FM 2-0 Intelligence Operations

FM 2-0
INTELLIGENCE
OPERATIONS
APRIL 2014
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Distribution authorized to U.S. Government Agencies and their contractors only because it
requires protection in accordance with AR 380-5 and as specified by DCS G-3 Message DTG
091913Z Mar 04. This determination was made on 5 September 2013. Other requests must be
referred to ATTN: ATZS-CDI-D, U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, Fort Huachuca, AZ
85613-7017, or via e-mail at [email protected].
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in accordance with AR 380-5.
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*FM 2-0
Field Manual Headquarters
No. 2-0 Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 15 April 2014
Intelligence Operations
Contents
Page
PREFACE..............................................................................................................iii
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................iv
Chapter 1 FOUNDATIONS OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS ....................................... 1-1
Role of Intelligence Operations .......................................................................... 1-1
U.S. Code and Intelligence Authorities............................................................... 1-1
Information Collection and Intelligence Operations ............................................ 1-2
Intelligence Operations Guidelines ..................................................................... 1-3
Intelligence Operations Contributions to the Intelligence Process ..................... 1-5
Using the Operations Process in Intelligence Operations .................................. 1-8
Intelligence Operations and the Integrating Processes.................................... 1-11
Intelligence Operations and the Continuing Activities................................................ 1-14
Regionally Aligned Forces ................................................................................ 1-14
Special Operations Forces Integration ............................................................. 1-14
Mission Command of Intelligence Operations .................................................. 1-15
Language Support ............................................................................................ 1-20
Chapter 2 BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS .......................... 2-1
Intelligence Capabilities Across the Brigade Combat Team .............................. 2-1
Company Intelligence Support Team ................................................................. 2-2
Battalion Intelligence Cell ................................................................................... 2-2
Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Cell ............................................................. 2-3
Military Intelligence Company ............................................................................ 2-8
Counterintelligence Augmentation ................................................................... 2-20
Remote Sensors ............................................................................................... 2-21
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government Agencies and their contractors only
because it requires protection in accordance with AR 380-5 and as specified by DCS G-3 Message DTG
091913Z Mar 04. This determination was made on 5 September 2013. Other requests must be referred to ATTN:
ATZS-CDI-D, U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7017, or via e-mail at
[email protected].
DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the
document in accordance with AR 380-5.
*This publication supersedes Appendix B of FM 2-0, dated 23 March 2010. It completes the supersession of FM 2-0,
dated 23 March 2010. Chapters 1 through 13 and appendix A of that manual were superseded by ADRP 2-0,
dated 31 August 2012.

Contents
Chapter 3 DIVISION AND CORPS INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS ................................. 3-1

Role of the Division and Corps ........................................................................... 3-1
Division and Corps Intelligence Organizations ................................................... 3-1
Integrating Cells .................................................................................................. 3-4
Planning Considerations for Division and Corps Intelligence Operations .......... 3-6
Support Brigades ................................................................................................ 3-7
Chapter 4 THEATER ARMY AND JOINT FORCE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS ......... 4-1
Role of Theater Army Intelligence Operations .................................................... 4-1
Theater Army Intelligence Organizations ............................................................ 4-1
U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command.................................................. 4-2
Operating as a Joint Task Force Headquarters .................................................. 4-4
Chapter 5 INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS WITH UNIFIED ACTION PARTNERS ........... 5-1
Unified Action Intelligence Concerns .................................................................. 5-1
Multinational Operations ..................................................................................... 5-1
National Disclosure Policy and the Disclosure of Classified Information............ 5-2
Intelligence Operations Planning and Coordination in Multinational
Operations ........................................................................................................... 5-3
Chapter 6 ARMY TACTICAL TASKS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE WARFIGHTING
FUNCTION.......................................................................................................... 6-1
The Army Universal Task List ............................................................................. 6-1
Support to Force Generation .............................................................................. 6-1
Support to Situational Understanding ................................................................. 6-5
Conduct Information Collection ........................................................................... 6-8
Support to Targeting and Information Capabilities ........................................... 6-11
GLOSSARY .......................................................................................... Glossary-1
REFERENCES.................................................................................. References-1
INDEX ......................................................................................................... Index-1
Figures
Figure 2-1. Signals intelligence baselines............................................................................ 2-13
Figure 2-2. Line of bearing ................................................................................................... 2-14
Figure 2-3. Approximate emitter location based on a cut .................................................... 2-14
Figure 2-4. Probable emitter location based on a fix ........................................................... 2-15
Tables
Table 1-1. Sources of law, policy, and other documents applicable to intelligence
operations ........................................................................................................... 1-2
Table 1-2. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield and intelligence operations ................ 1-12
Table 1-3. The targeting process and intelligence operations ............................................. 1-13
Table 1-4. Army command and support relationships ......................................................... 1-18
Table 4-1. Joint ISR and Army information collection responsibilities ................................... 4-5
ii FM 2-0 15 April 2014

Preface
Conduct intelligence operations is one of four primary tasks conducted as part of information collection.
(The others are reconnaissance, surveillance, and security operations.) FM 2-0 describes how military
intelligence (MI) units and collection assets conduct intelligence operations to accomplish the tasks
developed during information collection. FM 2-0 also contains the descriptions of the Army tactical
tasks included in the intelligence warfighting function, doctrine on language support, and doctrine on
employing remote sensors. This manual is designed to be used with ADPs 2-0, 3-0, and 5-0 and ADRPs
2-0, 3-0, and 5-0.
The principal audience for FM 2-0 is commanders, staff officers, and senior noncommissioned officers
of organizations that conduct intelligence operations, including MI organizations subordinate to
battalion and higher level maneuver and support formations, and the intelligence staffs of those
formations. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational
headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning joint intelligence.
This manual forms the foundation for instruction on intelligence operations within the Army’s
educational system. Trainers and educators throughout the Army also use this manual.
Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S.,
international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure
their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)
Paragraphs 5-12 through 5-14 implement multinational doctrine in Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 2-0.
FM 2-0 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both
the glossary and the text. For definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the
proponent publication follows the definition. This publication is not the proponent for any Army terms.
At the time of final development of this publication, the Army is well on its way to replacing battlefield
surveillance brigades and modernizing the force with expeditionary military intelligence brigades (E-MIBs).
Therefore, FM 2-0 briefly describes the base structure and capabilities of the E-MIBs. Echelon
publications, when developed, will provide a more detailed description and techniques for employment
of the E-MIB.
FM 2-0 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United
States, and the U.S. Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.
The proponent of FM 2-0 is the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence. The preparing agency is
the Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate, U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence.
Send written comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to
Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, ATTN:
ATZS-CDI-D (FM 2-0), 550 Cibeque Street, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7017; by e-mail to
[email protected]; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 iii

Introduction
Intelligence operations are one of the primary activities within information collection. Intelligence operations
collect information used to develop the intelligence vital to exercising mission command. Commanders, through
their choice of critical information requirements and through mission command, drive the operations process.
Commanders visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess throughout the operations process, with understanding
as their starting point. The staff process of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) assists in developing
in-depth understanding of relevant aspects the operational environment. Based on IPB results, commanders
visualize the desired end state and a broad concept of how to shape the current conditions into that end state.
Commanders express gaps in relevant information as commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs).
The staff performs the planning requirements task to develop an integrated plan to collect the information
needed to answer those requirements. Plans and orders provide information collection tasks to be accomplished
and inform units of support requirements for intelligence operations. Plans and orders provide the basis for
employing MI collection assets effectively and efficiently.
MI units and Soldiers conduct intelligence operations to obtain information to satisfy formal requirements. For
tactical operations, these requirements are specified in the information collection plan. Intelligence operations
collect information about the intent, activities, and capabilities of threats and other relevant aspects of the
operational environment to inform commander’s decisions.
Intelligence operations also form one of the three core competencies of the intelligence warfighting function.
The others are intelligence synchronization and intelligence analysis. Intelligence units and staffs at all echelons
of a deployed force conduct intelligence operations to acquire the information and data needed to satisfy
requirements. Intelligence staffs combine the results of intelligence operations with all available information
and perform intelligence analysis to create products that support commanders’ decisionmaking. Intelligence
synchronization integrates information collection and intelligence analysis with operations to effectively and
efficiently support decisionmaking. Successful execution and assessment of the force’s overall operation
depends on an intelligence staff proficient in all three competencies.
An understanding of joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is required to understand the
relationship of intelligence operations and information collection to joint ISR. Army doctrine recognizes the
joint definition of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance: an activity that synchronizes and integrates
the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct
support of current and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function (JP 2-01).
The Army executes ISR through information collection and the operations and intelligence processes (with an
emphasis on intelligence analysis and leveraging the larger intelligence enterprise). Consistent with joint
doctrine, the activities of Army information collection complement joint ISR activities. Developing the
intelligence needed for success requires a fully concerted effort by all information collection assets, including
coordinated exploitation of joint and national ISR capabilities.
The focus of this edition of FM 2-0 is distinctly different from that of previous editions. Previous editions
established the fundamentals of military intelligence. This version focuses on the tactics used in the intelligence
warfighting function’s contribution to information collection—intelligence operations.
FM 2-0 describes the tactics all echelons use to conduct intelligence operations.
• Chapter 1 describe the role of intelligence operations in Army operations and in the production of
intelligence in terms of the operations and intelligence processes. It include the contributions
intelligence operations make to information collection. It also addresses language support to Army
forces (previously in appendix B), the role of regionally aligned forces, and the integration of
special operations forces into intelligence operations.
• Chapter 2 discusses the tactics used by intelligence organizations and staffs supporting BCTs.
• Chapter 3 addresses division- and corps-level intelligence operations.
iv FM 2-0 15 April 2014

Introduction
• Chapter 4 describes theater army-level intelligence contributions to deployed forces and

considerations intelligence staffs must address when a division or corps headquarters is required to
serve as a joint force headquarters.
• Chapter 5 addresses considerations intelligence staffs must address when operating as part of a
multinational force.
• Chapter 6 lists the Army tactical tasks associated with the intelligence warfighting function. Task
descriptions have been revised to incorporate doctrine on information collection and other changes
made by ADRP 3-0.
Note. FM 2-0 uses TUAS (for tactical unmanned aircraft system) in discussions specific to the
RQ-7B Shadow, which is organic to the MI company and battlefield surveillance brigade. It uses
UAS (for unmanned aircraft system) in discussions of topics common to all UAS categories.
FM 2-0 uses the word “theater” to indicate “theater of operations.”
FM 2-0 refers to elements of intelligence staff organizations by the name used for them in tables
of organization and equipment. When task-organized in a command post, these organizations
fulfill the role of staff elements as described in ATTP 5-0.1.
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 v

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Chapter 1
Foundations of Intelligence Operations
ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
1-1. Intelligence operations collect information used to develop intelligence in support of the
decisionmaking process of commanders down to the small-unit level. The primary purpose of Army
intelligence operations is generating intelligence that supports the conduct of (planning, preparation,
execution, and assessment) operations. (See ADRP 5-0.) Nonetheless, tactical-level Army forces draw on
joint, operational, and strategic intelligence resources. Army forces conduct intelligence operations to support
operational-level and even strategic-level requirements.
1-2. Successfully applying the Army’s mission command philosophy requires timely, accurate
intelligence. (See ADP 6-0.) Intelligence is a critical underpinning for each operations process activity.
Intelligence operations are a way of collecting information, with the means ranging from national and joint
collection capabilities to individual MI Soldier observations and reports.
1-3. Information collection is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of
sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of
current and future operations (FM 3-55). FM 3-55 describes an information collection capability as any
human or automated sensor, asset, or processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) system that can be
directed to collect information that enables better decisionmaking, expands understanding of the operational
environment, and supports warfighting functions in decisive action. The intelligence warfighting function’s
contribution to information collection is intelligence operations.
1-4. Intelligence operations are the tasks undertaken by military intelligence units and Soldiers to obtain
information to satisfy validated requirements (ADRP 2-0). Intelligence operations collect information about
the activities and resources of the threat or information concerning the characteristics of the operational
environment. At the tactical level, intelligence operations, reconnaissance, security operations, and
surveillance are the four primary tasks conducted as part of information collection. The intelligence
disciplines of counterintelligence (CI), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), human intelligence (HUMINT),
measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and technical intelligence
(TECHINT) routinely conduct tasks associated with intelligence operations.
1-5. A military intelligence collection asset is a trained and certified military intelligence Soldier or a
sensor operated by MI Soldiers that can be directed to collect information. MI collection assets are distinct
from other Army information collection capabilities. The distinction is required because intelligence
collection is enabled by and must comply with all applicable U.S. laws and policy. Table 1-1 on page 1-2 lists
some of the most important laws, policy documents, and other authoritative documentation. Additionally,
certain intelligence disciplines require specific training and certifications to conduct intelligence operations.
U.S. CODE AND INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES

1-6. G-2s, intelligence planners, and intelligence unit commanders should be aware of the implications of
and considerations associated with the general intelligence provisions and authorities included in the
following titles of the U.S. Code: Title 10, Armed Forces of the United States; Title 32, National Guard; and
Title 50, War and National Defense; and with Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities.
The implications of and considerations associated with these provisions and authorities include the oversight,
management, and resourcing of intelligence operations and the authority for or prohibitions on certain
specific intelligence activities. Titles 10 and 50 are inextricably linked and mutually supportive statutory
provisions for Department of Defense (DOD) intelligence activities at every level of operations (strategic,
operational, and tactical) during peacetime or war.
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 1-1

Chapter 1
Table 1-1. Sources of law, policy, and other documents applicable to intelligence operations
• Executive Order 12333 • U.S. Code Titles 10, 32, and 50

• AR 381-10 • Relevant DOD instructions
• DOD 5240.1-R • Manual for Courts-Martial (Uniform Code of Military Justice)
• DODD 2310.1E • Law of land warfare
• DODD 3115.09 • International treaties, such as the Hague Convention (1899 and 1907),
• FM 2-22.3 the Geneva Conventions (1949), and Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions (1977)
• FM 27-10
1-7. Some key Title 10 topic areas include—

 The authority of the Secretary of Defense over all DOD intelligence organizations and activities.
 The position of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
 The role of national intelligence through tactical intelligence and the integration of DOD ISR
capabilities.
 Meeting the needs of combatant commanders through tactical commanders.
 Funds for foreign cryptologic support.
 Appropriations, use, and auditing of DOD intelligence funds.
 Congressional oversight.
 Posse Comitatus.
 Defense support of civil authorities.
 The role of the Secretary of Defense in conducting intelligence activities.
 The purpose of all-source intelligence and the role of an integrated and synchronized DOD
intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination as a part of the larger intelligence community.
 The role of national intelligence through tactical intelligence.
 The needs of combatant commanders through tactical commanders.
 Specialized intelligence functions of the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and Defense Intelligence Agency.
 CI activities.
 Intelligence budget and oversight.
1-10. Intelligence activities authorized by Executive Order 12333 are further extended to combatant
commanders through operation orders and plans. Additionally, certain intelligence activities may be directed
by other legislative authority and are not exclusive to Title 10 or Title 50 statutes. Beyond these general
intelligence authorities, it is important to note that an organization or unit must have a specific assigned
mission to conduct a particular type of intelligence activity. These specific authorities are often found in a
wide range of documents such as DOD directives, intelligence-agency-specific authorities, Army regulations,
operation orders, and operation plans. If the intelligence staff has any questions on authorities or funding
sources, it should coordinate closely with the unit staff judge advocate because of the dynamic nature,
complexity, and large volume of intelligence laws and policies.
INFORMATION COLLECTION AND INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

1-11. At the tactical level, reconnaissance, surveillance, security operations, and intelligence operations are
the primary means by which a commander conducts information collection to answer the CCIRs and to
support operations. Information collection consists of the following tasks:
 Plan requirements and assess collection.
 Task and direct collection.
 Execute collection.
1-2 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

PLAN REQUIREMENTS AND ASSESS COLLECTION

1-12. Planning requirements and assessing collection is the task that analyzes requirements, evaluates
available assets (internal and external), recommends to the operations staff taskings for information collection
assets, submits requests for information for adjacent and higher collection support, and conducts an
assessment of the effectiveness of the information collection plan (ATTP 2-01). Planning requirements and
assessing collection is a commander-driven, coordinated staff effort led by the G-2 or S-2 officer. The
continuous functions of planning requirements and assessing collection identify the best way to satisfy
requirements of the supported commander and staff.
1-13. After receiving inputs from the commander and staff—the commander’s intent, planning guidance,
and intelligence requirements—the intelligence staff, in close coordination with the operations staff, performs
the planning requirements and assessing collection tasks. These tasks are the basis for creating an information
collection plan that synchronizes intelligence operations to enable the commander’s visualization and
situational understanding. The planning requirements and assessing collection tasks are—
 Requirements development.
 Develop planning requirements tools.
 Assess the execution of tactical tasks.
 Update planning requirements tools.
1-14. These tasks are not necessarily sequential. The result of planning requirements and assessing
collection are used by the staff to create orders detailing information collection tasks. (See FM 3-55 and
ATTP 2-01 for doctrine on planning requirements and assessing collection.)
TASK AND DIRECT COLLECTION

1-15. Based on mission requirements and recommendations from the entire staff, the operations staff
develops orders that task, direct, and when necessary, retask unit information collection assets. Tasking and
directing information collection is vital to control limited information collection assets. Staffs accomplish
tasking information collection by issuing warning orders, fragmentary orders, and operation orders. They
accomplish directing information collection assets by continuously monitoring the operation. Staffs conduct
retasking to refine, update, and create new requirements. (See FM 3-55.)
EXECUTE COLLECTION
1-16. Intelligence operations are driven by the need to answer questions crucial to the conduct of the
overall operation of the supported force. Units conducting intelligence operations follow the operations
process. Collection activities acquire information and provide that information to intelligence analytical
elements. Information and data collected during intelligence operations may require processing, where
collected data is correlated and converted into a format suitable for analysis and further exploitation.
Processing during collection remains distinct from the intelligence process steps of analysis and production in
that the resulting information is not yet fully subjected to analytical techniques that produce an intelligence
product. Nevertheless, relevant, time-sensitive information resulting from processing and exploitation
(especially targeting, personnel recovery, or threat warning information) should be immediately disseminated
to commanders and staffs to facilitate timely operations.
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES

1-17. There are guidelines for conducting successful intelligence operations. They are not a checklist; rather,
they describe ways to effectively and efficiently employ MI collection assets. Mirroring the fundamentals of
reconnaissance, the intelligence operations guidelines support efforts that result in timely collection and
reporting of the relevant, accurate information needed to produce intelligence. Commanders determine which
guidelines to emphasize based on the situation. The guidelines of intelligence operations are—
 Ensure continuous intelligence operations.
 Orient on requirements.
 Provide mixed and overlapping coverage.
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 1-3

Chapter 1
 Gain and maintain sensor contact.

 Report information rapidly and accurately.
 Provide early warning.
 Retain freedom of maneuver.
ENSURE CONTINUOUS INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

1-18. Commanders direct the conduct of information collection activities before, during, and after the
execution of all operations. Commanders depend on intelligence to know where, when, and how best to
employ forces during all military operations.
1-19. Typically, collection activities begin soon after receipt of the mission and continue throughout
preparation and execution of the overall operation. They do not cease at the conclusion of the operation but
continue as required. Before execution of the overall operation, intelligence operations focus on filling gaps
in information about all relevant aspects of the operational environment. During execution, intelligence
operations focus on providing the commander with updated information that verifies the threat’s composition,
dispositions, and intentions as the operation progresses. This allows commanders to verify which course of
action the threat is actually adopting and to determine if the plan is still valid, based on actual events in the
area of operations (AO). Commanders can then make decisions as needed. These include adjustment
decisions (those that modify the order to respond to unanticipated opportunities or threats). After execution,
intelligence operations focus on maintaining contact with the threat forces to collect information necessary for
planning subsequent operations and protecting the force. In stability operations, intelligence operations often
focus on relevant aspects of the AO and area of interest and on civil considerations the commander
designates.
ORIENT ON REQUIREMENTS
1-20. Commanders prioritize intelligence operations primarily through providing their guidance and
commander’s intent early in planning. Commanders—
 Identify and update their priority intelligence requirements (PIRs).
 Ensure PIRs are tied directly to the concept of operations and decision points.
 Focus PIRs on their most critical needs (because of limited information collection assets).
 Ensure PIRs include the latest time information is of value or the event by which the information
is required.
 Approve requests for intelligence for collection requirements beyond a unit’s capabilities.
 Aggressively seek the results of higher echelon intelligence operations and answers to information
requirements across the intelligence enterprise through intelligence reach.
1-21. Commanders assign information collection tasks based on a unit’s collection capabilities. Therefore,
commanders ensure the tasks they assign do not exceed the collection and analytical ability of their unit.
When not using organic assets, commanders use habitual relationships to optimize effective operations as a
combined arms team, when possible.
PROVIDE MIXED AND REDUNDANT COVERAGE

1-22. Commanders integrate the capabilities of their assets to provide mixed and redundant coverage of
critical locations identified during planning. Maximum efficiency in information collection is achieved when
all MI collection assets are carefully employed together. The appropriate mix of collection assets helps satisfy
as many different requirements as possible. It also reduces the likelihood the unit will favor or become too
reliant on one particular unit, discipline, or system. The intelligence and operations staffs work together to
balance requirements, available capabilities, and areas to be covered. Commanders and staffs continuously
assess results to determine any changes in critical locations requiring this level of coverage.
1-4 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

GAIN AND MAINTAIN SENSOR CONTACT

1-23. Once a unit conducting intelligence operations gains sensor contact, it maintains that contact unless
directed otherwise or the survival of the unit is at risk. In intelligence operations, gaining and maintaining
sensor contact occurs when the MI collection asset is capable of observing or receiving a signal or observable
from a person or object. Sensor contact is critical in signals intercept and imagery collection missions.
REPORT INFORMATION RAPIDLY AND ACCURATELY

1-24. MI collection assets acquire and report accurate and timely information on all relevant aspects of the
operational environment within the area of interest. Information may quickly lose its value. MI collection
assets report exactly what they observe and, if appropriate, what they do not observe. Seemingly unimportant
information may be extremely important when combined with other information. Negative reports may be as
important as reports of threat activity. The intelligence staff works with the signal staff to ensure
communications plans incorporate MI collection asset communications requirements.
PROVIDE EARLY WARNING

1-25. Commanders and staffs position MI collection assets to provide early warning of threat action.
Commanders use intelligence operations as part of their information collection effort to ascertain the threat
course of action and timing. They then orient assets to observe these locations for indicators of threat actions.
Timely and complete reporting is essential to providing early warning.
RETAIN FREEDOM OF MANEUVER

1-26. MI collection assets require battlefield mobility to successfully accomplish their missions. These
assets do not engage in close combat in the execution of their collection tasks. The criticality of MI collection
assets makes their survival the utmost consideration. If these assets are decisively engaged, collection stops
and a battle for survival begins. MI collection asset leaders’ initiative and knowledge of the terrain, weather,
and threat reduce the likelihood of decisive engagement and help maintain freedom of movement. The IPB
process can identify anticipated areas of likely contact.
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE

INTELLIGENCE PROCESS
1-27. The design and structure of the intelligence process support commanders by providing intelligence
needed to support their situational understanding and the exercise of mission command. The Army’s
intelligence process consists of four steps (plan and direct, collect, produce, and disseminate) and two
continuing activities (analyze and assess). (See ADRP 2-0.)
1-28. The Army views the intelligence process as a model that describes how the intelligence warfighting
function develops intelligence that facilitates situational understanding and supports decisionmaking. This
process provides a common framework to guide Army professionals in their thoughts, discussions, plans, and
assessments pertaining to intelligence.
1-29. Commanders drive the intelligence process. The intelligence process supports all activities of the
operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) and can be performed multiple times to support each
activity. Although designed similarly to the operations process, the intelligence process includes aspects and
activities specific to the intelligence warfighting function:
 The plan and direct step of the intelligence process closely corresponds with the plan activity of
the operations process.
 The collect, produce, and disseminate steps and the analysis activity of the intelligence process
together correspond to the execute activity of the operations process.
 Assess, which is continuous, is part of the overall assessment activity of the operations process.
1-30. Intelligence operations must be vertically and horizontally integrated and synchronized with joint,
theater, lateral, and lower echelons. Staff members must know the collectors and PED enablers available at
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 1-5

Chapter 1
their echelon, as well as those at echelons above and below, and how to request and manage those assets. (See
ADRP 2-0.) Combatant command and subordinate joint forces apportion joint assets to subordinate echelons.
Corps and divisions allocate support from the apportioned assets to brigade combat teams (BCTs) and below.
Staff members must understand the system of apportionment and allocation. They determine what joint assets
are available by conducting collaboration and coordination early in the planning process. The staff must also
analyze the higher headquarters order and review the various scheduling or tracking mechanisms. Due to the
complexity of intelligence operations, the staff must know and consider practical capabilities and limitations
of all unit organic assets. Capabilities include the following:
 Range. Range deals with the collector’s ability to provide target coverage. When considering an
asset’s range, it is important to consider mission range (duration and distance) and how close the
collection asset must be to the target to collect against it. Additionally, intelligence staffs consider
communications requirements from the asset to the command post. The staff determines—
 Ability to maneuver, including travel and support times.
 Transit and dwell times, if the best asset is an aerial system such as an unmanned aircraft
system (UAS).
 Day and night effectiveness. Staffs consider factors such as available optics and any effects of
thermal crossover.
 Technical characteristics. Each asset has time factors (such as set-up and tear-down times) for
task accomplishment that must be considered. Other technical characteristics include the following:
 Whether the sensor can see through fog or smoke.
 The effects of the environment on the collection asset (including factors such as urban or
rural terrain and soil composition).
 Whether the asset can continue despite electronic attack.
 Reporting timeliness. Each asset is assigned an earliest time and a latest time information
reporting is of value to the information collection plan. Other timeliness factors are—
 The established reporting criteria for each collection asset.
 How long it takes to disseminate collected information to each requester.
 Geolocation accuracy. Accuracy implies reliability and precision. The asset must be capable of
locating a target accurately enough to engage it with precision-guided munitions.
 Durability. Durability includes such factors as—
 Whether the aircraft can launch in high winds or limited visibility.
 Whether the prime mover can cross restricted terrain.
 Threat activity. The staff considers whether the collection asset can detect the expected threat
activity.
 Performance history. Experienced staff officers know which information collection assets are
reliable to meet the commander’s information requirements. Readiness rates, responsiveness,
and accuracy over time may raise one collector’s reliability factor.
 PED enablers. The staff considers whether the unit has the PED enablers required to support
more flexible and responsive intelligence operations. (See ADRP 2-0.)
PLAN AND DIRECT

1-31. The intelligence staff performs most of the tasks associated with the plan and direct step. The most
prominent task is planning requirements. (See paragraph 1-12 through 1-14.) The planning requirements task
results in information collection tasks, which the operations staff incorporates into the supported unit’s
information collection plan. These requirements are passed to MI collection assets as missions. MI leaders
then develop their own plans for executing the intelligence operations necessary to accomplish their assigned
mission.
COLLECT
1-32. Intelligence operations are a major contributor to the collect step. These operations involve
collecting, processing, and reporting information in response to information collection tasks. Effective
1-6 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

intelligence operations allow flexibility and responsiveness to changing situations and adaptive threats. The
effective use of the intelligence architecture allows for the dynamic execution of intelligence operations. (See
ADRP 2-0.)
1-33. Effective collection requires using a variety of mutually reinforcing collection assets. Planned
redundancy of MI collection assets increase the reliability of information and can reduce the effectiveness of
enemy deception or denial efforts. (See paragraph 1-22.)
1-34. During intelligence operations, MI collection assets collect information, process it, and report it to
the appropriate intelligence staff for analysis—or, in the case of combat information, directly to the
appropriate commander for immediate action.
1-35. Collection focuses on requirements tied to the execution of tactical tasks. MI collection assets
executing intelligence operations are performing collection activities. These activities acquire information
about the threat and AO and provide that information to the intelligence staff for analysis and other
exploitation.
1-36. MI collection assets process collected information before reporting it. Processing converts
information into a form in which it can be used for reporting and intelligence analysis. This usually involves
placing the information in a standard report format (such as the spot report). It may involve translating the
material. Some MI information systems have their own processing systems, with details in the appropriate MI
system manuals and technical manuals.
1-37. Timely and accurate reporting of information is critical to developing the intelligence essential to
successful operations. Information and intelligence is delivered as voice, text, graphic, or digital media. Voice
data is reported over tactical radios on the command net or operations and intelligence net. Text, graphic, and
other digital media are reported over mission command network systems and deposited in the common
database, e-mail accounts, and on the unit’s Web page.
1-38. Combat information and intelligence that affects the current operation is reported and disseminated
immediately upon recognition. Combat information is unevaluated data, gathered by or provided directly to
the tactical commander which, due to its highly perishable nature or the criticality of the situation, cannot be
processed into tactical intelligence in time to satisfy the user’s tactical intelligence requirements (JP 2-01).
Some collection assets, particularly air and ground reconnaissance, can report combat information. The
routing of combat information proceeds immediately in two directions: directly to the commander, and
through routine reporting channels, which include intelligence analysis and production elements.
PRODUCE
1-39. Production (which involves analysis and synthesis) can be complex or simple. Complex production is
required for comprehensive products such as detailed intelligence studies for predeployment or higher
echelon operation planning. Simple production is necessary for products like information commanders need
to make quick decisions in a time-constrained situation. There is an inherent friction between the desire to
provide complete, accurate intelligence reports and the continuous requirement to support time-sensitive
tactical decisionmaking. In practice, these conflicting demands must be balanced by using both stated
direction (such as the commander’s intent and PIRs) and knowledge of the operational situation to determine
when to finish and disseminate a report.
DISSEMINATE
1-40. Timely dissemination of intelligence is critical to the success of operations. Effective dissemination
is deliberate, based on a communications architecture that includes a dissemination plan. Every echelon
works together to tailor the communications architecture, making it as efficient as possible by removing
information-sharing barriers.
ANALYZE
1-41. The detailed analysis that converts information into intelligence occurs during the production step.
However, hasty analysis occurs as part of processing at various stages throughout the intelligence process and
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Chapter 1
is inherent in all intelligence support to situational understanding and decisionmaking. (See TC 2-33.4.)
Collectors perform processing and initial analysis before reporting. For example, for a HUMINT collector
processing involves reviewing the results of a source meeting to determine and analyze if any of the
information meets reporting criteria and then completing the appropriate report.
1-42. All-source intelligence analysts and staffs use analytical techniques in situation development to
determine the significance of collected information and its significance relative to the threat, terrain, weather,
civil considerations, and other relevant aspects of the operational environment. Through predictive analysis,
the staff attempts to identify threat activity or trends that present opportunities or hazards to the friendly force.
They often use indicators developed for each threat course of action as the basis for their analysis and
conclusions. All-source intelligence analysts and staff rely on the distributed PED enablers sent forward with
collectors and a federated analytical approach. Federated analysis allows analysts at various echelons to
simultaneously work together on identifying threat activities and trends, answering PIRs and other
intelligence requirements, and predicting the threat courses of action. (For more information on distributed
PED enablers and federated analysis refer to doctrine on intelligence support to brigade operations and
intelligence support to division and above operations.)
ASSESS
1-43. The intelligence process assess activity is part of the overall assessment activity of the operations
process. For intelligence purposes, assessment is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current
situation, particularly significant threat activities and changes in the operational environment. Assessing the
situation begins upon receipt of mission and continues throughout the intelligence process. Friendly actions,
threat actions, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and events in the area of interest interact to form a
dynamic operational environment. Continuous assessment of the effects of each of these on the others,
especially the overall effect of threat actions on friendly operations, is essential to situational understanding.
USING THE OPERATIONS PROCESS IN INTELLIGENCE

