G.R. No.

157658               October 15, 2007 whether the appellate court was correct in ascribing negligence
on the part of the petitioners.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS and VIRGILIO J.
BORJA, Petitioners, HELD:
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), CORAZON C. The petition must fail.
AMORES, MA. EMILIE A. MOJICA, CECILE C. SISON, DINO
C. AMORES, LARISA C. AMORES, ARMAND JINO C. The only issue to be resolved in the present case is It was
AMORES and JOHN C. AMORES, Respondents. ascertained beyond quandary that the proximate cause of the
collision is the negligence and imprudence of the petitioner PNR
The factual antecedents are as follows: and its locomotive driver, Borja, in operating the passenger
train.
Jose Amores (Amores) was traversing the railroad tracks in
Kahilum II Street, Pandacan, Manila. Before crossing the As the action is predicated on negligence, the relevant provision
railroad track, he stopped for a while then proceeded is Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, which states that:
accordingly. Unfortunately, just as Amores was at the
intersection, a Philippine National Railways’ (PNR) train turned Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
up and collided with the car. being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there was no pre-existing contractual
At the time of the mishap, there was neither a signal nor a relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is
crossing bar at the intersection to warn motorists of an governed by the provisions of this chapter.
approaching train. The car was dragged about ten (10) meters
beyond the center of the crossing. Amores died as a We hold that the petitioners were negligent when the collision
consequence thereof. took place. The transcript of stenographic notes reveals that the
train was running at a fast speed because notwithstanding the
The heirs of Amores, filed a Complaint for Damages against application of the ordinary and emergency brakes, the train still
petitioners PNR and Virgilio J. Borja (Borja), PNR’s locomotive dragged the car some distance away from the point of impact.
driver at the time of the incident, Evidence likewise unveils the inadequate precautions taken by
petitioner PNR to forewarn the public of the impending danger.
The petitioners denied the allegations, stating that the train was Aside from not having any crossing bar, no flagman or guard to
railroad-worthy and without any defect. According to them, the man the intersection at all times was posted on the day of the
proximate cause of the death of Amores was his own incident. A reliable signaling device in good condition, not just a
carelessness and negligence, dilapidated "Stop, Look and Listen" signage because of many
years of neglect, is needed to give notice to the public. It is the
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners. responsibility of the railroad company to use reasonable care to
keep the signal devices in working order. Failure to do so would
the CA reversed the RTC decision. be an indication of negligence.
ISSUE:
G.R. No. L-7760             October 1, 1914 Whether or not the negligence of plaintiff contributed to the
principal occurrence or only to his own injury?
E. M. WRIGHT, plaintiff-appellant,
vs. Held:
MANILA ELECTRIC R.R. & LIGHT CO., defendant-appellant.
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative

As is clear from reading the opinion, no facts are stated therein

The defendant is a corporation engaged in operating an electric which warrant the conclusion that the plaintiff was negligent.
street railway in the city of Manila and its suburbs, including the The conclusion that if he had been sober he would not have
municipality of Caloocan. The plaintiff's residence in Caloocan been injured is not warranted by the facts as found. It is
fronts on the street along which defendant's tracks run, so that impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from
to enter his premises from the street plaintiff is obliged to cross the vehicle under the conditions described. A horse crossing the
defendant's tracks. On the night mentioned plaintiff drove home railroad tracks with not only the rails but a portion of the ties
in a calesa and in crossing the tracks to enter his premises the themselves aboveground, stumbling by reason of the unsure
horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, causing the vehicle footing and falling, the vehicle crashing against the rails with
with the rails, resulting in a sudden stop, threw plaintiff from the such force as to break a wheel, this might be sufficient to throw
vehicle and caused the injuries complained of. a person from the vehicle no matter what his condition; and to
conclude that, under such circumstances, a sober man would
It is undisputed that at the point where plaintiff crossed the not have fallen while a drunken man did, is to draw a conclusion
tracks on the night in question not only the rails were above- which enters the realm of speculation and guesswork.
ground, but that the ties upon which the rails rested projected
from one-third to one-half of their depth out of the ground, thus
making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more above
the level of the street.

It is admitted that the defendant was negligent in maintaining its

tracks as described, but it is contended that the plaintiff was
also negligent in that he was intoxicated to such an extent at the
time of the accident that he was unable to take care of himself
properly and that such intoxication was the primary cause of the
accident.

