Rafael Peralta Medal of Honor Recommendation Files
Rafael Peralta Medal of Honor Recommendation Files
Rafael Peralta Medal of Honor Recommendation Files
Original
Medal of Honor
recommendation
for
Sergeant
Rafael Peralta, USMC
1. OP AV 150/3 ..... ............... .... .. ............... ..... ...... ........ .. ........ TAB
6. Preliminary utopsy Report ............ ......... .... .. . .. .. .. ....... ....... .... ... ..... TAB F
9. Grenade ... .... .... . ....... ................. .... ... . .... .. .................. . .. .... ..... TAB I
. ,,,,
TABA
PERSONAL AWARD RECOMMENDATION
ENSUR E ALL BLOCKS ARE FILLED IN , SIGN ED AND DATED .
4. COMPONENT (USN, USMC, etc.I 16. NEW DUTY STATION (Home address if separa tion anticipated)
USMC
ADDRESS:
1 1 . NUMBER OF AWARD OF RECOMMENDED MEDAL 20. PERSONAL AWARDS RECOMMENDED -N OT YET APPROVED
1 NONE
12. ACTION DA T E/MERITORIOUS PERIOD 2 1. OTHER PERSONNEL BEING RECO M MENDED FOR SAME ACTION
NONE
200411 15
13. GEOGRAPHIC AREA OF ACTION/S ERVICE
~i~
1ST MARINE DIVISION D YES
2
MH ~ NO ll"M-OH
COMMANDING GENERAL
D Y ES
3
I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
DISPOSITION OF BASIC
RECOMMENDA TION
COMBAT
"V"
EXTRAORDINARY
HEROISM
RE COMMENDED
I/ SIG NATUR E, GRADE, TITLE
DATE
APPROVED
DISPOSITION OF BASIC
RECOMMENDATION D YES
D NO D YES D NO
FOR USE OF NDBDM ONLY
FROM : SECNAV (NDBD M ) DATE :
CNO (N09833) CMG (CODE MHM)
'( .
aordinary heroism recommended
__ ,riewed and recorded.
§] Y ES §] NO §] NA
By direction
OPNAV 1650 /3 (Rev. 1-94) .,S/N 01 07-LF-01 7-5800 Designed Using FormFlow 2. 1, HOMC/ARAE, Apr 98
TABB
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, D. C . 20350 - 1000
4 October 2006
The Commandant of the Marine Corps recommends, and I concur, that you endor e
the recommendation for tbe Medal of Honor (posthumously) to Sergean t Rafael Peralta,
USMC, for bis gallantry and intrepidity at the ri sk of life above and beyond the call of
duty during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
concurs with the recommendation for award of the Medal of Honor.
The Medal of Honor citation and certificate for Sergeant Rafael Peralta are
attached. The file supporting the recommendation is also attached for your review, if
desired.
Donald C. Winter
Attachments:
As stated
OSD 15779-06
Ill!llllllllillllllllllllllllfIfIUI
1
10/512006 3"59:40 PM
Pages 7 through 10 redacted for the following reasons:
----------------------------
(b)(5)
(b)(5) Draft
AWARD
RECOMMENDATION
IN CASE OF
SERGEANT
RAFAEL PERALTA
BATTALION LANDl·N G
TEAM 1/3
Name: Rafael (NMI) Peralta
Rate or rank at time of action: _S_e_r~g~e_a_n_t~/_E_-_5_ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __
Organization: 1st Platoon , Company A, Battalion Landing Team 1/3,
Regimental Combat Team 7 , 1st Marine Division
Next of Kin: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Person who assisted: N/A
--'---------------------------
Conditions Under Which Act Performed
2
Subj : RECOMMENDATION FOR THE CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL OF HONOR
(POSTHUMOUSLY) FOR SERGEANT RAFAEL PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) /0311 USMC
4. Enclosures (1) through (6) , (9) , (11) through (iS) , and Attachment A
to · (16) to the original letter are handwritten statements from the
witnesses td Sergeant Peralta ' s actions . Many of these testimonials are
difficu l t to read. I , therefore , have had my staff transpose each a
into typed form to ease review by higher headquarters . Each copy is an
exact r epl ication of the origi na l statement - to include spelling .and
grammatica l errors . The transposed versions are provided as enclosures
(25) through (37) .
R . F . NATONSKI
3
Sergeant Peralta
Award Recommendation
D10
D9
1
Stack Outside House
@
@
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
e Insurgent
LIVING ROOM
KITCHEN
Sgt Peralta,
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)were
stacked away from the
lead fire team initially D1 @@ @ ® D9
0®®®
Gaining Entry
@
@ "THE DARKROOM' ·
p11 .
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) BEciRGOlvl
@ 0 ·1 0
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
@
e Insurgent
THE BIG ROOM
D4
LMNGROOM
KrfCHEN ,
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
move into
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Entrance Room
-Find 02 locked
-Move to 0 3
2
Clearing Living Room
©
@ "THE DARK ROOM'
0 11
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) BEDROOM
@ D10
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
@
i-t\E BIG ROOM
8 Insurgent
D4
@ NG ROOM KfTCHEN
® Sgt Peralta
@
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) D10
@
0 Insurgent ··-. THEBIG :ROQ.M LM['JG ROOM
KfTCHEN
enters and clears
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
D4
T he Big Room through D4
.®
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)moves to cover
D5 & D6 . ©
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) D9
move to stack next to D5
-Remaining personnel move
into Entrance Room and start
moving into Living Room
3
Moving into Living Room
0
@ D11
'THE DARK ROOM'
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
_BEDROOM
©
'THE KITCHEN AREA'
0)
® Sgt Peralta
@
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
@
e Insurgent
KrrCHEN
remains in The Big
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Room
-Sgt Peralta moves behind
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) i;:,{ .
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 0.1
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stack
to the right of D5
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
move into Living
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Room
Engagement Begins
0
@
'THE DARK ROOM'
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
@
0
0 Sgt Peralta
@
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) D10
@
e Insurgent
KrrCHEN
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)opens D5
-Insurgents immediately open
fire from Bedroom and The
Kitchen Area
4
The Fire Fight
@
@
"THE OARK ROOM' DH
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
BEDROOM
®
0 'THE KITCHEN AREA'
0 Sgt Peralta
@
D10·
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
·e Insurgent
KITCHEN
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(firing over
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
shoulder)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
return fi re D9
·@ 011
. 'THE DARK ROOM'
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
BE;QR00 ~1
© D$
0 Sgt Peralta
@
010
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
e Insurgent · THE BIG ROOM
KITCHEN
-Sgt Peralta is shot, rotates _):J4>
counter-clockwise and falls onto
his stomach in the middle of D4 @f
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)rotates clockwise
and moves out of the line of fire @.
through D4 Into the Big Room 09
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)is shot in forearm
-Other Marines continue to engage
5
Insurgents Cease Firing -
@
@ 011
@(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 'THE DARK ROOM"
BEQROOM
©
0 0 ·THE KITCHEN AREA'
® Sgt Peralta
@
0 10
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
e Insurgent
KITCHEN
Insurgents Flee
@
@ 01 1
@(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 'THE DARK ROOM"
BEDROOM
©
0
0 Sgt Peralta
••
@
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) D10
@
e Insurgent
KITCHEN
/§ Grenade
-Insurgents flee @
- As they move through The
Kitchen Area, they toss a @
grenade through D5 and D6 , D9
landing near Sgt Peralta on his
front right side
6
"Grenade"
-"Grenade" is shouted
BEDROOM
"THE DARK ROOM'
Explosion / Retrograd e
@
@ D11
"THE.DARK ROOM'
@(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
BEDROOM
@
0 'THE KITCHEN AREA'
0 Sgt Peralta
@
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) D10
@
G Insurgent
KITCHEN
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
receive shrapnel
wounds
D9
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
orders everyone out ®
to regroup before they finish
clearing the house
7
TABC
1
/
(
2 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
3
4
Investigation Officer for
5 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
(
28 ENCLOSURE (1 )
DECLARAT IO O (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I PPORT OF MEDAL O F HO OR (PO THUMO )
RECOM 1E DATION I THE CASE OF SERGEANT RAFAEL PERALTA(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
0311 U MC
DECLARATION OF (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
3
4 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
8 SERGEA T RAFAEL PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 031 1 USMC. I was the Investigating Officer for
9 the Review of Insurgent Engagement on 15 November 2004 Involving Sergeant Rafael Peralta
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
1o 0311
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC dated January 1, 2005 and have been involved with the investigation of this
11 matter since its inception and was part of the investigatory team in the original inquiry.
12 2. I have first hand knowledge of the facts and events stated herein and know them to
13 be true, except for those matters stated on information and belief and as to those matters I here so
14 state I believe them to be true. If called upon as a witness and placed under oath I could testify to
15 the following.
17 Insurgent Engagement in Fallujah, Iraq which resulted in the untimely death of Sergeant Rafael
18 Peralta, USMC.
19 4. My recommendation was then and remains now that "Sergeant Rafael Peralta,
20 United States Marine Corps, receive the Medal of Honor." [Recommendation 1 to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
22 5. I submitted the Investigation to the authority who appointed me, the Commanding
23 Officer of what at that time was Battalion Landing Team 1/3, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
24 USMC.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
25 6. I am informed and believe tha (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) forwarded the Investigation, favorably
26 endorsed, through BLT l /3's operational chain of command. I am also informed that each
ENCLOSIIE ( 1 )
2
DECLA~ T ION OF (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) IN SUPPORT OF MEDAL OF HO OR (POSTHUMOUS)
RECOMMENDATIO IN TH E CASE OF SERGEANT RAFAEL PERAL TA(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
0311 USMC
1 7. I am informed and believe that in the course of his review for endorsement, the
3 warranted to expound upon some findings, recommendations and opinions and deconflict oth.ers.
4 8. I am informed that the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology has reviewed the
5 autopsy report on Sergeant Peralta and come to a contrary conclusion to that of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
7 9. I am informed and believe that since that time, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) M.D., MC
8 US , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) aval Medical Hospital San Diego, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) MD, MC
9 US , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) aval Medical Hospital San Diego and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
10 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)M.D., MC US aval Medical Hospital San Diego and former Department Head of
11 Internal Medicine and eurology at NAMI have also reviewed the autopsy report on Sergeant
12 Peralta and concur with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) opinion. I have reviewed the written opinions of these three
13 Neurologists, true and con-ect copies of which are attached to the Supporting Documentation
14 con-espondence o (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and incorporated by this reference as though fully set forth herein.
(
15 10. I am informed that a question has arisen as to inconsistencies in witness testimony.
16 11. I am informed that a question has arisen as to on which side the grenade exploded
18 12. I am informed that a question has arisen as to why Sergeant Peralta's palm has exit
19 wounds.
20 13. In response to the foregoing questions, I provide the following undisputed facts.
23 14. Although it was not part of his duties as platoon guide, Sgt Peralta took it upon
24 himself to assist an undersized rifle squad in clearing houses of insurgents over the course of two
26 15. At the last house he cleared on the day of his death, he was one of the first six
27 Marines to enter (the actual sequence is in-elevant. What is relevant is every witness has him
28 entering the house). [En cls 1-6. 9-11. 13- 17 to Ill\ e tigat ion]
ENCL0-(1)
3
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
1 16. Once inside the house, Sgt Peralta was in close proximity to the door to the next
2 room being cleared (the actual distance is irrelevant. What is relevant is every witness places him
3 in the room where the subsequent firefight broke out). [Encls 1-6, 9-11 , 13-17 to Investigation]
5 18. Sergeant Peralta went down during the firefight. [Encls 1-6, 9-11, 13-1 7 to
6 Investigation]
7 19. Sergeant Peralta came to rest on his stomach. [Encls 1-6, 9- 11 , 13-17 to
8 Investigation]
9 20. Sergeant Peralta received a penetrating wound to the back of his head. [Encl 19 to
10 Investigation]
11 21. Sergeant Peralta's feet fell oriented towards and partially in the room with the
12 firefight, with the bulk of his body pointed towards and laying in the room where the grenade
13 entered, ultimately came to rest and subsequently exploded. [Encls 1-6, 9-11, 13-17 to
14 Investigation]
16 22. There is only slight variance among the witnesses. The longest any witness places
17 the time is 15 seconds from Sergeant Peralta's fall to the grenade explosion. Every witness who
18 was present when the grenade exploded states the grenade seemed to take a long time or "forever"
19 to go off, as much as 10 seconds from first sighting to explosion. [Encls 1,3 , 5, 9, 10, 16, 17 to
20 Investigation]
22 time is a difficult thing to measure from recollection. A common technique (which I employed on
23 this occasion with each of the witnesses) is to first ask, " How many seconds?", then breakout a
24 stopwatch - start it - and count off the stated time - then ask - " Still think that was it? Was it
26 25 . After doing the foregoing, the times testified to were 15 seconds MAX from fall to
27 exp losion and 10 seconds MAX from sighting of grenade to explosion. Therefore: I deduce that
28
ENCLOSIIE ( 1)
4
DECLARATION OF (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I SUPPORT OF MEDAL OF HONOR (POSTHUMOUS)
RECOMMENDATIO l THE CASE OF SERGEANT RAFAEL PERALTA(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
03ll USMC
1 the time from when Sergeant Peralta fell to when the grenade exploded was at most - 15
2 seconds.
3 26. I understand that our regulations on this type of award require " certainty" and that
4 we must have "no doubt." I respectfully opine to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology
5 ("AFIP") that it is possible for a person to doubt anything. The question is: is the doubt in
6 question a reasonable doubt based on the evidence? As this standard of proof is the same as used
7 in criminal cases under all State and Federal law [see, e.g. , California Eviden ce Code and Military
8 Rules of Evidence] , where we are deliberating deprivation of a person' s liberty - and somet1mes -
9 his or her life, I am infom1ed and believe there is no higher standard of proof and have applied this
1o standard herein. Based on all the evidence, I cannot reasonably doubt the sworn time frame and
11 therefore state with certainty th e time from fall to explosion was at most 15 seconds .
13 27. The grenade came from the insurgents. [Encls 1-3, 5, 9, 10, 13 , 16, 17 to
14 Investigation]
(
15 28. The insurgents were in the room the rifle squad was in the process of clearing when
16 the firefight broke out. [Encls 1-3, 5, 9-11 , 13, 16, 17 to Investigation]
17 29. There was an open doorway adjacent to the doorway leading to the insurgent's
19 30. The grenade came from the insurgent' s room, through the adjacent doorway and
20 into the room where Sergeant Peralta lay on his stomach, head first. [Ends 2, 3, 5, 9, 10, 13, 16, 17
21 to Investigation]
22 31. The grenade was smaller than the standard U.S . fragmentation grenade, oblong,
23 orange or yellowish-orange in color with a long fuse. [Encls 2, 3, 5, 9, 10, 13, 16, 17, 20, 22(D),
24 22(E) to Investigation]
25 D. Deduced Fact No. 2: The Grenade W as An " Iraqi Grenade, Model Unknown" .
27 examine Sergeant Peralta's flak, and read the witness descriptions of the gren ade. Based on these
:28 exam inatio ns. he ga , e u statement stating with cc1iainty that the grenac~NCmstJIE'\(il1at
5
DECLARATIO ' OF (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I SUPPORT OF MEDAL OF HO OR (POSTH UMOUS)
RECOMMENDATION IN T HE CASE OF SERGEANT RAFAEL PERALTA(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
0311 USMC
1 EOD calls, "Iraqi Grenade, Model unknown. " I am informed and believe based on my interview
2 with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) this model grenade is the only grenade Iraq ever manufactured. BLT 1/3
3 uncovered this exact model grenade all over its battle space (and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
4 USMC of combat camera has video footage of one being found on the BLT 1/3 video CD he made
6 33. Having viewed the actual grenade model personally, I concur with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
7 description as related to me during his interview. This model grenade is a small, plastic grenade
8 with approximately 37 grams of explosives containing a metal spring coil similar to a thi n "slinky"
9 inside (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) added that, by comparison, the standard U.S. Fragmentation Grenade has
1o approximately 85 grams of expl osive]. The plastic exterior is not unlike a silly putty' container
11 and is Orange. Upon extended exposure to sun and the elements, the orange plastic fades to
12 "yellowish-orange." I have personally viewed newer and older versions of this model and the
· 13 newer ones (as well as the unexposed interiors of older ones) are Orange while the exterior of older
15 34. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated to me this grenade can accommodate any standard soviet fuse
16 and normally takes 10-15 seconds to explode once initiated. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) also stated this model
17 is "very low yield" and "it is not uncommon for those exposed to its force to live because the
18 intended effect of its shrapnel is to 'shred',' or words to that effect. I personally observed(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
19 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)remove bits of shrapnel from Sergeant Peralta's flak and compare them to an actual Iraqi
20 grenade he had brought with him (photos are in the investigation at Encl 22(D)). The shrapnel
21 matched. ·
22 35. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) then looked at the blast pattern on the flak. He stated that based on
23 this blast pattern, the grenade went off " directly under " Sergeant Peralta on the Lower left .flank.
24 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated it is tare for this type of grenade "to penetrate our flak jackets, even under
25 these conditions because it simply has too low a yield," or words to that effect. Those witnesses in
26 a position to hear or observe the blast all confirm that 'the blast was not as loud as I expected," or
27 "it wasn' t as loud as I thought it would be" or '·it made a ki nd of ' pop " - - or words to that effect.
28
ENCi.OS• ( 1)
6
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) l
RECOMMENDATIO I THE CA E OF ERGEANT RAFAEL PERALTA(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
03 11 U MC
1 These statements are consistent with the type of explosion made by the Iraqi Grenade, Model
2 unknown.
3 36. In other words, while plenty lethal, the grenade' s effects can be defeated by
5 have no reasonable doubt and so state with certainty that the grenade in question was in fact an
8 37. The grenade entered the room where Sergeant Peralta lay FROM HIS RIGHT.
9 [Encls 2, 3, 5, 9, 10, 13, 16, 17 to Investigation] I consider the point of origin a critical fact. If you
1o are supine on your stomach and a grenade is thrown from your right, how does it come to rest
12 38. The grenade came to rest within arm's reach of Sergeant Peralta. Most witnesses
13 have it corning to a stop at ri ght shoulder level or a bit above his head - still on the right. I believe
14 one witness stated it stopped above head height but on the left. My first observation is every
15 witness places the grenade shoulder height or above, within arm ' s reach. o one says the grenade
16 stopped UNDER Sergeant Peralta. So we are certain the grenade was not under his body, but
18 39 . Certainty that the grenade was not under Sergeant Peralta' s body, but within arm's
19 reach when it can1e to rest of its own accord is critical. The only way a grenade which comes to
20 rest outside your body but within arm's reach can create a blast pattern UNDER your lower left
21 flank [as attested to by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) is if something or SOMEO E moves it. There is no
22 evidence that any THING moved the gren ade. There is eyewitness testimony that Sergeant Peralta
24 40. Given the foregoing, it 1s not necessary to resolve the conflict between the
25 testimony as to whether the grenade came to rest shoulder level or above on either the right (as
26 most say) or the left (as one says). By way of analogy, if the issue is whether or not I was wea1ing
27 a shirt or not it does not matter if one witness says I w as wearing a red shirt and the other says I
28 \\'8S weari ng a blac k shirt - I \>-,"A S \\·earing a shirt. Conti nuing the analogy fo r those \\·ho do
7
ENCLOSIIE ( 1)
DECLARATION OF (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) UPPORT OF MEDAL OF HONOR (POSTHUMOU )
RECOMME DATIO I THE CASE OF ERGE T RAFAEL PERALTA(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
0311 U MC
1 desire to resolve such a conflict in testimony, if these witnesses observed me and my shirt during
2 the hours of darkness, a red shirt can appear " dark" or' black in low or no light.
3 41. Similarly, the one witness who places the grenade [I believe it was (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
4 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to the upper left of Sergeant Peralta was situated to the left of Sergeant Peralta's supine
5 form in a corner of the room in a low kneel or squatting position. This position will impair depth
6 perception and spatial relationship between two objects viewed laying next to one another on the
7 ground at a distance. The grenade may APPEAR to be left of its actual position.
8 42. Among the witnesses placing the grenade to the right of Sergeant Peralta, ome are
9 perpendicular to him facing his feet. This view, even if made by someone in a crouched position
1o will still provide a better spatial position of two objects laying next to one another on the floor.
11 Therefore, I conclude the grenade came to rest on the upper 1ight side of Sergeant Peralta. This
J2 opinion is consistent with both logic and my personal experience with interviewing eye witnesses
14 43 . At this juncture in the chronology of events, the actual side on which the grenade
15 came to rest is OT what is critical. The fact that it came to rest outside his body within arm's
19 44. What I consider "certain" another may consider "deduction." Based on(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
20 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)forensic analysis of the type of grenade, the blast fragments recovered from the flak and
21 the blast pattern on Sergeant Peralta's flak, I am certain the grenade exploded UNDER Sergeant
23 45. There is plenty of testimony stating this was this platoon s (and Sergeant Peralta's)
25 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) provide excellent examples] I am absolutely ce11ain that Sergeant Peralta 's flak is
26 singed and tom. [Encl 22(D) to Investigation] It was clearly exposed to some type of blast. The
27 grenade explosion is the O LY blast to which either Sergeant Peralta or his flak was exposed prior
28 to hi s death (according to a ll the e,·idence). Bits of shra pnel from an Iraqi grenade. \/lode!
8
~NCLOSURE ( .t)
DECLARATIO OF (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) MOU)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
1 unknown, were recovered from Sergeant Peralta's flak by EOD. Fmihermore, one of the pieces of
(_-
2 _shrapnel recovered from Sergeant Peralta's flak jacket by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) in my presence, and
3 included in Enclosure 22(D) is the actuai fuse of the grenade. The fuse could not have lodged
4 where it was recovered unless the grenade exploded directly under Sergeant Peralta. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
was most emphatic about this point and I concurred in his conclusion.
5 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
6 46. I am certain the singeing and tearing evident on Sergeant Peralta's flak came from
7 the explosion of the Iraqi grenade, Model unknown in the room with him that day based on both
8 my Jay observation and the statements made to me directly by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Some may call this
9 fact "deduction. ' I call it " the certainty of cause and effect. '
10 47 . Looking at the flak (many pictures in the investigation) and reviewing with(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
11 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)I have no reasonable doubt and therefore state with certainty that the Iraqi grenade, Model
12 unknown which was thrown by insurgents into the room where Sergeant Peralta lay and came to
13 rest of its own accord outside his body but within arm's reach EXPLODED UNDER HIS BODY'S
14 LOWER LEFT FLANK. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) forensic blast analysis AND the autopsy report both
18 medical opinions as to what a wounded person was or was not capable of doing under a given set
19 of circumstances. I am also somewhat familiar with the legal evidentiary standard in this area.
20 Since a medical expert can rarely if ever, render an opinion to a "mathematical certainty," the law
21 requires the opinion be given to a medical certainty. ' "Medical certainty'' is a synonym for
22 " probability."
23 49. In the case at hand, we have four physicians of excellent pedigree who state to a
24 medical certainty that Sergeant Peralta was medically capable of placing the grenade under
25 himself. We also have a physician of excellent pedigree who disagrees. While the weight of such
26 testimony is heavily in our favor, I view this mental exercise akin to Stonehenge.
27
28
ENCLOSURE ( 1)
9
DECLARATIO OF (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I UPPORT OF MEDAL OF HO OR (PO THUMO
RECOMMENDAT!O I THE CA EOF ERGE TRAFAELPERALT (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
0311 USMC
1 50. There are experts of excellent pedigree who say the Druids built it. There are other
2 experts of just as excellent pedigree who say no one had the technology to make it. Yet there
3 Stonehenge stands, as I myself have seen it in the shire north of South Hampton, England.
4 51. Similarly, the grenade that once was outside Sergeant Peralta' body exploded
5 UNDER Sergeant Peralta's body. Stonehenge stands and the grenade was moved. We have a
6 distinct advantage over Stonehenge which is aptly pointed out by Major General atonski, USMC.
8 52. While there can be no doubt that the grenade was moved, all the witnesses who
10 MOVED THE GRENADE. ewton s first law of motion tells us " every action has a reaction. "
11 Ocam 's Razor tells us "the simplest explanation is usually the explanation.' Therefore, I have no
12 reasonable doubt and state with certainty that Sergeant Peralta moved the grenade under his left
13 flank.
15 53. I personally walked the ground of this firefight and took the photographs of the spot
16 of the explosion and the shrapnel pattern. I reviewed and discussed the photographs with(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
17 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
and the BLT 1/3 Executive Officer, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC. The two Marines huddled
18 down in the comer off to the left side of Sergeant Peralta's supine person received shrapnel
19 because when Sergeant Peralta moved the grenade from outside his body to under his LEFT flank,
20 his body did not completely cover the blast. Anyone to his left remained exposed to shrapnel.
23 recollection is the witnesses say Sergeant Peralta extended his am1 (the arm as a whole) in a
24 "scooping" fashion, lasso-ing the grenade if you will, and bringing it into his body. It is difficult to
26 55 . If a person is supine on his stomach as ergeant Peralta was, the only way his palm
27 faces up without contortion or discomfort is if his ann is along the side of his body pointed
28
ENCLOS•(1)
10
DECLARL\TION OF (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) IN MOU)
RECOMME DATIO I THE CA E OF ERGE T RAFAEL PERALTA(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
/0311 USMC
1 towards his feet. o witness testified to that orientation. Quite the contrary. As a person so
2 situated brings his arm up while laying on his stomach, the palm just about has to FACE DOWN.
3 56. ow follow through with the whole arm "scoop" and bring that under your stomach
4 stopping about the left kidney and, if your palm is on the deck, a grenade exploding in proximity to
5 the hand would leave shrapnel no point of entry other than the side of the hand and the back of the
7 57. I think the reviewers have a mental picture of Sergeant Peralta using the hand itself
8 to grab the grenade. o one says that. He used his ann, mostly the inner forearm if I recall
9 (maybe the crook of the arm or perhaps the crook between the wrist and thumb) to "scoop" it into
1o and under him. Anyone trying to re-enact this movement would find his palm facing the deck
11 once the arm reaches about shoulder height (which is as low as any of the witnesses put the
12 location of the grenade - some have it head height or above head height).
13 58. I am informed and believe that 113 has retained possession of Sergeant Peralta's
14 flak jacket, but that the pieces of shrapnel we recovered therefrom may have been lost or destroyed
15 through inadvertence or mistake. Again, I myself took the photos contained in the investigation, to
16 include the photographs of the flak and all slu·apnel recovered from it in iny presence.
17 50. I am informed that further forensic tests may be conducted on the flak jacket to
18 confirm or deny the conclusions reached by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and concurred and amplified herein by
19 myself. I welcome such testing as I am confident it will confirm the conclusions stated in the
22 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
23 61. I thank (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the AFIP and all those involved in this solemn process for
24 their attention to detail and this opportunity to address the supplementary material acquired
25 thereby.
26 Ill
27 Ill
28
ENCLOSURE ( 1)
l1
DECLAR TIO OF (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I PPORT OF MEDAL OF HO OR (PO TH UMO U )
RECOMME DATIO I THE CASE OF SERGE T RAFAEL PERALTA(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
0311 U MC
1 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California and the Uniform
4
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
5
6
7
10
11
12
13
14
(
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
ENCLOSURE ( 1)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) MOU)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
TABD
Statement of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC
/Isl/
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Enclosure (25)
Statement of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC
1300 041115
1st Plt . 2~ Sqd . made entry on a house , it was breached by
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (front door) . He was followed by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
& the rest of the squad & combat camera . Shots fired by
enemy fir~t , then returned by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
those 2 Marines went into the room on the left & (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
also l eft l eavi ng me exposed . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) shot 3 rounds &
got cover to the wall on my right side . Where I saw Sgt
Peralta took fire , & feel down . Went -for aid & then saw a
frag , tried to pull Sgt Peralta but was to heavy , so I ran
out . 2nct time in the building nobody in house that I can
see , but Sgt Peral ta was dead .
