Booking and Arrest Sheet and Referral to Inquest.11

Version of the Defense

The defense vehemently denied the version of the prosecution and interposed that at the time of the incident,
appellant was sleeping at his house on Diamante St., Sta. Ana, Manila where his mother, father, siblings and son
likewise lived. He was awakened by a loud noise and when he inquired about it from his father, he was told that
there was a robbery in the vicinity. He then went out of their gate where their neighbor, Junior Santos, told him to get
a taxicab. When it arrived, he assisted his neighbors to carry Mijares into the taxicab to be brought to the hospital.
Thereafter, he went back to sleep and was only awakened at around 11:00 in the morning when armed police
officers were already inside his room. The police officers invited him to the police station for an investigation and he
voluntarily went with them.12

Appellant insisted that he never knew Mijares and he saw the victim for the first time when he assisted in carrying
him to the taxicab. During the time of the incident, he was wearing a gray t-shirt and black pants contrary to
Adelriza's description of the clothes of her husband's killer. However, he could not impute any reason as to why
Adelriza would ever testify against him.13

Victoria Moreno ("Victoria"), appellant's mother, and Crispulo Moreno III ("Crispulo"), his brother, corroborated
appellant's whereabouts.14

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Appellant pleaded "not guilty."15 After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision16 finding appellant guilty of Murder,
treachery having attended the attack. The trial court disposed the case in this wise:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Gerald Moreno y
Tazon GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is hereby sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua
and ordered to pay [the] heirs of Cecil Mijares the following amounts: PHP75,000.00 as indemnity for his death;
PHP603,288.00 as unearned income; PHP31,500.00 as actual damages; PHP50,000.00 as reimbursement for
attorney's fees; and PHP50,000.00 as moral damages.

Cost against the accused.

SO ORDERED.17

The trial court rejected appellant's defenses of alibi and denial; his alleged lack of motive in committing the crime;
his arguments that the uncorroborated testimony of Adelriza was insufficient to convict him; and that his
identification outside a police line-up was irregular. Ultimately, the RTC ratiocinated that the clear, positive and
credible testimony of Adelriza that appellant was the culprit sufficiently removed any reasonable doubt on his guilt.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Undeterred, appellant appealed his conviction before the CA.18 The appellate court, finding no reversible error,
upheld the trial court's Decision. The CA held that the lone, positive and credible testimony of the eyewitness was
sufficient to support appellant's conviction.19 Any inconsistencies in the testimony of Adelriza did not destroy the
strength of her testimony. The appellate court stressed that there is no rule requiring for a police-line up in the
identification of offenders and that the same is not indispensable for the proper and fair identification of
offenders.20 The CA also held that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over, and is worthless in the face of the
positive identification by a credible witness. Moreover, appellant's alibi was inherently weak as he failed to prove
that it was physically impossible for him to have been present at the scene of the crime. The appellate court
disregarded the argument that he was illegally arrested because the objection was not raised before arraignment
and was deemed waived. In sum, the CA did not depart from the trial court's ruling. The dispositive portion of the
appellate court's Decision stated:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the 25 August 2006 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(Branch 53) in Criminal Case No. 01-197519 finding accused-appellant Gerald Tazon Moreno guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.21

Aggrieved, appellant brought the case before Us, raising the same arguments he had at the CA.

Issue

Appellant raised the sole error: The trial court has committed a serious reversible error when it pronounced the guilt
of the appellant on the supposition that the quantum of proof constitutionally required to sustain a conviction was
proven.22

THE COURT'S RULING

The appeal has no merit.

Positive testimony despite minor inconsistencies prevails over the defenses of denial and alibi

Appellant claims that the trial court erred in ruling that the positive testimony of the prosecution's witness prevailed
over his defense of alibi. He alleges that contrary to the conclusion of the trial court, his defense was not at all an
alibi to account his whereabouts, rather it was an attestation of his plain denial of the crime charged.23 He asserts
that there were inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the uncorroborated testimony of the eyewitness that tarnished
its veracity and diminished its probative value to prove his guilt.24

The arguments of the appellant deserve scant consideration.

Denial is inherently a weak defense which cannot outweigh positive testimony. A categorical statement that has the
earmarks of truth prevails over a bare denial25 which can easily be fabricated and is inherently unreliable.26 For the
defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was at some other place at the time of the commission
of the crime and it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. These
requirements of time and place must be strictly met.27

Appellant asserts that he was asleep at the time of the commission of the crime. He insists that he has never met
Mijares before and just saw him for the first time when he assisted in getting a taxicab so he may be rushed to the
hospital. However, in the same breath, appellant himself admitted that only a wall separated his house and the
crime scene.28 Such admission negated physical impossibility of him being at the crime scene,29 making his alibi
simply unbelievable. While the testimonies of his mother, Victoria, and his brother, Crispulo, supposedly
corroborated his claim that he was in a different place when the stabbing took place,30 such testimonies did not
bolster appellant's defenses of alibi and denial.
This Court has consistently assigned less probative weight to a defense of alibi when it is corroborated by relatives.
For corroboration to be credible, the same must be offered preferably by disinterested witnesses.31 Evidently,
Victoria and Crispulo were not disinterested witnesses both being appellant's relatives. Their testimonies are
rendered suspect because the former's relationship to them makes it likely that they would freely perjure themselves
for his sake.32 Hence, by all accounts, appellant failed to meet the requirements for his defense of alibi to prosper.

Concerning the supposed inconsistencies and contradictory statements in the eyewitness' testimony in open
court,33 this Court finds them immaterial and did not diminish appellant's guilt.

The inconsistencies in Adelriza's and SPO1 Olavario's testimonies on the number of persons present when she
identified the appellant, Adelriza stated that the appellant was the only person present, while SPO1 Olavario
maintained that there were other people present,34 referred to a minor detail which did not diminish the probative
value of the testimonies at issue. After all, it is well-settled that immaterial and insignificant details did not discredit a
testimony on the very material and significant point bearing on the very act of the perpetrator. As long as the
testimonies of the witnesses corroborate one another on material points, minor inconsistencies therein cannot
destroy their credibility. Inconsistencies on minor details do not undermine the integrity of a prosecution
witness.35 Here, it remains that Adelriza was able to categorically identify the appellant as the very culprit of the
crime.

Moreover, courts cannot expect the testimonies of the witnesses to be impeccable.36 In People v. Givera,37 the
Court explained that minor inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimonies actually tend to strengthen the
credibility of the witness because they discount the possibility of them being rehearsed, viz.:

In any event, these discrepancies are minor and insignificant and do not detract from the substance of her
testimony. This Court has time and again said that a few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of
witnesses referring to minor details and not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair the
credibility of the witnesses. Instead of weakening their testimonies, such inconsistencies tend to strengthen their
credibility because they discount the possibility of their being rehearsed testimony.38 (Underscoring supplied)

Appellant also points out that his physical appearance varies from the description given by Adelriza of her husband's
assailant. He argues that such contradictory observation proves the unreliability of Adelriza's testimony and provides
reasonable doubt on his guilt.39

The arguments of appellant fail to impress Us.

This Court has consistently ruled that witnesses frequently concentrate on the facial features and movements of the
accused. Victims of violence tend to strive to see the appearance of the perpetrators of the crime and observe the
manner in which the crime is being committed and not unduly concentrate on extraneous factors and physical
attributes unless they are striking.40 The appellate court correctly pointed out that any difference between Adelriza's
description of the victim's assailant and that of appellant's actual appearance, particularly as to height, was
inconsequential because she cannot be expected to give an accurate estimate of his height. We thus adhere to the
finding of the appellate court that Adelriza's immediate description of the assailant matched squarely with the actual
appearance of appellant.41

Ultimately, Adelriza's positive, categorical and consistent identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the
crime prevails over the rehashed defenses of denial and alibi by the appellant.

Police line-up, conduct of arrest and rights of the accused in custodial investigations

Appellant likewise questions the legality of his identification and arrest and the conduct of custodial investigation. He
alleges that the procedure was irregular and that he was deprived of his constitutional right to have a counsel
present.42

The arguments do not hold water.

A police line-up is not indispensable for the proper and fair identification of offenders. The important consideration is
for the victim to positively declare that the persons charged were the malefactors.43

In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,44 this Court explained the procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to
determine the admissibility of such identifications in this manner:

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect
alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are
shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness identifies the suspect from
a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court
identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following
factors, viz[.]: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of
attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and
(6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.45

Applying the totality of circumstances test, We find appellant's out-of-court identification to be reliable and thus
admissible. To recall, Adelriza after being awakened when a hard object hit her head and after she switched on the
lights inside the room, had a clear and direct view of the attack on her husband and the perpetrator. Moreover, she
described with certainty the assailant to the police cartographer barely hours from the time of the incident, which
description matched the facial features of the appellant, whom she subsequently identified as the assailant. In other
words, the interval between the time she witnessed the crime and her identification of the appellant, was merely a
matter of hours, leaving no room for her recollection to be tainted.

Verily, it was Adelriza's own description that led to the apprehension of the appellant. There was no evidence on
record indicating any hint of a suggestion from the police officer who presented the appellant to Adelriza. Hence, the
identification of the appellant as the culprit of the crime stands.

About the legality of appellant's arrest, it bears stressing that questions on arrest shall be made before arraignment
and failure to object to the illegality of arrest constitutes a waiver on the part of the accused. It is settled that any
objection to the manner of arrest must be opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is
deemed waived.46 Here, the records clearly show that the objection was only raised on appeal.47

The Court ruled in People v. Kulais and Samson:48

[A]ppellant is now estopped from questioning any defect in the manner of his arrest as he failed to move for the
quashing of the information before the trial court. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest was
cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of "not
guilty" and by participating in the trial. x x x49 (Emphasis supplied)

Even assuming that appellant's arrest was irregular, still, it is not a jurisdictional defect, and objection thereto is
waived where the person arrested submits to arraignment without objection.50

There was no violation of appellant's right to counsel during custodial investigation. The records show that appellant
was informed of his constitutional rights when he was arrested. Since he chose to remain silent, he was not
interrogated and no statement or evidence was extracted from him; neither was any evidence presented in court
that was supposedly obtained from him during custodial investigation.51

Crime committed and Proper indemnities

We agree that treachery attended the attack on Mijares. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and
specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself/herself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.52 In order for the qualifying circumstance of treachery to be appreciated, the following requisites must be
shown: (1) the employment of means, method, or manner of execution that would ensure the safety of the
malefactor from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim, and (2) the means, method, or manner of execution
was deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender.53 The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden
attack, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape.54

Appellant's sudden attack on Mijares while asleep in his own home amply demonstrates treachery in the
commission of the crime. Mijares had no inkling of the impending attack that night; or any peril to his person as he
felt secured in his home. Mijares was not able to put up an effective defense. Although he kicked and pushed the
appellant out of their room, this did not negate the presence of treachery. In People v. Baltazar,55 We ruled that
treachery must still be appreciated even if the victim was able to retaliate as a result of his reflexes, so long as he
did not have the opportunity to repel the initial assault, viz.:

Although appellant contends that there were defensive wounds on his arms, these do not show that the
victim was able to put up an effective defense. This Court finds these wounds to be merely the result of a
reflex action on the victim's part, in a vain attempt to avoid the thrusts of the knife.

Apropos to this is the case of People v. Go-od, where even the fact that a victim was able to stab one of his
assailants was held as not negating the presence of treachery:

The fact that the victim was able to grab one of the bolos after he had already been hit and used the same to
stab one of his assailants does not negate the presence of treachery in the commission of the crime. The
characteristic and unmistakable manifestation of treachery is the deliberate and unexpected attack on the
victim without any warning and without giving him the opportunity to defend or repel the initial assault, x x x
Ygot stabbed Nestor Go-od after he himself had already been wounded by the attack which as we have already
mentioned was so sudden and unexpected that it did not give Aladino Ygot an opportunity to offer an effective
defense nor to repel the initial attack.56 (Emphasis Ours)

Further, We find that the appellant consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or form of
attack in order to ensure the execution of the crime. He stabbed Mijares several times so that he would not be a risk
to himself. He lodged a bladed weapon on the victim's chest and back.57 Indeed, the attack on Mijares was
treacherous thereby qualifying the killing to murder.

The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, awarded P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P603,288.00 as unearned income,
P31,500.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as reimbursement for attorney's fees, and P50,000.00 as moral
damages.58

It is jurisprudentially settled that when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil
indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4)
exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases.59
In People v. Jugueta,60 this Court held that for crimes like murder where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua,
the nature and amount of damages that may be awarded are: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, among others.61

Pursuant to Jugueta, We sustain the award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity but increase the moral damages from
P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. In addition, an award of exemplary damages in the amount of P75,000.00 is proper.

However, in lieu of actual damages, We award temperate damages in the amount of P50,000.00. The settled rule
1âшphi1

is that when the amount of actual damages proven by receipts during the trial is less than the sum allowed by the
court as temperate damages,62 the award of temperate damages in lieu of actual damages, which is of a lesser
amount, is justified. Conversely, if the amount of actual damages proven exceeds P50,000.00, then temperate
damages may no longer be awarded; actual damages based on the receipts presented during trial should instead
be granted. The rationale for this rule is that it would be anomalous and unfair for the victim's heirs, who tried and
succeeded in presenting receipts and other evidence to prove actual damages, to receive an amount which is less
than that given as temperate damages to those who were not able to present any evidence at all.63

In the present case, Mijares' heirs were able to prove, and were awarded, actual damages in the amount of
P31,500.00.64 Since, prevailing jurisprudence now fixes the amount of P50,000.00 as temperate damages in cases
where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, this Court finds it proper to award temperate damages to Mijares'
heirs, in lieu of actual damages.

Considering too that Mijares' heirs spent for attorney's fees to prosecute the case against the appellant, the award of
P50,000.00 is sustained.65 Article 2208 of the Civil Code66 enumerates the legal grounds warranting the grant of
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, and this case qualifies since exemplary damages are awarded and the
Court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees be recovered.67

Anent unearned income, the RTC awarded P603,288.00 without elaborating on its basis. To determine the
compensable amount of lost earnings, We consider (1) the number of years for which the victim would otherwise
have lived (life expectancy); and (2) the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased. Life expectancy is
computed by applying the formula (2/3 x [80 - age at death]) adopted in the American Expectancy Table of Mortality
or the Actuarial Combined Experience Table of Mortality. The second factor is computed by multiplying the life
expectancy by the net earnings of the deceased, i.e., the total earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of
such earnings or income and less living and other incidental expenses. The net earning is ordinarily computed at
fifty percent (50%) of the gross earnings. Thus, the formula used by this Court in computing loss of earning capacity
is: Net Earning Capacity = [2/3 x (80 - age at time of death) x (gross annual income - reasonable and necessary
living expenses)].68

Here, it was sufficiently established that the victim, at the time of his death, was 32 years old and was employed as
a bookkeeper at the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp. with a monthly basic salary of P7,182.00 or
P86,184.00 in a year.69 We thus apply the formula for loss of income capacity in this wise:

Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x [gross annual income - living expenses]

= 2/3 [80-age of the victim at time of death] x [gross annual income - 50% of gross annual income]

= 2/3 [80-32 years] x [P86,184.00- P43,092.00

2(48)
= x P43,092.00
3

= 32 x P43,092.00

= P1,378,944.00

We are thus impelled to modify the award of unearned income from to P603,288.00 to P1,378,944.00.

Finally, all damages awarded shall earn six percent (6%) interest per annum from the date of finality of this Decision
until full payment.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The August 27, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 03204 finding appellant Gerald Moreno y Tazon guilty of Murder and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, thus:
1) Moral damages is hereby increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00;
2) Unearned income due to loss of income capacity is hereby increased from P603,288.00 to
P1,378,944.00;
3) Actual damages in the amount of P31,500.00 is deleted;
4) Temperate damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is awarded in lieu of actual damages;
5) Exemplary damages in the amount of P75,000.00 is likewise awarded.

All damages awarded shall then earn six percent (6%) interest per annum from the date of finality of this Decision
until full payment.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 117407 April 15, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs IRVIN TADULAN y EPAN, accused-appellant.

PADILLA, J.:

Accused-appellant Irvin Tadulan was charged with the crime of rape before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Branch 157, Metro Manila, in a complaint docketed as Criminal Case No. 92-186, alleging as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of April, 1992 in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, armed with a knife, with lewd design and by
means of force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with one Maristel Cruz, a minor, nine (9) years old, without her consent and
against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1

When arraigned under the foregoing indictment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime attributed to him.
Thereafter, trial commenced with both prosecution and defendant presenting evidence consisting of testimonies of
witnesses and documentary exhibits.

The evidence presented by the prosecution tended to establish the following facts:

. . . Complainant Estela Santos owns a house at No. 6 Dr. Garcia St., in Barangay Sumilang Pasig,
Metro Manila where she resides with her common-law husband and their minor daughter, Maristel
Cruz. Behind the said house, complainant also owns a three-door apartment building, one unit of
which was rented and occupied by accused Irvin Tadulan, his wife Adefa Tadulan and their three
children name [sic] Dianne, Angie and Bochoy who were aged 10, 9 and 5, respectively. In 1992
complainant's daughter, Maristel Cruz was about nine (9) year [sic] old (Exh. "A") and was in grade
school. She often played with the accused's children in the vicinity of their house and the apartment
building.

