Myburgh V The State
Myburgh V The State
Myburgh V The State
: SA 21/2001
AND
APPEAL JUDGMENT
O’LINN, A.J.A.:
SECTION A:
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS:
The appellant appeals, with leave of this Court against a finding of the Court a
quo against the rejection of his application for a permanent stay of prosecution
The appellant was represented before us by Mr. Du Toit, S.C., assisted by Mr.
Prosecutor-General.
Counsel on both sides provided this Court with detailed and well-researched
heads of argument as well as the viva voce arguments which were extremely
helpful.
follows:
counts of fraud.
The background to the appellant’s application for the stay of the criminal
proceedings:
2. The Trial Court refused the application for the permanent stay of the
criminal proceedings and gave as its only reason that the Appellant
failed to show that the matter was urgent; it was ordered that the
permanent stay was filed, but was turned down on 14 December 2000.
existence.
proceedings.
without warning.
6
in his defence and that the trial against him should not
proceedings.
prosecuted.”
The main ground on which leave to appeal against the verdict of the Court a
granted, was that it appeared that the learned judge a quo rejected the
application on the sole ground that it was not urgent and without going into
SECTION B:
The appellant in this case relies primarily on sub-article 12(1)(b) read with
12(1)(a) of the Namibian Constitution as the basis for his application in the
v The Magistrate for the District of Oshakati NO and the Prosecutor-General NO,
the accused similarly relies on the provisions of Art. 12(1)(a) and (b) for her
appeal.
advocates, this Court had the benefit of hearing counsel in both cases.
At the outset it is best to set out the contents of the whole of Art. 12. It reads:
sub-article (1) deals with certain basic requirements of a fair trial relating to the
charges against them, subparagraphs (b) to (f) of sub-article (1) as well as sub-
articles (2) and (3) deal exclusively with certain specific requirements for fair
is made mandatory for the trial as described in subparagraph (a), “to take
place within a reasonable time, failing which the accused shall be released”.
The principle and requirement that a trial must take place within a reasonable
providing for a speedy trial and in the criminal law systems of all democratic
the International Covenant of Political and Human Rights provides in Art. 14.3(c)
shall have the right … to be tried without undue delay.” This Covenant has
trial” or “trial within a reasonable time” has been accepted in South African
and Namibian common law and criminal law and procedure long before the
1990 and the South African Interim Constitution of 1994 and final Constitution of
1996. The significance of this fact is that the common law has been developed
by statute and court precedents into a body of law not only recognizing the
1The Government of the Republic of Namibia and Others v G.K. Mwilima and Others,
unreported, NmS, delivered on 7/6/2002
11
requirements of a fair trial, but has provided remedies for ensuring a fair trial and
Several provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act were available to ensure a fair
disclosing an offence may lead to a quashing of the charge before trial.2 This
time.3
It was even possible and still is, to sue the Attorney-General (after Namibian
Then section 317 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 and its predecessor
provides for a special entry for the formulation of any alleged irregularity either
during or after the trial, which could lead to the quashing of any conviction or
sentence on appeal.
As was stated in State v Xaba4, the basic concept underlying section 317(1) is
But even though convictions and sentences were often quashed on appeal
during the trial and even before the trial if related to the trial, a further
prosecution and retrial was not barred if the accused was not in jeopardy of
being legally convicted, such as e.g. where the Court did not have the
(six) however expressly provides that such withdrawal does not amount to an
these methods were available and are still available to prevent or minimise
irregularities before trial which led to convictions and sentences being set aside
or an accused being acquitted at the end of the trial, have recently been
referred to in the decision of this Court in the case of Monday v The State.5
Although many principles relating to a fair trial were thus entrenched in the
South African and Namibian Law, the remedy of a permanent stay of the
prosecution applied for and granted at the pre-trial stage, was not resorted to
it may, this fact serves to underline that a pre-trial remedy of a permanent stay
exceptional circumstances.
National Defence and Martial Law. Moreover, the provisions for the
detracts from the fundamental rights and freedoms as contained and defined
in Chapter 3.6
See also: Mushimba v The State, 1977(2) SA 829(A); S v Xaba, 1983(3) SA 717 AD at 728;
S v Burger and v/d Merwe, High Court, SWA, 11/5/89, not reported, S v Alexander &
Ors(1) 1965(2) SA 796 (AD) at 809 C – D; S v Ebrahim, 1991(2) SA 553 AD.
6 Art 24, 26, 131
14
The only limitation upon the aforesaid Fundamental Rights and Freedoms is that
provided for in Art. 22, which deals with limitations contemplated by Chapter 3
itself, such as those apparent from the definition of the fundamental rights
The Namibian Constitution is not only unique in the world in regard to this
Art. 12, should the trial as defined in 12(1)(a), not take place within a
reasonable time.
provision from “speedy trial” provisions in the USA and in the rest of the world.
