Rafael Peralta Medal of Honor Recommendation Files

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Binder A

Original
Medal of Honor
recommendation
for
Sergeant
Rafael Peralta, USMC
1. OP AV 150/3 ..... ............... .... .. ............... ..... ...... ........ .. ........ TAB

2. Proposed Citation .. ..................... .... .. . . . .... .................... ........ .... .TABB

3. Executive ununary ............ ......................... . .. ......... . .. ....... ... ... TAB

4. Witness tatements ..................... ............................. ............ .. .... T B D

5. Interview with om bat ameraman ......................... .................. .. .. TAB E

6. Preliminary utopsy Report ............ ......... .... .. . .. .. .. ....... ....... .... ... ..... TAB F

7. EOD Opinion of Grenade . ....... ... .......... .. ....................................... TAB G

8. GMO tatement............................................................ ....... .... TAB H

9. Grenade ... .... .... . ....... ................. .... ... . .... .. .................. . .. .... ..... TAB I
. ,,,,

TABA
PERSONAL AWARD RECOMMENDATION
ENSUR E ALL BLOCKS ARE FILLED IN , SIGN ED AND DATED .

FROM TO: (Awarding A u thority/ ADD RESS: UIC/RUC:


ADDRESS: COMMA DI G OFFICER BATI ALIO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
I ANDING TEAM 1/3
·r 440 10
I AP 96607-4010
14. EXP. OF ACTIVE DUTY
,v1AND POC: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) PHONE (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) IF RETIREMENT/SEPARATION, NUMBER OF YEARS
1 . SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 2. DESIG/N EC/MOS 15. EST. DETACHMENT DATE
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 0311
3. NAME (Last, first, Ml)
PERALTA, RAFAEL, (NMI) D RETIREMEN T D TRANSFER D TERM INAL LEAVE

4. COMPONENT (USN, USMC, etc.I 16. NEW DUTY STATION (Home address if separa tion anticipated)
USMC
ADDRESS:

5. GRADE/RATE 17. UNIT AT TIME OF ACTION/SERVICE 118. DUTY ASSIGNMENT


SGT/E-5 COMPANY A BATTALION LANDING TEAM 1/3 PLATOON GUIDE
6. WARFARE DE SIGNATOR , 7 . UIC/RUC: 19 . PREVIOUS PERSONAL DECORATIONS AND PER IOD
13ll0 RECOGN IZED (exclude Purple Heart and Combat Action Ribbon)
8. RECOMM ENDED AWARD 9 . SPECIFIC ACHIEVEMENT
(See instruction #3 on back)
NOE
MH
0 YES D NO
10.
D HEROIC
D MERI•
TORIOUS
0 HEROIC
POSTHUMOUS
D MERITORIOUS
POSTHUMOUS D MIA

1 1 . NUMBER OF AWARD OF RECOMMENDED MEDAL 20. PERSONAL AWARDS RECOMMENDED -N OT YET APPROVED

1 NONE
12. ACTION DA T E/MERITORIOUS PERIOD 2 1. OTHER PERSONNEL BEING RECO M MENDED FOR SAME ACTION
NONE
200411 15
13. GEOGRAPHIC AREA OF ACTION/S ERVICE

FALLUJAH AL ANBAR PROVINCE IRAQ


D 0
'f
l certify that the facts comained in rh e summary of action are
.:, GRADE, TITLE OF ORIGINATOR SIG NA TUR
known to me
- a matter of record
DATE
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) , COMMA DING OFFICER (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
20050102
~
23. FORWARDING EN DORSEM ENTS BY VIA ADDRESSEE (S). (A ttach additional sheets only as necessary)
COMMAND RECO MM ENDED COMBAT DATE
VIA SIGNATURE, GRADE
(To be completed by originator) AWARD " V" FWD
COMMANDING OFFICER
REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM 7 D YES
oo
1
Mt+ NO
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
DDDDDU lo [Ul$]-iJ..il...DDD
-, jpLL()<
COMMANDING GENERAL

~i~
1ST MARINE DIVISION D YES
2
MH ~ NO ll"M-OH
COMMANDING GENERAL
D Y ES
3
I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

AN.~ C.0l\\M~ ~ 6-t<T


24 . TO BE COMPLETED BY AWARDING AUTHORITY
f'(\ \-.\ ~ NO
V--fk~
/
I 2SEfci -
~

DISPOSITION OF BASIC
RECOMMENDA TION
COMBAT
"V"
EXTRAORDINARY
HEROISM
RE COMMENDED
I/ SIG NATUR E, GRADE, TITLE
DATE
APPROVED

DISPOSITION OF BASIC
RECOMMENDATION D YES

D NO D YES D NO
FOR USE OF NDBDM ONLY
FROM : SECNAV (NDBD M ) DATE :
CNO (N09833) CMG (CODE MHM)

'( .
aordinary heroism recommended
__ ,riewed and recorded.
§] Y ES §] NO §] NA

By direction

OPNAV 1650 /3 (Rev. 1-94) .,S/N 01 07-LF-01 7-5800 Designed Using FormFlow 2. 1, HOMC/ARAE, Apr 98
TABB
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, D. C . 20350 - 1000

4 October 2006

MEMORANDUM f?OR SECRET ARY OF DEFE SE

SUBJECT: Recommendation for the Medal of Honor

The Commandant of the Marine Corps recommends, and I concur, that you endor e
the recommendation for tbe Medal of Honor (posthumously) to Sergean t Rafael Peralta,
USMC, for bis gallantry and intrepidity at the ri sk of life above and beyond the call of
duty during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
concurs with the recommendation for award of the Medal of Honor.

The Medal of Honor citation and certificate for Sergeant Rafael Peralta are
attached. The file supporting the recommendation is also attached for your review, if
desired.

Donald C. Winter

Attachments:
As stated

OSD 15779-06

Ill!llllllllillllllllllllllllfIfIUI
1

10/512006 3"59:40 PM
Pages 7 through 10 redacted for the following reasons:
----------------------------
(b)(5)
(b)(5) Draft
AWARD
RECOMMENDATION
IN CASE OF

SERGEANT
RAFAEL PERALTA

BATTALION LANDl·N G
TEAM 1/3
Name: Rafael (NMI) Peralta
Rate or rank at time of action: _S_e_r~g~e_a_n_t~/_E_-_5_ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __
Organization: 1st Platoon , Company A, Battalion Landing Team 1/3,
Regimental Combat Team 7 , 1st Marine Division
Next of Kin: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Person who assisted: N/A
--'---------------------------
Conditions Under Which Act Performed

Location: Hey Al Askari District , Al Fallujah , Al Anbar Province ,


Iraq , UTM 38S MGRS LB 889 918
Date: 15 November 2004
Te rrain: Urban Residential
Weather: Sunny , Clear Skies , 70 degrees

Enemy condition: Insurgent groups occupying vacant buildings


throughout the city operating primarily in 4- 8 man cells . Insurgent
tactics varied from actively seeking out and ~ngaging coalition forces
to remaininq dormant inside buildings until coalition forces entered
the building . When contact was £creed by coalition forces , insurgents
generally fought from fortified positions inside houses , using
automatic weapons and grenades and attempted to flee after inflicting
casualties on the first coalition forces to enter the building .
Insurgents were supplied via weapons and food caches pre-positioned
throughout the city.

Friendly condition: Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 1/3 attacked in zone


during the initial assault on Fallujah from 8 thru 10 November . Upon
reaching its limit of advance , BLT 1/3 established company sectors and
conducted search and attack operations throughout its tactical area of
responsibility (TAOR) . Operating independently , each company of BLT
1/3 came into contact with insurgent forces on a daily basis to include
the day of 15 November 2004 . BLT 1/3 also began psychological
operations on 11 November 2004 to encourage insurgents to surrender ;
these operations were conducted in conjunction wi th humanitarian aid
operations at the Mujahareen and Al Haydra Mosques .

Narrative Description of Gallant Conduct

Sergeant Rafael (NMI) Peralta is enthusiastically recommended for


the Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the
risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as
Platoon Guide , 1st Platoon , Company A, Battalion Landing Team 1/3 ,
Regimental Combat Team 7(-) (Reinforced) , 1st Marine Division(-)
(Reinforced) in action against Anti- Coalition Forces in the City of
Fallujah , Iraq , 15 November 2004 , during Operation Phantom Fury/Al
Fajr.

At approximately 0830 , Sergeant Peralta was conducting search and


attack operations with 2d Squad , 1st Platoon . The squad was clearing
their seventh house of the day . Sergeant Peralta was augmenting 2d
Squad because they were short personnel due to recently sustained
casualties . Sergeant Peralta was positioned in the center of the squad
between the first and second fire teams as they prepared to enter the
house .
Th e squad met no resistance during their initial entry into the
house and cleared the front rooms without incident. The door to the
back rooms of the house was closed . The squad staged for entry into
the back rooms with Sergeant Peralta positioned behind the point man .
As the point man pushed open the door , the squad immediately came under
a heavy volume of close-range automatic weapons fire f rom multiple
insurgents located in the back rooms . The squad instantaneously
returned fire , wounding one of the insurgents . As the squ.ad sought
cover , Sergeant Peralta was shot in the head as he attempted to
maneuver out of the line of fire . Sergeant Peralta fell to the ground ,
still attempting to speak , though his wo~ds were unintelligible .

A£ter the initial exchange of gunfire , the insurgents broke


contact , throwing a fragmentation grenade towards the Marines as the
insurgents fled the building . The grenade bounced off the side of a
couch and came to rest approximately one foot away from Sergeant
Peralta ' s head. The grenade lay between Sergeant Peralta and other
members of the squad . Though wounded , Sergeant Peralta , without
hesita t ion , reached out and scooped the grenade under him and used his
body to bear the brunt of the explosion , shielding other Marines of the
squad who were o n ly feet away . The grenade exploded underneath
Sergeant Peralta with his body absorbing most of the blast . Other
members of the squad nearby received only minor shrapnel wounds from
the explosion .

Sergeant Peralta was immediately medevaced via amphibious assault


vehicle but succumbed to his wounds and was pronounced dead at 0915 ,
15 November 2004 while en route to Bravo Surgical Company .

Sergeant Peralta ' s gallant leadership , bravery and unwavering


dedication to duty and to his fellow Marines distinguish his conduct as
above and beyond the call of duty . Sergeant Peralta ' s willingness to
make the ultimate sacrifice to preserve the lives of his comrades
reflected great credit upon him and was in keeping with the highest
traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.
For his actions , h e is worthy of being decorated with the Medal of
Honor .
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
1ST MARIN8 DIVISION (REIN)
UIC 40120
FPO AP 96426-0120

IN REPLY REFER TO:


1650
G- 1
3 Mar 05

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ltr 1650 SJA/ of 1 Jan 05

From : Commanding General , 1st Marine Division (Rein}


To : Secretary Of The Navy C
Via: (1) Commanding General , I Marine Expeditionary Force
(2) Commander , Marine Forces , U. S . Central Command
(3) Commander , U. S . Central Command
(4) Commandant of the Marine Corps

Subj : RECOMMENDATION FOR THE CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL OF HONOR


(POSTHUMOUSLY) FOR . SERGEANT RAFAEL PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) /0311 USMC

Encl : (24) Composite Drawing Collection of Incident Series


(25) Transposed Statement of
(26) Transposed Statement of
(27) Transposed Statement of
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(28) Transposed Statement of
(29) Transposed Statement of
(3 0) Transposed Statement of
(31) Transposed Witness Interview Form of
(32) Transposed Witness Interview Form of
(33) Transposed Witness Interview Form of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(3~) Transposed Witness Interview Form of
(35) Transposed Witness Interview Form of
(36) Transposed Statement of
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(37) Transposed Statement of

1 . It is with great honor and reverent respect that I enthusiastically


forward the recommendation for Sergeant Rafael Peralta to be
posthumously awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor . Sergeant Peralta
heroically gave his life on 15 November 2004 to save his fellow Marines
during combat operations in Al Fallujah, Iraq .

2 . While the basic application provides an extremely detailed account


of the incident , the following is offered as an executive summary :

a . Having completed the initial assault through the city of Al


Fallujah , Iraq, Battalion Landing Team 1/3 , Regimental Combat
Team 7 , 1st Marine Division , i Marine Expeditionary Force during
Operat i on PHANTOM FURY (later renamed Operation AL FAJR) , was
conducting detailed clearing operations on 15 November 2004 .
b . The incident occu rr ed at approximately 0830L as the Marines
cleared their seventh house of the day .
Subj : RECOMMENDATION FOR THE CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL OF HONOR
(POSTHUMOUS LY) FOR SERGEANT RAFAEL PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) /03 11 USMC

c . Sergeant Peralta , the platoon . sergeant f or 1 st Pl atoon , Alpha


Company , was leading a composite squad of ei ght Marines on the
date o f the i ncident .
d . The squad included (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) in the first stack (or
"fire team) and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Sergeant Peral ta , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) in the s econd stack .
e . Enclosure (24 ) provides a series of PowerPoint diagrams to
i llustrate the actions as· they to ok place on the mor ning of the
incident . The first image is a cover sl ide .
f . The se cond diagram , "Contact House Composite Floor Pl an , " is a
drawing of the house where the incident took place . Each room is
named , and each doorway is numbered.
g . The third diagram , "Stack Outside House ," shows how th~ two teams
lined up as t hey p repared to m~ke entry .
h . The fourth diagram , "Gaining Entry," shows (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) a s they e ntered the foyer beyond the first d oorway .
Finding Doorway 2 locked , they entered Doorway 3 .
i. The fifth diagram , "Cl earing Living Room , " shows (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) in the Living Room with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) in the foyer and preparing to enter the
Living Room .
j. Th e sixth dia g ram , "Clearing Big Room , " shows (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)in the Big Room after moving thro ugh Doorway 4 a nd shows
~he rest of t he squad in , or preparing to e nter, the Living Room .
k . The seventh diagram , " Moving into Living Room ," shows(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) in the Bi g Ro om with the rest of the squad
d ispersed around the Living Room .
1 . The eighth diagram, " Engagement Begins , " shows (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) opening doorway five . Two insurgents a ppear, one e ach
in the Bedroom and Kit chen Area . The insurgents immediate ly
opened f ir e on the Marines upon the open ing o f t he d oo r.
m. The ninth di agram , "The Fire Fight," show~ the Marines returning
f i re again st the insurgents . Sergeant Peralta wa s directly in ·
the line of fire from t he insurgents . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
was be t ween Sergeant Peralta and the i nsurgents, slight l y to
Sergeant Peralta ' s left sid e .
n . The tenth diagram, "Sgt Peralta Hit," shows Sergeant Peralta and
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) being s hot . After shooting one
ins urgent, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) turned to move out of the line
of fire and saw Sergeant Peralta as he fell after being shot .
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) then moved past Sergeant Peralta and i nto
the Big Room. ·
o . The e l eventh diagram , " Ins urgents Cease Firing , " shows the
l ocati o n of the Marines as the shooting stops . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) are in the Big Room, Sergeant Peralta is on
t he deck wi th hi s head in the Big Room a nd feet i n the Living
Room . · The other four Marines are disper sed around the Living
Room . One insurgent is beg i nning to flee through the Kitchen
Area while the other is still in t he Bedroom .

2
Subj : RECOMMENDATION FOR THE CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL OF HONOR
(POSTHUMOUSLY) FOR SERGEANT RAFAEL PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) /0311 USMC

p. The twe lf th diagram , "I nsurgents Flee ,u shows the insurgents


beginning to move through the Kitchen Area toward a back door ,
Doorway 11. One insurgent throws a grenade through Doorway 5 and
Doorway 6 . The grenade lands near Sergeant Peralta ' s head as he
remained on the deck in the edge of the Big Room .
q . The thirteenth diagram , "Grenade , u shows the insurgents departing
Doorway 11 . The Marines who saw the grenade thrown announce this
to everyone in the room , and . they all begin trying to escape .
Sergeant Peralta is seen actively reaching out , grabbing the
grenade , and scooping it under his body . He is heard to make a
guttural groan as he rolls over on top of the grenade . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) cannot get out the locked Doorway 2 ,
so they attempt to take cover in the corner . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) all attempt to
exit Doorway 3 . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) cannot escape and takes
cover in the corner of the Living Room.
r. The fourteenth (final) diagram , "Explosion/Re trograde ,u shows the
actions as the grenade exp l odes . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) all received small amounts of
shrapnel from t h e explosion . The other four Marines are unhurt .
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) then has all of the remaining Marines regroup
before t hey attempt to reenter, clear the house , and recover
Sergeant Peralta's body .

3. I believe Sergeant Peralta made a conscious , heroic decision to


cover the grenade and minimize t he effects he knew it wou ld have on the
rest of his Marine team . As he lay injured , rather than using his
strength in an attempt to save himself , he knowingly and selflessly
opted to give his lif e for his fellow Marines . No one wou ld have ever
thought l ess of him if he would have c h osen to save himself . Sergeant
Peralta's actions clearly rise above and beyond the call of duty and
deserve to be recognized by award of our Nation's highest coIT~at award,
the Congressional Medal of Honor.

4. Enclosures (1) through (6) , (9) , (11) through (iS) , and Attachment A
to · (16) to the original letter are handwritten statements from the
witnesses td Sergeant Peralta ' s actions . Many of these testimonials are
difficu l t to read. I , therefore , have had my staff transpose each a
into typed form to ease review by higher headquarters . Each copy is an
exact r epl ication of the origi na l statement - to include spelling .and
grammatica l errors . The transposed versions are provided as enclosures
(25) through (37) .

5. The point of contact at this Headquarters until 17 March 2005 is


(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) G-1 (Forward) , at DSN (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) or email at
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) . After 17 March , the point of contact will
be (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) G-1 (Rear) , at (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) or email at
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

R . F . NATONSKI

3
Sergeant Peralta
Award Recommendation

Actions of 2d Squad, 1st Platoon, Company A,


Battalion Landing Team 1/3 at Contact House
15 November 2004

Contact House Composite


Floor Plan
D11
'THE DARK ROOM'
BEDROOM

'THE KITCHEN AAEA'

D10

THE BIG•ROOM LMNG ROOM


KITCHEN
04

D9

1
Stack Outside House
@

@ ' THE DARK ROOM"


D11
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) BEDROOM
@ 'THE KITCHEN /!>REA'
0
® Sgt Peralta

@
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
e Insurgent
LIVING ROOM
KITCHEN

Sgt Peralta,
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)were
stacked away from the
lead fire team initially D1 @@ @ ® D9

0®®®

Gaining Entry
@

@ "THE DARKROOM' ·
p11 .
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) BEciRGOlvl

@ 'THE KITCHEN AREA'


0
® Sgt Peralta

@ 0 ·1 0
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
@
e Insurgent
THE BIG ROOM
D4
LMNGROOM
KrfCHEN ,

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
move into
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Entrance Room
-Find 02 locked
-Move to 0 3

2
Clearing Living Room
©
@ "THE DARK ROOM'
0 11
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) BEDROOM

® "THE KITCHEN />REA'


0
0 Sgt Peralta

@ D10
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
@
i-t\E BIG ROOM
8 Insurgent
D4
@ NG ROOM KfTCHEN

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) move


into Living Room
-Remainder of 1st stack enters
building
-2nd stack moves into position
01 00·00 D9

Clearing Big RoorJl


©
@ D11
'Tf:{_E DARK ROOM"
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
©
0 'THE KITCHEN AREA'

® Sgt Peralta

@
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) D10
@
0 Insurgent ··-. THEBIG :ROQ.M LM['JG ROOM
KfTCHEN
enters and clears
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
D4
T he Big Room through D4

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)moves to cover
D5 & D6 . ©
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) D9
move to stack next to D5
-Remaining personnel move
into Entrance Room and start
moving into Living Room

3
Moving into Living Room
0
@ D11
'THE DARK ROOM'
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
_BEDROOM
©
'THE KITCHEN AREA'
0)
® Sgt Peralta

@
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
@
e Insurgent
KrrCHEN
remains in The Big
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Room
-Sgt Peralta moves behind
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) i;:,{ .
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 0.1
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stack
to the right of D5

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
move into Living
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Room

Engagement Begins
0
@
'THE DARK ROOM'
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
@
0
0 Sgt Peralta

@
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) D10
@
e Insurgent
KrrCHEN
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)opens D5
-Insurgents immediately open
fire from Bedroom and The
Kitchen Area

4
The Fire Fight
@

@
"THE OARK ROOM' DH
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
BEDROOM
®
0 'THE KITCHEN AREA'

0 Sgt Peralta

@
D10·
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
·e Insurgent
KITCHEN

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(firing over
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
shoulder)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
return fi re D9

Sgt Peralta Hit


@

·@ 011
. 'THE DARK ROOM'
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
BE;QR00 ~1
© D$

0 'THE KITCHEN AREA~

0 Sgt Peralta

@
010
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
e Insurgent · THE BIG ROOM
KITCHEN
-Sgt Peralta is shot, rotates _):J4>
counter-clockwise and falls onto
his stomach in the middle of D4 @f
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)rotates clockwise
and moves out of the line of fire @.
through D4 Into the Big Room 09
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)is shot in forearm
-Other Marines continue to engage

5
Insurgents Cease Firing -
@

@ 011
@(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 'THE DARK ROOM"
BEQROOM
©
0 0 ·THE KITCHEN AREA'
® Sgt Peralta

@
0 10
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
e Insurgent
KITCHEN

-Insurgents cease firing


moves to assist
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Sgt Peralta
09

Insurgents Flee
@

@ 01 1
@(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 'THE DARK ROOM"
BEDROOM
©
0
0 Sgt Peralta
••
@
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) D10
@
e Insurgent
KITCHEN
/§ Grenade

-Insurgents flee @
- As they move through The
Kitchen Area, they toss a @
grenade through D5 and D6 , D9
landing near Sgt Peralta on his
front right side

6
"Grenade"

-"Grenade" is shouted
BEDROOM
"THE DARK ROOM'

'THE KrfCHEN AREA'o


r G
-Sgt Peralta sees and scoops
grenade from his right side to'
under the left side of his body D10
sees the grenade and
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
runs out of the room
LMNG ROOM
rotates and drops to KITCHEN
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
the floor seeking cover

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) run


out of room
have no
®
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
place to run; seek cover in The Big D9
Room ®
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)seeks cover in
back of Living Room

Explosion / Retrograd e
@

@ D11
"THE.DARK ROOM'
@(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
BEDROOM
@
0 'THE KITCHEN AREA'

0 Sgt Peralta

@
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) D10
@
G Insurgent
KITCHEN

-Grenade explodes under left


side of Sgt Peralta

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
receive shrapnel
wounds
D9

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
orders everyone out ®
to regroup before they finish
clearing the house

7
TABC
1
/
(
2 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

3
4
Investigation Officer for
5 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines

7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

8 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

10 ) DECLARATION OF (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO: ) IN SUPPORT OF
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
11 ) MEDAL OF HONOR (POSTHUMOUS)
REVIEW OF INSURGE T ) RECOMMENDATION IN THE CASE
12 E GAGEMENT ON 15 OVEMBER 2004 ) OF SERGEANT RAFAEL PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
fNVOLVING SERGEANT RAFAEL ) 0311 USMC
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
13 PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 0311 USMC )
) Date: June 20, 2005
14 ) Time: 4:00 p.m.
) Location: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USA
15 )
)
16 )
)
17 1--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - )
18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27
(
28 ENCLOSURE (1 )
DECLARAT IO O (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I PPORT OF MEDAL O F HO OR (PO THUMO )
RECOM 1E DATION I THE CASE OF SERGEANT RAFAEL PERALTA(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
0311 U MC
DECLARATION OF (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

2 I, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) declare:

3
4 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

6 I (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) make this declaration in support of

7 MEDAL OF HO OR (POSTHUMOUS) RECOMMENDATIO IN THE CASE OF

8 SERGEA T RAFAEL PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 031 1 USMC. I was the Investigating Officer for

9 the Review of Insurgent Engagement on 15 November 2004 Involving Sergeant Rafael Peralta
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

1o 0311
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC dated January 1, 2005 and have been involved with the investigation of this

11 matter since its inception and was part of the investigatory team in the original inquiry.

12 2. I have first hand knowledge of the facts and events stated herein and know them to

13 be true, except for those matters stated on information and belief and as to those matters I here so

14 state I believe them to be true. If called upon as a witness and placed under oath I could testify to

15 the following.

16 3. On January 1, 2005, I completed my investigation into the 15 ovember 2004

17 Insurgent Engagement in Fallujah, Iraq which resulted in the untimely death of Sergeant Rafael

18 Peralta, USMC.

19 4. My recommendation was then and remains now that "Sergeant Rafael Peralta,

20 United States Marine Corps, receive the Medal of Honor." [Recommendation 1 to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

21 Inv dtd 1 Jan 05 (hereinafter referred to as the "Investigation")].

22 5. I submitted the Investigation to the authority who appointed me, the Commanding

23 Officer of what at that time was Battalion Landing Team 1/3, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

24 USMC.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

25 6. I am informed and believe tha (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) forwarded the Investigation, favorably

26 endorsed, through BLT l /3's operational chain of command. I am also informed that each

27 subsequent higher headquarters also favorably endorsed the Investigation.

ENCLOSIIE ( 1 )
2
DECLA~ T ION OF (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) IN SUPPORT OF MEDAL OF HO OR (POSTHUMOUS)
RECOMMENDATIO IN TH E CASE OF SERGEANT RAFAEL PERAL TA(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
0311 USMC
1 7. I am informed and believe that in the course of his review for endorsement, the

2 Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force has determined further investigation is

3 warranted to expound upon some findings, recommendations and opinions and deconflict oth.ers.

4 8. I am informed that the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology has reviewed the

5 autopsy report on Sergeant Peralta and come to a contrary conclusion to that of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

6 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USN, Bn Surgeon, 1/3.

7 9. I am informed and believe that since that time, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) M.D., MC

8 US , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) aval Medical Hospital San Diego, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) MD, MC

9 US , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) aval Medical Hospital San Diego and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

10 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)M.D., MC US aval Medical Hospital San Diego and former Department Head of

11 Internal Medicine and eurology at NAMI have also reviewed the autopsy report on Sergeant

12 Peralta and concur with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) opinion. I have reviewed the written opinions of these three

13 Neurologists, true and con-ect copies of which are attached to the Supporting Documentation

14 con-espondence o (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and incorporated by this reference as though fully set forth herein.
(
15 10. I am informed that a question has arisen as to inconsistencies in witness testimony.

16 11. I am informed that a question has arisen as to on which side the grenade exploded

17 in relation to Sergeant Peralta.

18 12. I am informed that a question has arisen as to why Sergeant Peralta's palm has exit

19 wounds.

20 13. In response to the foregoing questions, I provide the following undisputed facts.

21 I. FACTS IN SEQUE CE OF EVE TS

22 A. Undisputed Facts Part 1

23 14. Although it was not part of his duties as platoon guide, Sgt Peralta took it upon

24 himself to assist an undersized rifle squad in clearing houses of insurgents over the course of two

25 days. [Encls 1-6,9-11, 13-17tolnvestigation]

26 15. At the last house he cleared on the day of his death, he was one of the first six

27 Marines to enter (the actual sequence is in-elevant. What is relevant is every witness has him

28 entering the house). [En cls 1-6. 9-11. 13- 17 to Ill\ e tigat ion]
ENCL0-(1)
3
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
1 16. Once inside the house, Sgt Peralta was in close proximity to the door to the next

2 room being cleared (the actual distance is irrelevant. What is relevant is every witness places him

3 in the room where the subsequent firefight broke out). [Encls 1-6, 9-11 , 13-17 to Investigation]

4 17. A firefight broke out. [Encls 1-6, 9-11 , 13-17 to Investigation]

5 18. Sergeant Peralta went down during the firefight. [Encls 1-6, 9-11, 13-1 7 to

6 Investigation]
7 19. Sergeant Peralta came to rest on his stomach. [Encls 1-6, 9- 11 , 13-17 to

8 Investigation]

9 20. Sergeant Peralta received a penetrating wound to the back of his head. [Encl 19 to

10 Investigation]

11 21. Sergeant Peralta's feet fell oriented towards and partially in the room with the

12 firefight, with the bulk of his body pointed towards and laying in the room where the grenade

13 entered, ultimately came to rest and subsequently exploded. [Encls 1-6, 9-11, 13-17 to

14 Investigation]

15 B. Deduced Fact o. 1: Time from Peralta's fall to grenade explosion.

16 22. There is only slight variance among the witnesses. The longest any witness places

17 the time is 15 seconds from Sergeant Peralta's fall to the grenade explosion. Every witness who

18 was present when the grenade exploded states the grenade seemed to take a long time or "forever"

19 to go off, as much as 10 seconds from first sighting to explosion. [Encls 1,3 , 5, 9, 10, 16, 17 to

20 Investigation]

21 23. From my experience as (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) judge advocate interviewing witnesses,

22 time is a difficult thing to measure from recollection. A common technique (which I employed on

23 this occasion with each of the witnesses) is to first ask, " How many seconds?", then breakout a

24 stopwatch - start it - and count off the stated time - then ask - " Still think that was it? Was it

25 more? Was it less?" This method gives a more reliable baseline.

26 25 . After doing the foregoing, the times testified to were 15 seconds MAX from fall to

27 exp losion and 10 seconds MAX from sighting of grenade to explosion. Therefore: I deduce that

28
ENCLOSIIE ( 1)
4
DECLARATION OF (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I SUPPORT OF MEDAL OF HONOR (POSTHUMOUS)
RECOMMENDATIO l THE CASE OF SERGEANT RAFAEL PERALTA(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
03ll USMC
1 the time from when Sergeant Peralta fell to when the grenade exploded was at most - 15

2 seconds.

3 26. I understand that our regulations on this type of award require " certainty" and that

4 we must have "no doubt." I respectfully opine to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology

5 ("AFIP") that it is possible for a person to doubt anything. The question is: is the doubt in

6 question a reasonable doubt based on the evidence? As this standard of proof is the same as used

7 in criminal cases under all State and Federal law [see, e.g. , California Eviden ce Code and Military

8 Rules of Evidence] , where we are deliberating deprivation of a person' s liberty - and somet1mes -

9 his or her life, I am infom1ed and believe there is no higher standard of proof and have applied this

1o standard herein. Based on all the evidence, I cannot reasonably doubt the sworn time frame and

11 therefore state with certainty th e time from fall to explosion was at most 15 seconds .

12 C. Undisputed Facts Part 2

13 27. The grenade came from the insurgents. [Encls 1-3, 5, 9, 10, 13 , 16, 17 to

14 Investigation]
(
15 28. The insurgents were in the room the rifle squad was in the process of clearing when

16 the firefight broke out. [Encls 1-3, 5, 9-11 , 13, 16, 17 to Investigation]

17 29. There was an open doorway adjacent to the doorway leading to the insurgent's

18 room. [Encls 1-3, 5, 9-11, 13, 14, 16, 17 to Investigation]

19 30. The grenade came from the insurgent' s room, through the adjacent doorway and

20 into the room where Sergeant Peralta lay on his stomach, head first. [Ends 2, 3, 5, 9, 10, 13, 16, 17

21 to Investigation]

22 31. The grenade was smaller than the standard U.S . fragmentation grenade, oblong,

23 orange or yellowish-orange in color with a long fuse. [Encls 2, 3, 5, 9, 10, 13, 16, 17, 20, 22(D),

24 22(E) to Investigation]

25 D. Deduced Fact No. 2: The Grenade W as An " Iraqi Grenade, Model Unknown" .

26 32. I had an EOD Gunnery Sergeant, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USM C,

27 examine Sergeant Peralta's flak, and read the witness descriptions of the gren ade. Based on these

:28 exam inatio ns. he ga , e u statement stating with cc1iainty that the grenac~NCmstJIE'\(il1at
5
DECLARATIO ' OF (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I SUPPORT OF MEDAL OF HO OR (POSTH UMOUS)
RECOMMENDATION IN T HE CASE OF SERGEANT RAFAEL PERALTA(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
0311 USMC
1 EOD calls, "Iraqi Grenade, Model unknown. " I am informed and believe based on my interview

2 with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) this model grenade is the only grenade Iraq ever manufactured. BLT 1/3

3 uncovered this exact model grenade all over its battle space (and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

4 USMC of combat camera has video footage of one being found on the BLT 1/3 video CD he made

5 for the unit and which I have personally viewed).

6 33. Having viewed the actual grenade model personally, I concur with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

7 description as related to me during his interview. This model grenade is a small, plastic grenade

8 with approximately 37 grams of explosives containing a metal spring coil similar to a thi n "slinky"

9 inside (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) added that, by comparison, the standard U.S. Fragmentation Grenade has

1o approximately 85 grams of expl osive]. The plastic exterior is not unlike a silly putty' container

11 and is Orange. Upon extended exposure to sun and the elements, the orange plastic fades to

12 "yellowish-orange." I have personally viewed newer and older versions of this model and the

· 13 newer ones (as well as the unexposed interiors of older ones) are Orange while the exterior of older

14 or long-exposed ones is Yell ow or Yellowish-Orange.

15 34. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated to me this grenade can accommodate any standard soviet fuse

16 and normally takes 10-15 seconds to explode once initiated. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) also stated this model

17 is "very low yield" and "it is not uncommon for those exposed to its force to live because the

18 intended effect of its shrapnel is to 'shred',' or words to that effect. I personally observed(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

19 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)remove bits of shrapnel from Sergeant Peralta's flak and compare them to an actual Iraqi

20 grenade he had brought with him (photos are in the investigation at Encl 22(D)). The shrapnel

21 matched. ·

22 35. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) then looked at the blast pattern on the flak. He stated that based on

23 this blast pattern, the grenade went off " directly under " Sergeant Peralta on the Lower left .flank.

24 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated it is tare for this type of grenade "to penetrate our flak jackets, even under

25 these conditions because it simply has too low a yield," or words to that effect. Those witnesses in

26 a position to hear or observe the blast all confirm that 'the blast was not as loud as I expected," or

27 "it wasn' t as loud as I thought it would be" or '·it made a ki nd of ' pop " - - or words to that effect.

28
ENCi.OS• ( 1)
6
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) l
RECOMMENDATIO I THE CA E OF ERGEANT RAFAEL PERALTA(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
03 11 U MC
1 These statements are consistent with the type of explosion made by the Iraqi Grenade, Model

2 unknown.

3 36. In other words, while plenty lethal, the grenade' s effects can be defeated by

4 cove1ing it with anti-penetration m aterial - uch as Sergeant Peralta's fl ak jacket. Therefore, I

5 have no reasonable doubt and so state with certainty that the grenade in question was in fact an

6 Iraqi Grenade, Model unknown.

7 E. Undisputed Facts Part 3

8 37. The grenade entered the room where Sergeant Peralta lay FROM HIS RIGHT.

9 [Encls 2, 3, 5, 9, 10, 13, 16, 17 to Investigation] I consider the point of origin a critical fact. If you

1o are supine on your stomach and a grenade is thrown from your right, how does it come to rest

11 UNDER your LEFT side? More on this point below.

12 38. The grenade came to rest within arm's reach of Sergeant Peralta. Most witnesses

13 have it corning to a stop at ri ght shoulder level or a bit above his head - still on the right. I believe

14 one witness stated it stopped above head height but on the left. My first observation is every

15 witness places the grenade shoulder height or above, within arm ' s reach. o one says the grenade

16 stopped UNDER Sergeant Peralta. So we are certain the grenade was not under his body, but

17 within arm's reach when it came to rest of its own accord.

18 39 . Certainty that the grenade was not under Sergeant Peralta' s body, but within arm's

19 reach when it can1e to rest of its own accord is critical. The only way a grenade which comes to

20 rest outside your body but within arm's reach can create a blast pattern UNDER your lower left

21 flank [as attested to by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) is if something or SOMEO E moves it. There is no

22 evidence that any THING moved the gren ade. There is eyewitness testimony that Sergeant Peralta

23 moved the grenade (More on this later) .

24 40. Given the foregoing, it 1s not necessary to resolve the conflict between the

25 testimony as to whether the grenade came to rest shoulder level or above on either the right (as

26 most say) or the left (as one says). By way of analogy, if the issue is whether or not I was wea1ing

27 a shirt or not it does not matter if one witness says I w as wearing a red shirt and the other says I

28 \\'8S weari ng a blac k shirt - I \>-,"A S \\·earing a shirt. Conti nuing the analogy fo r those \\·ho do

7
ENCLOSIIE ( 1)
DECLARATION OF (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) UPPORT OF MEDAL OF HONOR (POSTHUMOU )
RECOMME DATIO I THE CASE OF ERGE T RAFAEL PERALTA(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
0311 U MC
1 desire to resolve such a conflict in testimony, if these witnesses observed me and my shirt during

2 the hours of darkness, a red shirt can appear " dark" or' black in low or no light.

3 41. Similarly, the one witness who places the grenade [I believe it was (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

4 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to the upper left of Sergeant Peralta was situated to the left of Sergeant Peralta's supine

5 form in a corner of the room in a low kneel or squatting position. This position will impair depth

6 perception and spatial relationship between two objects viewed laying next to one another on the

7 ground at a distance. The grenade may APPEAR to be left of its actual position.

8 42. Among the witnesses placing the grenade to the right of Sergeant Peralta, ome are

9 perpendicular to him facing his feet. This view, even if made by someone in a crouched position

1o will still provide a better spatial position of two objects laying next to one another on the floor.

11 Therefore, I conclude the grenade came to rest on the upper 1ight side of Sergeant Peralta. This

J2 opinion is consistent with both logic and my personal experience with interviewing eye witnesses

13 on their recollections of events such as speed and distance.

14 43 . At this juncture in the chronology of events, the actual side on which the grenade

15 came to rest is OT what is critical. The fact that it came to rest outside his body within arm's

16 reach is the critical fact.

17 n. THE LOCATION OF THE GRENADE UPON EXPLOSION

18 A. "Certainty' versus ' Deduction. '

19 44. What I consider "certain" another may consider "deduction." Based on(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

20 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)forensic analysis of the type of grenade, the blast fragments recovered from the flak and

21 the blast pattern on Sergeant Peralta's flak, I am certain the grenade exploded UNDER Sergeant

22 Peralta's lower left flank.

23 45. There is plenty of testimony stating this was this platoon s (and Sergeant Peralta's)

24 first hostile contact inside a house. [The statements of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

25 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) provide excellent examples] I am absolutely ce11ain that Sergeant Peralta 's flak is

26 singed and tom. [Encl 22(D) to Investigation] It was clearly exposed to some type of blast. The

27 grenade explosion is the O LY blast to which either Sergeant Peralta or his flak was exposed prior

28 to hi s death (according to a ll the e,·idence). Bits of shra pnel from an Iraqi grenade. \/lode!

8
~NCLOSURE ( .t)
DECLARATIO OF (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) MOU)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
1 unknown, were recovered from Sergeant Peralta's flak by EOD. Fmihermore, one of the pieces of
(_-
2 _shrapnel recovered from Sergeant Peralta's flak jacket by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) in my presence, and

3 included in Enclosure 22(D) is the actuai fuse of the grenade. The fuse could not have lodged

4 where it was recovered unless the grenade exploded directly under Sergeant Peralta. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
was most emphatic about this point and I concurred in his conclusion.
5 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

6 46. I am certain the singeing and tearing evident on Sergeant Peralta's flak came from

7 the explosion of the Iraqi grenade, Model unknown in the room with him that day based on both

8 my Jay observation and the statements made to me directly by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Some may call this

9 fact "deduction. ' I call it " the certainty of cause and effect. '

10 47 . Looking at the flak (many pictures in the investigation) and reviewing with(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

11 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)I have no reasonable doubt and therefore state with certainty that the Iraqi grenade, Model

12 unknown which was thrown by insurgents into the room where Sergeant Peralta lay and came to

13 rest of its own accord outside his body but within arm's reach EXPLODED UNDER HIS BODY'S

14 LOWER LEFT FLANK. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) forensic blast analysis AND the autopsy report both

15 support an explosion of this type at this location.

16 B. Sergeant Peralta Placed The Grenade Under Himself.

17 48. As a (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I can fully appreciate the value of

18 medical opinions as to what a wounded person was or was not capable of doing under a given set

19 of circumstances. I am also somewhat familiar with the legal evidentiary standard in this area.

20 Since a medical expert can rarely if ever, render an opinion to a "mathematical certainty," the law

21 requires the opinion be given to a medical certainty. ' "Medical certainty'' is a synonym for

22 " probability."

23 49. In the case at hand, we have four physicians of excellent pedigree who state to a

24 medical certainty that Sergeant Peralta was medically capable of placing the grenade under

25 himself. We also have a physician of excellent pedigree who disagrees. While the weight of such

26 testimony is heavily in our favor, I view this mental exercise akin to Stonehenge.

27

28
ENCLOSURE ( 1)
9
DECLARATIO OF (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I UPPORT OF MEDAL OF HO OR (PO THUMO
RECOMMENDAT!O I THE CA EOF ERGE TRAFAELPERALT (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
0311 USMC
1 50. There are experts of excellent pedigree who say the Druids built it. There are other

2 experts of just as excellent pedigree who say no one had the technology to make it. Yet there

3 Stonehenge stands, as I myself have seen it in the shire north of South Hampton, England.

4 51. Similarly, the grenade that once was outside Sergeant Peralta' body exploded

5 UNDER Sergeant Peralta's body. Stonehenge stands and the grenade was moved. We have a

6 distinct advantage over Stonehenge which is aptly pointed out by Major General atonski, USMC.

7 Unlike Stonehenge, we have witnesse .

8 52. While there can be no doubt that the grenade was moved, all the witnesses who

9 were in a position to observe so w1animously state IT WA SERGEANT PERALTA WHO

10 MOVED THE GRENADE. ewton s first law of motion tells us " every action has a reaction. "

11 Ocam 's Razor tells us "the simplest explanation is usually the explanation.' Therefore, I have no

12 reasonable doubt and state with certainty that Sergeant Peralta moved the grenade under his left

13 flank.

14 C. Why Marines To The Left Of Sergeant Peralta Received Shrapnel.

15 53. I personally walked the ground of this firefight and took the photographs of the spot

16 of the explosion and the shrapnel pattern. I reviewed and discussed the photographs with(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

17 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
and the BLT 1/3 Executive Officer, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC. The two Marines huddled

18 down in the comer off to the left side of Sergeant Peralta's supine person received shrapnel

19 because when Sergeant Peralta moved the grenade from outside his body to under his LEFT flank,

20 his body did not completely cover the blast. Anyone to his left remained exposed to shrapnel.

21 D. Why Sergeant Peralta's Palm Has 'Exit Wounds From Shrapnel.

22 54. We have no testimony on the orientation of the hand itself. My summary

23 recollection is the witnesses say Sergeant Peralta extended his am1 (the arm as a whole) in a

24 "scooping" fashion, lasso-ing the grenade if you will, and bringing it into his body. It is difficult to

25 do that with your palm up.

26 55 . If a person is supine on his stomach as ergeant Peralta was, the only way his palm

27 faces up without contortion or discomfort is if his ann is along the side of his body pointed

28
ENCLOS•(1)
10
DECLARL\TION OF (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) IN MOU)
RECOMME DATIO I THE CA E OF ERGE T RAFAEL PERALTA(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
/0311 USMC
1 towards his feet. o witness testified to that orientation. Quite the contrary. As a person so

2 situated brings his arm up while laying on his stomach, the palm just about has to FACE DOWN.

3 56. ow follow through with the whole arm "scoop" and bring that under your stomach

4 stopping about the left kidney and, if your palm is on the deck, a grenade exploding in proximity to

5 the hand would leave shrapnel no point of entry other than the side of the hand and the back of the

6 hand - exiting - if exiting at all - through the palm.

7 57. I think the reviewers have a mental picture of Sergeant Peralta using the hand itself

8 to grab the grenade. o one says that. He used his ann, mostly the inner forearm if I recall

9 (maybe the crook of the arm or perhaps the crook between the wrist and thumb) to "scoop" it into

1o and under him. Anyone trying to re-enact this movement would find his palm facing the deck

11 once the arm reaches about shoulder height (which is as low as any of the witnesses put the

12 location of the grenade - some have it head height or above head height).

13 58. I am informed and believe that 113 has retained possession of Sergeant Peralta's

14 flak jacket, but that the pieces of shrapnel we recovered therefrom may have been lost or destroyed

15 through inadvertence or mistake. Again, I myself took the photos contained in the investigation, to

16 include the photographs of the flak and all slu·apnel recovered from it in iny presence.

17 50. I am informed that further forensic tests may be conducted on the flak jacket to

18 confirm or deny the conclusions reached by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and concurred and amplified herein by

19 myself. I welcome such testing as I am confident it will confirm the conclusions stated in the

20 investigation and this declaration.

21 60. If I may be of any further assistance in this investigation, I am available at the

22 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

23 61. I thank (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the AFIP and all those involved in this solemn process for

24 their attention to detail and this opportunity to address the supplementary material acquired

25 thereby.

26 Ill

27 Ill

28
ENCLOSURE ( 1)
l1
DECLAR TIO OF (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I PPORT OF MEDAL OF HO OR (PO TH UMO U )
RECOMME DATIO I THE CASE OF SERGE T RAFAEL PERALTA(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
0311 U MC
1 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California and the Uniform

2 Code of Military Justice that the foregoing is true and correct.


,

Executed this 17th day of June, 2005 at (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)


3

4
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
5

6
7

10

11

12

13

14
(
15

16

17

18

19

20
21

22

23
24

25

26
27
28
ENCLOSURE ( 1)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) MOU)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
TABD
Statement of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC

0900 041115 1st Plt , A Co , 1/3 , 2~ Squad


Contact in Grid LB 889918 Block 407 city of Fallujah . I
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) , on the date listed above , was attempting to
clear a building at the above grid . Once my point man
entered the building the lead fireteam cleared the first
room on the left side . Myself , along with the second
fireteam breached a door tq the direct front and both fire
teams imediatley began taking fire. The Marines inside the
building returned fire into the two rooms we were taking
contact from . Sgt Peral~a was hit , and dove into the .
adjacent room on the left , with two members of first fire
team. The enemy thru a grenade , that landed next to Sgt
Peralta , who was lying on the deck , he reached over , and
p u lled the grenade into himself . The grenade detonated ,
injuring (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) with
shrapnel . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) moved in from behind me and was
also wounded in the forearm by possible small arms fire .
I made the call to pull back , we retrograded across the
street , rendered aid to our wounded , and then called Gator
(AAV ' s) to supress the house , once the building was
suppressed , my remaining squad moved back in to finish
clearing the building . We found an assortment of RPG ' s ,
AK- 47 ' s and ot h er explosives . The building was on fire the
second time we went in so we did not collect the
explosives , before pulling back .

/Isl/
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Enclosure (25)
Statement of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC

1300 041115
1st Plt . 2~ Sqd . made entry on a house , it was breached by
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (front door) . He was followed by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
& the rest of the squad & combat camera . Shots fired by
enemy fir~t , then returned by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
those 2 Marines went into the room on the left & (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
also l eft l eavi ng me exposed . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) shot 3 rounds &
got cover to the wall on my right side . Where I saw Sgt
Peralta took fire , & feel down . Went -for aid & then saw a
frag , tried to pull Sgt Peralta but was to heavy , so I ran
out . 2nct time in the building nobody in house that I can
see , but Sgt Peral ta was dead .

/Isl/
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

En c l os ure (2 6 )
Statement of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC

0900 041115
1st Plt . 2nct Squad entered a house at LB 889918 on block#
407 in fallujah . We breeched the doorway , cleared the room
on the left and began to push forward to clear the rest of
the house . We began taking fire . I saw a number of muzzle
flashes and a Marine , uninjured , fell back onto me to
escape the rounds . We immediately got up and I returned
fire with five shots . A grenade was thrown , by the enemy ,
into the adjacent room . Sgt Perralta , who had been hit by
small arms fire , hugged the grenade and saved the lives of
the Marines in the room with him . Those Marines ' lives
were saved by his actions . · If Sgt Perralta haden ' t stepped
up into my place in the squad before we cleared that house ,
it would have been me getting dragged out of that house .

/Isl/

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Enclosure (27)
Statement o f (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC

0900 041 11 5
1st Plt , 2nd Squad entered a house at LB 88991~ on block
.#407 in Fallujah . After the front entryway was breached ,
we immediate l y took f ire from an unknown number of
insurgents who were wait i ng for us there . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) , was in the back of the squad by the front
door . I set up security by the front of the house while
the squad started to pull back . After Sgt Peralto pulled
the li ve grenade into his body, The Squad pulled back to
take care of our wounded . We regrouped and went back into
the house to recover Sgt Peralto ' s body and clear the house
w/ the AAV ' s support . · Sgt Peralto saved a lot of lives by
taking as much of the blast from the grenade as he could .

