The Impact of Online Video Distribution

on the Global Market for Digital Content

David Blackburn, Ph.D.

Jeffrey A. Eisenach, Ph.D.
Bruno Soria, Ph.D.
March 2019
 About the Authors
Dr. Blackburn is a Director in NERA’s Communications, Media, and Internet Practice as well its Intellectual
Property and Antitrust Practices. Among other issues, Dr. Blackburn’s work at NERA has focused on media
production and distribution, and assessing the value of IP in music, television, and film. Dr. Blackburn has
taught at the undergraduate level at Harvard University and Framingham State College, and at the graduate
level at the Universidad Nacional de Tucumán in Argentina.

Dr. Eisenach is a Managing Director and Co-Chair of NERA’s Communications, Media, and Internet Practice.
He is also an Adjunct Professor at George Mason University Law School, where he teaches Regulated Industries,
and a Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, where he focuses on policies affecting the
information technology sector, innovation, and entrepreneurship. Previously, Dr. Eisenach served in senior
policy positions at the U.S. Federal Trade Commission and the White House Office of Management and Budget,
and on the faculties of Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government and Virginia Polytechnic Institute
and State University.

Dr. Soria is an Associate Director in NERA’s Communications, Media and Internet Practice. While at NERA, he
has advised governments, telecommunications operators and media companies, including on convergent
competition and the pricing of content. He is also Guest Professor at the University of Barcelona where he
lectures on Telecommunications Economics and Regulation. Previously, he held executive positions in
Telefónica and MCI Worldcom. He also worked as Project Leader at a leading management consulting firm.

The authors are grateful to Corinne Candilis, Ryan Chan, Patrick McGervey and Gabriela Orsini for their
assistance with this report, and to Facebook and Google for sponsorship. The views expressed are exclusively
those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of NERA Economic Consulting or any of the
institutions with which they are affiliated.
 The Impact of Online Video Distribution on the
Global Market for Digital Content
Executive Summary
This study examines the impact of online video distribution platforms (OVDs), defined as applications and
services that distribute video over the Internet, on the market for video content. The evidence and analysis it
presents demonstrate that OVDs have expanded the market for video content of all types, providing content
producers with new ways to reach audiences and consumers with new ways to identify and consume the
content of their choice. These findings suggest that proposals to impose regulations designed for traditional
platforms like broadcast television on OVDs are both unnecessary and undesirable. As an alternative,
regulators could consider modernizing, simplifying, and/or lightening regulations for incumbents to increase
competition and increase further the availability of quality content to consumers.

The study’s key findings include the following:

OVDs are able to connect consumers with video content that most closely matches their tastes, including
ethnic or niche content that would otherwise be unavailable or difficult to find. Their ability to do so is the
result of both extensive catalogues and sophisticated “matching” capabilities. As a result, the content
distributed by OVDs is culturally diverse. For example, of the top ten YouTube video channels (by views), two
originate in India, and one each in Brazil, Russia, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom, while three
originate in the U.S.

Increased demand for video content is leading to an increased supply of diverse video content, including both
professionally-produced and user-generated content (UGC). OVDs are increasing demand for UGC – for
example, in 2016 approximately 14.8 million Americans earned income totaling $5.9 billion from independent
creations on online platforms, including Instagram, Twitch and YouTube. Meanwhile, the number of feature-
length films produced worldwide grew by 11 percent from 2010 to 2015 (from 7,612 to 8,429).

The growth in output is occurring in nearly every region. The number of video content production companies
in the European Union (EU) grew by 28 percent between 2011 and 2015, while video content sector
employment grew by seven percent. Estimated revenues for Indian film producers increased by 38 percent
from 2013 to 2017 (from INR 125 billion to INR 173 billion). Spending on Canadian film and television
production grew by 40 percent between 2011 and 2016 (from CAD 6.0 billion to CAD 8.4 billion).

Generally accepted economic principles explain why OVDs have economic efficiency advantages compared
with traditional video distribution platforms. By capturing economies of scale and scope, increasing the ability
of consumers to discover and obtain content of their choice, and allowing content producers to reach larger
numbers of interested viewers, OVDs increase economic welfare. Users value OVDs because the breadth of
offerings allows them to find video content they wish to see, at any moment and from any connected device;
content creators value OVD applications because of their large audiences and because they are easy and
inexpensive to use; and, advertisers value them because the overlap between viewers and content creators
generates an engaged audience to whom they can advertise their products and services. The more content
OVD platforms can offer viewers, the greater the value to consumers. The upshot is that producers of all kinds
of video content – professional or amateur, mainstream or niche – can reach more consumers, while
consumers have access to content that more closely matches their tastes.

The concern that the growth of OVDs comes at the expense of domestic content distributors and producers is
not supported by data. Subscription Video On Demand (SVOD) subscribership is rising fastest in developing
countries, often led by local firms. In India, for example, Star India’s Hotstar has more than 75 million monthly
active subscribers, compared with 11 million for Amazon and five million for Netflix. Fears that viewing
behavior would shift away from local content to foreign-produced video have also proven unfounded. The
data show that production of traditional video content – i.e., professionally-produced feature films,
documentaries and television programs – is increasing throughout the world. Both video content producers
and amateur producers (Internet users) are producing more content and films, earning higher revenues, and
employing more people – and this growth is expected to continue.

Our analysis suggests that extending local content regulations designed for traditional video distributors to
OVDs would hinder innovation and reduce choice for both consumers and producers of digital video. Such
regulation would have the opposite of its intended effects, ultimately reducing both the quantity and the
diversity of digital video content available to consumers.
 Contents

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1
II. THE ECONOMICS OF VIDEO DISTRIBUTION ............................................................................. 2
A. Economies of Scale and Scope ............................................................................. 2
B. Platform Markets and the Matching Problem ...................................................... 6
III. OVDS AND THE GROWING MARKET FOR VIDEO CONTENT ........................................................ 9
A. Growth in Video Consumption ........................................................................... 10
B. Global Growth in Video Production and Output ................................................. 18
IV. OVDS AND LOCAL CONTENT OBLIGATIONS ......................................................................... 35
A. Local Content Obligations on Traditional Broadcasters ...................................... 36
B. Proposals to Regulate Online Video ................................................................... 37
C. The Economics of Extending Local Content Regimes to OVDs ............................ 39
V. CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................. 42

APPENDIX A: INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF BROADCASTING CONTENT

APPENDIX B: INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF ONLINE VIDEO CONTENT
 I. Introduction
Video distribution platforms are “multi-sided” markets that create value by matching “upstream” (both
amateur and professional) producers of video content with “downstream” consumers and, in many cases, with
advertisers. 1 Traditional platforms like movie theaters and broadcast television are limited in the amount of
content they can display (i.e., one program at a time) and the size of the audience they can reach. Online
video distributors (OVDs), defined here as any application or service that distributes video over the Internet,
face neither limitation: They can offer “on demand” viewing of large video content libraries to anyone with a
broadband Internet connection, anywhere in the world. 2

As a result, OVDs have expanded dramatically both the upstream and downstream sides of video distribution
markets. And, just as economic theory would predict, more consumers are watching more video content than
ever before. Content variety has also increased; consumers can now choose among applications that serve a
variety of video consumption needs, including those that provide a wide array of long-form content like
Amazon, ClaroVideo (in Mexico), iflix (focused on Asia) and Netflix, those that specialize primarily in user-
generated content (UGC), like Facebook, Niconico and YouTube, and direct offerings from content producers
like BBC, HBO, Televisa, and Walt Disney – while still having access to traditional linear offerings from theaters,
terrestrial and satellite broadcasters, and cable operators.

Policymakers in several countries have expressed concerns about the impact of online distribution on the
production and consumption of “local” content, or its impact on traditional video distribution channels such
as broadcasting and cable TV. These concerns, in turn, have led to calls for government intervention, including
proposals to impose on OVDs taxes and regulatory obligations designed for traditional distribution platforms
(i.e., broadcasters). In this context, the purpose of this study is to assess the impact of online digital distribution
platforms on the market for video content.

We begin by providing an economic framework for assessing the performance of video distribution markets.
We apply that framework to show how OVDs increase economic efficiency relative to traditional video
distribution platforms by capturing economies of scale and scope, by enhancing the ability of consumers to
discover and obtain content, and by allowing content producers to more effectively reach interested audiences.

Next, we examine the actual performance of video distribution markets around the world, focusing on both
output (that is, the amount and diversity of video content actually being produced and consumed) and inputs
(that is, the number of people and amount of resources devoted to video content production). The data we

1
Throughout this paper the word “market” refers to “an institution that facilitates the exchange of goods and services” and
is not meant to imply the existence of a “relevant market” as that term is understood in the context of competition policy and
antitrust enforcement.
2
This definition is somewhat broader than the term sometimes applied by regulators. See e.g., Federal Communications
Commission, Communication Marketplace Report, GN Docket No. 18-231 (December 12, 2018) at n. 131 (defining an OVD as “an
entity that distributes video programming (1) by means of the Internet or other Internet Protocol (IP)-based transmission path; (2)
not as a component of an MVPD subscription or other managed video service; and (3) not solely to customers of a broadband
Internet access service owned or operated by the entity or its affiliates.”) (available at https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-adopts-
first-consolidated-communications-marketplace-report-0).
present show that the emergence of OVDs has been accompanied by an increase in the output of video content
and in the revenues and employment of professional content producers, as well as making it possible for
millions of platform users to generate and distribute their own independently produced videos, and monetize
those videos if desired.

While proposals to extend local regulatory regimes developed for traditional broadcasters to OVDs may be
well-intended, our analysis suggests that such regulation would be both unnecessary and undesirable.
Furthermore, regulation would raise the costs and distort the incentives of OVDs and thus have the opposite
of the intended effect, potentially hindering innovation and in turn providing less diversity of options for
consumers.

The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section II discusses relevant economic characteristics of
the markets for digital video content and video content distribution, including the presence of strong
economies of scale and scope and “multisided-ness.” It also explains how OVDs facilitate more efficient
matching between consumers and content producers. Section III presents evidence on the growth of online
video platforms and their impact on the market for video content. Section IV discusses the role of local content
regulation in the online video era. Section V provides a brief summary.

II. The Economics of Video Distribution 3

Video distribution platforms 4 constitute a classic example of a multi-sided market, serving content producers
(who value the ability to reach viewers), viewers (who value the ability to access content) and, in many cases,
advertisers, who value the ability to reach consumers by bundling their messages with other content.

Like other information markets, both video distribution and video content markets are subject to strong
economies of scale and scope, meaning that costs decline (and value increases) as the market grows. Also,
because content is differentiated (e.g., by genre and language) and consumers have heterogeneous tastes,
the value of a distribution platform depends in part on how efficiently it can match consumers with the content
of their choice.

A. Economies of Scale and Scope

One source of the economic value created by OVDs lies in their ability to achieve economies of scale and scope,
which are inherent in markets for both video content and distribution.

In general, the term “economies of scale” refers to markets in which average costs decline as the volume of
output increases, while “economies of scope” refer to circumstances where average costs decline as a result

3
Readers who are mainly interested in our empirical findings rather than our economic framework may wish to skip ahead to
Section III.
4
We use the term “video distribution platforms” to refer to both OVDs and to traditional platforms (i.e., movie theaters,
broadcast and cable television, and physical distribution (e.g., DVDs)).

2
of diversity of output (e.g., when it is more efficient to produce multiple products through a single production
process). Economies of scale and scope can exist on both the demand and supply side of a market. Demand-
side economies of scale include “network effects,” which occur when the value of a product grows with the
number of people who use it (e.g., fax machines, email, video game platforms). Demand-side economies of
scope are closely associated with platform markets – that is, they refer to markets in which the value of the
product grows with the diversity of its customers. 5

Compared with traditional video distribution platforms, OVDs increase economic efficiency in four ways:
supply-side economies of scale, supply-side economies of scope, demand-side economies of scale, and
demand-side economies of scope.