Before dealing with the more difficult and controversial issue of the
the interpretation of the words in which the specific right under 12(1)(b) is
formulated, namely:
Although not specifically raised or argued before us, I will assume for the
purposes of this decision that when the issue of whether or not art. 12(1)(b) has
15
been complied with must be decided, time begins to run from the time a
person has been arrested on a particular charge or when not arrested, from the
against him and some official action is taken against him in regard to the
specified charge.7
I assume also for the purposes hereof that although not spelled out in the
implication that the trial “begins and concludes without unreasonable delay”.
The South African Constitutional Court pointed out that separate and distinct
requirements of the right and that of the remedy, should not be overlooked,
“The first leg of the enquiry is whether the right under s. 25(3)(a) has
been infringed. If not, that is the end of the matter. If the right is
found to have been infringed then the enquiry turns to potential
remedies under 7(4)(a). A finding that the consequential relief
sought is inappropriate must not be confused with the antecedent
finding as to infringement.”8
7 Compare the South African Interim Constitution of 1994 where art. 25(3)(a) provide the
time to run from “having been charged”. Art. 35(3)(d) of the final Constitution of 1996
does not specify and merely describes the right as: “To have their trial begin and
conclude without unreasonable delay”.
8 Wild & A v Hoffert NO & Others, 1998(2) SACR 1 at 13 b-c
16
The enquiry is a difficult one. This was underlined in the Canadian decision of R
v Morin in regard to the wording of the speedy trial requirement of a fair trial:
but complicates the interpretation of the right – being the right to a trial within a
reasonable time.
The interpretation of the words establishing the right as well as the remedy
compartments, even less so than the enquiry about whether there was in fact a
breach of the right and the enquiry as to the applicable remedy. To illustrate:
one of the mandatory remedies in the discretion of the Court on the one hand,
or merely for a release from detention or a release from the pending trial, on
Court, the remedy for the breach is a permanent stay of prosecution, as the
only remedy or even as one of several mandatory remedies, then the Court will
be inclined in its interpretation of the provision establishing the right and its
establish a breach than would be the case if the words “shall be released” are
If however, the interpretation of the right and the requirements for establishing a
breach are relatively onerous and difficult to establish, then a Court will be
The consequence is that when interpreting the provision for the right and the
In State v Strowitzki and Another, the Court adopted the words of the learned
The Court then also specifically agreed with the following remarks in Baker v
The factors to be considered in deciding when “long is too long” were summed
reasonable time”.
11 IBID, p. 203
12 S v Heidenreich, 1996(2) SACR 171 (Nm) at 178 d
13 2002(1) SACR 70
21
reasonable time” but emphasis was placed on the meaning of the words –
“shall be released”.
Heidenreich in this regard was merely reaffirmed, but the interpretation of the
substance on the same lines as those already discussed to establish what was
I can now turn to the second leg of the enquiry, being the interpretation of the
Those who drew up the South African Interim Constitution in 1994 and its final
Constitution in 1996, which followed upon the Namibian Constitution and which
In South Africa the writers of both the 1994 Interim Constitution and the final
fundamental right and left it to the Court to exercise its discretion within the
that the Court “may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights”.
Mr. Small, for the State, was the only counsel who traced a Constitution where
the words – “shall be released” were used as part of the specific sanction
prescribed for instances where a person “arrested or detained”, “is not tried
The right protected is that of a person arrested or detained and the remedy is a
prosecution.
A general remedy for the breach of any of the Namibian fundamental rights
and freedoms and which corresponds to the aforesaid South African remedy
(4) The power of the Court shall include the power to award
monetary compensation in respect of any damage suffered
by the aggrieved persons in consequence of such denial or
violation of their fundamental rights and freedoms, where it
considers such an award to be appropriate in the
circumstances of particular cases”
(My emphasis added.)