OPERATIONS
1-44. The operations process describes the activities performed by any military unit to accomplish a
mission. (See ADRP 5-0.) For the supported unit, these activities pertain to the overall operation. The same
activities describe what MI units do to accomplish the tasks assigned to them in support of that mission.
However, an MI unit’s operations process may not correspond in time to the supported unit’s operations
process. Often, MI units must execute intelligence operations while the supported unit is planning or
preparing for the overall operation.
1-45. Intelligence operations occur during all activities of the supported unit’s operations process. At the
same time, the nature of the supported unit’s mission and the concept of operations focus and shape the effort
of intelligence operations. Intelligence operations executed during supported unit planning collect information
needed to complete the plan. This information and intelligence developed from it shape the plan and provide
knowledge that facilitates its execution. Operations executed during the supported unit’s preparation and
execution collect information needed for execution decisions regarding the overall operation. Intelligence
operations that contribute to the supported unit’s assessment occur during the other three operations process
activities; the difference is their purpose. These operations collect information used to assess the progress of
the overall operation, that is, to identify variances from the plan that would require adjustment decisions. (See
ADRP 5-0 for doctrine on execution and adjustment decisions.)
1-46. Intelligence units follow the operations process to conduct intelligence operations, the same way
maneuver units do to conduct their operations. Intelligence unit planning begins with receipt of information
collection tasks in the form of a mission. The unit prepares for and executes the mission, completing
collection before the latest time information is of value has passed. During the execution of intelligence
operations, MI collection assets process collected information and provide it to the intelligence staff for
analysis. Combat information identified by the intelligence staff is immediately passed to the commander.
1-8 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS DURING SUPPORTED UNIT PLANNING

1-47. Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying
out effective ways of bringing that future about (ADP 5-0). It results in a plan or order that communicates the
commander’s intent, understanding, and visualization of the operation to subordinates, focusing on desired
results.
1-48. During the plan activity, the supported unit performs the military decisionmaking process,
developing a plan or order that lays out the schemes of support for intelligence and information collection that
support the concept of operations. The information collection plan contains the information collection tasks to
be completed by MI units. Additionally, the commander and staff develop and monitor the task organization,
command and support relationships, risk management, terrain management, weather effects, and airspace
coordination products.
1-49. The supported unit commander’s involvement in intelligence operations begins with providing
planning guidance and specifying requirements. The guidance and requirements focus intelligence operations.
Supported commanders need to understand the capabilities and limitations of organic and supporting MI
collection assets. This awareness means understanding employment tactics and techniques as well as
understanding these assets’ practical capabilities and limitations, including vulnerabilities to weather effects.
The supported commander ensures that intelligence operations support not just the supported unit information
collection requirements but their subordinate units’ requirements as well.
1-50. Deconfliction and coordination require a series of related activities that facilitate operations in the
supported unit’s AO. Planning and continuous coordination with the movement and maneuver cell clears
positions for MI collection assets to observe and report on threat activities. These activities facilitate
successful intelligence operations and fratricide avoidance. At a minimum, MI collection assets coordinate for
positions and report their presence to the command post of the unit owning the AO. They request information
on any conditions or ongoing situations that may affect how they conduct their mission. MI collection assets’
leadership also coordinates with the controlling unit’s intelligence cell for debriefings of returning members,
convoy leaders, and others.
1-51. The supported unit’s intelligence cell also coordinates with the movement and maneuver cell to
establish fire support coordination measures around MI collection assets, airspace control measures, and
appropriate weapons control status (in reference to aerial information collection assets). Failure to conduct
proper deconfliction and coordination may result in mission failure or unnecessary risk to personnel and
equipment.
1-52. The fires cell requires information from intelligence operations to decide which surface targets to
track and engage with indirect fires and aircraft. The fires warfighting function provides offensive and
defensive fires as well as air and missile defense to support the conduct of intelligence operations. (See ADP 3-09
and ADRP 3-09.)
1-53. The sustainment cell requires information and intelligence concerning the AO in order to accomplish
its sustainment tasks. (See ADP 4-0 and ADRP 4-0.) Conversely intelligence operations require sustainment
to accomplish their tasks.
1-54. The protection cell identifies critical and defended assets that provide another focus for intelligence
operations. These lists are dynamic. The critical asset list is a prioritized list of assets that should be protected.
It is normally identified by the phase of an operation. The defended asset list identifies assets from the critical
asset list to be defended with available resources. Intelligence operations support protection through the
identification and tracking of threat activities near those critical assets. (See ADP 3-37 and ADRP 3-37 for
doctrine on the protection warfighting function.)
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS DURING SUPPORTED UNIT PREPARATION

1-55. Preparation consists of those activities performed by units and Soldiers to improve their ability to
execute an operation (ADP 5-0). The prepare activity begins upon receiving a plan or order, including a
warning order. During preparation, commanders take every opportunity to improve their situational
understanding. Intelligence operations begin once an order containing information collection tasks is
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Chapter 1
received. For MI collection assets conducting intelligence operations, preparation activities include but are
not limited to—
 Conducting necessary coordination, link-up movements, staging, terrain deconfliction, and
terrain reconnaissance in accordance with the order and unit standard operating procedures
(SOPs).
 Verifying fire support, casualty evacuation, fratricide avoidance, airspace coordination, and
other coordination measures and procedures.
 Coordinating with the Air Force weather team on weather effects on collection assets and
sensors.
 Refining plans, backbriefs, SOP reviews, and rehearsals, and coordinating with various elements
and organizations.
 Making other coordination as the situation requires.
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS DURING SUPPORTED UNIT EXECUTION

1-56. During execution, intelligence operations are executed as specified in the information collection plan
of the supported unit. Information from MI collection assets is collected, processed, and reported to the
intelligence staff for all-source intelligence analysis. The resulting intelligence aids the commander’s
situational understanding and the staff’s knowledge and understanding of the current situation.
1-57. Intelligence operations are integrated into the concept of operations to develop situational awareness,
enhance protection, and support combat assessment. The results of these operations are used to modify the
plan or exercise tactical options, thereby enabling rapid decisionmaking as well as generating and maintaining
tempo.
1-58. During execution, the supported unit order, including the information collection plan, is refined,
implemented, and adapted in response to changes in the situation, weather, and actions of threat forces. The
commander uses a variety of techniques and measures to supervise, monitor, and modify the execution of the
order, thereby shaping the battle and maintaining unity of effort. Effective intelligence operations are
responsive to the needs of the overall operation. They provide a continuous flow of information used to
produce intelligence that is disseminated throughout the force to maintain a shared picture of the AO and
satisfy new requirements.
1-59. Intelligence operations supporting execution differ significantly from intelligence operations
supporting planning. First, intelligence operations support to planning requires collection to develop a large
volume of basic intelligence and broad-scope estimates used to develop and analyze courses of action. In
contrast, intelligence support to execution involves satisfying a much larger body of requirements in a
significantly greater degree of detail. For example, during course of action development, it may be sufficient
to tell a commander that an enemy force is located in a general area and has an approximate number of tanks
and armored personnel carriers of various types. However, the subordinate unit tasked with establishing a
blocking position opposite that enemy force will require more detailed information on the enemy force
disposition.
1-60. Intelligence support during execution focuses on giving commanders all information available to
facilitate decisionmaking. Although eliminating uncertainty during execution is impossible, focused
intelligence operations can reduce uncertainty by providing situational awareness and identifying
opportunities as they present themselves. Effective intelligence operations provide indications and warnings
of new or unexpected threat activities, enhance efforts to engage the threat through support to targeting, assist
in protecting the force, and support the planning of future operations by providing timely and accurate
information for assessments.
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS DURING ASSESSMENT

1-61. Staffs track the progress of intelligence operations against unsatisfied requirements and the
information collection plan. As the operation continues, the intelligence and operations staffs track the status
of each collection task, analyze reporting, and ultimately satisfy requirements. When reporting satisfies a
1-10 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

requirement, the staff relieves the affected MI collection assets of responsibility for information collection
tasks related to that requirement.
1-62. As the situation changes, staffs also adjust the information collection plan to keep information
collection tasks synchronized with the overall operation, optimize collection, and support future operation
planning. As collected information answers requirements, the staff removes tasks associated with those
requirements from the information collection plan.
1-63. Changes to the situation may require retasking MI collection assets to answer new intelligence
requirements. The operations staff issues orders to retask assets. This is normally done in consultation with
the intelligence staff and other staffs as appropriate. Retasking is assigning an MI collection asset a new task
and purpose. Retasking may involve simple adjustments undertaken by the MI collection asset to meet the
new requirements or may require movement to another location. Significant retaskings require staff
coordination and deconfliction as discussed in paragraphs 1-50 and 1-51.
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AND THE INTEGRATING

PROCESSES
1-64. Throughout the operations process, commanders and staffs integrate the warfighting functions to
synchronize the force in accordance with the commander’s intent and concept of operations. In addition to the
major activities of the operations process, commanders and staffs use several integrating processes to
synchronize specific functions throughout the operations process. The integrating processes are intelligence
preparation of the battlefield, targeting, and risk management.
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

1-65. IPB supports all activities of the operations process. Most requirements are generated as a result of
IPB and the interrelationship of IPB, the military decisionmaking process, and the targeting process. (See FM
2-01.3.) IPB identifies gaps in current intelligence holdings. Filling some of these gaps require conducting
intelligence operations. IPB products help commanders and staffs understand all relevant aspects of the
operational environment throughout all operations process activities. In addition, the commander and staff
consider IPB results when planning employment of MI collection assets. (Table 1-2 on page 1-12 describes
the relationship of IPB to intelligence operations.)
TARGETING
1-66. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to
them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). Army targeting uses the functions
decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) as its methodology. Intelligence operations support the targeting
process by the following: locating targets; identifying, classifying, and tracking targets; observing actions on
targets; determining whether to engage or continue collection on targets; and assessing the effects of those
actions. MI collection assets collect information to aid in situation development, target acquisition, functional
damage assessment, munitions effects assessment, and battle damage assessment; however, many cannot
support all these tasks at the same time. Therefore prioritizing the information tasks given to them is critical.
Thorough planning and disciplined execution use high-demand MI collection assets more efficiently. (Table 1-3
on page 1-13 describes the relationship of the targeting process and intelligence operations. For doctrine on
targeting see FM 3-60. For doctrine on fires planning see ADRP 3-09.)
Decide
1-67. The decide function provides the overall focus and sets priorities for intelligence operations that
support targeting. This function draws heavily on IPB products and continuous assessment of the situation.
Targeting priorities are addressed for each phase or critical event of an operation. The decisions made are
reflected in the following products:
 High-payoff target list, a prioritized list of high-payoff targets.
 Information collection tasks to support targeting requirements.
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Chapter 1
 Target selection standards, which address accuracy or other attack criteria.

 Attack guidance matrix, which addresses which targets to attack, how and when to attack them,
and the desired effects.
Table 1-2. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield and intelligence operations
IPB Step IPB output Significance to intelligence operations
Step 1. • Significant characteristics of • Effects of climate and terrain on military
Define the the operational environment intelligence (MI) collection assets
operational • Limits of the unit’s area of • Input to the task organization of MI
environment interest collection assets
• Intelligence gaps • Development of the initial information
collection plan containing tasks for
intelligence operations
• Initiate intelligence operations to acquire
information to complete the plan
Step 2. • Analysis of the operational • Weather and terrain analysis to
Describe the environment determine potential MI collection asset
• Effects of the operational locations
environmental
effects on environment on threat and • Civil considerations effects on
friendly courses of action intelligence operations
operations
Step 3. • Updated or created threat • Threat composition, disposition, and
Evaluate the models tactics to determine indicators for
• Threat capabilities intelligence operations
threat
• Identification of high-value targets to
support targeting
• Threat composition, disposition, and
tactics to consider when planning
Step 4. • Threat courses of action • Threat event template that includes
Determine threat named areas of interest and predicted
threat activity
courses of action
• Initial information collection
requirements
Detect
1-68. Intelligence operations locate and track targets during the detect function. Requirements for target
detection and tracking are expressed as information collection tasks. These are incorporated into the
information collection plan and passed to MI collection assets as missions. Their priority depends on the
importance of the target to the concept of operations.
1-69. MI collection assets report information they collect, processing it as necessary. In the intelligence
cell, targeting information is forwarded to all-source intelligence analysts for situation and target
development. Once a target specified for attack is identified, the analysts pass it to the fires cell. The fires cell
directs execution of the attack based on the fire support plan. Coordination between the intelligence staff and
the fires cell is essential to ensure that the targets are passed to an attack system that will engage the target.
Deliver
1-70. The deliver function involves attacking targets with lethal or nonlethal weapons systems. The
requirement to observe delivery of fires, adjust artillery fires, or control air-delivered fires is not normally
assigned to MI collection assets.
1-12 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

Assess
1-71. The assessment function is continuous and directly tied to the commander’s decisions throughout the
conduct of operations. Intelligence operations conducted to assess the effects of fires contribute to
assessment. For MI collection assets, missions to assess the effects of fires take the same form as other
collection missions. The commander incorporates information collected during intelligence operations into
combat assessment to determine if attacks have had the required effects or if reattack is necessary.
Table 1-3. The targeting process and intelligence operations
Targeting
Key input Key output
function
• Commander’s intent • High-payoff target list
• Completed intelligence preparation of • Target selection standards
Decide
the battlefield products • Attack guidance matrix
• Targeting requirements • Input to information collection plan
• Intelligence operations to identify and
• Information collection tasks Detect track key targets for delivery of fires
• Decision to attack target (with lethal • Intelligence operations to continue to
or nonlethal weapons) Deliver identify and track targets
• Attack guidance matrix
• Delivery of fires (lethal or nonlethal) • Intelligence operations to determine

Assess the effects of fires for combat
• Information collection tasks assessment
Dynamic Targeting
1-72. Dynamic targeting has six steps: find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess. Targets of opportunity
have been the traditional focus of dynamic targeting, because decisions on whether and how to engage must
be made quickly. Planned targets are also covered during dynamic targeting, but the steps simply confirm,
verify, and validate previous decisions. In some cases, dynamic targeting requires change or cancellation to
planned missions. The find, fix, and track steps tend to be information-intensive, while the target and engage
steps are typically labor-, unit-, and decisionmaking-intensive. The final step of dynamic targeting is
assessment. (See ADRP 3-09.)
Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate

1-73. Find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate (F3EAD) provides maneuver leaders at all levels
with a methodology that enables them to organize resources and array forces. While the targeting aspect of
F3EAD is consistent with D3A methodology (see paragraph 1-66), F3EAD provides maneuver commanders
an additional tool to address certain targeting challenges, particularly those found in a counterinsurgency
environment. F3EAD is not a replacement for D3A, nor is it exclusive to targeting; rather it is a specific
technique that works best at the tactical level for leaders to understand their operational environment and
visualize the effects they want to achieve. (See ADRP 3-09.)
RISK MANAGEMENT
1-74. Risk management is the process for identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from
operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits (JP 3-0). Throughout the
operations process, commanders use risk management techniques to develop mitigation and control measures
to help manage risk and protect the force. (See ADRP 3-37 for doctrine integrating risk management into
protection.)
1-75. For intelligence operations, risk management applies both to hazards to MI collection assets and to
the resulting information and intelligence. Disclosure of any information that could possibly compromise the
source of the information and tie it to intelligence operations must be consistent with U.S. national policies
and military objectives.
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Chapter 1
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AND THE CONTINUING ACTIVITIES

1-76. The commander and staff also ensure several activities are continuously planned for and coordinated.
(See ADRP 5-0.) The following continuing activities have an impact on intelligence operations throughout
the operations process: liaison, terrain management, and airspace control.
1-77. Liaison is that contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or
other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action (JP 3-08). With MI collection
assets from various echelons operating in multiple AOs, effective liaison ensures the required coordination
between units occurs. MI collection assets and units provide liaison as required by the command or support
relationship assigned to them or as specified in the plan or order.
1-78. Terrain management is the process of allocating terrain by establishing areas of operations,
designating assembly areas, and specifying locations for units and activities to deconflict activities that might
interfere with each other (ADRP 5-0). Through terrain management, commanders and staffs deconflict
operations, control movements, and reduce the chances of fratricide as units get in position to execute planned
missions. The unit owning an AO is responsible for terrain management within that AO. The intelligence
staff coordinates MI collection asset positions with either the movement and maneuver cell or current
operations integration cell. MI collection assets report their presence and movements to the command post of
the AO-owning unit.
1-79. Airspace control is a process used to increase operational effectiveness by promoting the safe,
efficient, and flexible use of airspace (JP 3-52). The joint force provides airspace control guidance in the
following: rules of engagement, airspace control plan, airspace control order, area air defense plan, and air
tasking order special instructions (also called SPINS). Conforming to this guidance is essential to maximize
combat effectiveness, minimize the risk of fratricide, and assure deconfliction. Some smaller (group 1) UASs,
such as the Raven, may not be included on the air tasking order, depending on use and mission requirements.
The inclusion of air assets in the air tasking order does not imply any change in command relationships or
tasking authority over them, nor does it restrict commanders’ flexibility to respond to the dynamics of the
operational environment. Airspace control includes both positive and procedural controls to facilitate the use
of airspace during operations. (See FM 3-52.)
REGIONALLY ALIGNED FORCES

1-80. Regionally aligned forces are those Army units assigned and allocated to combatant commands, as
well as those capabilities that are Service-retained (but aligned to a combatant command) and prepared by the
Army for regional missions. These missions include theater security cooperation and other shaping efforts.
Regional missions are driven by combatant command requirements and require an understanding of the
cultures, geography, languages, and militaries of the countries where they are most likely to occur. These
missions also require expertise in how to impart military knowledge and skills to others.
1-81. Regional alignment’s goal is to provide combatant commanders task-organized, responsive, and
consistently available capabilities to achieve the end state specified in the DOD guidance for global
employment of the force. Additionally, these forces help meet other requirements, including operational
missions in response to a crisis or contingency, operations support, theater security cooperation activities, and
bilateral or multilateral military exercises.
1-82. Regional alignment also provides a more effective approach for facing nontraditional threats in an
increasingly interdependent security environment. Forces organized under this concept provide a persistent
presence for combatant commanders and an immediate force capability to assure partners and deter potential
adversaries.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES INTEGRATION

1-83. Special operations forces (SOF) and conventional forces may rely on each other’s capabilities to
maximize the complementary and reinforcing effects of both. The degree of interdependence varies based on
the specific roles, activities, and circumstances. Depending on requirements, SOF can operate independently
or with conventional forces. SOF can assist and complement conventional forces so they can achieve an
1-14 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

objective that otherwise might not be attainable. The best means of employing SOF is usually with
conventional forces in which each force fulfills the role it is optimally designed to accomplish.
1-84. During extended or large-scale operations involving both conventional forces and SOF, combined
control and deconfliction measures take on added significance and the integration and synchronization of
conventional and special operations missions are critical. The tactical commander must consider both
conventional and special operations capabilities and limitations, particularly in the areas of tactical mission
command and sustainment. The exchange of liaison elements between the staffs of appropriate conventional
forces and SOF further enhances integration of all forces concerned.
1-85. The exchange of liaison elements between the staffs of appropriate conventional forces and SOF
further enhances integration of all forces concerned. These liaison elements aid in executing the mission,
precluding fratricide, and eliminating duplication of effort, disruption of ongoing operations, or loss of
intelligence sources. These efforts are crucial to maintaining the overall unity of effort, coordination of
limited resources, and campaign tempo. SOF and conventional forces integration considerations include the
following:
 Exchange and use of liaison and control elements are critical when conventional forces and SOF
conduct operations in the same operational area against the same threat.
 A thorough understanding of a unit’s capabilities and limitations enhances integration and
interoperability planning.
 During mission planning, options regarding how to integrate conventional forces and SOF
maneuver elements should be considered. Detailed planning and execution coordination is
required throughout the process.
 Successful integration and interoperability of conventional forces and SOF are dependent upon
each understanding the other’s missions, systems, capabilities, and limitations.
1-86. Special operations missions are both intelligence-driven and intelligence-dependent. Intelligence
products developed for SOF must be detailed, accurate, relevant, and timely. For example, infiltrating a
building in a hostile noncombatant evacuation operation requires exact information on its structure and
precise locations of hostages or persons to be rescued. National- and theater-level intelligence products are
often required at a lower echelon than is normally associated with support to conventional forces. They may
also require near real-time dissemination to the operator level.
1-87. Special operations requirements are heavily mission- and situation-dependent. Because SOF
missions may vary widely, the associated intelligence support also may vary. Therefore, intelligence support
for SOF requires a thorough understanding of special operations requirements at the tactical level. This causes
national and theater support to be much more detailed and precise to support special operations requirements.
(See ADRP 3-05 for more details. The following variables can affect intelligence support:
 Combat (hostile) or cooperative noncombat (permissive) environments.
 Multinational, joint, or unilateral operations.
 Force composition.
 Maritime or land-based operations.
 Mission duration.
 Mission command elements and intelligence support facilities.
 Adversary capabilities, objectives, and operational concepts.
MISSION COMMAND OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

1-88. ADP 6-0 discusses the exercise of mission command, referring to an overarching idea that unifies the
mission command warfighting function and the mission command philosophy of command. This idea applies
the principles of mission command with the art of command and science of control in order to integrate the
warfighting functions. Under mission command, the supported commander and staff describe the task and
purpose for intelligence operations through mission orders. Control of intelligence operations is achieved
through the establishment of command and support relationships and also through MI technical channels.
Management of collected data and information is accomplished through information management procedures.
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Chapter 1
ROLE OF THE COMMANDER

1-89. Commanders and staffs at all levels synchronize intelligence with the other warfighting functions to
maximize their ability to visualize the operational environment and disrupt the threat simultaneously
throughout the AO. The distribution of specific intelligence assets enhances the capability of the combined
arms team to concentrate combat power and minimize risk. The commander, based on recommendations from
the intelligence staff, tailors intelligence capabilities and intelligence operations to support the mission. The
general force tailoring and specific task organization establishes an ordered command and support structure
with technical channels for intelligence operations. Commanders provide guidance and continuous feedback
throughout operations by—
 Providing direction.
 Stating clear, concise CCIRs.
 Synchronizing the intelligence warfighting function.
 Participating in planning.
 Collaborating with the G-2 or S-2 during the execution of operations.
1-90. The commander’s involvement and interaction enable the operations and intelligence staffs to more
effectively assess how well the intelligence produced is meeting the commander’s requirements. Commander
involvement also helps the staff keep the command’s information collection efforts, including intelligence
operations, synchronized with the overall operation. The commander drives intelligence, intelligence
facilitates operations, and operations are supportive of intelligence; this relationship is continuous.
Commanders’ considerations for the intelligence warfighting function include the following:
 Reducing operational uncertainty. Intelligence does not eliminate uncertainty entirely.
Commanders determine prudent risks inherent in any operation.
 Determining the appropriate balance between the time allotted for collection and operational
necessity. It takes time to collect information and then develop that information into detailed and
precise intelligence products.
 Prioritizing finite resources and capabilities.
 Resourcing and prioritizing the intelligence warfighting function appropriately to have enough
network capability and access to meet the commander’s needs.
 Employing organic and supporting collection assets as well as planning, coordinating, and
articulating requirements to leverage the entire intelligence enterprise.
ROLE OF THE STAFF

1-91. The staff’s main task is to support the commander in the exercise of mission command throughout
the operations process. Staffs use knowledge management and information management practices to provide
commanders with the information they need to create and maintain their understanding and make effective
decisions. The preceding discussions of the operations process, the intelligence process, and mission
command address specific staff responsibilities for intelligence operations. Staff leaders also keep the
intelligence operations guidelines in mind. In addition, staff members consider the following when planning,
controlling, and assessing intelligence operations:
 Nature of the mission and threat. Offensive, defensive, and stability operations differ in many
ways: among them, information requirements, time frames, and rules of engagement. These
differences influence the information staffs require.
 Terrain, weather, and civil considerations. The type of environment (such as, urban,
mountain, jungle, or desert), the size of the AO, trafficability, and weather conditions affect
when, where, and how MI collection assets are employed. Conditions may degrade sensor
capabilities. Staffs consider how employing MI collection assets, especially HUMINT
collectors, may affect the local population’s attitude toward the force. While all operations
involve interaction with locals, this interaction is most likely to affect mission accomplishment
during stability operations.
 Commander’s intent and guidance. The commander’s intent and guidance may include
specific requirements for or constraints on intelligence operations. Conversely, they may leave
leeway for subordinate commanders and staffs.
1-16 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

 Troops and support available. Available MI collection assets determine the possible
intelligence operations. Organic assets are often augmented by capabilities from higher
headquarters. Command and support relationships may limit how supported units employ these
assets.
 Time available. When planning intelligence operations, staffs consider both the time required to
collect information and the time required to produce intelligence from that information. It makes
no sense to collect information if there is not enough time to produce intelligence from it. Staffs
pay particular attention to the time available before H-hour when considering whether to execute
intelligence operations to support planning.
 Complexity of synchronizing intelligence operations. Intelligence operations by nature are
conducted over a wide breadth and depth of the supported command’s AO. Successful
intelligence operations require coordination across multiple echelons. They require airspace and
ground-space deconfliction and coordination. They require a tailored approach for PED enablers
to ensure assets are able to communicate, process, exploit, and disseminate efficiently and
effectively.
TASK-ORGANIZING
1-92. Planners carefully consider the appropriate command or support relationship needed for each
situation. Planners balance responsive support to the augmented unit with flexibility to distribute the low-
density, high-demand MI collection assets as necessary across the AO. Planners consider command and
support relationships along with the mission variables when developing plans and orders. The following
discussion addresses factors to consider for intelligence operations. (See ATTP 5-0.1 for doctrine on task-
organizing.)
Command Relationships
1-93. Command relationships are used when the most responsive employment of augmenting MI units is
required. Army command relationships are assigned, attached, operational control (OPCON), and tactical
control (TACON). Each relationship has inherent responsibilities associated with it. (See table 1-4 on page
1-18.) All relationships other than assigned temporarily associate the augmenting MI unit with the gaining
unit. Augmenting units return to their MI parent unit at the end of the operation, as specified in the plan or
order directing the relationship, or when directed by a fragmentary order.
1-94. OPCON normally provides full authority to task-organize augmenting commands and forces and to
employ those forces as the gaining commander considers necessary. It does not, in and of itself, include
authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit
training. A significant consideration in the OPCON relationship is that sustainment and other administrative
control (ADCON) responsibilities remain with the parent MI unit unless the plan or order directing the
relationship specifies otherwise. Normally, modifications to the inherent responsibilities are directed in the
Tasks to Units subparagraph of paragraph 3 of the order (for example, 1st BCT: Provide security and
sustainment support to 1/1/A/32 MI).
1-95. TACON limits the gaining commander’s authority to the detailed direction and control of movement
or maneuver necessary to accomplish the missions or tasks assigned. TACON does not provide authority to
change the organizational structure of the augmenting asset or direct administrative or logistic support.
Support Relationships
1-96. Commanders establish support relationships when subordination of one unit to another is
inappropriate, such as when limited MI collection capabilities must support multiple units. Support
relationships provide the greatest flexibility to distribute MI collection assets across an AO. Support
relationships are graduated from an exclusive supported and supporting relationship between two units—as in
direct support—to a broad level of support extended to all units under the control of the higher
headquarters—as in general support. Support relationships do not normally alter ADCON. Intelligence
operations normally use two support relationships: direct support and general support.
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 1-17

Chapter 1
Table 1-4. Army command and support relationships

1-97. In all support relationships, the parent unit has the responsibility for sustainment. Conditions may
exist in which sustainment by the parent unit is not possible because of time, distance, or threats. In these
cases the plan or order directing the support relationship could direct the supported unit to provide
sustainment for the supporting unit as described in paragraph 1-94.
1-98. The MI commander normally provides recommendations to the staff in matters of task-organizing MI
collection assets and outlines the effects of the command and support relationships being considered. The
following paragraphs address factors to consider when specifying relationships for ground-based SIGINT
collection teams, HUMINT collection teams, and tactical unmanned aircraft system (TUAS) assets.
1-18 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

Ground-Based Signals Intelligence Collection Teams

1-99. When task-organizing ground-based SIGINT teams, considerations include the supported unit’s
ability to—
 Control SIGINT collection teams.
 Receive, use, and store classified SIGINT reporting.
 Perform additional analysis of SIGINT collection and reporting.
1-100. Direct support is effective when—
 Potential targets are concentrated and relatively static.
 SIGINT teams operate in an uncertain or hostile environment where focused maneuver unit
operations occur in the same area where targets are available.
1-101. General support is effective when—
 Potential targets are widely dispersed and move freely.
 The supported unit is unable to meet the prerequisites associated with direct support (that is,
unable to control missions).
 More than one battalion is operating in the area where the SIGINT teams will operate.
 Targeted communications can best be collected outside of the supported unit’s AO.
Human Intelligence Collection Teams

1-102. When task-organizing HUMINT collection teams, considerations include—
 The supported unit’s ability to control the teams.
 The number of teams augmenting each subordinate unit.
 The ability of the supported unit to provide security for team movements and meetings.
1-103. HUMINT teams of the MI company HUMINT collection platoon may operate in direct support of a
maneuver battalion, the reconnaissance squadron, or these formations’ subordinate companies or troops.
Operational management teams control HUMINT collection operations at battalion and lower levels. A single
operational management team is designed to control two to four HUMINT collection teams (mission-
dependent). (See FM 2-22.3.)
1-104. Direct support is effective when—
 Potential sources are within the supported unit’s AO and relatively static.
 HUMINT collection teams can accompany maneuver units during operations in areas where
sources and networks are available. (Teams must accompany maneuver forces in uncertain or
hostile environments.)
1-105. General support is effective when—
 HUMINT collection teams are required to cover large areas in which sources and networks
move freely.
 More than one battalion is operating in the area where teams will operate.
 The tactical situation is permissive, allowing for the employment of teams without a security element.
 The MI company can provide sustainment for the team.
Note. Paragraphs 1-104 and 1-105 do not apply to HUMINT support to detainee operations. See
FM 2-22.3 for detailed information on this task.
Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System Platoon Control Considerations