/Isl/
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Enclosure (28)
Statement of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC

0900 041115 1st Plt Alpha Co. 1/3 2nd Squad


Contact in grid LB 889918 block 407 of Fallujah . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was behind the point (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) breached the
doorway and immediatly cleared the first room . After
clearing the first room, the enemy opened up with small
arms fire . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and myself saw Sgt Peralta fall down
in front of us . We immediatly open. fire . I saw 2 enemies ,
1 in the kneeling the other in the prone . Suddenly a
grenade flew into the room Sgt Peralta , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and
myself were in . Sgt Peralta grabbed the grenade and pulled
it underneath him while we took cover . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) took
shrapnel in his buttocks and I recieved some in my right
thigh . We tried exiting the door but in was closed shut
and we had trouble breaching it . I was able to kick it
open and •h elp (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) up . As he got up I covered him
with suppression fire along with the rest of the squad .
Then we eggressed back to the PLT CP and provided medical
aid to the wounded . Sgt Peralta saved (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and
myself lives . Along with others from 2nd squad .

/Isl/
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

-Enclosure (29)
Witness Sta t ement of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) , USMC

090 0 041 11 5 1st PLT A Co . 1/3 2nd Squad


Took contact in gri d LB 8899 1 8 BLOCK 407 of the city of
Fallu jah . I (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) , on the date listed above , breached
a house in the grid listed above . My team moved in second
behind first team as soon ~s my two men in front of me
entered we took fire . I seeked cover right outside the
front door and retu r ned f i re . The Sqd pulled out sought
cover on the street . As soo n as I got up I h ea rd a grenade
go.off but , it d i dn ' t sound as loud as a normal grenade .
When I exited the Build i ng we got medical attention to(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) We picked up and moved back to the PLT CPI
tu r ned around fo r rear security and saw (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on come running out . I held security till they got
by me . Whe n we seeked medi~ 9 1 attention for (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) we returned for the body of SGT PERALTA . We
c l eared the house and picked up SGT PERALTA and moved o ut .
He had to of taken t he Bl ast because I didn ' t see a lef~
hand and h i s face was not recon-izab l e. We brought Sgt
Peralta back to the AAV ' s and l oaded him up with(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

/Isl/
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Enclosure (30)
Witness Interview Form

Date : 19 December 2004

Witness name/rank :
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Unit : 1st Fire Team 2nd Squad 1st Platoon Alpha Company 1st
Battalion 3rd Marines

Location of interview : Alpha Company Firm Base

Subject incident : Engagement involving SGT Peralta

Testimony : I , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) provide the following Swearn


statement to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) regarding the fire fight
involving SGT Peralta on November 15 , 2004. My platoon ,
1st Platoon Alpha Co. 1st BN 3rd MAR was the Battalion
Reserve . On Nov . 8th, we were task with a mission to
provide security for a 09 Bulldoz er to breach the railroad
track just north of the city of Fallujah . My platoon then
ended up setting up a CP in a house on the very edge of the
city . We were there for 3 days doing rotations throughout
the 3 squads in the platoon . Our schedule was 4 hours on
post providing security for the CP . Then 4 hours of ·
patrols and clearing houses looking for insurgents and
weapons cache . Finally 4 hours of rest . Then we were task
to provide security at Dr . Talib Al ' Janibe Hospital on
phase l in e Fran for 1 day . The n~xt day we were task to
clear section 412 were we set up a CP at night . On this
day the 11th , 12th November we started clearing house by
house , street by street , block by block and then at night
set up a CP and do our 4 hour rotation . On midday of the
14th of November while we were clearing houses . SGT
Peralta came up to my squad and asked if he can help clear
houses with us . He said he · would only clear houses with us
because he used to be our squad leader and was a close
personal friend . He was already on his 2nd Enlistment and
was the Platoon guide . He chose to come clear with us also
out of his own unselfishness knowing he didn't have to but
he also chose to because we were also short of Marines in
my squad . He helped cleared about 15-20 houses with us by
the end of the day on the 14th . He also chose to stand
post that night to help us stand less post and get more
rest . Being the platoon Guide who is in charge of the
Squad leaders and being a SGT , they don ' t have to stand
post , but he chose to out of his own will . On the morning
of November 15th we stepped off at 0700 . We were given our

Enclosure (31)
Frag Order to go clear section 407 of the city of Fa l lujah .
We have cleared about 7 houses prior to our Fire fight at
ruff l y 0900 . We reached a house at LB 889918 . We then
ca l led up (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who carried al l of our
breaching tools , to breach the front qate . He kicked the
gate door and it f l ew open easily without any resistance .
My squad then moved up to the fron t door . Our order of
movemen~ was (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (Pointman) , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (SAW
Gunne r ) , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (Team Leader) , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (Rifleman) , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)(Squad Leader) , SGT Peralta (Guide) , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(Rifleman) , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (SAW Gunner) , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (Team
Leader) , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (Rifleman) , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (Corpsmen) ,
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (Combat Camera) , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (combat
Photographer) . To assist in th i s statement I made a
d i agram in this interview . There were several things that
were different about this house then all the others . The
first thing was is how the front gate was very easy to
open . Second the~e were no curtains in the front windows .
The first door we tried to breach after we easily got _
thro u gh t h e front door was locked and wouldn ' t open . So we
ki cked in the door on our right . As we entered the living
room , we notice that all the couches and chairs in the
li v i ng room on our left were in unusual positions , as
refer r ed to the diagram . The seque n ce th u s far at this
point is Dl opened easi l y , 02 was solidly locked , D3 was
easily kicked open . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) procedes from D3 through 04
i nto l iving room 1 and clears i t at a counter c l ockwise
fashion towards D2 . As he finishes he is ' at the position
where D2 is and procedes to try to open up D2 but it is
sol i dly locked . -Myself and t he rest of my squad move
towards D5 were the door is shut . As I grab the door
handle , I asked my squad if t hey are ready . So I then
pushed open D5 easily , after my- squad acknowledged they
were ready . After I pushed open D5 then immediatly rounds
started flying right by me . I saw two insurgents in the
Doorway of D7 . One in the prone labeled as " l ", the other
in the kneeling labeled as " 2 ". I then immediatly open
fire , hi tting the insurgent in the prone ( " ~" ) . I then
t u rned clockwise to get away from enemy fire . I know I hit
the insu r gent in the prone because I saw the rounds impact
against him and he curled up into the room out of sight
from D5 . After I turned clockwise I saw Sgt Peralta about
2 ft above the ground before he hit the deck . As he was on
the deck . He fe l l face first , stomach down with his weapon
underneath him . His face was toward D6 , on his left cheek
his right arm was at a L-shape , palm down , at a outward
stretch at about a shoulder level . His left arm was also
at a L- shape , palm down , outward stretch at shoulder level .
His left leg was straight and his left foot looked like he
was trying to push forward with his toes . His right leg
was slightly bent while his right foot was at a 90° angle
to his leg and his inside sole was touching , the ground . I
have marked the diagram with an " X" to indicate the general
position of SGT Peralta ' s body . The tick mark next to the
word feet indicates the approximate position o f his feet .
The tick mark next to the word shin indicates the
approximate position of his shins . The tick mark . next ·to
the word Head indicates the approximate position of his
Head . As I bounded back clockwise I stepped over SGT
Peralta ' s feet from Living room 2 , through D4 , into living
room 1 were I notice D6 was opened all the way . I heard
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) yelling " Corpmen up " after SGT Peralta got shot .
As (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was ye l ling r . could hear SGT Peralta
mumbleling , not gurgling . He was a l so trying to push off
of his toes on his left foot , and his left elbow was moving
very slight l y up and down . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) proceeded to go Aid
Sgt Peralta while I started to move up towards D6 . I then
saw the 2 insurgents running out of D7 headed towards the
back door labeled as Dll , As shown on the diagram . As they
were running out , one . of the in surgents lobbed . a grenade
backwards underhanded . The grenade looked like a yellow ,
egg shaped grenade , with a 1/2 " - l " metal fuse at the top
of it . I have review several photo ' s of grenade with the
IO and believe that the grenade looks most like the picture
of the RGD - 5 Fragmentation Grenade . As soon as I saw the
grenade coming into the room , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) yelled " Grenade ",
t h en I yelled " Grenade ". and ran back towards D2 along with
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) The grenade ricocheted off of the couch
nearest to Sgt Peralta and came to a dead stop right by his
head were I have l abeled " G" for grenade as shown in the
diagram . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and myself · tried to open D2 and it
wouldn't so I dropped straight down on my back with both
knee ' s up . As I dropped I lo6ked at Sgt Peralta and saw
him with his right arm scoop tne grenade into the small of
his right shoulder . The grenade appeared to be more
against him then under him . Irnrnediatly (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dropped
right next to me on his left side curling both feet towards
his buttocks . We ' both dropped in the corner of the room in
l i ving room 1 , next to D2. We are both Labeled "A"(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) " M" (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) as shown in the diagram . The
grenade exploded about 3- 5 seconds later . The total
elasped time from when I saw Sgt Peralta fall to the ground
until the explosion of · the grenade was 10 - 15 seconds .
After the explosion I felt shrapnel hit my right thigh ,
right above my knee . I later found out I was hit by 4
pieces of shrapnel . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) started scraming after the
explosion . He started panicing saying our squad left us .
I told him that they didn ' t . I told him to shoot towards
D6 . So he can cover me while I kick open D2 . When he
started firing I · began to kick the door . It took me 5 - 6
times to kick open 02 . I also recall the sound of the
explosion of the grenade was less loud than I expected -
compare to the U. S . M67 Fragmentation grenade which is very
loud . After I * i cked the door open , I helped (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) up
and told him " to get out of here so I can cover you ." As
he ran out I shot about 75-100 rounds of 5.56 mm rounds
from my M249 Squad Automatic Weapon into 05 , just in case
the insurgents were still there . After I shot through 05,
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and I ran through the front gate where we saw
our squad stacked up on the right side of the gate agaist
the wall . We took our wounded to the platoon CP . I
refused to go because myself along with everyone e l se in my
squad wanted to go back to get Sgt Peralta . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)who I subsequently learned was also injured by frag
while he was in living room 2 , with other members of my
squad went back into the house . I was told by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
to not look at Sgt Peralta because of emotions and me being
in the room during his death . We enter through 02 an I and
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) went up through 06 and shot rounds through 07
and 08 were a fire broke out in both rooms . I s ubsequetly
learned that there was a weapons cache in the bedroom
through 07 , which included the following : 3 AK-47 , 2
grenades , 3 man-made ~ortars , 2 mortar tubes , 10 AK-4 7
magazines , 5 RPG ' s , 3 RPG ' s launchers . I also subsequetly
learned from (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that all the rooms were dark and
the windows painted red along with the back door wide open .
As we were exiting the house due to a fire in the weapons
cache in the bedroom I notice Sgt Peralta ' s Kevlar was a 2-
3 ft . away from his head , were I have labeled with a " K" as
shown in the diagram . I remember as prior to the exp l osion
his kevlar was on his head . So I retrieved his kevlar and
gave it to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who was a close friend of Sgt Peralta .
I believe that if Sgt Peralta didn ' t grab the grenade that
it would have seriously injure me or most 'like kill me
along with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who were
a ll ther~ when the grenade was thrown into living room 1 .
If Sgt Peralta was stil l alive and I can talk to him I
would thank him a million times. It was an unselfish act .
He didn ' t have to do what he did but he loved us . He would
always tell us that we were his squad and he would only
operate with us .
SIGNED
Witness Interview Form

Date : 041220
Witness name/rank : (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Unit : 2nd Fire Team 2nd Squad 1st Plattoon Alpha Company
1st BN 3rd MAR
Location qf interview : BLT 1/3 COC , Camp Owen , Iraq
Subject incident : Sgt Peralta Ingagement of 15 Nov 04

Testimony : On Nov 14 2004 Aproxametly 1600 Sgt PERALTA


Joind 2nd Squad he helped clear a house that we were going
to stay I n For the night . After securing the house SGT
PERALTA ofeard to help out with standing post that night so
the squad could get some extra sleep . On 15 Nov 2004
Aproxarnetly 0830 2nd Squad started to clear houses from
West to East . The house that we took contact In was
roughly the 4th or 5th house . . I was· point man for 2nd Fire
team there were aproxarnetly six or sevan Marines stacked In
front of me . When I aproached 01 I saw · First Fire team to
i n clud (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
making their way through 03 , SGT PERALTA, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had
already made their way through 02 and were approaching D4 I
maid my way Through 01 , 02 . SGT PERALTA and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
turned right through D4 as I reached 04 apon my arrival at
D4 gun fire started as I crossed through the threshold I
turned right and saw muzzle Flash aproxametly nine steps up
on the stairs . I Got shot in the right forearm immediatly
apo n being hit I put my back against the wall behind what
looked li ke a door jam without no door I returned fire in
th e direction of the muzzle flashes until my weapon ran dry
I attempted t o reload my weap on with my right hand At that
time I noticed my right forearm was covered in blood and ·I
was unab l e to move my Fingures . . With my Back against the
wall and slightly peaking around the corner I must have
fired with my right hand even though I ' m a left handed
shooter. Approxametly five seconds had gone by when I made
the decision to leave the house as I left my possison I saw
SGT PERALTA make a sweaping motion with his right arm while
layihg Face down on the floor . All I reamember is SGT
PERALTA lying Face down I don ' t no what position his body
was In and I had no idea where his weapon was ·. As I exited
the house I went through D4 to 02 then D1 to the Gate as I
was going through the gate I started asking For a Corpsman
and I was letting people in the squad that SGT PERALTA was
still In the house . After going through the Gate (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) gave me First aid during this time The squad
started t o regroup pulling people from 1st Squad . The
squad went back into the house to get SGT PERALTA . They

Encl osure (32)


pu l led him out of the house and put him on the AAV Before
loading myself and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) onto the AAV to be medivaced
out of the city . I did not look at SGT PERALTA 1 s injury ' s .
Throughout the event that took place I did not see any
granaides nor did I hear any one yeall grainade or hear any
explosions go off .

For the record I believe that this was the first hostile
contact my plattoon had taken in a house . I know for a
fact that this was the first hostile contact my squad has
taken while in a house . As a follow up I can not rectolect
when exactly I first became aware that SGT PERALTA was
lying on the deck other then in obsearving him when he made
the sweeping motion with his arm . It appeared to me at
first that SGT PERALTA wasn ' t moving then he made a
sweeping motion with his arm . From my po i nt of view I
could not tell If SGT PERALTA was injured or not . In . spit
of every thing going on around me it didn ' t rejister that
SGT PERALTA had been injured during the fire fight or
wasn ' t making no atempt to move out of harms way

In viewing my diagram I did not enter Open Room 2 and the


FOYER at any time during the engagement I did not enter
these two rooms . . on my diagram I have marked an area known
as the " unknown additional space ". From my experience of
clearing other houses and seeing the outstide of the house
before entering I know this house had more area then what I
saw . (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
weeks ago and since that time I and my squad have many many
Blocks of hous~s many we have cleared more then once

S I GNED
Witness Interview Form

Date : 20 DEC 04
Witness name/rank : (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Unit : 2nd squad , 1st PLT , Alpha Co ., 1/3
Location of interview : BLT 1/3 COC , Camp Owen , Iraq
Subject incident : SGT Pera l ta engagement of 15Nov04

Testimony : Sgt Pera l ta joined our 2nd squad on the evening


of the 14th . From what I kn ew , he was not pleased with our
1st squad and wanted a change of pace . This sort of thing
was not at all out of the ordinary , and his company was
we l l r ec i ev~d . Upon entering what seemed to be a house
3/4 ' s of the way down street , we recieved contact . Sgt
Peralta had been with us the who l e day , and had worked his
way to very nearly t h e front of the squad by the time we
reached this house . I carried assorted tools used fo r
bre a ch i ng obstacles upon entering the houses . I typical l y
have to either pry or bludgeon certain doors , gates and
what not before we ente r the houses . In this specific
i n stance , I dia no s u ch thing . By the time I entered the
ga t e near the street , the Marine ' s in front of me were
a l ready enteri ng the house . There were roughly six or
( seven Marines al r eady in t he house before I got in along
with them . I barely made my way into the enterance way
wh en I · looked to the right . Upon looking to the right , I
foc u sed in on who was no doubt (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) only to hear
gu nfire immedi a tely there a fter . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was a good
d i s t ance in front of me (at least 10 feet) , and was merely
· a point of refrence f or me due to his height . Upon hearing _
the gunf i re , I ran to the outside of the house and knelt
near the entrance , waiting fo r all the Marines to get out ~
Afte r I saw them stop runnin g out , I ran to the st r eet
where they had posted up and began treating (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
I brough t (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) across the street to the house , where I
dressed the gunshot wound to his forearm . After I was
through treating (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I turned around to see (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)who had come back to the house , along with the rest
of the Marines . I began trea t ing his shrapnel wounds , when
I heard from one of the Marines that Sgt Peralta was dead .
I do not recall who said it , nor did that person specify
how he was killed . I had been treating both (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)for about 10 minu tes , if that , when the Medevac AAV
pul led up . Before I got the both of them aboard the AAV ,
the Marin~s had already brought Sgt Peralta ' s body aboard
the AAV .' I walked (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and some Marines assisted
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)aboard the AAV . Upon entering the cargo area , the
AAV corpsman told me Sgt Peralta was dead . I saw him

Enclosure (33)
laying face down on the middle bench , and had to move him
to accomidate (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Upon moving his body , I
saw a brief glimpse of what his face looked like . It was
not enough of a look to make any pathological judgement ,
but there was obviously a significant amount of facial
trauma , consistent with an explosion near his head . No one
had said specifically what the cause of death was , but
after seeing his body , it looked as though he had very
nearly swallowed the grenade . After the AAV ' s had left we
got to more or less piece together what had happened . Then
I was told that he had pulled the grenade that was thrown
into his body , potentially saving half the squad .

SIGNED
Witness Interview Form

Date : 041220
Witness name/rank : (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Unit : lTm 2nd Sqd 1st plt . A. Co .
Location of interview : BLT 1 /3 COC , Camp Owens , Iraq
Subject incident : Sgt. Pera l ta engagment of 15 Nov 04

Testimony : On the 1 4th of Nov . 04 Sgt . Peralta got


attached to Second Squad 1st plt . fo r reasons I dont know ,
Id? know he stood post with us night pryer . On the day of
Nov 15 04 , that morning we started clearing houses , when we
took contact it was the 4th house we had c leared that
morning. The Order· of the squa d that day was , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Sgt Peralta , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Now (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was behind(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)in the Stack , he was in front of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) from Combat Camera so .
position in stack may have been reversed . I have included
a diagram with my s tatement , I carit remember h ow long it
took to open the front gate , but I remember it taken a
couple of minutes & kicks to open the front door . I was
the 4th man i n & I remember (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) not being able to
open (02) , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) then moved to (D3) , he was able to
open that , once we all got int o the second living room (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)ran into (D4) which was another living room & he
waved us in to clear the rest of the house. At this time
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was now running point (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was behind him
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) At that time (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) put
his hand on the ·door (D5) & asked me if I was ready . He
pul led the door open & we recived contact , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) got on
a knee started ~iring I got behind him & fired 3 shots &
then t ook some covei to t h ~ end of the wa ll . I saw an
insurjen firing at us from (D7) , after I got to the end of
the wall I looke d back & saw Sgt Peralta laying on the
flo6r at (04) . On the diagram I have represented a
location of his h ea d with an (H) and a (f) fo r his feet .
Sgt Peralta was laying faci ng to his left & his face sti l l
facing as if he was shooting . His face was laying o n his
weapon as if aimi ng i n on something . Legs were straight be
hind him with no movement . From their I ran to him , from
where I too k cover & to him at (04) . Came up to him on
~is left side & asked him i f he was ok , he then just
mumbled to me I could not understand him so I just
· attempted to pick him up . I could not te l l i .f he was
wounded or not, at ~hat time I attempted to pick him up &
then I heard a gr e nade He thumps so then I ran threw (03) &

Enc lo sure · (34)


(Dl) while I was running out I can hear (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) through
(02) yell out grenade, before I ran out of Dl I saw a
Marine fall down by the sink at (Dl) when I ran out of (Dl)
I ran outside of the gate where then the grenade went off .
From their we went back to the COC were (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) were shot . We took a team from first Squad & went
back to the house were then I was the new pointman I walked
threw (Dl) then (02) made a right & saw Sgt Peralta laying
on the . floor the same way I saw him earlier right hand on
the trigger & the left hand on the other part of the weapon
as i£ shooting from their I went through (06) & cleard the
rest of the bottom deck while 2nd Tm cleared the top deck .
When I saw Sgt Peraltq ' s face on the AAV he was missing a
chunck of his scalp , then I looked away . Starting to
forget little important details because its been a while
since it happend . When I took cover behind the wall & then
turned all my attension went to Sgt Peralta & possibly
their could have been other people in the room . For
further recaletion I can ' t remember how Sgt Peralta ' s head
was facing the first time I saw him , the statement above is
the second time I saw him . When I attempted to pick him up
By the waist I was unable to move his whole body included
head just his waist , I do not believe his head changed
positions when I tried to pick him up . When I departed
from (03) I don ' t know if anybody was still in the living
room .

SIGNED
Witness · Interview Form

Date : 21 December 2004


Witness name/rank : (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Unit: 1st Fireteam Leader , 2nd Sqd. , Alpha Co . 1st Plt . BLT
1/3
Location of interview: BLT 1/3 COC ~ Camp Owen , Iraq
Subject incident : Engagement i nvolving Sgt . Peralta of 15
November 2004

Testimony : I , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) provide the following sworn


statement to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) regarding the events of 15 nov .
2004. First plt . Alpha Co was tasked as the battalion
reserve for 1/3. For the first three days of the attack on
Fallujah our platoon held security at the breech site .
From there security patrols were ran in the city . We then
rejoined Alpha Co . and took the Al - Janabi hospital . From
there 1st Plt . . joined Alpha Co . in clearing blocks North of
the hospital . On the 14th of November Sgt. Peralta joined
second sqd . Our sqd . was moving down a street when Sgt .
Peralta yelled to second sqd leader, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that he
would like to go with our sqd . I do not recall if we
cleared anymore houses after Sgt Peralta joined U$ on the
14th. On the evening of the 14th 2nd Sqd . occupied a house
that would be the sqds · CP . . First fireteam began
barricading the lower leve l of the house while second
fireteam posted as security on the roof . Sgt Peralta chose
to form a third fire team with himself , 2 combat camera
guys , and our corpsman even though he could have slept all
night at the platoon CP . He stood post with the third
fireteam · to let the other fireteams get a few extra hours
of sleep. On the morning of the 15th , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) get~ the
word of which houses we would be clearing that day . We
then step off to begin clearing . I do not recall a
specific time that we stepped off , but it was the morning
of the 15th . Normally when clearing house 1st fireteam is
the 1st to make entry through any gates and into the house .
Movement of 1st fireteam is (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) first as the
pointman . He generally breeches the gates and doors
through which we make entry into the houses . Second in the
order of movement is (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the SAW gunner . After
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) follows myself as the teamleader . Then(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)follows as the fireteams assistant automatic rifleman
(A- gunner) . We had cleared about 4 houses and stacked up
to clear the 5th house which I will call the " contact
house " because it is the only house we had hostile contact .
I should add that this was the first house in which 1st
Plt . of Alpha Co had taken hostile enemy contact . Our sqd

Enclosure (35)
stacked outside the gate and I believe that it was(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)who breeched the gate . Once the breech was made on
the gate , my fireteam went to the front door of the house
where we would make entry. While I ' m not certain of his
exact position I am certain that Sgt . Peralta was in the
stack with second sqd ., somewhere behind my team . I should
also add that I have made a diagram in which the entrance
to the house is labeled as Dl. While I can ' t specifically
recall who breeched Dl I am almost certain that it was(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)as it was our fireteam SOP for him to do so . Once Dl
was breeched (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) were the first to
enter followed by the rest of 2nd sqd . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) made an
attempt to breech D2 then entered through D3 knowing from
previous experiences that we could probably clear living
room #2 in my diagram by going through a different
entrance . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) then moved toward 04 with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and .the rest of the sqd following . I followed
through 03 then (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) movep through
D4 to clear living room #2 leaving myself as the pointman
~ in Living room #1. We are taught in training to call out
vocally the word " clear " if the room is clear of enemy or
any threat . However we had cleared so many houses that we
had developed the habit of not always calling out clear but
everyone would assume that the room was clear if no shots
were fired or no one gave any kind of alarm . After (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) moved through 04 I continued past
04 and approached D5 near the wall to my left . I noticed
that D5 was open and that it was dark beyond 05 . I reached
approximately 4 feet from 05 when enemy fire opened up . I
could see muzzle flash from an enemy weapon in front of me .
It sounded as though there were more enemy firing in the
house as well , however , I only saw the muzzle flash coming
from one weapon being fired in front of me . The muzzle
flash I saw in front of me was coming either from the
entierior wall of the bedroom or on the exterior wall of
the room beyond 05 . At that point I dropped to a knee and
returned approximately 5 to 10 rounds toward the muzzle
flash I saw . From living room #2 I heard someone yell
" grenade ," or " frag ". I then turned clockwise and ran
through D3 After exiting through D3 I passed at least 2
Marines bottled up between D3 and Dl . It appeared to me
that the Marines I passed in the doorway were not aware of
the situation inside the house because it did not appear to
me that they were trying to exit the house as quickly as
they should if they had known that a grenade had been
thrown inside the house . I exited -the house through Dl
where I then ·proceeded to the gate . After reaching outside
the gate , I turned and stacked on the wall with another
Marine , expecting that the squad would reform at that point
and go back into the house to finish clearing after the
grenade went off . While I recall someone yelling " Grenade "
or " Frag " I do not actually recall hearing the grenade
explode . From my position outside the gate I heard Marines
yelling for our corpsman . I then saw Marines running from
the house who appeared to be wounded . As (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) passed
me as he was running back toward the platoon CPI asked him
if everyone was okay and he replied " no . " At that point I
knew that we would return to the Plt CP with our wounded ,
because the Plt CP was so close to our position . As I
reached the Plt . CPI noticed large amounts of blood on
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) pants . Until that point I didn ' t know that he
had been wounded . When we reached the Plt CPI got
accountability for my fireteam , to make sure that all of
them had exited the house . I then assisted our corpsman in
treating (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) injury . During this time (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
discovered that Sgt Peralta had not exited the house and
that we were going back to get him . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that
he knew Sgt Peralta was dead . The remaining uninjured
members of our squad assisted by two Marines from 1st sqd
left the Plt CP back to the contact house to finish
clearing and to recover Sgt Peralta's body. As my fireteam
was clearing , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) of 1st Sqd pulled Sgt Peralta's
body out of the house to the street . After clearing the
house 2nd sqd pulled out quickly because there was a fire
burning in the house and the enemy had left RPG ' s and other
explosives inside . Upon exiting the house , members of 2nd
Sqd including myself carried Sgt Peralta ' s body back to the
Plt CP where we loaded him onto an AAV to be medevaced with
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) My recollection was that the
RPG ' s were inside the bedroom where the fire was burning .
Upon entering the house the second time as I entered Living
Room #2 I noticed the form of Sgt Peralta ' s body lying face
down . I have marked his posi~ion with an X. I only saw
Sgt Pera l ta ' s body through my periphrial vision as I had my
eyes forward on D6 looking for the enemy . I did not notice
what gear Sgt Peralta did or did not have on but only that
he appeared to be face down.

SIGNED
Sworn Statement of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC

12-21-2004
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
2nd team Ldr , 1st sq , 1st plt, A . Co . 1/3
Location : Alpha Co . Firm base , Fallujah , Iraq
Regarding : engagment regarding Sgt . Peralta of 15 Nov . 04

I (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) give the Following sworn statement


to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) regarding the above incident . As I enter
living room 2 (room on Left as your facing iterior of
house) Sgt . Peralta's upper body is in Living room 2 and
about waist down is in living room one .. I saw his left arm
fully extended to his side palm up and the top of his hand
(opposite of palm) was black . His head was faced to his
right shoulder as he was laying face down with his kevlar
still on . His weapon was still slung and under him . And I
say by his hand fu l ly extended I mean his hand by his flank
and pointing to his feet . What I mean by his hand being
black it looked to me as if his hand (top of hand) had been
burnt . I could tell the top of his hand was burnt by
looking at the edges of his palm , because they were black
(from about the pinky finger to his wrist and thumb to his
wrist) . I do not recall Sgt . Peralta grasping any part of
his weapon . I know for a fact his left hand was not
grasping anyth i ng , but his right hand I do not remember
seeing . I know his head was facing toward the right
because when I entered room two I could see the back of his
kevlar . Before entering the building another Marine had
told me that Sgt . Peralta had been shot in the face , so
that is why I tried to avoid looking face to face wi t h him .
Also as I entered living room two I could see some blood
over his right shoulder . As I entered room two Security
was already posted (Marines with there weapon aimed in on
doors) and I had my weapon up too . I saw that no one
really wanted to pick up his body so I kept my weapon slung
with my tactical sling and approached him walking toward
his left (as he is laying face down) shoulder and head . I
came to a stop with my legs stradling his head because I
knew I was going to drag him by his flak jacket . Again I
don ' t reca l l where his right arm was and if there was a
grenade blast by him , I knew there were st{ll insurgents in
the building and I wanted to get him out as fast as .
possible . And I still knew his face had been injured so I
did what I could by not look down at his face while I was
going to grab him by his flak jacket . As I reached down
with two hands grabing his flak jacket I began to back
trace my movement in . As I was exiting room two Sgt .

Enclosure (36)
Peralta ' s weapon was perpendicular to him not allowing me
to pull him out . With my right hand I reached to move his
weapon and get him through the door . After I get his body
to exit room two I was exiting the main house door . Again
hi~ weapon got caught in the door so I told a combat camera
man who was standing to my left to move Sgt . Peralta 's
weapon so he could fit through the main door . As he moved
the weapon I continued to pull his flak with two hands and
got him through the door . Then after his body was out I
grabed the flak jacket with my right hand and began to drag
him to the end of the driveway . As I ' am exiting the drive
way drag ing Sgt . Peralta I hear gun shots , I irnmediatly
droped his body next to a wall by the gate (out side the
gate) I pointed to the Marines ion the roof across the
street that I was leaving the body there and going back
inside to assist . When I got done assisting I was one of
the last Marines to exit the main gate to the house a
Marine gave me Sgt . Peralta ' s bloody helmet and his weapon .
I knew it was bloody because I looked at it before a grabed
it and I did not bother to inspect it for damages , I carred
it walking behind the Marines that were earring Sgt .
Peralta to the track . I then put the helmet and weapon in
the track . That was the last time I saw Sgt . Peralta , his
kev l ar (helmet) , and his weapon .
I have personal knowledge of the foregoing facts . I have
reviewed this statement and swear that it is true to the
best of my recolection , except as to those matters stated
under information or belief , and as to those matters I
believe them to be true .

SIGNED

Attested and sworn to before me by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)


this 21s t day of December , 2004 at Alpha Co . Firm 'base ,
Falluj ah , Iraq .

SIGNED
Written Statement of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC

I (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 0311 make this voluntry


statement in the facts that I witnessed in the case of Sgt .
Peralta . I was point man in a 9 man stack in Fallujah
while · we were clearing houses . I went into the house and
ran into 2 doors . One was unlocked , so I went iri and
cleared the room with the squad . The next door was
unlocked and I went in and cleared the room That when I
heard gun fire coming from the kitchen . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) came
in the room I was in , I told him to come back to where I
was and he did. Then SGT Peralta came in and I seen him
get shot . I ran over to him and yelled corpman up . As
soon as I yelled corpman up the enemy threw a grenade in
the room . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) run into the corner and
hide , at that time I SAW SGT Peralta reached for the
gernade . I put my head down and It went off. After it
went off myself and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) got out of the building
and told (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) our Squad leader that SGT Peralta was
dead :

SIGNED
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Enclosure (37)
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
BATIAllON LANDING TEAM 1/ 3
31ST MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT
UNIT 44010
FPO AP 96607-4010

N REPl Y REFER TO:


1650
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
2 Jan 05

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ltr of 1 January 2005

From : Commanding Officer , Battalion Landing Team 1/3


To : Commanding Officer , Regimental Combat Team 7

Subj : REVIEW OF THE ENGAGEMENT ON 15 NOVEMBER 2004 INVOLVING SERGEANT RAFAEL


PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) /03 11 USMC

1 . I concur with the Investigating Officer ' s findings , opinions , and


recommendation .

2 . This investigation contains con~lusive evidence , to include sworn


eyewitness testimony , of Sergeant Peralta ' s conscious self sacrifice to
protect the lives of his fellow Marines.

3 . I t is my soiemn honor and privi l ege to f orward this investigation for


your consideration , with my strongest recommendation that Sergeant Peralta be

.
awarded the Medal of Honor posthumous l y .

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
BATTALION LANDING TEAM 1/ 3
31ST M ARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT
UNIT44010
FPO AP 96 607 - 4010

M REPLY lEFEt TO:

1650
SJA/
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
1 Jan 05

From : Investigating Officer , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)


To : Commanding Officer , Battalion Landing Team 1/3

Subj: REVIEW OF INSURGENT ENGAGEMENT ON 15 NOVEMBER 2004 INVOLVING SERGEANT


RAFAEL PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) /0311 USMC

Ref : (a ) SECNAVINST 1650.lG

Encl : (1 ) Strnt of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC dtd 15 Nov 04


(2 ) Strnt of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC dtd 15 Nov 04
(3 ) Stmt of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC dtd 15 Nov 04
(4 ) Stmt of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC dtd 15 Nov 04
(5 ) Stmt of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC dtd 15 Nov 04
(6 ) Stmt of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC dtd 15 Nov 04
(7 ) DD Form 890 , Jan 58, Record Of Identification Processing , dtd 15
Nov 04
(8) DD Form 893 , Feb 56(EG) , Record Of Identification Processing
Anatomical Chart , undated
(9) Sworn Stmt of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC dtd 19 Dec
04 (w/diagram )
(10) Sworn Stmt of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC dtd 20 Dec 04
(w/diagram)
(1 1 ) Sworn Stmt of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC dtd 20
Dec 04 (w/diagram )
(12) Sworn Stmt of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USN dtd 20 Dec
04
(13) Sworn Stmt pf (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC dtd 20
Dec 04 (w/diagram)
(1 4 ) Sworn Stmt of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC dtd 21 Dec 04
(w/diagram)
(15) Sworn Stmt of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC dtd 21 Dec 04
(16) IO Summary of telephonic interview of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)USMC of 21 December 2004 (with second written statement of
SNM enclosed as Attachment - A)
(17) IO Summary of telephonic interview of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC (w/ photographic attachments (A)-(G) , inclusive)
of 22 December 2004
(18) Personnel Casualty Report ICO Sergeant R . Peralta , USMC
(1 9} Armed Forces Institute of Pathology Preliminary Autopsy Report
(Final) , dtd 21 December 2004
(20) Stmt of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC , dtd 24 Dec 04
(21 ) Stmt of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 23 Dec 04
(22) Stmt of Investigating Officer w/attachments (A - Article by
Oliver North (LtCol, USMC (Ret)) , " Hero in Fallujah : Marine Laid
Himself on Top of Grenade to Save Rest of Squad";- B - Article by
Lance Corporal T.J . Kaemerer , USMC , "A Hero ' s Sacrifice" dtd 2
Dec 04 ; C - Powerpoint of aerial map enlargements of incident
location ; D - Photographs taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) of Sergeant
Peralta ' s Flak Jacket , contact house , shrapnel and grenades;
Subj : REVIEW OF INSURGENT ENGAGEMENT ON 15 NOVEMBER 2004 INVOLVING SERGEANT
RAFAEL PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) /0311 OSMC

E - photographic "lineup" of different grenades used to assist


witnesses ; F - Powerpoint composite floor plan)
(23) Recommended Citation and Summary of Action for Medal Of Honor ICO
Sergeant Rafael Peralta, United States Marine Corps

Preliminary Statement

1 . I have reviewed the reference , enclosures and all available information


concerning the engagement against anti-coalition £orces on 15 November 2004 ,
in Fallujah, Iraq , which lead to the death of Sergeant Rafael Peralta , USMC .
It is my conclusion that Sergeant Peralta was mortally wounded during a fire-
fight in a house while conducting search and attack operations. While
Sergeant Peralta lay mortally wounded on the ground, an insurgent lobbed a
grenade that came within proximity of Sergeant Peralta and lay between him
and other Marines . Aware of the danger it presented, Sergeant Peralta
scooped the grenade under himself , sacrificing his life to save the lives of
others by using his body to shield them from the blast of the grenade .

2 . Throughout this report, a composite floor plan diagram will be used as a


reference to orient the reader on individual actions . All references to "D#: "
refer to doors located in the "contact house" as labeled in attachment (F) to
enclosure (22) . In addition , attachment (C) to enclosure (22) is a Bl ock Map
of eastern Fallujah , which is also referred to throughout this report.

Findings

1 . On 8 November 2004 , Battalion Landing Team 1/3 (BLT 1/3) , Regimental


Combat Team 7 , 1st Marine Division , I Marine Expeditionary Force participated
in Operation Phantom Fury and Al Fajr , the initial assault and penetration
into the insurgent held City of Fallujah, Iraq . On 10 November 2004, having
seized its initial objectives and reached its limit of advance , BLT 1/3
assigned company sectors within its Tactical Area Of Responsibility (TAOR)
and began detailed clearing operations in the northeast section of the city .

2 . Sergeant Rafael Peralta was the Platoon Guide for 1st Platoon , Alpha
Company, BLT 1/3. During the initial breach of insurgent defenses north of
the city, 1st Platoon provided security for a D9 bulldozer as it worked to
clea~ a breach lane for the assault force . After the initial penetration
into the city , 1st Platoon , as part of the BLT reserve, established a command
post (CP) on the northern edge of the city and maintained open lines of
communications into and out of the city for medevac and logistical resupply
vehicles . The platoon remained there for approximately three days,
conducting search and attack operations. On 13 November 2004 , the platoon
was tasked with providing security at the Dr . Talib Al Janabe Hospital near
phase line " Fran" in Block 426 . On 14 November 2004 , 1st Platoon moved
north , cleared Block 412 and began clearing Block 407 [see Attachment C to
Enclosure (22)].

3. An infantry rifle squad was the basic unit for conducting clearing
operations. Generally, one squad per platoon would clear a house while the
other t wo squads cordoned off the area and provided over watch.

4 . Functioning below its table of organization strength of 13 Marines , 2d


Squad, 1st Platoon , Alpha Company , BLT 1/3 (hereafter referred to as 2d
Squad) used two four-man fire teams , vice the standard three . In the

2
Subj : REVIEW OF I NSURGENT ENGAGEMENT ON 15 NOVEMBER 2004 INVOLVING SERGEANT
RAFAEL PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) /0311 USMC
I.,,-
afternoon of 13 November 2004 , 2d Squad received two combat cameramen , who
also assisted the squad with its search and attack mission .

5 . At some point in the late afternoon or early evening of 14 November 2004,


Sergeant Peralta approached the squad leader of 2d Squad , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and
asked if he could assist the squad in clearing houses in Block 407 .

6 . Witnesses attribute Sergeant Peralta ' s joining 2d Squad to his sense of


loyalty and the fact that the squad was at less than full strength .
According to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) "He [Sergeant Peralta] said he
would only clear houses with us because he used to be our squad leader and he
was a close personal friend ," and "He was already on his second en l istment
and was the platoon guide . He chose to come clear [houses] with us also out
of his own unselfishness proving he didn ' t have to , but he also chose to
because we were also short of Marines in my squad . He helped clear about 15
to 20 houses with us by the end of the day on the four teenth . " [Enclos u re
( 9) l

7. On the evening of 14 November 2004 , Sergeant Peralta organized himself


and the two combat cameramen into a provis i onal fire team , which he
integrated into the four-hour duty rotation that same night . Sergeant
Peralta , as the platoon guide , wou ld normally sleep at the platoon CP , vice
t h e squad CP . On that night , he e lected to remain with 2d Squad and stood
post with the additional fire team he had organized . Because of this , the
remaining members of the squad were able to get more rest during the night .

( 8. On the morning of 15 November 2004 , the squad awoke around dawn ,


perfo r med hygi ene , ate chow , and awaited orders to move out . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
got t h e mission fragmentary order from the Platoon Commander to continue
search and attack opera t ions in the 407 Block . He briefed the Pla toon
Commander o n his plan and the squad moved out.

9 . By most accounts , the squad had cleared four to eight houses before
reaching the house (the "contact house") where they engaged insurgent forces
on 15 November 2004 . A review of the actua l block being cleared shows the
contact house was the seventh house on the block moving from east to west
[see Attachment C to Enclosure (22)] .

10. Upon reaching the contact house , Sergeant Peralta was positioned in the
middle of the squad , one to two Marines ahead of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(Combat Camera) , but somewhere behind (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who was the last
man in first fire team. The majori t y of statements indicate that (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(Squad Leader) was ahead of
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) at this point .
Enclosures (1)-(3) , (5) , (9) - (11) , (13) , (16) and (17) pertain .

11 . Se veral squad members state that Sergeant Peralta carried bolt-cutters


when he operated with the squad , and would move to the front of the squad if
his services were r equired to breach a lock . However , there is no report of
Sergeant Peralta using his bolt-cutters on 15 November 2004 .

12 . In general, Sergeant Peralta and the personnel he organized into a


provisional fire team would remain in the center of the squad , between the
other two f i re teams , as it cleared buildings.

13 . The order of movement for first fire te am was as follows : (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(breacher/pointman) ;
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (Squad Automatic

3
Subj : REVIEW OF INSURGENT ENGAGEMENT ON 15 NOVEMBER 2004 INVOLVING SERGEANT
RAFAEL PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 0311 USMC

Weapons gunner) ; (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (team leader) ; (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (Assistant


Squad Automatic Weapon Gunner) .

14 . The second fire team contained (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (pointman) and


(team leader). Available statements indicate that(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
was the only Marine from second fire team to enter the
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
contact house .

15 . At the contact house , breaching tools were not necessary , as(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
was able to kick the gate open . The squad then rapidly
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
proceeded to Dl . Some Marines peeled off to provide perimeter security , so
the squad order changed from that of the previous house between the gate and
Dl .

16 . The squad order outside Dl was (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)


(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and
Sergeant Peralta were close by , if not next , followed by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and then the beginning of the next fire team lead by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) breached Dl and the squad flowed in behind
him . There is a s i nk or washbasin inside this first room and it is variously
referred to as the "sink room" , the portico, the foyer , and the entrance
room . As it is not marked with a name on the composite floor plan , it is
referred to here as ~he sink room . A sink is depicted in the photograph
appearing at page 15 of Attachment D to Enclosure (22) .

17. Upon gaining entry to the sink room , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) then attempted
to b reach D2 . He found it locked and moved to D3. Some testimony states D2
was open ; however , the two individua l s in the best position to know the
status of this doo r state it was locked , causing them to turn to D3
[Enc l osures (9) and (16)] . As the two lead Marines progressed , other members
of the squad entered through Dl .

18 . Upon entering the house and clearing the first room , the order of
movement was not pre-determined. Marines would use initiative based tactics ,
with the Marine in the most advantageous position clearing rooms or areas as
they presented themselves . Several members of the squad , to include Sergeant
Peralta and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had freedom to change their position in
the squad as they saw fit .

19. Entering through D3 into t h e Living Room , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) entered


the Big Room on the l eft through D4 . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) says D4 was closed
and blocked by a couch , but he is the only witness to say such with the
others stating D4 was open or did not have _doors and was unblocked . He also
states that (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) came charging into the Big Room through
this closed , blocked door but does not recall how (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) did so . In
addition (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) confirms that (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) actually
entered the Big Room through D4 as well , making it more likely this door was
already open as the others describe . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) cleared the Big
Room while (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) went to D5 , followed by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) The latter three then stacked to the right of D5 ,
while (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) went to the center and right of the Living
Room , remaining behind them . Sergeant Peralta approached towards D5 and
stopped at approximately the middle of D4 , with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) now in the vicinity of D3 .

4
Subj : REVIEW OF INSURGENT ENGAGEMENT ON 15 NOVEMBER 2004 INVOLVING SERGEANT
RAFAEL PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) /0311 USMC

20 . Sergeant Peralta moved forward and was i n close proximi t y to D5 as(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
made ready to push the door open . Upon doing so , Marines
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
in the Living Room immediately began taking fire from "the kitchen area" and
bedroom side of D5 . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) states he saw one insurgent in
the prone and another in the kneeling f i ring from D7 . Others state they saw
mu zzle f .l ash from D8 . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) s t ates he s aw muzzle flash
from 07 and to the left of D7 , as we l l as an actual muzzle protruding from
the s t airs to the right of 05 . All Marines in the house testify there was
more than one insurgent weapon fir i ng based on the sound and rapidity of
fire , with as many as three insurgents firing at once .

21 . No one can testify to actually seeing Sergeant Peralta being hit by


i n surgent f i re . Most believed he had been hit to his front and/or h i s face .
Th ere is confl icting testimony as to Sergeant Peralta ' s exact position at the
time he was hit and to the orientat i on of his body and face . Some witnesses
observe him going down whi l e others only notice h i m afte r he is down . All
wi t n esses place him going down more or less in between the Big Room and the
Livi n g Room , coming to rest at approximately the point shown by the
designation "04 " on the composite floor plan with his feet in the Living Room
while his upper body and head are in the Big Room .

22 . There is also some c onf l icting testimony as to which way Sergeant


Pe r al t a ' s head was turned once he went down . Most witnesse s who can recall
Sergeant Pera l ta ' s posit i on describe him facing to the right . Two witnesses
have him facing t o the l eft. However , the autopsy and medica l evidence
demonstrate Sergeant Pera l ta s till had the ability to see , hear and move .
Th is same evidence shows Sergeant Pe r alta had no wounds or ba ll isti c impacts
to the fron t of h is body at t h is po i nt . He rece i ved a singl e bullet wound to
the back of the head , which the medical evidence deemed as fata l . The
Personnel Casualty Report (PCR) was based on initial reports that have since
been refuted by the medical evidence .

23 . Almos t irrunediately after Sergeant Peralta went down , an insurgent tossed


a g r enade f r om the kitchen area through 05 and D6 and into the Big Room ,
l anding approx i mately one foot f rom Sergeant Peralta ' s head . Those who are
able to recall the grenade describe it as "yel l ow" or "orangish ye l low" in
col or , s i mi l ar to a coconut or pineapple grenade but with no serrations ,
about the s i ze of the palm o f one ' s hand . They also describe it as having a
long fuse that took much l onger than anyone expected to go off . Once the
grenade went off , everyone who heard it d~scribes the explosion as not being
as loud as any of them expected .

24 . Rep r esentatives of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) inspected Sergeant


Pera l ta ' s flak jacket and retrieved severa l shrapnel fragments as well as a
piece of the grenade ' s f use . The f act that a piece of the fuse was found
imbedded in the Velcro of the flak jacket means the grenade went off "very
clo s e " to Sergeant Peralta . By viewi ng the photographs contained in
En closures (17) and (22) , the flak jacket , the fragments , and the witness
statements , EOD determined this grenade to be "Iraqi grenade , model unknown . "
This grenade has a plastic casing , vice metal, with a thin , slinky- like
spring inside as its source of shrapnel. The grenade has a low yield based
on its 37 grams of explosive and is adaptable to any USSR fuse . It is rare
for shrapnel from a grenade of this type to penetrate metal or a flak jacket ,
as i t i s designed . to cause damage to flesh and disrupt the enemy .

5
Subj : REVIEW OF INSURGENT ENGAGEMENT ON 15 NOVEMBER 2004 INVOLVING SERGEANT
RAFAEL PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) /0311 USMC

25. Upon seeing the grenade , one or more Marines shouted "frag" or
"grenade . " Testimony differs slightly as to which arm Sergeant Peralta used
and where the grenade was in relation to his body , but most of the tes.timony
has Sergeant Peralta using his right arm and reaching for the grenade on his
right side . Since the grenade was moving from right to left , from 06 towards
the center of the Big Room , and since most testimony has Sergeant Peralta
facing to his right on the ground , I find it most probable that the grenade
was slowing or had come to a stop on his right side and that he reached to
scoop it using his right arm .

26. There is absolutely no doubt that Sergeant Peralta did in fact scoop the
grenade with his arm .

27 . EOO ' s review of the burn pattern on Sergeant Peralta ' s flak jacket ;
combined with the fragmentation pattern documented by the battalion surgeon
and the autopsy report; as well as the photographs of the spot where Sergeant
Peralta was recovered , where the grenade exploded on the floor and the
fragmentation pattern left on the wall inside the Big Room between 04 and D2 ;
leave no doubt that the grenade exploded underneath Sergeant Peralta on the
left side of his flak jacket .