In the morning of April 2, 1992, at about 11:00 o'clock, Maristel Cruz was playing with the other
children when she was called by Irvin Tadulan into the latter's apartment unit. He brought the girl
upstairs and told her to lie down on the floor. Irvin Tadulan then removed the shorts and panties of
Maristel Cruz and his own pants and briefs. He kissed the girl and fondled her breasts and private
parts. Then he put himself on top of her and inserted his organ into her genitals. Maristel Cruz felt
the pain in her vagina. She pushed Irvin Tadulan away from her and got up, but the latter poked a
kitchen knife at her and told her to remain lying down; and because of fear, Maristel Cruz lay [sic]
down on the floor again. Irvin Tadulan placed himself on top of her once more, kissed and fondled
her breasts as before, and finally succeeded in inserting his penis into her sex organ. As he had
intercourse with Maristel Cruz, blood oozed out of her vagina and she felt the pain. Shortly
thereafter, however, she heard her mother calling her. So, Irvin Tadulan told her to dress up quickly
and ordered her to go home.

Upon reaching home, Maristel Cruz did not inform her mother that Irvin Tadulan had carnal
knowledge of her; but two days later, their laundry woman saw the blood stains on her panties and
told her mother about it. At first, Maristel Cruz refused to talk when her mother asked her about the
said blood stains, but when the mother persisted in asking her, the girl cried and revealed that Irvin
Tadulan had sexual intercourse with her. The mother (Estela Santos) was shocked. She reported
the matter to her godson who immediately confronted Irvin Tadulan relative to what he had done to
Maristel Cruz. At first, Irvin Tadulan denied having done the act imputed to him by the said girl, but
he later on admitted that he had sexual intercourse with her.

Shortly thereafter, Irvin Tadulan's wife (Adefa Tadulan) arrived from a trip from Cagayan de Oro City,
and Estela Santos immediately informed her that her husband, Irvin Tadulan has raped her (Estela)
daughter Maristel Cruz. Estela Santos further informed Adefa Tadulan that she would not take action
against the latter's husband if they would vacate the apartment unit right away. Adefa Tadulan later
on met with Estela Santos and told her that she had driven away Irvin Tadulan, but requested that
she and her children be allowed to stay until Saturday, April 11, 1992. Estela Santos thereafter
noted, however, that Irvin Tadulan was still coming home to the apartment unit every night despite
the promise of his wife that she herself would call the police should he ever come back to the place.
So, Estela Santos conferred with her cousin, a lawyer, and later on made up her mind to file a
criminal charge against Irvin Tadulan before leaving for abroad, for she was then scheduled to go to
the United States to fetch her mother who was ill due to a stroke.

On the night of April 11, 1992, Estela Santos heard a loud noise coming from the apartment building,
and when she inquired about it she came to know that it was Irvin Tadulan creating the noise
because he was kicking the door of the apartment unit occupied by him and his family. So, Estela
Santos called up the police because of her apprehension that Irvin Tadulan would create trouble due
to the quarrel that was then taking place between him and his wife. Responding policemen soon
arrived at the place in a mobile car, and because Irvin Tadulan was denounced by his wife for having
rape [sic] the daughter of Estela Santos, the said police officers brought Irvin Tadulan to the Pasig
Police Station for questioning and also asked Estela Santos and her daughter to follow them. So,
that same evening, Estela Santos and her daughter went to the Pasig Police Station where they
 gave their respective sworn statements (Exhs. "B" & "E") and lodged their complaint against Irvin
Tadulan. It was during the taking of her statement before the police when Maristel Cruz also
revealed that Irvin Tadulan had laid with her not only on April 2, 1992. She stated that Irvin Tadulan
had previously laid on top of her and first attempted to have intercourse with her sometime in
September 1, 1991, but it was not consummated because she was hurt whenever he tried to insert
his penis into her vagina.

In order to determine physical signs of sexual abuse, the Pasig Police Station made a Request For
The Medico Legal Examination of Maristel Cruz to the PC Crime Laboratory Service at Camp
Crame, Quezon City (Exh. "F") on the following day, April 12, 1992, upon the written Consent For
Examination (Exh. "G") which was signed by the mother, Estela Santos. A medico-legal officer of the
PCCLS examined Maristel Cruz and then issued Medico-Legal Report No. M-0708-92 dated April
13, 1992 (Exh. "C") finding her "hymen with deep, healed laceration at 4 o'clock", and with the
conclusion that the "Subject is in non-virgin state physically". Thereafter, the Pasig Police Station
forwarded the sworn statements of Maristel Cruz and her mother, together with all the pertinent
papers to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal where the said minor child and her mother
signed the Complaint for Rape (Exh. "D") against Irvin Tadulan, which initiated the prosecution of the
said accused in this case.2

On the other hand, accused Irvin Tadulan set up the defense of alibi and pardon. In support of his defense, Tadulan
testified that he could not have raped Maristel Cruz in his apartment unit in Sumilang, Pasig, Metro Manila, at 11:00
o'clock in the morning of 2 April 1992 as he was then at his place of work at the Republic Asahi Glass Corporation in
Pinagbuhatan, Pasig, Metro Manila, where he was employed as a mobile equipment operator. His testimony was
corroborated by his supervisor at the plant who testified that on 2 April 1992, Irvin Tadulan worked with him at the
company plant during the first shift, from 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.; and that as shown in Tadulan's daily time record
(Exhibit "1"), said accused punched in at 5:25 a.m. and punched out at 2:31 p.m.

Relative to the defense of pardon or condonation, Adefa Tadulan, wife of accused-appellant, testified that when she
arrived at their apartment on 7 April 1992 from Cagayan de Oro, she learned from Estela Santos and her daughter
Maristel Cruz that the latter had been raped by her husband, that she again went to see Estela Santos and asked
for forgiveness and that the latter told her: "Hayaan mo na lang, umalis na lang kayo dito, kung and Dios
nagpapatawad, tao pa kaya." Said witness also testified that she asked Estela Santos if the accused Irvin Tadulan
could just leave first while she and their children would vacate the apartment unit on the coming Saturday, and
Estela Santos agreed; and that pursuant to said agreement, Irvin Tadulan immediately left the apartment and she
started packing their belongings and sent their children to Cagayan de Oro in the company of her mother.

Adefa Tadulan further testified that on the night of 11 April 1992, her husband came home and upon learning that
she had sent their children to the province, he got angry and they had a violent quarrel. The noise created by the
quarrel was heard by Estela Santos who immediately called the police; and on that same night, Estela Santos and
Maristel Cruz lodged a complaint for rape against accused Irvin Tadulan despite the previous understanding
between Estela Santos and Adefa Tadulan that Estela would not take action anymore against Irvin Tadulan.

Prior to the reception of evidence for the accused, his counsel filed a Motion to Plead Guilty to Lesser
Offense 3 praying that accused be allowed to plead guilty to the crime under Article 336, Revised Penal Code,
denominated as Acts of Lasciviousness. No communication having been received from the complainant with regard
to said offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense, the trial proceeded for the reception of evidence for the defense.

After trial, the now appealed judgment was rendered by the lower court finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The dispositive part of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, AND IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this Court hereby
finds accused IRVIN TADULAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE defined and
penalized by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and he is hereby sentenced to the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua, with the accessory penalties the law provides therefor.

Accused Irvin Tadulan is also hereby ordered to indemnify the offended minor girl, Maristel Cruz in
the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), with interest thereon at the legal rate of six
per cent (6%) per annum from the filing of the complaint in this case until the same is fully paid.

SO ORDERED. 4

In this appeal, accused Irvin Tadulan assigns the following errors to the trial court:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING EXCULPATORY WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE
ADDUCED BY THE DEFENSE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES
OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES MARKED AS THEY ARE WITH INCONSISTENCIES AND
IMPROBABILITIES WHICH CAST SERIOUS DOUBTS AS TO THEIR TRUTHFULNESS.

III
 ASSUMING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S VERSION OF THE INCIDENT IS CORRECT, THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS
ALREADY PARDONED BY COMPLAINANTS.

IV

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON

GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.5

The issues raised by accused-appellant boil down to credibility of witnesses.

In rejecting the version of the accused-appellant, the trial court made the following findings and conclusions to which
we agree.

This Court finds, however, that the abovementioned testimonies of accused Irvin Tadulan and his
witness cannot prevail over the more convincing testimony of the rape victim, Maristel Cruz, who
positively identified the said accused as the one who raped her and described in a clear and
straightforward manner how she was sexually abused by him. In the absence of any clear showing
of ill motive that might have impelled her to impute the heinous crime of rape against the said
accused, there is no reason to doubt the veracity of the declarations of the said victim in court; for as
held in a case (People vs. Camasis, 189 SCRA 649), "it is hard to believe that a young unmarried
woman would reveal that she was deflowered and allow the examination of her private parts and
thereafter permit herself to be the subject of public trial if her motive was not to bring to justice the
person who wronged her." Also applicable here is the well-settled principle that "alibi is unavailing as
a defense where there is positive identification of the perpetrator of the crime, most specially, when
the said identification is made by the victim of the rape herself in the absence of any motive to
implicate the assailant". (People vs. Felipe, 191 SCRA 176, and cases therein cited). Besides, it has
been held time and time again, that for alibi to prosper as a defense the accused must show that he
was so far away that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime, or its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission (People vs. Tasurra, 192 SCRA 266). In this case,
however, it is clear that accused Irvin Tadulan was not so situated on April 2, 1992, for according to
him he was at the plant of the Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation in Barangay Pinagbuhatan, Pasig,
Metro Manila — which is but a few kilometers from Barangay Sumilang of the same municipality
where the crime was committed.

Relative to the defense of pardon or condonation also set up by accused Irvin Tadulan, his wife
Adefa Tadulan testified that on April 7, 1992 when she arrived at their apartment unit from a trip from
Cagayan de Oro City, she came to know from both Estela Santos and her daughter, Maristel Cruz,
that the latter has been raped by her husband; that she again met with Estela Santos and asked for
forgiveness, and that the said mother told her: "Hayaan mo na lang, umalis na lang kayo dito, kung
ang Diyos ay nagpapatawad, tao pa kaya." The said wife also testified that she asked Estela Santos
if her husband could just leave first while she and their children could vacate the apartment unit on
the coming Saturday, and Estela Santos agreed; and that pursuant to the said agreement Irvin
Tadulan immediately left their house, after which she also sent their children to Cagayan de Oro City
in the company of her mother and then started packing-up their belongings. She further testified that
on the night of April 11, 1992, however, her husband came home and quarreled with her upon
knowing that she had sent their children to the province; that because of the noise their quarrel
created, Estela Santos called for the police; and that on that same night, Estela Santos and her
daughter lodged a complaint for rape against Irvin Tadulan, despite the previous understanding
between her and Estela Santos that the latter would not anymore take any action against her
husband.

It should be pointed out, however, as earlier narrated above, that according to Estela Santos, she
agreed not to file any complaint against Irvin Tadulan upon the representation of his wife, Adefa
Tadulan, that she had driven away her husband, and her promise that if he would ever return to their
apartment unit, she herself would call for the police; that she (Estela Santos) noted, however, that
Irvin Tadulan was still coming home to their apartment unit every night; that she was prompted to
call for police assistance because she saw Irvin Tadulan kicking the door of the apartment during a
violent quarrel with his wife on the night of April 11, 1992; and that because soon after policemen
arrived at the place, Adefa Tadulan herself informed them that her husband has raped Maristel Cruz,
she (Estela Santos) and her said child proceeded with the filing of their complaint for rape against
Irvin Tadulan.

From the evidence just discussed, it would appear that the initial desistance of Estela Santos from
taking any action against Irvin Tadulan, was upon the representation of the latter's wife Adefa
Tadulan that she had driven away her husband, and her promise that should he ever come back to
their apartment unit she herself would call for the police; but that the said representation turn [sic] out
to be untrue, and the promise was not complied with because Irvin Tadulan was still coming home
every night and, in fact, he and her [sic] wife had a violent quarrel in the apartment unit on the night
of April 11, 1992. Otherwise stated, the desistance was subject to certain conditions which were not
complied with, and for which reason Estela Santos proceeded with the filing of a criminal complaint
against Irvin Tadulan. Upon such circumstances, it is clear to the mind of this Court that the
complainant has not expressly pardoned the said accused.

Besides, there are authorities holding that pardon must be granted not only by the parents of an
offended minor but also by the minor herself in order to be effective as an express pardon under Art.
 344 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in the case of People vs. Lacson, Jr., (C.A.) 55 O.G. 9460, we
find the following words: "Neither must we be understood as supporting the view that the parents
alone can extend a valid pardon. Far from it, for we, too are of the belief that the pardon by the
parents, standing alone, is inefficacious." It was also held in another case, that "The express pardon
of a person guilty of attempted abduction of a minor, granted by the latter's parents, is not sufficient
to remove criminal responsibility, but must be accompanied by the express pardon of the girl
herself." (U.S. vs. Luna, 1 Phil. 360)

In the present case, the supposed pardon of the accused was allegedly granted only by the mother
(Estela Santos) without the concurrence of the offended minor, Maristel Cruz. Hence, even if it be
assumed for the sake of argument that the initial desistance of the said mother from taking any
action against the accused, constitutes pardon, it is clear that upon the authorities cited above, such
pardon is ineffective without the express concurrence of the offended minor herself.

In fine, this Court concludes that the prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused Irvin Tadulan of
the crime of rape charged against him, and that the defenses of alibi and pardon or condonation set
up by him are lacking in merit.6

We have consistently held that appellate courts, as a rule, will not disturb the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses. We have sustained trial courts in this respect, considering their vantage point in the
evaluation of testimonial evidence, absent, of course, any showing of serious error or irregularity that otherwise
would alter the result of the case. 7 We find no such serious error or irregularity in the case at bar.

Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court gravely erred when it disregarded the defense of alibi despite the
overwhelming evidence that the accused did not leave his place of work on 2 April 1992. According to the appellant,
his immediate supervisor, Leandro Daguro, testified that he (appellant) reported for work on 2 April 1992 and was
assigned in a critical area, and being the only driver at that time a problem would have ensued had he left his post at
any given time on 2 April 1992. Appellant likewise faults the trial court when it observed that there was no physical
impossibility for him to be at Barangay Sumilang, Pasig where the crime was committed because the court mainly
focused its attention on the fact that Barangay Pinagbuhatan is but a few kilometers away from Barangay Sumilang,
both in Pasig, hence, appellant could have returned to his place of work after committing the crime at the time and
place it occurred. Accused argues that the distance between the two barangays was never an issue; that the
question really is whether or not appellant left or could have left his work at the Republic Asahi Glass Corporation in
barangay Pinagbuhatan and gone home to barangay Sumilang in the morning of 2 April 1992.

We are not persuaded. The testimony of Leonardo Daguro that accused could not have left his work as this would
have resulted in a big problem at the area where appellant was working is too simple for comfort. The same witness
testified that he could not remember if a problem arose on that date when the crime was committed and that he was
supervising an average of seventeen (17) men in different sections of the raw material department so that he had to
go around each section.

We quote with approval the following observation of the court a quo:

. . . Besides, it has been held time and time again that for alibi to prosper as a defense the accused
must show that he was so far away that he could not have been physically present at the place of
the crime, or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission (People vs. Tasurra, 192 SCRA.
266) In this case, however, it is not so situated on April 2, 1992, for according to him he was at the
plant of the Republic Asahi Glass Corporation in Barangay Pinagbuhatan, Pasig, Metro Manila —
which is but a few kilometers from Barangay Sumilang of the same municipality where the crime was
committed. 8

Accused-appellant tries to discredit the victim's testimony by questioning her behavior after she was allegedly raped
by the accused in September 1991 in that she did not show any fear of the accused on 2 April 1992 when she was
called by him. It should be borne in mind, in this connection, that the victim was only a naive nine (9) year old child
when the crime was committed on her. She considered the accused as a friend, almost like a relative, as in fact she
called him "Tito Loloy." She therefore unsuspectingly went near the accused when called by the latter.

As we have stressed in a recent case —

. . . it is not proper to judge the actions of children who have undergone traumatic experience by the
norms of behavior expected under the circumstances from mature people. The range of emotion
shown by rape victims is yet to be captured even by the calculus. It is thus unrealistic to expect
uniform reactions from rape victims. 9

The victim Maristel was too young to totally comprehend the consequences of the dastardly act inflicted on her by
the accused-appellant.

As correctly observed by the Solicitor General: "(A)s regards the acts imputed to Estela, the delay of seven (7) days
from the date of her knowledge of the rape incident on 4 April 1992 in reporting to the authorities the rape of her
daughter is excusable. At that time, she was not yet certain of the steps she would take considering the delicate
nature of the problem they were facing" (citing People v. Danguilan, 218 SCRA 98; People v. Joaquin, Jr., 225
SCRA 179)." Besides, we have ruled that a delay in prosecuting the rape is not indicative of fabricated charges. 10
Finally, the accused's denial and alibi cannot prevail over his positive identification by the victim Maristel as her
rapist. Maristel testified in a clear and straightforward manner that appellant through force and intimidation and with
use of a deadly weapon (kitchen knife), succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. 11

As for the defense that Estela Santos, as the mother of the victim Maristel, expressly pardoned him, we sustain the
trial court's finding which reads as follows.