1-106. The techniques used to control the TUAS platoon depend on the mission. The supported unit
normally places the platoon’s elements where they can best conduct the required missions. This could include
operating from a subordinate battalion’s AO. The staff should consider the locations of the remote video
terminals that receive the video broadcast from the TUAS. The following paragraphs outline operational
considerations for the various types of control for the TUAS platoon.
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 1-19

Chapter 1
1-107. Brigade control (general support) eliminates one echelon in planning, control, and reporting. This can
decrease planning time and improve responsiveness and flexibility. Brigade control may be appropriate under
these conditions:
 The analytical requirements exceed the capacity of the supported battalion or reconnaissance squadron.
 The TUAS launch and recovery section and/or the common ground station are close to the
controlling BCT command post, and the launch and recovery and common ground station elements
are close enough to the required named areas of interest to ensure sufficient time on station.
1-108. Supported battalion control (direct support) may be appropriate when the TUAS launch and recovery
section and common ground station are close to the battalion command post and both elements are close
enough to the required named areas of interest to ensure sufficient time on station.
TECHNICAL CHANNELS
1-109. Information normally moves throughout a force along specific transmission paths, or channels.
Establishing command and support relationships directs the flow of reported information during intelligence
operations. Channels help streamline information dissemination by ensuring the right information passes
promptly to the right people. Commanders and staffs normally communicate through three channels:
command, staff, and technical. (See ADRP 6-0 and FM 6-02.71.)
1-110. For intelligence operations, technical channels are the transmission paths between intelligence units
(including sections) performing a technical function requiring special expertise. Technical channels control
the performance of technical functions. They neither constitute nor bypass command authorities; rather, they
serve as the mechanism for ensuring the execution of clearly delineated technical tasks, functions, and
capabilities to meet the dynamic requirements of unified land operations. Establishing intelligence technical
channels ensures oversight of and adherence to existing policies or regulations for information collection
tasks contained within the information collection plan. It also ensures compliance with all applicable U.S.
laws and policy, including, but not limited to, those listed in table 1-1 on page 1-2. In specific cases,
regulatory authority is granted to national and DOD intelligence agencies for specific intelligence discipline
collection and is passed through technical channels.
1-111. Commanders direct operations but often rely on MI technical expertise to plan portions of the unit’s
intelligence operations effort. This expertise includes focusing information collection tasks involving SIGINT
collection, HUMINT military source operations, and CI. It involves applying highly technical or legally sensitive
aspects and specific parameters to each task. Information and requirements concerning these areas are passed over
technical channels. Specifically, uses of technical channels include, but are not limited to, the following:
 Defining, managing, or prescribing techniques for the employment of specific MI collection assets.
 Identifying critical technical collection criteria, such as technical indicators.
 Recommending collection techniques, procedures, or assets.
 Receiving classified reporting from MI collection assets.
LANGUAGE SUPPORT
1-112. Military operations are highly dependent on military- and contractor-provided foreign language
support. The requirement to communicate with and serve on multinational staffs, communicate with local
populations, and collect information necessitates the use of linguists. The growing focus on multinational
operations increases the competition for limited linguist resources that are vital for mission success. Language
support requirements typically fall into one of four broad categories:
 Intelligence operations. This category includes the traditional SIGINT, HUMINT, and CI
disciplines, as well as foreign language support to protection and exploitation of open-source
information.
 Operations and multinational liaison. This category includes coordination of military
operations and liaison with multinational partners, previously unaffiliated nations, host-nation
personnel and offices, and at times adversary or former adversary nations. (See ATTP 5-0.1.)
 Civil affairs operations. Civil affairs operations enhance the relationship between civil
authorities and military forces. They involve applying civil affairs functional specialty skills to
1-20 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

areas normally under the responsibility of the civil government. These operations involve
establishing, maintaining, influencing, or exploiting relations between military forces and all
levels of host-nation government agencies. These activities are fundamental to executing
stability operations and stability tasks conducted during offensive and defensive operations.
Civil affairs personnel, other Army forces, other government agencies, or a combination of all
three performs these tasks. Foreign language support is critical to civil affairs in such areas as
government liaison, legal agreements, medical support and operations, law enforcement,
engineering projects, public safety, security, and population control. (See FM 3-57.)
 Sustainment. This category consists of foreign language support to sustainment functions.
These functions include logistic contracting; port, railhead, airhead, or transshipment operations;
and convoy operations. (See ADP 4-0 and ADRP 4-0.)
1-113. The G-1 or S-1 is responsible for the linguist staffing and replacement management. The G-4 or S-4
has duties and responsibilities in some circumstances when local hire contract linguists are utilized to support
operations. Each staff element is responsible for determining linguist requirements for their staff or
warfighting function needs.
LANGUAGE SUPPORT FOR INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

1-114. The SIGINT, HUMINT, and CI intelligence disciplines require specific language skills to
successfully accomplish their collection tasks. SIGINT collectors often analyze and report information
obtained through intercept of foreign language communications. Communications intelligence, together with
intelligence research and analysis missions, demands highly skilled listening and reading language
capabilities. HUMINT collection operations that require foreign language capabilities include the following:
 Interrogation. Foreign language requirements for interrogation include listening and speaking
abilities for conducting the interrogation itself.
 Debriefing. Debriefers require foreign language reading, listening, and speaking capabilities to
prepare for and carry out debriefings of foreign subjects.
 Liaison. HUMINT collectors rely heavily on language ability to conduct effective liaison with
host-nation and other officials.
 Military source operations. All foreign language capabilities are required for effective conduct
of military source operations.
1-115. CI tasks often require language skills similar to those required for HUMINT tasks. The CI and
HUMINT specialties both identify language proficiency with a skill qualification identifier. However, when
language-qualified CI debriefers are not available, interpreters may be used.
LANGUAGE SUPPORT SOURCES

1-116. Commanders can use various sources to obtain the linguists needed to support operations. It is vital
to know the advantages and disadvantages of each type of linguist and to carefully match the available
linguists to the various requirements of the operation.
Army Language Military Occupational Specialities

1-117. The language-dependent MI enlisted military occupational specialty (MOS) is 35P with a skill
qualification identifier of L (cryptologic linguist). HUMINT collector specialties (MOS 35M and warrant
officer MOS 351M) are designated as language-capable (but not language-dependent). Leaders should be
aware of the language proficiency level of their assigned HUMINT collectors, which may range from almost
no language to full native proficiency. Some Soldiers in the following enlisted and warrant officer MOSs are
trained in foreign languages: MOSs 35F and 350F (All-Source Intelligence Analyst), MOSs 35L and 351L
(CI Agent), and MOSs 35N and 352N (SIGINT Analyst).
1-118. The following non-MI career management fields, branches, and functional areas include language-
qualified enlisted MOSs and officer areas of concentration:
 18 (Special Forces [enlisted, warrant officers, and officers]).
 37 (Psychological Operations [enlisted and officers]).
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 1-21

Chapter 1
 38 (Civil Affairs).
 Functional area 48 (Foreign Area Officer).
 09L (Interpreter-Translator).
Contract Linguists
1-119. U.S. civilians can be contracted to provide linguist support. They have an advantage over local-
national hires because their loyalty to the United States is more readily evaluated and it is easier for them to
be granted the necessary security clearance. However, there are usually severe limitations on the deployment
and use of civilians. A careful assessment of their language ability is important because, in many cases, they
use old-fashioned terms or interject U.S. idioms. If the linguists are recent immigrants, the use of the
language in their country of origin could be dangerous to them. Similarly, their loyalty may reside with their
country of origin, religious group, tribal affiliation, or other close connections when the interests of these
groups are at odds with U.S. interests.
1-120. Local-national hires often provide the bulk of linguist support. They are usually less expensive to
hire than U.S. civilians are and know the local dialect, idioms, and culture. The expertise of these linguists in
particular areas or subject matters can be an asset.
1-121. All commands must comply with the CI screening policy for contract linguist support. This may be
done by the hiring agency within the joint operations area or by CI personnel. These individuals must also be
screened by CI personnel periodically throughout their employment.
1-122. When requesting civilian contract linguists, the commander and staff must identify requirements by
category. The contract linguist categories are—
 Category I. Category I linguists are locally hired personnel with an understanding of the English
language. They undergo a limited screening, are hired in-theater, do not possess a security
clearance, and are used for unclassified work. During most operations, category I linguists must be
rescreened on a scheduled basis. Category I linguists cannot be used for intelligence operations.
 Category II. Category II linguists are U.S. citizens who have native command of the target
language and near-native command of the English language. They undergo a screening process
that includes a national agency check. Upon favorable findings, these personnel are granted a
Secret Collateral clearance.
 Category III. Category III linguists are U.S. citizens who have native command of the target
language and native command of the English language. They undergo a screening process that
includes a special background investigation and a polygraph. Upon favorable findings, category III
linguists are granted an interim or final Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information
clearance by the designated U.S. Government personnel security authority.
Army Linguists not DOD-Trained

1-123. The Army also includes numerous Soldiers of all grades who are proficient in a foreign language but
whose primary duties do not require foreign language proficiency. They may have attended a civilian school
to learn a foreign language, or they may have acquired proficiency through their heritage. They have the
advantage of being trained Soldiers and are therefore readily deployable throughout the AO. They may
qualify for a foreign language proficiency bonus by passing the Defense Language Proficiency Test. It is
difficult for a nonlinguist to assess the capabilities of Soldiers who have not taken the Defense Language
Proficiency Test. Without a test score on record, it is also difficult for the manpower and personnel staff to
identify them as a linguist.
DETERMINING LANGUAGE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

1-124. Determining linguist requirements for any operation can be difficult because each operation is
unique. The staff determines linguist requirements as part of IPB during mission analysis. It starts by
identifying specified or implied tasks requiring foreign language support. Other critical factors are the
organization or echelon of command and the location of the AO. The staff uses these criteria to determine the
allocation of linguists, such as one linguist team per echelon of command, one linguist per piece of
1-22 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

equipment, or one linguist team per location where the function is to be performed. The staff then determines the
number of linguists needed for an operation based on the tasks to be performed and the allocation of linguists.
Within this process the staff considers the different dialects within the AO when determining language support
requirements. The intelligence cell at each echelon is responsible for the following:
 Identifying category II and category III linguist requirements needed to support intelligence
functions in all contingency areas. Intelligence staff requirements for linguist support include but
are not limited to the following:
 Evaluate and/or use local maps and terrain products in operations.
 Assess local open-source information for intelligence value.
 Determining linguist requirements, based on the mission and on the foreign languages and
dialects spoken in the AO.
 Providing intelligence training for MI linguists employed in AOs.
 Coordinating for security investigations, as necessary, for local-hire linguists.
 Providing support to CI screening of contracted linguists and hired local-national labor force.
1-125. For policy on the Army foreign language program, see AR 11-6.
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 1-23

Chapter 2
Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Operations
INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES ACROSS THE BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM
2-1. As a combined arms organization, the BCT forms the basic building block of the Army’s tactical
formations. All BCTs include the following capabilities: maneuver, fires, reconnaissance, sustainment,
medical, MI, military police, signal, and engineer. This organizational flexibility enables BCTs to function
across the range of military operations. Armored BCTs have combined arms battalions. Infantry BCTs and
Stryker BCTs have infantry battalions.
2-2. Intelligence is represented at all BCT echelons. Company-level commanders may form a company
intelligence support team (COIST) as the situation requires The BCT staff and all battalion staffs include an
intelligence cell. In addition, all BCT designs contain an organic MI company, and all are augmented by an
Air Force weather team.
2-3. The function of the MI company is to develop intelligence for the BCT. The MI company conducts
SIGINT collection, HUMINT collection, and full-motion video collection in support of the BCT and its
subordinate commands. The MI company also provides intelligence analysis capability and other support to
the intelligence cell. In addition, the MI company may augment selected maneuver companies with MI
Soldiers to form the nucleus of the COIST.
2-4. BCT intelligence assets are employed to support mission command by meeting the information
collection tasks of the BCT and its subordinate units. The BCT staff develops a scheme of information
collection, which employs maneuver and MI units and on the basis of the BCT’s mission, PIRs, concept of
operations, and commander’s intent. This scheme integrates intelligence operations with the BCT’s overall
operation. MI collection assets are positioned to—
 Satisfy specific information requirements. (See ATTP 2-01.)
 Expose threat vulnerabilities.
 Monitor key locations.
 Detect targets.
 Collect information for assessment of lethal and nonlethal effects.
 Identify opportunities as they arise.
2-5. Intelligence operations are normally weighted to support the main effort. The BCT intelligence
structure has the flexibility to tailor its capabilities to meet the requirements of various types of operations
and to adapt to changing operational needs during execution. For each operation, the commander and staff
create and refine requirements and develop a scheme of information collection that positions MI and
maneuver collection assets where they can best satisfy those requirements.
2-6. The BCT MI company may receive augmentation from higher echelons and national agencies. This
augmentation may include the following:
 Additional SIGINT, HUMINT, and UAS collection capabilites.
 Additional processing and analytical capabilities.
 Biometrics-enabled intelligence, document and media exploitation, and forensic-enabled intelligence
capabilities.
 CI personnel.
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 2-1

Chapter 2
COMPANY INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TEAM

2-7. Many maneuver company commanders organize small intelligence support teams from within their
units to provide tailored intelligence products to the company leadership. The COIST does this by
combining information gained from company operations with intelligence received from adjacent and
higher units. The COIST analyzes and reports information collected by the company while receiving,
parsing, and reporting intelligence collected by other organizations. (See TC 2-19.63.)
2-8. COIST Soldiers are integral to providing platoons with information about enemy forces and potential
hostile areas. COISTs use information derived from all intelligence disciplines to determine changes in
enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action. The battalion or brigade intelligence cell
provides an initial analysis of the AO to the company. COISTs refine these products based on knowledge
gained by assets performing company missions.
2-9. The COIST assists the company leadership throughout the conduct of troop leading procedures.
Upon receipt of mission, the COIST assists the company leadership with mission analysis, focusing on
refining what is known about the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations, and their effects on the
company’s operation. As the company leadership develops a tentative plan, the COIST refines battalion
products, creating detailed situation and event templates. As each friendly course of action is being
developed, the COIST provides possible and likely enemy reactions, along with the effects of terrain and
weather on friendly and enemy courses of action.
2-10. During execution of company operations, the COIST analyzes information and produces intelligence,
assisting the company commander in recognizing and interpreting indicators of enemy intentions and
objectives. This analysis accomplishes the following: confirms or denies enemy courses of action, provides
enemy locations, explains what the enemy is doing in relation to the company operations, and provides an
estimate of enemy combat effectiveness.
Note. Forming and resourcing the COIST is vital to its successful employment. The earlier the
COIST is formed, the better. Early formation allows opportunities to practice and refine SOPs
prior to deployment. Communications requirements for the COIST require consideration by the
battalion and company commanders and staff.
BATTALION INTELLIGENCE CELL

2-11. The battalion intelligence cell contains the battalion S-2, an assistant S-2, and one or more all-source
intelligence analysts. The cell is responsible for providing timely, accurate intelligence analysis and
products in support of the commander, staff, and subordinate units. The S-2 supervises and coordinates
collection, processing, production, and dissemination of intelligence, in conjunction with the S-3. The cell
makes analytical predictions on when and where actions will occur. It also provides analysis on the effects
of relevant aspects of the operational environment on friendly and enemy courses of action and capabilities.
The S-2 is responsible for evaluating the enemy in terms of doctrine, threat characteristics, high-value
targets, capabilities, and vulnerabilities. In conjunction with the S-3, the S-2 coordinates the battalion
staff’s recommended PIRs for inclusion in the CCIRs. The intelligence cell integrates staff input to IPB
products for staff planning, decisionmaking, targeting, and combat assessment. The S-2 also plans and
manages information collection tasks in coordination with the S-3 and fires cell.
2-12. A battalion intelligence cell is also responsible for—
 Attending all military decisionmaking process and targeting meetings.
 Proposing new PIRs to the commander.
 Providing the staff with a detailed projection of possible enemy courses of action for the next 24
to 72 hours, based on all enemy, terrain, and weather factors.
 Creating and maintaining the intelligence running estimate, which provides the commander and
staff with current assessments of the situation in the AO, based on enemy activities and other
relevant aspects within the AO.
 Integrating COIST reporting into intelligence cell products.
2-2 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM INTELLIGENCE CELL

2-13. The BCT intelligence cell is the intelligence organization in the command post that answers directly
to the BCT S-2. Higher headquarters may augment this cell with additional capabilities to meet mission
requirements. The BCT intelligence cell requests, receives, and analyzes information from all sources to
produce and distribute intelligence products. Although there are intelligence staff elements in other
command post cells, most of the intelligence staff section resides in this cell. (See ATTP 5-0.1 for doctrine
on command post organization. See FM 2-19.4 for more information on the BCT intelligence cell.)
COMPOSITION
2-14. The BCT intelligence cell consists of—
 The BCT intelligence staff section, established by a unit table of organization and equipment.
The section is the core around which the BCT S-2 forms the BCT intelligence cell.
 Designated Soldiers from the BCT MI company.
 An assigned Air Force weather team.
BCT S-2
2-15. The BCT S-2 is the principal advisor to the BCT commander and staff for all matters concerning the
intelligence warfighting function. In that role, the S-2 leads the intelligence cell and advises the commander
on intelligence matters. The BCT S-2 helps the commander focus and integrate MI collection assets and
resources to satisfy BCT intelligence requirements. Some of the specific responsibilities of the S-2 are—
 Oversee the BCT intelligence cell’s activities, specifically support to—
 Situation development.
 Lethal and nonlethal targeting.
 Indications and warnings.
 Assessment.
 Protection.
 Provide the commander and staff with assessments of threat capabilities, intentions, and courses
of action as they relate to the BCT and its mission.
 With the S-3, help the commander coordinate, integrate, and supervise the conduct of
intelligence operations. This includes but is not limited to—
 Overseeing the intelligence cell’s contributions to planning requirements and assessing
collection. (See ATTP 2-01.)
 Recommending changes to the information collection plan based on changes in the situation
and weather.
 Participate with the staff in performing IPB.
 Evaluate language support requirements and manage linguist support for intelligence operations.
 Coordinate for foreign disclosure training (when conducting operations with multinational
partners).
BCT S-2X
2-16. The S-2X is the principal advisor for all matters concerning the conduct of HUMINT and CI
activities. The S-2X staff element provides oversight and technical support for all HUMINT and CI
activities. This staff element assists the BCT staff in developing HUMINT and CI collection requirements.
(See TC 2-22.303 for 2X doctrine.)
2-17. While the MI company is responsible for tactical HUMINT collection, the S-2X provides the
collection focus, technical support, and technical guidance. The S-2X receives support and advice from the
BCT legal section. The S-2X—
 Develops specific information requirements for HUMINT from the PIRs.
 Deconflicts and synchronizes all HUMINT and CI activities in the BCT’s AO.
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 2-3

Chapter 2
 Coordinates technical support as needed for the HUMINT assets in the BCT’s AO.
 Performs analysis of HUMINT reporting and provides input to the MI company’s analysis
platoon.
 Oversees the BCT’s source registry.
 Oversees the BCT’s intelligence contingency fund and source incentive program.
 Reviews HUMINT tasking, funding requests, and collections to ensure compliance with legal,
regulatory, and procedural guidelines.
 Oversees the reporting of questionable activities committed by intelligence employees in
accordance with AR 381-10, procedure 15.
 Participates in planning for deployment and employment of CI assets in support of operations.
(CI assets from higher headquarters normally augment the BCT.)
Air Force Weather Team

2-18. For the BCT to conduct effective operations, all the command post cells as well as subordinate
commands and staffs must have current, high-resolution, and tailored weather intelligence upon demand.
Although the BCT relies heavily on reachback for weather support, it also requires local tailoring of
weather products by on-site weather specialists.
2-19. Air Force weather teams are specialists, experts in the art of determining the effects of weather on
tactical operations. They evaluate and apply operational weather squadron forecasts to specific BCT
missions, weapons systems, tactics, techniques, and applications. These teams deploy with the BCT and
provide both direct and indirect weather support tailored to the BCT’s needs. Specifically, the Air Force
weather team—
 Coordinates with all BCT planners to integrate weather intelligence into the conduct of BCT
operations.
 Advises the BCT commander on Air Force weather capabilities and limitations and on the ways
in which weather can contribute to or detract from BCT operations.
 Advises the Air Force on Army operational weather support requirements.
 Assists the S-2 and S-3 in monitoring the weather support mission, identifying responsibilities,
and resolving weather support deficiencies.
FUNCTIONS
2-20. The BCT intelligence cell produces tailored intelligence analysis and products to support the
commander, staff, and subordinate units by performing the following functions:
 Facilitate commanders’ visualization and understanding of the threat, terrain and weather, and
civil considerations, as well as other relevant aspects of operational environment within the BCT
area of interest.
 Support targeting and protection.
 Assist in information collection planning.
 Produce intelligence products.
 Disseminate and integrate intelligence.
Facilitate Commander’s Visualization and Understanding

2-21. The BCT intelligence cell provides information and intelligence that assists commanders in
performing their commander’s visualization. (See ADRP 5-0.) The cell provides this information and
intelligence by performing IPB, indications and warning, and situation development tasks.
Perform Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

2-22. IPB is the staff planning activity undertaken to understand the operational environment and the
options it presents to friendly and threat forces. It is a systematic process of analyzing the threat and
environment in a specific geographic area for a specific mission. By applying IPB, the commander gains
2-4 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

the information necessary to selectively apply and maximize combat power at critical points in time and
space. (See FM 2-01.3.)
Perform Indications and Warning

2-23. Indications and warning provides early warning to the commander and prevents surprise through
anticipation of significant changes in threat activities. It provides commanders with information that allows
them to shape the battlefield and quickly reorient forces on unexpected major opportunities or threats.
Perform Situation Development

2-24. Performing situation development confirms or denies threat courses of action, explains what the
threat is doing in relation to the friendly force commander’s intent, and provides an estimate of threat
combat effectiveness. Commanders use situation development to help understand the AO, thereby reducing
risk and uncertainty. Situation development helps commanders make decisions and execute branches and
sequels.
Support Targeting and Protection

2-25. The BCT intelligence cell provides the commander and staff with information and intelligence
support for targeting of the threat’s forces, organizations, units, and systems through lethal and nonlethal
fires. It also conducts tasks to deny or degrade threat efforts to access and collect information on friendly
forces. The BCT intelligence cell—
 Supports targeting by developing target systems, locating targets, and performing battle damage
assessment on engaged targets. (See FM 3-60.)
 Performs CI by reporting to the commander the capabilities and limitations of threat intelligence
services. (See FM 2-22.2.)
Assist in Information Collection Planning

2-26. The BCT intelligence cell integrates MI collection assets in an effort to produce intelligence that
helps commanders gain situational understanding. Information collection tasks are identified, prioritized,
and validated. An information collection plan is developed and synchronized with the concept of
operations. The BCT intelligence cell performs the planning requirements and assessing collection tasks to
support this function.
2-27. Planning requirements and assessing collection is a commander-driven, coordinated staff effort led
by the BCT S-2. The continuous activities of planning requirements and assessing collection identify the
best way to satisfy requirements of the supported commander and staff. These activities are not necessarily
sequential. (See ATTP 2-01.)
Produce Intelligence Products

2-28. Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis,
and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces
or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity that results in
the product and to the organizations engaged in such activity (JP 2-0). Intelligence informs commanders
and staffs of where and when to look. Reconnaissance, surveillance, security operations, and intelligence
operations are the collection means. These range from national and joint collection capabilities to
individual Soldier observations and reports. The result or product is intelligence that supports the
commander’s decisionmaking.
Disseminate and Integrate Intelligence

2-29. The BCT intelligence cell provides intelligence concerning the BCT’s AO by using various
communications networks. The cell provides intelligence via verbal reports, documents, textual reports,
graphic products, softcopy products, and automated databases. The commander and staff integrate the
intelligence to assist them in maintaining situational awareness.
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 2-5

Chapter 2
Establish the Intelligence Architecture

2-30. The BCT’s intelligence architecture is the compilation and interrelationship of all relevant
intelligence and communications capabilities, structures, concepts of operations, and personnel necessary to
ensure successful execution of the intelligence process This intelligence architecture includes more than
just organic BCT intelligence capabilities, systems, and personnel; all elements of the larger intelligence
enterprise that provide information and intelligence to the BCT are included in the intelligence architecture.
2-31. Planning the intelligence architecture is inseparable from long-range planning for future intelligence
operations and is closely tied to identification of the types and specifications of support directed by the
commander. It is roughly equivalent to the development of a blueprint for a house and gathering the
materials to build the house. The BCT cannot count on intelligence capabilities unless they are carefully
included in the intelligence architecture and supported by adequate communications.
2-32. The intelligence staff captures the architecture as a series of planning products that map the
operational and technical aspects of the interrelationship of the many components of the architecture. The
intelligence architecture includes but is more encompassing than the different intelligence and
communications technical networks. Technical networks are those information management and
information system connections that allow sharing of resources and information. The intelligence
architecture not only captures networks and technical specifications of those networks but also how the
elements of the architecture relate to each other. This architecture should address the following in terms of
mission tasks: technical control, tipping and cueing, maintenance, security measures, medical evacuation,
and force protection, among other considerations.
2-33. When developing the intelligence architecture, the intelligence staff considers all personnel,
organizations, systems, and procedures necessary for intelligence operations. The architecture must address
the following: preparing for operations, collecting the required information and analyzing it, producing the
required products, disseminating the resulting intelligence, and assessing both the intelligence produced
and the process that produced it. The BCT commander and staff must provide the resources (to include
personnel) and bandwidth necessary for the architecture based on requirements and realistic expectations
for intelligence and information collection capabilities. This is accomplished by ensuring the intelligence
architecture supports the necessary operational and technical connections between collection assets, control
elements, analytical cells, and headquarters to enable an effective and efficient information flow.
2-34. Planning and coordinating the intelligence architecture is critical during all types of operations. The
task is especially difficult when fixed sites and a robust communications infrastructure are not in place. It is
critical that the intelligence staff work with the commander and rest of the staff as early as possible and
throughout the entire planning process, especially during the military decisionmaking process.
Collaboration with the intelligence and other staffs of higher and lower units is also required to ensure the
BCT and its subordinates are integrated into the division intelligence architecture and LandWarNet.
2-35. Effective communications connectivity and automation are essential components of the intelligence
architecture. Establishing the communications network involves many complex technical issues. The
intelligence staff collaborates closely with the signal staff to arrange the required communications links.
The intelligence staff requires classified and unclassified network connections for its equipment. If
elements of the intelligence staff will be working outside the range of the unit’s communications systems, it
is necessary to coordinate for global or extended-range capabilities.
2-36. Some of the questions the staff must answer to establish an effective intelligence architecture
include—
 What types of intelligence support and intelligence mission tasks has the commander directed?
 Where will the unit decisionmakers operate from?
 How does the unit disseminate information to its decisionmakers and consumers?
 What are the information exchange rates on each network relative to the network capacity?
 How long does it take to pass certain reports and products?
 Identify the primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency forms of communications.
 Where are the unit’s collectors expected to operate from (across all disciplines and
complementary intelligence capabilities)?
2-6 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

 What are the unit’s intelligence processing capabilities (personnel and systems)?
 Does the unit have enough personnel (operators and maintainers) to conduct distributed analysis,
provide PED enablers, and provide analytical and other support from multiple locations in the
AO?
 Where are the unit’s intelligence production elements?
 What equipment is needed to support intelligence operations and intelligence staff operations
and to provide analytical and other support from multiple locations in the AO?
 Are the systems within the intelligence architecture (collection, production, and processing)
compatible with each other, and how do those systems communicate?
 Identify the intelligence databases that intelligence staff personnel must access and the networks
or systems that are necessary to access them.
 Identify users who require access to unit intelligence Web sites, Web postings, data files, and
databases, conforming to the appropriate U.S. law, DOD regulations, classification guidelines,
and security protocols.
 Identify any special requirements necessary to access this data (that is, security clearance,
polygraph, training or certification, regulatory, procedural, and so forth) and the points of
contact to acquire the necessary authorization and permissions.
 How does the unit work around incompatibility within the other warfighting functions’
architectures?
 What are the security requirements to support intelligence operations and intelligence staff
operations?
 What language support capabilities are needed for intelligence operations, key leader
engagement, and multinational liaison and information sharing.
 How can the unit access databases and information from higher echelons and other agencies?
Are there special requirements necessary to access these databases, such as a security clearance,
polygraph, training, or certification?
 How are unified action partners integrated into the intelligence architecture?
 What are the personnel training requirements for equipment, systems, and software to establish
and maintain the intelligence architecture?
Provide Intelligence Network Requirements

2-37. The BCT S-2 provides the intelligence cell’s communications requirements to the BCT S-6 as part of
creating the BCT communications architecture and communications plan. The S-6 is responsible for
planning the communications and information systems support for the BCT and its subordinate and
supporting units.
2-38. The role of the BCT S-6 is to support all warfighting functions by providing the connectivity
appropriate to passing voice and data information. All warfighting functions depend on a secure
communications infrastructure, which the BCT S-6 and organic signal company provide in the form of
LandWarNet. LandWarNet is a network for intelligence, fires, sustainment, protection, and movement and
maneuver to use for operations and to provide the commander and staff information necessary to make
decisions. It represents the Army’s portion of the DOD Global Information Grid. (See JP 6-0.)
Perform Information Management and Knowledge Management

2-39. Staffs use information management and knowledge management to provide commanders the
information they need to create and maintain their situational understanding and make effective decisions.
Information is disseminated, stored, and retrieved according to established information management
practices. Information management practices allow all involved to build on each other’s knowledge to
further develop a shared understanding across the force. (See ADRP 6-0.) Knowledge management
practices enable the transfer of knowledge between individuals and organizations. Knowledge transfer
occurs both formally (through established processes and procedures) and informally (through collaboration
and dialog). (See FM 6-01.1.)
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 2-7