/Isl/
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
En c l os ure (2 6 )
Statement of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC
0900 041115
1st Plt . 2nct Squad entered a house at LB 889918 on block#
407 in fallujah . We breeched the doorway , cleared the room
on the left and began to push forward to clear the rest of
the house . We began taking fire . I saw a number of muzzle
flashes and a Marine , uninjured , fell back onto me to
escape the rounds . We immediately got up and I returned
fire with five shots . A grenade was thrown , by the enemy ,
into the adjacent room . Sgt Perralta , who had been hit by
small arms fire , hugged the grenade and saved the lives of
the Marines in the room with him . Those Marines ' lives
were saved by his actions . · If Sgt Perralta haden ' t stepped
up into my place in the squad before we cleared that house ,
it would have been me getting dragged out of that house .
/Isl/
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Enclosure (27)
Statement o f (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC
0900 041 11 5
1st Plt , 2nd Squad entered a house at LB 88991~ on block
.#407 in Fallujah . After the front entryway was breached ,
we immediate l y took f ire from an unknown number of
insurgents who were wait i ng for us there . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) , was in the back of the squad by the front
door . I set up security by the front of the house while
the squad started to pull back . After Sgt Peralto pulled
the li ve grenade into his body, The Squad pulled back to
take care of our wounded . We regrouped and went back into
the house to recover Sgt Peralto ' s body and clear the house
w/ the AAV ' s support . · Sgt Peralto saved a lot of lives by
taking as much of the blast from the grenade as he could .
/Isl/
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Enclosure (28)
Statement of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC
/Isl/
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
-Enclosure (29)
Witness Sta t ement of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) , USMC
/Isl/
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Enclosure (30)
Witness Interview Form
Witness name/rank :
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Unit : 1st Fire Team 2nd Squad 1st Platoon Alpha Company 1st
Battalion 3rd Marines
Enclosure (31)
Frag Order to go clear section 407 of the city of Fa l lujah .
We have cleared about 7 houses prior to our Fire fight at
ruff l y 0900 . We reached a house at LB 889918 . We then
ca l led up (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who carried al l of our
breaching tools , to breach the front qate . He kicked the
gate door and it f l ew open easily without any resistance .
My squad then moved up to the fron t door . Our order of
movemen~ was (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (Pointman) , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (SAW
Gunne r ) , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (Team Leader) , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (Rifleman) , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)(Squad Leader) , SGT Peralta (Guide) , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(Rifleman) , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (SAW Gunner) , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (Team
Leader) , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (Rifleman) , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (Corpsmen) ,
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (Combat Camera) , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (combat
Photographer) . To assist in th i s statement I made a
d i agram in this interview . There were several things that
were different about this house then all the others . The
first thing was is how the front gate was very easy to
open . Second the~e were no curtains in the front windows .
The first door we tried to breach after we easily got _
thro u gh t h e front door was locked and wouldn ' t open . So we
ki cked in the door on our right . As we entered the living
room , we notice that all the couches and chairs in the
li v i ng room on our left were in unusual positions , as
refer r ed to the diagram . The seque n ce th u s far at this
point is Dl opened easi l y , 02 was solidly locked , D3 was
easily kicked open . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) procedes from D3 through 04
i nto l iving room 1 and clears i t at a counter c l ockwise
fashion towards D2 . As he finishes he is ' at the position
where D2 is and procedes to try to open up D2 but it is
sol i dly locked . -Myself and t he rest of my squad move
towards D5 were the door is shut . As I grab the door
handle , I asked my squad if t hey are ready . So I then
pushed open D5 easily , after my- squad acknowledged they
were ready . After I pushed open D5 then immediatly rounds
started flying right by me . I saw two insurgents in the
Doorway of D7 . One in the prone labeled as " l ", the other
in the kneeling labeled as " 2 ". I then immediatly open
fire , hi tting the insurgent in the prone ( " ~" ) . I then
t u rned clockwise to get away from enemy fire . I know I hit
the insu r gent in the prone because I saw the rounds impact
against him and he curled up into the room out of sight
from D5 . After I turned clockwise I saw Sgt Peralta about
2 ft above the ground before he hit the deck . As he was on
the deck . He fe l l face first , stomach down with his weapon
underneath him . His face was toward D6 , on his left cheek
his right arm was at a L-shape , palm down , at a outward
stretch at about a shoulder level . His left arm was also
at a L- shape , palm down , outward stretch at shoulder level .
His left leg was straight and his left foot looked like he
was trying to push forward with his toes . His right leg
was slightly bent while his right foot was at a 90° angle
to his leg and his inside sole was touching , the ground . I
have marked the diagram with an " X" to indicate the general
position of SGT Peralta ' s body . The tick mark next to the
word feet indicates the approximate position o f his feet .
The tick mark next to the word shin indicates the
approximate position of his shins . The tick mark . next ·to
the word Head indicates the approximate position of his
Head . As I bounded back clockwise I stepped over SGT
Peralta ' s feet from Living room 2 , through D4 , into living
room 1 were I notice D6 was opened all the way . I heard
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) yelling " Corpmen up " after SGT Peralta got shot .
As (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was ye l ling r . could hear SGT Peralta
mumbleling , not gurgling . He was a l so trying to push off
of his toes on his left foot , and his left elbow was moving
very slight l y up and down . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) proceeded to go Aid
Sgt Peralta while I started to move up towards D6 . I then
saw the 2 insurgents running out of D7 headed towards the
back door labeled as Dll , As shown on the diagram . As they
were running out , one . of the in surgents lobbed . a grenade
backwards underhanded . The grenade looked like a yellow ,
egg shaped grenade , with a 1/2 " - l " metal fuse at the top
of it . I have review several photo ' s of grenade with the
IO and believe that the grenade looks most like the picture
of the RGD - 5 Fragmentation Grenade . As soon as I saw the
grenade coming into the room , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) yelled " Grenade ",
t h en I yelled " Grenade ". and ran back towards D2 along with
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) The grenade ricocheted off of the couch
nearest to Sgt Peralta and came to a dead stop right by his
head were I have l abeled " G" for grenade as shown in the
diagram . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and myself · tried to open D2 and it
wouldn't so I dropped straight down on my back with both
knee ' s up . As I dropped I lo6ked at Sgt Peralta and saw
him with his right arm scoop tne grenade into the small of
his right shoulder . The grenade appeared to be more
against him then under him . Irnrnediatly (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dropped
right next to me on his left side curling both feet towards
his buttocks . We ' both dropped in the corner of the room in
l i ving room 1 , next to D2. We are both Labeled "A"(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) " M" (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) as shown in the diagram . The
grenade exploded about 3- 5 seconds later . The total
elasped time from when I saw Sgt Peralta fall to the ground
until the explosion of · the grenade was 10 - 15 seconds .
After the explosion I felt shrapnel hit my right thigh ,
right above my knee . I later found out I was hit by 4
pieces of shrapnel . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) started scraming after the
explosion . He started panicing saying our squad left us .
I told him that they didn ' t . I told him to shoot towards
D6 . So he can cover me while I kick open D2 . When he
started firing I · began to kick the door . It took me 5 - 6
times to kick open 02 . I also recall the sound of the
explosion of the grenade was less loud than I expected -
compare to the U. S . M67 Fragmentation grenade which is very
loud . After I * i cked the door open , I helped (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) up
and told him " to get out of here so I can cover you ." As
he ran out I shot about 75-100 rounds of 5.56 mm rounds
from my M249 Squad Automatic Weapon into 05 , just in case
the insurgents were still there . After I shot through 05,
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and I ran through the front gate where we saw
our squad stacked up on the right side of the gate agaist
the wall . We took our wounded to the platoon CP . I
refused to go because myself along with everyone e l se in my
squad wanted to go back to get Sgt Peralta . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)who I subsequently learned was also injured by frag
while he was in living room 2 , with other members of my
squad went back into the house . I was told by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
to not look at Sgt Peralta because of emotions and me being
in the room during his death . We enter through 02 an I and
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) went up through 06 and shot rounds through 07
and 08 were a fire broke out in both rooms . I s ubsequetly
learned that there was a weapons cache in the bedroom
through 07 , which included the following : 3 AK-47 , 2
grenades , 3 man-made ~ortars , 2 mortar tubes , 10 AK-4 7
magazines , 5 RPG ' s , 3 RPG ' s launchers . I also subsequetly
learned from (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that all the rooms were dark and
the windows painted red along with the back door wide open .
As we were exiting the house due to a fire in the weapons
cache in the bedroom I notice Sgt Peralta ' s Kevlar was a 2-
3 ft . away from his head , were I have labeled with a " K" as
shown in the diagram . I remember as prior to the exp l osion
his kevlar was on his head . So I retrieved his kevlar and
gave it to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who was a close friend of Sgt Peralta .
I believe that if Sgt Peralta didn ' t grab the grenade that
it would have seriously injure me or most 'like kill me
along with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who were
a ll ther~ when the grenade was thrown into living room 1 .
If Sgt Peralta was stil l alive and I can talk to him I
would thank him a million times. It was an unselfish act .
He didn ' t have to do what he did but he loved us . He would
always tell us that we were his squad and he would only
operate with us .
SIGNED
Witness Interview Form
Date : 041220
Witness name/rank : (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Unit : 2nd Fire Team 2nd Squad 1st Plattoon Alpha Company
1st BN 3rd MAR
Location qf interview : BLT 1/3 COC , Camp Owen , Iraq
Subject incident : Sgt Peralta Ingagement of 15 Nov 04
For the record I believe that this was the first hostile
contact my plattoon had taken in a house . I know for a
fact that this was the first hostile contact my squad has
taken while in a house . As a follow up I can not rectolect
when exactly I first became aware that SGT PERALTA was
lying on the deck other then in obsearving him when he made
the sweeping motion with his arm . It appeared to me at
first that SGT PERALTA wasn ' t moving then he made a
sweeping motion with his arm . From my po i nt of view I
could not tell If SGT PERALTA was injured or not . In . spit
of every thing going on around me it didn ' t rejister that
SGT PERALTA had been injured during the fire fight or
wasn ' t making no atempt to move out of harms way
S I GNED
Witness Interview Form
Date : 20 DEC 04
Witness name/rank : (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Unit : 2nd squad , 1st PLT , Alpha Co ., 1/3
Location of interview : BLT 1/3 COC , Camp Owen , Iraq
Subject incident : SGT Pera l ta engagement of 15Nov04
Enclosure (33)
laying face down on the middle bench , and had to move him
to accomidate (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Upon moving his body , I
saw a brief glimpse of what his face looked like . It was
not enough of a look to make any pathological judgement ,
but there was obviously a significant amount of facial
trauma , consistent with an explosion near his head . No one
had said specifically what the cause of death was , but
after seeing his body , it looked as though he had very
nearly swallowed the grenade . After the AAV ' s had left we
got to more or less piece together what had happened . Then
I was told that he had pulled the grenade that was thrown
into his body , potentially saving half the squad .
SIGNED
Witness Interview Form
Date : 041220
Witness name/rank : (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Unit : lTm 2nd Sqd 1st plt . A. Co .
Location of interview : BLT 1 /3 COC , Camp Owens , Iraq
Subject incident : Sgt. Pera l ta engagment of 15 Nov 04
SIGNED
Witness · Interview Form
Enclosure (35)
stacked outside the gate and I believe that it was(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)who breeched the gate . Once the breech was made on
the gate , my fireteam went to the front door of the house
where we would make entry. While I ' m not certain of his
exact position I am certain that Sgt . Peralta was in the
stack with second sqd ., somewhere behind my team . I should
also add that I have made a diagram in which the entrance
to the house is labeled as Dl. While I can ' t specifically
recall who breeched Dl I am almost certain that it was(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)as it was our fireteam SOP for him to do so . Once Dl
was breeched (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) were the first to
enter followed by the rest of 2nd sqd . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) made an
attempt to breech D2 then entered through D3 knowing from
previous experiences that we could probably clear living
room #2 in my diagram by going through a different
entrance . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) then moved toward 04 with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and .the rest of the sqd following . I followed
through 03 then (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) movep through
D4 to clear living room #2 leaving myself as the pointman
~ in Living room #1. We are taught in training to call out
vocally the word " clear " if the room is clear of enemy or
any threat . However we had cleared so many houses that we
had developed the habit of not always calling out clear but
everyone would assume that the room was clear if no shots
were fired or no one gave any kind of alarm . After (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) moved through 04 I continued past
04 and approached D5 near the wall to my left . I noticed
that D5 was open and that it was dark beyond 05 . I reached
approximately 4 feet from 05 when enemy fire opened up . I
could see muzzle flash from an enemy weapon in front of me .
It sounded as though there were more enemy firing in the
house as well , however , I only saw the muzzle flash coming
from one weapon being fired in front of me . The muzzle
flash I saw in front of me was coming either from the
entierior wall of the bedroom or on the exterior wall of
the room beyond 05 . At that point I dropped to a knee and
returned approximately 5 to 10 rounds toward the muzzle
flash I saw . From living room #2 I heard someone yell
" grenade ," or " frag ". I then turned clockwise and ran
through D3 After exiting through D3 I passed at least 2
Marines bottled up between D3 and Dl . It appeared to me
that the Marines I passed in the doorway were not aware of
the situation inside the house because it did not appear to
me that they were trying to exit the house as quickly as
they should if they had known that a grenade had been
thrown inside the house . I exited -the house through Dl
where I then ·proceeded to the gate . After reaching outside
the gate , I turned and stacked on the wall with another
Marine , expecting that the squad would reform at that point
and go back into the house to finish clearing after the
grenade went off . While I recall someone yelling " Grenade "
or " Frag " I do not actually recall hearing the grenade
explode . From my position outside the gate I heard Marines
yelling for our corpsman . I then saw Marines running from
the house who appeared to be wounded . As (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) passed
me as he was running back toward the platoon CPI asked him
if everyone was okay and he replied " no . " At that point I
knew that we would return to the Plt CP with our wounded ,
because the Plt CP was so close to our position . As I
reached the Plt . CPI noticed large amounts of blood on
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) pants . Until that point I didn ' t know that he
had been wounded . When we reached the Plt CPI got
accountability for my fireteam , to make sure that all of
them had exited the house . I then assisted our corpsman in
treating (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) injury . During this time (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
discovered that Sgt Peralta had not exited the house and
that we were going back to get him . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stated that
he knew Sgt Peralta was dead . The remaining uninjured
members of our squad assisted by two Marines from 1st sqd
left the Plt CP back to the contact house to finish
clearing and to recover Sgt Peralta's body. As my fireteam
was clearing , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) of 1st Sqd pulled Sgt Peralta's
body out of the house to the street . After clearing the
house 2nd sqd pulled out quickly because there was a fire
burning in the house and the enemy had left RPG ' s and other
explosives inside . Upon exiting the house , members of 2nd
Sqd including myself carried Sgt Peralta ' s body back to the
Plt CP where we loaded him onto an AAV to be medevaced with
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) My recollection was that the
RPG ' s were inside the bedroom where the fire was burning .
Upon entering the house the second time as I entered Living
Room #2 I noticed the form of Sgt Peralta ' s body lying face
down . I have marked his posi~ion with an X. I only saw
Sgt Pera l ta ' s body through my periphrial vision as I had my
eyes forward on D6 looking for the enemy . I did not notice
what gear Sgt Peralta did or did not have on but only that
he appeared to be face down.
SIGNED
Sworn Statement of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC
12-21-2004
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
2nd team Ldr , 1st sq , 1st plt, A . Co . 1/3
Location : Alpha Co . Firm base , Fallujah , Iraq
Regarding : engagment regarding Sgt . Peralta of 15 Nov . 04
Enclosure (36)
Peralta ' s weapon was perpendicular to him not allowing me
to pull him out . With my right hand I reached to move his
weapon and get him through the door . After I get his body
to exit room two I was exiting the main house door . Again
hi~ weapon got caught in the door so I told a combat camera
man who was standing to my left to move Sgt . Peralta 's
weapon so he could fit through the main door . As he moved
the weapon I continued to pull his flak with two hands and
got him through the door . Then after his body was out I
grabed the flak jacket with my right hand and began to drag
him to the end of the driveway . As I ' am exiting the drive
way drag ing Sgt . Peralta I hear gun shots , I irnmediatly
droped his body next to a wall by the gate (out side the
gate) I pointed to the Marines ion the roof across the
street that I was leaving the body there and going back
inside to assist . When I got done assisting I was one of
the last Marines to exit the main gate to the house a
Marine gave me Sgt . Peralta ' s bloody helmet and his weapon .
I knew it was bloody because I looked at it before a grabed
it and I did not bother to inspect it for damages , I carred
it walking behind the Marines that were earring Sgt .
Peralta to the track . I then put the helmet and weapon in
the track . That was the last time I saw Sgt . Peralta , his
kev l ar (helmet) , and his weapon .
I have personal knowledge of the foregoing facts . I have
reviewed this statement and swear that it is true to the
best of my recolection , except as to those matters stated
under information or belief , and as to those matters I
believe them to be true .
SIGNED
SIGNED
Written Statement of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC
SIGNED
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Enclosure (37)
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
BATIAllON LANDING TEAM 1/ 3
31ST MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT
UNIT 44010
FPO AP 96607-4010
.
awarded the Medal of Honor posthumous l y .
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
BATTALION LANDING TEAM 1/ 3
31ST M ARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT
UNIT44010
FPO AP 96 607 - 4010
1650
SJA/
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
1 Jan 05
Preliminary Statement
Findings
2 . Sergeant Rafael Peralta was the Platoon Guide for 1st Platoon , Alpha
Company, BLT 1/3. During the initial breach of insurgent defenses north of
the city, 1st Platoon provided security for a D9 bulldozer as it worked to
clea~ a breach lane for the assault force . After the initial penetration
into the city , 1st Platoon , as part of the BLT reserve, established a command
post (CP) on the northern edge of the city and maintained open lines of
communications into and out of the city for medevac and logistical resupply
vehicles . The platoon remained there for approximately three days,
conducting search and attack operations. On 13 November 2004 , the platoon
was tasked with providing security at the Dr . Talib Al Janabe Hospital near
phase line " Fran" in Block 426 . On 14 November 2004 , 1st Platoon moved
north , cleared Block 412 and began clearing Block 407 [see Attachment C to
Enclosure (22)].
3. An infantry rifle squad was the basic unit for conducting clearing
operations. Generally, one squad per platoon would clear a house while the
other t wo squads cordoned off the area and provided over watch.
2
Subj : REVIEW OF I NSURGENT ENGAGEMENT ON 15 NOVEMBER 2004 INVOLVING SERGEANT
RAFAEL PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) /0311 USMC
I.,,-
afternoon of 13 November 2004 , 2d Squad received two combat cameramen , who
also assisted the squad with its search and attack mission .
9 . By most accounts , the squad had cleared four to eight houses before
reaching the house (the "contact house") where they engaged insurgent forces
on 15 November 2004 . A review of the actua l block being cleared shows the
contact house was the seventh house on the block moving from east to west
[see Attachment C to Enclosure (22)] .
10. Upon reaching the contact house , Sergeant Peralta was positioned in the
middle of the squad , one to two Marines ahead of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(Combat Camera) , but somewhere behind (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who was the last
man in first fire team. The majori t y of statements indicate that (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(Squad Leader) was ahead of
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) at this point .
Enclosures (1)-(3) , (5) , (9) - (11) , (13) , (16) and (17) pertain .
13 . The order of movement for first fire te am was as follows : (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(breacher/pointman) ;
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (Squad Automatic
3
Subj : REVIEW OF INSURGENT ENGAGEMENT ON 15 NOVEMBER 2004 INVOLVING SERGEANT
RAFAEL PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 0311 USMC
15 . At the contact house , breaching tools were not necessary , as(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
was able to kick the gate open . The squad then rapidly
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
proceeded to Dl . Some Marines peeled off to provide perimeter security , so
the squad order changed from that of the previous house between the gate and
Dl .
17. Upon gaining entry to the sink room , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) then attempted
to b reach D2 . He found it locked and moved to D3. Some testimony states D2
was open ; however , the two individua l s in the best position to know the
status of this doo r state it was locked , causing them to turn to D3
[Enc l osures (9) and (16)] . As the two lead Marines progressed , other members
of the squad entered through Dl .
18 . Upon entering the house and clearing the first room , the order of
movement was not pre-determined. Marines would use initiative based tactics ,
with the Marine in the most advantageous position clearing rooms or areas as
they presented themselves . Several members of the squad , to include Sergeant
Peralta and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had freedom to change their position in
the squad as they saw fit .
4
Subj : REVIEW OF INSURGENT ENGAGEMENT ON 15 NOVEMBER 2004 INVOLVING SERGEANT
RAFAEL PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) /0311 USMC
20 . Sergeant Peralta moved forward and was i n close proximi t y to D5 as(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
made ready to push the door open . Upon doing so , Marines
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
in the Living Room immediately began taking fire from "the kitchen area" and
bedroom side of D5 . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) states he saw one insurgent in
the prone and another in the kneeling f i ring from D7 . Others state they saw
mu zzle f .l ash from D8 . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) s t ates he s aw muzzle flash
from 07 and to the left of D7 , as we l l as an actual muzzle protruding from
the s t airs to the right of 05 . All Marines in the house testify there was
more than one insurgent weapon fir i ng based on the sound and rapidity of
fire , with as many as three insurgents firing at once .
5
Subj : REVIEW OF INSURGENT ENGAGEMENT ON 15 NOVEMBER 2004 INVOLVING SERGEANT
RAFAEL PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) /0311 USMC
25. Upon seeing the grenade , one or more Marines shouted "frag" or
"grenade . " Testimony differs slightly as to which arm Sergeant Peralta used
and where the grenade was in relation to his body , but most of the tes.timony
has Sergeant Peralta using his right arm and reaching for the grenade on his
right side . Since the grenade was moving from right to left , from 06 towards
the center of the Big Room , and since most testimony has Sergeant Peralta
facing to his right on the ground , I find it most probable that the grenade
was slowing or had come to a stop on his right side and that he reached to
scoop it using his right arm .
26. There is absolutely no doubt that Sergeant Peralta did in fact scoop the
grenade with his arm .
27 . EOO ' s review of the burn pattern on Sergeant Peralta ' s flak jacket ;
combined with the fragmentation pattern documented by the battalion surgeon
and the autopsy report; as well as the photographs of the spot where Sergeant
Peralta was recovered , where the grenade exploded on the floor and the
fragmentation pattern left on the wall inside the Big Room between 04 and D2 ;
leave no doubt that the grenade exploded underneath Sergeant Peralta on the
left side of his flak jacket .
28 . Given that Sergeant Peralta was lying atop his weapon , which was found
still slung on his person when he was retrieved from the house , and that he
was lying on his stomach on the floor with the grenade coming from his right ,
there is no way for the grenade to have lodged itself under Sergeant
Peralta ' s left side unless he , himself , put it there .
29 . Those witnesses able to make an estimate believe that the time from when
Sergeant Peralta hit the deck until the time when the grenade exploded was
between 10 and 15 seconds . The medical evidence states that as badly wounded
as Sergeant Peralta was prior to reaching for the grenade , his faculties and
motor control would have still allowed him to recognize the grenade as a
grenade and scoop i t under himself . In other words , he knew what he was
doing and intended to do what he did .
31 . After the grenade exploded , those still in the house left , regrouped and
made another assault to both clear the house and retrieve Sergeant Peralta .
The medical evidence is unclear as to the precise time of death . I can only
conclude that Sergeant Peralta succumbed to his wounds some point after the
explosion of the grenade but before being pronounced dead by Bravo Surgical .
32 . The Marine who retrieved Sergeant Peralta from the house stated that
Sergeant Peralta was facing to his left when he was picked up . In addition,
the entire left side of Sergeant Peralta ' s face was macerated, indicating
that the right side must have been against the floor and thus shielded .
However , most witnesses state that Sergeant Peralta was facing to the right
when the grenade entered the Big Room . Based on the totality of the
testimony and evidence , I find it entirely reasonable that Sergeant Peralta
was originally facing to his right as the grenade entered the room and came
within his grasp . The injuries to his right arm are consistent with it being
6
Subj : REVIEW OF INSURGENT ENGAGEMENT ON 15 NOVEMBER 2004 INVOLVING SERGEANT
RAFAEL PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 0311 USMC
under him when the grenade exploded. At some point after scooping the
grenade , Sergeant Peralta turned his head under .
33. The insurgents subsequently fled out the back of the house and were
ultimately killed by members of 3d squad, 1st Platoon , Alpha Company , BLT
1/3 , in a house immediately adjacent to the contact house .
34 . Sergeant Peralta was taken to Bravo Surgical , where enclosures (7) and
(8) were generated . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) M. D. , Medical Corps ,
USN , Medical Officer , BLT 1/3 , also viewed and inspected Sergeant Peralta at
the forward BLT Aid Station (co-located with the BLT field trains) prior to
him being taken to Bravo Surgical Company [Enclosure (21)] .
35 . After the contact house was secured, some Marines who were present
provided written statements of their account of these events , which are
enclosed herewith as Enclosures (1) thru (6) .
38 . Sergeant Peralta succumbed to his wounds some time after the grenade
exploded but prior to being pronounced dead by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) at 0915 on
15 November 2004 .
Opinions
5. There is no doubt that Sergeant Peralta fell at least halfway into the
room where he was later recovered .
7
Subj : REVIEW OF INSURGENT ENGAGEMENT ON 15 NOVEMBER 2004 INVOLVING SERGEANT
RAFAEL PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) /0311 USMC
7. There is no doubt a grenade was thrown through D6 into the room where
Sergeant Peralta lay .
9. There is no doubt Sergeant Peralta reached for the grenade with his arm .
10 . There is no doubt the g r enade exp l oded under Sergeant Peralta , on his
left side .
11 . The r e is no qoubt that the only way a grenade entering the Big Room
through D6 cou l d have gotten underneath the left hand side of Sergeant
Peralta was if Sergeant Peralta put it there .
12 . Tha t Sergeant Peralta sacrificed himself to save the l i ves of his fellow
Ma r ines .
Recommendations
/
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Cop y to :
File
8
Pages 69 through 77 redacted for the following reasons:
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(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
DATE
RECORD OF IDENTIFICATION PROCESSING
· (Effects and Physical Data/
I
(Or un- GRADE SERVICE NO. SSAN
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
• EVACUATION NUMBER. OR SEARCH AND RECOVERY NUMBER
070 04 vS ·M.C.
RECEIVED FROM
fAUu ~
OFFICIAL IDENTIFICATION FOUND WITR REMAINS (fnclude personal effects aiding identific;r
tion) ~.~ii'v\A- tDN Vi;w'r'l-.:>o...J C·~J>
o,ik, ·~
WOUNDS OR INJURIES
I HAVf PERSONALLY VIEWED THE REMAINS OF TH IS DECEASED AND ALL RESULTING INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECORDED
TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE.
!\JAME, GRADE. AND ORGANIZATION SIGNATURE
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
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,ECORD OF 108\ITIACATIOm PROCESSH:
ANATOM.! CAl CHA!RT
SERVICE MJMilal pt]'
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
GnA.VE ·ESTlMA.TED ESTIMATED
AGE /YL5J HBGHT
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ANTERIOR
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0 6UR1,ED (Degree:
POSTERCOR
D O:COMPOSED
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I am the Squad Leader, 2nd Squad, 1st Platoon, Alpha Co . , BLT 1./ 3 . On or
abou t 7 November 2004, our platoon was tasked by Bn as the Bn reserve
for Operations Phantom Fury and Al Fajr. Our battalion went through
the breach, in zone, on 8 November 2004 . Our breaching point was
across the rail r oad tracks on the northern edge o f the City of
Fallujah . During the breach, we provided security to the rear by the
Logistical Operations Center (LOC) . The following morning (9 Nov 04),
we received orders from the Bn Cmdr to move up to the breach site and
provide security and clear the breach site and improving ("proofing")
it to make it more accessible. Upon completion of this mission, we
received further orders from t he Bn Cmdr to move through the breach and
occupy the first building on the corner at the northern edge o f the
c ity (approximately at Phase Lines (PL) Charlie and April).
The following morning (14 Nov 04) our platoon got the order to move
into block 407. My squad started in the center of the block, with 3rd
Squad on our left f lank, 1st Squad on our right flank , a ll clearing from
south to north . Towards the end of the afternoon that day, 1500ish,
Sergeant Peralta linked up with me in the middle of clearing one of the
houses . He asked if he could join our squad for the remainder of the
day to help c l e ar houses, knowing we we r e undermanned. I should add at
this point that my squad had only two fire teams strength , as did all
of our squads . With Sergeant Peral ta, and two other Marines (a combat
cameraman named (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and a combat correspondent named (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) both of whom had joined my squad about five houses prior ) ,
we cleared an additional eight houses .
