Petitioner Vs Vs Respondents: Second Division
Petitioner Vs Vs Respondents: Second Division
Petitioner Vs Vs Respondents: Second Division
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE , J : p
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision 2 dated
November 11, 2015 and the Resolution 3 dated August 19, 2016 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 131582 denying the petition for review led by
petitioner Augustin International Center, Inc. (AICI) questioning the Resolution 4 dated
March 15, 2013 and the Decision 5 dated June 27, 2013 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), which a rmed the Labor Arbiter's (LA) nding that respondents
Elfrenito B. Bartolome (Bartolome) and Rumby L. Yamat (Yamat; collectively,
respondents) were illegally dismissed from employment.
The Facts
In 2010, Bartolome and Yamat applied as carpenter and tile setter, respectively,
with AICI, an employment agency providing manpower to foreign corporations. They
were eventually engaged by Golden Arrow Company, Ltd. (Golden Arrow), which had its
o ce in Khartoum, Republic of Sudan. Thereafter, they signed their respective
employment contracts stating that they would render services for a period not less
than twenty-four (24) months. 6 In their contracts, there was a provision on dispute
settlement that reads:
14. Settlement of disputes: All claims and complaints relative to the
employment contract of the employee shall be settled in accordance with
Company policies, rules[,] and regulations. In case the Employee contests the
decision of the employer, the matter shall be settled amicably with [the]
participation of the Labour Attaché or any authorised representative
of the Philippines Embassy nearest the site of employment . x x x 7
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Upon their arrival in Sudan sometime in March and April 2011, Golden Arrow
transferred their employment to its sister company, Al Mamoun Trading and
Investment Company (Al Mamoun). A year later, or on May 2, 2012, Al Mamoun served
Notices of Termination of Service 8 to respondents, causing them to return to the
Philippines. On May 22, 2012, they led their complaint 9 before the NLRC seeking that
AICI and Al Mamoun be held liable for illegal dismissal, breach of contract, and payment
of the unexpired portion of the contract. 1 0
For their part, AICI and Al Mamoun claimed that respondents abandoned their
duties by mid-2012, based on the e-mail message 1 1 from Golden Arrow to that effect,
viz.:
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2. Illegal Termination — I understand Mr[.] [Yamat] and Mr[.]
Bartolome refused to work resulting in the work they were designated to
complete remaining pending. It is our policy that should a member of staff
refuse to carry out their normal duties without a satisfactory and timely
explanation then we believe they have terminated their employment themselves.
12
In a Decision 1 3 dated August 31, 2012, the LA held that respondents were
illegally dismissed, and accordingly, ordered AICI and Al Mamoun to pay the former
P69,300.00 each, representing their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contract.
1 4 The LA explained that AICI and Al Mamoun failed to overcome their burden to prove
that the dismissal was for a just or authorized cause. They likewise failed to show that
respondents abandoned their duties. 1 5
Aggrieved, AICI and Al Mamoun filed an appeal. 1 6
In a Decision 1 7 dated June 27, 2013, the NLRC a rmed the LA's ruling, noting
that AICI and Al Mamoun failed to discharge their burden to prove by substantial
evidence that the termination of respondents' employment was valid. 1 8
Undaunted, AICI and Al Mamoun filed a petition for certiorari 1 9 before the CA. CcSTHI
In a Decision 2 0 dated November 11, 2015, the CA denied the petition. 2 1 It held
that AICI and Al Mamoun failed to comply with procedural and substantive due process
in dismissing respondents from their employment. 2 2
AICI and Al Mamoun moved for reconsideration, 2 3 arguing for the rst time that
they were denied due process because respondents did not rst contest their
termination before the "[Labor] Attaché or any [authorized] representative of the
Philippine[] Embassy nearest the site of employment," as stipulated in the employment
contracts, before filing the complaint before the LA. 2 4
In a Resolution 2 5 dated August 19, 2016, the CA denied the said motion. 2 6 It
explained that, as a rule, termination disputes should be brought before the LA, except
when the parties agree to submit the dispute to voluntary arbitration pursuant to then
Article 262 2 7 (now Article 275) of the Labor Code, provided that such agreement is
stated "in unequivocal language." Citing jurisprudence, 2 8 the CA added that the phrase
"all disputes" is not su cient to divest the LA of its jurisdiction over termination
disputes. In the same manner, the phrase "all claims and complaints" in respondents'
employment contracts does not remove the LA's jurisdiction to decide whether
respondents were legally terminated. 2 9
Hence, AICI filed this petition.