28 . Given that Sergeant Peralta was lying atop his weapon , which was found
still slung on his person when he was retrieved from the house , and that he
was lying on his stomach on the floor with the grenade coming from his right ,
there is no way for the grenade to have lodged itself under Sergeant
Peralta ' s left side unless he , himself , put it there .

29 . Those witnesses able to make an estimate believe that the time from when
Sergeant Peralta hit the deck until the time when the grenade exploded was
between 10 and 15 seconds . The medical evidence states that as badly wounded
as Sergeant Peralta was prior to reaching for the grenade , his faculties and
motor control would have still allowed him to recognize the grenade as a
grenade and scoop i t under himself . In other words , he knew what he was
doing and intended to do what he did .

30 . I can find no explanation for Sergeant Peralta ' s scooping a grenade


under himself except as an attempt to shield others around him . By no
stretch of the imagination can scooping a grenade into one ' s self be deemed
as an act of self-preservation . In other words , Sergeant Peralta was
sacrificing himself for his fellow Marines .

31 . After the grenade exploded , those still in the house left , regrouped and
made another assault to both clear the house and retrieve Sergeant Peralta .
The medical evidence is unclear as to the precise time of death . I can only
conclude that Sergeant Peralta succumbed to his wounds some point after the
explosion of the grenade but before being pronounced dead by Bravo Surgical .

32 . The Marine who retrieved Sergeant Peralta from the house stated that
Sergeant Peralta was facing to his left when he was picked up . In addition,
the entire left side of Sergeant Peralta ' s face was macerated, indicating
that the right side must have been against the floor and thus shielded .
However , most witnesses state that Sergeant Peralta was facing to the right
when the grenade entered the Big Room . Based on the totality of the
testimony and evidence , I find it entirely reasonable that Sergeant Peralta
was originally facing to his right as the grenade entered the room and came
within his grasp . The injuries to his right arm are consistent with it being

6
Subj : REVIEW OF INSURGENT ENGAGEMENT ON 15 NOVEMBER 2004 INVOLVING SERGEANT
RAFAEL PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 0311 USMC

under him when the grenade exploded. At some point after scooping the
grenade , Sergeant Peralta turned his head under .

33. The insurgents subsequently fled out the back of the house and were
ultimately killed by members of 3d squad, 1st Platoon , Alpha Company , BLT
1/3 , in a house immediately adjacent to the contact house .

34 . Sergeant Peralta was taken to Bravo Surgical , where enclosures (7) and
(8) were generated . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) M. D. , Medical Corps ,
USN , Medical Officer , BLT 1/3 , also viewed and inspected Sergeant Peralta at
the forward BLT Aid Station (co-located with the BLT field trains) prior to
him being taken to Bravo Surgical Company [Enclosure (21)] .

35 . After the contact house was secured, some Marines who were present
provided written statements of their account of these events , which are
enclosed herewith as Enclosures (1) thru (6) .

36 . As part of this inqui-:r::y , additional , sworn statements and telephonic


interviews were taken from eyewitnesses , which are attached hereto as
Enclosures (9) thru (17) .

3 7. As part of the casualty reporting process , First Marine Division


generated a Personnel Casualty ·Report (PCR) (Enclosure (18)) . The PCR
erroneously refers to Sergeant Peralta ' s unit as "1st Bn , 8th Mar" (1st
Battalion , 8th Marines was also participating in Operation Al Fajr under 1st
Marine Divi sion on 15 November 2004) and attributes wounds to him that were
subsequently refuted by medical evidence obtained after the fact .

38 . Sergeant Peralta succumbed to his wounds some time after the grenade
exploded but prior to being pronounced dead by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) at 0915 on
15 November 2004 .

39 . The Armed Forces Institute of Pathology conducted an autopsy of Sergeant


Pera l ta ' s remains , and provided a copy of its report for this inquiry ,
attached as enclosure (19).

40 . Representatives of EOD rendered their expertise and the summary of


(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC , is attached hereto as enclosure
(20) .

Opinions

1 . There is no doubt that Sergeant Peralta was in the contact house as he


was subsequently retrieved from that house .

2. There is no doubt that (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)


were also i n the contact house , as each sustained injuries
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
from the engagement therein .

3. There is no doubt there was a fire-fight .

4. There is no doubt that Sergeant Peralta fell mortally wounded early in


the fire-fight .

5. There is no doubt that Sergeant Peralta fell at least halfway into the
room where he was later recovered .

7
Subj : REVIEW OF INSURGENT ENGAGEMENT ON 15 NOVEMBER 2004 INVOLVING SERGEANT
RAFAEL PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) /0311 USMC

6. There is no doubt Sergeant Peralta fell face down .

7. There is no doubt a grenade was thrown through D6 into the room where
Sergeant Peralta lay .

8. There is no doubt the grenade landed or came to a stop in close proximity


to Sergeant Peralta .

9. There is no doubt Sergeant Peralta reached for the grenade with his arm .

10 . There is no doubt the g r enade exp l oded under Sergeant Peralta , on his
left side .

11 . The r e is no qoubt that the only way a grenade entering the Big Room
through D6 cou l d have gotten underneath the left hand side of Sergeant
Peralta was if Sergeant Peralta put it there .

12 . Tha t Sergeant Peralta sacrificed himself to save the l i ves of his fellow
Ma r ines .

Recommendations

1. Th at Sergeant Rafae l Pe r a l ta , Uni t ed States Marine Corps , receive the


Meda l of Honor .

/
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Cop y to :
File

8
Pages 69 through 77 redacted for the following reasons:
----------------------------
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
DATE
RECORD OF IDENTIFICATION PROCESSING
· (Effects and Physical Data/
I
(Or un- GRADE SERVICE NO. SSAN

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
• EVACUATION NUMBER. OR SEARCH AND RECOVERY NUMBER

070 04 vS ·M.C.
RECEIVED FROM
fAUu ~
OFFICIAL IDENTIFICATION FOUND WITR REMAINS (fnclude personal effects aiding identific;r
tion) ~.~ii'v\A- tDN Vi;w'r'l-.:>o...J C·~J>

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FINGERPRINTS TAKEN FLUOROSCOPE STATEMENT ATTACHED
Oves [l)No Qves NO Qves 00No
PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN ANTHROPOLOG CAL STATEMENT MADE CHEMICAL STATEMENT ATTACHED
Oves [KLNo Oves (1§._NO OvES o
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
ESTIMATED HEIGHT MUSCULARITY COLOR OF HAIR RACE OR NATIVITY

TATTOOS, SCARS OR MARKS ON BODY

EVIDENCE OF HEALED FRACTURES AND BONE MALFORMATIONS

o,ik, ·~
WOUNDS OR INJURIES

I HAVf PERSONALLY VIEWED THE REMAINS OF TH IS DECEASED AND ALL RESULTING INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECORDED
TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE.
!\JAME, GRADE. AND ORGANIZATION SIGNATURE

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
/
,ECORD OF 108\ITIACATIOm PROCESSH:
ANATOM.! CAl CHA!RT
SERVICE MJMilal pt]'
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
GnA.VE ·ESTlMA.TED ESTIMATED
AGE /YL5J HBGHT

Bl.ACK OUT PORTIONS NOT RECOVERED

LEFT LEFT

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.1NAME OF PREPARING OFFlCt:..l /?ti'n.•• or "Y'e,' I


(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
';:~ -
USAPJ:. Vl.00
Pages 80 through 84 redacted for the following reasons:
----------------------------
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Sworn Statement of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC

Da te: 20 December 2004


Unit : Sqd Ldr, 2nd Squad, 1st Platoon, Alpha Co . , BLT 1/3
Locati on of Interview : BLT 1/3 COC, Camp Owen, Iraq
Subject: Engagement involving Sgt Peralta on or about 15 Nov 04

I, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) provide the following Sworn Statement


to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who has typed this statement for me, regarding the
firefight i nvolving Sgt Peralta on November 15 , 2004 .

I have previously provided a written statement regarding these events.


That statement was written by me on the date of the incident, 15
November 2004 . I reviewed my prior written statement prior to further
discussing these events with the IO .

I am the Squad Leader, 2nd Squad, 1st Platoon, Alpha Co . , BLT 1./ 3 . On or
abou t 7 November 2004, our platoon was tasked by Bn as the Bn reserve
for Operations Phantom Fury and Al Fajr. Our battalion went through
the breach, in zone, on 8 November 2004 . Our breaching point was
across the rail r oad tracks on the northern edge o f the City of
Fallujah . During the breach, we provided security to the rear by the
Logistical Operations Center (LOC) . The following morning (9 Nov 04),
we received orders from the Bn Cmdr to move up to the breach site and
provide security and clear the breach site and improving ("proofing")
it to make it more accessible. Upon completion of this mission, we
received further orders from t he Bn Cmdr to move through the breach and
occupy the first building on the corner at the northern edge o f the
c ity (approximately at Phase Lines (PL) Charlie and April).

We secured the building and established a platoon command post (CP)


there . For the next three days (9 Nov - 11 Nov 04 ) we maintained
secu rity at the breach site and sent patrols in the surrounding blocks .
The next day (12 Nov 04) we cleared and occup i ed the Al Janabi Hospital
on the northern edge of PL Fran. The fol l owing day (13 Nov 04), we
began "search and assess" clearing of block 412. We finished block
412, as well as a small section of block 406, with one squad (1st Squad)
clearing and occupying the school to the immediate east of the block
412 (NE of the Hospital ).

The following morning (14 Nov 04) our platoon got the order to move
into block 407. My squad started in the center of the block, with 3rd
Squad on our left f lank, 1st Squad on our right flank , a ll clearing from
south to north . Towards the end of the afternoon that day, 1500ish,
Sergeant Peralta linked up with me in the middle of clearing one of the
houses . He asked if he could join our squad for the remainder of the
day to help c l e ar houses, knowing we we r e undermanned. I should add at
this point that my squad had only two fire teams strength , as did all
of our squads . With Sergeant Peral ta, and two other Marines (a combat
cameraman named (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and a combat correspondent named (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) both of whom had joined my squad about five houses prior ) ,
we cleared an additional eight houses .

At the e nd of the day , we g o t t he orde r to h old security on the


northern e dge of this bl ock (40 7 ). We s ti ll had on e row o f h o u ses on
the direct north of this block which had not yet been cleared . Our
platoon commander previously selected a house on the northeast section

Page 1 of 5 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)


,'

of the block overlooki ng t he row of houses we had not yet cleared , to


use as our squad CP . We set security , barricading and reinforcing the
ground f l oo r, stationing one Marine at the top of the stairs and the
bulk of our remaining security on the roof in overwatch positions.

During this time, Sergeant Peralta remained with us. We all retrieved
our rucksacks , chow and water resupply , returned to our CP and set our
watch rotations . I approached him and asked about using the two combat
camera guys i n a provisional fireteam along with myself. Sergeant
Peralta told me I was in charge as the squad leader and that he woula
stand the watch with the two cameramen and that I should get some
sleep. The night went through without incident.

The following morning (15 Nov 04), I got the call from the platoon
commander to pack up and get ready to take down the northern block of
block 407 which had not been cleared yet . I advised the plt cmdr I
would take the southern row of houses first , from east to west , and
then go to the northern row from west to east . The plt cmdr agreed and
we were instructed to return to the plt CP to stage our gear and packs
prior to stepping off for our mission.

Once we returned to our CP , Sgt Peralta asked to go with our squad. I


told him it was up to him , that he didn ' t have to go , but that he was
more than welcome to come with us . He agreed to come with us a nd we
stepped off around 0700 for the southeastern portion of the northern
row of houses we were to clear .
/

We continued to clear houses as we had done the day before . For the
first four houses we cleared , the order of march was 1 st Fire Team(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
[point] ,
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [SAW] , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [Tm ldr) , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
[Asst . Automatic Rifleman or "A Gunner"]), one of the combat camera
guys , myself , Sergeant Peralta , 2nd Fire Team (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
[po i nt/rifleman] , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [A Gunner] , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [Tm ldr] (b)(6), , (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)[SAW)), s econd combat cameraman , and the corpsman (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Going in to ·the fifth house , Sergeant Peralta took the place in the
order of march formerly ·occup i ed by the first cameraman , which put him
directly in front of me . In previously discussing our order of march
wi th Se r geant Pe ra lta , I felt he was free to position himself wherever
i n the stack he felt best for him, so I did not think anything about
his change of position in the stack leading into the fifth house . When
we cleared the fifth house , there was an open doo r unlocked and wide
open in the rear of that house leading into the back alley . We cleared
the alley. and upon searching the house , found a fully loaded AK-4 7
leaning up against one wall .

Once everything was c l eared , we brought the who l e squad to the front
door and I sent the first fire team across the street to th e platoon CP
to drop of the weapon for subsequent destruction . Once they dropped
of f the weapon , they came back and linked up with the rest of the squad
as we came out of the front gate of house five .

At approximately 0800, we lined up in our stack outside the gate to


house number six . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) gave one kick on the front gate and it
im.~ediately came open . As soon as the squad made entry through the
gate into the courtyard , we noticed that the front door to the house

Page 2 of 5 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)


was wide open . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) shouted "we ' re in" , which is squad SOP for
indicating we had made entry .

At this point I should add that I made a diagram of the first floor of
house six , as best I recollect . The diagram is part of this statement
and references to "the diagram" are references to this enclosure . The
front door which was wide open is marked as "Dl" on the diagram .

The first fire team made entry through Dl and ended up in what I have
marked as "Living Room l." I ' m not sure how they got there but assume
they entered through D3 . Sergeant Peralta entered through Dl, directly
in front of me and continued through D3 . I took a position on D3
looking directly on D5 , with my visible line of sight being just to his
right , looking down his right side . By the time I set myself , Sergeant
Peralta was 6-8 feet ahead of me, directly towards D5 and slightly
left . As was his habit , and as what I have marked as "Living Room 2 11
was a l ready clear , Sergeant Peralta made a quick movement forward
towards DS . I do not know if he intended to position himself nearer to
DS or if he intended to proceed through D4 .

At this point , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was off to the right of DS , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was
directly behind (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was in living room 1 (it was
his habit after clearing the living room directly in front of the
breach to remain in that room as security) . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was either in
living room 1 or living room 2 ; I cannot recall , but he was definitely
in one or the other . At this po i n t, the en trance room (room surrounded
by Dl, D2 and D3 , aka the "portico") had myself and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) with
the res t of the second f ire team starting to enter .

At some point , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) must have opened D5 since that is our SOP
and I have subsequently confirmed this point with both (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Once the door opened up , we immediate ly started taking
small arms fire from what I believe to be DB . From where I was
standing in D3 , I could see muzzle flashes from DB . I t h en saw
Sergeant Peralta fall or go down . When Sergeant Peralta went down , I
had a direct line of sight into D8 . I took a knee and returned fire .

At this po i nt , I saw an object , which looked like a grenade , enter


living room 1 from D6 . I saw it come in, looked at it rea l quick ,
continued to fire i nto D8 . At one point , I had to cease fire , because
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) cut across my line of sight . Ultimately , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ran out
D3 and Dl , past me at some point. I heard a voice I recognized as(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
shout , "grenade" and in what appeared to happen simultaneously ,
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
my eye caught the sight of movement by Sergeant Peralta .

I saw Sergeant Peralta 's right arm moving . The general location of his
body has been marked with an "X" on the diagram , with a tick mark for
foot end and anothe r tick mark for his head. He lay about midway
between living room 1 and living room 2 in D4 . He was face down , on
his stomach. I did not notice which way his head was turned . His legs
appeared outstretched in a natural "V" shape behind him . His weapon
was underneath him and a little off to the left with his left hand
still on the forward pistol grip.

I saw his right arm move up in an "L" shape up towards his head and
almost "scooped" the grenade in , towards his body . I do not recall
what position his right arm started from before doing this. As I

Page 3 of 5 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)


noticed the movement of Sergeant Peralta ' s right arm , I not i ced the
grenade had come to a stop 1-2 feet from his right side , ju~ t above h is
head . In recalling these events , the movement by Sergeant Peralta to
"scoop" the grenade into himself seemed to be in response to the
previous shout of "grenade , " as well as because I did not notice any
previous movement by him . Based on these observations , I believe
Sergeant Peralta knew the object next to him to be a grenade at the
time he scooped it into his body .

As Sergeant Peralta was doing the above , I rolled on one knee to my


right in an attempt to take cover behind the wall closest to me . At
this point I lost s ight of Sergeant Peralta . The la st thing I recall
seeing of Sergeant Peralta was he was still in the act of scooping the
grenade towards himself .

I had just turned my head to my right as part of my roll when the


grenade detonated . The total time from when Sergeant Peralta hit the
deck until the explos i on of the grenade was approximately 10 - 15
seconds . Th e ex:f?losion sounded "muffl ed " and not as loud as one of
our , U. S . M67 fragmentation grenades . While still in my roll , I felt
something , like someone throwing a rock , hit me in my left buttocks .

Right about the time I felt the impact , I reached to where I was hit
with my left hand to see if I was b l eeding . I then looked at my hand ,
didn ' t see any blood and got right back in the doorway (D3) facing into
D5 . At this point I was on the left side of D3 to keep as much cover
as possible . I could see Sergeant Peralta ' s feet and just the bottom
of his legs .

We were still taking fire f rom D8 as well as somewhere else in the rear
of the house . I recognized the shooting as enemy weapons by its sound .
I returned fire into D8 and made the call for the 1st fire team to
retrograde out of the house . I yelled words to the effect , "pull out"
or " get out of the house " or something like that . Our intention was t o
regroup and immediate re-attack . At this point I believe (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) were already out of the house . I then moved out through
Dl and held security for (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to make their
exit out of the house .

I know from subsequently talking with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that he and(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
exited
from D2 through Dl , as well as the fact that D2 was closed
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
when I exited through Dl and it was open when we subsequently re -
entered the residence .

Once (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) linked up with us , the entire squad


was basically standing between Dl and D9 . I determined that was not a
safe p l ace and that we should regroup outside of the gate . Once
outs i de the gate, I attempted to get accountability of personnel and
assess our injuries . I made the ca ll to evacuate the injured personnel
ac r oss the street into the platoon CP and we did so .

Once we returned to the CP , I contacted the Plt Cmdr , and inf ormed him
we had taken casualties and that Sergeant Peralta was believed to be
KIA and still inside the house . The Plt cmdr informed me that we would
supp ress the house with aav' s , and then r eturn to finish clearing the
house and retrieve sergeant Peralta ' s body .

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Page 4 of 5
The house was subsequently suppressed as described , and my squad then
re-entered the house . Prior to suppressing the house , I informed the
pl t cmdr of the location of sergeant Peralta ' s body , and was informed
that the machine guns would fire · into the kitchen , on the right side of
the house to avoid hitting him with the machine gun fire .

Upon re-entering the house , my squad moved in through Dl and


irmnediately began firing in to D7 , and D8 , subsequently starting fires
in both rooms . I then moved into living room 1 and saw Sergeant
Peralta l ying in the same position as noted in the diagram , midway
between living room 1 and living room 2 . Once I approached Sergeant
Peralta ' s body , I observed that his Kevlar helmet was no l onger on his
head , but in front of him about 1- 2 feet . I have marked the location
of the Kevlar helmet on the diagram with a "K" . Once living room 1 was
secure , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) began to retrieve Sergeant Pera l ta ' s body , taking
him out through D2, and then Dl . I retrieved Sergeant Peralta ' s Kevlar
helmet from the deck , and placed it o n the chair inside of living room
1.

Once sergeant Peralta ' s body was moved out of the house , my squad
continued to clear the rest of the house . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) informed me there
was a weapons cache inside of the bedroom, and I moved in to inspect
it . The bed inside the room was on fire , and was sitting over top of
the weapons cache . The cache appeared to include about 12-14 rocket
propelled grenades (RPG ' s), about 4-5 57mm rockets , an assortment of
hand grenades , and two ak-47 ' s . The squad continued to clear the rest
of the residence without incident , and I gave the order to return to
the platoon CP . Once the squad began the retrograde out of the house ,
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and myself , picked up Sgt Peralta ' s body , and
carried him across the street to t h e wa i ting AAV . Sergeant Peralta ' s
body was loaded onto the AAV and was moved out of the city . I am
unaware of the location where his body was taken .

In my own opinion , based on what I saw , if Sergeant Peralta had not


done what he did that day , based on where the grenade landed inside of
living room 1 , in relation to where (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and
myself were standing , we would have sustained serious if not fatal
injuries . My own belief is that Sergeant Peralta gave his own life ,
knowingly , and conscious l y to save t h e lives of the others in that
house .

I have personal knowledge of the foregoing events . I have reviewed the


foregoing statement as to form and content and made any revisions I
desired . I swear this statement is true and correct to the best of my
knowledge , except as to such matters which are stated under information
and belief, and as to such matters I believe them to be true .

Date : 20 December 2004 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Attested and sworn to before me on 20 December 2004 in Fallujah, Iraq ,


by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC.

Date : 20 December 2004


(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Page 5 of 5 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)


Pages 90 through 107 redacted for the following reasons:
----------------------------
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), handwritten statements
Summary of Telephonic Interview with
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC
Of 21 December 2004
On 21 December 2004 I, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) interviewed (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC, 1st Fire Team, 2°d Squad, 1st Platoon, Alpha Company,
Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment (BLT 1/3). The interview
commenced at approximately 2026, local time, Camp Owen (IVO the City of Fallujah),
Iraq.

I telephoned via the Kaneohe Bay operator to the two following numbers: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I confirmed the
individual I was speaking with was (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Our connection dropped three times
during the call, twice due to the fact(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
only landline phone was a cordless phone
and the batteries were cutting out and the third time for good when his cell phone cut out.
When the line cut out the final time, I called back twice attempting to re-establish and got
voice mail both times. I left a message stating I would attempt to reach at the same
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
numbers at the same time the following day . The interview was complete through the
point of where had run out of the "contact house." I had but a few follow-up
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
questions, but got voice mail again the following day. Deciding I had enough for the
purposes of this inquiry, no further attempt was made at contact. The following are my
notes ofthis interview.

knew
Sgt Peralta as the Plt Guide. On 14 Nov 04, Peralta linked up w ith 2°d Sqd,
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
1st Plt, A Co, BLT 1/3. Peralta was the Guide for that plt. Peralta had been with 1st Sqd
and showed up carrying bolt cutters. This was in the late afternoon. Peralta spent about
4-5 hours with the Sqd. The Sqd Ldr for this squad is (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) The Sqd quit clearing
houses around dark. It had finished the block of houses.

The Sqd then set up a Sqd CP in a house and set security, got sleep. Peralta was with
them through the night and set up a 3rd Fire Team to include himself and the two combat
camera Marines who were with the sqd.

15 Nov 04-The sqd dropped off its packs at the plt CP down the street, got water and
started clearing houses. Had contact on the 4th house (contact house). This was the first
insurgent contact in a house this squad or platoon had had since first entering the city.
Peralta was with them at the contact house. Normal breaching order fo(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) fire team
(stack order) (b)(6),
is (b)(7)(c) pointman/breacher),(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)(SAW) tm ldr),(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (A-
Gunner) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (sqd ldr) would be wherever. Then cam (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)(pointman for
fireteam 2). Peralta was near the end of our stack. During the breach of the contact
house there was no change in the normal order.

began
breaching the house by kicking in the front gate. He then kicked in the front
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
door. He found himself in a little room with two doors. The door directly ahead of him
was locked so he tried the one to his right. It opened. He knew from previous house

Enclosure (16)
Summary(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)Interview, page I of 5
breaches that when one door to a room is locked, often there is another door to the same
room. When he opened the second door he was in what he called the "Dining Room".
There were a set of larger, double doors to his left leading into the room he was
previously trying to enter through the locked door. The doors are closed and there is a
couch in front of them. proceeds forward . There are two more doors or doorways
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
in the room, one directly ahead of him and one to the left of that which also leads into the
closed room to his left.

As approached these two doorways, he could tell the room ahead of him was some
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
kind of kitchen and the door leading to it was either already open or did not have a door
at all (Interviewer's note(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
is the only witness to state the "kitchen door" may not
have had a door at all. Others state it was closed or ajar and one other states it was open,
but that it did have a door) . He states he never got into that part of the house. He took
the door to its left into another, larger living room he calls the "big room." He now heads
through the big room towards the locked door he first tried entering through. He got
about midway through the room with the double doors now on his left when he heard gun
fire.

At first he could not tell if the firing was friend! y fire or not, but he figured it out. The
firing was rapid, a couple of bursts, then stop, then couple bursts, then stop, etc. He sees
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)come through the double doors into the big room and kneels on one knee
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
near the end of the double doors closest to the "locked door" he first tried to open to gain
entrance to the big room in which he now found himself. He state (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)opens or
kicks in the double doors and is now at the opposite end of the double doors from
himself. He's closest to the locked door and(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)is closest to the "kitchen door."
He does not know what became of the couch, if it was moved, pushed, knocked aside or
what. (Interviewer' s note: is the only witness to state these double doors were
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
closed on entry and that there was a couch in front of them. Upon review of the house
and pictures taken on the day of the event, there are several pieces of furniture in the "big
room" to include several couches and a couple chairs). does not recall just how the
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
couch had been previously blocking the double doors from the dining room side, but it
was and(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)came through it. He (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had been somewhere in the Dining
Room near the couch.

The Kitchen was the source of the firing, but never got back there.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) bases this
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
statement on the source of the sound of the firing. He asks (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)if he can see
anything and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)replies, "No." From where he is at a knee can see in the
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
big room, the living room and the entrance of the house (if he were to tum his head right
over his right shoulder). is on a knee at his end of the double doors (end nearest the
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
locked door) and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)is on a knee at his end of the double doors (end nearest the
kitchen) is looking towards what he believes is the source of the fire, where
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)just came from then tells(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)to pull back to where he is and
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)does. tells(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)to cover the door to his front (the one between the
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
dining room and the big room), while covers where(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)came from, towards
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
the kitchen.(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)is still at his end of the double door.

Enclosure (16)
Summar (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)Interview, page 2 of 5
Then Sergeant Peralta comes into the big room from the dining room and fell to the
ground. says tha
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) should be next behind (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)in the stack, followed by
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) does not recall seeing either (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) in either room. Just Peralta.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)returned
fire at first until old him to pull back.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) also shot towards
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
the kitchen. Then Peralta came in. states he had stopped firing before Peralta came
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
in . Peralta was coming from(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) right-to-left in front of him.(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
was still hearing
bursts of fire coming from the kitchen.(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) says Peralta was "walking, I think just
trying to get in my room." states he never heard Peralta saying anything, was not
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
yelling or running. He just walked into the room and went down.

Peralta went down because of a gunshot. He did not see the gunshot, wear
says
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Peralta was hit or where the shot came from .

runs
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)up to Peralta and yells, "corpsman up!" Peralta's body was all the way in the
big room. saw a little pool of blood above shoulder height. At this point,
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) is
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
only aware of himself, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)and Peralta in the house. He never saw and
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
never saw run up to Peralta (Interviewer's note: only(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) says he(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)ran
up to Peralta).

states
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) he was standing on the other side of some furniture. When Peralta first went
down, could not see all of him because furniture blocked his view, which is one
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
reason he ran up to Peralta. ow is looking down at Peralta over some furniture.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
He can see Peralta and yells "corpsman" three times and then see the grenade.

"They" throw a grenade through the door I used to enter the big room (the same door
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)wastold to watch) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)had pulled back as previously stated. So when
checks Peralta, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)is to his rear ("right on my ass") .
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

says
"They" meaning insurgents (plural), because the bursts sounded like more
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
than one weapon firing.

- (b)(7)(c)
Grenade(b)(6), saw it. Looked like one of those old coconut grenades except orangish
yellow in color. It came in flying in the air. He saw it hit the ground and he turned away
counter clockwise and ran towards the locked door but realized it was locked and the
window to the right of it had bars on it. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)was already in that same corner of the
room. is not quite sitting on(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) but they are "really, really close" together
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
facing toward the grenade.

does
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) not know why he chose to face towards the grenade. He recalls thinking it
was taking the grenade a long time to go off. The grenade seemed to have a long fuse.
wasn't expecting to make it to the comer of the room where he ended up because
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
he expected the grenade to go off sooner, if not immediately. Once he reached the locked
corner of the room, neither he no (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)had anywhere to go. So both huddled down.
was looking at the grenade.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Enclosure (16)
Summary of Interview, page 3 of 5
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
,-----
states
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) he was sitting on the deck, hands on his weapon, weapon between his legs,
legs in front of him bent at the knees. He was looking at the grenade because he was
expecting it to go off. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)was behind him but (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) head was above his
("higher"). do~s not know if(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)was squatting or what.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

sees
Peralta's arm move, so he knows Peralta was still moving. By being down
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
and further back, now he could see under the furniture between himself and Peralta,
whereas before, when he was closer and higher, the furniture blocked his view.

states
Peralta was facing left, towards
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) says he could see Peralta' s
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
eyes. Peralta is laying stomach side down. does not recall where Peralta' s weapon
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
was .

states
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) when he first went up to Peralta, Peralta was facing left (Interviewer's note:
only (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) state Peralta was facing left. Others state he was facing right or
can't tell which direction he was facing) .

At all times when Peralta was down, his body was oriented with the head end pointed
further into the big room and the feet end pointed back into the dining room.

is looking
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) at the grenade, which is above Peralta's head. The grenade is qbove and
to the left of Peralta' s head. can see the entire grenade, which is about one foot
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
from Peralta' s head.

Peralta's eyes are open and that's when sees Peralta reach up. At no time did
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Peralta say anything. Nor did Peralta ever say anything while in the room. Peralta did
make a "grunt" sound like "er" or "ugh" as he was reaching up.

As Peralta was reaching up could not tell where Peralta was looking.(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
thinks Peralta reached up with the arm that was closest to (making it the left
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
only noticed
arm). Do not recall seeing where Peralta's weapon was after he fell.(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Peralta' s arm moving once the arm was above Peralta's head (above in the sense it
was above his head on the floor, not "over" his head as if in the air).

After Peralta reaches up with his arm, looks down, closes his eyes and tilts his
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
head down, with the remainder of his person remaining as previously described.(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
states he looked down at this time because he is still expecting the gr_enade to go off.

The grenade goes off. did not continue to observe Peralta' s arm movement
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
because he had looked down in expectation of the grenade going off.

After the grenade goes off, opens his eyes. There is a big dust cloud in the air and
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
he feels a stinging in his ass (Interviewer's note: received multi pie shrapnel
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
wounds to his hind quarters and buttocks).

Enclosure (16)
Summary o Interview, page 4 of 5
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
then
said to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) "Let's go" and they took off
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) lead them out through
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
the double doors between the big room and the dining room, cutting around the corner
nearest them and out the entrance to the house.

does
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) not recall seeing any other Marines on his way out of the house, but states
other Marines came up to him afterwards and told him they saw him running past them.
ran out of the house and across the street to the platoon CP, with
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
then took his pants down and started washing blood off himself due to shrapnel.(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
states he knew (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)was injured and heard that it was shrapnel in the arm. He also
learned that(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)(pointman for second fire team) had been shot "twice" in the arm.
states he believes (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)must have been in the "other" room (dining room) .
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

At this point I and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) lost telephone connectivity for the third and final time and
I was unable to re-establish communications as described above .

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Enclosure (16)
Summary o(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Interview, page 5 of 5
Pages 113 through 114 redacted for the following reasons:
----------------------------
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), handwritten statement
Summary of Telephonic Interview with
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC
Of 22 December 2004
On 22 December 2004 I (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) interviewed (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC, a combat cameraman formerly attached to znd Squad, 1st
Platoon, Alpha Compa_ny, Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment
(BLT 1/3). The interview commenced at approximately 1740, local time, Camp Owen
(IVO the City ofFallujah), Iraq.

I telephoned via the ta~..ical phone net (TAC) to 3220-120 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) work space at
Camp TQ). I confirmed the individual I was speaking with was (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Our
connection dropped three times during the call, but we were able to re-establish
communication on.each occasion and complete the interview, which ended
approximately 2323, 22 December 24, 2004. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) confirmed he has previously
provided both a written statement written on the day of this incident, as well as authoring
the news article bearing his name at1d enclosed with this inquiry.

was with BLT 1/3 from early November until approximately 22 November
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
2004. He spent his entire time with BLT 1/3 with Alpha Company, tagging along with
one platoon or another as the situation allowed. He was with the BLT before D-Day for
approximately two weeks in the City ofFallujah. He is a combat cameraman and linked
up with 2nd Squad, 1st Platoon, Alpha Company, BLT 1/3 sometime after dark on 13 Nov
04. He states his training is to both write and take photographs but while with BLT 1/3
his job was only photography, to capture images and document the battle. Another
combat cameraman (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) also joined Alpha Company at the same time and his
job was to video tape.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) states that on 13 Nov 04 his camera batteries had died. His rucksack was
aboard one of the AAVs, as were his spare batteries. So by the time he linked up with 2"d
sqd, he was just clearing houses and not taking photos.

By 14 Nov 04, be states his position in the "stac~' (order of march for breaching houses),
"floated around." Most often he would shadow LCpl Brov.rn, who was the A-Gunner for
1st Fire Team and the fourth man in that fire team's "stack." Otherwise, he cannot say
how his position in the stack was determined and that he "just fell in."

His first recollection of Sgt Peralta being with 2nd Sqd is on 14 Nov 04. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) did
not know Peralta was the plt guide. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) recalls that his sqd was at only a two fire
team strength, instead of the normal three :fire teams. He recalls Peralta remained with
2nd sqd the night of 14 Nov 04. He believes it was Peralta who formed a 3rd :fire team out
of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the corpsman and himself The sqd ldr, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) may have
been a part of the provisional 3rd fire team as well. They stood post and got sleep.

Enclosure (17), page 1 of 13 ·


(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) states his sqd arose at first light on 15 Nov 04. They did hygiene, got chow
and waited for orders to move out. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)would give the word on what they we're
doing. Same as any other day, "we're here; we're going there and clearing houses."

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) thinks they had cleared 1-3 houses before reaching the "contact house"
(house in which the sqd received hostile fire). For 15 Nov 04, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
to get behind (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) recalls he and first fire team holding their stack
order for hous_es 1-3. He thinks they received contact on the 4th house. He thinks they
had been clearing houses 1-2 hours before reaching the contact house.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) recalls Peralta had the bolt cutters and would be in the squad stack, but not
sure where. If a bolt needed cutting, he'd come up and cut it and then move back. For
houses 1-3, Peralta was_not in front o (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) in the sqd stack. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) recalls
the order being (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) perhaps (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) did not know
the Marines well, or by name or sight, since he was relatively recent to the platoon), then
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) says he was always behind(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)He thinks the corpsman
may have been behind him.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) states that the stack order can change between when the front gate of a house
is breached and prior to breaching the entrance door. The sqd will typicaily set some
security prior to the breaching of the entrance door and the Marines performing security
are not always the same.

After leaving the previous house (the last house immediately before the "contact house"),
Peralta is now in front o (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) in the stack. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) cannot recall the specific
stack order or just how far in front of him Peralta is. He knows that (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and
are also all ahead of him in the stack_ The next time he sees Peralta is in the
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
contact house.

The entryway to the contact house had a porcelain sink or wash basin (the "sink room").
Once inside it had 3 doors: the entrance you came through, a door directly ahead leading
ultimately to a big living room (the "big room"), and a door to the right leading into a
living room/dining room (the "living room"). There is a wide opening between the big
room and the living room (it may have had French doors, or an accordion door or double
doors or no doors but (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) recalls it was open). To the right ofthis wide space if
one is standing in the living room looking into the big room is another door which adjoins
the big room with the living room. To the right of this adjoining door is another door
which leads into a kitchen area. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) calls this last door the ''Peralta" door since
he recalls Peralta being the one to open it or near it when it opens.

states the one to first breach the contact house entrance was probably
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
opened the door and a mew Marines enter the sink room. The tempo is the first
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
two Marines would stay really close together but after that Marines just kind of filter for
flow through and get ready to go to the next room because the room they are all in is
already dear. They try not to bunch up.

Enclosure (17), page 2 of 13


(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) states he entered the sink room behind others, and went through the right
door into the living room. He recalls the door in the sink room leading into the big room
being "open." (Interviewer's note: Both (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) specifically state that door
was locked, which is why t.1-)ey tried the other door and went into the living room).

states he would normally just shadow the guy in front of him but back
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
enough to stay out of the way. He states, as a combat cameraman, he does not have the
same level of experience clearing houses as the grunts. So he would try to learn from
them, defer to their experience, maintain his flow, tempo and interval and stay out their
way, helping when and how he could.

was armed with a standard issue Ml 6A2 with iron sights. He had added an
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
extra magazine pouch to the buttstock of the weapon, but the pouch was empty because
he had placed that magazine in the weapon, carrying extra mags elsewhere on his person.
He was not carrying his camera. He is right handed.

entered the sink room and flowed right into the living room. He flowed into
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
the living room out of habit because that would be the best position to normally get a
picture of a Marine kicking in a door. So even though he did not have his camera, he
continued the habit. He flowed into the living room and stopped sort of in the middle of
the living room and to the right (using the point of entry as a reference for right and left).
At this point he is looking at the closed door leading into the kitchen (the Peralta door).
He stops because the Peralta door is closed and based on the situation, that would be the
next step - the next place they would go through.

states(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)was to the left of the Peralta door with his SAW. He thinks
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
was near. He states
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was in t11e living room as well.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was somewhere
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
off to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) left, but cannot tell if he is in the living room as well or in the big
room, but in any event, to his left.

can tell there are more people in the living room as well but cannot say who
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
or how many. There also may have been people in the big room.

Peralta is in the living room. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) first notices him by the closed door to the
kitchen (the Peralta door). (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)and another Marine are stacked to the left of this
door as you are looking at it. Sgt Peralta is now standing in front of this door, and
appears about to open it. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) sees Peralta' s hand on the door handle.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) is 90% sure there was at least one other :Marine stacked to the left of the
Peralta door.

Once inside a residence, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) says the "stack order" breaks down. People do what
is needed and it does not have to be the same Marine doing the same thing each time.
The Marine who is closest to the next door, once a room is cleared, may be the one to
breach it. He states he, himself, has opened or breached doors simply because he was
closest at hand at the time.

Enclosure (17), page 3 of 13


Peralta and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)were approximately the same distance from the Peralta door. Then
the door opens. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) cannot state whether it opens because Peralta opens it, or
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)opens it or if someone on the opposite side opens it. But it opens and he
ho]i,:,,uos
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\ ..:a..... .1.1., ,.,i y .,. ....,-r'i-.a
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'-'" ..... . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) is the
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to state it was Peralt a who opens this door. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)specifically states it was himself
who opened this door).

When the door opened it opened all the way and it stayed open. Almost i.ii1.Il1ediately
there is gun fire from within. The firing was "pretty continuous.,, It was not the kind of
"empty the magazine" type of firing but it was also more than 3 round bursts. It was
continuous. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) could tell it w as more than one weapon firing.

saw one insurgent in a room off to the left of the Peralta door (which he
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
learned upon subsequent re-entty of the residence after the fire fight to be a bedroom)
which he calls the "bedroom." He also saw another insurgent off to the left in the rear of
the house. There was another room to the right of the bedroom. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) is not sure
what that room was and calls it the "unknown room." (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) saw a third insurgent
by the fact he could see the muzzle of a weapon sticking out from the right of the Peralta
door doorway (from what he later learned was a stair well leading up to the residence's
second story).

After the firing started, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) says at first he did nothing. "I stood there and did
nothing, then it hit me, 'holy shit, people are shooting at us!"' (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) then fired off
5 shots from his weapon. He states the first shot was well aimed over the sights at the
bedroom. For the other 4 shots the rifle was in his shoulder aimed at the bedroom. Then
another Marine came towards him and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stopped firing. The other Marine did
bump into him and he almost fell but didn't. But then he had trouble getting his weapon
back up to re-engage and there were people running all around the room so he did not
have a clear line of fire. So he asked himself what he should do and he sees Peralta on
the ground.

Someone screamed "frag" or "grenade" and Marines in the big room scrambled and
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) saw a grenade come into the big room. It came from right to left as he was
looking into the big room. It bumped or bounced and then rolled and then
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) saw Peralta "scoop" the grenade towards himself.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) said to himself, "Shit! That's a grenade!" and ran to the right rear comer of
the living room and "hunkered down" (if the entrance from the sink room to the living
room is the "rear", (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was in the comer to the right of the entrance from the sink
room). Then the grenade went off

Looking around now (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) saw Marines making their way to the exit through the
sink room. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) said to himself, "Time to get out" and "hauled ass."

At first when Peralta was moving back from the Peralta door it was like he was
scrambling, but then he staggered. It appeared Peralta saw the insurgents and tried to

Enclosure (17), page 4 of 13


,,-
back off (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) doesn't know if gun fire impacted Peralta' s sapi-plate or what but
it he was scrambling backvvards and then staggering.

V/hen Peralta fell, .his body (head) was pointed towards the wall inside the "big room" at
about the 1130 position (if one is stai.1ding in the middle of the living room facing directly
into the big room, the wall beyond the big room is the 12 o'clock position for point of
reference, making Peralta's feet in roughly the 6 o'clock position pointing back towards
the living. room).

The grenade was round.but not a circle. It was "ovular," about the same shape as o-ld
World War II pineapple grenades but it wasn't a pineapple grenade. It's dimensions from
top to bottom were about 3.5 inches in height, but he's not sure. At it's thickest part it is
smaller than a person's wrist in width. Overall it would not fit in his palm (iflayed on its
side on his palm, each end would extend beyond the palm). The color of the grenade was
"yellow."

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) thinks only one person yelled "frag" or "grenade", but it could have been
more than one person. Also, the explosion from the grenade was not as loud as he was
expecting it to be. Not that he's heard many grenades, but it just wasn't that loud.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) thinks the grenade was on Peralta' s right side. He also think Peralta
scooped the grenade with his right arm. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) did not see any other part of
Peralta's body move. The arm moved and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) turned to run and lost sight
of Peralta as he was "scooping."

Peralta's arm looked like it was going up towards his head as though attempting to
snare the grenad~ and then (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) turned away. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ran to the corner
of the room and faced just to the right of the comer slightly towards the entrance to the
room (towards the sink room), and doubled over at the waist, bending at his knees.

From the time he first "frag" or "grenade" until the time of the explosion it seemed like a
long time but in all reality he doesn't know if it was as long as it seemed. Time seemed
different. The grenade seemed like an eternity. "Forever."

Next everyone was moving, yelling and taking off. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ran out of the house and
out the front gate of the contact house. He stopped, looked around, saw where people
where headed and ran to the platoon CP. He and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) combat videographer)
stopped at the comer of the wall around the CP and waited to see. Somebody, probably
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) shouted to get inside the CP. There was a gate that was partially down close
to them and didn't realize it was rigged with a "flash/bang" by the Marines and
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
tripped
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) it and it exploded next to his boot. After that, they ran around into the CP.

They had left Peralta behind in the building. The first thing on everybody' s mind was to
go back and pull him out. Pretty much everybody who was ·available went back. They
went back in the house. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) does not remember how they got back in or what
they did .

Enclosure (17), page 5 of 13


does remember having to get out of another Marine' sway at the entrance to
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
the contact house because that Marine was pulling Peraita's body through the front door
into the courtyard. Peralta's rifle 1.vas _still slung on his body and it was catching on the
door and the other I'viarine said, "Don't just stand there, help me," and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) helped
him move the rifle out of the way.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) remembers forming up outside the gate for a second time to go back into the
contact house. When he got there to form up, there was a Marine already there.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) does not remember if Peralta still had his Kevlar helmet on when he was
being brought out of the contact house. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) does remember that there was blood
on the rifle. The rifle is supposed to be black and he saw red, so there was enough blood
on it to tell it was blood (Interviewer's note: the Bn Adj spoke with the supply chain and
learned the weapon was serviceable and has since been cleaned and re-issued. This unit
has been unable to locate the Kevlar for further inspection and it is believed to have been
disposed of. At least one witness states he recalls viewing the Kevlar and it appeared
bloody and damaged.)

remembers traks (AAVs) outside the gate after Peralta was brought out of the
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
house and saw Peralta being placed in one of the AAVs. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) pack was on one
of the AAV's and he retrieved it, replaced the batteries in his camera and later went back
into the contact house (for what was now the third ti.me), this time with EOD and his
camera and took pictures. He photographed some of the rooms and ordnance found in
the building. He went straight to the rear of the house where the insurgents had been and
took pictures while EOD removed ordnance. He didn't want to go back to where Peralta
had fallen but talked himself into it, for some reason thinking he should take a photo. He
took a picture of the spot where Peralta fell. Someone had lain a sheet or piece of cloth
over the spot, partially covering it, but not really covering it and blood was very visible.

still had the photographs he took and agreed to email them to the Bn
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Adjutant's account for purposes of this inquiry. The photographs are attached to this
summary (there were a total of 10, but three are of poor quality and unclear, so only
seven are attached).

stated he had nothing else to add to this interview and that his statement to
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
me was his best recollection of these events .

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Enclosure (17), page 6 of 13


ttachm nt toE closur (17
Picture taken on J5 o 04 by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) of pon each in ·bed room"

nclo ure ( 17), page 7 of 13


(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
staged

Enclo ure 17), page 8 of 13


chment C to Enclosure ( 17)
Picture t.aken on 15 ov 04 by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ofEOD staging reco ered weapons from
contact house ·th another room beyond and rear exit to house to the left

oclosure ( 17), page 9 of J3


ttachment D to Enclosure 17)
Picture tak n oo 15 ov 0 by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) of EOD ta.ging reco ered weapons in the
' kitchen ' area of the contact hous ith anoth r room b yond and rear exit to house to
the left and another door to the right under th tai ay. From Po t-h u -rubblin
photos, the door directly ahead (and dark) is the entrance to the acrual kitchen of the
house.

Enclosure ( 17) page 10 of 13


(b)(6)

Attach:m-ent E to Enclosure (17)


Picture taken on 15 ov 04 by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) of spot where Sergeant Peralta fell and from
which he was subsequently reco ered in big room." The entryway between this room
and the' living room" is between the two chairs to the le.ft of the picture. There is a door
from thi "big room" into the "sink room,, out o ·ght in the extre e upper left of the
photograph. The marks on the floor leading av ay :from the cloth indicate the direction of
removal of Peralta from tbe room.

Enclosure ( 17), page 11 of 13


( tachment F to nclosure (17)
Picture taken on 15 ov 04 by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) of -47 magazines on f oor of 'contact
hou e"

nclosure ( 17), page 12 of 13


(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) of food ores and bunk beds in \mkno 1 n
room' of 'contact hous "

Enclosure ( 17), page 13 of 13


PERALTAROl

************************************************************
*********** CASUALTY REPORT ***********
***************************************** *******************
(01) Report Type: INIT
(02) casualty Type: HOSTILE
(03) casualty status: DECEASED
(04) Report Number: DIV3586
(07) category: ACTIVE DUTY/
(08) SSN(New/old): (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(09) Name(Last/First/Middle/sfx): PERALTA/RAFAEL//


(11) Date/Place of Birth: 19790407///us
(12) Rank: Sgt
(13) Service/Component: USMC/REGULAR
(14) Organization/Station: A co, 1ST BN, 8TH MAR, RCT- 7, 1ST MARDIV {13110}
(15) Duty MOS/AFSC: 0311
(25) Home of Record: SAN DIEGO/CA/
(36) Date/time of Incident: 20041115/0915//
(37) Place of Incident: FALLUJAH//IZ
(39) circumstances: SGT PERALTA SUSTAINED A GUNSHOT WOUND TO THE CHEST FROM SMALL
ARMS FIRE AND A SHRAPNEL WOUND TO HIS HEAD FROM AN EXPLOSION WHILE CONDUCTING COMBAT
OPERATIONS IN THE AL ANBAR PROVINCE. SGT PERALTA DIED OF WOUNDS (DOW) WHILE ENROUTE
TO BRAVO SURGICAL COMPANY. HE WAS PRONOUNCED DECEASED AT 0915/041115 BY (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ATTENDING PHYSICIAN. NOK HAS NOT BEEN NOTIFIED. PURPLE HEART IS
RECOMMENDED. THIS IS A FINAL PCR.
(40) Inflicting Force: ENEMY FORCES
(57) Date/Time of Death 20041115/0915 (confirmed)
(61) Additional Remarks: REQUEST CACOS TACTFULLY INFORM NOK THAT WHEN THE MEDIA IS
ALERTED TO SPECIFIC INFORMATION ABOUT A CASUALTY (INFORMATION SUCH AS LOCATION,
SPECIFIC INJURIES, UNIT, ETC.), IT PROVIDES THE ENEMY AN IMMEDIATE BATTLE DAMAGE
ASSESSMENT (BDA), NOT OTHERWISE AVAILABLE TO HIM. THIS TYPE OF INFORMATION GIVES
THE ENEMY THE ABILI TY TO INFLICT FURTHER CASUALTIES ON FORCES I N THE THEATER.
(70) software Version: DCIPS Forward - version 3.2 DB - Vers ion 1.2M
supp. rtem(s): 10, 24, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54,
55, 56, 58 , 59,
D

Page 1
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY
WASHINGTON, DC 2 0 ~

December 21 , 2004
IIEPLYTO
4TTemONO~

Office of the Armed Forces


Medical Examiner

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Battalion Landing Team 1/3
Faliujah , Iraq

Dear (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

As requested , enclosed is a copy of the Preliminary Autopsy


Report Protocol in the case of SGT Rafa el Peralta , SSN (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) These findings are preliminary , and subject to
modification . pending further investigation and laboratory
testing .