During this time, Sergeant Peralta remained with us. We all retrieved
our rucksacks , chow and water resupply , returned to our CP and set our
watch rotations . I approached him and asked about using the two combat
camera guys i n a provisional fireteam along with myself. Sergeant
Peralta told me I was in charge as the squad leader and that he woula
stand the watch with the two cameramen and that I should get some
sleep. The night went through without incident.
The following morning (15 Nov 04), I got the call from the platoon
commander to pack up and get ready to take down the northern block of
block 407 which had not been cleared yet . I advised the plt cmdr I
would take the southern row of houses first , from east to west , and
then go to the northern row from west to east . The plt cmdr agreed and
we were instructed to return to the plt CP to stage our gear and packs
prior to stepping off for our mission.
We continued to clear houses as we had done the day before . For the
first four houses we cleared , the order of march was 1 st Fire Team(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
[point] ,
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [SAW] , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [Tm ldr) , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
[Asst . Automatic Rifleman or "A Gunner"]), one of the combat camera
guys , myself , Sergeant Peralta , 2nd Fire Team (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
[po i nt/rifleman] , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [A Gunner] , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) [Tm ldr] (b)(6), , (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)[SAW)), s econd combat cameraman , and the corpsman (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Going in to ·the fifth house , Sergeant Peralta took the place in the
order of march formerly ·occup i ed by the first cameraman , which put him
directly in front of me . In previously discussing our order of march
wi th Se r geant Pe ra lta , I felt he was free to position himself wherever
i n the stack he felt best for him, so I did not think anything about
his change of position in the stack leading into the fifth house . When
we cleared the fifth house , there was an open doo r unlocked and wide
open in the rear of that house leading into the back alley . We cleared
the alley. and upon searching the house , found a fully loaded AK-4 7
leaning up against one wall .
Once everything was c l eared , we brought the who l e squad to the front
door and I sent the first fire team across the street to th e platoon CP
to drop of the weapon for subsequent destruction . Once they dropped
of f the weapon , they came back and linked up with the rest of the squad
as we came out of the front gate of house five .
At this point I should add that I made a diagram of the first floor of
house six , as best I recollect . The diagram is part of this statement
and references to "the diagram" are references to this enclosure . The
front door which was wide open is marked as "Dl" on the diagram .
The first fire team made entry through Dl and ended up in what I have
marked as "Living Room l." I ' m not sure how they got there but assume
they entered through D3 . Sergeant Peralta entered through Dl, directly
in front of me and continued through D3 . I took a position on D3
looking directly on D5 , with my visible line of sight being just to his
right , looking down his right side . By the time I set myself , Sergeant
Peralta was 6-8 feet ahead of me, directly towards D5 and slightly
left . As was his habit , and as what I have marked as "Living Room 2 11
was a l ready clear , Sergeant Peralta made a quick movement forward
towards DS . I do not know if he intended to position himself nearer to
DS or if he intended to proceed through D4 .
At this point , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was off to the right of DS , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was
directly behind (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was in living room 1 (it was
his habit after clearing the living room directly in front of the
breach to remain in that room as security) . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was either in
living room 1 or living room 2 ; I cannot recall , but he was definitely
in one or the other . At this po i n t, the en trance room (room surrounded
by Dl, D2 and D3 , aka the "portico") had myself and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) with
the res t of the second f ire team starting to enter .
At some point , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) must have opened D5 since that is our SOP
and I have subsequently confirmed this point with both (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Once the door opened up , we immediate ly started taking
small arms fire from what I believe to be DB . From where I was
standing in D3 , I could see muzzle flashes from DB . I t h en saw
Sergeant Peralta fall or go down . When Sergeant Peralta went down , I
had a direct line of sight into D8 . I took a knee and returned fire .
I saw Sergeant Peralta 's right arm moving . The general location of his
body has been marked with an "X" on the diagram , with a tick mark for
foot end and anothe r tick mark for his head. He lay about midway
between living room 1 and living room 2 in D4 . He was face down , on
his stomach. I did not notice which way his head was turned . His legs
appeared outstretched in a natural "V" shape behind him . His weapon
was underneath him and a little off to the left with his left hand
still on the forward pistol grip.
I saw his right arm move up in an "L" shape up towards his head and
almost "scooped" the grenade in , towards his body . I do not recall
what position his right arm started from before doing this. As I
Right about the time I felt the impact , I reached to where I was hit
with my left hand to see if I was b l eeding . I then looked at my hand ,
didn ' t see any blood and got right back in the doorway (D3) facing into
D5 . At this point I was on the left side of D3 to keep as much cover
as possible . I could see Sergeant Peralta ' s feet and just the bottom
of his legs .
We were still taking fire f rom D8 as well as somewhere else in the rear
of the house . I recognized the shooting as enemy weapons by its sound .
I returned fire into D8 and made the call for the 1st fire team to
retrograde out of the house . I yelled words to the effect , "pull out"
or " get out of the house " or something like that . Our intention was t o
regroup and immediate re-attack . At this point I believe (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) were already out of the house . I then moved out through
Dl and held security for (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to make their
exit out of the house .
I know from subsequently talking with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that he and(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
exited
from D2 through Dl , as well as the fact that D2 was closed
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
when I exited through Dl and it was open when we subsequently re -
entered the residence .
Once we returned to the CP , I contacted the Plt Cmdr , and inf ormed him
we had taken casualties and that Sergeant Peralta was believed to be
KIA and still inside the house . The Plt cmdr informed me that we would
supp ress the house with aav' s , and then r eturn to finish clearing the
house and retrieve sergeant Peralta ' s body .
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Page 4 of 5
The house was subsequently suppressed as described , and my squad then
re-entered the house . Prior to suppressing the house , I informed the
pl t cmdr of the location of sergeant Peralta ' s body , and was informed
that the machine guns would fire · into the kitchen , on the right side of
the house to avoid hitting him with the machine gun fire .
Once sergeant Peralta ' s body was moved out of the house , my squad
continued to clear the rest of the house . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) informed me there
was a weapons cache inside of the bedroom, and I moved in to inspect
it . The bed inside the room was on fire , and was sitting over top of
the weapons cache . The cache appeared to include about 12-14 rocket
propelled grenades (RPG ' s), about 4-5 57mm rockets , an assortment of
hand grenades , and two ak-47 ' s . The squad continued to clear the rest
of the residence without incident , and I gave the order to return to
the platoon CP . Once the squad began the retrograde out of the house ,
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and myself , picked up Sgt Peralta ' s body , and
carried him across the street to t h e wa i ting AAV . Sergeant Peralta ' s
body was loaded onto the AAV and was moved out of the city . I am
unaware of the location where his body was taken .
I telephoned via the Kaneohe Bay operator to the two following numbers: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I confirmed the
individual I was speaking with was (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Our connection dropped three times
during the call, twice due to the fact(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
only landline phone was a cordless phone
and the batteries were cutting out and the third time for good when his cell phone cut out.
When the line cut out the final time, I called back twice attempting to re-establish and got
voice mail both times. I left a message stating I would attempt to reach at the same
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
numbers at the same time the following day . The interview was complete through the
point of where had run out of the "contact house." I had but a few follow-up
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
questions, but got voice mail again the following day. Deciding I had enough for the
purposes of this inquiry, no further attempt was made at contact. The following are my
notes ofthis interview.
knew
Sgt Peralta as the Plt Guide. On 14 Nov 04, Peralta linked up w ith 2°d Sqd,
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
1st Plt, A Co, BLT 1/3. Peralta was the Guide for that plt. Peralta had been with 1st Sqd
and showed up carrying bolt cutters. This was in the late afternoon. Peralta spent about
4-5 hours with the Sqd. The Sqd Ldr for this squad is (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) The Sqd quit clearing
houses around dark. It had finished the block of houses.
The Sqd then set up a Sqd CP in a house and set security, got sleep. Peralta was with
them through the night and set up a 3rd Fire Team to include himself and the two combat
camera Marines who were with the sqd.
15 Nov 04-The sqd dropped off its packs at the plt CP down the street, got water and
started clearing houses. Had contact on the 4th house (contact house). This was the first
insurgent contact in a house this squad or platoon had had since first entering the city.
Peralta was with them at the contact house. Normal breaching order fo(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) fire team
(stack order) (b)(6),
is (b)(7)(c) pointman/breacher),(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)(SAW) tm ldr),(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (A-
Gunner) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (sqd ldr) would be wherever. Then cam (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)(pointman for
fireteam 2). Peralta was near the end of our stack. During the breach of the contact
house there was no change in the normal order.
began
breaching the house by kicking in the front gate. He then kicked in the front
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
door. He found himself in a little room with two doors. The door directly ahead of him
was locked so he tried the one to his right. It opened. He knew from previous house
Enclosure (16)
Summary(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)Interview, page I of 5
breaches that when one door to a room is locked, often there is another door to the same
room. When he opened the second door he was in what he called the "Dining Room".
There were a set of larger, double doors to his left leading into the room he was
previously trying to enter through the locked door. The doors are closed and there is a
couch in front of them. proceeds forward . There are two more doors or doorways
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
in the room, one directly ahead of him and one to the left of that which also leads into the
closed room to his left.
As approached these two doorways, he could tell the room ahead of him was some
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
kind of kitchen and the door leading to it was either already open or did not have a door
at all (Interviewer's note(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
is the only witness to state the "kitchen door" may not
have had a door at all. Others state it was closed or ajar and one other states it was open,
but that it did have a door) . He states he never got into that part of the house. He took
the door to its left into another, larger living room he calls the "big room." He now heads
through the big room towards the locked door he first tried entering through. He got
about midway through the room with the double doors now on his left when he heard gun
fire.
At first he could not tell if the firing was friend! y fire or not, but he figured it out. The
firing was rapid, a couple of bursts, then stop, then couple bursts, then stop, etc. He sees
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)come through the double doors into the big room and kneels on one knee
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
near the end of the double doors closest to the "locked door" he first tried to open to gain
entrance to the big room in which he now found himself. He state (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)opens or
kicks in the double doors and is now at the opposite end of the double doors from
himself. He's closest to the locked door and(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)is closest to the "kitchen door."
He does not know what became of the couch, if it was moved, pushed, knocked aside or
what. (Interviewer' s note: is the only witness to state these double doors were
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
closed on entry and that there was a couch in front of them. Upon review of the house
and pictures taken on the day of the event, there are several pieces of furniture in the "big
room" to include several couches and a couple chairs). does not recall just how the
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
couch had been previously blocking the double doors from the dining room side, but it
was and(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)came through it. He (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had been somewhere in the Dining
Room near the couch.
The Kitchen was the source of the firing, but never got back there.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) bases this
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
statement on the source of the sound of the firing. He asks (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)if he can see
anything and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)replies, "No." From where he is at a knee can see in the
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
big room, the living room and the entrance of the house (if he were to tum his head right
over his right shoulder). is on a knee at his end of the double doors (end nearest the
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
locked door) and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)is on a knee at his end of the double doors (end nearest the
kitchen) is looking towards what he believes is the source of the fire, where
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)just came from then tells(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)to pull back to where he is and
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)does. tells(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)to cover the door to his front (the one between the
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
dining room and the big room), while covers where(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)came from, towards
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
the kitchen.(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)is still at his end of the double door.
Enclosure (16)
Summar (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)Interview, page 2 of 5
Then Sergeant Peralta comes into the big room from the dining room and fell to the
ground. says tha
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) should be next behind (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)in the stack, followed by
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) does not recall seeing either (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) in either room. Just Peralta.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)returned
fire at first until old him to pull back.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) also shot towards
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
the kitchen. Then Peralta came in. states he had stopped firing before Peralta came
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
in . Peralta was coming from(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) right-to-left in front of him.(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
was still hearing
bursts of fire coming from the kitchen.(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) says Peralta was "walking, I think just
trying to get in my room." states he never heard Peralta saying anything, was not
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
yelling or running. He just walked into the room and went down.
Peralta went down because of a gunshot. He did not see the gunshot, wear
says
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Peralta was hit or where the shot came from .
runs
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)up to Peralta and yells, "corpsman up!" Peralta's body was all the way in the
big room. saw a little pool of blood above shoulder height. At this point,
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) is
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
only aware of himself, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)and Peralta in the house. He never saw and
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
never saw run up to Peralta (Interviewer's note: only(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) says he(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)ran
up to Peralta).
states
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) he was standing on the other side of some furniture. When Peralta first went
down, could not see all of him because furniture blocked his view, which is one
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
reason he ran up to Peralta. ow is looking down at Peralta over some furniture.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
He can see Peralta and yells "corpsman" three times and then see the grenade.
"They" throw a grenade through the door I used to enter the big room (the same door
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)wastold to watch) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)had pulled back as previously stated. So when
checks Peralta, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)is to his rear ("right on my ass") .
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
says
"They" meaning insurgents (plural), because the bursts sounded like more
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
than one weapon firing.
- (b)(7)(c)
Grenade(b)(6), saw it. Looked like one of those old coconut grenades except orangish
yellow in color. It came in flying in the air. He saw it hit the ground and he turned away
counter clockwise and ran towards the locked door but realized it was locked and the
window to the right of it had bars on it. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)was already in that same corner of the
room. is not quite sitting on(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) but they are "really, really close" together
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
facing toward the grenade.
does
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) not know why he chose to face towards the grenade. He recalls thinking it
was taking the grenade a long time to go off. The grenade seemed to have a long fuse.
wasn't expecting to make it to the comer of the room where he ended up because
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
he expected the grenade to go off sooner, if not immediately. Once he reached the locked
corner of the room, neither he no (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)had anywhere to go. So both huddled down.
was looking at the grenade.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Enclosure (16)
Summary of Interview, page 3 of 5
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
,-----
states
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) he was sitting on the deck, hands on his weapon, weapon between his legs,
legs in front of him bent at the knees. He was looking at the grenade because he was
expecting it to go off. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)was behind him but (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) head was above his
("higher"). do~s not know if(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)was squatting or what.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
sees
Peralta's arm move, so he knows Peralta was still moving. By being down
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
and further back, now he could see under the furniture between himself and Peralta,
whereas before, when he was closer and higher, the furniture blocked his view.
states
Peralta was facing left, towards
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) says he could see Peralta' s
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
eyes. Peralta is laying stomach side down. does not recall where Peralta' s weapon
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
was .
states
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) when he first went up to Peralta, Peralta was facing left (Interviewer's note:
only (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) state Peralta was facing left. Others state he was facing right or
can't tell which direction he was facing) .
At all times when Peralta was down, his body was oriented with the head end pointed
further into the big room and the feet end pointed back into the dining room.
is looking
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) at the grenade, which is above Peralta's head. The grenade is qbove and
to the left of Peralta' s head. can see the entire grenade, which is about one foot
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
from Peralta' s head.
Peralta's eyes are open and that's when sees Peralta reach up. At no time did
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Peralta say anything. Nor did Peralta ever say anything while in the room. Peralta did
make a "grunt" sound like "er" or "ugh" as he was reaching up.
As Peralta was reaching up could not tell where Peralta was looking.(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
thinks Peralta reached up with the arm that was closest to (making it the left
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
only noticed
arm). Do not recall seeing where Peralta's weapon was after he fell.(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Peralta' s arm moving once the arm was above Peralta's head (above in the sense it
was above his head on the floor, not "over" his head as if in the air).
After Peralta reaches up with his arm, looks down, closes his eyes and tilts his
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
head down, with the remainder of his person remaining as previously described.(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
states he looked down at this time because he is still expecting the gr_enade to go off.
The grenade goes off. did not continue to observe Peralta' s arm movement
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
because he had looked down in expectation of the grenade going off.
After the grenade goes off, opens his eyes. There is a big dust cloud in the air and
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
he feels a stinging in his ass (Interviewer's note: received multi pie shrapnel
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
wounds to his hind quarters and buttocks).
Enclosure (16)
Summary o Interview, page 4 of 5
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
then
said to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) "Let's go" and they took off
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) lead them out through
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
the double doors between the big room and the dining room, cutting around the corner
nearest them and out the entrance to the house.
does
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) not recall seeing any other Marines on his way out of the house, but states
other Marines came up to him afterwards and told him they saw him running past them.
ran out of the house and across the street to the platoon CP, with
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
then took his pants down and started washing blood off himself due to shrapnel.(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
states he knew (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)was injured and heard that it was shrapnel in the arm. He also
learned that(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)(pointman for second fire team) had been shot "twice" in the arm.
states he believes (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)must have been in the "other" room (dining room) .
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
At this point I and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) lost telephone connectivity for the third and final time and
I was unable to re-establish communications as described above .
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Enclosure (16)
Summary o(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Interview, page 5 of 5
Pages 113 through 114 redacted for the following reasons:
----------------------------
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), handwritten statement
Summary of Telephonic Interview with
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC
Of 22 December 2004
On 22 December 2004 I (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) interviewed (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC, a combat cameraman formerly attached to znd Squad, 1st
Platoon, Alpha Compa_ny, Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment
(BLT 1/3). The interview commenced at approximately 1740, local time, Camp Owen
(IVO the City ofFallujah), Iraq.
I telephoned via the ta~..ical phone net (TAC) to 3220-120 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) work space at
Camp TQ). I confirmed the individual I was speaking with was (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Our
connection dropped three times during the call, but we were able to re-establish
communication on.each occasion and complete the interview, which ended
approximately 2323, 22 December 24, 2004. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) confirmed he has previously
provided both a written statement written on the day of this incident, as well as authoring
the news article bearing his name at1d enclosed with this inquiry.
was with BLT 1/3 from early November until approximately 22 November
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
2004. He spent his entire time with BLT 1/3 with Alpha Company, tagging along with
one platoon or another as the situation allowed. He was with the BLT before D-Day for
approximately two weeks in the City ofFallujah. He is a combat cameraman and linked
up with 2nd Squad, 1st Platoon, Alpha Company, BLT 1/3 sometime after dark on 13 Nov
04. He states his training is to both write and take photographs but while with BLT 1/3
his job was only photography, to capture images and document the battle. Another
combat cameraman (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) also joined Alpha Company at the same time and his
job was to video tape.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) states that on 13 Nov 04 his camera batteries had died. His rucksack was
aboard one of the AAVs, as were his spare batteries. So by the time he linked up with 2"d
sqd, he was just clearing houses and not taking photos.
By 14 Nov 04, be states his position in the "stac~' (order of march for breaching houses),
"floated around." Most often he would shadow LCpl Brov.rn, who was the A-Gunner for
1st Fire Team and the fourth man in that fire team's "stack." Otherwise, he cannot say
how his position in the stack was determined and that he "just fell in."
His first recollection of Sgt Peralta being with 2nd Sqd is on 14 Nov 04. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) did
not know Peralta was the plt guide. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) recalls that his sqd was at only a two fire
team strength, instead of the normal three :fire teams. He recalls Peralta remained with
2nd sqd the night of 14 Nov 04. He believes it was Peralta who formed a 3rd :fire team out
of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the corpsman and himself The sqd ldr, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) may have
been a part of the provisional 3rd fire team as well. They stood post and got sleep.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) thinks they had cleared 1-3 houses before reaching the "contact house"
(house in which the sqd received hostile fire). For 15 Nov 04, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
to get behind (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) recalls he and first fire team holding their stack
order for hous_es 1-3. He thinks they received contact on the 4th house. He thinks they
had been clearing houses 1-2 hours before reaching the contact house.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) recalls Peralta had the bolt cutters and would be in the squad stack, but not
sure where. If a bolt needed cutting, he'd come up and cut it and then move back. For
houses 1-3, Peralta was_not in front o (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) in the sqd stack. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) recalls
the order being (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) perhaps (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) did not know
the Marines well, or by name or sight, since he was relatively recent to the platoon), then
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) says he was always behind(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)He thinks the corpsman
may have been behind him.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) states that the stack order can change between when the front gate of a house
is breached and prior to breaching the entrance door. The sqd will typicaily set some
security prior to the breaching of the entrance door and the Marines performing security
are not always the same.
After leaving the previous house (the last house immediately before the "contact house"),
Peralta is now in front o (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) in the stack. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) cannot recall the specific
stack order or just how far in front of him Peralta is. He knows that (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and
are also all ahead of him in the stack_ The next time he sees Peralta is in the
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
contact house.
The entryway to the contact house had a porcelain sink or wash basin (the "sink room").
Once inside it had 3 doors: the entrance you came through, a door directly ahead leading
ultimately to a big living room (the "big room"), and a door to the right leading into a
living room/dining room (the "living room"). There is a wide opening between the big
room and the living room (it may have had French doors, or an accordion door or double
doors or no doors but (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) recalls it was open). To the right ofthis wide space if
one is standing in the living room looking into the big room is another door which adjoins
the big room with the living room. To the right of this adjoining door is another door
which leads into a kitchen area. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) calls this last door the ''Peralta" door since
he recalls Peralta being the one to open it or near it when it opens.
states the one to first breach the contact house entrance was probably
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
opened the door and a mew Marines enter the sink room. The tempo is the first
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
two Marines would stay really close together but after that Marines just kind of filter for
flow through and get ready to go to the next room because the room they are all in is
already dear. They try not to bunch up.
states he would normally just shadow the guy in front of him but back
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
enough to stay out of the way. He states, as a combat cameraman, he does not have the
same level of experience clearing houses as the grunts. So he would try to learn from
them, defer to their experience, maintain his flow, tempo and interval and stay out their
way, helping when and how he could.
was armed with a standard issue Ml 6A2 with iron sights. He had added an
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
extra magazine pouch to the buttstock of the weapon, but the pouch was empty because
he had placed that magazine in the weapon, carrying extra mags elsewhere on his person.
He was not carrying his camera. He is right handed.
entered the sink room and flowed right into the living room. He flowed into
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
the living room out of habit because that would be the best position to normally get a
picture of a Marine kicking in a door. So even though he did not have his camera, he
continued the habit. He flowed into the living room and stopped sort of in the middle of
the living room and to the right (using the point of entry as a reference for right and left).
At this point he is looking at the closed door leading into the kitchen (the Peralta door).
He stops because the Peralta door is closed and based on the situation, that would be the
next step - the next place they would go through.
states(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)was to the left of the Peralta door with his SAW. He thinks
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
was near. He states
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was in t11e living room as well.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was somewhere
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
off to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) left, but cannot tell if he is in the living room as well or in the big
room, but in any event, to his left.
can tell there are more people in the living room as well but cannot say who
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
or how many. There also may have been people in the big room.
Peralta is in the living room. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) first notices him by the closed door to the
kitchen (the Peralta door). (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)and another Marine are stacked to the left of this
door as you are looking at it. Sgt Peralta is now standing in front of this door, and
appears about to open it. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) sees Peralta' s hand on the door handle.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) is 90% sure there was at least one other :Marine stacked to the left of the
Peralta door.
Once inside a residence, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) says the "stack order" breaks down. People do what
is needed and it does not have to be the same Marine doing the same thing each time.
The Marine who is closest to the next door, once a room is cleared, may be the one to
breach it. He states he, himself, has opened or breached doors simply because he was
closest at hand at the time.
to state it was Peralt a who opens this door. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)specifically states it was himself
who opened this door).
When the door opened it opened all the way and it stayed open. Almost i.ii1.Il1ediately
there is gun fire from within. The firing was "pretty continuous.,, It was not the kind of
"empty the magazine" type of firing but it was also more than 3 round bursts. It was
continuous. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) could tell it w as more than one weapon firing.
saw one insurgent in a room off to the left of the Peralta door (which he
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
learned upon subsequent re-entty of the residence after the fire fight to be a bedroom)
which he calls the "bedroom." He also saw another insurgent off to the left in the rear of
the house. There was another room to the right of the bedroom. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) is not sure
what that room was and calls it the "unknown room." (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) saw a third insurgent
by the fact he could see the muzzle of a weapon sticking out from the right of the Peralta
door doorway (from what he later learned was a stair well leading up to the residence's
second story).
After the firing started, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) says at first he did nothing. "I stood there and did
nothing, then it hit me, 'holy shit, people are shooting at us!"' (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) then fired off
5 shots from his weapon. He states the first shot was well aimed over the sights at the
bedroom. For the other 4 shots the rifle was in his shoulder aimed at the bedroom. Then
another Marine came towards him and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stopped firing. The other Marine did
bump into him and he almost fell but didn't. But then he had trouble getting his weapon
back up to re-engage and there were people running all around the room so he did not
have a clear line of fire. So he asked himself what he should do and he sees Peralta on
the ground.
Someone screamed "frag" or "grenade" and Marines in the big room scrambled and
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) saw a grenade come into the big room. It came from right to left as he was
looking into the big room. It bumped or bounced and then rolled and then
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) saw Peralta "scoop" the grenade towards himself.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) said to himself, "Shit! That's a grenade!" and ran to the right rear comer of
the living room and "hunkered down" (if the entrance from the sink room to the living
room is the "rear", (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was in the comer to the right of the entrance from the sink
room). Then the grenade went off
Looking around now (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) saw Marines making their way to the exit through the
sink room. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) said to himself, "Time to get out" and "hauled ass."
At first when Peralta was moving back from the Peralta door it was like he was
scrambling, but then he staggered. It appeared Peralta saw the insurgents and tried to
V/hen Peralta fell, .his body (head) was pointed towards the wall inside the "big room" at
about the 1130 position (if one is stai.1ding in the middle of the living room facing directly
into the big room, the wall beyond the big room is the 12 o'clock position for point of
reference, making Peralta's feet in roughly the 6 o'clock position pointing back towards
the living. room).
The grenade was round.but not a circle. It was "ovular," about the same shape as o-ld
World War II pineapple grenades but it wasn't a pineapple grenade. It's dimensions from
top to bottom were about 3.5 inches in height, but he's not sure. At it's thickest part it is
smaller than a person's wrist in width. Overall it would not fit in his palm (iflayed on its
side on his palm, each end would extend beyond the palm). The color of the grenade was
"yellow."
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) thinks only one person yelled "frag" or "grenade", but it could have been
more than one person. Also, the explosion from the grenade was not as loud as he was
expecting it to be. Not that he's heard many grenades, but it just wasn't that loud.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) thinks the grenade was on Peralta' s right side. He also think Peralta
scooped the grenade with his right arm. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) did not see any other part of
Peralta's body move. The arm moved and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) turned to run and lost sight
of Peralta as he was "scooping."
Peralta's arm looked like it was going up towards his head as though attempting to
snare the grenad~ and then (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) turned away. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ran to the corner
of the room and faced just to the right of the comer slightly towards the entrance to the
room (towards the sink room), and doubled over at the waist, bending at his knees.
From the time he first "frag" or "grenade" until the time of the explosion it seemed like a
long time but in all reality he doesn't know if it was as long as it seemed. Time seemed
different. The grenade seemed like an eternity. "Forever."
Next everyone was moving, yelling and taking off. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ran out of the house and
out the front gate of the contact house. He stopped, looked around, saw where people
where headed and ran to the platoon CP. He and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) combat videographer)
stopped at the comer of the wall around the CP and waited to see. Somebody, probably
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) shouted to get inside the CP. There was a gate that was partially down close
to them and didn't realize it was rigged with a "flash/bang" by the Marines and
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
tripped
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) it and it exploded next to his boot. After that, they ran around into the CP.
They had left Peralta behind in the building. The first thing on everybody' s mind was to
go back and pull him out. Pretty much everybody who was ·available went back. They
went back in the house. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) does not remember how they got back in or what
they did .