Chapter 2
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY

2-40. As the BCT’s organic intelligence organization, the MI company supports the BCT and its
subordinate commands through collection and analysis of information and dissemination of intelligence.
The MI company comprises a company headquarters and four platoons (analysis, SIGINT collection,
HUMINT collection, and TUAS).
2-41. The MI company provides continual input for the BCT commander by maintaining the threat portion
of the common operational picture. MI company elements working in the intelligence cell collaborate with
the BCT operations staff to integrate information collection tasks and coordinate requirements as directed
by the BCT S-3.
2-42. MI company commanders direct the employment of the company in accordance with missions and
guidance from the BCT headquarters. MI company commanders locate where they can best exercise
mission command of company assets. As part of exercising mission command, MI company commanders
visit company elements deployed with forward units, maintain situational awareness of all teams’ positions,
and perform required administrative functions.
2-43. The MI company command post is usually co-located with the BCT main command post to facilitate
control of company assets and maximize support to the BCT intelligence cell. The MI company command
post includes the company headquarters element and representatives from each platoon. During BCT
operations, the analysis platoon normally augments the BCT intelligence cell under control of the BCT S-2.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
2-44. During the BCT’s planning, the MI company commander advises the BCT staff on employment
considerations of MI company assets and may assist in information collection planning. Mission variable
considerations affect the ability of the MI company commander to support BCT planning. When the BCT
commander approves the order, the MI company commander produces a company order. In addition to task
organization considerations addressed in ATTP 5-0.1, the MI company commander—
 Reallocates and repositions company assets in response to changes in the BCT’s mission or
threat actions.
 Establishes sustainment and security relationships with the BCT headquarters company and
subordinate battalions to sustain and protect MI company personnel and equipment as specified
in the BCT order.
 Integrates higher echelon augmentations into company operations as directed in the BCT order.
2-45. MI leaders ensure that intelligence operations conform to and support the commander’s intent, concept
of operations, scheme of information collection, and the scheme of maneuver. Key questions for planning
intelligence operations and integrating them into the overall BCT operation may include the following:
 What is the BCT task organization?
 How will terrain affect the employment of MI company assets?
 What effect will weather have on the capabilities of MI company assets?
 How does the selected friendly course of action portray the threat and the threat’s reactions to
the plan?
 What coordination is required with supported subordinate commanders and staffs?
 What is the role of intelligence operations within the scheme of information collection?
 Does the scheme of fires require intelligence operations support for target location and tracking?
 Does the scheme of fires require intelligence operations support for battlefield damage assessment?
 Does the communications plan provide adequate support for intelligence operations?
 Does the BCT order provide for sustainment of MI collection assets that cannot be sustained by
the BCT headquarters company?
 Do any MI collection assets require engineering support?
 Does the scheme of mobility/countermobility require intelligence operations support?
 Are there requirements or opportunities for biometrics collection?
2-8 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

Terrain
2-46. Terrain and vegetation have a significant impact on intelligence operations, particularly on the following:
 Operational effectiveness of line-of-sight sensors.
 Requirements for line-of-sight communications.
 Time-sensitive dissemination of collected information.
2-47. SIGINT and imagery collection systems require line of sight to the target area to be effective.
Accordingly, planners assess the effects of natural and artificial obstacles—such as mountains, buildings,
and vegetation—on planned intelligence operations.
2-48. Commanders assigned an AO are responsible for terrain management within its boundaries. Effective
terrain management ensures commanders know what units are in their AO and where they are located. This
information helps commanders deconflict operations, control movement, and prevent fratricide. Terrain
management includes the movement and positioning of MI collection assets. The intelligence staff
coordinates MI collection asset movement and positioning. The MI company commander ensures assets are
at locations to conduct intelligence operations according to the information collection plan.
Weather
2-49. Weather is a critical factor in most intelligence operations. Adverse weather and its associated effects
may degrade the ability to identify and locate targets. Weather effects on platforms and sensors can also
limit the type, location, and availability of collection capabilities. The MI company receives weather
information from the Air Force weather team in the BCT intelligence cell. (See paragraphs 2-18 and 2-19.)
Threat
2-50. A detailed threat analysis is performed to determine how and where to employ MI collection assets
and how to obtain the best possible information about the threat. Intelligence operations can be hampered
by the threat’s air defense capability and by camouflage, cover, concealment, and deception activities.
Threat electronic warfare capabilities must be determined to assess their effects on the following:
 Unmanned aircraft systems.
 Various downlinks.
 Communications links from collection assets to their controlling headquarters.
Coordination with Maneuver and Fires

2-51. The MI company plans for and coordinates some important maneuver and fires considerations with
many different units and headquarters in order to conduct operations. BCT and battalion SOPs should
address how the supported unit provides security for and fire support to intelligence operations. SOPs also
need to discuss integration of intelligence operations into the supported unit’s schemes of maneuver and
fires. The most important operational considerations include the following:
 Requests and coordination of air support and integration of UAS operations into the air tasking order.
 Planning of fires and fire support coordination measures needed to protect MI collection assets
(especially restricted fire areas and no fire areas). (See FM 3-09.)
 Maneuver control measures needed to control intelligence operations (such as insertion and
extraction requirements and plans, including short-notice emergency extractions). (See ADRP 3-90.)
 Coordination, deconfliction, and terrain management for ground collection assets.
 Coordination, deconfliction, and management of UAS operations with other air operations (airspace
control). (See paragraph 1-79.)
2-52. Changes to the situation during execution of the overall operation usually result in fragmentary
orders and changes to intelligence operations. In order to prevent fratricide and ensure the protection of
intelligence units and assets the staff and MI leadership considers—
 What assets need to be moved?
 What is the risk in moving the asset? Is the risk worth the potential information that might be gained?
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 2-9

Chapter 2
 Does the fire support plan need to change?

 Does the MI company need to conduct any subsequent planning, deconfliction, or coordination of
terrain management, movement control, casualty evacuation, or other operational consideration?
Sustainment
2-53. Sustainment considerations affecting intelligence operations include the following:
 Logistics.
 Maintenance, both motor maintenance on prime movers and electronic maintenance on
collection systems and sensors.
 Supplies, especially fuel (class III), major end items, including radios (class VII), medical
(class VIII), and repair parts and components for equipment maintenance (class IX).
 Personnel services. Human resources support.
 Health service support. Medical evacuation.
Combat Engineer
2-54. When planning intelligence operations, MI company commanders should consider combat engineer
support requirements for mobility, countermobility, and survivability; contingency spill plans; disposal of
hazardous materials; and detecting and neutralizing explosive hazards. (See FM 3-34.22.)
Communications
2-55. Effective communications—analog or digital, voice or data, secure or nonsecure—is essential for
successful intelligence operations. A complete communications plan addresses many technical details. Key
requirements and planning considerations for intelligence operations include the following:
 Determine and coordinate radio net requirements, supporting frequencies, and operational procedures
for reporting collected information.
 Obtain the required type and amount of communications equipment and related components.
 Possess and be familiar with all instructions, passwords, policies, regulations, and directives
required for operations security.
 Ensure Soldiers are trained in the use and procedures involved in operating the equipment, such
as reactions during jamming.
 Verify the fills, frequencies, alternate frequencies, and reporting guidelines for specific information.
 Coordinate collection and dissemination procedures with multinational forces.
 Establish, operate, and manage collection asset-specific communications networks.
2-56. The MI company operates on several communications nets. Communications redundancy reduces the
likelihood that losing any one system or command post will severely disrupt support to BCT operations. MI
company assets use three basic communications nets: the operations and intelligence nets, command nets,
and a discipline-specific technical net.
2-57. Operations and intelligence nets links the information collectors to controlling headquarters or
command posts. They are used to pass information of immediate value to the affected unit and to analytical
elements at the supported unit.
2-58. Command nets link higher headquarters with its subordinate elements. Normally a unit operates on two
command nets: one that links it to its higher headquarters and one that links it to its subordinate elements.
2-59. Technical nets link the control team to subordinate collection teams and to the centers or
organizations that provide the databases and technical guidance necessary for single discipline collection,
reporting, and analysis. (See paragraphs 1-109 through 1-111.)
2-60. Trojan SPIRIT communications systems are organic to the MI company. Through the Trojan SPIRIT
network, intelligence analysts gain access to national centers and other intelligence organizations outside
the BCT’s AO. Via these links, analysts can pull intelligence products, receive and analyze direct
downlinks from intelligence collection assets, and access external databases to fuse with organically
2-10 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

collected information. Trojan SPIRIT also provides access to JWICS through its joint deployable
intelligence support system (also called JDISS).
MULTIFUNCTIONAL PLATOON
2-61. In the near future, the design of the BCT MI company will change with the creation of one design for
each of the three types of BCTs—infantry, armored, and Stryker. The multifunctional platoon of the MI
company can employ multifunctional teams capable of multidiscipline collection and limited analysis.
Alternatively, it can employ a combination of SIGINT, HUMINT, and exploitation teams. The
multifunctional platoon is composed of—
 Ground-based SIGINT and HUMINT collection teams.
 An exploitation team. The exploitation team is responsible for receiving information and intelligence,
conducting initial analysis, and forwarding the results to the BCT intelligence staff and/or the
appropriate intelligence organization for further analysis.
2-62. The multifunctional platoon supports offensive, defensive, and stability tasks by providing—
 Support to targeting, using SIGINT terminal guidance; tagging, tracking, and locating; and
intelligence collection.
 Support to site exploitation, which includes support to document and media exploitation,
biometrics collection and enrollment, and battlefield forensic collection and limited exploitation.
 Intelligence operations that include—
 Determining threat locations, disposition, and intent.
 Supporting interrogation of detained personnel.
 Conducting SIGINT collection, direction finding of threat communications, support to SIGINT
surveys, and limited analysis.
 Conducting military source operations. The multifunctional team or HUMINT collection
team can leverage relationships with the local population (especially leaders) to gain additional
information on the enemy’s intentions and to identify threats. They can also assist with debriefing
displaced persons and interrogating detainees.
 Assisting in the conduct of threat vulnerability assessments.
 Performing limited all-source intelligence analysis.
2-63. The multifunctional platoon’s flexible design permits it to be employed in a number of
different ways for simultaneous missions. The platoon possesses the organic equipment needed to
accomplish most missions; however, it may be augmented with specialized equipment to expand its
capabilities. The specific design and any requirements for augmentation are based on the situation
(described in terms of the mission variables, METT-TC) and outcomes of the BCT’s military
decisionmaking process and the MI company commander’s and the platoon leader’s troop leading
procedures. The troop leading procedures are a dynamic process used by small-unit leaders to
analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation. These procedures enable leaders to
maximize available planning time while developing effective plans and preparing their units for an
operation.
2-64. The platoon leader employs the platoon’s mix of capabilities to answer the commander’s specific
information requirements identified for each mission and to identify combat information. The platoon is
most successful when supported by the S-2X or G-2X and cryptologic support teams. Without these
organizations and relationships, the platoon may be limited to tactical questioning, support to situation
development, limited SIGINT and targeting analysis, and HUMINT liaison opportunities. (See ATP 2-19.5
for doctrine on the multifunctional team.)
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 2-11

Chapter 2
Planning Considerations for Signals Intelligence Collection

2-65. (FOUO) Two major missions performed by SIGINT elements are signals intercept and direction
finding. Signals intercept includes those actions used to search for, intercept, and identify threat
electromagnetic signals for the purpose of immediate threat recognition. Direction finding is a procedure
for obtaining lines of bearing of threat emitters for the purpose of determining their location.
Prophet Site Selection

2-66. (FOUO) The BCT’s organic ground-based SIGINT collection system is the Prophet. Several factors
are considered when recommending locations for Prophet SIGINT assets, including the following:
 What is the weather, including conditions in the atmosphere and in the vicinity of the collection
asset and the targeted signal?
 What triggers the asset’s movement to subsequent positions?
 What is the asset’s movement priority, approved routes, security requirements for movement,
and coordination procedures?
 Will anticipated precipitation, wind, temperature, or space weather cause any adverse effects on
collection?
 What is the primary threat to the asset?
 What kind of threat forces?
 How can threat forces locate the asset (electronic warfare, observation, aerial)?
 When and where will they be a threat?
2-67. (FOUO) The Prophet collection teams, whether conducting missions in support of the BCT or the
subordinate maneuver elements, must be placed close to the targeted source while maintaining
communications with the control team. The limited height of collection antennas, the low-power output of
threat emitters, and the line-of-sight constraints imposed by terrain, require deployment of collection assets
as far forward as possible. The BCT SOP should state all control measures and coordination required for
movement and positioning of SIGINT collection assets; otherwise, these must be included in the BCT
order.
2-68. (FOUO) As ground-based SIGINT collection assets are moved closer to threat emitters, direction
finding accuracy improves and the collection assets develop the potential to hear and find deeper threat
targets. In contrast, positions along the BCT’s rear boundary limit collection to the close combat area. More
forward positions allow for collection beyond the close area but may stretch the communications links
between the Prophet teams, the SIGINT analysis and control teams, and the BCT command post. Forward
positions may also degrade Prophet teams’ survivability and mission capability if not augmented with
security elements.
2-69. (FOUO) During collection, the Prophet element forms an extended, integrated baseline that supports
both intercepting and locating threat emitters across the width and depth of the supported unit’s front. A
baseline consists of two or more Prophet teams deployed in a roughly linear formation. When operating in
a multistation baseline, collection assets work together to locate and, if directed, track a threat emitter’s
movement. The Prophet control team directs each collection asset to locate the same emitter. This entails
the control team providing (through technical channels) the collection teams with the emitter’s frequency
and any technical data that would help the teams find the same emitter. The terrain and the location of the
threat in relationship to the baseline are the basis for formation selection. (See figure 2-1.)
2-70. (FOUO) When developing a SIGINT baseline, MI leaders consider the following:
 Identify locations from which threat communications can be detected. GEOINT products can
assist in developing line-of-sight overlays and other tools for identifying potential baseline
locations. (See TC 2-22.7.) Prophet collection sites are selected based on the following criteria:
 Fightable. The position has line of sight to suspected threat emitter locations and is within
range of the targeted threat emitters.
2-12 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

 Survivable. The position can protect the system from observation and threat fires and can
be exited quickly.
 Achievable. The site can be reached by the collection asset under the anticipated weather,
trafficability, and visibility conditions.
 Controllable. The site has line-of-site communications with the command post and with
other systems with which it must maintain data links or communications.
 Tie the locations into baselines. Baselines normally are created in conjunction with phase lines
established in the supported unit’s concept of operations.
 Coordinate with the operations staff for approval of locations. Coordination is critical in terrain
management and fratricide avoidance.
 Include baseline locations on the information collection overlay and any other operational
graphics.
Figure 2-1. Signals intelligence baselines
Performing Signals Intercept and Direction Finding

2-71. (FOUO) Signals intercept can provide information of immediate tactical value that will affect
decisions and operations, such as the identification of imminent hostile actions and target locations.
2-72. (FOUO) Direction finding involves determining the direction of arrival of a radio wave. Direction
finding systems indicate the approximate direction along an imaginary line upon which an emitter lies. This
is commonly referred to as a line of bearing. (See figure 2-2 on page 2-14.)
2-73. (FOUO) A stationary ground-based SIGINT collection asset can determine only the approximate direction
of an emitter. Stand-alone is a single-station formation where each collection asset operates independently. This
is the least desirable method of direction finding; however, particular variants of the Prophet can perform signals
intercept and direction finding while on the move. This mobile intercept and direction finding capability allows
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 2-13

Chapter 2
the flexibility to provide collection support to units during a variety of missions. Also, the greater the distance
from the collection asset to the emitter, the greater the possibility for error.
Figure 2-2. Line of bearing

2-74. (FOUO) Two stationary ground-based collection assets can approximate the general vicinity of an
emitter. This approximation is determined by the intersection of two lines of bearing and is referred to as a
cut. Two teams working together or one team moving between two sites can produce a cut (provided the
emitter remains stationary). (See figure 2-3.) This data can be adequate for nonlethal (electronic) attack but
inadequate for targeting by lethal attack. A cut may also be used to cue other collection assets to assist in
providing targetable information.
Figure 2-3. Approximate emitter location based on a cut

2-75. (FOUO) Three or more stationary ground-based SIGINT collection assets can determine the location
of a specific emitter more accurately than two assets. Lines of bearing from three different locations
normally form a triangle when plotted on the map, which is called a fix. (See figure 2-4.) The required
information can be derived from the line-of-bearing data of fewer than three assets moving among multiple
sites or by an airborne platform. Through terrain analysis of the area within the triangle, the SIGINT
2-14 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

collector or analyst can determine the emitter’s most probable location. Some systems are designed to
automatically determine the emitter’s location without collector or analyst action.
Figure 2-4. Probable emitter location based on a fix

2-76. (FOUO) A factor that influences the accuracy of a fix is the geographic relationship of the collection
assets to the threat emitter. Multiple lines of bearing on the same threat emitter offer the most effective
application of the SIGINT collection assets. Thus, ground-based SIGINT collection teams are most
effectively deployed in multistation formations as the situation allows.
Low-Level Voice Intercept

2-77. (FOUO) The Prophet SIGINT collection system can be employed in dismounted collection missions,
sometimes referred to as low-level voice intercept (LLVI) missions. The LLVI capability allows BCTs to
collect SIGINT information from locations not accessible to vehicles or where threats may not expect to
find MI collection assets.
2-78. (FOUO) Typical LLVI missions last three to five days. An LLVI team normally consists of four
Soldiers; however, a team’s exact composition may vary based on the situation. In addition to their
personal and combat gear, LLVI team members carry the signals intercept system and batteries. The
heaviest items are the batteries.
2-79. (FOUO) The means and methods of movement for LLVI teams vary, depending on the mission.
LLVI teams are mobile and should be prepared to move to locations and sites by any means available.
Teams might conduct ground movement many miles to a remote site over rough terrain or at high altitudes,
they might convoy to an urban site and collect from inside a vehicle, or they might be inserted to or near a
site using available air assets.
2-80. (FOUO) Staff coordination for planning LLVI missions requires the same level of detail as planning
scout or long-range reconnaissance missions. Although LLVI teams can be employed on short notice, the
potential benefit is weighed against the risk associated with hasty planning and execution. (See ADRP 3-90
for doctrine on hasty versus deliberate operations.) At a minimum, the following information is needed to
conduct LLVI missions:
 Mission statement, including SIGINT collection tasks, latest time information is of value, and
anticipated length of mission.
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 PIRs, collection requirements, and associated specific information requirements.

 Enemy situation in the target area.
 Method of insertion, with abort criteria. Coordination time and place are included, if applicable.
 Fire support plan, to include assets available.
 Sustainment plan.
 Exfiltration plan.
 Communications plan.
Signals Intelligence Reporting

2-81. (FOUO) SIGINT assets can immediately report enemy actions or events critical to the operations of
friendly units. Time-sensitive SIGINT reporting may be via standard intelligence communications
channels.
2-82. (FOUO) Most SIGINT reports are formatted and classified. Common reports include—
 KLEIGLIGHT and tactical report (also called TACREP).
 Critical intelligence report (also called CRITIC).
2-83. (FOUO) SIGINT information may also be disseminated using unclassified (noncodeword) reports.
Unlike standard SIGINT product reports, noncodeword reports may be passed directly to commanders for
immediate tactical use. Specific procedures for noncodeword reporting during operations are normally in
the SIGINT appendix to the intelligence annex of the BCT order.
Planning Considerations for Human Intelligence Collection

2-84. Human intelligence is the collection by a trained human intelligence collector of foreign information
from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics,
equipment, and capabilities (FM 2-22.3). HUMINT uses human sources as a tool and a variety of collection
methods, both passive and active, to gather information to satisfy the commander’s intelligence
requirements and cue other information collection assets. (See FM 2-22.3.)
2-85. Successful HUMINT collection requires detailed planning and extensive research of the population
within the AO. The requirements for HUMINT collection must be detailed enough to allow identification
of sources that can provide the needed information. HUMINT source selection involves identifying,
researching, and actively locating a specific group, organization, or individual for the purpose of collecting
information in response to intelligence requirements. The source selection process allows for the
identification of the most likely source of information, minimizing the uncertainty of the access and
placement of sources. Source selection also helps optimize the HUMINT collection effort. Sources are
chosen according to their reliability, level of cooperation, and placement and access. HUMINT missions
include military source operations and interrogation.
Military Source Operations

2-86. (FOUO) Military source operations encompass the HUMINT tasks of screening, debriefing, liaison
and controlled source operations in support of Army operations. (See classified TC 2-22.302.)
Note. Military source operations are only conducted by HUMINT collectors. A HUMINT
collector is a person who is trained to collect information from individuals (HUMINT sources)
for the purpose of answering requirements. HUMINT collectors include trained and certified
enlisted personnel in MOS 35M, warrant officers in MOSs 351Y and 351M, commissioned
officers in area of concentration 35F, and their federal civilian employee counterparts. Trained
and certified civilian contractors can perform debriefing, screening, and other activities in
support of HUMINT operations.
2-87. Screening. As it applies to HUMINT collection, screening is the process of evaluating and selecting
human sources and documents for the prioritized collection of information based on the collection
2-16 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

requirements and mission of the unit conducting the screening. Screening categorizes and prioritizes
sources based on the probability of a particular source having priority information and the level of
cooperation of the source.
2-88. Debriefing. Debriefing is the process of overtly questioning cooperating human sources to satisfy
requirements, consistent with applicable law. The source usually is not in custody and usually is willing to
cooperate. Debriefing may be conducted at all echelons and throughout the range of military operations.
The primary categories of sources for debriefing are refugees, émigrés, displaced persons, local civilians,
and friendly forces.
2-89. Liaison. Liaison activities are programs to coordinate activities and exchange information with host-
nation military and civilian agencies, unified action partners, and nongovernmental organizations.
2-90. (FOUO) Controlled Source Operations. Controlled source operations are conducted using recruited
sources that respond to direction and control of the handling agent or collector and that are tasked and
provide information for which the source has placement and access. (See classified TC 2-22.307.)
2-91. Interrogation. HUMINT interrogation is the systematic process of using approved interrogation
approaches to question a captured or detained person to obtain reliable information to satisfy intelligence
requirements, consistent with applicable law and policy (FM 2-22.3). (See DODD 3115.09 and FM 2-22.3
for applicable law and policy.)
Note. HUMINT interrogation is to be conducted by personnel trained and certified in accordance

with the standards established pursuant to DODD 3115.09.
Employment and Control of Human Intelligence Collection Teams

2-92. Commanders consider security when planning for the employment of HUMINT collection teams.
(See TC 2-22.303.) Generally three security conditions exist: permissive, uncertain, and hostile.
2-93. Permissive Environment. In a permissive environment, HUMINT collection teams normally travel
throughout the AO without escorts or a security element. HUMINT collectors may frequently make direct
contact with overt sources, view the activity, or visit the area that is the subject of the information
collection effort. They normally use debriefing and elicitation as their primary collection techniques to
obtain firsthand information from local civilians and officials.
2-94. Uncertain Environment. In an uncertain environment, security considerations increase, but risk to
the collector is weighed against the potential intelligence gain. An uncertain environment limits use of
controlled sources and requires additional resources. HUMINT collection teams should still be used
throughout the AO but normally are integrated into other ground reconnaissance or other missions. For
example, a HUMINT collector may accompany a patrol visiting a village. Security for the team and their
sources is a prime consideration. HUMINT collection teams are careful not to establish a fixed pattern of
activity or arrange contacts in a manner that could compromise the source or the collector. Debriefing and
elicitation are still the primary collection techniques. Teams are frequently deployed to conduct collection
at checkpoints, refugee collection points, and detainee collection points. They may conduct interrogations
of detainees within the limits of applicable laws and policies.
2-95. Hostile Environment. In a hostile environment, the three concerns for HUMINT collection are
access to the sources of information, timeliness of reporting, and security for the HUMINT collectors. A
hostile environment requires significant resource commitments to conduct controlled source operations.
Prior to the entry of a force into a hostile area, HUMINT collectors may be used to debrief civilians,
particularly refugees, and to interrogate other detainees who have been in the area. HUMINT collection
teams are normally located with the friendly units to facilitate timely collection and reporting. HUMINT
collectors accompany the BCT lead elements or ground reconnaissance forces during operations. They
interrogate detainees and debrief refugees, displaced persons, and friendly force patrols.
.
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 2-17

Chapter 2
Human Intelligence Reporting

2-96. (FOUO) HUMINT reports are common to most HUMINT agencies within DOD. (See classified
DHE-M 33001.001.) They include—
 Intelligence information report (IIR).
 Tactical intelligence information report (TIIR).
 Spot report.
 HUMINT contact report.
2-97. Intelligence Information Report and Tactical Intelligence Information Report. The IIR is the
standard information report accepted by the Defense Intelligence Agency to answer HUMINT requirements
at any level. Tactical collectors may write IIRs and TIIRs based on SOP. The TIIR is a tactical report
released to units and organizations operating within the supported unit’s AO. An IIR is released to the
national database, whereas a TIIR is not. The operations management team or the G-2X or S-2X performs
quality control on TIIRs and IIRs and releases the reports.
2-98. Spot Report. The spot report is completed using the SALUTE format (size, activity, location, unit,
time, equipment). (See FM 6-99) It is a simple, easily understood means for disseminating time-sensitive
information. Follow-ups to the initial spot report provide additional details and background information,
when available. Spot reports are sent simultaneously to the supported unit’s intelligence cell, to the team’s
responsible G-2X or S-2X (and/or operational management team), and to the intelligence cell of any other
tactical unit that may be affected by the information contained in the spot report. Spot reports may be
followed by a TIIR or an IIR.
2-99. HUMINT Contact Report. HUMINT collectors use contact reports to record all relevant
information concerning specific meetings with HUMINT sources. Information typically includes the
following: circumstances of the contact (purpose, locations, time), operational matters relative to the
contact (topics discussed, taskings given), reports produced as a result of the contact, and resources
expended. Contact reporting is conducted within technical channels only.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM COLLECTION

2-100. Through its Shadow TUAS and augmenting UASs from higher headquarters, the BCT collects
full-motion video used to develop intelligence about the AO for current and future operations in real time.
Several command post cells are involved in synchronizing and integrating TUAS missions. (See paragraphs
2-109 through 2-114.)
2-101. The Shadow provides a reconnaissance capability to cover areas of the earth’s surface. The
Shadow uses two techniques that are especially suited for providing area coverage for baseline studies of
terrain and lines of communications: directed search area and broad area coverage.
2-102. Directed search area missions identify a geographic region in the shape of a polygon that may
contain from 3 to 24 corner points identified with latitude and longitude coordinates. This gives intelligence
planners the flexibility to tailor collection and other plans to meet commanders’ needs.
2-103. Broad area coverage missions, also known as broad area search missions, entail imagery coverage
of large areas of the earth’s surface. This technique enables analysis of a larger area and provides the
imagery needed for the creation of large area mosaics.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Missions

2-104. Normally, a UAS is assigned one of the four missions discussed below.
Route Reconnaissance or Lines of Communications Coverage

2-105. A route reconnaissance or line of communications coverage mission is defined by a road, mobility
corridor, or other form of transportation passageway delineated by a specific starting and ending point. This
type of mission is not limited to threat areas but may be requested to facilitate friendly logistic or troop
movements as well. The directed search area technique is normally used for this mission.
2-18 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

Zone Reconnaissance
2-106. The typical planning area for a UAS zone reconnaissance is five by eight kilometers in rural areas
and three by three kilometers in urban areas. UAS zone reconnaissance provides broad area search with
minimal target acquisition capability and is used to confirm or deny the existence of vehicles or personnel.
Area Reconnaissance
2-107. The typical planning area for a UAS area reconnaissance is three by five kilometers in rural areas
and one by one kilometer in urban areas. UAS area reconnaissance provides a narrower search area than
that of zone reconnaissance as well as the ability to acquire and report location data. It should be used to
confirm or deny threat activity and is often cued by another information collection asset. Both broad area
coverage and directed search area techniques are used for area reconnaissance.
Point Target
2-108. A point target is a specified imaging target. This mission is conducted to provide the clarity of
detail required for specific equipment identification or precision targeting. This type of mission is best
suited for identifying static or semistatic targets that require detailed analysis to answer specific
requirements. Point targets in a directed search area are the most common technique.
Control and Coordination of Unmanned Aircraft System Missions

2-109. UAS airspace deconfliction requires constant attention. The airspace over the BCT AO can
become crowded with unmanned aircraft, manned rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft, and indirect fires. The air
defense management/brigade aviation element develops and coordinates the airspace control architecture
during planning. It develops the required airspace coordinating measures and fire support coordination
measures and monitors the situation for compliance. (See FM 3-52.)
2-110. The intelligence cell develops tasks for UASs as part of planning requirements and assessing
collection. These tasks are incorporated into the BCT information collection plan, which is prepared by the
operations staff and included in the BCT order. The intelligence cell and the operations and intelligence
working group monitor UAS collection activities and integrate and synchronize UAS use. (See FM 3-55
and ATTP 2-01.)
2-111. The fires cell develops targets suitable for UAS missions and integrates them into the fires annex
of the BCT order. The fires cell provides input to the BCT information collection plan to synchronize it
with regards to designated targets. The field artillery intelligence officer coordinates with the intelligence
cell for target selection, prioritization, and assessment. The fires cell coordinates clearance of fires with
other cells and staff elements in the main command post. (See ADRP 3-09.)
2-112. The protection cell coordinates with other functional and integrating cells. Together they conduct Army
support to personnel recovery and protection support, which can be facilitated by UASs. (See ADRP 3-37.)
2-113. The MI company coordinates with the sustainment cell for appropriate sustainment support, such
as repairs, parts, and maintenance of UASs. (See ADRP 4-0.)
2-114. The Air Force weather team provides weather support for the conduct of UAS missions. It
monitors the effects of weather at the launch and recovery location and along the mission route.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Employment

2-115. UAS flight operations require a complete staff effort in the planning and monitoring of UAS
missions. Comprehensive coordination between the operations and intelligence staffs ensures critical
collection requirements are as well forecasted and resourced as possible. However, deliberate planning for
support does not alter the fact that more immediate and critical requirements emerge and evolve
continually. The ability to retask assets quickly is an important aspect of exploiting opportunities that
present themselves and are in line with the commander’s intent and standing priorities.
2-116. Full-motion video provides a unique capability: a mixture of reconnaissance, surveillance, and
target acquisition. The full-motion video collection process begins at supported company level and
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 2-19