I understand that this report will be used as part of an


investigation into SGT Rafael Peralta ' s death . I realize that
there is a possibility that some of the terminology used therein
may be un f amiliar to you . I-f you have questions regarding any
portion of the report provided , please do not hesitate to call me
at (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) You may also contact
F
me via e - mail at the following address : (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

As these are copies of the reports , there is no need to


return them to our office . If you need any further assistance ,
please do not hesitate to contact me .

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

. Commander , Medical Corps


United States Navy
·Armed Forces Medica l Examiner

;
l
I
£,,c./M i, . rt C/'1 J I
rl
/b/3
f
Pages 130 through 133 redacted for the following reasons:
----------------------------
(b)(6)
Not a USMC record, referred to AFIP.
The following tatem nt is based on (I) my interprelati n of the findings of the enclo ed
formal autopsy(..,) my examination of Sgt Peralta's body, which occurred at the field
Battalion ·d tation approximately 30 minute aft r llis injury (3) my examination of his
flak jacket on 22 DE 2004 (4) th witnessed account of the death of Sgt Peralla
contained within the investigation fold r.

Tbe au top y detail the cau e of d ath: 0 un hot wow1d to the back f the head.

EAND TRAJE TORY:


Tb gm1 hot wound entered the occipital area of the bead• tangentially," mearung not
traight on. It caused a depressed, pushed in entranc wound, creating multiple skull
fragment . A a re ult the trajectory entrance path of the bull tis inconclu i e. In
Figure l Uus i depicted by an arc of approximately 160 degrees repres nting po sibl
angles of entry that a.re tangential to the cur ature of the skull. Therefore he wa hot
from behind at an undetermined side angle.

EXIT:
o exit wound.

wiLh an end point in the right brain.

DAMAGE:
The bullet penetrated the kull, dura, and araclmoid, which are lissue covering the
outside of the brain. It caused bleeding on the outside and in ide of the brain, jn the areas
of both 1 ft and right occipital lobes and the cerebellar area, as it passed through its
course. The fir t area of the brain ncouotered was the left occipital lobe ttich was
ma erated es entiaUy destroyed. Lacerations were noted along the rest of the pathway,
going through t.be right temporopaiietal area (see Figur 1).
Ba ed on this report of damage, and area affected, it i one ivable that gt Peralta had
intact cognitive and motor function for 30 seconds or more after his brain injury. The left
occipital lobe of the brain p1irnarily function in ision. D troying this area would
disturb vi ion, most lik Jy causing a loss of ability to see the right half of each eye'
. visual fi Id, as well as the enter. However the left visual field would most likely be
preserved. Thi visual defi it is depicted below, oriented a if one wa looking out
through the circle , with the right and center field of vision blacked out but the left
fields intact and clear.

Figure 3
s the bullet moved into the right paJietal and Lemporal area gt Peralta would likely
!1 ve l Sl some motor function on hi lefl id . It is not pas ible to know how much
bility to move his left ide remained intact, but in e thi area was lacerated, rather than
macerated and completely destroyed, he likely retained ome ability to move hi left ide
as well a his right. Hi frontal lob s were not affi cted by the bullet path meaniog hi
ability to perform high r functioning tasks such as recognizing a situation and willfully
re ponrung was intact. It i possible and likely that ome of his hearing was intact in the
30 seconds following his injury.

OTHER
Figure 2 show multiple penetrating balli tic injuries, entering Lhe left face from the front
nd breaking and lodging in th facial bones without ntering the cranium or rain.
hese did not contribute to his death.

He als had "too-numerous-to-count" superfi ial fragm nt wound to the face. groin and
e tremitie . The examination of the body documented at Camp Fallujah Mortuary
Affair specifically points to numerous shrapnel injuries to the 1ight wrist.

Examination of his flak jacket reveal n umerou hrapnel fragments on the left side, most
densely grouped at the left mid-chest, with fewer fragments uperiorly and inferiorly.
There are a few fragments in the groin protector. These fragments do not appear to have
penetrated thrnugh the flak jacket. They are con ist with the relatively 1ow velocity
fragments that entered the left ide of his face lodged in the facial bones, but did not
penetrated tl1Jough to the brain.

UMM.ARY:
gt Peralta died from a gun hot wound to the back of the bead, which lodged in bi brain.
Based on the path of the bullet and do umented damage it is possibl and mo t likely
t.hat Sgt Peralta did not uffer instantaneous death or immobilization. Instead, he bad
visual impairm nt, but not total blindness, progressing to primarily Jeft-sid d motor
dysfun tion. It i po sible that he could willfully mo e his body in the econds foUowing
thi eventually fatal brain injury.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Battalion Landing Team 1/3 Surgeon

ote:
I am lken ed to practice medicine by th Commonwealth of Virginia. I am a General
edical Officer a signed to th Marine Corps. I am not a certified medical examiner
pathologist, or neurologist. Thi tatement is my int rpretation of formal autopsy result ,
translation into more asily understandable verna ular and an informed a imilation of
medical findings and po sible actions by the deceased.
Dec 24 2005

On December the 23rd I, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) responded to a request by Battalion


Landing Tean1 1 /3, for an Explosive Ordnance disposal Technician. Upon arrival at
1/3 's position I was informed that my assistance was required in an investigation
regarding the death of Sgt Peralta. I was then inforn1ed of what had happened to Sgt
Peralta, according to eyewitness statements and shown many pictures from the scene of
his death. I was informed that during an encounter with insmgents in a house Sgt Peralta
suffered a bullet wound to the head and in an effo1i to protect his fellow Marines, was
still able to puU an enemy grenade to his body when it was thrown.
I, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was infonned that my presence was requested in an effort to
positively identify the type of grenade that was used, and possibly where the detonation
occurred in relation to Sgt Peralta's body. Upon request I was allowed to examine Sgt
Peialta's flack jacket. The flack jacket showed little blast damage with minor
:fragmentation damage located mostly on the left front portion. On further examination I
removed several small pieces of metal fragmentation from within exterior wall of the
flack jacket and first aid kit. Also located under the front closme Velcro flap of the flack.
jacket was a piece of the grenade fuse. The fragment pattern on the front left portion of
Sgt Peralta's flack jacket indicated the grenade was directly underneath Sgt Peralta's left
side and was shielded by something (possibly his arm) on the right side, blocking any
grenade damage to that side of his body and deflecting the fragment from the fuse under
the Velcro closme flap. The eyewitness description of what the grenade looked like stated
it was yellowish with the standard USSR type grenade fuse. This description is consistent
with the Iraqi "model Unlmown" grenade. The pieces of metal fragmentation removed
from Sgt Peralta's flack jacket are also consistent with the :fragmentation of this particular
grenade being the only grenade, which us~s a flexible, low-grade senated spring as its
liner. The blast damage caused on Sgt Peralta's flack jacket is also consistent with the
effects this grenade would cause as it's explosive weight is only 36.05 grams compared
to the US, M67 grenade of 184 grams of explosives. In conclusion, no other grenade
would have caused the minimal blast and fragmentation effects as seen in the
photographs or as was evident on Sgt Peralta's flack jacket. The metal fragmentation
pieces recovered from Sgt Peralta's flack jacket were also indicative to only one type of
grenade, the Iraqi "model unlmown". It was also evident by fragmentation patterns on Sgt
Peralta's flack j acket that he had pulled the grenade underneath his body upon detonation.

Respectfully Submitted

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Teclmician/ Team Leader


14 years experience in BOD
Statement of Investigating Officer
On December 19, 2004, the Executive Officer, Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 3rd
Marine Regiment (BLT 1/3), with the knowledge and consent of the Battalion
Commanding Officer, verbally appointed both myself, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to inquire into the
allegation of heroism surrounding the death of Sergeant Rafael (NMl) Peralta, USMC,
occurring on 15 ovember 2004, Fallujah, Iraq.

I already had a passing knowledge of the general circumstances of Sgt Peralta's death
from having read two, open source, news articles ( one by former Lieutenant Colonel
Oliver North, USMC (Ret.) and the other by Lance Corporal Travis J. Kaemmerer,
USMC, a combat cameraman attached to 2nd Squad, 151 Platoon, Company "A", BLT 1/3
at the time of the incident). I ha e enclosed copies of both of these news articles as
attachments (A) and (B) respectively to this statement.

I began this investigation by reviewing the reference. I learned that several witnesses had
previously provided, unswom, written statements on the day of the incident. I reviewed
these prior statements, which are enclosed with this investigation as enclosures (1)-(6),
inclusive. We requested, BOD support, as well as medical, ballistic and autopsy records.
Meanwhile, we commenced to interview, or re-interview as the case may be, percipient
witnesses to this engagement. We obtained sworn statements_from percipient witnesses
whenever possible. I telephon.ically interviewed (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
and have transcribed my notes of these conversations as Enclosures (16) and (17)
respectively. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) also took pictures within the contact house the
day of the engagement. He sent me ten photographs by electronic mail. Of the 10
photographs, 2 are very blurry and 1 is simply redundant ofEOD staging weapons by the
stain:vay of the contact house. All photographs have been preserved, but only photos 1-7
(entitled "Attachments (A)-(G)" to Enclosure (17)) are attached.

I spoke with the -2 section for BLT 1/3 and had them put together a sequence of aerial
maps of the city, neighborhood, block and house where the engagement took place. This
montage appears in a powerpoint sli de presentation I have attached to this statement as
Attachment (C).

I also took several photographs. I initially photographed Sergeant Peralta' s Flak Jacket
recovered from his person the day of the incident. I next photographed the contact house
when I toured it with the platoon commander, the squad leader (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and the Bn
XO (and confirmed the layout of tbe ground floor and geometry of fires and blast radius
in the process) . My viewing of the contact house confirms that the diagrams made by
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) most closely approximate the actual layout . My photos
and those taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) support this conclusion as well. The foregoing also
confirms that (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) diagram is inaccurate. (See attachment (D) to this
enclosure).

Enclosure (22) Page 1 of 3


( In personally viewing the contact house, our group also went next door to where the
insurgents who fled the contact house were killed . Still in the kitchen of that house were
the remains of one insurgent under the kitchen sink.

I also took photographs of the flak jacket and gear when (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was inspecting
the flak jacket. All the witnesses who heard the grenade explode stated it did not sound
loud or did not sound as loud as they expected. All the witnesses who were able to recall
the color of the grenade stated it was "yellow" or "organish yellow." All the witnesses
who recalled the grenade stated it had a long fuse. All the witnesses who heard the yell
"frag" or "grenade" said it seemed like a long time before the grenade went off The frag
pattern on the floor and wall did not recover any actual shrapnel. I photographed the bits
of shrapnel EOD recovered from the flak jacket (to include a piece of the fuse of the
grenade), and two sample grenades. These photographs appear collectively in
Attachment (D) to this statement. Based on the foregoing, I agree with EOD that the
grenade in question was "Iraqi grenade model unknown," as depicted in the photographs.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) found a photograph depicting different grenade types and


we used it as a "lineup" to assist witnesses in identifying the grenade in this incident.
The actual grenade used, as determined by EOD, is OT depicted in the composite
photograph. A close approximation is the RGD.-5, which does appear and was selected
by a couple witnesses who were able to make an identification at all. This composite
photo is enclosed as Attachment (E) to this statement.
(
Using the witness testimony, diagrams and photographs, I and another officer created a
composite diagram in powerpoint showing the layout of the first floor of the contact
house. This diagram is attached as (F) to this statement.

The witness statements are fairly consistent as to the circumstances of Sergeant Peralta's
heroic act, as well as the heroic act itself. There are differences among the statements as
to the number of people in the house, where they were located, and in what order. There
are differences as to which way Sergeant Peralta's head was facing and which arm he
used and where the grenade was located in proximity to his head. Another difference was
whether or not Sergeant Peralta still had his Kevlar helmet on his head after the
explosion. Two Marines testify that each of them was the one to pick the Kevlar off the
floor as Sergeant Peralta was being recovered from the house. However, the Marine who
actually pulled Sergeant Peralta out of the house himself states the Kevlar was still on the
Sergeant. He goes on to add it and Peralta's weapon were subsequently handed to him
once Peralta was being loaded on the evacuation vehicle. A search of the supply section
has revealed the Kevlar was either lost, destroyed or misplaced and the weapon bas since
been cleaned and re-issued . Neither was initially available for viewing for during the
course of this inquiry, until January 1, 2005, when (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) inspected and
photographed the Ml6A4. These photographs appear at the end of Attachment D to
Enclosure 22. None of the testimonial differences I noted in any way clouds or
diminishes the confirmed and certain heroic act of Sergeant Peralta on this occasion.

Enclosure (22) Page 2 of3


There is no doubt that Sergeant Peralta fell mortally wounded early in the fire fight of 15
Nov 04. Neither is there any doubt that he fell at least half way into the room where he
was later recovered . There is no doubt he fell face down. There is no doubt a grenade
was thrown into the room where he lay. There is no doubt the grenade landed or came to
a stop in close proximity to him (about a foot by most accounts) . There is no doubt he
reached for the grenade with his arm (according to most, his right arm - according to one,
his left). There is no doubt the grenade exploded under him, on his left side. There is no
doubt that the only way the grenade entering the room from right to left could have gotten
underneath the left hand side of Sergeant Peralta unless Sergeant Peralta put it there.

We requested, and the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology kindly provided its autopsy
report on Sergeant Peralta. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) M.D ., MC US reviewed the results of autopsy
and provided a summary for this inquiry. EOD kindly provided its expertise to us as
well.

Given the circumstances of the subject of this inquiry, as well as the combat
circumstances under which it was conducted, we experienced very little in the way of
difficulties in conducting.

My deepest sympathies for the Peralta family .

Our deepest gratitude to Sergeant Rafael (NMI) Peralta, United States Marine Corps
( (KIA), 15 ovember 2004, Fallujah, Iraq.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Investigating Officer
01 January 2005

Enclosure (22) Page 3 of 3


OF 4
3 OF L{
Photograp taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6)

Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 19 Dec 04 at BLT 1/3 COC IYO of Camp Fallujab
using flash depicting Peralta's flak jack.e wi h piece o shrapnel (later identified by EOD
as being part ofa fuse to an Iraqi grenade mode] unknown') embedded in e elcro.

ttachment (D) to Enclosure (22), page I of 65


(b)(6)

Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 19 Dec 04 at BLT 1/3 COC rvo of Camp Fa!lujah
using ambient light d picting same piece of shrapnel in. Velcro of gt Peraita's flak
jacket.

. ttachment (D) to Enclosure (22), page 2 of 65


(b)(6)

(
Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 19 Dec 04 at BLT 1/3 COC IVG of Camp Fallujab
using ambient light depicting front of Peralta s flak jacket. The moile gear on the left
side of the flak has shrapnel holes and scorch marks.

Attachment (D) o Enclosure (22 , page 3 of 65


(b)(6)

Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 19 Dec 04 at BLT 1/3 COC O of Camp Fallujah
depicting entire front of Peralta's flak jacket and groin protector.

tachrneat D) to Enclosure 22), page 4 of 65


(b)(6)

.,- :.

Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 19 Dec 04 at BLT lf" COC IVO of amp Fallujah
dep.icting interior of Peralta flak jacket as opened from the front. The dark patch on the
top left and left side of the flak (appearing on the right wben vi wed here) is dried blood.

Attachment (D) to Enclosure 22), page 5 of 6 ~


(b)(6)

Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 19 Dec 04 at BLT 1/3 COC I O of amp Fallujah
usin0 tla h of close up of interior of back panel of Peralta flak jacket. The writing reads,
' GOD 1Y LIFE IS · OUR HANDS' and is belie ed to have been written by
Sergeant Rafael PeraJta.

Attachment (D) to Enclosure (22) page 6 of 65

"
(b)(6)

Photo taken.by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 19 Dec 04 at BLT 1/3 0 0 of Camp Fallujah


using flash of in erior of back panel of PeraJta flak jacket take slightly further back than
pr ceding photo.

Attachment (D) to Enclosure 22), page 7 of 6~


(b)(6)

Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 19 Dec 04 at BLT 1/3 COC IVO of amp Fallujah
usiog ash of ex'terior of back of Peralta flak jacket depicting Peral la s "CamelBack' and
medicaJ kit (the rnedica) kit vvas subsequently inspected and d isassembled by(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
of EOD se era.I days later when searching fur bi of shrapnel).
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Attachment (D o Enclosure (22) page 8 of 6 r


(b)(6)

Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on I 9 Dec 04 BLT 1/3 COC IVO of amp Fallujah
using ambient light depicting leR exterior side of eralta flak jacket which scorching and
shrapnel damage to molle gear.

. ttachm nt (D) to Enclosure (22) page 9 of 6 -


(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 21 Dec rdin tes 3 LB 89918 using
ambient li 0 ht depictin gate to eel from court yard f hous
lookin° out owards the

ttachm nt D) to nclosur 22 pag 10 of 6 ~


Photo t ·en by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 21 Dec 04 at grid rdinat s 3 8 LB 889918 using
ambien Ligb1 depicting front entran o conta t house n a.ken fro same po ition
as precedin photo and rot ·ng 180 egr . Th ru bl to the right of the photo is the
former li ing room/dining room .

ttachm nt (D o Enclosur 22 page 1 I of 6 -


Pho o tak n by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 21 D c 04 at grid coordinat 38 L 889918 u ing
ambi nt li bt depictin front entran o oat ct ou oft '00 n oor fr
i protrud.in0 from the entrance. Tbe rounded " to er" con a.in
portico or foyer room first entered from tl1 front door.

ttachm nt D to En losure (22 page 12 of 65


Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on _ J Dec 04 LB 8899 1 u mg
am.bi nt li ,[lt d pi tin fr nt trance o nt akin ut.

tta hm nt D) to Enclosure 22 , pag I of 6 -


Photo taken by (b)(6),
_ (b)(7)(c) on 21 D at grid coordiaat 38 LB 88991 using
ambient Light d picting front entran t on c h u with ider iew of the rounded
o er v hi b has the otrance room at it bas . Tb ·odo into the ig room" or
Ii ing room 2 is ·sibl o the left of he o r.

Attachment o Enclosure _2) page 14 of 6-


Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 21 Dec O at grid coordinat s .,g using
ambient i t depicting entranc roo sink room/portico/foyer to 'contact house". The
n y is off camera to the left of the photo. There is a oor direct! bin th
cam ra an another to the right of th camera. bro ink or ash basin i visibl
in th lo er cen r for ground.

Attachm nt D) to Enclosure 22) pag 1 of 6 -


Photo tak a by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) grid rdioa 38 LB 8899 I 8 using
ambient light depicting & nt entrance o contact ho s vie ed from insid th sink
room and oriented 4 - degr e o he I oft e door v. a . Another door i 4 - egr
further o th left a depic ed elo .

ttachm t D) o En lo ure 22), page 16 of 65


Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) o 21 D O grid coordinat 3& LB 889918 u jng
ambi nt light , n from th ntry room or sink r m looking· 1to the Living room/Ii ing
rooml/dining room. The front ntrance to the 10us is off cam ra lo he right and th
ntran to the' big ro m • or Li\ ·o-=> room 2 is off camera to the left (which i also th
locked door' ntry into th big room.

ttachm nt D o Endo ure (2 ). pag 17 of 65


Photo tak n by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 21 Dec 04 grid coordinat 3 S LB 889918 usin
ambient li:::,ht de icting the entry into the t living room/living rooml/dinin:::, room thru
'D., and the lo door or ·02' ( ad door ta · tried to br b I ding to 'big
room /living roo _ to the left. The sink i hind tb camera and the front entranc to
'contact house" i off camera to the right.

. tta hment D to Enclosure (22 , page J8 of 65


Phot taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) · at
am ient light depicting' double door' or ench door' or "accordion doo
adjoining Ii ing room/li, ·og rooml/dinin room with i0 room· /livin
alkin0 through the thr bold of the doof'\Vay leading from e ink
room/portico/fey r/ otry room

ttacbment (D) o Enclosure 22 pa0 e 19 of6~


Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 21 D 04 a: grid coordin es 38S LB 8899 18 u ing
ambient light depicting further in o li · ng room/living roo 1/dinin r om than pre eding
picture and no facing directly ahead from ink room/portic /fo •er/ try room
to ards the area generally describ as the ource of insuraent fir . Th dark rubble
ahead is here s raJ ·tn s d crib th dooT to th kitchen area• or rear of th
building.

ttachm nt (D to Enclosure (22 page 20 of 65


(
Photo ta.ken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 21 Dec 04 at grid coordina using
ambien light depicting anoth ·ew further int th in erior of he Li ·ng room/living
room2/dining room than the preceding p oto. e bi room i o he left and he one
sid f tbe double door entrance is isibl to the I ft. arin i i ible to tb I ft,
kneeling to cl rubble from th flo exp s the it of the grenad bl

Attachment (D to Enclo ure 22 , pa e 21 of 65


Pboto taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 21 Dec 04 at grid coordinat B 88991 usmg
ambi at light depicting the ca, ed in roof of the 'conta ous in e area of th Li ing
room/Ii ing rooml/djning room. Th do bl door entrance to the big room /li ing
room 2 is off camera o th left. Part of the charred d or frame leading from the sink
r om/entry room/portico/foyer i vi ibl on the ri.::,ht.

tachm nt (D) to nclosure 22), page 22 of 65


Photo tak n (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 21 D c 04 at grid coordinat LB 889918 using
ambient light 1ookin.::i pa one en of the doubl door entrance ·e nth li ·ng
room/Li ing rooml /dining room and in o the " big room /Ji ing room 2. bb ed
furniture i isible in th background and th outline o th rrn r wall i isible on the
remaining ceiling.

chment (D) to nclo ure 22 page 23 of 6


(b)(6)

Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 21 Dec 04 at grid coordina es 38 LB 889918 using


ambient light depicting the floor of the "big room '/living room2 . Camera man is
standing b lm the b ast area, with the double door entry way off camera to the right and
the rubbled left wall of the big room off camera to the left. The scorched black area is
pointing rougW to\\rards the cameraman and is emanating from the depression next to it
to its Jeft. The" ·de streaks on th floor abo e e depression are dried. blood.

Attachment ) to Enclosure 22) page 24 of 6-


(b)(6)

Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) oo 21 Dec 04 at grid coordinate 38 LB 889918 using


flash depic ing same position as in preceding photograph.

ttacbm nt D) to Enclosure (22). page 2 of 65


(b)(6)

Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 21 Dec 04 at grid coordinate 38S LB 889918 using
flash depicting the same position as in the preceding pho ograph with th addition of a
standard issue, B retta 9mm pis ol for sea e. The blast depression is visible directly
below the 9 mil.

Attachment (D) to Enclosure (22), page 26 of 6 ~


Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 21 Dec 04 at grid coordinates 38 LB 88991 usmg
ambient light taken from big room /living room2 I oking awards the door at the end of
t e room ttich leads back into the livin room/Ii ing room 1/dinin room. Thmu b and
to the left of that door i the former location of the doorway leading furth r back into the
rear ofth contact bouse (the icitch a' area . Part ofth double door entrance b twe n
1e o living room is isi le to the right of th hoto.

rtachment ) to Enclosure 2~ , age 27 of 6


Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I on 21 Dec 04 at grid coordina es 38S B 89918 using
ambient ljght Joo.king from the a proxim te pot oft:he grenad e osion · owards the
door leading from th "sink room '/entry roonv'p rtico/foy into the big room iving
ro rn2. The window into thi room i ·sibI as II the depicting th floor of the
big room' /Ii ing roorru. Th direction nd pattern of fragm ntati n from th grenade i
isible on the left wall wilb the greatest cone ntration nearest the floor.

ttachmenl (D) to Enclosure 22 , page 28 of 6:


(
Pho o taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 21 D
ambient light looking from the doorway
hich th gr nade i stated to ha
arr .

nachm nt D) to Enclosure 22) page 29 of 6


holo t en by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 21 D 04 at grid coorclin te 8S LB 89918 u ing
ambient light looking from the a proximat position of the doon ay, 1hicb ould ha e
lead to the kitcbeo' area, lo ·n c to "3fds Lb front of th b us and into the «si ,
room . ' The bi r om~ i ·s:ible through the double d r entrance I the right. Th
door ay throu0 h hich L e pr io s picture as tak is off c rn ra o the right . T, o
st ps back and to the ri 0 ht, off camera, wou d b the door ay t th b d room."

. ttachm nt to Enclosur (22), pag "O of 6-


Photo t ' n by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) oo 21 D 04 at gri
fla h looking from th same ositioa
right ( loc b
closur (17)). P
a11.

ttachm nt ) t Enclo ure (22), page 31 of 6-


Pho o taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 21 Dec O at grid coordinat 38 88991 using
tla b looking from the dou le door entry to the big room looking into the Li · g
room/Ji ·ng room I/dining room. The former outline ofth rooms is · "bl by look.in at
the outlin of tbe former aJI I on the ceiling, The dangling ceiling fan near the
cent r of the pboto · the appro · ma e location of th r idence area.

Attachm nt (D) o Enclosure 22 ), page 2 of 6


Photo t~ n by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 21 D c O at grid coordinates 3 LB 88991 using
flash looking from i oom through the li ·ng room an out both the oor from Lhe
Li ing room io o the sink room aod the entry to h sink room from front door be on
Fragmentation from the grenade i visibl on th all to the ri ht.

chm nt D o Enclosure (22 page 33 o 6


ame picture a abo e onJ without flash. Photo en b (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 21 Dec
at grid coo~ inates 38 LB 8899 l 8 using am · nt r gb loo · g from big room through
t e Ii ing room and o t both door from the Ii ing room into the ink room and the
entry to the sink room from the front door beyond. Fragmentation from the gr nad i
isible on the wall to the right.

ttacbment (D to Enclosure 22) pa 0 e 34 of 6 -


/

Pb.oto taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 21 Dec O at.grid coordinates 38S LB 889918 using
ambient light lookin0 from the ap rmcimate point of the explosion in the Big room
looking towards the comer of the room nearest the entry from the sink room. This is the
comer (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) occupied during the blast. Again, .fragmentation from
the grenade is ·sibJe on the wall to the left.

Attachment (D) to EnclosuTe (22) page 3 5 of 6 -


Photo ta en by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 21 D c O at grid coor ioale 38S LB 889918 usin
ambient light looking fro th approximate po · ion of the grenade bla towards the
door b een th ig room (this side) an b nt from thi photo is ny
ign o f fragmentation from the grenade, hich as llield by gt Peralta body since
the grenade i under his le sj (to the di tio of th preceding photo)

ttachm nt (D) t nclosure 22), pag 36 of 6 ~


Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 21 Dec 04 at grid coordinat .,g 8 88991 u ing
flash looking from big room out h room s o y vindo . aU to th right is the
direction gt Peralta body fir pointed a he tim of the blast. Part oftbe
grate fi rm rly co ering the window i i ible ou ide the ·ndow.

ttachment D) to Enclosure 22 page 7 of 6~


(
Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 21 D O at grid coordina 8 8899 18 u ing
fl h looking from Li ing room through the door into th sink room. Tbe big room i off
camera to the rig t .

ttachment (D) to Enclo ur 22 page 38 o 6 -


Photo a.ken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 21 Dec 04 at grid coordinates 38S LB 889918 using
flash looking :from big room through the living room and out both the door from the
living room into the sjnk room and the entry o the sin room from the big room are
visjble. Fragmentation from the grenade i vi ible on the wall to the center of the photo
vvith the concentration of fragmentation d ma:> increasing as it g s nearer the floor.
The depression in the floor is tbe spot here the grenad exploded and the burn pa ch
from the grenade' fuse · still · ible. t the tim of the explo ·o (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ,. ere approximate! b re the chair i presen ly situated, and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)was at
a knee and rolling towards the entrance door of lhe house placin~ him in the sli er of
doorway visible to the left of he frag'd wal l.

Attachment (D) to Enclosure (22 , page 39 of6~


(b)(6)

Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 22 Dec 04 at BLT 1/3 COC NO of amp FaUujah
using flash of Peralta• s flak jacket with EOD holding back the elcro to expo e what
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) identified as the "a piece of he fu e' of the Iraqi grenade, 'model
unknown."

Attachment (D) t Endo w-e (22) page 40 of 65


Photo tak n by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 2_ Dec at B 1/ 0 I O of amp allujah
using flash of P raita's rauma kit as it as remo e by D from hi medicaJ pouch
wh.il searching or shrapn I fragments. Frag damage i ·sibl atth opcenterofth
photo.

ttachment D) to Enclo ure 22 , page 1 of 6


(b)(6)

Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 22 Dec 04 at BLT 1/3 COC rvo of Camp Fallujah
using flas h ofPeralta' s medical ouch being searched by EOD . ShrapneJ damage is
visible on the pouch.

.Attachment (D) to En losure (2- ), page 2 of 65


(b)(6)

Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 22 Dec 04 at BLT l/3 CO O of Camp Fallujah


using flash of Peralta s vital statistic' card and some of the con: ents of his medical
pouch as remo ed by EOD.

ttachment (D) to Enclosure (22) page 43 of 65


(
Photo taken by aj. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)on 2- D 04 BLT 1/ 0 fVO of
mp allujah
using flash of th con ts of P ralta s medical pouch and trauma ldt as r mo by OD
during it search for rape!.

ttaclunent (D) to Enclosure 2- ), page 44 of 65


Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 22 Dec 04 at BL l/3 QC I O of Camp Fallujab
using flasb of the piece of gr nade fuse remov by EOD from P ralta's fla jacket

ttachm nt (D) o Enclosure 22) page 5 of 65


(

(
Photo tak a by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 22 D c 04 at BLT 1/ COC I O of Camp FaJ lujah
using flash of four pieces of shrapnel rerno ed by EOD from Peral a s flak jacket.

ttachment D) to Enclosure 22 , page 46 of 6 ~


(
Photo tak o by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 22 Dec 0 at BL 1/ 0 amp Fallujah
using fla h of same photo as abo e v ·th a 9mm round for per p

ttachm nl D to En losure (22), page 47 of 65


(

Clo eup Photo tak: n by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 22 D 04 BLT l/ OC I O of amp


Fallujah us:ing flash of shrapnel reco ered by D from PeraJta's flak jacke .

ttachmen (D) to Enclosure 22 . page 4 o 6


(
ame photo and condition a above using ambi nt ligbt (no ash).

. ttachment D to Enclo ure (22 , page 49 of 65


Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 22 Dec 04 at B T 1/3 COC IYO of Camp Fallujab
using flash of inert "RGD-5' grenade identified by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) from available photos
as type most closely approximating the grenade he saw a1 the contact house. EOD
brought this grenade for comparison to the shrapnel and witness descriptions.

Attachment (D to EncJosure (22 , page SO of 65


Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) n 22 Dec 04 at BLT 1 OC O of Camp Fallujab
u iog fla h of cut a ray portion ofgr :nad depicted i.n precedin ho o. This grenade
contains e. 'plosi es comparable to the S model 67 an has a thi m :tal casing
which ould cau e thicker brapnel than that found i Peralta' flak jacket.

ttachment (D to Enclosure (22), page 51 of 6 ~


Close up photo taken b (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 22 D O at BLT 1/3 QC f O of amp
FaJlujah u ing flash of same grenade depi t in lhe pre ious photo. The thickness of the
metal ca ing is vi ible.

ttachm (D) to Enclosure 22 pag 52 of 6


I'

Photo n by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 22 Dec 04 at B 1/3 OC 1 0 of amp allujah


usin0 flash of Iraqi grenade .. m de! unkno The casing i pl tic. It is pineapple or
coconut haped and "orangish y !lo or ')tello as d crib b the witn s . EOD
tate its original color i orang but it fad to llo o er time or upon exposure to sun
and el men of eath r. It adap o accept fu e .

ttachm nt D) to Enclosure (22), pa0 e 5 of 6


Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 22 D O at BLT It' OC IYO of Camp Fallujab
using flash of same Iraqi grenade "mo el unknown' depicted in previou picture no
eparat in half to o e its int rior. The rod on th left half how its true color b n
oot expose to sun or eather. he thin metal spring at left is similar to a slinky" and is
consistent with the hrapn I r ered from PeraJta s flak jac , t.

ttachm nt (D) to Enclosure (22 , pag ~ 4 of 6


Photo takeo by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) o 22 D O at B T l/ OC rvo of Camp Fallujah
using fla h of same Iraqi gr aacle um el unknown depicted in pr vious pictur , now
disassembled.

ttachment (D to Enclosure (22 , page 5 of 6 ·


Photo tak by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 22 04 at BLT 1/3 QC O of amp FaJJujah
using flash of same Iraqi gr Jade umodel unkno o depict
di ass mbled and with E D sbo ing the thinness and flecibili

ttachment (D) to nclo ure (22 . oage 6 of 6


Pno o tak n by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 22 D c 04 a: BL l/3 0 0 of amp Fallujab
using flash o liuky portion oflraqi gr oade model tmknown as d pie ed in previous
picture, now being compared by EOD lo a pi c of th hra n I r ered from P ral ·
akjackel.

ttachment (D) to Enclosure (22 , page 57 of6~


Photo taken b) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
rgeant Peralta s 16 4

. ttachment D to Enclo ur (22 page 8 of 6 -


Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
geant Peral ta s 16 4 clo up of serial number

At1achmen t (D to Enclosure (22 page ~9 of 6


(
Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Sergeant Peralta 16 forward assist · th hrapn I damage

ttachment (D o Enclosur (22 page 60 of 65


Photo taken b (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
ergeant Peralta s 16 post ith pnel damage

ttachment (D) o Enclo ure (22), page 6 1 of 6


Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 02 Jan 05 at BLT 1/3 COC I O of Camp FalJujah of
Sergeant Peralta s 16A4, close up of fon ard lower rail with brapnel damage

Attachment (D) to Enclosure (22), page 62 of 65


(
Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 01 Jan 05 at BLT 1/3 COC NO of Camp Fallujah of
Sergeant Peralta,s Ml 6A4, shrapnel damage to forward lower hand guard and rail

Attachment (D) to Enclosure (22), page 63 of 65


(
Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 01 Jan 05 at BLT 1/3 COC IVO of Camp Fallujah of
SergeantPeralt.a'_s M16A4, .hand guard _slide bowing shrapnel damage to the froot lower
handguard

Attachment (D) to Enclosure (22), page 64 of 65


Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 01 Jan 05 at BLT 1/3 COC I O of Camp Fallujah of
Sergeant Peralta s M 16 4, side bandguard showing blast pattern to the upper left

ttachmeot (D) to Enclosure (22) page 65 of 65


18 . (Only for those Marines who saw the grenade which killed Sergeant
Peralta) With the understanding that the situation was very chaotic and the
details of this incident are difficult to remember, please do your best to
identify the grenade that Sergeant Peralta absorbed the blast with . If you
cannot iden tify the grenade from this lineup, please draw a representation of
the grenade in the blank :

.
""
C
:r:
'&
~ __,_,.. ,,
N / pr2,k;6
f,)f SO. U'4t) /3J,f !c-& ;/it:rf?(J/N<a

.Af>P 01::so--0140
-.5-rN o/L &,Tri ;.iovS6"1 cotJTfrC,1'"
_ l,IJb 1-{ou.sz: f (Z.01.,1._ vJE.S.1 b D_)

_. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) .SQ.D U)f'2_ (:z1JJ; b &°"C."2}


- Pa&PPG.b vJJ fl1.& fl/Jo -ffT-z..J
- (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) i t;LL-S (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

- Hc;L.~ µJSS 1/.JG- (jJfl...(,-p;: f°ll§C(3

.-- .3J::> .so.u.4D c.L6AP--s,. (tf2.c7U(J~ ;Cll,U::,"]) a Cot<J(=- tAJ /{Oc/..S.b 131-lcr-:.s tC>B

- / Sr ANO 31) cc.-<-oc;-J


- ou, JJfJ.CIL- DooP- t-fouSG , 0 dAST

tN ... ··~ .. ·--·~ .

(
I
/

)(
--- .
__.------···---- -
- )

1
L/07
Composite Floor Plan

11 THE DARK/ UNKNO\.NN


D11
ROOM"
BEDROOM

11 THE 1-<JTCHEN RE.A.11

D10

THE BIG ROOM LIVING ROOM


KITCHEN
D4

09
Name: Rafael {NM.I) Peralta
Rate or rank at time of action: _S_e_r_g-e_a_n_t_/_E_-_5_ _ _ _ _ _ __ __ _ _ __
Organization: 1st Platoon , Company A, Battalion Landing Team 1/3 ,
Regimental Combat Team 7 , 1st Marine Division
Next of Kin: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Person who assisted: _ N~/_A________________________ _

Conditions Under Which Act Performed

Location: Hey Al Askari District , Al Fallujah , Al An.bar Province ,


Iraq , UTM 38S MGRS LB 889 918
Date: 15 November 2004
Terrain: Urban Residential
Weather: Sunny, Clear Skies , 70 degrees

Enemy condition: Insurgent groups occupying vacant buildings


throughout the city operating primarily in 4-8 man cells . Insurgent
tactics varied from actively seeking out and engaging coalition forces
to remaini ng dormant inside buildings until coalition forces entered
the building . When contact was forced by coalition forces , insurgents
generally fought from fortified positions inside houses , using
automatic weapons and grenades and attempted to flee after inflicting
casua l ties on the fir s t coalition forces to enter the building .
I n s u r gen t s were supplied via weapons and food caches pre-positioned
throughout the city .

Friendly condition: Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 1/3 attacked in zone


during the initial assault on Fallujah from 8 thru 10 November . Upon
rea ching i t s limit of advance , BLT 1/3 established company sectors and
conducted search and attack operations thxoughout its tactical area of
responsibility (TAOR) . Operating independently , each company of BLT
1 / 3 came into contact with insurgent forces o n a daily basis to include
the day of 15 Nov ember 2004 . BLT 1 / 3 also began psychological
o peration s on 11 November 2004 to encourage insurgents to surrender ;
these operations were conducted in conjunction with humanitarian aid
operation s at the Mujahareen and Al Haydra Mosques .

Narrative Description of Gal.lant Conduct

Sergeant Rafael (NMI) Peralta is enthusiastically recommended for


the Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the
risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as
Platoon Guide , 1st Platoon , Company A, Battalion Landing Team 1/3 ,
Regimental Combat Team 7(-) (Reinforced) , 1st Marine Division(-)
(Reinforced) in action against Anti-Coalition Forces in the City of
Fallujah , Iraq, 15 November 2004 , during Operation Phantom Fury/Al
Fajr.

At approximately 0830 , Sergeant Peralta was conducting search and


attack operations with 2d Squad, 1st Platoon . The squad was clearing
their seventh house of the day . Sergeant Peralta was augmenting 2d
Squad because they were short personnel due to recently sustained
casualties . Sergeant Peralta was positioned in the center of the squad
between the first and second fire teams as they prepared to enter the
house .

Enclosure (23)
The squad met oo resistance during theix initial entry into the
house and cleared the front rooms without incident . The door to the
back rooms of the house was closed . The squad staged for entry into
the back rooms with Sergeant Peralta positioned behind the point man .
As the point man pushed open the door, the squad immediately came under
a heavy volume of close-range automatic weapons fire from multiple
insurgents located in the back rooms. The squad instantaneously
returned fire , wounding one of the insurgents . As the squad sought
cover, Sergeant Peralta was shot in the head as he attempted to
maneuver out 0£ the line of fire . Sergeant Peralta fel l to the ground ,
still attempting to speak, though his words were unintelligible.

After the initial exchange of gunfire , the insurgents broke


contact , throwing a fragmentation grenade towards the Marines as the
insurgents fled the building . The grenade bounced off the side of a
couch and came to rest approximately one foot away from Sergeant
Peralta' s head . The grenade lay between Sergeant Peralta and other
members of· the squad . Though mortally wounded , Sergeant Peralta , with
out hesitation , reached out and scooped the grenade under him and used
hi s body to bear the brunt of the explosion, shielding other Marines of
the squad who were only feet away . The grenade exploded underneath
Sergeant Peralta with his body absorbing most of the blast . Other
members of the squad near by received only minor shrapnel wounds from
the explosion .

Sergeant Peralta was immediately medevaced via amphibious assault


vehicle but succumbed to his wounds and was pronounced dead at 0915 , 15
November 2004 while en route to Bravo Surgical Company .

Sergeant Peralta ' s gallant leadership, bravery and unwavefing


dedication to duty and to his fellow Marine$ distinguish his conduct as
above and beyond the call of duty . Sergeant Peralta ' s willi ngness to
make the ultimate sacrifice to preserve the lives of his comrades
reflected great credit upon him and was in keeping with the highest
traditions of the Marines Corps and the United States Naval Service .
For his actions he is worthy of being decorated with the Medal of
Honor.

Enclosure (23)
Page 214 redacted for the following reason:
---------------------
(b)(5)
Natonski MajGen Richard F

'11: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)


Friday, June 17, 2005 9:22 AM
Natonski MajGen Richard F
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Subject: Transcript from Prayer Breakfast

Transcript provided as ordered, Sir.

Very Respectfully,

. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

President Attends National Hispanic Prayer Breakfast


Andrew W. Mellon Auditorium
Washington, D.C.

8:28 AM. EDT

THE PRESIDE T: Gracias, y sientese. (Laughter.) Thank you for the warm welcome. It's an·honor to be here at
the National Hispanic Prayer Breakfast. Thanks for inviting me back. I understand this, like you understand this:
America is founded on los valores de fey familia. (Applause.) These are the values at the heart of the Hispanic
'-' merican community. These are the values that enrich our nation. And I am grateful.

,ur good works and reverence bring compassion to our country and more importantly, honor to the Almighty.
·s morning we come together to pray, to pray for God's help as we serve our fellow citizens. Danny, thank
you very much for the· invitation and the introduction. I'm proud to be with a lot of the faith leaders from around
our country. I saw my friend Luis Cortes. It's good to see you again, Luis. I want to thank John ·von Seggern,
who is the Chairman of the Prayer Breakfast.

I want to thank the members of the Congress who are here -- ancy Pelosi, Chris Cannon, Hilda Solis, Rahm
Emanuel, Luis Fortuna. I want to thank you all for serving our country, and thank you for setting aside politics
to come and honor the Almighty through prayer.

It's good to see my old buddy, former member of the Cabinet Ridge. Tom Ridge is with us. Good to see Hector
Barreto. He runs the SBA. Go ahead and pray, and then get back to work. (Applause.) It's good to see Don
Powell, Gaddi -- who runs the FDIC, by the way -- G~ddi Vasquez is the Director of the Peace Corps.

Arid finally, 1want to pay homage to the First Lady of Panama. I want to welcome you here, Madam First Lady.
Thank you for coming. (Applause.) We're really glad you're here. Your husband is kind of like me; we both
married well. (Laughter.)

We come from many faiths. In America, every religion is welcome. That's the great thing about our country:
every faith is important. In America, people of faith have no corner on compassion, but people of faith need
compassion to be true to the call to "Ame al projimo como a si mismo," love your neighbor like you'd like to be
loved yourself. That's a universal call.

- Hispanic Americans, a Jove of neighbor is more than a gospel command -- it's a way of life. We see the love
neighbor in the strong commitment of Hispanic Americans to family and the culture of life. For Hispanic
4

Americans, families are a source of joy and the foundation of a hopeful society. We're working to support and
defend the sanctity of marriage and to ensure that the most vulnerable Americans are welcomed in life and
1
protected in love. (Applause.)

We see the love of neighbor in the tireless efforts of Hispanic American faith-based and corrununity
:111izations that work daily to bring hope to harsh places. In Boston, the Leon de Juda Congregation mentors
.er-city teens so they have a chance to realize the great dreams of Am rica. In t. Louis, Acci6n Social
jmunitaria helps im..migrants and their children adapt to American life. In the archdiocese of Miami, Catholic
Chari ies ministers to people with HIV /AIDS; inn r-city Philadelphia Cortes run a fantastic program to help
lift the spirits of eve1y single child. (Applause.)

Many in the Hispanic community understand that by serving the least of -- nuestros hermanos y hermanas -- that
we1re serving a cause greater than ourselves. And by doing so, we're helping all citizens have an opportunity to
realize their dreams here in America.

Finally, we see the love of neighbor in tens of thousands of Hispanics who serve America and the cause of
freedom. One of these was an immigrant from Mexico named Rafael Peralta. The day after Rafael got his green
card, be enlisted in the Marine Corps. Think about that. \Vbile serving in Iraq this good sergeant wrot a letter
to hjs younger brother. He said "Be proud of being an American. Our father came to this country, became a
citizen because it was the right place for our family to be. 11 hortly after writing that letter, ergeant Peralta used
his own body to cover a grenade an enemy soldier had rolled into a roomful of Marines.

This prayer breakfast, we rememb r the sacrifices of honorable and good folks like ergeant Peralta, who have
shown their love of neighbor by giving their life for freedom.

Hispanic Americans answer the call to service willingly because you understand that freedom is a divine gift
that carries with it serious responsibiliti s. And as you go about the work of repairing broken lives and bringing
Jove into the pockets of hopelessness and despair be strong, because you're sustained by prayer. Through prayer
rapplause.)

ne of the most powerful aspects of being tJ1e Pr sident is to know that millions of people pray for me and
aura. People that r11 never have a chance -- (applause.) Think about a country where millions of people of all
faiths, peop1e whom Pll never ha ea chance to look face-to-face with and say thank you, take ti.me to pray. It
really is the strength of America, isn't it? Through prayer we ask that our hearts be aligned with God 1s. Through
prayer we ask that we may be given the strength to do what's right and to help those in need.

I want to thank you for the fine tradition you continue here toda . This is an important tradition to continue right
here in the heart of the nation's capital. 1 want to thank you for what you do for our nation. Que di os les bendiga,
and may God continue to bless our country. Thank you very much. (Applause.)

END 8:36 .M. EDT

2
Binder B
Additional Investigation
for the
Medal of Honor
recommendation
for
Sergeant
Rafael Peralta, USMC
l. Recommendation emorandum .................................................TAB

2. First Endorsement ....................... ..... ...................................... TABB

3. econd and Third Endor ement. ............. ..................................... TAB C

4. E ecutive ummary .... ........ .. . ... .. . .............. .. ..... .. . ........ ....... ... .TAB D

5. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Memorandum ........... .. ...... .............. ........... .. .... ...... TAB E

6. Medical pecialist Opinions ....................................................... TAB F

7. Engagement Movement ummary .... . ..... ............ ............... .. .. ....... TAB G

8. Sworn Telephoruc Interview .. .... ......... .. ... .... . ...... ....... ... . . ... ... .. .. .TAB H

9. Revie, of Insurgent Engagement ................................ ..... ............ TAB I


Congressional Medal of Honor
Recommendation
Supporting Documentation
Sergeant
Rafael Peralta
8 August 2005
UNITED STATES CENTR.i\L CO:rvfW".LA.Nl)
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER
71 15 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

CCJl

MEMORANDUM FOR Commandant of the Marine Corps, Headquarters United States Marine
Corps, ATTN: Military Awards Branch, 3280 Russell Road,
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5103

SUBJECT: Posthumous Medal of Honor Recommendation, Case of Sergeant Rafael Peralta,


(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 0311 USMC

1. I recommend posthumous award of the Medal of Honor to Sergeant Rafael Peralta, USMC,
for his conspicuous gallantry above and beyond the call of duty against the enemies of our nation
in Fallujah, Iraq, on 15 November 2004.

2. After careful review of the documentation, it is clear Sergeant Peralta' s personal bravery,
unwavering dedication to duty and to his fellow Marines, distinguished him in combat far
beyond the call of duty. Though no one can know his thoughts at that decisive moment, his
actions speak volumes. There can be no doubt that he consciously acted to contain the blast and
protect his fellow squad members without regard for his own safety or risk of harm. In doing so~
he saved the lives ofb.is comrades.