The trial court held that both parties were negligent, but that the
plaintiff's negligence was not as great as defendant's

ISSUE:
G.R. No. L-21486             May 14, 1966 which was easily discoverable if the bus had been subjected to
a more thorough, or rigid check-up before it took to the road that
LA MALLORCA and PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY, petitioner, morning.
vs.
VALENTIN DE JESUS, MANOLO TOLENTINO and COURT Then again both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found
OF APPEALS, respondents. as a fact that the bus was running quite fast immediately before
the accident. Considering that the tire which exploded was not
The suit arose by reason of the death of Lolita de Jesus, 20- new — petitioner describes it as "hindi masyadong kalbo," or
year old daughter of Valentin de Jesus and wife of Manolo not so very worn out — the plea of caso fortuito cannot be
Tolentino, in a head-on collision between petitioner's bus, on entertained.
which she was a passenger, and a freight truck traveling in the
opposite direction, in a barrio in Marilao Bulacan, in the morning
of October 8, 1959. The immediate cause of the collision was
the fact that the driver of the bus lost control of the wheel when
its left front tire suddenly exploded.

Petitioner maintains that a tire blow-out is a fortuitous event and

gives rise to no liability for negligence, citing the rulings of the
Court of Appeals in Rodriguez vs. Red Line Transportation Co.,
CA-G.R. No. 8136, December 29, 1954, and People vs.
Palapad, CA-G.R. No. 18480, June 27, 1958. These rulings,
however, not only are not not binding on this Court but were
based on considerations quite different from those that obtain in
the at bar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is liable for damages?

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative

In the present case, the cause of the blow-out was known. The
inner tube of the left front tire, according to petitioner's own
evidence and as found by the Court of Appeals "was pressed
between the inner circle of the left wheel and the rim which had
slipped out of the wheel." This was, said Court correctly held, a
mechanical defect of the conveyance or a fault in its equipment
G.R. No. L-4977             March 22, 1910 contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious
injuries to all three Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting
DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee, a match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and
vs. started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck Manuel
THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT had his hand burned and wounded David was struck in the face
COMPANY, defendant-appellant. by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured
his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal
September 30, 1905 Sunday afternoon: David Taylor, 15 years by the surgeons
of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the
average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and ISSUE:
training in mechanics with a boy named Manuel Claparols,
about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Whether or not respondent proved that they exerted the
Provisor, for the purpose of visiting Murphy, an employee of the diligence of a good father to avoid the injury?
defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a
miniature engine HELD:

After leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative
Murphy, they walked across the open space in the
neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the Plaintiff appears to have rested his case, as did the trial judge
cinders and ashes from its furnaces his decision in plaintiff's favor, upon the provisions of article
1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles 1902, 1903,
They found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps and 1908 of that code.
scattered on the ground,these caps are approximately of the
size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts,
attached to it 2 long thin wires by means of which it may be by quasi-contracts, and illicit acts and omissions or by
discharged by the use of electricity those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.

They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes
dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosive damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall
power the boys picked up all they could find, hung them on be obliged to repair the damage so done.
stick, of which each took end, and carried them home
ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding
After crossing the footbridge, they met Jessie Adrian, less than article is demandable, not only for personal acts and
9 years old, and they went to Manuel's home. The boys then omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom
made a series of experiments with the caps trust the ends of the they should be responsible.
wires into an electric light socket - no result break the cap with a
stone – failed opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is
that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches liable for the damages caused by the minors who live
David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the with them.
xxx             xxx             xxx It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the
fulminating caps been left exposed at the point where they were
Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are found, or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping them
equally liable for damages caused by their employees in in an appropriate place; but it is equally clear that plaintiff would
the service of the branches in which the latter may be not have been injured had he not, for his own pleasure and
employed or on account of their duties. convenience, entered upon the defendant's premises, and
strolled around thereon without the express permission of the
xxx             xxx             xxx defendant, and had he not picked up and carried away the
property of the defendant which he found on its premises, and
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the had he not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and
persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all applied a match to its contents.
the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the
damage. But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's
property without defendant's express invitation or permission
ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries
damage caused — incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such
injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we
1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the
cared for with due diligence, and for kindling of explosive negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its
substances which may not have been placed in a safe premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by
and proper place. the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking,
"attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the
We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open
as under the generally accepted doctrine in the United States, the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the
the plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration, in proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries
order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is
competent evidence: not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred.

