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INSTRUCTOR TRAINING DIVISION
GENRAL INSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT
THE ARMORED SCHOOL
Fort Kncoc, Kentucky

-ADVANCED OFFICERS CLASS #1 DATE 3.May 191

MILITARY MONOGRAPH

TITLE: C~p'rations of the 106th Cavalry Group in the

Forast of Parroy.

Prepared by: DAN P. B OGS

MAJOR-s ICAV. mmomo~om

 By the la te summer months of 1944, the Th ird U. S. Army offen-

sive had carried wefl across France stretching supply lines almost

to the breaking point. The Seventh Army had driven north from their
beaches in Southern France and ground to a halt because of a critical.
shortage of the supplies necessary to continue the offensive. Both
Armies had been directed to assume a defensive attitude and to await

supplies and reinforcements before resuming the offensive. At the

same time, it was decided by higher headquarters to strengthen the
Sixth Army Group since it had only three corps and an extended front,

and lacked both artillery and ammunition to adequately support sus,-

tained attacks by both the American Seventh and the First French
Armies at the same time. As a result of this decision the XI! Corps
was assigned to the Seventh Army on 29 September, 1944. The Corps
combat elements at this time consisted ,of the,79th Infantry Division,

the Second French Armored Division, and the 106th Cavalry Group.

At the time the XV Corps was transferred to Seventh Army its

mission was to protect the south flank of Third Army and to continue

the advance in its zone, to clear the eastern approaches to the

Vosges Mountains, and to secure ground favorable to launch an attack

that would lead to the capture of STRABURG and a clearing of the

approaches to the Rhine River. After the transfer, this mission

remained unchanged pending the- issuance of a new operation order.
Partafl
beaus of he eneal tablizaionon he hol

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 larly gasoline and artillery ammunition, the decision was made to
clear the Forest of Parroy. Under more favorable conditions, the
forest would-have been bypassed because the terrain greatly favored

the defender. In the First World War the position in the forest was
never reduced. The attitude of-the Germans who were captured here
ithis war was that they intended to repeat that performance.

The Forest of Parroy is located about 21 miles east of the

north-south line joining LUNZVIIJLE and EINVILLE. It is about 7k1
miles from east to west and about 51 miles from north to south.
It is characterized Wy dense woods and very thick underbrush, cat
occasionafly by very poorly maintained logging trails, fire breaks,
and small clearings. Many of the field f ortif ications of the First
World War remain in the forest and the Germans put them to good use

in this war as well as in the last.

"On a cloudy afternoon it is a dark, forbidding

place, a good home for the lost souls of all wars. .,.
We have our memories of Parroy, indelible ones wvhich cannot
be felt 'without-being experienced: Foxholes half filled
with water, enemy minefields .s~o laid that even Germans didn't
dare pick them up, incessant shelling that gave no respite,
the rain, the cold and all the misery of hopelessness for
the present. 1
On 28 September at 1045, 187 B-26 bombers flew over the forest..
but because of the bad weather conditions, only 37 dropped their bombs,

on the target. In spite of the failre of the bombers to carry out

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their mission, the attack by the 79th Infantry Division jumped off

at 1400 hours and by dark had penetrated about 1 kilometer into the

forest. The 106th Cavalry Group', meanwhile,, had been given the MiLs-

sion to advance in zone and protect the left flank of the corps and

maintain contact with the elements of the Third Army on the north.
On 28 September both squadrons,. the la1st Squadron north of the

MARNE AU RUIN canal and the 106th Squadron south of the canal, ad-

vanced to BAUZEMONT and the high ground overlooking BONNEVAI FAR

respectively:" Each squadron had a company of the 813 Tank Destroyer

Battalion attached. Next day, 29 September, the 106th Squadron

advanced to -the high ground southwest of HENAMENIL. During the after-s

noon, an enemy colum of tanks and trucks was observed moving west on

the north side of the MARNE AU RUIN canal. The tank destroyers opened

fire,'knocked out the first and last vehicles, then proceeded to work

on the rest of the column. When the smoke cleared away, the Germans

had lost thirteen Mark IV tanks, two Mark V tanks, four self-propelled
guns and two half tracks.

On 2 October, the 121st Squadron moved to the south of the canal

and took up positions in the vicinity of HEMAMENIL. Meanwhile, the

106th Squadron sent dismounted patrols into the northwest edge of the

forest to maintain contact with elements of the 79th Infantry Division.

Some smallarias and mortar.'fite was encountered and the enemy was con-
t~indorer
i o prtec th let flnk f 7th ivison.Thenex

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CPl? m A /ot, Cas- Pac" 2r

HOPMC StiCrTY ,ol L:

sector of the forest. The main position of the enemy in this area

was found in a road center and clearing in the northwest portion of

the forest. This position was to be known as the "Circle" in the

attack of the next day.

In the reconnaissance of the position, the 106th Squadron found

three approaches to the position; one from the -south, one from the

southwest, and the other form the northwest. The plan of attack was

to have Troops A and C attack from the south and southwest respectively,

with Troop B attacking- from the northwest and enrveloping theenm

right flank., Each Troop was reenforced with a platoon of light tanks.
Troops A and C jumped off on the attack and were immediately pinned

down by small arms and mortar fire. The attack of Troop B,, timd

a little later than that of the other two troops, took the enemy by

complete surprise and the battle of the "Circle" was ended. Total

casualties for the enemy included 10 killed, bl captured. Casualties

for the 106th Squadron included 4 lightly wounded. It is interesting

to note that among the prisoners taken was the first sergeant of the

3rd.Company of the 2113 Panzer Grenadier Regiment and according to a

roster of the company that the sergeant had in hid' possession when

captured, the Squadron had accounted for every man in the company.
Following the action at the "Circle"l, patrols were sent oat to