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) remembers forming up outside the gate for a second time to go back into the
contact house. When he got there to form up, there was a Marine already there.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) does not remember if Peralta still had his Kevlar helmet on when he was
being brought out of the contact house. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) does remember that there was blood
on the rifle. The rifle is supposed to be black and he saw red, so there was enough blood
on it to tell it was blood (Interviewer's note: the Bn Adj spoke with the supply chain and
learned the weapon was serviceable and has since been cleaned and re-issued. This unit
has been unable to locate the Kevlar for further inspection and it is believed to have been
disposed of. At least one witness states he recalls viewing the Kevlar and it appeared
bloody and damaged.)
remembers traks (AAVs) outside the gate after Peralta was brought out of the
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
house and saw Peralta being placed in one of the AAVs. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) pack was on one
of the AAV's and he retrieved it, replaced the batteries in his camera and later went back
into the contact house (for what was now the third ti.me), this time with EOD and his
camera and took pictures. He photographed some of the rooms and ordnance found in
the building. He went straight to the rear of the house where the insurgents had been and
took pictures while EOD removed ordnance. He didn't want to go back to where Peralta
had fallen but talked himself into it, for some reason thinking he should take a photo. He
took a picture of the spot where Peralta fell. Someone had lain a sheet or piece of cloth
over the spot, partially covering it, but not really covering it and blood was very visible.
still had the photographs he took and agreed to email them to the Bn
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Adjutant's account for purposes of this inquiry. The photographs are attached to this
summary (there were a total of 10, but three are of poor quality and unclear, so only
seven are attached).
stated he had nothing else to add to this interview and that his statement to
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
me was his best recollection of these events .
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
************************************************************
*********** CASUALTY REPORT ***********
***************************************** *******************
(01) Report Type: INIT
(02) casualty Type: HOSTILE
(03) casualty status: DECEASED
(04) Report Number: DIV3586
(07) category: ACTIVE DUTY/
(08) SSN(New/old): (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Page 1
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY
WASHINGTON, DC 2 0 ~
December 21 , 2004
IIEPLYTO
4TTemONO~
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Battalion Landing Team 1/3
Faliujah , Iraq
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
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Pages 130 through 133 redacted for the following reasons:
----------------------------
(b)(6)
Not a USMC record, referred to AFIP.
The following tatem nt is based on (I) my interprelati n of the findings of the enclo ed
formal autopsy(..,) my examination of Sgt Peralta's body, which occurred at the field
Battalion ·d tation approximately 30 minute aft r llis injury (3) my examination of his
flak jacket on 22 DE 2004 (4) th witnessed account of the death of Sgt Peralla
contained within the investigation fold r.
Tbe au top y detail the cau e of d ath: 0 un hot wow1d to the back f the head.
EXIT:
o exit wound.
DAMAGE:
The bullet penetrated the kull, dura, and araclmoid, which are lissue covering the
outside of the brain. It caused bleeding on the outside and in ide of the brain, jn the areas
of both 1 ft and right occipital lobes and the cerebellar area, as it passed through its
course. The fir t area of the brain ncouotered was the left occipital lobe ttich was
ma erated es entiaUy destroyed. Lacerations were noted along the rest of the pathway,
going through t.be right temporopaiietal area (see Figur 1).
Ba ed on this report of damage, and area affected, it i one ivable that gt Peralta had
intact cognitive and motor function for 30 seconds or more after his brain injury. The left
occipital lobe of the brain p1irnarily function in ision. D troying this area would
disturb vi ion, most lik Jy causing a loss of ability to see the right half of each eye'
. visual fi Id, as well as the enter. However the left visual field would most likely be
preserved. Thi visual defi it is depicted below, oriented a if one wa looking out
through the circle , with the right and center field of vision blacked out but the left
fields intact and clear.
Figure 3
s the bullet moved into the right paJietal and Lemporal area gt Peralta would likely
!1 ve l Sl some motor function on hi lefl id . It is not pas ible to know how much
bility to move his left ide remained intact, but in e thi area was lacerated, rather than
macerated and completely destroyed, he likely retained ome ability to move hi left ide
as well a his right. Hi frontal lob s were not affi cted by the bullet path meaniog hi
ability to perform high r functioning tasks such as recognizing a situation and willfully
re ponrung was intact. It i possible and likely that ome of his hearing was intact in the
30 seconds following his injury.
OTHER
Figure 2 show multiple penetrating balli tic injuries, entering Lhe left face from the front
nd breaking and lodging in th facial bones without ntering the cranium or rain.
hese did not contribute to his death.
He als had "too-numerous-to-count" superfi ial fragm nt wound to the face. groin and
e tremitie . The examination of the body documented at Camp Fallujah Mortuary
Affair specifically points to numerous shrapnel injuries to the 1ight wrist.
Examination of his flak jacket reveal n umerou hrapnel fragments on the left side, most
densely grouped at the left mid-chest, with fewer fragments uperiorly and inferiorly.
There are a few fragments in the groin protector. These fragments do not appear to have
penetrated thrnugh the flak jacket. They are con ist with the relatively 1ow velocity
fragments that entered the left ide of his face lodged in the facial bones, but did not
penetrated tl1Jough to the brain.
UMM.ARY:
gt Peralta died from a gun hot wound to the back of the bead, which lodged in bi brain.
Based on the path of the bullet and do umented damage it is possibl and mo t likely
t.hat Sgt Peralta did not uffer instantaneous death or immobilization. Instead, he bad
visual impairm nt, but not total blindness, progressing to primarily Jeft-sid d motor
dysfun tion. It i po sible that he could willfully mo e his body in the econds foUowing
thi eventually fatal brain injury.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
ote:
I am lken ed to practice medicine by th Commonwealth of Virginia. I am a General
edical Officer a signed to th Marine Corps. I am not a certified medical examiner
pathologist, or neurologist. Thi tatement is my int rpretation of formal autopsy result ,
translation into more asily understandable verna ular and an informed a imilation of
medical findings and po sible actions by the deceased.
Dec 24 2005
Respectfully Submitted
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
I already had a passing knowledge of the general circumstances of Sgt Peralta's death
from having read two, open source, news articles ( one by former Lieutenant Colonel
Oliver North, USMC (Ret.) and the other by Lance Corporal Travis J. Kaemmerer,
USMC, a combat cameraman attached to 2nd Squad, 151 Platoon, Company "A", BLT 1/3
at the time of the incident). I ha e enclosed copies of both of these news articles as
attachments (A) and (B) respectively to this statement.
I began this investigation by reviewing the reference. I learned that several witnesses had
previously provided, unswom, written statements on the day of the incident. I reviewed
these prior statements, which are enclosed with this investigation as enclosures (1)-(6),
inclusive. We requested, BOD support, as well as medical, ballistic and autopsy records.
Meanwhile, we commenced to interview, or re-interview as the case may be, percipient
witnesses to this engagement. We obtained sworn statements_from percipient witnesses
whenever possible. I telephon.ically interviewed (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
and have transcribed my notes of these conversations as Enclosures (16) and (17)
respectively. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) also took pictures within the contact house the
day of the engagement. He sent me ten photographs by electronic mail. Of the 10
photographs, 2 are very blurry and 1 is simply redundant ofEOD staging weapons by the
stain:vay of the contact house. All photographs have been preserved, but only photos 1-7
(entitled "Attachments (A)-(G)" to Enclosure (17)) are attached.
I spoke with the -2 section for BLT 1/3 and had them put together a sequence of aerial
maps of the city, neighborhood, block and house where the engagement took place. This
montage appears in a powerpoint sli de presentation I have attached to this statement as
Attachment (C).
I also took several photographs. I initially photographed Sergeant Peralta' s Flak Jacket
recovered from his person the day of the incident. I next photographed the contact house
when I toured it with the platoon commander, the squad leader (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and the Bn
XO (and confirmed the layout of tbe ground floor and geometry of fires and blast radius
in the process) . My viewing of the contact house confirms that the diagrams made by
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) most closely approximate the actual layout . My photos
and those taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) support this conclusion as well. The foregoing also
confirms that (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) diagram is inaccurate. (See attachment (D) to this
enclosure).
I also took photographs of the flak jacket and gear when (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was inspecting
the flak jacket. All the witnesses who heard the grenade explode stated it did not sound
loud or did not sound as loud as they expected. All the witnesses who were able to recall
the color of the grenade stated it was "yellow" or "organish yellow." All the witnesses
who recalled the grenade stated it had a long fuse. All the witnesses who heard the yell
"frag" or "grenade" said it seemed like a long time before the grenade went off The frag
pattern on the floor and wall did not recover any actual shrapnel. I photographed the bits
of shrapnel EOD recovered from the flak jacket (to include a piece of the fuse of the
grenade), and two sample grenades. These photographs appear collectively in
Attachment (D) to this statement. Based on the foregoing, I agree with EOD that the
grenade in question was "Iraqi grenade model unknown," as depicted in the photographs.
The witness statements are fairly consistent as to the circumstances of Sergeant Peralta's
heroic act, as well as the heroic act itself. There are differences among the statements as
to the number of people in the house, where they were located, and in what order. There
are differences as to which way Sergeant Peralta's head was facing and which arm he
used and where the grenade was located in proximity to his head. Another difference was
whether or not Sergeant Peralta still had his Kevlar helmet on his head after the
explosion. Two Marines testify that each of them was the one to pick the Kevlar off the
floor as Sergeant Peralta was being recovered from the house. However, the Marine who
actually pulled Sergeant Peralta out of the house himself states the Kevlar was still on the
Sergeant. He goes on to add it and Peralta's weapon were subsequently handed to him
once Peralta was being loaded on the evacuation vehicle. A search of the supply section
has revealed the Kevlar was either lost, destroyed or misplaced and the weapon bas since
been cleaned and re-issued . Neither was initially available for viewing for during the
course of this inquiry, until January 1, 2005, when (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) inspected and
photographed the Ml6A4. These photographs appear at the end of Attachment D to
Enclosure 22. None of the testimonial differences I noted in any way clouds or
diminishes the confirmed and certain heroic act of Sergeant Peralta on this occasion.
We requested, and the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology kindly provided its autopsy
report on Sergeant Peralta. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) M.D ., MC US reviewed the results of autopsy
and provided a summary for this inquiry. EOD kindly provided its expertise to us as
well.
Given the circumstances of the subject of this inquiry, as well as the combat
circumstances under which it was conducted, we experienced very little in the way of
difficulties in conducting.
Our deepest gratitude to Sergeant Rafael (NMI) Peralta, United States Marine Corps
( (KIA), 15 ovember 2004, Fallujah, Iraq.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Investigating Officer
01 January 2005
(b)(6)
Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 19 Dec 04 at BLT 1/3 COC IYO of Camp Fallujab
using flash depicting Peralta's flak jack.e wi h piece o shrapnel (later identified by EOD
as being part ofa fuse to an Iraqi grenade mode] unknown') embedded in e elcro.
Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 19 Dec 04 at BLT 1/3 COC rvo of Camp Fa!lujah
using ambient light d picting same piece of shrapnel in. Velcro of gt Peraita's flak
jacket.
(
Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 19 Dec 04 at BLT 1/3 COC IVG of Camp Fallujab
using ambient light depicting front of Peralta s flak jacket. The moile gear on the left
side of the flak has shrapnel holes and scorch marks.
Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 19 Dec 04 at BLT 1/3 COC O of Camp Fallujah
depicting entire front of Peralta's flak jacket and groin protector.
.,- :.
Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 19 Dec 04 at BLT lf" COC IVO of amp Fallujah
dep.icting interior of Peralta flak jacket as opened from the front. The dark patch on the
top left and left side of the flak (appearing on the right wben vi wed here) is dried blood.
Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 19 Dec 04 at BLT 1/3 COC I O of amp Fallujah
usin0 tla h of close up of interior of back panel of Peralta flak jacket. The writing reads,
' GOD 1Y LIFE IS · OUR HANDS' and is belie ed to have been written by
Sergeant Rafael PeraJta.
"
(b)(6)
Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 19 Dec 04 at BLT 1/3 COC IVO of amp Fallujah
usiog ash of ex'terior of back of Peralta flak jacket depicting Peral la s "CamelBack' and
medicaJ kit (the rnedica) kit vvas subsequently inspected and d isassembled by(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
of EOD se era.I days later when searching fur bi of shrapnel).
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on I 9 Dec 04 BLT 1/3 COC IVO of amp Fallujah
using ambient light depicting leR exterior side of eralta flak jacket which scorching and
shrapnel damage to molle gear.
Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 21 Dec 04 at grid coordinate 38S LB 889918 using
flash depicting the same position as in the preceding pho ograph with th addition of a
standard issue, B retta 9mm pis ol for sea e. The blast depression is visible directly
below the 9 mil.
Pb.oto taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 21 Dec O at.grid coordinates 38S LB 889918 using
ambient light lookin0 from the ap rmcimate point of the explosion in the Big room
looking towards the comer of the room nearest the entry from the sink room. This is the
comer (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) occupied during the blast. Again, .fragmentation from
the grenade is ·sibJe on the wall to the left.
Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 22 Dec 04 at BLT 1/3 COC NO of amp FaUujah
using flash of Peralta• s flak jacket with EOD holding back the elcro to expo e what
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) identified as the "a piece of he fu e' of the Iraqi grenade, 'model
unknown."
Photo taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 22 Dec 04 at BLT 1/3 COC rvo of Camp Fallujah
using flas h ofPeralta' s medical ouch being searched by EOD . ShrapneJ damage is
visible on the pouch.
(
Photo tak a by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on 22 D c 04 at BLT 1/ COC I O of Camp FaJ lujah
using flash of four pieces of shrapnel rerno ed by EOD from Peral a s flak jacket.
.
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09
Name: Rafael {NM.I) Peralta
Rate or rank at time of action: _S_e_r_g-e_a_n_t_/_E_-_5_ _ _ _ _ _ __ __ _ _ __
Organization: 1st Platoon , Company A, Battalion Landing Team 1/3 ,
Regimental Combat Team 7 , 1st Marine Division
Next of Kin: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Person who assisted: _ N~/_A________________________ _
Enclosure (23)
The squad met oo resistance during theix initial entry into the
house and cleared the front rooms without incident . The door to the
back rooms of the house was closed . The squad staged for entry into
the back rooms with Sergeant Peralta positioned behind the point man .
As the point man pushed open the door, the squad immediately came under
a heavy volume of close-range automatic weapons fire from multiple
insurgents located in the back rooms. The squad instantaneously
returned fire , wounding one of the insurgents . As the squad sought
cover, Sergeant Peralta was shot in the head as he attempted to
maneuver out 0£ the line of fire . Sergeant Peralta fel l to the ground ,
still attempting to speak, though his words were unintelligible.
Enclosure (23)
Page 214 redacted for the following reason:
---------------------
(b)(5)
Natonski MajGen Richard F
Very Respectfully,
. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
THE PRESIDE T: Gracias, y sientese. (Laughter.) Thank you for the warm welcome. It's an·honor to be here at
the National Hispanic Prayer Breakfast. Thanks for inviting me back. I understand this, like you understand this:
America is founded on los valores de fey familia. (Applause.) These are the values at the heart of the Hispanic
'-' merican community. These are the values that enrich our nation. And I am grateful.
,ur good works and reverence bring compassion to our country and more importantly, honor to the Almighty.
·s morning we come together to pray, to pray for God's help as we serve our fellow citizens. Danny, thank
you very much for the· invitation and the introduction. I'm proud to be with a lot of the faith leaders from around
our country. I saw my friend Luis Cortes. It's good to see you again, Luis. I want to thank John ·von Seggern,
who is the Chairman of the Prayer Breakfast.
I want to thank the members of the Congress who are here -- ancy Pelosi, Chris Cannon, Hilda Solis, Rahm
Emanuel, Luis Fortuna. I want to thank you all for serving our country, and thank you for setting aside politics
to come and honor the Almighty through prayer.
It's good to see my old buddy, former member of the Cabinet Ridge. Tom Ridge is with us. Good to see Hector
Barreto. He runs the SBA. Go ahead and pray, and then get back to work. (Applause.) It's good to see Don
Powell, Gaddi -- who runs the FDIC, by the way -- G~ddi Vasquez is the Director of the Peace Corps.
Arid finally, 1want to pay homage to the First Lady of Panama. I want to welcome you here, Madam First Lady.
Thank you for coming. (Applause.) We're really glad you're here. Your husband is kind of like me; we both
married well. (Laughter.)
We come from many faiths. In America, every religion is welcome. That's the great thing about our country:
every faith is important. In America, people of faith have no corner on compassion, but people of faith need
compassion to be true to the call to "Ame al projimo como a si mismo," love your neighbor like you'd like to be
loved yourself. That's a universal call.
- Hispanic Americans, a Jove of neighbor is more than a gospel command -- it's a way of life. We see the love
neighbor in the strong commitment of Hispanic Americans to family and the culture of life. For Hispanic
4
Americans, families are a source of joy and the foundation of a hopeful society. We're working to support and
defend the sanctity of marriage and to ensure that the most vulnerable Americans are welcomed in life and
1
protected in love. (Applause.)
We see the love of neighbor in the tireless efforts of Hispanic American faith-based and corrununity
:111izations that work daily to bring hope to harsh places. In Boston, the Leon de Juda Congregation mentors
.er-city teens so they have a chance to realize the great dreams of Am rica. In t. Louis, Acci6n Social
jmunitaria helps im..migrants and their children adapt to American life. In the archdiocese of Miami, Catholic
Chari ies ministers to people with HIV /AIDS; inn r-city Philadelphia Cortes run a fantastic program to help
lift the spirits of eve1y single child. (Applause.)
Many in the Hispanic community understand that by serving the least of -- nuestros hermanos y hermanas -- that
we1re serving a cause greater than ourselves. And by doing so, we're helping all citizens have an opportunity to
realize their dreams here in America.
Finally, we see the love of neighbor in tens of thousands of Hispanics who serve America and the cause of
freedom. One of these was an immigrant from Mexico named Rafael Peralta. The day after Rafael got his green
card, be enlisted in the Marine Corps. Think about that. \Vbile serving in Iraq this good sergeant wrot a letter
to hjs younger brother. He said "Be proud of being an American. Our father came to this country, became a
citizen because it was the right place for our family to be. 11 hortly after writing that letter, ergeant Peralta used
his own body to cover a grenade an enemy soldier had rolled into a roomful of Marines.
This prayer breakfast, we rememb r the sacrifices of honorable and good folks like ergeant Peralta, who have
shown their love of neighbor by giving their life for freedom.
Hispanic Americans answer the call to service willingly because you understand that freedom is a divine gift
that carries with it serious responsibiliti s. And as you go about the work of repairing broken lives and bringing
Jove into the pockets of hopelessness and despair be strong, because you're sustained by prayer. Through prayer
rapplause.)
ne of the most powerful aspects of being tJ1e Pr sident is to know that millions of people pray for me and
aura. People that r11 never have a chance -- (applause.) Think about a country where millions of people of all
faiths, peop1e whom Pll never ha ea chance to look face-to-face with and say thank you, take ti.me to pray. It
really is the strength of America, isn't it? Through prayer we ask that our hearts be aligned with God 1s. Through
prayer we ask that we may be given the strength to do what's right and to help those in need.
I want to thank you for the fine tradition you continue here toda . This is an important tradition to continue right
here in the heart of the nation's capital. 1 want to thank you for what you do for our nation. Que di os les bendiga,
and may God continue to bless our country. Thank you very much. (Applause.)
2
Binder B
Additional Investigation
for the
Medal of Honor
recommendation
for
Sergeant
Rafael Peralta, USMC
l. Recommendation emorandum .................................................TAB
4. E ecutive ummary .... ........ .. . ... .. . .............. .. ..... .. . ........ ....... ... .TAB D
5. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Memorandum ........... .. ...... .............. ........... .. .... ...... TAB E
8. Sworn Telephoruc Interview .. .... ......... .. ... .... . ...... ....... ... . . ... ... .. .. .TAB H
CCJl
MEMORANDUM FOR Commandant of the Marine Corps, Headquarters United States Marine
Corps, ATTN: Military Awards Branch, 3280 Russell Road,
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5103
1. I recommend posthumous award of the Medal of Honor to Sergeant Rafael Peralta, USMC,
for his conspicuous gallantry above and beyond the call of duty against the enemies of our nation
in Fallujah, Iraq, on 15 November 2004.
2. After careful review of the documentation, it is clear Sergeant Peralta' s personal bravery,
unwavering dedication to duty and to his fellow Marines, distinguished him in combat far
beyond the call of duty. Though no one can know his thoughts at that decisive moment, his
actions speak volumes. There can be no doubt that he consciously acted to contain the blast and
protect his fellow squad members without regard for his own safety or risk of harm. In doing so~
he saved the lives ofb.is comrades.
3. I strongly concur with LtGen Sattler and Maj Gen Natonski that this deed earned the award of"
the Medal of Honor.
6 Encls
1. CDR, USMARCENT Memo 12 Sept 05
2. 1st Marine Division Memo 9 Aug 05
3. 1st Battalion 3d Marine Division Memo 8 Jul 05
4. 1st Marine Division (Rein), Memo 3 Mar 05
5. OPNAV 1650/3
6. Citation
-·
us CENTRAL COMMAND ACTION PROCESSING FORM
TO : CLASSIFI CATION : ACTION NUMBER
I
case of Ser geant Rafael Peralt a, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) /0331, X SI GNATURE STAFF SUSPENSE
USMC INFORMATI ON
ACTI ON SUMMARY:
1. PURPOSE . To obtain CDR's endorsement of a MOH for Sgt Rafael Pera l ta, USMC (Tab A).
2. DI SCUSSION.
a . On 15 November 2004, Sgt Rafael Peralta and his team were conducting a house-to-
house search for insurgents in Fallujah, Iraq. Upon encountering enemy personnel
hidden in one of the homes, Sgt Peralta received a gunshot wound to the back of the
head and fell to the ground. The enemy then delivered a grenade into the room occupied
by Sgt Peral ta and his team, threatening the lives of his fellow Marines. Prior to the
grenade ' s detonation, it came to rest near Sgt Peralta's head. Sgt Peralta scooped the
grenade with his hand and secured it under his chest. The grenade detonated killing
Sgt Peralta, while inf l icting only minor injuries to some of his fellow Marines.
b . For his actions, Sgt Pera l ta's battalion commander has posthumously nominated him
for the MOH (Binder A, Tab A) . The package has been endorsed by each step of the
member ' s Chain of Command and has been forwarded to CDRUSCENTCOM for endorsement to the
_noi:>artment of the Navy via the Commandant of the Marine Corps .
(
c. The MOH nominat i on (Binders A and B) has twice been considered by the Commanding
1eral, I Marine Expeditionary Force, LtGen Sattler . Initial concerns invo l ving a
1-'athologist's opinion on Sgt Peralta's abi l ity to v oluntarily move following the
gunshot wound to the head have been answered during the subsequent re - investigation
(Binder B). In the reinvestigation, three highly credentialed neurosurgeons refuted
the original pathologist's opinion. Additionally , there is detailed eyewitness
testimony and physical evidence to support this position.
d. Per SECNAV Instruction 1650.lG , Section 3, paragraph 230.1.b. (2), "There must be
no margin of doubt or possibility of error in a warding this honor . To justify the
decoration, the individual's service must ciearly be rendered conspicuous above his or
her comrades .by an act so outstanding that it clearly distinguishes his or her
gallantry beyond the call of duty from lesser forms of brav ery ; and it must be the type
of deed which i f not done would not subject the individual to any justified criticism.
The deed must be without detriment to the mission of the command or to the command... " .
e. The staff review of the entire nomination package (Binders A and B) has
determined that Sgt . Peralta's actions meet the criteria of the MOH . Sgt Peralta did
conspicuously distinguish himself b y gallantry & int repidity at the r i sk of his l i fe
above & beyond the call of dut y .
COORDINATION/APPROVAL
OFFICE ACTION NAME & DATE EXT OFFICE ACTION NAME & DATE EXT
COORD (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) CDR SIGN
j DCDR COORD
cos COORD M~ A,< 'f'f/1/ //h.t..t.
ACTION OFFI CER :
DATE PREPARED: CLASSIFICATION : CLASSIFIED BY :
DECLASSIFY ON:
UNCLASSIFIED
3. RECOMMENDATION . CDR favorably endorse the MOH recommendation for
Sergeant Peralta . Once the endorsement is approved, the recommendation
letter will be coordinated through SJS for signature.
//Signed//
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
1 . On the day after he r eceived his Green Card, Sergeant Peralta , a native
of Mexico , join ed the United States Marine Cor ps . He was proud to live in
America and serve our count~y . In November 2004 in Fallujah , Iraq , Serqeant
Peralta above and beyond the call of duty, made the ultimate sacrifice to
save the l ives of h is fellow Marines . It is with great pride and honor that
I enthusiastically recommend Sergeant Peralta for our nation ' s highest award ,
the Congressional M~dal of Honor .
2. The priginal submiss i on of Sergeant Peralta ' s Medal of Honor was returned
from I Mari ne Exped itionary Force over their concerns of a pat holo gist ' s
opinion that stated Sergeant Per alta could not have executed any meaningful
physical motions based on the injuries from a gunshot wound to the head_
When t he Medal of Honor recommendation was returned I instructed the
Battalion Commander , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to conduct a detailed a nd
comprehens i ve review of t h e investigation . (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who
was a ssigned to Ser gean t Peralta ' s Battalion when this heroic action took
place , condu cted a review dur i ng June 20 0 5 . This p ackage is being
resubmitted based on re- interviews and sworn state~ents from eyewitnesses as
wel l as n e w statements from three neurosurgeons wit h. outstanding credentials
who have given their medical opinion . Thes e doctors opine that Sergeant
Peralta could have scooped the grenade under his body despite his h ead wo und .
Howe ver , regardless of the me dical · opinions rende r ed after the fact there is
s u fficient eyewitness tes t imony and physical evidence (grenade fuze loclkged in
Se r geant Peralta ' s f l ak jacket) to suppo rt this award recommen dation . After
reviewing the evidence submitted and the testimony of competent professional
medical officers , I believe beyond a shadow of doubt that Sergeant Peralta
made a conscious decision to scoop t he grenade u nder his body to protecit hi s
fel low Marines . He made the ultimate ·sacrifice to his country and fell o w
Marines .
R. F . NATONSKI
3
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. fMF
BOX 555300
CAMP PENDLETON, CA 92055-5300
1600
CG
12 Sep 05
"4 [ ~
J.
~
. SATTLER
4
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
1ST BATIALION, 30 MARINES
/ JD MARINE DIVISION (·)(REIN )
M CBH KANEOHE BAY, HAWAII 96863
2 . Enclosures (1) through (3) are submitted for official documentation into
the award recommendation of the MOH for Sergeant Peralta . Enclosure (1) is
an executive summary by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the or igi nal investigating
officer , considering new information presented in enclosures (2) and (3) and
after a comprehensive review of all facts relevant to this case . Enclosure
(2) is (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) memorandum endorsement on the autopsy conducted by
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USA , Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AF IP). This autopsy
and memorandum call into question Sergeant Peralta ' s abi l ity to consciously
scoop a grenade to his body after having received a ·mort a l guns h ot wound to
the head . Enclosure ('3) is a summary of medical specialist opinions from
medical off i cers with the Naval Medical Center , San Diego, CA s u pporting
Sergeant Peralta ' s ability to pull an enemy grenade under him after receiving
a mortal gunshot wound to the head . Enclosure (4) is a composite graphic
which reconstructs the sequence of events and positioning of personnel within
the engagement house on 15 November 2004 . Enclosure (5) is a sworn
telephonic interview with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) In this interview
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) describes the iocation of the grenade blast depression as
directly underneath Sergeant Peralta ' s left pectoral as observed when he and
two other Marines removed Sergeant Peralta ' s body from the engagement house.
Enc l osure (6) is (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) additional statement based on (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)sworn statement .
Peralta ' s body from the engagement house) attests that the grenade blast
depression was indeed underneath Sergeant Peralta ' s left pectoral . After
first hand examination of Sergeant Peralta ' s flak jacket , an explosive
ordnance disposal expert found the fuse to the grenade located in the front
flap o f the f l ak ja_cket . He concluded that based on the location of the fuse
and the grenade ' s relative lack of explosive mate r ial , the only way the fuse
could have penetrated the front of the flak jacket is i f it exploded
u nderneath Sergeant Peralta. In (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) memorandum endorsement , he
s't:ates that " Some type of explosion occurred on the left side of Sergeant
Peralta ' s flak jacket" . Four sworn eyewitness statements attest to Sergeant
Pe r alta scooping the grenade to his body with his right arm . In his
executive summary , (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) makes a clear argument that based on all
witnes s testimony and physical evidence , the only conclusion that can be
r eached is that Sergeant Peralta pulled an enemy grenade underneath his body .
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
2
<\'"-
--
.r
From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
To: BGenHejlik
21 Apr 2005
Encl: (1) Aimed Forces Institute of Pathology Final Autopsy Report dtd 20 Dec 2004
(2) E-mail of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USA, Regional Medical_Examiner, Armed Forces Medical
Examiner System, Dept of Pathology (medical examiner who performed the
autopsy on Sgt Peralta, to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I MEF AC/S G-1, of 20 Apr 2005.