The aforesaid sub-articles thus give the competent Court the power to make
any order necessary and appropriate, which include interdict and damages. A
range of possible remedies in the discretion of the Court. One would have
thought that the founding fathers would have been satisfied with these wide
add the specific and mandatory remedy for a breach of the right of a accused
complicates and confuses the issue. What was intended by the founding
the General Assembly of the Constituent Assembly does not reflect any debate
by the representatives or their legal advisers on the issue and the minutes of the
Committees of the Constituent Assembly are not freely and readily available to
24
at least to attempt to establish, what the founding fathers had in mind. But from
what has been available to the Court, it seems that issues such as these were
It seems therefore that at present, there is little or no assistance which this Court
can derive from a reference to and study of the minutes of the said Constituent
In view of the fact that sub-article (3) of article 25 of the Constitution makes the
said wide discretion of the Court “subject to the provisions of this Constitution”,
those powers would be subject to article 12(1)(b) which makes it mandatory for
the Court to order the release of the accused, should the trial not take place
If the intention was to allow any one or more of the remedies “release from
adequately covered by the powers provided under sub-articles (2) and (3) of
articles 25 and the mandatory provision that the accused “shall be released” if
15 The relevance and usefulness of such records are also acknowledged in the US
Supreme Court case of Dickey v Florida, 398 US 30 (1970) 398 US 30 where it was said:
“Records are scarce. There is eg no account of the Senate Debate, and the House
deliberations give little indication of the Representatives intent”. See also Makwanyane
& Another, the quotation from the judgment written by Chaskalsen, P, infra, when
referring to a judgment written by Kentridge in S v Zuma & Others. Ex Parte Attorney-
General in re the Constitutional relationship between the Attorney-General and the
Prosecutor-General, 1995(8) BCLR 1070 (NmS) at 1080 D – I.
25
the trial does not take place within a reasonable time as provided in part
It seems that the only way that Art. 25(2) and 25(3) could legally co-exist with
Art. 12(1)(b), is if it could be said that in Art. 12(1)(b), it was intended to provide
for a specific but limited breach of the requirements of a fair trial – namely the
requirement that the trial shall be held within a reasonable time and that the
remedy for that particular breach shall be limited to the “release”, of the
accused.
It further follows that if the breach is a breach other than the mere failure of the
trial to take place within a reasonable time, then Art. 12(1)(b) will not apply. Art.
25(2), (3) and (4) will then apply and the remedy will be sought and given in
accordance with Art. 25(2) read with Art. 25(3). Art. 25(2), 25(3) and 25(4) read
which will include an appropriate remedy for failure of a trial to take place
The problem which has crystalized in this case, is a Namibian problem in the first
Constitution. Decisions in the South African Courts and the courts of the USA,
Canada, Great Britain and other democracies, are consequently not directly in
point and not very helpful in regard to the provision: “shall be released”. The
Namibian High Court has however, attempted to come to grips with this difficult
26
and important problem on various occasions but the solutions found were not
uniform. It has now become necessary for this Court to strive to provide an
In the first case where an attempt was made to address the difficult problem of
interpreting the words “shall be released”, the accused had applied before
proceedings”. The application was based on the alleged failure of the trial to
irregularities16. The Court interpreted the words in Art. 12(1)(b) which read:
The Court commented as follows on the remedy provided by the words “shall
be released”:
The words “prima facie, it does not seem to include a permanent quashing or
opinion but was part and parcel of the interpretation of the whole of Art.
12(1)(b).
28
The application by the accused however, was rejected because the accused
had failed to prove the first leg of the Art. 12(1)(b), being that the trial did not
requested by the State and found that Art. 12(1)(b) had been breached
because the trial had not taken place within a reasonable time. It is not quite
clear from the judgment what were the precise words of the magistrate, but it
was stated in the High Court judgment that the magistrate had said that “an
order should be made releasing him from his trial and such an order was
made”. Thereafter the magistrate had second thoughts about this order and
submitted the record for review expressing the opinion that she “had no
jurisdiction to make the order”. The case was set down for argument and it was
agreed between counsel for the State and the accused that three points were
to be argued being:
(1) Was the magistrate correct in holding that the trial of the accused
(3) Was it competent for the magistrate to order that the accused be
(1) The magistrate was wrong in finding that the trial of the accused
accused’s right to a fair trial, but the High Court was the only
(3) It was competent for the magistrate to make an order for the
release of an accused.
“But when regard is had to the underlying purpose of Art. 12(1)(b) I am of the
view that a broader, more liberal, construction should be given to the word.
Once the main purpose of the sub-article is identified as being not only to
30
social stigma and other pressures which he is likely to suffer and to advance the
released from further prosecution for the offence with which he is charged. It is
only by giving the term this wider meaning that the full purpose of the sub-
article is met. Release from custody or from onerous conditions of bail only
As I understand it the learned judges did not find that “released” has the
that “released” “must mean” released from further prosecution and that that is
I am not convinced that this finding is justified by the so-called “main purpose”
of the provision – even though I have no problem with the formulation of the
time”, the Court inter alia referred to the Canadian decision in R v Askov where
The Namibian High Court and the Supreme Court have in recent years placed
much emphasis on the need to balance the rights and interests of accused
persons with those of the victims of crime and to consider also the public
appointed called “The Commission of Inquiry into Legislation for the More
enquire into and make recommendations regarding the balancing of the rights
of convicted and accused persons with those of victims and with the public
interest.