Supply-side economies of scale: In comparison to traditional video platforms, OVDs have enhanced ability to
capture supply-side economies of scale. In other words, OVDs can enable video producers to reach more
viewers at a lower cost. We focus on three ways this is true: increased geographic reach, decreased cost of
video distribution infrastructure, and increased availability to consumers in the time, place, and manner of
their choosing. First, unlike traditional video platforms, OVDs are not limited by the geographic reach of special
purpose distribution infrastructures. Thus, whereas a broadcaster’s audience is limited by the reach of its
signal, and a wireline cable operator by its infrastructure footprint, OVDs reach anywhere there is an Internet
connection. Larger audience sizes exploit the “first copy” property of digital content – i.e., the fact that the
costs of producing video content are fixed, while the costs of making it available to an additional customer
are essentially nil. 6 By expanding the size of the market, OVDs allow content producers of all sizes – from
large movie studios to individuals posting local sporting events to “vloggers” posting a cooking series on social
media outlets – to reach larger audiences.

Second, OVDs also allow for the achievement of economies of scale in video distribution infrastructure.
Whereas a traditional video distributor must defray the fixed costs of building a distribution infrastructure
(e.g., TV towers, cable systems, movie theaters) over just the audience for its own content, OVDs capitalize on
the ability of the Internet to convey all kinds of digital information, allowing infrastructure costs to be defrayed
over the entire universe of Internet users.

Third, OVDs facilitate increased per capita consumption of video by allowing viewers to access content at the
time and place of their choosing, including while in transit. As 4G (and soon 5G) mobile technology proliferates,

5
See e.g., Bruce M. Owen and Steven S. Wildman, Video Economics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992) and
Jeffrey H. Rohlfs, Bandwagon Effects in High-Technology Industries (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003) (hereafter Rohlfs 2003).
6
The importance of economies of scale in video distribution is widely recognized. For example, the Motion Picture
Association of America (MPAA) estimated that in 2007 the average cost of producing and distributing a studio film was about
$107 million, of which only $3.7 million (about four percent) represented physical distribution costs. See Motion Picture
Association of America, Entertainment Industry Market Statistics (2007) at 7, 15. Empirical estimates of the extent of economies
of scale in television broadcasting show that smaller stations (e.g., as measured by total revenues) have significantly higher costs
per unit of output than larger ones. See e.g., Jeffrey A. Eisenach and Kevin W. Caves, The Effects of Regulation on Economies of
Scale and Scope in TV Broadcasting (June 2011) at 14 (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1894941)
(finding that output rises 22 percent faster than costs over the relevant range).

3
mobile video consumption is growing rapidly both in the U.S. and globally, leading to increased demand for
both short- and long-form video.

Supply-side economies of scope: Internet distribution also allows OVDs to achieve supply-side economies of
scope by dramatically increasing the variety of both professionally-produced and user-generated content
available to consumers. That is, OVDs can offer more variety than traditional providers at substantially lower
incremental cost. Traditionally, cable and satellite operators have been limited to a finite number of channels,
and even as they have transitioned to offering some content on a non-linear, on-demand basis, the volume of
content in these offerings is typically constrained by limited capacity. By contrast, an OVD can distribute a
nearly unlimited variety of content in parallel, and the costs of doing so are continually declining with the
advance of online video compression technologies and better connectivity. 7

This difference is vital. Simply put, the structure of linear video distribution is zero-sum; there are only so many
slots that can be filled with programming, and when some of that capacity is used to deliver one title, no
other title can use that spot. Once 24 hours of programming is being delivered, the television station cannot
deliver any more programming in a day. In contrast, there is essentially no capacity constraint on digital
distribution networks. No matter how much video programming is available on Facebook, Netflix, YouTube or
others, there is always capacity available to include additional programming. Making one title available to
customers does not limit the other titles an OVD can deliver to customers, nor does it limit the ability of
different customers, all around the globe, to access different content at the same time.

One important consequence of OVDs’ ability to carry large libraries is to eliminate the scarcity that discourages
traditional video distributors from carrying “niche” or specialty content. While the scarcity of capacity on
traditional local video distribution platforms may make it uneconomic to distribute (for example) a Brazilian-
produced video program to audiences in Portugal, or to Portuguese speaking viewers in other countries, OVDs
can add such content to their libraries at minimal cost and make it available globally, increasing consumer
choice around the world. 8

Demand-side economies of scale: As noted above, demand-side economies of scale include network effects,
and refer to the fact that consumers gain increased value from participating in larger networks. One type of
network effect that occurs in video markets is that consumers prefer to watch programming that is also

7
Stephen Shankland, “Netflix and YouTube Streaming Video Is About to Get a Lot Faster,” CNET (March 28, 2018) (available
at https://www.cnet.com/news/netflix-youtube-streaming-video-is-about-to-get-a-lot-faster-av1-compression/).
8
Some economists have likened the effect of OVDs on the economics of niche content to the Alchian-Allen effect, which
posits that trade in “lower-quality” products increases with reductions in transportation costs. (For example, if it is costly to ship a
bottle of wine from Australia to California, only more expensive wines will be shipped. Thus, California consumers will drink
higher-quality Australian wines on average than Australian consumers do.) In the case of online video distribution, “lower
quality” does not necessarily imply less desirable, but rather “less popular” (i.e., niche). Thus, the Alchian-Allen effect explains
why the reduction in video distribution costs brought about by OVDs makes it economical to produce and distribute more niche
content. See e.g., Jason Potts, “The Alchian-Allen Theorem and the Economics of Internet Animals,” M/C Journal 17;2 (February
2014). See also Chris Anderson, The Long Tail: Why the Future of Business is Selling Less of More (Hyperion, 2006) (hereafter
Anderson 2006).

4
watched by their friends and acquaintances. 9 The effect of OVDs on demand-side economies of scale include
the value consumers gain from being able to participate in communities of interest that most closely mirror
their own tastes, as well as the value advertisers gain from being able to reach larger audiences.

For example, YouTube is attractive to users due to the breadth of offerings, which allows them to find video
content they wish to see, at any moment and from any connected device. Content creators value the platform
more because the viewers who would want to see their content are on the platform (and the platforms are
easy and inexpensive to use, opening the platform to a broader population of content creators); and,
advertisers value the platform because this overlap between viewers and content creators means that there
are more engaged viewers to whom they can advertise their products and services. Even applications which
do not involve advertisers, such as subscription-supported services or free educational services are able to
increase the value of their platforms to content creators by offering larger customer bases which in turn
increase the value to customers by offering large and diverse sets of video programming.

Demand-side economies of scope: Demand-side economies of scope arise from the fact that consumers on
both sides of a multi-sided market value diversity on the other side. OVDs directly enhance demand-side
economies of scope for all the platform participants. Consumers value the ability to access an almost unlimited
variety of content and to sample new programming; content providers value the ability to reach new
audiences; and, advertisers value the ability to better target their messages to interested consumers by
presenting them in conjunction with content consumers find appealing.

As should be apparent, economies of scale and scope in video markets are self-reinforcing. Lower costs
associated with supply-side economies lead to greater volume and variety of output, which in turn generates
greater demand-side economies of scale and scope. These synergies have been present throughout the history
of video content production. By dramatically expanding the size and scope of the market, however, OVDs
have accelerated the process, leading to increased production and consumption of video content. We provide
empirical evidence on these effects in Section III below. First, however, we explain how the ability of OVDs to
solve the matching problem more efficiently than traditional video platforms generates economic value and
thus further expands the market.

9
See e.g., Rohlfs 2003 at 21 (“In terms of bandwagon theory, a consumer’s demand depends on the number of users with
whom that consumer has some community of interest. For example, communities of interest include for a telecommunications
service, those persons with whom the consumer wants to communicate; for a computer operating system, those persons whose
needs for applications software resemble the consumer’s; and for a machine that plays prerecorded programming, those persons
whose tastes resemble the consumer’s.”); Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, “Systems Competition and Network Effects,” The
Journal of Economic Perspectives 8;2 (1994) 93-115.

5
B. Platform Markets and the Matching Problem
As noted above, economists define platform markets as markets which bring together different types of
economic actors, each of which values the presence of the others. 10 In differentiated product markets with
heterogeneous consumers – that is, markets with different types of products and consumers with different
tastes – a central economic challenge is to efficiently match participants on each side of the market with their
most desirable partners or products on the other side. This challenge has been studied extensively in a variety
of markets, including employment markets (matching workers with employers), the “market” for marriage (i.e.,
the challenge of finding the optimal mate), and the market for Internet search. 11

Video distribution platforms bring together three types of economic actors: content creators, viewers and (for
advertising-supported business models) advertisers, all of which are highly differentiated: No two video
programs, viewers, or advertisers are identical. And all three types of participants value the ability to be
matched with the best possible partner or product.

Compared with OVDs, the ability of traditional video platforms such as broadcasters and cable systems to
efficiently match platform participants is limited by significant technological constraints, two of which were
discussed in Section II.A. above: (1) the variety of content available is constrained by the linear nature of the
technology; and, (2) the size of the audience (and potential audience) is limited by the geographic reach of
the distribution infrastructure. As a result, traditional platforms cannot rival OVDs when it comes to the choices
available to content producers and advertisers (in terms of audience size and variety) and viewers (in terms of
the amount and variety of content).

Another limitation of traditional platforms is related to information and search costs. Traditional video
distribution technologies such as broadcast and cable offer consumers relatively rudimentary content discovery
options, such as on-screen program guides (or, until relatively recently, printed “TV guides”). Similarly,
providers of these traditional services are extremely limited in their ability to discover information about
consumer preferences. On traditional platforms, information on what programs consumers watch, or what
advertisements are effective, has generally been indirect, derived from consumer surveys or inferences about
the relationship between sales and advertising efforts. 12 OVDs, by contrast, apply sophisticated techniques
to match consumers with the content of their choice and advertisers to interested consumers.

See generally Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, “Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets,” Journal of the European
10

Economic Association 1;4 (June 2003) 990-1029 and see e.g., Mark Rysman, “The Economics of Two-Sided Markets,” Journal of
Economic Perspectives 23;3 (Summer 2009) 125-43.
11
For a broad survey of the economic literature on the matching problem, see Hector Chade, Jan Eeckhout and Lones Smith,
“Sorting Through Search and Matching Models in Economics,” Journal of Economic Literature 55;2 (2017) 493-544.
12
Traditional distributors are working to improve their ability to target advertising. See e.g., Sara Jerde, “With This New
Deal, More Targeted Ads Are Coming to Your TV,” Adweek (April 5, 2018) (available at https://www.adweek.com/tv-video/with-
this-new-deal-more-targeted-ads-are-coming-to-your-tv/).

6
On the consumer side, OVDs use search algorithms to analyze a wide variety of information about consumer
search patterns and present tailored recommendations. As Baye, De los Santos and Wildenbeest explain:

Leading media platforms (e.g., Netflix, Amazon, and iTunes) now provide users with
recommendations for specific media titles based on sophisticated algorithms that account for
a given user’s preferences as well as the ratings provided by other users. Consumers also
receive recommendations through social networks such as Facebook; “friends” can indicate
whether they “liked” a particular song, movie or book. Many of these recommendation
systems operate in real-time and use purchase patterns of consumers with similar profiles to
identify products consumer would be otherwise unaware of. 13

Baye et al also note that, in addition to facilitating content discovery through recommendations, OVDs also
allow consumers to directly access relevant information.

Additionally, advances in search technologies have made it easier for consumers to directly
access information that is relevant for their purchase decisions…. These changes in search
technologies allow consumers to find a greater breadth of products and make the long tail
more accessible; it is now easier to find rare and obscure books, music and movies. And
thanks to digitization, consumers can now view samples of book pages, listen to sample
music tracks, and watch scenes from movies through a plethora of devices connected to the
Internet. In short, finding the “right” product now takes less effort, and it is easier to compare
the prices different sellers charge for that product. 14

OVDs compete actively to offer the best solutions to the matching problem. For example, YouTube famously
changed its matching algorithm in May 2012 to incorporate measures of quality (i.e., viewing time) as well as
popularity (i.e., number of views). 15 Similarly, Netflix, whose initial success in the video rental business was
attributed by many to its recommendations function, has also worked to improve and better personalize the
search experience for its users. As a Netflix executive explained, “We have to make customers happy and
that’s the single guiding light.” 16 It has been reported that Netflix invests $150 million annually on its

13
Michael R. Baye, Babur De los Santos, and Matthijs R. Wildenbeest, “Searching for Physical and Digital Media: The
Evolution of Platforms for Finding Books,” in Avi Goldfarb, Shane M. Greenstein and Catherine E. Tucker, eds., Economic Analysis
of the Digital Economy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015) at 138.
14
Ibid.
15
Jillian D’Onfro, “The ‘Terrifying’ Moment in 2012 When YouTube Changed Its Entire Philosophy,” Business Insider (July 3,
2015) (available at http://www.businessinsider.com/youtube-watch-time-vs-views-2015-7).
16
Lara O’Reilly, “Netflix Lifted the Lid on How the Algorithm That Recommends Titles to Watch Actually Works,” Business
Insider (February 26, 2016) (available at http://www.businessinsider.com/how-the-netflix-recommendation-algorithm-works-2016-
2); see also Todd Spangler, “Amazon Video Direct: E-Commerce Giant Reveals Top-Performing Content Partners (EXCLUSIVE),”
Variety (October 5, 2016) (available at https://variety.com/2016/digital/news/amazon-video-direct-top-studio-digital-partners-
1201878900/).