3. I strongly concur with LtGen Sattler and Maj Gen Natonski that this deed earned the award of"
the Medal of Honor.

4. The point of contact for this action is (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

6 Encls
1. CDR, USMARCENT Memo 12 Sept 05
2. 1st Marine Division Memo 9 Aug 05
3. 1st Battalion 3d Marine Division Memo 8 Jul 05
4. 1st Marine Division (Rein), Memo 3 Mar 05
5. OPNAV 1650/3
6. Citation

us CENTRAL COMMAND ACTION PROCESSING FORM
TO : CLASSIFI CATION : ACTION NUMBER
I

CDR UNCLASSIFIED 20060113-024


,
': FILE NAME : ORIG SUSPENSE
r
J I DCS, COS , DCDR
JECT : ACTION SJS SUSPENSE

Posthumous Medal of Honor (MOH) Re commendat i o n, APPROVAL

case of Ser geant Rafael Peralt a, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) /0331, X SI GNATURE STAFF SUSPENSE
USMC INFORMATI ON

ACTI ON SUMMARY:
1. PURPOSE . To obtain CDR's endorsement of a MOH for Sgt Rafael Pera l ta, USMC (Tab A).

2. DI SCUSSION.

a . On 15 November 2004, Sgt Rafael Peralta and his team were conducting a house-to-
house search for insurgents in Fallujah, Iraq. Upon encountering enemy personnel
hidden in one of the homes, Sgt Peralta received a gunshot wound to the back of the
head and fell to the ground. The enemy then delivered a grenade into the room occupied
by Sgt Peral ta and his team, threatening the lives of his fellow Marines. Prior to the
grenade ' s detonation, it came to rest near Sgt Peralta's head. Sgt Peralta scooped the
grenade with his hand and secured it under his chest. The grenade detonated killing
Sgt Peralta, while inf l icting only minor injuries to some of his fellow Marines.

b . For his actions, Sgt Pera l ta's battalion commander has posthumously nominated him
for the MOH (Binder A, Tab A) . The package has been endorsed by each step of the
member ' s Chain of Command and has been forwarded to CDRUSCENTCOM for endorsement to the
_noi:>artment of the Navy via the Commandant of the Marine Corps .
(
c. The MOH nominat i on (Binders A and B) has twice been considered by the Commanding
1eral, I Marine Expeditionary Force, LtGen Sattler . Initial concerns invo l ving a
1-'athologist's opinion on Sgt Peralta's abi l ity to v oluntarily move following the
gunshot wound to the head have been answered during the subsequent re - investigation
(Binder B). In the reinvestigation, three highly credentialed neurosurgeons refuted
the original pathologist's opinion. Additionally , there is detailed eyewitness
testimony and physical evidence to support this position.

d. Per SECNAV Instruction 1650.lG , Section 3, paragraph 230.1.b. (2), "There must be
no margin of doubt or possibility of error in a warding this honor . To justify the
decoration, the individual's service must ciearly be rendered conspicuous above his or
her comrades .by an act so outstanding that it clearly distinguishes his or her
gallantry beyond the call of duty from lesser forms of brav ery ; and it must be the type
of deed which i f not done would not subject the individual to any justified criticism.
The deed must be without detriment to the mission of the command or to the command... " .

e. The staff review of the entire nomination package (Binders A and B) has
determined that Sgt . Peralta's actions meet the criteria of the MOH . Sgt Peralta did
conspicuously distinguish himself b y gallantry & int repidity at the r i sk of his l i fe
above & beyond the call of dut y .

COORDINATION/APPROVAL
OFFICE ACTION NAME & DATE EXT OFFICE ACTION NAME & DATE EXT
COORD (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) CDR SIGN
j DCDR COORD
cos COORD M~ A,< 'f'f/1/ //h.t..t.
ACTION OFFI CER :
DATE PREPARED: CLASSIFICATION : CLASSIFIED BY :
DECLASSIFY ON:
UNCLASSIFIED
3. RECOMMENDATION . CDR favorably endorse the MOH recommendation for
Sergeant Peralta . Once the endorsement is approved, the recommendation
letter will be coordinated through SJS for signature.

//Signed//
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Director, Manpower and Personnel


UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
1ST MARINE DIVlSION (REIN), FMF
BOX 555380
CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA 92055-5380

IN R£PLY REFER TO,


1 650
1
9 Aug 05

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, lstBn , 3d Mar ltr 1650 adj of 8 Jul 05

From : Corn.manding General , 1st Marine Division (Rein)


To : Secretary of the Navy
Via : (1) Commanding General , I Marine Expeditionary Force
(2 ) Commander , Marine Forces, U. S . Ce ntral Command
(3) Commander , 0 . S . Central Command
(4 ) Commandant of t he Marine Corps

Subj : SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION; MEDAL OF HONOR (POSTHUMOUS) RECOMMENDATION


IN THE CASE OF SERGEANT RAFAEL PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) /0311 USMC

Ref: (a ) MOH Award Recorrunendation ·Package Dat e d 2 Jan 05

1 . On the day after he r eceived his Green Card, Sergeant Peralta , a native
of Mexico , join ed the United States Marine Cor ps . He was proud to live in
America and serve our count~y . In November 2004 in Fallujah , Iraq , Serqeant
Peralta above and beyond the call of duty, made the ultimate sacrifice to
save the l ives of h is fellow Marines . It is with great pride and honor that
I enthusiastically recommend Sergeant Peralta for our nation ' s highest award ,
the Congressional M~dal of Honor .

2. The priginal submiss i on of Sergeant Peralta ' s Medal of Honor was returned
from I Mari ne Exped itionary Force over their concerns of a pat holo gist ' s
opinion that stated Sergeant Per alta could not have executed any meaningful
physical motions based on the injuries from a gunshot wound to the head_
When t he Medal of Honor recommendation was returned I instructed the
Battalion Commander , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to conduct a detailed a nd
comprehens i ve review of t h e investigation . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who
was a ssigned to Ser gean t Peralta ' s Battalion when this heroic action took
place , condu cted a review dur i ng June 20 0 5 . This p ackage is being
resubmitted based on re- interviews and sworn state~ents from eyewitnesses as
wel l as n e w statements from three neurosurgeons wit h. outstanding credentials
who have given their medical opinion . Thes e doctors opine that Sergeant
Peralta could have scooped the grenade under his body despite his h ead wo und .
Howe ver , regardless of the me dical · opinions rende r ed after the fact there is
s u fficient eyewitness tes t imony and physical evidence (grenade fuze loclkged in
Se r geant Peralta ' s f l ak jacket) to suppo rt this award recommen dation . After
reviewing the evidence submitted and the testimony of competent professional
medical officers , I believe beyond a shadow of doubt that Sergeant Peralta
made a conscious decision to scoop t he grenade u nder his body to protecit hi s
fel low Marines . He made the ultimate ·sacrifice to his country and fell o w
Marines .

3. I stand by my original endorsement and wit h great humility recommend


Sergeant Peralta be awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for the actl: ions
in which he los t his life .

R. F . NATONSKI

3
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. fMF
BOX 555300
CAMP PENDLETON, CA 92055-5300

IN REPLY REFER TO:

1600
CG
12 Sep 05

SECOND AND THIRD ENDORSEMENTS on CO, lstBn, 3d Mar ltr 1650


adj of 8 Jul 05

From : Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force,


Camp Pendleton apd Commander, U.S. Marine Forces,
Central Command
To : Secretary of the Navy
Via : (1) Commander, U.S. Central Command
(2) Commandant of the Marine Corps

Subj: SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION; MEDAL OF HONOR {POSTHUMOUS)


RECOMMENDATION IN THE CASE OF SERGEANT RAFAEL PERALTA
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 10311 USMC

1 . It should be noted that I hold both positions as


Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force and
Commander, U .S. Marine Forces, Central Command; therefore, I
am endorsing this document under both titles .

2. I initially spent 20 plus hours going through this


investigation in great detail back in May 2005. I returned
it to the 1st Marine Division Commanding General with a
number of questions/points requiring c lari fication before I
could unhesitantly recommend Sergeant Peralta for the Medal
of Honor. My questions have been answered . I have just
completed a third complete read of the entire award
recommendation to include all statements and have r eviewed
all enclosures . Without hesitation and without doubt, I
recommend Sergeant Rafael Peralta for our Nation's highest
award, the Medal of Honor .

"4 [ ~
J.
~
. SATTLER

4
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
1ST BATIALION, 30 MARINES
/ JD MARINE DIVISION (·)(REIN )
M CBH KANEOHE BAY, HAWAII 96863

IN REPLY REFER TO: L.


1650
adj B
8 Jul 05
y
From: Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion , 3d Marines
To: Commanding General , 1st Marine Division

Subj: SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION ; MEDAL OF HONOR (POSTHUMOUS) RECOMMENDATION


IN THE CASE OF SERGEANT RAFAEL PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 0311 USMC

Ref : (a) MOH award recommendation package dtd 2 Jan. 05

Encl : (1) Executive summary from (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)


(2) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Memorandum Endorsement on Sgt Peralta ' s MOH
package of 21 Apr 05
(3) Medical specialist opinions ISO Sergeant Peralta ' s MOH nomination
(4) Engagement movement summary graphic
(5) Sworn Telephonic Interview of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) of 23 Jun 05
(To be included as Enclosure (23) to the original investigation)
(6) Review of Insurgent Engagement involving Sgt Rafael Peralta -
Additional Inquiry of 23 Jun 05

1. I have thoroughly reviewed the references, enclosures and all available


information pertaining to the Medal of Honor (MOH) recommendation in the ca3e
of Sergeant Rafael Peralta . I submit the following addit iona l material with
my most enthusiastic recommendation that Sergeant Rafael Peralta receive the
Medal of Honor.

2 . Enclosures (1) through (3) are submitted for official documentation into
the award recommendation of the MOH for Sergeant Peralta . Enclosure (1) is
an executive summary by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the or igi nal investigating
officer , considering new information presented in enclosures (2) and (3) and
after a comprehensive review of all facts relevant to this case . Enclosure
(2) is (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) memorandum endorsement on the autopsy conducted by
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USA , Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AF IP). This autopsy
and memorandum call into question Sergeant Peralta ' s abi l ity to consciously
scoop a grenade to his body after having received a ·mort a l guns h ot wound to
the head . Enclosure ('3) is a summary of medical specialist opinions from
medical off i cers with the Naval Medical Center , San Diego, CA s u pporting
Sergeant Peralta ' s ability to pull an enemy grenade under him after receiving
a mortal gunshot wound to the head . Enclosure (4) is a composite graphic
which reconstructs the sequence of events and positioning of personnel within
the engagement house on 15 November 2004 . Enclosure (5) is a sworn
telephonic interview with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) In this interview
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) describes the iocation of the grenade blast depression as
directly underneath Sergeant Peralta ' s left pectoral as observed when he and
two other Marines removed Sergeant Peralta ' s body from the engagement house.
Enc l osure (6) is (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) additional statement based on (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)sworn statement .

4 . This recommendation was returned to my command based on a medica l opinion


stating that Sergeant Peralta could not have made a conscious decision to
scoop an enemy grenade underneath him given the nature of his wounds when he
fell on 15 November 2004 . Since that time, medical professionals with
credentials similar to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) have refuted this conclusion . An
additional sworn statement from (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (who carried Sergeant
Subj: · SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION ; MEDAL OF HONOR (POSTHUMOUS) RECOMMENDATION
IN THE CASE OF SERGEANT RAFAEL PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 0311 USMC

Peralta ' s body from the engagement house) attests that the grenade blast
depression was indeed underneath Sergeant Peralta ' s left pectoral . After
first hand examination of Sergeant Peralta ' s flak jacket , an explosive
ordnance disposal expert found the fuse to the grenade located in the front
flap o f the f l ak ja_cket . He concluded that based on the location of the fuse
and the grenade ' s relative lack of explosive mate r ial , the only way the fuse
could have penetrated the front of the flak jacket is i f it exploded
u nderneath Sergeant Peralta. In (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) memorandum endorsement , he
s't:ates that " Some type of explosion occurred on the left side of Sergeant
Peralta ' s flak jacket" . Four sworn eyewitness statements attest to Sergeant
Pe r alta scooping the grenade to his body with his right arm . In his
executive summary , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) makes a clear argument that based on all
witnes s testimony and physical evidence , the only conclusion that can be
r eached is that Sergeant Peralta pulled an enemy grenade underneath his body .

5 . I s ubmit this additional material with complete confidence that Sergeant


Rafael Peralta made a conscious and heroic decision to pull an enemy grenade
under h i s body to protect his fellow Marines .

6. Point of contact on this issue is (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) at


(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) .n

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

2
<\'"-

--
.r
From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
To: BGenHejlik
21 Apr 2005

Via: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Subj: MEMORANDUM ENDORSEMENT ON SERGEANT PERALTA'S MEDAL OF


HONOR PACKAGE

Encl: (1) Aimed Forces Institute of Pathology Final Autopsy Report dtd 20 Dec 2004
(2) E-mail of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USA, Regional Medical_Examiner, Armed Forces Medical
Examiner System, Dept of Pathology (medical examiner who performed the
autopsy on Sgt Peralta, to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I MEF AC/S G-1, of 20 Apr 2005.
(3) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Review of Sergeant Peralta' s Medal of Honor Package dated 16 Apr 05

1. Per my request (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) MD, USA, Regional Medical Examiner, (medical
examiner who performed the autopsy on Sgt Peralta), provided Enclosures (1) and (2). The
original Sgt Peralta MOH package contained an undated Preliminary Autopsy Report and the
Battalion Landing Team Surgeon's (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)General Medical Officer who is not a certified
medical examiner, pathologist, or neurolqgist) interpretation of the findings contained in the
undated Preliminary Autopsy Report, which was based on his examination of Sgt Peralta's body
at the Battalion Aid Station 30 minutes after his injury, his examination of Sgt Peralta's flack
jacket, and witness accounts contained in the Investigation Officer's review.

2. Per Encl (2), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)disagrees with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) opinion that "it is conceivable that Sgt
( Peralta had intact cognitive and motor function for 30 seconds or more after his brain injury . . .his
frontal lob es were not affected by the bullet path, meaning his ability to perform higher
functioning tasks such as recognizing a situation and willfully responding was intact. . .it is
possible and Iilcely that some of his heru.ing was intact in the 30 seconds following his injmy."
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)states: "The head gunshot wound would have been immediately incapacitating and
nearly instantly fatal. He could not have executed any meaningful motions."

3. Per Encl (2), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)disagrees witl1.the testimony of the witnesses who stated that Sgt
Peralta scooped the hand grenade to his body, hugged the grenade to his body, or tucked the
grenade under his shoulder/under him. According to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) "he (Sgt Peralta) had no .
significant internal mjuries from blmit force trauma of.the thorax and abdomen, which virtually
mles out a grenade explosion beneath his body. Even with body rumor, a military grenade would
cause blunt force trauma, and tl1ere was none." (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)goes on to state: "The slu·apnel injury
pattern is consistent with an explosion at about the lmee or thigh h eight, and a few feet to the left
of the left lmee-thigh, and slightly in front of it."

4. Based on the statements of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)above, the inconsistencies contained in Encl (3), and
my complete review of the entire package, I believe that due to the fog of war (first time the team
had encountered insurgents and a fire fight in a house cleru.ing operation), what the witnesses
thought they saw (Sgt Peralta scooping/grabbing for a grenade) was in reality Sgt Peralta's
involuntary muscle spasms caused by a fatal gun shot wound to tl1e head. However, I can't
explain or guess how Sgt Peralta's flack jacket could have sustained the damage it did (some
type of explosion occun-ed on the left breast portion of his flack j aclcet).

5. It is my reconunendation that no award be presented at this time.unless we can refute what


(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)has stated above.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
ENCUIIIE(1)
Pages 228 through 229 redacted for the following reasons:
----------------------------
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), not a USMC record.
,,

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)


Sent: W ednesday, April 20, 200 5 2:10 PM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: SGT PERAL TA'S PRELIMINARY AUTOPSY REPORT SSN (b)(6)

Greetings (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) The main points we discussed are :

(b)(5)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
-Contact info below
-----Original Message --- - -
From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
.sent: Tues day, Apri l 19 , 2005 6 : 17 PM
To:
Subject: RE : SGT PERALTA'S PRELIMIN~~~Y AUTOPSY REPORT SSN (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Than ks aga in for giving me your insigh t s - you have a fasci nating job.
I sure would appreciate if you could put some a£ your answers/com.~ents
down on a n e-mai l so I don ' t screw up what you said.

S/F

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

---- - Ori g~nal Message--- - -


From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Se:-:t: T·c:esci ay , Apri .:. .:. 9, 2'.lO S 9 : 47
ENCLOS• (.2)
~~c.\ (_2-)
~
'
16 Apr 2005

Subj : SERGEANT PERALTA'S MEDAL OF HONOR PACKAGE REVIEW

1. Testimony differs slightly as to which arm Sergeant Peralta used (4 witnesses said Sergeant
Peralta used his 1ight ann and 1 said left). Additionally, 3 witnesses statements changed during
the course oftl1e investigation. Their original statements dated 15 ov 04 don't specify which
ann Sgt P eralta used to scoop up the hand grenade, however, their later statements specifically
address which aim was used. One witness stated: "I saw his 1ight arm move up toward his head
and almost scoop the grenade in toward his body'' and later h1 fue same paragraph the wih1ess
states he did scoop up.the hai1d grenade. Testimony also differs regarding which way Sergeant
Peralta's head was facing when he was struck down by insurgents and was lying face down on
his stomach prior to the grenade exploding (2 witnesses said his head was facing to th e 1i ght, 2
~ritnesses said his head was facing to the left, and 1 w itness said his head was at the 1130
position).

2. There are differences among the statements as to the number of p eople in the house, where
they were located, and in what order. Another difference was whether or not Sergeant Peralta
still had.his Kevlar helmet on his head after the explosion. Two Maiines tes_tify that each of
them was the one to pick up the Kevlar off the floor as Sergeant Peralta w as being recovered
from the house. However, the Marine who actually pulled Sgt Peralta out of th e house himself
. stated the Kevlar wap still on the Sergeant. A search of the supply sec.t ion has revealed that the
Kevlar was lost, destroyed 0r replaced and the w eapon has since been cleaned and reissued.
Neither was initially available for viewing.

3. The IO states that Sergeai1t Peralta's entire left side of his face was macerated, "indicating
that the right side of his face must have been against the floor and shielded." Enclosure (8),
Record ofldentification Processing Anatomical Ch.rut, contained in the IO's Review dated 1 Jai1
05, shows wounds to both sides of Sgt Peralta's face, left arm and leg and back of right hand.
Additionally, the autopsy report states that th6re were: "Too-numerous to count superficial
fragment wounds (lacerations, abrasions, contusions) of the face, pelvic region and genatalia, and
extremities." After reviewing the Record of Identification Processing Anatomical Chart and the
autopsy report I cannot determine nor come to the conclusion that Sergeant Peralta's head was
facing to the right. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) BOD Tech who ex.amined Sgt Peralta's flack jacket, stated.:
"The flack showed little blast damage with minor fragmentation damage located mostly on the
left front portion .. .the fragment pattern on the front left portion of Sgt Peralta' s flack jacket
indicated the grenade was directly underneath Sgt Peralta's left side and was shielded by
something (possibly his aim) on the 1ight side:" (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) statement/findings are
consistent with the findings/injmies contained in the above·reports.

4. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)MD, BLT 1/3 Surgeon, said it is possible and most likely that Sgt_Peralta did not
suffer instantaneous death or immobilization. Instead, he had v isual impainnent, but not total
blindness, progressing to primarily left-sided motor dysfunction. It is possible that h e could
willfully move his body in the seconds following the eventually fatal brain injury. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)is
not a certified medical examiner, pathologist, or neurolo gist. His st atement is his interpretation
of a formal autopsy results, "a translation into .m ore easily understandable vernacular, and an
infonned assimilation of medical findings and possible action by the deceased."

5. Finally, the c:iJ:cumstances surrnunding how Sergeant Peralta could have received a gunshot
wound to the back of his head when he was engaged witl1 insurgents who were directly in front
of him was not addressed in the IO's review nor any of the endorsements. ENCLOSURE {:2..)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
e~c.\(3)
•> ,

Saw Sgt Said Sgt Said Sgt


Preach P's P's
for head head
Saw Sgt grenade was was
P scoop Saw Sgt or pu11 facing facing
grenade P scoop to to the to the
to grenade himself right left Didn't
Saw Sgt himself to (doesn't (left (1ight Saw or see or Saw
P face with himself mention cheek check heard a hear a damage
down on right with left which on the on the grenade grenade to Sgt
Witness stomach arm arm ann) deck) deck) explode explode P's face

X X X X

X X X

X X X

X I X
X X

' (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

( X X
note 1
X X
note 2
X X X X
X
note 3
X X X X X
X
X

Note 1 -Enclosure (37) Transposed Statement o (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dated 15 Nov 04 contained in CG lstMarDiv's 2nd
Endorsement dated 3 Mar 05 doesn't mention which arm Sgt Peralta used, howev er, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
telephonic statement fo the IO contained in Enclosure (16) of the IO's R eview dated 1 Jan 05 states
that Sgt Peralta used his left ann to scoop up the grenade.

Note 2 - Enclosure (25) Transposed Statement of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)dated 15 Nov 04 contained in CG l stM arDiv's 2nd
Endorsement dated 3 Mar 05 doesn't mention which arm Sgt Peralta used, h owever (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
sworn statement contained in Enclosure (10) of the IO' s Review dated 1 Jan 05 states in great detail
how Sgt Peralta used his right ann to scoop up the grenade.

Note 3 -Enclosure (27) Transposed Statement of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dated 15 Nov 04 contained in CG
· lstMarDiv's 2nd Endorsement dated 3 Mar 05 doesn't mention which ann Sgt Peralta used, however,
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) telephonic statement to the IO contained in Enclosure (1 7) of the I O's Review
dated 1 Jan 05 states that Sgt Peralta used his right am1 to scoop the grenade up under his body.

INCLOSURE (2)
1 June 2005

From: Surgeon
To: CG
Via: G-1

Subj : MEDICAL SPECIALIST OPINIONS· ISO SGT PERALTA MOH


NOMINATION

Encl: (1)
(2) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
(3)

1. Sir, on 25 May 2005 I met with two senior neurosurgeons (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)and
one senior neurologist (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) at Naval Medical Center San
Diego. Together we reviewed the first-hand witnesses'. observations and the autopsy
findings in the case of Sgt Peralta. This was done in order to obtain their opinions
regarding the medical plausibility of Sgt Peralta's actions as described in the witness
statements.

2. Each of the specialists felt that it was possible that Sgt Peralta acted as the witnesses
described. Their statements are enclosures 1-3.
(
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

ENCLOSURE ( 3 )
MEMORANDUM 30 May 05

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)


To : 1 MARDIV Surgeon
51

Subj: Battle Injury Medical Opinion

1. Credentials: MEDICAL

CAPTAIN USN MEDICAL CORPS 26 yrs Active Service

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Board Certified Staff eurosurgeon NMCSD


Combat Casualty Care Course Instructor Fort Sam Houston
Course Director Advanced Tramna Life Support NMCSD

OPERATIONAL

UDT/SEAL Class #48 Subspecialty Ordinance (kitchen demolition)


Air Force Pilot B52, T38 Pilot Instructor Trainer, 560th Asst Squadron
Operations Officer, li 11 Air Force Headquarters Air Training Command
( Randolph Air Force Base Texas

RELEVANT EDUCATION & PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Aeronautical Engineer F-14 Analysis Center NARF Norfolk


Combat Casualty Care Course (6A-C4)
Combat Casualty Management, Echelon III Course (6A-C4A(III))
Strategic Medical Readiness& Contingency Course (SMRCC)
Landing Force Medical Staff Planning
Advanced Officer _Leadership Course
. Marine Corps Command & Staff Course
Naval War College Joint Maiitime Operation
T-AH 19 Mercy
MAP Echelon II

2. Documents : REVIEWED

AFIP FINAL AUTOPSY REPORT #ME04-927 pgs 2 of 2

E-mail 20 APR 05 Fm (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) pg 1 of 1

ENCLOSURE ( 3 )
Subj: Battle Injury edical Opinion

2. Documents :

MOH package review 16 APR O- pgs 2 of_

3. Opinion: ergeant Peralta was capabl e of tuf.fin a gr uad / [JJIO · j e d e witlJ


either upp r 'tr mi .

. Woun Injury Analysis:


After reviewing the AL AUTOP Y DIAG O E listed in# 04-927, it is clear
that ergeant Peralta's head body and e tremities were sufficiently intact to be
conscious and capable of stuffing a grena e with either upper extremity. The penetrating
injuri_es described as blast fragments o the left fac and skull penetrating fragment
rajectory from the left occipital Jobe to Lhe right t mporal pari tal lobes and penetrating
lacerating fragment to the 1igbt occipital lobe are not sufficient for full visual loss tota l
incapacitation or fatal respiratory arrest. The left face and skull .fragments did not
penetrate the brain. There is no repo1i for embedded bone fragments along the brain
trajectory path. There is no report on the steel penetrator tip dimensions, weight ,
additional fragments or retained foreign bodies. There is no report for significant
subarachnoid hemonhage, epidural, subduraJ or intra entricular bematoma basilar skull
fracrure, tympanic membrane rupture, auditory ossicular chain injury mass shift,
hydrocephalus basal cistern encroa hment, uncal herniation tonsil h miation or
tentorial notching. There is no report for vascular injury to the common carotid, internal
carotid, e temal carotid, middle cerebral, anterior cerebral, circle of illis vertebral
posterior inferior cerebellar anterior inferior cerebellar, superior cerebellar basilar
posterior cerebral arteries . There is no report for vascular injmy to the superior saggital
sinus inferior saggital sinus straight sinus transverse sinus ca ernous sinus superior
petrosal sinus, inferior petrosal sinus, occipital sinus, sigmojd sinus superior anastamotic
vein of Trolard inferior anastamotic vein of Labbe ein of Galen. There is no report of
injury to the fron al lobes specifically Broadman Areas 4,6 8,44 Broca). here is no
report for injury o the left tern oral lobe-Broadman Ar as 39 40 41 43- auditory
asso iation including Wem.icke s area, left parietal Jobe, ventricles caudate, basal
gangba, thalamus, hypothalamus pituitary, optic chiasm, orbi al fissures, corpus
caUosum brainstero, cerebellum cranial ne1 es corricobulbar tract, estibuJospinal tract
rnbrospinal tract, co1iicospinal tract, red nucleus spinal cord, brachial plexus peripheral
nerves. There is no reported injury to: airway, head disarticulation extremity
disarticulation, bone muscle avulsion, lung, heart, great vessel injmy, thorax
hemothorax pneumothorax diaphragmatic rupture abdominal organ damage abdominal
hematoma, retroperitoneal bematoma, long bone fracture spine fracture, pelvic fracture,
burn or powder bum injuries. The report confoms no confounding variables o
phy iologic function such as drugs or alcohol-none present.

With no reported injurie as Ii ted above ergeant Peralta was not shot at close range
bad a patent airway, could ventilate, perfuse oxygenated blood to his brain and was not in
hemorrhagic shock. He

ENCLOSURE ( 3 )
( ubj: Battle Injmy Medical Opinion

4. Wound Injury Analysis (can't):

could readily be conscious have situational awareness, judgment decision making


emotion, memory, vision visual /verbal/auditory association heaiing, rapid eye
movement, rapid head tum, and execute purposeful coordinated motor activity of all four
extremities. He wa capable of malting a con sciou s deci ion and had the phv ical
ability to tuff a grenade/e 'plosiv de ice with ither upper e ·trem.ity.

5. Ballistic Analysis :
There are three theo1ies us din ballistic studies omentum (M=mass times velocity)
Power (P=rnass times velocity cubed) and Kinetic Energy (KB= one half the mass times
velocity squared). Most ballistic studies use KE to quantify wounding potential. A
p rforating brain injury would be a missile/bullet/fragment (projectile which creates an
entrance and exi t wound in which the intracranial transfer of, ounding KE would be the
difference bet\,veen t11e ente1ing and exiting KE s = KE(in) minus KE(out). In the case of
a peneh·ating i_njury the projectile would be retained and tbe KE (out) would equal zero .
.A bullet has a aerodynamic design to minimize drag and maximize velocity and distance.
A fragment can be a por6on of a bullet which results from a ricochet or collision w ith
another object or structure and will loose KE exponentially over distance. The steepness
of the curve fo r energy Joss wil l depend upon the drag forces . The drag would depend
(
upon the fragment velocity, density of medium (bone, brain, Kevlar), cross sectional area
of the projectile which would then detennine be depth of penetration. Additional ball istic
considerations are muzzle velocity, rifling, trajectory yaw precession and nutation. The
trajectory is the fo1ward motion of the center of mass of a projectile.Yaw is the side to
side motion along the longitudinal axis of the projectile analogous to an automobile fish
taibng.

The damage from a projectile to the head and brain results from shock waves, laceration,
crushing and cavitation. Low velocity projectiles crush and lacerate brain tissue. ost of
the damage is done to the tissue in direct contact or pusbed aside by the projectile. The
permanent cavity along the trajectory path is determined by the velocity mass of the
projectile cross sectional area of the projectile and yaw or tumble. The emporary cavity
is small compared to a high velocity projectile. The major difference ,:vith the high
velocity projectile is a cone shaped pressure wave which transfers KE to the brain tissue
ahead of the trajectory path and radially or ninety degrees in all directions from the
trajectory path.

In the plane at the level on the sku ll of ergeai1t Peralta s left occipital penetrating
entrance wound the nominal inner table dimensions of the calvruium are front to back
(anterior to posterior 16cm by 14cm side to side (transverse). The occipital lobe is the
smallest brain lobe. The approximate rounded tetrahedral/pyramidal shape enlarges to 4-
4.5 cm anteriorly and 0. 75-1.5 cm at the occipital pole. The maximum height is at the
an eiior medial port_ion of the occipital lobe approximately 4-Scm which tapers

ENCLOSURE ( 3 )
Subj : Battle Injury Medical Opini on

5. Ballistic Analysis (can't) :

poste1iorly on the medial side down to approximately 0.5-1 .5 cm. Based on the reported
entrance wound it is estimated that the steel tip projectile' s vertical angle was between
20-40 degrees and had an estimated anterior posterior angle between 10-30 degrees in
order to avoid damage to the structures listed in #4 and embed in the right
tetnporoparietal lobe. The trajectory path is estimated at 8- 10 cm.

The reported steel penetrator tip is part of a projectile and has lost KE. The
fragmentation mechanism to create this projectile is unknown. During a close quaiier fire
fight in a building stril.cture richocet fragmentation is quite possible as well as impact
fragmentation when the skull was penetrated. Material failure of a poor quality bullet is
another less likely explanation. Regardless, Sergeant Peralta sustained a low velocity
penetrating projectile injury to the brain. The early transfer of KE in the ME04-927
findings are: an atypical tangential bone gutter penetration, macerated left occipital lobe
quckly trai1sitioning to a permanent track coming to rest a short distance in the right
temporparietal lobe.

6. Contact at (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

ENCLOSURE ( J )
NAVAL MEDICAL CENTER
Department of eurosciences
34730 Bob Wilson Dr., Ste. 201
San Diego, CA 92134-3201
619-532-7250/7275 (Commercial) 619-532-5118 (Fax)

Chairman/ Staff Neurosurgeon


CAPT John P. Grossmitll. MC, USN

Clerical Assistant (OA): Barbara Snow MEMORANDUM


Vice·Chairman 6320
Vacant 006400
27 May 2005
Medical Support Asst: Maxine Smith

Division Officer From:


LCDR Janet R. Keais, MC, USNR
To:
LCPO/Customer Service Rep
HMC Rosalynn Bendtsen, USN
Subj: NEUROLOGICAL OPINION ICO
LPO SGT RAFAEL PERALTA USMC, SSN 20 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
HM2(FMF) Richie Secooy, USN

Supply Petty Officer I am a Board Certified Neurologist with 34 years of clinical experience,
HM3 Katllerine Aeschlimann, USN
Ph.D. in Neurochemistry, Naval Flight Surgeon with considerable
Division of Neurology (619-532-7275) operational experience both as Department Head of Internal Medicine and
Head Neurology at NAMI as well as Director of Medical Services at NAMI,
( - Terry S. Peery, MC, USNR Senior Medical Officer on the JOHN F KENNEDY (CVN-67), and Senior
Medical Officer for the United States Naval Academy. While in private
: . W. Hopkins, MC, USNR practice I served as an independent Medical Examiner for Workers
J . Mark E. Llewellyn, MC, USN
l,ur<: J. M. Apides, MC, USNR Compensation as well as Expert Witness for numerous forensic cases over a
LCDR Stacie R. Daniels, MC, USNR period of ten years.
Dr. Stephen L. Stecker, CIV

Division of Neurosurgery
619-532-7250
I have reviewed the autopsy report and documents containing opinions and
observations of what occurred during the firefight and fatal injuries
Head sustained by SGT Peralta while in Fulluja Iraq, November 2004.
CDR John E. Wanebo, MC, USNR

Staff
LCDR Cyril T. Sebastian, MC, USNR
According to the autopsy report, he sustained a penetrating injury to the
CDR Wayne M. Gluf, MC, USN brain, which entered the left occipital scalp and skull; transversed the left
Physician Assistant
occipital pole then entered the right temporoparietal brain where a steel
Mr. Patrick Kearney, CIV penetrating tip came to rest. There was subarachnoid hemorrhaging of the
Division of Physiatry
left occipital lobe, lacerations of the right occipital, parietal and temporal
(619) 532-7275 lobes. No mention is made of any injuries to the brain stem, frontal lobes,
Head: LCDR Janet Keais, MC, and USNR
motor cortex, internal capsule, and carotid or vertebrobasilar arteries.

Staff: CDR John T. Neff, MC, .LJSN

DVBIC
Dr. Angela Drake, Neuropsychologist
Dr. Sharon Nichols, Neuropsychologist
Dr r.vnthia Boyd, Psychologist
•ne Cessante, Psycholog ist
oder, Case Manager
d Mack, Program Manger
Maren Cullen, Research Associate
Elizabetll Ziegler, Psychometrist

ENCLOSURE ( 3 )
NEUROLOGICAL OPINION ICO SGT RAFAEL PERALTA USMC,
SSN 20 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Understanding that the penetrating injury was of relatively low velocity (no exit
wound and steel penetrating tip within the brain), and that there was no damage to the
brain stem, frontal lobes or motor pathways or blood supply to these regions, it is
quite possible, indeed likely that SGT Peralta was not immediately incapacitated by
the brain injury and could well have carried out an intentional motor act such as that
described by the witnesses on the scene. Namely, intentional scooping of a grenade
with either his right or left arm, pulling it beneath his body.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

ENCLOSURE ( .3 )
NAVAL MEDICAL CENTER
Department of Neurosciences
34730 Bob Wilson Dr. , Ste 201
San Diego, CA 92 134-320 1
619-532-725 0/7275 (Commercial) 619-532-5118 (Fax)

Service - Professionalism - Teamwork - Respect- Compassion


CAPT John P. Grossmith, MC, USN 2 7 May 2005
Chairman/ Staff eurosurgeon
Vacant
Vice-Chairman To:
Barbara Snow FM :
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
CIV, Clerical Assistant (OA)
Anna Martin RE: Sergeant Raphael Peralta 20/ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
CIV, Case Manager
Maxine Smith 1 . I reviewed the data provided regardi ng Sergeant
cry.,_Medical Support Asst (OA)
Peralta ' s unfortunate death while in combat in Iraq .
LCD~ Janet R. Keais, MC, USNR This data included his autopsy report and descriptions
Division Officer of witnesses .
HMC Rosalynn Bendtsen, USN
LCPO / Customer Service Rep
HM2 Richie Secody, USN 2 . My professional qualifications to evaluate this case
LPO / Customer Service Rep include both n eurosurgical and naval experience .
HM3 Katherine Aeschlimann, USN Specifically, I graduated from the U. S . Naval Acidemy
Supply Petty Officer with a B . S . in Mathematics and compl eted 2 years of a
mechani cal engineering degree and have a solid
( Division of Neurology
;DR Terry S. Peery, MC, USNR foundation in physics and mechanics . My operational
'cad, eurology Division experi ence includes my Naval Ac a demy experience and a
two year general medical officer tour with the Seabee
ca ff: unit , Naval Support For ce Antarctica . My neurosurgica l
CAPT E.W. Hopkins, MC, USNR
CAPT D. M. E. Llewellyn, MC, USN training ~ncludes r esidency at Washington University in
CDR J. M. Apidcs, MC, USNR Saint Louis and an additional one year fellowship in
Dr. Stephen L. Stecker, crv cerebrovascular and skull base surgery at Barrow
Division of Neu.rosurgery
Neurological Institute in Phoenix , AZ giv~ng me
CDR John E. Wanebo, MC, USNR extensive knowledge of cranial injuries and complex
Head, euros urgery Division cranial anatomy . I have been a Naval Neurosurgeon for
three yea r s serving as the head of the division of
Staff: neurosurgery at Naval Medical Center San Diego for two
CDR W. M. Glut; MC, USN
LCDR C. T. Sebastian, MC, USNR years and have managed a number of patients with
ballistic i nju rie s from OI F.
Physician Assistants:
Mr. Patrick Kearney, CIV
Ms. Tistia Gaston, CTY 3. The wi tne ss es report that Sergeant Pera lt a made an
effort to pull a live grenade on the ground towards his
Division of Physiatry & R elrab body with an upper extremity shortly after being
LCDR Janet R. Keais, MC, USNR
Head, Pbysiatry & Rehab Divi ion injured by a bu llet o r fragment to the back of his
head . The grenade discharged and Se r geant Pe r alta died .
Staff: The medical examine r stated that Sergeant Peralta could
CDR J. T. Neff; MC, USN not have had the cognitive function to perform the act
D VBIC of reaching for a grenade following his initial injury .
Dr. Angela Drake, Neuropsychologist
Dr. Sharon Nichols, Neuropsycholgist
Dr. Cynthia Boyd, Psychologist
Dr. Lynne Cessante, Psychologist
·san Yoder, Case Manager
landa Mack, Program Manager
Jren Cullen, Research Associate
I .t.lizabeth Ziegler, Psychometrist

ENCLOSURE ( J )
·~ NAY DICALCE T R
~
.. •
Department of eurosciences
47 0 Bob Wilson Dr. te 201
an Di go, C 92134-320 1
619--32-7250/7275 Commercial) 619--32-5118 ax)

en ;ce - Profe ionalism - Teamwork-Respect- Compas ion


CAPT John P. Grossmith, MC, USN
hairman / Staff euro urgeoo
Vacant
Vice- hairman
Barbara Snow
4. My professional op nion as a Staff Neurosurgeon is
CIV, Clerical As istn nt (OA) hat Sergeant Peralta may very poss i bly have been able
to do he act i on reported . Specifically , Sergea t
Anna artin
IV, Cnsc Manngc r Peralta s usta ined a gunsho t wound to his left occiput ,
which had a tangential direction and had a bullet
Maxine Smith fragment passing from his left occip ital pole passin g
IV, Medical upport t (OA)
into his right temporal-parietal region . There were
LCDR Janet R. Keais, MC, USNR some lacerations of the l eft occipital lobe and right
Division Officer
occipita l, temporal and par · etal lobes but no evidence
HMC Rosalynn Bendtsen, USN of brainstem destructio or major cavitat i on effects .
LCPO / u tomcr ervicc Rep
There was some subarachnoid blood over the right
HM2 Richie Secody, USN cereb e l lum a~d occipital poles but no report of large
LPO / Customer en•ice Rep hemor rhage or areas of infarct i on . The a utops y also
HM3 Katherine Aeschlimann, USN notes signific ant multiple small fragments and
upply Petty Officer lacer ations to the face and body consistent with the
Diliisio11 of Neurology grenade d ischarge . Thes e data leave me to belief that
( 'DR Terry S. Peery, MC, IJSNR it is like ly that the bullet may have stuck another
read, eurology Division ob jec t pri or to hitting Sergeant Per alt a given t he lac k
of ma jor deva s tation known wi h mili ary rounds . It
raff:
CAPT E. W. Hopkins, MC, USNR
trav eled from left occipital lobe to the right
CAPT D. M. E. Llewellyn, MC, USN temporal- parietal region , ehind t he brains t em.
CDR J. M. Apid cs, MC, USNR Frontal e xecutive func t ion and arm function wou l d be
Dr. Stephen L. Stecker, CfV preserve d . Occipital lobes could be well enough
Divisio11 of euro:rttrgery preserved f or vision.
CDR John E. Wnncbo, MC USNR
Head, eurosurgery Division

tnff: 5. In conclusion , based on the e vidence pr esented , it is


CDR W. M. Gluf, MC, USN very possible that Sergeant Pe r alta could have reac hed
LCDR C. T. Sebastian, MC. USNR for the grenade after his initial gunshot wound .
Physicia n si lants:
Mr. Patrick Kearney, CIV
Ms. Tist.ia Gaston, CIV
Divisio11 of Pl,ysiatry & Rehab (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
LCDR Janet R. Kcais, MC, USNR
Jlead, Physiatry & Rehnb Dh•ision

DVBIC
Dr. Angela Drake, Neuropsychologist
Dr. Sharon Nichols, Neuropsycholgist
Dr. Cynthia Boyd. Psychologist
Dr. Lynne Cessante, Psychologist
·san Yoder, Case Manager
landa Mack, Program Manager
.i.ren Cullen, Rescarcb Associale
d izabeth Ziegler, Psychometrist

ENCLOSURE (J )
Sgt Peralta
BLT 1/3

Award Recommendation

Actions of 2d Squad at Contact House


15 November 2004
ENCLOSURE (4)
Contact House Composite
Flnnr Pl~n
"THE DAR f-< ROOM"
D11

BEDROOM D8
"THE KITCHEi\! AREA.' 1

D10

THE BIG ROOM LIVING ROOM


KITCHEN
D4

03
09

Pg 2 ENCLOSURE (4)
Stack Outside House
@
@ 11
THE D.A.Rr< F:OC)lv1" 011
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
BEDROOM
08
@
'TH E f<.ITC::HEf". J AF.'. E.A. 11
0
® Sgt Peralta

® (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
010
@
LI . ·1r Jr-·· R t_)
\/ \ .-. '~·----) r\,11
..._""J ,,

• Insurgent l<.ITC::HE~,J

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Sgt Peralta ,


(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

stacked away from the


lead fireteam initially. D1@@@© D9

Pg 3 ENWo~@@
Gaining Entry
0
@ "TH E c:,1.<• "1._
[ 'I,~. ,11\r . ._. ..•1 ''
r ,i"..,. 1(··1r• I
0 ·11
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) BEDROOM
08
© "THE f·<.ITCHEf··. J .8..REA. 11

0
0 Sgt Peralta

@ 010
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

@
Ll\/l~\JC3 ROO tvl
• Insurgent f<ITCHEN
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

move into
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Entrance Room
-Find 02 locked

--Move to 03

Pg 4 ENCLOSURE (4)
Clearing Living Room
0
@ 'THE DARf< ROOtv1 11
011
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) BE DROO rv1 08
@ 11
THE f<ITCHE[\J .AF.:E.A. 11

0
0 Sgt Peralta

@ 0 ·10
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

TH E BIG ROOrv1
• Insurgent f<.ITCHEN
D4
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

into Living Room


move
®
-Remainder of team enters
l'lil"iil building.

e
z
-2 nd stack moves into position
0100®® 09

II Pg 5 ENCLOSURE (4)
Clearing Big Room
@L

@ 0 ·11
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
BEDROOM
© 08
TH E 1.t -.(IT(-··HE[\I r, F'·· E .''
0
11 1 11
. ..__.. •J ,/-4, ,i-!,,,

® Sgt Peralta

@ 06 D·10·.
' '
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
@
• Insurgent THE BIG RO OM
f<.ITCHE t··..J
enters and clears
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

the Big Room through 04

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) moves to cover


m1'iJ 05 & 06
?£ 09
6 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

f:g move to stack next to 05


!.t. -Remaining personnel move
into entrance room and start Pg 6 ENCLOSURE (4)
moving into living room
Moving into Living Room
0
@
"THE c ·11\ ......., ('·, '·..·1 "
i::::;, 1,.; ci i..__ D11
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
. ,>-<,,.;. r , " • ·-· I ,

BEDROOtv1
D8
@
0 "THE ~<ITCH Er\J .~.RE.A"

,..._j ® Sgt Peralta

@
@
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
© D10

• Insurgent THE BI G ROO tv1


04
LI\/IN(3 ROOIB f<.ITC:; HE r··.,J
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) remains in Big
Room
-Sgt Peralta moves behind(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
®
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

z
frinl (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stac k
D9
f; to the right of D5
en
c::: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

ii
...... (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) move into living room ENCLOSURE (4)
_['.
..._...
Engagement Begins
0
@ D11
11 TH E [I ..-../•, F. . I/r " R ,.-,I(_)-, t,,1 11

@
1
1.. ... _ ~ ... 1,,1

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
BEOROOtv1 08
@
0
® Sgt Peralta

@
010
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

• Insurgent THE E:JG ROOlv1


f<.ITC:HE r··..J
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) opens 05 D4
-Insurgents immediately open
fire from Bedroom and Kitchen ®
Area

D9

ENCLOSURE (4)
The Fire Fight
0
@ 011 ·
i1 THE O..'\ C1I.{
,,_., r-..;. r . c,i'-'
ri.. ._. 1. i'-'
..._..1/'·1"
@
1,'

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
BEDROOf'./1
D8
@
0 "THE f<ITC:HEr\J.A.REA"

® Sgt Peralta

@
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) D10
@
• Insurgent THE BIG ROOtv1
f<ITCHE f··..J
D4
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (firing over


(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) shoulder)
return fire 09

Pg 9 ENCLOSURE (4)
Sgt Peralta Hit
0
@
11
THE DAF?f< ROOM 11
011
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
BEDROO tv1
D8
@
0 11
THE f<ITCHEN ,A,RE.~ 11

0 Sgt Pe ralta .
a
@
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

@
• Insurgent THE BIG ROO tv1 -..,
LIVW.JG RO~ f<.ITC: HE r··..J
-Sgt Peralta is shot, rotates
counter-clockwise and falls onto
@
...··
.S4
his stomach in the middle of 04
rotates clockwise
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
:@:
., '
and moves out of the line of fire
into th e Big Room
mi D9
~ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) is shot in forearm
§ -Other Marines continue to engage

i ENCLOSURE (4)
Insurgents Cease Firing
@
@
D11
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
'THE D.ARr< ROO tv1 11

BEDROOM
08
@
0 . "THE l{ ITCHEI~ AREA"

®
@
Sgt Peralta
• D6
@
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
® 0 -10

• Insurgent LI. · 1 I~\ JI...J


\•1
~- R ,-i 1'""
. . I"-.. 1 1
......) I \
11

f<ITCHEt··J
®
-Insurgents cease firing
@
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) moves to assist
ITft Sgt Peralta
z
e, 09
6
en
c:::
= Pg 11 ENCLOSURE (4)
Insurgents Flee
©
@
D11
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
'THE O..&.Rf-< F.IC:i0 ~,/1 11

BEOROOtv1
D8
@
0
® Sgt Peralta

@ D6
~ D5

@
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
® D10

• Insurgent Ll\/1 t···,113 R() 0 tvl


f<.ITCHE f\J
@ Grenade ®
-Insurgents flee
- As they move through the
fi=iTil kitchen they toss a· grenade
~ through 05 & D6, landing near D9
6 Sgt Peralta on his right side
i
.......
...t'.
Pg 12 ENCLOSURE (4)
~
"Grenade"
"THE D.~,R~< R()O rv1"
BEOROO tvl
08

~
W -"Grenade" is shouted
-Sgt Peralta sees and scoops
grenade from his right side to

under the left side·of his body D10
sees the grenade and
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
@
runs out of the room THE BIG ROOfv1 -..-c U\/1r··..J(3 F.'. 0 0 tv1
rotates and drops to f<.ITCHEt·~
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
04
the floor seeking cover
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) run

~
out of room
have no
0
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
~ place to run; seek cover in Big @ D9
fj; Room
c:: .
@ 02 ©
ii (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) seeks cover 1n
,.......,. back of Living Room
...c Pg 13 ENCLOSURE (4)
......
Explosion / Retrograde
©
@ 011
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
11
THE D.A.RK-F?C10M 11

BEDR OO t·,/1
DB
@
0 11
THE l<ITC:HEt··~ ,A,RE.A.
11

0 Sgt Peralta

@
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 010
@
• Insurgent Ll\."I r··..JC:3 Ro o tv1
l·<.ITCHEf\J

-G renade explodes under left


side of Sgt Peralta

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

receive shrapnel
®
li'ITTJ
ii; wounds D1 @ D9
r-
5: orders everyone out
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
@ ©
§a to regroup before they finish
ffl clearing the house
........ .
ENCLOSURE (4)
-C
.......
FROM (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) JUt-.J. 23 2 005 01 : 11PM Pl
06 123 10 5 THU 11:04 FAX (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

So.p plemental Swam Statement of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) U SMC of June 23.,


2005 to REVIEW OF INSURGENT ENGAGEMENT ON 15 NOVEJYIBER 2004 .
INVOLVING SERGEAN"TRAFAELPERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 03 11 USMC Tnvs of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 1 Jan 05

I, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC, being advised by the Investigating Officer,


(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that I am still under oath, provide the following Supplementary
Statement regarding the above-captioned investigation.