the Criminal Procedure Act No. 51 of 197719. It will also similarly affect the
the Criminal Procedure Act. In terms of the latter provision, the right to institute
a prosecution for crimes for which the death sentence could previously have
been imposed, “shall not be barred by the lapse of time”, whereas the
prosecution for other crimes, “lapse only after the expiration of 20 years from
the time when the offence was committed”, “unless some other period is
expressly provided by law”. The concern that the permanent stay of the
imposing a judicially created limitation period for a criminal offence” was also
One can therefore imagine why the sanction or remedy of permanent release
remedy which may adversely affect the interests of the victims of crime and the
public interest, as well as that of the accused, should not be imposed in other
prosecution has been applied for, not one has been successful so far. In S v
Uahanga & Others,21 however, the accused was acquitted on the authority of
the Heidenreich decision, but that decision can be distinguished because the
order was made after the accused had pleaded “Not Guilty”.
20 R v Francois, 18 CRR (2nd) 1994, 187 at 190, quoting with approval from R v L, (UK) 1991
Malama-Kean, infra, the Namibian High Court rejected the applications for a
permanent stay.
33
In South Africa, where the Court has a discretion to impose and/or to provide
necessary and appropriate relief, the Constitutional Court has stated in regard
In the following decision of the South African Constitutional Court, namely Wild
and An v Hoffert & Ors23, where Kriegler, J, writing the judgment for the Court as
It has been argued that in interpreting art. 12(1)(b) the Court must apply a
In this regard it is appropriate to repeat what was said in the majority judgment
‘…for in the last analysis the decision must depend upon the
words of the Constitution which the Court is interpreting and
since no two constitutions are in identical terms, it is
extremely unsafe to assume that a decision on one of them
can be applied without qualification to another. This may
be so even when the words or expressions are the same in
both cases, for a word or phrase may take a colour from its
content and bear different senses altogether.’
But as pointed out by Seervai, citing what was said by Gwyer, C.J.,
In the aforesaid decision, this Court also relied inter alia on a dictum
by Lord Wilberforce in Minster of Home Affairs & An v Fisher & An,
wherein the learned Law Lord had said:
Kentridge, A.J., also pointed out in S v Zuma & Ors that ‘it cannot
be too strongly stressed that the Constitution does not mean
whatever we might wish it to mean…’
It follows from the above that when a Court interprets and applies
a constitution and adheres to the principles and guidelines above-
stated, a ‘purposive’ interpretation also requires that a Court has
regard to ‘the legal history, traditions and usages of the country
concerned, if the purposes of its constitution must be fully
understood’.
When interpreting Art. 12(1)(b) of the Namibian Constitution, one should also
keep in mind that there has never been a principle in South African and
for any breach of any of the principles of a fair trial. So e.g. in South Africa, in
stated:
24The Chairperson of the Immigration Selection Board v Frank & An, unreported, NmS
dated 05/03/2001.
See also: Minister of Defence v Mwandinghi, 1992(2) SA 355 (NmS); Van As & A v
Prosecutor-General of Namibia, 2002(1) SACR 70 at 76 C – I. Compare also: Berg v
Prosecutor-General, Gauteng, 1995(11) BCLR 1441 (T) at 1445 G – 1446 E. Ex Parte
Attorney-General, Namibia: In re: The Constitutional Relationship between the Attorney-
General and the Prosecutor-General, 95(2) BCLR 1070 NmS. At 1080
38
In the light of the foregoing, it seems extremely unlikely that the Constituent
mandatory remedy, and as the one and only remedy, a permanent stay of
prosecution.
None of counsel who appeared in this appeal and the one of Malama-Kean
referred to supra, have been able to point to any court decision, or legal
dictionary, where the word “release” was used to provide for a permanent stay
The nearest one counsel could get was “The Oxford Companion to Law”, by
David M. Walker, MA, PL D, LLD, FBA, One of Her Majesty’s Counsel in Scottland,
Glasgow.
In this dictionary, the meaning of the word release is given as: “A discharge or
It is significant that even an academic, professor of law and Barrister with such
credentials could not find an application for the word “release” in criminal law
meanings are given with a measure of relevance to the word in Art. 12(1)(b):
“To allow to go; to set free; release a man from prison on order for his release
In Heidenreich the Court did however refer to the reference by Mr. Small,
counsel for the State, to various dictionary meanings of the term “released”
showing that the word “released” can have a variety of meanings, including
concluded as I have shown supra, on the ground of the need for a broader,
be the true and exclusive meaning to be given to the words. Counsel as well as
the Court in that case, appears to have given insufficient weight to the fact
that in the most relevant legislation the Criminal Procedure Act, the word
“released” is only used in the sense of released from custody, released on bail,
Section 58 provides:
The term “released” is also used in regard to bail in section 59, 60, 61, 66(1), 71
and 179. Section 72 deals with release on warning instead of bail. Section 185
deals with the detention of witnesses and the release from detention of such
Nowhere in the Act is the term “released” used in any other sense than released
from detention.