Chapter 2
ultimately involves each echelon from company to BCT. At each echelon, full-motion video requirements
are developed, refined, and tasked for collection, or the requests are forwarded to higher echelons. This is
based on several factors, including aircraft capability, airspace coordination measures, operational
requirements, and weather. To be used efficiently, full-motion video requires more coordination than any
other collection capability within the BCT. There are three types of collection requests: preplanned and
immediate requests, and dynamic retasking.
Preplanned Requests
2-117. Preplanned requests are those anticipated by the requesting unit far enough in advance to permit
detailed mission coordination and planning. They may also be standing requests for indications and
warnings or force protection. The intelligence cell monitors and analyzes threat activity and supports
targeting while providing feedback to the commander to aid decisionmaking. Coupled with continuous
assessment, preplanned collection enables the seamless transition from preplanned missions to dynamic
retasking and cueing of other information collection assets. Preplanned requests typically focus on—
 Indications and warning—key events and potential indicators.
 Target development—collection and refinement of information needed to determine the type
and duration of action needed to create the effects specified in the attack guidance matrix.
 Target verification—assistance in establishing the identification and status of a target.
 Combat assessment—collection of information to support combat assessment.
 Situational understanding—collection of information used to develop knowledge and understanding
of the current situation.
Immediate Requests
2-118. An immediate collection request is submitted outside the normal information collection planning
cycle after the air tasking order and daily information collection plan are published. It attempts to integrate
collection into a time-sensitive operation. Proper coordination through the chain of command is vital
throughout the process. Subordinate units must coordinate immediate collection requests with their higher
headquarters. This makes the request process quicker and ensures proper prioritization of immediate
requests with regard to existing requests.
Dynamic Retasking
2-119. Another type of request is dynamic retasking. The most notable difference between immediate
requests and dynamic retasking is aircraft launch status. Typically, immediate requests require generating a
new mission. Dynamic retaskings are requests that divert existing missions to new priorities. Dynamic
retasking requires a greater level of risk assessment, as some approved collection requirements must be
cancelled to meet a dynamic retasking. In addition to risk assessment, dynamic retaskings require a stricter
approval process and an increased level of airspace coordination because airspace situational understanding
by aircrews and air controllers is necessary.
Mission Execution
2-120. Mission execution involves conduct of the flight and the delivery of information, combat
information, and targeting data to the requester or others who require it. Digitization allows a high volume
of data to be received, correlated, analyzed, and viewed graphically. With digitization, information can
flow directly from the collector or processor to the requester in near real time.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AUGMENTATION
2-121. The BCT may receive CI teams from a higher echelon unit. CI at the tactical level is primarily
focused on CI support to protection. CI assets at the tactical level are instrumental in protecting bases from
infiltration, collection, and targeting by foreign intelligence and security services and international terrorist
organizations. (See FM 2-22.2.)
2-20 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

2-122. The employment of CI teams includes varying degrees of contact with the local population. As the
degree of contact increases, both the quantity and quality of CI collection increases. However, in many
instances, there is a risk to CI teams inherent with increased exposure to the local population. The decision
at what level to employ a CI team is situation-dependent. The risk to the CI assets must be balanced with
the need to collect against PIRs and to protect the force as a whole. Rules of engagement, status-of-forces
agreements, direction from higher headquarters, and the overall threat level may also restrict the
deployment and use of CI teams.
2-123. The situation and the command and support relationships influence the execution of CI plans and
operations. The CI scheme of support and support relationships are established in the CI appendix to the
intelligence annex to the BCT order, fragmentary orders, or other directives. (See ATTP 5-0.1.)
2-124. Characteristics of the AO influence the nature and extent of CI operations. The following AO
factors influence CI employment:
 Historical and recent espionage, sabotage, subversion, or terrorist activities within the AO.
 Population density.
 Cultural makeup of the civilian population.
 Attitude of the people and political groups toward friendly and threat forces.
 Population’s susceptibility to threat penetration (hostile intelligence threat) and propaganda.
 Stability of the local government, security, and law enforcement.
2-125. The number of CI resources available is critical. Careful planning, awareness of CI operations
throughout the deployed force joint operations area, and detailed intelligence and operations preparation are
required. CI targets should be identified as early as possible at the start of a contingency or new operation;
then appropriate operations are planned to exploit or neutralize threats. Care is taken to not overestimate CI
element capabilities. This risks overextending and dispersing CI activities on too many targets with limited
effectiveness. CI elements can be deployed on an area coverage concept or by unit assignment.
AREA COVERAGE
2-126. CI elements employed under area coverage are assigned a specific geographic area. Under area
coverage, CI support is provided to commands located within the designated area. CI elements continue to
operate within the assigned area, even when the tactical situation or supported units operating in the area
change.
2-127. General support is the best support relationship to use for area coverage. General support best
provides the means to meet the specific operational requirements of supported forces with limited organic
CI resources.
2-128. Area coverage provides the greatest continuity of tactical CI operations. It allows CI operations to
focus on the threat’s intelligence organization and activities while remaining unrestricted by the AOs
assigned to supported units. It also allows CI personnel to become familiar with the area, threat intelligence
organization and operations, and CI targets. Area coverage is particularly effective when conducting
stability tasks where threat demographics or operating areas do not match friendly force boundaries.
UNIT ASSIGNMENT
2-129. Situational and operational factors may require some CI elements to be either attached or placed in
direct support of the BCT (for example, during operations involving widely separated units in areas of
dense population). CI elements employed on a unit assignment basis normally remain with designated
supported units in a direct support relationship. The supported unit normally provides sustainment. They
operate within that unit’s AO under the specified relationships. In such cases, supported unit commanders
employ CI personnel to satisfy their CI requirements or other missions specified by the commander.
REMOTE SENSORS
2-130. Remote sensors are used to perform such tasks as perimeter defense, surveillance, environmental
monitoring (including radiological, nuclear, and early warning), and target acquisition. Remote sensors are
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Chapter 2
not an MI collection asset; however, they do provide information used to cue MI collection assets to
activity and should be considered when preparing the information collection plan. They are hand-emplaced
by Soldiers or robotic vehicles either inside or outside buildings and structures.
2-131. Remote sensors can be employed in almost any tactical situation. However, their optimal
employment is in areas where major movement is restricted to a few key lines of communications and the
traffic pattern of military and civilian activity can be easily discriminated. Remote sensor missions are
ideally suited to support relatively stable situations, such as long-term defensive or security operations,
where the time and resources are available to develop an extensive sensor network throughout the AO.
Remote sensors have limited utility in fast-moving mobile missions, raids, and other limited-duration
operations unless adequate time and means are provided to emplace sensors before executing the operation.
In addition, the employment of sensors in open terrain or heavily congested urban concentrations requires
detailed planning to ensure the sensor network can provide the desired information in those environments.
APPLICATIONS
2-132. Remote sensors may be employed in the following roles.
General Surveillance
2-133. In the general surveillance role, sensors are used to provide general surveillance of lines of
communications, helicopter landing zones, assembly areas, objectives, and other named areas of interest.
Sensor information is used to develop the general threat situation and support the concept of operations
through the detection of threat activity near insertion points or other objectives.
Early Warning
2-134. In the early warning role, sensors are placed along avenues of approach to provide early warning
of threat movement toward friendly positions. Sensor strings may be placed forward, on the flanks, or in
the rear of friendly units to facilitate force protection. In this application, sensors should be implanted as far
forward of friendly positions as possible, exploiting the extended range of the remote sensor system to
provide maximum reaction time.
Target Acquisition
2-135. A well developed sensor network can be used for target acquisition. Sensors are implanted along
key threat lines of communications or targeted areas of interest; then sensor activations are used to initiate
targeting action. The key limitation of sensors in this application is the inability to discriminate between
hostile, friendly, and noncombatant activity. As a result, sensor data normally must be confirmed by some
other reconnaissance, surveillance, or MI collection asset.
2-136. Sensors do provide an excellent means of facilitating the targeting process through the cueing of
other target acquisition sources. Once a target is positively identified, a well planned sensor network can track
a target as it moves across the AO. If used for target acquisition, care must be taken not to compromise the
location of sensor strings through repeated attacks on threat forces located in the same area.
Environmental Monitoring
2-137. Remote weather sensors are used in data-sparse or operationally significant regions to collect
critical weather observations to enhance the quality and quantity of weather data.
CAPABILITIES
2-138. Remote sensors have the following capabilities.
Remote Surveillance
2-139. Remote sensors provide an extended-range surveillance capability without the requirement to
maintain a physical presence in the surveillance area. With relays to maintain line-of-sight communications
2-22 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

connectivity between the sensors and the monitoring site, monitoring can be conducted a hundred miles or
more from the surveillance area. This capability gives commanders a means to economically monitor
activity in the AO, conserving the use of other reconnaissance, surveillance, and MI collection assets for
other critical tasks.
Target Detection and Classification

2-140. Sensors can confirm or deny the presence of activity in the surveillance area and give a general
indication of the type and volume of activity. Sensors can provide the number, general type, location,
direction, and speed of most acquired targets. The degree of detail and accuracy of the target classification
is a function of the number and type of sensors used as well as the proficiency of the monitoring site
operator. While sensor data alone is rarely sufficient for target acquisition, sensors can be used to cue other
surveillance and target acquisition assets to obtain the data required for targeting.
Near Real-Time Reporting

2-141. Electronic transmission of sensor detections to the monitoring site provides near real-time
reporting of activity in the surveillance area. Automated processing equipment can generate a sensor report
for transmission within minutes of activation.
Continuous Operations
2-142. Sensors operate day and night, in all weather conditions. Individual sensors can operate
continuously for up to 30 days; relay systems can function for up to 45 days. Battery life is the primary
factor limiting sensor and relay endurance. Battery life depends on the number of activations and
transmissions required, along with weather and other environmental factors.
Stealth
2-143. Properly emplaced remote sensors are extremely difficult to detect. Built-in electronic
countermeasures also make electronic detection and countermeasures against remote sensors unlikely. To
enhance system security, individual sensors contain an alarm circuit that notifies the monitoring station if
the sensor is tampered with.
Flexibility
2-144. Remote sensors can be employed in a variety of means to support the concept of operations.
Sensors can be hand-emplaced by mounted or foot patrols or dropped from aircraft. Detections can be
relayed and processed in real time or stored by relays for transmission on command.
LIMITATIONS
2-145. Remote sensors have the following limitations.
Implant Missions
2-146. The time and resources required to implant sensors and relays are the key limitations on remote
sensor missions. The placement of sensors and relays needs to be planned in detail and accomplished well
in advance of when the information is needed. The tactical situation may preclude use of aircraft for
implant missions and limit the number of ground patrols that can be employed for implanting sensors.
Terrain Masking
2-147. Remote sensors require radio frequency line of sight between sensors and the monitoring site. As a
result, they are susceptible to terrain masking. Effective employment requires detailed planning of sensor,
relay, and monitoring site locations as well as knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the
transmitters. Terrain masking may preclude extended-range employment of sensors in mountainous areas.
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Chapter 2
Limited Target Discrimination

2-148. Remote sensors by themselves cannot provide positive target identification. Sensors activate in
response to some type of physical presence. Using a mix of sensor types can provide a general category of
the target, for example, personnel, wheeled vehicles, or tracked vehicles. However, sensor data must be
combined with other information to provide positive target identification.
Responsiveness
2-149. Because of the time required to plan, prepare, and execute implant missions, remote sensors are
generally not responsive to rapidly changing requirements. Advance planning of sensor support through
detailed study of the mission, threat, AO, and commander’s intent provides the best means of anticipating
future sensor requirements.
Sensor Positioning
2-150. Accurate emplacement of the sensors is crucial to obtaining coverage of the surveillance area.
Knowing the exact location of the implanted sensor is critical to successful relay and monitoring. As a
result, sensor implant is done according to a plan, and the location of the implants must be accurately
reported to the monitoring agency.
Failure Rate
2-151. Inherent in all electronic systems is the possibility of component failure. Loss of any single
electronic component may render the device inoperable and degrade the operation of the overall system.
SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS
2-152. The nature of the operation determines the tactical application and scope of remote sensor
missions. For each type of mission, there are distinct considerations for the employment of remote sensors.
Offense
2-153. Offensive tasks are the most difficult to support with remote sensors. The rapid pace and fluid
nature of the offense may result in emplaced sensor networks being quickly uncovered by friendly forces.
Sufficient time and resources may not be available to reestablish the network to support the tactical tasks of
exploitation and pursuit. In addition, monitoring sensors and disseminating sensor data are complicated by
frequent displacements of advancing units.
2-154. When a sensor network can be established in advance of the operation, remote sensors can provide
the following support:
 Monitoring of objectives. Sensors can provide surveillance of an objective and the avenues of
approach to it, detecting and characterizing the nature of activity on and around the objective.
 Surveillance of entry points. As with objectives, sensors can provide surveillance of helicopter
landing zones and drop zones to provide early warning of threat activity that might preclude
their use.
 Surveillance of the deep area. Sensors emplaced in the deep area can help guide planning by
characterizing the location, nature, and intensity of threat activity. Once execution begins, the
sensor network helps monitor threat response to the attack, providing early warning of
reinforcement or counterattacks, identifying retrograde operations, and assisting in target
acquisition efforts.
Defense
2-155. The use of remote sensors is well suited to support defensive tasks. Sensors provide the best
support when they can be emplaced in the covering force area. In the defense, sensors are implanted along
likely avenues of approach and in and around probable assembly areas to provide early warning of attacks.
An extensive sensor network can be used to track threat formations as they move across the AO, providing
2-24 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

basic targeting data and cueing other target acquisition assets. In a mobile defense, sensors can also be used
to provide surveillance of gaps between units or open flanks or rear areas.
Stability
2-156. For stability tasks, sensors can provide surveillance of population centers and key infrastructure
areas. They can also provide surveillance along lines of communications and borders.
EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
2-157. Successful remote sensor missions require detailed planning and intelligence developed through
the IPB process. The mission, AO, threat, commander’s intent, and concept of operations must be analyzed
to determine the potential for remote sensor employment and the sensor information requirements that must
be satisfied.
2-158. The supported unit’s information collection plan includes provisions for sensor surveillance.
Incorporating remote sensors into the information collection plan provides the employment concept and
detailed instructions for the execution of remote sensor missions. Requirements for sensor employment are
developed along with concepts for the monitoring and dissemination of sensor data. These elements are
incorporated into the information collection plan.
Terrain
2-159. Terrain factors have a significant impact on sensor employment. The prevailing terrain in large
part determines a number of factors: among them, potential sensor locations, implantation means, sensor
detection radius, the requirement for relays, and the positioning of monitoring sites. Terrain factors to be
considered are as follows:
 Soil type and composition. These factors determine detection radius and emplacement method.
Hard, compacted soils offer best detection conditions for seismic sensors.
 Ambient interference. Seismic noise due to volcanic activity, earth tremors, or running water
degrades the quality of seismic sensor performance. (These can be either natural, such as rivers
and streams, or manufactured, such as sewer or water supply systems.) Emissions from power
lines and other electronic sources can disrupt magnetic sensors.
 Vegetation. Vegetation provides concealment for sensors and relays but may inhibit antenna
placement and interfere with communications.
 Lines of communications. The traffic pattern in the AO is a critical factor in determining the
best locations for sensor emplacement. In general, areas with limited lines of communications
and restricted cross-country mobility provide the best sensor information. Choke points along
lines of communications are particularly lucrative sensor targets.
Weather
2-160. While sensor components are designed to operate in a variety of weather conditions, extreme
weather conditions can impact the system’s performance. Adverse weather can—
 Cancel or delay implant missions.
 Displace antennas and above ground sensors or relays.
 Degrade sensor performance.
Threat
2-161. The nature of the threat has a major effect on the success of remote sensor missions. A threat force
made up of mechanized or motorized units with an established doctrine for movement and pattern of
activity is more susceptible to detection by remote sensors than a small, foot-mobile insurgent group.
2-162. The threat’s ability to detect and interdict emplacement missions is also considered during
planning. The potential compromise of operations security and loss of assets during emplacement missions
must be balanced against the benefits to be gained from sensor employment.
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Chapter 2
EMPLACEMENT
2-163. The establishment of a comprehensive sensor network requires time and a significant investment
of resources. In addition to the operations security concerns discussed above, assets must be available to
conduct emplacement missions and there must be sufficient time to establish the network before sensor
information is required. Successful employment of remote sensors requires detailed planning.
2-164. During the planning requirements task, the operations and intelligence working group identifies
specific information requirements that remote sensors can answer. The intelligence and operations staffs
then develop information collection tasks for remote sensors based on these requirements. These tasks are
included in the sensor surveillance portion of the information collection plan, and sensors are emplaced to
perform them.
2-165. As part of the information collection plan, the sensor surveillance plan specifies the—
 Type and location of sensors, relays, and monitoring sites.
 Time of emplacement and unit responsible for emplacing each sensor string and any relays.
 Time of recovery and unit responsible for recovery.
2-166. Remote sensors are usually emplaced during planning and preparation for the overall operation.
Therefore, a separate operation or fragmentary order is used to task units with employment or recovery of
sensors and associated equipment. Recovery of sensors and equipment may be directed in a separate order
or as a task to units in the operation order.
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Chapter 3
Division and Corps Intelligence Operations

ROLE OF THE DIVISION AND CORPS
3-1. Division and corps headquarters assign missions with required resources to any combination of
divisions, BCTs, or support brigades provided from the Army pool of forces or other Service equivalents.
The headquarters are almost identical in structure and differ only in the commander’s rank and the echelon
each is designed to employ. Divisions employ brigades to fight battles and engagements. Corps conduct
large-scale land operations as part of a joint campaign, employing divisions as their base. (See FM 3-92 for
doctrine on corps operations.)
3-2. Division headquarters have no organic troops other than their headquarters battalion. The three
programmed corps headquarters have an E-MIB assigned for intelligence operations. Division and corps
headquarters receive forces through attachment or under OPCON and task-organize these forces. Both
headquarters, with augmentation, can serve as an ARFOR headquarters. An ARFOR is the Army component
and senior Army headquarters of all Army forces assigned or attached to a combatant command, subordinate
joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational command (ADRP 1-02). The division or
corps headquarters, whether serving as an ARFOR or a joint force land component command, is concerned
with the conduct of land operations and employment of forces required to accomplish operational-level
objectives. Divisions and corps execute simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability tasks in an assigned
AO to establish specific conditions. They combine operational- and tactical-level tasks and missions through
the organization of operational frameworks to accomplish assigned missions. (See ADRP 3-0.) Divisions and
corps organize the battlefield by assigning AOs, weighting the main effort, and establishing priorities of
support.
DIVISION AND CORPS INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS

3-3. Controlling land forces for operations is the corps headquarters’ first priority. If the corps
headquarters is not the senior Army headquarters within the AO, then it is an intermediate tactical
headquarters. If it is the senior Army headquarters within a joint operations area, then it is the ARFOR for
the joint or multinational force. If the corps is given control of Marine Corps forces, then it is a joint force
land component command. If the corps is given control over multinational forces, then it is a multinational
joint force land component command. The role the corps is assigned determines whether the corps utilizes
Army, joint, or multinational processes.
EXPEDITIONARY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE

3-4. As part of Intel 2020, the Army is establishing three new brigade-level commands to enhance the
intelligence capability within each of the Army’s three programmed corps. These commands, called E-
MIBs are designed to conduct intelligence operations in support of decisive action. An E-MIB provides the
following capabilities:
 CI collection and activities.
 HUMINT collection.
 SIGINT collection.
 PED.
3-5. The E-MIB can also augment corps, division, and BCT intelligence cells, specifically aiding in the
processing, exploitation, and dissemination of SIGINT, imagery, and full-motion video provided by higher
echelon and national organizations. The E-MIB is the primary information collection asset assigned or
attached to corps and division commands. The E-MIB conducts multidiscipline intelligence operations in
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 3-1

Chapter 3
support of corps and division operational requirements, to include being the military intelligence force
provider for BCTs. The E-MIB is designed to perform in a variety of situations and be task-organized in
multiple ways.
3-6. The E-MIB is comprised of a headquarters and headquarters company and two MI battalions. Each
battalion is composed of a headquarters and headquarters detachment, a CI and HUMINT company, and a
collection and exploitation company. An E-MIB’s assets can be allocated across the corps to augment
existing capabilities or cover gaps, such as the lack of CI assets in the BCT.
DIVISION AND CORPS COMMAND POSTS

3-7. Division and corps commanders normally organize their headquarters staff into six functional cells, three
integrating cells, and other groupings (boards, working groups, and meetings) as needed. (See ATTP 5-0.1.)
Some staff members are permanently assigned to and serve in one cell or element for the mission.
However, others move from cell to cell based on the need for their expertise. It is possible for one member
of the staff to serve in five or more components of the main or tactical command post, depending on that
member’s skill set and ability to contribute to the mission.
INTELLIGENCE CELL
3-8. The intelligence functional cell is concerned with facilitating understanding of the operational
environment. The cell requests, receives, and analyzes information from all sources. It disseminates
intelligence products to support division or corps operations and the commander’s situational
understanding. This cell manages all requirements for information collection and MI collection assets under
division or corps control. It interfaces with the movement and maneuver cell to integrate intelligence
products and intelligence operations activities into current operations. It recommends tasks to the division
or corps operations staff for resources under division or corps control. This cell receives, processes,
analyzes, and disseminates all-source intelligence to support current and future operations. The intelligence
cell provides representatives to the current operations integration cell.
3-9. Each intelligence cell provides policies and procedures for conducting intelligence operations to
subordinate echelon intelligence cells. These policies and procedures allow the lower echelon intelligence
staffs the freedom to conduct intelligence operations more efficiently, as routine tasks can be executed
without obtaining approval from higher echelons.
3-10. To support operations, the main command post intelligence cell—
 Receives, processes, and analyzes information from all sources, and disseminates intelligence.
 Provides relevant intelligence to support current and future operations.
 Participates in information collection planning.
 Participates in the targeting process.
3-11. The intelligence cell at the corps and division consist of the three principal sections: intelligence
operations, the analysis and control element, and the G-2X.
Intelligence Operations Section

3-12. The intelligence operations section serves as the operations hub for intelligence activities. It
interfaces the intelligence cell with the movement and maneuver cell to integrate intelligence products and
collection activities into current operations. It recommends intelligence tasks to the operations staff for
resources under the headquarters’ control. This section includes the following subelements.
Current Operations Integration Cell Support Element

3-13. Personnel in this element provide intelligence cell support to the current operations integrating cell.
This support element provides intelligence capability to the main command post by integrating intelligence
and collection planning products received from the analysis and control element.
3-2 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

Special Security Office

3-14. The special security office exercises oversight of reception, transmission, and storage of sensitive
compartmented information. The special security office establishes, manages, and provides security for the
main command post’s sensitive compartmented information facility.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Target Development

3-15. This element develops and nominates priority targets as part of the targeting process. (See FM 3-60 for
targeting process doctrine.)
Communications Integration
3-16. The communications integration staff element establishes communications connectivity with outside
intelligence elements, maintains internal and external intelligence digital communications functions, and
exercises communications security oversight of intelligence-specific communications equipment. The
intelligence cell develops the intelligence architecture to ensure a continuous flow of information and
intelligence within the command and to higher, lateral, and subordinate units.
3-17. The signal staff and the intelligence cell work closely to establish an architecture that meets the
command’s intelligence communications needs. The intelligence cell provides access to networks such as
JWICS and the National Security Agency Network (also called NSANET). The signal staff maintains the
command’s network for NIPRNET and SIPRNET access. Within the architecture, establishing protocols
and adhering to them provides for network discipline and more efficient information and intelligence
sharing.
Air Force Weather Team

3-18. Division and corps command posts typically have an assigned staff weather officer and Air Force
weather team to assist the commander and staff in determining the effects of current and forecast weather
on operations. In most cases, the staff weather officer is both a member of the Army commander’s special
staff and an Air Force squadron or detachment commander with OPCON and ADCON over Air Force
weather team personnel supporting the force. (See AFDD 3-59.)
3-19. Specific staff weather officer and Air Force weather team functions are similar to those described in
paragraphs 2-18, 2-19, and 2-114. Duties specific to division and corps command post operations include—
 Coordinating meteorological and oceanographic sensing requirements. (See JP 3-59.)
 Actively collaborating with other weather forces to ensure unity of effort.
Analysis and Control Element

3-20. The analysis and control element performs collection management, produces all-source intelligence,
provides SIGINT technical control, produces GEOINT products, and disseminates intelligence and
targeting data to the headquarters and subordinate intelligence cells. The analysis and control element
includes the following subelements.
Fusion Cell
3-21. The fusion cell performs situation development, prepares combat assessments, and develops and
updates threat information for the ongoing intelligence running estimate. The fusion cell provides
assessments to subordinate intelligence staffs. These assessments provide the current overall assessment of
the relevant aspects of the operational environment.
Geospatial Intelligence Cell

3-22. The GEOINT cell provides correlation and analysis of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial
information to create products or display timely intelligence. GEOINT cells combine current information,
combat information, and intelligence from other disciplines to produce geospatially referenced products
and assessments that support the headquarters and its subordinate units.
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Chapter 3
Signals Intelligence Cell

3-23. The SIGINT cell performs SIGINT analysis and assists in the technical control of supporting
SIGINT collection assets. It assists the electronic warfare officer in creating electronic IPB products and
tasks SIGINT systems to support the ongoing operation.
Collection Management Cell

3-24. The collection management cell monitors information collection asset status, develops planning
requirements tools, and assists in developing the information collection plan. It works with the current
operations integration cell to keep the information collection plan synchronized with current operations.
The cell works with the plans and future operations integrating cells in the development of information
collection plans for future operations.
G-2X Staff Element

3-25. The G-2X staff element advises the commander and staff on employing CI and HUMINT collection
assets. It interfaces with external organizations to synchronize and deconflict CI and HUMINT tasking and
missions. The G-2X includes the—
 Counterintelligence coordinating authority. The CI coordinating authority (often called the
CICA) provides technical control, oversight, and deconfliction for CI assets.
 HUMINT operations cell. This cell provides primary technical control and deconfliction for all
HUMINT assets in the AO.
 HUMINT analysis cell. This cell serves as the single fusion point for HUMINT reporting and
operational analysis. It answers requests for information related to HUMINT.
INTEGRATING CELLS
3-26. Integrating cells are organized by planning horizon rather than warfighting function. (See ATTP 5-0.1.)
A planning horizon is a point in time commanders use to focus the organization’s planning efforts to shape
future events (ADRP 5-0). The three planning horizons are short (usually associated with the current
operations integration cell), mid (usually associated with the future operations cell) and long (usually
associated with the plans cell). Commanders determine planning horizons based on the situation, echelon,
and tempo of operations. Horizons can range from hours and days to weeks and months. As a rule, the
higher the echelon, the more distant the planning horizon with which the headquarters is concerned. Thus,
divisions and corps are resourced for all three integrating cells. The intelligence functional cell provides
staff elements to all integrating cells.
CURRENT OPERATIONS INTEGRATION CELL

3-27. The current operations integration cell controls operations, monitors current operational status, and
updates the staff at the main command post. The cell is composed of representatives from all functional
cells and most special staff sections. Led by the chief of staff, it directs the actions of the main command
post. The intelligence cell provides additional support to this cell as directed by the chief of staff.
3-28. The current operations integration cell monitors the situation and directs and synchronizes current
operations in accordance with the concept of operations and commander’s intent. It focuses on what is
happening and controls operations by executing its internal battle drills. Current operations produce a large
volume of orders, including administrative and tactical fragmentary orders. This cell’s tasks include—
 Assess the tactical situation.
 Recommend CCIRs and keep them current.
 Maintain the common operational picture.
 Maintain the battle rhythm.
 Control operations by issuing operation and fragmentary orders.
 Serve as the central clearinghouse for incoming messages, orders, requests for information, and taskings.
3-4 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

 Synchronize actions among the other command post cells, staff elements, meetings (including
boards and working groups), and other entities, such as personal and special staff sections that
operate independently.
 Establish and conduct liaison with unified action partners.
 Provide the current situation to the future operations and plans cells.
 Perform near-term task assessment.
FUTURE OPERATIONS CELL

3-29. The future operations cell (also called FUOPS) performs near-term planning, including preparing
branches to the current operation. This cell tracks and processes relevant information to create an ongoing
link between current operations and plans. Its tasks include—
 Monitor current operations.
 Contribute to the common operational picture.
 Turn command guidance into executable orders.
 Modify plans to support current operations.
 Assist in or produce fragmentary orders to support current operations.
 Develop branches to current operations.
 Recommend future CCIRs.
 Participate in the targeting process.
 Perform midterm operations assessments.
PLANS CELL
3-30. The G-5 leads the plans cell and oversees long-term planning. The G-5 is supported by two full time
intelligence planners. The plans cell develops plans, orders, branches, and sequels. It monitors the common
operational picture and stays abreast of the current operation by coordinating with the current operations
integration cell. When sufficient time exists before execution and the G-3 directs, the plans cell may write
branches for the current operation, particularly if those branch plans and fragmentary orders are relatively
complex.
3-31. Higher echelon plans cells provide IPB products tailored to the lower echelon needs within the
framework of the IPB process. (See FM 2-01.3.) Subordinate intelligence staffs then further refine the
higher echelon’s products into products usable for their commanders and staffs. Subordinate intelligence
staffs rely on higher headquarters staffs to provide the following intelligence products:
 Threat organizational charts.
 Available information regarding threat operational art, tactics, and techniques.
 Threat situation template and course of action statements for threat courses of action.
 Event templates and matrices.
 High-value target lists.
 Target packages on areas, structures, units, or individuals tasked out for reconnaissance,
surveillance, intelligence operations, and target acquisition.
 Terrain analysis showing the military aspects of terrain and its effects on friendly and threat
operations.
 Urban terrain analysis products showing the aspects of urban terrain and its effects on friendly
and threat operations.
 Weather conditions and effects on enemy and friendly operations, including intelligence
collection sensors, personnel, and equipment.
 Analysis of civil considerations, including IPB overlays.
 Civil affairs assessments.
 Military information support operations (formerly psychological operations) assessments.
 Other public affairs activities assessments.
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Chapter 3
3-32. Based on these products, the lower echelon intelligence staffs further refine their intelligence
requirements and needs and nest their activities with those of higher echelons. They can also more
efficiently request further support as needed. Lower echelon intelligence staffs refine the products provided
to them by the higher echelon intelligence staffs, based on their commander’s requirements. These products
are sent back to the higher intelligence staffs along with the subordinate’s assessment for inclusion in the
higher intelligence staff’s assessment.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR DIVISION AND CORPS