On June 23, 2005 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) telephoned me at my cellular phone number (b)(6), of (b)(7)(c)
for
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) purposes ofre-1nterviewing me on the events of 15 1 ovember 2004. I am
presently (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

After the firefight of 15 November 2004 which is the subject of this investigation and
resulted in the death of Sergeant Rafael Peralta, USMC, I and other Marines re-entered
the hous~. I noticed (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC was attempting to lift
Sergeant Peralta by his feet. I told (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to stop so we could get additional
Marines to help.

Mys~lf, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC then


went to Sergeant Peralta to lift him. l grabbed Sergeant Peralta by both of his feet and to
the best of my recollection, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) grabbed his left arm and(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
grabbed his right ann. We lifted him face down. As we were lifting him I noticed
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
a shallow, ntbbled hole in the floor which appeared to me to have been made by the
grenade's explosion. The hole was lUlder Sergeant Peralta's left side, and based on how
we were holding him when I first noticed itt fuc hole seemed to be under Sergeant
l?eralta's upper left, around the left J)ectoral muscle. Because we carried Sergeant Peralta
face down in this fashion, I did not have an opportunity to note the condition of his flak
jacket at the time.

The "shallow, rubbled depression" is the same hole l identified to the Investigating
Officer when we subsequently returned to the house to survey and. photograph the site.

I swear the foregoing testimony


-
is the truth,
.
therd whole truth and notbino-
'
but the troth so
help me God. TelephomcalJy sworn to this 23 day of June, 2005 at (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Corporal, U.S. Marine Corps

Sworn to telepbonically before me on June 23, 2005

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Investigating Officer

~NCLOSURE (5 )
, __
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
1ST BATTALION. 30 MARIN ES
30 MARINE DIVISION (·)(REIN)
MC BH KA NEOHE BAY, HA WAII 96863

IN REPl Y lEFE I 10:


1650
SJA/
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
23 Jun 05

From: Investigating Officer, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)


To: Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines

Subj: REVIEW OF INSURGENT ENGAGEMENT ON 15 NOVEMBER 2004 INVOLVING SERGEANT


RAFAEL PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) /0311 USMC - ADDIT IONAL INQUIRY

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 1650.lG

Encl: (23) Supplemental Sworn Statement of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)


USMC of June 23, 2005 to REVIEW OF INSURGENT ENGAGEMENT ON 15
NOVEMBER 2004 INVOLVING SERGEANT RAFAEL PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 0311
USMC Invs of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dtd 1 Jan 05

1. In compliance with the reference and in furt herance of my investigatory


duties under the subject investigation, I telephonically re-interviewed
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC, at his home in (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on June
23, 2005.

2. I contacted (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) at his cellular telephone number of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)


( Based on my previous interactions with SNM, his voice and some
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
threshold personal identification interrogatories, I am satisfied that the
person to whom I spoke was in fact (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC, being
the same (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who previously provided two written statements in
this investigation, previously attached as Enclosures (1) and (10).

3. The substance of the June 23, 2005 interview was typed by myself during
the course of the interview. I then forwarded the statement by facsimile to
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) at (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) He reviewed it for accuracy, signed it
under oath and return faxed it to me. This statement is attached as
Enclosure (23).

4. Based on the substance of Enclosure (23), I make the additional findings:

41. That (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)


along with other Marines, re-entered the house where Sergeant
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Peralta lay after the firefight ended. [Encl (23))

42. That (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was the first to attempt to move Sergeant
Peralta, grabbing him by h is feet by himself. [Enc l (23)]

43. That (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) told (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to stop so they could
get additional Marines to help move Sergeant Peralta. [Encl (23) J

44. That (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) then


began to lift Sergeant Peralta, from the feet, right arm and left arm
respectively . (Encl (23) ]

ENCLOSURE ( b)
Subj:· REVIEW OF INSURGENT ENGAGEMENT ON 15 NOVEMBER 2004 INVOLVING SERGEANT
RAFAEL PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 0311 USMC - ADDITIONAL INQUIRY
45. That in the process of lifting Sergeant Peralta to remove him from
the house, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) noted a shallow, rubbled depression in the floor
under Sergeant Peralta' s left side (Encls (22D), (23)).

46. That based on how the Marines were holding Sergeant Peralta, the
grenade hole appe ared to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) when viewed from Sergeant Peralta's
feet to have been under Sergeant Peralta ' s left pectoral muscle. [Encl (23) J

47. That the shallow, rubbled depression in the floor was previously
identified by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to the Investigating Off i cer when the two where
among those who returned to the scene of the firefight to survey and
photograph it i n December 2004. [Encls (22), (23)]

48 . That (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) review of both the blast pattern on Sergeant


Peralta's flak and the photographs of the rubbled depression ~evealed the
depression to have been consistent with and therefore caused by the explosion
of an "Iraqi Grenade, Model Unknown." [Encls (20), (22) , (23)]

5. Based on the foregoing findings, I add the following opinions:

13 . The Iraqi Grenade, Model Unknown, which exploded in the insurgent


house on 15 November 2004 created the shallow, rubbled depression in the
f loor under Sergeant Peralta' s left flank which was found at the time Marines
l if ted him for removal from the house. (Findings (41)- (48)]

14. The act of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) attempting to lift Sergeant Peralta


by his feet possibly altered the perceived location of the grenade hole in
relation to Sergeant Peralta from being lower left to being upper left, but
left nevertheless, when subsequently viewed by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) from the
position of Sergeant Peralta's feet. [Finding (42))

6. I have no changes to my recommendation in this investigation. Point of


contact is (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

ENCLOS.(h)
-. H.P. WHITE LABORATORY, INC.
3114 Scarboro Road
Street, Maryland 21154-1822
Telephone: f4 l0) 838-6550
Facsimile: (.o lOl 838-2802
e111a1!: :11fo@·-,p,vh1te.com
w,,;w hpvvh1te .corn 29 July 2005
(HPWLI 9693-10A)

Battelle Memorial Institute


24 Center Street
Suite 103
Stafford , Virginia 22556

Attention: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Gentlemen :

In accordance with the general provisions of- Battelle Memorial Institute Purchase Order Number 189591
and your memo of 26 July 2005, H.P. White Laboratory, Inc. conducted an examination of a fragment
which you provided on 28 July 2005.

The fragment was in a sealed, plastic container identified as evidence (No. ME-04-927) in the death of an
U.S. Marine while on duty in Iraq.

The purpose of our examination was to identify, if possible, the caliber and type of bullet wh ich produced
the fragment. Enclosed please find Table I with the results of our examination of the contents of the
container.

The fragment was examined microscopically and photographed and compared to known exemplars.

The plastic container was resealed and returned to you via Federal Express, Signature Service, track~ng
number (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Should you have any questions regarding this matter, or if we may be of any further service, please do
not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,

r .-····-···~81:E LA~?RATORY, INC.


.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Enclosures

RESEARCH • DEVELOPMENT- • ENGINEER ING


Batte!le Memorial Institute
Attention : (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(HPWLI 9693-10A)
29 July 2005
Page 2

CONTAINER
Evidence No. ME-04-927

Evidence Exemplar
Contents: One Fraqment Steel Core from 5.56x45mm , M855
Description, General: Cylindrical w/truncated cone tip Cylindrical w/truncated cone tipz
Weiqht (Gr): 10.1 10.4
Lenqth (In.}: 0.3185 0.3165
Major Dia. (In.) 0.1805 0.1815
Tip Dia. (In.) 0.0980 0.0960
Color: Silver (corroded) Silver
Metallic: Yes Yes
Ma~metic: Yes Yes
Most llkely source: Steel Core of 5.56x45mm, M855, Bullet.

I
I

I
H.P. White Labora ory, Inc.

Figure 1. Exemplar 5.56 x 45mm M855 Ball round.


H.P. White Laboratory Inc.

Figure 2. Tip and side view of core from 5.56 x 45mm M855 Ball round.
'¢:JH.P. White Laboratory, Inc.

--;igure 3. 5.56 x 45mm MSSS Ball round with evidence and exemplar cores.
Binder C

Investigation of
Friendly Fire Incident
on 15 November 2004
Sergeant Rafael,
Peralta USMC
CC:JA

MEMOMNDUM FOR DEPUTY COMMANDER

)
(b)(5)

Attomey Work Product


Pages 266 through 268 redacted for the following reasons:
----------------------------
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), and (b)(5), attorney work product
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
! ~t;RINE EXP~O!TIONARY E'ORCE
0 . S . NARIN E COR?S FORCES, PACFIC
BOX 555300
CAM? PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA 92055-5300
IN REPLY RE,-""ER TO:
5630
SJA
r-.r--r·
U C. v 5 20 5
Si::COND A1D THIRD ENDORSE~ENT on (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Command Investigation of 17 Nov OS
From : Commanding Genera _, I Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, and
Commande r , U. S . Marine Forces, Central Command
To : Commander , United States Cent r al Command

Subj: COHt,,lJUD INVEST I GATION REGARDING THE SOORCE OF THE BALLISTIC FR.l':..GMENT
RECOVERED ? K0:1 SE:l.GE~ T R.lffAE PEF.11.L_A (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 0311 OSMC (DEClP..SED)

1. Keaddressed and forwarded.


2 . My heart fe_t condolences go out to the family and friends of Sergeant
Peralta . Sergeant Peralt a ' s heroism a nd personal sacrifice will inspire future
generations of Marines . Our Corps and Count r y mourns his loss , but is grar.e f~l
for his service .

3 . F~nd~ng of Fact# 2 is edified by adding the additional sentence :


"Howeve:::- , it is cow.men know edge that the - ~~ Mari e Division lost several
M- 16 rifles and associated 5 . 56mm ammunition dur~ng intense cowbat engagemen~s
in Fal _ujah withi n days prior to Ser gean _ Pe:::-alta ' s death. "

4 . Opinion ;l: 4 is modified 1:. 0 read , " References (c) and (d) conr.a~n complete,
thorough , and facr.ually accurate documentation supporting t:he award
recommendation con t ained the r ein , and that Sergeant Peralta ' s self ess a~d
hero~c actio, s a r e worthy of the Medal of Ho~or . " [Findings of Fact _Q, 11,
and 12] .

5. I recommend that the F~ndings of Fact , 0ps: ;on ~ and Recommendations, e.s
modified above , be approved .

~ r;yji/ft
J. F. S.ZI.TTLER

Copy to:
SJJ!. , I .:EF
SJA, MarCent

6
UNITED STATES :MARIN3 CORPS
lST'NAR: !-iE -I VISI .· ( R:2I )J}
3ox 55~3eo
CA~? PSND18TO, , C~2.IFOJ<N: A 92055- 5380

5830

0IT
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
200s
='IRS'? END03.S2MEKT on (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Co::anar.d I:1vescigat.ion o: 17 Nov 05

, r om : Co;ru:na .ding Ge~eral , l'" .arine Division {~eir. )


To : Cor.ur,a~d:ng Ge~eral, I M~rine Exped~t:o~ary ~orce

Subj : co;-.!MA
'D Il\VESTIGATION REGl'3,DI. "G THE so· :<.CS OF ':'HE :S;l,.LL:S"'IC FRZ\.GEEN~
RECO'ERED FROM SGT R.~~AEL PERA.LT~ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 0311 USMC (DEC'::AS~D)

~e:: : (£) DOD lnstruccion 6055 . 7

1. ~eadd~essed and forwarded .

2 . I recommend chat the findings of face, op~nions , and recomm~ndacions oft.he


Inves~igating Officer be approved .

3. Based on the findings and recommendatio~s oft.he In ve st.igating Officer ,


there is a good probability ~ha t Sergeant Peralta may have been hit by friencily
fire. As s uch , in accordance wic:. reference (e) , this inves::.iga.:ion is
forwarded for appropriate ac~ion . Further , I bel~eve that Sergeant Pe~al ta ' s
ac::io .. s do st.:ppo:r.: a recom:nendacion for ::.ie M€dal o .: Eonor .

4. _ reco:rn:mer.d no furtna, investigatioc. ~ ~

Copy to :
¥ F. .<TONSKI

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
File

5
'
\
I ':'\'!TED STA TES MA.RI. r£ CORP
FORWARD (WEST)
rn MARINE DiV!SfON (REfN) J\,ffR
BOX 5:538i
CAM'P PW· LE TON, CAw'FOR.~fA 9.::055-538 !

17 Nov 05

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)


To: Comrn<>nding Gen ra!, 1st Jvfa:r:ine D' ·js;o;o (REN)

Su ~: COM1\11A: •D Il 1 VE 'DGATI01 · .REGARD G THt O RCE OF THE B.AUJ"T.C


FRAG M . "T RECOVE. ED FRO.!! SGT. R FAEL PERA.LT (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 03 l :,
:s, IC (DECEA SED)

Ref: (a) JAGi i


(b) H.P. v 'hile Labo 11mry, Inc. Ltr HPWU 9693-lOA
(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) L!.r 1650 SJA f J Jru1 05
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
{d) CG"s .r:.ndorse o of9 Au0
(e) Preli ; at Inq . . · :5SOO...,JA of28 0 05

Encl: {l)
(2)
(3) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
\ (4)
/
C.-)
(6)
(7)
)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(9) ent of
(l 0) Statei e · o
tl I) State .. c1 of
< l2J 'iatemer r f

P relirninary Statement

l . 111is in.ve :gati n Wi'!S dir ·cted by th Comm· ncling General. l I Ma."in Di'vi:-ioo, in ord~r to
(1 ) inquire to the facts and circum. an es surrouuding the sourc of a ba11i tic frag "eni
recovered from < e dy of Sgt. 1<..afael Peralta and (2) assess and valuate th iripl teness of
the Reforence (c) ?.:ncl (d) documet supp r :ng rh award r co 'l end ion contained
th n.

2. 1 have reviewed Ll:te ref rences an'. Leir enciosures and all availa I information conce ing
the engagen l1t against anti-coaliti011 fi. ·ce' on 15 1-O\'e b r 2004, i r a.I ltrjah, Tra which 1 d 10
tbe death of S:::- ·. Rafael Pe~a.Jta, US?-K.
Subj: COM!.'L D l · lVEST1GA TlON REGARDD-../0 THE SOURCE OF THE BALLlSTJC
F G, lENT R£CO\ ER.ED FRO -1 SGT. RAFAEL PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)103 l, U MC
(DECEASED)

3. The only diffi ulry en.count.. r"'d in this inve tigarion was making contact i,vith two of r.be
\'ritne.sser to the firefight. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) both ·eached their end of active service io
or
the 'Manne Corps. At,.., )_pts were made to contact botb !hese individu ts at their last known
telephone numbers ;vithout su s ' . A!though(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)participated in the fi efi.ghr, his
sea eme ro ·i s no relevan · iltfon:narion as to whether gi. Pe '31ta reached for the grenade
and/or placed it '\.mder his flak jacket. Sinrilar!y (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) s teme11ts provide no reJevant
in rmation on tbis issue. However, interviewing (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) could gi e him an opportunity to
addres$ the issue of wbefuer he or ano b ~r me1 1ber of the squad may have ::iccidenrly shot Sgt.
Peralta. Additionailv, in· n iewing bot of thes individual.s couJd possibly~ ·ovide infmmation
as to whether they heard if me .1' ers of their squad we-re pi ssured to exaggerate Sgt. Peralta's
actions. However, in li::,1 of the evidcnc · ahady garh~r d concerning the two r:1ain issu - Lhnt
ar the subject of thls iu.vesligation, ii is doubrfol tbat (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) wo •ld provide
a 1y new evide "'.e that wou d ait th opjnions or c; ommendari contain din this
investigation. 11 er fore. it is to· -ecoromended that he mvestigation be kept open in order ro
make further atten pts at locati:lgtb ~" two iniLi, 'dlm.ls.

4. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) from th"' o flee f the Stn f Judge Advoca c 1,,vere
consulted duri the course of th is in.e .. tiga ·on.

FincliM:s of Fact

1. Tue ballistic fragment removed from Sgt. Pen !ta s body is consi n \vith a 5.56 min bullet
(E closure (2)}.

2. T ere is no evidenc~ tbat the P.. TF individual \Vhom the Marines en count red possessed
t-.ATO ammunition or weapons. Fu11hermore tb r is no evide ce that the cache discov Ted in
0

the ho1 se 'ncluded sucb a mur ition or weapons. [E 1.cJosures (3) and (4)J.

3. Seven Ma ·n s ·ere io the living roo-1 of rbe cor act! ouse at tbe tirne they began receiving
fire from insurget . . Most of ·. em returned fire . [En !osures (3) and ( J.

4. Five ol1t of the sevc. Marine that retnme: 11.re w -. to the right or beh-ind Sgt. P~rnlta These
Jvfa:·ines were (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
[Enclosures
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (3) and (4)J.

5. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) wa· a me oer of l" Sq 1ad, lj: Pin 0011, Alpba Campany Bl T 1/3 at 1he
ti 'e of the engage ,1ent. He re,)ponded to 2"~ . 'qt ad's rmro call for assistance and upon· rrival at
tlle '·contact hous ", approxirna·· 1 l ~~ minu es Jaier fom1d (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) walking around outsid .
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and told (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that be had accidently shot Sgc. Pera!t2.
[Enclosure 5)).
ubj: COMMAND l ..fV~STlG .'i. T!ON RE ARD G THE ·o RCE OF Tl .E BALE T .C
FRAmvfENT RECO\ ER.ED FRO :--.·f G 1. RAFAEL PERA LTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)'0:.1 l 1C
(DECEASED)

6. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was am.:> nt. r o. 2"..i Scua :, l Platoon. Alpha Company BLT l/3 at the it ·
of rbe en.::,.._gemcm. b Jan 1 ary 200 · (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) cold b.i11 d1at he co ,Ju have po sibl,\' hir ., g...
Pe:~lta \.Vi h rie dly cros_fire du ring de !refig_ht. [Enc!o · e '6)].

7. The b lie that \ ouud xi Sg!. Peralta er:re ·ed h · l froccipi ta calp ud sknl . Theo iph;I
r gion of the sk.'1.11! is the back of the sb.'TI l. [Enclo ure (41].

8. The A rmed Forces Iustitu e of Parholog., lisrs • e caus of de th .s "gun.:·bot nnd ballis ·c
injuri:s of the head.'' The ter:i 'ba Usti c i1fu ·i of l.e h ,. re.'."crs to sl , nel from an
e:p loding grenade. [En losu.re 4): .

9. It is (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) i
ression t.rnt (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) s to say
that Sgl Peralta ju. ed on rhe .,..,:e ade. [Enclo u e 5 ].

10.(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)deuie · that he p1 ::sure any of he ?v' arii es to s. ate thm $gt. Pera.It. "jL n p ·d 011
the g,·en_de", scoop up .he ~ ·eJ1a e a1d pta e it und · hls ves or otb ,vi e exagger2.1e ·g1.
Peralta's a ions. [Enclosure (7)J .

l l . There i:- nothit,g to corrobora (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was


l t(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) put ·ng essure
on ome of tl e a i .c·· to sa; th?J Sgt Per 1a·s a io J. w_re 'va!o-ro '·- than they real!_
vcr. [En lo&ures (6) ,{7), {8) (9), (i O , .ll l) an · (LL.

12. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)


contirrue to attest co e
t'1 an accL racy of he sra
tl , em they providvd in References (c) and
(d). Euclosutes (6) (SJ, (9), (10) ll l) and (12 ).

Opinions

The cause of _gt. P=ralra ·s dea h was (.a a pene .id g gunsho, wo , drone he d and (b)
balhs!" inj uri-s of the ead from . gr - ~de e :plosion fFindi _,s of Fa r l a.nd 8}.

3. The s a ernents of the 1Vlari cs invol ved i1 tl1, firefight on Nove , bcr 15. 2004 contained in
Refo cnces (c} "iid (d are trut' if. . ed 1c,ally, rhc Meri.! es f)Volved in the firefigl:i- gnve an
hone taccoun of t e ·~1 e rceptiouof Sgr. Pe ai ta·~ actions. - heywe ·enotpr-es ured to
xaggerate his vaior in the hope thr:t Sgt. :Peralta would ultima !y be warded be Me al of
Honor. [findings of f act JO, 11 and l2J.

4. Refer 11ccs ( -) and (d) 01 tain co:npiete and th ro:1gh documenta 'on . upporti--i£ d .e a\·v ·
Subj: COMMA.1 ·o i~:vE . !GA TION REGARD.ING T.i.E ()l"RCE OF . HE BALU,Ti C
FR.A.Gi t!"ENT RECO\ 'ET{ED FR , SCT. RAF ..i.,E L PER.-\LT (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 31 1, USMC
DECEA-EDJ

rec , men ation con ained rhe,ein. [Finding of Fat 10 l l and 12].

Re ommendstions

l . Thac no fur, 1-r in ·::st g2tion be conduced in o tbc foe·_ i'..,1d circumvic.! ce. nrrounding the
source of the baaistic -fy,..gmcn retrieved f:- r . de body of Sgt Peralta.

2. "That no farber investigation be c -ndu te · to a ~s an e\'alua: e ' ompletcnes of th


Refer- ce (c) a d (d) do WJ1:.::n. ;on · ppor ing th·• a\\ ard r nomm ·n ati0n comained there·n .

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

fovcst'ga ·ng Officer


UNITED S ·ATES M?'-!.RL."m COPPS
)
;?.! :e-.t1.:i1 U sit .~

583,C

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Subj : [email protected]) IN -::STTGA':'ION REGA~ JI1 ~ T!iE SOURCE ,...:: THE. Ehl,!,;ST!(:
FPJ G!.: 8NT ?SCOV~RZV ~O! SERGSANT R~F.~2, ?:;!C-~!'?~
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

( b ) .H.E!-. Whit: 1~::,o:ato::y, !nc . ltr E?w::,: 96 93-lvA


{0-a_listic s;,aninc.tion a:-d. .;va~uatior: 1
, (c) _tr 1650 SJ(b)(6), .. / (b)(7)(c)
of 1 Ja..n n 5
: (d ) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) l tr 165,J 1 of S ~;;.g 05
(e ) P~.el.:r::,in$:r; I r:.c;i.:.i!:'y 5200 SJ A of 2B Oct ,.!~

l. Pur~\;.C: !"'i::. to 'n a?t e:- ; : c= r~ _a r-a .ce -:a; JOU ::re a.?. o.:...nted '::o i:;qci.r-e
.:.~to t h~ fiicts a;1d c.:..:c;;..--:;.s t a:-.ces $~:.:::' '..l:ldin~ .:.~e sc:.1:c1: o:: a :::allis-::ic
f ragm.e·nt, .re=ov-c red fr cm t :1-s boC,. of se::-gea t ru:-=ael c 0 .,.-~ · -i:: . Riefsrences
('.:) ) , (c) anc (d J pE::ta..:.. . Yot: a :-;e al;;o dl.re -;;;€:cl t:;; a:5S"'SS ar.c eve.:.uate
the c i~P-e~e=--l ss of 1h: rai e::--2.;c... {c } 2.~-=:, C") riac·...imgn-cati ~:1 su9port.:ng
t h-s c:!.\~c.rci. rec~7-it.e::cta.t;.or: ccn;c:i ned ::he:-~.:..r, . Rs£sren ~ e, p!"o~. . iCe s
additional info;:!:\a,:..:.o:r.. p-er;::;.r;e:-it ;::c, y •·r i rw<2s-..:.;a1::. ::m. ·por, ra=si 9t o:
.:..=-iis a ~poi.r--~Mer_t lt;t.~e.r1 t~....:s- i ::;... est~ .. a :..:.o:i -; ::., __ ~:sc::,m.e ye·..::: :-=:::..:r.cr _"
duty .

2.
fomat by ,., ? xo-.;e . ,. Oe: 20 .5, u, ._ es.s a:'!. ex-,e.:is:.on o : :.-.~rr.a .:.. s ;-re;:::~~d} .:.- ....J:
you i1eve not ;,_e""i7.:. = ..:sly do:1e sc, r ead c!'_apte.: !! f .::-e:"e ...·~ ce. (a ) in its
~..1r.i.r~"::y bei=,=s be,;-i.::.r;_.i:1.g ~ur i ~-,es-c. :ga- ic~ .

C0:.1!" !- 6 i nvas t:.. g a~io;, .

R. F, ~.<-,.':'.'CNSK.!
,H.P. WHITE LABORATORYr U\iC.
3114 Scarboro Road
Street. Maryland 2115,1-1822
Telephone· 14 i 01 B38-u55C
F-ac:;er,i,le. {41Dl 838-2802
. ,rail. :n!c@h~1wh1tc \'.'Orn
29 July 2005
(HPWLI 9693-10A)

Battelle Memorial Institute


24 Center Street
Suite 103
Stafford, Virginia 22556

Attention : (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Gentlemen:

In accordance with the general provisions of Battelle Memorial Institute Purchase Order Number 189591
and your memo of 26 July 2005, H.P. White Laboratory, Inc. conducted an examination of a fragment
which you provided on 28 July 2005.

The fragment was in a sealed, plastic container identified as evidence (No. ME-04-927) in the death of an
U.S. Marine while on duty in Iraq.

The purpose of our examination was to identify, if possible, tile caliber and type of bullet which produced
the fragment Enclosed please find Table I with the results of our examination of the contents of the
container.

The fragment was examined microscopically and photographed and compared to known exemplars.

The plastic container was resealed and returned to you via Federal Express, Signature Service, track~ng
numbe (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Should you have any questions regarding this matter, or if we may be of any further service. please do
not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,

r/·--·(~81:E ~?RATORY, INC.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Enclosures

RESEARCH• DEVELOPMENT· ENGINEERING


Battel/e Memorial lnstllute
Attention: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(HPWLI 9693-10A)
29 July 2005
Page2

CONTAINER
Evidence No. ME-04-927

Evidence Exemplar
Contents: One Fragment Steel Core from 5.56x45mm. M855
Description , General: Cvtindrical w/truncaled cone tio Cvtindrical w/lruncaled cone tipz
Wel~ht (Gr): 10.1 10.4
Lenoth (In.): 0.3185 0.3165
Maior Dia. {In.) 0.1805 0.1815
Tip Dia. (In .) 0.0980 0.0960
Color. Silver (corroded) Silver
Metallic: Yes Yes
Maanetic: Yes Yes
Most llkelv source: Steel Core of 5.56x45mm, M855, Bullet.
'
\~H.P. White Laboratory Inc.

Figure 1. Exemplar 5.56 x 45mm M855 Ball round.


-:(H.P. '\iVhite Laboratory, Inc.

Figure 2. Tip and side view of core from 5.56 x 45mm M855 Ball round.
• I

~r,(R.P. Whit Laboratory, Inc.

Figure 3. 5.56 x 45mm M855 Ball round with evidence and exemplar cores.

r
... --· -·- -- · · - - ·-- _ ..__ _ ··~ ·· - --r~

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Nm1. 9,2005
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) When. I was running to tbe house ~ oss the st{eet where ·the rest of
the p1t. was I saw (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) wa1kmg back a..11d forli:t and he looked at me (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

anything about Jt. Mi.er we went in the house to retrieve the body of Sgt Peralta, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
went and tried to gather with all the other Marines 10 see how we were ta.~g it lat<:r told
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
me w:tule he '\'i.-as crying "damn, I cant believe he's gone1 v..-e were talking last night Iil.e nothing
and now he's gone:.'' A couple ofdays after eve1:rtlringhaypcnoo there .v.as an argument to
W'<!th.er or not Sgt Peraitajm:u.ped on the grenti!de or not. M,:m,es where talldng saying that (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
was saying thrtt he will probabl;· receive the m..ooal. ofbonor fur doing ·what be did,, what that
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
,:,,:as that he did I don't e;;:actly kn.ow "W!lat be was ta!.hlng aoout
Th-:, -word that was going·around
,,vhen. we fonnd 01:-rt.. we were going to be getti.P.g guestioi,:ed wa<s :i;hat 'r;{f.<; putth,g
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
presstire on san1eMarlnes to say that Sgt. Peraltajumped on the grenade. We foun..d that out
when w-en.tto the .hospiial there to ta:lk (b)(6),
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to (b)(7)(c) We btew(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)wouldn't listen to him
lll)d "vould: say the truth, bat the ~ Ma,--ines 'Where the ones that we wm-en't sure about. T!le'J
w:ere more likely to d{) what ~ said and follow those orders. To the best pfmy knowledge (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
v.,as with
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) when they went to go visit
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and it v-,,as his sg. that got bit. 1 don't
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
recall him encouraging the situation on what happene<l fo Peralta because the Marines that were
in the house that I asked Scrid L\ey didn't see Sgt Peralta jump in the grenade,. they said they saw
hlm Oil the floor and they were- running out. I really believe that w.ha told me how Sgt
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Peralta really died that day and didn't say anyt1.ing a out it because Ms:riJ;les weie saying he took
the grenade. wet.her or not it rolled to his body or not. What did ,was not on purpose and
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
what he t.old me ,...as no !l'.i~..ake. If there ate 5.56 rounds in the body, there i:s proof tight there.
From what I was told the Ma..rines were running out when the grenade was tr..roWl\ and Pem:Ita
,.,,.as 21.teady on 'the floor. I don't under~.iand how someone shot three tim~s,in th~ face could pull
in a grenade knowing what they are.do·ng. I say three ~use I .rec;£tll saying that he shot
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
him three times in the face because bis ~ n was on butst

I swear or affirm tha t t he foregoing informa tion i s true and


accurate t o the best of my knowledge .
Telep~;)t2_ swornon -thi s _;_o_ day of November 20 05 .
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Sworn to te lephon ically before me on Novemb er .l.Q.._ , 2005

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

:cnvestiga 1:ing Off i.cer


F:,ffi'l
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Nev . 11 2005 08: 4""'.:'.PM i"2
1e1rn1wes J.5; .;s (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) P4E a2 NJ5

STAT.EM:EXT OF (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Dtte: .~o'\-·ember .10, 2005


to~o;i-oi.!ntetvfow; T.:le bonic
St.:bjeot &~gerner.~ i!!vo V'J".g " gt. Per;;!~ on 15 ~ov 04

l,(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) provide the fo loWit'\!! S'Pom s(3lcment .o(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)


who hlls fyp~ this
ight in\•olving:'sgt. Peral.ta on Novffllber l S, Z004,
st11.t~\'Zl.t · o- l!l.¢, ~tartling the·fir m
falluj~.1-aq. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 1 C"J.rrcnt ·· ::esl.ee in
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

.thaverev·ewed my pr.or suittm:entdated T vemoer15. 2()('A z:idagirin ztt'est to i slr~th :md


~c;cur~y.
i
Sc ••etime in J:tc=-t 2005, I b.zd -a con.~on with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Dtiri:-tg 6 .u t
rust.\Jssl6r. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)said tt.at he cou!.d ha:ve .P ~b y rlt Sgt. Pm! .~ with frl~d!:y crossfire.
l: sho~<i emp-b.!s1z! 1:m.1 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)only S'.:ggested !he possr · ·~ · u;.t S~ Peralta IT'..ay h~
been idllpi byfti~dly fo~ by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) d0-ttotrce;:· diseuss·ng wi!.hat.}' ofthtotber
Marines that were in the contact bouse tb.2! ri.ll fue pc sibi ity of S2t. P~lta bi:mg killed by
friendly :fue.

. nevet ::dd uy ~ nversaticns r'v'it:i (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ~4 !'!! No ·emb~ ! 5, 2004 in whim (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ytricd to
i fiuence me tn ~unt the int:<l:::llt in a way othe: "o!ll 't re«.h· oo;uITTd. .ifo;::evc.:, it sa.ould be
notsd. that I '?/ZS ~ot '0 1::::: c.om.ac: !)O'l!iii! lt U-.e mna of the fL"'!mgh!..,, d ti;,?.,""cll::r,:~ c· d nor.\;..: .....t;SS.
0

Sst. P=1t:a's actions.


Fi:ll!.lly, l d~ nof~~nll .aey Mher Mar'.zc tellJ:;i; -~ ,hat
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)trii:d to influcn~ hcirtendition
offne fine gr.t by tclllil.~ fr~ lo i·:COUJll that Sgt. ! e;a fa .... ;:ey>t a gre11t::ie mi.der his body.

l SW"'--ll.t or afiinn tE2.t thE fcresc,tng inf;:;nnati:) is ttue and .accurate fo t:'he best of my kn.o Iec.ge,
Te!~,h nically sw.cm on this l O'' day o:f'Nove.u.b_er 2 •05, m(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Hov 15 2 0 0 S 1 5 : 49 SONNl:c i3Rl0 Gf.S 0 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

D at1!: N civem:,e:r I .5, 200 ,


Location offnte..,-,,' iev.r: Telephonic
Subjec~: Engagement ·nvol ving Sgt Perelca on 15 Nov 04

1, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) US.\.fC, pro·,~de the foHowiog- sworn statem.e;i.t to


typed this sr2.r.:.mir, for me, regarding th~ fuefi,gh.t i.ovclving Sgt.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)tvilo has
Pen:.Jta on Novembe, 15, 2004, in .Fa1lujah, Iraq. I am currently assign-::xi to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

At tho time of th ·s ind ·en; I was the (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) or 11:. Platoon, Alpha Co:m.pany
BLT l/3 . I hcld tMs bil1et from ap)?roxi.tr.ate- y September 2004 to Sep ember 2005.

I was not il'l the contllct house at Lh-e tirne of Otis incident :and ·was the:-e.'.'o:re not a."1
eyewitness ro those e,,enrs.

A.t no point .af·er this incident did I panidpate in. a con.versatlon with any of the Marines
who were 'involved ht the .fircfigbt in w· ·ch W'"'.)' ra:is.ed rhe p!}ssibility that Sgt. Peralul
was hit by friendly fite. Spc~ffically, no on.e ever su:gges e<l tha (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) nutY have-
accidently sl:ot Sgt. !' ""ra !ta nor did (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ever st!ggest this poss ihility to mt!!.

Subse-que.nt o the firefight> I did. have conven;c!lioru; with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who was 1he
Sqi.md Lead r. a.."ld the other Ma.1'1?les p.ieserrdn the oont.!ct house. Based on trry
conversations with 'the'1l, it w.es my impressiou that Sgt, Pera' te.'s a·:::tions wc:-c valorous
ohd that h.e would probably b ~ put in for a posrhumou~ award. I told the Marines that
they would need to prepa."'8 statements as to w:hat they saw. However, I n.everpressu:red
them to exaggerste Sgt. P era:!ta'-s actions or otbcr;vise make his actions m ore velciOUS
than th..--y rc;ally w ere . To th¢ ·c cntra.., y, 1 instructed th:m to simply tel.ate the fac;s as they
could recall an<l not to embellish ru.'1ythiog.

I sw~ or affinn tha, 'ta e for,egoing informa.tion :s t:i..¢ md accurate to the best of my knowl~g:.
Telephonica,ly sworn on the 15- day ofNovernber~ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Sworn to telep hon.icuJly bc'6re me on ; 1ov~ei: • 5, .2005

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Inv:stigatir...g Officer

_)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
......... - ----
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

STA.TEME :T OF (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

D~te: No·:~bet 14, 2005


Looation of interview; TekpMnic.:
Subject Eng~gc.-ner.t involving Sg,1. Pc:rati:?. o~ 15 No-v 04

r. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) provide the folio'1'ltl~ swom statement to(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)who hl!.s typt.d this
sta:~nt for Tnl!:, re_m:Hng foe fi:ef.gI it1voZ-.-in2 Sgt. P~:;.ka. on.:Nove:robr.r l :5, 200t, in
Falluj ah, f."'aq. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
2005. J cur:e.'l!ly r~id~ in (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) r can he r:.u:hed at (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) My
fa·.::snm ~ machirlt-riUUlbe~ is (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

I beve;ievie ·ed. yprior s·~t~ent dated November 15. 200-'-and the su.-nn:.nr.; i)f n;ytelepl1on
i.nte:-v'icw :fat~ ucce:mbor 2 l, 2004 ,md ~gaib art~'i to ihdr trUth oorl accu:racy.

l did not se! if Sgt. P'm:..J-.a, ·aa hit by en=:, er fnc.,"'!dly 5~. It sr.ou d be rerrzn1beted that I was
ir, ..the big room- when Sgt. Peraltz wu s.301. Sgt Pe:ralra was in 'the living-com cl the timll he
was shot and I 1..-n: fore did. not hav- th" best v;u;tag:::, p,:/, , cf obs~/ ng wlief}:er the t.'l$ur,.: r.ts
t>~ M~es from. cur squad ~he! .h.int

'1,'hen I \\:as-in fue hosp'i ta! fo: my iajuries (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)did ccm.e and \'tsit !De, At tke tim: of tr,¢
fur.fight, he WU our uti - Pfa;oon Sq;eant. "\'{\,,:n vis.it"od. me, he appatsi!1y kn~· 'ha:
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
I v:culc be .J)tO\-.i.ai.n"' more infomia::on. :::gz..rd.ir..g t:-ic fi~fig,'it. !n that re~ rd, h~ ro!d me ro ''do
what's rl:gbt'j wb.kh I mkrpreted to mean provide a s.at:.::m~t th1lt .included Sgt Pe~ lla:jum:;ting
on er s~vooy · th,: grzn."..de under hi. ::i:iy or otherwi£e m~.i.'l! his a:;tio:n rn ;c vakr'l,1l,S than
they UC!Ually ,,;,er•. B'..o..,.-e•,;er, when r was interviewed by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on December 21. 2004.
! did not exz.ggcrate S~~ Peral~' s actions.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)never to1d :n.e th:i.? he tho ugh he :n~y havt =:idemly s\ Sgt. Peraha or that Sgt.
Peral ta m ~y have beth kiUed by f:ien<lly fire.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Swor., :;::, tdc?boni::alJy be.rare :I\c on No ·em -:- ~ 2005

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
... .. _ -· - --
l3/l7/2005 l8: 3e (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) PAE: e'.?/0?

STATEMENT Of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Di,te: Ncve;nb~ 151 2005


Loe:tf.cn of Inter-view: Tel~bo~ic
Suhjiu::t: Engagement bl·,·01',;i.ng Sg:. Peralta on 15 No,· 04

1, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) provide the following sworn stawmcnt to(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)whc has ty~;;..'<l
this ;,!,a~t fer roe, ..:gaming the fi.rcfl,ght ir.volvm_g Sgt. Peralta en Kov~be;- t5, 2004, in
hllujeh, blq. At the time of llic nrsfight, ! was (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Alpha Go.mpa1;y, BLT 1/3. Tac cu...--ren.tt (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and can be
read1d. ;:.t (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

l have reviewed myprior. st;i~en{s dated No-.r-:zmb!:r 15, 2004 and Detembcr 2.1), 2004 anrl ag.;in
attest to their t.'Uth a,nd accu;acy.

At uo point a."rer tltls incident did {participate in a canve;;;ario'\1 ·with ?.ny of the Z,,!'min:s who
we;-e: h,;\·o1y::d fo the f.r¢.fi.ght in which they rais.cd fue riossiirilliy that Sgt. .Peralta was hit by
frfodly fire. Sps:cifi,;;ally, nc or,e ~ve~ sugg?"stcd tbat (b)(6), (b)(7)(c):ney have accidently shot Sgt.
J?eralta no.r did (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)ever sugg:cst this to Cl¢.

Our SGuad v,-as subsequer,tly in~cted to propare 5"..a,em.e:nts concernir.g ili.e fu-efi.ght Tc my
knowledge. eve::yor.~ ,,·,,row their ov.,11 ~1AtE:mtr.t and the;o was no collusio:o as to wh~ to say
co:1e.emi~ Sgt Pc:alta' s actions. 1 i:u:ver pres!U!ed tnyonc to exaggerzte Sgt .?cnlf.a's actions
or ot:i.~wisc make his ac:tio.cs more V!liorous than tiley rca.!ly ',',"!:~c. l never bea:-d anyone else
suggest or instruct m€tllbc:s of our Squad to smbe!Us.n Sgt. ?er?J~a's ~ti.ons. Similarly, l nev~
hem-cl anyo~e froo our Squad tell me tl,at they bad somebow bce:1 pressured to ~hellish th:::ir
stnfelne;n:s_ !O the COC\r.!:ry, we were Sl.'!lp].j' told tO Wn te d ~ t.?,e fai::S $ best WC could rxaiJ.

I s ;vea;: or a."f.rm that the foregoing faiorm2.tion is true and !Ceutaie to the best of ::ny bowled£~.
TeJ,';p;1onic.ally swom on Lrie 1 ~ d11y ofNo,e::r.~ 2 ' (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Swow to telepho!licaUy hdorz mt: on November 17, 2005

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
-11/15/2005 TU"E 14:18 FAX (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) @0021002
10/lS/200'5 0S: 11 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Pt;Gc B2110

STATI:TvIE "T OF (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Date; No ...mber 14, 2005


Location of Interview: Te ephao:ic
Subject: Engagemzni :nvo ving Sgt. Pc:alta on 1S Nov 04

I, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) provide the followi."1.g sworn statement to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c).who has
typed this statemev.t fotme,regard:iug the frrefig.t:i.t uiv:o! ing Sgt Peralta on November
1S, 2004, in FaLujah, L:..a.q. I am asi.gned to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Cuueufly I am
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)Irnay be contact"d.at either (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

I have reviewed my .:prior statements &.tsd No··e.:n.ber 15, 2004 an.d December 19, 2004
and again attest to tbci- truth and accuracy.

I carmot &.-..termine whether Sgt Prm!ta was shot by ecemy or friendly frre. It s ;o ) d be
noted faat at the ti.me we fust en.ccn.i:nrerecl :fire frc..-n ·t11e lnsu:ci::rents, I was standing in front
of Sgt Pe.r.dia As I tui'"I1¢d a.ound from fue doonvt!y leading into the kitchen area, I
cou d see th.at Sgt. Pera!ta had alre d;.-beer.i shot, ·

At no poin• ar~r the f'ti."1:;fight did (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) e-1cr. mention to me fua• he thought be n>.a:j
~ve accide.ntly shot S-gt. Per2lta. No one: else from our squad that ,.JBS in the house at tbe
time of the firefight ever n:i.eutio ed to me that they thonght they had acoidently shot Sgt.
Pe~ta.

Ar.er the frrefigh~ I was toJd by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) at they needed to get a
sta:temeut cOD.cemi:ng what had ha:ppene.d. Howe ·er, nci+ er they nor a.nyo else e
pr~sured me to r..;::;ount actions on the pm of Sgt Peralta that 1ie did not do. .
Specifically, ne one ev,:;r pressured m~ into rs!Colll}ting that Sgt. Pe.i.--alta 's ae.-ions w-ere
tnor~ vilorous than they actda:Uy •;;ere. My rendition of Sgt. Peta!ta's actions cou.t.ained
in FiY two earlier statements ai-e md.:.~ed wh.at I saw and r stand by them.

I swear or affirm that the foregoi .1g information ls true an,d acc.u.,.--ate to th~ best o.fmy knowl~4,_°'1?,
Te!spbO'nicilly sworn otl the t.$' day of' ovember 2005, at (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Swo:n to tekp:ionically before me on Nov~mb::r !.&; 2005

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
- -· ·--· ... -··, , ••

12116/2~05 14; _2 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

STATEME1':"T OF (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

P~L: N'cvember lu, 2005


koruion of Inrerview: Tc:lephonfo
Subjeor: Eng2.gement h1vo ;,i.J g Sgt Peralt~ on 15 Nov 04

!, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) provide the following S\Vorn sl:.te.;r;.e,- ro(b)(6), (b)(7)(c),,;,ho h2S typed this
5'i..aremer:t for me, reg:an:lli1g tl;e nrclig:b.r in.volvit:g Sgt. P~ral~a ;:m No•1en1b-er 15, 2004. m
Fallu·ai,. Iraq, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I can ~et~hed a (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

I h£ ·e reviewed my prier s12·cment d:rte<l 1)¢ce;m e. 2 0, 2.004 and again att~ t:o its ,:n1th a d

I did oot ;,c~ if Sgt. P~ai '7/a.3 h:t by enemy or friendly fire. 1t sbould be r:eme:o~red that foe
ilrefight was iw~~iate ~d of short dil.-at(c,r1- I was sho.. in·· e .ri.g.l'lt f'oreanll ·ust abou the same
time that Sgt Per:$lta wa;; &ho· . My focus of s.tteri!:bm was on retw;r,=r.g fire and uo bow Sgt.
Peralta g r sh _

Su::s~cru.ent c ih1:1 ~"'~ght, J did talk witl (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) !knew t.1:13. h!?, wa (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
·o .ev~lu ·:,;-ated o,ttt::: that hem~· have bt~ ~s,?(filsible fur ~dentary shooting S :t.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Pera1 . L'l :act) the s, b.j~ of _g-.. :Pere tap s-si:ily be n killed by fdencily i .r e ne 'e?' C3Jile up
until I was con.tact:;d by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) i.11 O,,..,ti:i::er
2005 .

.No Me evz,-p~ssured me to embellish Sg( Pei:alza's ac'ricns itd,,sg e fucfightor s01).lehaw


maks hf& con.duct :more vak;rou:s man it re.ally v.·as. Sp~ifically, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
neve p1,1t such ;p,!::ss~ on m~. i nevet beard anyone in our Sq-11ad ma partfoipazej in 'the
f!.'.'dlghi: teU me Ihat they som..,how felt riresso:red to cxag3e«:'-e or entb(?llish Sf¥. Peralta s
actions. Agrin, having Wi1ewing: my prio:- ~tcmem cl •ed Dec:1:tilicr 20, 2004, l con~.uue to
"t-lie>'e Th2:t jt is accwa:.<e t.nd trutI"11:J.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Swo;:n fo 1.~1cr, o,~lly bzfor!: :ne on 'oveo:iber 16, 2005

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

:bve~gating Officer

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)


. .... .·~- . ~ .. ...~- · ··~-~-·
Mo v 17 2 005 3 : 18PM HP LASERJET 3330 p.2

10/1 7 /'2085 ll : 2a (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Da•e: No·.;cmbcr 16, .200.S


Lc~tio:o ofinte.r-,1io•;rr. Tc.c:phODic
S ubject: Er;.gagernent invo ving Sgt. Pm.lta ·1 5 Nov 04

I, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USM<;, ~.j,;i~e. th.~ fo owbg :swo:m state.1ie..1tt t'.)


(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)who' bu typed ihi s S"1foD:t<mt for me, rcganiin,g the firenght i' :volving S gt. Peralta on
November l5r 2004, in FaHujah, lr.,q. l am.cutrently assigned to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ! can bcrcacl!.:d at (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) My ·aes,imil¢
nu..-nbcr is (7 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

I ha-<1e reviewed my p.rio.r. s•arement dat.a! No"tJc:mber l 5, 2004·as well as tne sumrnary of my
telephonic _inter,riew wicb (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ofDcccmbor 22, 2004. f ag?.in attC?St ,o·ili:: tru:th and
;;,ccu,r-.u:y oft.hnse starern.ents.

lt w.n.s r.i.}• i.mp.r~ion ibat Sgt. Peralta wm; hit by enemy fi·e. f bas~ this o n the fad that h.c
n.pptsrcd to j oi:k back aftzr being snot. From my van.tage point r could no1 s~ that he .bad b~¢.n
hit by Z-"l.Y aft.he. other Marines.

At no point af>er the fir:Jight did (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)ever mention LO me that he th.ought h.e ~)la,.,e
~::::den!:ly shot S~t Per-aJta. No one else from curs . um th.a was in the house at fue time cf th,e
fire.fight ev~r p,.enti.c:oed to me tba.f fuey though tr,ey foid accident y S")l ot Sgt. Peralta .nor did :they
ever mention that (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) told tl:em that be, may have a.ccldently shot Sgt. Ps.2.lta. In fact
µie 'iiie:tdly fire'~!asue·n~er cam~ 'P wa ·1 I was i-otorv::eye~ by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on D-ecember
22, 2004.