The Prison Act of 1995 also uses the term in sections 5, 61, 62, 64, 66, 67, 69 and
The notorious section 103 ter (4) and (5) of the Defence Act as it stood before
should they wish to bar a prosecution whether before or after plea. In the case
of a bar before plea, these provisions provided that the State President could
proceedings shall not be continued”. The task for the Court then was to
determine whether there was such a certificate. Once it determines that there
These provisions further serve to indicate how explicit the language must be to
Furthermore, the Legislature in enacting the Criminal Procedure Act, has used
the express term “acquit” in section 6(b) when it intended to provide for that
effect in cases where the State stops the prosecution after plea. If an acquittal
exclusive remedy was intended, why not say so, considering the fact that it is an
extraordinary remedy with wide-ranging implications. This need to use the terms
the same effect, becomes even more apparent if sub-article (2) of article 12 is
convicted or punished again for any criminal offence for which they have
added.)
Sub-article (2) must also be read in conjunction with the provisions of section
106 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 which was in existence at the time
the Namibian Constitution was enacted and is still valid and applicable in
Court that it is unconstitutional. I can also see no reason at all for declaring the
The significance of section 106 is that it provides in sub-section 1(c) and (d):
(f) …
43
Section 204 provides for a person who may be charged but is used as a state
witness and who, should the Court find at the end of the trial that he has
answered all questions frankly and honestly, “such witness shall, subject to the
deals with a case where the witness testifies at a preparatory examination and
after having been given the immunity, does not testify frankly or honestly at a
subsequent trial.
In all these cases the special pleas are tendered before any plea to the merits
and exhaust the pleas under statute where an accused can be permanently
The accused can also demand, in accordance with section 108 that the issues
the case of subsection 106(1)(e) read with section 204(2), the remedy provided
The words “discharge from prosecution” are not used in any other part of the
It is also significant that in the USA and Canada where a so-called dismissal with
“dismissal of the charge” and the focus is not on the person of the accused but
person of the accused and provides that the “accused shall be released”, not
In the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act, and Prisons Act where released
terms of the Criminal Procedure Act the terms “discharge from prosecution” or
The Court in Heidenreich held that Art. 25 “is concerned with specific and
freedom guaranteed by the Constitution has been infringed and whilst such
claims must be made in proceedings before the High Court, it does not mean
claims under Art. 25 and claims under Art. 12 and that claims under Art. 25 “are
specific and independent claims” and that such claims “must be made in
proceedings before the High Court” and that a magistrate’s court will not have
jurisdiction to hear such claims, but will have jurisdiction to hear complaints
proceedings which take place before it…”. The Court went on to indicate that
claims under Art. 12(1)(b) would be justiciable by the magistrate’s court in terms
of art. 5 if raised in the course of criminal proceedings before it. In view thereof
that the Court also found that the remedy provided for in art. 12(1)(b) is a
the magistrate’s court has jurisdiction by virtue of article 5 read with 12(1)(b), to
In the subsequent decision of Van As, the Court held that: “If the effect of the
necessity “release” does not have the extended meaning given to it in the
Heidenreich’s case. It seems that the learned judges in Van As based their view
that the magistrate’s court has no jurisdiction to grant such an interdict in terms
It follows that the Court in Van As correctly argued that if the words “shall be
released” mean that the Court shall grant a permanent stay of prosecution,
then a magistrate’s court will not have the jurisdiction to grant such an order. In
my respectful view, the Court in Van As came to the correct conclusion in this
regard.
This is so because art. 5 clearly provides that the Court and others, having the
duty to uphold and protect the fundamental rights and freedoms, provided
expressly that such rights and freedoms “shall be enforceable by the Courts in
The question must therefore be further examined what is the manner hereinafter
prescribed?
with articles 80(2), 80(3), 12 read with section 2 of the High Court Act 16 of 1990,
the Magistrate’s Court Act 32 of 1944, Chapter (VI) – Civil Jurisdiction and
Chapter XII – Criminal Jurisdiction and the Criminal Procedure Act No. 51 of
1977.
47
terms of sub-article (3), has wide powers in regard to providing remedies for the
breach of any fundamental human right or freedom but these powers are
again “subject to the provisions of the Constitution” which obviously also mean
“shall be released” should a trial not take place within a reasonable time.
Art. 80(2) provides that the High Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and
adjudicate upon all civil disputes and criminal prosecutions, including cases
thereunder…”
Parliament and shall have the jurisdiction and adopt the procedures prescribed
by the Act and the regulations made thereunder…” (My emphasis added.)
