Atp6 02 45
Atp6 02 45
Atp6 02 45
45
NOVEMBER 2019
ATP 6-02.45 i
Contents
Figures
Figure 2-1. Colorless core architecture .......................................................................................... 2-2
Figure B-1. Stages of a tactical regional cyber center integration program .................................. B-2
Figure C-1. Force tracking number format..................................................................................... C-1
Figure C-2. Request for forces process ......................................................................................... C-2
Tables
Table A-1. Expeditionary signal company communications equipment allocations ...................... A-1
Table A-2. Joint/Area signal company communications equipment allocations ............................ A-3
communications allocations table identifies the team and equipment types in the expeditionary signal
companies and joint/area companies, including the line item numbers and equipment amount.
Appendix B describes the five stages of the Tactical Regional Cyber Center Integration Program. This
appendix describes the use of the five stages to ensure that communications support packages remain in a
constant state of employment.
Appendix C describes the request for forces process. It discusses how a joint task force headquarters requests
communications support packages to meet the various communications requirements when conducting
operations in theater.
Appendix D discusses how communications support packages receive communications and electronics
maintenance support while providing communications support in theater. It describes how a communication
support package receives both field-level and sustainment-level maintenance when under operational control
or tactical control of a supported unit conducting theater operations.
This chapter discusses the information environment and the tactical network as part of
the operational environment. It discusses the difficulties encountered while conducting
Department of Defense information network operations in a congested and contested
spectrum. This chapter discusses the various types of cyberspace threats and threat
actors encountered while conducting Department of Defense information network
operations. It describes the tactical network and provides a brief description of the
network service center.
CONGESTED ENVIRONMENT
1-4. The competition for finite available bandwidth sometimes results in an extremely congested spectrum,
particularly when operating in developed nations. Commanders must gain and maintain control of
cyberspace. Cyberspace includes the interdependent network connectivity of cyberspace capabilities
throughout the electromagnetic spectrum and wired networks. Tactical signal support enables commanders
at the theater level to project command and control in and through cyberspace. All forces and supporting
agencies depend on cyberspace to collect, process, disseminate, and act on information throughout the
multiple domains. Throughout cyberspace, joint forces contend with civil agencies, commercial entities,
allied forces, enemies, and adversaries for the use of a common electromagnetic spectrum resource.
1-5. Insufficient resources caused by spectrum congestion may result in degraded capabilities in the
information systems of U.S. forces and allies. Lack of coverage in the electromagnetic spectrum because of
inadequate communications satellite capacity is an example of a degraded capability due to insufficient
resources. As cyberspace use increases, information transported in and through cyberspace becomes more
congested, requiring the commander to make decisions on the prioritization or shaping of traffic flows for
mission critical data.
Note. As the Army transitions from its current operational concept (unified land operations) to
multi-domain operations (MDO), we can expect that new network requirements will continue to
drive change to both communications systems and organization structure. The implications that
MDO will result in increased congestion throughout cyberspace is highly conceivable.
CONTESTED ENVIRONMENT
1-6. Enemies and adversaries may deliberately attempt to deny the Army and its ally’s use of cyberspace
across multiple domains. Because of heavy joint reliance on advanced communications systems, such an
attack may be a central element of any enemy or adversary anti-access and area denial strategy, requiring a
higher degree of protection for friendly command and control (C2) systems and planning for operations in a
denied or degraded environment.
1-7. Enemies and adversaries have demonstrated an increased technological capability that has become a
continuous threat to U.S. dominance throughout cyberspace. U.S. military communications and information
networks have become high-value targets of an enemy or adversary trying to deny or manipulate
communications, a key enabler to U.S. military operations.
1-8. Technologically sophisticated enemies and adversaries understand the extent of U.S. forces’ reliance
on cyberspace capabilities. These peer and near-peer enemies and adversaries have demonstrated the ability
to cause an immediate threat. We should expect continued contests throughout the information environment
by enemies and adversaries in an attempt to deny or manipulate operations and diminish the effectiveness of
U.S. and allied forces.
1-9. Successfully integrating communications support with cyberspace, electronic warfare, and intelligence
operations are crucial to obtaining and maintaining freedom of action in the electromagnetic spectrum. These
integrated capabilities provide the ability to deny or manipulate enemy and adversary abilities to conduct
successful operations. Synchronizing these integrated capabilities across multiple domains and warfighting
functions maximize their effects in and through cyberspace.
THREATS
1-10. A threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm
U.S. forces, U.S. national interests, or the homeland (ADP 3-0). Various actors in any area of operations
(AO) qualify as either an enemy, an adversary, an insider, a neutral, or a friend. The Army categorizes an
adversary, enemy, and insider threat as types of threat actors. An adversary is a party acknowledged as
potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged (JP 3-0). An enemy
is a party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized (ADP 3-0). An insider threat is a
person with placement and access who intentionally causes loss or degradation of resources or capabilities
or compromises the ability of an organization to accomplish its mission through espionage, providing support
to international terrorism, or the unauthorized release or disclosure of information about the plans and
intentions of U.S. military forces (AR 381-12). Insider threats may include unintentional or accidental threats
that impact operations. Insider threats may include shooters, bombers, spies, and other threats embedded
within or working with U.S. forces. Insider threats present unique challenges because they are trusted
individuals with authorized access to Army capabilities and sensitive operational information.
1-11. In large-scale combat operations, a peer threat poses the most concern. Communications support
packages are designed to provide signal support for Army forces implementing the Army strategic roles in
defeating peer threats during large-scale combat operations (see FM 3-0 for more information on the Army
strategic roles). A peer threat is an adversary or enemy with capabilities and capacity to oppose U.S. forces
across multiple domains worldwide or in a specific region where they enjoy a position of relative advantage
(ADP 3-0). Peer threats possess roughly equal combat power in geographical proximity to a conflict area
with U.S. forces.
UPPER TIER
1-13. The upper tier consists of commercial off-the-shelf, WIN-T at-the-halt, and WIN-T on-the-move
resources that allow tactical network connectivity. Communications transport is attained using frequency
division multiple access satellite transmission, time division multiple access (TDMA) satellite transmission
tropospheric scatter (TROPO) transmission, and line-of-sight transmission as means of network transport.
The upper tier connects the lower tier to the Department of Defense information network (DODIN).
1-14. An expeditionary signal battalion (ESB), assigned to a theater tactical signal brigade (TTSB), provides
WIN-T at-the-halt resources to units and organizations in a theater that do not have organic communications
assets or require communications augmentation. ESBs can support small to large command posts.
1-15. The expeditionary signal battalion-enhanced (ESB-E), assigned to a TTSB, provides the same at-the-
halt capabilities as an ESB using commercial off-the-shelf modular communications resources. Like an ESB,
the ESB-E can support medium and large command posts but is scalable to support a smaller command post
than an ESB. The ESB-E provides rapid enroute and force entry capabilities for a joint task force (JTF)
headquarters, a joint force land component commander (JFLCC), and a global response force conducting
joint operations.
1-16. A brigade combat team primarily employs WIN-T on-the-move assets with limited WIN-T at-the-halt
capabilities. A brigade combat team uses combat net radio gateways that provide a bridge between the upper
and lower tiers. WIN-T on-the-move communications assets support small-to-medium sized command posts
using TDMA satellite transmission, and high band networking waveform line-of-sight transmission as a
means of communications transport.