7
recommendation system. 17 Similarly, Facebook’s new Facebook Watch application contains several features
to help users find content based on categories and discover new content and creators. 18

There is a substantial body of research suggesting that the improved search capabilities inherent in online
markets, including video markets, lead consumers to purchase a wider range of products – the so-called long-
tail effect. 19 In the market for online video, researchers have also suggested that the increased demand for
“niche” content spawned by OVDs may flow through to content producers, leading them to produce a greater
variety of content than would otherwise be the case. 20 The long-tail effect also extends the commercial life of
video content, increasing the returns to production by making content available, and discoverable, for a longer
period. 21

OVDs are also more efficient than traditional video distribution platforms in matching consumers with
advertisers, allowing many OVDs to offer a wide variety of content at no charge to consumers. Empirical
studies have demonstrated that the ability to better target advertising to consumers increases advertising
efficiency and thereby supports the content creation ecosystem, 22 and the same phenomenon is generally

17
Janko Roettgers, “Netflix Spends $150 Million on Content Recommendations Every Year,” Gigaom (October 9, 2014)
(available at https://gigaom.com/2014/10/09/netflix-spends-150-million-on-content-recommendations-every-year/); Adam Levy,
“How Netflix’s AI Saves $1 Billion Every Year,” The Motley Fool (June 19, 2016) (available at
https://www.fool.com/investing/2016/06/19/how-netflixs-ai-saves-it-1-billion-every-year.aspx).
18
See e.g., Josh Constine, “Facebook Launches Watch Tab of Original Video Shows,” TechCrunch (August 9, 2017) (available
at https://techcrunch.com/2017/08/09/facebook-watch/). Facebook Watch launched internationally in August 2018. See Robert
Mitchell, “Facebook Watch Rolls Out Internationally,” Variety (August 29, 2018) (available at
https://variety.com/2018/digital/news/facebook-watch-international-rollout-1202918777/).
19
See e.g., Erik Brynjolfsson, Yu (Jeffrey) Hu and Michael D. Smith, “Consumer Surplus in the Digital Economy: Estimating the
Value of Increased Product Variety at Online Booksellers,” Management Science 49;11 (November 2003) 1580-1596; Joel
Waldfogel, “How Digitization Has Created a Golden Age of Music, Movies, Books, and Television,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 31;3 (2017) 195-214; and Anderson 2006.
20
See Alejandro Zentner, Michael Smith, and Cuneyd Kaya, “How Video Rental Patterns Change as Consumers Move Online,”
Management Science 59;11 (November 2013) 2622–2634, at 2633 (“Our results show that there is a change in consumption
patterns caused by the characteristics of the Internet channel. As a consequence, our finding that online channels may shift DVD
consumption away from blockbuster titles and toward more niche titles may have implications for movie studios and movie
producers. Specifically, movie studios have typically faced a market where a small number of hits made up the vast majority of
industry profits. Our results suggest that this historical pattern of highly concentrated transactions in a handful of titles might
have been driven by the characteristics of the offline channel and that studios may wish to shift their resources relatively toward
more long-tail titles as consumers move online.”). See also Oxera, “How Did Cats Get the Cream of the Internet?” Agenda (January
2018) (available at https://www.oxera.com/Latest-Thinking/Agenda/2018/How-did-cats-get-the-cream-of-the-Internet.aspx) (“The
rise of matching algorithms means that consumers can now search for and find content that matches their interests and tastes
much more specifically. Search boxes, shared content and algorithmically derived recommendations allow consumers to find and
explore very specific genres, which would not have been possible for TV or film previously… the lower cost of production and
distribution, as well as search and automated recommendations, now mean that previously unviable markets…may be able to
thrive.”).
21
See e.g., Meg James and Yvonne Villareal, “Nostalgia TV Makes a Comeback. How Hulu and Netflix Are Breathing New Life
into Old TV Shows,” Los Angeles Times (August 20, 2017) (available at http://www.latimes.com/business/hollywood/la-fi-ct-
timeless-tv-streaming-20170820-story.html).
22
See e.g., J. Howard Beales and Jeffrey A. Eisenach, An Empirical Analysis of the Value of Information Sharing in the Market
for Online Content, Navigant Economics (January 2014); John Deighton and Peter A. Johnson, The Value of Data: Consequences

8
recognized within the video content industry. Indeed, the ability of digital distribution platforms to improve
advertising efficiency was cited by the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia in its decision approving
AT&T’s acquisition of Time Warner:

The classic model of television advertising is limited in two ways. First, in deciding the
placement of commercials to be seen by a wide audience, programmers generally must rely
on general demographic data, such as age range, about the typical audience for a given
program. Second, and as a result, programmers have no choice but to saturate all viewers
of a program with the same, undifferentiated ads – despite knowing that the selected ad will
be of little interest to some number of those viewers. 23

A third disadvantage faced by traditional distribution platforms is the relative homogeneity of the platforms
themselves: Before the Internet there were four primary video distribution business models: movie theaters,
cassettes and DVDs, over the air (ad supported) television, and pay TV. 24 OVDs, by contrast, provide a variety
of business models, including: ad supported applications like Facebook Live/Facebook Watch, Niconico, and
YouTube; subscription applications (SVODs) like Claro Video and Netflix; single-play “rent or buy” applications
like iTunes; direct delivery from content producers like BBC Online and HBO Go; and, a seemingly infinite
variety of alternatives such as Amazon Prime (which bundles video with a wide variety of other “prime”
benefits) and Hotstar (a “freemium” application that offers both ad-supported and subscription content). The
multitude of available choices gives platform participants – including content providers, consumers and
advertisers – the ability to “go to market” in whatever ways best match their needs.

All of these factors taken together provide a strong economic foundation for the hypothesis that the growth
of OVDs should expand the market for video, raising both output and consumption.

III. OVDs and the Growing Market for Video Content

In this section, we present empirical evidence showing that as online video platforms have grown, the market
for video content has grown across all sectors and regions. The data we analyze below are consistent with the

for Insight, Innovation & Efficiency in the U.S. Economy, Direct Marketing Association and Data-Driven Marketing Institute
(October 18, 2013) (available at https://thedma.org/advocacy/data-driven-marketing-institute/value-of-data-study-2013/).
23
Memorandum Opinion, U.S.A. v. AT&T Inc. et al, No. 17-2511 (D.C. Cir., June 12, 2018) at 10; see also ibid. at 26 (“Why
the rush away from television ads to digital ones? Simply put, digital ads are more efficient. Through their access to and use of
consumer data, Google and Facebook are better able to discern the purchasing preferences and interests of individuals viewing
particular online content. They can use that information to infer what types of ads would most interest those users. And they can
tailor digital advertisements to those users based on those preferences. Best of all from an advertiser’s perspective, Google,
Facebook and other entities engaged in digital advertising have confirmatory data that demonstrates whether particular ads were
effective.” (citations omitted)).
24
Partially in response to competition from OVDs, “traditional” platforms have evolved to offer more flexible choices,
including pay-per-view purchase and rental options. Some now offer OVD applications such as Hulu and Netflix as part of their
offerings.

9
predictions of economic theory: Market expansion driven by OVDs has led to increased production and
consumption of video content, including increases in the quality, quantity, and variety of video production.

Specifically, the growth of OVDs has expanded the market for professional video production while at the same
time creating a market for UGC, primarily on social media platforms. Market expansion led to the entry of new
studios and production companies, some of which are run by the distributors themselves: Amazon, Hulu, and
Netflix, for example, have all enjoyed critical and commercial success in recent years with original mass-market
programming. 25 The growth in original mass-market programming, spurred by original content being
produced for online distributors, has contributed to what is widely seen as more and better new content than
ever before, a “golden age of television.” 26 At the same time, OVDs have enabled an explosion in the
production and availability of UGC on platforms like Facebook, Niconico and YouTube, which allow amateur
and independent content creators to make their video productions available to audiences worldwide.

A. Growth in Video Consumption

Online video consumption has grown rapidly in recent years and is projected to continue growing over the
next several years. As shown in Figure 1, global consumption of online video is projected to increase at an
average annual rate of 31 percent from 2016 to 2021. The fastest growth is expected in the Middle East and
Africa (56 percent per year) and Asia Pacific (35 percent per year).

25
See e.g., John Hazelton, “How Netflix, Amazon and Hulu Are Transforming the TV Business,” Screen Daily (March 30,
2017) (available at https://www.screendaily.com/features/how-netflix-amazon-and-hulu-are-transforming-the-
tv-%20business/5116347.article); and Mark Sweney, “Will the New TV Golden Age Produce the First $20M per Show Series,” The
Guardian (February 11, 2018) (available at https://www.theguardian.com/media/2018/feb/11/will-the-new-tv-golden-age-produce-
the-first-20m-per-show-series).
26
See e.g., Adrienne Gibbs, “Year-End Peak TV Debate: Is There Too Much TV?” Forbes (December 27, 2016) (available at
https://www.forbes.com/sites/adriennegibbs/2016/12/27/peak-tv-debate-is-there-too-much-tv/#1d9c4207166c).
10
 FIGURE 1:
CONSUMER INTERNET VIDEO DATA CONSUMPTION BY REGION
(EXABYTES PER MONTH; 2016 ACTUAL – 2017-21 FORECAST)

Source: Cisco, “Cisco Visual Networking Index: Forecast and Methodology, 2016–2021” (September 15, 2017) (available at
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/visual-networking-index-vni/complete-white-paper-c11-
481360.html#_Toc484813989). Note: * forecast.

The growth of the online viewing audience is being driven by both growing Internet penetration and the
availability of increasingly capacious broadband networks (both fixed and mobile) capable of transmitting
high-quality video, and is occurring in both developed and developing countries. For example, Figure 2 shows
the projected growth in the online viewing audience between 2012 and 2017 in eight developed countries,
with the fastest growth occurring in countries like Australia, Austria, Singapore and the U.S., all of which have
highly-developed broadband infrastructures.

11
 FIGURE 2:
GROWTH IN MONTHLY ONLINE VIDEO VIEWERS
(INDEX, 2012=100)

Sources: Anne Austin, Jonathan Barnard and Nicola Hutcheon, Online Video Forecasts 2015, ZenithOptimedia
(July 2015) at 6, 8, 14, 29, 40, 60, 66, 75, 81 (available at https://www.mumbrella.asia/content/uploads/2015/08/Online-Video-
Forecasts-20154.pdf). Note: [1] * forecast. [2] Growth in Spain was 237 percent over the period, but Spain is excluded from the
chart to maintain scale.

As shown in Figure 3, SVOD applications are increasingly popular in developing as well as developed countries.
While penetration remains highest in the U.S. (where 79 percent of consumers subscribe to at least one SVOD
application), India (75 percent) and South Korea (65 percent) are not far behind, and penetration rates exceed
50 percent in all the countries surveyed except Singapore (48 percent) and France (45 percent).

12
 FIGURE 3:
SUBSCRIPTIONS TO ONLINE VIDEO STREAMING APPLICATIONS
(PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS, ADULTS 18+; JUNE 2017)

Source: Limelight Networks, The State of Online Video 2017 (2017) at 17 (available at
https://img03.en25.com/Web/LLNW/%7B66d0e66a-ac16-4c1e-9e12-
d8d845f2bddf%7D_State_of_Online_Video_2017.pdf).