(3) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Review of Sergeant Peralta' s Medal of Honor Package dated 16 Apr 05
1. Per my request (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) MD, USA, Regional Medical Examiner, (medical
examiner who performed the autopsy on Sgt Peralta), provided Enclosures (1) and (2). The
original Sgt Peralta MOH package contained an undated Preliminary Autopsy Report and the
Battalion Landing Team Surgeon's (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)General Medical Officer who is not a certified
medical examiner, pathologist, or neurolqgist) interpretation of the findings contained in the
undated Preliminary Autopsy Report, which was based on his examination of Sgt Peralta's body
at the Battalion Aid Station 30 minutes after his injury, his examination of Sgt Peralta's flack
jacket, and witness accounts contained in the Investigation Officer's review.
2. Per Encl (2), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)disagrees with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) opinion that "it is conceivable that Sgt
( Peralta had intact cognitive and motor function for 30 seconds or more after his brain injury . . .his
frontal lob es were not affected by the bullet path, meaning his ability to perform higher
functioning tasks such as recognizing a situation and willfully responding was intact. . .it is
possible and Iilcely that some of his heru.ing was intact in the 30 seconds following his injmy."
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)states: "The head gunshot wound would have been immediately incapacitating and
nearly instantly fatal. He could not have executed any meaningful motions."
3. Per Encl (2), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)disagrees witl1.the testimony of the witnesses who stated that Sgt
Peralta scooped the hand grenade to his body, hugged the grenade to his body, or tucked the
grenade under his shoulder/under him. According to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) "he (Sgt Peralta) had no .
significant internal mjuries from blmit force trauma of.the thorax and abdomen, which virtually
mles out a grenade explosion beneath his body. Even with body rumor, a military grenade would
cause blunt force trauma, and tl1ere was none." (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)goes on to state: "The slu·apnel injury
pattern is consistent with an explosion at about the lmee or thigh h eight, and a few feet to the left
of the left lmee-thigh, and slightly in front of it."
4. Based on the statements of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)above, the inconsistencies contained in Encl (3), and
my complete review of the entire package, I believe that due to the fog of war (first time the team
had encountered insurgents and a fire fight in a house cleru.ing operation), what the witnesses
thought they saw (Sgt Peralta scooping/grabbing for a grenade) was in reality Sgt Peralta's
involuntary muscle spasms caused by a fatal gun shot wound to tl1e head. However, I can't
explain or guess how Sgt Peralta's flack jacket could have sustained the damage it did (some
type of explosion occun-ed on the left breast portion of his flack j aclcet).
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
ENCUIIIE(1)
Pages 228 through 229 redacted for the following reasons:
----------------------------
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), not a USMC record.
,,
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
(b)(5)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
-Contact info below
-----Original Message --- - -
From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
.sent: Tues day, Apri l 19 , 2005 6 : 17 PM
To:
Subject: RE : SGT PERALTA'S PRELIMIN~~~Y AUTOPSY REPORT SSN (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Than ks aga in for giving me your insigh t s - you have a fasci nating job.
I sure would appreciate if you could put some a£ your answers/com.~ents
down on a n e-mai l so I don ' t screw up what you said.
S/F
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
1. Testimony differs slightly as to which arm Sergeant Peralta used (4 witnesses said Sergeant
Peralta used his 1ight ann and 1 said left). Additionally, 3 witnesses statements changed during
the course oftl1e investigation. Their original statements dated 15 ov 04 don't specify which
ann Sgt P eralta used to scoop up the hand grenade, however, their later statements specifically
address which aim was used. One witness stated: "I saw his 1ight arm move up toward his head
and almost scoop the grenade in toward his body'' and later h1 fue same paragraph the wih1ess
states he did scoop up.the hai1d grenade. Testimony also differs regarding which way Sergeant
Peralta's head was facing when he was struck down by insurgents and was lying face down on
his stomach prior to the grenade exploding (2 witnesses said his head was facing to th e 1i ght, 2
~ritnesses said his head was facing to the left, and 1 w itness said his head was at the 1130
position).
2. There are differences among the statements as to the number of p eople in the house, where
they were located, and in what order. Another difference was whether or not Sergeant Peralta
still had.his Kevlar helmet on his head after the explosion. Two Maiines tes_tify that each of
them was the one to pick up the Kevlar off the floor as Sergeant Peralta w as being recovered
from the house. However, the Marine who actually pulled Sgt Peralta out of th e house himself
. stated the Kevlar wap still on the Sergeant. A search of the supply sec.t ion has revealed that the
Kevlar was lost, destroyed 0r replaced and the w eapon has since been cleaned and reissued.
Neither was initially available for viewing.
3. The IO states that Sergeai1t Peralta's entire left side of his face was macerated, "indicating
that the right side of his face must have been against the floor and shielded." Enclosure (8),
Record ofldentification Processing Anatomical Ch.rut, contained in the IO's Review dated 1 Jai1
05, shows wounds to both sides of Sgt Peralta's face, left arm and leg and back of right hand.
Additionally, the autopsy report states that th6re were: "Too-numerous to count superficial
fragment wounds (lacerations, abrasions, contusions) of the face, pelvic region and genatalia, and
extremities." After reviewing the Record of Identification Processing Anatomical Chart and the
autopsy report I cannot determine nor come to the conclusion that Sergeant Peralta's head was
facing to the right. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) BOD Tech who ex.amined Sgt Peralta's flack jacket, stated.:
"The flack showed little blast damage with minor fragmentation damage located mostly on the
left front portion .. .the fragment pattern on the front left portion of Sgt Peralta' s flack jacket
indicated the grenade was directly underneath Sgt Peralta's left side and was shielded by
something (possibly his aim) on the 1ight side:" (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) statement/findings are
consistent with the findings/injmies contained in the above·reports.
4. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)MD, BLT 1/3 Surgeon, said it is possible and most likely that Sgt_Peralta did not
suffer instantaneous death or immobilization. Instead, he had v isual impainnent, but not total
blindness, progressing to primarily left-sided motor dysfunction. It is possible that h e could
willfully move his body in the seconds following the eventually fatal brain injury. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)is
not a certified medical examiner, pathologist, or neurolo gist. His st atement is his interpretation
of a formal autopsy results, "a translation into .m ore easily understandable vernacular, and an
infonned assimilation of medical findings and possible action by the deceased."
5. Finally, the c:iJ:cumstances surrnunding how Sergeant Peralta could have received a gunshot
wound to the back of his head when he was engaged witl1 insurgents who were directly in front
of him was not addressed in the IO's review nor any of the endorsements. ENCLOSURE {:2..)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
e~c.\(3)
•> ,
X X X X
X X X
X X X
X I X
X X
( X X
note 1
X X
note 2
X X X X
X
note 3
X X X X X
X
X
Note 1 -Enclosure (37) Transposed Statement o (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dated 15 Nov 04 contained in CG lstMarDiv's 2nd
Endorsement dated 3 Mar 05 doesn't mention which arm Sgt Peralta used, howev er, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
telephonic statement fo the IO contained in Enclosure (16) of the IO's R eview dated 1 Jan 05 states
that Sgt Peralta used his left ann to scoop up the grenade.
Note 2 - Enclosure (25) Transposed Statement of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)dated 15 Nov 04 contained in CG l stM arDiv's 2nd
Endorsement dated 3 Mar 05 doesn't mention which arm Sgt Peralta used, h owever (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
sworn statement contained in Enclosure (10) of the IO' s Review dated 1 Jan 05 states in great detail
how Sgt Peralta used his right ann to scoop up the grenade.
Note 3 -Enclosure (27) Transposed Statement of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) dated 15 Nov 04 contained in CG
· lstMarDiv's 2nd Endorsement dated 3 Mar 05 doesn't mention which ann Sgt Peralta used, however,
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) telephonic statement to the IO contained in Enclosure (1 7) of the I O's Review
dated 1 Jan 05 states that Sgt Peralta used his right am1 to scoop the grenade up under his body.
INCLOSURE (2)
1 June 2005
From: Surgeon
To: CG
Via: G-1
Encl: (1)
(2) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
(3)
1. Sir, on 25 May 2005 I met with two senior neurosurgeons (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)and
one senior neurologist (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) at Naval Medical Center San
Diego. Together we reviewed the first-hand witnesses'. observations and the autopsy
findings in the case of Sgt Peralta. This was done in order to obtain their opinions
regarding the medical plausibility of Sgt Peralta's actions as described in the witness
statements.
2. Each of the specialists felt that it was possible that Sgt Peralta acted as the witnesses
described. Their statements are enclosures 1-3.
(
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
ENCLOSURE ( 3 )
MEMORANDUM 30 May 05
1. Credentials: MEDICAL
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
OPERATIONAL
2. Documents : REVIEWED
ENCLOSURE ( 3 )
Subj: Battle Injury edical Opinion
2. Documents :
With no reported injurie as Ii ted above ergeant Peralta was not shot at close range
bad a patent airway, could ventilate, perfuse oxygenated blood to his brain and was not in
hemorrhagic shock. He
ENCLOSURE ( 3 )
( ubj: Battle Injmy Medical Opinion
5. Ballistic Analysis :
There are three theo1ies us din ballistic studies omentum (M=mass times velocity)
Power (P=rnass times velocity cubed) and Kinetic Energy (KB= one half the mass times
velocity squared). Most ballistic studies use KE to quantify wounding potential. A
p rforating brain injury would be a missile/bullet/fragment (projectile which creates an
entrance and exi t wound in which the intracranial transfer of, ounding KE would be the
difference bet\,veen t11e ente1ing and exiting KE s = KE(in) minus KE(out). In the case of
a peneh·ating i_njury the projectile would be retained and tbe KE (out) would equal zero .
.A bullet has a aerodynamic design to minimize drag and maximize velocity and distance.
A fragment can be a por6on of a bullet which results from a ricochet or collision w ith
another object or structure and will loose KE exponentially over distance. The steepness
of the curve fo r energy Joss wil l depend upon the drag forces . The drag would depend
(
upon the fragment velocity, density of medium (bone, brain, Kevlar), cross sectional area
of the projectile which would then detennine be depth of penetration. Additional ball istic
considerations are muzzle velocity, rifling, trajectory yaw precession and nutation. The
trajectory is the fo1ward motion of the center of mass of a projectile.Yaw is the side to
side motion along the longitudinal axis of the projectile analogous to an automobile fish
taibng.
The damage from a projectile to the head and brain results from shock waves, laceration,
crushing and cavitation. Low velocity projectiles crush and lacerate brain tissue. ost of
the damage is done to the tissue in direct contact or pusbed aside by the projectile. The
permanent cavity along the trajectory path is determined by the velocity mass of the
projectile cross sectional area of the projectile and yaw or tumble. The emporary cavity
is small compared to a high velocity projectile. The major difference ,:vith the high
velocity projectile is a cone shaped pressure wave which transfers KE to the brain tissue
ahead of the trajectory path and radially or ninety degrees in all directions from the
trajectory path.
In the plane at the level on the sku ll of ergeai1t Peralta s left occipital penetrating
entrance wound the nominal inner table dimensions of the calvruium are front to back
(anterior to posterior 16cm by 14cm side to side (transverse). The occipital lobe is the
smallest brain lobe. The approximate rounded tetrahedral/pyramidal shape enlarges to 4-
4.5 cm anteriorly and 0. 75-1.5 cm at the occipital pole. The maximum height is at the
an eiior medial port_ion of the occipital lobe approximately 4-Scm which tapers
ENCLOSURE ( 3 )
Subj : Battle Injury Medical Opini on
poste1iorly on the medial side down to approximately 0.5-1 .5 cm. Based on the reported
entrance wound it is estimated that the steel tip projectile' s vertical angle was between
20-40 degrees and had an estimated anterior posterior angle between 10-30 degrees in
order to avoid damage to the structures listed in #4 and embed in the right
tetnporoparietal lobe. The trajectory path is estimated at 8- 10 cm.
The reported steel penetrator tip is part of a projectile and has lost KE. The
fragmentation mechanism to create this projectile is unknown. During a close quaiier fire
fight in a building stril.cture richocet fragmentation is quite possible as well as impact
fragmentation when the skull was penetrated. Material failure of a poor quality bullet is
another less likely explanation. Regardless, Sergeant Peralta sustained a low velocity
penetrating projectile injury to the brain. The early transfer of KE in the ME04-927
findings are: an atypical tangential bone gutter penetration, macerated left occipital lobe
quckly trai1sitioning to a permanent track coming to rest a short distance in the right
temporparietal lobe.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
ENCLOSURE ( J )
NAVAL MEDICAL CENTER
Department of eurosciences
34730 Bob Wilson Dr., Ste. 201
San Diego, CA 92134-3201
619-532-7250/7275 (Commercial) 619-532-5118 (Fax)
Supply Petty Officer I am a Board Certified Neurologist with 34 years of clinical experience,
HM3 Katllerine Aeschlimann, USN
Ph.D. in Neurochemistry, Naval Flight Surgeon with considerable
Division of Neurology (619-532-7275) operational experience both as Department Head of Internal Medicine and
Head Neurology at NAMI as well as Director of Medical Services at NAMI,
( - Terry S. Peery, MC, USNR Senior Medical Officer on the JOHN F KENNEDY (CVN-67), and Senior
Medical Officer for the United States Naval Academy. While in private
: . W. Hopkins, MC, USNR practice I served as an independent Medical Examiner for Workers
J . Mark E. Llewellyn, MC, USN
l,ur<: J. M. Apides, MC, USNR Compensation as well as Expert Witness for numerous forensic cases over a
LCDR Stacie R. Daniels, MC, USNR period of ten years.
Dr. Stephen L. Stecker, CIV
Division of Neurosurgery
619-532-7250
I have reviewed the autopsy report and documents containing opinions and
observations of what occurred during the firefight and fatal injuries
Head sustained by SGT Peralta while in Fulluja Iraq, November 2004.
CDR John E. Wanebo, MC, USNR
Staff
LCDR Cyril T. Sebastian, MC, USNR
According to the autopsy report, he sustained a penetrating injury to the
CDR Wayne M. Gluf, MC, USN brain, which entered the left occipital scalp and skull; transversed the left
Physician Assistant
occipital pole then entered the right temporoparietal brain where a steel
Mr. Patrick Kearney, CIV penetrating tip came to rest. There was subarachnoid hemorrhaging of the
Division of Physiatry
left occipital lobe, lacerations of the right occipital, parietal and temporal
(619) 532-7275 lobes. No mention is made of any injuries to the brain stem, frontal lobes,
Head: LCDR Janet Keais, MC, and USNR
motor cortex, internal capsule, and carotid or vertebrobasilar arteries.
DVBIC
Dr. Angela Drake, Neuropsychologist
Dr. Sharon Nichols, Neuropsychologist
Dr r.vnthia Boyd, Psychologist
•ne Cessante, Psycholog ist
oder, Case Manager
d Mack, Program Manger
Maren Cullen, Research Associate
Elizabetll Ziegler, Psychometrist
ENCLOSURE ( 3 )
NEUROLOGICAL OPINION ICO SGT RAFAEL PERALTA USMC,
SSN 20 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Understanding that the penetrating injury was of relatively low velocity (no exit
wound and steel penetrating tip within the brain), and that there was no damage to the
brain stem, frontal lobes or motor pathways or blood supply to these regions, it is
quite possible, indeed likely that SGT Peralta was not immediately incapacitated by
the brain injury and could well have carried out an intentional motor act such as that
described by the witnesses on the scene. Namely, intentional scooping of a grenade
with either his right or left arm, pulling it beneath his body.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
ENCLOSURE ( .3 )
NAVAL MEDICAL CENTER
Department of Neurosciences
34730 Bob Wilson Dr. , Ste 201
San Diego, CA 92 134-320 1
619-532-725 0/7275 (Commercial) 619-532-5118 (Fax)
ENCLOSURE ( J )
·~ NAY DICALCE T R
~
.. •
Department of eurosciences
47 0 Bob Wilson Dr. te 201
an Di go, C 92134-320 1
619--32-7250/7275 Commercial) 619--32-5118 ax)
DVBIC
Dr. Angela Drake, Neuropsychologist
Dr. Sharon Nichols, Neuropsycholgist
Dr. Cynthia Boyd. Psychologist
Dr. Lynne Cessante, Psychologist
·san Yoder, Case Manager
landa Mack, Program Manager
.i.ren Cullen, Rescarcb Associale
d izabeth Ziegler, Psychometrist
ENCLOSURE (J )
Sgt Peralta
BLT 1/3
Award Recommendation
BEDROOM D8
"THE KITCHEi\! AREA.' 1
D10
03
09
Pg 2 ENCLOSURE (4)
Stack Outside House
@
@ 11
THE D.A.Rr< F:OC)lv1" 011
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
BEDROOM
08
@
'TH E f<.ITC::HEf". J AF.'. E.A. 11
0
® Sgt Peralta
® (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
010
@
LI . ·1r Jr-·· R t_)
\/ \ .-. '~·----) r\,11
..._""J ,,
• Insurgent l<.ITC::HE~,J
Pg 3 ENWo~@@
Gaining Entry
0
@ "TH E c:,1.<• "1._
[ 'I,~. ,11\r . ._. ..•1 ''
r ,i"..,. 1(··1r• I
0 ·11
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) BEDROOM
08
© "THE f·<.ITCHEf··. J .8..REA. 11
0
0 Sgt Peralta
@ 010
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
@
Ll\/l~\JC3 ROO tvl
• Insurgent f<ITCHEN
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
move into
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Entrance Room
-Find 02 locked
--Move to 03
Pg 4 ENCLOSURE (4)
Clearing Living Room
0
@ 'THE DARf< ROOtv1 11
011
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) BE DROO rv1 08
@ 11
THE f<ITCHE[\J .AF.:E.A. 11
0
0 Sgt Peralta
@ 0 ·10
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
TH E BIG ROOrv1
• Insurgent f<.ITCHEN
D4
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
e
z
-2 nd stack moves into position
0100®® 09
II Pg 5 ENCLOSURE (4)
Clearing Big Room
@L
@ 0 ·11
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
BEDROOM
© 08
TH E 1.t -.(IT(-··HE[\I r, F'·· E .''
0
11 1 11
. ..__.. •J ,/-4, ,i-!,,,
® Sgt Peralta
@ 06 D·10·.
' '
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
@
• Insurgent THE BIG RO OM
f<.ITCHE t··..J
enters and clears
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
BEDROOtv1
D8
@
0 "THE ~<ITCH Er\J .~.RE.A"
@
@
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
© D10
z
frinl (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) stac k
D9
f; to the right of D5
en
c::: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
ii
...... (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) move into living room ENCLOSURE (4)
_['.
..._...
Engagement Begins
0
@ D11
11 TH E [I ..-../•, F. . I/r " R ,.-,I(_)-, t,,1 11
@
1
1.. ... _ ~ ... 1,,1
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
BEOROOtv1 08
@
0
® Sgt Peralta
@
010
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
D9
ENCLOSURE (4)
The Fire Fight
0
@ 011 ·
i1 THE O..'\ C1I.{
,,_., r-..;. r . c,i'-'
ri.. ._. 1. i'-'
..._..1/'·1"
@
1,'
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
BEDROOf'./1
D8
@
0 "THE f<ITC:HEr\J.A.REA"
® Sgt Peralta
@
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) D10
@
• Insurgent THE BIG ROOtv1
f<ITCHE f··..J
D4
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Pg 9 ENCLOSURE (4)
Sgt Peralta Hit
0
@
11
THE DAF?f< ROOM 11
011
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
BEDROO tv1
D8
@
0 11
THE f<ITCHEN ,A,RE.~ 11
0 Sgt Pe ralta .
a
@
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
@
• Insurgent THE BIG ROO tv1 -..,
LIVW.JG RO~ f<.ITC: HE r··..J
-Sgt Peralta is shot, rotates
counter-clockwise and falls onto
@
...··
.S4
his stomach in the middle of 04
rotates clockwise
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
:@:
., '
and moves out of the line of fire
into th e Big Room
mi D9
~ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) is shot in forearm
§ -Other Marines continue to engage
i ENCLOSURE (4)
Insurgents Cease Firing
@
@
D11
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
'THE D.ARr< ROO tv1 11
BEDROOM
08
@
0 . "THE l{ ITCHEI~ AREA"
®
@
Sgt Peralta
• D6
@
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
® 0 -10
f<ITCHEt··J
®
-Insurgents cease firing
@
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) moves to assist
ITft Sgt Peralta
z
e, 09
6
en
c:::
= Pg 11 ENCLOSURE (4)
Insurgents Flee
©
@
D11
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
'THE O..&.Rf-< F.IC:i0 ~,/1 11
BEOROOtv1
D8
@
0
® Sgt Peralta
@ D6
~ D5
@
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
® D10
~
W -"Grenade" is shouted
-Sgt Peralta sees and scoops
grenade from his right side to
•
under the left side·of his body D10
sees the grenade and
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
@
runs out of the room THE BIG ROOfv1 -..-c U\/1r··..J(3 F.'. 0 0 tv1
rotates and drops to f<.ITCHEt·~
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
04
the floor seeking cover
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) run
~
out of room
have no
0
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
~ place to run; seek cover in Big @ D9
fj; Room
c:: .
@ 02 ©
ii (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) seeks cover 1n
,.......,. back of Living Room
...c Pg 13 ENCLOSURE (4)
......
Explosion / Retrograde
©
@ 011
@ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
11
THE D.A.RK-F?C10M 11
BEDR OO t·,/1
DB
@
0 11
THE l<ITC:HEt··~ ,A,RE.A.
11
0 Sgt Peralta
@
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 010
@
• Insurgent Ll\."I r··..JC:3 Ro o tv1
l·<.ITCHEf\J
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
receive shrapnel
®
li'ITTJ
ii; wounds D1 @ D9
r-
5: orders everyone out
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
@ ©
§a to regroup before they finish
ffl clearing the house
........ .
ENCLOSURE (4)
-C
.......
FROM (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) JUt-.J. 23 2 005 01 : 11PM Pl
06 123 10 5 THU 11:04 FAX (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
On June 23, 2005 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) telephoned me at my cellular phone number (b)(6), of (b)(7)(c)
for
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) purposes ofre-1nterviewing me on the events of 15 1 ovember 2004. I am
presently (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
After the firefight of 15 November 2004 which is the subject of this investigation and
resulted in the death of Sergeant Rafael Peralta, USMC, I and other Marines re-entered
the hous~. I noticed (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USMC was attempting to lift
Sergeant Peralta by his feet. I told (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to stop so we could get additional
Marines to help.
The "shallow, rubbled depression" is the same hole l identified to the Investigating
Officer when we subsequently returned to the house to survey and. photograph the site.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Investigating Officer
~NCLOSURE (5 )
, __
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
1ST BATTALION. 30 MARIN ES
30 MARINE DIVISION (·)(REIN)
MC BH KA NEOHE BAY, HA WAII 96863
3. The substance of the June 23, 2005 interview was typed by myself during
the course of the interview. I then forwarded the statement by facsimile to
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) at (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) He reviewed it for accuracy, signed it
under oath and return faxed it to me. This statement is attached as
Enclosure (23).
42. That (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was the first to attempt to move Sergeant
Peralta, grabbing him by h is feet by himself. [Enc l (23)]
43. That (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) told (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to stop so they could
get additional Marines to help move Sergeant Peralta. [Encl (23) J
ENCLOSURE ( b)
Subj:· REVIEW OF INSURGENT ENGAGEMENT ON 15 NOVEMBER 2004 INVOLVING SERGEANT
RAFAEL PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 0311 USMC - ADDITIONAL INQUIRY
45. That in the process of lifting Sergeant Peralta to remove him from
the house, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) noted a shallow, rubbled depression in the floor
under Sergeant Peralta' s left side (Encls (22D), (23)).
46. That based on how the Marines were holding Sergeant Peralta, the
grenade hole appe ared to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) when viewed from Sergeant Peralta's
feet to have been under Sergeant Peralta ' s left pectoral muscle. [Encl (23) J
47. That the shallow, rubbled depression in the floor was previously
identified by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to the Investigating Off i cer when the two where
among those who returned to the scene of the firefight to survey and
photograph it i n December 2004. [Encls (22), (23)]
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
ENCLOS.(h)
-. H.P. WHITE LABORATORY, INC.
3114 Scarboro Road
Street, Maryland 21154-1822
Telephone: f4 l0) 838-6550
Facsimile: (.o lOl 838-2802
e111a1!: :11fo@·-,p,vh1te.com
w,,;w hpvvh1te .corn 29 July 2005
(HPWLI 9693-10A)
Gentlemen :
In accordance with the general provisions of- Battelle Memorial Institute Purchase Order Number 189591
and your memo of 26 July 2005, H.P. White Laboratory, Inc. conducted an examination of a fragment
which you provided on 28 July 2005.
The fragment was in a sealed, plastic container identified as evidence (No. ME-04-927) in the death of an
U.S. Marine while on duty in Iraq.
The purpose of our examination was to identify, if possible, the caliber and type of bullet wh ich produced
the fragment. Enclosed please find Table I with the results of our examination of the contents of the
container.
The fragment was examined microscopically and photographed and compared to known exemplars.
The plastic container was resealed and returned to you via Federal Express, Signature Service, track~ng
number (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Should you have any questions regarding this matter, or if we may be of any further service, please do
not hesitate to contact us.
Sincerely,
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Enclosures
CONTAINER
Evidence No. ME-04-927
Evidence Exemplar
Contents: One Fraqment Steel Core from 5.56x45mm , M855
Description, General: Cylindrical w/truncated cone tip Cylindrical w/truncated cone tipz
Weiqht (Gr): 10.1 10.4
Lenqth (In.}: 0.3185 0.3165
Major Dia. (In.) 0.1805 0.1815
Tip Dia. (In.) 0.0980 0.0960
Color: Silver (corroded) Silver
Metallic: Yes Yes
Ma~metic: Yes Yes
Most llkely source: Steel Core of 5.56x45mm, M855, Bullet.
I
I
I
H.P. White Labora ory, Inc.
Figure 2. Tip and side view of core from 5.56 x 45mm M855 Ball round.
'¢:JH.P. White Laboratory, Inc.
--;igure 3. 5.56 x 45mm MSSS Ball round with evidence and exemplar cores.
Binder C
Investigation of
Friendly Fire Incident
on 15 November 2004
Sergeant Rafael,
Peralta USMC
CC:JA
)
(b)(5)
Subj: COHt,,lJUD INVEST I GATION REGARDING THE SOORCE OF THE BALLISTIC FR.l':..GMENT
RECOVERED ? K0:1 SE:l.GE~ T R.lffAE PEF.11.L_A (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 0311 OSMC (DEClP..SED)
4 . Opinion ;l: 4 is modified 1:. 0 read , " References (c) and (d) conr.a~n complete,
thorough , and facr.ually accurate documentation supporting t:he award
recommendation con t ained the r ein , and that Sergeant Peralta ' s self ess a~d
hero~c actio, s a r e worthy of the Medal of Ho~or . " [Findings of Fact _Q, 11,
and 12] .
5. I recommend that the F~ndings of Fact , 0ps: ;on ~ and Recommendations, e.s
modified above , be approved .
~ r;yji/ft
J. F. S.ZI.TTLER
Copy to:
SJJ!. , I .:EF
SJA, MarCent
6
UNITED STATES :MARIN3 CORPS
lST'NAR: !-iE -I VISI .· ( R:2I )J}
3ox 55~3eo
CA~? PSND18TO, , C~2.IFOJ<N: A 92055- 5380
5830
0IT
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
200s
='IRS'? END03.S2MEKT on (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Co::anar.d I:1vescigat.ion o: 17 Nov 05
Subj : co;-.!MA
'D Il\VESTIGATION REGl'3,DI. "G THE so· :<.CS OF ':'HE :S;l,.LL:S"'IC FRZ\.GEEN~
RECO'ERED FROM SGT R.~~AEL PERA.LT~ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 0311 USMC (DEC'::AS~D)
Copy to :
¥ F. .<TONSKI
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
File
5
'
\
I ':'\'!TED STA TES MA.RI. r£ CORP
FORWARD (WEST)
rn MARINE DiV!SfON (REfN) J\,ffR
BOX 5:538i
CAM'P PW· LE TON, CAw'FOR.~fA 9.::055-538 !