Note. For more information on brigade combat teams (BCT) and WIN-T on-the-move
communications, refer to ATP 6-02.60.
LOWER TIER
1-17. The lower tier consists primarily of single channel tactical satellite systems, and single channel radio
systems in support of tactical formations down to team leaders. The WIN-T combat net radio gateway
provides a bridge to connect the tactical radio network to the WIN-T network, thus establishing the tactical
network.
Note. WIN-T at-the-halt continues to be a key component when the integrated tactical network
(ITN) architecture replaces the current DODIN-A tactical network. WIN-T is interoperable with
communications systems currently in development for the integrated tactical network architecture,
including the modular communications systems and enroute communications systems used by the
global response force, security force assistance brigades, and the expeditionary signal battalion-
enhanced (ESB-E).
centers. Network service centers extend DODIN access, connecting Army users to DISA services and
applications. A network service center consists of three critical components:
Regional cyber center—enterprise manager that provides network oversight, security of the
DODIN-A, DODIN operations capability, and services to support the Army.
Regional hub node (RHN)—provides Defense Information Systems Network services (data,
voice, and video teleconferencing), extends connectivity between WIN-T and the DODIN, and
provides reachback for units conducting operations in the tactical network.
Data center—provides enterprise information technology services, application hosting, and
backup for C2, intelligence, and business systems. Services include SECRET Internet Protocol
Router Network (SIPRNET), Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET), and
mission partner environment within all theaters.
Connectivity to the tactical network uses the colorless core 3 architecture. WIN-T at-
the-halt provides connectivity to the tactical network and provides tactical users with
access to such DISA services as SIPRNET, NIPRNET, secure and non-secure Voice
over Internet Protocol digital phones, secure and non-secure analog phones, Defense
Red Switched Network phones, DODIN operations capabilities, and battlefield video
teleconferencing services to tactical users at-the-halt.
2-8. The SIPRNET and NIPRNET local area network data undergo separate user data encryption before
passing through the INE for link encryption at the local area network side of the wide-area network router.
Only the encrypted colorless core data passes through the wide-area network (see figure 2-1).
network operations and security center (NOSC) do not perform DODIN operations for the sensitive
compartmented information networks.
2-10. The division, brigade, and battalion G-6/S-6 perform DODIN operations to establish a tactical network
that allows the ability to share top secret and sensitive compartmented information. The G-6/S-6 receives
assistance from the intelligence staff using policy guidance from the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence.
REACHBACK COMMUNICATIONS
2-12. Reachback is the process of obtaining products, services, and applications, or forces, or equipment, or
material from organizations that are not forward deployed (JP 3-30). WIN-T at-the-halt connects to the
DODIN-A using the RHN. The RHN provides reachback to home station, and access to DISA services.
2-13. RHNs and Department of Defense (DOD) gateways connect through the global agile integrated
transport (GAIT). With GAIT architecture, data remains on the tactical network between RHNs, or from the
home station to a DOD Gateway site for extension to deployed elements. GAIT architecture reduces the need
for multi-hop satellite transmission paths. GAIT eliminates the need to push data from an RHN over a satellite
back to the home station. The new architecture simplifies the network and supports planning, operations,
management, and troubleshooting.
LINE-OF-SIGHT TRANSMISSION
2-16. After establishing the tactical network in theater, major WIN-T nodes create a high bandwidth line-of-
sight backbone between the large and small nodes throughout the local area network. Distance, terrain, and
man-made obstructions are limiting factors when employing line-of-sight transmission systems at-the-halt.
2-17. Line-of-sight terminals provide primary network transport between the large and small nodes
throughout a local area network. Line-of-sight systems provide much greater bandwidth and lower operating
costs than the satellite systems but are limited by the maximum distance for which they can transmit. Line-
of-sight systems can transmit in satellite denied environments.
to small tactical terminals. A network centric waveform modem supports a mobile, distributed network by
design.
2-27. A network centric waveform satellite network depends on accurate master network timing from one
network centric waveform modem acting as a network controller. For all terminals in the network to share
the allotted satellite bandwidth, the network controller—
Transmits timing information to each satellite terminal on the network.
Controls network signaling and communications traffic between satellite terminals on the network.
Manages, controls, and allocates satellite bandwidth and time assigned in the satellite access
authorization for all network signaling and communications traffic.
2-28. Although the network centric waveform modem at the RHN is usually the network controller, the
number of satellite terminals it can effectively manage is limited. For better management and redundancy,
the network controller can designate a large to medium satellite terminal on the network as a backup. A
network member configured as a backup network controller can assume control if the designated network
controller fails. The network controller and backup controller monitor their control transmissions on the
satellite downlink.
Note. The ESB-E consists of non-WIN-T systems, employing modular communications systems
that provide supported units with the same WIN-T capabilities, however, with a significant
reduction in size, weight, and power. Both the ESB-E’s modular communications systems and
WIN-T are components of integrated tactical network architecture when it replaces the current
DODIN-A tactical network.
and coalition interoperability using organic coalition communications equipment, while providing
communications officers increased functionality to engineer the unit’s portion of the tactical network and
overseeing DODIN operations. The SSS uses HCLOS systems as their primary transmission means to
connect to line-of-sight systems, to connect to its associated CPNs. The SSS can be employed as a
contingency hub node for a local area network, using the Phoenix terminal to attain X band satellite
connectivity to a DOD gateway for DODIN-A and DISA services access.
a frequency division multiple access transmission link with an RHN or tactical hub node, attaining DODIN-
A connectivity and accessing DISA services. This frequency division multiple access path, along with an
RHN or tactical hub node in conjunction with the network centric waveform path with the CPNs, allows the
JNN or SSS the ability to forward DODIN-A connectivity and access to DISA services to tactical users
throughout its local area network. Time division multiple access waveforms with the STT V(1) allows on-
the-move WIN-T and other legacy and coalition satellite systems to attain access to the tactical network
through the JNN or SSS.
Note. In addition to the STT, the SMART-T and Phoenix systems are additional satellite systems
used throughout the tactical network. TROPO systems are another beyond-line-of-sight tactical
communications transmission alternative using the troposphere. The Phoenix satellite terminals
provide more capabilities and higher data rate transmission capability in comparison to the STT.
Both the SMART-T and TROPO systems provide higher data rates and can operate in satellite
denied environments (see Chapter 2 for additional information).
HIGH-CAPACITY LINE-OF-SIGHT
2-41. After establishing the tactical network in theater, major WIN-T nodes create a high bandwidth line-of-
sight backbone using and HCLOS systems. Distance, terrain, and man-made obstructions are limiting factors
when employing line-of-sight transmission systems at-the-halt.
2-42. The HCLOS terminal provides alternate network transport for the JNN and CPNs. The HCLOS radio
is a terrestrial microwave radio system capable of up to 16 megabits per second data throughput, depending
on the radio band selected. Its maximum range is 40 kilometers, depending on the terrain. There are two types
of HCLOS systems. The HCLOS V(3) is collocated with the JNN, while the HCLOS V(2) is with a CPN.
The HCLOS terminal provides much greater bandwidth and lower operating costs than the STT but is limited
to terrestrial line-of-sight.
Note. The terrestrial transmission line-of-sight (TRILOS), though not a WIN-T asset, is a more
robust means of line-of-sight transport for WIN-T, further discussed throughout Chapter 2.