From the evidence just discussed, it would appear that the initial desistance of Estela Santos from
taking any action against Irvin Tadulan, was upon the representation of the latter's wife Adefa
Tadulan that she had driven away her husband, and her promise that should he ever come back to
their apartment unit she herself would call for the police; but that the said representation turned out
to be untrue, and the promise was not complied with because Irvin Tadulan was still coming home
every night and, in fact, he and her wife had a violent quarrel in the apartment unit on the night of
April 11, 1992. Otherwise stated, the desistance was subject to certain conditions which were not
complied with, and for which reason Estela Santos proceeded with the filing of a criminal complaint
against Irvin Tadulan. Upon such circumstances, it is clear to the mind of this Court that the
complainant has not expressly pardoned the said accused.

Besides, there are authorities holding that pardon must be granted not only by the parents of an
offended minor but also by the minor herself in order to be effective as an express pardon under Art.
344 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in the case of People vs. Lacson, Jr., (C.A.) 55 O.G. 9460, we
find the following words: "Neither must we be understood as supporting the view that the parents
alone can extend a valid pardon. Far from it, for we, too are of the belief that the pardon by the
parents, standing alone, is inefficacious." It was also held in another case, that "The express pardon
of a person guilty of attempted abduction of a minor, granted by the latter's parents, is not sufficient
to remove criminal responsibility, but must be accompanied by the express pardon of the girl
herself." (U.S. vs. Luna, 1 Phil. 360)

In the present case, the supposed pardon of the accused was allegedly granted only by the mother
(Estela Santos) without the concurrence of the offended minor, Maristel Cruz. Hence, even if it be
assumed for the sake of argument that the initial desistance of the said mother from taking any
action against the accused, constitutes pardon, it is clear that upon the authorities cited above, such
pardon is ineffective without the express concurrence of the offended minor herself. 12

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated 4 August 1994 in Criminal Case No. 92186 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 157 of Pasig, Metro Manila, is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification as to the indemnity for the victim which
is raised to P50,000.00 from P30,000.00 to conform with prevailing jurisprudence including the recent case
of People v. Romualdo Miranda y Geronimo, et al., G.R. No. 97425, 24 September 1996, where the victim was also
a minor, as in the case at bar.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 119063 January 27, 1997

JOSE G. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ADELA TEODORA
P. SANTOS, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The issue here is whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming the trial court's order granting
the motion to quash the information for bigamy based on prescription.

On 28 August 1991, petitioner Jose G. Garcia filed with the (Quezon City Prosecutor's Office an "Affidavit of
Complaint"1 charging his wife, private respondent Adela Teodora P. Santos alias "Delia Santos," with Bigamy,
Violation of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085, and Falsification of Public Documents. However, in his
letter of 10 October 1991 to Assistant City Prosecutor George F. Cabanilla, the petitioner informed the latter that he
would limit his action to bigamy.2

After appropriate proceedings, Assistant Prosecutor Cabanilla filed on 8 January 1992 with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of (Quezon City an information,3 dated 15 November 1991, charging the private respondent with Bigamy
allegedly committed as follows:

That on or before the 2nd day of February, 1957, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being previously united in lawful
marriage with REYNALDO QUIROCA, and without the said marriage having been dissolved, (or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings), did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with JOSE G. GARCIA, which marriage has [sic] discovered in 1989, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the
Civil Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The information was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-92-27272 and assigned to Branch 83 of the said court. On 2
March 1992, the private respondent filed a Motion to Quash alleging prescription of the offense as ground therefor.
She contended that by the petitioner's admissions in his testimony given on 23 January 1991 in Civil Case No. 90-
52730, entitled "Jose G. Garcia v. Delia S. Garcia," and in his complaint filed with the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) on 16 October 1991, the petitioner discovered the commission of the offense as early as 1974. Pursuant then
to Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),4 the period of prescription of the offense started to run therefrom.
Thus, since bigamy was punishable by prision mayor,5 an afflictive penalty6 which prescribed in fifteen years
pursuant to Article 92 of the RPC, then the offense charged prescribed in 1989, or fifteen years after its discovery by
the petitioner.

The private respondent quoted7 the petitioner's testimony in Civil Case No. 90-52730 as follows:

Q No, no, just answer. What did you learn from her (Eugenia) about the private
respondent?

A That she has been married previously in case I don't know it. But she said she has
been previously married, in fact I saw her husband — Rey, a few days ago and they
said, "Baka magkasama pa silang muli."

xxx xxx xxx

A'ITY. EVANGELISTA:

Q When did Eugenia R. Balingit told [sic] that private respondent was already
married to another man?

A That was when I told her that we are Separating now. I told her in tagalog, "na
maghihiwalay na kami ni Delia ngayon." "Ang unang tanong niya sa akin, "si Rey ba
ang dahilan," ang alam ko po, Rey ang dating boyfriend niya, kaya ang sabi ko,
"hindi po, Mario, ang panga!an," napabagsak po siya sa upuan, sabi niya, "hindi na
nagbago."

Q When was that when you came to know from Eugenia Balingit, the judicial
guardian, that private respondent was already married to another man when she
married you?

A That was when the affair was happening and I found out.

Q What year?

A 1974.8
The portion of the complaint filed on 16 October 1991 before the CSC which the private respondent alluded to,
reads as follows:

5. At the time the respondent married the herein complainant she never informed him that she was
previously married to a certain REYNALDO QUIROCA" on December 1, 1951 wherein she used the
name of "ADELA SANTOS" which was part of her true name "ADELA TEODORA P. SANTOS" as
per her genuine Baptismal Certificate issued by the Parish of San Guillermo, Bacolor, Pampanga, a
copy of the said Baptismal Certificate is hereto attached as ANNEX "D";

6. . . .

7. These facts were discovered only by the herein complainant in the year 1974 where they
separated from each other because of her illicit relations with several men continued use of her alias
name "DELIA", without proper authority from the Courts; and committing a series of fraudulent acts;
her previous marriage to a certain "Reynaldo Quiroca" is evidenced by a certification issued by the
Local Civil Registrar of Manila, a copy of which is hereto attached as ANNEX "F",9

In its 29 June 1992 order,10 the trial court granted the motion to quash and dismissed the criminal case, ruling in this
wise:

This court believes that since the penalty prescribed under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code for
the offense of bigamy is prision mayor, which is classified as an afflictive penalty under Article 25 of
the same Code, then said offense should prescribe in fifteen (15) years as provided in Article 92 of
the Code. The complainant having discovered the first marriage of the accused to one Reynaldo
Quiroca in 1974 when he was informed of it by one Eugenia Balingit, the offense charged has
already prescribed when the information was filed in this case on November 15, 1991. The argument
presented by the prosecution that i was difficult for the complainant to obtain evidence of the alleged
first marriage, hence, the prescriptive period should be counted from the time the evidence was
secured will not hold water. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code specifically provides, thus:

"The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered. . . ."

it did not state "on the day sufficient evidence was gathered," thus this Court cannot
change the requirements of the law.

The petitioner moved for reconsideration of the above order on 26 August 1992,11 to which he filed "numerous"
supplements thereto, focusing on the private respondent's many trips abroad which the petitioner claimed
suspended the running of the prescriptive period. These trips were enumerated in the certification 12 issued by
Associate Commissioner Ramon M. Morales of the Bureau of Immigration (BID), which reads as follows:

This is to certify that the name GARCIA/DELIA/S. appears in the Bureau's files of Arrivals and
Departures as having the following travel records:

Departed for HKG on 06/03/77 aboard PR

Arrived from HKG on 07/02/77 aboard PA
Arrived from SYD on 07/09/77 aboard PR
Arrived from GUM on 06/14/80 aboard PA
Arrived from MEL on 07/17/81 aboard PR
Arrived from TYO on 05/20/83 aboard PA
Departed for HKG on 09/22/83 aboard PR
Arrived from SIN on 09/28/83 aboard PR
Departed for TYO on 04/30/84 aboard PA
Arrived from SFO on 07/03/84 aboard PA
Departed for TYO on 11/19/84 aboard PA
Departed for TYO on 08/05/85 aboard PA
Departed for TYO on 11/1 7/86 aboard UA
Arrived from LAX on 12/12/87 aboard UA
Departed for LAX on 11/30/87 aboard UA
Departed for CHI on 11/14/88 aboard UA

The trial court disallowed reconsideration of its 29 June 1992 order, finding "no urgent or justifiable reason to
disturb or set [it] aside." As to the sojourns abroad of the private respondent as shown in the certification, the
trial court held that the same "is not that kind of absence from the Philippines which will interrupt the period
of prescription of the offense charged. . ."13

The petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. CR No. 14324. He
contended therein that: (a) the trial court erred in quashing the information on the ground of prescription; and (b) the
counsel for the accused was barred from filing the motion to quash the information against the accused. 14 As to the
first, the petitioner argued that bigamy was a public offense, hence "the offended party is not the first or second
(innocent) spouse but the State whose law/policy was transgressed." He tried to distinguish bigamy from private
offenses such as adultery or concubinage "where the private complainant is necessarily the offended party," thus,
the prescriptive period for the former should commence from the day the State, being the offended party, discovered
the offense, which in this case was on 28 August 1991 when the petitioner filed his complaint before the
Prosecutor's Office. The petitioner added that the "interchanging use" in Article 91 of the RPC of the terms "offended
party," "authorities," and "their agents" supports his view that the State is the offended party in public offenses.

Additionally, the petitioner referred to the general rule stated in People v. Alagao15 "that in resolving the motion to
quash a criminal complaint or information[,] the facts alleged in the complaint or information should be taken as they
are." The information in this case mentioned that the bigamy was discovered in 1989. He admitted, however, that
this rule admits of exceptions, such as when the ground for the motion to quash is prescription of the offense, as
provided in Section 4 of the old Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Nonetheless, he advanced the view
that this exception is no longer available because of the implied repeal of Section 4, as the amended Rule 117 no
longer contains a similar provision under the rule on motions to quash; and that granting there was no repeal, the
private respondent failed to introduce evidence to "support her factual averment in her motion to quash," which is
required by Rule 117. He further asserted that the factual bases of the motion to quash, viz., the petitioner's
testimony in Civil Case No. 90-52730 and his complaint filed with the CSC are not conclusive because the testimony
is hearsay evidence, hence inadmissible, while the complaint is vague, particularly the following portion quoted by
the private respondent:

7. These facts where discovered only by the herein complainant in the year 1974
when they separated from each other because of her illicit relations with several men
continued use of her alias name "DELIA", without proper authority from the Courts;
and committing a series of fraudulent acts; her previous marriage to a certain
"Reynaldo Quiroca" is evidenced by a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar
of Manila, a copy of which is hereto attached a ANNEX "F";

The petitioner alleged that the phrase "These facts" in said paragraph 7 does not clearly refer to his
discovery of the private respondent's first marriage. Moreover, he doubted whether the term "discovered" in
the said paragraph was used in the sense contemplated by law. At best, the petitioner theorized, the
discovery only referred to the "initial, unconfirmed and uninvestigated raw, hearsay information" which he
received from Balingit.

Finally, the petitioner reiterated that the prescriptive period was interrupted several times by the private respondent's
numerous trips abroad.

As regards his second contention, the petitioner argued that the counsel for the private respondent had already
stated that he represented only Delia S. Garcia and not Adela Teodora P. Santos. Consequently, the private
respondent's counsel could not ask for the quashal of the information in favor of Adela Teodora P. Santos alias
Delia Santos. The petitioner opined that the counsel for the private respondent should have sought a dismissal of
the case in favor of Delia Garcia alone.

The Court of Appeals gave credence to the private respondent's evidence and concluded that the petitioner
discovered the private respondent's first marriage in 1974. Since the information in this case was filed in court only
on 8 January 1992, or eighteen years after the discovery of the offense, then the 15-year prescriptive period had
certainly lapsed.16 It further held that the quashal of an information based on prescription of the offense could be
invoked before or after arraignment and even on appeal,17 for under Article 89(5) of the RPC, the criminal liability of
a person is "totally extinguish[ed]' by the prescription of the crime, which is a mode of extinguishing criminal liability."
Thus, prescription is not deemed waived even if not pleaded as a defense.18

Undaunted, the petitioner is now before us on a petition for review on certiorari to annul and set aside the decision
of the Court of Appeals and to compel the respondent court to remand the case to the trial court for further
proceedings. He submits the following assignment of errors:

BIGAMY IS A PUBLIC OFFENSE, CONSEQUENTLY, PRESCRIPTION SHOULD

HAVE BEEN COUNTED FROM THE TIME THE STATE DISCOVERED ITS
COMMISSION;

II

A MOTION TO QUASH CANNOT ALSO GO BEYOND WHAT IS STATED IN THE

INFORMATION;

III

BY THEMSELVES, THE FACTUAL BASES OF THE MOTION TO QUASH ARE

NOT ALSO CONCLUSIVE;

IV

ASSUMING THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD STARTED IN 1974, SAID PERIOD

HOWEVER WAS INTERRUPTED SEVERAL TIMES.

We notice that except for the first two pages of the petition, the deletion of a few paragraphs, the substitution of the
term "petitioner" for "appellant," and the deletion of the contention on the' counsel for the private respondent being
barred from filing a motion to quash, the herein petition is a reproduction of the Appellant's Brief filed by the
petitioner with the Court of Appeals. Verily then, the instant petition is a rehash of an old tale. However, the Court of
Appeals failed to sufficiently address several issues raised by the petitioner, most probably prompting him to seek
redress from this Court.

We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. The
Office of the Solicitor General was the last to submit a Memorandum for the public respondent. Both the private and
public respondents ask for the dismissal of this petition and the affirmance of the challenged decision.

Petitioner's position is untenable. Denial then of this petition is all it merits.

We shall take up the assigned errors in seriatim.

It is true that bigamy is a public offense. But, it is entirely incorrect to state, as the petitioner does, that only the State
is the offended party in such case, as well as in other public offenses, and, therefore; only the State's discovery of
the crime could effectively commence the running of the period of prescription therefor. Article 91 of the RPC
provides that "[t]he period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by
the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. . . ." This rule makes no distinction between a public crime and a
private crime. In both cases then, the discovery may be by the "offended party, the authorities, or their agents."

Article 91 does not define the term "offended party." We find its definition in Section 12, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court as "the person against whom or against whose property, the offense was committed.19 The said Section reads
as follows:

Sec. 12. Name of the offended party. — A complaint or information must state the name and
surname of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed, or any
appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known, and if there is no better way of
identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name.

More specifically, it is reasonable to assume that the offended party in the commission of a crime, public or
private, is the party to whom the offender is civilly liable, in light of Article 100 of the RPC, which expressly
provides that [e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." 20 Invariably then, the private
individual to whom the offender is civilly liable is the offended party.

This conclusion is strengthened by Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which reads:

Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with a criminal action, unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or
omission of the accused. . . .

It is settled that in bigamy, both the first and the second spouses may be the offended parties depending on
the circumstances.21

The petitioner even admits that he is the offended party in Criminal Case No. (Q-92-27272. The information
therein,22 which he copied in full in the petition in this case, describes him as the "offended party" who suffered
"damage and prejudice . . . in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code."23

The distinction he made between public crimes and private crimes relates not to the discovery of the crimes, but to
their prosecution. Articles 344 and 360 of the RPC, in relation to Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, are clear
on this matter.

II

The petitioner's contention that a motion to quash cannot go beyond the information in Criminal Case No. Q-92-
27272 which states that the crime was discovered in 1989, is palpably unmeritorious. Even People v. Alaga,24 which
he cites, mentions the exceptions to the rule as provided in paragraphs (f) and (h) of Section 2, and Sections 4 and
5 of the old Rule 117, viz., (a) extinction of criminal liability, and (b) double jeopardy. His additional claim that the
exception of extinction can no longer be raised due to the implied repeal of the former Section 4, 25 Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court occasioned by its non-reproduction after its revision, is equally without merit. No repeal, express or
implied, of the said Section 4 ever took place. While there is no provision in the new Rule 117 that prescribes the
contents of a motion to quash based on extinction of criminal liability, Section 2 thereof encapsulizes the former
Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the old Rule 117. The said Section 2 reads as follows:

Sec. 2. Foms and contents. — The motion to quash shall be in writing signed by the accused or his
counsel. It shall specify distinctly the factual and legal grounds therefor and the court shall consider
no grounds other than those stated therein, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. (3a,
4a, 5a). (underscoring supplied for emphasis)
It is clear from this Section that a motion to quash may be based on factual and legal grounds, and since extinction
of criminal liability and double jeopardy are retained as among the grounds for a motion to quash in Section 3 of the
new Rule 117, it necessarily follows that facts outside the information itself may be introduced to grove such
grounds. As a matter of fact, inquiry into such facts may be allowed where the ground invoked is that the allegations
in the information do not constitute the offense charged. Thus, in People v. De la Rosa,26 this Court stated:

As a general proposition, a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations of the information do
not constitute the offense charged, or any offense for that matter, should be resolved on the basis
alone of said allegations whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted. However, as held in
the case of People vs. Navarro, 75 Phil. 516, additional facts not alleged in the information, but
admitted or not denied by the prosecution may be invoked in support of the motion to quash. Former
Chief justice Moran supports this theory.27

In Criminal Case No. 92-27272, the trial court, without objection on the part of the prosecution, allowed the private
respondent to offer evidence in support of her claim that the crime had prescribed. Consequently, the trial court,
upon indubitable proof of prescription, correctly granted the motion to quash. It would have been, to quote De la
Rosa, "pure technicality for the court to close its eyes to [the fact of prescription) and still give due course to the
prosecution of the case" — a technicality which would have meant loss of valuable time of the court and the parties.