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
3-33. Division and corps commanders rely on subordinate brigades, the E-MIB, and resources from higher
echelons to conduct intelligence operations. Division and higher level intelligence operations collect
information to support current and future operations. Detailed intelligence analysis drives information
collection for the division and its higher headquarters. To collect the information needed for planning and
decisionmaking, division and corps staffs integrate all tools at their disposal into a synchronized and
integrated echelon information collection plan.
INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE
3-34. Corps and division intelligence cells operate as integrated parts of the intelligence enterprise. The
intelligence enterprise is communications network-enabled. The backbone is based on an architecture that
transmits intelligence and information to and from various collection elements, units, and agencies by
means of different technologies and systems. With the continued development of sensors, processors, and
communications systems, it is increasingly important that intelligence cells understand the requirements for
establishing an effective architecture. Adequate communications and access to the intelligence enterprise
are often the most critical enablers for the intelligence warfighting function. Each staff element in the
intelligence cell, as well as the G-6, has some role in assisting the G-2 to establish and maintain the
intelligence architecture.
3-35. Corps and division intelligence architectures comprise specific intelligence and communications
structures that form the tactical portion of the intelligence enterprise. These structures include all personnel,
organizations, systems, and procedures necessary to assist in collecting, analyzing, producing, and
disseminating intelligence and information. Corps and division G-2s normally develop the overall
intelligence architecture and subarchitectures for HUMINT, GEOINT, and SIGINT communications.
FORCE TAILORING
3-36. Force tailoring is the process of determining the right mix of forces and the sequence of their
deployment in support of a joint force commander (ADRP 3-0). It involves selecting the right force
structure for a joint operation from available units within a combatant command or from the Army force
pool. Commanders then sequence selected forces into the joint operations area as part of force projection.
Joint force commanders request and receive forces for each campaign phase, adjusting the quantity of
Service component forces to match the weight of effort required. Army Service component commanders
tailor Army forces to meet land force requirements determined by joint force commanders. Army Service
component commanders also recommend forces and a deployment sequence to meet those requirements.
Force tailoring is continuous.
TASK-ORGANIZING
3-37. Task-organizing is the act of designing an operating force, support staff, or sustainment package of
specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission (ADRP 3-0). Once intelligence assets have
been allocated, each echelon task-organizes the assets to provide maximum mission support. Intelligence
asset task organization occurs within a tailored force package as commanders organize units for specific
missions. As commanders reorganize units for subsequent missions, intelligence assets may be
redistributed to support new or changing requirements.
3-6 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

SUPPORT BRIGADES
3-38. Corps and divisions receive a mix of support brigades based on mission requirements. The types of
support brigades are the E-MIB, fires brigade, combat aviation brigade, maneuver enhancement brigade,
and sustainment brigade. These brigades are combined arms units designed to support BCTs and carry out
tasks in support of the division and corps. The joint force, corps, and division level each have different
relationships with support brigades. The supported unit intelligence cell provides intelligence support to
support brigades. Support brigades may receive MI collection assets as needed to support their missions.
These assets conduct intelligence operations the same way as assets supporting BCTs do.
FIRES BRIGADE
3-39. Fires brigades are normally assigned to, attached to, or placed under OPCON of a division, as the
mission requires. The fires brigade includes assets that can augment the supported division’s targeting
capabilities. The fires brigade main command post fires cell is the primary organization responsible for
interfacing with the division staff and for executing fires directed by the division. (See ATP 3-09.24.)
COMBAT AVIATION BRIGADE

3-40. Combat aviation brigades support joint force land component command, corps, or division operations
with task-organized aviation teams. Based on priorities and missions, the combat aviation brigade can also
collaborate directly with a supported brigade for operational details of the support required. The combat
aviation brigade, containing both manned and unmanned systems, can be task-organized for specific
missions and can support multiple BCTs. Combat aviation brigades can be configured as heavy, medium,
or light in accordance with the numbers and types of assigned aircraft. (See FM 3-04.111.)
MANEUVER ENHANCEMENT BRIGADE

3-41. The maneuver enhancement brigade receives and controls forces that provide mobility support and
protection to prevent or mitigate effects of hostile action against supported forces. Maneuver enhancement
brigades preserve freedom of movement and maneuver for the supported force. These brigades control terrain
and facilities and prevent or mitigate hostile actions or weather effects. (See FM 3-90.31.)
SUSTAINMENT BRIGADE
3-42. Sustainment brigades are subordinate to the theater sustainment command. They provide control of
the full range of logistic operations. Sustainment brigades consolidate functions previously performed by
corps and division support commands and area support groups into a single organization. The sustainment
brigade is normally given a support relationship with the supported force. However, under certain
conditions, a sustainment brigade could be placed under OPCON of a division for a specified operation,
such as an exploitation or pursuit. A division headquarters does not routinely have a command relationship
with its supporting sustainment brigades. All sustainment brigade headquarters have identical
organizations. (See ATP 4-93.)
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 3-7

Chapter 4
Theater Army and Joint Force Intelligence Operations
ROLE OF THEATER ARMY INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
4-1. The Army Service component command of a combatant command is called a theater army. Theater
army intelligence operations are continually conducted to provide information and intelligence used to
support land forces across the range of military operations. Results from these operations are used in
providing guidance on plans and policies. For the Army’s corps, divisions, and BCTs, theater army
intelligence operations provide information used in IPB, targeting, situational development, and protection,
as well as providing indications and warnings. The Army contributes organizational elements and
capabilities to joint force commanders to conduct unified action across the range of military operations.
Theater army headquarters, with their command posts and their associated theater-enabling commands and
functional brigades, can control Army or joint forces for smaller scale contingency operations. (See FM 3-93.)
THEATER ARMY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS

4-2. The theater army intelligence cell is responsible for synchronizing and integrating Army intelligence
operations throughout the combatant command’s area of responsibility. The cell’s staff elements either
embed or coordinate with other command post cells to facilitate this synchronization. Specifically, the
intelligence cell performs the following tasks: policy formulation, planning, programming, budgeting,
management, force integration, evaluation, and oversight of all intelligence activities. It provides functional
oversight of assigned or attached intelligence personnel and units. It manages theater army intelligence
collection, production, dissemination, disclosure, and CI requirements. The cell coordinates for national
intelligence support and executes intelligence engagement and theater security cooperation as required.
4-3. The intelligence cell in the theater army command post provides regionally focused intelligence
support to Army and joint forces operating in the combatant command’s area of responsibility. It is
organized as a planning staff that assists the theater army commander in developing the plans required to
support the combatant command’s operations.
4-4. The intelligence cell depends on the theater MI brigade for intelligence collection, single-source
analysis, and all-source intelligence to meet the theater army’s intelligence needs. With augmentation, the
intelligence cell can conduct operational intelligence collection and analysis to support theater army
operations or operate in direct support of a corps or other subordinate headquarters.
4-5. The intelligence cell consists of the—
 Intelligence operations section.
 Intelligence control section.
 G-2X section.
 Intelligence support and foreign disclosure office.
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS SECTION

4-6. The intelligence operations section supervises the processing, reporting, and dissemination of
combatant command and national intelligence to ensure the combatant commander’s daily operational
requirements are satisfied. The intelligence operations section coordinates for operations collection and
analysis by theater army intelligence organizations. The section manages the theater army’s PIRs,
information requirements, and intelligence requirements. It establishes the theater MI brigade’s collection,
analysis, and production priorities and recommends the allocation of intelligence assets to satisfy theater
army intelligence needs. The section evaluates theater MI brigade intelligence products and disseminates
all-source intelligence to the theater army staff. It collaborates with the theater operations company and
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 4-1

Chapter 4
regional operations company of the theater MI brigade for prioritization of analytic requirements as
required. It works with the geospatial planning cell normally assigned or attached to the theater MI brigade
to prioritize requests for geospatial data, information services, and terrain products for the theater army
staff. The section exercises requirements validation authority on staff and subordinate force requests for
information for theater army-, combatant command-, and national-level collection and production support.
Upon validation, the section submits and tracks requests for requirements satisfaction. The section is the
primary interface with the intelligence staff element in the current operations integration cell. The section
manages, validates, approves, and disseminates the threat portion of the common operational picture to
higher, lower, and adjacent commands and agencies. It advises the commander and subordinate units on the
enemy, weather, and terrain.
INTELLIGENCE CONTROL SECTION

4-7. The intelligence control section develops and maintains intelligence input to theater army estimates,
plans, and orders. It coordinates and integrates the intelligence security cooperation (military-to-military)
mission. The section manages intelligence force management and operational needs statement issues. It
develops the capstone intelligence policy and tactics, techniques, and procedures in coordination with the
combatant command. The section coordinates and participates in intelligence support to exercises. It
develops the theater intelligence plan in coordination with the combatant command and national agencies.
The section acts as the theater army proponent for reconnaissance and surveillance. It provides input to the
integrated priority list, reconnaissance and surveillance review, and the Joint Strategic Planning System. It
reviews and recommends the task organizations and allocation of forces to support plans and orders.
G-2X SECTION
4-8. The G-2X section synchronizes and integrates national to tactical level CI and HUMINT assets in the
combatant command area of responsibility for all operations. The G-2X is the primary advisor to the
commander on the employment of all CI and HUMINT assets, including relevant laws, policies, and
regulations affecting CI and HUMINT operations. The section directs, supervises, and coordinates the
planning, collection, analysis, and dissemination of CI and HUMINT.
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT AND FOREIGN DISCLOSURE OFFICE

4-9. The intelligence support and foreign disclosure office reviews and validates Army requirements for
linguists, manages sensitive compartmented information and communications technology, and is
responsible for managing the disclosure of classified information to foreign governments and international
organizations. The section develops sensitive compartmented information procedures and controls, and it
establishes and disestablishes all theater army sensitive compartmented information facilities. The section
provides oversight to the special security office’s use, dissemination, storage, and security of sensitive
compartmented information materials, equipment, and systems. The section oversees the procedures for
handling sanitized or decompartmentalized final version intelligence products prior to dissemination
outside the sensitive compartmented information facilities or U.S. channels. The section oversees the
management of any special access program.
U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND

4-10. The U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) is a direct reporting unit of
Headquarters, Department of the Army under the staff supervision of the Army G-2. The director of the
Army Staff has designated the Commanding General, INSCOM as assistant deputy chief of staff, G-2 for
intelligence operations. This allows the Commanding General, INSCOM to enhance the Army G-2’s ability
to carry out efficient and effective CI and HUMINT programs Army-wide. The INSCOM mission is to—
 Conduct worldwide multidiscipline and all-source intelligence operations.
 Support offensive cyberspace operations.
 Conduct theater aerial ISR operations.
 Conduct knowledge management for the Army intelligence enterprise.
4-2 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

4-11. INSCOM also delivers advanced skills training, linguist support, specialized quick reaction
capabilities and comprehensive intelligence-related logistics, contracting, communications, and other
expertise in order to enable mission command in support of Army, joint, and multinational commands and
the national intelligence community.
FOUNDRY
4-12. The Foundry program provides commanders with the means to achieve their priority intelligence
training. The purpose of the Foundry Intelligence Training Program is to provide Soldiers with focused
intelligence training to meet their commander’s training and readiness requirements. Soldiers participating
in the Foundry program receive training that builds on institutional, unit, and individual training; reflects
the current and changing operating environment; and increases functional and regional expertise while
developing and expanding contacts within the greater intelligence community. Additionally, the Foundry
program develops and implements longer term sustainment training capabilities through home-station
training sites. The Foundry portal links MI Soldiers, units, and commanders with Foundry training
opportunities, resources, and guidance. The MI Foundry program training course descriptions, schedules,
and standards are available on the portal for community-wide access. Access to the portal is gained through
Army Knowledge Online and also through the U.S. Army Intelligence Center Intelligence Knowledge
Network. (See AR 350-32 for more details.)
SUBORDINATE UNITS
4-13. There are two types of INSCOM subordinate units: functional commands and theater MI brigades.
Functional Commands
4-14. Functional commands have missions and capabilities focused on specific intelligence or operational
disciplines. INSCOM functional commands provide access to the national intelligence community and can
be leveraged to provide operational and training capabilities to meet Army and intelligence community
requirements. They can also be leveraged to reinforce theater MI brigades or to meet combatant command
requirements.
Theater Military Intelligence Brigades

4-15. INSCOM theater MI brigades operate under OPCON of the combatant commands’ Army Service
component commands, except in Korea, where U.S. Forces Korea has retained OPCON of the theater MI
brigade at the joint force command level. The five INSCOM theater MI brigades are the 66th, 470th, 500th,
501st, and 513th. These brigades have multidiscipline intelligence capabilities.
4-16. Theater MI brigades serve as anchor points for deploying forces. As anchor points, they provide
materiel and personnel support related to combatant command-specific operational environments. They
also provide expertise on ISR posture, resources, and access to theater army-specific intelligence
architectures and data.
4-17. Theater MI brigades provide regionally aligned analysis, products, and collection in support of
theater army daily operations requirements and contingency operations. In particular, the theater army
headquarters relies heavily on the theater MI brigade for the following:
 Language, geographic, cultural, socio-cultural, and targeting expertise.
 Threat characteristics, threat models, and threat templates.
 Intelligence reports and estimates.
 Fused intelligence products to support theater army planning requirements, including—
 Maintenance of operation plans and concept plans.
 Development of Army supporting plans to the combatant commander’s theater campaign
plan.
4-18. Theater MI brigades deploy scalable and tailorable intelligence capabilities to meet combatant
command, Army Service component command and joint task force intelligence requirements. Deployed
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 4-3

Chapter 4
theater MI brigade forces leverage secure communications networks to access theater MI brigade, higher
echelon Army, joint, and intelligence community capabilities through intelligence reach. Although each
one is organized differently, their organization may include—
 A multicomponent brigade headquarters that includes Regular Army and Army Reserve
elements.
 An operations battalion, which serves as the theater army intelligence staff’s analysis and control
element. This battalion may also be task-organized into a theater ground intelligence center. The
battalion may contain a theater operations company and two regional operations companies.
 A forward collection battalion, which may possess CI, HUMINT, and sometimes ground
SIGINT capabilities.
 An aerial reconnaissance battalion or aerial exploitation battalion, which may be assigned either
to the brigade or to INSCOM and attached to the brigade. (See TC 2-19.13.)
 A SIGINT battalion, which may be attached to the brigade for ADCON and operate under
OPCON of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service.
OPERATING AS A JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS

4-19. When a division or corps is designated to function as a joint task force headquarters, it requires
significant augmentation to fulfill the associated tasks. An Army unit designated as a joint task force
headquarters follows joint doctrine. (See JP 3-33.) The Army intelligence staff assumes the role of the joint
force intelligence staff. (Joint doctrine calls this staff the intelligence directorate.) (See JP 2-01.)
4-20. The primary function of the Army intelligence staff when employed as a joint task force intelligence
staff does not change; however, this function becomes more complex. The amount of available information
often exceeds the staff’s ability to manage, fully understand, and leverage it. There is a high demand for
information from national leadership, the media, and higher headquarters. This demand has the potential to
overwhelm the staff unless additional resources are allocated. There are also complex multinational and
interagency considerations for the conduct of intelligence operations, the intelligence architecture, liaison,
and intelligence sharing.
4-21. The primary tasks of the joint intelligence staff are the following:
 Tailor and distribute intelligence operations, if necessary implementing a federated structure
across multiple echelons. When appropriate, the joint force intelligence staff must also place
analysis assets in forward locations to better support lower echelon requirements.
 Ensure availability of intelligence and indications and warning.
 Prioritize collection and allocate analysis resources.
 Integrate threat assessments developed by the combatant command intelligence organization to
provide the joint task force commander, staff, components, and subordinate units with the
complete air, space, ground, maritime, and cyber threat situation.
 Facilitate an understanding of the operational environment.
4-22. The joint force intelligence staff uses the joint intelligence preparation of the operational
environment process to analyze the relevant aspects of the environment, including the physical domains,
the information environment, and political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure
(PMESII) system and subsystems. (See JP 2-01.3.) This analysis allows the joint staff to develop a common
operational picture and the joint force intelligence staff to provide other intelligence support products.
4-23. Joint ISR and Army information collection both share the purpose of synchronizing and integrating
the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and PED systems in direct support of current and future
operations. In both joint and Army doctrine, this activity is an integrated operations and intelligence
function.
4-24. Army information collection doctrine expanded the joint doctrinal concept of ISR by better
accounting for the role of ground reconnaissance and surveillance operations. (See FM 3-55.) Information
collection activities are a synergistic whole, with emphasis on synchronization and integration of all
components and systems. Commanders and staffs have vital responsibilities in information collection
planning, preparation, and execution. Commanders’ involvement is particularly important. The success of
4-4 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

information collection is measured by its contributions to the commander’s understanding, visualization,

and decisionmaking. (Table 4-1 depicts the comparison of the joint ISR and Army information collection.)
Table 4-1. Joint ISR and Army information collection responsibilities
Joint ISR Army
Task Responsibility Task Responsibility
G-2 and G-3
ISR concept of operations J-2 and J-3 Annex L of the plan or order
(S-2 and S-3)
Collection management Plan requirements and
G-2 (S-2)
• Collection requirements J-2 (in assess collection
management coordination
• Collection operations with the J-3) Task and direct collection G-3 (S-3)
management
Units and Units and

Execute collection Execute collection
organizations organizations
G-2 assistant chief of staff, intelligence J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff
G-3 assistant chief of staff, operations S-2 battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance S-3 battalion or brigade operations staff officer
J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff
4-25. The ISR concept of operations roughly corresponds to annex L (information collection) of an Army
operation plan or order. The ISR concept of operations documents the synchronization, integration, and
operation of ISR resources in support of current and future operations. It outlines the capability to task,
collect, process, exploit, and disseminate accurate and timely information that provides the awareness
necessary to successfully conduct operations. It addresses how all available ISR collection assets and
associated PED infrastructure, including multinational and commercial assets, will be used to satisfy the
joint force’s anticipated collection tasks.
4-26. To facilitate the optimum utilization of all available ISR assets, an ISR concept of operations should
be developed in conjunction with the command’s planning effort. The ISR concept of operations should be
based on the collection strategy, and ISR execution planning, and should be developed jointly by the joint
force intelligence and operations staffs. The ISR concept of operations should also identify and discuss any
ISR asset gaps and shortfalls relative to the joint force’s validated PIRs and may be used as a vehicle for
justifying a request for the allocation of additional ISR resources. It should also require a periodic
evaluation of the capabilities and contributions of all available ISR assets relative to the joint force mission
in order to maximize their efficient utilization and to ensure the timely release of allocated ISR resources
when no longer needed by the joint force.
4-27. In the joint lexicon, collection management is a process with two subfunctions: collection
requirements management and collection operations management.
4-28. Collection requirements management—
 Defines what intelligence systems must collect.
 Focuses on the requirements of the customer.
 Is all-source- (all intelligence discipline-) oriented and advocates (provides and supports) what
information is necessary for collection.
4-29. Collection operations management—
 Specifies how to satisfy the requirement.
 Focuses on the selection of specific intelligence disciplines and systems within a discipline to
collect information addressing the customer’s requirement.
 Is conducted by organizations to determine which assets can best satisfy customers’ product
requests.
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 4-5

Chapter 5
Intelligence Operations with Unified Action Partners
UNIFIED ACTION INTELLIGENCE CONCERNS
5-1. Every operation is different. So are the ways in which intelligence operations are conducted with
unified action partners, especially multinational forces. There are many complex considerations when
conducting interagency and multinational intelligence operations, to include intelligence sharing, the
intelligence architecture, and liaison.
MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS
5-2. Multinational operations are common, making multinational intelligence operations very important.
(See FM 3-16.) National interests require the United States to act with other nations. In many situations,
U.S. forces join with foreign forces to defeat common threats. The classification of U.S. intelligence may
present a challenge in releasing information, but sharing as much information and intelligence as possible
improves interoperability and trust within a multinational force. Commanders and staffs need to understand
their own and other nations’ policies on intelligence sharing. Early sharing of information during planning
ensures that multinational forces operate effectively.
SHARING AND WRITE TO RELEASE

5-3. Because each multinational operation is unique, there are generally no fixed set of rules or policies
for conducting intelligence operations as part of multinational operations. Commanders participating in a
multinational operation develop the policy and procedures for that particular operation. In most
multinational operations, commanders are required to share intelligence with foreign forces and to
coordinate receiving intelligence from those forces. A multilevel security system that can easily facilitate
sanitization and dissemination of information to U.S. and multinational commanders does not currently
exist.
5-4. One technique to facilitate collaboration and intelligence sharing is to establish an information
exchange cell. Another technique to share critical intelligence with multinational partners efficiently, U.S.
intelligence information should be written for release at the lowest possible classification level (with the
least dissemination restrictions) within foreign disclosure guidelines. When information relating to a
particular source cannot be shared, the intelligence derived from that source should still be provided as long
as the information itself does not potentially compromise the source. The U.S. director of intelligence must
establish procedures for separating intelligence from sources and methods. Analysts must balance the
accuracy and amount of information that is written for release with the security of classified material and
then properly vet that intelligence through the foreign disclosure officer prior to dissemination. Intelligence
production agencies often print highly classified reports in a format that separates compartmented
information from intelligence that can be widely disseminated with what is referred to as a tear line. The
U.S. joint and component intelligence staffs keep information above the tear line for U.S. forces while
disseminating the intelligence below the tear line to multinational forces. Having intelligence production
agencies use tear lines greatly facilitates intelligence sharing.
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Chapter 5
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
5-5. Other general principles that help guide multinational intelligence operations are—
 Maintain unity of effort. Intelligence officers of each nation need to view the threat from
multinational as well as national perspectives. A threat to one element of a multinational force
must be considered a threat to all elements.
 Make adjustments. There will be differences in intelligence doctrine and procedures among
multinational partners. Major differences may include how intelligence is provided to the
commander or procedures for sharing information among intelligence agencies.
 Plan early and plan concurrently. This permits solutions to any differences to be developed
and tried before operations begin. Ensure there are sufficient resources for liaison requirements
to support multinational operations.
 Perform complementary operations. Partner intelligence operations must be complementary,
and all intelligence resources must be available for application to the entire intelligence problem.
The intelligence staff must be prepared to navigate different approval processes and political
sensitivities when executing multinational intelligence operations.
5-6. The following are considerations for intelligence networks and architectures while operating with
multinational forces:
 Establish a shared local area network using systems such as the Combined Enterprise Regional
Information Exchange System (also called CENTRIX) or the battlefield information, collection,
and exploitation system. Establish and enforce a standardized process for the intelligence sharing
architecture, such as utilizing the cross-domain enterprise all-source user repository for cross-
domain operations.
 Many nations provide their own national suite of analytical tools, digital mapping capabilities,
collaboration software, and internal capabilities. DCGS-A is the primary intelligence component
residing on the U.S.-only mission command network.
 Multinational intelligence analysis occurs on the multinational network of shared database
servers, with its metadata catalog and releasable databases. These tools access and pull data from
the multinational force shared databases and other nationally owned storage facilities.
 Standardize compatible formats in which information is converted or stored so that it is
accessible and useable by multinational partners. However, ensure that information that does not
require conversion is left in its original format in order to facilitate faster flow of information.
 Use the multinational intelligence center to coordinate multinational ISR and collection plans for
each nation.
 Designate a single officer as the director of intelligence for the multinational force.
 Ensure each nation has a representative present at the multinational intelligence center.
5-7. Effective use of intelligence liaison personnel can establish strong relationships with multinational
partners. Effective liaison can be instrumental in resolving the normal problems that result from language
barriers and cultural and operational differences during multinational intelligence operations.
NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY AND THE DISCLOSURE OF

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
5-8. The foreign disclosure office (FDO) may approve the disclosure of classified and controlled
unclassified military information to foreign representatives. This is based on the policies, directives, and
laws that govern national disclosure policy and the release of classified information. The FDO provides this
service to the command and staff and to assigned, attached, and supporting agencies, allies, and other
multinational partners. Each nation individually determines what collected information can be passed, in
what format, and how that information is passed. The U.S. force intelligence staff enforces national
disclosure policy and disclosure of classified information to multinational intelligence partners through the
FDO. The FDO has staff proponency for this action.
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Intelligence Operations with Unified Action Partners
5-9. Using the disclosure policy, pertinent laws, regulations and directives, the FDO adjudicates
disclosure requests through the use of delegated disclosure authorities and sanitization guidelines. The FDO
also advises the commander and staff on potential problems that may arise when current or future
requirements to disclose are not supported by existing disclosure authorities. The FDO facilitates sharing
relevant and pertinent intelligence about the situation and threat between the U.S. military and allies and
other multinational partners consistent with disclosure policy and U.S. joint force guidance. The FDO pays
special attention to intelligence classification and levels of access of multinational personnel. However, it
avoids sharing information about intelligence sources and methods with allies and other multinational
partners until approved by the appropriate national-level agency.
5-10. The U.S. joint force intelligence staff obtains the necessary foreign disclosure authorization for
category 8 (Military Intelligence) information from the Defense Intelligence Agency and disclosure
authority from the combatant command FDO as soon as possible. U.S. intelligence personnel should be
knowledgeable of the specific foreign disclosure policy, procedures, and regulations for the operation. It is
therefore imperative that the U.S. joint force intelligence staff considers adding extra FDO billets to the
joint manning document. The efficient flow of intelligence is enhanced by personnel knowledgeable of
foreign disclosure.
5-11. Intelligence support to protection of the force is critical. Every effort should be made to share any
intelligence that could affect accomplishing the multinational force mission or protecting the force. A key
consideration is the apportionment of trained foreign disclosure personnel within a theater of operations to
facilitate the capability of sharing information and products with the multinational force. (See AR 380-10
for additional information on foreign disclosure.)
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS PLANNING AND COORDINATION

IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS
5-12. The multinational force intelligence staff plans and coordinates intelligence operations to support the
multinational effort. The U.S. joint force staff provides intelligence and products to partners as authorized
within the confines of the national disclosure policy and direction of the FDO. The multinational force
intelligence staff uses the collection coordination and intelligence requirements management (CCIRM)
process. (See AJP 2-0.) A CCIRM staff section executes the CCIRM process.
5-13. The CCIRM process describes those activities that result in the effective and efficient employment
of intelligence collection and PED in order to satisfy intelligence requirements in support of operations.
CCIRM consists of two major activities: intelligence requirements management and collection
coordination. Intelligence requirements management equates to planning requirements and assessing
collection in Army doctrine, and to collection requirements management in joint doctrine. Collection
coordination equates to task and direct collection in Army doctrine and to collection operations
management in joint doctrine. (See paragraphs 4-27 through 4-29.)
5-14. The CCIRM staff duties involve the following:
 Coordinating component-level collection requirements.
 Developing an electronic collection exploitation plan.
 Validating, prioritizing, and disseminating PIRs, specific information requirements, and requests
for information received from subordinate elements and adjacent staffs respectively.
 Monitoring and ensuring collection requirements are identified in minimum time to satisfy
requesters.
Note. Paragraphs 5-12 through 5-14 implement multinational doctrine contained in AJP 2-0.
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 5-3

Chapter 6
Army Tactical Tasks for the Intelligence Warfighting
Function
THE ARMY UNIVERSAL TASK LIST
6-1. The Army Universal Task List (also called the AUTL, FM 7-15) is a comprehensive, but not all-
inclusive listing of Army tactical tasks, missions, and operations. Units and staffs perform these tasks,
missions, and operations or capabilities at corps level and below. As a catalog, the Army Universal Task
List captures doctrinal tasks. This appendix lists the Army tactical tasks associated with the intelligence
warfighting function.
SUPPORT TO FORCE GENERATION

6-2. Support to force generation is the task of generating intelligence knowledge concerning an area of
interest, facilitating future intelligence operations, and tailoring the force. It includes establishing
intelligence communications and knowledge management architectures. These architectures enable
collaboration among strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence organizations in the following areas:
intelligence reach; collaborative analysis; data storage, processing, and analysis; and intelligence
production. Support to force generation includes five tasks:
 Provide intelligence readiness.
 Establish an intelligence architecture.
 Provide intelligence overwatch.
 Generate intelligence knowledge.
 Tailor the intelligence force.
PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE READINESS

6-3. Intelligence readiness operations develop baseline knowledge of potential threats and other relevant
aspects of the operational environment for multiple contingencies. These operations support ongoing
operations, contingency planning, and operational preparation. These operations and related intelligence
training activities enable the intelligence warfighting function to support the commander’s intelligence
requirements effectively. Provide intelligence readiness includes the following three tasks:
 Perform indications and warnings.
 Conduct intelligence readiness operations.
 Conduct Foundry.
Perform Indications and Warnings

6-4. This task provides the commander with advance warning of threat actions or intentions. The
intelligence staff develops indications and warnings to rapidly alert the commander of events or activities
that would change the basic nature of the operation. Indications and warnings enable the commander to
quickly reorient the force to unexpected contingencies and shape the operational environment.
Conduct Intelligence Readiness Operations

6-5. Intelligence readiness operations support contingency planning and preparation by developing
baseline knowledge of multiple potential threats and operational environments. This information and
training enable a collaborative effort and environment to provide the best possible initial threat
understanding.
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 6-1

Chapter 6
Conduct Foundry
6-6. Foundry is a training program designed to sustain critical intelligence capabilities and perishable
intelligence skills, and to provide regional focus, technical training, and functional expertise to the tactical
MI force through home-station training platforms, mobile training teams, and live-environment training
opportunities. Foundry provides a single hub for advanced skills training across the Active Army, Army
National Guard, and Army Reserve MI force. It also provides training to leaders who supervise MI
missions and Soldiers who perform MI activities.
ESTABLISH AN INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE

6-7. Establishing an intelligence architecture includes complex and technical issues that include the
following: sensors, data flow, hardware, software, communications, communications security materials,
network classification, technicians, database access, liaison officers, training, and funding. A well-defined
and well-designed intelligence architecture can offset or mitigate structural, organizational, or personnel
limitations. This architecture provides the best possible understanding of all relevant aspects of the
operational environment. Establish an intelligence architecture includes the following four tasks:
 Conduct intelligence reach.
 Develop and maintain automated intelligence networks.
 Establish and maintain access.
 Create and maintain intelligence databases.
Conduct Intelligence Reach

6-8. Intelligence obtained through intelligence reach helps the staff plan and prepare for operations and
answer CCIRs without the need for the information to pass through a formal hierarchy. The following are
steps the staff can take to ensure optimal use, operability, and effectiveness of intelligence reach:
 Establish data exchange methods and procedures.
 Establish electronic message transfer procedures.
 Establish homepages for identified forces.
 Establish points of contact for the following:
 Indications and warnings centers.
 Production centers.
 Combatant command joint intelligence and operations centers.
 Defense Intelligence Agency, INSCOM, and their major subordinate commands, such as the
National Ground Intelligence Center.
 Higher MI organizations.
 Ensure the intelligence staff has the necessary personnel, training, automated systems,
bandwidth, and resources to conduct intelligence reach.
 Determine information requirements through staff planning.
 Develop production requirements for identified intelligence gaps.
 Order geospatial products for the projected area of interest.
 Establish and maintain a comprehensive directory of intelligence reach resources before
deployment and throughout operations. The value of intelligence reach greatly increases as the
staff develops and maintains ready access to rich information resources. These resources are
numerous and may include Army, joint, DOD, non-DOD, national, commercial, foreign, and
university research programs.
 Know what types of information the resources can provide. Continuously expand the resource
directory through identification of new resources.
 Use intelligence reach first to fill intelligence gaps and requirements and answer requests for
information. This technique can preclude unnecessary tasking or risk to limited information
collection assets.
6-2 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