TRILOS comes in a significantly reduced size, weight, and power (SWaP) in comparison to the
HCLOS, while providing increased bandwidth, range, and with lower latency than satellite
communications.
Note. RHNs have X band capability to support transportable tactical command communications
(T2C2) and Phoenix systems.
2-45. RHNs are globally distributed and collocated with selected DOD gateways. They operate in a sanctuary
or outside the combat zone. RHNs’ strategic positioning provides global coverage to give Soldiers immediate
access to DISA services. Some theater missions may operate in austere environments where communications
infrastructure often does not exist. RHNs allow forces to establish DODIN-A connectivity and reachback
capabilities quickly, without having to develop network access solutions.
2-46. An RHN permanently connects to a tier 1 network. It extends access to DISA services and provides
alternate transport of the top secret and sensitive compartmented information networks from the Trojan
Network Control Center to tactical users equipped with MCN-AE or TROJAN Special Purpose Intelligence
Remote Integrated Terminal. The RHN transports the data top secret and sensitive compartmented
information networks; it does not encrypt or decrypt this data. RHNs provide enclave boundary protection
between the tier 1 and tier 2 network, as well as between SIPRNET and NIPRNET. The RHN has frequency
division multiple access modems, TDMA modems, network centric waveform modems, colorless core
routers, and type-1 encryption devices. The RHN’s frequency division multiple access, TDMA, and network
centric waveform modems and colorless core routers support WIN-T at-the-halt satellite communications
links.
Note. Both United States Army units and deployed Marine Corps use RHNs when conducting
operations.
This chapter discusses the roles and responsibilities of a theater tactical signal brigade
and the capabilities of its subordinate units. Tactical signal battalions deploy to install,
operate, and maintain commercial off-the-shelf and WIN-T at the halt communications
systems for theater communications support. The tactical installation and networking-
enhanced company deploys personnel to install, repair, and maintain cable networks
and power distribution systems in tactical environments and strategic facilities.
OVERVIEW
3-2. A TTSB and its subordinate units provide communications support to meet theater and joint
requirements for theater operations. A TTSB provides communications support packages according to the
supported unit’s mission variables and communications and network specifications identified during the
request for forces (RFF) process. A TTSB is structured so that the commander can task organize to design
staff, sustainment, and communications support packages to meet a unique task or mission. A TTSB consists
of—
A headquarters and headquarters company.
Up to four tactical signal battalions composed of ESBs, ESB-Es, or both.
A tactical installation and networking-enhanced (TIN-E) company.
3-3. A TTSB provides communications support using its tactical signal battalions (ESB or ESB-E), TIN-E
company. A TTSB’s headquarters assists its assigned and attached subordinate units with the following
support—
Communications oversight.
Personnel support.
Administrative support.
Logistical support.
Information protection of the TTSB’s portion of the tactical network.
Training management.
Operational planning.
DODIN operations.
3-4. Active Army TTSBs are assigned to U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), except for 1st TTSB
(see note). TTSBs and their subordinate units are mission forces and part of FORSCOM’s available force
pool (see AR 525-93). When FORSCOM receives a request for communications support from the Joint
Chiefs of Staff through the RFF process (see Appendix C), FORSCOM forwards orders to one of its TTSBs
to provide communications support packages for a geographic combatant commander (GCC), a joint force
commander, a JFLCC, or a corps or division conducting theater operations. TTSBs may be under operational
control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) to a—
Note. The 1st TTSB is currently the only theater organic TTSB assigned to U.S. Army Network
Enterprise Technology Command. The 1st TTSB provides communications support to United
States Forces Korea and 8th Army in the Korean theater of operations. The 1st TTSB is not part
of FORSCOM’s available force pool.
Note. The 35th TTSB and 11th TTSB are the only two TTSBs under OPCON to corps. The 35th
TTSB is under OPCON to XVIII Airborne Corps. The 11th TTSB is under OPCON to 3rd Corps.
Note. National Guard and U.S. Reserve TTSBs and subordinate ESBs are assigned to their states.
They are OPCON to FORSCOM once mobilized.
OPERATIONS STAFF
3-6. The S-3 consists of a signal plans branch, a signal engineering branch, a signal control branch, and a
command, control, and communications branch. The S-3 is responsible for—
Developing and publishing OPORDs and OPLANs to subordinate units.
Coordinating with other staff for administrative, logistical, and maintenance support.
Providing mission command for all subordinate assigned and attached units.
Conducting spectrum management operations and cyberspace security within the TTSB’s AO (see
ATP 6-02.70 for spectrum management operations).
Overseeing the integration of the brigade’s communications systems into a theater tactical
network, while identifying and resolving compatibility issues with established communications
systems that are already in theater.
In conjunction with the S-2, developing the cyberspace common operational picture of the
supported theater tactical network for the commander and subordinate units.
If required, establishing a tactical NOSC for conducting DODIN operations for the TTSB’s
portion of the tactical network.
Directing and managing the TTSB’s portion of the tactical network to ensure network and
information systems availability and delivery.
Conducting continuous network optimization for the theater tactical network in response to
continually changing network configurations and unit movement.
Establishing and maintaining the required databases necessary to assist in near real-time control
of TTSB’s communications systems.
Providing cybersecurity guidelines to subordinate units for patches, updates, and scans.
Employing a contingency hub to support subordinate or attached units.
PLANNING
3-8. Conducting planning activities allows the brigade commander and staff the ability to develop an in-
depth understanding of the mission in conjunction with the operational and mission variables as described by
the OPORD or OPLAN received from higher headquarters. Effective planning helps leaders understand the
land domain throughout the theater AO that communications assets provide theater communications support.
Leaders attain an understanding of the information environment within the theater AO to identify cyberspace
challenges throughout the operational environment.
3-9. Leaders can then develop solutions to solve or manage those problems by designing a communications
support package with continuous and reliable capabilities that meet the requesting unit’s communications
requirements. A communications support package could be one small network team providing
communications support to a small command post for a contingency mission, up to an entire TTSB, including
all assigned communications equipment and personnel, for a large-scale combat operation.
3-10. Understanding the mission and developing solutions to mitigate problems enhances the brigade
commander’s and staff’s ability to task-organize the TTSB while establishing support priorities to ensure the
communications support package has the necessary resources to accomplish the theater communications
support mission. When task organizing, the brigade commander and the S-3 designates which tactical
battalion is to provide the communications support package.
3-11. The battalion commander of the designated tactical battalion and staff design the communications
support package with equipment and personnel necessary to meet the supported unit’s unique theater mission.
Designing a communications support package may require allocating communications assets from other
tactical battalions within the TTSB to the communications support package to ensure mission readiness.
3-12. The TTSB establishes command and support relationships with the supported unit in the theater to
define command responsibility and authority. Typically, the deploying communications support package is
under TACON of the supported unit once in theater; however, the establishment of a command relationship
specifies the chain of command and ensures unity of effort, enabling the commander of the supported unit
the flexibility to maximize the use of the communications support package to accomplish the mission. This
flexibility may require the requesting unit to have full OPCON of the communications support package. The
establishment of the support relationship specifies how the communications support package receives
sustainment and protection while in the theater. If a single communications support package is deploying,
the brigade commander focuses priority of support on that single communications support package; however,
if more than one communications support package is deploying, the brigade commander shifts priorities
according to the relativeness of importance. The brigade commander directs, coordinates, and synchronizes
all aspects of planning through orders and plans developed using the military decision-making process.