As noted by Dr. Fortunato Gupit, Jr., consultant of the Rules of Court Revision Committee, the aforequoted Section
2 of the new Rule 117 on "factual and legal grounds" of a motion to quash is based on the De la Rosa case.28

III

The petitioner likewise claims that the factual bases of the private respondent's motion to quash are inconclusive.
The petitioner cannot be allowed to disown statements he made under oath and in open court when it serves his
purpose. This is a contemptible practice which can only mislead the courts and thereby contribute to injustice.
Besides, he never denied having given the pertinent testimony. He did, however, term it vague in that it was not
clear whether the prior marriage which Eugenia Balingit disclosed to him was that entered into by the private
respondent with Reynaldo Quiroca. It is immaterial to whom the private respondent was first married; what is
relevant in this case is that the petitioner was informed of a prior marriage contracted by the private respondent.

Neither may the petitioner be heard to cast doubt on the meaning of his statements in his sworn complaint filed
before the CSC. We find no hint of vagueness in them. In any event, he has not denied that he in fact discovered in
1974 that the private respondent had been previously married.

Finally, the petitioner draws our attention to the private respondent's several trips abroad as enumerated in the
certification of the Bureau of Immigration, and cites the second paragraph of Article 91 of the RPC, viz.: "[t]he term
of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago." We agree with the Court
of Appeals that these trips abroad did not constitute the "absence" contemplated in Article 91. These trips were
brief, and in every case the private respondent returned to the Philippines. Besides, these were made long after the
petitioner discovered the offense and. even if the aggregate number of days of these trips are considered, still the
information was filed well beyond the prescriptive period.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the challenged decision of 13 February 1995 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14324 is AFFIRMED.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 100382-100385 March 19, 1997

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIO TABACO, accused-appellant.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

In four related informations, Mario Tabaco was charged with four counts of Murder for shooting to death on
March 22, 1987 Capt. Oscar Tabulog (Criminal Case No. 10-259), Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola (Criminal Case No.
10-270), Felicito Rigunan (Criminal Case No. 10-284) and Pat. Romeo Regunton (Criminal Case No. 10-317).
Except for the names of the victims, the informations in these four (4) cases identically read:

That on or about March 22, 1987, in the Municipality of Aparri, Province of Cagayan, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Mario Tabaco, armed with a
gun, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one [name], inflicting upon him
several wounds which caused his death.

Contrary to Law. 1

In Criminal Case No. 10-316, accused was charged in the following information with the complex crime of Homicide
and Frustrated Homicide for shooting to death Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the wounding of Sgt. Benito Raquepo:

That on or about March 22, 1987, in the municipality of Aparri, province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Mario Tabaco, armed with a gun, with intent to
kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot Jorge Siriban, Jr.,
and S/Sgt. Benito Raquepo, inflicting upon them wounds on their bodies, which wounds sustained
by Jorge Siriban, Jr., caused his death.

That the accused had performed all the acts of execution (with respect to the victim Sgt. Benito
Raquepo) which would have produced the crime of Homicide as a consequence but which
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his own will.2

All cases were consolidated before Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan.

The mass of evidence for the prosecution, as found by the trial court, is as follows:

In the evening of March 22, 1987, the 117th PC stationed at Aparri, Cagayan, under then Lt. James
Andres Melad, sponsored a cock derby, under the name of Jose Ting, at the Octagon Cockpit Arena
located at Aparri, Cagayan.

This being so, peace officers in uniform with long firearms were assigned as guards to maintain
peace and order at the cockpit arena namely: (1) Sgt. Benito Raquepo; (2) CIS Roque P. Datugan,
both from the 117th PC and (3) Pat. Andres Semana, INP, Aparri, Cagayan. Accused Mario Tabaco
who was in civilian clothes claims to have been also assigned by his Commanding Officer of 117th
PC, to verify the presence of NPAs and assist in the protection of VIPs in the cockpit arena, bringing
with him his M-14 issued firearm.

Other peace officers who came to participate were: (1) Policeman Mariano Retreta of INP, Buguey,
Cagayan, who arrived with the deceased Jorge Siriban and Licerio Antiporda, Jr., Licerio Antiporda
II; (2) Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer of 117th PC Company; (3) Policeman Romeo Regunton (deceased) who
was also armed, arrived in company with the deceased Ex-Mayor Arreola; (4) Fireman Rogelio
Guimmayen, INP Buguey; (5) Pat. Barba; and (6) CIC PC Paragas.

At about nine (9) o'clock in the evening of same date, the group of the late Mayor Jorge Arreola of
Buguey, Cagayan, arrived at the cockpit arena. His companions were (1) Antonio Villasin; (2)
Rosario Peneyra; (3) victim Loreto Pita, Jr. and/or five (5) of them including the Mayor. They
occupied and were (4th row) north western part cockpit-gate. Others seated with the Mayor were: (1)
the late Capt. Oscar Tabulog; (2) the late Pat. Romeo Regunton, who was at the back of the mayor;
(3) the late Felicito Rigunan. The accused CIC Tabaco was seated on the arm of the bench situated
at the lower portion of the arena about more than three (3) meters away, (infront and a little bit in the
west), from the place where the late Mayor and his group were seated (at the 4th row of seats upper
portion). During the ocular inspection conducted, the Court noticed the distance to be more than
three (3) meters, and/or probably 4-5 meters.

At about ten (10) o'clock 1987, while the accused Mario Tabaco was seated as described above, he
suddenly without warning or provocation, shot the late mayor Jorge Arreola, with his M-14 rifle,
followed by several successive burst of gunfire, resulting in the shooting to death of the late Mayor
Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Pat. Romeo Regunton, although the latter
managed to run passing through the western gate near the gaffers cage but was chased by accused
Tabaco. Regunton was later found dead inside the canteen of Mrs. Amparo Go inside the Octagon
cockpit arena.

Pat. Mariano Retreta of INP Buguey, who was then at the Co's canteen, saw the accused going out
rushing from the cockpit arena, at a distance of one meter. Pat. Retreta is a relative and neighbor of
the accused Tabaco in Buguey, Cagayan. He tried to pacify Tabaco telling him "what is that that
 happened again Mario." Meanwhile, Sgt. Benito Raquepo of 117th PC, and one of those assigned to
maintain peace and order at the Octagon cockpit arena, who was at the canteen taking snacks,
heard five (5) successive gun reports coming from inside the cockpit arena. In a little while, he saw
the accused Tabaco coming from inside the cockpit arena. Raquepo advised Tabaco — "Mario relax
ka lang" — "Mario keep calm." They stood face to face holding their rifles and when Tabaco pointed
his gun towards Sgt. Raquepo, Pat. Retreta grappled for the possession of the gun to disarm
Tabaco, and in the process, the gun went off hitting Sgt. Raquepo and also the late Jorge Siriban
who happened to be near Raquepo. Siriban died on the spot while Raquepo survived his wounds on
his legs due to adequate medical treatment.

There were other persons injured that evening namely: (1) Antonio Chan — injured on his right foot;
(2) Salvador Berbano — injured on his right forearm and on his right abdomen and (3) Rosario
Peneyra on his Face and right shoulder. But, the three, did not file their complaints. 3

Upon the other hand, the evidence for the defense as stated in the Brief for the Accused-appellant is as follows:

Ordered by his commanding officer in the 117th PC Company to assist in the maintenance of peace
and order at the Octagon Cockpit Arena located at Talungan, Aparri, Cagayan on March 22, 1987,
accused Mario Tabaco with his officially issued M-14 rifle and with the basic load of ammunition
went to the Octagon Cockpit arena on March 22, 1987 in compliance to the orders of a superior
officer arriving thereat at about 12:00 o'clock noon, more or less. He directly went inside the cockpit
arena to make some observations and found out that there were several persons inside the said
cockpit who were in possession of firearms, some short and some long, and were seen in different
places and/or corners of the cockpit. Accused did not bother to verify as to why the said persons
were allowed to carry their firearms because of his impressions that if they did not have the
authority, the guards of the main gate of the cockpit would surly have confiscated the same from
them. It was his belief then that they may have come from other agencies of the government,
assigned to help in the maintenance of peace and order in the cockpit. Accused thus seated himself
at the lowermost seat (first step) of the slanted bleachers of the Octagon Cockpit arena on March 22,
1987.

At about 9:00 o'clock that very night of March 22, 1987, while accused was seated at the lowermost
seat of the slanted bleachers of the Octagon Cockpit arena, he heard a gun report fired atop his
head. Having been officially assigned to help in the maintenance of peace and order in the cockpit
and that his presence must be known, his immediate reaction upon hearing the gun report was to
fire a warning shot in the air and directed to the ceiling and/or roof of the Octagon cockpit arena.
After firing a warning shot, his warning was answered by burst of gun fire coming from different
directions inside the cockpit arena, for which reason, he forced to leave and rush outside, holding his
M-14 rifle with the muzzle pointed downwards. As he (accused) rushed towards the main gate of the
cockpit arena, Mariano Retreta and Sgt. Benito Raquepo saw him and who told him, (accused) to
relax lang. Accused testified that when Mariano Retreta and Sgt. Benito Raquepo told him to relax
lang, he all the time thought that the gun reports fired inside the cockpit arena was nothing to said
persons. Accused however, insisted to go out, but in so doing, Mariano Retreta pressed the gun
which he was holding downwards and grabbed said gun from accused. As the gun was pressed by
Mariano Retreta, said gun went off, hitting Sgt. Benito Raquepo and the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr.
That because of such incident, accused had to run away, out of fear to Sgt. Benito Raquepo and the
family of Jorge Siriban who may lay the blame on him. The following morning, accused surrendered
to the police authorities of Lallo, Cagayan, who happened to pass by, not on account of the death of
Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Oscar Regunton which he did
not know at the time he surrendered, but on account of the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the injury
sustained by Sgt. Benito Raquepo.4

After trial, the court a quo, in a joint decision dated January 14, 1991, found accused-appellant guilty as charged on
all counts. In giving credence to the version of the prosecution over that of accused-appellant, it found that:

From the evidence adduced, it is easily discernible that the prosecution and defense cannot agree
on what actually transpired that night of March 22, 1987, at the Octagon Cockpit Arena, Aparri,
Cagayan leading to the shooting to death of subject victims. For, while the prosecution maintains
that it was the accused Mario Tabaco who shot the victims, the defense insists that he is not the
assailant, but somebody else or others, since the accused merely fired a warning shot upwards the
roof of the cockpit arena.

In fine, the Court is called upon to resolve the issue of credibility versions. "Where there are directly
conflicting versions of the same incident, the Court, in its search for the truth, perforce has to look for
some facts and circumstances which can be used as valuable tools in evaluating the probability or
improbability of a testimony for after all, the element of probability is always involved in weighing
testimonial evidence. (Carolina Industries, Inc. vs. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., et al., L-46908, May
17, 1980, 97 SCRA 734; Lacsan vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-46485, November 21, 1979, 94
SCRA 461, both citing the case of People vs. Boholst Caballero, L-2349, November 25, 1974, 61
SCRA 180).

Towards this end, the prosecution presented three (3) eyewitnesses, namely: Antonio Villasin,
Rosario Peneyra and Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen in the shooting to death of the deceased victims,
Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Romeo Regunton and Felicito Rigunan. Also, the
prosecution presented Sgt. Benito Raquepo, Pat. Mariano Retreta and PC Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer, and
three (3) eyewitnesses in the shooting to death of Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Sgt. Raquepo.
 So too, the prosecution presented PC Sgt. Antonio Domingo, Pat. Andres Semana, PC Sgt. Jose
Algeria and Pat. Merlin Bautista, as corroborative witnesses in both situational cases/incidents. As
well stated in the above findings of facts, prosecution witnesses Antonio Villasin and Rosario
Peneyra actually saw the accused Mario Tabaco stood up from his seat at the lower front row and in
port arm position directed his M-14 rifle towards the place of the late Mayor Arreola, and his group at
the 4th row upper portion of the bleachers and fired three successive automatic gun shots that felled
Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Pat. Romeo Regunton and one Felicito Rigunan. This
was corroborated by prosecution witness Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen who was then ten (10)
meters away from the accused, which was not far, considering that the cockpit arena was well
lighted at that time.

Not only that, immediately after the gun burst of automatic fire, the accused was seen coming out
rushing from inside the cockpit arena by INP Pat. Mariano Retreta and PC Sgt. Raquepo, the former
being a relative and neighbor, pacified accused Tabaco, telling — "what is that happened again
Mario," while the latter told him — "Mario relax ka lang keep calm." After which Mariano Retreta
grappled for the possession of the gun assisted by PC Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer when Tabaco refused to
stop. Sgt. Ferrer got the gun M-14 and surrendered it to his Commanding Officer, as corroborated by
Sgt. Antonio Domingo, while in the process of disarming the accused Mario Tabaco, when the gun
went of, hitting the deceased victim Jorge Siriban and Sgt. Raquepo. 5

The accused admitted that the M-14 rifle which he brought with him to the cockpit arena was heavily loaded, but
when the gun was taken from his possession by Pat. Retreta and PC Sgt. Ferrer, the gun's magazine was already
empty.

The court a quo said further:

ATTY. VILLENA:

Q: When you took that M-14 from the accused, do you remember if it had a
magazine that time?

A: Yes, sir with magazine.

Q: Do you have the magazine now?

A: It is with 117th PC Company, sir.

Q: After taking that M-14 from the accused, did you examine the rifle?

A: Yes, sir, I examined it.

Q: Did you examine the magazine of that rifle?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Did you examine if there are live bullets?

A: No live bullets, sir. (TSN, direct examination, Sgt. Ferrer, pp. 44-45, March 26,
1990 session, stenographer L. Tamayo).

Further, Sgt. Ferrer continued:

PROSECUTOR ATAL:

Q: You likewise mentioned in your direct examination that when you surrendered this
gun, M-14, and this magazine, there were no live ammunitions in the magazine?

A: There were two remaining bullets, sir.

Q: How many bullets in all?

A: Twenty, sir.

Q: You said you heard first seven gun reports?

A: Yes, sir I heard seven gun reports. (TSN, continuation of direct examination, Sgt.
Ferrer, May 14, 1990 session, Stenographer L. Tamayo).

MORE, there is evidence that empty/spent shells of bullets were found inside the
cockpit arena (Exh. "R" & "R-l", pp. 157-158, record).

ATTY. ARRIOLA:
 Q: Showing to you Exh. "R", do you know whose picture is this?

A: Picture of spent shells.

Q: How about Exh. "R-l", do you know what is this?

A: The same, sir spent shells. (TSN, PC/CIS Sgt. Investigator Jose Algeria, p. 29,
Oct. 1, 1990 session, Stenographer L. Tamayo).

Finally, another circumstance which maybe considered as adverse against the accused, is the fact
that he was really arrested and not that he voluntarily surrendered as appearing in the INP Lallo
Police Blotter, as testified to by Pat. Melin Bautista (Exh. "S", p. 188, record).

Furthermore, it appears that the same accused Mario Tabaco, has still a pending case for murder
before Branch 6, of this Court. (Exh. "T", p. 187, record).

The Court is impressed with the testimonies of the three prosecution eyewitnesses namely: Antonio
Villasin, Rosario Peneyra and INP Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen who narrated their versions of the
incident with ring of truth, which are both clear and convincing, in regard to the shooting to death by
accused Mario Tabaco of the deceased victims Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola (Crim. Case No. 10-270),
Capt. Oscar Tabulog (Crim. Case No. 1259), Pat Romeo Regunton (Crim. Case No. 10-317) and the
late Felicito Rigunan (Crim. Case No. 10-284).

Such positive testimonies were corroborated by the testimonies of PC Sgt. Raquepo, PC Sgt. Ferrer
and Pat. Mariano Retreta, who saw the accused rushing outside the cockpit arena holding his M-14
rifle, immediately after the burst of successive and automatic gunfire inside the cockpit arena.
Although they have not seen the accused shoot the four victims (Arreola, Tabulog, Rigunan and
Regunton), yet their corroborative testimonies constitute sufficient combination of all circumstances,
so as to produce a conviction of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (People vs. Pimentel, 147 SCRA
251; People vs. Trinidad, 162 SCRA 714), even as such circumstances proved reasonable leads to
the conclusion pointing to the accused Tabaco, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the
crime. (People vs. Magallanes, 147 SCRA 92; People vs. Macatana, 161 SCRA 235). And, in the
face of all these circumstances, the burden of proof to establish his innocence LIES on the accused,
as the ONUS PROBANDI from that moment is now shifted to the accused. (Dulpo vs.
Sandiganbayan, 150 SCRA 138). A resort to circumstantial evidence is in the very nature of things, a
necessity, and as crimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions where concealment is
highly probable, and to require direct testimony would in many cases result in freeing criminals and
would deny the proper protection of society. (People vs. ROA, 167 SCRA 116).

As to the death of Jorge Siriban (Crim. Case No. 10-316) and the wounding of Sgt. Raquepo, there
is no adventure of doubt, that accused Mario Tabaco was the author of the crime charged and thus
be held responsible for the same. The evidence adduced in this case is overwhelming, coming no
less from accused's brothers PC personnel, who, aside from their direct testimonies, are entitled to
the settled rule that they have regularly performed their official duty. (Section 5(M), Rule 131,
Revised Rules of Court).