It is common cause that neither the Magistrate’s Court Act, its abovestated
a criminal case.
It is consequently beyond doubt that the only so-called “competent Court” for
the purposes of article 25 is the High Court and as such, that Court has wide
48
and freedoms, including interdicts and damages and obviously in the case of
court has no jurisdiction to do so as the law stands at the moment. Even if art.
of the envisaged remedies for the trial as envisaged in art. 12(1)(a) not taking
place within a reasonable time, that fact, read with art. 5, does not allow a
longer dominus litus and the magistrate’s court could in an appropriate case,
where the trial has not taken place within a reasonable time, refuse further
postponements and acquit the accused. This was done in the case of State v
amendment to the Magistrate’s Court Act and the Criminal Procedure Act,
25(2) or at any event clothe such courts with the necessary jurisdiction to
49
in appropriate cases.
The fact that a magistrate’s court does not have the jurisdiction to apply the
remedies provided for in art. 25, is not an insuperable obstacle to the granting
of the remedies provided for in art. 25. Should an aggrieved accused insist on a
Uahanga & Others, referred to supra. Smuts, A.J., wrote this judgment and
Mtambanengwe, J, concurred.
This was a case where a prosecutor, after some delay on the side of the State
apparently did not deal with the application for postponement, but acquitted
the accused in view thereof that he had already pleaded “not guilty” on a
previous occasion. This time the State appealed. The appeal was dismissed on
the authority of State v Heidenreich. The Court did not voice any criticism and
The next decision of the High Court was that in Van As & Another v Prosecutor-
General of Namibia, a full bench decision of three judges where the judgment
The first point made by the Court in this judgment with reference to the decision
that the words “shall be released” must mean that the prosecution is
the meaning and effect of the words “shall be released” in Art. 12(1)(b) was an
obiter dictum is probably correct because once it was found that it was not
proved that the trial did not take place within a reasonable time, it was not
necessary to decide the question of the meaning and effect of the words “shall
be released”.
In the following case, that of Malama-Kean, it was argued that the decision in
Van As relating to the words “shall be released” was obiter. It is not necessary
for this Court to further elaborate on whether or not the aforesaid decisions
released”, because this Court will not be bound by those decisions, whether or
not they were obiter dicta. This Court will in any event consider all those
decisions and decide to what extent those precedents have persuasive value.
It is apposite however, to point out at this stage that it is not always easy to
draw the line between what is a binding precedent and what is obiter. A rigid
27 2002(1) SACR 70
51
approach to avoid at all costs overstepping the line is not necessarily in the
interests of justice. Very often judicial guidelines are appropriate for guidance
particularly in those cases where the points were properly raised and argued
before the Court. It is also undeniable that our case law has been enriched by
In Van As, the Court in my respectful view, correctly accepted that the ratio of
was that the word must mean and therefore means that the mandated remedy
The Court in Van As disagreed with this conclusion in Heidenreich and followed
S v Strowitzki and Another, which was the first decision on the issue, even though
The reasons for the Van As decision were set out as follows:
It is true that a Court must start with the interpretation of any written
document whether it be a Constitution, a statute, a contract or a
will by giving the words therein contained their ordinary literal
meaning. The Court must ascertain the intention of the legislator or
authors of document concerned and there is no reason to believe
that the framers of a Constitution will not use words in their ordinary
and literal sense to express that intention. As was said by Innes CJ in
Venter v R 1907 TS 910 at 913:
One need not consult a dictionary for the meaning of the word
'release'. It is frequently used by members of the public and by
lawyers in Courts and in documents. In the instant case, the word is
used in art 12 which deals with a fair trial. In the same article the
framers of the Constitution used the word 'acquit' and dealt with
the effect thereof, namely having been acquitted an accused
could not be charged again.
These two concepts namely 'release, because the trial has not
taken place within a reasonable time' and 'acquit' where the trial
has been completed appear in the same article. It is therefore
logical to contrast the concepts and not to give them the same
meaning.
It is true the framers of the Constitution did not recite what the
effect of a 'release' would be. This is not a casus omissus as it was
not necessary to elaborate on the normal consequences of a
person who is being prosecuted, being released. A person who is
prosecuted is arrested in order to be prosecuted but may be on
bail. When such person is released from arrest and bail it does not
terminate the prosecution. One can attend a trial on a 'warning'
from the Court and one can be on one's own recognisance and
still be prosecuted.