Army Tactical Tasks for the Intelligence Warfighting Function
 Maintain continuous situational understanding and anticipate intelligence requirements. Use

intelligence reach to answer these requirements and provide the results to the commander and
staff for the conduct of operations.
 Exchange intelligence reach strategies with other units.
 Present the information retrieved through intelligence reach in a usable form. Share the
information derived from intelligence reach with subordinate, lateral, and higher echelons.
Ensure follow-on forces have all information as well.
Develop and Maintain Automated Intelligence Networks

6-9. This task entails providing information systems that connect unique assets, units, echelons, agencies,
and multinational partners for intelligence, collaborative analysis and production, dissemination, and
intelligence reach. It uses existing automated information systems, such as DCGS-A, and when necessary,
creates operationally specific networks. In either case, these networks allow access to unclassified and
classified means and interoperability across the AO. This task includes identifying deficiencies in the
following: systems or networks, Service procedures, system administration procedures, security
procedures, alternate power plan, redundancy, system backups, and update procedures.
Establish and Maintain Access

6-10. This task entails establishing, providing, and maintaining access to classified and unclassified
programs, databases, networks, systems, and other Web-based collaborative environments for Army forces,
joint forces, national agencies, and multinational organizations. Its purpose is to facilitate intelligence
reporting, production, dissemination, and sustainment; intelligence reach; and a multilevel collaborative
information environment.
Create and Maintain Intelligence Databases

6-11. This task entails creating and maintaining unclassified and classified databases. Its purpose is to
establish interoperable and collaborative environments for Army forces, joint forces, national agencies, and
multinational organizations. This task facilitates intelligence analysis, reporting, production, dissemination,
sustainment, and intelligence reach. It also includes the requirements for formatting and standardization,
indexing and correlation, normalization, storage, security protocols, and associated applications. The
following must be addressed in database development, management, and maintenance:
 Data sources.
 Information redundancy.
 Import and export standards.
 Data management and standards.
 Update and backup procedures.
 Data mining, query, and search protocols.
PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE OVERWATCH

6-12. Intelligence overwatch is creating standing fixed analytical intelligence capabilities that provide
dedicated intelligence support to committed maneuver units. The overwatch element is connected via a
shared intelligence network that can extract information from multiple sources and provide succinct
answers (vice megabytes of information) directly to supported units when time is critical.
GENERATING INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE

6-13. Generate intelligence knowledge is a continuous task driven by the commander. It begins before
mission receipt and provides the relevant knowledge required regarding the operational environment for the
conduct of operations. As soon as the intelligence officer and other staff sections begin to collect data on
the operational environment, they should organize the data into databases that meet the commander’s
visualization requirements. The execution of this task must follow all applicable policies and regulations on
information collection and operations security.
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 6-3

Chapter 6
6-14. The information and intelligence obtained are refined into knowledge for use in mission analysis
through functional analysis. Information is obtained through intelligence reach; research; data mining;
database access; academic studies, products, or materials; intelligence archives; open-source intelligence
(OSINT); and other information sources. Generate intelligence knowledge is the foundation for performing
IPB and mission analysis. The primary products of the generate intelligence knowledge task are the initial
data files and intelligence survey. Generate intelligence knowledge includes five tasks. Each of the first
four tasks is translated into a database or data files based on the commander’s guidance to support the
commander’s visualization:
 Develop the foundation to define threat characteristics.
 Obtain detailed terrain information and intelligence.
 Obtain detailed weather and weather effects information and intelligence.
 Obtain detailed civil considerations information and intelligence.
 Complete studies.
Note. These tasks outline a basic approach to build and organize databases and data files. This
approach does not preclude users from organizing databases and data files in another manner,
such as by the operational or mission variables.
Develop the Foundation to Define Threat Characteristics

6-15. This task entails obtaining detailed information and intelligence concerning threat characteristics
(formerly order of battle) affecting the conduct of operations. The intelligence section obtains this
information from sources that include intelligence reach; research; data mining; database access; academic
studies, products, or materials; intelligence archives; and OSINT. This task develops specific, detailed
information for each threat characteristic. The information, intelligence, products, and materials obtained
are refined for use in mission analysis, IPB, and other planning tasks. This refinement occurs through
functional analysis and other analytic techniques.
Obtain Detailed Terrain Information and Intelligence

6-16. This task entails obtaining detailed information and intelligence about the terrain in the expected area
of interest from sources that include intelligence reach; research; data mining; database access; academic
studies, products, or materials; intelligence archives; and OSINT. The information, intelligence, products,
and materials are refined for use in mission analysis, IPB, and other planning tasks through functional
analysis. This task encompasses the types of environments (for example, desert and jungle) and the military
aspects of terrain.
Obtain Detailed Weather and Weather Effects Information and Intelligence

6-17. This task entails obtaining detailed information and intelligence regarding recent and historical
weather trends, seasonal patterns, aspects of the weather, and weather zones, including obtaining
operational climatology for long-range planning (several weeks to one year). This task includes obtaining
information from sources about the weather’s effects on friendly and threat forces and operations in the
area of interest. Sources include intelligence reach; research; data mining; database access through the
digital topographic support system; academic studies, products, or materials; intelligence archives; and
OSINT. This task requires specific and detailed information for each weather factor and identification of
places, routes, and areas vulnerable to weather effects.
Obtain Detailed Civil Considerations Information and Intelligence

6-18. This task entails obtaining detailed information and intelligence concerning the civil considerations
within or affecting the expected area of interest. The intelligence section obtains this information from
sources that include intelligence reach; research; data mining; database access; academic studies, products,
or materials; intelligence archives; and OSINT. The data, information, intelligence, products, and materials
obtained are refined for use in mission analysis, IPB, and other planning tasks through functional analysis.
This task develops specific and detailed information for each characteristic of civil considerations.
6-4 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

Complete Studies
6-19. To assist in achieving goals and objectives, this task entails providing the requesting command or
organization with detailed information, assessments, and conclusions about the AO and area of interest. A
study can be a systems or functional analysis product. It should be as detailed and in-depth as time allows.
Studies provide knowledge that supports understanding of the local populations; cultures and caste systems;
societal systems or organizations; political systems and structures; religions practiced and their impacts;
moral beliefs and their impacts; civil authority considerations; military organizations, structure, and
equipment; and attitudes toward U.S., multinational, or host-nation forces. Studies can also include the
views and attitudes of multinational and host-nation forces towards these factors. Complete studies includes
two tasks:
 Conduct area, regional, or country study.
 Conduct specified study.
Conduct Area, Regional, or Country Study

6-20. This task entails studying and providing mission-focused knowledge of the relevant aspects of the
operational environment for a specified area or region of a foreign country—including the attitudes of the
populace and leaders toward joint, multinational, or host-nation forces—to assist in achieving goals and
objectives. Studies can also include the views and attitudes of multinational and host-nation forces. Studies
provide detailed information, assessments, and conclusions on the area of interest of the requesting
command or organization. Studies should be as detailed as time allows.
Conduct Specified Study

6-21. This task entails studying and providing focused knowledge of the relevant aspects of the operational
environment for a specified topic or requirement. Studies provide the requesting command or organization
with detailed information, assessments, and conclusions on the topic or requirement. Studies should be as
detailed and in-depth as time allows.
TAILOR THE INTELLIGENCE FORCE

6-22. The generating force uses mission analysis to focus the allocation of intelligence resources for use by
a joint task force or combatant commander as well as to support strategic objectives, the Army’s mission,
and operations at each echelon. Based on their own mission analysis, the staff at each echelon allocates
intelligence resources obtained through the generating force according to the commander’s guidance,
intent, and mission objectives.
SUPPORT TO SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

6-23. Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to
determine the relationships among the operational and mission variables to facilitate decisionmaking
(ADP 5-0). Support to situational understanding is the task of providing information and intelligence to
commanders to assist them in achieving a clear understanding of the force’s current state with relation to
the threat and other aspects of the AO. It supports the commander’s ability to make sound decisions.
Support to situational understanding includes the following six tasks:
 Perform intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
 Perform situation development.
 Provide intelligence support to protection.
 Provide tactical intelligence overwatch.
 Conduct police intelligence operations.
 Provide intelligence support to civil affairs operations.
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 6-5

Chapter 6
PERFORM INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

6-24. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield is a systematic process of analyzing and visualizing the
portions of the mission variables of threat, terrain and weather, and civil considerations in a specific area of
interest and for a specific mission. By applying IPB, commanders gain the information necessary to
selectively apply and maximize operational effectiveness at critical points in time and space (FM 2-01.3).
IPB is a continuous staff planning activity undertaken by the entire staff. The staff aims to understand the
operational environment and the options it presents to friendly and threat forces. (See FM 2-01.3 and
FMI 2-01.301.)
Define the Operational Environment

6-25. Initially examine the AO, define the area of interest, identify other characteristics in the AO—such as
the role of nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations—that influence friendly and threat
operations, and identify gaps in current intelligence holdings.
Note. The term operational in the title of this task does not refer to the operational level of war.
Describe Environmental Effects on Operations

6-26. This activity evaluates all aspects of the AO with which all forces involved—enemy, friendly, and
neutral—must contend during the conduct of unified land operations. This includes the portions of the
mission variables of enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations in the AO and the area of interest.
Evaluate the Threat

6-27. This activity analyzes current intelligence to determine how the threat normally organizes for combat
and conducts operations. The evaluation includes each threat operating system as well as potential criminal
organizations, factions, guerrillas, and insurgents. This step focuses on creating threat models and templates
that depict how the threat operates when unconstrained by effects of the environment.
Determine Threat Courses of Action

6-28. This activity determines possible threat courses of action, describes threat courses of action, ranks
courses of action in probable order of adoption, and at a minimum identifies the most probable and the
most dangerous threat courses of action.
PERFORM SITUATION DEVELOPMENT

6-29. Situation development is a process for analyzing information and producing current intelligence
concerning the relevant aspects of the operational environment within the AO before and during operations.
The process helps the intelligence officer recognize and interpret indicators of threat intentions and
objectives. Situation development confirms or denies threat courses of action, provides threat locations,
explains what the threat is doing in relation to the friendly force commander’s intent, and provides an
estimate of threat combat effectiveness. The locations and actions of noncombatant elements and
nongovernmental and other civilian organizations in the AO that may impact operations should also be
considered. Through situation development, the intelligence officer quickly identifies information gaps,
explains threat activities in relation to the unit’s operations, and assists the commander in gaining and
maintaining situational understanding. Situation development helps the commander make decisions,
including when to execute branches and sequels.
PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO PROTECTION

6-30. This task includes providing intelligence that supports measures the command takes to remain viable
and functional by protecting itself from the effects of threat activities. It also provides intelligence that
supports recovery from threat actions. This task supports the protection warfighting function and is linked
to antiterrorism and homeland security.
6-6 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

PROVIDE TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE OVERWATCH

6-31. Tactical intelligence overwatch involves creating standing fixed analytical intelligence capabilities that
provide dedicated intelligence support to committed maneuver units. The tactical intelligence overwatch
element is connected through a shared intelligence network that can extract information from multiple sources
and provide succinct answers directly to supported units when time is critical.
CONDUCT POLICE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

6-32. Police intelligence operations is a military police function, integrated within all military police
operations, that supports the operations process through analysis, production, and dissemination of
information collected as a result of police activities to enhance situational understanding, protection, civil
control, and law enforcement. This information—whether police, criminal, or tactical in nature—is
gathered during the conduct of military police operations and upon analysis may contribute to CCIRs and
to intelligence-led, time-sensitive operations or policing strategies necessary to forecast, anticipate, and
preempt crime or related disruptive activities to maintain order. Police intelligence results from the
application of systems, technologies, and processes that analyze applicable data and information necessary for
situational understanding and for focusing policing activities to achieve social order. (See ATTP 3-39.20.)
6-33. Police intelligence operations respond to the reality that in some operational environments the threat
is more criminal than conventional in nature. In those environments, it is not uncommon for members of
armed groups, insurgents, and other belligerents to use or mimic established criminal enterprises and
practices to move contraband, raise funds, or to generally or specifically further their goals and objectives.
Assessing the impact of criminal activity on military operations and deconflicting that activity from other
threat or environmental factors can be essential to effective targeting and mission success.
6-34. The police intelligence operations function represents the military police capability to collect,
analyze, and process relevant information from many sources generally associated with policing activities
and military police operations. The police intelligence operations function is a continuous process used by
military police to collect, analyze, and disseminate police information and police intelligence on
infrastructure, systems, populations, and individuals gathered while conducting military police operations.
Information is collected and analyzed from a policing viewpoint. Information and intelligence from other
operational elements are also fused with information collected through police intelligence operations to
develop a complete common operational picture of the operational environment that drives future
operations. Information collected through the execution of police intelligence operations is fed into the
integrating processes of the operations process.
Note 1. The police intelligence operations function is not an intelligence discipline; it is a law
enforcement function. However, it is within the critical intelligence task of support situational
understanding that police intelligence operations best support the operations process and inform
the intelligence process. Police intelligence operations are essential to this task, particularly
where irregular threats (criminal, terrorist, and insurgents) threaten the security of U.S. forces
and military operations. This function supports and enhances the commander’s situational
awareness and the common operational picture through collection, analysis, and appropriate
dissemination of relevant criminal and police information, and police intelligence.
Note 2. The police intelligence operations function is a vital tool of law enforcement and
criminal investigators that distributes and focuses military police and criminal investigation
assets. And while police intelligence is not collected by or for members of the intelligence
community, this intelligence could be relevant to a military intelligence mission. Remember that
there are additional rules that apply when members of the military intelligence community
collect, retain and disseminate U.S. persons information. Any access by the intelligence
community to information or products resulting from police intelligence operations directed
against U.S. persons should undergo competent legal review.
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 6-7

Chapter 6
PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

6-35. MI organizations performing this task collect and provide information and intelligence products
concerning civil considerations in support of civil affairs operations. (See FM 3-57.)
CONDUCT INFORMATION COLLECTION

6-36. Information collection is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of
sensors, assets, as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of
current and future operations (FM 3-55). This integrates the intelligence and operations staff functions
focused on answering the CCIRs. For joint operations, this is referred to as ISR. Information collection
supports four tasks:
 Plan requirements and assess collection.
 Support site exploitation.
 Task and direct collection.
 Execute collection.
PLAN REQUIREMENTS AND ASSESS COLLECTION

6-37. The intelligence staff (in collaboration with the operations officer and the entire staff) receives and
validates requirements for collection, prepares the planning requirements tools, recommends collection
assets and capabilities to the operations staff, and maintains synchronization as operations progress.
6-38. This task ensures that information collection, intelligence reach, and requests for information
successfully report, produce, and disseminate information, combat information, and intelligence to support
decisionmaking. The intelligence officer, in coordination with the operations officer and other staff
elements as required, synchronizes the entire collection effort. This effort includes assets the commander
controls and those of adjacent and higher echelon units and organizations. It also uses intelligence reach to
answer the CCIRs and other requirements. (See ATTP 2-01.) Planning requirements and assessing
collection has four tasks:
 Requirements development.
 Planning requirements tools development.
 Assessing collection.
 Updating planning requirements tools.
Requirements Development
6-39. The intelligence staff develops a prioritized list focusing on what information it needs to collect in
order to produce intelligence. Additionally, the intelligence staff dynamically updates and adjusts the
requirements in response to mission adjustments and changes. Each requirement is assigned a latest time
information is of value to meet operational requirements.
Planning Requirements Tools Development

6-40. The entire unit staff develops their information requirements and determines how best to satisfy
them. The staff uses reconnaissance, surveillance, and MI collection assets to collect information. There are
at least three planning requirements tools: the information collection matrix, collection synchronization
matrix, and collection overlay. Planning requirements tools address all assets the operations officer can task
or request as well as the coordinating mechanisms needed to ensure adequate coverage of the area of
interest. The operations officer uses these tools in task and direct collection to develop the information
collection plan.
Assessing Collection
6-41. The commander and staff continuously evaluate the information collection plan based on the
assessment of results from reconnaissance missions, surveillance tasks, intelligence operations, and security
6-8 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

operations. Collection assessment is particularly important during execution because situations change
rapidly; evaluation identifies updates for information collection activities. Together, commanders and staffs
determine if CCIRs have been satisfied or are still relevant:
 If CCIRs have been satisfied or are no longer relevant, they are eliminated from the information
collection plan.
 If CCIRs have not been satisfied but are still relevant, the intelligence staff coordinates with the
operations staff during the operations and intelligence working group for additional assets and/or
recommends adjustments to the current coverage.
Updating Requirements Planning Tools

6-42. During this task, the intelligence staff accomplishes the following:
 Receives inputs from the commander and other staff sections.
 Eliminates satisfied requirements.
 Develops and adds new requirements.
 Transitions to the next operation.
SUPPORT SITE EXPLOITATION

6-43. Site exploitation consists of a related series of activities inside a captured site to exploit personnel,
documents, electronic data, and materiel captured at the site, while neutralizing any threat posed by the site
or its contents. A site is a designated, geographically limited area with special diplomatic, informational,
military, and economic sensitivity for the United States. This includes factories with technical data on
threat weapons systems, war crimes sites, critical hostile government facilities, areas suspected of
containing persons of high rank in a hostile government or organization, terrorist money-laundering areas,
and document storage areas for secret police forces. While the physical process of exploiting the site begins
at the site itself, full exploitation may involve teams of experts located worldwide. (See ATTP 3-90.15.)
TASK AND DIRECT COLLECTION

6-44. The operations officer (based on recommendations from the staff) tasks, directs, and when necessary
retasks the information collection assets.
6-45. The operations officer synchronizes the information collection efforts of the entire staff across all
warfighting functions. Specific information requirements facilitate tasking by matching requirements to
assets. Task and direct collection is vital in controlling limited information collection assets. During task
and direct collection, intelligence requirements are identified, prioritized, and validated. The staff
recommends redundancy, mix, and cues as appropriate, as well as feasible tasks that are thoroughly
planned and written into the order. The result of planning requirements and assessing collection and task
and direct collection is an effort focused on answering the commander’s requirements. Task and direct
collection includes three tasks:
 Develop the information collection plan.
 Execute, evaluate, and update the information collection plan.
 Provide intelligence support to personnel recovery.
Develop the Information Collection Plan

6-46. The operations officer develops the information collection plan. This plan reflects an integrated
collection strategy and an employment, production, and dissemination scheme that will effectively answer
the CCIRs. The entire unit staff analyzes each requirement to determine how best to satisfy it. The staff
receives information collection tasks and requests for information from subordinate and adjacent units and
from higher headquarters. The information collection plan includes all assets that the operations officer can
task or request and coordinating mechanisms to ensure adequate coverage of the area of interest.
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 6-9

Chapter 6
Execute, Evaluate, and Update the Information Collection Plan

6-47. This task includes updating reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence operations through
dynamic retasking and periodic updates of the information collection plan. The operations officer updates
the information collection plan based on information received from the intelligence officer. The operations
officer integrates and manages the information collection effort through an integrated staff process and
procedures. As PIRs are answered and new information requirements arise, the intelligence officer updates
the intelligence synchronization tools and provides new input to the operations officer, who updates the
information collection plan. The intelligence and operations officers work closely with all staff elements to
ensure the unit’s organic, assigned, attached, and OPCON collectors receive appropriate taskings.
Provide Intelligence Support to Personnel Recovery

6-48. Support to personnel recovery consists of intelligence activities and capabilities focused on collecting
information needed to recover and return U.S. personnel—whether Soldier, Army civilian, selected DOD
contractors, or other personnel as determined by the Secretary of Defense—who are isolated, missing,
detained, or captured in a specific AO. This support also includes conducting detailed analysis, developing
detailed products, and preparing estimates to support operations undertaken to recover isolated, missing,
detained, or captured personnel. (See FM 3-50.1.)
EXECUTE COLLECTION
6-49. Executing collection focuses on requirements tied to the execution of tactical missions (such as
reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and intelligence operations) based on the CCIRs. Collection
activities acquire information about the adversary and the AO, and provide that information to intelligence
processing and exploitation elements. Typically collection activities begin soon after receipt of the mission
and continue throughout preparation and execution of the operation. They do not cease at conclusion of the
mission but continue as required. This allows the commander to focus combat power, execute current
operations, and prepare for future operations simultaneously. Execute collection includes three tasks:
 Establish technical channels and provide guidance.
 Collect and report information.
 Establish a mission intelligence briefing and debriefing program.
Establish Technical Channels and Provide Guidance

6-50. Commanders and intelligence staffs maintain control of each intelligence discipline during
operations through technical channels to ensure adherence to applicable laws and policies, ensure proper
use of doctrinal techniques, and provide technical support and guidance. Applicable laws and policies
include all relevant U.S. law, the law of war, international law, directives, DOD instructions, and orders.
Commanders direct operations but often rely on the intelligence section’s technical expertise to conduct
portions of the unit’s collection effort. Technical channels also involve translating information collection
tasks into the specific parameters used to focus highly technical or legally sensitive aspects of the
information collection effort. Technical channels include but are not limited to defining, managing, or
guiding the use of specific information collection assets; identifying critical technical collection criteria,
such as technical indicators; recommending collection techniques, procedures, or assets; coordinating
operations; and directing specialized training for specific MI personnel or units.
Note. In specific cases, regulatory authority is granted to specific national and DOD intelligence
agencies for specific intelligence discipline collection and is passed through technical channels.
Collect and Report Information

6-51. This task involves collecting and reporting information in response to collection tasks. Collection
assets collect information and data about the relevant aspects of the operational environment for a particular
area of interest. A successful information collection effort results in the timely collection and reporting of
combat information and of relevant and accurate information that supports the production of intelligence.
6-10 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

Establish a Mission Intelligence Briefing and Debriefing Program

6-52. Commanders establish, support, and allocate appropriate resources for a mission intelligence briefing
and debriefing program. Conducting battle updates and after action reviews are separate tasks from the
mission briefing and debriefing program.
6-53. The intelligence staff develops a mission intelligence briefing plan and complementary debriefing
plan to support the commander’s program. Soldiers receive a mission intelligence briefing before executing
a patrol or similar operation. The briefing sensitizes Soldiers to specific information and reporting
requirements, information gaps, and unique mission requirements. The mission intelligence briefing and
debriefing generally follow the format of a mission briefing: review the route traveled, collection objectives
of the patrol, and the methods employed. The debriefing program captures the specific information
requirements the patrol was to collect and any additional information and observations the patrol made
concerning the operational environment. It also collects any documents or media the patrol found or
obtained. Within this task are two tasks:
 Establish a mission intelligence briefing plan.
 Establish a debriefing plan.
Establish a Mission Intelligence Briefing Plan

6-54. The intelligence staff develops the mission intelligence briefing plan. The mission intelligence
briefing plan identifies information Soldiers executing patrols should be seeking. It ensures that all Soldiers
conducting patrols, tactical movements, and nontactical movements are sensitized to specific information
requirements, reporting requirements, information gaps, and unique mission requirements. The intelligence
mission briefing and debriefing generally follow the format of a mission briefing: review the route traveled,
collection objectives of the patrol, and methods employed.
Establish a Debriefing Plan

6-55. The intelligence staff develops a complementary debriefing plan. The debriefing plan captures
information related to the specific information requirements the patrol collected against and any additional
information and observations the patrol made concerning the operational environment. It also collects any
documents and media the patrol found or obtained. The plan should include all returning patrols, leaders
who have traveled to meetings, returning HUMINT collection teams, aircrews, and others who may have
obtained information of intelligence value. The intelligence section debriefs personnel. Debriefers then
write and submit a report or report information verbally, as appropriate. The requirement for a debriefing
by the intelligence staff following each mission should be a part of the mission intelligence briefing.
Leaders should not consider the mission complete and release personnel until the debriefings and reporting
are completed.
SUPPORT TO TARGETING AND INFORMATION CAPABILITIES

6-56. Intelligence support to targeting and information capabilities is the task of providing the commander
information and intelligence support for targeting for lethal and nonlethal actions. It includes intelligence
support to the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of direct and indirect fires, public affairs
activities, cyber electromagnetic activities, military information support operations, information protection,
operations security, and military deception, as well as assessing the effects of those operations. Within this
task are three tasks:
 Provide intelligence support to targeting.
 Provide intelligence support to mission command.
 Provide intelligence support to combat assessment.
PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO TARGETING

6-57. The intelligence officer (supported by the entire staff) provides the fire support coordinator, public
affairs officer, electronic warfare officer, psychological operations officer, and other staff officers with
information and intelligence for targeting the threat’s forces and systems with lethal and nonlethal weapons and
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 6-11

Chapter 6
for supporting the information-related activities. (See JP 3-60, FM 3-13, FM 3-36, and FM 3-60.) The
information and intelligence include identification of threat capabilities and limitations. The targeting
process uses the decide, detect, deliver, assess methodology. The intelligence officer supports targeting by
providing accurate, current intelligence and information to the staff and ensures the information collection
plan supports the finalized targeting plan. Provide intelligence support to targeting includes two tasks:
 Provide intelligence support to target development.
 Provide intelligence support to target detection.
Provide Intelligence Support to Target Development

6-58. Target development is the systematic analysis of threat forces and operations to determine high-value
targets (people, organizations, or military units the threat commander requires for successful completion of
the mission), high-payoff targets (people, organizations, or military units whose loss to the enemy
contributes significantly to the success of the friendly course of action), and systems and system
components for potential engagement through maneuver, fires, military information support operations,
cyber electromagnetic activities, or other operations.
Provide Intelligence Support to Target Detection

6-59. The intelligence staff establishes procedures for disseminating targeting information. The targeting
working group develops the sensor and attack guidance matrix to determine the sensors required to detect
and locate targets. The intelligence staff incorporates these requirements into the planning requirements
tools for later incorporation into the information collection plan.
PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO MISSION COMMAND

6-60. Intelligence support provides the commander information and intelligence support for targeting and
information-related activities through nonlethal actions. It includes intelligence support to the planning,
preparation, and execution of public affairs, cyber electromagnetic activities, military information support
operations, information protection, operations security, and military deception, as well as assessing the
effects of those operations. Key activities reflected in this task include communications, planning,
synchronization, and integration of intelligence into plans and orders. Within this task are seven tasks:
 Provide intelligence support to public affairs.
 Provide intelligence support to cyber electromagnetic activities.
 Provide intelligence support to military information support operations.
 Provide intelligence support to information protection.
 Provide intelligence support to operations security.
 Provide intelligence support to military deception.
 Provide intelligence support to civil affairs.
Provide Intelligence Support to Public Affairs

6-61. This task entails MI organizations collecting and providing information and intelligence products
concerning civil considerations in the AO to support public affairs activities. (See FM 3-61.1.)
Provide Intelligence Support to Cyber Electromagnetic Activities

6-62. Cyber electromagnetic activities are activities leveraged to seize, retain, and exploit an advantage
over adversaries and enemies in both cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, while simultaneously
denying and degrading adversary and enemy use of the same and protecting the mission command system
(ADRP 3-0).
Provide Intelligence Support to Military Information Support Operations

6-63. Military information support operations (formerly psychological operations) requires information
and intelligence (expressed in terms of the operational or mission variables) to support analysis of foreign
6-12 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

target audiences and their environment. (See FM 3-53.) Continuous and timely intelligence is required to
assess target audience behavioral trends. Information and intelligence focus on the following:
 Target audience’s motivation and behavior.
 Indicators of success or lack of success (measures of effectiveness).
 Target audience’s reaction to friendly, hostile, and neutral force actions.
Provide Intelligence Support to Information Protection

6-64. The intelligence warfighting function supports information protection by providing information to
identify threat cyber electromagnetic capabilities, activities, and tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Intelligence provides information relating to computer network defense, physical security, operations
security, counterdeception, and counterpropaganda.
Provide Intelligence Support to Operations Security

6-65. This task identifies capabilities and limitations of the threat’s intelligence system, including
adversary intelligence objectives and means, procedures, and facilities that collect, process, and analyze
information. This task supports the identification of indicators that adversary intelligence capabilities and
systems might detect that could be interpreted or pieced together to obtain essential elements of friendly
information in time to use against friendly forces. (See JP 3-13.3 and ADRP 3-37.)
Provide Intelligence Support to Military Deception

6-66. This task identifies capabilities and limitations of the threat’s intelligence collecting capabilities,
systems, and means. This task also identifies threat biases and perceptions. (See JP 3-13.4.)
Provide Intelligence Support to Civil Affairs

6-67. MI organizations performing this task collect and provide information and intelligence products
concerning civil considerations in support of civil affairs operations. (See FM 3-57.)
PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO COMBAT ASSESSMENT

6-68. Intelligence supports the assessment activity of the operations and targeting processes. (See ADRP 5-0
and FM 3-60.) The commander uses combat assessment to determine if targeting actions have met the
attack guidance and, if reattack is necessary, to perform essential fires tasks and achieve the commander’s
intent for fires. The staff determines how combat assessment relates to specific targets by completing battle
damage, physical damage, functional damage, changes in threat or enemy behavior, and target system
assessments. This task includes two tasks:
 Conduct physical damage assessment.
 Conduct functional damage assessment.
Conduct Physical Damage Assessment

6-69. Conduct physical damage assessment is a staff task that estimates the extent of physical damage to a
target based on observed or interpreted damage. It is a postattack target analysis that is a coordinated effort
among all units and the entire staff.
Conduct Functional Damage Assessment

6-70. The staff conducts the functional damage assessment for the threat’s remaining functional or
operational capabilities. The assessment focuses on measurable effects. It estimates the threat’s ability to
reorganize or find alternative means to continue operations. The targeting working group and staff integrate
analysis with external sources to determine if the commander’s intent for fires has been met.
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 6-13

Glossary
SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ADCON administrative control

ADP Army doctrine publication
ADRP Army doctrine reference publication
AFDD Air Force doctrine document
AJP allied joint publication
AO area of operations
AR Army regulation
ATP Army techniques publication
ATTP Army tactics, techiques, and procedures
BCT brigade combat team
CCIR commander’s critical information requirement
CCIRM collection coordination and intelligence requirements management
CI counterintelligence
COIST company intelligence support team
DA Department of the Army
DCGS-A distributed common ground system–Army
DHE-M Defense Human Intelligence Enterprise manual
DOD Department of Defense
DODD Department of Defense directive
E-MIB expeditionary military intelligence brigade
F3EAD find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate
FDO foreign disclosure office
FM field manual
G-1 assistant chief of staff, personnel
G-2 assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G-3 assistant chief of staff, operations
G-4 assistant chief of staff, logistics
G-5 assistant chief of staff, plans
G-6 assistant chief of staff, signal
GEOINT geospatial intelligence
HUMINT human intelligence
IIR intelligence information report
INSCOM Intelligence and Security Command
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 Glossary-1