Accordingly, the Court is not impressed with the defense put up by the accused, even as it does not
inspire confidence, hence, the same deserves no credence.

The accused contends that he merely fired his gun up towards the roof, and that he could have not
shot the four (4) deceased victims with the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola considering the elevation of
the 4th step or row in the upper bleachers of the cockpit arena, in relation to where the accused was,
the front row, in much lower elevation. The accused further contends that he could not have shot
aforesaid victims, as maybe gleaned from the testimony of Dr. Rivera, especially to wound No. 2,
inflicted upon the body of the late Mayor Arreola.

The Court believes otherwise. In the first place, the three (3) eyewitnesses Antonio Villasin, Rosario
Peneyra and INP Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen, testified that they saw the accused stood up from
his seat and directed his gun M-14 towards the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola who were then at the
upper 4th row of cemented seats at the bleachers. They could have been inaccurate of the distance
of meters, as it could have been around 5 meters from where the accused stood up, which is a little
bit west of the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola, who were then facing south, face to face with the
accused. This is true and the same will jibe with the findings of Dr. Rivera, where the gun shot
wounds inflicted upon the body of the late Capt. Tabulog, were on the left portion of his forehead
front to back (Wound No. 1); Wound No. 2, in his left temple; Wound No. 3, below his right clavicle of
his right shoulder and Wound No. 4, on his left thigh downward.

In the case of the late Mayor Arreola his wounds are: Wound No. 1, is on the left side of his head
above the hairline; Wound No. 2, right base of his neck and exited at the upper shoulder base
through and through. Wound No. 3, was on his left lower abdomen and his lower back as exit for
wound Nos. 1 and 2, the relative position of the assailant and the victim is face to face, so with
Wound No. 3. For wound No. 2, the point of entry is higher than the point of exit, but there is a
possibility that the victim Arreola, probably bent forward and the bullet ricocheted.
 It must be noted that the seats in the upper bleachers where the group of the late Mayor stayed were
all cemented including their back rests and the bullets fired from the gun of the accused must have
rebounded or deflected from surface to surface, on the cemented back rests and seats hitting wound
No. 2, on the body of the Mayor and the bodies of Romeo Regunton and Felicito Rigunan. The
bullets RICOCHETED, at the place where the group of the Mayor stayed. Anent the cemented
railguard dividing the lower and upper bleachers, the same is not too high so as to obviate the
possibility of hitting the group of the late Mayor Arreola, especially as in this case, when the accused
stood up from his seat and fired at his victims. Witness Rosario Peneyra testified that his wound on
his face and right abdomen must have been caused by the debris of the said cemented railguard
which was hit by the bullets.

In the case of the death of Jorge Siriban, there is not much dispute as the evidence adduced is
overwhelming and even the defense admits that Siriban died due to gunshot wounds — inflicted
upon him during the grappling of the subject gun (Exh. "K").

The Court believes in the reliability and intrinsic credibility of the prosecution witnesses, there being
no competent evidence presented for them to falsely testify against the accused. There is no issue
of motive, as the accused was clearly and positively identified.

All told, the Court believes and so holds that herein accused Mario Tabaco is the author/culprit in the
shooting to death of the deceased victims, Jorge Arreola, Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and
Romeo Regunton, as well as the deceased Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Benito Raquepo. 6

The dispositive part of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing, and fortified by the balm of clear judicial conscience,
the Court finds the accused Mario Tabaco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of all the crimes charged
against him:

1. In Criminal Cases Nos. (a) 10-259 (Oscar Tabulog); (b) No. 10-270 (Jorge Arreola); (c) 10-284
(Felicito Rigunan); and (d) 10-317 (Romeo Regunton), involving four (4) murder victims, but declared
to have been prosecuted in one Information; the same being a complex crime under Art. 248,
Revised Penal Code, the accused Mario Tabaco is sentenced to a single penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, in its maximum period, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay
the heirs of the deceased victims — Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, the
amount of P50,000.00 each for a total of P150,000.00 subject to the lien herein imposed for payment
of the appropriate docket fees if collected, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
However, in Criminal Case No. 10-270, the accused Mario Tabaco is further ordered to pay the heirs
of the late Mayor Jorge Arreola, the grand total amount of P633,500.00, by way of total civil liability,
subject to the lien herein imposed for payment of the appropriate docket fees, in case of successful
collection, both without subsidiary imprisonment in case insolvency.

2 In Criminal Case No. 10-316 for Homicide with Frustrated Homicide, the accused Mario Tabaco is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from, ten (10) years and one (1) day Prision
Mayor as MINIMUM, to Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months, one (1) day of RECLUSION
TEMPORAL as MAXIMUM, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Jorge Siriban, the amount of
P50,000.00, by way of death indemnity, plus P30,000.00 to Sgt. Benito Raquepo, by way of medical
expenses incurred, subject to the lien herein imposed for payment of the appropriate docket fees in
case of successful collection; both without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

3. The M-14 rifle (Exh. "K" and "K-2") the corpus delicti, presently deposited with 117th PC
Company, Aparri, Cagayan, is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the government; Perforce, the
Commanding Officer of the 117th PC, Aparri, Cagayan, is peremptorily ordered to deposit to the
Acting Branch Clerk of Court of this court, the said M-14 rifle with magazines, for proper disposition
in accordance with law and the rules.

4. The accused to pay the costs.

5. In the service hereof, the accused shall be entitled to the full length of time, he underwent
preventive imprisonment (March 23, 1987), provided he voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by the
same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, he shall be credited to only
four-fifth (4/5) thereof. (Art. 29, NCC; as amended by RA 6127, June 17, 1970; U.S. vs. Ortencio, 38
Phil. 341; People vs. Chavez, 126 SCRA 1).

SO ORDERED. 7 (Emphasis ours)

Notwithstanding the single penalty imposed by the trial court, accused still interposed the present appeal on the
following grounds:

(1) The trial court erred in convicting Mario Tabaco of the crime of murder in connection with the
deaths of Oscar Tibulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan, and Romeo Regunton.

(2) The trial court erred in holding Mario Tabaco liable for homicide on the death of Jorge Siriban
and the injury sustained by Benito Raquepo.
 (3) The trial court erred in not giving credence to the testimony of accused-appellant Tabaco.

The pivotal issue presented in this case is one of credibility. Time and again, we have ruled that when the issue
hinges on the credibility of witnesses vis-a-vis the accused's denials, the trial court's findings with respect thereto
are generally not disturbed on appeal, 8 unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. 9 The reason for the rule
is eloquently stated in the case of People vs. de Guzman, 10 thus:

In the resolution of factual issues, the court relies heavily on the trial court for its evaluation of the
witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to observe them on the stand, the trial judge is
able to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal
record by the reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth
or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a
discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply.
The record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in confession or gazed
steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were
shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying
the case can see all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned
verdict. 11

After a careful examination of the records, we find no ground or reason to set aside or disturb the trial court's
assessment of credibility of the eyewitnesses when they testified pointing to accused-appellant as the assailant in
the shooting of the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola and his companions.

1. Eyewitnesses Antonio Villasin and Rosario Peneyra, who were with the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola on that fateful
night of March 22, 1989, categorically testified that it was accused-appellant, whom they positively identified in court,
who fired his M-14 Rifle at their direction hitting the ex-mayor and his companions.

Villasin's testimony on this point is as follows:

COURT:

Q: You heard gun report, what can you say?

A: I saw that he was the one who made the gun report, sir.

ATTY ARRIOLA:

Q: Who was that "he" you are referring to?

A: Mario Tabaco, sir. (p. 19, tsn, March 19, 1990)

Q: Why do you say that Mario Tabaco was the one from whom those gun reports
come from?

A: Because he was the only person from whom I saw a gun, sir.

Q: What did you do also upon hearing those gun reports?

A: I had to seek shelter, sir.

Q: What happened to Ex-Mayor Arreola?

A: He was hit, sir.

PROSECUTOR MIGUEL:

Q: You said that the accused shot Ex-Mayor Arreola, what kind of weapon did he use
if you know?

A: M-14, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: After the incident (precedent) have you come to learn what happened to
Regunton?

A: I came to know that he was dead, sir.

Q: Was that all you gathered?

A: Also Capt. Tabulog, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: How many shots did you hear?

A: Three (3) shots, sir.

Q: All those three (3) shots were directed to Ex-Mayor?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You heard three shots according to you, was that successive or automatic?

A: Successive, sir.

Q: You were seated at the left side of Ex-Mayor Arreola, who was seated on his right
side?

A: None, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Mr. witness, you said that you saw the deceased holding a gun when you first
heard gun shot, will you please describe the stands (position) of the accused?

A: Like this. (The witness demonstrated that the accused was standing on a forth
(port) arm position).

xxx xxx xxx

Q: What did he do with the gun when you saw him?

A: He fired the gun, sir.

Q: To what the gun was directed when he fired the gun?

A: To Ex-Mayor Arreola, sir.

ATTY. VILLENA:

Q: You said earlier that after the incident you left the cockpit and returned, when you
returned, what did you see?

A: I saw two dead persons, sir.

Q: Whose cadavers were these that you saw?

A: The cadavers of Ex-Mayor Arreola and Capt. Tabulog, sir.

Q: How far was the cadaver of Tabulog to Arreola?

A: Less than a meter, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: When you saw the corpse of Capt. Tabulog, can you identify the person passing
as you mentioned?

A: They have similarity, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: When you heard first gun shot, can you tell the position of Arreola, you and your
companions?

A: We were sitting at the backrest of the 4th seat, sir.

Q: Where were you facing?

A: We were facing south the arena.

Q: Where did the first gun shot came from?

 A: It came from Mario Tabaco, sir.

Q: From what direction?

A: Infront of us, sir.

Q: Where was he, was he in your front?

A: He was in the first row of seats.

Q: After the first gun shot, what happened?

A: Somebody was killed, sir.

Q: Who was that?

A: Ex-Mayor Arreola, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

Q: How many gun shot reports did you hear?

A: Many, sir.

ATTY. VILLENA:

Q: You said that you heard more gun shots, can you tell the nature, was there in
succession or automatic?

A: Automatic, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Can you tell us your previous occupation?

A: An army man, sir.

Q: How long have you been employed with the army?

A: Five (5) years, sir.

Q: As an army before, have you ever been handled an M-14?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Can you tell us if you are familiar with a M-14 being fired?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, you said earlier that you heard many more shots after you run, would you
say that these gun shots you heard were fired from M-14 rifle?

A: Those are that came from M-14, sir.

Q: Where were you at the time when you heard the automatic gun shot?

A: I was outside the cockpit, sir. 12

On cross-examination by the defense counsel, witness Villasin testified, thus:

ATTY. CONSIGNA:

Q: You said that after the first gun shot or gun report, Mr. Tabaco was on the first
seat downward, is it not?

A: Mr. Tabaco placed his left foot on the first seat aiming his gun, sir.

Q: Directly toward the first seat, is that what you mean?

A: It was directed to Ex-Mayor Arreola.

 xxx xxx xxx

Q: I want to make it clear, Mr. witness, it was the first gun that you went to hide
yourself at the gate of the cockpit, is that correct?

A: After the 3rd gun shot, sir.

Q: And these three (3) gun reports, they were in a single successive shot, is it not Mr.
witness?

A: Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: That person who allegedly passed by you or infront of you prior to the first gun
report, did you notice if he had a gun with him?

A: He passed by our back, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: And that person according to you was still there when the late Mayor Arreola was
shot?

A: He was directly behind him when the gun reports were made, sir.

Q: You mean to say the first gun report?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And that first gun report was hit Ex-Mayor Arreola?

A: The three gun reports hit the Mayor, sir. 13

For his part, Peneyra testified as follows:

ATTY. ARRIOLA

Q: Do you remember what particular place of the cockpit when you go with Mayor
Arreola?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What part of the cockpit?

A: We went up to the bleacher, sir.

Q: Do you remember how the bleachers were arranged inside the cockpit?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How were they arranged?

A: In rows, step by step, sir.

COURT:

Q: How many rows?

A: Four rows, sir.

ATTY. ARRIOLA:

Q: And what row did you stay together with the late Mayor Arreola?

A: The late Mayor Arreola and Antonio Villasin took the 4th step, sir.

Q: And how about you?

A: We stood at their back west of them, sir.

 Q: By the way, can you tell to the court what were your respective position of the
place where you stayed?

A: The late Mayor Arreola and Antonio Villasin sat at the backrest of the fourth step,
sir.

Q: And how about you, where did you stay also?

A: I stood at the right back of Mayor Arreola, sir.

Q: And how about Romeo Regunton?

A: He also stayed at the back of Mayor Arreola, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: While you were in that position together with your companions, do you remember
if there was untoward incident that happened?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was that untoward incident that happened?

A: That was the time when Mario Tabaco shot the late Mayor Arreola, sir.

Q: Do you know what did Mario Tabaco use in shooting the late Arreola?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What kind of firearm?

A: M-14, sir.

Q: And do you know if Mayor Arreola was hit when Mario Tabaco shot him?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How do you know that Mayor Arreola was hit?

A: Because I saw it, sir.

Q: What did you do also?

A: When Mayor Arreola was already dead, I sought cover because I was also
wounded.

Q: Do you know what happened also to Romeo Regunton?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What happened to him?

A: When I was wounded he also said, "uncle I was also wounded."

Q: What did you tell when he told you that?

A: I told him, "you seek cover also my son".

Q: How did Romeo Regunton took cover?

A: He moved slowly by dragging his body along the ground, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: By the way, how far were you from Mario Tabaco who fired upon the person of
Mayor Arreola?

A: Probably more than 3 meters, sir. 14

On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:

ATTY. CONSIGNA:
 Q: When for the first time when you were already in the cockpit arena did you see the
accused Mario Tabaco?

A: Before the shooting, sir.

Q: And approximately how many minutes or seconds did you see Mario Tabaco for
the first time prior to the shooting incident?

A: Probably 5 minutes before, sir.

Q: And in that place of the cockpit arena have you seen the accused herein Mario
Tabaco?

A: He sat on the first row of the seats.

Q: And sitting on the first row of the bleachers, on what part of the cockpit arena did
Mario Tabaco, the accused sit?

A: He sat a little bit west of us, sir.

COURT:

Q: How far?

A: Probably more than 3 meters, sir.

Q: A little bit to the west, do I get from you that he was seated on the western part of
the cockpit?

A: A little to the west, sir.

Q: An you together with the late Mayor Arreola were also on the western part of the
cockpit?

A: We were on the northwest.

Q: Mario Tabaco, therefore, the accused in these cases was not directly in front of
you?

A: A little bit west of us, sir.

Q: It was on that position of the accused Mario Tabaco and your position with the late
Arreola on the northwest when you according to you saw Mario Tabaco fired his gun,
is that what you mean?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: That the accused Mario Tabaco was on the first row when he allegedly shot on
Mayor Arreola who was on 4th row, is that what you mean?

A: Mario Tabaco stood up and faced us, sir.

Q: So while Mario Tabaco stood up and faced towards the direction where you were
together with the late Mayor Arreola still Mario Tabaco was on the floor of the cockpit
arena?

A: Yes, sir, on the cemented floor.

Q: And immediately after you heard the first shot coming from the accused Mario
Tabaco considering that you were right behind the late Mayor Arreola, as you have
stated in your direct examination you immediately sought cover?

A: I only lay flat to the floor of the cockpit when Mario Tabaco fired three (3) shots.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: At the time you laid flat facing down and you did not come to know that Mayor
Arreola was dead already?

A: Why not, the first and second shots, I know him that he was already dead.

Q: And the three (3) shots that you heard were all directed towards Mayor Arreola?
 A: Yes, sir, in our place.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

Q: To whom the 3rd shot directed?

A: In our place, sir.

Q: No person was involved on the 3rd shot?

A: That was also the time when Romeo Regunton came toward me and told me that
he was also hit.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

Q: You don't know the person who shot him?

A: It was Mario Tabaco because he was still firing then, sir.

Q: You do not know the person who shot him?

A: It was Mario Tabaco because he was still firing then, sir. 15

The above testimonies of Villasin and Peneyra pointing to accused-appellant as the assailant in the shooting of the
ex-mayor and his companions were corroborated further by the testimony of another eyewitness in the person of
Rogelio Guimmayen. His account of the incident is as follows:

PROSECUTOR ABAD:

xxx xxx xxx

Q: How far were you from Tabaco when you saw him holding that gun?

A: More or less ten (10) meters, sir.

Q: Where was he at that specific time and place?

A: Inside the cockpit, sir.

Q: Where were you also?

A: I was at the stairs, sir.

Q: When you saw him what happened if any?

xxx xxx xxx

A: When he entered he stopped and then the gun fired and that was the time when I
got down, sir.

Q: Did you see to whom he was directing the gun?

A: It was directed to the Mayor's place, sir.

Q: How far was the Mayor from the accused Mario Tabaco?

A: More or less three (3) meters only. There was only one bench between them, sir.

Q: Did you see the accused firing his gun towards the Mayor?

A: With his first shot which was directed to the Mayor that was the time I got down to
hide myself, sir. 16

On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:

ATTY. CONSIGNA:

Q: So, it was at the time you were inside the cockpit arena that you heard gunfire?
 A: Yes, sir.

Q: And you did not see who fired that gunfire while you were inside the cockpit
arena?

