Future of Russian Military

THE
FUTURE
RUSSIAN
OF THE
MILITARY
RUSSIA’S GROUND COMBAT Andrew Radin
Lynn E. Davis
CAPABILITIES AND IMPLICATIONS
Edward Geist
FOR U.S.-RUSSIA COMPETITION Eugeniu Han
Dara Massicot
Matthew Povlock
Clint Reach
Scott Boston
Samuel Charap
William Mackenzie
Katya Migacheva
Trevor Johnston
Austin Long
C O R P O R AT I O N
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Preface
This document presents the results of a project titled U.S.-Russia Long

Term Competition, sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7,
U.S. Army. The purpose of the project was to help the U.S. Army
understand the shifting relative capabilities of the U.S. and Russian
militaries of the next twenty years.
The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project
that produced this document is HQD167556.
This research was conducted within the RAND Arroyo Center’s
Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part
of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and develop-
ment center (FFRDC) sponsored by the United States Army.
RAND operates under a “Federal-Wide Assurance” (FWA00003425)
and complies with the Code of Federal Regulations for the Protection
of Human Subjects Under United States Law (45 CFR 46), also known
as “the Common Rule,” as well as with the implementation guidance
set forth in DoD Instruction 3216.02. As applicable, this compliance
includes reviews and approvals by RAND’s Institutional Review Board
(the Human Subjects Protection Committee) and by the U.S. Army.
The views of sources utilized in this study are solely their own and do
not represent the official policy or position of DoD or the U.S. govern-
ment. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of
its research clients and sponsors.
iii
Contents
Preface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Figures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Tables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix
Abbreviations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxi
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background and Purpose. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Methodology and Sources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
CHAPTER TWO
Factors Underlying Russian Military Power. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Russia’s Security Priorities.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Societal Support. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Economic Performance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Defense Spending. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Demographics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Military Personnel Policies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
CHAPTER THREE
Key Capability Areas for Ground Combat.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Analysis of Key Capability Areas.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
General Approach and Recent Procurement.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
v
vi The Future of the Russian Military
Defense Industrial Policy.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Future Outlook.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
CHAPTER FOUR
Future Russian Capabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Possible Changes in Factors and Future Ground Combat Capabilities. . . . . 67
CHAPTER FIVE
Policy Implications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
References: Chapters 1–5.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Figures
2.1. Russian Growth Rates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

2.2. Change in Russian GDP, Petroleum Production (Measured
in Millions of Tons of Oil Equivalent [MTOE] and
Commodity Prices Over Time). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3. Change in Household Consumption Over Time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4. Past and Projected Russian GDP and Spending on
National Defense in Constant 2015 Rubles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.5. Russian GDP and Spending on National Defense in
Inflation Adjusted Dollars. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.6. Russian Procurement Expenditures Compared to Other
Military Expenditures in 2015 Constant Rubles.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.7. Dynamics of Crude Birth and Death Rates and Total
Population of Russia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.8. Population Pyramid in 2017 (Estimate). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.9. Net Migration from Selected FSU and Other Countries. . . . . . . . 39
2.10. Population Projections to 2036. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.11. Forecast of Number of Males of Conscription Age (18–27).. . . . 41
vii
Tables
2.1. Targets of the SAP-2020. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

3.1. Summary of Findings of Key Capability Areas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.1. Mapping Strategy for Armed Forces to Capabilities for
Ground Combat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.2. Possible Changes in Factors Affecting Russian Strategy for
Armed Forces and Ground Combat Capabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
ix
Summary
Understanding how Russian military capabilities will develop over the

next 20 years is critical to future Western defense planning. Perfectly
predicting the future is not possible, but one can gain insights for the
future of key Russian ground capabilities by analyzing the critical
political, economic, demographic, and societal factors underlying Rus-
sian military power.
Factors Underlying Russian Military Power
A relatively coherent and consistent view of Russia’s security policy goals

currently exists, and these have been translated into a political-military
strategy for the armed forces that involves five key tasks: strategic deter-
rence (to prevent aggression on the Russian homeland); regional domi-
nance, including responding to instability, terrorism, or conflict in the
near abroad (meaning the non-Baltic former Soviet Union); expedi-
tionary operations; preparedness in case of a major ground war; and
domestic stability. While changes are possible, we expect continuity in
this strategy.
Other economic, demographic, and societal factors underlying
Russian military power over the last decade have undergone significant
change, but they also show signs of remaining stable over the medium
term (ten years). Public attitudes show support for Russia’s govern-
ment, foreign policies, and the military. Russia is projected to experi-
ence relatively stagnant economic growth of 1 percent to 2 percent of
xi
xii The Future of the Russian Military
gross domestic product (GDP), due to low growth in oil and gas export
revenue, poor prospects for domestic reform, and low investment,
although higher and lower growth scenarios are possible. Russia’s mili-
tary budget has increased substantially due to larger acquisition expen-
ditures, although we expect future military budgets to level out and
grow proportionate to GDP. While Russia is not expected to enjoy
major population growth, its demographic situation is not by any mea-
sure crippling. Russia also has built a relatively stable mixed conscript
and contract manning system for the military.
In aggregate, we expect these factors to facilitate continued incre-
mental modernization of Russia’s military but not major discontinuous
improvements or collapse.
Key Capability Areas for Ground Combat
To analyze Russia’s developing ground combat capabilities, we look at

eight key areas: maneuver ground forces; indirect fire (<100 km range);
long-range strike; rapidly deployable forces; command, control, com-
munications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(C4ISR); air defense, electronic warfare (EW); and internal security
forces. For each of these areas, we systematically analyze recent trends
in doctrine, spending, personnel, and recent operations, and extract
the near-term outlook from these trends.
We identify three general modes of development that characterize
the changes we observe in the key capability areas: retain-and-adapt,
in which Russia draws on sometimes-modernized Soviet-era systems or
concepts; emulate-and-adapt, in which Russia draws on foreign models
or concepts; and asymmetrically countering foreign threats.
Russia’s maneuver ground forces are the prime example of the
retain-and-adapt approach. The ground forces have received a small
proportion of resources for procurement and modernization. Modern-
ized Soviet-era platforms, such as the T-72B3, can be made almost as
effective as new platforms with the addition of new components (such
as fire control or active protection systems) at a fraction of the cost.
Russia has maintained a massed and area-effects threat by retaining a
Summary xiii
large volume of indirect fire launchers and munitions from the Soviet
Union with less significant modernization. Russia’s rapidly deployed
forces—including the Airborne and GRU Spetsnaz—also build on
Soviet-era formations, but represent new and dramatically reformed
forces, with novel C4ISR systems and other state-of-the-art equipment.
Russia’s internal security forces, which play an important role in the
defense of Russia, have been built from pieces of Soviet-era structures
within newly created or reorganized institutions.
Russia also retained-and-adapted Soviet designs in its acquisi-
tion of long-range strike systems (i.e., systems that are used at the the-
ater level, generally with >100 km range) while emulating-and-adapting
U.S. operating concepts in its doctrine and approach. Russia has devel-
oped the ground-launched Iskander-M from the Oka intermediate-range
ballistic missile, and the sea-launched Kalibr from the RK-55 Relief
ground-launched cruise missile. Russia has long sought to emulate
aspects of the U.S. use of long-range strike systems, as in Kosovo,
Afghanistan, and Iraq. However, Russia needed the additional resources
that became available after 2008 to begin deploying additional air-,
sea-, and ground-launched long-range strike systems. Russia’s C4ISR
also represents a combination of legacy Soviet systems and the emulation-
and-adaptation of concepts and approaches such as net-centric warfare.
Russia’s highly advanced air defense systems build on the extensive
Soviet-era investment in air defenses, while its EW offers a primary
example of where Russia has invested in capabilities that can asym-
metrically counter perceived U.S. advantages.
We also examine how the Russian government has funded or sub-
sidized the defense industry. We identify different patterns of investment
and state support that shed light on priorities and future developments.
In some areas, particularly long-range strike and C4ISR, the Kremlin
has invested significant resources in recapitalizing particular enterprises,
indicating its prioritization of the systems they produce. In other areas,
such as air defense and EW, Russia has engaged in long-standing sup-
port of companies producing systems that are strategically significant. A
third pattern reflects the collapse and incorporation of troubled enter-
prises into state-owned holding companies. This has been the fate of
Russia’s main producers of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, in part
xiv The Future of the Russian Military
because of weak demand and undercapitalization. A fourth approach

is investment in more speculative technologies through means such as
venture capital, but these efforts are quite modest. The overall outlook
for Russian development in these key capabilities is continuity in terms
of overall approach and with respect to the characteristics of the military
industrial complex.
Projecting Future Russian Capabilities
Looking back, Russia’s development of its ground capabilities reflects

the strategy we identified for the armed forces, within the constraints
of Russia’s economic performance, defense budget, demographics,
and military personnel system. Russia improved its long-range strike,
C4ISR, and air defense capabilities to strengthen strategic deterrence.
Changes in military personnel policy, among other reforms, enabled
the professionalization, increased reliability, and greater readiness of
Russia’s rapidly deployable forces. In turn, these forces strengthened
Russian military capabilities for the task of regional dominance, as
shown by its operations in Ukraine. Russia’s investment in rapidly
deployable forces and long-range strike also improved its expedition-
ary capabilities, as shown by Russia’s operations in Syria. Still, Russia
retained the ability to fight a major ground war with the West or China
through the capability of its maneuver ground forces, indirect fires,
and long-range strike, its rescue of firms producing ground vehicles,
and the retention of conscription.
The same underlying factors that shaped Russia’s military devel-
opment in the past will also likely shape Russian capabilities in the
future. While there may be continued incremental developments in
the future, we view the most likely future as one of continuity in the
strategy for the armed forces and social stability, small growth in the
economy and defense budget, and a small demographic decline. Russia
will continue to focus on achieving dominance in its near abroad, with
an emphasis on readiness and professionalization of a small component
of the force. Some expansion and incremental improvements will occur
in long-range strike, rapidly deployable forces, C4ISR, and air defense,
Summary xv
while relative stagnation will occur in the maneuver ground forces and
indirect fires.
While we see continuity as most likely, we recognize that change
is possible. Energy prices could increase or decrease, which could, in
turn, affect growth in the economy and Russia’s defense budget and
military capabilities. Another possibility is that changes in Russia’s
economic growth and security strategy could occur because of shifts
in relations with the West or China. Such changes could give Russia
incentives to shift priorities within its strategy for the armed forces
and pursue different ground capabilities, but in general we continue
to expect a prioritization of capabilities associated with strategic deter-
rence, regional dominance, and internal security.
Policy Implications
To achieve U.S. interests, the U.S. military will need to provide forces
that can compete with Russia across a range of different types of inter-
actions, from cooperation to conflict. Given Russia’s extensive con-
ventional and nuclear strategic deterrent capabilities, the key challenge
will be how to develop U.S. capabilities that can achieve U.S. interests
at any intensity of competition without escalation. The United States
will also need to consider how to minimize cost, given the limited risk
of Russian actions threatening U.S. core interests and competing bud-
getary priorities. Using the framework of our identified Russian strat-
egy for the armed forces, we describe the policy implications for the
United States of our analysis of Russia’s future interests, capabilities,
and priorities, with a focus on the U.S. Army.
The first and last elements of Russia’s security strategy, strate-
gic deterrence, and internal security, are inherently defensive, although
strategic deterrent forces could threaten the United States and its allies.
Russia clearly sees threats from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) enlargement and the enhancement of U.S./NATO military
capabilities on its borders, and the possibility exists that Russia’s view
of the threat could increase or a crisis could develop that could lead to
unintended military escalation. U.S. policymakers need to be attuned
xvi The Future of the Russian Military
to Russian perceptions of the threat posed by U.S. force deployments

in Europe.
Regional dominance, the second element of Russia’s strategy for
the armed forces, poses a more immediate threat to U.S. interests, given
that Russia’s primary desired sphere of influence includes former Soviet
republics such as Ukraine and Georgia, who aspire to join Euro-Atlantic
institutions. Given Russia’s growing capabilities and greater interests,
U.S. support has not been, and does not appear likely to be, able to
significantly undermine Russia’s regional dominance; however, the
U.S. military can explore options to bolster partners’ security forces by
improving the quality and capacity of niche areas such as foreign area
officers, units focused on providing security-force assistance, informa-
tion operations, and military medical units.
Russia’s expeditionary operations and capabilities, the third element
in Russia’s strategy for the armed forces, pose a complex challenge that
will require both flexibility and preparedness for high-intensity conflict
with well-armed adversaries. While Russia has invested in special forces,
long-range strike, and air defense, the Russian military is not config-
ured to be a global expeditionary military, especially given its gaps in
expeditionary logistics and standing basing arrangements. Neverthe-
less, Russia may support proxies who may undermine U.S. interests.
The U.S. Army should investigate options to prepare for the challenge
of Russian expeditionary capabilities, such as ensuring that its forces
deployed in areas where a conflict with Russia is conceivable have the
necessary training and equipment and are prepared to take action
while avoiding escalation.
Perhaps the most dangerous possibility is a large-scale ground war
with Russia. We see it as unlikely that Russia is preparing to initiate
such a war given its security goals and strategy, past decisions to develop
key capabilities, and the constraints posed by its economy, demogra-
phy, and personnel policy. Nevertheless, beyond Russia’s advantage in
the size of ground forces in Europe, existing research shows various
ways that Russia’s current and projected near-term capabilities pose a
threat to the U.S. Army in Europe.
To address these developments in Russian capabilities, our analy-
sis offers insight across the range of capability areas outlined. For the
Summary xvii
maneuver ground forces, the Army should prepare for challenges from
the overall size of the Russian forces and modernized Soviet-era plat-
forms. To address the challenge posed by Russia’s indirect fire and
long-range strike capabilities to U.S. forces at all echelons of the battle-
field, the U.S. Army should investigate options to attrite Russian sys-
tems; to pursue dispersal, denial, and deception; and to improve EW
and air and missile defenses. Improving U.S. cyber and EW capability
at the tactical and operational level could help address Russia’s growing
parity in C4ISR, although this may require investment in command,
control, and planning, as well as possible changes in authorities to use
cyber. The U.S. military should also continue to pursue options to
bolster communications, positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT),
and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) against Rus-
sia’s EW, and Multi-Domain Battle and related concepts to address
Russia’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities.
In addition to filling U.S. Army capability gaps, a joint U.S. mili-
tary and combined alliance response will be required. For allies who
border Russian territory, including Poland and the Baltic states, find-
ing ways to better compete with Russian military forces in possible
collaboration with U.S. forces could be invaluable for deterring both
Russian subversion short of war and high intensity conflict.
While Russia’s ground capabilities will continue to develop, they
will be constrained and directed by political, demographic, economic,
and social factors within Russia, which will likely change slowly over
the next five to ten years. Studying Russia’s priorities and its constraints
helps shed light on how the U.S. military can best develop its full range
of capabilities to better compete with Russia and achieve U.S. interests,
while minimizing financial cost and the risk of war.
Acknowledgments
We are grateful for the support of many people over the course of this
project. We would like to thank the U.S. Army G3/5/7 DAMO-SSX
for initiating and sponsoring this study, including Colonel Mark Solo-
mons, Colonel Brian Davis, Major Thomas Arnold, and Major Corey
Steiner. We would also very much like to thank our interlocutors in
Washington, D.C., and Moscow for taking the time to speak with
us. Hearing your perspective was invaluable for bringing this project
to fruition. Our further thanks go to our colleagues and compatri-
ots at other research organizations working to understand the Russian
military. We have greatly benefited from your work and analysis. Our
two reviewers, Brian Taylor of Syracuse University, and Elina Treyger
of RAND, offered thoughtful, detailed, and extremely helpful com-
ments, greatly improving the final product. Our sincere thanks go to
Jerry Sollinger for his editorial assistance and Natalie Ziegler for her
administrative assistance. Any remaining errors are our own.
xix
Abbreviations
A2/AD Anti-access/area denial

ALCM air-launched cruise missile
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
BTG Battalion Tactical Groups
C2 command and control
C4ISR command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
CAST Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DIA Defence Intelligence Agency
DOTMLPF Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel and
Education, Personnel and Facilities
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
EEU Eurasian Economic Union
EU European Union
EW electronic warfare
xxi
xxii The Future of the Russian Military
FDI foreign direct investment

FFRDC federally funded research and development center
FMSO Foreign Military Studies Office
FOI Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut (Swedish Defense
Research Agency)
FPI Fond perspektivnykh issledovaniy (Foundation for
Prospective Research)
FSB Federal'naya sluzhba bezopasnosti (Federal Security
Service)
FSU former Soviet Union
GDP gross domestic product
GRU Glavnoye Razvedatel'noye Upravleniye (Main
Intelligence Directorate)
IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMF International Monetary Fund
INF Intermediate Nuclear Forces
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
KMZ Kurganmashzavod (Russian arms manufacturer)
KSO Komandovaniye Sil Spetsial’nykh Operatsiy
(Special Operations Command)
MENA Middle East and North Africa
MOD Ministry of Defense
MTOE Millions of tons of oil equivalent
MVD Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del (Ministry of Internal
Affairs)
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Abbreviations xxiii
NDMC National Defense Management Center