PREPARING
3-13. The company commander of the communications support package conducts troop-leading
procedures as preparation measures for mission readiness of Soldiers and equipment. Incorporating
preparation measures ensures the unit is proficient at executing the upcoming theater communications
support mission. The Tactical Regional Cyber Center Integration Program (TRIP) plays a vital role in
preparing the communications support package’s for deployment (see Appendix B) and consists of five
stages—
Preparation.
Installation as a Docking Station (IaaDS)
Home station training.
Combat training center.
Deployment.
3-14. Preparation measures improve the chances of success. These measures include back briefs, rehearsals,
and inspections.
Note. Army National Guard and Army Reserve TTSBs and associated ESBs do not use TRIP for
operational readiness and deployment preparation. See AR 140-145 for information regarding
preparing the Army National Guard and Army Reserve units for mobilization.
BACK BRIEFS
3-15. Using back briefs, the company commander can update the battalion commander and staff with
training, maintenance, and logistical statuses of the communications support package, while requesting
support and resources as needed. Back briefs allow the opportunity for the battalion commander and staff to
provide mission updates to the company commander while maintaining a shared understanding of the
situation and requirements.
REHEARSALS
3-16. The brigade commander, subordinate commanders, and staff members ensure the deploying
communications support package conducts rehearsals using IaaDS, home station training, and combat
training centers during preparation. Rehearsals should simulate the operational environment that the
communications support package may encounter when providing theater communications support, as best
understood from higher headquarters’ OPORD or OPLAN. Rehearsals include engineering the
communications support package’s portion of the tactical network, as described in the higher headquarters
OPORD or OPLAN. During rehearsals, the communications support package reacts to various scenarios
consistent with communications-related challenges that may occur during the theater mission. Rehearsals
facilitate the communications support package, staff, and Soldiers with gaining a better understanding of
their roles in the upcoming communications mission, training on complicated tasks, and ensuring
communications equipment is functioning properly.
3-17. The company commander and subordinate leaders conduct inspections to identify and resolve
problems as quickly as possible. In addition to rehearsals, inspections further enable the commander to
identify personnel, maintenance, and logistical issues that must be resolved before deployment execution.
OVERVIEW
3-20. An ESB provides upper tier communications support for theater operations to establish the tactical
network. An ESB contains all switching personnel, transmission systems, network management systems, and
C2 systems necessary to create a complete communications node. An ESB’s design simplifies the overall
control of communications assets. As a scalable element, it eliminates the need to task organize from multiple
organizations to form a single communications support package, thereby enhancing unit cohesion and
deployment planning. Each ESB allows reachback to the home station while providing interconnectivity
between intra-theater nodes using network service centers.
3-21. An ESB may be under OPCON or TACON to a division or higher when conducting theater operations.
An ESB can operate as part of a separate communications support package supporting specific missions such
as homeland defense. ESBs deploy to provide communications support to units and organizations that do not
have organic communications assets or require additional augmentation to meet mission requirements. Units
and organizations that do not have organic communications assets and require communications support from
an ESB include—
Theater army main or contingency command posts.
JTF headquarters.
JFLCC.
A forward-deployed signal command (theater) [SC(T)].
A security force assistance brigade (SFAB).
A functional support brigade or group.
Some multifunctional support brigades: military intelligence brigade and some maneuver
enhancement brigades.
3-22. Units and organizations that have organic communications assets, but may require an ESB to provide
additional communications support for augmentation include—
Corps headquarters.
Division headquarters.
Global response forces.
Brigade combat team (BCT).
Some multifunctional support brigades: combat aviation brigades, most maneuver enhancement
brigades, field artillery brigades, and sustainment brigades.
3-23. An ESB can support up to 30 command posts—two large command posts, four medium command
posts, and 24 small command posts—simultaneously. An ESB consists of—
A headquarters and headquarters company.
Two expeditionary signal companies.
A joint/area signal company.
Note. See Appendix A for an ESB’s communications equipment allocation tables. Modifications
to the ESB’s current table of organization and equipment (TOE) will be necessary to meet future
MDO communications requirements.
3-25. When deployed, an ESB is under OPCON or TACON to the supported unit unless a different command
relationship has been determined to allow more flexibility. Expeditionary signal companies and the joint/area
signal company both provide personnel and communications assets necessary to establish DODIN
connectivity for supported units that require DISA services. The expeditionary signal companies provide
communications support for small to medium command posts located at battalions and brigades. The
joint/area signal company provides more substantial switch data capabilities, and more robust transmission
capabilities to support base clusters and large command posts, with limited communications support for small
command posts.
3-26. The headquarters staff sections support the commander with executing the battalion’s communications
support mission. The headquarters staff sections are responsible for—
Attaining an understanding of the situation and mission, developing courses of action, and
producing an OPORD or OPLAN for subordinate companies using the military decision-making
process.
Planning and installation oversight during the engineering of an ESB’s portion of the tactical
network, establishing DODIN-A connectivity.
Conducting DODIN operations within an ESB’s AO.
Providing administrative support to assigned or attached subordinate units.
Providing logistical support to assigned or attached subordinate units.
Planning and oversight of force protection within an ESB’s AO.
Oversight and support for field-level maintenance of organic and attached units’ wheeled vehicles,
power generation equipment, communications and electronics (C&E) equipment, and weapons.
3-27. The headquarters company provides personnel to perform the duties in the headquarters staff sections.
The headquarters company provides food services in a field environment. An ESB headquarters and each
signal company contains an operations section scalable and capable of providing support as tactical NOSC
for supported units or providing augmentation to established signal organizations based on mission variables.
This role expands when providing tactical network connectivity to multiple collocated units without organic
communications capabilities or for units that require augmentation due to geographical separation.
3-28. An ESB’s scalability affords network planners at the supported unit’s G-6/S-6 flexibility while
configuring the tactical network by providing communications resources that meet the supported unit’s
requirements without underusing resources. An ESB and its signal companies, platoons, and teams are
tailorable, and task organized so that only the capabilities needed to satisfy a specific mission deploys.
3-29. An ESB and its subordinate units can provide communications support to units anywhere in a theater
AO. Communications support missions may require a full battalion, a company, or a platoon; however,
missions may require the deployment of individual teams to support separate units in widely dispersed
locations at every echelon of an operation. Mission orders flow down from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the
Army G-3/5/7 in coordination with the Army chief information officer G-6 through FORSCOM and arrive
at the ESB through the TTSB headquarters (see Appendix C).
Note. Three ESBs are theater committed assets and not part of FORSCOM’s available force pool.
The 44th ESB belongs to 2nd Theater Strategic Signal Brigade; the 307th ESB belongs to 516th
Theater Strategic Signal Brigade, and the 304th ESB belongs to 160th TTSB. These ESBs provide
tactical communications support within their assigned theater’s area of responsibility only.
Mission orders flow down from the GCC, through the theater army headquarters, to the signal
command (theater), and arrives at the ESB through the assigned theater strategic signal brigade or
TTSB.
3-30. While primarily an echelon above corps asset, an ESB can support corps, division, brigade combat
team, or multinational headquarters based on mission variables. ESBs assigned to a TTSB can be OPCON
or TACON to higher-level organizations or operate as part of a separate network package supporting specific
missions such as a global response force or homeland defense.