maintain contact with the withdrawing enemy and to feel out the next

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mi-nes made progress through the forest very slowv and tedious. During

nearly all phases of this operation the weather was cloudy or rai'ny

which made the forest a quagmire and hampered the movement of all

vehicles. At times, tanks and Jeeps were the only vehicles that could

move.
On 8 October, reconnaissance patrols found the second main posi-

tion of the Germans in the f orest, at a 'IV"l shaped notch on the north

edge of the forest. For the attack, this position was given the name

of the "Horn." The plan called for the 121st Squadron to attack south-

east along the south bank of the ETANG DE BASSJPIE with two troops,

each'reinforced with a platoon of tanks. Two troops, similarly re-

inforced, of the .106th Squadron were to attack north guiding on the

road TRANCHE DE MILIEU. The attack Jumped off according to plan and
the 121st Squadron ran into many anti-tank and anti-personnel mi*Lnes.

Pressing on., they were finally pinned down at the edge of the clearing

by small arms and mortar fire. The troops of the 106th Squadron were.

couitted and pressed the attack across the clearing, supported by

-the fires of the la1st Squadron and the combined fires of the Assault
Gun Troops of both Squadrons. The attack was successful and the

position was consolidated by 1800. The 'Germans lost 23 prisoners and

an undetermined number of killed and wounded. The Group had 18 men

wounded, one of whom died of wounds a few days later, and two tanks

becase f very
tthedeneowoods. Thevrees, close a they were an

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wet from the incessant rains, completely absorbed all radio trans-m
missions from both the 508 radios i*n the tanks and the 536 radios

carried by the dismounted personnel.

Foflowing the attack on the "Horn" it was decided by the Group

commander to employ one squadron in the forest and hold the other in

reserve in order to rest, reorganize, and perform some much-needed

maintenance on the vehlicles. The Squadrons were rotated weekly and,

aside from the problems encountered in effecting the relief of the

squadrons, there is not much to be learned tactically from this phase

of the operation. Logistically, however, the problems were complex.

The Army of "General Mad" was our greatest enemy. In support of each

Squadron, when it was in the forest, was one combat engineer company.
This company was continually kept busy putting corduroy on the roads.
One road especially, which ultimately was known as ",U. S. Highway
Number 1"1, was particularly bad.o Trees from one and one half inch

in diameter to three inches diameter were used as corduroy on this

road and each night it would sink completely out of siLght. The only
vehicles which could get all the way to the front line troops were

the light tanks and horse-drawn wagons which were requisitioned from

the French farmers. Inasmuch as every time a tank was moved, artila-
lery was placed on our positions, horse-drawn wagons were used for
resuply
i thefrontlineposiions

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holes before the tank would move in or out of position. In this.
manner, casualties from the artillery fires resulting from the move-

ment of tanks could be reduced.

During the entire operation in the forest, the Assault Gun

Troops of the squadrons we're employed as a troop firing indirect fire

missions. During the relief of squadrons, a liaispn airplane attached

to the group-from Corps Artilery, was used to fire the initial regis-

tration of the troops. On other days, weather permitting, the liaison

plane was up observing and adjusting artillery fires on all movement

of enemy troops.
One lesson was learned the hard way during this phase, that is-man

during a slow moving situation in a heavily Mined area, absolute con-

trol must be exercised over the civilians. At this time, the weather
was cold and damp, fuel for the French homes was in short supply,

and the forest was a very tempting source of fire wood. One French-
mfan, yielding to the temptation, stepped on a mine and was wounded.
A rescue party was sent to recover the wounded man, and despite care,

one man in the rescue party stepped on a mine--2 men were kild and
three men were wounded. Following this episode, the Group commander
issued proclamations in all towns forbidding French people to enter

the forest and established patrols to enforce-the provisions of the

proclamations.

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on 10 November. At about the same tune, h 4h naty0iiin

which had replaced the 79th Division, reached the edge of the forest.

in their sector. XV Corps commander ordered an attack on 11 November

to break out of the forest., In suppdrt of the Corps and firing

preparations, all during the night of-10-fl November, iwere 114 bat-

talions of Corps Artillery, 2 Battalions of Tank Destroyers, and the

combioned artillery of the 79th and 44th Infantry Divisions. Prepara-

tion fires started at about 2100 on 10 November and lasted without

interruption until 0600 hours, lX November. The morning of 11

November, the 106th Squadron occupied VAUCOURr, and attacked two troops,

each with a platoon of light tanks attached, abreast to clear the

BOIS DYE TILLOT And BOIS DE LA CHARB0NNII3RE.

In the attack on the-BOIS DYE TILLOT., the platoon of tanks and

one reconnaissance platoon moved around the north edge of the woods,

then down the road through the center of the woods. This force quickly

overran about 20 Germans in the cemetery, another 10 Germans in the

western tip-of the woods and completely enveloped a road block in the
center of the woods. The remainder of the troop attacked up the road

through the center of the woods pinning down the defenders of the

road block.

Meanwhile, to the south, B Troop pressed forward on the BOBS DE

LA CHAIRBONNIFJRE.' Initially, the. only enemy reaction to this attack

Only light covering forces were encountered in the DOIS DE LA CHAR-

DONNIERS and these were very quickly overrun.

Following these two actions, the Group assembled and moved to

the south on a new mission and the battle in the FOREST OF PARROY

was ended.

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 Spl s /E'*Ll 1

We r L4"i- e 77
 BIBIOOCRAPHY

After Action Report, XV Corps, Sept.., Oct., Nov*, 1944.

After Action Report, 106th Cavalry Group,*Sept.,, Oct., Nov., 19L44.

Seventh Army, Report of Operations, 1944-1945, Vol. IL.

The 106th Cavalry Group in Europe, 1944*-1945.
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