(1) Damages to the plaintiff.

(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant

personally, or some person for whose acts it must
respond, was guilty.

(3) The connection of cause and effect between the

negligence and the damage.
G.R. No. 172122              June 22, 2007 Respondents fault petitioner Del Rosario for committing gross
negligence and reckless imprudence while driving, and
MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION and ROLANDO J. DEL petitioner Mercury Drug for failing to exercise the diligence of a
ROSARIO, petitioners, good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
vs. driver.
SPOUSES RICHARD HUANG and CARMEN HUANG, and
STEPHEN HUANG, respondents. petitioners allege that the immediate and proximate cause of the
accident was respondent Stephen Huang’s recklessness.
First, the facts: Further, petitioner Mercury Drug claims that it exercised due
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
Petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation (Mercury Drug) is the supervision of all its employees.
registered owner of a six-wheeler 1990 Mitsubishi Truck. It has
in its employ petitioner Rolando J. del Rosario as driver. The trial court, found petitioners Mercury Drug and Del Rosario
Respondent spouses Richard and Carmen Huang are the jointly and severally liable to pay respondents actual,
parents of respondent Stephen Huang and own the red 1991 compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees,
Toyota Corolla GLI Sedan. and litigation expenses.

These two vehicles figured in a road accident on December 20, The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court
1996 at around 10:30 p.m. within the municipality of Taguig,
Metro Manila. Respondent Stephen Huang was driving the car, Issue:
Both were traversing the C-5 Highway, north bound, coming
from the general direction of Alabang going to Pasig City. The Whether or not petitioner is liable for damages?
car was on the left innermost lane while the truck was on the
next lane to its right, when the truck suddenly swerved to its left Held;
and slammed into the front right side of the car. The collision
hurled the car over the island where it hit a lamppost, spun The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative
around and landed on the opposite lane. The truck also hit a
lamppost, ran over the car and zigzagged towards, and finally The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code is
stopped in front of Buellah Land Church. direct or immediate. It is not conditioned on a prior recourse
against the negligent employee, or a prior showing of insolvency
Petitioner Del Rosario only had a Traffic Violation Receipt of such employee. It is also joint and solidary with the employee.
(TVR). His driver’s license had been confiscated because he
had been previously apprehended for reckless driving. To be relieved of liability, petitioner Mercury Drug should show
that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family, both
Respondent Stephen Huang sustained massive injuries. in the selection of the employee and in the supervision of the
Despite a series of operations, respondent Stephen Huang is performance of his duties. Thus, in the selection of its
paralyzed for life from his chest down and requires continuous prospective employees, the employer is required to examine
medical and rehabilitation treatment. them as to their qualifications, experience, and service
records. With respect to the supervision of its employees, the
employer should formulate standard operating procedures, superior, but nothing was done about it. He was not suspended
monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures or reprimanded. No disciplinary action whatsoever was taken
for their breach. To establish compliance with these against petitioner Del Rosario.
requirements, employers must submit concrete proof, including
documentary evidence.

In the instant case, petitioner Mercury Drug presented

testimonial evidence on its hiring procedure. According to Mrs.
Merlie Caamic, the Recruitment and Training Manager of
petitioner Mercury Drug, applicants are required to take
theoretical and actual driving tests, and psychological
examination. In the case of petitioner Del Rosario, however,
Mrs. Caamic admitted that he took the driving tests and
psychological examination when he applied for the position of
Delivery Man, but not when he applied for the position of Truck
Man. Mrs. Caamic also admitted that petitioner Del Rosario
used a Galant which is a light vehicle, instead of a truck during
the driving tests. Further, no tests were conducted on the motor
skills development, perceptual speed, visual attention, depth
visualization, eye and hand coordination and steadiness of
petitioner Del Rosario. No NBI and police clearances were also
presented. Lastly, petitioner Del Rosario attended only three
driving seminars – on June 30, 2001, February 5, 2000 and July
7, 1984. In effect, the only seminar he attended before the
accident which occurred in 1996 was held twelve years ago in
1984.

It also appears that petitioner Mercury Drug does not provide for
a back-up driver for long trips. At the time of the accident,
petitioner Del Rosario has been out on the road for more than
thirteen hours, without any alternate. Mrs. Caamic testified that
she does not know of any company policy requiring back-up
drivers for long trips.