PNT positioning, navigation, and timing
PUIC Project Unique Identification Code
R&D research and development
SAP State Armaments Program
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SDO State Defense Order
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Institute
SOCOM U.S. Special Operations Command
SOE state-owned enterprise
SOF Special Operations Forces
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
UN United Nations
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UVZ Uralvagonzavod (Russian arms manufacturer)
VDV Vozdushno-desantnye voyska (Airborne Troops)
VKO Voyskaya Vozdushno-Kosmicheskaya Oborona
(Aerospace Defense Forces)
VKS Vozdushno-Kosmicheskiye Sily (Aerospace Forces)
WMV weapons of mass destruction
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
Background and Purpose
Given conflicting interests between Russia and the West and uncer-
tainty about Russia’s future intentions, the development of the Rus-
sian military poses real challenges to the United States and its allies.
Russia’s military appears to have improved significantly since the war
in Georgia in 2008, as demonstrated by Russia’s successful seizure of
Crimea in February 2014, its ability to support separatist forces in
eastern Ukraine, and Russia’s military action to shore up Bashir al-
Assad’s government in Syria. While perfectly predicting the future is,
of course, impossible, understanding the potential range of the devel-
opment of Russian military forces is critical for Western defense plan-
ning. If Russia were able to dramatically modernize its forces to achieve
parity with the West and could use its military strength to pursue more
aggressive policies in Europe, a significant shift in Western military
policy could be necessary. If, by contrast, Russia’s military collapsed
under the weight of economic and demographic pressures or if there
were no likelihood that Russia would use military force against the
West, Russia might no longer need to be viewed as a major potential
adversary. This report analyzes the development of Russia’s military
capabilities over the next 20 years, with a focus on ground combat and
the implications for U.S.-Russian competition.
While building on the extensive literature on the Russian mili-
tary, our report focuses on addressing two key gaps. First, the literature
focuses on Russia’s current military potential by noting specific mili-
tary actions that Russia is taking or could take that would be harmful
1
2 The Future of the Russian Military
to U.S. or allied interests. While these current or hypothetical threats

are important, it is also critical to prepare for future military challenges
by studying the broader political, social, and economic context of Rus-
sia’s military development.
Second, the study of Russian military capabilities focuses largely
on specific military hardware or systems, without necessarily study-
ing how these systems fit into Russia’s overall force structure, doc-
trine, training, and strategy, or investigating the military industrial,
political, or economic constraints on the development or employment
of future systems. We show how the development of Russia’s ground
combat capabilities are constrained and motivated by political priori-
ties and economic constraints, and, as far as possible, show the linkages
between the factors underlying Russian military power and the specific
capabilities it develops.
Methodology and Sources
The future is inherently uncertain, and so our forecasts about the

future of Russian military capabilities are necessarily speculative. Nev-
ertheless, past experience offers some guide to the future development
of Russia’s military forces. We designed a two-part theoretical frame-
work to analyze the development of Russia’s military forces relevant
to ground combat: 1) we identify and make forecasts about the politi-
cal, economic, demographic, and societal factors underlying Russian
military power, and 2) we analyze the likely future development of
key military capability areas. This framework is designed to provide
a transparent, flexible, and systematic approach for making forecasts
about the future over the short term (the next five years), medium term
(five to ten years), and long term (ten to twenty years).
In Chapter 2, we analyze six factors within Russia that underlie
military power: Russian strategy for what the armed forces should do;
societal support for the regime, foreign policy, and the military; Rus-
sia’s overall economy; the defense budget; demographics; and military
personnel policy. Along with other elements, such as bureaucratic iner-
Introduction 3
tia, the military industrial complex, and beliefs about the future of
warfare, these factors influence and constrain Russia’s efforts to shape
and develop the military. Each factor does have some observable direct
impact on specific military forces, especially the strategy for what the
military should do. To a greater degree, however, the precise effect of
the factors is difficult to disentangle because they interact and together
shape the overarching development of Russia’s military. By understand-
ing the recent history of these factors and making forecasts about their
trajectory over the next 20 years, we gain insight into the potential dif-
ferent paths Russia’s military could take.
After analyzing these factors, in Chapter 3, we turn to eight spe-
cific key military capability areas that are most important for ground
combat. We selected the main systems and forces involved in ground
combat and the key enablers that support them, and seek to understand
how these forces have developed in the past and the outlook for the
future. In particular, we examine: 1) ground vehicles, 2) indirect fires,
3) long-range strike, 4) air defense, 5) high-readiness light infantry,
6) internal security forces, 7) electronic warfare (EW), and 8) C4ISR
(command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveil-
lance, and reconnaissance). By indirect fires, we mean systems with
less than 100 km range, while long-range strike refers to longer-range
systems with theater-level effects. While the internal security forces,
including the National Guard (Rosgvardiya) or Federal Security Ser-
vice (Federal’naya sluzhba bezopasnosti, FSB), are not technically mili-
tary organizations, they play an important role in Russia’s approach to
internal security and they may be deployed abroad. Their development
also shapes Russia’s overall military potential. The future development
of these key capability areas together describes the future of Russia’s
ground combat capability.
The factors identified in Chapter 2, and especially the strategy
for the armed forces, offer significant insight into the development of
each key capability area. Based on these observations, in Chapter 4 we
consider possible future changes in the factors, for example, fluctuat-
ing oil prices or shifts in relations with the West and China, and the
implications for the key ground combat capability areas.
The final chapter in our report draws from our analysis to iden-
tify policy implications for the U.S. Army, and Western policymakers
more broadly.
The main body of our report, Chapters 1 through 5, is built on
and summarizes the core findings of the 12 appendixes. The appen-
dixes contain the bulk of our research and analysis, including analyz-
ing the factors that shape the future of the Russian military and the key
capability areas for ground combat. For two factors (Russia’s political-
military strategy and its economic performance), we draw on the well-
developed literature. No appendix is provided for that analysis, but we
do offer additional analysis of the likely future outlook in these areas.
For the four other factors—societal support, defense spending, demo-
graphics, and military personnel—in the relevant appendix we offer
a general causal framework describing what we believe explains the
development of this factor over time. We describe the recent historical
trend of each factor (e.g., the size of the past defense budget) based on
available evidence. We hypothesize explanatory variables that explain
these trends (e.g., in the case of the military budget, GDP growth and
the size of the acquisition budget). We then extrapolate forward, using
projections of the identified explanatory variables to make a range of
probable forecasts. The factor appendixes are meant to provide a sug-
gestive framework for analysis of the future rather than conclusively
demonstrate causation. Our methodology provides transparent and
flexible forecasts by mapping out the explanatory variables and basing
forecasts on stated alternative projections of these variables. While the
factor appendixes generally follow a similar structure, there is some
variation based on the specific content and data available, and some go
into more detail about the outlook and implications for other factors.
The next eight appendixes analyze the key capability areas for
ground combat. For each capability area, we examine the recent history
of doctrine and operating concepts, systems, level of resources spent,
the defense industry, personnel and training, and operations. We then
use our analysis of the past, and other available information, to assess
the likely future outlook. This framework draws from common ana-
lytic tools such as the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel and
Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) framework while
Introduction 5
adding a focus on military industrial considerations that play a major

role in the future development of Russian military capabilities. Because
of the diversity of the key capability areas and data available, there is
some variation in the structure of the capability appendixes.
This report does not attempt to offer a comprehensive treatment
of the overall Russian military and, instead, focuses on the potential
future development of capabilities related to ground combat. While
we do touch on some naval, air force, or other capabilities related to
ground combat, we do not offer a detailed analysis of these forces. Nor,
aside from our analysis of ground-related capabilities, do we detail the
overall structure of Russian military, command and control, the mili-
tary industrial complex, or other related organizations. This informa-
tion is covered in detail in other works.1
We rely on a wide range of open sources. We use official Russian
government documents, including official budgets, law, and public state-
ments. We also rely on a growing range of detailed open-source reports
about the Russian military by government, government-sponsored,
and nongovernmental research institutions such as the Defense Intel-
ligence Agency, the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI), Foreign
Military Studies Office (FMSO), the RAND Corporation, and others.
Russian and Western news media further provide valuable reporting on
Russian military developments and operations. Finally, we conducted
interviews and discussions in Washington, D.C., and Moscow with
U.S., Russian, and other officials and analysts engaged in the study of
the Russian military.
1 See, among others, Gudrun Persson, ed., Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year
Perspective-2016, FOI-R—4326—SE, Stockholm: Sweden, December 2016; Lester W. Grau
and Charles K. Bartles, The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Moderniza-
tion of the Russian Ground Forces, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Foreign Military Studies Office,
Foreign Military Studies Office, 2017; Defense Intelligence Agency, Russia Military Power:
Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations, 2017.
CHAPTER TWO
Factors Underlying Russian Military Power
Any country’s ability to generate and sustain military forces depends

on many factors, but some of the most important are their security
priorities, societal support, economic performance, defense spending,
demographics, and the quantity and quality of military personnel. We
appreciate that these factors are interrelated and that developments in
one will affect others. Demographics influence economic performance
and the size and structure of the military. Russian security priorities
and economic performance directly influence defense spending. Soci-
etal support affects the Russian government’s policies and military
budget.
This chapter analyzes these factors in Russia, considering their
recent past and potential future development (see also Appendixes A
through D). Our goal is to understand what underlies Russian military
power and the outlook for the long-term U.S.-Russian competition.
Russia’s Security Priorities
The Russian elite’s view of the country’s security priorities is, per-
haps, the most directly influential factor shaping the development
of its ground combat capabilities. The elite’s security policy goals
and threat perceptions shape the development of a strategy for the
armed forces that answers the basic question of “what is the military
7
for?”1 This strategy explains a great deal about Russia’s priorities

for key capability areas. To explore the elite’s perspectives on this
issue, we relied on a wide array of interviews, analysis, and official
documents.2
Security Policy Goals

A relatively coherent and consistent understanding of Russia’s security
policy goals currently exists, unlike in the 1990s and even the 2000s
when views within the establishment diverged sharply. The consensus
has been called the “hard realist” school.3 The other approaches to
security policy—“pro-Western” or ultranationalist—have been largely
discredited or partially coopted. The ultranationalist camp, initially
empowered by the annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbas,
was subsequently discredited by their own radicalism. Differences still
exist among Russian elites on the severity and prioritization of threats
and their predictions about the future of relations with other countries,
but most appear to share similar views about the broad contours of
1 Our description of and conception of strategy draws on, but differs from, the structure and
content of Russian strategic documents. We attempt to outline a parsimonious description of
the tasks the Russian armed forces are intended to accomplish to achieve Russia’s objectives
and response to threats, while the Russian strategic documents, such as the National Secu-
rity Strategy, detail all “the national interests and strategic national priorities of the Russian
Federation, and domestic and foreign policy goals, goals and measures directed at strength-
ening national security and ensuring the country’s stable long-term development” (Russian
Federation, “The Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy,” December 31, 2015).
2 In particular, we draw on over 25 interviews, conducted in Moscow in July 2017, with
Russian analysts and current and former officials; the Russian government’s official pro-
nouncements on strategy, including the 2014 Military Doctrine, the 2016 Foreign Policy
Concept, and the 2015 National Security Strategy; published interviews with Russian offi-
cials; and secondary literature, including elite surveys. Given our focus on the long-term
development of Russia’s strategic priorities, we have focused on documenting the views of
the wider foreign policy community in Russia rather than Putin’s public statements. These
views are largely consistent with those articulated by Putin. See Vladimir Putin, “Putin’s
Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy,” Munich, February 12,
2007; Vladimir Putin, “Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club,” Sochi, Russia:
Valdai International Discussion Club, October 24, 2014; and Vladimir Putin, “Address by
the President of the Russian Federation,” March 18, 2014.
3 Interview with Russian government advisor, Moscow, July 2017.
Factors Underlying Russian Military Power 9
Russian security policy goals. Some of these goals lead to specific poli-
cies, while in other cases Russia’s policies and behaviors appear to be
the product of the intersection or overlap of several goals.
The top security policy goal is stability, a concept in Russia that
is far broader than in the West. It entails a broad sense of predictability
and minimization of uncertainty about the future. Stability implies,
first and foremost, domestic political stability; in other words, avoid-
ance of any popular unrest, separatism, terrorism, or other threats to
the current political order. Economic stability—avoidance of sharp
downturns—is a means to the end of political stability and, thus, a
goal in and of itself.4
Russia also seeks stability externally, most of all on its borders,
because of a perceived direct link between events there and stability
inside Russia.5 Stability is defined particularly by avoidance of “color rev-
olution” scenarios whereby, as many Russian elites see it, Western govern-
ments capitalize on popular unrest to overthrow sitting governments and
install ones hostile to Russia.6 To avoid such an outcome, Russia tends to
support “friendly” regimes and put pressure on those that are not.
Beyond its own neighborhood, the security policy goal of stabil-
ity involves thwarting perceived U.S. attempts at regime change glob-
ally, and particularly vis-à-vis Russia, supporting like-minded sitting
(mostly, but not exclusively, authoritarian) governments and deterring
the United States from taking steps to undermine Russia’s domestic
stability.7
4 Interviews with Russian analysts, Moscow, July 2017.

5 See interview with Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev in Elena Chernenko,
“Za destabilizatsiei Ukrainy skryvaetsya popytka radikal’nogo oslableniya Rossii” [“The Desta-
bilization of Ukraine Is a Cover for an Attempt to Radically Weaken Russia”], Kommersant,
June 22, 2015. Patrushev says, “Behind the destabilization of Ukraine is hidden an attempt
to radically weaken Russia.”
6 See presentations by Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov,
and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov at the 3rd annual Moscow Conference on
International Security.
7 See Samuel Charap, “Russia, Syria and the Doctrine of Intervention,” Survival, Vol. 55,
No. 1, March 1, 2013, and Andrew Radin and Clinton Bruce Reach, Russian Views of the
International Order, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2017.
A second consensus security policy goal is retaining and increas-

ing Russia’s influence in its “near abroad”; that is, to be the political,
economic, and security center of gravity in the region that consists of
the 11 other non-Baltic former Soviet republics (the Baltic states, having
joined North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] and the European
Union [EU], seem to be viewed in the same, more “foreign” category as
the east and central European countries).8 This goal entails minimizing
the influence of the West in the region, since the West’s involvement
there is seen not only as leading to color revolutions but also as increas-
ing the integration of Russia’s neighbors into Euro-Atlantic institutions
leading to the potential placement of NATO forces and infrastructure
closer to Russian borders.9 To that end, Russia seeks to weaken NATO
to prevent its enlargement, although few in Moscow actively seek to
destroy the alliance and some believe that doing so would be destabiliz-
ing and could provoke a Western European military buildup.10 China’s
growing economic role has also eroded Russian dominance within the
former Soviet region, especially in Central Asia, but Moscow has con-
fidence that it can establish an effective division of labor with Beijing:
China defers to Russia on security and political matters while taking a
leading role on infrastructure and investment projects.11 The Russian
elite does not believe Chinese influence to be a security threat because
China also abhors color revolutions and does not seek to deploy forces
or build military infrastructure in the region.12
8 Ivan Timofeev, Theses on Russia’s Foreign Policy and Global Positioning (2017–2024),
Moscow: Center for Strategic Research, June 2017, p. 6; interviews with Russian analysts,
Moscow, July 2017.
9 Sergei Karaganov, et al., Strategiya dlya Rossii: rossiiskaya vneshnyaya politika: konets 2010-
kh—nachalo 2020-kh godov [Strategy for Russia: Russian Foreign Policy From the End of
the 2010s to the Beginning of the 2020s], Moscow: Council on Foreign and Defense Policy,
May 2016, p. 14.
10 Interview with Russian government advisor, Moscow, July 2017.
11
Samuel Charap, John Drennan, and Pierre Noël, “Russia and China: A New Model of
Great-Power Relations,” Survival, Vol. 59, No. 1, January 2, 2017.
The Russian elite also believes that the country needs to be the
leader of a broader region to further a third consensus security policy
goal: to enhance and reinforce Russia’s great power status. Moscow
wants a say on all matters of global importance and to be taken seri-
ously as a truly independent player with its own voice. Practically, this
means reinforcing the centrality of the United Nations Security Coun-
cil (UNSC) and the UN system generally, given Russia’s veto power
there.13 It also means pioneering Russia-led, or heavily Russia-influenced
international organizations, like the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-
tion (SCO), Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS),
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Eurasian Eco-
nomic Union (EEU).14 Maintaining nuclear parity with the United
States is another manifestation, as is having the ability to project mili-
tary forces outside Russia’s immediate near abroad. Moscow believes
that great powers should also cooperate with other great powers; Russia
should, therefore, be able to work with the United States, Europe,
China, and others on shared challenges.15
Threat Perceptions
Russian elites broadly share similar threat perceptions, although their
prioritization of these threats varies. Many Russian strategists consider
domestic stability to be the country’s top security priority and, thus,
domestic instability to be the number one threat.16 According to a 2016
study, more Russian elites see the “inability to solve domestic problems”
as the “utmost” threat to the country, greater than any other threat.17
13 Karaganov et al., 2016, p. 19.

14 Timofeev, 2017, pp. 18–21.
16 Indeed, the 2014 Military Doctrine states, “There is tendency for military risks and mili-
tary threats to shift into the information space and the internal sphere of the Russian Federa-
tion.” As one former senior official put it, “We long ago concluded that Russia could never be
defeated by external invasion. We can only be defeated from the inside out.” Interview with
former senior official, Moscow, July 2017.
17
Sharon Rivera, et al., The Russian Elite: Perspectives on Foreign and Domestic Policy, Clinton,
N.Y.: Hamilton College, 2016.
Popular unrest—spurred from abroad—that could topple the govern-

ment or undermine state institutions is seen as a very real prospect.18 For
Moscow, this threat is anything but purely domestic; most scenarios for
instability emphasize the role of external factors in fomenting discon-
tent, unrest, etc. Indeed, such a perspective is consistent with Russian
attitudes toward protests globally. From the Arab Spring to the Maidan
Revolution, Russia is inclined to see the hand of outside powers behind
the people in the streets.19
A second and related set of threats emanates from Russia’s near
abroad. The nature of these threats varies from subregion to subregion.
The main risk in Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus, as well as the South
Caucasus, is the further enlargement of the EU and NATO. While
the potential for Kyiv to join Euro-Atlantic institutions looms large,
Ukraine is in a category of threat by itself, both due to the country’s
centrality to Russia’s security concerns and the multifaceted and long-
term nature of the ongoing crisis.20 In the future, Russia is likely to be
facing a Ukraine that regards it as a mortal enemy and has the capac-
ity to cause trouble, particularly in Crimea and rebel-held areas in the
Donbas.21 Moscow is also concerned about state breakdown in Central
Asia or the South Caucasus, especially since weak states there facilitate
the spillover of Islamic extremism as well as potentially compel Russia
to intervene militarily to restore order.
18 “I count 30 color revolutions since 2003,” said the former senior official, who saw no
reason why one could not happen in Russia as well. He also alleged that there was an attempt
at such a revolution in 2011–2012, a reference to the mass protests in major cities following
a deeply flawed election cycle. Interview with former senior official, Moscow, July 2017.
19 As the former Chief of the General Staff writes, “I am fully convinced that any color revo-
lution is a stage-managed action intended to effect a coup d’etat.” Yurii Baluevskii, “Voina
ne konchaetsya, ona—zamiraet” [“War Doesn’t End; It Dies Down”], Nezavisimoe voennoe
obozrenie, May 26, 2017.
20 Even today, Russia is affected through the flow of refugees and economic migrants.
Formally, 1.1 million have registered as refugees, but one official estimated the total
number of Ukrainians, including those who did not register, at approximately 2.5 mil-
lion (UN High Commissioner for Refugees, “Ukraine: UNHCR Operational Update,
14 May 14–10 June 2016,” The UN Refugee Agency, 2016; and interview with Russian
official, Moscow, July 2017).
21 Timofeev, 2017, p. 19.
Islamic extremism and terrorism represents a third source of

threats to Russia, given its past extremist terrorist attacks and greater
risk of terrorism at home due to ties between Muslim communities in
Russia and Central Asia and extremist groups in the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) region.22 The extremist threat from the Middle
East is viewed differently from that in Russia’s near abroad, since the
Gulf region is considered the original source of radical Islamist theol-
ogy and funding for the global terrorist and extremist threat. Given
the lack of geographic continuity, Russian-speakers, and shared Soviet
past, the countries of MENA are viewed largely through a narrow
counterterrorism lens, albeit one that is linked to broader counter-
terrorism efforts in and around Russia.
The West, and more specifically the United States, represents a
fourth category of threat.23 The United States itself is now seen as the
single gravest source of global instability and unpredictability, which
will continue to threaten Russia directly and indirectly, in some cases
unintentionally.24 A direct conflict with NATO in Europe is viewed as
a very low probability but high consequence event, and one that would
be possible only due to an accident, miscalculation, or further NATO
enlargement to the east.25 The Baltic region is not seen as a priority
threat, although many in Moscow acknowledge the potential for unin-
tentional conflict.26
22 In the 2016 Hamilton survey, terrorism is ranked as the second “utmost” threat to Russia
(Rivera et al., 2016).
23 The Hamilton study of elites showed that 88 percent of respondents in 2016 believed that
the United States is either “fairly” or “very” hostile toward Russia (Rivera et al., 2016).
24 See Chernenko, 2015.
25 Interviews with Russian analysts and officials, Moscow, July 2017.
26 A Russian official emphasized, “I don’t believe scenarios” of Russia-NATO conflict
emerging because of the Russian-speakers in the Baltics, and noted Western officials’ “dan-
gerous philosophy” of playing out “sci-fi” scenarios (for example, Russia-NATO conflict)
publicly, and thereby making them become more real. Two possible scenarios that were
raised for conflict include the deployment of unspecified NATO military capabilities
and/or infrastructure or a massive “pogrom” against Russian speakers there (interviews with
Russian official and former senior official, Moscow, July 2017).
China is a final and far more distant threat for Russia, given
Russian confidence in its strategic partnership with China. However,
things could change for the worse in the future, for example, through
a nationalist takeover in Beijing.27
Strategy for the Armed Forces