Preliminarily, it bears stressing that AICI does not assail the CA's ruling of illegal
dismissal but instead, argues that the LA incorrectly took cognizance of the case at the
onset. It insists that based on the dispute settlement provision in respondents'
employment contracts, the "primary jurisdiction" to decide this case is with the "[Labor]
Attaché or any [authorized] representative of the Philippine[] Embassy nearest the site
of employment" (designated person). 3 0
After a judicious review of the case, the Court denies the petition.
Section 10 of Republic Act No. (RA) 8042, 3 1 as amended by RA 10022, 3 2
explicitly provides that LAs have original and exclusive 3 3 jurisdiction over
claims arising out of employer-employee relations or by virtue of any law or
contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment , as in this case. The
relevant portion of the provision reads:
Section 10. Money Claims. — Notwithstanding any provision of
law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide , within ninety (90) calendar days after ling of the complaint,
the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of
any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment
including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages. x x x
(Emphases supplied)
Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law 3 4
and cannot be acquired or waived by agreement of the parties. 3 5 As herein applied, the
dispute settlement provision in respondents' employment contracts cannot divest the
LA of its jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case. Hence, it correctly took cognizance
of the complaint filed by respondents before it.
Moreover, issues not raised in the previous proceedings cannot be raised for the
rst time at a late stage. In this case, the Court observes that AICI failed to raise the
issue of respondents' supposed non-compliance with the dispute settlement provision
before the LA, as well as before the NLRC. In fact, AICI only mentioned this issue for the
rst time before the CA in its motion for reconsideration. Therefore, such argument or
defense is deemed waived and can no longer be considered on appeal. 3 6 Hence, the
Court rules that the LA properly took cognizance of this case.
However, the Court deems it essential to point out that in resolving whether the
LA had jurisdiction over this case, the CA erroneously assumed that the designated
person in the dispute settlement provision is a Voluntary Arbitrator under the auspices
of the Labor Code, to wit:
It is true that the Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators
can hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and
bargaining deadlocks upon agreement of the parties. But if the parties wish to
submit termination disputes to voluntary arbitration, such an agreement must
be stated "in unequivocal language." In the present case, the agreement of the
parties was written in this manner:
Footnotes
* Designated Additional Member per Special Order Nos. 2629 and 2630 dated December 18,
2018.
3. Id. at 30-34.
4. Records, Vol. I, pp. 210-213. Penned by Commissioner Dolores M. Peralta-Beley with
Presiding Commissioner Leonardo L. Leonida and Commissioner Mercedes R. Posada-
Lacap, concurring.
This is to inform you that it has been decided to terminate your services with AL
MAMOUN CO. LTD. Effective 07/05/2012. Please contact the HR department to
finalizing (sic) your out process.
11. See e-mail correspondence dated July 4, 2012; records, Vol. I, p. 35.
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12. Id.
16. Dated October 25, 2012. Id. at 102-105. The appeal was initially denied in a Resolution
dated March 15, 2013 (id. at 210-213) due to non-perfection but was later reinstated in
the Decision dated June 27, 2013 (id. at 230-236), after AICI and Al Mamoun filed their
motion for reconsideration dated April 19, 2013 (id. at 215-216).
22. Anent procedural due process, the CA found that respondents were neither served with
notices recounting acts and/or omissions to justify their dismissal nor given the
opportunity to explain their side. Instead, they were merely sent the Notices of
Termination of Service briefly informing them of the management's decision to
prematurely conclude their services. As regards substantive due process, the CA held
that AICI and Al Mamoun's defense of abandonment of duties to justify respondents'
dismissal were unsubstantiated. It stressed that the burden of proof to show that the
dismissal was for a just or authorized cause rests with the employer and its failure to do
so would mean that the dismissal was illegal, as in this case. (See id. at 24-28.)
28. See Vivero v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 158 (2000); and Negros Metal Corporation v.
Lamayo, 643 Phil. 675 (2010).
29. See rollo, pp. 31-32.
30. See rollo, p. 10.
31. Entitled "AN ACT TO INSTITUTE THE POLICIES OF OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT AND
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ESTABLISH A HIGHER STANDARD OF PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF THE
WELFARE OF MIGRANT WORKERS, THEIR FAMILIES AND OVERSEAS FILIPINOS IN
DISTRESS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June 7, 1995.