Petitioner Mercury Drug likewise failed to show that it exercised

due diligence on the supervision and discipline over its
employees. In fact, on the day of the accident, petitioner Del
Rosario was driving without a license. He was holding a TVR for
reckless driving. He testified that he reported the incident to his
G.R. No. L-12986             March 31, 1966 Both the trial court and the appellate court refused to apply the
doctrine in the instant case on the grounds that “as to (its)
THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA and SOLEDAD C. applicability … in the Philippines, there seems to he nothing
AFRICA, and the HEIRS OF DOMINGA ONG, petitioners- definite,” and that while the rules do not prohibit its adoption in
appellants,
vs. appropriate cases, “in the case at bar, however, we find no
CALTEX (PHIL.), INC., MATEO BOQUIREN and THE COURT practical use for such doctrine.”
OF APPEALS, respondents-appellees.
The question deserves more than such summary dismissal. The
It appears that in the afternoon of March 18, 1948 a fire broke doctrine has actually been applied in this jurisdiction, in the case
out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo street of Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development Co
and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being
hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at The principle enunciated in the aforequoted case applies with
the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose equal force here. The gasoline station, with all its appliances,
was inserted. The fire spread to and burned several neighboring equipment and employees, was under the control of appellees.
houses, including the personal properties and effects inside A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the
them. Their owners, among them petitioners here, sued neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have
respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and Mateo Boquiren, the first as
known how the fire started were appellees and their employees,
alleged owner of the station and the second as its agent in
charge of operation. Negligence on the part of both of them was but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and
attributed as the cause of the fire. reasonable inference that the incident happened because of
want of care.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners
failed to prove negligence and that respondents had exercised Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the
due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of neighboring houses were it not for another negligent omission
their employees. on the part of defendants, namely, their failure to provide a
concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from leaping
ISSUE: over it.. Defendants’ negligence, therefore, was not only with
respect to the cause of the fire but also with respect to the
whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin of the
spread thereof to the neighboring houses.
fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as to
presume negligence on the part of appellees? There is an admission on the part of Boquiren in his amended
answer to the second amended complaint that “the fire was
HELD:
caused through the acts of a stranger who, without authority, or
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative permission of answering defendant, passed through the
gasoline station and negligently threw a lighted match in the
premises.” No evidence on this point was adduced, but
assuming the allegation to be true — certainly any unfavorable
inference from the admission may be taken against Boquiren —
it does not extenuate his negligence. A decision of the Supreme
Court of Texas, upon facts analogous to those of the present
case, states the rule which we find acceptable here. “It is the
rule that those who distribute a dangerous article or agent, owe
a degree of protection to the public proportionate to and
commensurate with a danger involved … we think it is the
generally accepted rule as applied to torts that ‘if the effects of
the actor’s negligent conduct actively and continuously operate
to bring about harm to another, the fact that the active and
substantially simultaneous operation of the effects of a third
person’s innocent, tortious or criminal act is also a substantial
factor in bringing about the harm, does not protect the actor
from liability.’ Stated in another way, “The intention of an
unforeseen and unexpected cause, is not sufficient to relieve a
wrongdoer from consequences of negligence, if such
negligence directly and proximately cooperates with the
independent cause in the resulting injury.”
G.R. No. L-21749             September 29, 1967 appellant's, it is undeniable that the unusual event that the
barge, exclusively controlled by appellant, rammed the bridge
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, supports raises a presumption of negligence on the part of