The Russian leadership appears to have developed a political-military
strategy for the armed forces based on its security policy goals and
threat perceptions. This strategy involves the military carrying out
five key tasks: strategic deterrence; regional dominance within Russia’s
near abroad (the non-Baltic former Soviet Union [FSU]); expedition-
ary operations; preparedness in case of major war; and domestic stabil-
ity. This strategy emerged, in part, out of Russia’s reconsideration of its
military priorities following a disappointing performance in Georgia
and the related military reform effort that focused on shrinking the
size of Russia’s military forces and increasing their readiness.28 Our
articulation of this strategy focuses on preparations for kinetic combat,
and does not include military support to political or intelligence activi-
ties (such as cyber or information operations) that are undertaken out-
side of possible kinetic operations.29 Capabilities to undertake such
operations may be implied by the elements of the strategy or may inde-
pendently shape military planning.
27
Interview with former senior official, Moscow, July 2017. See also Anton Lavrov, “Russia’s
Geopolitical Fears,” Moscow Defense Brief, Vol. 55, No. 5, 2016a.
28 See Appendix D and E as well as Andrew Monaghan, Power in Modern Russia, Manches-
ter: Manchester University Press, 2017, pp. 68–70; and Igor Sutyagin and Justin Bronk, Rus-
sia’s New Ground Forces: Capabilities, Limitations and Implications for National Security, RUSI
Whitehall Papers, Vol. 89, No. 1, 2017, pp. 10–42. Aleksandr Golts also highlights that, due
to the 2008 reforms, the military “had a clear mission. They had to win in a short-term local
conflict.” However, Golts notes that the only way to win a large-scale conflict with the West,
given the reformulation of the military, was using nuclear weapons, pointing to the impor-
tance of strategic deterrence over a preparation for large-scale war in Russia’s current strategy
for the armed forces. Aleksandr Golts, Military Reform and Militarism in Russia, Uppsala
Universitet, 2017, p. 290.
29 An example is the cyber activities by the GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate [Glavnoye
Razvedatel’noye Upravleniye]) in the case of the 2016 U.S. election. See Director of National Intel-
ligence, “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections,” ICA 2017-01D,
January 6, 2017.
Strategic deterrence is critical to this strategy and dates from

Soviet times. It has gained new salience as Russia has developed more
acute threat perceptions regarding Western intentions and fielded its
own new weapons classes. Strategic deterrence calls for nuclear weap-
ons, nonnuclear strategic weapons, and air defense to prevent any
aggression on the Russian homeland first and foremost. However, stra-
tegic deterrence is broadly defined and is intended to deter and coerce
potential adversaries across the range of potential conflicts.30 Strategic
deterrence also serves as the insurance policy in case the relationship
with China were to sour in the long term.
The second critical element of Russia’s strategy is regional domi-
nance: to be able to respond rapidly to any form of instability, terror-
ism, or conflict that may emerge within its near abroad and to have
escalation dominance over both regional actors and other external
powers. Russia’s military response within its region would not only
ensure a flexible and variable response to dominate any potential adver-
sary within the region but also deter outside powers by establishing
dominance immediately at the beginning of a conflict.
Third, Russia aims to be able to engage in out-of-area expedi-
tionary operations to respond to terrorism, instabilities, and humani-
tarian disasters and, thus, bolster Russia’s role as a great power. It is
important to note that Russia’s ambition for expeditionary operations
is quite limited, especially in comparison to the United States, which
is part of the reason Russia seeks collaboration for future expedition-
ary operations. Russia lacks a strong network of bases and allies to
support expeditionary operations, it has a very small expeditionary
logistics capacity,31 and there is little in Russia’s strategic documents
30
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “Russian Strategic Deterrence,” Survival, Vol. 58, No. 4,
August–September 2016.
31 For example, while Russia was acquiring aging cargo ships and standing up the ad hoc
“Syria express” to supply its forces in the region, the improvised nature of this effort and
the weakness of Russian military forces to provide logistical support are indicative of larger
challenges for expeditionary logistics. Jonathan Saul and Maria Tsvetkova, “Russia Supplies
Syria Mission With Old Cargo Ships Bought from Turkey,” Reuters, December 15, 2015.
On the larger military logistical challenges facing Russia, see also Grau and Bartles, 2016,
pp. 274–283.
to suggest that expeditionary operations are a priority. Nevertheless,

Russia’s engagement in Syria, its efforts to cultivate its expeditionary
capabilities through the development of a merchant marine, and other
procurement priorities indicate that Russia does seek to develop the
potential to use its military overseas in the future. While these activities
are expected to be largely in the MENA region, they may also occur on
the Korean peninsula if there were instability in the Democratic Peo-
ple’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) or, potentially, other regions.32
Fourth, Russia’s strategy calls for preparedness in case of major
war, largely through mobilization. As can be seen in relative resource
allocations discussed later, preparation for a land war with NATO or
China does not appear to be a top priority in developing the military
since the likelihood of such a conflict is viewed as highly remote.33
Still, the possibility of protracted ground conflict with a peer com-
petitor remains an important consideration in the minds of Russian
strategists, particularly given the enduring legacy of World War II and
Russia’s long history of being invaded by foreign powers.34
Finally, Russia wants its armed forces to play a role in maintain-
ing domestic security and stability. This priority is most vividly seen in
the creation of Rosgvardia and the strong financial and political sup-
port for it and other internal security agencies.
Conclusions and Outlook

Russia’s security policy goals reflect longstanding and, by all indica-
tions, deeply held views among elites. Despite some variation reflect-
ing recent events, there is also broad consensus on the threats facing

33 No interviewees claimed that the military should be focused on fighting large land wars
with peer competitors. As the former senior official put it, “the time of mass armies is over.”
However, officials and analysts saw value in maintaining conscription within a mixed system
as a means of instilling patriotism in the youth and as an insurance policy for the contin-
gency of a large-scale land war with NATO or China. Interviews with former senior official
and analysts, Moscow, July 2017.
34 See Makhmut Gareev, “Uroki i vyvody iz opyta Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny dlya stroitel’stva
i podgotovki Vooruzhennykh Sil,” Voennaya mysl’, No. 5, 2010.
the country. Russia has developed a strategy for its armed forces to
achieve its security policy goals and address its threat perceptions.
The five tasks are: strategic deterrence; regional dominance; expe-
ditionary operations; preparation in case of major war; and domes-
tic stability. While changes are possible, we expect continuity in this
strategy.
Societal Support
Support from Russian society is a second key factor in shaping Russia’s

military, including by influencing the stability of the regime, Russia’s
foreign policy, and its ability to generate and sustain Russian military
force. Current polling shows substantial, and likely continuing, public
support in each of these areas.35
There is extensive public support for Russia’s current system of
government and for President Putin. Through nearly two decades of
his leadership as Russia’s president or prime minister, Putin has gen-
erally enjoyed high levels of public support. Even at the time of the
lowest approval point, in 2011–2013, his ratings exceeded 60 percent.
Since the Ukrainian crisis and annexation of Crimea in early 2014,
Putin’s approval rating has stayed above 80 percent.36 Russians appear
to approve of Putin’s performance because they see him as respon-
sible for economic growth and for providing security and stability.37
35 See Appendix A for the polling data in these areas and additional analysis on the follow-
ing observations.
36 “Optimizm rossiyan snizhayetsya, reyting Putina—poka net” [“Russians’ Optimism Is
Waning—But Not Their Support for Putin”], Deutsche Welle, September 24, 2015; “Deyatel-
nost gosudarstvennyh institutov” [“Functioning of the State Institutions”], VTsIOM, no date.
37 Hilary Appel, “Is It Putin or Is It Oil? Explaining Russia’s Fiscal Recovery,” Post-Soviet
Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 4, 2008, pp. 301–323; Edward Lucas, The New Cold War: Putin’s Russia
and the Threat to the West, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014; Daniel Treisman, “Presiden-
tial Popularity in a Hybrid Regime: Russia under Yeltsin and Putin,” American Journal of
Political Science, Vol. 55, No. 3, 2011, pp. 590–609; Kathryn Stoner and Michael McFaul,
“Who Lost Russia (This Time)? Vladimir Putin,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 2,
Summer 2015, pp. 167–187.
Many Russians consider Putin’s primary accomplishments to be the

strengthening of Russia’s global standing and improvement of the Rus-
sian military force.38 Furthermore, only 12 percent of Russians think
that a future Russian president should pursue more liberal approaches
to governance, and over 70 percent are either content with the current
style of governance or think it should be harsher.39 Putin’s popularity
reinforces the stability of the regime, but other factors play a role in
maintaining that stability as well, including apathy and strong crack-
downs on the freedom of speech and assembly.40
Nevertheless, political protest activity seems to have grown
over the course of 2017, most visibly manifest in Russia-wide anti-
corruption protests in March and June 2017.41 Although these events
attracted the greatest numbers of participants since the mass protests
of 2011–2012, they are unlikely to signal a serious immediate chal-
lenge to the current regime, as the protesters represent a vocal and
educated middle-class minority among the Russian youth and Rus-
sians more generally. A great majority of Russians say they would not
participate in protests and do not seem to share the protesters’ views
or their antigovernment zeal.42 There is little indication that public
support for Putin and his regime is likely to wane drastically in the
near term given Putin’s dominance in polls leading up to the 2018
38 Robert Person, “Balance of Threat: The Domestic Insecurity of Vladimir Putin,” Journal

of Eurasian Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2017, pp. 44–59; “Vladimir Putin: Otnosheniye I Otsenki”
[“Vladimir Putin: Attitude And Evaluations”], Levada Center, April 4, 2017.
39 “Prezident 2018” [“President 2018”], Levada Center, May 7, 2017.
40 Douglas Rutzen, “Civil Society under Assault,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 26, No. 4,
2015, pp. 28–39; Daria Skibo, “Five Years of Russia’s Foreign Agents Law,” Open Democracy,
August 14, 2017; See also “Lyudi Privykayut K Nasiliyu” [“People Are Getting used to Vio-
lence”], Levada Center, January 18, 2017.
41 Denis Volkov, “Chto Osobennogo v Novoy Volne Protestov v Rossii” [“What Is Special
About the New Wave of Protests in Russia?”], Moscow Carnegie Center, April 6, 2017;
Denis Volkov, “Ottsy i Deti: Problema, s Kotoroy Stolknulsya Naval’nyy 12 Iyunya” [“Fathers
and Sons: The Problem Navalny Faced on June 12”], RBC, June 13, 2017.
42 “Protestnyj Potencial ” [“Protest Potential”], VTsIOM, January 15, 2017.
election.43 While it is difficult to see whether Putin’s popularity would

carry over to a new president in a new regime, there seems little reason
to suspect that low public opinion of the current regime will lead to
such a change in the near to medium term.
There is also strong public support for Russia’s foreign policy,
with more than 40 percent of the public seeing foreign policy as a main
accomplishment of the government.44 A strong majority believe that
Russia should be a great power, and an increasing majority believe
that Russia is a great power today.45 Russians are more likely to see
ISIS (58 percent) rather than U.S. power and influence (37 percent)
as a threat to their country.46 The public appears to largely support
Russia’s current policies, in part because recent policies—including
the annexation of Crimea, intervention in Ukraine, and opposition
to Western alliances—resurrected and built on longstanding patri-
otic sentiments. Russians tend to see the West as responsible for the
recent crisis in relations, with a majority of Russians claiming that
the West’s unwillingness to accept Russia as a great power is behind the
West’s hostility toward Russia. The Levada Center’s analysis of its
own polling also suggests that Russians are willing to sacrifice eco-
nomically (e.g., due to sanctions) to maintain Russia’s position as a
great power.47
Although the linkage between domestic political concerns and
military operations is uncertain and probably varies in different con-
43 “Vybory 2018” [“Elections 2018”], VTsIOM, December 2017.

44 Theodore Gerber, “Foreign Policy and the United States in Russian Public Opinion,
Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 62, No. 2, No. 98-111, 2015, p. 100.
45
“Derzhavnost’ I Osobyy Put’ Rossii” [“Russia’s Special Power and Path”], Levada Center,
December 12, 2016.
46 JacobPoushter and Dorothy Manevich, “Globally, People Point to ISIS and Climate
Change as Leading Security Threats,” Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project blog,
August 1, 2017.
47 “Russia and the West: How Russians Think the West Views Them,” Levada Center,
June 26, 2015; “Greatness Instead of Democracy: How Russia Became a Peer to the U.S. in
the Minds of Its Citizens” [“Velichiye Vmesto Demokratii: Kak Rossiya Dognala Nas V Umakh
Svoikh Lyudey”], Levada Center, February 4, 2016.
texts, analysts do emphasize that Russian foreign policy is, in part,

influenced by concerns about public opinion.48 In the case of the
annexation of Crimea, Putin, at a minimum, considered domestic pop-
ular support in formulating his policy and a desire to boost his popular
appeal after the 2012 election may have motivated his decision.49 From
this line of argument, it is possible to speculate that another Russian
military action might be motivated by a desire to boost the regime’s
popularity.50 However, war carries substantial risk to the government,
and Russian public support for military conflict is by no means guar-
anteed, as shown by the low popularity of a Russian military interven-
tion in Ukraine.51
Public support for the Russian military is strong. The Army
(which refers to all military services) is one of Russia’s most trusted
institutions and a tremendous and growing source of pride for the
Russian population.52 After common opposition to conscription due
to hazing and other problems, a growing number of Russians support
the preservation of compulsory Army service for all men (58 percent
in 2017 versus 47 percent in 2011).53 About 36 percent of Russians
48 See, for example, Kimberly Marten, “Crimea: Putin’s Olympic Diversion,” Washington Post,
March 26, 2014; Tobias Theiler, “The Microfoundations of Diversionary Conflict,” Security
Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2017, pp. 318–343; Olga Oliker, et al., Russian Foreign Policy in His-
torical and Current Context: A Reassessment, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, PE-
144-A, 2015.
49 “Address by President of the Russian Federation.” See John W. Parker, “Understanding
Putin Through a Middle Eastern Looking Glass,” Institute for National Strategic Studies,
July 2015, No. 19, p. 35; Stoner and McFaul, 2015, pp. 180–181.
50
See, for example, Dmitri Gorenburg, “Russian Military Intervention in Kazakhstan,”
American Enterprise Institute, January 17, 2018, p. 2.
51 In July 2014, polls found that only 5 percent to 10 percent of respondents supported such
a Russian military intervention, which likely explains Russia’s denial of its presence in the
country. Harley Balzar, “The Ukraine Invasion and Public Opinion,” Georgetown Journal of
International Affairs, March 19, 2015.
52 “Institutional Trust,” Levada Center, October 13, 2016; “Gordost’, patriotizm i otvetstven-
nost” [“Pride, Patriotism and Responsibility”], Levada Center, December 7, 2015.
53 “Rossiyskaya Armiya” [“Russian Army”], Levada Center, February 20, 2017.
believe defense spending should be a priority in 2016, in line with past

years.54
From the perspective of societal support, Russia’s current policies
appear quite sustainable. The population supports the government,
its foreign policy, the development of the military, and the necessary
public expenditures to that end. There are elements of the society that
might support a more aggressive nationalist foreign policy and smaller
elements that might prefer a more pro-Western foreign policy but, over-
all, public sentiment backs the status quo for the foreseeable future.
Economic Performance
Russia’s economic performance, measured by its gross domestic prod-

uct (GDP), is a third key factor in shaping Russia’s ability to generate
and sustain Russian military forces.55 Past performance offers some
insights into the future.
Historical Trends
Since the end of the Soviet Union, Russia has experienced major eco-
nomic fluctuations (see Figure 2.1). Based on World Bank data, Rus-
sia’s economy grew at an average rate of –3.14 percent from 1989 to
1997, approximately 6.9 percent from 1998 to 2008, 1.0 percent from
2009 to 2013, and –0.77 percent from 2014 to 2017.
The export of oil and gas has historically appeared to play a
strong role in explaining both Russia’s dynamic growth and periods of
recession. In a 2016 RAND report analyzing Russia’s medium-term
economic prospects, Keith Crane and coauthors estimated that the
54 “EkonoMika I Oborona” [“Economy and Defense”], Levada Center, July 21, 2015;
“V Rosii Vyroslo Chislo Tekh, Kto Predpochitayet Lichnoye Blagopoluchiye Velichiyu Strany”
[“The Number of Those Who Prioritize Personal Well Being to the Country’s Status Has
Grown in Russia”], RBC, December 12, 2016.
55 While Russia sees itself as a great power, its economy lags significantly behind the United
States, and its nominal GDP is approximately the same size as Italy, although taking into
account purchasing power, Russia’s economy is larger. See World Bank data.
Figure 2.1
Russian Growth Rates
10
Annual percent growth
–5
–10
–15
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
SOURCE: World Development Indicators, World Bank, Global Economic Prospects:

A Fragile Recovery, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2017.
proportion of energy revenues was approximately 17 percent to 25 per-

cent of Russia’s GDP between 2000 and 2011.56 Figure 2.2 shows that
GDP growth has generally correlated with the price of oil rather than
with oil and gas production, although there has been some gradual
increase in production and associated revenue over the last 25 years.
However, Russian economic growth over the last two decades has
been influenced by trends in several other factors. On the growth side,
Russia benefited from an increase in labor productivity in the early
2000s, which some analysts attribute to growth in the private sector
and the adoption of Western management practices and technology.
56 Keith Crane, et al., Russia’s Medium-Term Economic Prospects, Santa Monica, Calif.:
RAND Corporation, RR-1468-RC, 2016; Alexey Kudrin and Evsey Gurvich, “A New
Growth Model for the Russian Economy,” Russian Journal of Economics, Vol. 1, No. 1,
March 2015, p. 47, p. 5; World Bank, 2017, and Kudrin and Gurvich, 2015, p. 10, esti-
mate that approximately half of the 6.9 percent annual growth from 2000 to 2008 can be
explained due to revenues from oil and gas.
Figure 2.2
Change in Russian GDP, Petroleum Production
(Measured in Millions of Tons of Oil Equivalent [MTOE] and Commodity
Prices Over Time)
0.6
GDP
MTOE
0.3 Price
Percent change
0.0
–0.3
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
SOURCE: GDP is from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2017); MTOE
from OECD, 2017; oil prices from the U.S. Energy Information Agency, 2018.
New businesses were created in the service sector, and domestic con-
sumption steadily increased, which over time appears to have decreased
the importance of oil rents in GDP (see Figure 2.3). The effect of oil
and gas revenues on the economy was also stabilized by the creation of
a reserve fund and by government expenditures. For the future, Russia
has the advantage of a continuing high level of education, and a sub-
stantial reserve of Russian capital and skilled labor exists abroad, which
could return to Russia and encourage growth if economic conditions
appeared more favorable.57
57 Crane et al., 2016, pp. 9–10; Martin Gilman, “Demythologizing the Russian Economy,”
online presentation, March 26, 2013; discussions with economic analysts in Washington, D.C.,
and Moscow, June and July 2017.
Figure 2.3
24
Change in Household Consumption Over Time
The Future of the Russian Military

Consumption (constant USD)
60 8e+11
Consumption (% GDP) 40 6e+11
20 4e+11
0 2e+11
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Year Year
Government expenditure (% GDP)

60 60
Oil rents (% GDP)
40 40
20 20
0 0
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Year Year
SOURCE: World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2017.