To give the word 'release' its ordinary meaning (to release from
arrest or bail) fits in with the scheme of the Constitution and with the
existing common law and the Criminal Procedure Act (Act 51 of
1977) applicable before independence in Namibia and since
independence by virtue of art 140 of the Constitution.”
should a person be ‘released’ in terms of article 12(1)(b), such person would not
The next decision of the High Court, is now also on appeal before this Court,
The judgment was written by Hannah, J., concurred in by Maritz, J., and
Mainga, J. Hannah, J., was also as indicated earlier, the judge who wrote the
I will only deal in this judgment with the part of the High Court judgment in
“shall be released” in art. 12(1)(b) of the Constitution because all the other
Malama-Kean appeal.
The High Court in Malama-Kean not only differed from the judgment in State v
Strowitzki, and Van As & Another v The State, supra, but also the judgment in
State v Heidenreich.
In Malama-Kean it was found that the words “shall be released” allows “not
only release from custody and release from bail or conditions attached to bail,
and Malama-Kean, I have reached the conclusion that all of them were
appeal before us, was correct in his contention that “released” in art. 12(1)(b)
read with art. 12(1)(d) means “released from the trial as envisaged in 12(1)(a)”.
The Court a quo in Malama-Kean came to its conclusion on the three possible
forms of the order, without first concluding that the words “shall be released”
were intended in the first place to mean – “released from the trial as envisaged
accused persons who are not in detention, who would not have had a remedy
under art. 12(1)(b) if the term “released” in 12(1)(b) is restricted to release from
detention.
caused by the vague language of art. 12(1)(b) and the interpretation which
best reflects the probable intention of the authors of the Namibian Constitution.
The decisive consideration for the aforesaid construction however, is that the
principle that those criminal courts, which are “competent” courts with the
necessary jurisdiction, should have in their armoury of sanctions, the power and
The question however still remains what is the full significance of an order –
to me that only one form of release from the trial would meet the peremptory
requirement.
The following forms of release from the trial, will in my view all be legitimate
(i) A release from the trial prior to a plea on the merits, which does
Which form the order of “release from the trial” will take, will depend not only on
the degree of prejudice caused by the failure of the trial to take place within a
reasonable time, but also by the jurisdiction of the Court considering the issue
not be able, as the law stands at the moment, to order a permanent stay of
prosecution before plea and remedy no. (iii) supra would thus fall outside the
The High Court on the other hand, will be competent to grant all the remedies
enumerated under (i), (ii) and (iii) and as far as (iii) is concerned, it will act in
terms of its powers as a “competent” court under art. 25(2) read with article 5
will only be granted if the applicant has proved that the trial has not taken
place within a reasonable time and that there is irreparable trial prejudice as a
Courts making an order under 12(1)(b) must not merely state that the accused
“shall be released” but use one of the forms of order enumerated in (i), (ii) or
(iii), supra, so that the ambit of the order will be clearly understood by all
concerned.
SECTION C:
PROSECUTION
It was conceded by counsel on both sides that the only ground given by the
learned presiding judge in the Court a quo for rejecting the application was
It was also common cause that the Court a quo did not go into the merits of the
(1) “The trial Court should have found … that the appellant was entitled to
prosecution; it should also have held that there is no reason why such an
(2) “The trial Court should have held that there is every reason why the
application for a stay of prosecution could not wait until the criminal trial
60
was finalized and that in fact such an approach would defeat the very
Mr. Small in his argument set out the various stages of the proceedings before
the application was actually launched. As I understand it, the crux of Mr.
Small’s argument was that the requirements for a party relying on urgency were
not met, particularly that the grounds of urgency on which the applicant relied
were not properly set out in the application and that the urgency, if any, was
self-induced in that the applicant used various delaying tactics and did not act
in good faith. All this may have some substance, but unfortunately such reasons
do not appear from the judgment as the ratio of the judge a quo.
deal with this aspect in detail, particularly in view of the fact that the judgment
is already extensive.
plea, will naturally be launched at some stage before plea. In view of the fact
that the purpose of such an application is obviously to prevent the trial from
and a Court should not regard it as fatal to the application merely because the
grounds of urgency are not spelled out with the same precision and
particularity as in cases where only the applicant can say why the application is
urgent.
61
This Court has recently, in the case of The Government of the Republic of
Namibia & Ors. v G.K. Mwilima & Ors., dealt with the issue of whether a notice of
motion procedure was permissible where the subject matter was in substance
related to relief required for an alleged breach of the requirements of a fair trial,
The Court held that the notice of motion procedure was not only permissible in
that case but actually preferable, particularly in order to give all the parties
involved a proper opportunity to state their case.29 Although the present case is
In my respectful view, the Court a quo erred in rejecting the application on the
sole ground that the application was not urgent. However, that is not the end
of the matter.