vs. appellant or its employees manning the barge or the tugs that
LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION, defendant-appellant. towed it. For in the ordinary course of events, such a thing does
not happen if proper care is used.
In the early afternoon of August 17, 1960, barge L-1892, owned
by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation was being towed down The appellant strongly stresses the precautions taken by it on
the Pasig river by tugboats "Bangus" and "Barbero" also the day in question: that it assigned two of its most powerful
belonging to the same corporation, when the barge rammed tugboats to tow down river its barge; that it assigned to the task
against one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahan bailey bridge, the more competent and experienced among its patrons, had
smashing the posts and causing the bridge to list. The river, at the towlines, engines and equipment double-checked and
the time, was swollen and the current swift, on account of the inspected; that it instructed its patrons to take extra precautions;
heavy downpour of Manila and the surrounding provinces. and concludes that it had done all it was called to do, and that
the accident, therefore, should be held due to force majeure or
Sued by the Republic of the Philippines for damages, Luzon fortuitous event.
Stevedoring Corporation disclaimed liability on the grounds that
it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision These very precautions, however, completely destroy the
of its employees; that the damages to the bridge were caused appellant's defense. For caso fortuito or force majeure (which in
by force majeure; that plaintiff has no capacity to sue; and that law are identical in so far as they exempt an obligor from
the Nagtahan bailey bridge is an obstruction to navigation. liability) by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable
or avoidable, "events that could not be foreseen, or which,
After due trial, the court rendered judgment holding the though foreseen, were inevitable" (Art. 1174, Civ. Code of the
defendant liable for the damage caused by its employees. Philippines). It is, therefore, not enough that the event should
Defendant appealed directly to the Supreme Court. not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly
believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid.
ISSUE: The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility
to foresee the same: The very measures adopted by appellant
Whether or not the collision of appellant's barge with the prove that the possibility of danger was not only foreseeable,
supports or piers of the Nagtahan bridge was in law caused by but actually foreseen, and was not caso fortuito.
fortuitous event or force majeure?
Otherwise stated, the appellant, Luzon Stevedoring Corporation,
HELD: knowing and appreciating the perils posed by the swollen
stream and its swift current, voluntarily entered into a situation
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. involving obvious danger; it therefore assured the risk, and
cannot shed responsibility merely because the precautions it
Considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an immovable and adopted turned out to be insufficient.
stationary object and uncontrovertedly provided with adequate
openings for the passage of water craft, including barges like of
G.R. No. 118231 July 5, 1996 20, 1989 The results of all examinations impelled Dr. Kho to
suggest that Mrs. Villegas submit to another surgery to which
DR. VICTORIA L. BATIQUIN and ALLAN the latter agreed.
BATIQUIN, petitioners,
vs. When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas she found
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES QUEDO D. ACOGIDO and whitish-yellow discharge inside, an ovarian cyst on each of the
FLOTILDE G. VILLEGAS, respondents. left and right ovaries which gave out pus, dirt and pus behind
the uterus, and a piece of rubber material on the right side of the
Dr. Batiquin was a Resident Physician at the Negros Oriental uterus embedded.
Provincial Hospital, Dumaguete She was also the Actg. Head of
the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the said The piece of rubber allegedly found near private respondent
Hospital. Flotilde Villegas's uterus was not presented in court, and
although Dr. Ma. Salud Kho Testified that she sent it to a
Mrs. Villegas is a married woman who submitted to Dr. Batiquin pathologist in Cebu City for examination.
for prenatal care.
The trial court deemed vital Dr. Victoria Batiquin's testimony that
Dr. Batiquin, with the assistance of Dr. Doris Teresita Sy who when she confronted Dr. Kho regarding the piece of rubber, "Dr.
was also a Resident Physician at the same Hospital, C.I. and Kho answered that there was rubber indeed but that she threw it
O.R. Nurse Arlene Diones and some student nurses performed away."  This statement, the trial court noted, was never denied
18