Glossary
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

JWICS Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
LLVI low-level voice intercept
MASINT measurement and signature intelligence
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time
available, civil considerations (mission variables)
MI military intelligence
MOS military occupational specialty
NIPRNET Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network
OPCON operational control
OSINT open-source intelligence
PED processing, exploitation, and dissemination
PIR priority intelligence requirement
S-1 battalion or brigade manpower and personnel staff officer
S-2 battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
S-3 battalion or brigade operations staff officer
S-4 battalion or brigade logistics staff officer
S-6 battalion or brigade signal staff officer
SIGINT signals intelligence
SIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
SOF special operations forces
SOP standard operating procedure
SPIRIT special purpose intelligence remote terminal
TACON tactical control
TC training circular
TECHINT technical intelligence
TIIR tactical intelligence information report
TUAS tactical unmanned aircraft system
UAS unmanned aircraft system
U.S. United States
SECTION II – TERMS
all-source intelligence
(Army) The integration of intelligence and information from all relevant sources in order to analyze
situations or conditions that impact operations. (ADRP 2-0)
ARFOR
The Army component and senior Army headquarters of all Army forces assigned or attached to a
combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational
command. (ADRP 1-02)
Glossary-2 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

Glossary
combat information
(joint) Unevaluated data, gathered by or provided directly to the tactical commander which, due to its
highly perishable nature or the criticality of the situation, cannot be processed into tactical intelligence
in time to satisfy the user’s tactical intelligence requirements. (JP 2-01)
geospatial intelligence
(joint) The exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and
visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. Geospatial
intelligence consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information. (JP 2-03)
human intelligence
(Army) The collection by a trained human intelligence collector of foreign information from people
and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment,
and capabilities. (FM 2-22.3)
information collection
An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well
as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future
operations. (FM 3-55)
(Army) The tasks undertaken by military intelligence units and Soldiers to obtain information to satisfy
validated requirements. (ADRP 2-0)
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(joint) An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and
processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations.
This is an integrated intelligence and operations function. (JP 2-01)
planning requirements and assessing collection
The task that analyzes requirements, evaluates available assets (internal and external), recommends to
the operations staff taskings for information collection assets, submits requests for information for
adjacent and higher collection support, and conducts an assessment of the effectiveness of the
information collection plan. (ATTP 2-01)
reconnaissance
(joint) A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information
about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the
meteorological, hydrographic or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (JP 2-0)
security operations
Those operations undertaken by a commander to provide early and accurate warning of enemy
operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to
the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow the commander to effectively use the protected force.
(ADRP 3-90)
signals intelligence
(joint) (1) A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all
communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence,
however transmitted. (2) Intelligence derived from communications, electronic, and foreign
instrumentation signals. (JP 2-0)
surveillance
(joint) The systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things,
by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (JP 3-0)
technical channels
Technical channels provide commanders with the means to rapidly employ or modify functional
capabilities for mission requirements. It enables the timely implementation of techniques, procedures,
standards, configurations, and designs in support of operations at all levels. Technical channels neither
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 Glossary-3

Glossary
constitutes nor bypasses command authority, but serves as the mechanism for ensuring the execution
of clearly delineated technical tasks, functions, and capabilities to meet the dynamic requirements of
full spectrum operations. The orders process will delineate the appropriate authorities required to
implement functional capabilities from Army down to the lowest echelons of command through the
use of technical channels. (FM 6-02.71)
threat
Any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States
forces, United States national interests, or the homeland. (ADRP 3-0)
Glossary-4 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

References
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.
ADP 2-0. Intelligence. 31August 2012.
ADP 3-0. Unified Land Operations. 10 October 2011.
ADRP 1-02. Terms and Military Symbols. 24 September 2013.
ADRP 2-0. Intelligence. 31August 2012.
ADRP 3-0. Unified Land Operations. 16 May 2012.
JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 8 November 2010.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents are cited in this publication.
JOINT PUBLICATIONS
Most joint publications are available online: www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm.
JP 2-0. Joint Intelligence. 22 October 2013.
JP 2-01. Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. 5 January 2012.
JP 2-01.3. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 16 June 2009.
JP 2-03.Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations. 22 March 2007.
JP 3-0. Joint Operations. 11 August 2011.
JP 3-08. Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations. 24 June 2011.
JP 3-13.3. Operations Security. 4 January 2012.
JP 3-13.4. Military Deception. 26 January 2012.
JP 3-33. Joint Task Force Headquarters. 30 July 2012.
JP 3-52. Joint Airspace Control. 20 May 2010.
JP 3-59. Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations. 7 December 2012.
JP 3-60. Joint Targeting. 31 January 2013.
JP 6-0. Joint Communications System. 10 June 2010.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: www.apd.army.mil.
ADP 3-09. Fires. 31 August 2012.
ADP 3-37. Protection. 31 August 2012.
ADP 4-0. Sustainment. 31 July 2012.
ADP 5-0. The Operations Process. 17 May 2012.
ADP 6-0. Mission Command. 17 May 2012.
ADRP 3-05. Special Operations. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 3-09. Fires. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 3-37. Protection. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 3-90. Offense and Defense. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 4-0. Sustainment. 31 July 2012.
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 References-1

References
ADRP 5-0. The Operations Process. 17 May 2012.

ADRP 6-0. Mission Command. 17 May 2012.
AR 11-6. Army Foreign Language Program. 31 August 2009.
AR 350-32. Army Foundry Intelligence Training Program. 10 June 2010.
AR 380-5. Department of the Army Information Security Program. 29 September 2000.
AR 380-10. Foreign Disclosure and Contacts with Foreign Representatives. 4 December 2013.
AR 381-10. U.S. Army Intelligence Activities. 3 May 2007.
ATP 2-19.5. Multifunctional Team. 14 June 2013.
ATP 3-09.24. Techniques for the Fires Brigade. 21 November 2012.
ATP 4-93. Sustainment Brigade. 9 August 2013.
ATTP 2-01. Planning Requirements and Assessing Collection. 23 April 2012.
ATTP 3-39.20. Police Intelligence Operations. 29 July 2010.
ATTP 3-90.15. Site Exploitation Operations. 8 July 2010.
ATTP 5-0.1. Commander and Staff Officer Guide. 14 September 2011.
FM 2-01.3. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace. 15 October 2009.
FM 2-19.4 (FM 34-80). Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Operations. 25 November 2008.
FM 2-22.2 (FM 34-60). Counterintelligence. 21 October 2009.
FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52). Human Intelligence Collector Operations. 6 September 2006.
FM 3-04.111. Aviation Brigades. 7 December 2007.
FM 3-09 (FM 6-20). Fire Support. 3 November 2011.
FM 3-13. Inform and Influence Activities. 25 January 2013.
FM 3-16 (FM 100-8). The Army in Multinational Operations. 20 May 2010.
FM 3-34.22 (FMs 3-34.221, 5-7-30, 5-71-2, 5-71-3). Engineer Operations—Brigade Combat Team
and Below. 11 February 2009.
FM 3-36. Electronic Warfare. 9 November 2012.
FM 3-50.1. Army Personnel Recovery. 21 November 2011.
FM 3-52. Airspace Control. 8 February 2013.
FM 3-53 (FM 3-05.30). Military Information Support Operations. 4 January 2013.
FM 3-55. Information Collection. 3 May 2013.
FM 3-57 (FM 3-05.40). Civil Affairs Operations. 31 October 2011.
FM 3-60 (FM 6-20-10). The Targeting Process. 26 November 2010.
FM 3-61.1. Public Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 1 October 2000.
FM 3-90.31. Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Operations. 26 February 2009.
FM 3-92 (FM 100-15). Corps Operations. 26 November 2010.
FM 3-93. Theater Army Operations. 12 October 2011.
FM 6-01.1. Knowledge Management Operations. 16 July 2012.
FM 6-02.71. Network Operations. 14 July 2009.
FM 6-99 (FM 6-99.2). U.S. Army Report and Message Formats. 19 August 2013.
FM 7-15. The Army Universal Task List. 27 February 2009.
FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956.
FMI 2-01.301 (FM 34-130). Specific Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures and Applications for
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 31 March 2009.
TC 2-19.13. Aerial Exploitation Battalion and Aerial Reconnaissance Battalion Intelligence
Operations. 18 May 2010.
TC 2-19.63. Company Intelligence Support Team. 9 November 2010.
References-2 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

References
TC 2-22.7. Geospatial Intelligence Handbook. 18 February 2011.

(FOUO) TC 2-22.302. Controlled Military Source Operations (MSO). 16 February 2007. This is a
classified publication available online at “Intelligence Knowledge Network–Secret.” Select
“Active MI Doctrine Page.” Contact the preparing agency of this manual for access
instructions.
TC 2-22.303. The 2X Handbook. 31 July 2006.
(FOUO) TC 2-22.307. Source Validation Handbook. 25 August 2009. This is a classified publication
available online at “Intelligence Knowledge Network–Secret.” Select “Active MI Doctrine
Page.” Contact the preparing agency of this manual for access instructions.
TC 2-33.4. Intelligence Analysis. 1 July 2009.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
DOD publications are available at the DOD Issuances Web site (http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives).
(FOUO) AFDD 3-59. Weather Operations. 27 August 2012. Available online at the “Air University
Curtis E. LeMay Center for doctrine Development and Education” Web site.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/lemay/main.htm, accessed 24 October 2013.
(FOUO) AJP 2-0. Allied Joint Intelligence Counter Intelligence and Security Doctrine. December
2003. Available on line at the “NATO Standardization Agency (NSA) Public Web Site.”
http://nsa.nato.int/nsa/, accessed 24 October 2013.
(FOUO) DHE-M 3301.001. Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Enterprise Manual, Volume I:
Collection Requirements, Reporting, and Evaluation Procedures. 30 January 2009. This is a
classified publication available online at “The Army G-2 Homepage” (classified). Select the
HUMINT link. Contact the preparing agency of this manual for access instructions.
DOD 5240.1-R. Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect
United States Persons. 7 December 1982.
DODD 2310.1E. The Department of Defense Detainee Program. 5 September 2006.
DODD 3115.09. DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning.
11 October 2012.
Executive Order 12333. United States Intelligence Activities. 4 December 1981. Available online at the
National Archives Federal Register Web site at http://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/codification/executive-order/12333.html, accessed 24 October 2013.
Geneva Conventions (1949). Available online at the International Committee of the Red Cross.
“International Humanitarian Law—Treaties and Documents” Web site at
http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/CONVPRES?OpenView, accessed 24 October 2013.
Geneva Conventions, Protocol I (1977). Available online at the International Committee of the Red
Cross. “International Humanitarian Law—Treaties and Documents” Web site at
Hague Convention (1899 and 1907). Available online at the International Committee of the Red Cross.
“International Humanitarian Law—Treaties and Documents” Web site at
Manual for Courts-Martial (2012). Available online at the Army Publications Directorate Web site at
http://www.apd.army.mil/AdminPubs/ProductMap.asp, accessed 24 October 2013.
Title 10, United States Code. Armed Forces of the United States. Available online at the U.S. House of
Representatives Office of the Law Revision Counsel Web site at http://uscodebeta.house.gov/,
accessed 24 October 2013.
Title 32, United States Code. National Guard. Available online at the U.S. House of Representatives
Office of the Law Revision Counsel Web site at http://uscodebeta.house.gov/, accessed 24
October 2013.
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 References-3

References
Title 50, United States Code. War and National Defense. Available online at the U.S. House of
Representatives Office of the Law Revision Counsel Web site at http://uscodebeta.house.gov/,
accessed 24 October 2013.
RECOMMENDED READINGS
This document contains relevant supplemental information.
ATP 2-22.4. Technical Intelligence. 4 November 2013.
PRESCRIBED FORMS
None.
REFERENCED FORMS
Most Army forms are available online: www.apd.army.mil.
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
References-4 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

Index
Entries are by paragraph number.
A automated intelligence combat information, 1-34, 1-46,

networks, 6-9 6-38
adjustment decisions, defined, 1-38
intelligence operations and, B–C
1-19 command net, 2-58
baseline (SIGINT), 2-69–2-70
aerial reconnaissance/ command posts, division and
branches, 3-29, 3-30 corps, 3-7
exploitation battalions, 4-18
broad area coverage/search, command relationships, 1-93–
Air Force weather team, 2-2, 2-103, 2-106, 2-107
2-49 1-95
BCT, 2-14, 2-18 capabilities of collection assets, commander’s intent, and
division and corps, 3-18– 1-30 intelligence operations, 1-20
3-19 CCIRM, 5-12–5-14 common operational picture,
and preparation, 1-55 CI augmentation to BCTs, 2-41
and UASs, 2-114 2-121–2-129 communications, MI company
airspace control civil affairs operations, 6-35 considerations, 2-55–2-60
and dynamic retasking, intelligence support to, 6-67 communications integration
2-119 and language support, staff element, division and
and intelligence operations, 1-112 corps, 3-16–3-17, 3-24
1-51, 1-79
civil considerations, 6-18 communications networks,
MI company coordination
for, 2-51 COIST. See company types of, 2-56–2-59
intelligence support team. company intelligence support
allocation of support, 1-30
collect (intelligence process team (COIST), 2-2, 2-7–2-10,
analysis, 1-41–1-42
step), 1-31–1-38 6-18
functional, 6-14, 6-15, 6-16
collection activities, 1-19 and battalion intelligence
analysis and control element, cell, 2-12
3-20 collection coordination and
and MI company, 2-3
intelligence requirements
analyze (intelligence process role in planning, 2-9
management (CCIRM), 5-12–
step), 1-41–1-42 concept of operations, and
5-14
apportionment, 1-30 intelligence operations, 1-20
collection management
area coverage (CI), 2-126– division and corps, 3-20, continuing activities (operations
2-128 3-24 process), and intelligence
area reconnaissance (UAS), joint, 4-27–4-29 operations, 1-76–1-79
2-107 collection operations controlled source operations,
ARFOR, 3-2 management (joint), 4-29 2-90
Army Service component collection overlay, 6-40 coordination, and intelligence
command, 4-1 operations planning, 1-50
collection plans, for
assess (intelligence process multinational operations, 5-6 coordination, and retasking,
step), 1-43 1-63
collection requests, 2-116–
assessing collection, 6-41. See 2-119 corps, role of, 3-3
also planning requirements and collection requirements counterintelligence
assessing collection. management (joint), 4-28 augmentation to BCTs, 2-121–
assessment 2-129
collection synchronization
and intelligence operations, matrix, 6-40 critical asset list, and
1-45 intelligence operations
combat assessment, 1-71, planning, 1-54
MI collection assets and,
6-68–6-70
1-71 cueing, 6-45
and retasking, 1-63 combat aviation brigade, 3-40
and remote sensors, 2-130,
and targeting, 1-67 combat engineer support, MI 2-136, 2-155
company considerations, 2-54 and SIGINT collection, 2-74
15 April 2014 FM 2-0 Index-1

Index
current operations integration and intelligence operations geospatial intelligence

cell (COIC) planning, 1-51 (GEOINT)
division and corps, 3-27– MI company coordination division and corps, 3-20,
3-29 for, 2-51 3-22
and division and corps fires support to Prophet
intelligence cell, 3-8, 3-13 and MI collection assets, planning, 2-70
and MI collection asset 1-69, 1-70 theater army, 4-6
locations, 1-78 MI company coordination geospatial planning cell
theater army, 4-6 with, 2-51–2-52 (theater army), 4-6
cut (SIGINT), 2-74 and protection, 2-52 human intelligence (HUMINT)
cyber electronic activities, fires brigade, 3-39 collection planning, 2-84–
intelligence support to, 6-63 fires cell 2-99
and battalion intelligence collection teams, 1-102–
D–E–F 1-105, 2-92–2-95
cell, 2-11
decide, detect, deliver, and and intelligence operations collector, 2-86n
assess (D3A), 1-66 planning, 1-52 interrogation, 2-91, 2-91n
decision points, 1-20 and UASs, 2-111 reporting, 2-96–2-99
decisive engagement, 1-26 fix, (SIGINT collection), 2-75, immediate requests
2-76 (collection), 2-118
deconfliction
and intelligence operations force generation, support to, indications and warning, 2-23,
planning, 1-50 6-2–6-22 6-4, 6-8
and retasking, 1-63 force protection. See information collection, 1-2
defended asset list, 1-54 protection. conduct of, 6-36–6-55
capability, 1-3
defense, remote sensors use force tailoring, 3-36, 6-2 defined, 1-3
in, 2-155 of intelligence resources, and joint ISR, 4-23–4-24
directed search area, 2-102, 6-22 matrix, 6-40
2-105, 2-107 foreign disclosure (office) MI company role in, 2-44
direction finding, 2-65, 2-71– training, 2-15 planning, 2-26–2-27
2-76 and multinational tasks, 1-11–1-16
operations, 5-8–5-11 information collection plan,
disseminate (intelligence
theater army, 4-9 1-31, 1-48, 6-41
process step), 1-40
Foundry, 4-12, 6-3, 6-6 and assessment, 1-61, 1-62
dynamic retasking, 2-119
and information collection fratricide (avoidance) developing, 6-46
plan, 6-47 and airspace control, 1-79 division and corps, 3-24,
and intelligence operations 3-33
dynamic targeting, 1-72 executing, 1-56, 1-58, 6-47
planning, 1-50
early warning, and remote and MI company, 2-52 and remote sensors, 2-158,
sensors, 2-134, 2-154 and SOF integration, 1-85 2-165
E-MIB. See expeditionary MI and terrain management, and targeting, 1-68
brigade. 1-78, 2-48 and technical channels,
1-110
engineer support, MI company full-motion video, 2-100–2-101,
and UASs, 2-110
considerations, 2-54 2-116
information collection tasks,
execute collection, 1-16, 6-49– functional analysis, 6-14, 6-15,
1-31, 1-32
6-55 6-16
and targeting, 1-67, 1-68
execution decisions, and functional commands and technical channels,
intelligence operations, 1-45 (INSCOM), 4-10, 4-14 1-110, 1-111, 6-50
expeditionary MI brigade (E- functional damage information exchange cell, 5-4
MIB), 3-2, 3-4–3-6, 3-33, 3-38 assessment, 6-70
information management, 2-39
field artillery intelligence officer, fusion cell, division and corps,
information protection,
UASs and, 2-111 3-21
intelligence support to, 6-64
find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, future operations cell (FUOPS),
INSCOM, 4-10–4-18
and disseminate (F3EAD), 3-29
1-73 integrating processes, and
G–H–I intelligence operations,
fire support coordination 1-64–1-75
G-2X, 3-25, 4-8
measures
intelligence, defined, 2-28
Index-2 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

Index
intelligence analysis, and and intelligence operations M–N–O

multinational operations, 5-6 planning, 1-65 maneuver. See movement and
Intelligence and Security and remote sensors, 2-157 maneuver cell.
Command, 4-10–4-18 and targeting, 1-67
and theater army, 4-1 maneuver enhancement
intelligence architecture, 1-32, brigade, 3-41
6-2, 6-7 intelligence process
disseminate step, 1-40 MI collection assets, 1-5
described, 2-30 movement and positioning,
division and corps, 3-16– and intelligence operations,
1-27–1-44 2-48
3-17, 3-34–3-35 security for, 2-51
establishing, 2-30–2-39 and intelligence warfighting
function, 1-28 and targeting, 1-69
and multinational
operations, 5-6 plan and direct step, 1-31 MI company, 2-2, 2-40–2-120
produce step, 1-39 augmentation of, 2-6
intelligence authorities, 1-6– and BCT intelligence cell,
1-10 intelligence reach, 1-20, 6-8,
6-14, 6-15, 6-16, 6-38 2-14
intelligence cell, battalion, and BCT S-2X, 2-17
2-11–2-12 intelligence readiness, 6-3 and COIST, 2-3
BCT, 2-110, 2-13–2-39 intelligence running estimate, function of, 2-3
division and corps, 3-8– 2-12, 3-21 military deception, intelligence
3-25 intelligence security support to, 6-66
theater army, 4-2–4-5 cooperation, 4-7 military information support
intelligence control section intelligence sharing, 5-2–5-4 operations, 1-118, 3-31, 6-56,
(theater army), 4-7 6-57, 6-58, 6-60, 6-62, 6-63
intelligence, surveillance, and
intelligence knowledge, 6-13 reconnaissance (ISR). See military source operations,
intelligence operations joint ISR. 2-86–2-91
commanders’ interrogation, 2-91, 2-91n mission command
considerations, 1-90 intelligence support to,
defined, 1-4 IPB. See intelligence
preparation of the battlefield. 6-60–6-67
during assessment, 1-61– of intelligence operations,
1-63 ISR. See joint ISR.
1-88–1-111
during supported unit ISR concept of operations
execution, 1-45, 1-56– mission intelligence briefing
(joint), 4-25–4-26
1-60 and debriefing program, 6-52–
joint force intelligence staff, 6-55
during supported unit
4-19–4-29
planning, 1-45, 1-47– movement and maneuver cell
1-54, 1-91 J–K–L and division and corps
during supported unit intelligence operations,
joint ISR, 4-23–4-26, 5-6
preparation, 1-45, 1-55 3-8, 3-12
focus of, 1-19 knowledge management, 2-39, and intelligence operations
guidelines/fundamentals, 6-2 planning, 1-50, 1-51
1-17–1-26 LandWarNet, 2-34, 2-38 and MI collection asset
multinational operations language support, 1-112–1-124, locations, 1-78
and, 5-12–5-14 2-15 MI company coordination
planning considerations for, and contract linguists, with, 2-51–2-52
2-45 1-119–1-122 multifunctional platoon, 2-61–
prioritizing, 1-20 2-99
purpose of, 1-1 liaison, division and corps, 3-28
and intelligence operations, multinational operations, 5-51
section, 3-12, 4-6
security for, 2-51 1-76 offense, and remote sensors,
staff considerations, 1-91 and language support, 1-112 2-153–2-154
and multinational
intelligence overwatch, 6-12, operational control (OPCON),
operations, 5-5, 5-7
6-31 1-94
with SOF, 1-84, 1-85
intelligence preparation of the operations and intelligence
line of bearing, 2-72
battlefield (IPB), 1-26, 2-15, nets, 2-57
2-22, 6-14, 6-15, 6-16, 6-24– lines of communications
operations and intelligence
6-28 coverage, UASs and, 2-105
working group, 6-41
and battalion intelligence linguist categories, 1-122 and remote sensors, 2-164
cell, 2-11 low-level voice intercept, 2-77– and UASs, 2-110
division and corps, 3-31 2-80

Index
operations process preplanned requests, 2-117 sensitive compartmented

continuing activities of, priority intelligence information, 4-9
1-76–1-79 requirements, 1-20 sensor surveillance plan, 2-165
integrating processes of, processing, during collection, sensors, 1-23, 2-130–2-166
1-64–1-75 1-16, 1-36
and intelligence operations, sequels, 3-30
1-16, 1-44–1-63 processing, exploitation, and Shadow, 2-100, 2-101
and MI units, 1-44, 1-46 dissemination. See PED
enablers. SIGINT
operations security, intelligence baseline, 2-69–2-70
support to, 6-65 produce (intelligence process cell (division and corps),
step), 1-39 3-23
P–Q–R Prophet, site selection and collection planning
PED enablers, 1-3, 1-30 employment, 2-66–2-70 considerations, 2-65–
and analysis, 1-42 protection, 6-30 2-83
and intelligence operations, and CI, 2-121 collection teams, task
1-91 and MI company, 2-52 organization of, 1-99–
and ISR concept of and multinational 1-101
operations (joint), 4-25 operations, 5-11 reporting, 2-81–2-83
and multinational and remote sensors, 2-134 signals intercept, 2-71–2-76
operations, 5-13 support to, 2-25 described, 2-65
personnel recovery, 6-48 theater army, 4-1 site exploitation, 6-43
UASs and, 2-112 protection cell situation development, 1-42,
physical damage assessment, and intelligence operations 2-23, 4-1, 6-29
6-69 planning, 1-54
UASs and, 2-112 situational understanding,
PIRs, 1-20 support to, 6-23–6-35
public affairs, intelligence
plan and direct (intelligence support to, 3-31, 6-56, 6-57, special operations forces
process step), 1-31 6-58, 6-60, 6-61, 6-62 (SOF) integration, 1-83–1-87
planning Raven, 1-79 special security officer, division
COIST role in, 2-9 and corps, 3-14
defined, 1-47 reconnaissance, 1-4
redundancy, of MI collection stability operations, 1-19, 1-91
of division and corps
assets, 1-22, 1-33 and language support,
intelligence operations,
1-112
3-33–3-37 regional operations company, and remote sensors, 2-156
horizon, 3-26 4-6
information collection, 2-26– staff weather officer, division
regionally aligned forces, 1-80– and corps, 3-18. See also Air
2-27
1-82 Force weather team.
and language support, 1-124
MI company employment, remote sensors, 2-130–2-166 studies, 6-19–6-21
2-40–2-60 reporting media, 1-37 support brigades, 3-38–3-42
and remote sensors, 2-164 requirements development, support relationships, 1-96–
planning requirements and 6-39 1-105
assessing collection, 1-31, retasking, and assessment,
6-41, 6-37–6-42 surveillance, 1-4
1-63 remote sensors and, 2-133,
division and corps, 2-15,
2-26, 2-27, 3-24, 6-45 risk management, and 2-139, 2-154
defined, 1-12 intelligence operations, sustainment
and remote sensors, 2-164 1-74–1-75 language support and,
and UASs, 2-110 route reconnaissance, and 1-112
planning requirements tools, UASs, 2-105 MI company considerations,
6-40, 6-42 2-53
S responsibility for, 1-97
plans cell, division and corps, S-2, 2-15 and UASs, 2-113
3-30–3-32
S-2X, 2-16–2-17 sustainment brigade, 3-42
point target, and UASs, 2-108
S-6, 2-38 sustainment cell, and
police intelligence operations, intelligence operations
6-32–6-34 scheme of information
collection, 2-4, 2-5 planning, 1-53
preparation, MI unit actions
during, 1-55 security operations, 1-4
Index-4 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

Index
T Trojan SPIRIT,
tactical control (TACON), 1-95 communications links, 2-60
tactical unmanned aircraft troop leading procedures, 2-63
systems. See unmanned U–V
aircraft systems.
unit assignment (CI), 2-129
targeting, 6-57–6-59
defined, 1-66 unmanned aircraft systems
division and corps, 3-15, (UASs)
3-20 3-29 3-31 planning considerations for,
dynamic, 1-72 2-100–2-120
and intelligence operations, and air tasking order, 1-79,
1-66–1-73 2-51
methodology, 1-66 control and coordination of,
and remote sensors, 2-135– 2-109–2-114
2-136, 2-140, 2-148 employment of, 2-115–
support to, 2-25 2-120
theater army, 4-1 control of, 1-106–1-108.
and UASs, 2-111 and zone reconnaissance,
working group, 6-70 2-106
task and direct collection, 1-15, W–X–Y–Z
6-40, 6-44–6-48 weapons control status,
task-organizing, 3-37 intelligence operations
of MI collection assets, planning and, 1-51
1-92–1-108 weather, 6-14, 6-17. See also
tear lines, 5-4 Air Force weather team.
technical channels, 1-109– and intelligence operations,
1-111 2-49
establishing, 6-50 and remote sensors, 2-137,
and information collection 2-160
tasks, 6-50 zone reconnaissance, UASs
and intelligence operations, and, 2-106
1-88, 1-89
technical control
division and corps, 3-20
and intelligence
architecture, 2-32
technical nets/networks, 2-59
and intelligence
architecture, 2-32
terrain management
and intelligence operations,
1-78
and MI collection assets,
2-48
theater army, role of, 4-1
theater intelligence plan, 4-7
theater MI brigades, 4-15–4-18
and theater intelligence cell,
4-4, 4-6
theater operations company,
4-6
theater security cooperation,
1-80
threat characteristics, 6-15
translating, during collection,
1-36

FM 2-0
15 April 2014
By order of the Secretary of the Army:
RAYMOND T ODIERNO
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
GERALD B. O’KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
1405101
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the United States Army Reserve. To be distributed in
accordance with the initial distribution number (IDN) 111117, requirements for FM 2-0.
PIN: 081441-000

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FM 2-0

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Chapter 3 DIVISION AND CORPS INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS ................................. 3-1

ii FM 2-0 15 April 2014

15 April 2014 FM 2-0 iii

iv FM 2-0 15 April 2014

• Chapter 4 describes theater army-level intelligence contributions to deployed forces and

FM 2-0 uses the word “theater” to indicate “theater of operations.”

15 April 2014 FM 2-0 v

U.S. CODE AND INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES

15 April 2014 FM 2-0 1-1

• Executive Order 12333 • U.S. Code Titles 10, 32, and 50

1-7. Some key Title 10 topic areas include—

INFORMATION COLLECTION AND INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

1-2 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

PLAN REQUIREMENTS AND ASSESS COLLECTION

TASK AND DIRECT COLLECTION

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES

15 April 2014 FM 2-0 1-3

 Gain and maintain sensor contact.

ENSURE CONTINUOUS INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

PROVIDE MIXED AND REDUNDANT COVERAGE

1-4 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

GAIN AND MAINTAIN SENSOR CONTACT

REPORT INFORMATION RAPIDLY AND ACCURATELY

PROVIDE EARLY WARNING

RETAIN FREEDOM OF MANEUVER

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE

15 April 2014 FM 2-0 1-5

PLAN AND DIRECT

1-6 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

15 April 2014 FM 2-0 1-7

USING THE OPERATIONS PROCESS IN INTELLIGENCE

1-8 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS DURING SUPPORTED UNIT PLANNING

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS DURING SUPPORTED UNIT PREPARATION

15 April 2014 FM 2-0 1-9

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS DURING SUPPORTED UNIT EXECUTION

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS DURING ASSESSMENT

1-10 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AND THE INTEGRATING

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

15 April 2014 FM 2-0 1-11

 Target selection standards, which address accuracy or other attack criteria.

1-12 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

• Delivery of fires (lethal or nonlethal) • Intelligence operations to determine

Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate

15 April 2014 FM 2-0 1-13

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AND THE CONTINUING ACTIVITIES

REGIONALLY ALIGNED FORCES

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES INTEGRATION

1-14 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

MISSION COMMAND OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

15 April 2014 FM 2-0 1-15

ROLE OF THE COMMANDER

ROLE OF THE STAFF

1-16 FM 2-0 15 April 2014

15 April 2014 FM 2-0 1-17