At the same time, the Russian economy faces several longstanding

constraints on growth. First, Russia has quite low investment levels.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) levels have declined since 2009, which
became more severe after Western economic sanctions were imposed;
FDI dropped from 3.1 percent of GDP in 2013 to 0.49 percent in
2015.58 Russia has long experienced significant capital flight, estimated
at $151 billion in 2014 and $57 billion in 2015 (although 2016 capital
flight levels appear lower).59 Analysts also note that a serious problem for
domestic investment is that many wealthy Russians keep their capital
overseas. With the significantly lower access to foreign capital following
the development of the Western sanctions regime, Russian interest rates
also rose substantially, making domestic investment costlier.60
The second constraint on growth relates to Russia’s business cli-
mate, including both the interrelated issues of corruption and the regu-
latory burden. Corruption in Russia leads to differential treatment of
businesses by the government, with businesses that have better con-
nections receiving favorable tax treatment or easier access to govern-
ment contracts and others being subject to extortion or expropriation.
Corruption also creates incentives for public officials to maintain or
increase the complexity of regulation, which creates disincentives for
investment and hurts growth. Related, flaws in internal security and
law enforcement organizations in Russia are perceived to constrain
growth.61 Russia ranks low on international surveys for the protection
58 These FDI numbers derive from IMF data on inward flows. They are reported in U.S. dol-
lars and then converted to percent GDP.
59 Dmitry Dokuchaev, “Russian Capital, No Longer on the Run,” Russia Direct, August 24,
2016.
60 SeeCrane et al., 2016, pp. 41–43; Svetlana Ledyaeva and Mikael Linden, “Determi-
nants of Economic Growth: Empirical Evidence from Russian Regions,” European Journal of
Comparative Economics, Vol. 5, No. 1, June 2008, pp. 87–105, highlights the importance of
domestic investment in Russia by noting that variation in investment explains variation in
regional growth rates, at least before 2008.
61 Kudrin and Gurvich, 2015, p. 48, for example, highlight flaws in law enforcement that
undermine growth, including “the excessive centralization of law enforcement; prevailing
vertical hierarchical coordination; multiple parallel governance verticals; the persisting “tick-
sheet” evaluation system caused by centralized governance; a lack of external supervision and
communication with local communities and civil authorities.”
of property.62 Russia has made efforts to improve its regulatory burden,

especially by improving its standing on the World Bank’s “Ease of
Doing Business” ranking, from 120th in 2012 to 35th in 2018. Neverthe-
less, Russia actions have not fully addressed concerns about the police
and judiciary targeting innocent business owners, which clearly disin-
centivizes business investment.63 In aggregate, Crane et al., estimate
that Russia’s GDP growth could be 0.3 percent per year higher if cor-
ruption were reduced and, through a separate calculation, 2.2 percent
if the business climate were significantly improved.64
A third related constraint is state control of the economy. State-
owned enterprises (SOE), estimated to have contributed 70 percent of
GDP, are believed to be substantially less efficient than private enter-
prises.65 Analysts note a trend toward renationalization, meaning the
state taking over increasing control of the economy, with possible goals
including ensuring stability in a volatile world, state control of strategic
industries, or punishing opponents or rewarding supporters.66 Indeed,
Russian analysts blame, in part, the dominance of SOEs in the mili-
tary industrial sector for Russia’s lack of technological innovation.67
Although there are Russian venture capital approaches to innovation,
such as the Foundation for Prospective Research (FPI) founded in
62 Kudrin and Gurvich, 2015, p. 47.

63 Leonid Ragozin, “When Russian Officials ‘Nightmare’ Your Business, You Can Lose
Everything—Even Your Life,” Bloomberg News, January 29, 2018; World Bank, “Doing
Business 2018: Reforming to Create Jobs,” 2018, p. 4; Crane et al., 2016, p. xiii.
64 Crane et al., 2016, pp. xvi, 38–41.
65
Ekaterina Mereminskaya, “Gosudarstvo i goskompanii kontroliruyut 70% rossijskoj ehko-
nomiki” [“The Government and State-Owned Companies Control 70% of the Russian
Economy”], Vedomosti, September 29, 2016.
66 See,for example, Kudrin and Gurvich, 2015, pp. 43–44. Crane et al. claim that the low
labor productivity of SOEs and the large amount of capital invested in SOEs limit Russia’s
GDP growth. Crane et al., 2016, pp. 25–34. See also Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy,
Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin, new edition, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution
Press, 2015. Discussion with Russian analysts, Washington, D.C., and Moscow, July 17,
2017, and January 26, 2018.
67
One Russian analyst explained, “private companies are too weak, [but] government com-
panies are too inefficient.” Discussion with Russian analyst, Moscow, July 17, 2017.
2012, modeled after the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

(DARPA), analysts are not optimistic about their prospects.68
Fourth, Russia has faced a decline in available labor and chal-
lenges developing its human capital. As the following demographic sec-
tion details, in addition to a decline in population since the early 1990s,
Russia faces a future decline in the working-age population. Russia
has also experienced a decline in researchers working on research and
development (R&D) from about 3,800 per million people in 1996 to
3,100 in 2014. At the same time, Russian intellectuals and scientists
are far more integrated in global epistemic and scholarly communities
than they were in Soviet times, and Russia remains one of the most
highly educated countries in the world.69
Fifth, Russia’s economy remains subject to volatility in the price
of oil, although less vulnerable because of its recent decision to float
the ruble. In 2013, with a reduction in oil prices and increasing pres-
sure on Russia after sanctions were imposed in 2014, the exchange rate
of the ruble began to fall. After failing to retain a soft peg of the ruble
exchange rate after 2013, Russia in 2014 permitted the ruble to float.
This policy led to a sustained decrease in the value of the ruble, with
a number of negative consequences, including increased inflation and
lower private consumption due to Russia’s dependence on imported
consumer goods. This policy did, however, increase domestic produc-
tion and make exports significantly more attractive, which ultimately
stabilized the economy and reduced the effect of the oil price shock.70
By March 2017 inflation had diminished to 4.3 percent, the lowest
level since 2012.71 Going forward, the policy to float the ruble will
68 Dmitry Adamsky, “Defense Innovation in Russia: The Current State and Prospects
for Revival,” Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, January 2014, pp. 4–6; Irina
Dezhina, “Innovation Policy in Russia: Development, Challenges, and Prospects,” Note
No. 12, Observatoire Franco-Russe, February 2016.
69 In 2013, 58.2 percent of Russians between the ages of 25 and 34 had completed tertiary
education, making Russia third in the world, after South Korea and Japan (see OECD,
2017).
70 Crane et al., 2016, pp. 19–24.
71 Elena Holodny, “Russian Inflation Keeps Tumbling,” Business Insider, April 5, 2017.
continue to have stabilizing effects on the economy, although there

could be short-term impacts on consumers in the midst of crises.
Future Prospects of the Determinants of Russian Economic

Performance
Long-term predictions of Russia’s energy exports are uncertain. While
future forecasts of oil prices are notoriously imprecise, oil prices are
expected to slowly rise, from about $81 in 2020 to $152 in 2035.72
However, the volume of Russian energy exports are expected to decline
after 2020, in large part because of decreasing production due to lower
investment, restrictions on the import of Western extraction tech-
nology, and the depletion of existing reserves. Other Russian energy
exports of gas and coal are not expected to increase significantly, given
a lack of new markets. While energy exports will continue to sustain
the Russian economy, their role in bolstering Russian GDP growth
will diminish, and the relative contribution of fuel and energy to the
GDP is expected to decrease from 31 percent in 2015 to 13 percent to
15 percent in 2040.73
Continued Western sanctions impose another constraint on the
Russian economy, with a potentially significant long-term effect on
Russian energy production. Crane et al., expect that the end of sanc-
tions would increase Russia’s GDP growth rate by 1.4 percent.74 How-
ever, following the passage of U.S. legislation in August 2017 autho-
rizing new sanctions against the Russian energy sector and codifying
existing measures, sanctions relief appears unlikely for the near term.
A potential source of economic growth is structural reform,
including reforms that would diminish corruption, improve the Rus-
72
U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Annual Energy Outlook 2017: Table: Total
Energy Supply, Disposition, and Price Summary.”
73 One detailed Russian report expects a decline in oil production after 2020 under a range
of different political and economic scenarios. Alexey Makarov, Leonid Grigoriev, and Tati-
ana Mitrova, eds., “Global and Russian Energy Outlook 2016,” Energy Research Institute
of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Analytical Center for the Government of the
Russian Federation, 2016, pp. 162, 167, 172.
74 According to Crane et al., 2016, p. 52, such reforms could be the greatest potential for
sustained economic growth.
sian business climate, or enable privatization. President Putin has rec-

ognized the need for reform and tasked several different organizations
to offer suggestions, including the more liberal Center for Strategic
Research, led by Alexei Kudrin, and the more statist Stolypin Club, led
by Boris Titov.75 A wide range of analysts, however, remain skeptical
that major structural reform proposed by Kudrin’s group—such as the
privatization of state-owned enterprises and addressing law enforce-
ment’s abuse of businesses—is likely to occur. While these reforms
would address some of the concerns described, from the perspective
of some factions within Russia it could threaten stability by changing
the status quo and would also likely negatively impact powerful indi-
viduals and interest groups within the government.76 Absent the lifting
of sanctions, analysts speculate that Putin is unlikely to engage in the
significant liberalization that liberal economists advocate. While Rus-
sia’s reform prospects are uncertain until after the election, incremental
behind-the-scenes reform, that likely will not address the major flaws
described, and direct investment into the economy are viewed as most
probable—but probably unlikely to significantly change Russia’s eco-
nomic prospects.77
Conclusion and Outlook

While the Russia economy is not on the brink of collapse, it will likely
be constrained in the future by low investment, political and economic
institutions that discourage growth, high corruption, and a small demo-
graphic decline. In line with a consensus among economists studying
the Russian economy, for the foreseeable future we expect Russia to
75
Discussions with Russian analysts, Moscow, July 2017; see, for example, Kathrin Hille,
“Kremlin Gathers Experts to Tackle Russia’s Anemic Growth,” Financial Times, May 31, 2017.
76 See, for example, Andrew Kuchins, “Putin’s Legacy: Brezhnev Lite?” Russia Matters,
December 14, 2017; Evgenia Pismennaya, Stepan Kravchenko, and Ilya Arkhipov, “Even
After ‘Lost Decade’ Putin Isn’t Ready to Fix the Economy,” Bloomberg News, May 31, 2017;
Darya Korsunskaya and Andrey Ostroukh, “Putin Leaves Russians Guessing on Economic
Reform Plan,” Reuters, June 3, 2017.
77 Andrey Biryukov, Ilya Arkhipov, and Evgenia Pismennaya, “Russia Weighs Biggest
Spending Spree Since Putin’s Re-Election,” Bloomberg News, January 15, 2018; discussions
with U.S. and Russian analysts, Washington, D.C., and Moscow, June and July 2017.
experience steady but slow growth of 1 percent to 2 percent of GDP.78

This projection is consistent with projections from major international
organizations such as the UN, the World Bank, and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF).79
One Russian expert noted that the predictions from the major
international organizations are similar because they use similar models
and proposed that, if the structural reform proposed by Kudrin were
to occur, combined with an increase in oil prices and influx in capi-
tal from abroad, Russia could conceivably again experience sustained
growth at levels of 5 percent to 6 percent of GDP, as it did in the early
2000s.80 This event seems unlikely given the outlook of the oil market
and the domestic prospects for reform, but it is certainly possible.
Another, perhaps more likely possibility is for protracted low oil prices,
increased sanctions, or a domestic political crisis to lead to more nega-
tive than expected growth, including a sustained contraction in GDP.
Defense Spending
One of the main ways Russia’s economic performance influences Russia’s

ability to generate and sustain Russian military force is through enabling
defense spending. Indeed, Russia’s economic performance in early to mid-
2000s enabled a substantial increase in the country’s military expenditures
beginning in the late 2000s. As shown in Figure 2.4, in constant ruble
terms, Russia’s defense spending roughly doubled from 2000 to 2017, at
the same time GDP also roughly doubled. GDP and defense spending
were not closely aligned; for example, defense spending increased sub-
stantially from 2011 to 2015, at the same time the economy barely grew.
Further, while Russian defense expenditures rose in 2016, this was due to
a one-time 700 billion to 800 billion ruble payment to reduce the debt of
the military industrial complex rather than a planned sustained increase
78 See also Konstantin Sonin, “Russia’s Economic Stagnation Is Here to Stay,” Project Syn-
dicate, February 1, 2018.
79 Projections from World Bank, 2017; UN estimates from United Nations, World Economic
Situation and Prospects, New York: United Nations, 2017; IMF from imf.org.
80 Interview with Russian economic official, Moscow, July 17, 2017.
Figure 2.4
Past and Projected Russian GDP and Spending on National Defense in
Constant 2015 Rubles
120,000 4,000
Billions of constant 2015 rubles (GDP)
Billions of constant 2015 rubles

3,500
100,000
3,000
(national defense)
80,000
2,500
60,000 2,000
1,500
40,000
1,000
20,000
500
0 0
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
GDP (constant 2015 rubles)

National Defense (constant 2015 rubles)
SOURCE: GDP 2000–2015 from World Bank World Development Indicators;

GDP 2016–2019 from Cooper, 2017; National Defense from official executed
Russian budgets, except for future projections.
in spending.81 When this one-time payment is taken into account, the

defense spending trend is smoother and more in line with GDP growth.
Russia’s defense expenditures represent a significant portion of
its overall budget, varying between 12 percent and 23 percent of the
Russian federal budget and 2.6 percent and 4.4 percent of GDP. 82
81Michael Kofman, “The Russian Defense Budget and You,” Russian Military Analysis,
March 17, 2017; Julian Cooper, “Prospects for Military Spending in Russia in 2017 and
Beyond,” March 23, 2017a.
82 Our description of National Defense is based on the Russian government’s use of this term,
which does not include various social spending to support the military that is typically included
within NATO or Stockholm International Peace Institute (SIPRI) definitions of defense
spending. Spending under National Defense does include some spending outside of the Min-
istry of Defence, such as spending within the Ministry of Fuel or Rossatom, but spending on
internal security is carried out under other budget categories. Appendix B contains additional
charts that convert spending into constant dollars, share of budget, and GDP.
Figure 2.5
Russian GDP and Spending on National Defense in Inflation Adjusted
Dollars
3,500 90
Billions of constant 2015 dollars
Billions of constant 2015 dollars

80
3,000
70
2,500
60
2,000 50
1,500 40
30
1,000
20
500
10
0 0
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Year
GDP (constant 2015 dollars)

National defense (constant
2015 dollars)
SOURCE: Exchange rates and GDP 2000–2015 from World Bank World Development
Indicators; GDP 2016–2019 from Cooper, 2017; National Defense from official executed
Russian budgets, except for future projections.
In Figure 2.5, we convert the Russian GDP and defense spending into
constant 2015 U.S. dollars for comparison. Throughout the rest of our
analysis, we use constant rubles, rather than dollars, to analyze Russia’s
defense spending because of the large variation in exchange rates over
2000–2017. As Figure 2.5 indicates, considering dollar expenditures
implies that Russia’s defense expenditures dropped in 2013, which is
not accurate. Russia’s defense expenditures were largely carried out
within Russia, so constant rubles are a more accurate measure of the
expenditures.
Much of the increase in Russian defense expenditure since 2000
has gone toward acquisition of new materiel. Russia’s military acquisi-
tion is specified under Russia’s long-term procurement plans known as
State Armaments Programs (SAP),83 with yearly procurement carried

out under the State Defense Order (SDO).84 While SAPs are officially
intended to run ten years, they are often revised every five years. The
planned expenditures of the second half of the SAP are, thus, unreliable
because it is widely understood that these planned programs are likely
to be continually pushed forward in time and not implemented.85 The
details of SAPs and SDOs are classified, although some information is
either announced or can be extrapolated from open sources.
The most recent SAP was instituted in 2011 and was planned
to run until 2020. Russia allocated around 20 trillion rubles (about
$348 billion at September 2017 exchange rates), significantly above
prior levels of spending, and senior Russian leaders, including Presi-
dent Putin, played central roles in its implementation.86 Table 2.1 high-
lights its priorities, as estimated by the Russian Center for Analysis of
Strategies and Technologies (CAST).87 SAP-2020 focused significantly
on the Navy and Air Force, with the Ground Forces, despite its large
size, receiving a smaller proportion of the total. Some Russian defense
analysts claim that the SAP-2020 was intended more as a means of
redistributing oil money to struggling defense enterprises and investing
in new air and sea platforms to replace Russia’s air and sea fleet rather
than specifically about improving the military to achieve particular
83 In Russian, Gosudarstvennye Programmy Vooruzheniya.

84 Brian
Taylor, “Kudrin’s Complaint: Does Russia Face a Guns vs. Butter Dilemma?”
PONARS Eurasia, policy memo 254, June 2013; Susanne Oxenstierna, “Russian Military
Expenditure,” in Persson, 2016, p. 142.
85 Author discussions with Russian analysts, Moscow, July 2017.
86 Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), “Gosudarstvennye programmy
vooruzheniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii problemy ispolneniya i potentsial optimizatsii” [“The State
Armaments Programs of the Russian Federation: Problems of Implementation and Potential
for Optimism”], Moscow, 2015, pp. 8–9.
87 One goal of the 2020 SAP was to provide the military with at least 70 percent of modern-
ized equipment. The achievement has been uneven, with some sectors such as air defense and
aircraft seeing marked improvements while others, such as the army and navy, have fared
less well. Nevertheless, in spite of sanctions and loss of external technological sources, the
2020 SAP has markedly improved Russian military capabilities. Julian Cooper, Russia’s State
Armaments Programme to 2020: A Quantitative Assessment of Implementation 2011–2015,
FOI-R—4239—SE, Stockholm: Sweden, March 2016, p. 52.
Table 2.1
Targets of the SAP-2020
Size of allocation,
Branch trillions of rubles Percent of total
Ground Forces 2.6 15
Navy 5.0 25
Air Force 4.7 24
Strategic Missile Forces 1.0 5
Aerospace Defense Forces 3.4 17
Other multiservice (C4ISR) 2.7 14
Total 19.4 100
SOURCE: CAST, 2015, p. 23.
defense objectives. Analysts further emphasize that new procurement is

focused on upgrading or purchasing modernized older platforms rather
than “hasty” investments in next-generation systems fighters, bombers,
or tanks. While Russia has, in places, pursued next-generation plat-
forms, these investments are generally small, and procurement of these
platforms has generally been repeatedly delayed.88
The recent rise in Russian defense spending is, to a great extent,
the product of increased procurement under the 2020 SAP. This can
be seen by estimating the relative size of the yearly SDO, which we do
based on publicly released Russian budget figures and a method origi-
nally developed by Julian Cooper.89 In Figure 2.6, after adjusting for
inflation, we show the size of the yearly SDO, as a proportion of the
overall military budget. In 2017–2019, the size of planned acquisition
is expected to level off as the government reduces direct support for
the military industrial complex, although future expenditures are sub-
ject to change.90 We indicate the non-SDO component of the budget
88 Discussion with Russian military analysts, Moscow, July 2017.