As shown in Figure 4, as recently as 2013 three out of four Netflix subscribers were Americans; just four years
later, by 2017, more than half were from outside the U.S. Netflix revenues reflected the shift: Netflix’s
streaming revenue outside the U.S. increased from $83 million in 2011 to nearly $8 billion in 2018, or 91
percent per year. 27

27
Netflix, Inc. Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2012 (February 1, 2013) at 24; Netflix, Inc. Form 10-K for
the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2018 (January 29, 2019) at 61 (herafter Netflix 2019 10-K).
13
 FIGURE 4:
NETFLIX SUBSCRIBERS
(MILLIONS; 2007-2018)

Sources: Netflix, Inc., Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2011 (February 10, 2012) at 23-24; Netflix,
Inc. Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2013 (January 31, 2014) at 17, 19, 22; Netflix, Inc. Form 10-K
for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2016 (January 27, 2017) at 17, 20; Netflix, Inc. Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year
Ended December 31, 2017 (January 29, 2018) at 18, 20; Netflix 2019 10-K at 19-20.

The rapid growth of OVDs around the globe is by no means limited to U.S.-based platforms. In India, for
example, Star India’s Hotstar has more than 75 million monthly active subscribers, compared with 11 million

14
for Amazon and five million for Netflix. 28 Malaysia based iflix, which has undercut Netflix on pricing and
targeted the rapidly growing mobile device market, has 6.5 million active paying subscribers. 29

OVDs are also playing an especially important role in Africa, where video creators face high barriers to
monetizing their creations due to a weak distribution system: movie theaters are relatively rare, television
channels are fragmented at the national level, and counterfeited copies of movies arguably are easier to find
than legal ones. Several online platforms such as AfricaFilms.tv and Buni TV have identified the potential of
the Internet to overcome those limitations. 30 In the words of Enrico Chiesa, co-founder of AfricaFilms.tv, “While
the big players are implementing the infrastructure needed for individual legal film download in Africa
(affordable [I]nternet broad band connections, cheap smart mobile screens, adequate payment tools), we are
digitizing a wide catalogue and wish to market it to the audiences that are ready.” 31

AfricaFilms.tv uses the global reach of the Internet to pool together a number of formerly separate viewer
segments to reach critical mass: “[W]orld wide audiences: diasporas, Western world-culture fans and movie-
buffs, African upper-middle class, i.e.[,] 30 - 40 m people right now and tomorrow...African populations, who
will be widely connected to the [I]nternet and mobileTV.” 32 Their business model is based on bringing quality
African content into their platform in all formats: feature films, series, documentaries, animated movies or TV
sitcoms. To lure producers into the platform and stimulate the creation of new original content, they have
designed the platform to address the main concerns of African content producers, as shown in Figure 5.

28
See Hanish Bhatia, “Netflix Restricted to Premium Subscribers, While Hotstar Leads the Indian OTT Video Content Market
in 2017,” Counterpoint (December 27, 2017) (available at https://www.counterpointresearch.com/netflix-restricted-premium-
subscribers-hotstar-leads-indian-ott-video-content-market-2017/). Hotstar is a “hybrid” (or “freemium”) application that offers
both advertising-supported and subscription-based services.
29
Patrick Frater, “‘Lose All Your Assumptions About Asian Streaming,’ Says Iflix CEO Mark Britt,” Variety (November 23,
2017) (available at https://variety.com/2017/digital/asia/wrong-assumptions-about-asian-streaming-video-iflix-mark-britt-
1202622591/).
30
See “VoD Provides a Major Distribution Opportunity for African Producers, TV Channels and Investors...Now,” Balancing
Act (February 20, 2013) (available at https://www.balancingact-africa.com/news/broadcast_en/27171/vod-provides-a-major-
distribution-opportunity-for-african-producers-tv-channels-and-investorsnow).
31
See Hadrien Diez, “AfricaFilms.tv: The New Online Platform for Quality African Movies,” Institut Français Afrique du Sud
(available at http://www.ifas.org.za/index.php/cinema-media/cinema/211-africafilmstv-the-new-online-platform-for-quality-
african-movies).
32
See AfricaFilms.tv, AfricaFilms.tv: VOD 100% Africa (hereafter AfricaFilms.tv) (available at
http://www.casafrica.es/casafrica/Agenda/2011/02_FESPACO_Africa_Films.PDF).
15
 FIGURE 5:
AFRICAFILMS.TV BUSINESS PROPOSITION
TO VIDEO CONTENT PRODUCERS

Source: AfricaFilms.tv.

By 2018, AfricaFilms.tv addressed audiences in more than 50 countries and had more than 600 African films
in its catalog, in addition to soap operas and other video content. 33

Despite the rapid growth in online video applications (global SVOD subscriptions increased from
approximately 100 million in 2013 to 446.8 million in 2017, or 45 percent per year), subscriptions to cable,
satellite, and other video distribution platforms remained relatively stable. 34 Even the original method of
distributing video content, the movie theater, continues to prosper. As shown in Figure 6, global movie theater
box office revenues have grown steadily in recent years, increasing by about 14 percent between 2013 and
2017.

33
See “AFRICAFILMStv,” Facebook (available at https://www.facebook.com/pg/africafilmstv/about/?ref=page_internal).
34
Motion Picture Association of America, THEME Report 2017 (2018) at 13 (hereafter MPAA THEME Report 2017) (available
at https://www.mpaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/MPAA-THEME-Report-2017_Final.pdf). Similarly, BIA/Kelsey reports that
the revenues of U.S. broadcast television stations have continued to grow, exceeding $28 billion in 2016. See BIA/Kelsey,
“BIA/Kelsey Reports Local Television Station Revenue Reached $28.4 B in 2016; Retransmission Fees, Over-the-Air and Digital
Revenue Contribute to a Strong Year” (April 20, 2017) (available at http://www.biakelsey.com/biakelsey-reports-local-television-
station-revenue-reached-28-4-b-2016-retransmission-fees-air-digital-revenues-contribute-strong-year/)
16
 FIGURE 6:
GLOBAL BOX OFFICE REVENUES
($BILLIONS; 2013-2017)

Source: MPAA THEME Report 2017 at 7.

One likely explanation for the fact that the growth of OVDs is generally additive is that online video consumers
have relatively strong tastes for watching video in all forms. For example, as shown in Figure 7, the MPAA
reports that frequent moviegoers own more home entertainment devices (e.g., computers, smartphones,
video-streaming devices) than average, suggesting that online entertainment overall is a complement for
traditional viewing rather than a substitute. Thus, the primary effect of OVDs is to increase overall
consumption, not simply shift consumption from one modality to another.

17
 FIGURE 7:
OWNERSHIP OF DIGITAL HOME ENTERTAINMENT PRODUCTS
(UNITED STATES ADULTS; 2017)

Source: MPAA THEME Report 2017 at 22.

In summary, online video distribution is growing rapidly in every region of the world, and all of the available
evidence indicates that growth is increasing consumer demand for video content. In the following section,
we present data on the impact of that increased demand on video content output.

B. Global Growth in Video Production and Output

Increased consumer demand for online and traditional video content is leading to significant increases in
output for all types of video content, from traditional video productions (i.e., “long-form” productions like TV
shows and movies) to UGC, which takes a virtually unlimited variety of forms – from cat videos to
documentaries to karaoke – and is growing at an explosive rate. Moreover, as the data presented below
demonstrate, growth in both traditional video and UGC is occurring on a global basis. The first subsection
below presents data on the growth of traditional video content; the second focuses on UGC.

18
 1. Growth in Traditional Video Content

As discussed further in Section IV below, some policymakers have expressed concern that the growth of OVDs
may be coming at the expense of domestic content producers, especially outside the U.S. The data does not
support these concerns: As we demonstrate below, the output of “long-form” traditional content (i.e., movies
and television programming) is rising throughout the globe, including Asia, Canada, Europe, and Latin
America – as well as in the United States. Furthermore, much of the increased demand for such content is
coming from OVDs, who are competing among themselves (and with traditional platforms).

SVODs like Amazon Prime Video, Hulu and Netflix have invested heavily in creating original content. For
example:

• Amazon spent an estimated $512 million on original series in 2017, about $1 billion in 2018 and is
projected to spend $2.6 billion in 2021. In 2017 Amazon’s spending on original content was 13.9
percent of its total content budget, which is allocated between licensing acquired content and
original content. Amazon is predicted to spend 31.4 percent of its content budget on originals in
2021. 35

• Hulu spent an estimated $136 million on original programming in 2017, approximately $218 million
in 2018 and is projected to spend $447 million in 2021. Hulu’s original series The Handmaid’s Tale
helped Hulu gain subscribers and won an Emmy for best drama in 2017. 36

• Netflix spent more than $12 billion on content in 2018, with 700 original series worldwide, including
80 non-English language productions. 37 Netflix’s full-length motion picture Roma was nominated for
10 Oscars, and won three, at the 2019 Academy Awards. 38

In addition to these three major SVOD platforms, video sharing platforms and social media platforms Facebook,
Twitter and YouTube are also investing in original content.

35
Deana Myers, “Amazon Content Spend Up Nearly 40% This Year, $1 Billion in Originals,” Kagan (April 5, 2018) (hereafter
Myers 2018) (available at https://platform.mi.spglobal.com/web/client?auth=inherit#news/article?id=44131207).
36
Deana Myers, “Hulu Content Spend on Significant Upward Path,” Kagan (February 1, 2018) (available at
https://platform.mi.spglobal.com/web/client?auth=inherit#news/article?id=43322711&KeyProductLinkType=16).
37
Todd Spangler, “Netflix Eyeing Total of About 700 Original Series in 2018,” Variety (February 27, 2018) (available at
http://variety.com/2018/digital/news/netflix-700-original-series-2018-1202711940/); Todd Spangler, “Netflix Spent $12 Billion on
Content in 2018. Analysts Expect That to Grow to $15 Billion This Year,” Variety (January 18, 2019) (available at
https://variety.com/2019/digital/news/netflix-content-spending-2019-15-billion-1203112090/).
38
Joan E. Solsman, “Roma’s Oscars May Be Netflix’s Last Step to Conquering Hollywood,” CNET (February 24, 2019)
(available at https://www.cnet.com/news/roma-oscars-may-be-netflix-last-step-to-conquering-hollywood/).

19
 • Facebook is “aggressively courting video creators” by offering incentives for producers for its Watch
product. 39 For example, Facebook now allows producers to publish native ads and videos paid for by
brands or include product placement. 40 In preparation for its launch, Facebook signed deals with
companies such as BuzzFeed, Condé Nast and Vox Media to produce original shows and continues
to invest in original content including critically-acclaimed dramas like Sorry for Your Loss and new
interactive programming like Confetti. In an effort to create “more sophisticated, premium content,”
Facebook is reported to be willing to spend up to $1 billion to produce original shows for Watch. 41

• Twitter is expanding the breadth and depth of its premium video programming through collaborations
with content creators such as BuzzFeed News, ESPN, NBCUniversal and Viacom. 42 According to
Twitter’s Global Head of Content Partnerships Kay Madati, “In the past year, we’ve really expanded
our efforts with the best publishers and content creators in the world to bring a slate of programming
that reflects those diverse content interests.” 43

• YouTube started producing premium original content (YouTube Originals) that are available to
consumers through its YouTube Premium subscription platform in 2016, releasing 30 films and series
in the first year. 44 In 2017 YouTube began producing seven unscripted original series available for
free, with plans to invest several hundred million dollars in new content in the coming years. 45

Contrary to some policymakers’ concerns, OVDs’ spending on new content is by no means limited to U.S. or
“western” content producers. For example, Netflix planned to release 30 local language original series in

Kurt Wagner, “Facebook’s New Rules Let Video Creators Make Money on the Side,” Recode (April 8, 2016) (hereafter
39

Wagner 2016) (available at https://www.recode.net/2016/4/8/11585970/facebook-video-creators-publish-branded-content); David

Wehner, Facebook, Inc. Q3 2017 Earnings Call Transcript (November 1, 2017) at 9 (“[W]e are investing aggressively in video
content to support the Watch tab.”).
40
Wagner 2016.
41
Deepa Seetharaman, “Facebook Is Willing to Spend Big in Video Push,” The Wall Street Journal (September 8, 2017)
(available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-is-willing-to-spend-big-in-video-push-1504863181).
42
Twitter, “Twitter Announces over 30 Premium Video Content Deals at Digital Content NewFronts, Expands Depth and
Breadth of Programming Slate” (April 30, 2018) (available at https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/twitter-announces-over-
30-premium-video-content-deals-at-digital-content-newfronts-expands-depth-and-breadth-of-programming-slate-
300639486.html).
43
Ibid.
44
“From the Brandcast Stage: New Star-Studded Shows for Audiences Around the Globe,” Google Blog (May 4, 2017)
(herafter From the Brandcast Stage 2017) (available at https://youtube.googleblog.com/2017/05/from-brandcast-stage-new-star-
studded.html); Kia Kokalitcheva, “YouTube’s First Lineup of Original Content Is Here,” Fortune (February 10, 2016) (available at
http://fortune.com/2016/02/10/youtube-originals-release/).
45
From the Brandcast Stage 2017; Lucas Shaw and Mark Bergen, “With 40 New Original Series, YouTube Targets TV’s
Breadbasket,” Bloomberg (May 4, 2017) (available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-04/with-40-new-
original-shows-youtube-targets-tv-s-breadbasket).