A: When I was inside, I saw Mario Tabaco pointing a gun to the Mayor and the gun
went off and that's the time I took cover, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: And that was the last time you heard burst of gunfire inside the cockpit arena?

A: When I went outside, I heard shots inside and outside. 17

Set over against the foregoing positive and categorical testimonial declaration of the above-named eyewitnesses for
the prosecution is the accused-appellant's bare denial of the charges against him. As between the positive
identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses and the bare denial of accused, the choice is not difficult
to make. For, it is a settled rule that positive identification by the prosecution witnesses of the accused as
perpetrator of the crime is entitled to greater weight than his bare denial and explanation. 18

Likewise, there is no evidence from the record, as none was adduced by accused-appellant, of any ill-motive on the
part of the prosecution witnesses as to why would they testify adversely against accused-appellant in the way that
they did. Well settled is the rule that where there is no evidence and nothing to indicate, that the principal witnesses
for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, the presumption was that they were not so actuated and their
testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. 19

2. Accused-appellant contends that eyewitnesses Villasin and Peneyra were not telling the truth when they testified
that it was accused-appellant who was the assailant in the shooting of Ex-Mayor Arreola and his companions
considering that Dr. Rivera, who examined the cadaver of Ex-mayor Arreola, testified that the trajectory of the
bullets that hit the ex-mayor shows that the assailant was on the same level as the ex-mayor, and the trajectory of
the third bullet shows that the assailant was at a higher level as the point of entry was higher than the point of exit.
Appellant states that he was seated at the first row which was the lowest while the ex-mayor and his companions
were seated at the fourth row which was the highest. This contention, however, is untenable.

Eyewitnesses Villasin and Peneyra testified that accused-appellant was at the first row of seats of the slanted
bleachers of the cockpit arena, when he stood up, stepped on one of the seats, aimed his rifle at Ex-Mayor Arreola
and his companions and fired at them. 20

The above-quoted testimonies explain very well why two gunshot wounds found on the cadaver of Ex-mayor Arreola
appear to have been inflicted while he and his assailant were face to face and at the same level.

Upon the other hand, according to Dr. Rivera, one of the gunshot wounds of Ex-Mayor Arreola had a point of entry
higher than the point of exit because he must have already been lying down when his wound was inflicted. 21

Well established, too, from the evidence on record is accused-appellant's liability for the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr.
and the near-fatal wounding of Sgt. Benito Raquepo.

Not seriously disputed by accused-appellant are the testimonies of Sgt. Benito Raquepo and policeman Mario
Retreta. Sgt. Benito Raquepo testified that at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of March 22, 1987 while he was
taking his snacks at the canteen of Co located at the left side of the gate of the cockpit arena, he heard five
successive gun reports coming from inside the cockpit arena. While he was on his way inside the cockpit arena, he
saw the accused-appellant coming from inside the cockpit arena. He told the accused "Mario relax ka lang", after
which the accused pointed his gun at him. At that point in time, Mario Retreta who was among the persons near
Mario Tabaco, grabbed the gun from the latter. It was at that point when the gun went off hitting him on the right
thigh and the bullet exiting on his left thigh. He also saw that Jorge Siriban, who was then about three meters away
from his left side, was hit at his testicles.

Mario Retreta, a policeman and relative of accused-appellant, on the other hand corroborated in part the testimony
of Sgt. Raquepo. He testified that at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of March 22, 1987, he was at the canteen of
Mrs. Co. While thereat, he saw accused-appellant rushing out from the cockpit arena. Before he saw accused-
appellant, he heard a gun report from inside the cockpit arena. He was then about one meter away from accused-
appellant when he noticed Sgt. Raquepo whom he is acquainted with, and Jorge Siriban who was then standing at
the gate of the cockpit arena. Sgt. Raquepo was facing accused-appellant and at that distance and position, he
heard Sgt. Raquepo said: "Mario keep calm". He also told accused-appellant: "What is that happened again, Mario."
When he saw accused-appellant change his gun position from port arm to horizontal position, he got near accused-
appellant and pressed down the muzzle of the gun when accused appellant squeezed the trigger hitting Sgt.
Raquepo on both thighs and also Jorge Siriban. A certain Sgt. Ferrer joined in the grapple and was able to take
away the gun from accused-appellant.

Sgt. Raquepo survived the gunshot wounds due to adequate medical assistance but Siriban was not as lucky.

Accused-appellant claims that he did not have the criminal intent to kill Siriban or wound Sgt. Raquepo, and that the
gun would not have been fired in the first place had Mario Retreta, for no apparent reason, not tried to grab the gun
from him, are without merit.
Retreta testified that he grabbed the gun from accused-appellant because the latter changed his gun from port arm
position to horizontal position, and at that instance he thought accused-appellant might harm Sgt. Raquepo. 22

Furthermore, even assuming that he lacked criminal intent in the killing of Sgt. Raquepo and the near-fatal wounding
of Siriban, his claim of innocence cannot be sustained. His undisputed act of firing the gun, which is by itself
felonious in total disregard of the consequences it might produce, is equivalent to criminal intent.

Accused-appellant cannot evade responsibility for his felonious acts, even if he did not intend the consequences
thereof for, in accordance with Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person
committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

We note that while the accused was found guilty in all four (4) murder charges and the penalty of reclusion
perpetua should have been imposed on him in all four (4) murder charges, the trial court imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for all four murder charges. The trial court explained the single sentence for four murder
charges in this wise:

Whether or not the criminal cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317, involving the killings of Oscar
Tabulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, respectively, should have been
prosecuted under only one Information.

The law provides:

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.

When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. (as
amended by Art. No. 400). (Art. 48, Revised Penal Code).

Read as it should be, this article provides for two clauses of crimes where a single penalty is to be
imposed; first, where the single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (delito
compuesto); and second, when the offense is a necessary means for committing the other. (delito
complejo) and/or complex proper (People vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748).

In the cases at bar, the Provincial Prosecutor filed four (4) separate Informations of murder, which
should have been otherwise, as the shooting to death of the four (4) victims should have been
prosecuted under one information, involving four (4) murder victims.

The evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire and/or
successive automatic gun fires, meaning continuous. Hence, it is a complex crime involving four
murdered victims, under the first category, where a single act of shooting constituted two or more
grave or less grave felonies (delito compuesto), as decided in the cases of People vs. Dama, CA 44
O.G. 3339; People vs. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975; People vs. Pineda, L-26222, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA
748.

Paraphrasing a more recent decision of the Supreme Court, we say — as the deaths of Oscar
Tahulug, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, in Criminal Cases Nos. 259, 270,
284 and 317 respectively, were the result of one single act of the accused Mario Tabaco, (People vs.
Guillen, 85 Phil. 307) the penalty — is the penalty imposed for the more serious offense. The more
serious offense is murder, the killing have been attended by TREACHERY because the victims were
completely taken by surprise and had no means of defending themselves against Mario Tabaco's
sudden attack. The penalty is imposable in its maximum degree (People vs. Fernandez, 99 Phil.
515), but as the death penalty is no longer permitted the same is hereby reduced to a single Penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA for the four (4) murders. (People vs. Herson Maghanoy, GR Nos.
67170-72, December 15, 1989).

Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. 10-316, for homicide with Frustrated Homicide and it appearing
also that the death of Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Benito Raquepo, was the result of one
single act of the accused Tabaco, the applicable penalty is the penalty imposed for the more serious
offense. The more serious offense is HOMICIDE, to be imposed in its maximum degree of reclusion
temporal, which is 17 years, 4 months, 1 day to 20 years. There being no modifying circumstances
and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty that should be imposed, and which is
hereby imposed, upon the accused Mario Tabaco is 10 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as the
minimum, to 17 years, 4 months, 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, plus P30,000.00 actual
damages for medical expenses of Benito Raquepo.

It was duly proved beyond doubt that the gun (Exhs. "K", SN No. 1492932, "K-2" — magazine of M-
14 and Exh. "L" — Memo Receipt of M-14 issued to Tabaco), used by the accused, is admittedly an
automatic powerful weapon, more powerful than an M-16 armalite rifle. It is so powerful that the
bullets can penetrate even more than five (5) persons resulting to their deaths. And, this was proven
when, according to witness Rosario Peneyra, the bullets even destroyed the cemented rail guard
separating the lower and upper bleachers of the cockpit arena, and causing wounds on his face and
on his right shoulder. Additionally, we have the used/spent empty shells (Exh. "R" and "R-1"). 23
We hold that the trial court was in error in imposing only a single penalty of reclusion perpetua for all four murder
cases. The trial court holding that a complex crime was committed since "the evidence shows that the four (4)
victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire and/or successive automatic gun fires, meaning
continuous (emphasis ours) 24 does not hold water.

Of course, to justify the penalty imposed, the trial court relied on the doctrines enunciated in People vs. Pama 25 (not
People vs. Dama, as cited by the trial court), People vs. Lawas, 26 and People vs. Pineda. 27

The trial court misappreciated the facts in People vs. Pama. In said case, there was only one bullet which killed two
persons. Hence, there was only a single act which produced two crimes, resulting in a specie of complex crime
known as a compound crime, wherein a single act produces two or more grave or less grave felonies. In the case at
bench, there was more than one bullet expended by the accused-appellant in killing the four victims. The evidence
adduced by the prosecution show that Tabaco entered the cockpit with a fully loaded M-14 sub-machine gun. 28 He
fired the weapon, which contained 20 rounds of bullets in its magazine, continuously. When the rifle was recovered
from Tabaco, the magazine was already empty. Moreover, several spent shells were recovered from the scene of
the crime. Hence, the ruling enunciated in People vs. Pama cannot be applied. On the contrary, what is on all fours
with the case at bench is the ruling laid down in People vs. Desierto. 29 The accused in that case killed five persons
with a Thompson sub-machine gun, an automatic firearm which, like the M-14, is capable of firing continuously. As
stated therein:

In the case at bar, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable because the death of each
of the five persons who were killed by appellant and the physical injuries inflicted upon each of the
two other persons injured were not caused by the performance by the accused of one simple act as
provided for by said article. Although it is true that several successive shots were fired by the
accused in a short space of time, yet the factor which must be taken into consideration is that, to
each death caused or physical injuries inflicted upon the victims, corresponds a distinct and separate
shot fired by the accused, who thus made himself criminally liable for as many offenses as those
resulting from every single act that produced the same. Although apparently he perpetrated a series
of offenses successively in a matter of seconds, yet each person killed and each person injured by
him became the victim, respectively, of a separate crime of homicide or frustrated homicide. Except
for the fact that five crimes of homicide and two cases of frustrated homicide were committed
successively during the tragic incident, legally speaking there is nothing that would connect one of
them with its companion offenses. (emphasis ours)

In Desierto, although the burst of shots was caused by one single act of pressing the trigger of the
Thompson sub-machine gun, in view of its special mechanism, the person firing it has only to keep pressing
the trigger with his finger and it would fire continually. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the trigger which
should produce the several felonies, but the number of bullets which actually produced them. 30

The trial court also misread People vs. Pineda. 31 True, the case of Pineda provided us with a definition of what a
complex crime is. But that is not the point. What is relevant is that Art. 48, was not applied in the said case because
the Supreme Court found that there were actually several homicides committed by the perpetrators. Had the trial
court read further, it would have seen that the Supreme Court in fact recognized the "deeply rooted . . . doctrine that
when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes." 32 Clarifying the
applicability of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the Supreme Court further stated in Pineda that "to apply the first
half of Article 48, . . . there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the
law." 33 (emphasis supplied) The firing of several bullets by Tabaco, although resulting from one continuous burst of
gunfire, constitutes several acts. Each person, felled by different shots, is a victim of a separate crime of murder.
There is no showing that only a single missile passed through the bodies of all four victims. The killing of each victim
is thus separate and distinct from the other. In People vs. Pardo 34 we held that:

Where the death of two persons does not result from a single act but from two different shots, two
separate murders, and not a complex crime, are committed.

Furthermore, the trial court's reliance on the case of People vs. Lawas 35 is misplaced. The doctrine enunciated in
said case only applies when it is impossible to ascertain the individual deaths caused by numerous killers. In the
case at bench, all of the deaths are attributed, beyond a shadow of a doubt, to the accused-appellant.

Consequently, the four murders which resulted from a burst of gunfire cannot be considered a complex crime. They
are separate crimes. The accused-appellant must therefore be held liable for each and every death he has caused,
and sentenced accordingly to four sentences of reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the trial court in finding accused-appellant guilty of
four (4) counts of Murder and one (1) count of Homicide with Frustrated Homicide, the judgment appealed from
should be, as it is, hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that four sentences of reclusion perpetua be hereby
imposed.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 206666 January 21, 2015

ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, Petitioner, ALFREDO S. LIM Petitioner-Intervenor, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before the Court are (1) a Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, both of the Revised Rules
of Court, by Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal (Risos-Vidal), which essentially prays for the issuance of the writ of certiorari
annulling and setting aside the April 1, 20131 and April 23, 20132 Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), Second Division and En bane, respectively, in SPA No. 13-211 (DC), entitled "Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal
v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada" for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (2) a Petition-in-Intervention3 filed by Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), wherein he prays to be declared the 2013
winning candidate for Mayor of the City of Manila in view of private respondent former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada’s (former President Estrada) disqualification to run for and hold public office.

The Facts

The salient facts of the case are as follows:

On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former President of the
Republic of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder in Criminal Case No. 26558, entitled "People of the Philippines
v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al." The dispositive part of the graft court’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case No. 26558 finding the
accused, Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of PLUNDER,
defined in and penalized by Republic Act No. 7080, as amended. On the other hand, for failure of the prosecution to
prove and establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Court finds the accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and
Atty. Edward S. Serapio NOT GUILTY of the crime of plunder, and accordingly, the Court hereby orders their
ACQUITTAL.

The penalty imposable for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, is Reclusion Perpetua to Death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, however, the lesser
penalty shall be applied in accordance with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, the accused Former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.

The period within which accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been under detention shall be
credited to him in full as long as he agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed
upon convicted prisoners.

Moreover, in accordance with Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the Court
hereby declares the forfeiture in favor of the government of the following:

(1) The total amount of Five Hundred Forty[-]Two Million Seven Hundred Ninety[-]One Thousand Pesos
(₱545,291,000.00), with interest and income earned, inclusive of the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos
(₱200,000,000.00), deposited in the name and account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation.

(2) The amount of One Hundred Eighty[-]Nine Million Pesos (₱189,000,000.00), inclusive of interests and
income earned, deposited in the Jose Velarde account.

(3) The real property consisting of a house and lot dubbed as "Boracay Mansion" located at #100 11th
Street, New Manila, Quezon City.

The cash bonds posted by accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty. Edward S. Serapio are hereby ordered
cancelled and released to the said accused or their duly authorized representatives upon presentation of the original
receipt evidencing payment thereof and subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedures. Likewise, the hold-
departure orders issued against the said accused are hereby recalled and declared functus oficio.4

On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (former President Arroyo) extended
executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada. The full text of said pardon states:

MALACAÑAN PALACE MANILA

By the President of the Philippines

PARDON

WHEREAS, this Administration has a policy of releasing inmates who have reached the age of seventy (70),

WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been under detention for six and a half years,
WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office,

IN VIEW HEREOF and pursuant to the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution, I hereby grant executive
clemency to JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, convicted by the Sandiganbayan of Plunder and imposed a penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua. He is hereby restored to his civil and political rights.

The forfeitures imposed by the Sandiganbayan remain in force and in full, including all writs and processes issued
by the Sandiganbayan in pursuance hereof, except for the bank account(s) he owned before his tenure as
President.

Upon acceptance of this pardon by JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, this pardon shall take effect.

Given under my hand at the City of Manila, this 25th Day of October, in the year of Our Lord, two thousand and
seven.

Gloria M. Arroyo (sgd.)

By the President:

IGNACIO R. BUNYE (sgd.)

Acting Executive Secretary5

On October 26, 2007, at 3:35 p.m., former President Estrada "received and accepted"6 the pardon by affixing his
signature beside his handwritten notation thereon.

On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy7 for the position of President.
During that time, his candidacy earned three oppositions in the COMELEC: (1) SPA No. 09-024 (DC), a "Petition to
Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy" filed by Rev. Elly Velez B. Lao Pamatong, ESQ; (2) SPA
No. 09-028 (DC), a petition for "Disqualification as Presidential Candidate" filed by Evilio C. Pormento (Pormento);
and (3) SPA No. 09-104 (DC), a "Petition to Disqualify Estrada Ejercito, Joseph M.from Running as President due to
Constitutional Disqualification and Creating Confusion to the Prejudice of Estrada, Mary Lou B" filed by Mary Lou
Estrada. In separate Resolutions8 dated January 20, 2010 by the COMELEC, Second Division, however, all three
petitions were effectively dismissed on the uniform grounds that (i) the Constitutional proscription on reelection
applies to a sitting president; and (ii) the pardon granted to former President Estrada by former President Arroyo
restored the former’s right to vote and be voted for a public office. The subsequent motions for reconsideration
thereto were denied by the COMELEC En banc.

After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 synchronized elections, however, former President Estrada only managed to
garner the second highest number of votes.

Of the three petitioners above-mentioned, only Pormento sought recourse to this Court and filed a petition for
certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 191988, entitled "Atty. Evilio C. Pormento v. Joseph ‘ERAP’ Ejercito
Estrada and Commission on Elections." But in a Resolution9 dated August 31, 2010, the Court dismissed the
aforementioned petition on the ground of mootness considering that former President Estrada lost his presidential
bid.