89
Julian Cooper, Russian Military Expenditure: Data, Analysis, and Issues, FOI, Stockholm:
Sweden, September 2013; Cooper, 2017.
90 Kofman, 2017a.
Figure 2.6
Russian Procurement Expenditures Compared to Other Military
Expenditures in 2015 Constant Rubles
4,000
SDO
3,500
Other expenditures
Billions of constant rubles
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Year
SOURCE: RAND Arroyo Center analysis.
NOTE: The defense budget for 2016 includes a 700 to 800 billion-ruble one-time debt
repayment (Kofman, 2017a).
as “other expenditures,” which we assume includes the costs Russia

incurs from military operations, maintenance, personnel, and training.
Figure 2.6 shows that the size of the Russian defense expenditure, since
2009 is largely driven by changes in the overall size of the SDO rather
than by fluctuations of the other expenditures.
The Future
Although military expenditures will not be slashed drastically in the
near or medium term, they will decrease from prior levels. The general
parameters of the fiscally conservative 2017–2019 budget indicate that
defense spending (as defined by the “National Defense” budget cate-
gory) will remain around 3 percent of GDP and 17 percent of the bud-
get.91 We expect these general parameters to continue into the future,
91Dmitriy Butrin, Denis Skorobogat’ko, and Vadim Visloguzov, “Byudzhet mirnogo bre-
meni” [“The Budget of the Peace Burden”], Kommersant, October 27, 2016.
meaning that defense spending will rise at roughly the same pace as
GDP, about 1 percent to 2 percent per year. In the future, a significant
increase in GDP or a rise in perceived threat could similarly lead to
an increase in defense spending, while an increased need for social
spending would put pressure on the defense budget. Nevertheless, as
shown from the steady growth in the defense budget from 2008–2017
even with variable GDP growth, Russia has maintained high defense
spending even in the face of political and economic troubles, so a steady
or potentially somewhat higher spending seems likely in the future.
Future Russian defense expenditures will depend largely on the
costs of future procurement. Support to the military industrial com-
plex is expected to decline, as Russian officials have made clear to
defense firms that leaner times are ahead.92 The best indication of short
to medium term future procurement is the 2018–2025 SAP originally
intended to begin in 2020. The current value of the new SAP is cur-
rently estimated to cost 20 trillion rubles. Although the precise dis-
tribution is uncertain, preliminary reports expect an increase share to
be allocated to the Ground Forces and Airborne Troops (VDV) of
about 4 trillion rubles (20 percent to 21 percent of the total program),
an increase of approximately 15 percent over the previous SAP. This
apparent increase may be a less significant change, given that some
reports indicated that Russia had increased the relative share of expen-
diture on ground capabilities over the last few years.93 There is also
expected to be greater acquisition of conventional long-range strike sys-
tems, such as air-launched cruise missiles. 94
Demographics
Demographics are a key factor in shaping Russia’s ability to generate

and sustain Russian military forces, both because of the need to recruit
92 See, for example, Alexander Zudin, “Putin Tells Russia’s Defence Industry to Diversify,”
Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 9, 2016.
93 Leonid Nersisyan, “Kak budut vooruzhatsya Vooruzhennye sily Rossii v sleduyushchie desyat’
let?” [“How Will the Armed Forces of Russia Be Armed Over the Next 10 Years?”], Regnum,
November 17, 2017; interviews with Russian analysts, Moscow, July 2017.
94 Nersisyan, 2017.
a sufficient number of personnel and because the size and characteris-

tics of the Russian population underlie broader economic development.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the birthrate in Russia dropped
substantially, with total fertility per female dropping to 1.15 in 1999.
As a result of this decline and rising mortality rates among men, Rus-
sia’s population declined by approximately 4.15 million from 1991 to
2015, leaving a total population in 2015 of 144 million (see Figure 2.7).
Over the course of the 2000s, Russia’s demographics stabilized. Rus-
sia’s birthrate rose from 1.2 in 2000 to 1.7 in 2012. Mortality rates also
dropped, with male life expectancy increasing from 58.9 in 2005 to
Figure 2.7
Dynamics of Crude Birth and Death Rates and Total Population of Russia
149 18
148 16
Rate per 1,000 people

147 14
Million people
146 12
145 10
144 8
143 6
91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Year
Total population (left scale)

Crude birth rate (right scale)
Crude death rate (right scale)
SOURCE: UN, 2017; World Bank, 2017.

NOTE: We mainly rely on data from UN Population Division, World Bank, and the
Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) for our analysis. Differences between
data sources are a result of different methodologies and assumptions about the
future (in the case of forecasts). Most important, Rosstat has fully incorporated the
population of the annexed territories of Ukraine—Crimea and Sevastopol—in its
statistics. According to Rosstat, the population of the peninsula stood at 2.3 million
in 2014, raising the total population of Russia to over 146 million.
66.5 in 2016, although male life expectancy in Russia remains lower

than that of Western countries. The lower number of births from the
1990s had a significant and sustained effect on Russia’s demographic
future, as shown in the lower number of 9- to 25-year-olds in the popu-
lation pyramid in Figure 2.8.
The demographic problems of low birth and high mortality rates
were, in part, compensated for by in-migration from the former repub-
lics of the Soviet Union. In the mid-1990s until about 2005, a major
source of in-migration consisted of ethnic Russians who decided to
Figure 2.8
Population Pyramid in 2017 (Estimate)
84
81 Males
78 Females
75
72
69
66
63
60
57
54
51
48
45
42
Age
39
36
33
30
27
24
21
18
15
12
9
6
3
0
1.5 1 0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2
Million people
SOURCE: Rosstat, 2016a.
NOTE: The highest columns include males and females aged 85 and higher.
move to Russia from other former-Soviet republics. In the last decade,

net migration appears to largely be determined by non-Russian, pri-
marily economic, migrants from the former Soviet republics, especially
Central Asia (see Figure 2.9). Official Russian policy, developed in
2007, calls for net migration to reach 300,000 per year in 2025, which
is somewhat above the current levels of about 262,000 in 2016.
In the future, given these changing trends, Russia’s population is
generally expected to decline, although estimates widely differ based
on assumptions, as shown in Figure 2.10. Russia’s own Rosstat projec-
tions are higher than others, in part because they assume a higher birth
rate and significantly higher net migration (the UN and World Bank
project net positive migration of about 50,000 per year, compared with
288,000 in Rosstat’s medium scenario).
Even in the most optimistic case, Russia is projected to face an
aging population and decline in the labor force that will stress Russia’s
Figure 2.9
Net Migration from Selected FSU and Other Countries
500
Total net migration
450 Net migration from FSU
400 Net migration from other countries
350
Thousand people
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
–50
–100
97 998 999 000 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 010 011 012 013 014 015 016
19 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Year
SOURCE: Rosstat, 2017c.
NOTES: In this chart, we analyze migration from the FSU as defined as the Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS) countries plus Georgia, and does not include the
Baltics. In 2015, the net migration from Uzbekistan became negative, reaching a net
outflow of 20,000 people. Net migration is computed as the difference between the
number of people that arrived from a country and the number of people that left to
that country in a given year.
Figure 2.10
Population Projections to 2036
155
150
Million people
145
140
135
130
18 019 020 021 022 023 024 025 026 027 028 029 030 031 032 033 034 035 036
20 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Year
Rosstat_Low Rosstat_Medium Rosstat_High

UN_Low UN_Medium UN_High
World Bank US Census Bureau
SOURCE: Rosstat, 2017a; World Bank 2017; U.S. Census Bureau, “Population Projec-
tions,” 2017; UN, 2017.
social support system and yield fewer conscription-age males. Under

Rosstat’s medium forecast, the working age population is projected to
decline from about 82.3 million in 2018 to 78.7 million in 2036 at the
same time the above working age population increases from 37.5 mil-
lion to 42.6 million. Military-age males will also decline through
2024, as shown in Figure 2.11. Nevertheless, even at the lowest point
in 2024, there are still projected to be about 7.17 million males of
conscription age in Russia, implying that there will remain more than
enough personnel to staff the security forces, especially considering
that the armed forces will draw on personnel who are older than 18.
Still, Russia’s demographic decline will likely make recruitment more
expensive and could lead to lower than desired physical standards.
Overall, Russia will continue to face demographic challenges that
put pressure on the economy and on military recruitment due to the
Figure 2.11
Forecast of Number of Males of Conscription Age (18–27)
10.4
10.2
10
9.8
9.6
9.4
9.2
Million people
9
8.8
8.6
8.4
8.2
8
Low
7.8
Medium
7.6
High
7.4
7.2
7
18 019 020 021 022 023 024 025 026 027 028 029 030 031 032 033 034 035 036
20 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Year
SOURCE: Rosstat, 2017b.
lower birth rates of the 1990s. Its demographic trend is stabilizing,

however, due to rising birth rates and greater in-migration. Russia may
face labor shortages, higher social spending due to a lower working age
population, and greater competition for personnel to recruit into the
military. It seems unlikely that it will face an absolute lack of personnel
for internal security or military service, as discussed in more detail later,
since recruiting requirements have shrunk over the last decade due to
the rise of contract service and decline in annual draft requirements.
Military Personnel Policies
Russia’s military personnel policies are a key factor in shaping Russia’s

ability to generate and sustain Russian military forces. Russia has devel-
oped a mixed military manning system of contract and conscript person-
nel. While the military is authorized approximately one million active
duty personnel, current personnel numbers as of 2017 are approximately

993,000, of which about a fifth are officers, a bit more than a third are
professional enlisted, and a little less than one third are conscripts who
serve a one-year term. Russia’s reserve mobilization system has largely
been neglected since 2010. While there are approximately 900,000 per-
sonnel who recently served and who can be recalled as reservists, Russia’s
plan to develop a more active and professional reserve system has not
been well funded. Russia’s recent attention to territorial defense and inte-
grating civilian and military organizations during a crisis is anticipated to
address some lingering mobilization issues.
The post-1991 system was largely built on the Soviet system of
conscription and a cadre system of units that were intended to be fully
staffed through mobilization in times of war. In the 1990s, service con-
ditions and readiness in the Russian military deteriorated due to low
spending, increasing demographic challenges, entrenched corruption,
and widespread hazing of conscripts (dedovshchina). By 2008, only
13 percent of units were considered “permanently ready”—the highest
state of readiness.95
After 2008, Russia began a series of reforms to address these chal-
lenges. Russian leaders were guided, in part, by beliefs about the chang-
ing nature of warfare, such as the increasing occurrence of conflict on
the spectrum from war to peace and the increasing importance of the
aerospace domain, long-range strike, and net-centric conflicts. Russia
required competent, trained personnel to operate in low-intensity con-
flicts and additional specialized personnel to operate high technology
equipment. Readiness also became increasingly important to address
the potential for quickly emerging conflict on Russia’s periphery. The
reforms initiated in 2008, therefore, dramatically reduced the size of
the officer corps; eliminating low-readiness cadre units in favor of per-
manently ready forces; introducing professional contract service with
the goal of building skilled personnel; and switching from a two-year
conscription cycle to a one-year cycle to reduce hazing.96 These changes
95 “Army Reform Increased Number of Soldiers, Sergeants to 726,000,” ITAR-TASS, Febru-

ary 17, 2010.
96 See Appendix D for details.
did significantly shift the makeup of the Russian military, effectively

creating the current structure of a more-highly trained and ready con-
tingent, largely staffed by professional enlisted forces, and a larger, lower
readiness force comprised of conscripts. These reforms also improved
public perceptions of the military as already discussed. One interviewee
who is active in government commissions on these issues noted that
personnel problems in the military have “basically disappeared” and
the “quality of life dramatically improved.”97 Though the reforms of
the military were accomplished, there were considerable challenges and
much remains to be done. Russia’s reserve policy, for example, has not
significantly been dealt with since 2010 despite the intention to develop
a more active reserve system, and military wages, though higher than
many national averages, were stagnant from 2012–2017.98
Russia’s current mixed military manning policy and the general size
of its force appear likely to continue for the foreseeable future. A wide
range of Russian analysts emphasized the need to continue with Rus-
sia’s current combination of conscripts and contract personnel, in part
because of the importance of instilling patriotic values in young men and
having some ability to fight in a large war. We expect Russia to continue
to focus on improving contract service, with goals such as improving
training to operate sophisticated military systems, while at the same time
retaining conscription and a capacity for mass mobilization.99
As the number of draft age males decline into 2024, the military
will compete with the civilian sector and internal security forces for a
shrinking labor pool. However, the burden of the draft on the 18- to
27-year-old population will remain roughly constant. As detailed in
Appendix D, we calculate that the proportion of 18- to 27-year-olds to
97 Discussion with Russian analyst, Moscow, July 19, 2017.

98 Rosstat, “Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Rossii ” [“Social-Economic Situation of
Russia”], 2016b. Zhalovan’e voennosluzhashchikh I vyplaty otstavnikam vyrosli s yanvarya”
[“Servicemen’s Pay and Pensions Increased Starting from January”], Rossiskaya Gazeta, Janu-
ary 20, 2018.
99 A different view came from a former senior defense official heavily involved in the previous
reform efforts: Russia did not need a “massive army,” and the military should focus on build-
ing quality over quantity, even though conscription was still necessary as a means of instilling
patriotism. Author discussion with retired senior Russian officer, Moscow, July 2017.
whom Russia will need to send draft notices to achieve 300,000 con-
scripts will remain roughly constant from 2018 to 2024. This implies
that Russia can sustain the current size and structure of its armed forces,
absent major demographic or societal problems. Increasing the size of
the force beyond its current levels, however, would require reducing the
number of exemptions, extending the draft period, or widening draft
age, all of which would likely increase strain on the society and pos-
sibly produce public opposition. A changed political context, including
increased perception of threat or large-scale hostilities, could, however,
diminish public opposition to a larger military.
Conclusion
Over the last decade, the key factors in shaping Russia’s ability to
generate and sustain Russian military forces have undergone signifi-
cant change, but these factors show signs of remaining stable over the
medium term.
A consensus exists within the Russian elite on its strategic priori-
ties in terms of security policy goals and threat perceptions. No indi-
cation suggests that the perspective of Russia’s ruling coalition will
change. Russia appears to have developed a coherent strategy for the
armed forces: a combination of strategic deterrence, rapid response,
and dominance in the near abroad; expeditionary operations; prepara-
tion in case of major war; and building up its internal security forces.
Public attitudes show support for Russia’s government, foreign policies,
and the military.
Russia is projected to experience relatively low economic growth
of 1 percent to 2 percent of GDP, with a small increase in its mili-
tary budget proportionate to this growth. Russia’s military budget
has increased substantially due to increasing acquisition expenditures,
although we expect future military budgets to level out and grow pro-
portionately to GDP. While Russia will not enjoy major population
growth, its demographic situation is not by any measure crippling.
Russia has also built a relatively stable mixed conscript and contract
manning system for the military, enabling it to address the challenges
that undermined the military in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
CHAPTER THREE
Key Capability Areas for Ground Combat
Conceptually, we identify five distinct arenas for ground combat, and

within those we identify eight key capabilities areas for our analysis
(italicized). Our typology of ground combat differs from the organiza-
tion of units or combat arms in the U.S. or Russian military but offers
a useful categorization of broadly delineated tasks and capabilities for
ground combat. The forces that are relevant for these areas are focused
within the Russian Ground Forces but also draw from across the Rus-
sian military, including, for example, Navy ships equipped with sea-
launched missiles or Air Force bombers that carry air-launched weap-
ons. By considering forces that lie outside of the Ground Forces but
play a role in ground combat, we intend to provide a more complete
picture of Russian ground combat capabilities. We identify Russia’s
prioritization and approach within these ground capabilities while rec-
ognizing that Russia’s priorities within the set of ground capabilities
may be different from its overall military procurement priorities (which
include, for example, the strategic nuclear forces).
The first arena is combined arms ground combat, which involves
forces employed in large-scale, high-intensity ground warfare and con-
sists of two key capability areas, maneuver ground forces and indirect
fire. Maneuver ground forces include units that operate tanks, infantry
fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers, as well as integrated
air defense, EW, and other supporting roles. Indirect fire includes artil-
lery and rocket systems with less than 100 km range that directly sup-
port maneuver ground forces at the tactical level. Russia’s approach
to combined arms ground combat and employment draws from the
45
Soviet legacy, especially from World War II, although many changes
have occurred in the last decade.1
The second arena is long-range strike, which includes conventional
systems to be used at the theater level to accomplish operational rather
than tactical objectives. In practice, this includes cruise and ballis-
tic missiles, which are often high precision, with a range longer than
100 km, and may be launched from the ground, sea, or air. We con-
sider long-range strike systems separately from indirect fires, as they are
likely to be employed in qualitatively different ways to achieve different
effects. While long-range strike systems could, in theory, play a tacti-
cal role, they are more often conceptualized to be used to strike targets
deep behind the adversary’s lines and achieve effects such as disrupting
logistics, attacking massed forces, disrupting adversary air power, and
so forth. In some cases, long-range strike systems are dual use, meaning
they could be equipped with a nuclear weapon, although they need not
be, especially given precision targeting. Russia’s pursuit of these weap-
ons could imply fundamentally different political goals or means of
achieving them, such as an interest in achieving political objectives by
increasing the costs to an adversary rather than through compounded
tactical victories.
The third arena is rapidly deployable forces, or elite ground units
that are employed in conflicts short of conventional war, including the
Airborne Troops (VDV), GRU Spetsnaz, and the small Special Opera-
tions Command (KSO). These rapidly deployable forces are among
the highest readiness units in the Russian military and are available on
short notice to respond to regional conflicts or perform an expedition-
ary role. Indeed, these forces have been extensively used in Ukraine and
Syria, and their activities in these conflicts—including special recon-
naissance, covert and direct-action missions, unconventional warfare,
1 For details on the structure and history of Russian maneuver ground forces, see Grau and
Bartles, Chapters 3–7, 2017. Olga Oliker also highlights longstanding Soviet and Russian
military cultural components that draw from experience in World War II and heavily influ-
ence Russia’s development today, including a “preference for the offense,” “operational level
of warfare and deep strike,” and “firepower and artillery.” Olga Oliker, “Between Rhetoric
and Reality: Explaining the Russian Federation’s Nuclear Force Posture,” thesis, Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology, 2016, p. 64.
Key Capability Areas for Ground Combat 47
and working with proxies—highlight how they play a fundamentally

different role from their heavier ground-force counterparts.2 These
capabilities, in part, reflect Russia’s concerns about conflict in the near
and far abroad other than major wars.3
The fourth arena includes key enablers for the Ground Forces,
including C4ISR, air defense, and EW. Given advances in long-range
strike, Russia’s command and control and information gathering sys-
tems are fundamental in their ability to compete directly with the West
and dominate regional adversaries. Since the 1980s, Russia has observed
that U.S. developments in C4ISR in combination with improved strike
capabilities fundamentally change the nature of warfare and enable
U.S. superiority.4 Once greater resources began to become available
in 2008, Russia invested heavily in C4ISR systems. Their ability to
do so could qualitatively change Russia’s ability to compete with the
United States as a peer adversary. A second enabler, air defense, is
critical because it supports the ability of Russian forces to defend and
deter U.S. Air Force attack. Air defense is present within several dif-
ferent branches of the Russian military. The Russian Aerospace Forces
includes the Aerospace Defense Forces (VKO), which operate long-
range strategic defense capabilities, while the Ground Forces operate
short- and medium-range systems, which are integrated at multiple
levels of maneuver units. Finally, Russia has also made a significant
investment in a third enabler, EW, and has sought to integrate EW
capabilities throughout the Ground Forces.
The final arena is internal security forces, a somewhat different
category from the military capabilities already described. Understand-
ing the future development of the internal security forces is important
for several reasons: they represent one major way Russia seeks to defend
2 Alexey Ramm, “Russian Military Special Forces,” in Ruslan Pukhov and Christopher
Marsh, eds., Elite Warriors Special Operations Forces from Around the World, Minneapolis,
Minn.: East View Press, 2017, p. 2.
3 See also Valery Gerasimov, “Value of Science in Prediction,” Voenno-promyshlennyi Kuryer
[Military Industrial Courier], March 9, 2016.
4 Dmitry Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation, Stanford: Stanford Security Stud-
ies, 2010.
itself from foreign aggression. Russia’s investment of money and per-

sonnel in internal security forces may leave fewer resources available
for other military forces, and Russian internal security forces may be
deployable abroad to support military operations.5
Analysis of Key Capability Areas
Using a common framework, we look back in time to understand