No one ever press red me to recount .:~t.ions on t'u: p-a.rt of Sgt. Perz1ta that he d~d not co.
S_pe=ifically, no OJ e ever pressured me into ~ourtti:ng that Sgt. P eralta's- a.c ions. we;:e more
va1or0'.:.s tillll they z..'"tnaJly were. M;-·rendition ofS,gt. ? er.Jta~s m:;t:ons eo"Otain~d\;., Tl'I)' two
earlier statements_are indeed w hst I. saw and .I SWtd by !h~:

I swear oi affimi that the fo:.::goi.i;g infonnatian.is tr.u:: ·and ac.:uratz: to tho best of =->Y knowledg~.
T~lepb nically swo en tbe l ~ d.ay of ovem '"er 2005, ~t (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
-~

s..vorn to telep1• ·~·:1Uy bef.ore me on :r•ioveml:>tr -17, 2005

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

.fuv.esttgati:ng Officer '

_) 11
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, O. C . 20350-1000

12 July 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Recommendation for the Medal of Honor

The Commandant of the Marine Corps recommends, and I concur, that you~endorse
the recommendation for the Medal of Honor (Posthwnously) to Sergeant Rafael Peralta,
USMC, for his gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of life above and beyond the call of
duty during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The Chainnan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
concurs with the recommendation for award of the Medal of Honor.

This award has been through two complete award review and recommendation
cycles at Commandant of the Marine Corps, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
my level The reason for two such cycles is that on January 25, 2007 the Commandant
received a report regarding a friendly fire investigation of the circumstances sunounding
Sergeant Peralta's death from Commander, U.S. Central Command. After his own
thorough review, and after informing the family of the findings, the Commandant
resubmitted the package, again recommending award of the Medal of Honor
(posthumously) to Sergeant Peralta, stating that, "While the friendly fire investigation
concluded that Sergeant Peralta was most probably struck by an errant round from a
fellow Marine,s rifle, that conclusion in no way detracts from his extraordinary gallantry
in saving the lives of his fellow Marines when he saw the enemy grenade rolling towards
. "
hlJTI.

After my own thorough review of the resubmission, friendly fire report and al]
endorsements, I most strongly recommend award of the Medal of Honor (posthumously)
to Sergeant Rafael Peralta, USMC.

The entire Medal of Honor recommendation package, and a revised citation and

o~~_L
certificate for Sergeant Rafael Peralta are attached for your review, 1f desired.

Donald C. Winter

Attachments:
As stated
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
O FF I C E O F T HE S E CRETA RY
10 0 0 NAVY PEN T AGON
WASH I N G TON , D . C . 20 35 0 • 100 0

ACTION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF THE NAVY


Art'1 o1
FROM: Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) fll / 01, 0 ; -

SUBJECT: Second DON Review of Medal of Honor Recommendat~on (posthumous)


JCO Sergeant Rafael Peralta, USMC

• TAB A is an endorsement memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, for your


signature, again recommending approval of the Medal of Honor (posthumously)
for Sergeant Rafael Peralta, USMC. You originally endorsed award of the Medal
of Honor (MOH) to Sergeant Peralta on 4 October 2006, and forwarded the
package to SECDEF (TABB).

• On 2 February 2007, CMC (HQMC, Military Awards Branch) requested return of


the package in view of new information resulting from the conclusion of a friendly
fire investigation that reviewed circumstances of Sergeant Peralta's death. CMC
received the report on 25 January 2007 from Commander, U.S. Central Command.
The investigation was not previously considered during the award review process,
and CMC determined the most approptiate action would be to reconsider the
award in light of all relevant info1mation (TAB C).

• On 7 Febmary 2007, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense returned


the recommendation package to DON with a request for additional information
(TAB D).

• On 6 March, you retwned the recommendation package to CMC for appropiiate


action. (TAB E)

• On 16 April 2007, after reconsidering the entire recommendation package,


including the friendly fire report, CMC again endorsed award oftbe MOH to
Sergeant Peralta. CMC stated, "While the friendly fire investigation concluded
that Sergeant P ralta was most probably struck by an errant round from a fellow
Ma1ine's rifle, that conclusion in no way delTacts from his extraordinary galJantry
in saving the lives of his fellow Marines when he saw the enemy grenade rolling
towards him." (TAB F)
• On 26 May 2007, CJCS again endorsed award of the Medal of Honor to Sergeant
Peralta after considering the entire re-submission and all endorsements. (TAB G)

• On 15 June 2007, NDBDM thoroughly reviewed the entire re-submission with all
endorsements, including those of CMC and CJCS, and again unanimously
recommended award of the MOH. (Attached binder)

• After reviewing the recommendation package, all endorsements and the most
recent recommendations of the CMC, CJCS and NDBDM to award the Medal of
Honor (posthumously) to Sergeant Peralta, I concur.

• TAB H is a draft endorsement memorandum from the Secretary of Defem,r to the


President.

RECOMMENDATION: Again endorse award of the Medal ofHonor (posthumously) to


Sergeant Rafael Peralta, USMC, by signing $e memorandum for SECDEF at TAB A.

COORDINATION: N/ A

Attachments: As stated

Prepared By: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)


SUBJECT: Posthumous Medal of Honor Recommendation for Sergeant Rafael Peralta.
USMC

CJCS DECISION:

Recommend approval of MOH:

Recommend downgrade of award:


- - -- - - - - - - Date - - - -
Recommend disapproval of award
- - - - - - - - - - Date - - - -
Comments:

. : <,
I DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D . C . 203 5 0 - 1000

26 April 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Posthumous Medal of Honor Reconunendation for Sergeant Rafael Peralta,


USMC

On 31 May 2006, you reviewed the recommendation package for award of the
Medal of Honor (posthumously) to Sergeant Rafael Peralta, USMC, and recommended
approval of the Medal of Honor. Subsequent to your review, additional information
regarding circumstances sunounding the action became available. Therefore, request you
review the enclosed award recommendation package, which includes the additional
information and the endorsement of the Commandant of the Ma1ine Corps after his
second review. A recommendation form is attached to this memorandum for your
signature, as appropriate.

The point of contact regarding this matter is (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)


Navy Department Board of Decorations and Medals, at (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Enclosures

cc:
NDBDM/077
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-3000 IN RE?L Y REFER TO:
1650
MMMA- 2
APR I 6 2007
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Subj: POSTHUMOUS MEDAL OF HONOR RECOMMENDATION, CASE OF


SERGEANT RAFAEL PERALTA, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC

Encl: (1 ) Award Recommendation


(2) PDUSD{P&R) memo undated

1. Enclosure (1 ) is forwarded recommending approval of the


Medal of Honor (posthumo u s ly) to Sergeant Peralta .

2. As requested in enclosure {2), I have carefully considered


the information contained in the friendly fire investigation at
Tab C of enclosure (1) in making my endorsement decision. I t is
unfortunate that this friendly fire investigation was not made
available for consideration when he award recommendation was
reviewed by my predecessor in April, 2006. However , I am fully
confident that the source of the round that mortally wounded
Sergeant Peralta has no bearing in determining the merits of
this award . While the friendly fire investigation concluded
t hat Sergeant Peralta was most probably struck by an errant
round from a fellow Marine ' s rifle , that conclusion in no way
detracts from his extraordinary gallan t ry in saving the lives of
his fellow Marines when he saw the enemy grenade rolling towards
him. His actions in sweeping the grenade u nde r his body
constitute~ a selfless act of valor that rises well above . and
beyond what we normally expect o f our Marines . Sergeant Peralta
is exceptionally well deserving of our Nation ' s highest honor .

3. The Commanding General , 1st Marine Division , personally


informed Sergeant Peralta's mother in· December, 2005 that there
was a possibility that her son had been killed by friendly fire.
Subsequent to the endorsement of the completed friendly fire
investigation by Commander , U.S. Central Command ,
representatives from t he 1st Marine Division officially notified
the mother of the findings o f the investigation on 23 March 2007
and provided her with a copy of the redacted investigation.

4. Enclosure (2) requested an explanation of the timeline for


endorsements on the award recommendation. Major General
Natonski , Commandi ng General , 1st Marine Division , initially
endorsed the award recommendation on 3 Ma rch 2005 . Lieutenant
Subj: POSTHUMOUS MEDAL OF HONOR RECOMMENDATION, CASE OF
SERGEANT RAFAEL PERALTA, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC

General Sattler, Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary


Force and Commander, Marine Forces Central Command, reviewed the
recommendation and returned it to Major General Natonski in May
2005 with a request for additional information. Specifically,
he requested clarification on the opinion of the pathologist who
conducted the autopsy that Sergeant Peralta could not have
executed any meaningful physical motions based on the injuries
from the gunshot wound to his head. Major General Natonski
directed a detailed and comprehensive review of the original
award recommendation to answer the questions raised . .On 9
August 2005, Major General Natonski endorsed this second
investigation which contained additionai statements from three
neurosurgeons who opined that Sergeant Peralta could have
consciously swept the grenade under his body despite the severe
head wound. Lieutenant General Sattler reviewed this second
investigatiqn and endorsed the award recommendation on 12
September 2005. General Abizaid, Commander, U.S. Forces Central
Command, endorsed the award recommendation sometime after 11
February 2006.

5. The point of contact at this Headquarters is (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)


(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

2
. . . .
•··- -r· ·-- .... ..,....:-,.. · :. ..., .
. THE SECRETARY OF TH E_N AV Y
WAS H I N GT O ~ , .D . C . 2 0 3 5 9 - 1 0 0 0

March 6, 2007

.~¥Q~UM FOR COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORP~__;__~-:'----·;


SUBJECT.: Return of Medal·of.Honor Recommendatioii

.to
In respop.se your memorandw_n ·of February 2, _2007, the redomm~n~atiori to .
award the Medal"ofHono_r,(posthumou~ly) t~ Sergeant Rafael J?eralta, U.S. Marine Corps,
is returned for
appropriate actiori. In review of the recomme~dation, the Principal . . . ·
D~puty Secretary of Defense (Personµel and Readiness) requested additional inforiu.ation ·
in ~he ~ttached qiemor.andlllI}.. . . ·. . ... .

. My pomt _o f coritac(re~~.dilig this matte1;)s (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) :wh~·c~ be


. -· · , · ; ; reached ·a~ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) · · · ·. · · ··; · · · ·
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OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON , D .C . 20301 -4000

PERSONNE L AND
READINESS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRET ARY OF THE AVY

SUBJECT: Medal of Honor Recommendation

I have thoroughly reviewed yom Medal of Honor recommendation for


Then-Sergeant Rafael Peralta, USMC. While the valor of actions is clear, we note
at Tab I of the recommendation an email dated August 30, 2005 , and a Ba11istics
Report dated July 29, 2005, that indicate Sergeant Peralta may have been struck by
a ATO 5.56 mm bullet. In turn, this raises the concern that a friendly fire
incident might have occurred. However, the package does not indicate whether
an investigation was conducted.

Clarification is needed in regard to the investigation of death, specifically,


whether he was wounded by friendly fire, what the outcome of the investigation
was and whether the family was briefed of a possible friendly fire incident. Also
please provide a chronology between the times the Commanding General, 1st
Marine Expeditionary Force and the Commanding General, Central ommand
endorsed th r commendation package .

My staff is ready to assist you in expediting this recommendation. My


point of contact is (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Michael L. Dominguez
Principal Deputy
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-4000

PERSONNEL AND
READINE.5 5
ACTION MEMO
February 4, 2007, 3:30 PM

FOR: PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (P&R)

FROM: William J. Carr, Acting DUSD (MPP) ~ 2 • A/-t:17


SUBJECT: Medal of Honor (MoH}Recommendations for (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and Then-Sergeant Rafael Peralta, USMC

• The memoranda at Tabs A and B return Medal of Honor recommendations for


(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and Then-Sergeant Rafael Peralta,
USMC to the Secretary of the Navy. We have split the two letters as you
asked, and stipulated in Sergeant Peralta's that our concern centers on the
possibility of friendly fire, but not valor ..

• In the case of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) we are requesting


for clarification on the inconsistency between the endorsements and the
witness statement, and any additional information to inform leadership of the
basis of the comments made by the senior endorsers.

• In the case of Then-Sergeant Rafael Peralta, USMC, clarification is needed in


regard to the investigation of death. Specifically, whether he was wounded by
friendly fire, the outcome of investigation, and whether the family was briefed
of a possible friendly fire incident. We are also requesting a chronology
between the time the Commanding General, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force
and the Commanding General, Central Command endorsed the
recommendation package.

RECOMMENDATION: PDUSD (P&R) sign the memoranda at Tabs A and B.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)


Page 299 redacted for the following reason:
---------------------
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(5)
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350-1000

4 October 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Recommendation for the. Medal of Honor

The Commandant of the Marine Corps recommends, and I concur, that you endorse
the recommendation for the Medal of Honor (posthumously) to Sergeant Rafael Peralta,
USMC, for his gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of life above and beyond the call of
duty during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
concurs with the recommendation for award of the Medal of Honor.

The Medal of Honor citation and certificate for Sergeant Rafael Peralta are
attached. The file supporting the recommendation is also attached for your review, if
desired.

Donald C. Winter

Attachments:
As stated

OSD 15779-08

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10/512006 3:59:40 PM
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES WASHINGTON, DC OFFICE:
2429 RA, • URN Houn OmcE Bu1t.1>11110
COMMITTEE ON WASHINGTON, 0C 20515
EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE TELlPHONE' 1202I 225-5672

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION 01STIUCT OFRces:


AND INFRASTRUCTURE EL C.UON TELE.HON!! (619) 44&-5201
c~ ...,~""""· SuaC:OMMITTEE Cl"l lHE CllAST •
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GUARD AND MAArflME TR•NSl'OAT•TJO'I

Bunrnn iltuntrr
ii.~. iaoust of 1Rt:prtst:nt8tiots
joth Bistrict, ~lifornia
October 19, 2017

General Robert B. Neller


Commandant of the Marine Corps
Headquarters, US Marine Corps
3000 Marine Corps, Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20350-3000

Dear General Neller:

As you might recall, I have been intensely involved in the effort to award the Medal of
Honor to Sergeant Rafael Peralta and petitioned multiple Defense Secretaries to review this case.
General Neller, I have worked this case personally and I ask for your support in receiving a copy
of Sgt Peralta's original Medal of Honor nomination package from Headquarters Marine Corps,
Manpower Management Military Awards Branch (MMMA).

Thank you for your attention to this important matter. I look forward to your response.

Duncan Hunter
Member of Congress

www hunter house.gov


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positions inside houses, using automatic weapons and grenades and attempted to
flee after inflicting casualties on the first coalition forces to enter the
building. Insurgents were supplied via weapons and food caches pre-positioned
:hroughout the city.
Friendly condition: Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 1/3 attacked in zone dur,ng
the initial assault on Fallujah from 8 thru 10 November. Upon reaching its

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limit of advance, BLT 1/3 established co~pany sectors and conducted search and
attack operations throughout its tactical area of responsibility (TAOR).
Operating independently, each company of BL'!' 1/3 carne into contact with
insurgent forces o~ a daily basis to include the day of 15 November 2004. BLT
1/3 also began psychological operations on 11 November 2004 to encourage
insurge~ts to surrender; these ope~ations were conducted in conjunction with
humanitarian aid operations at the Mujahareen and Al Haydra Mosques.
Narrative Description of Gallant Conduct
Sergeant Rafael INMI) Peralta is enthusiastically recolllll\ended for the
Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his
life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as Platoon Guide, 1st

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Platoon, Company A, Battalion Landing Team 1/3, Regimental Combat 'learn
7(-) (Reinforced), lst Marine Divisio~l-l (Reinforced) in action against
Anti-Coalition Forces in the City of Fallujah, Iraq, 15 November 2004, during
Operation Phantom Fury/Al Fajr.
At approximately 0830, Sergeant Peralta was conducting search and attack
operations with 2d Squad, 1st Platoon. The squad was clearing their seventh
house of the day. Sergeant Peralta was augmenting 2d Squad because they we,ce
short personnel due to recently sustained casualties. Se,cgeant Peralta was
positioned in the center of the squad between ~he first and second fire teams
as they prepared to enter the house,
The squad met no resistance during their initial entry into the ho,ase and
cleared the front rooms without incident. The door to the back rooms of tr.e
house was closed, The squad staged for e:1try into the bac:< rooms with
Sergeant Peralta positioned behind the point man. As the point man pushed open
the door, the squad immediately came under a heavy volume of close-range
PF
automatic 1-1eapons fire from multiple insurgents located in the back rooms.
The squad instantaneously returned fire, wounding one of the insurgents. As
the squad sought caver, sergeant Peralta was shot in the head as he attempted
to maneuver out of the line of fire, Sergeant Peralta fell to the ground,
still attempting to speak, though his words were unintelligible.
After the initial exchange of gunfire, the insurgents broke contact,
throwing a fragmentation grenade towacds the Marines as the insurgents fled
the building. The grenade bounced off the side of a couch and came to rest
approximately one foot away from Sergeant Peralta's head. The grenade lay
between Sergeant Peralta and other members of the squad. Though mortally
wounded, Sergeant Peralta, with out hesitation. reached out and scooped the
grenade under him and used his body to bear the brunt of the explosion,
OM

shielding other Marines of the squad who were only feet away, The grenade
exploded underneath Sergeant Peralta with his body absorbing most of the
blast. Other members of the squad near by received only minor shrapnel wounds
from the explosion.
Sergeant Peralta was immediately medevaced via amphibious assault vehicle
but succumbed to his wounds ana was pronounced dead at 0915. 15 November 2004
while en route to Bravo Surgical Company.
Sergeant Peralta's gallant leadership. bravery and unwavering dedicatio~
to duty and to his fellow Marines distinguis~ his conduct as above and beyond
the call of duty. Sergeant Peralta's willingness to make the ultimate
sacrifice to preserve the lives of his comrades reflected great credit upon
him and was in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marines Corps and
the United States Naval Service. For his actions he is worthy of being
decorated with the Medal of Honor.

PY
Citation:
For conspicuous gallantry and Intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as Platoon Guide with
1st Platoon, Company A. Battalion Lending Team 1/3, Regimental Combat Team 7, 1st Manne Division in action against
Anti,.Coalltion Forces in the City of Fallujah, Iraq on 15 November 2004 in support of Operation AL FAJR During searCh end attack
operations, Sergeant Peralta volunteered to augment an under strength squad as it cleared block407 house by house. While
cieartng the seventh house of the day, the point man opened a door to a back room and immediately came under intense,
ctose-range automatic weapons fire from multiple insurgents The squad returned fire, wounding one insurgent While attempting to
maneuver out of the line of fire, Sergeant Peralta was shot In the head and fell wuunded, but still conscious Alter the initial
exchange of gunfire, the Insurgents broke contact, throwing a fragmentation grenade as they fled the building: The grenade came to
rest a toot from Sergeant Peralta's head and lay between him and other members of the squael Without hesitation and with
complete disregard for his own personal safety, Sergeant Peralta reached out and pulled the grenade under his body, absorbing the
brunt of the blast and shielding fellow Marines only feet awa)! Sergeant Peralta never regained consciousness and succumbed to
his wounds moments later. By his undaunted courage, intrepid fighting spirit, and unwavering devotion to duty in the face of certain
death, Sergeant Peralta saved his comrades from further injury or pOSSible <leath thereby reflecting great credit upon him and
upholding the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service He gallantly gave his life tor is country

New
09/19/2008

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 2035<>-3000 IN REPLY REFER TO:
5730
OLAC-SG
26 Jul 11

The Honorable Jeanne Shaheen


United States Senator
340 Central Avenue, suite 205
Dover, NH 03820

Attention: Max Giella

Dear Senator Shaheen:

Thank you for your letter of June 29, 2011, to the Assistant secretary
of Defense for Legislative Affairs, on behalf of (b)(6)
regarding the Medal of Honor (MOH} recommendation for the late Sergeant
Rafael Peralta, U.S. Marine Corps. I have been asked to respond on behalf
of the Marine Corps.

I appreciate your interest in this matter and understand (b)(6)


concern that Sergeant Peralta's MOH award reconunendation be given fair
consideration. The Department of Defense went to significant lengths
to ensure the MOH recommendation for Sergeant Peralta received thorough
and complete consideration, just as they do every MOH nomination .
Unfortunately, the internal review could not reconcile the contradictory
evidence contained in the MOH recommendation. Therefore, .the Secretary of
Defense took the unprecedented step of soliciting the counsel of five
independent experts.

The independent experts included a former Multi-National Corps Iraq


Commanding General, a MOH recipient, a neurosurgeon, and two pathologists.
These reviewers were provided access to all available information
regarding the MOH recommendation, including detailed medical reports and
autopsy photographs. The reviewers interviewed numerous subject matter
experts, participated in a re-creation of the event, and inspected the
available evidence.

The five independent reviewers each individually concluded that the


evidence did not meet the exacting standard necessary to support the
awarding of the MOH. After careful consideration, the Secretary of
Defense concurred with this conclusion. Further, given the thoroughness
of the evaluation already conducted, the Secretary of Defense does not
believe further review is appropriate .

Again, thank- you for your concern. Sergeant Peralta was courageous
and dedicated; he continues to serve as an inspiration for all Marines.
We will always be . grateful for his heroism.

(b)(6)

ead Congressional Liaison


Office of Legislative Affairs
Correspondence
JUN.29.201112:llPM SHAHEEN DOVER HO. 7186 P. I
•• •
~Ce1"'11AWIIUISUl1e2Ce
Davw, ... 03820
p,(803) 7&0,J00,t Office of Senator
r.~) 761M04G Jeanne Shaheen
mu s!l!IOll!IIJ!CO,""""ffl

Fax
TD: DoD Cong. Affairs

(b)(6)
P...- 3 (includilg cowr)

.
Fmc

Phcmet .,. June 29",2011

Rei cct

Uqront Pins• R.ecyol•

Thia correspandenc:a (lncbl~ ellaChmen1a) ts prMleged and 00nftclential. If you are not ht Wended
redpilnt. please de5lte t\ without flr1her MlbutiOli, notitt lhe &mdw hit you have receNld tha
faclimlle In enor. and dlsrlprd c:ont1nt1 herein.
• Commanls:
JUN. 29. 2011 12: 11 PM SHAHEEN DOVER NO. 7186 P. 2
.............
•' JEANIII: 5HAHeEN IUnlllf.m
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WASMINGTON. DC .20510
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June 29, 201 l
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M&. Elizabeth King
Auistant Secretuy for Defense f'or Legislatiw Affairs
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U.S. Department Of Defense ::.:
1300 Defense Pentaaon "9 ..:.-:
~

Washington, DC 20301-1300 V,
CX>

Dear E1i1.abcth.
I have been contacted by my constiiuen (b)(6) regardins
the important issue he is oxperi=icing with the Department of Defense.

I have enclosed Mr. Milter's inquity for reference purposes. 1 belir.vc you will find the
Jetter self explanatory.

l would appreciate any assistan«:c you me able to offer (b)(6) PJcue reapond
directly to (b)(6) and send a copy of your response to Max Ciielfa in my Dover state
office at 340 Central Avenue Suite 20S, Dover. NH, 03820.

Thank you for your attcndon to thi9 matter.


Sincerely,

~~-
Jeanne Shaheen
United States Senator

Encl0111re
JUN, 29. 2011 12: 11 PM SHAHEEN DOVER NO. 7186 P. 3
.. .

Senator Shaheen.

During the baltle of Falhtjah, Iraq, 25 yr old Marine Sgt Rafael Pcmlta. thouiluuffering ftom a
gunshot wound to the hcim, dove on an enemy greMde and gave his life to protect nearby fellow
marines. Doth the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Sectewy of the Navy
recommended he be posthumously awarded the Congressional Modal of Honor, yet he was not~
and instead awarded the Navy Cmas. WouJd you look Into this?
(b)(6)
• I' ,, -

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY


HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-3000 IN REPLY REFER TO:

5730
OLAC-SG
15 Mar 11

The Honorable Patrick J. Tiberi


Member, United States House
of Representatives
3000 Corporate Exchange Drive
Columbus, OH 43231

Attention: Lucas P. Crumley

Dear Congressman Tiberi:

Thank you for your letter of July 30, 2010, to the Chief,
Legislative Affairs, on behalf of (b)(6) regarding
the Medal of Honor (MOH) recommendation for the late Sergeant
Rafael Peralta, U.S. Marine Corps. I have been asked to respond
on behalf to the Marine Corps. I also regret the extended delay
in replying to your correspondence.

I appreciate your interest in this matter and understand


(b)(6)
concern that Sergeant Peralta's MOH award
recommendation be given fair consideration. The Department
of Defense went to significant lengths to ensure the MOH
recommendation for Sergeant Peralta received thorough and
complete consideration, just as they do every MOH nomination.
Unfortunately, the internal review could not reconcile the
contradictory evidence contained in the MOH recommendation.
Therefore, the Secretary of Defense took the unprecedented
step of soliciting the counsel of five independent experts.

The independent experts included a former Multi-National


Corps Iraq Commanding General, a MOH recipient, a neurosurgeon,
and two pathologists. These reviewers were provided access to
all available information regarding the MOH recommendation,
including detailed medical reports and autopsy photographs.
The reviewers interviewed numerous subject matter experts,
participated in a re-creation of the event, and inspected the
available evidence .

The five independent reviewers each individually concluded


that the evidence did not meet the exacting standard necessary
to support the awarding of the MOH. After careful considera-
tion, the Secretary of Defense concurred with this conclusion.
• r f ...

5730
OLAC-SG
15 Mar 11

Further, given the thoroughness of the evaluation already


conducted, the Secretary of Defense does not believe further
review is appropriate.

Again, thank you for your concern. Sergeant Peralta was


courageous and dedicated; he continues to serve as an
inspiration for all Marines. We will always be grateful for
his heroism.

Very respectfully,
(b)(6)

Head, Of fRe of Legislative Affairs


Correspondence

2
09/24/2010 15 . 49 !FAX OH12DOFAX@mail . house . gov -+ Jason Dominguez 141002/003

PATRICK J. TIBERI COLUMBUS OFFICE:


mH OIST!IICT OHIO :lOOO COAPOF!ATE E~CHANGE D'l!VE
SUITt 310
COLUMBUS, OH o m
COMMITTEE ON P'1UNI , (81.4), 523 2555
WAYS AND MEANS ~AX- (il1 0 81 IHISB7
~ANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON
SELECT REVENUE MEIISUl'iES WASHINGTON OFACE:
113 CANNON HOUSE Of f ICE BUILDING
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOOAL SECURITY
O:ongrrss of thr tinitcd iStatrs WASHINGTON DC 2:111~- l~U
Pi<O"l' !2021225-5355
f.u , (2C2122&-<1523
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INCOME SECURITY IIND FAMl~Y SUFPO!\T ilousr of 1Rcprc.smmttocs www hni.t::=n gov!tibnri

=nuashingron, 3EHt 20515-;512


July 30, 2010

Rear Admiral Barry M. Costello


Chief of Legislative Affairs
1300 Navy Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20350-1300

VIA FACSIMILE: (703) 614.7089

Dear Rear Admiral Costello:

The attached communication concerns a problem my constituent is experiencing with the


United States Navy.

Please investigate the statements contained therein and foiward me the necessary
information for reply. Please address your reply to my district office at 3000 Corporate
Exchange Dr, Columbus, Ohio 43231.

If you have any further questions, please contact Jason Dominguez in my district office at
(614) 523-2555. Thank you for your time and attention to this matter, and I look forward to your
reply.

Representative to Congress

PJT/jd
Enclosure

l"'tUNTrrJ ()~ , .. r;vt:ii I IJ , ....,,.n


09/24/2010 15 . 49 !FAX OH12DOFAX@mail . house . gov -t Jason Dominguez It! 003/003
Page 1 of 1

Dominguez, Jason ·
(b)(6)
From:
Sent; Wednesday, July 21, 2010 9:57 AM
To: Dominguez, Jason
Subject: Sgt. Rafael Peralta

Good Morning Jason,

Sgt. Rafael Peralta was killed in Fallujah, Iraq in November of 2004. He was nominated and denied the Medal of
Honor. All aspects of his
death point to the fact that he is deserving of this high honor for his action in saving the lives of his team.

He received posthumously the Navy Cross rather than the Medal of Honor because of conflicting medical analyis
about whether he consclously pulled the grenade toward him or whether lt was an automatic reflex of somebody
already dead. I find this story a travesty of justice for this soldier and his family.

Would you please have someone look into this matter ASAP.

Sincerely,
(b)(6)

7/29/2010
•• (b)(6)

From: Hummell, Jon (Brownback) [[email protected]]

( ient:
.-o:
Tuesday, February 08, 200510:49 AM
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: Peralta

(b)(6)

Ok, thank you. You can close out the inquiry.


I
Jon Hummell
State Aide, Military & Veterans Affairs
785-233-2503

-----Original Message---·-
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, February 08, 2005 5:55 AM
To: Hummell, Jon (Brownback)
Subject: RE: Peralta

Good morning Jon -

We have been told that the personal awards process can take anywhere
from 18
- 36 months.

-----Original Message----·

( ·om: Hummell, Jon (Brownback) [mailto:[email protected]}


ant: Monday, February 07, 2005 3:24 PM
io (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Peralta

(b)(6)

Thank you for the information. We understand why you would not want to
comment on a specific award. Can you give us any guidance as to the
timeline normally involved with this process?

Jon Hummell
State Aide, Military & Veterans Affairs
785-233-2503

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, February 05, 2005 10:39 AM
To: Hummell, Jon (Brownback)
Subject: Re: Peralta

Good morning Jon -

I want to acknowledge receipt of your phone call regarding the late


Sergeant
'iafael Peralta, U.S. Marine Corps.
( ,1fortunately, the details of award recommendations cannot be released
until
such time that the awards process is completed. I did want to share

1
that ·
Sergeant Peralta's command recognized his extraordinary actions and
submitted a personal award recommendation on his behalf. However, I
cannot

( lrovide comments on any specific award under consideration.

I do thank you for your interest on behalf of Sergeant Peralta. If I


can be
of any further assistance, let me know.
(b)(6)
Office of Legislative Affairs/Correspondence
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
Pentagon 4C553
Washington, DC 20380
Comm: (b)(6)
DSN: (b)(6)
Fax:
(b)(6)

CJ

C
2
l- i/28/~005 11:25 FAX 7852332616 SAM BROWNBACK ~001
... , '

SaID Brownback
United States Senator / Kansas

Fax
__ ... _. -- - .. - - - . - ·•-·- -- --------------

TO·:_ _ \J_~~ht--=G=-----------
FAX NUMBER:_ _--=-----------

FROM: Denise Coatney


~ Jon Hummell
Niomi Burget
Jill Casten

PHONE NUMBER: (785) 233-2503


FAX NUMBER: (785) 233-2616

NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER: _ _ y____


Message:-----.------------------,----


B 1 JAH lbo5
0~128/2005 11:26 FAX 7852332616 SAM BROWNBACK

COM~ITTEES"
SAM BROWNBACK APPROPRIATIONS
KANSAS
COMMERCE, SCIENCE,

(~ l:!021 :L2iM52t P>!ONl


[2021 228-1266 f 11)(
ANO TRANSPORTATION
FOREIGN RELATIONS
~nii£h ~ta:tes ~.enate JOINT ECONOMIC
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-16D4

January 28, 2005

Col. Ben Cassidy


Marine Senate Liaison
182 Russell Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Col. Cassidy:


(b)(6)
I have been contacted by a constituent of min~--=---.....,........=--=--=-=-=-'tegarding
an article that he recently read describing the heroic actions of USMC SGT Rafael
Peralta.

Please find attached a copy of the article.

It appears that SGT Peralta's actions on November 15, 2004 would warrant one
our country's highest military decorations. Therefore, I would like to know whether or
not he is being considered the Medal of Honor.

Please advise Jon Hummell in my Topeka office. Thank you for your service to
oui'Nation.

Sincerely,

Sam Brownback
United States Senator

SB:jh

0
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(7861233-2616 FAX (02D1 231--41347 FAJc ll20) 275-1837 FAX 13161 264-8078 FAM 19131492-7253 FA•
www.senate.gov/-brownbaa
01/!8/2005 11 : 26 FAX 7852332616 SAA1 8RO\YN8ACK ~uu.i

. Message Page 1 of2

Hummell, Jon (Brownback)


From: Burget, Nlomi (Brownback)
Sent: Thursday, January 27, 2005 4:06 PM
To: Hummell, Jon (Brownbaek)
Cc: Clark, Bryan {Brownback)
Subject: FW: Medal of Honor recommendation

Jon, this one sounds like one that you would handle...thanks.
--Original Message...--
From: Clark, Bryan (Brownback)
Sent: Thursday, January 27, 2005 4:03 PM
To: Burget, Nloml (Brownback)
Subject: Medal of Honor recommendation

Thanks Niemi!
(b)(6)

0 Incoming Message:

The below is an article about a US Marine deserving of the Medal of Honor. You should see it as part of your duty
to ensure he receives this. (b)(6)

January 11, 2005, 7:30 a.m.


Sgt. Rafael Peralta, American Hero
Everyone should know his name.

You probably don't know Rafael Peralta's name. If we llved In a country that more fully celebrated the heroics of
Its men In uniform, you would. He was a sergeant in Company A, 1st Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment for
Operation Dawn, the November offensive to retake the Iraqi city of Fallujah, which had become a haven for
terrorists. What he did on the day of Nov. 15 was an awe-inspiring act of selfless sacrifice and faithfulness to his
fellow Marines.

The only way we can honor Sgt Peralta's heroism Is to tell his story and remember his name. What follows Is
mostly drawn from the reporting of Marine combat correspondent Lance Cpl. T.J. Kaemmerer, who witnessed the
events on that day.

Sgt Peralta, 25, was a Mexican American. He joined the Marines the day after he got his green card and earned
.his citizenship whlle In uniform. He was fiercely loyal to the ethos of the Corps. While in Kuwait, waiting to go Into
Iraq, he had his camouflage uniform sent out to be pressed. He constantly looked for opportunities to help his
Marine t>rothers, which is why lie ended up where he was on Nov. 15. A week Into the battle for Fallujah, the

0
Marines were still doing the deadly work of clearing the city, house by house. As a platoon scout, Peralta didn't
have to go out with the assault team that day. He volunteered to go.

According to Kaemmerer, the- Marines entered a house and kicked in the doors of two rooms that proved empty.
But there was another closed door to an adjoining room. It was unlocked, and Peralta, in the lead, opened It. He
Of/28/2005 ' 11:26 FAX 7852332616 SAM BROWNBACK ~004
- M~ss.age Page 2 of2

was Immediately hit with AK-47 fire in his face and upper torso by three insurgents. He fell out of the way Into one
of the cleared rooms to give his fellow Marines a clear shot at the enemy. During the firefight, a yellow
fragmentation grenade flew out·of the room, landing near Peralta and several fellow Marines. The uninjured
Marines tried to scatter out of the way, two of them trying to escape the room, but were blocked by a locked door.
At that point, barely alive, Peralta grabbed the grenade and cradled it to his body.

His body took most of the blast. One Marine was seriously injured, but the rest sustained only minor shrapnel
wounds. Cpl. Brannon Oyer told a reporter from the Army Times, "He saved half my fire team."

Kaemmerercomparas Peralta's sacrifice to that of past Marine Medal of Honor Winners Pfc. James LaBelle and
Lance Cpl. Richard Anderson. LaBelle dove on a Japanese grenade to save two fellow Marines during the battle
of lwo Jlma. Although he had Just been wounded twice, -Anderson rolled over an enemy grenade to save a fellow
Marine during a 1969 battle In Vietnam.

Peralta's sacrifice should be a legend In the making. But somehow heroism doesn't get the same traction in our
media environment as being a victim or villain, categories that encompass the truly famous Jessica Lynch and
Lynndie England respectively. Peralta's story has been covered In military publications, a smattering of papers
Including the_ Seattle Times and the San Diego Union-Tribune, ABC News, and some military biogs. But the
Washington Post and the New York Times only mentioned Peralta's name in their lists of the dead. Scandalously,
the "heroism" of Spc. Thomas WIison - the national guardsman who asked a tough question of Secretary of
Defense Don Rutnsfeld that had been planted with him by a reporter - has been more celebrated in the press than
that of Peralta.

Kaemmerer recounts how later on the night of Nov. 15, a friend approached him and said: ''You're still here; don't
forget that Tell your kids, your grandkids, what Sgt. Peralta did for you and the other Marines today." Don't forget.
Good advice for all of us.

- Rich Lowry is author of Legacy: Paying the Price for the Clinton Years.

C} (c) 2004 King Features Syndicate

Bryan C. Clark
StaffAssistant .
US Senator Sam llrownback
303 Hart Senate Office Building
Washbigton, DC 20510
Phone (202) 224-6521
Fax (202) 228-1265

(
--

1/?R/?OM.
.'
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-3000 IN REPLY REFER TO:
5730
OLAC-SG
27 Dec 07

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar


United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510
Attention: Darlee Mccollum
Dear Senator Lugar:
Thank you for your inquiry of December 5, 2007, to the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs on behalf of your
constituent, I(b)(6) lhas concerns that
there is a lack of Medal of Honor recipients from the conflicts in
Iraq and Afghanistan. I am responding for Assistant Secretary Wilkie.
With respect to awarding the Medal of Honor during OEF/OIF, in
December 2006, the Director of our Personnel Management Division
addressed the House Armed Services Committee on this very issue. The
Marine Corps understands that the standards for the Medal of Honor are
exceptionally stringent, with no margin of doubt or possibility of
error in awarding this honor. To justify the Medal of Honor, Marines
or Sailors' actions must clearly be rendered conspicuous above their

0 comrades by an act so outstanding that it clearly distinguishes


gallantry beyond the call of duty from lesser forms of bravery.
Some Navy Cross Citations from the Global War on Terror (GWOT)
depict heroic actions similar to citations from previous conflicts for
the Medal of Honor; however, it should be noted that the citations
only give a short depiction of the actions that earned the Marine or
Sailor the award. The entire chain of command reviews a more detailed
narrative summary of action and a minimum of two eyewitness statements
in determining the appropriate award. This summary of action and the
eyewitness statements expound on the circumstances and events leading
up to the heroic action and enable the commanders to determine whether
the bravery displayed rises to the level of the Medal of Honor.
The process by which commanders consider award recommendations is
a time tested and thorough system that relies heavily on their
experience and judgment when applying the criteria and standards set
forth in the Navy and Marine Corps Awards Manual, in the most fair and
appropriate manner possible. At each level, the commanders can
recommend a higher award.
The Military Awards System by its nature is a very challenging
process that requires commanders to distinguish between varying levels
of heroism and achievement in combat in order to recommend the
appropriate level of award. The Marine Corps does not use a "cookie
cutter approach" in that there is no established set of criteria or
actions that will always result in one specific type of award. Each
individual combat action is different and occurs under different
( 5730
OLAC-SG
27 Dec 07

circumstances. We task our commanders to consider all aspects of the


action performed by the Marine or Sailor in comparison to the actions
of others in their command or theater of operations to determine the
most appropriate level of award. This time tested process maintains
the consistency and integrity of all awards.

Mr. Mansfield specifically mentions the late Sergeant Rafael


Peralta, U.S. Marine Corps, in his correspondence to your office. I
want to assure you that I, too, share your pride in Sergeant Peralta
and recognize the ultimate sacrifice he made for his fellow Marines
and our Country. His service reflected the highest ideals of our core
values of honor, courage, and commitment. Sergeant Peralta was
courageous and dedicated; and he continues to serve as an inspiration
for all Marines. While the details of award recommendations cannot be
released until such time that the awards process is completed, I did
want to share that Sergeant Peralta's command recognized his
extraordinary actions and submitted a personal award recommendation on
his behalf.
Again, thank you for your concern, and I hope this information is
helpful. If I can be of any further assistance, please let me know.
} Very respectfully,
(b)(6)

Head, Off of Legislative Affairs


Correspon ce

C
2
,•

. ' . ~
...

WASHINGTON, DC 20&~1401

~s.2001

.The Hoaonble Robert Wilkie


Alli.- Secatar)· of Defense
U.S. Depmtmeut of Defense
1300 Dofeme Penlqon
W ~ D.C. 20301

Dear Secretary Wilkie:

BcclUle of the cleme of this oftk.e to be nspcm:ive to all inquiries ad cmummir:alions.


your considrndon ofdie attached ii requested.

Your findinp IIDd views, in duplicate fonn. along with lhe return oflhe onc1osure, wiD be
greatly apprecial'ed. Plew direct yourn,p1y to~ IOmrinn r,fDmtee McCollrm ofmy

Sincerely,

Ric::bard 0. Lupr
U .~ Sbda Semdor
" . .
4

RGUqd
~ .. .
....,..
.c::

vi
Page 1 of 1
~t ....
'tlf. . ..
C - Lugar, Senator (Lugu)
(b)(6)
Fram:
Sant: Tuesday, November 27, 2007 9:54 PM
01 NOV 28 AH 11: 18
To: Lugar, Senator (Lugar) ·
SUl,fect: Recognlllon of aervlca members

Senator,

· I am writing n,ganling a seemingly lack of Medal of Honor recipients &om the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan.· ln particular Marine Sgt. Rafael Peralta, thia young man cradled in a grenade after being
libly already fatally wmmded to protect the Marines in his squad. ·In doing this knowing it would
certainly be his lack act on this earth. Actions lib these embody the dedication of men in combat to
each other and the willingness of a leader to cm for bis men rcprdlea of the situation they arc asked
to be in. Though, I know these conflicts are unpopular with many but, ~ hate to sec it when people ·
coofulc the actions of those doing what is asked of them over the issues they have with those doing the
· ulcing. These young men deserve the recognition of a gratefbl nation for their actiom and serve as a
model for Marines and aoldien alike to strive for in the future. No one can attempt to say or really
imagine what they would do in that type of situation. but men lib tim have done it and sacrificed all .
for the mm next to th=. Not all mm need to die to have done somdbing of UllCODIQlOD valor in the
face of combat worthy of this award. I truly believe the process to award our nation's highest homr bu
become to far out of reach for the men and woman who ICn'c. 'Ihc amount qfposdmmOD1 awards bu
gone up sharply over the yem and this I do not believe thia was the iDtc:nt of the ~ to have to die in
· orda' to be comidaed for such an a ~ I really think the review process needs to be reviewed to
ensure eligible acts are givm real consideration.

Tbankyou
(b)(6)

· Get easy. one--click access to your favorites. Mab Yahoo! your homo.pap,

..
...

C
J l/lS/2007
Pagel of 2

DC : 2007UCO GRESSIONAL-
Congressional Tasker
005772b
Status: Oo en f Print
5 bj ic{;-UGAR-SECNAV (050) - CONSTITUENT CONCERNED ABOUT LACK OF MEDAL
u e F HONOR RECIPIENTS FROM WARD IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
Type: ConQressional-Constituent
External DCN: OSD/19427-07
Serial#:
SSIC:
Keywords: SGT RAFAEL PERALTA: OIF· OEF· MOH
(b)(6)
Correspondent~ I
Notification to:
Legislative •..
Division: Senate
Committee: N/A
Member: RICHARD G. LUGAR
Case Worker: DARLEE MCCOLLUM (DC OFFICE)
Dates ••.
Document: 05-Dec-2007
Received: 17-Dec-2007
Tasker Created: 17-Dec-2007 15:51
OrlQlnal Due: 03-Jan-2008
Interim:
Tasker Due: 03-Jan-2008
Deliverables , ..
Action Products: Letter-Reply Direct

C For Signature By: CMC OR DIRECTED


Signed By:

Attachments
Tasker PackaQe: 05D 19427-07.odf
Final Response:
Working Documents:

Status and Comments

Status:

Workfiow

Workflow Due Dates: No


Tasking Authorltv summarized to: AASN
Action Office summarized to: CMC
Assigned Done
Tasking Authority
[C] &.EgjAY Con:gressional s Front Offl,ce
Chop
Parallel Chop
Action Office
I'r f.tMc ftont office.
Coordination Office
Information Only
o· nt Office

DEC 1 3 Z007
https://ucstcdom02.ahf.nmci.navy .mil/tcms/webtsk0 l .nsf/vwTa<;kersPrint/b79YTML ?Op... 12/18/2007
Cp~gressional Tasker - 2007UCONGRESSI0NAL-005772b Page 2 of 2

OPA ... SES Jon Ferko


SECNAV FO .. (b)(6)

C I Access Cont,ol
!Restricted: I No
Status and Comment History Id
(b)(6)
17 Dec 2007 ••• Task recieved. MCATS ID# rs 2007-12-10013

Change History 61
----------------------------(b)(6)
(17 Dec 2007 15:59) ...
Tasker Package added: OSD 19427-07.pdf, , ----------------------------
(17 Dec 2007 15:59} .. (b)(6)
Document Created ..,

https://ucstcdom02.ahf.nmci.navy .mil/tcms/webtskO 1.nsf/vwTaskersPrint/b79YTML?Op... 12/18/2007


Con reuional

C SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING SLIP


Action Agency: SECRETARY OJI' THE NAVY

Action Requited: UPLY DlltlCT (fernrd eopy of nply 1o CCD, Ro. 3CN3)
Coordinate With: LA
·Refi:rcax:s:
Remarks:
Docummt T)PC: INCOMIN~
Special lmtrudions:

Suspense Date: Jaaary 7 2818 Routing Date: December 13 2N'7 CONTROL#: OSD 1'427-o7

JNfORMADON PISTRIBU110N
omCE .
UNDER. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL & RBADJNF.SS
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS)

OSD1~27-87

C
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON

( WASHINGTON, DC 20350-'3000 IN REPLY REFER TO


5730
OLAC-5G
(b)(6)
J 6 JAN 20
The Honorable Darlene Hooley
Member, United States House
of Representatives
Suite 101
315 Mission Street, Southwest
Salem, OR 97302

Attention: Michele McAleer

De ar Congresswoman Hooley:

This responds further to your letter of October 16, 2006,


concerning the late Sergeant Rafael Peralta, U.S. Marine Corps,
and the status of his award recommendation. I regret the delay
in replying to your correspondence.

Thank you for your concern on behalf of Sergeant Peralta


and his family. As you are aware, the details of his award
recommendation cannot be released until such time that the awards

0 process is completed. Although I cannot provide comments on any


specific award under consideration, I can tell you that the
recommendation is still being appropriately reviewed.

Additionally, since the President of the United States, in


the name of Congress, awards the Medal of Honor, premature public
disclosure of any information concerning recommendations,
processing and approval, or disapproval actions is a potential
source of embarrassment to those recommended and the United
States Government. Also, in the case of approved recommenda-
tions, it could diminish the impact of ceremonies at which the
presentation is made.

Again, thank you for your concern in this matter. Sergeant


Peralta was courageous and dedicated; he continues to serve as an
inspiration for all Marines. We will always be grateful for his
heroism.

Very respectfully,
(b)(6)

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps


( Deputy Legislative Assistant to the Commandant
(
'
/I,

CONG'IIE&SlONA.t. omCES•
DARLENE HOOLEY


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October 16, 2006

(b)(6)

U.S.M.C. Liaison Officer


Department of the Navy
B-324 Rayburn House Office Building
US House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
Via Facsimile
(b)(6)
Dea

Enclosed is correspondence from (b)(6) ne of my constituents (SSN

C
(b)(6)

According to(b)(6) is requesting the status of award requests for three United
States Marines w110 were nominated for the Medal of Honor. The Marines in question are:
Corporal Jason Dunham, Sgt Rafael Peralta, Lance Corporal Christopher S. Adelsperger.
(b)(6)
Please give request full and fair consideration consistent with applicable laws
and regulations. I would appreciate it if you would please direct all correspondence to Michele
McAleer in my Salem district office at (503) 588-2468.

Thank you for your prompt attention and cooperation in this matter.