32. See Section 7 of RA 10022, entitled "AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8042,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE MIGRANT WORKERS AND OVERSEAS FILIPINOS ACT OF
1995, AS AMENDED, FURTHER IMPROVING THE STANDARD OF PROTECTION AND
PROMOTION OF THE WELFARE OF MIGRANT WORKERS, THEIR FAMILIES AND
OVERSEAS FILIPINOS IN DISTRESS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on March
8, 2010.
33. See Cubero v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., 538 Phil. 899, 905 (2006)
wherein the Court stated that original jurisdiction refers to the power "to take cognizance
of a cause at its inception, try it and pass judgment upon the law and facts" while
exclusive jurisdiction means that such power is "possessed to the exclusion of others."
34. See Spouses Santiago v. Northbay Knitting, Inc., G.R. No. 217296, October 11, 2017. See
also Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin, 503 Phil. 288, 304 (2005) citing Lozon
v. NLRC, 310 Phil. 1, 13 (1995), wherein the Court stated thus: "[Jurisdiction over the
subject matter] is conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone the parties, to
themselves determine or conveniently set aside. x x x"
35. See Office of the Court Administrator v. CA, 428 Phil. 696 (2002). The Court held thus: "[t]he
well-entrenched rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined exclusively
by the Constitution and the law. It cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or agreement
of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived or enlarged or diminished by, their
act or omission; neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court. x x x" (Id. at 701-
702.)
36. Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides that "[d]efenses and objections not pleaded
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. x x x." See also
Maxicare PCIB Cigna Healthcare v. Contreras, 702 Phil. 688, 696 (2013) wherein the
Court held that "[a]s a rule, a party who deliberately adopts a certain theory upon which
the case is tried and decided by the lower court, will not be permitted to change theory on
appeal. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the
lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as
these cannot be raised for the first time at such late stage. It would be unfair to the
adverse party who would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the
new theory, which it could have done had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing
before the trial court. x x x"
41. See the fourth paragraph of Article 276 (formerly 262-A), which reads:
Article 276. [262-A] Procedures. — x xx
The award or decision of the Voluntary Abitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall
contain the facts and the law on which it is based. It shall be final and executory after
ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties. x
x x (Emphasis supplied)
42. Rollo, pp. 37 and 43.
43. Previously, labor attachés were tasked "to provide all Filipino workers within their
jurisdiction assistance on all matters arising out of employment" pursuant to Article 21
of the Labor Code. However, said provision had been superseded by RA 8042 which
defined the roles and responsibilities of different government agencies involved in the
protection of migrant workers. Nevertheless, under RA 8042, labor attachés remain active
in protecting migrant workers as a member of the Filipinos Resources Center. (See
Section 19 of RA 8042 in relation to Sections 46 and 47 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations-RA 8042, entitled "OMNIBUS RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING
THE MIGRANT WORKERS AND OVERSEAS FILIPINO ACT OF 1995" [February 29, 1996]).
46. See Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles, 740 Phil. 403, 445 (2014), wherein
the Court elucidated on this point further, to wit: "[i]n overseas employment, the filing of
money claims against the foreign employer is attended by practical and legal
complications. The distance of the foreign employer alone makes it difficult for an
overseas worker to reach it and make it liable for violations of the Labor Code. There are
also possible conflict of laws, jurisdictional issues, and procedural rules that may be
raised to frustrate an overseas worker's attempt to advance his or her claims. x x x The
fundamental effect of joint and several liability is that 'each of the debtors is liable for
the entire obligation.' A final determination may, therefore, be achieved even if only one
of the joint and several debtors are impleaded in an action. Hence, in the case of
overseas employment, either the local agency or the foreign employer may be sued for
all claims arising from the foreign employer's labor law violations. This way, the
overseas workers are assured that someone — the foreign employer's local agent — may
be made to answer for violations that the foreign employer may have committed." See
also ATCI Overseas Corporation v. Echin, 647 Phil. 43 (2010); and Sevillana v. I.T.
(International) Corp., 408 Phil. 570 (2001).
47. See Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles, id. at 446, wherein the Court held
thus: "[a] further implication of making local agencies jointly and severally liable with the
foreign employer is that an additional layer of protection is afforded to overseas
workers. Local agencies, which are businesses by nature, are inoculated with interest in
being always on the lookout against foreign employers that tend to violate labor law.
Lest they risk their reputation or finances, local agencies must already have mechanisms
for guarding against unscrupulous foreign employers even at the level prior to overseas
employment applications."
48. See id.