17 Nov 05
Encl: {l)
(2)
(3) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
\ (4)
/
C.-)
(6)
(7)
)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(9) ent of
(l 0) Statei e · o
tl I) State .. c1 of
< l2J 'iatemer r f
P relirninary Statement
l . 111is in.ve :gati n Wi'!S dir ·cted by th Comm· ncling General. l I Ma."in Di'vi:-ioo, in ord~r to
(1 ) inquire to the facts and circum. an es surrouuding the sourc of a ba11i tic frag "eni
recovered from < e dy of Sgt. 1<..afael Peralta and (2) assess and valuate th iripl teness of
the Reforence (c) ?.:ncl (d) documet supp r :ng rh award r co 'l end ion contained
th n.
2. 1 have reviewed Ll:te ref rences an'. Leir enciosures and all availa I information conce ing
the engagen l1t against anti-coaliti011 fi. ·ce' on 15 1-O\'e b r 2004, i r a.I ltrjah, Tra which 1 d 10
tbe death of S:::- ·. Rafael Pe~a.Jta, US?-K.
Subj: COM!.'L D l · lVEST1GA TlON REGARDD-../0 THE SOURCE OF THE BALLlSTJC
F G, lENT R£CO\ ER.ED FRO -1 SGT. RAFAEL PERALTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)103 l, U MC
(DECEASED)
3. The only diffi ulry en.count.. r"'d in this inve tigarion was making contact i,vith two of r.be
\'ritne.sser to the firefight. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) both ·eached their end of active service io
or
the 'Manne Corps. At,.., )_pts were made to contact botb !hese individu ts at their last known
telephone numbers ;vithout su s ' . A!though(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)participated in the fi efi.ghr, his
sea eme ro ·i s no relevan · iltfon:narion as to whether gi. Pe '31ta reached for the grenade
and/or placed it '\.mder his flak jacket. Sinrilar!y (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) s teme11ts provide no reJevant
in rmation on tbis issue. However, interviewing (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) could gi e him an opportunity to
addres$ the issue of wbefuer he or ano b ~r me1 1ber of the squad may have ::iccidenrly shot Sgt.
Peralta. Additionailv, in· n iewing bot of thes individual.s couJd possibly~ ·ovide infmmation
as to whether they heard if me .1' ers of their squad we-re pi ssured to exaggerate Sgt. Peralta's
actions. However, in li::,1 of the evidcnc · ahady garh~r d concerning the two r:1ain issu - Lhnt
ar the subject of thls iu.vesligation, ii is doubrfol tbat (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) wo •ld provide
a 1y new evide "'.e that wou d ait th opjnions or c; ommendari contain din this
investigation. 11 er fore. it is to· -ecoromended that he mvestigation be kept open in order ro
make further atten pts at locati:lgtb ~" two iniLi, 'dlm.ls.
4. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) from th"' o flee f the Stn f Judge Advoca c 1,,vere
consulted duri the course of th is in.e .. tiga ·on.
FincliM:s of Fact
1. Tue ballistic fragment removed from Sgt. Pen !ta s body is consi n \vith a 5.56 min bullet
(E closure (2)}.
2. T ere is no evidenc~ tbat the P.. TF individual \Vhom the Marines en count red possessed
t-.ATO ammunition or weapons. Fu11hermore tb r is no evide ce that the cache discov Ted in
0
the ho1 se 'ncluded sucb a mur ition or weapons. [E 1.cJosures (3) and (4)J.
3. Seven Ma ·n s ·ere io the living roo-1 of rbe cor act! ouse at tbe tirne they began receiving
fire from insurget . . Most of ·. em returned fire . [En !osures (3) and ( J.
4. Five ol1t of the sevc. Marine that retnme: 11.re w -. to the right or beh-ind Sgt. P~rnlta These
Jvfa:·ines were (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
[Enclosures
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (3) and (4)J.
5. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) wa· a me oer of l" Sq 1ad, lj: Pin 0011, Alpba Campany Bl T 1/3 at 1he
ti 'e of the engage ,1ent. He re,)ponded to 2"~ . 'qt ad's rmro call for assistance and upon· rrival at
tlle '·contact hous ", approxirna·· 1 l ~~ minu es Jaier fom1d (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) walking around outsid .
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and told (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that be had accidently shot Sgc. Pera!t2.
[Enclosure 5)).
ubj: COMMAND l ..fV~STlG .'i. T!ON RE ARD G THE ·o RCE OF Tl .E BALE T .C
FRAmvfENT RECO\ ER.ED FRO :--.·f G 1. RAFAEL PERA LTA (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)'0:.1 l 1C
(DECEASED)
6. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was am.:> nt. r o. 2"..i Scua :, l Platoon. Alpha Company BLT l/3 at the it ·
of rbe en.::,.._gemcm. b Jan 1 ary 200 · (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) cold b.i11 d1at he co ,Ju have po sibl,\' hir ., g...
Pe:~lta \.Vi h rie dly cros_fire du ring de !refig_ht. [Enc!o · e '6)].
7. The b lie that \ ouud xi Sg!. Peralta er:re ·ed h · l froccipi ta calp ud sknl . Theo iph;I
r gion of the sk.'1.11! is the back of the sb.'TI l. [Enclo ure (41].
8. The A rmed Forces Iustitu e of Parholog., lisrs • e caus of de th .s "gun.:·bot nnd ballis ·c
injuri:s of the head.'' The ter:i 'ba Usti c i1fu ·i of l.e h ,. re.'."crs to sl , nel from an
e:p loding grenade. [En losu.re 4): .
9. It is (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) i
ression t.rnt (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) s to say
that Sgl Peralta ju. ed on rhe .,..,:e ade. [Enclo u e 5 ].
10.(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)deuie · that he p1 ::sure any of he ?v' arii es to s. ate thm $gt. Pera.It. "jL n p ·d 011
the g,·en_de", scoop up .he ~ ·eJ1a e a1d pta e it und · hls ves or otb ,vi e exagger2.1e ·g1.
Peralta's a ions. [Enclosure (7)J .
Opinions
The cause of _gt. P=ralra ·s dea h was (.a a pene .id g gunsho, wo , drone he d and (b)
balhs!" inj uri-s of the ead from . gr - ~de e :plosion fFindi _,s of Fa r l a.nd 8}.
3. The s a ernents of the 1Vlari cs invol ved i1 tl1, firefight on Nove , bcr 15. 2004 contained in
Refo cnces (c} "iid (d are trut' if. . ed 1c,ally, rhc Meri.! es f)Volved in the firefigl:i- gnve an
hone taccoun of t e ·~1 e rceptiouof Sgr. Pe ai ta·~ actions. - heywe ·enotpr-es ured to
xaggerate his vaior in the hope thr:t Sgt. :Peralta would ultima !y be warded be Me al of
Honor. [findings of f act JO, 11 and l2J.
4. Refer 11ccs ( -) and (d) 01 tain co:npiete and th ro:1gh documenta 'on . upporti--i£ d .e a\·v ·
Subj: COMMA.1 ·o i~:vE . !GA TION REGARD.ING T.i.E ()l"RCE OF . HE BALU,Ti C
FR.A.Gi t!"ENT RECO\ 'ET{ED FR , SCT. RAF ..i.,E L PER.-\LT (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 31 1, USMC
DECEA-EDJ
rec , men ation con ained rhe,ein. [Finding of Fat 10 l l and 12].
Re ommendstions
l . Thac no fur, 1-r in ·::st g2tion be conduced in o tbc foe·_ i'..,1d circumvic.! ce. nrrounding the
source of the baaistic -fy,..gmcn retrieved f:- r . de body of Sgt Peralta.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
583,C
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Subj : [email protected]) IN -::STTGA':'ION REGA~ JI1 ~ T!iE SOURCE ,...:: THE. Ehl,!,;ST!(:
FPJ G!.: 8NT ?SCOV~RZV ~O! SERGSANT R~F.~2, ?:;!C-~!'?~
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
l. Pur~\;.C: !"'i::. to 'n a?t e:- ; : c= r~ _a r-a .ce -:a; JOU ::re a.?. o.:...nted '::o i:;qci.r-e
.:.~to t h~ fiicts a;1d c.:..:c;;..--:;.s t a:-.ces $~:.:::' '..l:ldin~ .:.~e sc:.1:c1: o:: a :::allis-::ic
f ragm.e·nt, .re=ov-c red fr cm t :1-s boC,. of se::-gea t ru:-=ael c 0 .,.-~ · -i:: . Riefsrences
('.:) ) , (c) anc (d J pE::ta..:.. . Yot: a :-;e al;;o dl.re -;;;€:cl t:;; a:5S"'SS ar.c eve.:.uate
the c i~P-e~e=--l ss of 1h: rai e::--2.;c... {c } 2.~-=:, C") riac·...imgn-cati ~:1 su9port.:ng
t h-s c:!.\~c.rci. rec~7-it.e::cta.t;.or: ccn;c:i ned ::he:-~.:..r, . Rs£sren ~ e, p!"o~. . iCe s
additional info;:!:\a,:..:.o:r.. p-er;::;.r;e:-it ;::c, y •·r i rw<2s-..:.;a1::. ::m. ·por, ra=si 9t o:
.:..=-iis a ~poi.r--~Mer_t lt;t.~e.r1 t~....:s- i ::;... est~ .. a :..:.o:i -; ::., __ ~:sc::,m.e ye·..::: :-=:::..:r.cr _"
duty .
2.
fomat by ,., ? xo-.;e . ,. Oe: 20 .5, u, ._ es.s a:'!. ex-,e.:is:.on o : :.-.~rr.a .:.. s ;-re;:::~~d} .:.- ....J:
you i1eve not ;,_e""i7.:. = ..:sly do:1e sc, r ead c!'_apte.: !! f .::-e:"e ...·~ ce. (a ) in its
~..1r.i.r~"::y bei=,=s be,;-i.::.r;_.i:1.g ~ur i ~-,es-c. :ga- ic~ .
R. F, ~.<-,.':'.'CNSK.!
,H.P. WHITE LABORATORYr U\iC.
3114 Scarboro Road
Street. Maryland 2115,1-1822
Telephone· 14 i 01 B38-u55C
F-ac:;er,i,le. {41Dl 838-2802
. ,rail. :n!c@h~1wh1tc \'.'Orn
29 July 2005
(HPWLI 9693-10A)
Gentlemen:
In accordance with the general provisions of Battelle Memorial Institute Purchase Order Number 189591
and your memo of 26 July 2005, H.P. White Laboratory, Inc. conducted an examination of a fragment
which you provided on 28 July 2005.
The fragment was in a sealed, plastic container identified as evidence (No. ME-04-927) in the death of an
U.S. Marine while on duty in Iraq.
The purpose of our examination was to identify, if possible, tile caliber and type of bullet which produced
the fragment Enclosed please find Table I with the results of our examination of the contents of the
container.
The fragment was examined microscopically and photographed and compared to known exemplars.
The plastic container was resealed and returned to you via Federal Express, Signature Service, track~ng
numbe (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Should you have any questions regarding this matter, or if we may be of any further service. please do
not hesitate to contact us.
Sincerely,
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Enclosures
CONTAINER
Evidence No. ME-04-927
Evidence Exemplar
Contents: One Fragment Steel Core from 5.56x45mm. M855
Description , General: Cvtindrical w/truncaled cone tio Cvtindrical w/lruncaled cone tipz
Wel~ht (Gr): 10.1 10.4
Lenoth (In.): 0.3185 0.3165
Maior Dia. {In.) 0.1805 0.1815
Tip Dia. (In .) 0.0980 0.0960
Color. Silver (corroded) Silver
Metallic: Yes Yes
Maanetic: Yes Yes
Most llkelv source: Steel Core of 5.56x45mm, M855, Bullet.
'
\~H.P. White Laboratory Inc.
Figure 2. Tip and side view of core from 5.56 x 45mm M855 Ball round.
• I
Figure 3. 5.56 x 45mm M855 Ball round with evidence and exemplar cores.
r
... --· -·- -- · · - - ·-- _ ..__ _ ··~ ·· - --r~
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Nm1. 9,2005
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) When. I was running to tbe house ~ oss the st{eet where ·the rest of
the p1t. was I saw (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) wa1kmg back a..11d forli:t and he looked at me (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
anything about Jt. Mi.er we went in the house to retrieve the body of Sgt Peralta, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
went and tried to gather with all the other Marines 10 see how we were ta.~g it lat<:r told
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
me w:tule he '\'i.-as crying "damn, I cant believe he's gone1 v..-e were talking last night Iil.e nothing
and now he's gone:.'' A couple ofdays after eve1:rtlringhaypcnoo there .v.as an argument to
W'<!th.er or not Sgt Peraitajm:u.ped on the grenti!de or not. M,:m,es where talldng saying that (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
was saying thrtt he will probabl;· receive the m..ooal. ofbonor fur doing ·what be did,, what that
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
,:,,:as that he did I don't e;;:actly kn.ow "W!lat be was ta!.hlng aoout
Th-:, -word that was going·around
,,vhen. we fonnd 01:-rt.. we were going to be getti.P.g guestioi,:ed wa<s :i;hat 'r;{f.<; putth,g
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
presstire on san1eMarlnes to say that Sgt. Peraltajumped on the grenade. We foun..d that out
when w-en.tto the .hospiial there to ta:lk (b)(6),
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to (b)(7)(c) We btew(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)wouldn't listen to him
lll)d "vould: say the truth, bat the ~ Ma,--ines 'Where the ones that we wm-en't sure about. T!le'J
w:ere more likely to d{) what ~ said and follow those orders. To the best pfmy knowledge (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
v.,as with
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) when they went to go visit
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and it v-,,as his sg. that got bit. 1 don't
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
recall him encouraging the situation on what happene<l fo Peralta because the Marines that were
in the house that I asked Scrid L\ey didn't see Sgt Peralta jump in the grenade,. they said they saw
hlm Oil the floor and they were- running out. I really believe that w.ha told me how Sgt
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Peralta really died that day and didn't say anyt1.ing a out it because Ms:riJ;les weie saying he took
the grenade. wet.her or not it rolled to his body or not. What did ,was not on purpose and
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
what he t.old me ,...as no !l'.i~..ake. If there ate 5.56 rounds in the body, there i:s proof tight there.
From what I was told the Ma..rines were running out when the grenade was tr..roWl\ and Pem:Ita
,.,,.as 21.teady on 'the floor. I don't under~.iand how someone shot three tim~s,in th~ face could pull
in a grenade knowing what they are.do·ng. I say three ~use I .rec;£tll saying that he shot
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
him three times in the face because bis ~ n was on butst
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
. nevet ::dd uy ~ nversaticns r'v'it:i (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ~4 !'!! No ·emb~ ! 5, 2004 in whim (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ytricd to
i fiuence me tn ~unt the int:<l:::llt in a way othe: "o!ll 't re«.h· oo;uITTd. .ifo;::evc.:, it sa.ould be
notsd. that I '?/ZS ~ot '0 1::::: c.om.ac: !)O'l!iii! lt U-.e mna of the fL"'!mgh!..,, d ti;,?.,""cll::r,:~ c· d nor.\;..: .....t;SS.
0
l SW"'--ll.t or afiinn tE2.t thE fcresc,tng inf;:;nnati:) is ttue and .accurate fo t:'he best of my kn.o Iec.ge,
Te!~,h nically sw.cm on this l O'' day o:f'Nove.u.b_er 2 •05, m(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Hov 15 2 0 0 S 1 5 : 49 SONNl:c i3Rl0 Gf.S 0 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
At tho time of th ·s ind ·en; I was the (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) or 11:. Platoon, Alpha Co:m.pany
BLT l/3 . I hcld tMs bil1et from ap)?roxi.tr.ate- y September 2004 to Sep ember 2005.
I was not il'l the contllct house at Lh-e tirne of Otis incident :and ·was the:-e.'.'o:re not a."1
eyewitness ro those e,,enrs.
A.t no point .af·er this incident did I panidpate in. a con.versatlon with any of the Marines
who were 'involved ht the .fircfigbt in w· ·ch W'"'.)' ra:is.ed rhe p!}ssibility that Sgt. Peralul
was hit by friendly fite. Spc~ffically, no on.e ever su:gges e<l tha (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) nutY have-
accidently sl:ot Sgt. !' ""ra !ta nor did (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ever st!ggest this poss ihility to mt!!.
Subse-que.nt o the firefight> I did. have conven;c!lioru; with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who was 1he
Sqi.md Lead r. a.."ld the other Ma.1'1?les p.ieserrdn the oont.!ct house. Based on trry
conversations with 'the'1l, it w.es my impressiou that Sgt, Pera' te.'s a·:::tions wc:-c valorous
ohd that h.e would probably b ~ put in for a posrhumou~ award. I told the Marines that
they would need to prepa."'8 statements as to w:hat they saw. However, I n.everpressu:red
them to exaggerste Sgt. P era:!ta'-s actions or otbcr;vise make his actions m ore velciOUS
than th..--y rc;ally w ere . To th¢ ·c cntra.., y, 1 instructed th:m to simply tel.ate the fac;s as they
could recall an<l not to embellish ru.'1ythiog.
I sw~ or affinn tha, 'ta e for,egoing informa.tion :s t:i..¢ md accurate to the best of my knowl~g:.
Telephonica,ly sworn on the 15- day ofNovernber~ (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Inv:stigatir...g Officer
_)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
......... - ----
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
r. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) provide the folio'1'ltl~ swom statement to(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)who hl!.s typt.d this
sta:~nt for Tnl!:, re_m:Hng foe fi:ef.gI it1voZ-.-in2 Sgt. P~:;.ka. on.:Nove:robr.r l :5, 200t, in
Falluj ah, f."'aq. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
2005. J cur:e.'l!ly r~id~ in (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) r can he r:.u:hed at (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) My
fa·.::snm ~ machirlt-riUUlbe~ is (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
I beve;ievie ·ed. yprior s·~t~ent dated November 15. 200-'-and the su.-nn:.nr.; i)f n;ytelepl1on
i.nte:-v'icw :fat~ ucce:mbor 2 l, 2004 ,md ~gaib art~'i to ihdr trUth oorl accu:racy.
l did not se! if Sgt. P'm:..J-.a, ·aa hit by en=:, er fnc.,"'!dly 5~. It sr.ou d be rerrzn1beted that I was
ir, ..the big room- when Sgt. Peraltz wu s.301. Sgt Pe:ralra was in 'the living-com cl the timll he
was shot and I 1..-n: fore did. not hav- th" best v;u;tag:::, p,:/, , cf obs~/ ng wlief}:er the t.'l$ur,.: r.ts
t>~ M~es from. cur squad ~he! .h.int
'1,'hen I \\:as-in fue hosp'i ta! fo: my iajuries (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)did ccm.e and \'tsit !De, At tke tim: of tr,¢
fur.fight, he WU our uti - Pfa;oon Sq;eant. "\'{\,,:n vis.it"od. me, he appatsi!1y kn~· 'ha:
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
I v:culc be .J)tO\-.i.ai.n"' more infomia::on. :::gz..rd.ir..g t:-ic fi~fig,'it. !n that re~ rd, h~ ro!d me ro ''do
what's rl:gbt'j wb.kh I mkrpreted to mean provide a s.at:.::m~t th1lt .included Sgt Pe~ lla:jum:;ting
on er s~vooy · th,: grzn."..de under hi. ::i:iy or otherwi£e m~.i.'l! his a:;tio:n rn ;c vakr'l,1l,S than
they UC!Ually ,,;,er•. B'..o..,.-e•,;er, when r was interviewed by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on December 21. 2004.
! did not exz.ggcrate S~~ Peral~' s actions.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)never to1d :n.e th:i.? he tho ugh he :n~y havt =:idemly s\ Sgt. Peraha or that Sgt.
Peral ta m ~y have beth kiUed by f:ien<lly fire.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
... .. _ -· - --
l3/l7/2005 l8: 3e (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) PAE: e'.?/0?
1, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) provide the following sworn stawmcnt to(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)whc has ty~;;..'<l
this ;,!,a~t fer roe, ..:gaming the fi.rcfl,ght ir.volvm_g Sgt. Peralta en Kov~be;- t5, 2004, in
hllujeh, blq. At the time of llic nrsfight, ! was (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Alpha Go.mpa1;y, BLT 1/3. Tac cu...--ren.tt (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and can be
read1d. ;:.t (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
l have reviewed myprior. st;i~en{s dated No-.r-:zmb!:r 15, 2004 and Detembcr 2.1), 2004 anrl ag.;in
attest to their t.'Uth a,nd accu;acy.
At uo point a."rer tltls incident did {participate in a canve;;;ario'\1 ·with ?.ny of the Z,,!'min:s who
we;-e: h,;\·o1y::d fo the f.r¢.fi.ght in which they rais.cd fue riossiirilliy that Sgt. .Peralta was hit by
frfodly fire. Sps:cifi,;;ally, nc or,e ~ve~ sugg?"stcd tbat (b)(6), (b)(7)(c):ney have accidently shot Sgt.
J?eralta no.r did (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)ever sugg:cst this to Cl¢.
Our SGuad v,-as subsequer,tly in~cted to propare 5"..a,em.e:nts concernir.g ili.e fu-efi.ght Tc my
knowledge. eve::yor.~ ,,·,,row their ov.,11 ~1AtE:mtr.t and the;o was no collusio:o as to wh~ to say
co:1e.emi~ Sgt Pc:alta' s actions. 1 i:u:ver pres!U!ed tnyonc to exaggerzte Sgt .?cnlf.a's actions
or ot:i.~wisc make his ac:tio.cs more V!liorous than tiley rca.!ly ',',"!:~c. l never bea:-d anyone else
suggest or instruct m€tllbc:s of our Squad to smbe!Us.n Sgt. ?er?J~a's ~ti.ons. Similarly, l nev~
hem-cl anyo~e froo our Squad tell me tl,at they bad somebow bce:1 pressured to ~hellish th:::ir
stnfelne;n:s_ !O the COC\r.!:ry, we were Sl.'!lp].j' told tO Wn te d ~ t.?,e fai::S $ best WC could rxaiJ.
I s ;vea;: or a."f.rm that the foregoing faiorm2.tion is true and !Ceutaie to the best of ::ny bowled£~.
TeJ,';p;1onic.ally swom on Lrie 1 ~ d11y ofNo,e::r.~ 2 ' (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
-11/15/2005 TU"E 14:18 FAX (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) @0021002
10/lS/200'5 0S: 11 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Pt;Gc B2110
I, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) provide the followi."1.g sworn statement to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c).who has
typed this statemev.t fotme,regard:iug the frrefig.t:i.t uiv:o! ing Sgt Peralta on November
1S, 2004, in FaLujah, L:..a.q. I am asi.gned to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Cuueufly I am
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)Irnay be contact"d.at either (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
I have reviewed my .:prior statements &.tsd No··e.:n.ber 15, 2004 an.d December 19, 2004
and again attest to tbci- truth and accuracy.
I carmot &.-..termine whether Sgt Prm!ta was shot by ecemy or friendly frre. It s ;o ) d be
noted faat at the ti.me we fust en.ccn.i:nrerecl :fire frc..-n ·t11e lnsu:ci::rents, I was standing in front
of Sgt Pe.r.dia As I tui'"I1¢d a.ound from fue doonvt!y leading into the kitchen area, I
cou d see th.at Sgt. Pera!ta had alre d;.-beer.i shot, ·
At no poin• ar~r the f'ti."1:;fight did (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) e-1cr. mention to me fua• he thought be n>.a:j
~ve accide.ntly shot S-gt. Per2lta. No one: else from our squad that ,.JBS in the house at tbe
time of the firefight ever n:i.eutio ed to me that they thonght they had acoidently shot Sgt.
Pe~ta.
Ar.er the frrefigh~ I was toJd by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) at they needed to get a
sta:temeut cOD.cemi:ng what had ha:ppene.d. Howe ·er, nci+ er they nor a.nyo else e
pr~sured me to r..;::;ount actions on the pm of Sgt Peralta that 1ie did not do. .
Specifically, ne one ev,:;r pressured m~ into rs!Colll}ting that Sgt. Pe.i.--alta 's ae.-ions w-ere
tnor~ vilorous than they actda:Uy •;;ere. My rendition of Sgt. Peta!ta's actions cou.t.ained
in FiY two earlier statements ai-e md.:.~ed wh.at I saw and r stand by them.
I swear or affirm that the foregoi .1g information ls true an,d acc.u.,.--ate to th~ best o.fmy knowl~4,_°'1?,
Te!spbO'nicilly sworn otl the t.$' day of' ovember 2005, at (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
- -· ·--· ... -··, , ••
!, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) provide the following S\Vorn sl:.te.;r;.e,- ro(b)(6), (b)(7)(c),,;,ho h2S typed this
5'i..aremer:t for me, reg:an:lli1g tl;e nrclig:b.r in.volvit:g Sgt. P~ral~a ;:m No•1en1b-er 15, 2004. m
Fallu·ai,. Iraq, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I can ~et~hed a (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
I h£ ·e reviewed my prier s12·cment d:rte<l 1)¢ce;m e. 2 0, 2.004 and again att~ t:o its ,:n1th a d
I did oot ;,c~ if Sgt. P~ai '7/a.3 h:t by enemy or friendly fire. 1t sbould be r:eme:o~red that foe
ilrefight was iw~~iate ~d of short dil.-at(c,r1- I was sho.. in·· e .ri.g.l'lt f'oreanll ·ust abou the same
time that Sgt Per:$lta wa;; &ho· . My focus of s.tteri!:bm was on retw;r,=r.g fire and uo bow Sgt.
Peralta g r sh _
Su::s~cru.ent c ih1:1 ~"'~ght, J did talk witl (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) !knew t.1:13. h!?, wa (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
·o .ev~lu ·:,;-ated o,ttt::: that hem~· have bt~ ~s,?(filsible fur ~dentary shooting S :t.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Pera1 . L'l :act) the s, b.j~ of _g-.. :Pere tap s-si:ily be n killed by fdencily i .r e ne 'e?' C3Jile up
until I was con.tact:;d by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) i.11 O,,..,ti:i::er
2005 .
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
:bve~gating Officer
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
I ha-<1e reviewed my p.rio.r. s•arement dat.a! No"tJc:mber l 5, 2004·as well as tne sumrnary of my
telephonic _inter,riew wicb (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ofDcccmbor 22, 2004. f ag?.in attC?St ,o·ili:: tru:th and
;;,ccu,r-.u:y oft.hnse starern.ents.
lt w.n.s r.i.}• i.mp.r~ion ibat Sgt. Peralta wm; hit by enemy fi·e. f bas~ this o n the fad that h.c
n.pptsrcd to j oi:k back aftzr being snot. From my van.tage point r could no1 s~ that he .bad b~¢.n
hit by Z-"l.Y aft.he. other Marines.
At no point af>er the fir:Jight did (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)ever mention LO me that he th.ought h.e ~)la,.,e
~::::den!:ly shot S~t Per-aJta. No one else from curs . um th.a was in the house at fue time cf th,e
fire.fight ev~r p,.enti.c:oed to me tba.f fuey though tr,ey foid accident y S")l ot Sgt. Peralta .nor did :they
ever mention that (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) told tl:em that be, may have a.ccldently shot Sgt. Ps.2.lta. In fact
µie 'iiie:tdly fire'~!asue·n~er cam~ 'P wa ·1 I was i-otorv::eye~ by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on D-ecember
22, 2004.
No one ever press red me to recount .:~t.ions on t'u: p-a.rt of Sgt. Perz1ta that he d~d not co.
S_pe=ifically, no OJ e ever pressured me into ~ourtti:ng that Sgt. P eralta's- a.c ions. we;:e more
va1or0'.:.s tillll they z..'"tnaJly were. M;-·rendition ofS,gt. ? er.Jta~s m:;t:ons eo"Otain~d\;., Tl'I)' two
earlier statements_are indeed w hst I. saw and .I SWtd by !h~:
I swear oi affimi that the fo:.::goi.i;g infonnatian.is tr.u:: ·and ac.:uratz: to tho best of =->Y knowledg~.
T~lepb nically swo en tbe l ~ d.ay of ovem '"er 2005, ~t (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
-~
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
_) 11
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, O. C . 20350-1000
12 July 2007
The Commandant of the Marine Corps recommends, and I concur, that you~endorse
the recommendation for the Medal of Honor (Posthwnously) to Sergeant Rafael Peralta,
USMC, for his gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of life above and beyond the call of
duty during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The Chainnan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
concurs with the recommendation for award of the Medal of Honor.