Russia’s general approach to the development of each key capability
area to describe the likely outlook. We describe what weapons Russia
has procured and modernized. We consider the trends in the defense
industry by identifying the major companies that produce relevant
systems and understanding their current financial status, technologi-
cal development, and political situation. We conclude with a gen-
eral outlook for developments and forces in each of the capability
areas. Table 3.1 summarizes our findings, drawing from Appendixes E
through L.
General Approach and Recent Procurement
The developments highlighted in Table 3.1 reflect three general ways

Russia has sought to develop its capabilities for ground combat. First,
the perhaps predominant approach is to retain-and-adapt Soviet-era
capabilities and organizations. Russia’s military appears to recognize
that there are a range of ways in which Soviet investment produced a
capital stock and organizations that remain useful today, while also rec-
ognizing that precise replication of Soviet strategies is impractical and
ineffective. Instead, modern technology and useful Western approaches
can be grafted on to legacy structures or platforms. A second approach
to improving capabilities is to emulate-and-adapt U.S. military capa-
bilities and concepts, meaning that Russia has identified a desirable
5 See, for example, “National Guard to Complete Assigned Missions Both in Russia and
Abroad,” TASS, June 27, 2017.
Table 3.1
Summary of Findings of Key Capability Areas
Examples Current Military

Force General of Recent Industrial
Capability Approach Procurement Status Outlook
Maneuver Enlargement • For 2013–2015, Heavily indebted • Status quo

Ground of armored 723 T-72B3 but producers in expanded
Forces formations only 20 T-14 facing financial heavier
(Tanks, in western tanks produced collapse taken formations
IFVs, Russia; new • For IFV/APCs, over by Rostec • Continued
APCs) components on similar focus on in 2016—UVZ upgrades
Soviet legacy upgrades and (tanks) and to legacy
platforms legacy models KMZ (IFV/APCs). platforms
(active Apparent plan • Very slow
protection, fire for integrated develop-
control); small armored vehicle ment of next-
investment company gen plat-
in next forms (T-14,
generation T-15, and
systems Kurganetz)
• New
unmanned
systems
Indirect Continued • New Tornado- Uraltransmash • Retain legacy

Fires emphasis on G/S, but are (howitzer systems
(MRLs, volume area similar to producer) is • Low volume
Artillery) effects over legacy models subsidiary of or export-
precision; • Uragan-1M UVZ. Splav focus for
legacy Soviet- under slow (rocket artillery next-gen
era systems development producer) is systems and
• Upgrades to healthy due to precision
Msta-S self- exports, also munitions
propelled how- part of Rostec
itzer over next-
gen Koalitsiia
Long- Building on • Fully equipping High • Continued

Range legacy Soviet 10 Iskander-M prioritization; production of
Strike systems brigades recapitalizing cruise and bal-
to enlarge • Reportedly enterprises; listic missiles
capability for deploying a bottlenecks • Support for
long-range INF-violating due to loss enterprises
conventional long-range of Ukrainian • Uncertain-
precision strike, ground components ties exist as
emulating launched cruise (e.g., engines); to potential
United States missile some companies INF Treaty
• Production of also produce limitations
long-range strategic
sea- and air- systems and
launched cruise receive support
missiles (Kalibr accordingly
and Kh-101)
Table 3.1—Continued

Rapidly Key element • VDV Air N/A—small • Continued

Deployable of post-2008 Assault units impact on investment
Forces reforms, focus receiving military in VDV,
(VDV, on operations T-72B3 industrial Spetsnaz, and
Spetsnaz) in near • Adding UAVs, development related forces
abroad and new high- • Greater
expeditionary tech uniform effectiveness
operations; (Ratnik) with new
improving • Plans for new technology
readiness and airmobile • VDV becom-
effectiveness armed vehicle ing heavier,
by increased • Andromeda-D likely for
proportion automated C2 regional
of contract contingencies
personnel
C4ISR Shifting C2 • Integration of Domestic • Will pursue

relationships; military and industry advanced
major security ser- consolidated C4ISR
investment vices networks, within Rostec; • Longstanding
in networks including government gap between
to improve through NDMC pursuing import Russia and the
effectiveness • Tactical, opera- substitution to West will per-
and tional, and resolve foreign sist, although
centralization; strategic C2 dependence; lessen with
emulation networks (e.g., subsidized high spending
of Western Yesu-TZ) through • More likely
investments in • New multi- multiple progress in
reconnaissance- domain ISR revenue streams; UAVs and
strike complex, platforms (e.g., good domestic other ISR
including UAVs, UAVs such as software systems
space, etc. Orlan-10)
• Domestically
produced
software and
hardware
Air Major spending New and Almaz-Antey Continued

Defense on air defense; modernized state-owned leadership in air
improvements systems: conglomerate; defense
of tactical and • Buk-M2 and large revenues;
strategic air M3 management
defense • Pantsir S1, S2 challenges;
• S-300 for Army sanctions
and S-300/400 restricting
for VKS imports;
reduction in
Total procurement direct funding
2011–2020 of through State
473 billion rubles Targeted
Programs
Table 3.1—Continued

Electronic EW is Various ground Consolidated Continued view

Warfare opportunity and air tactical production into of EW as useful
for asymmetric and strategic two holding asymmetric
capabilities systems companies, capability
against West; throughout EW under Rostec;
increasing spectrum challenge to
investment, but recruit and
low proportion retain specialists
of spending; and by cutoff
increasing from Western
number of EW technology by
units sanctions
Internal Multiple Rosgvardiya N/A • Continued

Security organizations components growth in
Forces with military operate BTR- funding given
capabilities and 80/80A, BMP-2, concerns
overlapping Mi-8, and Mi-24 about terror-
roles; transfer helicopters, and ism, conflict
of internal expect to receive • Unlikely to
militarized new BTR-82B shrink security
forces to forces once
Rosgvardia in created
2016; planned
use of internal
security forces
abroad
SOURCE: Appendixes E through L.
capability or concept from abroad and adapted it to the Russian mili-

tary context. According to a third approach, Russia has sought to asym-
metrically counter capabilities it cannot match. In some capability areas,
multiple approaches are applied simultaneously.
Russia’s maneuver ground forces are the prime example of the
retain-and-adapt approach. The ground forces have received a small
proportion of resources for procurement and modernization consider-
ing their large size, and Russia’s Ground Forces draw heavily on adapted
Soviet-era platforms, such as the T-72, BMP-2, and BTR-80/82. These
platforms can be made almost as effective as new platforms with the
addition of new components, such as fire control or active protection
systems, at a fraction of the cost.6 Since 2013, the proportion of tank

forces has grown within the Ground Forces, and the size and capability
of maneuver ground forces in Western Russia has expanded, including
through the formation of the 1st Guard Tank Army and enlarged tank
and motor rifle divisions (see Appendix E). The Ground Forces have
a smaller proportion of contract soldiers, although some select, higher
readiness battalions have more contract personnel. These developments
have significantly increased the capabilities of Russian Ground Forces,
for example around the Ukrainian border.
Russia’s indirect fires are also a case of retaining Soviet capabili-
ties, with less significant modernization and adaptation. Russia’s cur-
rent indirect fire capabilities are the direct legacy of massive volumes of
launchers and munitions produced by the Soviet Union. To date, while
Russia has imagined new revisions, it has not funded major upgrades.
The only new indirect fire systems that have been fielded since 1990
are direct successors that look very similar to the legacy system, includ-
ing Tornado-G and Tornado-S (see Appendix F). More substantial
improvements, such as the Uragan-1M or Koalitsiia, have been repeat-
edly pushed back. Furthermore, while Russia recognizes the potential
benefit of precision weapons employed by the West and has developed
new systems for upgrades, it has not pursued upgrades to precision
indirect fires for its own forces. Russia’s approach appears consistent
with the belief that slightly upgraded massed and area-effects artil-
lery can be as, if not more, effective than precision weaponry, espe-
cially when supported by new C4ISR systems such as unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs). Analysts highlight that Russia’s ground force continue
to believe in “muscle and effort” and “streetfighting” rather than fully
supplanting old practices with new technology.7
Russia’s acquisition of long-range strike systems and its doctrine
and approach have emulated and adapted U.S. operating concepts
while retaining and adapting Soviet designs. Russia’s key long-range
6 For example, an upgraded T-72B3 (obr 2016 version) costs an estimated 79 million rubles
compared with an estimated 350 million rubles for a T-14 Armata, although that number is
not finalized as the T-14s have not entered serial production. See Table E.4.
7 Discussion with Russian analysts, Moscow, July 17, 2017.
strike systems draw from Soviet systems. For example, the Iskander-
M is developed from the Oka intermediate-range ballistic missile,
and the Kalibr from the RK-55 Relief ground-launched cruise missile.
The Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty banned both of these
Soviet-era missiles, but the technology associated with them was appar-
ently adapted into the new systems (see Appendix G). With regard to
the integration of long-range strike and C4ISR, the decision to emulate
aspects of U.S. warfighting goes back to the early 1980s.8 At the time,
the Russian military did not have the ability or resources to use such
technology, but after additional resources became available after 2008,
Russia began deploying long-range strike technology it had seen the
United States employ in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
Russia’s rapidly deployed forces also build on Soviet-era formations
but represent new and reformed forces. The VDV, historically intended
to act as an air-mobile strategic reserve, was rapidly professionalized
after 2008 and became more of an elite mobile infantry rather than a
parachute force. The GRU Spetsnaz, historically intended to conduct
reconnaissance, subversion behind enemy lines, and attacks on weap-
ons of mass destruction (WMD), evolved to continue to provide recon-
naissance forces, as well as developing a capability for unconventional
warfare. While capabilities were built upon Soviet-era considerations,
many elements are new and unique to Russia. Still, it appears that
the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and other models
of special operations forces influenced Russia when it created the
500-operator strong KSO units.9 The VDV have also adopted a novel
C4ISR system, the Andromeda-D (Appendix I), the state-of-the-art
Ratnik infantry kit, integrated air defense capabilities, and potentially
new vehicles (Appendix H).
8 See Mary FitzGerald, “Marshal Ogarkov and the New Soviet Revolution in Military
Affairs,” Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 1987, and Richard Van Atta, Sidney
G. Read, and Seymour J. Deitchman, “Assault Breaker,” in DARPA Technical Achievements,
Vol. II, Alexandria, Va.: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1991.
9 Tor Bukkvoll, “Military Innovation Under Authoritarian Government—The Case
of Russian Special Operations Forces,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 38, No. 5, 2015,
pp. 618–619.
Russia’s C4ISR represents a combination of legacy Soviet systems

and the emulation and adaptation of concepts and approaches, such
as net-centric warfare. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia
was left with hundreds of stove-piped command and control (C2) sys-
tems and did not invest significantly in modernization of these systems
through the 1990s and early 2000s. During this period Russia studied
Western C4ISR and hoped eventually to adapt modern C4ISR develop-
ments as well. With the increase in defense resources after 2008, Russia
began modernizing its C4ISR infrastructure in earnest. Through the
creation of the National Defense Management Center (NDMC) and
continued integration with civilian agencies, local and regional gov-
ernments, military, and internal security services, Russia has laid the
foundations for a C4ISR infrastructure more complicated and inter-
connected than the U.S. interagency, with both the potential risks and
benefits of greater centralization. Russia is in the process of developing
and implementing a modern, whole-of-government C4ISR infrastruc-
ture that will enable Russia to pursue its vision of net-centric or “non-
contact warfare.” For example, in 2014 Russia established the NDMC,
pursuing the integration of existing communications systems within a
single network, as well as the development of UAVs, space-based intel-
ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and other sensors. Still,
Russia’s ability to develop and integrate high-technology C4ISR will
continue to be limited by Russia’s poorly developed domestic electronics
industry, Western sanctions, and high costs (see Appendix I for details).
Russia has a highly advanced air defense system within multiple
services, building on and modernizing the extensive Soviet-era invest-
ment in air defenses. Indeed, ground units have potent integrated air
defenses to complement the strategic air defenses within the Aero-
space Forces (VKS), although the ground force systems are somewhat
less modern. Russia is expected to produce additional systems, with
increased range and detection capabilities. To date, Russia has priori-
tized its strategic systems but appears to be fulfilling its needs and
likely shifting toward acquiring new tactical systems over the next ten
years (see Appendix J).
To develop its internal security forces, Russia has incorporated
pieces of Soviet-era structures within newly created or reorganized
institutions (see Appendix L, Figure L.1). In particular, responsibility for
ensuring internal security lies with Rosgvardiya, which was created in

2016 and took responsibility for several of the militarized internal secu-
rity organizations, including the internal troops and various riot police
organizations, which operated a range of armored personnel vehicles and
helicopters. The creation of a militarized internal security force is not
unique. But it is new for Russia; since the Soviet collapse, Russian lead-
ership has tended to empower the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD),
largely a law-enforcement body, with domestic policing functions. As
one interlocutor explained, by creating Rosgvardiya, any debate about
the need for militarized internal security forces had been resolved.10
Still, there remains a multiplicity of overlapping Russian internal secu-
rity organizations, including the FSB, the Federal Protection Service,
and a variety of private security firms and paramilitary groups.
EW offers the primary example in the case of ground capabili-
ties where Russia has invested in capabilities that can asymmetrically
counter perceived U.S. advantages. Senior Russian military leaders,
including Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, recognize the
extent to which adversaries depend on the reliability of electronic com-
mand and control systems, and see that EW can “neutralize” adver-
sary advantages (see Appendix K, Outlook). Since 2011, Russia has
delivered a number of advanced EW systems to the Ground Forces,
at the company, battalion, and brigade levels, which seek to jam VHF
radio, radio-controlled fuses, and GPS. UAVs with EW capabilities
also complement existing airborne systems.11 Although procurement
of EW represents a small portion of overall expenditures, it likely has
an outsized negative impact on Russia’s adversaries.
Defense Industrial Policy
Russia’s ability to field new military systems is determined by the

capacity of its defense industry. Russian strategic documents highlight
the role of what they term the “defense-industrial complex” and its
10 Interview with Russian professor, Moscow, July 2017.

11 See, for example, FMSO, “Counter UAV Tactics and the ‘Leer-3’ Electronic Warfare
System,” OE Watch, Vol. 7, No. 7, August 2017, p. 3.
technological development as integral contributors to the country’s

national security.12 State-owned enterprises dominate the Russian
defense-industrial complex, and many of them are subsidiaries of one
large state-owned holding company, Rostec. Recognizing the impor-
tance of the defense-industrial complex for Russian security, in 2006
the Russian government established the Military Industrial Commis-
sion to oversee and coordinate it. The influence of this body, which
includes government officials, military commanders, and representa-
tives of defense enterprises, has grown over time. In 2011, it fell under
the purview of Dmitry Rogozin, a colorful Deputy Prime Minister
with a background as a nationalist politician. In the aftermath of the
annexation of Crimea, President Putin decided to transfer the Military-
Industrial Commission formally to the Russian President’s office, and
Putin became its formal head in 2015 while retaining Rogozin to run
its day-to-day affairs. Control over the defense-industrial complex and
military procurement is highly centralized: all of the major stakeholders
are controlled by the state, including the Ministry of Defense (MOD),
the state-owned enterprises, and the Military Industrial Commission.
Our analysis of Russia’s military industrial complex focused on
the enterprises producing the major systems, their corporate perfor-
mance, and what type of resources they receive. All the major enter-
prises are funded or subsidized by the state in some way, and in the
end the MOD is their primary customer. But the ways through which
the Russian state supports these companies illuminates its priorities
and has major implications for the development of Russian capabili-
ties. The extent to which defense enterprises succeed in terms of their
domestic and export sales are also opportunities for or constraints on
the development of Russia’s overall military potential.
Four general patterns of investment emerge from our analysis of
Russia’s defense-industrial complex. First, in some areas, particularly
long-range strike and C4ISR, the Kremlin has invested significant
resources, recapitalizing particular enterprises, including the use of
specific State Targeted Programs to facilitate the production of new
12 See, for example, Russian Federation, 2015, para 37, 62, 69.
high-technology systems. The Iskander program, for example, was

expected in 2012 to receive 40 billion rubles in capital investment
before 2020, 60 percent from the state budget with the balance from
production enterprises’ own resources (see Appendix G). With regard
to C4ISR, Russia has sought to counter its dependency on foreign
components by investing in domestic electronics companies under
Rostec, including Sozvezdiye, the producer of the Yesu-TZ tactical
C2 system (see Appendix I). These investments illustrate how the
Russian state prioritizes particular enterprises producing systems that
Russian leaders consider to be of particular importance.
A second approach is the longer-term support of companies pro-
ducing systems that are strategically significant, such as in the case
of air defense and EW. A few Russian defense enterprises are success-
ful enough that they require relatively few direct state subsidies. For
instance, Almaz-Antey, a state-owned holding company manufactur-
ing air defense systems and one of the Russia’s largest defense firms,
enjoyed steady revenue growth from 2010–2015 thanks both to strong
sales from the Russian government and to robust demand from foreign
customers. Almaz-Antey benefits from the fact that it manufactures
some of the world’s most advanced air defense systems and that these
systems are competitively priced on the world market, particularly after
the post-2014 collapse in the value of the ruble (see Appendix J). Unfor-
tunately, Almaz-Antey is an outlier among Russia’s defense enterprises,
many of which are poorly managed, undercapitalized, and struggling
to attract demand for their military and civilian output.
These troubles lead to the third observed trend within the mil-
itary industrial complex, the collapse and incorporation of troubled
enterprises into state-owned holding companies. In recent years, this
fate has afflicted several of Russia’s remaining large independent
defense enterprises, both state and privately owned. Ironically, the rela-
tively high diversification of some of these firms made them vulnerable
to exogenous shocks unrelated to demand for their military products.
Uralvagonzavod (UVZ), Russia’s main tank producer, nearly went
bankrupt in 2016, apparently due to the collapse of its civilian railcar
business, which resulted from the falling price of natural resources. In
other cases, chronic weak demand and undercapitalization left defense
enterprises so weakened they could not weather a sudden downturn

like that experienced in 2014. The major producer of infantry fighting
vehicles, Kurganmashzavod (KMZ), which had been one of Russia’s
few large private defense enterprises, went bankrupt. The Russian gov-
ernment responded similarly in both cases, by incorporating UVZ and
KMZ into Rostec. This step not only gave the firms access to greater
financing, it subordinated them to Rostec’s management, which is rela-
tively professional by Russian standards (see Appendix E). Time will
tell if these enterprises will fare better under Rostec’s purview than they
did as independent companies.
A fourth approach is investment in more speculative technolo-
gies through means such as venture capital. The Russian state first
attempted to channel venture capital toward the defense sector over
ten years ago, but these efforts remain quite modest in absolute terms,
with only a few tens of millions of dollars invested.13 A high-profile
effort to encourage the development of advanced defense technologies
is the DARPA-modeled FPI, led by Dmitry Rogozin. The FPI culti-
vates partnerships between the Russian state, academic research insti-
tutions, and commercial firms to encourage the development of exotic
new technologies for military use. FPI projects have investigated topics
such as UAVs and military robots.14 Most of these projects remain too
preliminary for immediate military application, but Russian leaders
hope they will eventually translate into both battlefield advantages and
lucrative new profit centers for Russia’s economy.
Future Outlook
The overall outlook for Russian development in these key capabilities

for ground combat is continuity, in terms of the overall approach and
13 Yuriy Emelin, “Venchurnye investitsii prikhodit v OPK ” [“Venture Investors Are Coming
to the Industrial-Military Complex”], Voenno-promyshlennyi Kuryer, April 7, 2004; Denis
Legezo, “V Rossii sozdan venchurnyi fond dlia oboronnykh predpriatii” [“Russia Created a
Venture Fund for Defense Enterprises”], CNews, May 29, 2017.
14 Foundation for Advanced Studies, Fond perspektivnykh issledovannykh, website, undated.
with respect to the characteristics of the military industrial complex.