On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of
Candidacy,10 this time vying for a local elective post, that ofthe Mayor of the City of Manila.

On January 24, 2013, Risos-Vidal, the petitioner in this case, filed a Petition for Disqualification against former
President Estrada before the COMELEC. The petition was docketed as SPA No. 13-211 (DC). Risos Vidal anchored
her petition on the theory that "[Former President Estrada] is Disqualified to Run for Public Office because of his
Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26558 entitled ‘People of the Philippines vs.
Joseph Ejercito Estrada’ Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetuawith Perpetual Absolute
Disqualification."11 She relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC), which state respectively, that:

Sec. 40, Local Government Code:

SECTION 40. Disqualifications.- The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable
by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; (b) Those removed
from office as a result of an administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and
continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
 (g) The insane or feeble minded. (Emphasis supplied.)

Sec. 12, Omnibus Election Code:

Section 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or
has been sentenced by final judgmentfor subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has
been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any public office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty. (Emphases supplied.)

In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013,the COMELEC, Second Division, dismissed the petition for disqualification, the
fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.12

The COMELEC, Second Division, opined that "[h]aving taken judicial cognizance of the consolidated resolution for
SPA No. 09-028 (DC) and SPA No. 09-104 (DC) and the 10 May 2010 En Banc resolution affirming it, this
Commission will not be labor the controversy further. Moreso, [Risos-Vidal] failed to present cogent proof sufficient
to reverse the standing pronouncement of this Commission declaring categorically that [former President Estrada’s]
right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M.
Arroyo. Since this Commission has already spoken, it will no longer engage in disquisitions of a settled matter lest
indulged in wastage of government resources."13

The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by Risos-Vidal was denied in a Resolution dated April 23, 2013.

On April 30, 2013, Risos-Vidal invoked the Court’s jurisdiction by filing the present petition. She presented five
issues for the Court’s resolution, to wit:

I. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR

EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ESTRADA’S PARDON WAS NOT
CONDITIONAL;

II. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR

EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT ESTRADA IS DISQUALIFIED TO
RUN AS MAYOR OF MANILA UNDER SEC. 40 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTCODE OF 1991 FOR
HAVING BEEN CONVICTED OF PLUNDER, AN OFFENSE INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE;

III. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK

OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION ON THE
GROUND THAT THE CASE INVOLVES THE SAME OR SIMILAR ISSUES IT ALREADY RESOLVED IN
THE CASES OF "PORMENTO VS. ESTRADA", SPA NO. 09-028 (DC) AND IN "RE: PETITION TO
DISQUALIFY ESTRADA EJERCITO, JOSEPH M. FROM RUNNING AS PRESIDENT, ETC.," SPA NO. 09-
104 (DC);

IV. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK

OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT ESTRADA’S PARDON NEITHER
RESTORED HIS RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE NOR REMITTED HIS PERPETUAL ABSOLUTE
DISQUALIFICATION FROM SEEKING PUBLIC OFFICE; and

V. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK

OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT HAVING EXERCISED ITS POWER TO MOTU PROPRIO
DISQUALIFY RESPONDENT ESTRADA IN THE FACE OF HIS PATENT DISQUALIFICATION TO RUN
FOR PUBLIC OFFICE BECAUSE OF HIS PERPETUAL AND ABSOLUTE DISQUALIFICATION TO SEEK
PUBLIC OFFICE AND TO VOTE RESULTING FROM HIS CRIMINAL CONVICTION FOR PLUNDER. 14

While this case was pending beforethe Court, or on May 13, 2013, the elections were conducted as scheduled and
former President Estrada was voted into office with 349,770 votes cast in his favor. The next day, the local board of
canvassers proclaimed him as the duly elected Mayor of the City of Manila.

On June 7, 2013, Lim, one of former President Estrada’s opponents for the position of Mayor, moved for leave to
intervene in this case. His motion was granted by the Court in a Resolution 15 dated June 25, 2013. Lim subscribed to
Risos-Vidal’s theory that former President Estrada is disqualified to run for and hold public office as the pardon
granted to the latter failed to expressly remit his perpetual disqualification. Further, given that former President
Estrada is disqualified to run for and hold public office, all the votes obtained by the latter should be declared stray,
and, being the second placer with 313,764 votes to his name, he (Lim) should be declared the rightful winning
candidate for the position of Mayor of the City of Manila.

The Issue

Though raising five seemingly separate issues for resolution, the petition filed by Risos-Vidal actually presents only
one essential question for resolution by the Court, that is, whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and
be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.
In her petition, Risos-Vidal starts her discussion by pointing out that the pardon granted to former President Estrada
was conditional as evidenced by the latter’s express acceptance thereof. The "acceptance," she claims, is an
indication of the conditional natureof the pardon, with the condition being embodied in the third Whereas Clause of
the pardon, i.e., "WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position
or office." She explains that the aforementioned commitment was what impelled former President Arroyo to pardon
former President Estrada, without it, the clemency would not have been extended. And any breach thereof, that is,
whenformer President Estrada filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President and Mayor of the City of Manila, he
breached the condition of the pardon; hence, "he ought to be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of
his sentence x x x and disqualifies him as a candidate for the mayoralty [position] of Manila."16

Nonetheless, Risos-Vidal clarifies that the fundamental basis upon which former President Estrada mustbe
disqualified from running for and holding public elective office is actually the proscription found in Section 40 of the
LGC, in relation to Section 12 ofthe OEC. She argues that the crime of plunder is both an offense punishable by
imprisonment of one year or more and involving moral turpitude; such that former President Estrada must be
disqualified to run for and hold public elective office.

Even with the pardon granted to former President Estrada, however, Risos-Vidal insists that the same did not
operate to make available to former President Estrada the exception provided under Section 12 of the OEC, the
pardon being merely conditional and not absolute or plenary. Moreover, Risos-Vidal puts a premium on the
ostensible requirements provided under Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.– A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold publicoffice, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.

A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence.

xxxx

ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory penalties.– The penalties of reclusion
perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the
sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even
though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
(Emphases supplied.)

She avers that in view of the foregoing provisions of law, it is not enough that a pardon makes a general statement
that such pardon carries with it the restoration of civil and political rights. By virtue of Articles 36 and 41, a pardon
restoring civil and political rights without categorically making mention what specific civil and political rights are
restored "shall not work to restore the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage; nor shall it remit the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification for the principal penalties of reclusion
perpetua and reclusion temporal."17 In other words, she considers the above constraints as mandatory requirements
that shun a general or implied restoration of civil and political rights in pardons.

Risos-Vidal cites the concurring opinions of Associate Justices Teodoro R. Padilla and Florentino P. Feliciano in
Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.18 to endorse her position that "[t]he restoration of the right to hold public office to one who
has lost such right by reason of conviction in a criminal case, but subsequently pardoned, cannot be left to
inference, no matter how intensely arguable, but must be statedin express, explicit, positive and specific language."

Applying Monsantoto former President Estrada’s case, Risos-Vidal reckons that "such express restoration is further
demanded by the existence of the condition in the [third] [W]hereas [C]lause of the pardon x x x indubitably
indicating that the privilege to hold public office was not restored to him."19

On the other hand, the Office ofthe Solicitor General (OSG) for public respondent COMELEC, maintains that "the
issue of whether or not the pardon extended to [former President Estrada] restored his right to run for public office
had already been passed upon by public respondent COMELEC way back in 2010 via its rulings in SPA Nos. 09-
024, 09-028 and 09-104, there is no cogent reason for it to reverse its standing pronouncement and declare [former
President Estrada] disqualified to run and be voted as mayor of the City of Manila in the absence of any new
argument that would warrant its reversal. To be sure, public respondent COMELEC correctly exercised its discretion
in taking judicial cognizance of the aforesaid rulings which are known toit and which can be verified from its own
records, in accordance with Section 2, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court on the courts’ discretionary power to take
judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, orare capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to
be known to them because of their judicial functions."20

Further, the OSG contends that "[w]hile at first glance, it is apparent that [former President Estrada’s] conviction for
plunder disqualifies him from running as mayor of Manila under Section 40 of the [LGC], the subsequent grant of
pardon to him, however, effectively restored his right to run for any public office."21 The restoration of his right to run
for any public office is the exception to the prohibition under Section 40 of the LGC, as provided under Section 12 of
the OEC. As to the seeming requirement of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., the express
restoration/remission of a particular right to be stated in the pardon, the OSG asserts that "an airtight and rigid
interpretation of Article 36 and Article 41 of the [RPC] x x x would be stretching too much the clear and plain
meaning of the aforesaid provisions."22 Lastly, taking into consideration the third Whereas Clause of the pardon
granted to former President Estrada, the OSG supports the position that it "is not an integral part of the decree of
the pardon and cannot therefore serve to restrict its effectivity."23
Thus, the OSG concludes that the "COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions."24

For his part, former President Estrada presents the following significant arguments to defend his stay in office: that
"the factual findings of public respondent COMELEC, the Constitutional body mandated to administer and enforce
all laws relative to the conduct of the elections, [relative to the absoluteness of the pardon, the effects thereof, and
the eligibility of former President Estrada to seek public elective office] are binding [and conclusive] on this
Honorable Supreme Court;" that he "was granted an absolute pardon and thereby restored to his full civil and
political rights, including the right to seek public elective office such as the mayoral (sic) position in the City of
Manila;" that "the majority decision in the case of Salvacion A. Monsanto v. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,which was
erroneously cited by both Vidal and Lim as authority for their respective claims, x x x reveal that there was no
discussion whatsoever in the ratio decidendi of the Monsanto case as to the alleged necessity for an expressed
restoration of the ‘right to hold public office in the pardon’ as a legal prerequisite to remove the subject perpetual
special disqualification;" that moreover, the "principal question raised in this Monsanto case is whether or not a
public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement toher
former position without need of a new appointment;" that his "expressed acceptance [of the pardon] is not proof that
the pardon extended to [him] is conditional and not absolute;" that this case is a mere rehash of the casesfiled
against him during his candidacy for President back in 2009-2010; that Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal
Code "cannot abridge or diminish the pardoning power of the President expressly granted by the Constitution;" that
the text of the pardon granted to him substantially, if not fully, complied with the requirement posed by Article 36 of
the Revised Penal Code as it was categorically stated in the said document that he was "restored to his civil and
political rights;" that since pardon is an act of grace, it must be construed favorably in favor of the grantee; 25 and that
his disqualification will result in massive disenfranchisement of the hundreds of thousands of Manileños who voted
for him.26

The Court's Ruling

The petition for certiorari lacks merit.

Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored allhis civil and political rights, which
naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the
pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of
the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
Recall that the petition for disqualification filed by Risos-Vidal against former President Estrada, docketed as SPA
No. 13-211 (DC), was anchored on Section 40 of the LGC, in relation to Section 12 of the OEC, that is, having been
convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment of one year or more, and involving moral turpitude, former
President Estrada must be disqualified to run for and hold public elective office notwithstanding the fact that he is a
grantee of a pardon that includes a statement expressing "[h]e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights."
Risos-Vidal theorizes that former President Estrada is disqualified from running for Mayor of Manila inthe May 13,
2013 Elections, and remains disqualified to hold any local elective post despite the presidential pardon extended to
him in 2007 by former President Arroyo for the reason that it (pardon) did not expressly provide for the remission of
the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification, particularly the restoration of his (former President Estrada) right
to vote and bevoted upon for public office. She invokes Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code as the
foundations of her theory.

It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted by former President Estrada does
not actually specify which political right is restored, it could be inferred that former President Arroyo did not
deliberately intend to restore former President Estrada’s rights of suffrage and to hold public office, orto otherwise
remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her intention was the contrary, the same cannot be
upheld based on the pardon’s text.

The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.

The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President
of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency, to wit:

Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.

xxxx

Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and
regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission.

It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in which the President may not
extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and
(3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable
recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of
statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.
In Cristobal v. Labrador27 and Pelobello v. Palatino,28 which were decided under the 1935 Constitution,wherein the
provision granting pardoning power to the President shared similar phraseology with what is found in the present
1987 Constitution, the Court then unequivocally declared that "subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution,
the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action." The Court reiterated this
pronouncement in Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.29 thereby establishing that, under the present Constitution, "a pardon,
being a presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action." Thus, it is unmistakably the long-
standing position of this Court that the exercise of the pardoning power is discretionary in the President and may not
be interfered with by Congress or the Court, except only when it exceeds the limits provided for by the Constitution.

This doctrine of non-diminution or non-impairment of the President’s power of pardon by acts of Congress,
specifically through legislation, was strongly adhered to by an overwhelming majority of the framers of the 1987
Constitution when they flatly rejected a proposal to carve out an exception from the pardoning power of the
President in the form of "offenses involving graft and corruption" that would be enumerated and defined by
Congress through the enactment of a law. The following is the pertinent portion lifted from the Record of the
Commission (Vol. II):

MR. ROMULO. I ask that Commissioner Tan be recognized to introduce an amendment on the same section.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Tan is recognized.

SR. TAN. Madam President, lines 7 to 9 state:

However, the power to grant executive clemency for violations of corrupt practices laws may be limited by
legislation.

I suggest that this be deletedon the grounds that, first, violations of corrupt practices may include a very little offense
like stealing ₱10; second, which I think is more important, I get the impression, rightly or wrongly, that
subconsciously we are drafting a constitution on the premise that all our future Presidents will bebad and dishonest
and, consequently, their acts will be lacking in wisdom. Therefore, this Article seems to contribute towards the
creation of an anti-President Constitution or a President with vast responsibilities but no corresponding power
except to declare martial law. Therefore, I request that these lines be deleted.

MR. REGALADO. Madam President,may the Committee react to that?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, please.

MR. REGALADO. This was inserted here on the resolution of Commissioner Davide because of the fact that similar
to the provisions on the Commission on Elections, the recommendation of that Commission is required before
executive clemency isgranted because violations of the election laws go into the very political life of the country.

With respect to violations of our Corrupt Practices Law, we felt that it is also necessary to have that subjected to the
same condition because violation of our Corrupt Practices Law may be of such magnitude as to affect the very
economic systemof the country. Nevertheless, as a compromise, we provided here that it will be the Congress that
will provide for the classification as to which convictions will still require prior recommendation; after all, the
Congress could take into account whether or not the violation of the Corrupt Practices Law is of such magnitude as
to affect the economic life of the country, if it is in the millions or billions of dollars. But I assume the Congress in its
collective wisdom will exclude those petty crimes of corruption as not to require any further stricture on the exercise
of executive clemency because, of course, there is a whale of a difference if we consider a lowly clerk committing
malversation of government property or funds involving one hundred pesos. But then, we also anticipate the
possibility that the corrupt practice of a public officer is of such magnitude as to have virtually drained a substantial
portion of the treasury, and then he goes through all the judicial processes and later on, a President who may have
close connections with him or out of improvident compassion may grant clemency under such conditions. That is
why we left it to Congress to provide and make a classification based on substantial distinctions between a minor
act of corruption or an act of substantial proportions. SR. TAN. So, why do we not just insert the word GROSS or
GRAVE before the word "violations"?

MR. REGALADO. We feel that Congress can make a better distinction because "GRAVE" or "GROSS" can be
misconstrued by putting it purely as a policy.

MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.

MR. RODRIGO. May I speak in favor of the proposed amendment?

THE PRESIDENT. Please proceed.

MR. RODRIGO. The power to grant executive clemency is essentially an executive power, and that is precisely why
it is called executive clemency. In this sentence, which the amendment seeks to delete, an exception is being made.
Congress, which is the legislative arm, is allowed to intrude into this prerogative of the executive. Then it limits the
power of Congress to subtract from this prerogative of the President to grant executive clemency by limiting the
power of Congress to only corrupt practices laws. There are many other crimes more serious than these. Under this
amendment, Congress cannot limit the power of executive clemency in cases of drug addiction and drug pushing
which are very, very serious crimes that can endanger the State; also, rape with murder, kidnapping and treason.
Aside from the fact that it is a derogation of the power of the President to grant executive clemency, it is also
defective in that it singles out just one kind of crime. There are far more serious crimes which are not included.

MR. REGALADO. I will just make one observation on that. We admit that the pardoning power is anexecutive
power. But even in the provisions on the COMELEC, one will notice that constitutionally, it is required that there be a
favorable recommendation by the Commission on Elections for any violation of election laws.

At any rate, Commissioner Davide, as the principal proponent of that and as a member of the Committee, has
explained in the committee meetings we had why he sought the inclusion of this particular provision. May we call on
Commissioner Davide to state his position.

MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. I am constrained to rise to object to the proposal. We have just approved the Article on Accountability
of Public Officers. Under it, it is mandated that a public office is a public trust, and all government officers are under
obligation to observe the utmost of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, to lead modest lives and to act with
patriotism and justice.

In all cases, therefore, which would go into the verycore of the concept that a public office is a public trust, the
violation is itself a violation not only of the economy but the moral fabric of public officials. And that is the reason we
now want that if there is any conviction for the violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which, in effect,
is a violation of the public trust character of the public office, no pardon shall be extended to the offender, unless
some limitations are imposed.

Originally, my limitation was, it should be with the concurrence of the convicting court, but the Committee left it
entirely to the legislature to formulate the mechanics at trying, probably, to distinguish between grave and less grave
or serious cases of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Perhaps this is now the best time, since we
have strengthened the Article on Accountability of Public Officers, to accompany it with a mandate that the
President’s right to grant executive clemency for offenders or violators of laws relating to the concept of a public
office may be limited by Congress itself.