The fact that the Court did not go into the merits, places this Court in a dilemma
as to the course of action to follow. In the usual type of case where the merits
of a matter were not decided because of a point in limine, this Court would
See The Govt. of the Rep. of Namibia & Ors v G K Mwilima & Ors , NmS, unreported,
29
delivered on 7/06/2002
62
refer the matter back to the Court a quo to decide the merits where the point
In the present case however, where so much time has already been lost, it
would not be in the interests of justice of delay the final decision on the issues
any longer. The merits of the application can be decided on the record, not
only of the application but of the trial which followed and which are before this
Court, even though the Court of first instance did not decide it. It seems to me
therefore that a robust approach is necessary to reach finality in the matter and
that this Court could and should decide the issue on the merits.
The grounds relied on for the application are set out in Section A, supra. These
officers who investigated the case against the accused and others, the
the alleged breach of the fundamental right to a trial within a reasonable time.
The applicant/appellant relies for a remedy on art. 5 read with 25(2) and 25(3)
of the Namibian Constitution as well as art. 12(1)(b), providing for a trial within a
this judgment infra and refer to that section in so far as it is necessary for this part
of the judgment.
The first question which arises on the merits is whether the applicant/appellant
The allegations of fact made about irregularities are vague and unimpressive.
When counsel for the appellant was asked to demonstrate any trial related
prejudice from the record of the trial, he was completely unable to do so and
the record.
through the criminal proceedings and did not enjoy the benefit of
This type of prejudice does not constitute the prejudice required in regard to
the merits of the application for a permanent stay of the prosecution and is no
64
prosecution.
It follows that the application for a stay had no substance and should have
The only issue which remains in regard to the application for a stay, is whether or
not the Court a quo should have made an order for costs against the
The Court a quo however, did not consider the merits at all and should not
have ordered the applicant to pay the costs where the application was merely
SECTION D:
The accused was sentenced to three (3) years imprisonment, two (2) years of
of this count.
Leave was however, granted in regard to counts 6 and 7 where the sentences
imposed were:
Mr. Du Toit made the following submissions in regard to the appeal against the
aforesaid sentences:
“1. It is trite law that the sentencing discretion is that of the Trial
Court; that the Court of Appeal will only interfere when the
Trial Court erred by committing an irregularity or a
misdirection in respect of sentence or if the sentence
induces a sense of shock and is startlingly inappropriate.
3.4 The money was stolen from Willie Dames and the
Appellant was not able to buy the trucks;
Mr. Small in reply contended that “none of the misdirections alleged by the
Defence was in fact committed, alternatively that they do not vitiate the
Mr. Small also reminded the Court of all the principles applicable in regard to
which are well-known and can be regarded as trite law at this stage. The
30S v Van Wyk, 1992(1) SACR 147 Nm at 165 d – g and the authorities collected.
S v De Jager & An, 1965(2) SA 616 AD at 629 A – B;
S v Pillay, 1977(4) SA 531 AD at 535 D – G.
68
The judgment of the Court a quo, on sentence, is, generally speaking, thorough
and commendable.
It seems to me however, that the Court has given insufficient weight to the role
played by Carl von Shicht, the senior bank official who as found by the Court,
the grave and ugly offences against the bank. The Court was of course also
correct in pointing out that “the crimes were committed with fraudulent
The fact is that the complainant Bank was extremely lax in its administration and
control. Having a manager or senior official, who runs the Loan and Hire-
Purchase section, not only openly allowing business without the proper security
and relaxing all the rules, must have been an open invitation for the sort of
business in effect done between the accused and the bank. Where as here,
prejudice complainant suffered was caused by the Bank’s own officials. In such
a situation a client may think with some justification that the practice to allow
these procedures and practices are aimed at increasing the Bank’s turnover
Although the Court correctly convicted the accused and rejected the
argument raised by the defence at the sentence stage that the accused did
not “intend” to defraud the Bank, the Court failed to consider and/or give the
necessary weight to the argument that the accused did not intend to cause
the Bank prejudice and at all times had the intention to pay the Bank what was
security, were false. Proof of this was that certain instalments were in fact paid
by the accused on both agreements before his bank account was closed; the
greater part of the purchase price of the two trucks (N$416 250) was diverted
for a tyre deal but was stolen from Willie Dames with the result that the
appellant was not able to buy the two trucks; the appellant never fled from
Furthermore, it is clear from the judgment that the learned trial judge had failed
time, and intention that these two counts could properly be regarded as one
crime in substance and that the Court should have followed one or more of the
justifying this Court to consider a more appropriate sentence in the light of all
In my respectful view, counts 6 and 7 should be taken together for the purposes
2. The order of costs given against the appellant in the Court a quo
is set aside.
3. The sentences on counts 6 and 7 are set aide and the following
Court. The substituted sentence on count 6 and 7 will run from the
________________________
O’LINN, A.J.A.
I agree.
________________________
STRYDOM, C.J.
I agree.
________________________
CHOMBA, A.J.A.
/mv
72