We expect continued upgrades in maneuver forces and indirect fires
and very slow development of the next generation of platforms. Pro-
duction will continue of cruise and ballistic missiles with support for
their firms, but uncertainties do exist as to potential limits under the
INF Treaty. There will be continued investment in rapidly deployable
forces and their effectiveness will improve with the introduction of new
technology. Advanced C4ISR will be pursued, with likely progress in
UAVs and other systems, but the gap between Russia and the West
will persist. Russia will continue to be a leader in air defense and seek
EW systems to counter the West’s systems. Finally, Russia’s internal
security forces will continue to receive funding and political support.
CHAPTER FOUR
Future Russian Capabilities
Chapter 3 described the development of eight key capability areas over

the last ten years. The factors described in Chapter 2 explain much of
their development, although beliefs about the future of warfare, tech-
nological limitations, the characteristics of Russia’s military industrial
complex, bureaucratic politics, and inertia also play a role. Indeed,
Russia’s decisions to develop ground capabilities reflect the strategy
for the armed forces, within the constraints of its economic perfor-
mance, defense budget, demographics, and military personnel system.
See Table 4.1.
First, Russia improved long-range conventional strike, C4ISR,
and air defense to strengthen strategic deterrence. Drawing from its
observation of Western military actions in the Balkans, Libya, and
Syria, long-range strike offered a lower-cost means of degrading West-
ern military capabilities and holding at risk high-value targets. The
nonnuclear deterrent capacity provided by these capabilities comple-
mented Russia’s increased spending on its nuclear forces, which ensured
that a peer adversary, such as the West or China, would face a grave
cost in aggression directly against Russia.1
Second, Russia’s military capabilities relevant to regional domi-
nance improved substantially after 2008. The key developments were
the changes in military personnel policy and other improvements that
enabled the professionalization, increased reliability, and readiness of
the Airborne, GRU Spetsnaz, and other rapidly deployable forces. The
1 See Ven Bruusgaard, 2016.
61
Table 4.1
Mapping Strategy for Armed Forces to Capabilities for Ground Combat
Tasks Description Developments
Strategic Prevent aggression against Modernized nuclear forces;

deterrence Russian homeland by improved long-range conventional
imposing costs strike; C4ISR; air defense
Regional Rapidly respond and Professionalization, increased

dominance dominate in near abroad reliability, readiness of rapid
(former Soviet Union reaction forces (Airborne,
except Baltics) Spetsnaz); reorganized and
modernized maneuver ground
forces
Expeditionary Out-of-area campaigns Investments in rapidly deployable

operations to respond to terrorism, ground forces and long-range
instabilities, humanitarian strike
disasters
Preparedness in Ability to have sufficiently Modernizing maneuver ground

case of major war large, capable forces in forces; maintaining indirect fires;
case of major war, largely improving long-range strike, C4ISR,
through mobilization EW, and air defense; maintaining
conscription
Domestic stability Ensure regime survival, Expanding internal security forces

defend against color and creation of Rosgvardia
revolutions, terrorism
Airborne, the first to integrate substantial contract personnel, benefited

from new C4ISR networks; more recently, they have begun to receive
tanks. The GRU Spetsnaz was also reorganized several times with the
goal of improving reconnaissance but only began to focus on the criti-
cal task of unconventional warfare after 2013.2 Russia also reorganized,
modernized, and expanded its maneuver ground units. This included
creating the First Guards Tank Army in the Western Military District
in 2015 and creating new divisions with additional tank and motor
rifle regiments. It is notable that much of the expanded force, totaling
approximately 1,000 infantry vehicles and more than 750 main battle
tanks, is near the Ukrainian border, including three of the new divi-
sions (see Appendix E). According to one analyst, the Airborne’s role
2 Ramm, 2017, pp. 2–11.

Future Russian Capabilities 63
is to act as the “light imperial infantry,” responsible for quick reaction

within Russia’s near abroad (i.e., the empire according to the imperial
analogy), while the rest of the ground forces would act as the “heavy
imperial infantry,” responsible for backing up the Airborne in case of
more heavily equipped and more numerous adversaries.3 Russia would
also rely on an aging, but nevertheless effective, indirect fires capabil-
ity and, theoretically, long-range strike systems, depending on range
requirements, to dominate regional adversaries.
Russia’s activities in Crimea and eastern Ukraine demonstrate
how the developments in these capabilities improved Russia’s combat
effectiveness in its near abroad. In Crimea, in late February, GRU
Spetsnaz, Airborne Forces, naval infantry, and special operations
forces were moved into the peninsula, and they rapidly seized strategic
points. A snap inspection exercise involving 150,000 troops, as well
as a complex information operation, backed their action.4 In eastern
Ukraine, after Ukrainian forces began to take ground against the Rus-
sian-backed separatists despite Russian train-and-equip efforts, Russia
directly intervened in late August with conventional forces.5 The novel
and legacy tactics that separatist forces used—including massed artil-
lery strikes, cyber attacks, UAVs, and attacks on Ukrainian supply
lines—indicate the improvements in the Russian forces that supported
them.6
Third, Russia bolstered its expeditionary capabilities through
investment in rapidly deployable ground forces and long-range strike.
Russia’s operations in Syria demonstrate these improvements. Russian
3 Interview with Russian analyst, Moscow, July 17, 2017.

4 Michael Kofman, et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine,
Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2017; Ellen Nakashima, “Inside a Russian Dis-
information Campaign in Ukraine in 2014,” Washington Post, December 25, 2017.
5 Kofman et al., 2017, pp. 33–45.
6 See Persson, 2016, pp. 56–57; David Hambling, “Russian Drones Attack With Grenade
Weapons,” Scout, September 18, 2017; Anton Lavrov, “The Use of Tanks in Eastern Ukraine:
Lessons Learnt,” Moscow Defense Brief, Vol. 3, No. 53, 2016b; Dustin Volz, “Russian Hack-
ers Tracked Ukrainian Artillery Units Using Android Implant: Report,” Reuters, Decem-
ber 22, 2016; see Phillip Karber and Joshua Thibeault, “Russia’s New Generation Warfare,”
Army Magazine, Vol. 66, No. 6, June 2016.
Special Operations Forces (SOF) are reported to have played a role in

securing the Tartus port and the airfield at Latakia, as well as in the lib-
eration of Palmyra (see Appendix H), although details remain unclear.
Russia also used Kalibr missiles and Kh-101 air-launched cruise mis-
siles (ALCMs) to strike ground targets in Syria, and there are reports of
Iskander launchers at the Khmeimim Airbase (see Appendix G). While
these strikes undoubtedly were intended to be a training mission and
demonstration of Russian capabilities for external signaling more than
for direct military effects in Syria, they do show how developments in
these areas support Russia’s expeditionary capabilities. Russia’s capa-
bilities for expeditionary operations largely depend on the supporting
naval and air forces. Russian analysts also highlight investments in the
Navy and Air Force in the 2020 SAP, although some remain skeptical
of Russia’s naval capabilities and investment.7
Fourth, Russia retained preparedness in case of a large war with
the West or China by maintaining conscription and the size of its
overall military (see Appendix D); modernizing and, to a degree,
restructuring its maneuver ground forces; maintaining indirect fires;
and improving long-range strike. Russia’s modernization of the T-72s,
rescue of firms producing ground vehicles, maintenance of conscrip-
tion, and the type of major ground exercises it holds shows Russia’s
continued desire to be ready for a major ground war (see Appen-
dixes G, I, J, and K).8 Igor Sutyagin also specifically attributes Russia’s
7 In discussions with the authors, Russian analysts highlighted the need for building Rus-
sia’s Navy transport capability, for example, to enable expeditionary operations. However,
Michael Kofman criticizes the Defence Intelligence Agency’s (DIA) “Russian Military
Power” report’s claim that Russia is investing in out-of-area operations by explaining, “There
is nothing to substantiate that besides long-range strike capability. Russia is not investing in
the sea lift, logistics sustainment, a blue water navy, or other capacities for combat operations
distant from its borders. Equally there is nothing to indicate a preparation for the occupa-
tion of other countries, an operational reserve, or other capacity to operate “out of area”—of
course we should note that Russia’s area is quite vast but in general the Armed Forces are
clearly setup for fights ‘across the street’ more so than anything else.” Discussions with Rus-
sian analysts, Moscow, July 2017; Michael Kofman, “DIA’s Military Power,” Worldpress.
com, July 3, 2017b.
8 Johan Norberg, “Training to Fight—Russia’s Major Military Exercises 2011–2014,”
December 2015.
changes from a brigade-centric structure under the post-2008 reform

to a mixed brigade, division, and army-level capability to an inten-
tion to hedge against a conflict with NATO or China.9 However, the
re-creation of divisions should not imply that Russia has abandoned
the prior focus on local wars, as many brigades remain and the divi-
sions appear, in part, centered around potential regional conflicts, as
already noted. The reform of the personnel system, including the shift
from a cadre-based military and from a two-year to a one-year con-
scription period and recruiting additional professional soldiers to staff
high-technology systems, will also likely make Russia more able to
fight a high intensity war.10
Russia appears to be pursuing its capabilities for large-scale ground
warfare through retaining and upgrading legacy capabilities rather than
pursuing next-generation ground platforms (see Appendixes E and F).
This choice can be interpreted in multiple ways. It could imply that
Russia does not expect to fight in a major ground war, in part because
it expects its strategic deterrent approach to work and, hence, is devot-
ing its resources to capabilities it expects to employ in the near future,
such as rapidly deployable forces. This interpretation also reflects the
discourse of military analysts and officials, who emphasize that they do
not see Russia fighting a major ground war in the near future.11 Alter-
natively, while Russia may believe a major ground war is possible and
it seeks to prepare for one, it simply sees less benefit for a given invest-
ment in indirect fires or maneuver ground forces as compared with
long-range strike, EW, or C4ISR. These approaches are not mutually
exclusive, and Russia’s actual policy may reflect elements of both.
9 Sutyagin and Bronk, 2017, pp. 25, 43–44. Another reason given for the creation of
division-level headquarters was to provide a professional growth for Army leadership. “The
Return of Divisions: The Ground Forces Will Reverse the ‘Brigade Bias’” [“Vozvrashhenie
divizij: V Suhoputnyh vojskah ispravjat ‘brigadnyj perekos’”], Voyenno-Promyshlenny Kuryer,
February 8, 2016. See also Appendix E.
10 One Russian academic noted that Russia’s military force was “much smaller,” “about 1/4
or 1/5 of what they used to be,” but with “equal or greater military capacity.” Interview with
Russian academic, Moscow, July 19, 2017.
11 Interviews with former senior Russian officer and Russian analysts, Moscow, July 2017.
Several details of Russia’s development of its force structure, per-

sonnel policy, and industrial policy indicate that it is not preparing
to initiate a large-scale ground war. Russia has paid little attention to
developing an effective and sizable active reserve system that might be
immediately required in the event of a major war (see Appendix D).
Its current active reserve force of 4,000 to 5,000 and the small size of
its territorial reserve force (two battalions and a regiment) are more
consistent with reserve forces for regional contingencies than large-
scale war with the West.12 Further, while Russia has reestablished
some ground divisions, it retains an approach to ground readiness in
which ground brigades should be able to produce one battalion tacti-
cal group of highly-ready professional soldiers.13 This approach enables
combat units to rapidly support regional contingencies with highly
capable forces while leaving forces in reserve in the event of a major
war. Finally, Putin has encouraged the defense industry to switch to
civilian production while retaining the capability to rapidly switch to
defense production in the event of conflict, a policy more consistent
with preparation for the possibility of a future war than immediate
preparation for initiating one.14
Fifth, Russia invested in expanding its internal security forces
given the perceived threats from terrorism and external subversion.
Internal security and law enforcement organizations include approxi-
mately 3.2 million personnel in 2017 (see Appendix L, Table L.1), sig-
nificantly higher than the approximately 961,000 active duty personnel
in the armed forces (see Appendix D). The 2016 creation of Rosgvard-
iya demonstrated the concern of the ruling regime about internal secu-
rity and created a dominant militarized organization responsible for
internal security. Still, as Appendix L highlights, there remain multiple
internal security organizations with close connections to the regime
and overlapping roles, which compete for resources and position. Rus-
sia’s spending on internal security increased in 2012–2013, likely, in
12 See also Monaghan, 2017, pp. 77–78.

13 See, among others, Sutyagin and Bronk, 2017, pp. 22–24.
14
Kremlin, “Meeting with Defence Ministry and Defence Industry Senior Officials and
Heads of Ministries and Regions,” November 22, 2017.
part, as a response to the Bolotnaya protests, and it appears unlikely

that Russia will be easily able to reduce the size of or its spending on
security forces. Continuing social support for the regime and lack of
opposition to Rosgvardiya likely indicates the sustainability of Russia’s
approach to internal security (see Appendix A).
Possible Changes in Factors and Future Ground Combat

Capabilities
Just as the five factors shaped the development of the Russian military
over the last decade, the trajectory of these factors is likely to shape
Russian capabilities in the future. As described in Chapter 2, while
there may be continued incremental developments in the future, there
will not be major changes in the factors. We view the most likely future
as one of overall continuity.
Russia’s military forces will generally meet its security goals
within its available resources. Russia will likely face higher costs for
military recruitment due to declining military-age males through 2024
but should be able to find and recruit sufficient personnel to maintain
the current size of its military forces. Russia will continue to focus on
achieving regional dominance in its near abroad, with an emphasis on
readiness and professionalization of a small component of the force.
Some expansion and incremental improvements will occur in long-
range strike, rapidly deployable forces, C4ISR, and air defense, while
relative stagnation will occur in the maneuver ground forces and indi-
rect fires. Russia will pursue continued collaboration with the West in
activities such as counterterrorism in the Middle East while attempting
to pivot east toward closer relations with India and China.
At the same time, the future is not known, and we see two areas
where changes in the factors are possible and consequential for the
development of Russian military capabilities. One is fluctuating energy
prices, which could affect growth in the economy and, in turn, Russia’s
defense budget and military capabilities. The second area is changes in
Russia’s economic growth and security strategy due to shifts in relations
with the West or China. See Table 4.2 for a summary of these potential
Table 4.2
Possible Changes in Factors Affecting Russian Strategy for Armed Forces
and Ground Combat Capabilities
Potential Developments in Russian Strategy for Armed Forces and

Changes Ground Combat Capabilities
Energy Increase • Improvements in maneuver ground forces, C4ISR, long-

prices range strike, air defense, and rapidly deployable forces
• Faster pace of modernization of legacy ground systems and
production of the next generation ground vehicles
Decrease • Emphasis on internal security forces and strategic nuclear
forces rather than more costly improvements to C4ISR and
long-range strike
• Improvements in maneuver ground forces for internal security
and deterrence against Western domestic interference
Relations Improve • Western incursion into the near abroad or direct conflict less
with focus in security strategy
West
• Adoption of domestic economic reforms leading to
economic growth and increase in defense spending and
opportunity to pursue technological innovation
• Upgrade in legacy platforms as well as improvements in
Russia’s C4ISR, long-range strike, and air defense
• Improvements in rapid reaction forces continue due
to ongoing concern about threats from terrorism and
instability in the near abroad
Worsen • Security strategy focus primarily on strategic deterrence and
regional dominance
• Limited resources focused on nuclear weapons and long-
range strike, while pursuing a steady modernization of
ground forces
• Possible buildup of ready forces in the Western Military District
Relations Worsen • Budgetary resources and demographic flexibility lacking to

with expand military forces
China
• Priority to strategic deterrent, including both nuclear forces
and long-range strike over maneuver ground forces
• Emphasis on rapidly deployable forces to ensure regional
dominance within the near abroad
• Attention to preparing for an invasion by increasing
mobilization capacity
• Few available resources for modernizing legacy equipment
for C4ISR or acquiring next-generation systems
changes and what it could mean for Russian strategy for armed forces
and ground combat capabilities.
Changes in Energy Prices

Russia’s economic prospects could improve if energy prices increase.
In this case, with the increase in GDP, Russia could choose to increase
the defense budget and military expenditures and use these additional
resources to improve the maneuver ground forces, C4ISR, long-range
strike, air defense, and rapidly deployable forces. Russia could also
undertake a faster pace of modernization of its legacy systems (such as
T-72s, T-80s, or T-90s; BMP-2s; and BTR-80/82s) as well as move to
serial production of the next generation of ground vehicles.
More unlikely, but possible, energy prices could drop, leading to a
Russian economic crisis, especially if economic reform had not occurred.
In this case, social stability could decline, which would add pressure to
Russia’s internal security situation. What Russia would do in this situ-
ation is uncertain, although at a minimum Russia would likely bolster
its internal security forces and prioritize strategic deterrence, possibly
by bolstering its legacy strategic nuclear forces instead of committing to
more costly improvements to C4ISR and long-range strike. It might also
strengthen its maneuver ground forces to bolster its internal security and
deterrence against the West and potential domestic interference.
Changes in Russia’s Relations with the West or China