This award has been through two complete award review and recommendation
cycles at Commandant of the Marine Corps, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
my level The reason for two such cycles is that on January 25, 2007 the Commandant
received a report regarding a friendly fire investigation of the circumstances sunounding
Sergeant Peralta's death from Commander, U.S. Central Command. After his own
thorough review, and after informing the family of the findings, the Commandant
resubmitted the package, again recommending award of the Medal of Honor
(posthumously) to Sergeant Peralta, stating that, "While the friendly fire investigation
concluded that Sergeant Peralta was most probably struck by an errant round from a
fellow Marine,s rifle, that conclusion in no way detracts from his extraordinary gallantry
in saving the lives of his fellow Marines when he saw the enemy grenade rolling towards
. "
hlJTI.
After my own thorough review of the resubmission, friendly fire report and al]
endorsements, I most strongly recommend award of the Medal of Honor (posthumously)
to Sergeant Rafael Peralta, USMC.
The entire Medal of Honor recommendation package, and a revised citation and
o~~_L
certificate for Sergeant Rafael Peralta are attached for your review, 1f desired.
Donald C. Winter
Attachments:
As stated
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
O FF I C E O F T HE S E CRETA RY
10 0 0 NAVY PEN T AGON
WASH I N G TON , D . C . 20 35 0 • 100 0
ACTION MEMO
• On 15 June 2007, NDBDM thoroughly reviewed the entire re-submission with all
endorsements, including those of CMC and CJCS, and again unanimously
recommended award of the MOH. (Attached binder)
• After reviewing the recommendation package, all endorsements and the most
recent recommendations of the CMC, CJCS and NDBDM to award the Medal of
Honor (posthumously) to Sergeant Peralta, I concur.
COORDINATION: N/ A
Attachments: As stated
CJCS DECISION:
. : <,
I DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D . C . 203 5 0 - 1000
26 April 2007
On 31 May 2006, you reviewed the recommendation package for award of the
Medal of Honor (posthumously) to Sergeant Rafael Peralta, USMC, and recommended
approval of the Medal of Honor. Subsequent to your review, additional information
regarding circumstances sunounding the action became available. Therefore, request you
review the enclosed award recommendation package, which includes the additional
information and the endorsement of the Commandant of the Ma1ine Corps after his
second review. A recommendation form is attached to this memorandum for your
signature, as appropriate.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Enclosures
cc:
NDBDM/077
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-3000 IN RE?L Y REFER TO:
1650
MMMA- 2
APR I 6 2007
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
2
. . . .
•··- -r· ·-- .... ..,....:-,.. · :. ..., .
. THE SECRETARY OF TH E_N AV Y
WAS H I N GT O ~ , .D . C . 2 0 3 5 9 - 1 0 0 0
March 6, 2007
.to
In respop.se your memorandw_n ·of February 2, _2007, the redomm~n~atiori to .
award the Medal"ofHono_r,(posthumou~ly) t~ Sergeant Rafael J?eralta, U.S. Marine Corps,
is returned for
appropriate actiori. In review of the recomme~dation, the Principal . . . ·
D~puty Secretary of Defense (Personµel and Readiness) requested additional inforiu.ation ·
in ~he ~ttached qiemor.andlllI}.. . . ·. . ... .
•.
'.' ·. ,As
·
stated
. · •, • : I
•, :, ,
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,N.DBDM/021
. .. .· . :· · \ • I : ' :_ ' •
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'· · :·
: ... ,. • i •.•
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OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON , D .C . 20301 -4000
PERSONNE L AND
READINESS
Michael L. Dominguez
Principal Deputy
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-4000
PERSONNEL AND
READINE.5 5
ACTION MEMO
February 4, 2007, 3:30 PM
COORDINATION: None.
Attachments:
As stated
4 October 2006
The Commandant of the Marine Corps recommends, and I concur, that you endorse
the recommendation for the Medal of Honor (posthumously) to Sergeant Rafael Peralta,
USMC, for his gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of life above and beyond the call of
duty during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
concurs with the recommendation for award of the Medal of Honor.
The Medal of Honor citation and certificate for Sergeant Rafael Peralta are
attached. The file supporting the recommendation is also attached for your review, if
desired.
Donald C. Winter
Attachments:
As stated
OSD 15779-08
/:/Ifl111111ll!~ll!IIIIIJ
1
ll/ll lllll11,11111
10/512006 3:59:40 PM
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES WASHINGTON, DC OFFICE:
2429 RA, • URN Houn OmcE Bu1t.1>11110
COMMITTEE ON WASHINGTON, 0C 20515
EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE TELlPHONE' 1202I 225-5672
Bunrnn iltuntrr
ii.~. iaoust of 1Rt:prtst:nt8tiots
joth Bistrict, ~lifornia
October 19, 2017
As you might recall, I have been intensely involved in the effort to award the Medal of
Honor to Sergeant Rafael Peralta and petitioned multiple Defense Secretaries to review this case.
General Neller, I have worked this case personally and I ask for your support in receiving a copy
of Sgt Peralta's original Medal of Honor nomination package from Headquarters Marine Corps,
Manpower Management Military Awards Branch (MMMA).
Thank you for your attention to this important matter. I look forward to your response.
Duncan Hunter
Member of Congress
(b)(6)
OM
(b)(6)
PY
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
CO (b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
F
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
O
positions inside houses, using automatic weapons and grenades and attempted to
flee after inflicting casualties on the first coalition forces to enter the
building. Insurgents were supplied via weapons and food caches pre-positioned
:hroughout the city.
Friendly condition: Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 1/3 attacked in zone dur,ng
the initial assault on Fallujah from 8 thru 10 November. Upon reaching its
PY
limit of advance, BLT 1/3 established co~pany sectors and conducted search and
attack operations throughout its tactical area of responsibility (TAOR).
Operating independently, each company of BL'!' 1/3 carne into contact with
insurgent forces o~ a daily basis to include the day of 15 November 2004. BLT
1/3 also began psychological operations on 11 November 2004 to encourage
insurge~ts to surrender; these ope~ations were conducted in conjunction with
humanitarian aid operations at the Mujahareen and Al Haydra Mosques.
Narrative Description of Gallant Conduct
Sergeant Rafael INMI) Peralta is enthusiastically recolllll\ended for the
Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his
life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as Platoon Guide, 1st
CO
Platoon, Company A, Battalion Landing Team 1/3, Regimental Combat 'learn
7(-) (Reinforced), lst Marine Divisio~l-l (Reinforced) in action against
Anti-Coalition Forces in the City of Fallujah, Iraq, 15 November 2004, during
Operation Phantom Fury/Al Fajr.
At approximately 0830, Sergeant Peralta was conducting search and attack
operations with 2d Squad, 1st Platoon. The squad was clearing their seventh
house of the day. Sergeant Peralta was augmenting 2d Squad because they we,ce
short personnel due to recently sustained casualties. Se,cgeant Peralta was
positioned in the center of the squad between ~he first and second fire teams
as they prepared to enter the house,
The squad met no resistance during their initial entry into the ho,ase and
cleared the front rooms without incident. The door to the back rooms of tr.e
house was closed, The squad staged for e:1try into the bac:< rooms with
Sergeant Peralta positioned behind the point man. As the point man pushed open
the door, the squad immediately came under a heavy volume of close-range
PF
automatic 1-1eapons fire from multiple insurgents located in the back rooms.
The squad instantaneously returned fire, wounding one of the insurgents. As
the squad sought caver, sergeant Peralta was shot in the head as he attempted
to maneuver out of the line of fire, Sergeant Peralta fell to the ground,
still attempting to speak, though his words were unintelligible.
After the initial exchange of gunfire, the insurgents broke contact,
throwing a fragmentation grenade towacds the Marines as the insurgents fled
the building. The grenade bounced off the side of a couch and came to rest
approximately one foot away from Sergeant Peralta's head. The grenade lay
between Sergeant Peralta and other members of the squad. Though mortally
wounded, Sergeant Peralta, with out hesitation. reached out and scooped the
grenade under him and used his body to bear the brunt of the explosion,
OM
shielding other Marines of the squad who were only feet away, The grenade
exploded underneath Sergeant Peralta with his body absorbing most of the
blast. Other members of the squad near by received only minor shrapnel wounds
from the explosion.
Sergeant Peralta was immediately medevaced via amphibious assault vehicle
but succumbed to his wounds ana was pronounced dead at 0915. 15 November 2004
while en route to Bravo Surgical Company.
Sergeant Peralta's gallant leadership. bravery and unwavering dedicatio~
to duty and to his fellow Marines distinguis~ his conduct as above and beyond
the call of duty. Sergeant Peralta's willingness to make the ultimate
sacrifice to preserve the lives of his comrades reflected great credit upon
him and was in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marines Corps and
the United States Naval Service. For his actions he is worthy of being
decorated with the Medal of Honor.
PY
Citation:
For conspicuous gallantry and Intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as Platoon Guide with
1st Platoon, Company A. Battalion Lending Team 1/3, Regimental Combat Team 7, 1st Manne Division in action against
Anti,.Coalltion Forces in the City of Fallujah, Iraq on 15 November 2004 in support of Operation AL FAJR During searCh end attack
operations, Sergeant Peralta volunteered to augment an under strength squad as it cleared block407 house by house. While
cieartng the seventh house of the day, the point man opened a door to a back room and immediately came under intense,
ctose-range automatic weapons fire from multiple insurgents The squad returned fire, wounding one insurgent While attempting to
maneuver out of the line of fire, Sergeant Peralta was shot In the head and fell wuunded, but still conscious Alter the initial
exchange of gunfire, the Insurgents broke contact, throwing a fragmentation grenade as they fled the building: The grenade came to
rest a toot from Sergeant Peralta's head and lay between him and other members of the squael Without hesitation and with
complete disregard for his own personal safety, Sergeant Peralta reached out and pulled the grenade under his body, absorbing the
brunt of the blast and shielding fellow Marines only feet awa)! Sergeant Peralta never regained consciousness and succumbed to
his wounds moments later. By his undaunted courage, intrepid fighting spirit, and unwavering devotion to duty in the face of certain
death, Sergeant Peralta saved his comrades from further injury or pOSSible <leath thereby reflecting great credit upon him and
upholding the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service He gallantly gave his life tor is country
New
09/19/2008
CO
PF
OM
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 2035<>-3000 IN REPLY REFER TO:
5730
OLAC-SG
26 Jul 11
Thank you for your letter of June 29, 2011, to the Assistant secretary
of Defense for Legislative Affairs, on behalf of (b)(6)
regarding the Medal of Honor (MOH} recommendation for the late Sergeant
Rafael Peralta, U.S. Marine Corps. I have been asked to respond on behalf
of the Marine Corps.
Again, thank- you for your concern. Sergeant Peralta was courageous
and dedicated; he continues to serve as an inspiration for all Marines.
We will always be . grateful for his heroism.
(b)(6)
Fax
TD: DoD Cong. Affairs
(b)(6)
P...- 3 (includilg cowr)
.
Fmc
Rei cct
Thia correspandenc:a (lncbl~ ellaChmen1a) ts prMleged and 00nftclential. If you are not ht Wended
redpilnt. please de5lte t\ without flr1her MlbutiOli, notitt lhe &mdw hit you have receNld tha
faclimlle In enor. and dlsrlprd c:ont1nt1 herein.
• Commanls:
JUN. 29. 2011 12: 11 PM SHAHEEN DOVER NO. 7186 P. 2
.............
•' JEANIII: 5HAHeEN IUnlllf.m
HMT IUIUIINI
~111:M1t
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~-
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U.S. Department Of Defense ::.:
1300 Defense Pentaaon "9 ..:.-:
~
Washington, DC 20301-1300 V,
CX>
Dear E1i1.abcth.
I have been contacted by my constiiuen (b)(6) regardins
the important issue he is oxperi=icing with the Department of Defense.
I have enclosed Mr. Milter's inquity for reference purposes. 1 belir.vc you will find the
Jetter self explanatory.
l would appreciate any assistan«:c you me able to offer (b)(6) PJcue reapond
directly to (b)(6) and send a copy of your response to Max Ciielfa in my Dover state
office at 340 Central Avenue Suite 20S, Dover. NH, 03820.
~~-
Jeanne Shaheen
United States Senator
Encl0111re
JUN, 29. 2011 12: 11 PM SHAHEEN DOVER NO. 7186 P. 3
.. .
Senator Shaheen.
During the baltle of Falhtjah, Iraq, 25 yr old Marine Sgt Rafael Pcmlta. thouiluuffering ftom a
gunshot wound to the hcim, dove on an enemy greMde and gave his life to protect nearby fellow
marines. Doth the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Sectewy of the Navy
recommended he be posthumously awarded the Congressional Modal of Honor, yet he was not~
and instead awarded the Navy Cmas. WouJd you look Into this?
(b)(6)
• I' ,, -
5730
OLAC-SG
15 Mar 11
Thank you for your letter of July 30, 2010, to the Chief,
Legislative Affairs, on behalf of (b)(6) regarding
the Medal of Honor (MOH) recommendation for the late Sergeant
Rafael Peralta, U.S. Marine Corps. I have been asked to respond
on behalf to the Marine Corps. I also regret the extended delay
in replying to your correspondence.
5730
OLAC-SG
15 Mar 11
Very respectfully,
(b)(6)
2
09/24/2010 15 . 49 !FAX OH12DOFAX@mail . house . gov -+ Jason Dominguez 141002/003
Please investigate the statements contained therein and foiward me the necessary
information for reply. Please address your reply to my district office at 3000 Corporate
Exchange Dr, Columbus, Ohio 43231.
If you have any further questions, please contact Jason Dominguez in my district office at
(614) 523-2555. Thank you for your time and attention to this matter, and I look forward to your
reply.
Representative to Congress
PJT/jd
Enclosure
Dominguez, Jason ·
(b)(6)
From:
Sent; Wednesday, July 21, 2010 9:57 AM
To: Dominguez, Jason
Subject: Sgt. Rafael Peralta
Sgt. Rafael Peralta was killed in Fallujah, Iraq in November of 2004. He was nominated and denied the Medal of
Honor. All aspects of his
death point to the fact that he is deserving of this high honor for his action in saving the lives of his team.
He received posthumously the Navy Cross rather than the Medal of Honor because of conflicting medical analyis
about whether he consclously pulled the grenade toward him or whether lt was an automatic reflex of somebody
already dead. I find this story a travesty of justice for this soldier and his family.
Would you please have someone look into this matter ASAP.
Sincerely,
(b)(6)
7/29/2010
•• (b)(6)
( ient:
.-o:
Tuesday, February 08, 200510:49 AM
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: Peralta
(b)(6)
-----Original Message---·-
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, February 08, 2005 5:55 AM
To: Hummell, Jon (Brownback)
Subject: RE: Peralta
We have been told that the personal awards process can take anywhere
from 18
- 36 months.
-----Original Message----·
(b)(6)
Thank you for the information. We understand why you would not want to
comment on a specific award. Can you give us any guidance as to the
timeline normally involved with this process?
Jon Hummell
State Aide, Military & Veterans Affairs
785-233-2503
-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, February 05, 2005 10:39 AM
To: Hummell, Jon (Brownback)
Subject: Re: Peralta
1
that ·
Sergeant Peralta's command recognized his extraordinary actions and
submitted a personal award recommendation on his behalf. However, I
cannot
CJ
C
2
l- i/28/~005 11:25 FAX 7852332616 SAM BROWNBACK ~001
... , '
SaID Brownback
United States Senator / Kansas
Fax
__ ... _. -- - .. - - - . - ·•-·- -- --------------
TO·:_ _ \J_~~ht--=G=-----------
FAX NUMBER:_ _--=-----------
o·
B 1 JAH lbo5
0~128/2005 11:26 FAX 7852332616 SAM BROWNBACK
COM~ITTEES"
SAM BROWNBACK APPROPRIATIONS
KANSAS
COMMERCE, SCIENCE,
It appears that SGT Peralta's actions on November 15, 2004 would warrant one
our country's highest military decorations. Therefore, I would like to know whether or
not he is being considered the Medal of Honor.
Please advise Jon Hummell in my Topeka office. Thank you for your service to
oui'Nation.
Sincerely,
Sam Brownback
United States Senator
SB:jh
0
612 SOI/TII l<ANSAS AIIIHIJf. 1001-C NoRllt BIIOAUWAV 911 Nol!TH MAIN SmEET, Sum; A 246 N01m,1 WACD, Sum; 240 1\111 WHT 95TH, S1.1m
TO,lKA. ltS 66603 Prrmau11G, KS 118782 GA.~tlPI CITY, KS 87B46 Wla11T.a, KS moz DVIIII.AND l'AIIK. KS 86
178$) ~2fi03 PHONE 1112D) 231-8040 Pliom {112111275-1'24 PHONE (316l 284-B06B PliDNS 1!1131 492-6376 PHO~
(7861233-2616 FAX (02D1 231--41347 FAJc ll20) 275-1837 FAX 13161 264-8078 FAM 19131492-7253 FA•
www.senate.gov/-brownbaa
01/!8/2005 11 : 26 FAX 7852332616 SAA1 8RO\YN8ACK ~uu.i
Jon, this one sounds like one that you would handle...thanks.
--Original Message...--
From: Clark, Bryan (Brownback)
Sent: Thursday, January 27, 2005 4:03 PM
To: Burget, Nloml (Brownback)
Subject: Medal of Honor recommendation
Thanks Niemi!
(b)(6)
0 Incoming Message:
The below is an article about a US Marine deserving of the Medal of Honor. You should see it as part of your duty
to ensure he receives this. (b)(6)
You probably don't know Rafael Peralta's name. If we llved In a country that more fully celebrated the heroics of
Its men In uniform, you would. He was a sergeant in Company A, 1st Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment for
Operation Dawn, the November offensive to retake the Iraqi city of Fallujah, which had become a haven for
terrorists. What he did on the day of Nov. 15 was an awe-inspiring act of selfless sacrifice and faithfulness to his
fellow Marines.
The only way we can honor Sgt Peralta's heroism Is to tell his story and remember his name. What follows Is
mostly drawn from the reporting of Marine combat correspondent Lance Cpl. T.J. Kaemmerer, who witnessed the
events on that day.
Sgt Peralta, 25, was a Mexican American. He joined the Marines the day after he got his green card and earned
.his citizenship whlle In uniform. He was fiercely loyal to the ethos of the Corps. While in Kuwait, waiting to go Into
Iraq, he had his camouflage uniform sent out to be pressed. He constantly looked for opportunities to help his
Marine t>rothers, which is why lie ended up where he was on Nov. 15. A week Into the battle for Fallujah, the
0
Marines were still doing the deadly work of clearing the city, house by house. As a platoon scout, Peralta didn't
have to go out with the assault team that day. He volunteered to go.
According to Kaemmerer, the- Marines entered a house and kicked in the doors of two rooms that proved empty.
But there was another closed door to an adjoining room. It was unlocked, and Peralta, in the lead, opened It. He
Of/28/2005 ' 11:26 FAX 7852332616 SAM BROWNBACK ~004
- M~ss.age Page 2 of2
was Immediately hit with AK-47 fire in his face and upper torso by three insurgents. He fell out of the way Into one
of the cleared rooms to give his fellow Marines a clear shot at the enemy. During the firefight, a yellow
fragmentation grenade flew out·of the room, landing near Peralta and several fellow Marines. The uninjured
Marines tried to scatter out of the way, two of them trying to escape the room, but were blocked by a locked door.
At that point, barely alive, Peralta grabbed the grenade and cradled it to his body.
His body took most of the blast. One Marine was seriously injured, but the rest sustained only minor shrapnel
wounds. Cpl. Brannon Oyer told a reporter from the Army Times, "He saved half my fire team."
Kaemmerercomparas Peralta's sacrifice to that of past Marine Medal of Honor Winners Pfc. James LaBelle and
Lance Cpl. Richard Anderson. LaBelle dove on a Japanese grenade to save two fellow Marines during the battle
of lwo Jlma. Although he had Just been wounded twice, -Anderson rolled over an enemy grenade to save a fellow
Marine during a 1969 battle In Vietnam.
Peralta's sacrifice should be a legend In the making. But somehow heroism doesn't get the same traction in our
media environment as being a victim or villain, categories that encompass the truly famous Jessica Lynch and
Lynndie England respectively. Peralta's story has been covered In military publications, a smattering of papers
Including the_ Seattle Times and the San Diego Union-Tribune, ABC News, and some military biogs. But the
Washington Post and the New York Times only mentioned Peralta's name in their lists of the dead. Scandalously,
the "heroism" of Spc. Thomas WIison - the national guardsman who asked a tough question of Secretary of
Defense Don Rutnsfeld that had been planted with him by a reporter - has been more celebrated in the press than
that of Peralta.
Kaemmerer recounts how later on the night of Nov. 15, a friend approached him and said: ''You're still here; don't
forget that Tell your kids, your grandkids, what Sgt. Peralta did for you and the other Marines today." Don't forget.
Good advice for all of us.
- Rich Lowry is author of Legacy: Paying the Price for the Clinton Years.
Bryan C. Clark
StaffAssistant .
US Senator Sam llrownback
303 Hart Senate Office Building
Washbigton, DC 20510
Phone (202) 224-6521
Fax (202) 228-1265
(
--
1/?R/?OM.
.'
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-3000 IN REPLY REFER TO:
5730
OLAC-SG
27 Dec 07
C
2
,•
. ' . ~
...
WASHINGTON, DC 20&~1401
~s.2001
Your findinp IIDd views, in duplicate fonn. along with lhe return oflhe onc1osure, wiD be
greatly apprecial'ed. Plew direct yourn,p1y to~ IOmrinn r,fDmtee McCollrm ofmy
Sincerely,
Ric::bard 0. Lupr
U .~ Sbda Semdor
" . .
4
RGUqd
~ .. .
....,..
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vi
Page 1 of 1
~t ....
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C - Lugar, Senator (Lugu)
(b)(6)
Fram:
Sant: Tuesday, November 27, 2007 9:54 PM
01 NOV 28 AH 11: 18
To: Lugar, Senator (Lugar) ·
SUl,fect: Recognlllon of aervlca members
Senator,
· I am writing n,ganling a seemingly lack of Medal of Honor recipients &om the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan.· ln particular Marine Sgt. Rafael Peralta, thia young man cradled in a grenade after being
libly already fatally wmmded to protect the Marines in his squad. ·In doing this knowing it would
certainly be his lack act on this earth. Actions lib these embody the dedication of men in combat to
each other and the willingness of a leader to cm for bis men rcprdlea of the situation they arc asked
to be in. Though, I know these conflicts are unpopular with many but, ~ hate to sec it when people ·
coofulc the actions of those doing what is asked of them over the issues they have with those doing the
· ulcing. These young men deserve the recognition of a gratefbl nation for their actiom and serve as a
model for Marines and aoldien alike to strive for in the future. No one can attempt to say or really
imagine what they would do in that type of situation. but men lib tim have done it and sacrificed all .
for the mm next to th=. Not all mm need to die to have done somdbing of UllCODIQlOD valor in the
face of combat worthy of this award. I truly believe the process to award our nation's highest homr bu
become to far out of reach for the men and woman who ICn'c. 'Ihc amount qfposdmmOD1 awards bu
gone up sharply over the yem and this I do not believe thia was the iDtc:nt of the ~ to have to die in
· orda' to be comidaed for such an a ~ I really think the review process needs to be reviewed to
ensure eligible acts are givm real consideration.
Tbankyou
(b)(6)
· Get easy. one--click access to your favorites. Mab Yahoo! your homo.pap,
..
...
•
C
J l/lS/2007
Pagel of 2
DC : 2007UCO GRESSIONAL-
Congressional Tasker
005772b
Status: Oo en f Print
5 bj ic{;-UGAR-SECNAV (050) - CONSTITUENT CONCERNED ABOUT LACK OF MEDAL
u e F HONOR RECIPIENTS FROM WARD IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
Type: ConQressional-Constituent
External DCN: OSD/19427-07
Serial#:
SSIC:
Keywords: SGT RAFAEL PERALTA: OIF· OEF· MOH
(b)(6)
Correspondent~ I
Notification to:
Legislative •..
Division: Senate
Committee: N/A
Member: RICHARD G. LUGAR
Case Worker: DARLEE MCCOLLUM (DC OFFICE)
Dates ••.
Document: 05-Dec-2007
Received: 17-Dec-2007
Tasker Created: 17-Dec-2007 15:51
OrlQlnal Due: 03-Jan-2008
Interim:
Tasker Due: 03-Jan-2008
Deliverables , ..
Action Products: Letter-Reply Direct
Attachments
Tasker PackaQe: 05D 19427-07.odf
Final Response:
Working Documents:
Status:
Workfiow
DEC 1 3 Z007
https://ucstcdom02.ahf.nmci.navy .mil/tcms/webtsk0 l .nsf/vwTa<;kersPrint/b79YTML ?Op... 12/18/2007
Cp~gressional Tasker - 2007UCONGRESSI0NAL-005772b Page 2 of 2
C I Access Cont,ol
!Restricted: I No
Status and Comment History Id
(b)(6)
17 Dec 2007 ••• Task recieved. MCATS ID# rs 2007-12-10013
Change History 61
----------------------------(b)(6)
(17 Dec 2007 15:59) ...
Tasker Package added: OSD 19427-07.pdf, , ----------------------------
(17 Dec 2007 15:59} .. (b)(6)
Document Created ..,
Action Requited: UPLY DlltlCT (fernrd eopy of nply 1o CCD, Ro. 3CN3)
Coordinate With: LA
·Refi:rcax:s:
Remarks:
Docummt T)PC: INCOMIN~
Special lmtrudions:
Suspense Date: Jaaary 7 2818 Routing Date: December 13 2N'7 CONTROL#: OSD 1'427-o7
JNfORMADON PISTRIBU110N
omCE .
UNDER. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL & RBADJNF.SS
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS)
OSD1~27-87
C
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON
De ar Congresswoman Hooley:
Very respectfully,
(b)(6)
CONG'IIE&SlONA.t. omCES•
DARLENE HOOLEY
•
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CiOVllltNMl!t,,- ~l'nNSOR.UO l:m'nPlll5P.~
atnngress of tqe ltlniteh ~tatrs
ihpous.e of &pr:esentatiu.es
"'11! MISSION ~T.. 5UITB IOI
$ Al.£M, ORl!OON S'l)lll
131,,,,.-.m, ,.,
(50)") SSHtr:o
(b)(6)
C
(b)(6)
According to(b)(6) is requesting the status of award requests for three United
States Marines w110 were nominated for the Medal of Honor. The Marines in question are:
Corporal Jason Dunham, Sgt Rafael Peralta, Lance Corporal Christopher S. Adelsperger.
(b)(6)
Please give request full and fair consideration consistent with applicable laws
and regulations. I would appreciate it if you would please direct all correspondence to Michele
McAleer in my Salem district office at (503) 588-2468.
Thank you for your prompt attention and cooperation in this matter.
DARLENE HOOLEY
Member of Congress
DH:mm
C}
(b)(6)
RECEIVED OCT 1 7 Zuu~lc
., ..,.,
\
C
CONGRESSWOMAN DARLENE HOOLEY
CONSTITUENT SERVICE FORM
Thank you for contacting me about the problem you are having with a federal agency. I will be happy to
assist in eny way that I can. Please print all informn1ion.
Name:_ (b)(6) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Address:
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
Phone: (home) _ _ _ _ __
BricfDe9cription of Problem:_Desirc to aquire to the status of the nomination of the Medal of Honor for the
following three (3) Marines_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
_ Cpl Jason Dunham Sgt Rafeal Peralta _Lance Corporal Christopher S. Adlesperger
It has been over 2 years since Cpl Dunham was killed and nominated. That time period is unacceptable. It has
been almost 2 years since Sgt Peralta was nominated. I have attempted to inquire as to the status of these
awards from some time now and have been unsuccessful in my attempts. In regards to LCpl Christopher
Adlcsperger, I have called the unit he was assigned to {1 11 MEU) at Camp Pcadleton and discussed the way to
secure the details of the reason for the nomination of Adlesperger to be considered for the Medal of Honor
and was referred to a Naval Lt Carnes who is a PAO at Camp Pendleton. He emailed me back later that day to
inform me: that Headquancrs Marine Corps does not release any information regarding the awards until the
C award is awarded. I question that lack of in.formation due to the fact that the Los Angeles Times bad an article
'T •
~
.. .