20
2018, 46 and intends to soon have approximately 100 local language series in production. 47 In Brazil, for
example, Netflix launched several original films and series, including a highly-acclaimed Western film, a
documentary film, a sci-fi dystopia series, a political corruption series, a supernatural thriller series, a
biographical docu-series, a 1950s romantic period drama series, a Brazilian folklore murder series, a sitcom
and stand-up comedy specials. 48 In Japan, Netflix has acquired and commissioned 20 Japanese animation
series that it exports across its global platform. 49 In India, it has made significant acquisitions and is
collaborating with local producers on original series, some of which it seeks to offer globally. 50 In Europe,
Netflix has invested more than $2 billion in content since its launch and is “one of the world’s biggest
purveyors of French content.” 51 Netflix will reportedly be ordering its first original series from Africa in 2019. 52

Amazon is also investing in geographically diverse markets. In India Amazon has earmarked $300 million for
original content production and is currently producing 20 original series, offering “one of the largest Indian
original line-ups on an OTT [over-the-top] platform.” 53

46
Reinhardt Krause, “Netflix Takes on Media Giants as Video Streaming War Goes Global,” Investor’s Business Daily (March
8, 2018) (available at https://www.investors.com/research/industry-snapshot/netflix-fights-media-giants-in-global-video-
streaming-war/).
47
Michael Schneider, “With 100 Foreign-Language Series, Netflix Will Take Binge-Watching Global,” IndieWire (November
15, 2018) (available at https://www.indiewire.com/2018/11/netflix-international-casa-de-papel-dark-sacred-games-erik-barmack-
interview-1202020918/); Harsh Chauhan, “What Are Netflix’s Biggest Challenges Abroad?” International Business Times (January
23, 2019) (available at https://www.ibtimes.com/what-are-netflixs-biggest-challenges-abroad-2755551).
48
Be Brasil, “Brazil’s Potential for Cinema and TV Inspires Netflix to Invest” (January 3, 2018) (available at
http://www.bebrasil.com.br/en/news/brazils-potential-for-cinema-and-tv-inspires-netflix-to-invest); Mac Margolis, “Netflix Woos
Latin American Viewers by Going Local,” Bloomberg (August 11, 2017) (available at
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-08-11/netflix-woos-latin-american-viewers-by-going-local); Netflix, “Dark Secrets
Surround The One, New Netflix Brazilian Original Series” (July 20, 2018) (available at https://media.netflix.com/en/press-
releases/dark-secrets-surround-the-one-new-netflix-brazilian-original-series); Netflix, “Netflix Announces the Docuseries Vai
Anitta” (July 12, 2018) (available at https://media.netflix.com/en/press-releases/netflix-announces-the-docuseries-vai-anitta);
Netflix, “Carlos Saldanha and Netflix Will Unveil Invisible Cities, New Brazilian Original Series” (June 22, 2018) (available at
https://media.netflix.com/en/press-releases/carlos-saldanha-and-netflix-will-unveil-invisible-cities-new-brazilian-original-series);
Netflix, “Netflix Announces New Original Series Set in 1950s Brazil, Coisa Mais Linda” (November 6, 2017) (available at
https://media.netflix.com/en/press-releases/netflix-announces-new-original-series-set-in-1950s-brazil-coisa-mais-linda); Netflix,
“Netflix’s Newest Original Series from Brazil, O Mecanismo, Started Production Last Weekend” (May 9, 2017) (available at
https://media.netflix.com/en/press-releases/netflixs-newest-original-series-from-brazil-o-mecanismo-started-production-last-
weekend).
49
Patrick Frater, “For Netflix, Local Content is King in Asia,” Variety (October 16, 2017) (available at
http://variety.com/2017/tv/markets-festivals/for-netflix-local-content-is-king-in-asia-1202588618/).
50
Ibid.
51
Elsa Keslassy, “Netflix, YouTube to Pay Tax on Turnover in France Under New Law,” Variety (September 21, 2017)
(available at http://variety.com/2017/film/global/netflix-youtube-pay-tax-on-turnover-france-new-law-1202565236/).
52
Stewart Clarke, “Netflix to Order African Original Series in 2019,” Variety (December 1, 2018) (available at
https://variety.com/2018/tv/news/netflix-order-africa-original-series-2019-1203061326/).
53
“Can Netflix and Amazon Disrupt India’s Streaming Video Market?” Knowledge@Wharton (May 4, 2017) (hereafter
Knowledge@Wharton 2017) (available at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/can-netflix-amazon-disrupt-indias-
streaming-video-market/); Myers 2018.

21
Non-U.S. based platforms are taking a similar tack. Malaysia-based iflix, which is now available in 25 countries
across Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, is investing in Malaysian and other local content. 54 In India
local video streaming platform Spuul will soon be producing original shows, and other local platforms like
Hotstar, Sony Liv, and Voot have increased their content spending significantly since Amazon and Netflix
entered the Indian market. 55 Growth in regional content on Indian OVD applications is “fueled by demand
from both local viewers and the international diaspora.” 56

Fears that viewing behavior would shift away from local content to foreign-produced video have also proven
unfounded. For example, one analysis found that consumption of online video in Southeast Asia has shifted
from “80% Hollywood/20% Asian” to “50% Hollywood/20% local/30% Korean.” 57 In India, 75 percent of new
Internet users consume content in their local languages, and industry analysts believe regional content is key
to capturing share because a large percentage of OVD viewership is fragmented across states and languages. 58
As one recent report explained, “multiple genres are fueling consumption” but “[l]ocal dramas…remain the
most important ratings driver.” 59

One factor driving demand for local content is the desire of OVDs to differentiate themselves from competitors
by varying their content mixes. Figure 8 shows the number of films available on major OVDs in France by
country of origin. As the figure shows, UniversCiné’s catalogue is weighted towards local content (43 percent
of the films in its catalog for which origin could be identified are French), while other platforms carry more
content from the U.S. and other countries. However, while the iTunes catalog is comprised of only 21 percent
French content, in absolute terms it offers more French films than any of the other platforms. 60

54
Thomas Adkins, “Lead OTT Players: Insights from APOS 2018,” Kagan (May 1, 2018) (available at
http://platform.mi.spglobal.com/SNL.Services.Application.Common.Service/v1/client?#news/article?id=44428984&KeyProductLinkT
ype=4); Venus Hew, “iflix Bags US$133m in Latest Funding Round, Ramps Up Local Content Strategy,” Marketing-Interactive
(August 8, 2017) (available at http://www.marketing-interactive.com/iflix-bags-us133m-in-latest-funding-round-ramps-up-local-
content-strategy/); Jon Russell, “Netflix Rival Iflix Reveals Its First Original Content Series for Emerging Markets,” TechCrunch (April
21, 2017) (available at https://techcrunch.com/2017/04/20/iflix-original-content/).
55
Knowledge@Wharton 2017.
56
“3 VOD Trends in India for 2017: Spuul CEO,” CXOToday (December 7, 2016) (hereafter CXOToday 2016) (available at
http://www.cxotoday.com/story/three-vod-trends-to-observe-in-india-in-2017/). See also Hotstar, The India Watch Report 2018
(February 2018) at ii (available https://www.hotstar.com/indiawatchreport2018/20180219_INDIA_WATCH_REPORT.pdf) (“In a
world that does not fear data charges, video is very often the first port of call for new data users. Familiar stories, whether TV
shows, movies or sports, unconstrained by any language limitation, are acting as powerful triggers to light up their smartphones
and their data connections.”); ibid. at 13 (“~70% of Premium users who watch English shows and movies also view multiple other
genres and languages.”)
57
Content Asia, “Data: Forecasts” (April 19, 2017) (hereafter Content Asia 2017) (available at
http://www.contentasia.tv/features/data-forecasts).
58
CXOToday 2016.
59
Content Asia 2017.
60
As noted above, many consumers subscribe to multiple OVDs.
22
 FIGURE 8:
FILM CATALOGS OF OVDS SERVING FRANCE, BY ORIGIN OF CONTENT
(OCTOBER 2016)

Source: Gilles Fontaine and Christian Grece, Origin of Films and TV Content in VOD Catalogues in the EU & Visibility of Films on
VOD Services, European Audiovisual Observatory (November 2016) at 31, 45, 54, 78, 98, 122 (hereafter Fontaine and Grece 2016)
(available at http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm?doc_id=43865). Note: Figures only include films for which country of
origin could be identified.

As shown in Figure 9, it is common for major European Video on Demand (VOD) platforms to focus on EU-
originated content.

23
 FIGURE 9:
PERCENTAGE OF EU CONTENT ON SELECTED ONLINE VOD PLATFORMS
(OCTOBER 2016)

Source: Fontaine and Grece 2016 at 73-74.

Increased demand for video content is leading to increased output of all kinds. Figure 10, for example, shows
the number of feature-length films produced worldwide, in the top ten film-producing countries and the rest
of the world separately. The number of feature film productions increased from 7,612 in 2010 to 8,429 in
2015, or 11 percent. Notably, the only two countries among the top ten in which the number of feature films
produced declined were the U.S. and the United Kingdom.

24
 FIGURE 10:
NUMBER OF FEATURE FILMS PRODUCED WORLDWIDE
(2010-2015)

Sources: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, “Feature Films (Full Dataset) - Total Number of National Feature Films Produced”
(available at http://data.uis.unesco.org/). Notes: [1] Figures represent feature films produced in each country each year. Films that
are internationally coproduced are thus counted more than once. Internationally coproduced films represent between five and
seven percent of total films each year. [2] Figures for “rest of world” are conservative, because they exclude Nigeria. Data are not
available for Nigeria from 2012 to 2015, though it had 1,074 and 997 films in 2010 and 2011, respectively.

The expansion of the video distribution market is leading to growth in the video content sector. For example,
as shown in Figure 11, the number of EU content production businesses (defined as enterprises involved in
“motion picture, video and television programme activities”) grew by 28 percent between 2011 and 2015,
from about 91,000 to over 116,000 in 2015.
25
 FIGURE 11:
EU ENTERPRISES ENGAGED IN VIDEO CONTENT PRODUCTION (2011-2015)

Source: Eurostat, “Structural Business Statistics & Global Business Activities: Annual Detailed Enterprise Statistics
for Services (NACE Rev. 2 H-N and S95)” (hereafter Eurostat) (available at
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/structural-business-statistics/data/database).

Employment in the EU video content sector has also been on the rise. As shown in Figure 12, between 2011
and 2016 the number of employees working in the TV, video, and motion picture industries grew by more
than 38,000, an increase of more than 10 percent.

26
 FIGURE 12:
EU MOTION PICTURE, VIDEO, AND TELEVISION INDUSTRY EMPLOYMENT
(2011-2016)

Source: Eurostat.

The video content production sectors in other major film producing countries are also growing. In India, for
example, film sector revenues were projected to grow from INR 125 billion in 2013 to INR 173 billion in 2017
– an increase of 38 percent – and to INR 238 billion in 2020.