Russia’s relations with the West in the future could improve or worsen.
In the case of improving relations and a diminished threat from the
West, the Russian strategy for the armed forces would likely focus less
on Western incursion into the near abroad or direct conflict. If, as a
result, Western sanctions were lifted, the Russian government could
develop a more positive view of the liberal reform ideas mentioned in
Chapter 2, leading to a higher than predicted economic growth.15 In
15 Russian analysts noted that reforms proposed by Kudrin’s group, with a perceived closer
connection with the West, were especially unlikely so long as Western sanctions and poor
relations with the West persisted. Interviews with Russian analysts, Moscow, July 2017.
this case, defense spending could rise proportionately, and rapproche-

ment could offer Russia an opportunity to pursue technological inno-
vation. This could lead to an upgrade in legacy platforms as well as
improvements in Russia’s C4ISR, long-range strike, and air defense.
Improvements in its rapid reaction forces would continue due to ongo-
ing concern about threats from terrorism and instability in the near
abroad. But Russia could seek greater cooperation with the West in the
Middle East and other regions.
Were relations with the West to worsen, the prospects for reform-
led Russian economic growth and the acquisition of modern technol-
ogies would decrease. Concern would arise about Western aggressive
intentions, both within Russia and in the near abroad. In its strategy
for the armed forces, Russia would focus on strategic deterrence and
regional dominance. In developing its military capabilities, Russia
would use its limited resources on nuclear weapons and long-range
strike while pursuing a steady modernization of its ground forces. It
could also build up its ready forces in the Western Military District.
Another possibility is that Russia’s relations with China could
worsen. While Russia’s current relationship with China appears strong,
conflict over China’s growing influence in Central Asia could emerge,
leading to greater tensions and a perceived threat from China.16
Facing a simultaneous threat from the two larger superpowers, Russia
would not have the budgetary resources or demographic flexibility
to expand its military forces. In this case, Russia would likely pri-
oritize its strategic deterrent, including both nuclear forces and long-
range strike over its maneuver ground forces. Russia would continue
to emphasize rapidly deployable forces to ensure regional dominance
within the near abroad and likely devote some attention to prepar-
ing for an invasion by increasing mobilization capacity, drawing on
Soviet-era systems. It would have few available resources for modern-
izing legacy equipment, improving C4ISR, or acquiring next-generation
systems.
16
See Alexander Gabuev, “Friends With Benefits: Russian-Chinese Relations After the
Ukraine Crisis,” Carnegie Moscow Center, June 2016, pp. 25–29.
Conclusion
Continuity in Russia’s development of ground capabilities is likely,
including a focus on long-range strike, C4ISR, and rapidly deploy-
able forces. However, there could be changes in the factors involving
energy prices and economic growth or in Russia’s relations with the
West or China that could give Russia incentives to pursue different
ground combat capabilities. The potential outcomes of these options
offer insights for the range of different future Russian military capa-
bilities. In general, we continue to expect a prioritization of capabilities
associated with strategic deterrence, regional dominance, and internal
security.
CHAPTER FIVE
Policy Implications
To draw the policy implications for the United States, we analyzed dif-
ferent ways in which Russia’s interests, preparations, and capabilities
may in the future interact with U.S. interests, priorities, and capabili-
ties. To achieve U.S. interests, the U.S. military will need to provide
forces that can compete with Russia across a range of different types
of interactions, from cooperation to conflict. As the 2018 National
Defense Strategy articulates, the U.S. military will likely be called
on to counter coercion and subversion short of military competition,
strengthen allies and partners, deter adversary aggression, and if neces-
sary, defeat aggression by a major power and manage escalation up to
and including nuclear war.1
Given Russia’s extensive conventional and nuclear strategic deter-
rent capabilities, the key challenge will be how to develop U.S. capa-
bilities that can best compete with Russia and achieve U.S. interests at
any intensity of competition without escalation. The United States will
also need to consider how to minimize cost, given the limited risk of
Russian actions threatening U.S. core interests and competing budget-
ary priorities. Using the framework of our identified Russian security
strategy, we describe the implications of our analysis for the United
States of Russia’s future interests, capabilities, and priorities, with a
focus on the U.S. Army.
The first and last elements of Russia’s security strategy, strate-
gic deterrence and internal security, are inherently defensive, although
1 Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United
States of America,” 2018.
73
strategic deterrent forces could threaten the United States and its allies.
It is unlikely that the United States would initiate conflict with Russia
or intervene militarily to support internal groups. The United States
should, therefore, not see these capabilities as posing an immediate
threat to U.S. interests. Nevertheless, Russia clearly sees threats from
the United States and the rest of NATO from NATO enlargement and
the enhancement of U.S.-NATO military capabilities on its borders.
Though neither the European Deterrence Initiative nor the NATO
Enhanced Forward Presence battalions are likely to trigger a Russian
military response, the possibility exists that Russia’s view of the threat
could increase or a crisis could develop that could lead to unintended
military escalation. U.S. policymakers need to be attuned to Russian
perceptions of the threat posed by U.S. force deployments in Europe.2
Regional dominance, the second element of Russia’s security strat-
egy, poses a more immediate threat to U.S. interests, given that Russia’s
primary desired sphere of influence includes former Soviet republics
such as Ukraine and Georgia, who aspire to join Euro-Atlantic institu-
tions. Russia’s military actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine clearly
demonstrate the threat that the Russian military and its proxies pose
to U.S. partners and demonstrates how an aggressive Russian foreign
policy can threaten U.S. interests.3 Our analysis suggests that Russia’s
capabilities for regional dominance are also likely to increase, since
Russia will continue to invest in its rapidly deployable forces, C4ISR,
and long-range strike assets across a range of possible future political
and economic changes.
Given these growing capabilities and Russia’s greater interests,
U.S. support has not and does not appear likely to be able to signifi-
cantly undermine Russia’s dominance in Ukraine, Georgia, and other
former Soviet republics. In these countries, the U.S. military can
explore options to bolster partners’ security forces. A stronger and more
2 Bryan Frederick, et al., Assessing Russian Reactions to U.S. and NATO Posture Enhance-
ments, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1879-AF, 2017.
3 David E. Johnson, The Challenges of the “Now” and Their Implications for the U.S. Army,
Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2016, PE-184; Radin and Reach, 2017.
Policy Implications 75
accountable Ukrainian security force can better achieve U.S. inter-

ests of securing Ukraine’s sovereignty and freedom of action without
increasing the likelihood of escalation.
The Army and other services could bolster partner-building capa-
bilities by improving the quality and capacity of niche areas such as
foreign area officers, units focused on providing security-force assis-
tance, information operations, and military medical units. There may be
other ways to adapt U.S. activities across the whole-of-government in
Ukraine to improve the prospects for reform, such as adopting longer
time horizons (five to ten years); increasing the training, specialization,
and tours of duty for U.S. personnel; and working with allies to place
greater and consistent pressure on the Ukrainian government to pursue
reforms. While existing support to Ukraine, such as U.S. training by
the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine, can be beneficial,
efforts that more systematically support the security establishment
may be more likely to be effective. Lethal aid backed by U.S. Army
train-and-equip, may increase the Ukrainian military’s capabilities and
clearly demonstrate U.S. commitment to the country. But it risks pro-
voking a strong counterreaction by Russia, which has many options to
escalate. Further, the potential for strengthening Ukraine’s military is
minimal compared with the possible benefit of bolstering the ability
of Ukraine’s large military industrial complex to provide better sup-
port to the country’s military.4 In other former Soviet republics, where
U.S. interests are more limited, such as Central Asia, ongoing Russian
regional dominance may pose less of a threat, but further study of pos-
sible Russian interventions in these countries may be desirable.
Russia’s expeditionary operations and capabilities, the third ele-
ment in Russia’s security strategy, pose a complex challenge that
will require both flexibility and preparedness for high-intensity con-
flict with well-armed adversaries. While Russia has invested in spe-
cial forces, long-range strike, and air defense, the Russian military is
4 See Andrew Radin and Lynn Davis, “What Ukraine Urgently Needs to Defend Itself,”
Newsweek, October 16, 2016; Olga Oliker, et al., Security Sector Reform in Ukraine, Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2016.
not configured to be a global expeditionary military, especially given

its gaps in expeditionary logistics and standing basing arrangements.
Russia is likely attempting to secure port or airfield access rights but
so far has not made breakthroughs. Nevertheless, Russia may support
proxies that may undermine U.S. interests without attribution to Rus-
sian forces. The U.S. Army should investigate options to prepare for
the challenge of Russian expeditionary capabilities, such as develop-
ing further military-to-military connections with Russian command-
ers. Reference to and study of Cold War-era strategies for engagement
may be valuable.
The U.S. government needs to prepare for direct and indirect
confrontation with Russia outside of Europe. As in former Soviet
republics, the United States and its partners will likely face Rus-
sian proxies with advanced military tactics and technology. A clearer
understanding of what capabilities Russia can provide through train-
ing and equipping partners may illuminate potential capabilities that
the United States could provide to its own partners. Furthermore, the
U.S. military needs to prepare for the potential that in a conflict like
Syria, where both U.S. and Russian forces are deployed, a direct con-
frontation between the United States and Russia could emerge. Beyond
contingency planning for such scenarios, the U.S. Army should assess
whether forces deployed in areas where a conflict with Russia is con-
ceivable have the necessary training and equipment and are prepared
to take action while avoiding escalation.
Perhaps the most dangerous possibility is the fourth element of
Russia security strategy, preparation for a large-scale ground war.5 It
seems unlikely that Russia is preparing to initiate such a war given its
security goals and strategy, past decisions to develop key capabilities,
and the constraints posed by its economy, demography, and personnel
policy. While the Baltics are often identified as a possible region in
which high intensity conflict will emerge, this analysis emphasizes that
5 A 2016 RAND study, for example, emphasizes that given the current U.S. posture, in the
event of a large Russian invasion, Russian forces would be on the outskirts of the Baltic capi-
tals of Riga and Tallinn within 60 hours. David A. Shlapak and Michael Johnson, Reinforc-
ing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics, Santa Monica,
Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2016.
Russia’s interests and military preparations do not indicate a political

desire to seize the region nor a particular focus on developing mili-
tary capabilities to facilitate an invasion as compared with other areas,
such as Ukraine. Nevertheless, the possibility of a major ground war in
Europe cannot be ruled out, and the U.S. military should prepare for
that possibility.
Beyond Russia’s advantage in the size of ground forces in Europe,
existing research has identified six ways Russia’s current and projected
near-term capabilities pose a threat to the U.S. Army in Europe.6 First,
Russian C4ISR and deep-strike capability pose a threat to fixed C2 sites
and logistics sites far behind the forward edge of battle. Second, Russia’s
extensive air defense network appears likely to impede access by NATO
air forces and, hence, overall NATO air superiority.7 Third, the com-
bination of Russian deep strikes, EW, and air defenses could degrade
U.S. and allied C4ISR and, with it, the ability of joint forces to provide
fire support to U.S. ground forces. Fourth, Russia has advantages in the
volume, area effects, and range of its indirect fires and, fifth, its maneuver
forces pose a far more significant direct fire threat to U.S. armored forces
than most other adversaries. Sixth, the ambiguities in Russia’s approach
to the use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons imply that U.S. ground forces
could face the use of nuclear weapons in the midst of a regional con-
flict.8 Eastern Europe is especially challenging for the U.S. military since
Russia can draw on its full range of military capabilities, but to the extent
Russian forces or capabilities may be deployed elsewhere, these six chal-
lenges may apply to other regional contingencies as well.
6 See, for example, Scott Boston and Dara Massicot, The Russian Way of Warfare: A Primer,
Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, PE-231-A, December 2017.
7 The combination of long-range strike, coastal defense, and air defenses to obstruct power
projection is sometimes referred to as the anti-access/area-denial threat (A2/AD). See, among
others, Timothy M. Bonds, et al., What Role Can Land-Based, Multi-Domain Anti-Access/
Area Denial Forces Play in Deterring or Defeating Aggression? Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND
Corporation, 2017, pp. 91–95.
8 See, for example, Dmitry Adamsky, “If War Comes Tomorrow: Russian Thinking About
‘Regional Nuclear Deterrence,’” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2014,
pp. 163–188.
For the future, these specific challenges will persist, and some
could become worse. Russian C4ISR and long-range strike is likely to
improve, posing a greater threat to fixed U.S. and allied positions. Air
defense and EW are likely to continue to experience gradual improve-
ment in the coming years. While Russia is unlikely in the near term
to significantly improve the quality of its indirect fires or adopt next-
generation ground vehicles, among other things, its existing capabili-
ties will continue to pose a threat.
Addressing the challenge of Russia’s developing military capa-
bilities likely requires a joint U.S. military and combined alliance
response. Improving the capabilities of the allies who are most proxi-
mate to Russia, such as Poland and the Baltic states, could be invalu-
able for deterring both Russian subversion short of war and high inten-
sity conflict.
In addition to responding to these geographically specific chal-
lenges, analysis of Russia’s development of key ground capabilities pro-
vides insights for the U.S. Army as it considers options for developing
its own capabilities:
• In terms of the maneuver ground forces, we expect incremental

modernization of legacy systems unless energy prices increase,
continued adoption of advanced fire control, sensors, and pro-
tection technologies on legacy Soviet systems, and the very slow
adaptation of next-generation systems, including the T-14 and
T-15. This calls for the U.S. Army to prepare for challenges from
the overall size of Russian forces and from modernized Soviet-era
Russian platforms, but probably not significant numbers of new
Russian platforms in the next five to ten years.
• Indirect fires are unlikely to experience significant improvement
in the next ten years, although these capabilities will likely be bol-
stered by improvements in C4ISR. This calls for the U.S. Army to
investigate future options to counter Russian C4ISR, to attrite the
long-range indirect fire systems, and to pursue dispersal, denial,
and deception.
• Russia’s long-range strike capacity and capabilities are expected to
increase, although production capacity challenges will likely place
limits in the near term. This could change if energy prices rise or
sanctions are relaxed. The U.S. Army needs to prepare for coor-
dinated and sustained attacks on critical rear-echelon nodes and
explore options to counter Russian long-range strike capabilities
to include improved air defense and EW.
• Russia’s rapidly deployable forces are likely to experience steady
investment and gradual improvement. The U.S. Army needs to
expect and prepare for its partners to face Russian forces or their
proxies, including in Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, and
Northeast Asia.
• Russian C4ISR is expected to improve, though its ability to meet
its 2020 goal of a unified information space and production of
ISR systems will be pushed farther back, absent improved relations
with the West (and, hence, diminished sanctions) or greater oil rev-
enue to fund the high costs of domestic procurement. Improving
U.S. cyber and EW capability at the tactical and operational level
could be beneficial to address Russia’s growing parity in C4ISR,
although this may require investment in command, control, and
planning, as well as possible changes in authorities to use cyber.9
• Russia’s air defense is expected to continue to improve slowly,
thereby continuing to threaten U.S. air superiority. The U.S. Army
needs to develop its capabilities in line with Multi-Domain Battle
and other new concepts to counter the adversary’s Anti-access/
area denial (A2/AD) capabilities.
• Russian EW will continue to improve, so the U.S. Army needs
to examine its capabilities and options to deny Russia the ability
to undermine U.S. communications, positioning, navigation, and
timing (PNT), and ISR.
• Russia’s internal security forces are likely to retain their current
size unless Russia experiences a significant economic collapse or
increased domestic protests, which could lead to an increase in
the size of its internal security forces. We do not expect dimin-
ished resources for the Russian military given the greater prioriti-
zation of domestic unrest, however, since Russia would likely link
external and internal threats.
9 Austin Long, “A Cyber SIOP? Operational Considerations for Strategic Offensive Cyber
Planning,” Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 3, No. 1, March 1, 2017, pp. 19–28.
While Russia’s ground capabilities will continue to develop, they

will be constrained and directed by political, demographic, economic,
and social factors within Russia, which will likely change slowly over
the next five to ten years. Studying Russia’s priorities and its constraints
helps shed light on how the U.S. military can best develop its full range
of capabilities to better compete with Russia and achieve U.S. interests
while minimizing financial cost and the risk of war.
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Russia and the United States have countervailing interests in multiple areas.
Since 2008 Russia’s military forces have improved substantially, enabling Russia
to pursue its interests much more aggressively, including intervening in Crimea,
eastern Ukraine, and Syria. Researchers analyze the factors that undergird Russian
military power: societal, political, economic, and demographic. They then turn to
specific ground combat capability areas, such as the maneuver ground forces,
indirect fires, long-range strike, and C4ISR. The researchers expect relative
continuity in the development of Russia’s military capabilities but recognize that
change is possible were energy prices to increase or decrease or Russia’s relations
with the West or China shift. The key challenge for the U.S. military will be to
develop capabilities that can enable the United States to compete with Russia and
achieve U.S. interests across different regions and intensities of conflict without
provoking escalation. The report presents several recommendations to the U.S.
Army, including considering how best to respond to Russia’s military dominance in
the near abroad and how to prepare for potential conflict with Russian forces and
their proxies in the Middle East. Given Russia’s security policy and economic and
demographic constraints, the researchers do not foresee Russia initiating a conflict
with the West. Nevertheless, the U.S. Army should prepare to counter Russian
capabilities that challenge current U.S. forces, including long-range strike, C4ISR,
and rapidly deployable forces.
A RROYO CENT ER
www.rand.org $23.00
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ISBN-13 978-1-9774-0074-1
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication.

Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.

Cover design by Tanya Maiboroda

Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights

The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public

This document presents the results of a project titled U.S.-Russia Long

Defense Industrial Policy.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

References: Chapters 1–5.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

2.1. Russian Growth Rates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

2.1. Targets of the SAP-2020. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Understanding how Russian military capabilities will develop over the

Factors Underlying Russian Military Power

A relatively coherent and consistent view of Russia’s security policy goals

Key Capability Areas for Ground Combat

To analyze Russia’s developing ground combat capabilities, we look at

because of weak demand and undercapitalization. A fourth approach

Projecting Future Russian Capabilities

Looking back, Russia’s development of its ground capabilities reflects

to Russian perceptions of the threat posed by U.S. force deployments

A2/AD Anti-access/area denial

FDI foreign direct investment

NDMC National Defense Management Center

Background and Purpose

to U.S. or allied interests. While these current or hypothetical threats

Methodology and Sources

The future is inherently uncertain, and so our forecasts about the

adding a focus on military industrial considerations that play a major

Factors Underlying Russian Military Power

Any country’s ability to generate and sustain military forces depends

Russia’s Security Priorities

for?”1 This strategy explains a great deal about Russia’s priorities

Security Policy Goals

4 Interviews with Russian analysts, Moscow, July 2017.

A second consensus security policy goal is retaining and increas-

13 Karaganov et al., 2016, p. 19.

Popular unrest—spurred from abroad—that could topple the govern-

Islamic extremism and terrorism represents a third source of

Strategy for the Armed Forces

Strategic deterrence is critical to this strategy and dates from

to suggest that expeditionary operations are a priority. Nevertheless,

Conclusions and Outlook

32 Interviews with Russian analysts, Moscow, July 2017.

Support from Russian society is a second key factor in shaping Russia’s

Many Russians consider Putin’s primary accomplishments to be the

38 Robert Person, “Balance of Threat: The Domestic Insecurity of Vladimir Putin,” Journal

election.43 While it is difficult to see whether Putin’s popularity would

43 “Vybory 2018” [“Elections 2018”], VTsIOM, December 2017.

texts, analysts do emphasize that Russian foreign policy is, in part,

believe defense spending should be a priority in 2016, in line with past

Russia’s economic performance, measured by its gross domestic prod-

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

SOURCE: World Development Indicators, World Bank, Global Economic Prospects:

proportion of energy revenues was approximately 17 percent to 25 per-

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

The Future of the Russian Military

Consumption (% GDP) 40 6e+11

Government expenditure (% GDP)

SOURCE: World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2017.