- ... I
published by one of their staff reporters by the name of Joe Percy that had all the details of the nomination. He
had to get it from somewhere in the government. I don't want to use the article on my web page without
permission from the LA Times which is too much personal detail for what I need. They would want me to use
the complete article and that would not fit into my content of the web page. Also if one would read some of
the citations of awards that have been given to past Marines that have received the MOH, by going to one of
my web pages at www.marlnemedaJs.com they would realize that in Dunham and Peraltas case, throwing
yourself on a grenade to save the lives of other Marines, bas always resulted in the Morine being awarded the
Medal of Honor.
We as Marines and Americans, need to Ja,ow that our heroes that have knowingly sacrificed their lives to save
( • The internet web pago that the lhrcc Marines noted above is located al www.godsmaripea,com
I hereby request the assistance of the Office of Congresswoman Darlene Hooley to resolve the matter
described above. I authorize Congresswoman Darlene Hooley and her staff to receive any information. that
they might need to provide this assistance.
The: io.fonnationl have provided to Coagresswoman Darlene Hooley is tnre and accurate to the best ofmy
know ledge end belief. The assistance I have requested from Congresswoman Darlene Hooley' s office is in no
way an attempt to evade or violate any federal, state, or local law.
(b)(6)
Your Signature:
Date:_10/13/20""_-~_-_-_-:_-:_:.:.:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Please include copies (do not send originals) of any documents or relevant materials you think
Congresswoman Hooley should have pertaining to this matter. Mail or fax to Congresswoman Hooley's
District Office in Salem or West Linn. Thank you for this opportunity to serve you in Congress.
OLAC-SG
OCT 2 0 2006
The Honorable Bob Filner
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
Very respectfully,
(b)(6)
~.---------=----1
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Deputy Legislative Assistant to the Commandant
FAX NO, 202 225 3073 P. 01
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, _ _ _ _ Fax: ] ~3 , (u q7 7dYf;,
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Phone:_ _ _ _ _ _ __
Received fax letter asking for status of Sgt Peralta's award nomination. Ref, Rep Filner letter dated 8 December
2004. OLAC for action.
Semper Fi,
(b)(6)
I
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2 NAVY ANNEX
WASHINGTON, DC 20380•1775 IN REPLY REFER TO
573 0
OLAC-5G
01 JUN 2005
The Honorable Christopher Shays
U.S. House of Representatives
1126 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
C
I want to assure y o u that we share your p r ide in Sergeant Peralta
and recognize the ultimate sacrifice he made for his fellow Marines
and our Country. His service reflected the highest i deals of our core
values of honor, c o u r age, and commitment . Sergeant Peralta was
courageous and dedicated and his conduct continue s to serve as an
inspiration for all Marines.
Very Respectfully ,
(b)(6)
0
..
CONGRESS OF lHE UNITED STATES
C April 4, 2005 .
Umlgcpon. CT OhbOi-422..'\
Reference #1147351
C,on•rnmcnt Ci:nrc:r
.~SIi \\:'~shingto11 !\,,ult·,·~ rJ 1126 Longworth House
~rnmfnrd. C:T \ll+lOI·· 2\}li Washington, DC 20515
1126 Lung\\Orth BuilJin~
Washington. DC 2051.'Hl704
Thank you for your time and attention to this matter.
Telephones!
BK.JP( :Ho R I : .'ii()- 5!170 ·"'·'
N, Ill~ ALI..; li66- M69
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E-mail :
( 0SD 1009Q-05
Internet:
Natonskl, Dave
From: Web forms [[email protected])
( Sent:
To:
Wednesday, December OB, 2004 8:05 AM
Shays, Rep
Subject: E-Malf
Name (b)(6)
Addressl: (b)(6)
Address2:
(b)(6)
City, State Zip:
--· .... ,. - -· -- -.-- --· - ___ ._....__ _ ___ _
. E- mail Address:
(b)(6)
~
' comments: As a veteran I feel quit' strongly that the actions of U.S. M~tne Sgt.
Raphael Peralta in combat in Falluja are deserving of the Medal of Honor I would ask
that do whatever is in your po~:t to ensure that his axctions are inves igated bt the
Marine Corps, and that if determined to merit consideration for the Medal of Honor that
you support this. ~:JU:
0 (.
C 3
,·
SECNAV
( OCN: 2005USECNAVC_ C-000462f
Subject: SHAYS-SUPPORT FOR AWARDING THE MEDAL OF HONOR TO SGT RAPHAE
Sta
PERALTA
Type: Congressional·Constituent Tasker Package
Originator: (b)(6)
Member: SHAYS
Division: House
Commitee: N/A
Case Worker:
Action Office: CMC
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Check
.• RE: SHAYS-SUPPORT FOR AWARDING THE MEDAL OF HONOR TO SGT RAPHAEL PERALTA - C2 E•
Kenneth J Nixon. 05/31/2005 07:42:27 AM
Staffer: Mr. Jordan Press, contacted in regards to receipt of this correspondence. (0) (202) 225-~
C Tasker History:
------
,· ...
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CORRESPONDENCE ACTION REPORT
This fonn must be complclcd 1111d forwarded lo the Co1TCspondencc Control Division
(CCD}, WHS Room 3A948. Suspense Desk: (703) 697-9287 FAX Number (703)
695-1219 Email: suspensc:[email protected] mil
Action Agency lsN I
S1l5pense Date 6/17/2005 I
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I below)
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b REQUEST EXTENSION OF SUSPENSE DATE TO
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c. INTERIM REPLY HAS BEEN SENT (Copy attached) EXTEND SUSPENSE TO [
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• f REQUEST DOWNGRADE TO
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2. JUSTIFICATION
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a. ACTION AGENCY c. APPROVrNG AU1ll0RITY
I I 1 I
c. TELEPHONE NO. 5, ACTION T Al<EN (For EXSECI Correspondence Con1ml Division Use Only)
I I
SD FORM 391, JAN 2000
Congressional
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING SLIP
( Action Agency: SECRETARY OF THE NA VY
Action Required: REPLY DIRECT (Forward copy of reply to CCO, Room 3A948)
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INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2 NAVY ANNEX
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775 IN REPLY REFER TO
5730
( OLAC-5G
I& HAR ZOU:>
The Honorable Bill Nelson
United States Senator
225 East Robinson Street, Suite 410
Orlando, FL 32801
Thank you for your letter of March 16, 2005, c o ncerning the late
Sergeant Rafael Peralta, U.S. Marine Corps, and h is actions on
November 15, 2004, as referred to by your constituent, (b)(6)
(b)(6)
() Peralta and recognize the ultimate sacrifice he made for his f e llo w
Marines and our Country. His service reflected the highest ideals of
our core values of honor, courage, and corrunitment. Serge ant Pe ralta
was courageous and dedicated; and he continues to serve as an
inspiration for all Marines.
(b)(6)
Lieutenant Colonel
U.S. Marine Corps
Office of Legislative Affairs
c·
~Ab!:. tll/ 1::1.:!
4078727165 B
03/16/2005 13:36
,' ,-'
BILL NELSON
FLORIDA
Date: 3/16/05
To:
Fax:
.
USMC Congressional Liaison Office
-- -- -- --·· --- - -·
(703) 614-4172
- _ ... ·- ·
Scarpiello
From:
-Jeff-- -- - · - --Fax Number:
---· (407) 872-7165
- -- --- -- ·
(_~ Number of pages (including cover sheet): _3_ _
Comments
IRE (b)(6)
-
I Regards,
(b)(6)
Jeff
C 16 MA9' 2005
_Jeff Scarpiello _ - · ·- _ _ _ - · - ·
225 1:31:t Robinson Street, Suite 410 • Orl.\ndo, florid:i 32SOI • Tclcphnnt: (40i) 1172-71 til • Fnx: (407) 872.7165
B PAGE 02/ U3
• 03/16/2005 13:36 407B7271e5
J c,~
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() •
~niiea ~fates ~enai£
WASHINGTON. DC 20510-090.5
Bll.t NF,L..."-ON
FLORID,\
) Please send your correspondence directly to my staff assist3.nt, Jeff Scarpiello, at the
address below. I look forward to a response at your earliest convenience and thank you in
advance for your assistance with this matter.
Sinci::rely,
!;at)~
BN/jjs
Enclosure
Uruted States Sen:itor Bill Nelson. 225 E.isl Robinson Street, Suite 410. Orlnndo. Florida 32801
Telephone (407) 872-7161 • Toll-Free In Florida Or,./y (888) 671-4091 • Fai'l (407) 872-7165
http://billneJson..!'.enal'c.gov
PAGE 03/03
4078727165 B
03/15/2005 13:36
.'-'
Tracking# 16132-0R
Phone: (b)(6)
Email:
(b)(6) 10/SSN:
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(b)(6) Promoted From Correspondence
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703-614-5772 (inquiries)
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Case Type: Casework Assigned To: Jeff Scarpiello
Category: Military (All, Coast Guard, Merchant
Marine, 000 Active Duty} - Awards
and Decorations
Date Received:03/08/2005 Status: Open
Received Via: Web
Casework Description: (b)(6) is writing in behalf of Sgt. Rarael Peralta (b)(6)claims that he
should recieve the Medal of Honar.
Branch: Marines
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Senator Nelson:
a short time ago, while reading Letters to The Editor in The Orlando Sentinel.
I came accross one of particular Interest to me. It talked about a marine who
fell on a grenade and saved the lives of the rest of his squad. Today I
received an e-mail from an old friend that contained a dissertation by Oliver
North detailing the events that took place on that day. What I find most
shocking Is the fact that I never read or saw anything about the incident in
magazines or on tv. Evidently the big media didn't find this heroic deed
newswonhy.l write this letter in order to urge that you and your colleagues in
Congress dont make the same oversight and that you will recommend that Sgt.
Rafael Peralta, 1st Btn.,3rd Marine Regt. be recommended for The Congressional
Medal of Honor, posthumously, for actions above and beyond the call of duty. He
made the ultimate sacrifice so his squad membeers could live.
This is also one way that Congress can show their pride in and appreciation for
the sacrifices that our Armed Forces are willing to make every day of their
service lives.
Thank you
(b)(6)
~~~ . ~~~
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Casework Information
Route History:
('
lnterTrac Tracksheel 01 1 03/15/2005
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2 NAVY ANNEX
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775 IN AEPL Y REFER TO
( 5730
OLAC-5G
II FEB zoa5
The Ho n o rab~e Mark Foley
Member, U.S. House of Representatives
4440 PGA Boulevard, Suite 406
Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410
(b)(6)
Lieutenant Colonel
U.S. Marine Corps
Office of Legislative Affairs
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(manually updated)
( tho u.lA
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Discussion Thread (Amplification, Com pr~6C-
Questions}
S6CN.A V
l 6 f£B 211DJ;
Special Instructions
Suspense Date: March/7/2005 IRouting Date: Fcbru:iry/11noos !osD CONTROL#; OSD 03045-05
INFORMATJON DISTRIBUTION
OFFICE
This fom, must be complc:ted and forwarded to the Correspondence Control 01v1s1on
(CCD), WHS Room 3A94S Suspense Desk: (703) 697-9287 FAX Nwnbcr (703)
695-1219 Email. suspcrac_dc:[email protected],I
Action Agency lsN I
Suspuse Dale
I
317/2005 I
I. ACTION TAKEN (Check one)
•
'
b REQUEST E:CTENSION OF SUSPENSE DATE TO
I I (J~tify below)
•n e. REQUEST TRANSFER TO
f REQUEST DO\.VNGRADE TO
I
I
I (Ju;tify below /include POC Name & Phone Number)
I(Justify below)
2. JUSTIFICATION
3. REPORTING AGENCY
a. ACTION AGENCY c APP ROVrNG AUTHORITY
!sN I (Scr--,cc Scc,ct.uy/Undcr Sccrctary/ASOIMil u.ary/Exe,ut1vc Arnsl3nl Leve!)
I I I I
c TELEPHONE NO 5. ACTJON TAK.EN (fer EXSECI Concspondcnco Conuol Division Use Only)
I I a. EXT
• Approved
• Dis:ipproved
d DATE b CANX
• Approved
• Disapproved
I I C OWNGRD
• Approved
•D Disapproved
4. CCD CONTROL #
d. TRANSFER
e. OTHER (Specify) I
• Approved OtS:ipprovcd
I
IOSD 03045-05
I S1gna:u1c Date Signc1
I
SD FORM 391, JAN 2000
0
0211~ 12005 !J:11 FAX 561 626 4749
I !41002
• "l
Wo~)d you please be so ldnd as to review the enclosed materials and inform me of your
find¥Igs? Please respond to Steve Martino of my Palm Beach Gardens office.
i
() Sin<frely,
p
•;
Thajk you for your assistance in this matter.
•I
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Meqiber of Congress
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11q.912oos 10:35:03 P~
To: ~fll [email protected]
SubJeC!: ~bsite E.!!latl From Cul Grilbot -
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Mr.Foley .t
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[ am ,.,,riling yo,~ to inqui:e whether you are :iware of the ;oqifice nude by !I ~arine Scrg~t during Operation Al Fajr m Pnllujah
dunng Novcm~ of 2004.
~
Sgt. Rsfael P~r~ta. A Co. 1/3, wa.s mortally wounded d1\ring a firefight uis1de a house on 11/15/04. While laying on the ground with
severe wocnds 'io his face, a g=d~ w.is toss,d into the room that he and his fello"' Marines were oc:::upying. Sgt. Pe.:ilt:i hugged
the grenade to ~,s body, unothencg the explosio11 aDd s:ivin~ the lives of his fellow Mannes at the cost oibis 0"'11.
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Mr.Folc:y, I os..~that you please look mlo wl!..ir., if my, medals Sgt. Peraha~ bt en rc:co.mmended for. In tb.e opinion of this M.irin::
mfa:inyman, Sgc. Peralta i.s dcseMng of nolhmg less dwi lhc Medal of Honor foe his acnons that day.
I ady write to 1_ou bc:c:.i115e I h~"v'e seen no mC":1.tioo of Sg:. Pealu since a brief arncle m the USA Today and an article on the U&\1C
website dat!d \U/02/04 by LCµ\ T. J, KaeI1]I1'acr. The Ammcan people need to know th;i: me:. such :is Sgt. Peralta. still serve our
country, and S~t. Per.ilta dc:sc:rves the banors he has so nc.hly emed.
Th~ you in .i~v2.!lec for nny attl!'Iltion. you offer this martcr.
I
Smcer:!y Youlf;
(b)(6)
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==- Originallfomuttcc.)..1essil.ge S~ns H:i:e . -
Date: Ol/29/2cb5, 22.06
X-URL: hnp :Jkww.house. gov/foky/m:iil.ht
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<MSG> Mr.F,iey
I am writing ~u to inquire whether you are aware of the s.icrificc made by a MaIUle Sergea.m duriIJ.g Operatian Al 1:ajr in Fallujah
duri:Jg Noventa of 2004.
~
Sgt. lhfad P«talc:a, A Co. 1/J, was ma.~lly woundi:d during a. firefight inside a house on 11/15/04. While laying oo the ~ound with
severe woun~ to his f:.cc, a grniadc W!t!i tossed into the room that he and bis fcllow M.innes wa:: occupying. Sgt Per.ilb hugged
7
0 the grenade: t~his body, smothering !he explosion. and saving the lives of his fellow Mmnes al the cost oflus owu.
Mr.Foley, I 41.h.it you pleas: look u:.to wlut, if a!lY, medals Sgt. Peralta h..ns been recocmended for. In the opinioc. of this M:!...-i:a:
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infa!lt.rym.atl, S!f-. Peral\n i.s des::rvw.g ofnothmg leu. tban tl1e Mcd.il of P.:Ollor for his actions thnt day,
I only wnte·to j-pu bee;i.usc l have seen no mcntton of Sgl. Peralta ,bee a brief artidc m the US.A.. Today cd ao article oo. the USMC
webs!te dated 1:2/02/04 by LCpl T. I. Kaemmer::r. The Amc:uc.t.a. people need to bow th.1t meu sllCb as Sgt. Peralt.i still se:ve our
country, and s1,-
Peralta deserves t.be hoi:ors be has so nchly cs.reed.
Thank you in a4vll!lce for ,iny attention you offcr this tn.lner.
.
SlllCC'IC l y if
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2 NAVY ANNEX
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775 IN REPLY REFER TO
( 5730
OLAC-5G
~- C
·• . l;I
J~"''~
~I • 'l
( ~., ,
Thank you for your inquiry of January 8, 2005, concerning the late
Sergeant Rafael Peralta, U.S. Marine Corps, and his actions on
Nover.'\ber 15, 2004, as referred to by your constituent, (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Very Respectfully,
(b)(6)
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FAX TRANSMISSION
OFFICE OF SENATOR JOHN CORNYN
Occid,mtal Tower
5005 LBJ Freeway, Suite 1150
Dallas, Texas 75244
Tele-phone: 972-239-1310
Fax: 972-239-2110
tO
To: U.S. Marine Corps - HQDate: January f, 2005
COMMENTS:
Thank you!
)
,•
.
I
JO~NCORNYN
' TE)(AS
January 8, 2005
My constituent has sent the enclosed communication. A response which addresses his/her
concerns would be appreciated.
Enclosure
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lnterTrac Tracksheet 01 1 12/10(2004
,, ....... .....-... - ...................
,
'
ABC's TI1anksgiving evening news had the story of California's Marine Sgt
Rafael Peralta In Iraq one day, even though he was woundc~ he hugged an
enemy grenade to his chest as it exploded. He saved the rest of his squad.
guy deserves the Congressional Medal of Honor. Could you help gel it for
. ?
h un.
Sincerely,
(b)(6)
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2 NAVY ANNEX
WASHINGTON, DC 20380·1775 IN AEPLV REFER TO
C 5730
OLAC-SG
. ,,..
The Honorable Elizabeth Dol e
United States Senator
310 New Bern Avenue, Suite 122
Raleigh, NC 27601
C_J Peralta and recognize th~ ultima te sacrifice he made for his fellow
Marines and our Country . His service reflected the highest ideals of
our core values of honor, courage, and commitment. Sergeant Peralta
was courageous and dedicated; and he continues to serve as an
inspiration for all Marines .
Senator John Cornyn and Congressman Bob Filner have also expressed
interest in this case.
Very Respectfully,
(b)(6)
0
(b)(6)
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/ . - - . -Dear-Senator Dole,
.. .. ·-·~------··- ,-· •- ·-·.•--,.---,..... - . ·-· - --=-·--------. --
During this busy Holiday season, as we hustle and bustle to get everything done in
preparation for our religious celebrations and the close of another year, many An1ericans'
thoughts and prayers are v.-ith our deployed anned forces personnel. These brave men
and women are far from home and loved ones, enduring daily hardships and separation:
to keep our beloved country and its citizens safe and free. I know you join millions of
your fellow citizens in wishing these heroes and their families' safety and joy during this
special time of year - and always.
Recently the news of the brave and selfless sacrifice of Sergeant Rafael Peralta, United
States Marine Corps, has 11hit the airwaves 11• Sergeant Peralta, an immigrant from
Mexico, so loved his adopted country that he volunteered for military ~en7ice. Not just
volunteered, but choose duty what is arguably the toughest and most dangerous branch of
service in our armed forces - the Marines. He then went on to volunteer, repeatedly, for
additional hazardous duties while in Iraq, so he could be with his comrades in anns,
doing what he could to protect the country he loved so much.
On November 15, 2004, Sergeant Peralta volunteered again for duty he did not have to
- .~ - . ___ t~~~ing the!==~ b!ttl!2.t f ~!~~. ~~ u,e E.ilQ.t;~e an9 !et11~w.li .~b.flL_. -------
- S'!tual1cins 1 Sergeant 'Peralta accompamed a squad of Mannes cleanng houses of enemy
combatants. At the fourth house that morning, Sergeant Peralta was hit in the head and
chest with multiple small arms fire at clo5e range from enemy combatants.
As Sergeant Peralta lay wounded, and perhaps dying, on the floor of the house his fellow
Marines were trying to clear, an enemy combatant rolled a grenade into the room. In the
tight confines of that space, with no shelter from the impending blast and no quick
escape, his fellow squad members were looking at almost certain death. That is when
Sergeant Rafael Peralta, with one last act in a string of many heroic actions, grabbed the
live grenade and cradled it to bis body, where it exploded and killed him. However, his
actions - and death- saved his squad.
1 8 JAN 2035
ScNA IO~ UULt KALtluH UrrlCt l'IV. lJ.jjcl . i
~.-. JA~I. 12. 20C 5 3: 28PM
,.
If there ever was a man who deserves the Congressional Medal ofHonori Sergeant
Rafael Peralta is indeed that man. His selfless act saved his friends and fellow Marines,
and is a shinning example of all that is good and honorable in our finest - those who
serve in the United States Anned Forces protecting our freedom and extending peace to
the troubled areas of the world.
Please take it upon yourself to lead the effort to award Sergeant Rafael Peralta,
posthumously, the Congressional Medal of Honor. He is a hero. He died an American.
Sincerely,
(b)(6)
Very Respectfully,
(b)(6)
....
(
, BOB Fil..NER TRANSPORTATION ANO INFRASTRUCTIJRE
51ST DISTIIICT, CALIFORNIA COht.ldJJ"J'EE
RAILROADS
AVIATION
During recent combat operations on the 15 th of November in Fallouga, Iraq, Sergeant Rafael
Peralta, a constituent of mine, lost his life while protecting members of his unit from a grenade
blast. A news account of Sergeant Peralta's efforts to save his fellow Marines is attached.
Sergeant Peralta's selfless performance of duty was indeed extraordinary and in keeping with the
greatest traditions and warrior spirit of the few, the proud, the brave, the United States Marine
Cotps.
I would ask that every effort be made to monitor the submission of the recommendation for
award of the Congressional Medal of Honor by Sergeant Peralta's chain of command and that it
be processed in a timely fashion.
Sergeant Peralta's courageous sacrifice is truly deserving of this nation's highest award.
Please keep me informed on the progress in obtaining the recognition this young Marine so justly
deserves.
i}in~er~ ~
~ FILNER
Member of Congress
BF/tb
2179056
Enclosure
December 6, 2004
SAN DIEGO - Sgt. Rafael Peralta is dead, but the story of his sacrifice to save fellow Marines will live long in Marine Corps lore.
In the fierce battle for the Iraqi town of Fallouja, Peralta, with gunshot wounds to his head and body, reached out and grabbed a grenade
hurled by an insurgent, cradling it to his body to save others from the blast.
The explosion in the back room of a house injured one Marine, but four others managed to scramble to safety.
Peralta, 25, an immigrant from Mexico who enlisted the day he got his green card work pennit, was declared dead en route to a field hospital.
"Ifhe hadn't done what he did, a lot of us wouldn't be seeing our families again," said Lance Cpl. Travis J. Kaemmerer, who witnessed the
blast.
Garry Morrison, the father of Lance Cpl. Adam Morrison, had trouble keeping his voice from breaking when he spoke of Peralta.
"He saved the life of my son and every Marine in that room," Morrison said in a phone call from Seattle. 11 I just know one thing: God has a
special place in heaven for Sgt. Peralta."
Similar gratitude was expressed by family members of other Marines in Peralta's unit who were close to the blast. The unit was Alpha
Company, 1st Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine Division.
Los f ' les Times: A Hero's Courageous Sacrifice ~ '2 0 f 4
'The Bible says it all: 1No greater love hath no man than to give his life for another,' 11 Becky Dyer, the wife of Cpl. Brannon Dyer, said in a
phone call from Honolulu.
"My husband and I both feel that way," she said. "That's how the whole company feels about Sgt. Peralta."
In a modest home in a blue-collar neighborhood, the Peralta family feels pride but also grief, anger and confusion.
Rafael Peralta was the oldest son: strong, a weightlifter and athlete, head of the family since his father died in a workplace accident three
years ago. He loved the Marine Corps.
He joined in 2000 and recently had reenlisted. While in the Marines, he became a U.S. citizen. The only decorations on his bedroom walls are
a copy of the U.S. Constitution, the Bill of Rights and a picture of his boot camp graduation.
As Peralta waited last month to begin the assault on the insurgent stronghold ofFallouja, he wrote a letter to his 14-year-old brother, Ricardo.
The letter arrived the day after several Marines and a Navy chaplain came to the Peralta home to notify the family of his death.
We are going to destroy insurgents," Peralta wrote. "Watch the news .... Be proud of me, bro. I'm going to do something I always wanted to
11
do.
You should be proud of being an American. Our father came to this country and became a citizen because it was the right place for our
11
family to be. If anything happens to ~e, just remember I've already lived my life to the fullest."
Peralta had left his mother, Rosa, with similar words. She said he told her, I want you to be strong and take care of my brother and sisters
11
Rafael Peralta had not been assigned to the Nov. 15 attack on Fallouja. Still, he volunteered.
As a scout, assigned to perimeter security, he could have stayed on the periphery. Instead, he took the lead as his platoon stormed a house in
search of heavily armed insurgents known to be hiding in the neighborhood.
The house appeared empty. Then Peralta opened a door to a back room, and three insurgents fired their AK-47s. Marines fired back at near
point-blank range with M-16 rifles and automatic weapons.
Hit several times in the chest and once in the head, Peralta went down and appeared dead. Insurgents tossed a "yellow, foreign-made, oval-
Los/"' •eles Times: A Hero's Courageous Sacrifice ~ 3 of 4 '
To the amazement of the other Marines, Peralta, apparently with his last bit of strength, 11 reached out and pulled the grenade into his body,"
said Kaemmerer, a combat correspondent from the 1st Force Service Support Group assigned to the battalion.
Peralta's body absorbed most of the deadly fragments from the blast.
"Most of the Marines in the house were in the immediate area of the grenade," Kaemmerer said. "Every one of us is grateful and will never
forget the second chance at life Sgt. Peralta gave us. 11
After the grenade blast, the house caught fire, and Marines repositioned in the street for a second assault.
Within minutes, the three insurgents had been killed by Marines and Peralta's body recovered.
In the hours after the battle, Marines spoke quietly of Peralta's heroism.
"You're still here, don't forget that," Lance Cpl. Richard A. Mason told Kaemmerer. "Tell your kids, your grandkids, what Sgt. Peralta did for
you and other Marines today. 11
Even in their pain, Peralta's family members are not surprised that he decided to lead from the front.
"My brother was very courageous," Ricardo Peralta said. "He wasn't scared of anyone or anything. 11
Still, his older sister, Icela Donald, 24, wished that her brother had not been so brave.
"It doesn't surprise me that he did something like that," she said. uBut it kind of makes me mad. He had a family, and we need him. 11
Donald, who lives in Florida, came to San Diego to be with Ricardo, their sister Karen and their mother.
The family has been accommodating to the media, but know that soon attention will shift. "People will forget about him, 11 Donald said.
"That's when it will hurt the most."
When Peralta's body returned to San Diego for burial, his family members were unable to recognize him. They identified him only by the
Marine tattoo on his left shoulder.
Family members kept a two-day vigil next to the casket before burial Nov. 23 at Ft. Rosecrans National Cemetery at Point Loma, Calif.
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Ricardo Peralta was the first family member to talk to members of the "casualty notification" team. Despite his youth, he knew instinctively
why they had come to his house.
Among family members of Marines, there is no greater fear than seeing an official car pull up at their house, with Marines in dress uniforms.
Ricardo Peralta called his mother to hurry home from her job as a housekeeper at a hospital. Once home, she quickly became distraught and
ordered the Marines to leave.
Donald said her mother had only recently begun to recover from the death of her husband and her son's fiancee.
Rosa Peralta's husband, a diesel mechanic, was killed in September 2001 when a truck he was working on rolled and pinned him.
In December 2003, Rafael Peralta's fiancee was killed in a traffic accident in Michoacan, Mexico, where she had gone to attend her mother's
funeral.
11 God is punishing me, but I don't know why, 11 Rosa Peralta said.
Karen Peralta, 13, knows how she will remember her older brother. "As a hero," she said.
"No,'' she said quietly, her eyes downcast and filling with tears.
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