MR. SARMIENTO. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Sarmiento is recognized.

MR. SARMIENTO. May I briefly speak in favor of the amendment by deletion.

Madam President, over and over again, we have been saying and arguing before this Constitutional Commission
that we are emasculating the powers of the presidency, and this provision to me is another clear example of that.
So, I speak against this provision. Even the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions do not provide for this kind of
provision.

I am supporting the amendment by deletion of Commissioner Tan.

MR. ROMULO. Commissioner Tingson would like to be recognized.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Tingson is recognized.

MR. TINGSON. Madam President, I am also in favor of the amendment by deletion because I am in sympathy with
the stand of Commissioner Francisco "Soc" Rodrigo. I do believe and we should remember that above all the
elected or appointed officers of our Republic, the leader is the President. I believe that the country will be as the
President is, and if we systematically emasculate the power of this presidency, the time may come whenhe will be
also handcuffed that he will no longer be able to act like he should be acting.

So, Madam President, I am in favor of the deletion of this particular line.

MR. ROMULO. Commissioner Colayco would like to be recognized.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Colayco is recognized.

MR. COLAYCO. Thank you very much, Madam President.

I seldom rise here to object to or to commend or to recommend the approval of proposals, but now I find that the
proposal of Commissioner Tan is worthy of approval of this body.

Why are we singling out this particular offense? There are other crimes which cast a bigger blot on the moral
character of the public officials.

Finally, this body should not be the first one to limit the almost absolute power of our Chief Executive in deciding
whether to pardon, to reprieve or to commute the sentence rendered by the court.
I thank you.

THE PRESIDENT. Are we ready to vote now?

MR. ROMULO. Commissioner Padilla would like to be recognized, and after him will be Commissioner Natividad.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Padilla is recognized.

MR. PADILLA. Only one sentence, Madam President. The Sandiganbayan has been called the Anti-Graft Court, so
if this is allowed to stay, it would mean that the President’s power togrant pardon or reprieve will be limited to the
cases decided by the Anti-Graft Court, when as already stated, there are many provisions inthe Revised Penal Code
that penalize more serious offenses.

Moreover, when there is a judgment of conviction and the case merits the consideration of the exercise of executive
clemency, usually under Article V of the Revised Penal Code the judge will recommend such exercise of clemency.
And so, I am in favor of the amendment proposed by Commissioner Tan for the deletion of this last sentence in
Section 17.

THE PRESIDENT. Are we ready to vote now, Mr. Floor Leader?

MR. NATIVIDAD. Just one more.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Natividad is recognized.

MR. NATIVIDAD. I am also against this provision which will again chip more powers from the President. In case of
other criminals convicted in our society, we extend probation to them while in this case, they have already been
convicted and we offer mercy. The only way we can offer mercy to them is through this executive clemency
extended to them by the President. If we still close this avenue to them, they would be prejudiced even worse than
the murderers and the more vicious killers in our society. I do not think they deserve this opprobrium and
punishment under the new Constitution.

I am in favor of the proposed amendment of Commissioner Tan.

MR. ROMULO. We are ready tovote, Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Is this accepted by the Committee?

MR. REGALADO. The Committee, Madam President, prefers to submit this to the floor and also because of the
objection of the main proponent, Commissioner Davide. So we feel that the Commissioners should vote on this
question.

VOTING

THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor of the proposed amendment of Commissioner Tan to delete the last
sentence of Section 17 appearing on lines 7, 8 and 9, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised their hand.)

As many as are against, please raise their hand. (Few Members raised their hand.)

The results show 34 votes in favor and 4 votes against; the amendment is approved.30 (Emphases supplied.)

The proper interpretation of Articles

36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

The foregoing pronouncements solidify the thesis that Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code cannot, in any
way, serve to abridge or diminish the exclusive power and prerogative of the President to pardon persons convicted
of violating penal statutes.

The Court cannot subscribe to Risos-Vidal’s interpretation that the said Articles contain specific textual commands
which must be strictly followed in order to free the beneficiary of presidential grace from the disqualifications
specifically prescribed by them.

Again, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.– A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold publicoffice, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.

A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence.

xxxx
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory penalties.– The penalties of reclusion
perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the
sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even
though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
(Emphases supplied.)

A rigid and inflexible reading of the above provisions of law, as proposed by Risos-Vidal, is unwarranted, especially
so if it will defeat or unduly restrict the power of the President to grant executive clemency.

It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Verba legis non est recedendum.
From the words of a statute there should be no departure.31 It is this Court’s firm view that the phrase in the
presidential pardon at issue which declares that former President Estrada "is hereby restored to his civil and political
rights" substantially complies with the requirement of express restoration.

The Dissent of Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen agreed with Risos Vidal that there was no express remission and/or
restoration of the rights of suffrage and/or to hold public office in the pardon granted to former President Estrada, as
required by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

Justice Leonen posits in his Dissent that the aforementioned codal provisions must be followed by the President, as
they do not abridge or diminish the President’s power to extend clemency. He opines that they do not reduce the
coverage of the President’s pardoning power. Particularly, he states:

Articles 36 and 41 refer only to requirements of convention or form. They only provide a procedural prescription.
They are not concerned with areas where or the instances when the President may grant pardon; they are only
concerned with how he or she is to exercise such power so that no other governmental instrumentality needs to
intervene to give it full effect.

All that Articles 36 and 41 do is prescribe that, if the President wishes to include in the pardon the restoration of the
rights of suffrage and to hold public office, or the remission of the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification,he or she should do so expressly. Articles 36 and 41 only ask that the President state his or her
intentions clearly, directly, firmly, precisely, and unmistakably. To belabor the point, the President retains the power
to make such restoration or remission, subject to a prescription on the manner by which he or she is to state it.32

With due respect, I disagree with the overbroad statement that Congress may dictate as to how the President may
exercise his/her power of executive clemency. The form or manner by which the President, or Congress for that
matter, should exercise their respective Constitutional powers or prerogatives cannot be interfered with unless it is
so provided in the Constitution. This is the essence of the principle of separation of powers deeply ingrained in our
system of government which "ordains that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive
cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere." 33 Moreso, this
fundamental principle must be observed if noncompliance with the form imposed by one branch on a co-equal and
coordinate branch will result into the diminution of an exclusive Constitutional prerogative.

For this reason, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code should be construed in a way that will give full effect
to the executive clemency granted by the President, instead of indulging in an overly strict interpretation that may
serve to impair or diminish the import of the pardon which emanated from the Office of the President and duly
signed by the Chief Executive himself/herself. The said codal provisions must be construed to harmonize the power
of Congress to define crimes and prescribe the penalties for such crimes and the power of the President to grant
executive clemency. All that the said provisions impart is that the pardon of the principal penalty does notcarry with it
the remission of the accessory penalties unless the President expressly includes said accessory penalties in the
pardon. It still recognizes the Presidential prerogative to grant executive clemency and, specifically, to decide to
pardon the principal penalty while excluding its accessory penalties or to pardon both. Thus, Articles 36 and 41 only
clarify the effect of the pardon so decided upon by the President on the penalties imposedin accordance with law.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty
of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the
executive clemency extended to former President Estrada who was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of plunder and
imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. The latter is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of
imprisonment. The sentence that followed, which states that "(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,"
expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even
if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the textof the pardon that the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with
the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.

In this jurisdiction, the right toseek public elective office is recognized by law as falling under the whole gamut of civil
and political rights.

Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225,34 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003,"
reads as follows:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.– Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this
Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: (1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet
the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
 (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath;

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear an oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they
renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath; (4) Those intending to practice
their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice; and

(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised
by, or extended to, those who:

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which theyare naturalized
citizens; and/or

(b) are in active service as commissioned or non commissioned officers in the armed forces of the
country which they are naturalized citizens. (Emphases supplied.)

No less than the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the Philippines is a signatory,
acknowledges the existence of said right. Article 25(b) of the Convention states: Article 25

Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in Article 2 and
without unreasonable restrictions:

xxxx

(b) To vote and to be electedat genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall
be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors[.] (Emphasis supplied.)

Recently, in Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections,35 the Court unequivocally referred to the right to seek
public elective office as a political right, to wit:

Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office specific only to Filipino citizens who re-acquire
their citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative act that restores their right to run for public
office. The petitioner’s failure to comply there with in accordance with the exact tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual
the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed on September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet
to regain her political right to seek elective office. Unless she executes a sworn renunciation of her Australian
citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any elective office in the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, from both law and jurisprudence, the right to seek public elective office is unequivocally considered as a
political right. Hence, the Court reiterates its earlier statement that the pardon granted to former President Estrada
admits no other interpretation other than to mean that, upon acceptance of the pardon granted tohim, he regained
his FULL civil and political rights – including the right to seek elective office.

On the other hand, the theory of Risos-Vidal goes beyond the plain meaning of said penal provisions; and
prescribes a formal requirement that is not only unnecessary but, if insisted upon, could be in derogation of the
constitutional prohibition relative to the principle that the exercise of presidential pardon cannot be affected by
legislative action.

Risos-Vidal relied heavily on the separate concurring opinions in Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.36 to justify her argument
that an absolute pardon must expressly state that the right to hold public office has been restored, and that the
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification has been remitted.

This is incorrect.

Her reliance on said opinions is utterly misplaced. Although the learned views of Justices Teodoro R. Padilla and
Florentino P. Feliciano are to be respected, they do not form partof the controlling doctrine nor to be considered part
of the law of the land. On the contrary, a careful reading of the majority opinion in Monsanto, penned by no less than
Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, reveals no statement that denotes adherence to a stringent and overly nuanced
application of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code that will in effect require the President to use a
statutorily prescribed language in extending executive clemency, even if the intent of the President can otherwise be
deduced from the text or words used in the pardon. Furthermore, as explained above, the pardon here is consistent
with, and not contrary to, the provisions of Articles 36 and 41.

The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC
was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him.

Section 40 of the LGC identifies who are disqualified from running for any elective local position. Risos-Vidal argues
that former President Estrada is disqualified under item (a), to wit:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one
(1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence[.] (Emphasis supplied.)
Likewise, Section 12 of the OEC provides for similar prohibitions, but it provides for an exception, to wit:

Section 12. Disqualifications. – x x x unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. (Emphasis
supplied.)

As earlier stated, Risos-Vidal maintains that former President Estrada’s conviction for plunder disqualifies him from
running for the elective local position of Mayor of the City of Manila under Section 40(a) of the LGC. However, the
subsequent absolute pardon granted to former President Estrada effectively restored his right to seek public elective
office. This is made possible by reading Section 40(a) of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC.

While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of
the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter
provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of
an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or national
position.

Take notice that the applicability of Section 12 of the OEC to candidates running for local elective positions is not
unprecedented. In Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,37 the Court acknowledged the aforementioned provision
as one of the legal remedies that may be availed of to disqualify a candidate in a local election filed any day after the
last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, but not later than the date of proclamation. 38 The pertinent ruling in the
Jalosjos case is quoted as follows:

What is indisputably clear is that false material representation of Jalosjos is a ground for a petition under Section 78.
However, since the false material representation arises from a crime penalized by prision mayor, a petition under
Section 12 ofthe Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code can also be properly filed.
The petitioner has a choice whether to anchor his petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code, or on Section 40 of the Local Government Code. The law expressly provides multiple remedies and the
choice of which remedy to adopt belongs to petitioner.39 (Emphasis supplied.)

The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional.

Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito
Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither makes the pardon
conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public
elective office have been restored.

This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering the
unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is
not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the
enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas."40 Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because,
strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute.41 In this case, the whereas clause at
issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the
pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to
limit the scope of the pardon.

On this matter, the Court quotes with approval a relevant excerpt of COMELEC Commissioner Maria Gracia
Padaca’s separate concurring opinion in the assailed April 1, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-211
(DC), which captured the essence of the legal effect of preambular paragraphs/whereas clauses, viz:

The present dispute does not raise anything which the 20 January 2010 Resolution did not conclude upon. Here,
Petitioner Risos-Vidal raised the same argument with respect to the 3rd "whereas clause" or preambular paragraph
of the decree of pardon. It states that "Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any
elective position or office." On this contention, the undersigned reiterates the ruling of the Commission that the 3rd
preambular paragraph does not have any legal or binding effect on the absolute nature of the pardon extended by
former President Arroyo to herein Respondent. This ruling is consistent with the traditional and customary usage of
preambular paragraphs. In the case of Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, the Supreme Court ruled on the legal
effect of preambular paragraphs or whereas clauses on statutes. The Court stated, viz.:

Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes.
It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its text.

If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on Respondent’s promise never to seek a public
office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself. Since former
President Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree of pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule
that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon extended to former President
Estrada.42 (Emphasis supplied.)

Absent any contrary evidence, former President Arroyo’s silence on former President Estrada’s decision torun for
President in the May 2010 elections against, among others, the candidate of the political party of former President
Arroyo, after the latter’s receipt and acceptance of the pardon speaks volume of her intention to restore him to his
rights to suffrage and to hold public office.

Where the scope and import of the executive clemency extended by the President is in issue, the Court must turn to
the only evidence available to it, and that is the pardon itself. From a detailed review ofthe four corners of said
document, nothing therein gives an iota of intimation that the third Whereas Clause is actually a limitation, proviso,
stipulation or condition on the grant of the pardon, such that the breach of the mentioned commitment not to seek
public office will result ina revocation or cancellation of said pardon. To the Court, what it is simply is a statement of
fact or the prevailing situation at the time the executive clemency was granted. It was not used as a condition to the
efficacy orto delimit the scope of the pardon.

Even if the Court were to subscribe to the view that the third Whereas Clausewas one of the reasons to grant the
pardon, the pardon itself does not provide for the attendant consequence of the breach thereof. This Court will be
hard put to discern the resultant effect of an eventual infringement. Just like it will be hard put to determine which
civil or political rights were restored if the Court were to take the road suggested by Risos-Vidal that the statement
"[h]e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights" excludes the restoration of former President Estrada’s rights
to suffrage and to hold public office. The aforequoted text ofthe executive clemency granted does not provide the
Court with any guide asto how and where to draw the line between the included and excluded political rights.

Justice Leonen emphasizes the point that the ultimate issue for resolution is not whether the pardon is contingent on
the condition that former President Estrada will not seek janother elective public office, but it actually concerns the
coverage of the pardon – whether the pardon granted to former President Estrada was so expansive as to have
restored all his political rights, inclusive of the rights of suffrage and to hold public office. Justice Leonen is of the
view that the pardon in question is not absolute nor plenary in scope despite the statement that former President
Estrada is "hereby restored to his civil and political rights," that is, the foregoing statement restored to former
President Estrada all his civil and political rights except the rights denied to him by the unremitted penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification made up of, among others, the rights of suffrage and to hold public office. He
adds that had the President chosen to be so expansive as to include the rights of suffrage and to hold public office,
she should have been more clear on her intentions.

However, the statement "[h]e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights," to the mind of the Court, iscrystal
clear – the pardon granted to former President Estrada was absolute, meaning, it was not only unconditional, it was
unrestricted in scope, complete and plenary in character, as the term "political rights"adverted to has a settled
meaning in law and jurisprudence.

With due respect, I disagree too with Justice Leonen that the omission of the qualifying word "full" can be construed
as excluding the restoration of the rights of suffrage and to hold public office. There appears to be no distinction as
to the coverage of the term "full political rights" and the term "political rights" used alone without any qualification.
How to ascribe to the latter term the meaning that it is "partial" and not "full" defies one’s understanding. More so, it
will be extremely difficult to identify which of the political rights are restored by the pardon, when the text of the latter
is silent on this matter. Exceptions to the grant of pardon cannot be presumed from the absence of the qualifying
word "full" when the pardon restored the "political rights" of former President Estrada without any exclusion or
reservation.

Therefore, there can be no other conclusion but to say that the pardon granted to former President Estrada was
absolute in the absence of a clear, unequivocal and concrete factual basis upon which to anchor or support the
Presidential intent to grant a limited pardon.

To reiterate, insofar as its coverageis concerned, the text of the pardon can withstand close scrutiny even under the
provisions of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed Resolutions.

In light of the foregoing, contrary to the assertions of Risos-Vidal, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions.

The Court has consistently held that a petition for certiorariagainst actions of the COMELEC is confined only to
instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patentand substantial denial of due process, because the
COMELEC is presumed to be most competent in matters falling within its domain.43

As settled in jurisprudence, grave abuse of discretion is the arbitrary exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or
personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal
to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be condemned as
having been done with grave abuse of discretion, such an abuse must be patent and gross.44

The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately demonstrate any factual or legal bases to prove that the
assailed COMELEC Resolutions were issued in a "whimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise of power that amounts
to an evasion orrefusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law" or were so "patent and gross" as to constitute
grave abuse of discretion.

On the foregoing premises and conclusions, this Court finds it unnecessary to separately discuss Lim's petition-in-
intervention, which substantially presented the same arguments as Risos-Vidal's petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and petition-inintervention are DISMISSED. The Resolution dated April 1,
2013 of the Commission on Elections, Second Division, and the Resolution dated April 23, 2013 of the Commission
on Elections, En bane, both in SPA No. 13-211 (DC), are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.