a caesarean section on Mrs. Villegas at the Negros Oriental nor disputed by Dr. Kho, leading it to conclude:
Provincial Hospital.
The trial court held in favor of the petitioners herein. The Court
Soon after leaving the Hospital Mrs. Villegas began to suffer of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court
abdominal pains and complained of being feverish. She
consulted Dr. Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who prescribed ISSUE:
for her certain medicines.
Whether or not petitioner is liable for damages?
In the meantime, Mrs. Villegas was given a Medical Certificate
by Dr. Batiquin on October 31, 1988 certifying to her physical HELD:
fitness to return to her work.
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative
The abdominal pains and fever kept on recurring and bothered
Mrs. Villegas no end despite the medications administered by The court assessed Dr. Kho to be a credible witness, her
Dr. Batiquin. When the pains became unbearable and she was positive testimony [that a piece of rubber was indeed found in
rapidly losing weight she consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho at the private respondent Villega's abdomen] prevails over the
Holy Child's Hospital in Dumaguete City on January 20, 1989. negative testimony in favor of the petitioners.

The evidence of Plaintiffs show that when Dr. Ma. Salud Kho
examined Mrs. Villegas at the Holy Child's Hospital on January
As such, the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore. This Court light, the private respondents were bereft of direct evidence as
has had occasion to delve into the nature and operation of this to the actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object
doctrine: finding its way into private respondent Villegas's body, which,
needless to say, does not occur unless through the intersection
This doctrine [res ipsa loquitur] is stated thus: "Where the thing of negligence. Second, since aside from the caesarean section,
which causes injury is shown to be under the management of private respondent Villegas underwent no other operation which
the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary could have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in
course of things does not happen in those who have the her uterus, it stands to reason that such could only have been a
management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in by-product of the caesarean section performed by Dr. Batiquin.
the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the The petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome the
accident arose from want of care." Or presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine
as Black's Law Dictionary puts it: of res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently
leaving behind a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas's
Under [this] doctrine the happening of an injury permits an abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof.
inference of negligence where plaintiff produces substantial
evidence that [the] injury was caused by an agency or
instrumentality under [the] exclusive control and management of
defendant, and that the occurrence [sic] was such that in the
ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonable care
had been used.

The doctrine of [r]es ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is

peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima
facie negligence may be established without direct proof and
furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The
doctrine is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of
proof or a mere procedural convenience. The rule, when
applicable to the facts and circumstances of a particular case, is
not intended to and does not dispense with the requirement of
proof of culpable negligence on the party charged. It merely
determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence
thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach
of the duty of due care. The doctrine can be invoked when and
only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is G.R. No. L-21676             February 28, 1969
absent and not readily available. 36