3-31. C&E maintenance support for an ESB resides at the company and battalion level. Companies, platoons,
sections, and teams that deploy separately receive C&E maintenance support from the supported unit (see
Appendix D).
Assisting the supported unit’s G-6 and the TTSB’s S-3 with conducting a signal site analysis with
a focus on mobility, survivability, and sustainability.
Understanding the operating characteristics, limitations, and the planning distance for each
communications asset assigned to the ESB.
Note. Only two expeditionary signal companies in an ESB can integrate into a coalition network
using the commercial coalition equipment.
Note. Modification to the expeditionary signal company’s current TOE is probable to meet future
MDO communications requirements.
COMPANY HEADQUARTERS
3-36. The company headquarters consist of personnel responsible for coordination and oversight of company
DODIN operations while providing administrative, logistical, and field-level maintenance support to its
signal platoons. Upon receiving OPORDs and OPLANs from the battalion, the company commander directs,
coordinates, and synchronizes all aspects of training by issuing company WARNORDs and OPORDs. Troop
leading procedures include rehearsals that allow the company commander and operations cell the ability to
analyze, plan, and prepare the communications support package for mission readiness. The company
commander organizes tasks to ensure the communications support package has the capabilities and resources
necessary to accomplish the assigned theater communications support mission.
3-37. When the company deploys as a single communications support package, the company headquarters
can conduct organic maintenance operations but may require additional sustainment support from the
supported unit. Commanders at all levels identify necessary sustainment requirements during the operations
process.
3-39. The platoon installs, operates, and maintains communications systems to support small to medium
command posts. The platoon can dispatch individual teams to support separate missions or combine with
other teams, platoons, or companies to meet mission requirements at any echelon.
3-43. The JNN uses satellite communications and HCLOS systems as its means of network transport.
Satellite transport is accomplished using its STT V(1) that is part of the JNN’s inventory. The satellite
transmission link between the JNN and the RHN is the backbone connection. The backbone connection is
the frequency division multiple access links that allows connectivity to the DODIN-A and access to DISA
services for the JNN and all associated CPNs in the local area network. When a CPN is in austere
environments or at a distance beyond the limits of the HCLOS, employment of the STT is necessary to
establish connectivity between the JNN and CPN. The STT V(1) uses frequency division multiple access,
TDMA, and network centric waveform, either individually or simultaneously. Use of the frequency division
multiple access waveforms is for the backbone; network centric waveforms are for linking to the CPNs, and
TDMA is used for communications systems that may be in the network incapable of transmitting or receiving
data using frequency division multiple access and network centric waveforms.
3-44. The line-of-sight V(3) teams provide HCLOS, the primary transport means for connectivity between
the JNN system and its associated CPNs (see the line-of-sight V3 team section for the HCLOS V(3)
capabilities).
establish a transport link radio link to the HCLOS V(3) collocated with an SSS. The HCLOS V(3) is capable
of handling three separate line-of-sight transmissions that are multiplexed and forwarded to the JNN over
one media source—employing the HCLOS V(3) to handle short communications transport results in less use
of satellite bandwidth while allowing dynamic routing.
Note. ESBs assigned to the 35th TTSB has replaced all HCLOS systems with TRILOS systems.
The TRILOS V(1) has replaced the HCLOS V(3) and the TRILOS V(2) has replaced the HCLOS
V(1). See paragraph 3-91 for information on the TRILOS systems.
Note. ESBs assigned to the 35th TTSB has replaced all HCLOS systems with TRILOS systems.
The TRILOS V(1) has replaced the HCLOS V(3) and the TRILOS V(2) has replaced the HCLOS
V(1). See paragraph 3-91 for information on the TRILOS systems.
Cable Section
3-52. The cable section is responsible for engineering cable runs of all fiber optic and coaxial cables used
for network cabling of the JNNs, CPNs, STTs, and the Phoenix. Personnel from the cable section deploy to
locations to engineer aerial cable runs, buried cable runs, and cable runs through manholes and hand-holes.
Cable sections create, install, and repair category 5 cable runs in DODIN operations cells and CPs for VoIP
phones, computers, peripherals, and video teleconferencing.
Note. Modification to the joint/area signal company’s current TOE will be necessary to meet future
MDO communications requirements.
COMPANY HEADQUARTERS
3-55. The company headquarters consists of personnel responsible for coordination and oversight of
company DODIN operations while providing administrative, logistical, and field-level maintenance support
to assigned signal platoons. Upon receiving OPORDs and OPLANs from the battalion, the company
commander directs, coordinates, and synchronizes all aspects of training by issuing company warning orders
and OPORDs. Troop leading procedures include rehearsals that allow the company commander and
operations cell the ability to analyze, plan, and prepare the communications support package for mission
readiness. The company commander may be required to task organize within the company to ensure the
communications support package has the capabilities and resources necessary to accomplish the theater
communications support mission.
3-56. When the company deploys as a complete communications support package, the company
headquarters can conduct internal maintenance operations, requiring additional logistical support from higher
as required. Commanders identify internal sustainment operations requirements during the operations
process.
as plan and engineer the local area network. A SSS deploys to establish a network communications node for
a large command post or command post cluster.
3-59. The SSS capabilities include—
Rapid deployment ability with a small footprint.
First in capability and a building block for network expansion.
S-6 communications functionality in a single shelter, not offered in a JNN.
Joint and coalition communications interoperability.
SIPRNET and NIPRNET voice, data, video teleconferencing, and private branch exchange
capability.
Ability to interface to a legacy line-of-sight, HCLOS, and TROPO systems, SMART-T, legacy
satellite systems, and commercial satellite communications.
Provision to interface with standardized tactical entry point or teleport, access to defense switch
network, joint worldwide intelligence communications system, and combined enterprise regional
information exchange system.
Enclave boundary protection.
3-60. The large network team uses its assigned Phoenix or SMART-T satellite systems for connectivity to
the DODIN-A and to provide users with access to DISA services. Determination on which satellite system
to employ depends on mission requirements.
Note. ESBs assigned to the 35th TTSB has replaced all HCLOS systems with TRILOS systems.
The TRILOS V(1) has replaced the HCLOS V(3) and the TRILOS V(2) has replaced the HCLOS
V(1). See paragraph 3-91 for information on the TRILOS systems.
to handle short-range communications results in less usage of satellite bandwidth while allowing dynamic
routing.
Note. ESBs assigned to the 35th TTSB has replaced all HCLOS systems with TRILOS systems.
The TRILOS V(1) has replaced the HCLOS V(3) and the TRILOS V(2) has replaced the HCLOS
V(1). See paragraph 3-91 for information on the TRILOS systems.
Cable Section
3-71. The cable section is responsible for engineering cable runs of all fiber optic and coaxial cables used
for network cabling of the SSS, CPNs, STTs, and the Phoenix. Personnel from the cable section employ to
locations throughout the AO to engineer aerial cable runs, buried cable runs, and cable runs through manholes
and hand-holes. Cable sections create and install category 5 cable runs in DODIN operations cells and CPs
for VoIP phones, computers, peripherals, and video teleconferences.
OVERVIEW
3-73. The ESB-E provides rapidly deployable, enroute, and forcible entry communications support to
FORSCOM units and the Army’s global response force. The ESB-E is an enabler for C2 and mission
command, allowing DODIN communications across air, land, and cyberspace domains. The ESB-E is a
modular, expeditionary battalion that provides commanders, across all echelons, a full range of DISA services
through a scalable, integrated internet protocol network architecture in a SWaP package. It provides DODIN-
A connectivity, allowing the capability to conduct C2 and mission command from a remotely located
company command post up to a JTF headquarters using scalable communications support teams.