27
 FIGURE 13:
INDIAN FILM INDUSTRY REVENUE
(INR BILLIONS; 2013-15 ACTUAL – 2016-20 FORECAST)

Source: Neeraj Jain, Tarun Soneja and Japun Ahluwalia, Indywood: The Indian Film Industry, Deloitte (September 2016) at 9
(hereafter Jain et al 2016) (available at https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/in/Documents/technology-media-
telecommunications/in-tmt-indywood-film-festival-noexp.pdf). Note: * forecast.

Employment in the Indian film industry is growing even faster than revenues: It is estimated to have increased
55 percent between 2013 and 2017, from 160,800 to 248,600, as shown in Figure 14.

28
 FIGURE 14:
INDIAN FILM INDUSTRY EMPLOYMENT
(2013-15 ACTUAL – 2016-17 FORECAST)

Source: Jain et al 2016 at 21. Note: * forecast.

Similarly, spending on Canadian film and television production grew by 40 percent between 2011 and 2016,
from CAD 6.0 billion to CAD 8.4 billion, as shown in Figure 15.

29
 FIGURE 15:
EXPENDITURES ON CANADIAN FILM AND TELEVISION PRODUCTION EXPENDITURE
(CAD BILLIONS; FY 2011-2016)

Source: Nordicity Group, Profile 2017: Economic Report on the Screen-Based Media Production Industry in Canada (2018) at 15,
127, 129 (hereafter Nordicity Group 2017) (available at http://www.primetimeinottawa.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Profile-
2017.pdf). Notes: [1] Some totals do not sum due to rounding. [2] The fiscal year referred to here begins April 1 and ends March
31. [3] Broadcaster in-house production refers to television programs made internally by broadcasters. It largely consists of news
and sports programming, but can also include production in other genres. [4] Foreign location and service production refers to
feature films and television programs filmed in Canada primarily by foreign producers. It also includes the visual effects work done
by Canadian visual effects studios for foreign films and television programs.

Over the same period, the Canadian video content production sector added about 15,000 jobs, an increase of
about 28 percent. 61

61
Fiscal Year (April 1 - March 31).
30
 FIGURE 16:
CANADIAN FILM AND TELEVISION PRODUCTION FULL TIME EMPLOYMENT
(THOUSANDS; FY 2011-2016)

Source: Nordicity Group 2017 at 23, 124-125, 127-130. Notes: [1] Some totals do not sum due to rounding. [2] The fiscal year
referred to here begins April 1 and ends March 31. [3] Broadcaster in-house production refers to television programs made
internally by broadcasters. It largely consists of news and sports programming, but can also include production in other genres.
[4] Foreign location and service production refers to feature films and television programs filmed in Canada primarily by foreign
producers. It also includes the visual effects work done by Canadian visual effects studios for foreign films and television
programs.

The U.S. content sector, in the meantime, is experiencing modest growth: Between 2011 and 2016, output
increased by about 1.5 percent annually, from $144 billion to $156 billion, as shown in Figure 17.

31
 FIGURE 17:
U.S. MOTION PICTURE, VIDEO, AND TELEVISION PRODUCTION REVENUE
($2016 BILLIONS; 2011-2016)

Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Supply, Output, and Its Components by Industries” (available
at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SNA_TABLE31#); Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index (CPI) All Urban
Consumers (Current Series) (Series ID CUUR0000SA0) (available at https://www.bls.gov/data/).

To summarize, the data shows that production of traditional video content – i.e., professionally-produced
feature films, documentaries and television programs – is increasing throughout the world. Video content
producers are producing more films, earning higher revenues, and employing more people, and that growth
is expected to continue.

2. Growth in User-Generated Content

As discussed in Section II above, supply- and demand-side economies of scale and scope provide video sharing
and social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube with powerful incentives to increase the size
of their ecosystems: The more content they can offer, the greater the value to consumers; the greater the value
to consumers, the more consumers join the platform; the more consumers join the platform, the more content
they generate; and so forth.

Thanks to recent technological advances, content on social media sites increasingly is dominated by user-
generated video, and the amount of video being uploaded and accessed from such sites is growing rapidly.
32
The volume of both publisher- and user-generated video content posted on Facebook is also growing rapidly.
For example, the number of videos posted by the top 10,000 Facebook video publishers increased from
approximately 70,000 in April 2015 to 140,000 in June 2016, while sharing of those videos increased from
an average of approximately 200 to approximately 500 shares per video over the same period. 62 User-
generated video has followed similar growth, as Facebook users globally posted 75 percent more videos in
2015 than in 2014 while U.S. users posted 94 percent more. 63 In 2017 Facebook introduced Facebook Watch
to organize video across Facebook pages in a single destination and in 2018 expanded it globally. 64 In 2018,
400 million Facebook users came to Facebook Watch each month, and watched an average of approximately
25 million hours of video every day. 65

According to a survey conducted by the Interactive Advertising Bureau, by 2018 social media platforms had
become the single most popular source for live video content. 66 Social media analysts have also noted that,
for brands, unpaid video posts have 135 percent greater reach than unpaid photo posts. 67

To accelerate the ability to capture scale and scope economies, content platforms engage in a variety of
investments designed to facilitate user engagement. For example, Facebook’s Creators App is an example of
investments to promote the production and distribution of videos through Facebook Live. 68 As shown in Figure
18, the app gives creators tools to personalize their live broadcasts, such as intros, outros and graphic frames
to create a consistent brand, and provides access to analytics about creators’ videos and fans to inform content
creation. 69

62
Steve Rayson, “New Facebook Share Data Reveals Why Video Is Key to Your Content Strategy,” Buzzsumo (July 5, 2016)
(available at http://buzzsumo.com/blog/facebook-share-data-every-publisher-needs-know/).
63
Facebook, “What the Shift to Video Means for Creators” (January 7, 2015) (available at
https://media.fb.com/2015/01/07/what-the-shift-to-video-means-for-creators/); Tim Peterson, “Facebook Users are Posting 75%
More Videos than Last Year,” AdAge (January 7, 2015) (available at http://adage.com/article/digital/facebook-users-posting-75-
videos-year/296482/).
64
Facebook, “Facebook Watch Is Going Global” (August 29, 2018) (available at
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/08/facebook-watch-global/).
65
Facebook, “Facebook Watch: What We’ve Built & What’s Ahead” (December 13, 2018) (available at
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/12/facebook-watch-what-weve-built-whats-ahead/.)
66
Interactive Advertising Bureau, Live Video Streaming – A Global Perspective (June 2018) at 21-22 (available at
https://www.iab.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/IAB-Live-Video-Streaming-Trends.pdf).
67
Phillip Ross, “Native Facebook Videos Get More Reach Than Any Other Type of Post,” Socialbakers (February 17, 2015)
(available at https://www.socialbakers.com/blog/2367-native-facebook-videos-get-more-reach-than-any-other-type-of-post).
68
Chris Hatfield, “Announcing New Tools for the Creator Community,” Facebook (November 16, 2017) (available at
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/11/announcing-new-tools-for-the-creator-community/); Fidji Simo and Sibyl Goldman,
“Testing New Tools and Experiences for Creators,” Facebook (March 19, 2018) (available at
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/03/testing-new-tools-and-experiences-for-creators/).
69
See e.g., ibid.

33
 FIGURE 18:
FACEBOOK CREATOR APP SCREENSHOTS

Source: Apple, “App Store Preview: Facebook Creator” (available at https://itunes.apple.com/app/id894913642).

Facebook has recently launched new tools to help creators engage and interact with fans, manage content
rights, connect with advertisers for branded content opportunities and receive monthly payments from
supportive fans in exchange for exclusive content and other perks. 70

Similarly, YouTube has launched “YouTube Spaces” in Berlin, Dubai, London, Los Angeles, Mumbai, New York,
Paris, Rio, Tokyo and Toronto, 71 which offer YouTube content creators “events, workshops, as well as the latest
production resources” to produce video content. YouTube Spaces offer classes, as well as access to editing
suites, production rooms, and soundstages. 72

Twitter is also working on a video sharing tool to make it easier for users to post video on the platform and
encourage users to share video clips of what is happening around them. 73

Many social media platforms offer users the opportunity to share in advertising revenues generated by their
content. A recent study found that 14.8 million Americans earned income totaling $5.9 billion in 2016 from

70
Ibid.; Fidji Simo and Sibyl Goldman, “Helping Creators Connect, Create and Grow,” Facebook (June 19, 2018) (available at
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/06/helping-creators-connect-create-and-grow/).
71
YouTube, “YouTube Space” (available at https://www.youtube.com/yt/space/).
72
See e.g., YouTube, “Access Program” (available at https://www.youtube.com/yt/space/rio/access.html).
73
Selina Wang, “Twitter Is Working on a Snapchat-Style Video Sharing Tool,” Bloomberg (January 25, 2018) (available at
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-25/twitter-is-said-to-work-on-snapchat-style-tool-for-video-sharing).

34
independent creations on online platforms, including Instagram, Twitch and YouTube. 74 According to this
same study, in the U.S. alone, more than 260,000 Instagram creators, 6,000 Twitch creators and one million
YouTube creators earned $500 or more, while 530 Instagram creators, 2,000 Twitch creators and 63,000
YouTube creators earned $10,000 or more.

As with traditional video, concerns that OVDs would favor Western- or U.S.-based UGC content are not
supported by the data. As shown in Table 1, for example, the most popular YouTube channel (measured by
total views) is Indian, and two of the ten most popular channels originate in Turkey (the 19th most populous
nation in the world) and Sweden (the 89th). 75 Only three of the top ten are based in the U.S.

TABLE 1:
TOP TEN YOUTUBE CHANNELS BY TOTAL VIDEO VIEWS
Rank Channel Total Video Views Country of Origin

1 T-Series 37,281,310,066 India

2 WWE 22,562,146,395 U.S.
3 Ryan ToysReview 21,576,801,276 U.S.
4 netd müzik 20,907,799,582 Turkey
5 PewDiePie 17,737,167,755 Sweden
6 SET India 17,676,532,503 India
7 JustinBieberVEVO 17,315,358,081 U.S.
8 LittleBabyBum 16,574,263,405 U.K.
9 Get Movies 16,131,749,585 Russia
10 Canal KondZilla 16,009,862,522 Brazil
Source: “All YouTube Channels,” Socialbakers (available at
https://www.socialbakers.com/statistics/youtube/channels/) (last visited May 11, 2018).

IV. OVDs and Local Content Obligations

Many governments have pursued national policies designed to promote domestic or “community-based”
programming on traditional video platforms. Such policies have taken a variety of forms, ranging from
licensing conditions requiring broadcasters to serve “the public interest” by covering community issues (as in

74
Robert Shapiro and Siddhartha Aneja, Unlocking the Gates: America’s New Creative Economy, Re:Create Coalition
(February 14, 2018) at 12, 84-85 (available at http://www.recreatecoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/ReCreate-Creative-
Economy-Study-Report.pdf).
75
United Nations, “World Population Prospects 2017” (available at https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DataQuery/).
35
the U.S.) to more prescriptive regulatory regimes mandating the carriage of specific types of domestically-
produced content or requiring content distributors to contribute to the funding of domestic content production.
At the time these regulations were implemented, governments were making decisions about how to allocate
scarce resources such as spectrum and access to rights of way, as well as regulating in an environment in
which platforms decided what content to push to users, rather than users deciding which content to pull into
their homes. The rise of OVDs has led policymakers to question whether such regulatory regimes should be
extended to some or all OVDs. This section presents an overview of local content regulation as it has applied
to traditional video platforms, reviews some of the current proposals to extend such regulation to OVDs, and
explains why we conclude that applying traditional content regulation to OVDs is neither necessary nor
desirable.

A. Local Content Obligations on Traditional Broadcasters

Local content regulation of video content distribution traditionally has focused on ensuring the availability of
programming produced in the native language, reflecting domestic cultural norms and traditions, and
promoting media freedom and pluralism. 76 To achieve these goals, governments have enacted a variety of
policies designed to support domestic content producers. The rights of governments to engage in such policies
are explicitly recognized in the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of
Cultural Expressions, 77 and in certain instances, cultural industries have been exempt from international trade
treaties, albeit to varying degrees. 78

While policies vary across countries, the main policy tools used to promote local content include domestic
content mandates on video distributors and various forms of subsidies. Content mandates typically require
content distributors (i.e., television broadcasters) to satisfy minimum quotas for carriage of domestically
produced content. These measures often include specific mandates on the nature of the content that must be
carried, as well as time-of-day requirements (e.g., requiring domestically produced content to be broadcast in
“prime time”).