VICENTE ALDABA, ET AL., petitioners,

In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine vs.
are present. First, the entire proceedings of the caesarean
section were under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this
COURT OF APPEALS, CESAR ALDABA, ET were cancelled by the Register of Deeds of Manila, and
AL., respondents. Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 49996 and 49997 in the name
of Emmanuel Bautista were issued in lieu thereof.
When Belen Aldaba, a rich woman of Malolos, Bulacan, died on
February 25, 1955, she left as her presumptive heirs her Emmanuel Bautista then required Dr. Vicente Aldaba to vacate
surviving husband Estanislao Bautista, and her brother Cesar the lots in question and, upon the latter's refusal, filed an
Aldaba. Belen Aldaba was childless. Among the properties that ejectment case against him in the City Court of Manila. Without
she left were the two lots involved in this case, situated at 427 awaiting the final result of the ejectment case, herein petitioners
Maganda Street, Santa Mesa, Manila. filed, on August 22, 1959, a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 41260, against
Petitioners Dr. Vicente Aldaba and Jane Aldaba, father and herein respondents Cesar Aldaba and Emmanuel Bautista and
daughter, respectively, lived during the last war in their house in the Register of Deeds of Manila, alleging that they had become
Malate, Manila. Belen Aldaba used to go to their house to seek the owners of the two lots in question, and praying that the deed
the advice and medical assistance of Dr. Vicente Aldaba. When of partition entered into by Estanislao Bautista and Cesar
the latter's house was burned during the liberation of Manila in Aldaba be declared null and void with respect to Lot No. 32,
1945, Belen Aldaba invited Dr. Aldaba and his daughter, who covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1334, and lot No. 34
was then a student in medicine, to live in one of her two houses covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No 1335; that said lots
standing on the lots in question, and the Aldaba father and be declared the property of therein plaintiffs (herein petitioners);
daughter accepted the offer of Belen and they actually lived in and that the Register of Deeds of Manila be ordered to cancel
one of those two houses until sometime in 1957 when TCT Nos. 49996 and 49997 in the name of Emmanuel Bautista
respondent Emmanuel Bautista filed an ejectment case against and in lieu thereof issue two new TCTs in the name of therein
them in the city court of Manila. Dr. Vicente Aldaba continued to plaintiffs.
act as a sort of adviser of Belen and Jane, after becoming a
qualified doctor of medicine, became the personal physician of After hearing, the court a quo rendered a decision dismissing
Belen until the latter's death on February 25, 1955. the complaint, and declaring, among others, that if the deceased
Belen Aldaba intended to convey the lots in question to Vicente
On June 24, 1955, the presumptive heirs Estanislao Bautista Aldaba and Jane Aldaba, by way of donation, the conveyance
and Cesar Aldaba, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition of should be considered a donation inter vivos, for the validity of
the properties left by the deceased Belen Aldaba, by virtue of which a public instrument was necessary pursuant to Article 749
which deed the two lots in question were alloted to Cesar of the Civil Code. The dispositive portion of the decision of the
Aldaba. Subsequently, on August 26, 1957, herein respondents trial court reads as follows:
Cesar Aldaba and Emmanuel Bautista, the latter being a
grandson of Estanislao Bautista by his first marriage, executed IN VIEW WHEREOF both complaint and counterclaim
a deed whereby the two lots that were alloted to Cesar Aldaba dismissed; the Court holds Emmanuel Bautista to be the
were ceded to Emmanuel Bautista in exchange of the latter's lot absolute owner of the property in question, land and
situated at San Juan, Rizal. By virtue of the deed of extra- improvement, but with the right of plaintiffs to stay until
judicial partition and the deed of exchange, Transfer certificates they should have been reimbursed of P5,000.00 but
of Title Nos. 1334 and 1335, respectively, covering lots Nos. 32 without any obligation, until such reimbursement, to pay
and 34 — now in question — both in the name of Belen Aldaba,
 any rental unto defendant Emmanuel Bautista. No June 18, 1953          
pronouncement as to costs.
Jane,
From this decision, therein plaintiffs appealed to the Court of
Appeals, and the latter court rendered a decision, on June 21, Huag kayong umalis diyan. Talagang iyan
1963, raising from P5,000 to P8,000 the amount to be ay para sa inyo. Alam nila na iyan ay sa
reimbursed to plaintiffs-appellants, but affirming in all other inyo.
respects the decision of the lower court. Herein petitioners'
motion for reconsideration of the decision having been denied Belen A. Bautista.         
by the Court of Appeals, they forthwith filed the present petition
in this Court. Petitioners maintain that the note, although it could not transmit
title, showed, nevertheless, that a donation had already been
Before this Court, petitioners now contend that the Court of made long before its writing, in consideration of the services
Appeals erred: (1) in affirming the decision of the Court of First rendered before the writing and to be rendered after its writing.
Instance; (2) in holding that the donation, as found by the Court And the donation being with an onerous cause, petitioners
of First Instance of Manila, was a simple donation inter maintain that it was valid even if it was done orally. Petitioners
vivos and not a donation "con causa onerosa and so it was void further maintain that if Exhibit 6 labors under some ambiguity,
for it did not follow the requirements of Article 749 of the Civil this ambiguity is cured by Exhibit 7, which reads as follows:
Code; (3) in not holding that the property in question had
already been donated to herein petitioners in consideration of June 27, 1956          
the latter's services; (4) in not declaring petitioners to be the
absolute owners of the property in dispute; and (5) in Dear Nana Tering,
considering testimonies which had been stricken out.
Narito po ang notice tungkol sa
The errors assigned by petitioners being interrelated, We are amillaramiento na pagbabayaran diyan sa
going to discuss them together. lupa at bahay na kinatatayuan ninyo. Sa
Malolos po ito tinanggap. Ang
Petitioners contend that petitioners Dr. Vicente Aldaba and Jane pagbabayaran po ng Inkong ay bayad na.
Aldaba had rendered services to the deceased Belen Aldaba for
more than ten years without receiving any compensation, and Gumagalang,                             
so in compensation for their services Belen Aldaba gave them "Cely."         
the lots in dispute including the improvements thereon. It is the
stand of petitioners that the property in question was conveyed The addressee, Tering, was the wife of Dr. Vicente Aldaba, and
to them by way of an onerous donation which is governed by the sender, Cely was the wife of respondent Emmanuel
Article 733, and not Article 749, of the Civil Code. Under Article Bautista. This note, petitioners argue, proves that respondents
733 of the Civil Code an onerous donation does not have to be had recognized the ownership of the petitioners of the house
done by virtue of a public instrument. The petitioners point to the and lot, for, otherwise, Cely should have sent the notice of real
note, Exhibit 6, as indicating that a donation had been made, estate tax to respondent Cesar Aldaba, to whom was alloted the
which note reads as follows: property in question by virtue of the extra-judicial partition.
Respondents, Cesar Aldaba and Emmanuel Bautista, on the Aldaba to petitioners is based upon their appreciation of the
other hand, contend that the evidence of the plaintiff does not evidence, and this Court will not disturb the factual findings of
disclose clearly that a donation had been made. Respondents those courts.lawphi1 .nêt