3-74. An ESB-E has much more flexibility than an ESB because of its force structure consisting of four
Soldier teams that can—be scaled to support a small command post of ten users or less with one team, by
merging to support a large command post by combining four teams.
3-75. The ESB-E consists of—
A battalion headquarters and headquarters company.
Three identical expeditionary signal companies-enhanced.
3-76. The ESB-E structure provides scalable communications assets that enhance ESB capabilities by having
a force structure that can support smaller units such as a maneuver company command post. The ESB-E can
execute missions across the range of military operations and supports the joint fight and the expeditionary
Army.
Note. The 50th ESB-E additionally has one en route communications company. See section IV of
this publication for more information.
Note. Modification to the ESB-E’s current TOE will be necessary to meet future MDO
communications requirements.
Can provide communication support to six large command posts that can support up to 350 users.
Communications support provided by combining two medium modular communications systems
and either a 2.4-meter baseband kit, SMART-T, or Phoenix-E for satellite transport.
3-79. The amount of network support teams available for communications missions is contingent on the size
of command posts that require communications support at a given time. For example, if an ESB-E is
supporting 48 command posts simultaneously, it is not capable of providing support for additional small or
large command posts. However, if an ESB-E provides support two small command posts (requires personnel
from one of the network support teams) and one large command posts (requires personnel and medium
modular communications systems from two network support teams) simultaneously, only 45 network support
teams will remain for follow-on missions.
Performs reset operations for communications support packages that return from deployment.
COMPANY HEADQUARTERS
3-85. The company headquarters conducts mission command and provides administrative, logistics, and
limited maintenance support to the network support platoons. The headquarters oversees training,
administration, and logistics functions; and supervises subordinate platoon leaders. The company
headquarters does not have organic food service, fuel handling, or health service functions.
3-90. Each network support team provides line-of-sight capability using a terrestrial TRILOS. TRILOS
provides a substantial increase in bandwidth in comparison to the HCLOS radio system, with a significant
reduction in size, weight, and power. TRILOS allows the ability to transport up to three line-of-sight
transmissions from one antenna. The TRILOS (V)1 can transport up to six line-of-sight transmissions from
two antennas attached to one antenna base. The TRILOS (V)2 can transport up to three line-of-sight
transmissions from one antenna. The TRILOS can operate in a satellite denied environment. The TRILOS
can transmit and receive three separate lines of sight transmissions with one antenna mast. The TRILOS
allows line-of-sight transmissions between communications nodes throughout the theater AO. The TRILOS
small form factor provides a significant reduction in size, weight, and power compared to the HCLOS radio.
Employing the TRILOS results in using less satellite bandwidth while allowing dynamic routing.
3-91. Each network support section has modular coalition enclaves to provide communications integration
with unified action partners during multinational missions. Modular communications systems can support
MCN-AE or TROJAN Special Purpose Intelligence Remote Integrated Terminal belonging to intelligence
users for sharing intelligence information and data throughout the AO, using the tactical network.
Note. The 50th ESB-E is the only ESB-E assigned an en route communications company.
OVERVIEW
3-93. An ESB-E provides en route and early entry communications, allowing DISA services through all five
phases of joint operations. En route communications enable C2 while in flight. En route communications
allow aircraft-to-aircraft and aircraft-to-ground communications. Upon initial ground entry, an early entry
team remains in place until the supported unit’s organic communications support arrives. If the supported
unit does not have organic communication assets, or network requirements exceeds the early entry team’s
capabilities, additional ESB-E teams can deploy to augment the early entry team to meet network
requirements.
3-94. The en route communications company provides global response force units with critical in-flight C2
and mission command, plane-to-plane, and plane-to-ground network communications and situational
awareness on board while en route to a mission objective.
3-95. The en route communications company supports up to twenty-nine early entry packages. The en route
communications company provides network communications capabilities for small command posts
consisting of 4 to 12 end users. The en route communications company consists of a company headquarters,
two en route signal support platoons, and one CASPAN platoon.
COMPANY HEADQUARTERS
3-97. The company headquarters provides personnel and facilities for mission command and support of the
company mission. The company commander and first sergeant direct company operations; oversee company
training, administration, and logistics functions; and supervise subordinate platoon leaders. Support functions
include supply and limited light weapons maintenance. The company headquarters does not have organic
food service, fuel handling, or health service support capabilities.
Note. The DAN requires connectivity with a KEN for air-to-air and air-to-ground communications
capability. The DAN must be within 80km of a KEN. A KEN can handle up to three DANs.
OVERVIEW
3-101. The TIN-E company engineers and installs large network infrastructure and rapidly installs and
restores components of the Defense Communications System within an Army’s AO, to include the defense
switched network and the defense data network. Engineering conducted by the TIN-E company identifies the
necessary work requirements, specific core competencies, an estimated bill of materials, and personnel
requirements.
3-102. One TIN-E company deploys to an operational theater. The company may be under the OPCON or
TACON of an SC(T) headquarters, an ESB, a TTSB, an Army Force, a joint forces land component command
G-6, a J-6 staff section, or under an organization responsible for joint communications until an Army signal
headquarters deploys into the theater. Platoons, sections, and teams can operate autonomously to support
various locations, base clusters, and enclaves. The TIN-E company can deploy tasked organized teams,
sections, or platoons to support contingencies in and outside the continental United States.
3-103. A TIN-E company has two platoons consisting of—
Some organizations in the U.S. Army are tasked to perform tactical missions in a
theater but do not have the organic tactical communications assets necessary to attain
access to the tactical network. These organizations must request non-organic tactical
communications support that provides DODIN-A connectivity and access to DISA
services. Other organizations have organic tactical communications assets but require
augmentation to meet various tactical missions that require tactical communications
support beyond the scope of the organization.
4-4. A theater army's main command post receives communications support based on a joint manning
document or individual augmentation requests for Army and other Service forces to accomplish the mission
using the RFF process (see Appendix C, Request for Forces). The theater army's main command post submits
the RFF through the GCC to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ensuring the identification of all necessary
communications requirements. For more information on the theater army's main command post, see FM 3-
94.
meets all the JTF headquarters communications requirements necessary for conducting unified land
operations.
4-12. The joint force commander and his subordinate commanders traveling in adjacent aircraft require en
route communications, both air-to-air and air-to-ground, to maintain real-time situational awareness, C2, and
mission command. If there are no immediate communications assets in the theater AO, the joint force
commander uses early entry communications teams. Early entry communication teams provide
communications support to the JTF headquarters during the shape phase of large-scale combat operations.
Early entry communications teams could additionally be required to extend communications support
throughout other phases of operations until organic and non-organic communications assets are on the ground
and operational. For more information on a JTF headquarters, see JP 3-33.
4-13. A JTF headquarters receives communications support based upon a joint manning document or
individual augmentation requests for Army and other Service forces to accomplish the mission using the RFF
process (see Appendix C, Request for Forces). The JTF headquarters identifies all necessary communications
requirements and forwards the RFF to the joint force commander. The joint force commander submits the
RFF to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
CORPS
4-23. A corps may be assigned an AO in the theater during large-scale combat operations, yet not be
designated as a JTF headquarters or joint force land component command. In this instance, the JFLCC or its
subordinate ARFOR headquarters designates the corps’ AO. A corps organizes its AO into four distinct areas
during large-scale combat operations—consolidation area, support area (located in the consolidated area),
close area, and deep area.