Subsidies for domestic content production have taken the form of mandates on distributors to finance a
minimum number of locally produced original works (expressed either as a percentage of revenue or as a
given number of films or other measures) or taxes that are used to finance national productions. 79

Appendix A summarizes obligations in selected countries (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, France, India, Spain, and
U.S.). National content quotas are most frequently used, along with obligations to fund production of national

76
See e.g., European Commission, “Digital Single Market - Supporting Media and Digital Culture” (February 24, 2015)
(available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/policies/supporting-media-and-digital-culture).
77
UNESCO, Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (October 20, 2005)
(available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=31038&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html).
78
See “TTIP and the Cultural Exception,” European Parliamentary Research Service Blog (August 29, 2014) (available at
https://epthinktank.eu/2014/08/29/ttip-and-thecultural-exception/).
79
Governments have also set up public broadcasters with an explicit mandate to broadcast (and often to produce) national
and niche content. Public broadcasters are often funded by advertising, general taxation, and specific levies on TV viewers.
However, in some countries they are also funded by contributions from private broadcasters and telecommunications operators.
36
works. Contribution to national funds and to public broadcasters are also not uncommon. In our sample, only
countries with very strong film industries, such as the U.S. and India, refrain from imposing significant content
origination obligations on broadcasters.

B. Proposals to Regulate Online Video

The growth of online video has prompted authorities around the world to consider whether local content
obligations should be applied to OVDs. The debate over whether to do so is complex, and we do not attempt
to address every aspect here. Broadly speaking, however, proposals to extend such regulation to OVDs are
founded on concerns that the lack of such obligations provides them with a competitive advantage over
traditional platforms, or that the transition from traditional to online distribution platforms could reduce the
efficacy of existing regulatory regimes by depriving traditional platforms of audiences and revenues. 80

The debate over whether and how to extend content regulations to OVDs is extremely fluid, occurring in
dozens of countries around the world. In Appendix B we summarise the state of play in some major markets.
As the appendix shows, some jurisdictions, including Brazil, France and Spain, have already moved to extend
their local content regimes to online platforms, and active deliberations are ongoing in number of others,
including the EU and Canada. 81

The EU adopted the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD). 82 Although cultural policy is a competence
of Member States, the EU has an indirect mandate to contribute “to the flowering of the cultures of the
member states, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the
common cultural heritage to the fore.” 83 To advance this goal, the European Commission adopted the AVMSD
in 2010. The AVMSD specifically permits Member States to impose certain obligations on online video

80
See e.g., Alain Strowel and Wouter Vergote, Digital Platforms: To Regulate or Not to Regulate? (2016) (available at
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/document/2016-7/uclouvain_et_universit_saint_louis_14044.pdf).
81
The discussion of the potential extension of traditional media regulation to online video is not limited to their content
dimension. As an example, the city of Chicago extended its existing nine percent amusement tax to “electronically delivered
amusements” (including online video streaming). See PwC, City of Chicago – Amusement Tax Applies to Charges Paid for
Electronically Delivered Amusements (July 1, 2015) (available at https://www.pwc.com/us/en/state-local-tax/newsletters/salt-
insights/assets/pwc-chicago-amusement-tax-applies-electronically-delivered-amusements.pdf); PwC, “Chicago Amusement Tax
Applies to Electronically Delivered Amusements” (August 2015) (available at https://www.pwc.com/us/en/state-local-
tax/newsletters/salt-insights/chicago-amusement-tax-applies-electronically-delivered-amusements.html). The expressed rationale
for the new tax is to compensate for the loss of property taxes and other local taxes paid by video rental stores that went out of
business because of competition from online video. See Russell Brandom, “Chicago’s ‘Cloud Tax’ Makes Netflix and Other
Streaming Services More Expensive,” The Verge (July 1, 2015) (available at https://www.theverge.com/2015/7/1/8876817/chicago-
cloud-tax-online-streaming-sales-netflix-spotify).
82
European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 10 March 2010, on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in
Member States Concerning the Provision of Audiovisual Media Services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) (March 10, 2010)
(hereafter EU AVMSD 2010) (available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32010L0013&from=EN).
83
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union at Article 167 (available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN).

37
providers which are similar (though fewer in number) to those of broadcasters, in order to promote the
production and access to European works. Specifically:

Member States shall ensure that on-demand audiovisual media services provided by media service
providers under their jurisdiction promote, where practicable and by appropriate means, the
production of and access to European works. Such promotion could relate, inter alia, to the financial
contribution made by such services to the production and rights acquisition of European works or to
the share and/or prominence of European works in the catalogue of programmes offered by the on-
demand audiovisual media service. 84

Several EU countries, including France and Spain, took advantage of this provision to impose catalog quotas
and obligations to fund the production of national and European content on OVDs.

As the importance of online video continued to increase, the European Commission (EC) launched a proposal
to review the AVMSD in 2016, which it completed in 2018. 85 Key provisions include:

• VOD Services will be required to have in their catalog at least a 30 percent share of European works.

• Member states may also require VOD services to contribute financially to the production of European
works.

• Video-sharing platforms will not be subject to these requirements, but will be subject to requirements
that the platforms take appropriate measures to avoid harm to minors among other content
restrictions and comply with certain advertising restrictions.

Canada has also launched a series of consultations on the best way to adapt its regulation to the emergence
of online video. In its 2015 consultation, 86 the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications
Commission (CRTC) concluded that:

• Canadians throughout the country should have access to programming, including original Canadian
programming, on Canadian-operated online platforms.

84
EU AVMSD 2010 at Article 13.1 (emphasis added).
85
See European Commission, “Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD)” (available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-
single-market/en/policies/audiovisual-media-services). See also European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Directive
2018/1808 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the
coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the
provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) in view of changing market realities (November 14,
2018) (available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32018L1808).
86
Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, “Broadcasting Regulatory Policy CRTC 2015-86: The Way
Forward” (March 12, 2015) (available at https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2015/2015-86.htm); see also Canadian Radio-television
and Telecommunications Commission, “Consultation on the Future of Program Distribution in Canada” (hereafter CRTC
Consultation on Program Distribution) (available at https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/television/program/s15r.htm#2).
38
 • Policy focus should shift from a regulatory approach based on exhibition quotas to one based on
expenditures on Canadian programming.

• The broadcasting system should rely on market forces to the extent that the market can provide
programs and services that achieve the objectives of the Act. Only when the market fails to provide
such services or programming will the Commission intervene.

• Online video services should continue to be exempt from regulation provided they are accessible to
all Canadians through the Internet and not linked to a Pay-TV subscription.

In 2017, the Canadian government launched a review of its communication laws that seeks to “update and
modernize the legislative framework in a balanced way that takes into account the realities of Canadian
consumers and businesses, and our artists, artisans and broadcasters without increasing the cost of services
to Canadians.” 87 In response the CRTC announced new consultations to explore ways to further adapt its
regulatory framework to the growing importance of online video. 88 The CRTC’s report, issued in June 2018,
calls for extensive changes to Canada’s local content regime, and recommends including OVDs within the
Canadian broadcasting system. However, the report also recognizes that different OVDs contribute in different
ways, and proposes adopting a flexible approach involving negotiations with large platforms, rather than a
heavy handed, “one-size-fits-all” regulatory approach. 89 The Government also appointed an expert panel to
review Canada’s Broadcasting, Telecommunications and Radiocommunications Acts and recommend specific
legislative changes.

C. The Economics of Extending Local Content Regimes to OVDs

While proposals to extend local content regimes to OVDs are no doubt well intended, our analysis suggests
that such regulation would be both unnecessary and undesirable – unnecessary, because the advent of online
distribution has virtually eliminated the economic and social rationales for such policies, and undesirable

87
Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada and Canadian Heritage, “Government of Canada Launches Review
of Telecommunications and Broadcasting Acts” (June 5, 2018) (available at https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-
heritage/news/2018/06/government-of-canada-launches-review-of-telecommunications-and-broadcasting-acts.html); Government
of Canada, “Broadcasting and Telecommunications Legislative Review” (available at
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/110.nsf/eng/home).
88
Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, “Broadcasting Notice of Consultation CRTC 2017-359”
(October 12, 2017) (hereafter CRTC Notice of Consultation 2017) (available at https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2017/2017-359.htm);
see also Michael Geist, “No Panic: Canadian TV and Film Production Posts Biggest Year Ever Raising Doubts About the Need for
Site Blocking and Netflix Regulation” (February 6, 2018) (available at http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2018/02/no-panic-canadian-tv-
film-production-posts-biggest-year-ever-raising-doubts-need-site-blocking-netflix-regulation/).
89
Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, “Harnessing Change: The Future of Programming
Distribution in Canada” (May 31, 2018) (hereafter CRTC Harnessing Change 2018) (available at
https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/publications/s15/).

39
because such regulation would raise the costs and distort the incentives of OVDs and thus have the opposite
of the intended effect.

First, as discussed above, the advent of online distribution has solved the primary barriers to the production
of local, niche, and specialty content. By expanding the market geographically and solving the “matching
problem” of bringing content consumers together with producers, and advertisers together with both, OVDs
have reduced barriers to entry and made it possible for small, independent content creators of both user-
generated and professionally-produced videos reach larger audiences. No longer is consumer choice limited
by scarce spectrum or channel capacity, with consumers being forced to accept from a finite set of choices
pushed to them, but rather consumers now have the power to pull in content from vast catalogs from
seemingly endless sources. As detailed in Section III, the economic effects of this market expansion have been
to increase the production of video content of all types, including specifically the types of niche and specialty
content local content regulation regimes are intended to support. 90

Second, the effect of imposing content mandates or financial obligations on OVDs would be to increase costs
and distort incentives, potentially leading to the opposite of the intended effect. Consider, for example, the
effects of the EU’s proposed 30 percent quota of European works on the catalogs of online video providers. 91
The easiest way for online platforms to comply with such a quota would likely not be to increase the absolute
number of European films in their catalogs, but rather to remove niche content from cultural areas outside of
Europe. Figures 19 and 20 show the potential effect that imposing a 30 percent quota of European content
could have on two European online platforms that currently have diverse catalogs, iTunes (U.K.) and Wuaki.TV
(Italy).

As shown in Figure 19, iTunes U.K. catalog currently consists of approximately 23 percent U.K. and other
European content and 77 percent content produced outside of Europe, including content from the U.S. and
from other non-European nations. As the figure shows, one way of meeting a 30 percent European content
requirement would be to retain the vast majority of content from the U.S. while removing other non-European
content, thereby reducing the level of cultural diversity while having no effect at all on the availability of (or
demand for) European content.

90
There appears to be little debate about these benefits, even among those who support extending local content regulation
to OVDs. The CRTC’s June 2018 report, for example, unabashedly admits that “New online services have provided the tools and
opportunities for more Canadians to become creators than ever before. This has resulted in the development of a large pool of
Canadians who have developed the creative and technical talent and skills necessary to inform and entertain audiences large and
small, within local communities, across the country and around the globe.” Further, it continues, “New technologies and online
services create opportunities for content production by Canadian creators and producers. There is an increasing number of online
service providers, and each must invest in content to draw in viewers. Traditional services, particularly television services, must
also continually invest in content to compete with each other and their new competitors. There are great opportunities for new
and existing Canadian creators and producers to benefit from this demand.”). See CRTC Harnessing Change 2018.
91
European Parliament, Draft European Parliament Legislative Resolution on the Proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council Amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down by Law,
Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Provision of Audiovisiual Media Services in View of
Changing Market Realities (COM(2016)0287 – C8-0193/2016 – 2016/0151(COD)) (May 10, 2017) at 58 (available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A8-2017-0192+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN).
40
 FIGURE 19:
POTENTIAL IMPACT OF 30 PERCENT EUROPEAN CONTENT QUOTA
ON NUMBER OF FILMS IN ITUNES U.K. CATALOG (OCTOBER 2016)

Source: Fontaine and Grece 2016 at 31. Note: Figures only include films for which country of origin could be identified.