point out that the note, Exhibit 6, as worded, is vague, in that it

could not be interpreted as referring to the lots in question, or The question to be resolved in the instant case is: Was there a
that which was given therein was given for a valuable disposition of the property in question made by the deceased
consideration. And finally, respondents contend that if the Belen Aldaba in favor of herein petitioners? The note, Exhibit 6,
property had really been given to petitioners, why did they not considered alone, was, as held by the Court of Appeals,
take any step to transfer the property in their names? confirming the opinion of the lower court, only an indication of
the intention of Belen Aldaba to donate to the petitioners the
The Court of Appeals, in its decision, made the following property occupied by the latter. We agree with this conclusion of
findings and conclusions: the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The note, in fact,
expressed that the property was really intended for the
(1) The note Exhibit 6 did not make any reference to the petitioners, "talagang iyan ay para sa inyo." If the property was
lots in question, nor to the services rendered, or to be only intended for petitioners then, at the time of its writing, the
rendered, in favor of Belen. The note was insufficient is a property had not yet been disposed of in their favor. There is no
conveyance, and hence could not be considered as evidence in the record that such intention was effectively carried
evidence of a donation with onerous cause. This note out after the writing of the note. Inasmuch as the mere
can be considered, at most, as indicative of the intention expression of an intention is not a promise, because a promise
to donate. is an undertaking to carry the intention into effect, 1 We cannot,
considering Exhibit 6 alone, conclude that the deceased
(2) There is no satisfactory explanation why from 1945 to promised, much less did convey, the property in question to the
1955, no notarial document was executed by Belen in petitioners. That the note, Exhibit 6, was only an indication of an
favor of petitioners who were educated persons. The intention to give was also the interpretation given by petitioners
reason given was "extremada delicadeza" which reason themselves, when they said in their memorandum, dated
the Court of Appeals considered as unsatisfactory. February 2, 1960, in the lower court 2 thus:

(3) The evidence regarding the value of the services Legally speaking, there was a contractual relation
(P53,000.00) rendered by petitioners (father and created between Belen Aldaba and the plaintiff since
daughter) to Belen does not improve the proof regarding 1945 whereby the former would give to the latter the two
the alleged donation. If petitioners believed that the parcels of land, together with the house standing
gratuitous use of the property was not sufficient to thereon, upon the rendition of said services. This fact can
compensate them for their services, they could have be gleaned from the note (Exh. "6", Plaintiffs) which in
presented their claims in the intestate proceedings, which part says: TALAGANG IYAN AY PARA SAINYO
they themselves could have initiated, if none was
instituted. We have said that Exhibit 6 expressed only the intention to
donate. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that previous
The conclusion of the Court of Appeals, as well as that of the to the writing of the note there had already been a disposition of
trial court, that there was no onerous donation made by Belen the property in favor of the petitioners. This disposition alone,
would not make the donation a donation for a valuable the latter would give the property in question in consideration of
consideration. We still have to ask: What was the consideration the services of petitioners. All that petitioners could claim
of such disposition? We do not find in the record that there had regarding this matter was that "it was impliedly understood"
been an express agreement between petitioners and Belen between them. 5 How said agreement was implied and from what
Aldaba that the latter would pay for the services of the former. If facts it was implied, petitioners did not make clear. The question
there was no express agreement, could it not be at least of whether or not what is relied upon as a consideration had
implied? There could not be an implied contract for payment been knowingly accepted by the parties as a consideration, is a
because We find in the record that Jane did not expect to be question of fact, 6 and the Court of Appeals has not found in the
paid for her services. In the memorandum of counsel for the instant case that the lots in question were given to petitioners in
petitioners in the trial court We find this statement: consideration of the services rendered by them to Belen Aldaba.

For all she did to her aunt she expected not to be paid.3 We find, therefore, that the conditions to constitute a
donation cum causa onerosa are not present in the instant
When a person does not expect to be paid for his services, case, and the claim of petitioners that the two lots in question
there cannot be a contract implied in fact to make compensation were donated to them by Belen Aldaba cannot be sustained.
for said services.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed,
However, no contract implied in fact to make with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.
compensation for personal services performed for
another arises unless the party furnishing the services
then expected or had reason to expect the payment or
compensation by the other party. To give rise to an
implied contract to pay for services, they must have been
rendered by one party in expectation that the other party
would pay for them, and have been accepted by the
other party with knowledge of that expectation. (58 Am.
Jur. p. 512 and cases cited therein).

In the same manner when the person rendering the services

has renounced his fees, the services are not demandable
obligations. 4

Even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that the services

of petitioners constituted a demandable debt, We still have to
ask whether in the instant case this was the consideration for
which the deceased made the (alleged) disposition of the
property to the petitioners. As we have adverted to, we have not
come across in the record even a claim that there was an
express agreement between petitioners and Belen Aldaba that