4-24. Corps headquarters’ organic communications assets are a part of the signal intelligence sustainment
company. The intelligence sustainment company has enough WIN-T at-the-halt communications assets to
support the corps headquarters and one tactical command post. Corps requires augmentation of the
communications assets necessary to provide tactical network communications for assigned or attached
multifunctional and functional support units and groups, providing direct or general support for protection,
sustainment, and intelligence capabilities throughout the corps’ consolidation and support areas.
Multifunctional support units protecting the main supply routes may require communications augmentation
for assigned or attached battalions conducting operations in the corps close and deep areas. If a corps
headquarters forward-deploys a tactical command post into its deep area, augmentation of communications
may be necessary.
4-25. A corps receives communications support packages based on a joint manning document or individual
augmentation requests for Army and other Service forces using the RFF process (see Appendix C, Request
for Forces). The corps submits its RFF to the JFLCC. The JFLCC forwards the RFF through the JTF
headquarters to the GCC. The GCC validates the RFF and forwards it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When
submitting the RFF, the corps request communications support to meet each assigned multifunctional
brigades and functional support units and groups’ unique communications requirements.
DIVISION
4-26. During large-scale combat operations, a division is the tactical unit of execution for a corps. A corps
not assigned as a JTF headquarters or JFLCC but conducting a theater mission further divides its AO among
its divisions. Divisions conduct operations in a corps’ close area and organize into four distinct areas during
large-scale combat operations—close area, consolidation area, support area, and deep area.
4-27. A division’s organic communications assets are in its headquarters and headquarters battalion with
enough WIN-T at-the-halt communications assets to support the division headquarters and two small
command posts. A division requires augmentation of communications assets to provide tactical network
communications for assigned or attached functional units conducting protection, sustainment, and
intelligence operations throughout the division’s consolidation, and support area. A division commands up
to five BCTs. A division has multifunctional support units that provide support to the BCTs.
4-28. BCTs and multifunctional support brigades conduct operations in corps close area, corps deep area,
and the division’s deep area. BCTs have organic WIN-T on-the-move communications assets for continued
upper tier connectivity while maneuvering throughout the division’s close and deep areas. Some
multifunctional support units providing support to BCTs have organic WIN-T at-the-halt communications
assets for their brigade and battalion command posts. Other multifunctional support brigades do not have
upper tier communications capabilities (see Multifunctional Support Brigade Section). BCTs and
multifunctional support brigades may require additional communications support for small to medium
command posts established while conducting missions in close and deep areas.
4-29. A division receives communications support packages based on a joint manning document or
individual augmentation requests for Army and other Service forces using the RFF process (see Appendix C,
Request for Forces). The division submits its RFF to the corps headquarters. The corps headquarters forwards
the RFF to the JFLCC. The JFLCC forwards the RFF through the JTF headquarters to the GCC. The GCC
validates the RFF and forwards it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When submitting the RFF, the division requests
communications support to meet each BCT, multifunctional, and functional support unit’s unique
communications requirements.
4-31. Multifunctional support brigades receive communications support packages based on a joint manning
document or individual augmentation requests for Army and other Service forces using the RFF process (see
Appendix C, Request for Forces). The division submits the multifunctional support brigade’s RFF through
the corps to the JFLCC. The JFLCC forwards the RFF through the JTF headquarters to the GCC. The GCC
validates the RFF and forwards it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When submitting the RFF, the division requests
communications support to meet each assigned multifunctional support brigade’s unique communications
requirements.
Note. The 67th and 648th Maneuver Enhancement Brigades only have a headquarters and
headquarters company and do not have organic upper tier tactical communications assets.
fires throughout the corps and division’s deep areas. The field artillery brigade supports special operations
forces, electronic warfare, and airspace control elements by providing fires support when requested.
4-39. A field artillery brigade has organic upper tier tactical communications assets to support the brigade
headquarters and one of its subordinate battalions. A communications support package may be required to
provide communications support for two or more small to medium command posts established by battalions
assigned or attached to the field artillery brigade.
SUSTAINMENT BRIGADE
4-40. Sustainment brigades are subordinate to an expeditionary sustainment command and may be attached
to a division. Sustainment brigades provide support to a corps or division, including logistics, health service
support, personnel services, and financial management. Each sustainment brigade may be task organized
differently and may require additional communication support to meet its specific requirements.
4-41. A sustainment brigade receives organic upper tier tactical communications support from its signal
company. The brigade signal company has enough WIN-T at-the-halt communications assets to support the
brigade headquarters, the support battalion headquarters, and one additional company, unit, or detachment
assigned to the brigade. A communications support package may be required to provide small to medium
network communications nodes for remaining assigned or attached battalions, companies, or units.
amount and type of communications assets necessary to support the mission from the information from the
OPORD or OPLAN received from its higher headquarters.
Note. 1-2ID SBCT has replaced all its WIN-T at-the-halt communications assets for tactical
communications nodes—WIN-T on-the-move communications assets.
4-48. A Stryker BCT may require communications augmentation to support one or more of its battalions or
squadrons establishing command posts when conducting operations. Communications augmentation may be
necessary to support attached multifunctional support units or battalions establishing command posts
throughout the corps or division’s close and deep areas to augment the Stryker BCT’s organic combined arms
assets. A TTSB designated with providing communications support to a Stryker BCT determines the amount
and type of communications assets necessary to support the mission from the OPORD or OPLAN received
from its higher headquarters.
4-54. If an ESB provides communications support to an SFAB, it deploys small network teams to install,
operate, and maintain CPNs. The brigade headquarters and each of its assigned battalion headquarters receive
a small network team that provides DISA services. If an ESB-E provides communications support to an
SFAB, it deploys the necessary network support teams to meet the equivalent requirements of an ESB.
4-55. An SFAB receives communications support based upon a joint manning document or individual
augmentation requests for Army and other Service forces to accomplish the mission using the RFF process
(see Appendix C, Request for Forces). The SFAB submits the RFF to the SC(T). The SC(T) forwards the
RFF through the GCC to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ensuring the identification of all the SFABs
communications requirements.
This appendix depicts the communications allocation tables for an ESB’s subordinate
expeditionary signal companies and joint/area signal companies. Each
communications equipment allocation table shown in this appendix includes
equipment types and line item numbers for each major communications assemblage in
its defined company.
A-2. The company commander task organizes as necessary to design a communications support package to
meet mission requirements. Each expeditionary signal platoon has a cable team. The cable team does not
have communications equipment relevant to the allocation table. Table A-1 depicts the communications
equipment allocations for an expeditionary signal company.
Table A-1. Expeditionary signal company communications equipment allocations
Type of Team Equipment Line Item Number Amount
1st Platoon
Medium Network Team Joint node network (JNN) J05001 1
Central OFC telephone auto:
AN/TCC
Line-of-sight (LOS) (v)3 Radio terminal: LOS multi- R90587 2
Team channel 190F(V)3
Tactical Satellite Satellite communication system: S23268 1
(TACSAT) Team AN/TSC-156
Battalion command post B67234 5
switching group: OM-XXX
Radio terminal: LOS multi- R90451 5
Small Network Team
channel AN/TRC-190E(V)1
Computer group: tactical OL- C05046 5
761A(V)8T
Note. ESBs are in the process of replaced the AN/TRC-190F (V)3 and AN/TRC-190E (V)1
HCLOS systems with the AN/TRC-238 (V)2 TRILOS systems. For this reason, the table includes
the model number and line item number of the TRILOS system, denoted by an asterisk (*).