Figure 20 below shows the same calculations for Wuaki.TV Italy showing, again, that a 30 percent quota
requirement could easily be met by reducing non-European content while leaving the amount of European
content unchanged. 92

92
To be clear, we expect that OVDs would react to with a combination of reducing their non-EU catalogues and increasing
offerings of EU-originated content. Overall, however, consumer choice would be reduced due to the requirement to offer more
expensive and/or less desirable content.
41
 FIGURE 20:
POTENTIAL IMPACT OF 30 PERCENT EUROPEAN CONTENT QUOTA
ON NUMBER OF FILMS IN WUAKI.TV ITALY CATALOG (OCTOBER 2016)

Source: Fontaine and Grece 2016 at 55. Note: Figures only include films for which country of origin could be identified.

Obliging online platforms to devote a specified share of their revenue to fund local productions also overlooks
the fact that one of the success factors of online platforms is their ability to lower distribution costs and
increase the reach of video productions. International revenues and lower distribution costs allow online
platforms to pay niche producers for videos that would not be profitable for traditional broadcasters.

V. Conclusions
The advent of online video distribution has transformed the economics of the video marketplace, significantly
increasing the demand for video content of all kinds. This has fueled a massive growth in locally-produced,
culturally relevant content which local content regulation policies have aimed to support. The evidence
presented here shows that more video content is being produced in markets throughout the world, and that
the video content sector is growing in virtually every major market. Content producers in one market can find
audiences not just in their own market, but around the world, leading to a broad representation of countries
in the world’s most popular YouTube channels, and large growth in film production in countries like Canada
and India.

42
Extending local content regulation to OVDs would raise costs and distort incentives, ultimately reducing rather
than increasing the ability of local content producers to distribute their programs to consumers. OVDs are able
to connect viewers with the content of their choice, increasing audiences for independent content creators
and thereby preserving and showcasing local culture. By capturing economies of scale and scope, increasing
the ability of consumers to discover and obtain content of their choice, and allowing content producers to
reach larger numbers of interested viewers, economic welfare is increased.

The growth of online distribution has virtually eliminated the economic rationale for such policies. In the case
of OVDs, choice is not limited by access to a scarce public resource such as spectrum or rights of way, and
consumers are able to choose from a virtually unlimited library of content. Regulation of catalogs would only
serve to raise the costs and distort the incentives of OVDs and thus decrease availability of diverse content,
rather than encourage it.

43
Appendix A

Table A-1:
Local Content Obligations on Traditional Television Distributors
Monetary Contribution
Country Quotas Visibility
Contribution to a Contribution to Public
Direct Investment
Creation Fund Television

Argentina 60% Argentine content No regulation The licensees of open No regulation No regulation
• 30% original content television services must
with local information show eight films every year
• 30%, 15% or 10% local by independent national
independent content, producers whose antenna
depending on size of rights have been acquired
local population prior to the start of filming
All Pay-TV operators and free-to-
air operators covering less than
20% of population can meet the
screen quota by acquiring
antenna rights to films by
independent national producers
prior to filming
 Monetary Contribution
Country Quotas Visibility
Contribution to a Contribution to Public
Direct Investment
Creation Fund Television

Brazil Program Content Quotas: Pay-TV National No regulation No regulation Telecoms and private TV
channels must broadcast 3.5 programming must make fixed
hours of Brazilian prime time under quota payments, depending
programming per week must be on the type of service, to
• 50% produced by an delivered during fund public television
independent Brazilian prime time
producer
Channel Quotas: cable operators
must distribute at least 21 hours
per week of prime time Brazilian
Content/produced by an
independent Brazilian producer,
measured across packages of
channels distributed by the cable
operators
Canada 55% Canadian content No regulation No regulation Canadian No regulation
broadcasting
distributors are
required to
contribute 4.7% of
gross revenues to
support Canadian
content production

France 60% of films must be European General Pay-TV channels: No regulation Funding model for
works 15% of revenues to the public television
includes the collection

A-2
 Monetary Contribution
Country Quotas Visibility
Contribution to a Contribution to Public
Direct Investment
Creation Fund Television

40% must be original French- development of national of 3% of advertising

language works audiovisual works revenues from private
• Of which, 8.5% TV and 0.9% of
must be devoted to revenues from telecom
“œuvres operators
patrimoniales”
Cinema Pay-TV channels:
3.6% of revenue for “œuvres
patrimoniales.”
India Licensing of foreign channels: No regulation No regulation No regulation No regulation
government permission required
(around 100 international
channels now licensed, licenses
given for 10-year period)
• No local content quotas
• Content regulation not
restrictive – largely a
self-regulatory approach
• Based on a published
Program Code, with
separate codes adopted
by industry organizations

Spain 51% of annual broadcasting time No regulation 5% of revenues No regulation Funding model for the
for European works • 60% to feature films public broadcaster RTVE
includes the collection

A-3
 Monetary Contribution
Country Quotas Visibility
Contribution to a Contribution to Public
Direct Investment
Creation Fund Television

• 50% of which in any of • 40% to TV films, of 3% of gross income

Spain’s official languages series or mini-series from national
• 10% of which for works 60% must be produced in commercial
by independent one of Spain’s official broadcasters, 1.5%
producers languages, 50% of which from Pay-TV operators
o half of that 10% allocated to independent and 0.9% from telecoms
must have been production
produced in the
last five years
Broadcasting time to be
considered does not include time
dedicated to news, sports events,
games, advertising, teletext and
teleshopping services
U.S. No local content quotas No regulation No regulation No regulation No regulation
Pay-TV services perform self-
regulation based on individual
channel standards and guidelines

A-4
Table A-1 Sources: Argentina: Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos, Ley 26.522 (October 10, 2009) at Article 65, 67 (hereafter Argentina Ley 26.522 2009) (available at
http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/155000-159999/158649/norma.htm). Brazil: Presidência da República do Brasil, Lei nº 12,485 (September 12, 2011) at Article
16 (available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2011/lei/L12485.htm). Canada: Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, Broadcasting
Regulatory Policy CRTC 2011-288: Amendment to the Television Broadcasting Regulations, 1987 – Broadcast of Canadian Programs (May 3, 2011) (available at
https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2011/2011-288.htm); Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, Broadcasting Distribution Regulations SOR/97-555 (February
23, 2018) at Section 34 (available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/PDF/SOR-97-555.pdf); Nick Summers, “Canada Strengthens Net Neutrality with Zero-Rating Crackdown,” Engadget
(April 21, 2017) (available at https://www.engadget.com/2017/04/21/canada-zero-rating-quebecor-videotron/); Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission,
“TV and Radio Advertising Basics” (March 21, 2014) (available at https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/television/publicit/publicit.htm); Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications
Commission, “Access to Programs on TV That Are Not Canadian” (March 10, 2015) (available at http://crtc.gc.ca/eng/info_sht/b311.htm); Canadian Radio-television and
Telecommunications Commission, “Guide to the CRTC Canadian Program Certification Application Process” (September 5, 2017) (available at
https://crtc.gc.ca/canrec/eng/guide1.htm); Michael Rimock, “Regulatory Issues Considering New Media Alternatives to Television,” Canadian Journal of Law and Technology 11;2
(2013) 335-342; Sean Craig, “Content Quotas and Ownership Restrictions for Canadian Broadcasters,” Financial Post (May 25, 2016) (available at
http://business.financialpost.com/technology/content-quotas-and-ownership-restrictions-are-outdated-should-be-abolished-by-crtc-report). France: Conseil d’Etat, Décret n° 2010-
747 du 2 juillet 2010, Taux de la Contribution au Développement de la Production d’Oeuvres Audiovisuelles (August 2011) (available at http://www.csa.fr/Media/Files/Television/Le-
suivi-des-programmes/Taux-de-la-contribution-au-developpement-de-la-production-d-oeuvres-audiovisuelles-Decret-n-2010-747-du-2-juillet-2010-hertzien); Conseil d’Etat, Décret
nº 2010-1379 du 12 novembre 2010 Relatif aux Services de Médias Audiovisuels à la Demande (November 12, 2010) at Article 12 (available at
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/decret/2010/11/12/MCCE1019142D/jo). India: Cable and Satellite Broadcasting Association of Asia (CASBAA), Same Same But Different? Video
Policies for Asian Pay-TV and OTT (2016) at 30-33 (hereafter CASBAA 2016) (available at http://www.casbaa.com/publication/same-same-but-different-video-policies-for-asian-pay-
tv-and-ott/). Spain: Jefatura del Estado, Ley 7/2010 General de la Comunicación Audiovisual (March 31, 2010) at Article 5 (hereafter Spain Ley 7/2010 2010) (available at
https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-2010-5292); Francisco Javier Cabrera Blazquez, Maja Cappello, Christian Grece and Sophie Valais, VOD, Platforms and OTT: Which
Promotion Obligations for European Works, European Audivisual Observatory (2016) at 53-54 (available at https://rm.coe.int/1680783489); Jefatura del Estado, Ley 8/2009 de
Financiación de la Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española (August 28, 2009) at Article 5, 6 and 9 (available at https://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-2009-13988);
U.S.: U.S. television broadcasters are required to provide coverage of issues of local significance and make information about such coverage available for public inspection. See 47
C.F.R. § 73.3526; see also CASBAA 2016 at 95.

A-5
Appendix B

TABLE B-1:
Local Content Obligations on OVDs
Financing Content Production

Country Quotas Visibility Contribution

Contribution to a Creation
Direct Investment to Public
Fund
Television

Argentina No regulation No regulation No regulation No regulation No regulation

Brazil No regulation No regulation No regulation VOD providers must pay No regulation

“Contribution for the
Development of the National
Cinema Industry”
(CONDECINE). Rates depend
on the runtime, type and
origin of the titles in the
catalog:
• Less than 15
minutes: BRL 729
• 15-50 minutes: BRL
1,701
• More than 50
minutes: BRL 7,291
• Series: BRL 1,822
Canada Under discussion No regulation No regulation Under discussion No regulation
 Financing Content Production

Country Quotas Visibility Contribution

Contribution to a Creation
Direct Investment to Public
Fund
Television

60% European VOD’s homepage must Catch-up TV: identical 2% of revenues to the No regulation
works display a substantial contribution to that of the National Center for Cinema
proportion of European operation of the television and Motion Picture (10% for
40% original French- and French-language service from which the catch-up pornographic and violence
language works works, not only service originated inciting works)
mentioning the title of TVOD: 15% of net annual
the works, but also revenues for European works, of
France highlights of trailers and which at least 12% for original
visual elements French-language works
SVOD: 15-26% of revenue for
European works and 12-22% of
revenue for French-language
works, depending on the length
of time between theatrical
release and VOD release
No regulations No regulation No regulation No regulation No regulation
specifically applying
to OTT; Several local
OTT operators
India
voluntarily adhere to
the cable television
content and
advertising codes

Spain 30% European works No regulation 5% of revenues No regulation No regulation

• 60% to feature films

B-2
 Financing Content Production

Country Quotas Visibility Contribution

Contribution to a Creation
Direct Investment to Public
Fund
Television

50% of which in one • 40% to TV films, series

of Spain’s official or mini-series
languages • 60% must be produced
in one of Spain’s official
languages, 50% of
which allocated to
independent production
U.S. No regulation No regulation No regulation No regulation No regulation

Table B-1 Sources: Argentina: Argentina Ley 26.522 2009 at Article 65, 67. Brazil: Ministério da Fazenda, Portaria Interministerial nº 835 Atualiza Monetariamente a Contribuição
para o Desenvolvimento da Indústria Cinematográfica Nacional (CONDECINE) (October 13, 2015) at Article 33, Subsection I (available at http://www.fazenda.gov.br/acesso-a-
informacao/institucional/legislacao/portarias-interministeriais/2015/arquivos/portaria-interministerial-no-835-de-13-de-outubro-de-2015-1.pdf). Canada: CRTC Harnessing Change
2018; CRTC Notice of Consultation 2017; CRTC Consultation on Program Distribution. France: Conseil d’Etat, Décret nº 2010-1379 du 12 novembre 2010 Relatif aux Services de
Médias Audiovisuels à la Demande (November 12, 2010) at Article 4, 5, 12 (available at https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/decret/2010/11/12/MCCE1019142D/jo). India: CASBAA
2016 at 30-33. Spain: Spain Ley 7/2010 2010 at Article 5. U.S.: CASBAA 2016 at 93-95.

B-3