DARLENE HOOLEY
Member of Congress

DH:mm

C}
(b)(6)
RECEIVED OCT 1 7 Zuu~lc
., ..,.,
\

C
CONGRESSWOMAN DARLENE HOOLEY
CONSTITUENT SERVICE FORM

Thank you for contacting me about the problem you are having with a federal agency. I will be happy to
assist in eny way that I can. Please print all informn1ion.
Name:_ (b)(6) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Address:

City, State, Zip:_ (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)
Phone: (home) _ _ _ _ __

(work)_ _ _N/A._ _ _ _ _ _(0U1cr)_ _ _ _ _ __

Social Security Number: (b)(6) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Date of


(b)(6)
Birth:
----------
Name of Aacncy:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Claim Number:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

BricfDe9cription of Problem:_Desirc to aquire to the status of the nomination of the Medal of Honor for the
following three (3) Marines_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

_ Cpl Jason Dunham Sgt Rafeal Peralta _Lance Corporal Christopher S. Adlesperger

It has been over 2 years since Cpl Dunham was killed and nominated. That time period is unacceptable. It has

been almost 2 years since Sgt Peralta was nominated. I have attempted to inquire as to the status of these

awards from some time now and have been unsuccessful in my attempts. In regards to LCpl Christopher

Adlcsperger, I have called the unit he was assigned to {1 11 MEU) at Camp Pcadleton and discussed the way to

secure the details of the reason for the nomination of Adlesperger to be considered for the Medal of Honor

and was referred to a Naval Lt Carnes who is a PAO at Camp Pendleton. He emailed me back later that day to

inform me: that Headquancrs Marine Corps does not release any information regarding the awards until the

C award is awarded. I question that lack of in.formation due to the fact that the Los Angeles Times bad an article
'T •
~
.. .
- ... I

published by one of their staff reporters by the name of Joe Percy that had all the details of the nomination. He

had to get it from somewhere in the government. I don't want to use the article on my web page without

permission from the LA Times which is too much personal detail for what I need. They would want me to use

the complete article and that would not fit into my content of the web page. Also if one would read some of

the citations of awards that have been given to past Marines that have received the MOH, by going to one of

my web pages at www.marlnemedaJs.com they would realize that in Dunham and Peraltas case, throwing

yourself on a grenade to save the lives of other Marines, bas always resulted in the Morine being awarded the

Medal of Honor.

We as Marines and Americans, need to Ja,ow that our heroes that have knowingly sacrificed their lives to save

others be recognized in a timely and expedited manner..

( • The internet web pago that the lhrcc Marines noted above is located al www.godsmaripea,com

I hereby request the assistance of the Office of Congresswoman Darlene Hooley to resolve the matter
described above. I authorize Congresswoman Darlene Hooley and her staff to receive any information. that
they might need to provide this assistance.

The: io.fonnationl have provided to Coagresswoman Darlene Hooley is tnre and accurate to the best ofmy
know ledge end belief. The assistance I have requested from Congresswoman Darlene Hooley' s office is in no
way an attempt to evade or violate any federal, state, or local law.
(b)(6)
Your Signature:
Date:_10/13/20""_-~_-_-_-:_-:_:.:.:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Please include copies (do not send originals) of any documents or relevant materials you think
Congresswoman Hooley should have pertaining to this matter. Mail or fax to Congresswoman Hooley's
District Office in Salem or West Linn. Thank you for this opportunity to serve you in Congress.

Congre..,swoman Darlene Hooley


A1TN: Michele McAieer

0 315 Mission Street Sui.te 101 .,, Salem, Oregon 97302


(503) 588•2468
f

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY


HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2NAVYANNEX
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1ns l~3YcfEFER TO.

OLAC-SG
OCT 2 0 2006
The Honorable Bob Filner
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Attention: Thaddeus Hoffmeister

Dear Congressman Filner:

This responds furth~r to your inquiry of September 15, 2006,


concerning the late Sergeant Rafael Peralta, U.S. Marine Corps,
and the status of his award recommendation.

Thank you for your continued concern on behalf of Sergeant


Peralta and his family. As you are aware, the details of his
award recommendation cannot be released until such time that
the awards process is completed. Although I cannot provide
comments on any specific award under consideration, I can tell
you that the recommendation is still being appropriately
reviewed.

Additionally, . since the President of the United States, in


the name of Congress, awards the Medal of Honor, premature public
disclosure of any information concerning recommendations,
processing and approval, or disapproval actions is a potential
source of embarrassment to those recommended and the United States
Government. Also, in the case of approved recommendations, it
could diminish the impact of ceremonies at which the presentation
is made.

Again, thank you for your concern in this matter. Sergeant


Peralta was courageous and dedicated; he continues to serve as an
inspiration for all Marines. We will always be grateful for his
heroism.

Very respectfully,
(b)(6)

~.---------=----1
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Deputy Legislative Assistant to the Commandant
FAX NO, 202 225 3073 P. 01

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15T DISTRICT, C.AT ,IFORNIA


2428 Rayburr; Hol!sc: Office Buiiding
\!Vashington, ~c 20515
(202) 225-8045 Phone
(202) 225-9073 Fax

333 F Street, Suite A


Chula Vista, CA 91910
(619) 422-5963 Phone
(619) 422-7290 Fax

http://v-r,;.1w.house.gov/filner

Fax Cover Sheet


~te: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Time.· _ - - - - -·- - -

-;:____G_e_Q...._____._\-l..a....wch..-...~.._e_e,__
, _ _ _ _ Fax: ] ~3 , (u q7 7dYf;,
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lumber of Pages (including cover sheet): ~

. ,es;age, Sir J rn1 bo~~ 1tuo!/\' ili \; 1K <


On :b~J 1-e+~c
(b)(6)

Bamberger Col Mark H


Tuesday, September 26, 2006 2:18 PM
(b)(6)

CONGRINT Rep Filner (Award Nominee Sgt Peralta's

Ladies and Gents,

Received fax letter asking for status of Sgt Peralta's award nomination. Ref, Rep Filner letter dated 8 December
2004. OLAC for action.

Semper Fi,
(b)(6)

I
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2 NAVY ANNEX
WASHINGTON, DC 20380•1775 IN REPLY REFER TO
573 0
OLAC-5G
01 JUN 2005
The Honorable Christopher Shays
U.S. House of Representatives
1126 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Attention: Jordan Press

Dear Congressman Shays:

Thank you f o r your letter (reference #1147351) of April 4, 20 05,


to the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs,
concerning the late Sergeant Rafael Peralta, U.S. Marine Corps, and
his actions on No v e mber 15, 2004, as referred to by your constitue nt,
(b)(6) I am responding on behalf o f Secretary Stanley.

Your interest in this matter is appreciated. While the details of


award recommendations cannot be released until such time that the
awards process is completed, I did want to share that Sergeant
Peralta's corrunand recognized his extraordinary actions and submitted a
personal award recommendation on his behalf.

C
I want to assure y o u that we share your p r ide in Sergeant Peralta
and recognize the ultimate sacrifice he made for his fellow Marines
and our Country. His service reflected the highest i deals of our core
values of honor, c o u r age, and commitment . Sergeant Peralta was
courageous and dedicated and his conduct continue s to serve as an
inspiration for all Marines.

Again, thank you for your interest in this matter. If I c a n be of


any further assistance, please let me know.

Very Respectfully ,
(b)(6)

Major, U.S . Marine Corps


Office of Legislative Affairs

0
..
CONGRESS OF lHE UNITED STATES
C April 4, 2005 .

The Honorable Daniel Stanley


Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs
Department of Defense
1300 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1300

_-· __ De~r Mr. Stanley:

Enclosed is correspondence from a resident of (b)(6)


(b)(6) who contacted my office expressing
support for awarding a Medal of Honor to U.S. Marine Sergeant
Raphael Peralta who died while serving in Operation Iraqi
Freedom. According to some accounts reported · e press, Sgt.
Peralta was severely wounded when he cradl a live grenade
and saved the lives of many men in his un· .

While I am confident the Department of the Navy takes seriously


the awarding of medals to soldiers wounde~inttle, I would
appreciate your review of the enclosed corr ondence and any
assistance you can provide. 1
Congrc.~sman
Christopher Shays
l·ourth Districr Connt:cticut
Please direct your reply to:

Ofiices : Congressman Christopher S ays


Ill Middh: Stret:t, I Ith Flno r Attention:· ·-Jordah·Press- - T - - - -

Umlgcpon. CT OhbOi-422..'\
Reference #1147351
C,on•rnmcnt Ci:nrc:r
.~SIi \\:'~shingto11 !\,,ult·,·~ rJ 1126 Longworth House
~rnmfnrd. C:T \ll+lOI·· 2\}li Washington, DC 20515
1126 Lung\\Orth BuilJin~
Washington. DC 2051.'Hl704
Thank you for your time and attention to this matter.
Telephones!
BK.JP( :Ho R I : .'ii()- 5!170 ·"'·'
N, Ill~ ALI..; li66- M69
fl it K ,1l'IEll )'. 1:lR-~95.,
S l t[Ll ON" ~lll- 1}4:!6
s ·1 11t..1H ,m ). :l.'i7-i;2n
w ~~H1Nr ; 111N. DC: 202:22.'i ~s~1

E-mail :

( 0SD 1009Q-05
Internet:
Natonskl, Dave
From: Web forms [[email protected])
( Sent:
To:
Wednesday, December OB, 2004 8:05 AM
Shays, Rep
Subject: E-Malf

Name (b)(6)
Addressl: (b)(6)
Address2:
(b)(6)
City, State Zip:
--· .... ,. - -· -- -.-- --· - ___ ._....__ _ ___ _
. E- mail Address:
(b)(6)
~
' comments: As a veteran I feel quit' strongly that the actions of U.S. M~tne Sgt.
Raphael Peralta in combat in Falluja are deserving of the Medal of Honor I would ask
that do whatever is in your po~:t to ensure that his axctions are inves igated bt the
Marine Corps, and that if determined to merit consideration for the Medal of Honor that
you support this. ~:JU:

0 (.

C 3

SECNAV
( OCN: 2005USECNAVC_ C-000462f
Subject: SHAYS-SUPPORT FOR AWARDING THE MEDAL OF HONOR TO SGT RAPHAE
Sta

PERALTA
Type: Congressional·Constituent Tasker Package
Originator: (b)(6)

Tasking Authority: SECNAVC_C ~ Incoming ,P-df {122 KB)


(Entered By}

Due Date: Final Response


06/13/2005
Document Date: 04/04/2005
Received Date: 05/31/2005 Working Area (drafts, referen
Interim Date:
External DCN: OSD/10090·05
Key Words: (b)(6)

Member: SHAYS
Division: House
Commitee: N/A
Case Worker:
Action Office: CMC
DuRlicate Tasker
UnRestricted Tasker
Check

(, Action Products: Letter-Reply Direct

Coordination Status Assignment and Status


(manually updated)

Discussion Thread {Amplification, Comments, [Entj!r_C


Questions)

.• RE: SHAYS-SUPPORT FOR AWARDING THE MEDAL OF HONOR TO SGT RAPHAEL PERALTA - C2 E•
Kenneth J Nixon. 05/31/2005 07:42:27 AM
Staffer: Mr. Jordan Press, contacted in regards to receipt of this correspondence. (0) (202) 225-~

Assignments and Chop Chain


Routing Chop Chain
Lead: CMG Front Office
Coordination: a CMC Front Office .
Information: OLA Front Office
SECNAVC_ AASN Front Office
SECNAVC_C Front Office

C Tasker History:

h ttps ://ucso l .hq. navy.mi1/tv3/webtskO l .nsf/( vwGetB yDCN)/C270DDOFE7A7CD068525701 ... 5/31/05

------
,· ...
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CORRESPONDENCE ACTION REPORT

This fonn must be complclcd 1111d forwarded lo the Co1TCspondencc Control Division
(CCD}, WHS Room 3A948. Suspense Desk: (703) 697-9287 FAX Number (703)
695-1219 Email: suspensc:[email protected] mil
Action Agency lsN I
S1l5pense Date 6/17/2005 I
l. ACTION TAKEN (Check one)

• a. ACTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED (Copy attached}

I below)

_o._
b REQUEST EXTENSION OF SUSPENSE DATE TO
I
c. INTERIM REPLY HAS BEEN SENT (Copy attached) EXTEND SUSPENSE TO [
(Ju.r1ify
I {Jus1iJy below)

• d. REQUEST CANCELLATION (Jus1iJy below)


I (JustiJy below /include POC Name
• e. REQUEST TRANSFER TO I
I
& Phone Number)

• f REQUEST DOWNGRADE TO
I (Justify below)

2. JUSTIFICATION

3. REPORTING AGENCY
a. ACTION AGENCY c. APPROVrNG AU1ll0RITY

ISN I (Servi" Sccn:tary/Uodcr Sccn:1aiy/ASD/Mili1ary/Excc\llivc Assislant Level)


SipalUre Date Signed
b. NAME OF ACTION omCER

I I 1 I
c. TELEPHONE NO. 5, ACTION T Al<EN (For EXSECI Correspondence Con1ml Division Use Only)

I I a. EXT I l Approved 0 Disapproved


d. DATE b.CANX
D Appro\'cd 0 Disapproved
I I c.DWNGRD D Approved D Disapproved
4. CCD CONTROL#
d TRANSFER
• Approved D Disapproved
e. OlliER {Spceify) I I
joso 10090-os I Signanm: Date Siped

I I
SD FORM 391, JAN 2000
Congressional
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING SLIP
( Action Agency: SECRETARY OF THE NA VY
Action Required: REPLY DIRECT (Forward copy of reply to CCO, Room 3A948)
Coordinate With: LA
References:
Remarks:
Document Type: INCOMING

Special Instructions

Suspense Date: June/17/2005 IRouting Date: May/26/2005 I


OSD CONTROL #: OSD 10090-05

INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION
OFFICE
UNDER SEC FOR PERSONNEL & READINESS
ASD (Legislative Affairs)

C1
"----------------------------------
Page: 1 January, 2000
...

SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL


Print Date: S/26/2005
( .OCUME_N
_T_TY
--PE: INCOM
- 1-NG
- .. · - - - - - · - - -A
- TTACHMENT; · - - -
· - - - - ·- -
OSD CONTROL OSD 10090-05 DOC 4/4/2005 DOR 5/26/2005 SIGN ATIJRE CASE:
FROM MOC SHAYS, C TO LA
SUBJECT SUPPORT FOR AWARDING THE MEDAL OF HONOR TO U.S. MARINE SERGEANT RAPHAEL PERALTA
KEYWORDS (b)(6)
COMMENTS
FN SEC u OCN
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
STATUS CODE DECISION DECISION DATE PRIORITY ACTION REPORT:
AGENCY SN ACTION ASSIGNED RD SUSPENSE DOC SUSPENSE:
SUSPENSE COMPLETE ACD COORDINATION LA
PAGES I ENCLOSURES 1 PACKAGE VIEW:
SUSPENSE STATUS INCOMING

CREATED BY: (b)(6) _

DISTRIBUTION: OFFICE COPIES


ADC OWi
LA E
SN E
UPR E

(J

C
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2 NAVY ANNEX
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775 IN REPLY REFER TO
5730
( OLAC-5G
I& HAR ZOU:>
The Honorable Bill Nelson
United States Senator
225 East Robinson Street, Suite 410
Orlando, FL 32801

Attention: Jeff Scarpiello

Dear Senator Nelson:

Thank you for your letter of March 16, 2005, c o ncerning the late
Sergeant Rafael Peralta, U.S. Marine Corps, and h is actions on
November 15, 2004, as referred to by your constituent, (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Your interest in this matte r is appre ciated. While the details of


award recornmendations cannot be released until such time that the
awards process is completed, I did want t o share that Sergeant
Peralta's cornmand recognized his extraordinary actions and submitted a
personal award recommendation on his behalf.

I want to assure you that I, too, share your pride in Sergeant

() Peralta and recognize the ultimate sacrifice he made for his f e llo w
Marines and our Country. His service reflected the highest ideals of
our core values of honor, courage, and corrunitment. Serge ant Pe ralta
was courageous and dedicated; and he continues to serve as an
inspiration for all Marines.

Again, thank you for your interest in this matter. If I can b e of


any further assistance, please let me know.

(b)(6)

Lieutenant Colonel
U.S. Marine Corps
Office of Legislative Affairs


~Ab!:. tll/ 1::1.:!
4078727165 B
03/16/2005 13:36
,' ,-'

BILL NELSON
FLORIDA

(_ United States Senate


WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0905

TELECOPIER COVER SHEET

Date: 3/16/05
To:
Fax:
.
USMC Congressional Liaison Office
-- -- -- --·· --- - -·
(703) 614-4172
- _ ... ·- ·

Scarpiello
From:
-Jeff-- -- - · - --Fax Number:
---· (407) 872-7165
- -- --- -- ·
(_~ Number of pages (including cover sheet): _3_ _
Comments
IRE (b)(6)
-

I Regards,
(b)(6)

Jeff

- · - · - · - - - - - - - · ·- -- - ··- --- ...- · - - - ·-


Should you have any questions, please contact

C 16 MA9' 2005
_Jeff Scarpiello _ - · ·- _ _ _ - · - ·

225 1:31:t Robinson Street, Suite 410 • Orl.\ndo, florid:i 32SOI • Tclcphnnt: (40i) 1172-71 til • Fnx: (407) 872.7165
B PAGE 02/ U3
• 03/16/2005 13:36 407B7271e5

J c,~
~u~-

() •
~niiea ~fates ~enai£
WASHINGTON. DC 20510-090.5

Bll.t NF,L..."-ON
FLORID,\

March 16, 2005

Maj Gen Tony L. Corwin. USMC


Legislative Assistant to the Commandant of the :vfarine Corps
Department of the Navy
Headquarters United States Marine Corps
3000 Marine Corps Pentagon
Washington, District of Columbia 20350-3000
(b)(6)
RE:

Dear General Corwin:

Please find enclosed con-espondence I received from one of my constituents. It involves


an important matter under the jurisdiction of your agency. Your timely review and response to
the issues raised would be greatly appreciated.

) Please send your correspondence directly to my staff assist3.nt, Jeff Scarpiello, at the
address below. I look forward to a response at your earliest convenience and thank you in
advance for your assistance with this matter.

Sinci::rely,

!;at)~
BN/jjs

Enclosure

Uruted States Sen:itor Bill Nelson. 225 E.isl Robinson Street, Suite 410. Orlnndo. Florida 32801
Telephone (407) 872-7161 • Toll-Free In Florida Or,./y (888) 671-4091 • Fai'l (407) 872-7165
http://billneJson..!'.enal'c.gov
PAGE 03/03
4078727165 B
03/15/2005 13:36

.'-'

( Casework Tracking Sheet

Tracking# 16132-0R

Phone: (b)(6)
Email:
(b)(6) 10/SSN:
cJo
(b)(6) Promoted From Correspondence

!61~1!1.~~se~~r;.!J~~-.~ ·(b)(6)
... ! . ~~~n·w·'.4!;~i?~d.~;~~i?~.\]~it>,ll 1~~~
(b)(6)
Department of the Navy
Constituent
703-614-5772 (inquiries)
·, "~,,,..;lo:'!,.,..,(·""'~°"'........
jA'::?'~1A.·1· I ":l f,t'l~...r!. ~....",..,.Is;"' ~ ,.....m,.,.,,i'f1"'~""~::.r,u;,/.. r.111 I •., 'r· ) ''I W!"!lf,i ,' , . ?.,1 ~"!7 - ~-.~ ~~.. '.!·:,u& \:;(I.:!'!: .;<"'
11::1.eu:11 ,S'':,r,-:~;;,,.,,1.;,t\...~t."';.~-(!);\i:, ,..,~t«~~~>.• ~~¥-'..-~,;:"w.'~i~1·....~ ,,i .~ •'!.. • ~-"i r.;,~_-;;.~;.; ~..;1,;,,.;."!'i- .-....t!-_,.,. · ·~ ~' -- nH ..,..,.,_~~,
Case Type: Casework Assigned To: Jeff Scarpiello
Category: Military (All, Coast Guard, Merchant
Marine, 000 Active Duty} - Awards
and Decorations
Date Received:03/08/2005 Status: Open
Received Via: Web

Casework Description: (b)(6) is writing in behalf of Sgt. Rarael Peralta (b)(6)claims that he
should recieve the Medal of Honar.
Branch: Marines

~~?~~~~IPM8'!u. ~n<:w:J;~'·!
\1YV't,U~,,vu:1u~,~o-~~~t:,,.~~~, . . ~ . ...~~~!~f~~,:&...~ . . . ...·1
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• .,., • _.., · ,?~l>-1'!~¥,t·¥:.f ·}., h ;· > "t.~ ~'"~.1;;'!,·1.1.-,i,:.t""+..
r "1 • · .. • • • ' • T•·
1
... ..... ' .. '" . , W I'

Senator Nelson:
a short time ago, while reading Letters to The Editor in The Orlando Sentinel.
I came accross one of particular Interest to me. It talked about a marine who
fell on a grenade and saved the lives of the rest of his squad. Today I
received an e-mail from an old friend that contained a dissertation by Oliver
North detailing the events that took place on that day. What I find most
shocking Is the fact that I never read or saw anything about the incident in
magazines or on tv. Evidently the big media didn't find this heroic deed
newswonhy.l write this letter in order to urge that you and your colleagues in
Congress dont make the same oversight and that you will recommend that Sgt.
Rafael Peralta, 1st Btn.,3rd Marine Regt. be recommended for The Congressional
Medal of Honor, posthumously, for actions above and beyond the call of duty. He
made the ultimate sacrifice so his squad membeers could live.
This is also one way that Congress can show their pride in and appreciation for
the sacrifices that our Armed Forces are willing to make every day of their
service lives.
Thank you
(b)(6)

~~~ . ~~~
. ~- ~tG:
. ~:;:m,~~~~~~~~
Casework Information

Route History:
('
lnterTrac Tracksheel 01 1 03/15/2005
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2 NAVY ANNEX
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775 IN AEPL Y REFER TO

( 5730
OLAC-5G

II FEB zoa5
The Ho n o rab~e Mark Foley
Member, U.S. House of Representatives
4440 PGA Boulevard, Suite 406
Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410

Attentio n: Steve Martino

Dear Congressman Foley:

Thank you for your letter o f February 10, 20 0 5, to the Assistant


Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, c o ncerning the late
Sergeant Rafael Peralta, U.S. Marine Corps, and his actions on
November 15, 2004, as referred to by your constituent, (b)(6)
(b)(6)
I am responding for Secretary Stanley.

Your interest in this matter is appreciated. While the details of


award recommendations cannot be released until such time that the
awards process is completed, I did want to share that Sergeant
Peralta's command recognized his extraordinary actions and submitted a
personal award recommendation on his behalf.

I want to assure you that I, too, share y our pride in Sergeant


0 Peralta and recognize the ultimate sacrifice he made for his fellow
Marines and our Country . His service reflected the highest ideals of
our core values of honor, courage, and commitment. Sergeant Peralta
was courageous and dedicated; and he continues to serve as an
inspiration for all Marines.

Again, thank you for your interest in this matter. If I can be of


any further assistance, please let me know .

(b)(6)

Lieutenant Colonel
U.S. Marine Corps
Office of Legislative Affairs

0
rage 1 u1 .:.

S E~ NAV
C
Swln tOfficeWe b ActlveX control failed to load! Some functions on the form might not work property.
Please check browser security settings.

DCN: 2005USECNAVC_C-000119a Sta


Subject: FOLEY-CONCERNED ABOUT ANY MEDALS OR AWARDS FOR ACTIONS IN
FALLUJAH
Type: Congressional-Constituent Tasker Package
Originator: (b)(6)

Tasking Authority: SECNAVC_C


Final Response
(Entered By)

Due Date: 03/01/2005


Document Date: 02/10/2005 Working Area (drafts, referen
Received Date: 02/15/2005
Interim Date:
External DCN: OSD/03045-05
(b)(6)
Key Words:
Member: FOLEY
Division: House
Commitee: N/A
Case Worker:
Action Office: CMC

0
UnRestricted Tasker

Action Products: Letter- Reply Direct

Coordination Status
GT r- 1t and Status
(manually updated)
( tho u.lA
l--, wcyJ7)
Discussion Thread (Amplification, Com pr~6C-
Questions}

. . RE: FOLEY-CONCERNED ABOUT ANY MEDALS OR AWARDS FOR ACTIONS IN FALLUJAH - C2 ES Kt


J Nixon. 02/15/2005 08:45:50 AM
Staffer: Mr. Steve Martino, contacted in regards to receipt of this correspondence. (0) (561) 627·

Assignments and Chop Chain


Routing Chop Chain
Lead: CMC Front Office
fit CMC Front Office .
Coordination:
Information: OLA Front Office
SECNAVC_ AASN Front Office

C SECNAVC_C Front Office

S6CN.A V
l 6 f£B 211DJ;

https://ucso 1.hq.navy .mil/tv3/webtsk01 .nsf/(vwGetByDCN)/DFA8CC94C4FF25FB85256... 2/15/2005


Congressional
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING SLIP

C Action Agency: SECRETARY OF THE NA VY


Action Required: REPLY DIRECT (Forward copy of reply to CCD, Room 3A948)
Coordinate With: LA
References:
Remarks:
Document Type: INCOMING

Special Instructions

Suspense Date: March/7/2005 IRouting Date: Fcbru:iry/11noos !osD CONTROL#; OSD 03045-05

INFORMATJON DISTRIBUTION
OFFICE

ASD (Legislative Affairs)

Page I January, 2000


SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CORRESPONDENCE ACTION REPORT

This fom, must be complc:ted and forwarded to the Correspondence Control 01v1s1on
(CCD), WHS Room 3A94S Suspense Desk: (703) 697-9287 FAX Nwnbcr (703)
695-1219 Email. suspcrac_dc:[email protected],I
Action Agency lsN I
Suspuse Dale
I
317/2005 I
I. ACTION TAKEN (Check one)

• a. ACTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED (Copy am1chcd)


'
b REQUEST E:CTENSION OF SUSPENSE DATE TO
I I (J~tify below)

•D c. rNTERIM REPLY HAS BEEN SENT (Copy anochcd) EXTEND SUSPENSE TO j

d. REQUEST CANCELLATION (J,mify below)


I (Justify bt{ow)

•n e. REQUEST TRANSFER TO

f REQUEST DO\.VNGRADE TO
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d DATE b CANX
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• Disapproved

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• Approved
•D Disapproved

4. CCD CONTROL #
d. TRANSFER
e. OTHER (Specify) I
• Approved OtS:ipprovcd

I
IOSD 03045-05
I S1gna:u1c Date Signc1

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SD FORM 391, JAN 2000

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0211~ 12005 !J:11 FAX 561 626 4749
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MARK FdLEY IN ~.'iNON HOUSE OfFiCc SUILOJNC


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Febr.J.ary 10, 2005 ......


' . -.
The E:onorable Powell A. Moore

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.Assi~ant Secretary of De:fense-Legis lati ve


Dep~ent of Defense
130~Defense Pentagon
Was~ngton, DC 20301-1300
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DcatjMr. Moore:
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I a..-ntwriting on behalf of my c:onsh tuent, (b)(6)
,
Acc~rding to (b)(6) is trying to determine if Sgt. Rafael Peralt.a is entitled to any medals
or afards as a result of his actions in the battle of Fallujah.

Wo~)d you please be so ldnd as to review the enclosed materials and inform me of your
find¥Igs? Please respond to Steve Martino of my Palm Beach Gardens office.
i

() Sin<frely,
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Thajk you for your assistance in this matter.
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Meqiber of Congress
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.. W~eb fOJ'lilS <wc:[email protected] gov>
11q.912oos 10:35:03 P~
To: ~fll [email protected]
SubJeC!: ~bsite E.!!latl From Cul Grilbot -
J

Mr.Foley .t
r,

[ am ,.,,riling yo,~ to inqui:e whether you are :iware of the ;oqifice nude by !I ~arine Scrg~t during Operation Al Fajr m Pnllujah
dunng Novcm~ of 2004.
~
Sgt. Rsfael P~r~ta. A Co. 1/3, wa.s mortally wounded d1\ring a firefight uis1de a house on 11/15/04. While laying on the ground with
severe wocnds 'io his face, a g=d~ w.is toss,d into the room that he and his fello"' Marines were oc:::upying. Sgt. Pe.:ilt:i hugged
the grenade to ~,s body, unothencg the explosio11 aDd s:ivin~ the lives of his fellow Mannes at the cost oibis 0"'11.
r
Mr.Folc:y, I os..~that you please look mlo wl!..ir., if my, medals Sgt. Peraha~ bt en rc:co.mmended for. In tb.e opinion of this M.irin::
mfa:inyman, Sgc. Peralta i.s dcseMng of nolhmg less dwi lhc Medal of Honor foe his acnons that day.

I ady write to 1_ou bc:c:.i115e I h~"v'e seen no mC":1.tioo of Sg:. Pealu since a brief arncle m the USA Today and an article on the U&\1C
website dat!d \U/02/04 by LCµ\ T. J, KaeI1]I1'acr. The Ammcan people need to know th;i: me:. such :is Sgt. Peralta. still serve our
country, and S~t. Per.ilta dc:sc:rves the banors he has so nc.hly emed.

Th~ you in .i~v2.!lec for nny attl!'Iltion. you offer this martcr.
I
Smcer:!y Youlf;
(b)(6)

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==- Originallfomuttcc.)..1essil.ge S~ns H:i:e . -
Date: Ol/29/2cb5, 22.06
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(b)(6)

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I am writing ~u to inquire whether you are aware of the s.icrificc made by a MaIUle Sergea.m duriIJ.g Operatian Al 1:ajr in Fallujah
duri:Jg Noventa of 2004.
~
Sgt. lhfad P«talc:a, A Co. 1/J, was ma.~lly woundi:d during a. firefight inside a house on 11/15/04. While laying oo the ~ound with
severe woun~ to his f:.cc, a grniadc W!t!i tossed into the room that he and bis fcllow M.innes wa:: occupying. Sgt Per.ilb hugged
7
0 the grenade: t~his body, smothering !he explosion. and saving the lives of his fellow Mmnes al the cost oflus owu.

Mr.Foley, I 41.h.it you pleas: look u:.to wlut, if a!lY, medals Sgt. Peralta h..ns been recocmended for. In the opinioc. of this M:!...-i:a:
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infa!lt.rym.atl, S!f-. Peral\n i.s des::rvw.g ofnothmg leu. tban tl1e Mcd.il of P.:Ollor for his actions thnt day,

I only wnte·to j-pu bee;i.usc l have seen no mcntton of Sgl. Peralta ,bee a brief artidc m the US.A.. Today cd ao article oo. the USMC
webs!te dated 1:2/02/04 by LCpl T. I. Kaemmer::r. The Amc:uc.t.a. people need to bow th.1t meu sllCb as Sgt. Peralt.i still se:ve our
country, and s1,-
Peralta deserves t.be hoi:ors be has so nchly cs.reed.

Thank you in a4vll!lce for ,iny attention you offcr this tn.lner.
.
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2 NAVY ANNEX
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775 IN REPLY REFER TO

( 5730
OLAC-5G
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The Honorable John Cornyn


United States Senator
Occidental Tower
5005 LBJ Freeway, Suite 1150
Dallas, TX 75244

Attencion: Marissa Johannes

Dear Senator Cornyn:

Thank you for your inquiry of January 8, 2005, concerning the late
Sergeant Rafael Peralta, U.S. Marine Corps, and his actions on
Nover.'\ber 15, 2004, as referred to by your constituent, (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Your interest in this matter is appreciated. While the details of


award recommendations cannot be released until such time that the
awards process is completed, I did want to share that Sergeant
Pera~ta's corrunand recognized his extraordinary actions and submitted a
personal award recommendation on his behalf.

0 I want to assure you that I, too, share your pride in Sergeant


Peralta and recognize the ultimate sacrifice he made for his fellow
Marines and our Country . His service reflected the highest ideals of
our core values of honor, courage, and commitment. Sergeant Peralta
was courageous and dedicated; and he continues to serve as an
inspiration for all Marines.

Senator Elizabeth Dole and Congressman Bob Filner have also


expressed interest in this case.

Again, thank you for your interest in this matter. If I can be of


any further assistance, please let me know.

Very Respectfully,
(b)(6)

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps


Deputy Assistant to the Commandant of the Marine Corps

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FAX TRANSMISSION
OFFICE OF SENATOR JOHN CORNYN
Occid,mtal Tower
5005 LBJ Freeway, Suite 1150
Dallas, Texas 75244
Tele-phone: 972-239-1310
Fax: 972-239-2110

tO
To: U.S. Marine Corps - HQDate: January f, 2005

From: Marissa Johannes Pages to Follo,v: 3

Re: Sgt Rafael Peralta

COMMENTS:
Thank you!
)
,•
.
I
JO~NCORNYN
' TE)(AS

).(nif.eb ~faf e.S" .$.eunfe


WASHINGTON, DC 20510-4305

January 8, 2005

Headquaners, United States Marine Corps


Office of Legislative Affairs/Correspondence
3000 Marine Corps Pentagon (4C553)
Washington, D.C. 20350-3000

My constituent has sent the enclosed communication. A response which addresses his/her
concerns would be appreciated.

Please send your response to the following address:

Office of Senator John Comyn


Occidental Tower
5005 LBJ freeway, Suite 1150,
Dallas, Texas 75244-61 99

ATTN: Marissa Johannes


(972) 392-9293
(972) 239-2110 (Fax)

E-mail: Marissa_J [email protected]

Enclosure
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Dear Senator,
(b)(6)
My name is and I am a constituent of yours from (b)(6) and I
would like you to pursue a military incident that is very important to me . On
November 15 of this month, A 25 year old marine named Rafael Peralta was killed
in FalluJah, Iraq. To make the story as brief as possible, Corporal Peralta
and his fellow marines were cornered in a building in Fallujah and jihadists
threw a grenade in the close proximity of the marines. Without hesitation,
Corporal Peralta grabbed the grenade and cradled it to his own chest in order
to protect his fellow marines. Corporal Peralta was killed instantly and saved
the lives of his fellow marines. I think this action goes well above and
beyond the call of duty and I also think that this marine deserves serious
consideration for the Medal of Honor. I would like your office to pursue this
indident further. Corporal Peralta is not a resident of (b)(6) but rather a
resident of California. I could be wrong. but I have little confidence in the
two senators from California when dealing with milltary matters so I am asking
you to look into the action of this young man. This brave man deserves the
Medal of Honor.
(b)(6)

0
lnterTrac Tracksheet 01 1 12/10(2004
,, ....... .....-... - ...................
,

•' .. : -. ... DEC 13 REC'D


(b)(6)

'

November 29, 2004

Senator John Comyn


228 Russell Senate Office Bldg.
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Comyn:

ABC's TI1anksgiving evening news had the story of California's Marine Sgt

Rafael Peralta In Iraq one day, even though he was woundc~ he hugged an

enemy grenade to his chest as it exploded. He saved the rest of his squad.

As an ex-Marine (WWII) I was proud even through my tears. I do think the

guy deserves the Congressional Medal of Honor. Could you help gel it for

. ?
h un.

Sincerely,
(b)(6)
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2 NAVY ANNEX
WASHINGTON, DC 20380·1775 IN AEPLV REFER TO

C 5730
OLAC-SG
. ,,..
The Honorable Elizabeth Dol e
United States Senator
310 New Bern Avenue, Suite 122
Raleigh, NC 27601

Attention: Paula Noble

rear Senator Dole:

Thank you for your inquiry o f January 1 2, 2 0 05, concerning the


late Sergeant Rafael Peralta, U . S . Marine Corps, and his actions on
November 15, 2004, as referred t o by your constituent, (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Your interest in this matter is appreciated. While the details o f


award recommendations cannot be released until such time that the
awards process is completed, I did want to share that Sergeant
Peralta's command recognized his extraordinary actions and submitted a
personal award recorrunendation on his behalf.

I want t o assure you that I, t o o, share your pride in Sergeant

C_J Peralta and recognize th~ ultima te sacrifice he made for his fellow
Marines and our Country . His service reflected the highest ideals of
our core values of honor, courage, and commitment. Sergeant Peralta
was courageous and dedicated; and he continues to serve as an
inspiration for all Marines .

Senator John Cornyn and Congressman Bob Filner have also expressed
interest in this case.

Again, thank you for your interest in this matter. If I can be of


any further assistance, please let me know.

Very Respectfully,

(b)(6)

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps


De puty Assistant to the Commandant of the Marine Corps

0
(b)(6)
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, :- •. J1• : - ••

The Honorable Elizabeth Dole '


Senator - North Carolina
United States Senate
Senate Russ.ell Building
Room 120
Washington. DC 20510

RE: Sergeant Rafael Peralta, United States Marine Corps

/ . - - . -Dear-Senator Dole,
.. .. ·-·~------··- ,-· •- ·-·.•--,.---,..... - . ·-· - --=-·--------. --
During this busy Holiday season, as we hustle and bustle to get everything done in
preparation for our religious celebrations and the close of another year, many An1ericans'
thoughts and prayers are v.-ith our deployed anned forces personnel. These brave men
and women are far from home and loved ones, enduring daily hardships and separation:
to keep our beloved country and its citizens safe and free. I know you join millions of
your fellow citizens in wishing these heroes and their families' safety and joy during this
special time of year - and always.

Recently the news of the brave and selfless sacrifice of Sergeant Rafael Peralta, United
States Marine Corps, has 11hit the airwaves 11• Sergeant Peralta, an immigrant from
Mexico, so loved his adopted country that he volunteered for military ~en7ice. Not just
volunteered, but choose duty what is arguably the toughest and most dangerous branch of
service in our armed forces - the Marines. He then went on to volunteer, repeatedly, for
additional hazardous duties while in Iraq, so he could be with his comrades in anns,
doing what he could to protect the country he loved so much.

On November 15, 2004, Sergeant Peralta volunteered again for duty he did not have to
- .~ - . ___ t~~~ing the!==~ b!ttl!2.t f ~!~~. ~~ u,e E.ilQ.t;~e an9 !et11~w.li .~b.flL_. -------
- S'!tual1cins 1 Sergeant 'Peralta accompamed a squad of Mannes cleanng houses of enemy
combatants. At the fourth house that morning, Sergeant Peralta was hit in the head and
chest with multiple small arms fire at clo5e range from enemy combatants.

As Sergeant Peralta lay wounded, and perhaps dying, on the floor of the house his fellow
Marines were trying to clear, an enemy combatant rolled a grenade into the room. In the
tight confines of that space, with no shelter from the impending blast and no quick
escape, his fellow squad members were looking at almost certain death. That is when
Sergeant Rafael Peralta, with one last act in a string of many heroic actions, grabbed the
live grenade and cradled it to bis body, where it exploded and killed him. However, his
actions - and death- saved his squad.

1 8 JAN 2035
ScNA IO~ UULt KALtluH UrrlCt l'IV. lJ.jjcl . i
~.-. JA~I. 12. 20C 5 3: 28PM
,.

If there ever was a man who deserves the Congressional Medal ofHonori Sergeant
Rafael Peralta is indeed that man. His selfless act saved his friends and fellow Marines,
and is a shinning example of all that is good and honorable in our finest - those who
serve in the United States Anned Forces protecting our freedom and extending peace to
the troubled areas of the world.

Please take it upon yourself to lead the effort to award Sergeant Rafael Peralta,
posthumously, the Congressional Medal of Honor. He is a hero. He died an American.

Sincerely,
(b)(6)

- ____ . ...-... ---- ---~- ..

...... --· --- .... . --------- ·--- -----,-,~------- --------


' DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED ST ATES MARINE CORPS
2 NAVY ANNEX
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1ns .N REP_'I RE"tFi TO·
5730
(; OLAC ~5G

The Honorable Bob Filner


U.S. House of Representative s
2428 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Attention: Tony Buckles

Dear Congressman Filner:

Thank you f o r your letter of December 8, 2004, to the Commandant


of the Marine Corps, concerning the late Sergeant Rafael Peralta, U.S.
Marine Corps, and his actions on November 15, 2004. I am responding
on behalf of General Hagee. I also regret the delay in responding to
your correspondence.

Your interest in this matter is appreciated. While the details of


award recommendations cannot be released until such time that the
awards process is completed, I did want to share that Sergeant
Peralta's command recognized his extraordinary actions and submitted a
personal award recommendation on his behalf.

I want to assure you that I, too, share your pride in Sergeant


(, Peralta and recognize the ultimate sacrifice he made for his fellow
Marines and our Country. His service reflected the highest ideals of
our core values of honor, courage, and commitment. Sergeant Peralta
was courageous and dedicated; and he continues to serve as an
inspiration for all Marines.

Senators John Cornyn and Elizabeth Dole have also expressed


interest in this case.

Again, thank you for your interest in this matter. If I can be of


any further assistance, please let me know.

Very Respectfully,
(b)(6)

....

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps


Deputy Assistant to the Commandant of the Marine Corps

(
, BOB Fil..NER TRANSPORTATION ANO INFRASTRUCTIJRE
51ST DISTIIICT, CALIFORNIA COht.ldJJ"J'EE

2428 RAYBURN House OFFICE 8lJILDINO


WASHINGTON, DC20515
TEL. (202) 225-8045
FAX (202) 225-9073

333 F STREET, Sum A


CHULA VISTA, CALIFORNIA 91910
TEL· (619) 422-5963
FAX . (619) 422-7290

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
C.....n G UIJUI AND MAlunME TIIAN~l'ORTATION
RANKING MEMBER

RAILROADS
AVIATION

VEIIJl.Ai."<iS' AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

I IOI AIRPORT ROAD, Sum D


IMPERIAL, CALIFORNL'I 9225] December 8, 2004 website www .housc.gov/filncr
TEL. (760) 355-8800
FAX . (760) 355-8802

General Michael W. Hagee


Commandant of the Marine Cotps
Headquarters MC, 2 Navy Annex
Washington, D.C. 20380

Dear General Hagee:

During recent combat operations on the 15 th of November in Fallouga, Iraq, Sergeant Rafael
Peralta, a constituent of mine, lost his life while protecting members of his unit from a grenade
blast. A news account of Sergeant Peralta's efforts to save his fellow Marines is attached.

In recognition of Sergeant Peralta's heroic efforts, it is my understanding that his chain of


command has recommended him for the Congressional Medal of Honor. I fully support this
initiative and offer my services to assist in the recommendation being duly considered, and
approved.

Sergeant Peralta's selfless performance of duty was indeed extraordinary and in keeping with the
greatest traditions and warrior spirit of the few, the proud, the brave, the United States Marine
Cotps.

I would ask that every effort be made to monitor the submission of the recommendation for
award of the Congressional Medal of Honor by Sergeant Peralta's chain of command and that it
be processed in a timely fashion.

Sergeant Peralta's courageous sacrifice is truly deserving of this nation's highest award.

Please keep me informed on the progress in obtaining the recognition this young Marine so justly
deserves.

i}in~er~ ~
~ FILNER
Member of Congress

BF/tb
2179056
Enclosure

"'CALIFORNIA' S BORDER CONOKl!5SMAN"

Pnnled on R«ytled Paper


eles Times: A Hero's Courageous Sacrifice
0 · 1 of 4

http://w,vw.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-marine6dec06. l ,21 9594.story

A Hero's Courageous Sacrifice


Marine Sgt. Rafael Peralta saved the lives of five others in his unit by smothering the
blast of a grenade in Iraq. ·
By Tony Perry and Richard Marosi
Times Staff Writer

December 6, 2004

SAN DIEGO - Sgt. Rafael Peralta is dead, but the story of his sacrifice to save fellow Marines will live long in Marine Corps lore.

In the fierce battle for the Iraqi town of Fallouja, Peralta, with gunshot wounds to his head and body, reached out and grabbed a grenade
hurled by an insurgent, cradling it to his body to save others from the blast.

The explosion in the back room of a house injured one Marine, but four others managed to scramble to safety.

Peralta, 25, an immigrant from Mexico who enlisted the day he got his green card work pennit, was declared dead en route to a field hospital.

"Ifhe hadn't done what he did, a lot of us wouldn't be seeing our families again," said Lance Cpl. Travis J. Kaemmerer, who witnessed the
blast.

Garry Morrison, the father of Lance Cpl. Adam Morrison, had trouble keeping his voice from breaking when he spoke of Peralta.

"He saved the life of my son and every Marine in that room," Morrison said in a phone call from Seattle. 11 I just know one thing: God has a
special place in heaven for Sgt. Peralta."

Similar gratitude was expressed by family members of other Marines in Peralta's unit who were close to the blast. The unit was Alpha
Company, 1st Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine Division.
Los f ' les Times: A Hero's Courageous Sacrifice ~ '2 0 f 4

'The Bible says it all: 1No greater love hath no man than to give his life for another,' 11 Becky Dyer, the wife of Cpl. Brannon Dyer, said in a
phone call from Honolulu.

"My husband and I both feel that way," she said. "That's how the whole company feels about Sgt. Peralta."

In a modest home in a blue-collar neighborhood, the Peralta family feels pride but also grief, anger and confusion.

Rafael Peralta was the oldest son: strong, a weightlifter and athlete, head of the family since his father died in a workplace accident three
years ago. He loved the Marine Corps.

He joined in 2000 and recently had reenlisted. While in the Marines, he became a U.S. citizen. The only decorations on his bedroom walls are
a copy of the U.S. Constitution, the Bill of Rights and a picture of his boot camp graduation.

As Peralta waited last month to begin the assault on the insurgent stronghold ofFallouja, he wrote a letter to his 14-year-old brother, Ricardo.

The letter arrived the day after several Marines and a Navy chaplain came to the Peralta home to notify the family of his death.

We are going to destroy insurgents," Peralta wrote. "Watch the news .... Be proud of me, bro. I'm going to do something I always wanted to
11

do.

You should be proud of being an American. Our father came to this country and became a citizen because it was the right place for our
11

family to be. If anything happens to ~e, just remember I've already lived my life to the fullest."

Peralta had left his mother, Rosa, with similar words. She said he told her, I want you to be strong and take care of my brother and sisters
11

because I don't know if I'll return."

His mother added, "I'm proud of him, but my heart is sad. 11

Rafael Peralta had not been assigned to the Nov. 15 attack on Fallouja. Still, he volunteered.

As a scout, assigned to perimeter security, he could have stayed on the periphery. Instead, he took the lead as his platoon stormed a house in
search of heavily armed insurgents known to be hiding in the neighborhood.

The house appeared empty. Then Peralta opened a door to a back room, and three insurgents fired their AK-47s. Marines fired back at near
point-blank range with M-16 rifles and automatic weapons.

Hit several times in the chest and once in the head, Peralta went down and appeared dead. Insurgents tossed a "yellow, foreign-made, oval-
Los/"' •eles Times: A Hero's Courageous Sacrifice ~ 3 of 4 '

shaped" grenade toward the Marines.

To the amazement of the other Marines, Peralta, apparently with his last bit of strength, 11 reached out and pulled the grenade into his body,"
said Kaemmerer, a combat correspondent from the 1st Force Service Support Group assigned to the battalion.

Peralta's body absorbed most of the deadly fragments from the blast.

"Most of the Marines in the house were in the immediate area of the grenade," Kaemmerer said. "Every one of us is grateful and will never
forget the second chance at life Sgt. Peralta gave us. 11

After the grenade blast, the house caught fire, and Marines repositioned in the street for a second assault.

Within minutes, the three insurgents had been killed by Marines and Peralta's body recovered.

In the hours after the battle, Marines spoke quietly of Peralta's heroism.

"You're still here, don't forget that," Lance Cpl. Richard A. Mason told Kaemmerer. "Tell your kids, your grandkids, what Sgt. Peralta did for
you and other Marines today. 11

Even in their pain, Peralta's family members are not surprised that he decided to lead from the front.

"My brother was very courageous," Ricardo Peralta said. "He wasn't scared of anyone or anything. 11

Still, his older sister, Icela Donald, 24, wished that her brother had not been so brave.

"It doesn't surprise me that he did something like that," she said. uBut it kind of makes me mad. He had a family, and we need him. 11

Donald, who lives in Florida, came to San Diego to be with Ricardo, their sister Karen and their mother.

The family has been accommodating to the media, but know that soon attention will shift. "People will forget about him, 11 Donald said.
"That's when it will hurt the most."

When Peralta's body returned to San Diego for burial, his family members were unable to recognize him. They identified him only by the
Marine tattoo on his left shoulder.

Family members kept a two-day vigil next to the casket before burial Nov. 23 at Ft. Rosecrans National Cemetery at Point Loma, Calif.
Los( les Times: A Hero's Courageous Sacrifice
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Ricardo Peralta was the first family member to talk to members of the "casualty notification" team. Despite his youth, he knew instinctively
why they had come to his house.

Among family members of Marines, there is no greater fear than seeing an official car pull up at their house, with Marines in dress uniforms.

Ricardo Peralta called his mother to hurry home from her job as a housekeeper at a hospital. Once home, she quickly became distraught and
ordered the Marines to leave.

Donald said her mother had only recently begun to recover from the death of her husband and her son's fiancee.

Rosa Peralta's husband, a diesel mechanic, was killed in September 2001 when a truck he was working on rolled and pinned him.

In December 2003, Rafael Peralta's fiancee was killed in a traffic accident in Michoacan, Mexico, where she had gone to attend her mother's
funeral.

11 God is punishing me, but I don't know why, 11 Rosa Peralta said.

Karen Peralta, 13, knows how she will remember her older brother. "As a hero," she said.

Does his heroism make it easier to accept that he is gone?

"No,'' she said quietly, her eyes downcast and filling with tears.
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