A-4. The company commander task organizes as necessary to design a communications support package to
meet mission requirements. Each heavy signal platoon has a cable section consisting of two cable teams. The
cable section does not have communications equipment relevant to the allocation table. Table A-2 on page
A-3, depicts the communications equipment allocations for a joint/area signal company.
Note. The ESB-E currently does not have communications equipment established as a program of
record items. This publication only describes an ESB-E’s capabilities.
Note. Army National Guard and Army Reserve TTSBs and associated ESBs do not use TRIP for
operational readiness and deployment preparation. See AR 140-145 for information regarding
preparing the Army National Guard and Army Reserve units for mobilization.
STAGE 1–PREPARATION
B-2. Stage 1 is the preparation stage in which units undergo reset activities, begin new equipment and new
user training, manage personnel moves, and conduct individual training. The S-3 coordinates with the
network enterprise centers to determine connection requirements while establishing plans of action and
milestones for conducting software updates and training.
B-5. IaaDS allows a TTSB the ability to conduct global C2 from home station during theater missions, home
station training, or combat training center events. Before GAIT, TTSBs were limited in their ability to
conduct C2 due to latency from the numerous satellite hops required to communicate with communications
support packages in the theater. Home station organizations use GAIT to establish communications to
forward-deployed communications support packages with only one satellite hop. Home station organizations
send and receive data center services through the installation’s network enterprise center, which in turn
forwards the data through the multiprotocol label-switching network to a GAIT network support center,
collocated with an RHN servicing the forward-deployed communications support package.
B-6. A TTSB can conduct DODIN operations from its home station by establishing a tactical NOSC using
the network operations suite. The TTSB establishes connectivity to the GAIT through the installation’s
network enterprise center. The networks operation element in a TTSB is limited with its ability to conduct
DODIN operations. Typical when a TTSB is conducting DODIN operations in theater, it is only as oversight
for its communications support package that’s conducting a contingency mission, home station training, or
combat training center events.
B-7. IaaDS provides additional opportunities to train while building competency and trust in the network
and overall mission readiness. IaaDS provides a platform that enables—
Trained and ready Soldiers proficient with C2 systems.
Configured, updated, patched, and cybersecurity-compliant command post information systems.
Sustained proficiency with connecting, disconnecting, and reconnecting from any installation or
Army network, enabling the transport of tactical network traffic while at home station, within a
training environment, or when deployed.
Access to the distributed cloud-based integrated training environment and training resources to
enable live, virtual, and constructive training.
Distributed C2.
STAGE 5–DEPLOYMENT
B-13. Stage 5 starts when a unit is notified to deploy. The brigade commander, subordinate commanders, and
staff conduct C2 activities of the operations process while planning to deploy a communications support
package for a specified theater mission.
B-14. This stage culminates with the redeployment of the communications support package, conducting reset
operations, and transitioning back to stage 1 of TRIP.
Units that require tactical communications support to conduct theater operations make
requests using the request for forces process. The request for forces is an enabling
function of the force generation process. Force generation for a joint force commander
in a joint operations area ensures the Army is responsive to the requirements for
additional or specialized land forces.
OVERVIEW
C-1. A joint force commander requiring a communications support package for theater operations uses the
RFF process to fulfill those requirements. The joint force commander identifies the necessary capabilities
required of the communications support package and submits the RFF through two channels as follows:
The joint force commander first submits the RFF for validation through the GCC to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
The joint force commander submits the same RFF through its subordinate ARFOR to the
supporting theater army.
C-2. The ARFOR notifies the Department of the Army and FORSCOM of the submission of the RFF to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff for validation. Once the Joint Chiefs of Staff validates the RFF, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
tasks the Department of the Army to provide or source necessary communications support to the joint force
commander. Headquarters, Department of the Army, then tasks FORSCOM to source, mobilize, and deploy
a communications support package that meets the joint force commander’s requirements. Under current
policy, the Secretary of Defense signs all unit deployment orders (see figure C-1).
The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army, multi-Service, or joint definitions.
Where Army and joint definitions are different, (Army) precedes the definition. The
proponent publication for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.
SECTION II – TERMS
adversary
A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may
be envisaged. (JP 3-0)
ARFOR
The Army component and senior Army headquarters of all Army forces assigned or attached to a
combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational
command. (FM 3-94)
cyberspace
A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of
information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications
networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. (JP 3-12)
Department of Defense information network
The set of information capabilities, and associated processes for collecting, processing, storing,
disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters, policymakers, and support
personnel, whether interconnected or stand-alone, including owned and leased communications and
computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, security services, other
associated services, and national security systems. Also called DODIN. (JP 6-0)
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.
DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. July 2019.
ADP 1-02. Terms and Military Symbols. 14 August 2018.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.
JOINT PUBLICATIONS
Most joint publications are available online: http://www.jcs.mil/doctrine.
JP 3-0. Joint Operations. 17 January 2017.
JP 3-12. Cyberspace Operations. 8 June 2018.
JP 3-13. Information Operations. 27 November 2012.
JP 3-30. Command and Control of Joint Air Operations. 25 July 2019.
JP 3-33. Joint Task Force Headquarters. 31 January 2018.
JP 6-0. Joint Communications System. 10 June 2015.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: https://armypubs.army.mil.
ADP 3-0. Operations. 31 July 2019.
ADP 5-0. The Operations Process. 31 July 2019.
AR 140-145. Individual Mobilization Augmentation Program. 21 March 2016.
AR 381-12. Threat Awareness and Reporting Program. 1 June 2016.
AR 525-93. Army Deployment and Redeployment. 12 November 2014.
ATP 4-33. Maintenance Operations. 9 July 2019.
ATP 6-02.60. Techniques for Warfighter Information Network-Tactical. 9 August 2019.
ATP 6-02.70. Techniques for Spectrum Management Operations. 16 October 2019.
ATP 6-02.71. Techniques for Department of Defense Information Network Operations. 30 April 2019.
FM 2-0, Intelligence. 06 July 2018.
FM 3-0. Operations. 6 October 2017.
FM 3-94. Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations. 21 April 2014.
FM 6-02. Signal Support to Operations. 13 September 2019.
FM 6-27. The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare. 7 August 2019.
TC 6-02.20. Cable and Wire Systems Handbook. 23 January 2018.
PRESCRIBED FORMS
This section contains no entries.
REFERENCED FORMS
Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate website:
https://armypubs.army.mil
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
WEBSITE
This section contains no entries.
Single Shelter Switch, 2-6 Frequency Division Multiple Time Division Multiple
Tactical Hub Node, 2-9 Access Waveform, 2-4 Access Waveform, 2-4
Network Centric Waveform,
W 2-5
WIN-T Waveforms, 2-4
JAMES C. MCCONVILLE
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
KATHLEEN S. MILLER
Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary of the Army
1930301
DISTRIBUTION:
Distributed in electronic media only (EMO).
PIN: 205904-000